Imago Pauli: Memory, Tradition, and Discourses on the
“Real” Paul in the Second Century

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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Religious Studies (Ancient Mediterranean Religions).

Chapel Hill
2011

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ABSTRACT

BENJAMIN LEE WHITE: *Imago Pauli*: Memory, Tradition, and Discourses on the “Real” Paul in the Second Century
(Under the direction of Bart D. Ehrman)

The following dissertation is a theoretical and methodological examination of the legacy of the Apostle Paul in the second century. It explores the way he was remembered in the century after his death, as well as the discursive practices that accompanied claims about the “real” Paul in a period in which apostolic memory was highly contested. Five questions drive the inquiry:

1) How do we measure Pauline influence in the second century? (methodology);

2) How did various second-century writers imagine Paul and what resources were employed to produce a given interpretation of the Apostle? (exegesis);

3) What is meant, from a theoretical standpoint, by the language of tradition and memory, concepts often invoked by Pauline scholars, but hardly ever defined or explored? (theory);

4) What interests stand behind ancient discourses on the “real” Paul? (ideology); and

5) How did Paul become “the Apostle” for so many different kinds of Christian communities in the second century? (history).

The connection between these questions is not ultimately logical or sequential. Each is part of a larger hermeneutical conversation. Chapters One through Three provide the methodological and theoretical foundation for the exegesis of Chapters Four and Five,
which work through the Pauline tradition of 3 Corinthians and Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses, respectively.

The latter texts serve as test-cases for the thesis that Christians of the second century had no access to the “real” Paul. Rather, they possessed mediations of Paul as a persona. These idealized images were transmitted in the context of communal memories of “the Apostle.” Through the selection, combination, and interpretation of pieces of a diverse earlier layer of the Pauline tradition, Christians defended images of the Apostle that were particularly constitutive of their collective cultures. As products of tradition and memory, each imago Pauli exhibits a unique mixture of continuity with and change from the past. Consequently, ancient discourses on the “real” Paul, like their modern counterparts, are problematic. Through a whole host of exclusionary practices, the “real” Paul, whose authoritative persona possessed a certain delegated authority, was and is invoked as a wedge to gain traction for the conservation of ideology.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While I hope that this dissertation is a reflection of my participation in the species *homo sapiens*, I am a firm believer, with Berger and Luckmann, that “Homo sapiens is always, and in the same measure, *homo socius*” (cf. Chapter Three below). To a large degree, then, this project is a reflection of the various diverse communities within which my own interest in the figure of Paul developed. It is a work of tradition. From the academic side, I was first introduced to the variety within the canonical Pauline letter corpus as an undergraduate in the Department of Religion and Philosophy at Campbell University. Without knowing it at the time, Donald Penny’s dissertation on early Pauline pseudepigraphy would become important in my own thinking about the Apostle’s early legacy. The Master of Arts program at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary provided the necessary tools for doing historical-critical work on the New Testament. The seriousness with which the New Testament faculty there engages in exegesis is a perpetual model for my own work. Courses on Romans with Bill Mounce and 1 Corinthians with François Bovon at Harvard Divinity School quickened my focus on the primacy of the Pauline mission for describing earliest Christianity. Working with Richard Hays and Ed Sanders in the Master of Theology program at Duke Divinity School granted me the freedom to explore further issues in Pauline theology, and it was at Duke that I began to understand *how* I had come to know “Paul,” who had been traditioned to me in Protestant institutions and, thus, bore the Reformation stamp.
Douglas Campbell, whom I’ve only really gotten to know since moving to UNC, as odd as that sounds, has helped me to clarify further what is at stake in how we read Paul.

The opportunity to study and work in the Religious Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has proven to be the perfect incubator for developing traditional historical-critical work on early Christian texts within the context of more theoretically-driven questions. Jonathan Boyarin has been an important dialogue partner for the issues of memory and culture, while Zlatko Plese has provided innumerable suggestions over the past several years on issues as broad as intertextuality and Hellenistic anthropology. Whatever deficiencies still remain in this work are, of course, my own.

Most important, working with Bart Ehrman has convinced me that, in the end, it is not enough to be a scholar of the New Testament. We are all, knowingly or unknowingly, scholars of Early Christianity. We only have access to the initial decades of Christianity (Christian origins) through communities that lived a century or more later. Their later concerns have shaped much of what we know about the earliest years of this new religious movement. Through constructive criticism, a consistent example of hard work, a healthy dose of humor, and a zeal for clear communication, Bart Ehrman has exemplified what it means to be an educator; a scholar who is both rigorous with the data and generous in sharing his results.

Finally, this long and winding academic journey, in the end, was only possible by the support, sacrifice, and love of a wonderful family. My parents, Les and Marlene White, bred in me a love for the Bible and have watched their son stay in school for more years than I am sure they had imagined. During this entire time, my sister, Leslyn
Benfield, has made frequent phone-calls, faithfully checking in to see how her big brother is doing. And finally, Melissa, my γνήσιος σύζυγος, should be acknowledged for her (all too gracious) patience with me over the past eleven years. During this time she has been married both to me and to the institutions to which I have given my time and energy. This is an arrangement that has worked only because of her love and devotion through periods when my work has been all-consuming. To remain the object of her love will always mean more than the production of words, nuanced arguments, and arcane scholarly material.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

*All abbreviations of ancient texts follow the Society of Biblical Literature Handbook of Style (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999)*

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<td>AARAS</td>
<td>American Academy of Religion: Academy Series</td>
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<td>ABRL</td>
<td>Anchor Bible Reference Library</td>
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<td>ACW</td>
<td>Ancient Christian Writers</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGJU</td>
<td>Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums</td>
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<td>Ante-Nicene Fathers</td>
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<td>Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments</td>
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<td>AThR</td>
<td>Anglican Theological Review</td>
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<td>BBR</td>
<td>Bulletin for Biblical Research</td>
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<td>BETL</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium</td>
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<td>Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese</td>
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<td>BHT</td>
<td>Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie</td>
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<td>BibInt</td>
<td>Biblical Interpretation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td><em>Biblische Zeitschrift</em></td>
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<td>BZNW</td>
<td>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentlich Wissenschaft</td>
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<td>CBQ</td>
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<td>NHC</td>
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<td>NIGTC</td>
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<td>NovT</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
Introducing “Paul”

“The Apostle”

When confronted with questions about the origins of a certain “Acts of Paul” (Acta Pauli), the nameless presbyter under examination, according to Tertullian (Bapt. 17.5), confessed to having written the work “for love of Paul” (amore Pauli).¹ What the presbyter considered a chance to memorialize his hero, Tertullian viewed as “adding of his own to Paul’s reputation.” For Tertullian, Paul needed no reputational entrepreneurs, particularly not ones whose portrayals of the Apostle went against his own letters.² He quickly corrects the Pauline traditions of the Acts of Paul with one fell swoop, citing 1 Corinthians 14.35: “‘Let them keep silence,’ he [Paul] says, ‘and ask their husbands at home.’”

We see in this short, but now famous, episode an example of the kinds of social ramifications that the contestation of Paul’s legacy had and continues to have for the Church. Simply asked: Can women teach and baptize? The answer, both then and now, often hinges on whether or not the authority of the “real” Paul can be invoked in favor of

¹ Text and translation of De baptismo from Ernest Evans, Tertullian’s Homily on Baptism (London: SPCK, 1964).

² The language of “reputational entrepreneurs” comes from Barry Schwartz’s work on the commemoration of Abraham Lincoln and other important figures of American history. We will explore Schwartz’s work in detail in Chapter Three.
one’s side of the discourse. Tertullian’s strategy was to unmask a particular Pauline text as a fabrication. By doing so, he could marginalize its contents. He sidelined the Acts of Paul, whole-cloth, while some modern scholars dismiss 1 Corinthians 14.35 as a non-Pauline interpolation into an otherwise authentic text, robbing Tertullian of his preferred comeback-line. One can hardly escape this latter distinction in New Testament scholarship; a distinction that trades on differences between the “real” or “historical” Paul and some other Paul, normally designated the Paul of “tradition,” or the “ecclesiastical” Paul, or the “legendary” Paul:

Alongside this image of Paul, to which the ecclesiastical future belonged, there is, however, the real Paul as well. This Paul remains confined in seven letters and for the most part unintelligible to posterity, not only to the ancient Church and the Middle Ages.

the real Paul, as he himself admits, was anything but a master of the improvised speech . . . as a speaker he was feeble, unimpressive (II Cor. 10.10).

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3 I use scare quotes around several terms in this introductory chapter to signify their contested nature in modern scholarship. These terms, including “real,” “historical,” “tradition,” “ecclesiastical,” “Gnostic,” and “proto-orthodox,” are normally deployed in the midst of ideological discourses, and thus are often not transparent. Several of these terms and the discourses behind them are the subject of this thesis and, as such, will retain the scare quotes throughout. Others, however, are less central to my concerns. For these, such as “Gnostic” and “proto-orthodox,” a simple footnote to the ongoing scholarly discussion will suffice and then the scare quotes will drop out for the benefit of the reader. On the “Gnostics” and “Gnosticism,” for instance, cf. the section entitled “Paul and the Heretics: Marcion,” in Chapter Two. On the use of “proto-orthodox” as an etic designation for the theological forerunners of what would become “orthodoxy,” cf. Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: a Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings (3rd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7.


The Paul whose portrait Luke paints is the real Paul. It is the real Paul viewed in retrospect by a friend and admirer, whose own religious experience was different from Paul’s, who expresses a distinctive theological outlook, who writes for another constituency than that for which Paul wrote his letters.\(^7\)

If one thing is clear, it is that the real Paul was not a professor of systematic theology as medieval exegetes firmly believed and Luther and Melanchthon still assumed.\(^8\)

Catholicism can convincingly appeal to Ephesians, but Protestantism draws its ecclesiology and much of its practice from the real Paul reflected in his authentic epistles.\(^9\)

a kinder and gentler Paul will become visible. But, equally important, he will be simpler and more coherent. He will also be less like his modern Western readers, and so ultimately more able to help them. Hence, modernity may yet benefit from the abandonment of an essentially modern reading of Paul. It seems that beyond our European conceits, the real Paul awaits us.\(^10\)

The “real” Paul in most of these examples signifies the Paul of the seven “undisputed” letters: Romans, 1-2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. He should be differentiated from the “Paul” of tradition, largely signified by the pseudonymous Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, the Pastoral Epistles, as well as by Luke’s portrayal of Paul in Acts. These texts stand at some distance from what Paul was really like and what he really believed. Beginning in earnest with F.C. Baur in the mid-nineteenth century, this categorical division and arrangement of Pauline materials


has helped to resolve the problem of conflicting material in the canonical Pauline letter corpus and Acts, as well as to fill a historical void between Paul’s own life and his legacy in the second century. The “disputed” letters and Acts are then evaluated chiefly on how close or distant they are from the “historical” Paul. The “real” Paul was Protestant, liberal, dialogical, feminist, and anti-imperial. The Paul of “tradition” was and is Catholic, conservative, rigid, homophobic, and fixated on power.

This discourse on the “real” Paul, so apparent in modern Pauline Studies, was already alive and well in the second century, as Tertullian’s *De baptismo* and numerous other texts attest.¹¹ We see in that period all three of the modern rhetorical strategies for discerning and deploying the “real” Paul. First, the denial of Pauline authorship to a text, whole cloth, is found not only in Tertullian’s story about the origins of the *Acts of Paul*, but also in his claim that Marcion “rejected” the Pastoral Epistles:

> This epistle [Philemon] alone has so profited by its brevity as to escape Marcion’s falsifying hands. As however he has accepted this letter to a single person, I do not see why he has rejected (*recusaverit*) two written to Timothy and one to Titus about the church system. I suppose he had a whim to meddle even with the number of the epistles (Tertullian, *Marc*. 5.21.1).¹²

So then, shipmaster out of Pontus, supposing you have never accepted into your craft any smuggled or illicit merchandise, have never appropriated or adulterated any cargo, and in the things of God are even more careful and trustworthy, will you please tell us under what bill of lading you accepted Paul as apostle, who had stamped him with that mark of distinction, who commended him to you, and who put him in your charge? . . . From now on I claim I shall prove that no other god was the subject of the apostle's

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¹¹ Evans, *Tertullian’s Homily On Baptism*, xi, dates the text to the turn of the century, before Tertullian’s interest in Montanism.

¹² All texts and translations of *Against Marcion* come from Ernest Evans, *Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), unless otherwise noted. *Against Marcion* is usually dated from 207-208 C.E., but is actually the third edition of a piece against Marcion that Tertullian had been working on for some time (*Marc*. 1.1.1-2). The first edition may have been published as early as 197 C.E. (Evans, *Tertullian*, xviii). On whether or not Tertullian was correct in his characterization of Marcion’s position with respect to the Pastoral Epistles, cf. Chapter Four.
profession, on the same terms as I have proved this of Christ: and my evidence will be Paul’s epistles. That these have suffered mutilation (mutilatas) even in number, the precedent of that gospel, which is now the heretic’s, must have prepared us to expect (Tertullian, Marc. 5.1.2, 9).

Second, as the latter of these two passages suggests, one could accuse another of “adulterating” a Pauline text through interpolation, deletion or alteration:

So we must pull away at the rope of contention, swaying with equal effort to the one side or the other. I say that mine is true: Marcion makes that claim for his. I say that Marcion’s is falsified (adulteratum); Marcion says the same of mine. Who shall decide between us? Only such a reckoning of dates, as will assume that authority belongs to that which is found to be older, and will prejudge as corrupt that which is convicted of having come later (Tertullian, Marc. 4.4.1).

Finally, if the number of texts and their actual wording are not in dispute, one could contest the interpretation of particular Pauline passages:

Just as our beloved brother Paul wrote to you according to the wisdom given to him, speaking about these things as he also does in all his letters, in which certain things are hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable distort to their own destruction, as they also do with the rest of the Scriptures (2 Pet 3.15b-16).\(^13\)

Certain persons are afraid that they may arise (from the dead) naked: therefore they want to arise in the flesh. And they do not know that those who wear the flesh are the ones who are naked. Those who [. . .] to divest themselves are not naked. “Flesh [and blood will not] inherit the kingdom [of god].” [1 Cor 15.50] What is the flesh that will not inherit it? The one that we are wearing. And what, too, is this flesh that will inherit it? It is Jesus’ flesh, along with his blood (Gospel of Philip 56.26-57.3).\(^14\)

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\(^{13}\) All translations of ancient Greek sources, including the New Testament, are my own unless otherwise noted. For better or for worse, translations of the New Testament are based on the Nestle-Aland 27th revised edition. Many, if not most, New Testament scholars date 2 Peter to the early-second century. Cf, for instance, J.N.D. Kelly, *The Epistles of Peter and of Jude* (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 231, who places it between 100-110 C.E.

\(^{14}\) All translations of the Nag Hammadi library come from Bentley Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures* (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1987), unless noted otherwise. The Gospel of Philip, like the rest of the Nag Hammadi literature, is notoriously difficult to date. The reference to interpretive differences over 1 Corinthians 15, however, seems to reflect the kinds of debate on this text that we find in Irenaeus’ *Adversus Haereses* (cf. Chapters Two and Five below). For this reason, this particular saying from the Gospel of Philip likely dates back to the second century, regardless of the entire text’s final compilation.
But it is necessary to subjoin to this composition, in what follows, also the doctrine of Paul after the words of the Lord, to examine the opinion of this man, and expound the apostle, and to explain whatsoever [passages] have received other interpretations from the heretics, who have altogether misunderstood what Paul has spoken, and to point out the folly of their mad opinions; and to demonstrate from that same Paul, from whose [writings] they press questions upon us, that they are indeed utterers of falsehood, but that the apostle was a preacher of the truth, and that he taught all things agreeable to the preaching of the truth (Irenaeus, *Haer.* 4.41.4).

Even the heretics’ own apostle (*haereticorum apostolus*) interprets as concerning not oxen but ourselves that law which grants an unmuzzled mouth to the oxen that tread out the corn, and affirms that the rock that followed them to provide drink was Christ, in the same way as he instructs the Galatians that the two narratives of the sons of Abraham took their course as an allegory, and advises the Ephesians that that which was foretold in the beginning, that a man would leave his father and mother, and that he and his wife would become one flesh, is seen by him to refer to Christ and the Church (Tertullian, *Marc.* 3.5.4).

For let us pay attention to the meaning of his words, and the purpose of them, and *<your>* falsification of scripture will become evident (Tertullian, *Marc.* 5.3.3).

The language of the “real” Paul is absent from these ancient sources, but we find in each of them the same concern for who and what represent the true Pauline legacy. Like its modern counterpart, the second-century discourse on the “real” Paul was birthed in the variety of theologies and praxes that we find in the earliest layer of the “Pauline” tradition (first-century Pauline texts and oral traditions). On account of this early

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16 I use the phrase “earliest layer of the Pauline tradition” throughout this dissertation to signify 1) the broad stream of written material that circulated in Paul’s name between 50-100 C.E., without prejudging the authorship of any particular text, 2) the oral traditions about the Apostle that circulated in his former communities and elsewhere during this same period, whether they eventually made their way into literary form (*Acts* and the *Acts of Paul*) or not, and 3) the stories in the canonical Acts of the Apostles itself, whether they came from sources or were the literary creation of the author of Acts. In general, I use the
variety, by the end of the second century an increasingly rich variety of Pauline texts and traditions was available and the concomitant diversity of Christian authors who wrote about Paul or interpreted his texts for their communities was palpable. Canonical and non-canonical pseudepigrapha, various Acts of Paul traditions, Pauline apocalypses, martyrdom legends, theologically redacted Pauline letter collections, and a wide variety of exegetical traditions abounded. More than for any other apostolic figure, Paul’s second-century reputational entrepreneurs received, shaped, created, and passed on a wide variety of Pauline traditions. And with variety and competition, of course, comes the attempt to control. We can see this in the early Christian texts cited above.

Within a century and a half after his death, Paul had become “the Apostle” for a whole range of ideological adversaries. Not an Apostle, but the Apostle. His widespread and developing charisma as the figure par excellence of the apostolic age can be seen in the various epithets with which he is characterized in Christian literature from the late-first to the late-second centuries (cf. Table 1 below).

Table 1: Epithets for Paul in the Second Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| “The Apostle (Paul)” δ ἀπόστολος/apostolus | • Basilides (Origen, Comm. Rom. 5.1; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 3.2.1)  
• Theodotus (Clement of Alexandria, Exc. 22.1; 35.1; 48.2; 49.1; 67.1; 85.3)  
• Ptolemy (Epistle to Flora 33.5.15; 33.6.6)  
• Heracleon (fr. 24 in Völker)17 |

The term “Pauline” throughout this dissertation to indicate both texts bearing Paul’s name as author as well as texts about Paul, in additional to the stories, images, and other forms of tradition about Paul that were mediated to and through a variety of communities.

17 Walther Völker, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis (SAQ 5; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1932).
| **Treatise on the Resurrection** 45.23-27 |  
| **A Prayer of Paul the Apostle** (flyleaf of NHC I) |  
| **Athenagoras** (*Res.* 18) |  
| **Irenaeus** (81x) |  
| **Tertullian** (294x) |  
| **Clement of Alexandria** (214x) |  

| “The Apostolikon” τὸ ἀποστολικὸν |  
| “His Apostle” Ἀπόστολος εἰς |  
| “Your Apostle” τοῦ ἀποστόλου |  
| “The Apostle of the Lord” ὁ ἀπόστολος τοῦ κυρίου |  
| “The Apostle of the Resurrection” Ἀπόστολος Ἀναστάσεως |  
| “The great Apostle” ὁ ἀπόστολος |  
| “The Divine Apostle” ὁ θεός ἀπόστολος |  
| “The divinely inspired Paul/Apostle (of the Lord)” ὁ θεσπέσιος Παῦλος/ἀπόστολος |  
| “The fair Apostle” |  
| **Marcion** (Epiphanius, *Pan.* 42.10, 12) |  
| **Irenaeus** (*Haer.* 4.34.2; 5.2.2) |  
| **Tertullian** (*Marc.* 4.34.5) |  
| **Clement of Alexandria** (*Protr.* 9.87.4) |  
| **Theodotus** (Clement of Alexandria, *Exc.* 23.2-3) |  
| **Reality of the Rulers** 86.20 |  
| **Clement of Alexandria** (*Strom.* 1.1.10; 2.2.8; 2.20.109; 3.3.18; 4.12.87; 4.16.101; 4.21.132; 5.5.1; 5.9.57; 6.11.95; 7.14.84) |  
| **Clement of Alexandria** (*Strom.* 1.19.94; 5.10.60; *Protr.* 1.7.2) |  
| **Clement of Alexandria** (*Strom.* 5.2.15; 5.6.34) |  

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19 Cf. the data in Mark A. Frisius, “Interpretive Method and Theological Controversy: Tertullian’s Use of the Pastoral Epistles, Hebrews, James, 1 and 2 Peter, and Jude” (Ph.D. diss, The Catholic University of America, 2009), 283-300. Frisius shows that 99.3% of the time that Tertullian uses *apostolus* in the singular, he is referring to Paul.

20 ὁ ἀπόστολος in the singular appears 252 times in Clement, but 12 of these occurrences do not refer to Paul, and 26 of them add some additional qualifier. Cf. the data in the rest of this chart for these 26 occurrences.
But where does this near-universal Pauline charisma come from? And why does the “real” Paul carry so much authority in Christian polemics? For modern scholars, the answer to the latter question is clear. Paul is our earliest window into developing Christianity. How we describe that movement in its nascent form provides rhetorical payoffs in the authorization of various modern forms of Christianity. But how did he become known as “the Apostle” for a whole range of ideological adversaries in the
second century? And who, if any, got Paul right? Moreover, given the diversity of the first-century Pauline material, which “Paul” are we talking about? These kinds of questions, described in more detail just below, encompass a variety of disciplinary concerns (methodology, exegesis, theory, ideology, and historiography) and strike at the heart of issues related to the prolegomena of Pauline Studies. As the presenting questions of this dissertation, they arise out of the serious consideration of Stanley Stowers’ warning that “determining what is Pauline and what unpauline is an extremely difficult task that most of us do without much critical reflection.”21

Presenting Questions and Thesis

Rather than a comprehensive compendium of the use of Paul in the second century, or a declaration of which second century writers and communities preserved the “real” Paul (on both of which, cf. the last section of this chapter), this dissertation explores how Pauline traditions (written and oral) develop and make their way into early Christian rhetoric. It asks about the arrangement and interpretation of “Pauline” materials with an eye toward the memory of the Apostle in early Christianity. Five broad, interrelated questions drive the inquiry:

1) How do we measure Pauline influence in the second century? (methodology);

2) How did various second-century writers imagine Paul and what resources were employed to produce a given interpretation of the Apostle? (exegesis);

3) What is meant, from a theoretical standpoint, by the language of tradition and memory, concepts often invoked by Pauline scholars, but hardly ever defined or explored? (theory);

4) What interests stand behind ancient discourses on the “real” Paul? (ideology); and

5) How did Paul become “the Apostle” for so many different kinds of Christian communities in the second century? (history).

The connection between these questions is not ultimately logical and/or sequential. Each is part of a larger “hermeneutical conversation,” to use the language of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in which they inform and transform one another. I should say a few words about each, for the sake of definition, before laying out my thesis.

Methodology

Various ways of measuring Paul’s influence (“Paulinism”) on early Christian communities have been proposed: identifiable dependence on Pauline letters; discernable adherence to a particularly Pauline theology; and/or recognizable admiration/imitation of Paul as a person. Disagreements about what we are actually looking for in the search for Pauline influence in early Christianity divided two of the major studies from the late 1970’s. Andreas Lindemann was concerned both with “Das Bild des Apostels” as well as the “Aufnahme und Verarbeitung paulinischer Theologie.” By the former he meant “how Paul was viewed”; what images of the Apostle do we find in various texts, apart from the use of his letters? By the latter he meant the discernable continuities and discontinuities between Paul’s theology and second-century appropriations of his epistles.

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23 Andreas Lindemann, Paulus im ältesten Christentum: Das Bild des Apostels und die Rezeption der paulinischen Theologie in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Marcion (BHT 58; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1979).
David Rensberger, on the other hand, dealt only with the use of Pauline letters in the second century, deciding that concerns over Paul’s image were “of so little moment to most second-century writers that its usefulness is difficult to see.”

Chapter Two below provides the first substantial Forschungsgeschichte on the reception-history of Paul in the second century since Rensberger’s dissertation. In near totality, scholars have followed Lindemann over Rensberger, recognizing that the perceived influence of Paul on the Church was multifaceted. Various schemas for categorizing the data have been developed. Lindemann: “Bild” and “Theologie.” De Boer: “legendary” and “epistolary.” Bovon: “monument” and “document.” Aageson: “image”; “theology”; and “use of letters.” Marguerat: “documentaire”; “biographique”; and “doctoral.” But while these scholars have highlighted the importance of discerning the image of Paul in a given text, none explores the nature of images and how they encode information and transmit meaning. Chapter Three, among other things, grounds discussions of textually mediated images of Paul in theories of cognition and perception, both ancient and modern, as a way of highlighting how controlling images of the Apostle shaped the interpretation of Pauline texts within the second century and vice versa. In the explicitly polemical contestations over Paul’s legacy found in 2 Peter, Irenaeus, Marcion, the Gospel of Philip and Tertullian’s On Baptism (cited above), one gets the sense that Pauline texts were pawns in the defense of particular images of the Apostle; images that encoded the ideologies of a particular community. Irenaeus, for example, promises to “expound the Apostle,” while at the same time showing that Paul was a “preacher of the


25 References to these authors are found throughout Chapter Two.
truth and that he taught all things agreeable to the preaching of the truth.” The image of Paul as “preacher of the truth” was at stake in the interpretation of his texts.

Exegesis

Chapters Four and Five offer “thick descriptions” of the image of Paul in 3 Corinthians, a proto-orthodox pseudepigraphon from the late-second century C.E., and Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses, the first surviving heresiological tome, also dating from the last quarter of the second century C.E. These texts provide strikingly similar portrayals of the Apostle and are representatives of one particular stream of the Pauline tradition in the second century. They serve as test cases for two important theses of this dissertation: first, that image construction stands at the heart of textual interpretation, and second, that developing traditions/memories retain a complex mixture of continuity with and change from the past (cf. just below under Theory). Irenaeus is of particular interest because of his explicit claim to “expound the apostle” in the face of those who have “misunderstood what Paul has spoken.” The opportunity arises to explore Irenaeus’ reading of key Pauline texts in light of his rhetoric on the “real” Paul and to ask how he arranged, selected, and interpreted Pauline materials to fit his “rule of truth” and produce an image of the Apostle that is consonant with the rule; Paul is a “preacher of the truth.” Many other second-century texts, of course, need to be explored in due time. Chapter Six provides some suggestions for further work in this regard.

Theory

26 A “thick description,” as opposed to a “thin description,” to use the language of Gilbert Ryle, as popularized by Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30, attempts to describe individual performances within larger networks of meaning.
Pauline scholars are quick to deploy language like “tradition” and “memory,” but, as with “image,” these terms are almost never clarified, while the pertinent theoretical literature lies by the wayside. Chapter Three fully engages with this multidisciplinary literature (Halbwachs, Gadamer, Hobsbawm, Shils, Assmann, Gross, Fishbane, Nora, Schwartz, among many others) as a means of teasing out the particularly complex relationship between past and present as it relates to developing constructions of the Apostle in the second century.

A broad and consistent sociological approach to the production of knowledge (and thus, memory) drives Chapter Three. In particular, the social constraints on individual memory are explored at length. Every early Christian writer that interpreted Paul for his community did so as a member of their community. While I draw on the work of Maurice Halbwachs as a pioneer in social memory studies, I ultimately side with the more nuanced and balanced positions of Jan Assmann, Barry Schwartz, and Patrick Hutton. Memory is not just a product of present needs, though it certainly is this, but is also constrained by the past; molded by the force of tradition. Karl Mannheim’s work on the sociology of knowledge provides the context for these discussions.

Studies that apply theories of social remembering to the early Jesus tradition are now ubiquitous. Memory is once again *en vogue*. The Gospels are memorializations of

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Jesus. They are communal representations. Social memory theory has provided a fruitful alternative to prior discussions on memory in the Jesus tradition (Bultmann vs. Gerhardsson vs. Bailey), able to encompass the strengths of each. But there is still no full-scale study that applies these theoretical materials to the early memory of Paul. This study fills that gap. Paul, like Jesus, was a remembered figure in early Christian communities. As with the Evangelists, each of Paul’s second-century reputational entrepreneurs was interested in fixing a particular image of the Apostle for memorialization. Traditioned images were one important way in which Christians went about the “culture-making” process, as Elizabeth Castelli has argued. Christian identity was and is wrapped up in the representation of its Apostle.

_Ideology_

Christian culture-making was a highly contentious activity in the second century as communities with diverse backgrounds and traditions assimilated Christ and his...
Apostle into their prior ideological networks, producing the ancient discourses on the “real” Paul noted above. Ideological discourse is by nature conservative, as Mannheim argued (cf. Chapter Three). It springs into action when the status quo is threatened. While this dissertation is certainly interested in questions like “How has x author read y Pauline text?” and “Is his reading faithful to the earlier Pauline text(s)?,” it is equally invested in the discourses that surround individual readings of the Pauline tradition. A total conception of ideology,” according to Mannheim, “does not criticize thought on the level of the assertions themselves, which may involve deceptions and disguises, but examines them on the structural or noological level, which it views as not necessarily being the same for all men, but rather as allowing the same object to take on different forms and aspects in the course of social development.”

All language occurs in social contexts that are infused by power relations. Sara Mills puts it succinctly: “discourses are not simple groupings of utterances or statements, but consist of utterances which have meaning, force and effect within a social context.” This is what I mean by “discourses on the ‘real’ Paul.” Individual claims to “get Paul right” are situated within larger power structures (social and institutional). Recognizing this, several important questions arise. What does such rhetoric preserve? What does it produce/effect? Can such categorical language about the “real” Paul bear up under the nuance of concepts like tradition and memory?


32 Cf. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith; London: Tavistock, 1972 [1969]), 49, where he describes discourses as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Ideology, accompanied by its rhetorical discourses, is just as much production as it is conservation.
While I am not interested in the so-called “historical” Paul (cf. below), this dissertation is certainly not devoid of historical concerns. Once theories have been applied and individual data have been examined from a number of different angles, we are still left with the historical task: How can we narrate Paul’s developing charismas in the second century? How did he go from Paul to “Paul”? What story best makes sense of the available data? Chapter Two chronicles the demise of the Pauline Captivity Narrative, the dominant history of Paul in the second century from the time of F.C. Baur until just a few decades ago. According to this narrative, Paul’s radical, apocalyptic theology of divine grace had been appropriated by Marcion and the “Gnostics,” who trumpeted Paul as their Apostle. For much of the second century the proto-orthodox either had little regard for Paul and his theology or were too embarrassed to utter his name. To do the latter would smack of heresy. Only at the end of the second century, after the Pastoral Epistles and Acts had circulated widely, could Irenaeus finally assimilate Paul into the wider theology of the burgeoning Catholic Church. Once this Pauline Captivity Narrative was deconstructed by Lindemann, Rensberger, and others in the late 1970’s, creative space was opened for alternative stories (cf. Chapter Two). The current regnant narrative posits a number of developing, fragmented trajectories of Pauline tradition throughout the second century. Often times these trajectories were in competition with one another, while at other times these competing traditions were so close to one another (despite the rhetorical discourses of their tradents) that they are now
hard to distinguish, substantially. This now favored narrative, however, still lacks explanatory power. Chapter Three provides the theoretical engine for it.

**Thesis**

Weaving these interdisciplinary concerns together, I will argue that by the second century Paul had become a traditioned figure. His role as the individual who was responsible for the largest social shift in the history of the early Church, moving it out from under the auspices of Judaism and opening up the gospel to the Gentiles, fixed a permanent place for his memory as the Apostle in Christian communities across the ancient Mediterranean world. But Paul’s charisma did not develop in a straight line. A number of increasingly complex and diverse traditions were widening into full view of one another in the second century, producing rhetorical discourses on the “real” Paul. These traditions involved image production as well as textual interpretation; the two go hand-in-hand. The Pauline traditions of the second century each appealed to various pieces of the earlier layer of the Pauline tradition (however limited one now wants to describe it). Even the so-called seven “authentic” letters of Paul display a wide range of Pauline images and theologies. Appeals to particular combinations of texts and stories from this earliest layer, along with the elevation of some pieces above others, were the means of producing second-century Pauline image traditions. These images of the Apostle were not constructed out of thin air, but were part of the developing cultural and social memory of early Christianity. As such, they each exhibit a unique mixture of continuity with and change from the past. Earlier interpretive traditions make their way into the second century, but, when combined with the ideological and social needs of
developing Christian communities, ultimately evolve based on the factors of time and place. Consequently, ancient discourses on the “real” Paul, like their modern counterparts, are problematic. Through a whole host of exclusionary practices, the “real” Paul, whose authoritative persona possessed a certain delegated authority, was and is invoked as a wedge to gain traction for the conservation of ideology.

What this Study Is Not

A number of lengthy studies on “Paul in the second century” already exist. One thinks immediately of the three near-comprehensive works of Andreas Lindemann, Ernst Dassmann and David Rensberger, each authored about three decades ago. As was mentioned in brief above and will be explained in much greater detail in Chapter Two, these scholars helped reset a more than century-long narrative about Paul’s captivity to the “Gnostics” in the second century. Between their three works, the full range of data on the use of Paul in the second century is available for anyone who wants to explore the topic. Richard Pervo’s recently published book is an even better place to start, at least for the novice in this field. While following the basic conclusions of Lindemann, Dassmann and Rensberger and laying out much of the same data, Pervo updates the discussion in light of the so-called “New Perspective on Paul” and the concomitant de-centering of justification by faith as the sine qua non of Pauline theology. He raises some of the same methodological and ideological critiques of previous scholarship on Paul in

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33 Lindemann, Paulus im ältesten Christentum; Ernst Dassmann, Der Stachel im Fleisch: Paulus in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Irenäus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979); and Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches.”

the second century that will be found here, but offers no theoretical justification for these critiques nor is able to escape his own dependence on the interpretive traditions that he seeks to criticize. The relative merit of Pervo’s work will be discussed at length in Chapter Two.³⁵ This dissertation does not attempt to regurgitate the labor of these four scholars. For this reason, I offer no comprehensive enumeration of the data. It is widely available. I am more interested in what is going on behind the scenes; what accounts for the data as they appear in our sources. The last half of the dissertation will, however, offer “thick descriptions” of Paul in the two second-century “proto-orthodox” texts mentioned above (3 Corinthians and Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses) as a means of fleshing-out the methodological, theoretical, ideological and historical questions that drive my own interests. Many other second-century texts are enumerated, cited, and explored, in brief, where pertinent.

This dissertation is also not a quest for the “historical” Paul. Such a project is part of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century reception-history of the Apostle. Admittedly, the ancient and modern discourses on the “real” Paul are related in several ways. Generally, they display similar rhetorical maneuvers, as we have already seen. But more important, the manuscripts that modern scholars use to establish “what Paul actually said” are products of this early period when Paul’s legacy was a contentious matter. In

³⁵ Two recent dissertations have explored various aspects of the use of Paul in the second century, but each has major problems, either in terms of methodology, argument, and/or substance, as will be shown in Chapter Two: David H. Warren, “The Text of the Apostle in the Second Century: A Contribution to the History of its Reception” (Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 2001); and Jason M. Scarborough, “The Making of an Apostle: Second and Third Century Interpretations of the Writings of Paul” (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, 2007).
other words, the manuscripts are not innocent. They belong to the ancient discourse.  

For this reason, many of the methodological and theoretical discussions in this work may serve as a foundation for modern work on the “historical” Paul. But to be clear: we are not interested in “Who got Paul right in the second century?,” but in “What is at stake in asking this question?,” “What does it mean?,” and “Can it be answered?” The first question has dominated discussions of Paul in the second century for far too long. It presupposes that we know the “historical” Paul (as opposed to the Paul of “tradition”) and that the Apostle was some static individual; a motionless target that one can either hit or miss.

Like the quest for the “historical Jesus,” which has had its heyday at various periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but is now somewhat waning, F.C. Baur’s quest for the historical Paul is cracking, along with the epistemic certainty that comes with the language of the “real” Paul. While a full-scale deconstruction still awaits, Wayne Meeks, Robert Morgan, Stanley Stowers, and Robert Seesengood, among others, have already pointed in this direction. In light of the various inconsistencies that

36 Cf. Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 17: “The physical artifacts – manuscripts – are traditions . . . The manuscripts and printed books in which the text is recorded, the text and the interpretations of it are all *tradita.*”

37 Cf. Charles H. Cosgrove, “A Response to Ruth Clements and Sze-kar Wan: Will the Real Paul Please Stand Up!,” in *Early Patristic Readings of Romans* (ed. by K.L. Gaca and L.L. Welborn; Romans Through History and Cultures: Receptions and Critical Interpretations 1; New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 203: “it is almost impossible today to speak about the way premodern interpreters read Paul without assuming that the real Paul is the historical Paul (in the modern sense of the term), and that ‘we’ have a pretty sure grasp on that historical Paul.” Cf. also Maurice Wiles, *The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 132: “‘How far then did the early commentators give a true interpretation of Paul’s meaning?’ Yet the very form in which the question arises is not without danger. It implies the assumption that we have a true interpretation of Paul’s meaning – or at least a truer one than that of those whom we have studied – in the light of which theirs may be tested and judged.”

38 On recent criticisms not only of the conclusions of historical Jesus research, but on the historiographical method and theory behind it, cf. Wayne Meeks, *Christ is the Question* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 2006), and Dale Allison, Jr., *The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009).
can be found even within the seven “undisputed” letters, Meeks has famously tabbed Paul the “Christian Proteus” (cf. 1 Cor 9.19-23):

Where among these multiple pictures of Paul and his influence is the real Paul to be found? Or is the question itself, when posed against this history of “strong misreadings” (as the literary critic Harold Bloom might call them), not itself naïve?39

He points to trends in postmodern historiography that should impact the way that historians of early Christianity approach their material (cf. Appendix One).40

Robert Seesengood has recently offered a more sustained critique in the line of Albert Schweitzer’s *Quest of the Historical Jesus*:

Biographies and articles on Paul written in the last century have identified the apostle as a homophobe, a closeted gay man, a loyal Jew, a rabbi, a marginal Jew, a self-hating Jew, a cosmopolitan and urbane member of the Greco-Roman world, a radical dissenter opposed to the Roman empire with an unmatched vigor, a man motivated by religious impulses and ideas, or a man motivated by political agendas (which he, very literally, “baptizes”) . . . Even more, how is it that so many pictures of Paul can be drawn and defended? These various images survive (and attract attention, if not devoted followers) precisely because they can be defended from our evidence.

Much like Jesus, the historical Paul that emerges is plastic. Scholars have to make choices about what evidence is authentic and what is not. Scholars fill in the evidence. Scholars make choices about conflicting points of evidence. Scholars reconstruct the historical, communal, political, and confessional context of the evidence (and, so, determine what the evidence ‘means’) . . . I would also argue that the variety of ‘historical Paul(s)’ that are constructed are, in part, also reflections of the scholars’ own needs, agendas, and contexts. In many ways, a full, final picture of the ‘historical Paul’ is impossible to retrieve.41

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Seesengood also argues that the epistolary Paul is a mischaracterization. Even if all thirteen of the canonical epistles are attributed to Paul, that would only give us an average of 500 words every other year for a ministry that spanned nearly three decades. When compared with Cicero and Seneca, “Paul wasn’t much of a correspondent.”⁴² The further lack of dateable historical references in the Pauline letters impedes our ability to give more than the most bare-boned account of Paul’s chronology/biography, while the canonical order of the letters (Romans first) “conceals any development of his ideas or arguments.”⁴³ Language about the “real” Paul, or “true Paulinism,” freezes the Apostle in time and makes him less human, less real, and more open to ideological agendas that shape Paul in our own image.⁴⁴

Such trends in modern Pauline scholarship have implications for the ancient (and modern) polemical discourse on the “real” Paul, as Calvin Roetzel has noted:

But, which is the real Paul – the Paul of the letters or the Paul of later tradition? That is a very difficult question to answer for many reasons. In our discussions of Paul’s theologizing we suggested that Paul himself changed over time as he faced new situations that forced him to think through his gospel and its application in new ways . . . If we cannot locate a single archimedean point from which to measure Paul himself in the letters, how shall we do the same with a later tradition?⁴⁵

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⁴² Seesengood, Paul, 15. Of course, we know of other “lost” letters of Paul that the canonical epistles reference. But if one denies the Pauline authorship of several of the canonical epistles and then adds additional Corinthian correspondence, for instance, we are in the same ballpark, relatively.

⁴³ Seesengood, Paul, 22-23. Cf. Harold Hoehner, “Did Paul Write Galatians?,” in History and Exegesis: New Testament Essays in Honor of Dr. E. Earle Ellis for his 80th Birthday (ed. S.W. Son; New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 169: “Furthermore, it must be accepted that a creative person such as Paul is not sterile in his expressions; allowances must be made for development in his own thinking.”


In this same vein, Stanley Stowers wonders, “What does unpauline mean?,” offering a number of salient points:

Does unpauline mean that Paul would not have done or said whatever is reckoned unpauline in his own time and circumstances? . . . We cannot look into Paul’s mind. Did everything he write have just one legitimate implication?

Does unpauline mean something that contradicts beliefs and practices that are explicitly valorized in his letters? How do we know that the valorizations are to be universalized beyond the immediate circumstances of their utterance?

Are secondary implications and deductions from Paul’s statements unpauline? . . . I am convinced that if Paul himself had written an autobiographical narrative, it would almost certainly have been considered unpauline by New Testament scholars.


Is saying that something is unpauline a normative theological statement which means: in my tradition’s appropriation of Paul, ‘x’ is unpauline? This may be one of the most realistic perspectives. There is no Archimedean point.46

In order not to import increasingly contested nineteenth- and twentieth-century receptions of Paul into an exploration of Paul’s legacy in the second century, I have had to make several methodological decisions about issues concerning Pauline pseudepigraphy and the so-called “Pauline School.” The Pastoral Epistles, for instance, which have often been viewed since the early-nineteenth century as second-century Pauline pseudepigrapha, will be lumped together here in an undifferentiated layer of texts and traditions that I call, for better or for worse, “the earliest layer of the Pauline

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tradition,” without determination of actual authorship.\(^{47}\) So much of what we “know” about Christianity in the first century is dependent upon the modern discourse on Paul vs. “Paul,” and until that discourse is probed more critically (particularly with respect to the ideology that stands behind the uneven application of more “scientific” criteria in determining authorship), I have limited my investigation to texts and authors that are almost universally placed in the last decade of the first century up to the end of the second century. For this reason, the first generation or two after the death of the Apostle will have to go without narration here. There is no discussion here of the “Pauline School,” a product of modern debates about Pauline pseudepigraphy.\(^{48}\) I hope that one of the outcomes of this study will be an enlarged set of theoretical and methodological tools for trying to assess this murky, earlier period. But we cannot put the cart before the horse.

Much of the “proto-orthodox” reception of Paul in the third century is dependent on Irenaeus’ use of the Apostle, so, for all practical purposes, I have in mind the reception of Paul from *1 Clement* to Irenaeus, across the ideological spectrum from

\(^{47}\) On “the earliest layer of the Pauline tradition,” cf. n. 15 above. For comments on the early reception-history of the Pastoral Epistles, cf. Chapters Four and Five.

within that period, although Tertullian’s work *Against Marcion* should also be included. The second century marks the several generations of Pauline reception after which the Pauline epistles had been gathered, circulated, and mixed together with a variety of oral traditions about the Apostle to produce a variety of “Pauls” that in some ways outdoes those that we find in modern Christendom.49 We turn, now, to explore the various modern explanations for how this variety of “Pauls” came about during the period in question.

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49 On the Pauline canon, cf. Chapter Two.
CHAPTER TWO
Narrating Paul: The Apostle in the Second Century
from F.C. Baur to Richard Pervo

History-telling is a landscape portrait. It is a narrative. It is a rhetoric.\textsuperscript{50} Few scholars of early Christianity doubt that the Apostle Paul was a (if not \textit{the}) seminal figure in early Christian history during the mid-first century C.E. Likewise, no scholar of early Christianity can deny that Paul was \textit{“the Apostle”} for a wide-ranging set of Christian communities by the end of the second century (cf. Chapter One). The passage of time between point A and point B, however, requires a narrative. It requires a portrayal of the landscape of early Christian memory-making. It requires an argument for how Paul, one of the most controversial figures of nascent Christianity, became loved by so many. This chapter is a narration of several narrations of Paul’s reputation during the second century that have been given by scholars from F.C. Baur in the mid-nineteenth century up to the very recent publication of Richard Pervo’s \textit{The Making of Paul} (2010). The focus is on the last thirty years, the period after the seminal book-length projects of Andreas

Lindemann, Ernst Dassmann, Donald Penny and David Rensberger.\textsuperscript{51} These scholars displaced dominant narratives of a second-century Pauline Captivity to the “heretics” that had reigned since the time of F.C. Baur and replaced them with a more plausible story of Paul’s place in the second century; a more nuanced portrait of Paul’s influence on a wide range of Christian groups and authors, including the proto-orthodox. But despite some strong lineaments of agreement in the wake of these four studies, we are still in need of a clearly delineated model for measuring Paul’s legacy in the second century, as well as a more theoretically nuanced explanation of the data. Chapter Three will address these matters head on.

**Pauline Captivity Narratives**

Beginning in earnest with F.C. Baur in the mid-nineteenth century, and extending into the 1970’s, one family of narratives of Paul’s legacy in the second century dominated all others: that of a Pauline Captivity. Its most evolved form eventually detailed how Paul had been seized by Marcion and the “Gnostics,” who wrestled substantively with his theology, while the proto-orthodox could do nothing but sit back and watch. Any invocation of Paul would have risked association with the “apostle of the heretics” (cf. Tert., \textit{Marc.} 3.5.4). It was only with the pseudonymous authorship of the Pastoral Epistles, as well as the authorship of Acts, that Irenaeus could finally reclaim Paul for the proto-orthodox; a Paul that was now in line with the wider apostolic tradition. Hans von Campenhausen represents the mature form of the Pauline Captivity narrative:

\textsuperscript{51} Andreas Lindemann, \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}; Ernst Dassmann, \textit{Der Stachel im Fleisch}; Donald N. Penny, “The Pseudo-Pauline Letters of the First Two Centuries” (Ph.D. diss., Emory, 1979); and David Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches.”
Around the middle of the second century there was a falling-off in esteem for Paul in orthodox circles. This is connected with the fact that he was held in such high esteem by the heretics and especially by Marcion, and was treated by them virtually as one of themselves.\(^{52}\)

Only when combined with these inauthentic letters [the Pastorals] could the genuine legacy of the apostle be tolerated by the Church and made ‘canonical.’\(^{53}\)

This narrative is based largely on a Pauline “silence” in Justin Martyr, Papias and Hegesippus. Justin is particularly important because he would have certainly known the Pauline letters, living in Rome at the time of Marcion and Valentinus, both of whom, according to later proto-orthodox writers, considered themselves to have been devotees of the Apostle. Papias and Hegesippus are less consequential. So little of their work remains and Papias’ *Expositions of the Sayings of the Lord* would have given little, if any, room to Paul.

Attempts to deal with Justin’s silence evolved over time, giving the Pauline Captivity narrative a number of forms. Karl Credner, writing in the early-nineteenth century, tied Justin to a Jewish Christianity that was leery of Paul.\(^{54}\) Credner viewed Justin’s aversion to eating meat sacrificed to idols as being closer to James and Peter in Acts 15 than to Paul in 1 Corinthians 8-10. He was quickly refuted by Carl Semisch, who noted similarities between Justin and Paul on the Jewish Law while denying any

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\(^{52}\) *The Formation of the Christian Bible* (trans. J.A. Baker; Philadelphia: Fortress Pr, 1972 [1968]), 144, cited in Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 1. I am indebted to Rensberger for some earlier portions of this section of this chapter, particularly with respect to late-nineteenth century German authors who wrote about Justin.


\(^{54}\) *Beiträge zur Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften* (2 vols; Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1832-38), 1.94-9.
connection between Jewish scruples and Justin’s position on sacrificial meat. But Semisch’s rebuttal was overshadowed by the historical giant of the mid-nineteenth century, F.C. Baur, the founding father of the “Tübingen School” and the first major Pauline scholar of the Enlightenment era.

Baur’s work is important in a variety ways. He is most famous for his dialectical reading of early Christian history, which posited a division between two theological camps: a Jewish-Christian faction under Peter and James and a pro-Gentile faction under Paul. The entirety of early Christian literature (at least into the late-second century) can be assigned to one of these two sides or to the later “Catholic” synthesis of the mid-second century (cf. Acts). For Baur, the only authentically Pauline texts were Romans, 1-2 Corinthians, and Galatians, the so-called Hauptbriefe. This conclusion was largely made on ideological grounds. His Protestant upbringing in Germany and philosophical commitment to Hegelianism caused him to assign more “Catholic” appearing texts (e.g. Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles) to the later synthesis of Petrine and Pauline factions within the burgeoning Catholic Church. Baur found in the Hauptbriefe’s emphases on justification by faith and possession of the Spirit of God a version of Christianity that


58 Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Works, His Epistles and Teachings (Peabody, Mass: Hendrickson, 2003 [1845]).
most closely aligned not only with his Lutheranism, but also with his Hegelian commitment to history as the unfolding of Absolute Spirit.\textsuperscript{59} The other Pauline letters: stand below the originality, the wealth of thought, and the whole spiritual substance and value of [Rom, 1-2 Cor, Gal]. They are characterized by a certain meagerness of contents, by colourlessness of treatment, by absence of motive and connexion, by monotony, by repetition, by dependence, partly on each other, and partly on the Epistles of the first class . . . It is clear that the point of view from which these letters are written is not that of one seeking to make good, and to develop a general principle which has still to vindicate itself, and on which the Christian consciousness and life are to be formed . . . The authentic Pauline Epistles have a true organic development; they proceed from one root idea which penetrates the whole contents of the Epistle from the very beginning, and binds all the different parts of it to an inner unity, through the deeper relations in which it holds them, even though they appear at first sight to be only outwardly connected . . . Hence they exhibit a genuine dialectic movement.\textsuperscript{60}

The ideological overtones of his historical conclusions cannot escape one’s notice. A romantic attachment to Paul has been wedded with strong theological and philosophical commitments.\textsuperscript{61} Most critical New Testament scholarship, emanating as it did from Protestant Germany in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, was quite happy to follow

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\textsuperscript{59} Baur’s commitment to Idealism can be seen early on in his private communications with F.A. Baur, in which he praises Schleiermacher’s *The Christian Faith*: “One can consider the work from its philosophical and theological side. With regard to its philosophical side the basic view is certainly pantheistic, but one can just as well say, idealistic . . . Idealistic is above all the constant development of all the principal doctrines from the self-consciousness; pantheistic is especially the treatment of the doctrine of God which, certainly, sets God as the Absolute in the purest sense, but at the same time in such an abstract way that not just the essence of God but even the most general attributes . . . are taken into consideration; and in order to exclude every finite antithesis in the divine essence there can be no more talk of God as an actual personality . . . It is impossible for me to view his system, as it is here set forth, as a purely self-contained one; indeed, he himself always points out that his representation appears in this form only with reference to the feeling of dependence . . . I know of no representation of Christianity in which the peculiar essence of Christianity is so acutely comprehended and made so thoroughly the middle point of the whole system, none which could be held as being more Christian and orthodox.” Cited in Harris, *The Tübingen School*, 147-8. Also of interest is a line from his speech given for the commemoration of the 25th term of King Wilhelm: “That the finite spirit is also the infinite Spirit which raises itself out of the finitude of its nature to the infinitude of its nature; that the essence of the spirit generally is nothing other than the infinite self-mediation of thinking – this is the standpoint of a philosophy which has won such an important significance for our ages.” Also cited in Harris, *The Tübingen School*, 39.

\textsuperscript{60} *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, 2.106-7.

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. the critique of Baur in Robert Morgan, “The Significance of ‘Paulinism’,” 325.
Baur. Since then, the authorship of the *Hauptbriefe*, which in the wake of Luther had become polemical weapons against both the Catholic Church and Judaism, has never been seriously questioned (except by Bruno Bauer). They represent fundamental “Paulinism” against which all later receptions of Paul should be compared. This paradigm often led to the conclusion among German scholars of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries that Pauline theology became deformed among second-century, proto-orthodox interpreters, inasmuch as the latter did not emphasize justification by faith (cf. Chapter Five below on Irenaeus).

Like Credner before him, Baur argued that prominent proto-orthodox authors of the second century (Justin, Papias and Hegesippus) were the ideological heirs of the Jewish Christianity that had opposed Paul during his own lifetime. While these three were less radical in open opposition to Paul than either the Ebionites or the communities that produced the *Pseudo-Clementine* literature, the absence of any mention of his letters in these three writers did, however, suggested to Baur their outright opposition to the


63 The shining example of this view can be found in Otto Pfleiderer’s *Paulinism: A Contribution to the History of Primitive Christian Theology* (trans. E. Peters; 2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1877 [1873]). In volume one he charts the psychological development of Pauline theology from Sin/Law, through the person and work of Christ, to justification by faith, etc. This volume is dominated by the *Hauptbriefe*. The second volume traces the development of “Paulinism” in new directions (Alexandrian, proto-Catholic and Catholic) in the late-first and early-second centuries, finding both continuities with and differences from the heart of Paul’s theology. Pride of place is given to justification by faith alone. Pfleiderer sees a wide range of Pauline receptions in the early church, dealing with a variety of texts: Hebrews, Colossians, *Epistle of Barnabas, 1 Clement*, 1 Peter, Ephesians, the Pastoral Epistles, *Ignatius* and Acts. Cf. also Stewart Means, *Saint Paul and the Ante-Nicene Church* (London: Black, 1903). Means characterizes Paul’s ministry as follows: “It is generally recognized that the aim of St. Paul was to separate Christianity from Judaism and establish it on an independent foundation. There seems to have been no other Jewish mind bold enough to grasp this idea of a religion independent of law, and consequently the establishment of the heathen Christianity is due to St. Paul” (64). Inasmuch as Means views second-century Catholic theology as developing a sense of Christ as the “New Lawgiver” and piety as the “New Law,” he concludes that most authors of that period have fundamentally moved away from Paul.
Pauline gospel.\textsuperscript{64} Baur’s association of Justin with Jewish Christianity was tortured. He thought, on the one hand, that Justin’s predilection for the Old Testament, his benign attitude toward Jewish Christians (cf. \textit{Dial.} 47), and his aversion to meat sacrificed to idols were indications of an affinity for Jewish Christianity. On the other hand, Baur found some similarities between Justin and Paul, especially their common dislike for the Jewish ceremonial Law.\textsuperscript{65} Despite this ambiguity, he remained adamant that Justin did not want to be associated with Paul. Ultimately, as Semisch had done with Credner, Baur’s links between Justin and Jewish Christianity were roundly rejected by Albrecht Ritschl, J.B. Lightfoot, Theodor Zahn and Adolf von Harnack.\textsuperscript{66} But the weight of Baur’s larger historical reconstruction of a continuing Jewish Christian opposition to Paul in the second century opened up a wide ranging conversation about the Apostle’s legacy during the middle of that period. And noone doubts that an element of anti-Paulinism existed within some Jewish Christian communities in the second century (cf. the Ebionites and the \textit{Pseudo-Clementines}).\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{64} Baur, \textit{The Church History of the First Three Centuries}, 1.146-7.

\textsuperscript{65} Cf. Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 8-9.


Proponents of a strong Jewish-Christian connection for Justin (however weakly defined that term remained) became less numerous as the nineteenth century progressed.\(^{68}\) Other explanations for his Pauline silence were offered. The common denominator for these other explanations was the simple observation that silence does not automatically equal rejection of or antipathy toward Paul. Johann Otto, writing during Baur’s heyday, found numerous traces of Pauline language in Justin and argued that the lack of direct citations from Paul was due to Justin’s rhetorical contexts: both the audience of the *Dialogue with Trypho* as well as the influence of Marcion in Rome were prohibitive of him citing Paul directly.\(^{69}\) Justin’s Pauline language indicated that he was not antagonistic toward the Apostle. Theodor Zahn agreed that there was a lack of motive for mentioning Paul in both the *Apology* as well as the *Dialogue with Trypho*.\(^{70}\) On the other hand, Zahn argued that Justin did cite Paul (1 Cor 15.50) directly in his *On the Resurrection* (found in Methodius’ text of the same name) – a much more likely context for a Pauline reference.\(^{71}\) Of course, the authorship of *On the Resurrection* is


disputed by most modern scholars.\textsuperscript{72} By the late-nineteenth century, Marcion, in particular, began to take center stage in explanations for the absence of Paul in some second-century proto-orthodox circles. But for a time these explanations were sometimes still combined with theories about Justin’s Jewish-Christian affinities. Justin equated Paul with Marcion and thus tended toward Jewish-Christian sources and teaching, even if he betrayed knowledge of Paul in some of his language and arguments.\textsuperscript{73}

What we find in seed in Otto became a fully blossoming flower by the early-twentieth century. Among those who placed Marcion and other “heretics” front and center were Adolf von Harnack and Walter Bauer.\textsuperscript{74} Together, they combined to provide a powerful and influential narrative of Paul’s captivity in the second century. Harnack argued that the proto-orthodox (Justin in particular) faced a certain embarrassment over (though no lack of fondness for) Paul because of the ease by which their opponents made us of him. The Apostle was held captive by the other side. Justin was not antagonistic to Paul; but he was leery of invoking him in public discourse. In the end, however, the use of Paul’s letters within the burgeoning Catholic Church prevented a wholesale


abandonment of him. Irenaeus, through the use of Acts and the Pastoral Epistles, was finally able to win Paul back from the heretics. Harnack saw Marcion as the catalyst for a number of developments among the proto-orthodox, including the canonization of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline letters.\textsuperscript{75} His Marcion was chiefly a Pauline theologian, the first Reformer, inasmuch as Marcion, like Luther, Baur, and Harnack himself, saw the heart of Pauline theology to be justification by faith alone.\textsuperscript{76}

Walter Bauer’s now famous and ground-shifting thesis – that an originally diverse Christianity was eventually snuffed out by the growing proto-orthodox church of Rome – took over much of Harnack’s position (minus the \textit{philo}-Marcionism).\textsuperscript{77} While Christian thinkers like Marcion, Valentinus, Basilides and the Montanists were having a field day with Paul, Papias, Justin and Hegesippus stood on the sidelines and watched. They had no other choice, until the Pastoral Epistles were written to reclaim Paul from those with “myths and endless genealogies” (1 Tim 1.4), who proclaimed a “falsely-called knowledge” through the use of “antitheses” (1 Tim 6.20). Irenaeus was the first to fully incorporate the Paul of the Pastoral Epistles into the wider Pauline tradition.

Part and parcel with this Pauline Captivity narrative was the frequent claim that no one in the early Church, except for possibly Marcion and Valentinus, understood Paul’s dialectical theology nor did they inherit his doctrine of justification by faith. Paul’s earliest readers were, in essence, accused of not having elevated Romans and Galatians as the \textit{sine quibus non} of Pauline theology. As such, those few proto-orthodox


\textsuperscript{76} We will have more to say on Harnack’s Marcion in the next section of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{77} Bauer, \textit{Orthodoxy and Heresy}, 213-28.
authors who dared to invoke Paul misconstrued him. Bauer found no significant loyalty to Paul after his death, even among the congregations that he established.78 Eva Aleith, while conceding that most everyone in the second century had access to and had read Pauline epistles, concluded that no one actually understood Paul. By the time that his letters were circulating as a corpus, they had already been collected together with pseudo-Pauline literature, making it nearly impossible to get at the heart of Paul’s theology.79

The force of Harnack and Bauer and their Pauline Captivity narrative held sway into the second half of the twentieth century, reflected in essays by Wilhem Schneemelcher, Georg Strecker, C.K. Barrett, and Kurt Aland, as well as the work of Campenhausen, cited at the beginning of this section.80 Schneemelcher, in a widely cited article, found very little use of Paul’s letters in early Catholicism. 1 Clement only knew 1 Corinthians. Ignatius of Antioch had not read any of Paul’s letters. The Apologists do not mention Paul’s name. If Paul’s letters were not cited, they were either ignored or unknown to a particular author.81 He had been “intentionally shoved aside” (“als würde er absichtlich beiseite geschoben”) by some authors.82 The Apostle had been

78 Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy*, 233. Cf. more recently Ernst Käsemann, “Paul and Early Catholicism,” 238-9, 249.


81 Schneemelcher, “Paulus in der griechischen Kirche,” 6, 8, 16.

appropriated so thoroughly by the “heretics” that the Roman church would have preferred to have omitted his letters from the developing New Testament canon, but the force of tradition would not allow it. 83 Neither Polycarp nor Irenaeus, who actually cite from Pauline letters, was a true Paulinist (read: justification by faith alone was not important for them). 84 Strecker’s piece is little different, with the exception that he already sees in the canonical pseudo-Pauline literature a loss of the true Pauline legacy; a splintering of the Apostle into oblivion.

Kurt Aland directly challenged Schneemelcher’s position on the Apostolic Fathers, while still retaining the Pauline Captivity narrative in broad outline. He argued that the Pauline corpus had been assembled and had circulated widely by the end of the first century, as evidenced by 1 Clement (who knew 1 Cor, Eph and Heb), Ignatius (who knew 1 Cor and Eph), Polycarp (who knew Phil and the Pastorals), and 2 Peter 3.16. Aland disagreed with Schneemelcher that if a text was not cited, that it was unknown to an author. He advocated for a more sophisticated method of determining literary dependence in the Apostolic Fathers, both for Paul as well as the Gospels. 85 Aland also balked at the thought that the proto-orthodox were not interested in Pauline theology. 1 Clement, for instance, borrowed the seed imagery for the resurrection from 1 Corinthians 15 (1 Clem. 24.5). One might also point to the constellation of terms from 1 Corinthians 15 in Justin’s First Apology:

\[ \tauον \alphaυτον \tauροπον \lambdaογισαθε \ οτι \ διαλυβεντα \ και \ διχην \ \sigmaπερματων \ (cf. 1 Cor 15.38) \ εις \ γην \ \alphaναλυβεντα \ τα \ \alphaνθρωπεια \ \sigmaωματα \ (cf. 1 Cor 15.35-44) \ \kata\]

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83 Schneemelcher, “Paulus in der greichischen Kirche,” 11.
84 Schneemelcher, “Paulus in der greichischen Kirche,” 7, 9, 19.
καιρὸν προστάξει θεοῦ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ἀφθαρσίαν ἀφθαρσίαν ἀφθαρσίαν (cf. 1 Cor 15.53) οὐκ ἀδύνατον (1 Apol. 19.4).

But in the end, Marcion and the Gnostics best understood Paul’s theology. Irenaeus’ reading of Paul was, to a large degree, indebted to his engagement with his opponents’ use of the Apostle, not to a genuine wrestling with Paul’s writings on their own terms. The early Fathers often got Paul wrong, despite their interest in various aspects of his theology. Aland does, however, insist that the question about who got Paul right is not important for doing work on the second-century reception of the Pauline corpus.

C.K. Barrett began to anticipate the end of the Pauline Captivity narrative in a number of ways. For him, Papias, Hegesippus and Justin display “mistrust” for Paul because of his use among Marcion and the Gnostics. This sounds familiar. But Barrett also introduced the idea of a Pauline “legend” – a developing portrayal of Paul that was to some degree independent of his letters. Irenaeus’ “orthodox” or “good” legend of Paul as martyr, Apostle to the Gentiles, and subject to the Apostolic teaching eventually overcame the “Gnostic” or “bad” legend (inclusive of Marcion) because it had been already anticipated by the end of the first century in Ephesians, Acts, the Pastoral Epistles and 1 Clement. The “good” legend was cemented in too many communities for the proto-orthodox to fully do away with Paul. The eventual combination of the “orthodox” legend with the historical Paul in the New Testament canon was the “price we pay” for reclaiming Paul from the Gnostics. Barrett’s personal commitment to the Protestant

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86 Aland, “Methodische Bemerkungen,” 47.
87 Aland, “Methodische Bemerkungen,” 46.
88 Barrett, “Pauline Controversies,” 236.
89 Barrett, “Pauline Controversies,” 244.
Paul as the “historical” Paul and his evaluative positions on the two Pauline legends are noticeable. But he should be commended on two counts. First, as will become plain later in this chapter, Barrett was an early proponent of the thesis that developing Pauline images often controlled the fate and interpretation of Pauline epistles in the early Church. His delimitation of these images into only two kinds is, however, unhelpful. Second, Barrett saw lines of continuity between earlier and later Pauline legends. As we will argue in Chapter Three, any model for understanding the Pauline tradition in the second century must give due weight to the force of tradition. While Justin and others may have avoided using Paul, their theological progeny could not. The rise of a proto-orthodox Pauline legend during the second century was too widespread in too many communities.

Paul and the “Heretics”: Marcion

Before moving to the four works that were the death-knell for the Pauline Captivity narrative, we must pause here to tease out a little further the flip-side of this narrative. Marcion and his Valentinian confreres were viewed as the true inheritors of Pauline theology. They understood the radical nature of Paul’s dialectical theology and apocalyptic faith in Christ; a faith that was reckoned solely on the basis of God’s grace, apart from participation in traditional religious institutions and their necessary “works.”

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90 Cf. also Hans-Martin Schenke, “Das Weiterwirken des Paulus und die Pflege seines Erbes durch die paulus-Schule,” 505-18, who argued that the image and legends of Paul that we find in Acts predated the collection of Paul’s letters (in fact, they might have spurred the collection). The legendary Paul is taken up again in the Acts of Paul. Schenke also argued that in the second century the Pauline school divided into Gnostic (Ephesians and Colossians) and anti-Gnostic (Pastorals) camps.
Tertullian was right to call Paul the “apostle of the heretics” (*Marc. 3.5.4*). We begin with Harnack’s reading of Marcion.\(^91\)

Harnack had an existential relationship with Marcion from his teenage years until his death. The title of his recently edited and published Dorpater Preisschrift, written at the age of nineteen, is a clear indication of his favorable reading of Marcion: *Marcion: Der moderne Gläubige des 2. Jahrhunderts, der erste Reformator.*\(^92\) His *Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott*, published some fifty-one years later, became the standard work on Marcion’s Paulinism for over half a century.\(^93\) Harnack saw a line of theological succession running from Jesus → Paul → Marcion → Augustine → Luther.\(^94\) His love for Marcion’s reading of Paul is seen in two now-famous passages:

Marcion was the only Gentile Christian who understood Paul, and even he misunderstood him: the rest never got beyond the appropriation of particular Pauline sayings, and exhibited no comprehension especially of the theology of the Apostle, so far as in it the universalism of Christianity as a religion is proved, even without recourse to Moralism and without putting a new construction on the Old Testament religion.\(^95\)

the rejection of the Old Testament in the second century was a mistake which the great church rightly avoided; to maintain it in the sixteenth century was a fate from which the Reformation was not yet able to escape; but still to preserve it in Protestantism as a canonical document since the

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\(^94\) *Marcion*, 134-9. This and all further references to *Marcion* are references to Harnack’s later work of that name.

nineteenth century is the consequence of a religious and ecclesiastical crippling.\textsuperscript{96}

Working against the portrayal of Marcion in the early Church Fathers, Harnack distanced him from the syncretism of the “Gnostics” and rendered him as a consistent and simple reader of Paul – a Paul mediated chiefly through Galatians, which stood at the front of his \textit{Apostolikon}.

Marcion found a complete antithesis between Law and Gospel in Galatians, extrapolating from this an absolute antithesis between the God of the Jews (the Creator God) and the universal God of Jesus and Paul (the Unknown God of Love).\textsuperscript{98} He thus relieved the burgeoning Catholic Church of its “\textit{complexio oppositorum},” which tried to hold the Old and New together in unity.\textsuperscript{99} Marcion also found in Galatians 1-2 a thoroughgoing statement of Paul’s superiority to the Jerusalem Church.

The Church Fathers accused Marcion of having edited out elements of the Pauline letter corpus that were inconvenient for his reading of Paul, including whole texts (e.g. – the Pastoral Epistles; cf. Irenaeus, \textit{Haer}. 1.27.2, 4; Tertullian, \textit{Praescr}. 38; \textit{Marc}. 5.3.3; 5.21.1). Marcion, on the other hand, saw himself as restoring the pristine condition of Paul’s letters, which had been interpolated by Judaizing influences in the burgeoning Catholic Church in an attempt to bring them in line with its commitment to the Old

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Marcion}, 134.

\textsuperscript{97} The order of the Marcionite \textit{Apostolikon} is given in Epiphanius, \textit{Pan}. 42.9.4; 11.8: Gal, 1-2 Cor, Rom, 1-2 Thess, Eph, Col, Phile, Phil, Laod. Cf. \textit{Marc}. 3.4.2, where Tertullian claims that Marcion has “got hold of” (\textit{nactus}) Galatians. Major dissidents to Harnack’s position were E.C. Blackman, \textit{Marcion and His Influence} (London: SPCK, 1948) and Hans Jonas, \textit{The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity} (2nd ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1963 [1958]), 137-9. Both Blackman and Jonas, while acknowledging some differences with the Gnostics, lumped Marcion together with their wider thought-world. Blackman, \textit{Marcion and His Influence}, 82-7, 103-10, argued that Marcion was not dependent on Paul and that he shared with the Gnostics a metaphysical dualism, a disdain of Old Testament, a docetic Christology, and an acute concern for evil.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Marcion}, 21-4.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Marcion}, 5.
Testament (Tertullian, *Marc. 4.4.1*). Despite this rhetorical back and forth, recent studies have shown that Marcion’s *Apostolikon* (for the most part) represented the common Greek text of an already gathered *Corpus Paulinum* in Rome in the early-second century. His supposed changes were much less numerous than the Church Fathers imagined and many of them can be found throughout the *Vetus Latina* manuscript tradition. That is not to say that he did not delete passages that were positive toward Abraham and Israel or that portrayed Christ as having a share of the creation. But even this limited editorial work was not always consistent (Tertullian, *Marc. 4.43*).

Harnack’s more than half-century clutch on Marcion has been recently challenged by a number of scholars. His claim that Marcion forced the canon-making process upon the proto-orthodox has been largely muted. Marcion may have made the burgeoning Catholic Church more conscious of the canonical process that was already occurring in the early-second century, but he was not the first to draw up the combination of Gospel and Apostle. Marcion was the recipient of this schema.

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101 We only have access to Marcion’s work through Tertullian’s *Adversus Marcionem*, Epiphanius’ *Panarion*, and the *Dialogue of Adamantius*.


Gerhard May, and most recently Sebastian Moll, have also challenged Harnack’s portrayal of Marcion’s theological program.\textsuperscript{104} Aland argues that Marcion was much closer to the Gnostics than Harnack would want to admit. While gnosis, election, allegorical interpretation, and a complicated cosmogony were not primary features of Marcion’s thought, other emphases, including cosmological dualism and a separation between the Jewish and Christian gods were quite consistent with classical “Gnosticism.”\textsuperscript{105} He was neither pure Paulinist (contra Harnack) nor pure Gnostic (contra the Heresiologists). As Kurt Rudolf summarizes, “Marcion’s importance lies in many respects outside Gnosis, but he cannot be understood without it and, therefore,


\textsuperscript{105} Aland, “Marcion: Versuch einer neuen Interpretation,” 429-35.
belongs to its history.”

This particular question, of course, hinges on how broadly one wants to apply the term “Gnostic.” Recent studies on “Gnosticism” by Michael Williams and Karen King have alerted us to the ethical and historical problems of this term, and its cognate, “Gnostics.”

Gerhard May follows Aland and Rudolf, while also emphasizing that Marcion’s unique contributions in early Christianity were his prophetic (ethical) critique of burgeoning Catholicism and his radical dualism at a time when most Roman thinkers, including other Christians, sought philosophical unity. He was no pure Biblical theologian, but, like the “Gnostics,” had philosophical concerns that he brought to Paul’s texts. And contra Harnack, May sets out a course that is cautious with the data, noting both the problems in getting to Marcion’s text through the Church Fathers as well as the

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107 Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”: an Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); King, *What is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Cf. also Bentley Layton, “Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism,” in *The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks* (ed. L.M. White and O.L. Yarborough; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 334-50, for a more constructive approach. I do not think that Williams’ “biblical demiurgical traditions” helps to clarify matters. One could easily include under this term the Gospel of John, Colossians, Philo, much of the Jewish wisdom literature, etc. Further, there is some evidence in both Irenaeus (*Haer*. 1.25.6) and Hippolytus (*Haer*. 5.6) that suggests that several of these groups self-identified as “Gnostics.” In the end, I am more drawn to the projects of Layton and Birger Pearson, *Ancient Gnosticism: Traditions and Literature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), which are good attempts at unity in diversity.


differences among the Church Fathers in their representations of Marcion’s primary theological emphases.  

Sebastian Moll’s recent monograph, *The Arch-Heretic Marcion* (2010), is an attempt to re-envision Marcion in the wake of these studies. Moll argues that Marcion began not with Paul, but with the Old Testament. His “fanatical hatred of the world” led him to the problem of theodicy and the Creator God of the Old Testament.  

Unique among early Christian thinkers, Marcion came to loathe the capricious God that he found there and only subsequently found justification for his feelings in Luke and Paul, whose writings were edited to conform to his reading of the Old Testament. Moll concludes, “Marcion does not understand the Old Testament in the light of the New, he interprets the New Testament in light of the Old.”  

Paul, then, was not the primary lens of Marcion’s theology. Pride of place went, rather, to the Old Testament. 

Many of these more recent studies argue that Harnack’s romantic portrayal of Marcion as a second-century Reformer was too colored by his own historical location in the heart of Protestant Germany in the early-twentieth century.  

That is not to say that we can avoid our own subjectivity as modern interpreters of ancient texts. But our conclusions can always be checked by later generations who are better situated to see our own biases as socially located historians. No one disagrees with Harnack that Marcion 

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was the first known Christian to develop a consistent theological reading of the entire Pauline corpus (sans the Pastorals). But we must admit that his reading was quite tendentious. May concludes:

Similarly, his exegesis is dependent on massive dogmatic presuppositions. One calls him a biblical theologian only inasmuch as for him his scripture canon represents the only standard of faith. He is not one in the sense that he had brought the originality of the “Gospel” and Pauline theology to bear against speculative interpretations. His assault is directed against, as he thought, the Judaistically corrupted proclamation, not against the doctrinal framework of the Gnostics. However, the standard theology of the church was in almost every regard closer to the biblical texts than Marcion’s doctrine was.114

Paul and the “Heretics”: The Valentinians

Valentinus was present in Rome at the same time as Marcion. An Alexandrian Christian, Valentinus became the father of a large and extensive movement of churches that came to threaten proto-orthodox identity.115 According to Clement of Alexandria, the Valentinians claimed a direct line to Paul’s pneumatic teaching through Theudas, disciple of Paul and teacher of Valentinus (Strom. 7.17; cf. also Hippolytus, Haer. 6.35.5). Valentinus and his followers pointed to 1 Corinthians 2.6 (“But we speak wisdom among the mature”), arguing that Paul possessed secret wisdom from God the Father and in turn passed it down to those who were “mature” (Irenaeus, Haer. 3.2.1). This wisdom stood over and against the earthly traditions of the Apostles. Theodotus, a representative of eastern Valentinianism, states (somewhat programmatically):

114 May, “Marcion in Contemporary Views,” 147.

In the type of the Paraclete, Paul became the Apostle of the Resurrection (ὁ Παύλος ἀναστάσεως ἀπόστολος). Immediately after the Lord’s Passion he also was sent to preach. Therefore he preached the Saviour from both points of view: as begotten and passible for the sake of those on the left, because, being able to know him, they are afraid of him in this position, and in spiritual wise from the Holy Spirit and a virgin, as the angels on the right know him (Clement, Exc. 23.2-3).\textsuperscript{116}

Some of the language of the Pauline corpus was fertile ground for the Valentinians and their middle-Platonic thought.\textsuperscript{117} Passages such as Romans 8.3 (“God sent his own son in the \textit{likeness} of human flesh”) and Romans 7.5 (“When we were \textit{in the flesh}, sinful passions, which came about through the Law, worked in our members in order to bear fruit for death”) were particularly important (Tert., Carn. Chr. 16-17; Clem., Exc. 67.1). Most congenial was 1 Corinthians 15.50, of which Irenaeus laments:

\begin{quote}
Among the other truths proclaimed by the apostle, there is also this one, “That flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.” This is the passage which is adduced by all the heretics in support of their folly, with an attempt to annoy us, and to point out that the handiwork of God is not saved (\textit{Haer.} 5.9.1).
\end{quote}

Appeals to these Pauline texts and others by the Valentinians forced the hand of proto-orthodox defenders of the faith. They needed to reclaim these particular Pauline passages for their own side. The second half of this dissertation will explore two of these responses: \textit{3 Corinthians} and Irenaeus’ \textit{Adversus Haereses}.

Thanks to the Nag Hammadi library, we now have, among other things, an extensive hoard of Valentinian primary sources that use and appropriate Pauline material,

\textsuperscript{116} English translation from Robert Pierce Casey, \textit{The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria.} (SD 1; London: Christophers, 1934).

\textsuperscript{117} This is not to say that the Valentinians were in agreement on all matters of philosophy and theology. This was manifestly not the case. Cf. Thomassen, \textit{Spiritual Seed}, 492-4, on the two major schools of Valentinian thought. On the relationship between Valentinianism and middle-Platonism, cf. John M. Dillon, \textit{The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 384-9, and Christoph Marschies’ commentary on the fragments of Valentinus: \textit{Valentinus Gnosticus?}. 

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including the *Apocalypse of Paul* (NHC V, 2) and the *Prayer of Paul the Apostle* (NHC I, 1). A glimpse of this use could already be seen, pre-Nag Hammadi, in Ptolemy (cf. Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.1.1-1.8.5, and Epiphanius, *Pan.* 33.3.1-7.10), Heracleon (cf. Origen,...

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For many scholars, Nag Hammadi offered conclusive proof that the Church Fathers were half-right and half-wrong. The “Gnostics” did use Pauline texts to substantiate their theology, including the pesky 1 Corinthians 15.50. They made use of all of the Pauline epistles except for the Pastorals. But much to the chagrin of the Fathers, their opponents, according to these scholars, appear to have gotten Paul right quite often, particularly with respect to the resurrection (cf. the examples given below).

Space does not permit anywhere close to a full analysis of the Pauline material in the Valentinian texts from Nag Hammadi. One of the most cited examples from the Gospel of Philip will suffice for our purposes. For some scholars, the Gospel of Philip offers a more “faithful” reading of 1 Corinthians 15.50 than does Irenaeus (cf. Chapter Five below):

Certain persons are afraid that they may arise (from the dead) naked: therefore they want to arise in the flesh. And they do not know that those who wear the flesh are the ones who are naked. Those who [...] to divest themselves are not naked. “Flesh [and blood will not] inherit the kingdom [of god].” What is this flesh that will not inherit it? The one that we are wearing. (Gos. Phil. 56.26-57.1).

While 1 Corinthians 15.50 appears only here as a full citation in the Nag Hammadi texts, the language of 1 Corinthians 15.35-58 permeates several others and we should not discount the testimonies of Irenaeus or Tertullian that this was a particularly important

119 Ptolemy’s cosmogony, according to Irenaeus, was supported by references to Rom, 1 Cor, Gal, Eph, and Col. Ptolemy’s Epistle to Flora contains direct citations of “the Apostle Paul” (Rom 7.12; 1 Cor 5.7; Eph 2.15). Heracleon cites Rom 12.1 from “the Apostle” and alludes to several other Pauline texts, including Rom 13.1-4 and 1 Cor 15.53-4. In Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto, Paul is “the Apostle” (22.1; 67.1; 85.3) as well as “the Apostle of the resurrection” (23.2). Pauline texts are cited and alluded to throughout Theodotus (Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 236-41). There might also be a few echoes of Pauline language in the fragments of Valentinus: cf. Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 144-6.

120 Story, “The Valentinian (Gnostic) Use of the Letters of Paul,” 295.

121 This kind of analysis can be found in the works listed in n. 118 above.
text amongst their perceived opponents. Paul was, according to Theodotus, “the Apostle of the Resurrection” (Clement, Exc. 23, 2-3). We possess only a small percentage of “heretical” texts from antiquity, and the use of this verse in literary texts is only one of the ways Irenaeus would have encountered his opposition’s invocation of 1 Corinthians 15.50.

Paul’s insistence in 1 Corinthians 15.44 that the resurrection body will be a “spiritual body” (σῶµα πνευµατικόν), when combined with 1 Corinthians 15.50 and the surrounding dichotomies of “perishable/imperishable” (1 Cor 15.42, 50, 52-54), “mortal/immortal” (1 Cor 15.53-4), and “earthly/heavenly” (1 Cor 15.47-9), caused many scholars to anoint the Valentinians, with their emphasis on a spiritual resurrection, as the true inheritors of Pauline eschatology. A few representative statements concerning the aforementioned passage from the Gospel of Philip will suffice:

From the passage as a whole it would appear that he looked for a resurrection of the body, after which the Gnostic would strip off the garment of the flesh in order to be clothed upon with his heavenly robe. Which is a sufficiently faithful reproduction of the Pauline doctrine to explain why in the second century the Church departed from Paul and emphasized, with such writers as Justin and Tertullian, the resurrection of the flesh. Paul’s teaching lent itself too readily to adaptation in a Gnostic interest.

122 Cf. for example allusions to 1 Cor 15.53-4 in Treat. Res. 45.14-18; 45.39-46.2 and Gos. Truth 20.30-32; 25.15-19. Cf. also Heracleon, fr. 40, and Theodotus, Exc. 80.3. The latter uses language from 1 Cor 15.49. A full analysis of 1 Cor 15.50 in “Gnostic” literature can be found in Mark J. Olson, Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God: The Debate about 1 Corinthians 15:50 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Biblical Pr, 1995). Cf. also Ysabel de Andia, “La Résurrection de la Chair Selon les Valentiniens et Irénée de Lyon,” Quatres Fleuves 15/16 (1982): 59-70.

123 Robert McL. Wilson, “The New Testament in the Nag Hammadi Gospel of Philip,” 294. Cf. also his The Gospel of Philip (New York: Harper, 1962), 12: “It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that his discussion of the resurrection of the flesh (23), if the interpretation suggested in the notes is correct, reflects so accurately the Pauline doctrine.”
We contend that Philip reflects a dimension of realized eschatology through his emphasis on the necessity for attaining the resurrection in this life. This is not unlike Paul’s idea of the Christian ‘risen with Christ.’

Similar statements have been made about the use of Paul in other Valentinian texts:

**On the Gospel of Truth**

Ce tableau laisse voir combien profonde est l’influence paulinienne sur l’Évangile de Vérité. La réciprocité de la connaissance de Dieu et des élus . . . est une doctrine typiquement paulinienne.

**On the Treatise on the Resurrection**

Now, in fact, this interpretation of the form of the resurrection body seems a more faithful interpretation of the Pauline conception of such a body than does the interpretation of many of the early Heresiologists.

Moreover, the text agrees with what 1 Cor 15:39 points out, namely that not all flesh is the same flesh, and it is in line with 15:40, concerning the different kinds of bodies. From this, *Treat. Res.* seems to draw the conclusion that not only is there a flesh that is not destined for salvation, but there is also a different kind of flesh which indeed is, and which the text defines in conscious agreement with 1 Cor 15:44, while also drawing crucially on other Pauline texts, most notably 2 Corinthians and Romans.

Dissenting voices to these could be heard all along the way in the work of Theodor Zahn, Georg Henrici, Carola Barth, and Geoffrey Story, who each argued that the Valentinians were not close readers of Paul. Rather, like their proto-orthodox counterparts, they brought their philosophy and mythology to the New Testament texts. But these studies were too often swept away with a simple rhetorical move: to

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127 Lundhaug, “Conceptualizations of Death and Transformation,” 204-5.
agree with the estimation of the Church Fathers was to be complicit with their nasty polemic, to “have adopted from them certain value judgments and interpretations of the gnostic material.”

But, of course, noticing similarity of argument goes nowhere in actually denying the force of that argument. A cursory look at the data shows that Valentinian interpretations of Paul, aside from the occasional literalistic interpretation, as in the case of 1 Corinthians 15.50, were largely allegorical, like the rest of their Scriptural exegesis. This allowed them, possibly in reaction to Marcion, to preserve the Old Testament as a witness to spiritual truth. Ptolemy’s Epistle to Flora provides the most poignant description of Valentinian Scriptural hermeneutics:

Now, once the truth had been manifested, the referent of all these ordinances [the Jewish Law] was changed, inasmuch as they are images and allegories. As to their meaning in the visible realm and their physical accomplishment they were abolished; but as to their spiritual meaning they were elevated, with the words remaining the same but the subject matter being altered (Epiphanius, Pan. 33.5.9).

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Interpretation des NT in der Valentinianischen Gnosis (TUGAL 37, 3; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911), 44; Story, “The Valentinian (Gnostic) Use of the Letters of Paul,” 294, 316-225.


131 On Valentinianism as a response to Marcionism, cf. Christoph Markschies, “Die valentinische Gnosis und Marcion -- einige neue Perspektiven,” in Marcion und seine kirchengeschichtliche Wirkung, 159-76. Tertullian, Praescr. 38, comments on the differences between Marcionite and Valentinian approaches to Scripture: “One man perverts the Scriptures with his hand, another their meaning by his exposition. For although Valentinus seems to use the entire volume, he has none the less laid violent hands on the truth only with a more cunning mind and skill than Marcion. Marcion expressly and openly used the knife, not the pen, since he made such an excision of the Scriptures as suited his own subject-matter. Valentinus, however, abstained from such excision, because he did not invent Scriptures to square with his own subject-matter, but adapted his matter to the Scriptures; and yet he took away more, and added more, by removing the proper meaning of every particular word, and adding fantastic arrangements of things which have no real existence.” (ANF 3:262).

132 Translation from Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 312.
Ptolemy then substantiates this hermeneutic with an allusion to Romans 2.29, “And he
[the savior] wished us to perform circumcision, but not circumcision of the bodily
foreskin, rather of the spiritual heart” (33.5.11), and a citation of 1 Corinthians 5.7:
“Christ our Passover has been slain” (33.5.14).

Narrative Iconoclasm – The Deconstructive Work of Lindemann, Dassmann, Rensberger
and Penny

The Pauline Captivity narrative, made influential by Harnack, Bauer, and
Campenhausen, and undergirded by early work on the Nag Hammadi literature, was
finally challenged head-on by the monographs of Andreas Lindemann and Ernst
Dassmann, as well as the dissertations of David Rensberger and Donald Penny. Each of
these works, appearing in a three-year window between 1979 and 1981, de-centered the
narrative from a different angle. Covering much of the same material, but with unique
emphases, their combined weight reset the course for studies on the reception-history of
Paul in the second century.

Andreas Lindemann’s Paulus im ältesten Christentum (1979) is the most widely
recognized of the four works. A near comprehensive study of Paul in the late-first to
mid-second centuries, Lindemann’s work challenges the Pauline Captivity narrative of
Harnack by exploring a number of indications that Paul was revered by proto-orthodox
groups in the second century and by devaluing his role among “Gnostics.” He

133 For a condensed version of Lindemann’s tome, cf. his “Der Apostel Paulus im 2 Jahrhundert,” in The
zu Paulus und zum frühen Paulusverständnis (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999).

134 Lindemann, Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 10, claims to be building here on the suggestions of Walter
Schmithals, Das kirchliche Apostelamt: Eine historische Untersuchungen (FRLANT 19; Göttingen:
examines the deutero-Pauline literature, Acts, the canonical Gospels, the “Catholic”
Epistles, the apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, the Apostolic Fathers, Christian
Gnosticism, the Apologists, anti-Pauline Jewish Christianity, the *Epistula Apostolorum*
and Marcion. 135 From a methodological standpoint, as noted in Chapter One, Lindemann
is concerned both with “Das Bild des Apostels” as well as the “Aufnahme und
Verarbeitung paulinischer Theologie.” Lindemann is cautious in assigning dependence
on Paul unless a citation formula is present, although allusions to Pauline material can be
reasonably assumed when the content and wording is Pauline and cannot be assigned to
wider Christian tradition. The certainty of an allusion increases if knowledge of Pauline
letters can be shown elsewhere in a given author. 136

Lindemann finds early and extensive interest in Paul among the proto-orthodox.
The existence of a wide-ranging pseudo-Pauline literature in combination with the
redaction (2 Cor), collection, and circulation of Pauline letters toward the end of the first
century are sufficient to establish continued proto-orthodox attention to Paul into the
second century. 137 Several of the “Apostolic Fathers” invoke both Paul’s image as well

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135 Some of the texts that he explores go past Marcion, chronologically. The title is a misnomer.

136 *Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 17-18.

137 *Paulus im ältesten Christentum*, 20-35. Lindemann thinks that the process of redaction and collection
was complex, rejecting suggestions that there was a single collector/redactor (contra Schmithals) in a single
locale (Ephesus = Goodspeed; Corinth = Zahn and Harnack). He also argues that the collection process
was accompanied by an elevation of the letters as religiously authoritative texts. The bibliography on the
collection of the Pauline letter corpus is voluminous. For the past thirty-five years, cf. Harry Y. Gamble,
in den neutestamentlichen Spätschriften* (ed. by K. Kertelge; QD 89; Freiburg: Herder, 1981), 11-
24; E.H. Lovering, Jr., “The Collection, Redaction, and Early Circulation of the Corpus Paulinum,” (Ph.D.
diss., Southern Methodist University, 1988); David Trobisch, *Die Entstehung der Paulusbüchervereinigung:
Studien zu den Anfängen christlicher Publizistik* (Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1989); *Paul’s Letter*
as his letters.\textsuperscript{138} The author of \textit{1 Clement} certainly knew 1 Corinthians and Romans.\textsuperscript{139}
Ignatius knew 1 Corinthians, Ephesians, and possibly other Pauline letters.\textsuperscript{140} Polycarp, like \textit{1 Clement} and Ignatius, drew freely on Paul whenever he felt the need.\textsuperscript{141} The use of Paul by these authors was the initial phase of a trend whereby Paul would end up becoming the most frequently cited early Christian authority among second-century writers. He was always a “fundamentaler Bestandteil ihrer eigenen Tradition.”\textsuperscript{142} While justification by faith alone was absent from the proto-orthodox reception of Paul in the second century, more than a few authors were interested in aspects of his theology, even if they misunderstood it (cf. Aland above).\textsuperscript{143} Lindemann further argues that, at least among the proto-orthodox, Paul’s image retained a large degree of continuity from the early pseudo-Pauline literature to the mid-second century. Paul was, throughout, the Apostle to the Gentiles, the founder of churches and the opponent of heresy.\textsuperscript{144}

Those who did not invoke Paul had other grounds besides embarrassment over the Apostle: the geography of a particular writer; the genre of a particular writing; or the lack

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 177-99. This was also the conclusion of A.J. Carlyle, \textit{The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers}, 37-55, as well as most other commentators, including Andrew F. Gregory, “\textit{1 Clement} and the Writings that Later formed the New Testament,” 154.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 199-221.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 87-91, 221-32. Cf. also Lindemann, “Paul’s Influence on ‘Clement’ and Ignatius,” 24.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 400.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 401-2.

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Paulus im ältesten Christentum}, 112, 401.
of surviving evidence.\textsuperscript{145} Outside of the Epistle of James and some later pockets of marginal Jewish-Christian groups, no evidence exists for a widespread anti-Pauline movement.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, the Gnostic texts from Nag Hammadi show no real predilection for Paul over other Christian authorities. His theology was not “konstitutiv” for the Valentinians.\textsuperscript{147} Ptolemy, for instance, exhibits only a superficial use of Paul’s letters.\textsuperscript{148}

Lindemann’s work, which deserves much more space than I have given it here, was groundbreaking for at least two reasons. First, he convincingly showed the varieties of engagement with the Pauline tradition in both proto-orthodox as well as Marcionite and “Gnostic” forms of early Christianity. There was a robust Pauline influence among the proto-orthodox leading up to the mid-second century. While that influence might not have looked like what modern Protestant scholars have identified as the heart of Pauline theology, there is no evidence for a shying away from either Pauline literature or thought within burgeoning proto-orthodox circles.\textsuperscript{149} Furthermore, the “heretical” use of Paul is much less impressive than what supporters of the Pauline Captivity narrative had made it. Marcion, for instance, played little to no role in the Church’s decision to canonize Paul. Second, Lindemann’s methodology of outlining both the production of Pauline images as

\ \textsuperscript{145} Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 402.

\textsuperscript{146} Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 101-9, 367-71.

\textsuperscript{147} Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 300.

\textsuperscript{148} Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 304-5.

\textsuperscript{149} Cf. also the essays in Karl Kertelge, ed., Paulus in den neutestamentlichen Spätschriften: zur Paulusrezeption im Neuen Testament (1981), which trace the reception of Paul in the canonical pseudo-Pauline literature as well as Acts, self-consciously deconstructing the priority of justification by faith in the evaluation of the early Pauline tradition.
well as invocations of Pauline theology laid the groundwork for a near cottage-industry of articles and monographs on the “Paulusbild” of particular texts.\textsuperscript{150}

David Rensberger’s dissertation, “As the Apostle Teaches: The Development of the Use of Paul’s Letters in Second-Century Christianity” (Yale, 1981), was completed on the heels of Lindemann’s monograph. It was never published, despite the fact that it has become the standard English-language resource for the use of Paul’s letters in the second century. Rensberger self-consciously sets out to demolish the Pauline Captivity narrative through a rigorous examination of the full range of use of Pauline letters during this period.\textsuperscript{151} He is particularly concerned with understanding Justin’s Pauline silence, inasmuch as this served as the lynchpin for the Pauline Captivity narrative. His work differs from Lindemann’s on several counts. First, Rensberger pushes past Marcion to the end of the second century, including such figures as Irenaeus and Theophilus, as well as martyrological texts. It is more comprehensive, then, of the second century. Second, due to the dissertation genre, Rensberger provides a lengthy discussion (50 pages) of the Pauline Captivity narrative. Third, Rensberger deals only with the use of Pauline letters in the second century, deciding that concerns over Paul’s image were “of so little moment to most second-century writers that its usefulness is difficult to see.”\textsuperscript{152} This is the major weakness of the work, as I will suggest below. Fourth, Rensberger, like Aland, denies

\textsuperscript{150} I will discuss this more in the next two sections of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{151} Rensberger’s data comes from the \textit{Biblia Patristica}, though he has “carefully sifted” out potential allusions that are not the “most certain,” including general “Christological formulae, metaphors (the church as body; the believer as temple), bits of liturgy and song, and the like, which occur in Paul but may not have been his creations, or could have been created again independently of him, or even if original only with him could have passed readily into common tradition, as so in any case can have been learned by later writers through channels other than direct acquaintance with his letters.” (“As the Apostle Teaches,” 59-60).

\textsuperscript{152} “As the Apostle Teaches,” 56.
the importance of questions like who “rightly understood” Paul’s theology in the second century. He is concerned with the reception of Paul’s letters, not the influence of his theology, which was a major preoccupation for Lindemann.

Like Lindemann, Rensberger attacks the Pauline Captivity narrative from several angles. First, he exposes the data used to support the narrative, showing how the latter is over-argued from the paucity of available texts. The only obvious opposition to Paul in the second century comes from certain strains of Jewish Christianity. There are a number of better explanations for why some second-century authors avoided Paul’s letters than the assumption of either an intentional silence in light of opposition usage or an outright disavowal of the Apostle. The dearth of direct references to Pauline letters in the early-to-mid second century is attributable to the fact that Paul’s letters had not yet attained the necessary authority. But the same was also true of other literature bearing the apostolic stamp of Peter, James and John. Paul was only one of several potential sources of Christian teaching in this early period. Likewise, silence does not mean rejection of a particular apostle. Other considerations should also be taken into account, including genre. Apocryphal gospels and other apostolic apocrypha make very little use of Paul’s letters, regardless of ideological bent. Apologies, which are directed

153 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 57.
154 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 362.
155 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 331.
156 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 344.
157 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 332.
158 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 333, 338.
toward outsiders, never invoke the name of Paul. Yet several of the Apologists also wrote texts to insiders. We find Tatian freely using Pauline literature among believers. Rensberger finds that these intra-community texts, including “commentaries, doctrinal treatises, and polemical tracts” evidence much earlier and wider engagements with Paul, regardless of ideology. Furthermore, from an argumentative standpoint, the Dialogue with Trypho does not need Paul’s authority; in fact, to invoke him might have been counterproductive. Justin only needs the Jewish Scriptures and the words of Jesus (mediated through his apostles) to argue his point.

Second, based on the Nag Hammadi literature, Rensberger finds no special regard for Paul above other early apostolic figures or literature in either classical Gnosticism or Valentinianism. Rensberger’s conclusion here (like Lindemann’s) has been thoroughly substantiated by Jacqueline Williams with respect to the Gospel of Truth, where only one-third of the seventy-three potential allusions to texts that would become part of the New Testament come from the Pauline letters. Furthermore, just as many “Gnostic” texts “avoid” Paul as those from “proto-orthodox” circles. Tertullian’s characterization of Paul as the “apostle of the heretics” (Marc. 3.5.4) seems to go unsupported from the available literature of such groups, although we should be cautious here, given what little remains we do have of “heretical” literature. Only Marcion seems

159 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 332-6. Rensberger also notes that the apologies of Tatian and Theophilus do not even mention Christ. This certainly does not constitute an antagonism toward Christ.

160 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 358.

161 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 331, 361.

162 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 359-75. Cf. also Lindemann, Paulus im ältesten Christentum, 341-3.

163 Williams, Biblical Interpretation, 186-7.

164 “As the Apostle Teaches,” 332.
to have had a particular affinity for Paul.\textsuperscript{165} While not wanting to get into arguments over “who got Paul right,” Rensberger is deeply suspicious of those who vaunt the Valentinians as the true inheritors of Pauline theology:

Paul was, for these purposes, ‘the Apostle,’ but he was never the only Apostle. The effort to be apostolic took in more than him. It led to the making of myth in the light of Jesus’ and the Apostles’ language, and to the reading of apostolic books in the light of myth. Yet the myths and the ideas behind them continue to draw their basic impulse from other sources, and were turned in no fundamentally new directions by apostolic, including Pauline, thought.\textsuperscript{166}

Rensberger’s conclusions here are similar to Zahn, Henrici, Barth, Story, and Lindemann, and have been largely corroborated by a number of more recent studies.\textsuperscript{167}

Third, Rensberger meticulously explores the varieties of engagement with Paul’s letters in the Apostolic Fathers (\textit{1 Clement}, Ignatius and Polycarp), Pauline pseudepigrapha (the Pastorals and \textit{3 Corinthians}), the apocryphal Acts, apologetic literature (from Aristides to the \textit{Epistle to Diognetus}), Gnostic and Valentinian writers (from Basilides to the Valentinian school), Marcion, martyrlogical literature (from Lyons and Vienne as well as the \textit{Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs}), encratite sources (Tatian and Julius Cassianus), Irenaean sources (his unnamed Presbyter), and finally Irenaeus. He chronicles the variety of engagements with Paul in the second century and argues that

\textsuperscript{165} “As the Apostle Teaches,” 337, 349.

\textsuperscript{166} “As the Apostle Teaches,” 250. Emphasis his. Cf. his negative conclusions on the relationship between Paul and the \textit{Gospel of Truth} (146-8), Ptolemy (225-31), and the \textit{Treatise on the Resurrection} (245-6).

where reactions to an opponent’s use of Paul can be sensed, the response was always alternative exegesis, not avoidance.¹⁶⁸

Ernst Dassmann’s Der Stachel im Fleisch: Paulus in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Irenäus (1979), published the same year as Lindemann’s monograph, covers much of the same ground as Lindemann and Rensberger (Acts, pseudo-Pauline literature, 1 Peter, Hebrews, Apostolic Fathers, anti-Pauline literature, Marcion, the Apologists, Acts of Paul, Melito and Irenaeus), but is more concerned with modern theological norms than either Lindemann or Rensberger. Dassmann asks about the weight that should be given to Pauline theology in the modern church (in relationship to other early Christian authorities) and uses the examination of Paul’s early influence in the burgeoning Catholic Church as a way of helping illustrate his thesis that while Paul was an important ground for Christian theology in the first two Christian centuries, he was never the only ground and most often only one of a number of authoritative voices. The Church has always decided what from Paul was important at a given time, though his theologia crucis has served as a constant “Stachel im Fleisch” for the Church from its inception.¹⁶⁹

Dassmann, like Lindemann and Rensberger, subverts the Pauline Captivity narrative by showing how the claims of its proponents were over-inflated, particularly with respect to the “heretics.”¹⁷⁰ Johannine rather than Pauline traditions were most important in shaping Gnostic thought.¹⁷¹ On the other hand, proto-orthodox writers like Polycarp and Melito were steeped in Paul’s Corinthian correspondence and faithfully

¹⁶⁸ “As the Apostle Teaches,” 350, 363.
¹⁶⁹ Der Stachel im Fleisch, 1-21, 316-20.
¹⁷⁰ Der Stachel im Fleisch, 176-244.
¹⁷¹ Der Stachel im Fleisch, 199.
represented the Apostle.\textsuperscript{172} Both the person and work of Paul were recognized by a large variety of writers and genres.\textsuperscript{173} There was never a strong anti-Pauline stream of early Christianity. The Epistle of James was not written against Paul, but against a libertine misunderstanding of him. The \textit{Pseudo-Clementines} and the Ebionite Gospel do not represent groups that were still part of the mainstream Church.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, Dassmann (like Barrett and Lindemann) posits large degrees of continuity between first- and second-century proto-orthodox appropriations of Paul; between Acts, the pseudo-Pauline literature, Polycarp and Irenaeus.\textsuperscript{175}

Donald Penny’s unpublished dissertation, “The Pseudo-Pauline Letters of the First Two Centuries” (Emory, 1979), the least read of the four works summarized here, was completed in the same year that Lindemann and Dassmann published their monographs. Penny’s work was the first comprehensive post-Spreyer/Brox appraisal of Pauline pseudepigraphy in early Christianity.\textsuperscript{176} It addresses the Pastoral Epistles, II

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Der Stachel im Fleisch}, 149-58; 286-92.

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Der Stachel im Fleisch}, 316.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Der Stachel im Fleisch}, 108-25.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Der Stachel im Fleisch}, 316-17.

Thessalonians, Ephesians, *3 Corinthians*, and *Laodiceans.*\textsuperscript{177} Drawing from Wolfgang Speyer and Norbert Brox, Penny denies that pseudepigraphy was a generally accepted practice in antiquity and that Christian texts were only devalued based on content and not authorship (contra Arnold Meyer).\textsuperscript{178} With Brox he argues that early Christians were quite concerned with forgery (2 Thess. 2:2; Rev. 22:18-19) and with Speyer he asserts that there was a robust concept of intellectual property in antiquity, along with a developed vocabulary for acts of forgery. Distinctions, however, can be made between pseudonymous literature whose guise was adopted for purely literary reasons (speeches in histories, school exercises, etc.) and those whose guise served extra-literary purposes (most Christian pseudepigraphy).\textsuperscript{179} With respect to motives, Penny concludes:

> Pseudepigraphers knew quite well what they were doing, that it was not publicly acceptable, and that their procedure must be concealed. When they nevertheless proceeded, good reasons must have motivated them. Although occasionally loyalty to a school tradition or the consciousness of indebtedness to a teacher may have inspired a purely innocent pseudonymity, more general was the need to borrow authority for one’s work by adopting the great names of the past.\textsuperscript{180}

Penny’s dissertation is important for our concerns because of his engagement with the larger question of Paul’s legacy into the second century. In particular, Penny is concerned with the variety of developing “tendentious images of Paul.”\textsuperscript{181} Like Lindemann, and unlike Rensberger, Penny sees these divergent images of the Apostle

\textsuperscript{177} Colossians is relegated to a short appendix because Penny believes it was authored by Paul. In the appendix he explores how the letter would be read if pseudepigraphical.


\textsuperscript{179} “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 34-46.

\textsuperscript{180} “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 45-6.

\textsuperscript{181} “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 2.
serving as ciphers for a variety of second-century theological positions. They develop, then, in the midst of conflict and competition in early Christianity, with each side trying to wrest the Pauline tradition toward their own side. Each attempt to reclaim the Apostle “preserves something of the genuine Paul and distorts him, with the result that the Pauline heritage is fragmented.” Pauline pseudepigraphy, inasmuch as it was intentionally deceptive (it had extra-literary purposes), was part of this process.

Eschewing several of the dominant narratives concerning the fate of Paul after Paul (Goodspeed’s “Pauline Eclipse,” Conzelmann’s “Pauline School,” and Bauer’s “Pauline Captivity”), Penny settles on a narrative of “Pauline Fragmentation,” whereby Paul’s authority was invoked by various Christian groups from the beginning and trajectories of Pauline tradition developed around theological concerns that were in constant tension with one another.

The remainder of his dissertation explores the pseudepigraphical techniques and motivations of the various would-be Pauline letters, as well as the portrayal of Paul that each produces. Penny draws the following conclusions:

1) “The pseudo-Pauline letters vary widely in their use of the genuine letters known to them.”

2) “All of the pseudo-Pauline letters clearly make use of various literary devices designed to insure (sic) their being read as genuine.”

3) “Each of the letters presents a somewhat different image of Paul, shaped by its own particular concerns.”

4) “Each of the letters has a different interpretation of Paul’s theology, corresponding to its own interests.”

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182 “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 5.
184 “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 8-16.
5) “Within each of the letters can be discerned conflicts concerning Paul and the proper interpretation of his thought.”

6) “The pseudo-Pauline letters are polemical tools designed to engage in theological debates.”

7) “These letters must be understood within the context of the diverse views of Paul within early Christianity.”

8) “Those hypotheses (explicit or implicit) which assume a more or less unified ‘deutero-Pauline school’ as responsible for the pseudo-Pauline letters, or which propose other explanations of their pseudonymity on the basis of an innocent deference to the source of the authors’ ideas, must fall out of consideration as unwarranted by the evidence.”185

By the end of the 1980’s, thanks to these four works, the Pauline Captivity narrative had been largely displaced with another story, a different landscape portrait, an alternative rhetoric about Paul in the second century. To use the language of Penny, a narrative of “Pauline Fragmentation” was developing, which saw both Paul’s image (through narrative characterizations) as well as the use of Pauline letters moving out in different directions among a variety of often competing Christian communities, none of which had a monopoly on Paul. Rensberger’s dissertation, while the most complete of the four works with regard to the number and variety of second-century texts that he addresses, unfortunately did not address developing images of Paul. As I will argue in the remaining chapters of this dissertation, Pauline images and the interpretation of Pauline texts are intimately bound up with one another. This basic position can already been seen in Barrett and Schenke and was to a large degree teased out in Lindemann and Penny.

In the wake of this literature, the Southern Methodist University conference entitled “Paul and the Legacies of Paul” (1987) met to consolidate and build on the post-

Lindemann and Dassmann foundation, particularly as it related to various proto-orthodox groups and texts.\textsuperscript{186} The conference’s conveners sought to further destroy the “distressingly stereotyped pattern” of the Pauline Captivity narrative among modern Protestant scholarship.\textsuperscript{187} In the wake of Lindemann and Dassmann, we “must be willing to acknowledge both that there may be other ways to construe Paul and that there may be other ways to interpret the patristic evidence.”\textsuperscript{188} Conference essays ranged, chronologically, from Acts to Augustine; geographically, from east to west; substantively, from the use of Pauline texts to the variety of developing Pauline images.\textsuperscript{189} The conference now possesses symbolic value as the primary signal that the study of Paul in early Christianity had undergone a seismic shift in the wake of the four studies outlined above.

**Lingering Remnants of the Pauline Captivity Narrative**

Despite this shift, the Pauline Captivity narrative continues to live on in a few places. Calvin Roetzel, in a short essay for the *Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, finds a certain “avoidance of Paul” among some second-century Christians, while Marcion and Valentinus “rescue Paul from obscurity.”\textsuperscript{190} Of course, even Roetzel himself confesses in

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\textsuperscript{186} Revised conference papers were published in *Paul and the Legacies of Paul* (1990). Both Lindemann and Dassmann were contributors to this conference and its published volume.

\textsuperscript{187} *Paul and the Legacies of Paul*, xiii.

\textsuperscript{188} *Paul and the Legacies of Paul*, xiv.

\textsuperscript{189} Several of the more important essays for our purposes will be discussed in the remainder of this dissertation.

an endnote that “Admittedly, our knowledge about Papias is scanty.”\textsuperscript{191} The paucity of data does not prevent him, however, from issuing a rather confidently stated narrative of Pauline Captivity during the early- to mid-second century.

Roetzel served as a reader for Jason M. Scarborough’s 2007 dissertation, which also preserves much of the Harnack/Bauer/Campenhausen narrative. For Scarborough, Marcionite and Gnostic appropriations of Paul forced Irenaeus to “bring[s] the Pauline Epistles back into the mainstream of Christian thought.”\textsuperscript{192} Before Irenaeus, “Paul’s theology was all but absent from the writings of the apostolic period” and the threat of Marcion cast a “crisis of apostolic authority that dominated the latter half of the second century, and complicated Paul’s inclusion in the canon.”\textsuperscript{193} Ptolemy was “distinctly influenced by Paul” while “Pauline theology forms much of the substructure of Heracleon’s thought.”\textsuperscript{194}

Scarborough traces the use of Paul from Marcion, through the Valentinians, on to Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Origen. He completely ignores the use of Paul in the Apostolic Fathers, 2 Peter, and the \textit{Acts of Paul}, making his aforementioned statements foregone conclusions. The dissertation reads like a disjointed description of individual figures and their texts. The work is long on background information and woefully short on actual analysis of instances where Paul is invoked in the second century. Scarborough

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\textsuperscript{191} Roetzel, “Paul in the Second Century,” 240, n. 7.
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\textsuperscript{192} “The Making of an Apostle: Second and Third Century Interpretations of the Writings of Paul” (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, 2007), i.
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\textsuperscript{193} “Making of an Apostle,” 277 and 71. Cf. also 85 on Justin.
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\textsuperscript{194} “Making of an Apostle,” 131, 136.
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is correct, however, in recognizing that Irenaeus’ accusation that heretics had
misinterpreted Paul is the same sort of apologetic move made by nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century Protestant scholars; only that in the latter case it was the medieval and
modern Catholic Church that had corrupted Paul. Augustine and, subsequently, Luther
(for Protestant scholars) were able to see through to the theological core of the “real”
Paul.\(^{195}\)

Scarborough’s project, while wanting to steer around the Protestant bias against
burgeoning Catholic receptions of Paul, ends up continuing to play F.C. Baur’s game.
This game dogmatically asserts that we can know the “real” Paul as over and against the
Paul of tradition and asks questions like, “At the same time we are left with a more
fundamental question, that is, were the efforts of the early Fathers at providing a more
consistent Pauline theology faithful to the spirit of the authentic letters?”\(^{196}\) It still
conceives of the historical task in rather black-and-white categories: “Clearly one of these
groups [the “early church” and the “Gnostics”] erred in their interpretation of the
Apostle.”\(^{197}\) In the end, the only data set with which Scarborough is really concerned is
the so-called “authentic” Pauline Epistles. While positing a “Pauline school,” he ends up
ignoring it as a substantial Pauline movement in the “apostolic era.” He further faults
Irenaeus for using Acts as a source of Pauline thought, as if Irenaeus was somehow
corrupting the “real” Paul by catholicizing and de-eschatologizing him.\(^{198}\) But even
Scarborough himself admits that Paul’s eschatology was a work in progress – something

\(^{195}\) “Making of an Apostle,” 14.

\(^{196}\) “Making of an Apostle,” v. At a later point in the dissertation he says that Irenaeus “moves away from
the theology of the authentic letters” (208).

\(^{197}\) “Making of an Apostle,” 17.

\(^{198}\) “Making of an Apostle,” 175.
that shifted during his own ministry, leading to a “far from consistent” set of statements in his own letters. \(^{199}\) How, then, can Irenaeus be solely responsible for denuding Paul of his imminent eschatology? \(^{200}\)

**Competing “Pauls”**

Given the rhetoric over the “real” Paul found in 2 Peter, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and the *Gospel of Philip* (cf. Chapter One), it is hard to deny that Paul and his texts were contested entities in the second century. Two particular studies, written in the midst of the narrative turn from Pauline Captivity to Pauline Fragmentation, highlighted the kinds of tension that developed over the Apostle’s legacy in the second century. Weaving

\(^{199}\) “Making of an Apostle,” 15.

\(^{200}\) Equally problematic, but for other reasons, is the dissertation of David H. Warren (“The Text of the Apostle in the Second Century: A Contribution to the History of Its Reception”), who explores the use of Pauline texts in seven second-century writers: *1 Clement*, Ignatius, Polycarp, Aristides, Marcion, Justin and Irenaeus. Warren compares the rather elaborate concern in Irenaeus for citing Paul’s letters, including numerous citation formulae and arguments over the exact wording of Pauline texts, with the allusiveness with which these same texts are employed in the earlier authors. Ironically, Warren sees Marcion as a precursor to Irenaeus’ concern. The commonality between these two opponents is their lack of experience of the gift of prophecy (321-9). While the other authors reviewed by Warren each claim divine inspiration and do not need to cite Paul directly as an authority for their position, the Apostle’s texts came to serve as the authority base for both Marcion and Irenaeus. Warren discounts several other explanations of the data: 1) that Pauline allusions are the result of citing texts from memory; 2) the Pauline letters were not yet viewed as Scripture by these authors; and 3) increasing sophistication in the citation of Scripture, spurred on by Ptolemy and the Valentinians, who used the exact words of texts as jumping off points for allegorical exegesis (3-11). Warren’s dissertation is useful for its collection of Pauline allusions and citations in the seven texts that he explores. He does convincingly argue that Justin knew the Pauline Epistles and that his use of the letters is comparable to Aristides’ prior use of Romans. This is important because it allows him to deny that the lack of references to Paul in Justin has anything to do with a reaction to Marcion (286-7). On the other hand, one wonders whether Warren has undersold the data leading up to Irenaeus. He concedes that Polycarp directly cites from Pauline letters four times (107). He confesses that both Ptolemy and Marcion are concerned for the exact wording of specific Pauline texts. Rensberger’s data reveals a number of other second century authors either pre-dating or contemporaneous with Irenaeus who make explicit citation of Paul and are concerned for the interpretation of his texts: Basilides; Isidore; Epiphanes; Theodotus; Tatian; Julius Cassianus; several Irenaeans, including the unnamed Presbyter; and Theophilus (“As the Apostle Teaches,” 345-54). These Pauline citations occur in a variety of contexts, including the substantiation of doctrine, and in a variety of kinds of Christian thinkers. It would seem, then, that Irenaeus only accentuates a rhetorical practice that had been in use for quite some time. And I doubt that any of the “Gnostic” thinkers listed above would shy away from claiming divine inspiration for their own work.
together texts from Nag Hammadi with evidence from the Fathers, Elaine Pagels (The Gnostic Paul, 1975) argued that two divergent readings of Paul developed in the second century: one read Paul antignostically (cf. Irenaeus), while the other read him gnostically (cf. the Valentinians, in particular).\textsuperscript{201} “Gnostic” exegesis of Paul forced a response from his “anti-Gnostic” readers. Perhaps it was the “Gnostic” reading of Paul that engendered the “anti-Gnostic” reading in the first place. One of the other driving theses behind the book is that the historical Paul’s opponents in the Corinthian Correspondence, for instance, could not have been Gnostics since the Gnostics were his later champions (contra Schmithals).\textsuperscript{202} Given the creativity of the Valentinian use of the apostolic literature, her conclusion here seems hasty. Valentinians merely needed helpful language in the Pauline epistles (regardless of whom it was originally directed at) to undergird their myth. Pagels’ study has also been maligned both for its fanciful readings of Paul, many of which actually do not appear in the primary sources that she references, and for its lack of nuance in distinguishing between Valentinian schools.\textsuperscript{203}

But history-telling requires imagination. The historian, out of necessity, must fill in the large gaps between small shreds of evidence. Pagels has helped us envision what a consistent Valentinian reading of Paul might look like. She has also highlighted the responsiveness of different Christian groups to each others’ readings of Paul. The Valentinians took up Paul’s texts, recognizing that they could be read one way (dealing with Jews and Gentiles), and chose to read them another (as referring to psychics and pneumatics). The pre-Gnostic Paul became the Gnostic Paul, who then had to become

\textsuperscript{201} The Gnostic Paul, 5.

\textsuperscript{202} The Gnostic Paul, 1, 162-4.

\textsuperscript{203} Cf. Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 141-2.
the anti-Gnostic Paul. But which of these readings of Pauline texts was “right”? Pagels concludes, correctly, in my view:

Each of these opposing images of Paul (and each of the hermeneutical systems they imply) to some extent distorts the reading of the texts. To read Paul either way – as hypergnostic or hyperorthodox – is to read unhistorically, attempting to interpret the apostle’s theology in terms of categories formulated in second-century debate.  

Several aspects of her conclusion are pertinent here. One: Like Barrett, Schenke, Lindemann, and Penny, Pagels sees “images of Paul” at stake in the wrestling over Pauline texts. Two: She adequately recognizes that to interpret is to “distort.” The role of the reader always enters into the hermeneutical task, despite the attendant rhetoric over “true” and “real” readings (cf. Chapter Three below). Third: Her measure of comparison is not ultimately with the “historical” Paul, a reconstructed figure of the nineteenth and twentieth century, but with Pauline texts of the first century. How were particular Pauline texts received and read?

While Pagels highlighted competition in the theological reception of Paul, Dennis R. MacDonald’s *The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon* (1983) posited sociological tension between two particular trajectories of the Pauline tradition: those represented by the Pastoral Epistles and the *Acts of Paul*. MacDonald argues that the narratives that eventually made up the *Acts of Paul* (written between 150-190 C.E.) had a prior oral history. The presbyter of Tertullian’s *De baptismo* 17 was more of a chronicler than an author. The stories he preserves have a folkloristic flavor

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204 *The Gnostic Paul*, 164.


206 *The Legend and the Apostle*, 17-33.
and follow traditional patterns (cf. Axel Olrik’s “Epic Laws of Folk Narrative”).\footnote{207} The stories about Paul, Thecla, and other women surrounding their ministry were prized and preserved in south-central Asia Minor among Christian women who found in them a liberating effect.\footnote{208} They display “a sensitivity to the concerns of women that is extremely rare in early Christian writings” and functioned as a quasi-\textit{hieros logos} among groups of once or still marginalized Christian women.\footnote{209} These stories were the “old wives’ tales” (1 Tim 4.7; cf. 2 Tim 3.6) to which the author of the Pastoral Epistles responded: “Let a woman learn in silence with full submission. Now I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; but she is to be silent . . . she will be saved through childbearing” (1 Tim 2.11-12, 15). The Pastor’s knowledge of the legends accounts for the numerous narrative and onomastic similarities between the \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pastoral Epistles.\footnote{210}

MacDonald sees in the \textit{Acts of Paul} an apocalyptic strain that more closely resembles the “historical” Paul than do the Pastoral Epistles, which is one reason why both of the former evidence a greater role for women in early Christian ministry than do


\footnote{208} The Legend and the Apostle, 34-53.


\footnote{210} The Legend and the Apostle, 54-77.
the latter. While the Acts of Paul and the Pastorals both lay claim to the Pauline tradition, MacDonald concludes:

we are obligated to decide which of the interpretations of Paul we shall prefer . . . although the New Testament does not contain the Acts of Paul, it does contain two competing images of Paul to which we must respond: the Paul of the genuine epistles and the Paul of the Pastorals . . . I choose the Paul of the genuine epistles.

Again, like Pagels, we have “competing images of Paul.”

MacDonald’s final chapter reveals his subjective relationship to the material. He sees an ethical task in his work. While some might consider this commendable, Peter Dunn and others have persuasively argued that much of MacDonald’s historical thesis cannot bear up under critical scrutiny. Many now recognize a deep ambiguity towards women in the Acts of Paul. In its final form, at least, it still has a patriarchal edge. Dunn admits that there is, on the surface, a rather stark difference between 1 Timothy 2.12 – “I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man” and the Acts of

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211 The Legend and the Apostle, 98-9.

212 The Legend and the Apostle, 102.

213 He manages to salvage a single constructive element from the Pastorals: “The most important contribution of the Pastorals to Christian theology may be their reminder that Christ can be seen not only in the Christian community but also in nature and culture.” (The Legend and the Apostle, 101).


Paul, where Paul tells Thecla to “Go and teach the word of God” (*Acts Paul IV*, 16).\(^{216}\) Even a little digging, however, renders doubt about most of MacDonald’s conclusions. Dunn draws attention to MacDonald’s selective use of Axel Olrik and exposes places where he outright misuses him (e.g. – Olrik did not argue that one could easily decipher the oral traditions behind written texts, though this is how MacDonald tries to use him).\(^{217}\) He further argues that the “narrative inconsistencies” in the *Acts of Paul* are just as likely to be the result of the poor editorial work of the Presbyter, who we know was dealing with at least some written sources (cf. Chapter Four on *3 Corinthians* below), as they are a sign that the stories predated the literary creation of the *Acts of Paul*.\(^{218}\) Neither the *Martyrdom of Paul* nor the Ephesian Episode, both of which MacDonald tries to tie to ascetic, liberated women story-tellers, shows specific interest in the authority of women within the church. This leaves only the stories involving Thecla. Their eventual use among women at the time of Tertullian, however, says nothing about their original *Sitz im Leben*.\(^{219}\) The crowds of influential women opposing the state in the *Acts of Paul* are not a sign that these stories ultimately came from and supported women *qua* women any more than the men who defend Paul in the *Martyrdom of Paul* reflect a particular community of marginalized Christian men. Rather, the crowds of women are present as a common motif in ancient literature.\(^{220}\) Dunn also counters rather easily MacDonald’s assertion that the “young widows” of 1 Timothy 5.3-16 are virgins like Thecla and points

\(^{216}\) “The *Acts of Paul* and the Pauline Legacy,” 41.

\(^{217}\) “The *Acts of Paul* and the Pauline Legacy,” 50.

\(^{218}\) “The *Acts of Paul* and the Pauline Legacy,” 51.

\(^{219}\) “The *Acts of Paul* and the Pauline Legacy,” 55.

\(^{220}\) “The *Acts of Paul* and the Pauline Legacy,” 51, 58.
out that, in accordance with 1 Timothy 2.12, Thecla only teaches Tryphaena and her female attendants, while (possibly) baptizing only herself.\textsuperscript{221} Technically, then, she and the Pastor are not in disagreement. The fact that the Great Church venerated Thecla seems to suggest that they saw nothing out of order with her behavior. Tertullian is the only indication of problems regarding the influence of Thecla.\textsuperscript{222}

Dunn’s larger thesis is that the \textit{Acts of Paul} represents an orthodox outgrowth from Paul’s letters. They carry forward, in narrative form, the image of Paul found in 1 Corinthians 6-7.\textsuperscript{223} The author of the \textit{Acts of Paul}, the Presbyter mentioned by Tertullian, built his narrative on oral and written traditions, along with an imaginative reading of 2 Timothy, Galatians, 1 Corinthians and Philippians.\textsuperscript{224} The supposed opposition between the \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pastoral Epistles is “superficial” and, in fact, the two sets of literature are quite harmonious with one another.\textsuperscript{225} As an early interpreter of Paul, the author of the \textit{Acts of Paul} locates the center of Pauline thought in his:

\begin{quote}
 hope of a physical resurrection for which the Christian embraces the ascetic lifestyle of the future age in the likeness of the heavenly angels, renounces luxuries, beauty, and riches, which will burn in the eschatological fire, and even desires to die unjustly at the hands of wicked men in the perfect imitation of the Lord Jesus.\textsuperscript{226}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{221}“The \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pauline Legacy,” 59-64.

\textsuperscript{222}“The \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pauline Legacy,” 67.

\textsuperscript{223}Dunn concludes: “Paul’s image in the \textit{ActPl} is not un-Pauline. The Presbyter often drew his inspiration from the Pauline epistles . . . What appears the most bizarre to modern scholars, the ascetic and the divine Paul, likewise arise out of a second-century reading of the Pauline epistles, and may indeed be in closer keeping with the Paul of the epistles, dare I say, than some modern caricatures of Paul” (157).

\textsuperscript{224}“The \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pauline Legacy,” 194.

\textsuperscript{225}“The \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pauline Legacy,” iii.

\textsuperscript{226}“The \textit{Acts of Paul} and the Pauline Legacy,” iii. Emphasis his.
While the Presbyter has located these elements as the heart of Pauline theology based on “the needs of his times,” they “appear in the Pauline epistles with no less frequency than the theme of justification by faith which figures so prominently in the crisis of the judaizers and in modern Protestantism.” Dunn, like MacDonald, is trying to reclaim the *Acts of Paul* as a not-so-tendentious reflection of Pauline tradition in the second century, while, contra MacDonald, minimizing its distance from the Pastorals.

Though I am less inclined to accept the particulars of MacDonald’s study (preferring Dunn), he and Pagels rightly understand that Pauline traditions in the second century were diverse and often competing. Both recognize that what was at stake was claiming “the Apostle” for one’s own side. To do this required narrative and interpretive strategies that shaped earlier pieces of Pauline tradition into suitable images of Paul.

**Developing Pauline Images**

The importance of tracing Pauline images from the end of the first and into the second century, a period when Pauline letters were only beginning to have widespread circulation, seems to have received a firm foundation in the works described in the sections above. MacDonald has quite correctly posited the legendary and oral quality of much of the Pauline tradition in the late-first and early-second centuries. Like individual Pauline texts, Pauline narratives also portray particular images of the Apostle. The past thirty-five years have seen numerous studies directed at the *Paulusbild* of various

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canonical and non-canonical texts, fully cementing the methodological proposals of Barrett, Schenke, Lindemann, and others.\textsuperscript{228}

Martinus De Boer picked up where Barrett and Schenke left off, arguing that the common portrayal of Paul in Colossians, Ephesians, Acts and the Pastorals stood at the beginning of a “trajectory” of Pauline reception into the second century.\textsuperscript{229} De Boer identifies six aspects of this received image, showing continuities and developments between first- and second-century texts: 1) Paul, the Apostle; 2) Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles;\textsuperscript{230} 3) Paul, the Evangelist of the Whole World;\textsuperscript{231} 4) Paul, the Sufferer;\textsuperscript{232} 5) Paul, the Apostle to the...
Paul, the Redeemed Persecutor; and 6) Paul, the Authoritative Teacher of the Church. These six elements “were starting-points from which the authors of these works were able to appropriate Paul in a way meaningful and useful for their own time and situations.” De Boer finds a “dynamic interplay,” a “backward” and “forward” movement, between an older, received image of Paul and later “variations on common themes and concerns.”

This complex, developing image of Paul predated, in most cases, the influence of Paul’s letters. The Paul of the Apostolic Fathers was not the “epistolary Paul,” but the “legendary” or “ecclesiastical” Paul (as in Acts). Some places where Lindemann attributes knowledge of Pauline letters are just as easily explained by knowledge of particular Pauline legends, caricatures, and catchwords (1 Clem. 5; 30-33; Polycarp, Phil. 3.1, 3; 9.2). It is the “ecclesiastical Paul” who is raised to check the divisions produced by upstarts in Corinth in 1 Clement, not the “epistolary Paul.” Even those early second-century writers who show knowledge of Paul’s letters each have a different

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232 His suffering was necessary as a means of propelling the gospel into the oikoumene (“Images of Paul,” 368-9).

233 De Boer argues from 1 Tim 1.13 and Acts (370-8). His evidence from Colossians and Ephesians is weak. He discusses no non-canonical texts here.

234 De Boer explores the Pastorals and Acts 20 (378-9).

235 “Images of Paul,” 380.

236 “Images of Paul,” 380.


238 “Which Paul?,” 51-2.

239 I would have to argue against de Boer on this particular point. It seems to me that the author of 1 Clement gets right to the heart of 1 Corinthians, echoing the language of Paul’s thesis statement (1 Cor 1.10) throughout (cf. esp. 1 Clem. 42-49).
“epistolary Paul,” depending on which of the letters they know.\textsuperscript{240} “Which Paul?,” then, is the first question we must ask of each invocation of the Apostle. Is it the legendary Paul? If so, which legend? Is it the epistolary Paul? If so, which epistle(s)?

A number of others have argued similarly.\textsuperscript{241} Karlfried Froehlich concludes, “It seems that the tradition of a Pauline legend glorifying the great preacher, missionary, and miracle worker antedates the epistolary collection by a considerable margin . . . the legendary Paul had a life independent of such material.”\textsuperscript{242} But Froehlich also reminds that this was not the only set of images of Paul in the second century. Because of the “general versatility of Paul’s own theologizing in the surviving remnants of his correspondence,” a “plurality of ‘Pauls,’ all of whom had their supporters and detractors in various circles of Christians,” developed.\textsuperscript{243} Michael Kaler explores the images of Paul found in the Nag Hammadi literature, concluding, “‘Gnostics’ (I use the term loosely), like other early Christians, created and used legendary images of Paul, and these legendary images may not have been so different from those created and used by the

\textsuperscript{240} De Boer goes too far here. While it can easily be argued that certain texts show dependence on certain “epistolary Pauls,” it is harder to say what epistolary Paul any given writer in the second century knew. The lack of use of a particular Pauline text does not mean lack of knowledge of and/or influence by a particular Pauline text. That would be very difficult to show.


\textsuperscript{242} Karlfried Froehlich, “Which Paul?,” 279-99. I will argue in Chapter Three that there was a symbiotic relationship between Pauline image and text. The two were not independent.

\textsuperscript{243} Froehlich, “Which Paul?,” 290. Froehlich’s article traces the image of Paul in the history of his commentators.
proto-orthodox.”244 Kaler’s work is a self-conscious expansion of Koschorke in light of the *Paul and the Legacies of Paul* volume. He explores: 1) Paul, the Apocalyptic Hero (*Coptic Apocalypse of Paul*); 2) Paul, One of the Apostles (*Exegesis of the Soul*); and 3) Paul, the Image of Christ (*Testimony of Truth* and *Silvanos*). Kaler wants those who study “Gnosticism” to “expand [their] understanding of Paulinism” beyond the strict reception of Pauline letters or theology, as his colleagues who study proto-orthodox receptions of Paul have already done.245 His extensive work on the Coptic *Apocalypse of Paul*, for instance, has gone a long way in teasing out the image of Paul as apocalyptic mediator in various second-century texts.246 In addition to Froehlich and Kahler, several others should also be noted here. Calvin Roetzel traces several less-explored images of Paul into the second century: Paul as celibate and Paul as miracle-worker.247 Margaret Y. MacDonald, like Dennis R. MacDonald before her, compares the relationship between Paul and women in the Pastoral Epistles and in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*.248 On this count, she emphasizes that “it is important not to view development in Pauline Christianity as monolithic.”249

244 Michael Kaler, “Towards an Expanded Understanding of Nag Hammadi Paulinism,” 309.


246 Kaler, *Flora Tells a Story*, 94-117.

247 Cf. Calvin Roetzel, *Paul: The Man and the Myth*, 157-70. On several of these images, cf. also Ernst Käsemann, “Paul and Early Catholicism,” 242: “The miracle worker was acceptable; the apocalypticist had become intolerable. Indeed, this image of the apostle, which fits him into the early catholic world, has always been affirmed and beloved. Its destruction is still regarded as a sacrilege, even by many historians.”


249 Margaret MacDonald, “Rereading Paul,” 238.
Social-Scientific Approaches to the Image of Paul

Two works from the 1990’s attempt to ground the burgeoning discussion of Pauline image construction in social-scientific theories. Anthony Blasi’s *Making Charisma: The Social Construction of Paul’s Public Image* (1991) draws on Weberian concepts of charisma to describe how Paul went from being a person to a *persona* after his death. But Blasi, a sociologist, also goes beyond Weber, arguing that charisma is not just a quality that inheres within certain individuals, but is also socially projected:

> We are social beings with our language, imagery, and expectations. We transform public persons so that they become items of our vocabulary, figments of our collective imagination, and fulfillments of our societal needs. Charisma comes from us as much as it is projected by the personages.

For an individual *persona* to endure through time, it must be “constructed anew” in successive generations, resulting in change to the public image of the individual. The initial, remarkable impression that an individual makes on others will not attain beyond the first generation unless it is updated for new situations and needs. At the same time, a “charisma cannot represent a total break with what went before it; it appears to need to stand in some organic relationship with past beliefs and practices.”

Blasi, assuming a seven-letter “actual” Paul, charts the developing charisma of Paul in Acts and the “disputed” Pauline Epistles in the New Testament, touching briefly

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as well on  *1 Clement*, *Polycarp*, *2 Peter*, the *Acts of Paul*, and Marcion. He argues that various Pauline charismas can be charted along two axes:

1) Paul as Founder: Invoking Tradition/Outward Orientation = Acts;
2) Paul as Legitimator: Invoking Tradition/Inward Orientation = Pseudo-Paulines;
3) Paul as Martyred Innovator: Breaking Tradition/Outward Orientation = *Acts of Paul*;
4) Paul as Criterion for a New Canon: Breaking Tradition/Inward Orientation = Marcion.255

Blasi addresses issues of continuity and discontinuity with the “actual” Paul, weaving in the relevant issues that produced these charismas. There is much to quibble with here, from the lack of nuance in the above categories to the placement of particular texts in individual slots. One might also doubt his conclusion that, contra Weber, “the very process of successfully constructing Paul’s charisma tended toward the deemphasis of wonders and miracles, and even of adventurism.”256 The *Acts of Paul* “presented too exalted an image of Paul,” causing the church to shy away from its portrayal of Paul while accepting the “moderately exalted” Paul of the “disputed” Pauline Epistles.257 On the other hand, Blasi is to be commended for bringing theoretical tools to the discussion of Paul’s early legacy. Like Pagels and de Boer, he holds a balanced position, where the “backward” and “forward” dialectic of tradition (to use the language of de Boer) is at work in each of these developing traditions. We will explore this in much greater detail in Chapter Three below.

Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey (*Portraits of Paul: an Archaeology of Ancient Personality*, 1996) discuss constructions of Paul through the lens of “modal or typical

personality." By exploring encomium, forensic defense speeches, and physiognomy, Malina and Neyrey argue that Paul himself, the author of Acts, and the author of the *Acts of Paul* produce portrayals of the Apostle that are set within the framework of socially negotiated expectations for ancient personality. They work to show that “first-century Mediterranean persons were strongly group-embedded, collectivist persons . . . they were ‘socially’ minded, as opposed to ‘psychologically’ minded.” 1 Corinthians 4.7 serves as a theme for their inquiry: “What do you have that you did not receive? But if you did receive it, then why do you boast as if you did not?” Malina and Neyrey argue, correctly, that even the texts of the so-called “real” Paul (Gal 1-2; Phil. 3.2-11; and 2 Cor. 11.21-12.10) are socially-conscious self-constructions. While self-constructions, they are still constructions. The encomiastic elements of these passages highlight “everything a person has received from others or that has befallen a person, features that lay beyond the control of the individual.” Lists of Pauline accomplishments display concern for “the group’s well-being, integrity, solidarity, and health.” The argument is strained for Galatians 1-2, where Paul’s rhetoric seems to work in the opposite direction, but from a methodological standpoint their exploration of “undisputed” Pauline texts together with Acts and the *Acts of Paul* when discussing images of Paul is sound.

Numerous other interpreters have also taken up physiognomic studies of *Acts of Paul* 3.2, which describes Paul as “A man small in stature, bald, bow-legged, well-built,

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259 *Portraits of Paul*, 16.

260 *Portraits of Paul*, 218.

261 *Portraits of Paul*, 61.

262 *Portraits of Paul*, 62.
uni-browed, hook-nosed, full of grace, sometimes appearing as a man, at other times having the face of an angel.”

Malina and Neyrey build on Robert M. Grant’s brief study, which concludes that Paul is described here as the ideal general. Grant’s conclusion seems to accord well with some of the anti-imperial themes in the Martyrdom of Paul, but what he does not explain is why these particular physical descriptions were ascribed to generals in Archilochus and Herodes. Malina and Neyrey show how the individual elements of the list, when combined, signal the presence of an “ideal male,” someone who is “masculine, fearless, pious, virtuous, truthful, benevolent, but above all, fit for public life.” These qualities, then, are secondarily applied to ideal generals in antiquity (including Paul).

Status quaestionis: Most Recent Accounts (2005-2010)

Wide agreement now exists on the propriety of talking about textually-mediated images of Paul in his early interpreters. Several recent articles serve as evidence for this

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264 Grant, “Description of Paul,” 1-4.

265 Malina and Neyrey, Portraits of Paul, 148.
consolidation of opinion, even when dealing with first-century texts. Gregory Sterling argues that Ephesians and Acts, both written toward the end of the first century, provide similar images of Paul through different means (Ephesians = *vita contemplative*; Acts = *vita activa*): he was the primary apostolic figure upon whose revelatory experiences the church was built.

Daniel Marguerat charts the reception of Paul in the “disputed” Pauline texts of the New Testament canon, as well as Acts and the *Acts of Paul*, using a three-pronged typology: “documentaire” (the collection and use of Paul’s letters); “biographique” (the use of Pauline narratives); and “doctoral” (the use of Pauline theology in later Pauline pseudepigrapha). Each of these elements must be taken into account in order to provide a fully-orbed description of Paul’s early influence, which was “complexe et multiforme.” The letters of the historical Paul (seven) are only a (small) part of the ongoing Pauline influence at the end of the first century. Acts, then, can justifiably be

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266 In addition to the articles summarized below, cf. also Hanns Christof Brennecke, “Die Anfänge einer Paulusverehrung,” in *Biographie und Persönlichkeit des Paulus* (ed. E.-M. Becker and P. Pilhofer; WUNT 187; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 295-305; and Bernard Meunier, “Paul et les pères grecs,” *RSR* 94 (2006): 331-55. Brennecke highlights Paul as Martyr in early Christian texts (*1 Clement* and the *Acts of Paul*), while also giving due space to the use of Pauline texts. Meunier tips his hat early on to the importance of “la personne de Paul” as “croyant,” “missionnaire,” and “théologien” in the Greek Fathers (331), but winds up addressing only the last of these from Justin to Origen. Based on the data from *Biblia Patristica*, Meunier claims that there was a certain “oubli” (omission) of Paul in the first half of the second century (332). If he would have explored the image of Paul in early eastern writers like Ignatius and Polycarp this conclusion could have been avoided.


269 Marguerat, “Paul après Paul,” 321. Cf. also Andrew Gregory and Christopher Tuckett, “Reflections on Method: What constitutes the Use of the Writings that later formed the New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers?,” in *The Reception of the New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*, 80: “A further distinction which should be drawn, particularly with reference to Paul, concerns the question of whether later authors who might appear to appeal to Paul in some way actually make direct use of his letters, or whether they appeal either to a particular image (*Paulusbild*).”
called “Pauline,” despite its apparent lack of interest in Pauline letters. The author of Acts, like the author of the Acts of Paul, was privy to communally traditioned stories about the Apostle. Many of these stories were birthed in the very ekklesia that Paul had founded. Marguerat, for instance, positions the Pauline miracle stories in Acts in line with Paul’s own cryptic statements about “signs and wonders” within his ministry (cf. 2 Cor 12.12; 1 Thess 1.5; Rom 15.18-19; Gal 3.5). The portrayal of Paul as a healer, then, was not invented by Luke (contra Vielhauer). Community traditions about the Apostle share many similarities with the “undisputed” Pauline letters, but also exhibit differences in focus and characterization. This is an important aspect of Marguerat’s work, because it sets the stage for his more general comments about reception, which he claims always exhibits “cohérence et déplacement, continuité et rupture face à l’origine.” Using three images, Paul as Apostle, Paul as Sufferer, and Paul as Teacher, Marguerat explores lines of continuity between Acts, the canonical “pseudo-Paulines,” and the “undisputed” Pauline letters. While Acts and the Pastoral Epistles portray two divergent images of Paul’s relationship to the wider apostolic tradition, Marguerat finds that both are ultimately rooted in Paul’s own letters. Paul falls in the line of apostolic witnesses in Acts and 1 Corinthians 15.5-11. He is independent from them in the Pastoralis and Galatians 1-2. The image of Paul in his own letters, then, is neither “lisse” nor

270 Marguerat, “Paul après Paul,” 321. He is uncommitted as to whether or not the author of Acts knew any of the Pauline letters.


272 Marguerat, “Paul après Paul,” 337.
“uniforme.” Furthermore, the intertextual overlay of Jesus and Paul in Luke’s Gospel and Acts provides a biographical witness to Paul’s theology of suffering with Christ. This narrative identification is clearer in the *Martyrdom of Paul*, where Christ predicts Paul’s death as a new co-crucifixion with the Lord.\footnote{Marguerat, “Paul après Paul,” 334. The one unfortunate conclusion from this piece is Marguerat’s assertion that *1 Clement*, Ignatius of Antioch and Polycarp of Smyrna were not interested in the person of Paul (321). This is odd in light of his thesis and the data from each of these early second-century texts. These texts will be reviewed in the following chapter.}

The two most recent monographs on Paul’s early legacy also emphasize Pauline images and the developing *persona* of the Apostle. James Aageson’s *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church* (2008), like Marguerat, offers a nuanced, methodologically sound account of the reception of Paul in the second century. In a brisk and quasi-popular fashion, Aageson examines the whole of Pauline influence (images, theology, and use of his letters) from the Deutero-Paulines to Origin through the lens of one important piece of the Pauline tradition itself: the Pastoral Epistles. He pursues a “bifocal approach” by positioning the Pastorals “on a continuum that reflects and passes on the earlier Pauline tradition, as well as shapes and directs the subsequent Pauline legacy.”\footnote{James W. Aageson, *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church* (Library of Pauline Studies; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2008), 208.} Aageson sees in the Pastoral Epistles an early canonizing of the Pauline tradition. Paul is already being connected with the apostolic tradition at large. He assumes seven “authentic” letters of Paul and apparently places the Pastoral Epistles (likely written by two different authors given the differences in theological pattern between 2 Tim and 1 Tim/Titus) toward the end of the first century, although no firm dates are ever given. The book moves through chapters on the “Theological Patterns” of

each of the Pastoral Epistles, a “Comparison of Patterns” between the individual Pastoral letters and several “genuinely” Pauline letters, and finally to the development of Paul’s image and the use of his texts in the New Testament (Acts, Deutero-Pauline Epistles), the Apostolic Fathers, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement, Origen, and the Acts of Paul (and Thecla). “Heretical” texts are not explored.

Aageson grounds his work theoretically in Anthony Blasi’s aforementioned distinction between “person” and “personage,” showing the particular Pauline “charismas” that developed in the course of his sacralization in the second century. This is the book’s major methodological strength. Aageson states:

> If the image of Paul and the theology of his letters were thoroughly interwoven in the early church, as they undoubtably were, the adaptation of Paul and his words by the early Christians was more than an issue of simple textual reinterpretation. It was also a matter of an evolving Pauline image merging with the developing concerns of the day, where the words and ideas of the apostle came to bear on the circumstances and conflicts of the church.²⁷⁶

In the Pastorals, Paul is heresy fighter and caretaker of the household of God.²⁷⁷ He is inwardly focused. For Luke, Paul is public speaker and missionary.²⁷⁸ His mission is to the world.²⁷⁹ For Ignatius, Paul is the great martyr. For 1 Clement, Paul is the writer to a factious Corinthian congregation. He is the wise teacher for Polycarp. In the Acts of Paul and Thecla, which Aageson views as a set of traditions in direct competition with

²⁷⁶ *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 1-2.

²⁷⁷ *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 91-3.

²⁷⁸ *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 112.

²⁷⁹ Aageson makes the oft-repeated (in scholarship) distinction between Paul being “the Apostle” in the Pastorals, whereas in Acts Paul is “not strictly speaking” an apostle (*Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 113). Never mind the fact that Paul is never called ὁ ἀπόστολος in the Pastorals and that he is called an ἀπόστολος, along with Barnabas, in Acts 14.4, 14.
the Pastoral Epistles (cf. MacDonald), Paul is the challenger of traditional society.\textsuperscript{280} Each of these authors/texts presents an image of Paul that not only “conforms to [the author’s] needs and circumstances,” but also reflects the “social situation” in which the author shapes the Pauline tradition.\textsuperscript{281}

Aageson stands in the line of more recent interpreters who see the Pauline legacy in the second century as “complex, diverse, and uneven.”\textsuperscript{282} He believes that the “Pauline legacy displays a regional stamp, as different traditions, issues, and movements developed in different parts of the church,” and that we can talk about trajectories and “lines of development” (a la Robinson and Koester) in addition to “identifiable tensions between competing elements” (a la Pagels).\textsuperscript{283}

The most recent account of the reception of Paul in the first two centuries of the Church may also be the most robust English-language project on this topic since Rensberger. Richard Pervo’s \textit{The Making of Paul: Constructions of the Apostle in Early Christianity} (2010) tracks the influence of the “historical” Paul from his early pseudepigraphers (the six “disputed” Pauline epistles in the New Testament) to Irenaeus. Unlike Aageson, who is particularly attuned to the influence of the Paulinism found in the Pastoral Epistles and consequently leaves out whole swaths of early Christian literature (Marcion, “Gnostics,” etc.), Pervo’s account is comprehensive and a self-conscious attempt to update Lindemann, Dassmann, Rensberger, and Penny in light of the de-centering of justification by faith in modern Pauline studies. Easy to read and well

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church}, 206.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church}, 154, 206.

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church}, 2.

organized, this 239 page text (plus 75 pages of endnotes) is certain to become the standard introduction to the early legacy of Paul. Its strengths are concision and a vast knowledge of the relevant primary and secondary literature. Novelty, however, is lacking.

The results of *The Making of Paul* are mixed. From a methodological (and theoretical) standpoint, there are strengths. Like Aageson and Marguerat, Pervo works both with the use of Pauline letters in the early Church as well as with developing images of the Apostle, though sometimes these two features are not tightly intertwined in his textual analyses. He is concerned to show how “The portraits of Paul that emerge in early (and subsequent) Christianity . . . seek to address the problems of those churches in their own times.” Pervo’s stated goal is constructive: the “task involves showing how these interpreters understood Paul.” He correctly claims that “Letters contain or, more often, presume a story,” following de Boer and others who find that developing Pauline images and narratives lie behind later pseudepigraphic Pauline texts. I would tend to agree, but with the caveat that presumed narrative worlds exist in all communication, even “genuine” Pauline texts. Paul, for instance, presumes a narrative about his relationship with the Galatians and Corinthians when he implores them to stay aligned with his gospel.

Like Penny and Aageson, Pervo sees the Pauline tradition in this period as a mixture of “trajectories and common threads” displaying a range of “variety and

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284 *Making of Paul*, xiii.


creativity.” The Pauline tradition did not develop in a straight line but exhibited tension as various groups interpreted Paul for their own needs. Each of these “Pauls” retained some elements of “Paul’s own thought” while neglecting others. The “historical” Paul was “a master of polyphony,” providing the kind of diverse material with which his early interpreters could work (cf. Chapter One above). For the proto-orthodox, Pervo develops his own “paulology,” a quasi-creedal statement about the canonical Paul:

Paul, the missionary/apostle to the gentiles, evangelized the entire world and is now a figure within salvation history. Having once been an (essentially polytheist) unbeliever and persecutor, Paul subsequently converted by the power of Christ. Paul is a Redeemed Persecutor, the prototypical arch-sinner who became beneficiary of grace. Paul suffered and died, a martyr whose commitment to the gospel was sealed by his salutary passion and death. Paul remains a hero, a bearer of salvation, a teacher of the church. As a teacher Paul is a promulgator of virtuous conduct, an opponent of false teaching and will brook no deviation, and a champion of unity and ecclesiastical consolidation.

This canonical Paul is the Paul that Irenaeus would defend and that would become the received image of the Apostle into early Catholicism. Some basic form of it is already apparent in 1 Clement 5.5-7, which Pervo dates to the 90’s C.E., before the Pauline letter

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287 *Making of Paul*, 185.
288 *Making of Paul*, 233.
289 *Making of Paul*, 235.
290 *Making of Paul*, 235.
291 *Making of Paul*, 11-12.
collection, before Acts, and before the Pastoral Epistles.\footnote{Making of Paul, 132.} Again, he finds “some basis” for each aspect of his “paulology” in the ministry of the historical Paul, though the entire snapshot develops in the Church’s production of the Pauline canon (Acts + 13 letters).\footnote{Making of Paul, 12.} All of these aspects of Pervo’s work are to be heartily commended. He is on the right track.

But the book also has methodological problems – at least if we take seriously Pervo’s insistence on not privileging the Paul of the Reformation and later German Protestant scholarship.\footnote{Making of Paul, 4, 205, 224, 229.} The rather confident narrative that Pervo draws from the “real” Paul (of the seven “undisputed” letters) through the “pseudepigraphic Pauline letters” to the Apostolic Fathers, for instance, presupposes many of the decisions on Pauline authorship that originated among German scholarship of the nineteenth century; decisions that were often (if not always) generated out of theological preference (cf. on Baur at the beginning of this chapter).\footnote{Pervo, Making of Paul, 6, states, “The present consensus is that Paul wrote seven epistles: Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. These are ‘undisputed.’ This book regards the others (Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus) as post-Pauline compositions. The object is not to strip away this unseemly husk to reveal the ‘real’ Paul,’ but to utilize the Deutero-Pauline letters as components of the developing Pauline legacy.”} He never connects the fact that the “real” Paul discourse of the nineteenth century is part and parcel with the Lutheran reading of Paul. This is regrettable. The standard historical narrative which moves from Galatians (Paul) to Ephesians and Acts (pseudo-Paul) to the Pastoral Epistles (really pseudo-Paul) is ultimately built upon Luther being read through Baur and until we begin to treat the “real” Paul vs. the Paul of “tradition” discourse as part of a much later era of Pauline
reception, yet still driven by the same kinds of ideological concerns as were already present in the second century (i.e. – Who was the “real” Paul?), the early history of the Pauline tradition will continue to be narrated in our own image. Pervo pushes the “disputed” Pauline letters into the “Pauline School(s),” which he places in Ephesus (quite confidently), and lumps the phenomenon of Pauline pseudepigraphy under the singular title “Deutero-Paulinism.” But his picture of the Pauline School(s) becomes increasing speculative when he claims that they “were more like rival faculties of theology located within the same metropolis, inimical to each other, but reading one another’s literary output.” I wonder whether or not we might find the same degree of variety in the “undisputed” Pauline letters.

The methodological problem not only makes for an ideological narrative of Pauline democracy devolved into institutionalism, but also produces some waffling back and forth between “I’m not trying to say who got Paul right” and “Look at the differences between 1 Clement’s view of righteousness in Paul and Paul’s own view.” This despite the fact that Pervo tips his hat quite early on to the “dual impact of Christian ecumenism and postmodernism” on our ability to know the “real” Paul and suggests that “the only real Paul is the dead Paul” (i.e. – Paul had to die before his true impact could be felt). But his continued practice of comparing the historical, or “real” Paul, and the

296 Making of Paul, 9.
297 Making of Paul, 60.
298 Not actual quotes from Pervo. These are my own characterizations.
“Paul” of Acts as well as of the letters authored in his name betrays this earlier sentiment.\(^{299}\)

Pervo’s book also pulls in both directions on the second-century “Pauline Captivity” narrative. He delivers a very cautious statement about the silence of Justin, Hegesippus and Papias: “Those who neither name Paul nor appropriate aspects of his theology may have had negative views of the apostle, but this thesis cannot be assumed.”\(^{300}\) He finds no anti-Paulinism in these authors. In fact, the *Epistle to Diognetus*, Justin, and Tatian each betray, at times, a rather deep Pauline (theological) influence. Pervo’s conclusion about Irenaeus’ Paulinism is also on target:

Like every other interpreter of Paul, he brought to his construction presuppositions and goals that differed from those of the historical Paul, but these do not automatically amount to a betrayal. Irenaeus should be ranked among the creative and insightful exponents of Pauline theology. He provided stimulus for the subsequent Greek interpretation of Paul. Irenaeus did not ‘rescue’ Paul from the clutches of the heretics, but he did show one path to a positive theological use of the apostle’s words.\(^{301}\)

But Pervo also claims that “the major exponents of Pauline theology belonged to the heretical side of the eventual division. The proto-orthodox stressed his moral message.”\(^{302}\) He references the Household Codes in Colossians and Ephesians as an early witness to proto-orthodox ethical interest in Paul, failing to mention the deeply

\(^{299}\) *Making of Paul*, xii, 2. Examples of such comparisons between the historical Paul and the Paul of tradition within the canonical literature occur on pp. 13-15, 65-96, and 150-6. For instance, he denies that Paul is an Apostle in Acts without even addressing the problematic data in Acts 14.4, 14. Outside of the New Testament canon, this kind of distinction between the historical Paul and his early interpreters occurs on pp. 128, 133, and 142.


\(^{301}\) *Making of Paul*, 227.

\(^{302}\) *Making of Paul*, 19. Cf. 210, 228, and his comments on the *Treat. Res.*: “The argument of this treatise is thoroughly Pauline and, for the most part, is no less defensible as valid exegesis than the counter claims that Paul spoke about resurrection of the flesh . . . Not since Colossians and Ephesians had believers made such insightful use of the Pauline corpus.” (217).
theological nature of each of these letters, which, of course, Pervo thinks are proto-orthodox receptions of Paul. Furthermore, this characterization of the proto-orthodox use of Paul does not square with is conclusion that Ignatius was “the first creative Pauline theologian to find an eventual home in proto-orthodox circles.” Paul was his inspiration and model. Nor does it square with his attempt to show Pauline theological influence on Diognetus and Justin. Unless by “major exponents of Pauline theology” Pervo means those whom he believes prefigured Reformation theology, which, if so, signifies that he has not moved that far from Harnack and Campenhausen.

Conceptualizing Paul

The past thirty years of scholarship on “Paul in the second century” (since the deconstructive work of Lindemann, Dassmann, Rensberger and Penny) have produced several burgeoning trends. I gather together and highlight here major patterns during this period as a way of summarizing a rather long Forschungsgeschichte and of highlighting areas that still need to be addressed. First, a broad consensus seems to have emerged that views Paul’s legacy in the second century as a complex of fragmented trajectories. From the beginning, the Pauline tradition developed neither in a singular and straight line, nor in a hot-potato style handoff from one group to another (contra the Pauline Captivity narrative), but along a variety of trajectories amongst a variety of communities, each of which incorporated Paul’s letters, as well as stories about the Apostle, into their prior network of theological authorities. This is the basic position of an increasing number of scholars, including Pagels, Penny, de Boer, MacDonald, Froehlich, Kaler, Aageson, and Pervo.

303 Making of Paul, 139.
A second important trend in the past thirty years involves the increasing interest in Pauline images.\textsuperscript{304} Where data are sufficient, how has an individual author imagined the Apostle? And in what narrative about the Apostle has a given image become situated? Furthermore, how are these Pauline images related to the interpretation of Pauline texts? Each of the studies outlined in the last half of this chapter point in this direction. As I will argue in Chapter Three, it is not enough to merely catalogue the places where Pauline texts are used in the second century, as Rensberger has done. Yes, we must ask “where?” and “how?” and “why?” But more importantly, for any individual second-century text, we must ask, as have De Boer, Froehlich and Grappe, “which Paul?”

Third, several scholars have provided schemas for discerning “which Paul” a text invokes. Lindemann distinguishes between the reception of the Apostle’s “Bild” and his “Theologie.” De Boer differentiates between the “legendary” and “epistolary” Paul. Bovon between Paul as “monument” and Paul as “document.” Aageson divides the reception of Paul into three categories: “image”; “theology”; and “use of letters.” Marguerat also pursues a three-pronged approach: “documentaire”; “biographique”; and “doctoral.”

Fourth, these same scholars have helped us broaden the notion of “Paulinism,” once defined as the adherence to a singular Pauline \textit{theologoumenon}: justification by faith alone.\textsuperscript{305} As several of them have reminded, the “historical” Paul was at times complex and inconsistent. He provided no singular image for successive generations (cf. Froehlich, Marguerat, and Pervo). There is good reason, then, to de-center questions about the “real” Paul and about “who got Paul right” in the second century (cf. Aland, 304 The rationale for this interest in image, as a modern cultural trend, will be addressed in Chapter Three. 305 Cf. Morgan, “The Significance of ‘Paulinism’,” 320-38.
Rensberger, Dunn, and Pervo), at least from a historical perspective. Such questions are normally loaded with all kinds of ideological freight. Scholars are increasingly marking out elements of both continuity and change from the “real” Paul across all of the early receptions of the Apostle (cf. Pagels, de Boer, Blasi, Marguerat, and, to some extent, Pervo).

Finally, a few studies bring theoretical tools to the table. Sociological perspectives, in particular, have begun to inform the discussion of the data (cf. Blasi and Malina/Neyrey). Given that authors are members of communities, what communal pressures have been exercised in producing a particular image of Paul?

Despite these positive developments, a full-scale theoretical assessment of the Pauline Fragmentation narrative, however, is still needed. The scholarship on the early reception of Paul often deploys language without situating it conceptually within the larger theoretical frameworks of the humanities and cultural studies: tradition; memory; history; intertextuality; image construction; etc. As such, the Pauline Fragmentation narrative lacks explanatory power. The following chapter (Three) provides a theoretical framework for the data from the second century, narrating the emergence of Paul as a figure of memory among various Christian communities of that period. In line with recent social memory studies on the early Jesus tradition (cf. Chapter One), Chapter Three brings the full weight of tradition theory, social memory theory, and cognition theory to bear on the development of Paul as an imagined and interpreted figure of the second century.

Setting this theoretical framework will help clarify several of the aforementioned trends. First, it will provide a sufficient methodology for offering thick descriptions of
Pauline traditions in the second century. Not only are there multiple ways of receiving “Paul,” (image production, textual interpretation and theological characterization), but most often these ways of knowing the Apostle are synthetically related. Memory is difficult to compartmentalize and we must work harder at providing holistic descriptions of Pauline traditions. Second, the Pauline Fragmentation narrative will finally have a theoretical engine. Why was it *Paul* who became “the Apostle” in the second century and why did *he* become such a contested figure within Christian communities? Third, understanding the complex nature of tradition will help clarify what is at stake in the rhetoric concerning the “real” Paul, whether ancient (cf. 2 Peter, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and the *Gospel of Philip*) or modern (cf. Baur, et. al.).
CHAPTER THREE  
Imagining Paul: Pauline Memory Traditions into the Second Century

“The concept of memory is close to the concept of tradition and associated with it.”  
-Josef Pieper

The Pauline “tradition.” In modern scholarship, as we saw in Chapter One, such language is used to distinguish between the “real,” “actual,” or “historical” Paul and the later encrustations and interpretive frameworks that were added to and now surround such a pristine corpus as the “undisputed” Pauline letters. Such accretions to and changes of the “real” Paul are often characterized as producing a “domesticated,” “ecclesiasticized,” and “canonized” Paul.\(^\text{308}\) Sometimes this language is offered with a twinge of disappointment. There is no doubt that Paul had become a traditioned figure by the second century. Three generations, whose length and boundaries differ in each social

\(^\text{306}\) Shils, Tradition, 45.


\(^\text{308}\) This language is ubiquitous in the literature. Cf., for example, James Dunn, “Introduction,” in Cambridge Companion to St Paul, 2; Robert Morgan, “Paul’s Enduring Legacy,” in Cambridge Companion to St Paul, 243.
context, are needed to establish a *traditum*.\(^{309}\) Much like the portrayals of Jesus in the canonical Gospels (cf. Chapter One), communally traditioned narratives of Paul’s relevance for the early Church were becoming solidified in a variety of Christian locales throughout the Mediterranean world some forty to sixty years after his death. Unlike for Jesus, however, there was a broad swath of Pauline letters that influenced these developing Pauline traditions. There was, as I will argue below, a symbiotic relationship between oral and textual traditions about the Apostle.

Though ubiquitous in the scholarly literature on first- and second-century Paulinism, “tradition” is used more often as an ideological weapon than as a nuanced concept. The first half of this chapter provides a theoretical foundation on which future discourses on the Pauline “tradition” can be built. It addresses the questions, what is the relationship between past and present in the traditioning process, and how do we measure Pauline traditions? The second half of the chapter explores the relationship between tradition and memory. Sustained discussions of the latter have been all but absent from discussions on the Pauline tradition in the second century, despite the popularity of memory studies in Jesus scholarship. I am interested in the social and ideological constraints of memory, particularly as they relate to the developing reputation of key historical figures within the context of later social need. Rooted in these explorations of tradition, social memory and image construction, the end of the chapter offers a brief narration of how Paul became “Paul” in the second century as well as a critique of positivist discourses on the “real” Paul. The discussions throughout the chapter will be, by and large, theoretical. At various spots I will make suggestive comments about how

these concepts should affect our understanding of Pauline traditions in the second
century, but a full-scale application of theories and methods will have to wait for
Chapters Four and Five, where I begin to work much of this out in an extended way for 3
*Corinthians* and Irenaeus’ *Adversus haereses*.

**Tradition**

The distinction between the “real” Paul vs. the Paul of “tradition,” beginning with
F.C. Baur in the nineteenth century, was birthed as part of a larger cultural and
intellectual movement of several centuries wherein “tradition” had fallen on hard times in
the West. Edward Shils, David Gross and others have narrated the demise of “tradition”
and “traditional societies” in both the new social arrangements of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as well as the intellectual movements of that period (Enlightenment
and Progressive thinking), the latter of which elevated empiricism, rationality, industry,
individuality, creativity, the present, and, most importantly, the open future as the *sine
quibus non* of the modern experience.\(^{310}\) Once the wisdom of the fathers or any other
“given” was shown to serve the needs of those in power, and the institutional control
necessary for suppressing the contestation of such traditions collapsed, modernity was
birthed.\(^{311}\) Hans-Georg Gadamer described this project as the attempt to rid society of all

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prior prejudices.\textsuperscript{312} For Aquinas and other Scholastic figures, tradition (\textit{auctoritas} or \textit{consuetudo}) was equal in authority with \textit{ratio} and \textit{Scriptura}.\textsuperscript{313} But the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the later Romantic movement, while still “traditional,” inasmuch as they looked backward for their inspiration (to the pristine eras of the classical and apostolic periods), in a strange and unintended way provided the initial fuel for the intellectual tradition that led, finally, to Karl Marx’s proclamation that “The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”\textsuperscript{314} For Marx, tradition, like religion, provided a false-consciousness. Reality was something altogether different, just as, for many modern interpreters of Paul, the “canonical” Paul has completely obscured the “real” Paul of the “authentic” letters.\textsuperscript{315} Concerning “self-evident” truths, or what we are calling here tradition, Friedrich Nietzsche proclaimed:

\begin{quote}
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.\textsuperscript{316}
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}

\textsuperscript{312} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 276.


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But this signification of tradition as something unitary, static, all-encompassing, and perpetuated by elites was the necessary creation of modernity itself. To position itself as the bearer of progress, the Enlightenment eviscerated all progressive elements from its conception of tradition. It also constructed a vision of authority that meant nothing more than “blind obedience.” But what if tradition is something much more complex? Gadamer argued that tradition is the necessary means by which subjects in the present make sense of the past as it relates to the future: “The prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.” More important, for Gadamer, the present necessarily transforms what it receives, making tradition a progressive rather than a static phenomenon.

Leaving aside the ideologically infused wrangling over tradition for a moment, I want to tease out Gadamer’s theses in light of several more recent theoretical appraisals of the concept. What is “tradition”? Edward Shils, in his monumental *Tradition*, espoused a rather totalizing definition. He identified a “tradition,” or *tradtum*, as “anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present,” including “images of persons.” More recent, though not dissimilar, is Delwin Brown’s assertion

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319 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 279-80. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (trans. J. Cumming; New York: Herder and Herder, 1972 [1944]), 3-42, argued that the Enlightenment, while propagating a claim to “the autonomy of ideas” (i.e. – their own), was no less “totalitarian” or dictatorial in the propagation of its own sacred tradition (mythology) than the superstitious ancients whom it was trying to displace.


that traditions contain not only ideas, but also include “communal symbols and stories, institutional structures, moral practices, ritual actions, aesthetic sensibilities, personal feelings, etc. . . they are a mélange of these discursive and non-discursive practices, social and individual activities, spontaneous and formalized actions, analytical and affective processes.” Tradition, then, includes both conscious and unconscious features, though it is often characterized by its more tacit elements. And like “memory,” which will be discussed below, “tradition” can function as an “overarching concept for cultural theory.” Once Karl Mannheim (again, see below) challenged the givenness of even Marxist critiques of ideology, “tradition” was untethered to serve as a broadly applied heuristic for cultural analysis, leading to its “inflationary use” today. Its conceptual usefulness seems to be rooted in at least two key observations: “the

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325 Wiedenhofer, “Tradition – History – Memory,” 380. Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), has argued that such totalizing concepts as tradition, culture, presuppositions, tacit knowledge, worldview, practices, habitus, and paradigms have functioned as quasi-objects that have a causal relationship to individual habits. He argues that the reification of these concepts in social theory does not explain how individuals, through trial and error and cognition, develop habits. These terms have some descriptive value, but little explanatory power. He concludes, “The picture that I have developed here is one in which practices is a word not for some sort of mysterious hidden collective object, but for the individual formations of habit that are the condition for the performances and emulations that make up life.” (123). The reviews of Turner have been quite critical. Cf. Robert Alford, Contemporary Sociology 24 (1995): 705-7; James Bohman, History and Theory 36 (1997): 93-107; Neil Gross, Theory and Society 27 (1998): 117-27; Mikael Hård, Technology and Culture 37 (1996): 652-3; and Daniel Little, Ethics 106 (1996): 665-6, among many others.
anomalous persistence of patterns of behaviour . . . and the difficulty of understanding other cultures.”

When we say that Paul had become a “traditioned” figure by the second century, we mean that certain increasingly complex traditions about the Apostle were handed down early on from one generation to the next, including particular Pauline images. As we will see in subsequent chapters, these complex Pauline traditions, though often presented as obvious and coherent wholes, are, in fact, amalgams of smaller traditions that, when fashioned together in particular combinations at particular times, produced further unique traditions in particular social locations. As Shils states, “A tradition of belief contains constituent beliefs about many particular things.” Or further:

The [religious] tradition is usually put forth by learned believers as homogenous in composition and unilinear in interpretation. These self-interpretations are however incorrect. Every major tradition is a product of the confluence of contributory traditions, not only at its origin but in the course of its history.

A tradition, then, is not only a thing in itself, but is also the “chain of transmitted variants of a tradition.” This chain extends, from the present, both backward and forward. But to describe tradition as a “chain of transmitted variants of a tradition” still lacks the bite of tradition as an event/process/action (Latin: tradere). Gadamer understood tradition as Erfahrung (experience as “integrative process”) and Geschehen


Each subject of the chain is an actor/actress in history. Tradition is the “back-and-forth movement between the claims of the past and our appropriation of it (meaning our action in the world) . . . the human mode of being historical.” The process is a continuous and simultaneous handing down “from” and a handing down “to.” It assumes three locative and temporal places. Moreover, the traditioning process is always culturally situated in history, and thus contingent on a variety of exigencies. It is a constant negotiation of “two horizons,” to use the language of Gadamer – “the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.” Each chain of the tradition “participate[s] in the evolution of the tradition, and hence further determine[s] it [himself/herself].” Thus, despite the attempts of heresiologists like Irenaeus to protect the apostolic deposit (cf. Chapter Five), traditions are subject to a variety of kinds of pressures to change over the course of time. This is how they ultimately endure through time and space.

Traditions, then, are not fixed, hegemonic entities against which progress can be positioned. Progressives, who often see their contributions as breaking entirely new ground, free from the constraints of older traditions, are often blind to their own dependence on earlier progress and to the tradition of progressivity itself. Marcion should not be seen as an isolated individual who had a personal affinity for Paul and

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334 Gross, Past in Ruins, 13.

335 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 293.

forced everyone else to deal with him. We must ask about how Marcion received Paul. In what kind of Pauline tradition did he stand such that Galatians was the hermeneutical lens through which Paul should be read? And from where did this tradition develop? John Knox argued, for instance, that Marcion was raised on a collection of Paul’s letters, interpreted without reference to the LXX. 337 Whether Knox was right or not, this is the kind of imaginative historical reconstruction that takes the force of tradition seriously. Causality is not simple, but a complex web of interdependent variables. 338 Gadamer reminds, “the perspectives that result from the experience of historical change are always in danger of being exaggerated because they forget what persists unseen.” 339 As to the ubiquity of tradition, David Gross argues, “Wherever there is enculturation or socialization there is some element of tradition, and wherever there is a store of background information that people draw upon as tacit knowledge, some amount of tradition is present.” 340 Only those who are attuned to “substantive traditionality,” which, according to Shils, is “the appreciation of the accomplishments and wisdom of the past and of the institutions especially impregnated with tradition, as well as the desirability of regarding patterns inherited from the past as valid guides,” can see the chain of the progressive tradition. 341 Jaroslav Pelikan similarly argued that a “leap of progress” ought


338 Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 73.

339 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxiv.


341 Shils, Tradition, 21.
to be viewed as a running rather than a standing broad jump. Gadamer’s “historically
effected consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) is similar to Shils’
“substantive traditionality.” He saw authentic human experience as the confession of
finitude and historicity. “Hermeneutical experience,” in the end, “is concerned with
tradition.”

Though susceptible to progress and change, traditions are resistant to wholesale
alteration and preserve a traceable core through the traditioning process. This is due to
their history of usefulness for the construction of meaning. “Beliefs which have been
known to work are generally not lightly discarded.” They have not been “arbitrarily
accumulated.” Rather, they are the prejudices that provide the “common meaning”
necessary for social and cultural cohesion. Traditions are particularly resistant to
blanket change within short periods of time.

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dichotomy between tradition and insight breaks down under the weight of history itself. A ‘leap of
progress’ is not a standing broad jump, which begins at the line of where we are now; it is a running broad
jump through where we have been to where we go next.”


344 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 358. Emphasis his. Cf. also 360: “A person who does not admit that he is
dominated by prejudices will fail to see what manifests itself by their light.”

“Accordingly, our received traditions are complex blends of truditum and traditio in dynamic interaction,
dynamic interpenetration, and dynamic interdependence.” He is addressing the tension between continuity
and change in the Jewish Scriptural tradition.

346 Shils, *Tradition*, 204.

347 Shils, *Tradition*, 205. Cf. 198: “One of the main reasons why what is given by the past is so widely
accepted is that it permits life to move along lines set and anticipated from past experience and thus subtly
converts the anticipated into the inevitable and the inevitable into the acceptable.”


Cultural Criticism,” in *Tradition and Tradition Theories*, 233.
Oftentimes only the outsider to a particular tradition can see its unique mix of continuity and change over an extended period, whereas the adherent normally conceives of himself/herself as standing within something that is ancient and unchanged:

but what makes it a tradition is that what are thought to be the essential elements are recognizable by an external observer as being approximately identical at successive steps or acts of transmission and possession . . . Conversely, tradition might undergo very great changes but its recipients might regard it as significantly unchanged. What they are experiencing is rather a sense of filiation with a lineage of prior possessors of a tradition which, in any two successive generations, changes by variations so small as not to be perceived as significant changes.  

Irenaeus, as we will see in Chapter Five, constructs an image of Paul that he deems “natural.” He views his own reading of the Apostle as largely continuous with the Apostle himself. The heresiologist has a “sense of filiation” with his Paul. He is unaware, as an insider, that his reception of the Pauline tradition has been shaped in the century after Paul’s death by a number of external social forces and that he has made his own contributions to the developing Pauline tradition.  

While traditions do not die easily, some have argued that they can be invented without difficulty, particularly when perpetuated by elites to serve their own ends. Eric Hobsbawm, whose edited volume with Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, has become quite influential among some theorists of tradition, describes an “invented tradition” as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of

350 Shils, Tradition, 14. Cf. also Gross, Past in Ruins, 18, and Turner, Social Theory of Practices, 84: “Yet each of these small changes may well have seemed, from the point of view of the participants, to preserve ‘sameness’ in the sense that was relevant to them. At no point, perhaps, did they have any sense of the ‘inaccessibility’ of the culture of their parents or teachers. If the past is another country, it did not become so overnight.”

351 Cf. Shils, Tradition, 45: “Such modifications of the received occur even when the tradition is regarded as sacrosanct and the innovator might in good conscience insist that he is adhering to the traditions as received.”
behaviour by repetition, which automatically \textit{implies} continuity with the past.\footnote{352} They are traditions that “appear or claim” antiquity, but in the end “are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.”\footnote{353} Hobsbawm understands tradition, in general, as inflexible, whereas custom exhibits a “combination of flexibility in substance and formal adherence to precedent.”\footnote{354} As an example, Hobsbawm calls what a judge does “custom,” while “the wig, robe and other formal paraphernalia and ritualized practices” are invented tradition – an attempt to give a sense of historical invariance to the process of adjudicating legal disputes.\footnote{355} They are the authorizing elements of the judicial custom. Because for Hobsbawm traditions do not flex and change over space and time, invented traditions are the necessary products of rapid and robust social change. They replace older traditions that are no longer useful and/or sustainable.\footnote{356}

Hobsbawm’s thesis has been criticized in a number of ways. We will return to it again below when we take up the “politics of memory.” For the meantime, we should note that the rhetoric of the “invention of tradition” only retains power when one posits a particularly inflexible notion of tradition, as have Hobsbawm and a long list of modernist thinkers. For Hobsbawm, tradition is never “adaptive, constructive, or creative.”\footnote{357} It cannot evolve to fit the needs of new social realities. He seems to have confused the


\footnote{354}{Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 2.}

\footnote{355}{Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 2-3.}

\footnote{356}{Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 4-5.}

\footnote{357}{Phillips, “What is Tradition When It is Not ‘Invented’?,” 5-6.}
rhetoric of staunch loyalists within a tradition with how tradition actually works (cf. Gadamer and Shils). 358

Hobsbawm also seems to gloss over the fact that traditions are complexes of prior, smaller traditions, which, like tributaries, provide the momentum for larger streams of tradition. Even the Ebionites’ maliciously “invented” story (according to Epiphanius, Pan. 30.16.8-9) about Paul’s Gentile birth in Tarsus, subsequent conversion to Judaism to win the love of the high priest’s daughter, and eventual preaching against Judaism because of love unattained, is constrained, to a degree, by the early and broad tradition of Paul as Apostle to (and really “among”) the Gentiles.

But Hobsbawm was right in claiming that for those inside of a particular tradition, including the progressive, the tradition has normative power. 359 Replication across time is not enough to identify something as a tradition. The replication must occur for the sole reason that it was previously enacted. 360 This normative power, in a way, takes the form of belief. There is an existential trust in the authority of the tradition’s origin as well as its careful transmission over time and space. 361 This is what distinguishes a tradition from a custom, which normally lacks the full-scale “prescriptive power” of a tradition. 362

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358 Cf. Phillips, “What is Tradition When It is Not ‘Invented’?,” 6: “A simple opposition between ‘genuine’ and ‘invented’ traditions is unworkable. It corresponds to nothing we know about the transmission of culture, either in the conditions of modern West or elsewhere.”

359 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 280; Shils, Tradition, 24; Gross, Past in Ruins, 10; Schochet, “Tradition as Politics and the Politics of Tradition,” in Questions of Tradition, 305.

360 Gross, Past in Ruins, 8. Cf. Gordon Schochet, “Tradition as Politics and the Politics of Tradition,” 300: “There are few defences of authority that work so well as the invocation of historical continuity.”

361 Pieper, Tradition, 18, 23-35.

362 Gross, Past in Ruins, 12.
Most important, as Delwin Brown argues, tradition acts within a canonical structure. It is the continual “reconstruction of a canonical inheritance.” But like most canons, traditions are “internally diverse” and “never fully coherent,” and thus are susceptible to change from within. Endogenous changes to the tradition are the result of some perceived inconsistency within the tradition itself, provoking improvements through rationalization, correction and imagination. While these kinds of changes “proceed from a state of satisfaction with much of the tradition,” they are changes, nonetheless. They are predicated, according to Donald Marshall, on an “epistemological crisis.” These changes include “minor reformulations, clarifying definitions, differentiating categories or grouping them under more general categories, resolving apparent contradictions, and restoring the unity of the body of belief, which had been diminished by critical analysis.” Like culture itself, as James Clifford has shown, tradition is not a coherent whole, but possesses various pieces of different age and origin in “continuous negotiation.”

Endogenous changes are often provoked by and hard to distinguish from exogenous changes, the latter of which result from traditions being locatively and temporally transposed and encountering other traditions with which they need to become


365 Shils, Tradition, 213.


368 Shils, Tradition, 215.

The circumstances that once made the traditions useful no longer obtain, so they are updated. This updating allows them to survive as living traditions through time and space.

Regardless of the cause, changes in tradition normally find as their resources aspects of the tradition itself, particularly elements of the tradition that were not as useful in the past. A newly positioned piece of the tradition causes the once privileged elements to be “reinterpreted through the lens provided by the new center.” The variegated canon is, in a sense, rearranged in order to provide greater “efficacy” for its new social and cultural environment. The alteration of traditions, then, is normally an act of “recovery and reconfiguration of elements internal to the tradition.” In this sense, there is little difference between tradition and interpretation. Michael Fishbane concludes (on the traditions in the Hebrew Bible):

> each solidification of the *traditum* was the canon in process of its formation; and each stage of canon-formation was a new achievement in *Gemeindebildung*, in the formation of an integrated book-centered culture. The inner-biblical dynamic of *traditum-traditio* is thus culturally constitutive and regenerative in the most profound sense.

The highly diverse nature of what I am calling the “earliest layer of the Pauline tradition” (cf. Chapter One) provided the kind of variegated canon whereby second-century communities could easily shift forward and backward the necessary pieces from within

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375 *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, 18.
the tradition to provide updated readings of the Apostle that were more amenable to new cultural locations.

Finally, despite the claims of their adherents, apparently competing traditions often display family-like characteristics.\textsuperscript{376} This is mainly due to the fluid boundaries and composite nature of traditions. Smaller elements of larger, competing traditions sometimes exhibit remarkably consistent features, regularly leading to “embarrassment when such an overlapping is discovered.”\textsuperscript{377} But rather than give ground, the devoted often dig in their heels and deny these similarities.\textsuperscript{378} In Chapter Five we will explore, for instance, Irenaeus’ frustration that his opponents also laid claim to 1 Corinthians 15.50.\textsuperscript{379} Since this text had made its way into the Pauline tradition of both the Valentinians and the proto-orthodox, skirmishes over the Pauline tradition had to operate at the level of interpretation, requiring reorganization of canonical Pauline materials to suit the preferred reading.

Measuring Pauline Traditions in the Second Century: Image, Text, and Tradition

Inasmuch as Paul was a traditioned figure in the second century, the various developing complex Pauline \textit{tradita} that we find in a variety of early Christian texts were comprised of multiple kinds of smaller \textit{tradita}. As discussed in Chapter Two, a majority of scholars now hold, contra Rensberger, that the various Pauline traditions of the second century must be measured by describing both their use of Pauline letters as well as their

\textsuperscript{376} Shils, \textit{Tradition}, 266, 272.

\textsuperscript{377} Shils, \textit{Tradition}, 270.

\textsuperscript{378} Shils, \textit{Tradition}, 270.

\textsuperscript{379} Cf. Chapter Five for more on this.
invocations of developing Pauline images (cf. Lindemann, de Boer, Bovon, Aageson and Marguerat, among others). While in broad agreement with this trend, I want to push it a bit farther here, arguing that images of the Apostle are foundational in the use and interpretation of Pauline letters and exploring how some of the theoretical materials on imagery and textuality can help inform the discussion on how we measure what is going on with the Pauline tradition in the second century.

Our earliest evidence suggests that we cannot separate the tasks of trying to understand the variety of developing authoritative images of Paul (remember, “images of persons,” according to Shils, are traditions) and of exploring the use of his letters in the Christian literature of the second century. A number of texts at the end of the first and the beginning of the second centuries already commingle honorific titles for Paul with references to his letters:

- **I Clement 47.1-4**

  Ἀναλάβετε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ µακαρίου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου. 2 τὶ πρῶτον ύµῖν ἐν ἄρχῃ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἔγραψεν; 3 ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ πνευµατικῶς ἐπέστειλεν ύµῖν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ Κηφᾶ τε καὶ Ἀπολλώ, διὰ τὸ καὶ τότε προσκλίσεις ύµᾶς πεποίηθαι. 4 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πρόσκλισις ἐκείνη ἥττονα ἁµαρτίαν ύµῖν προσήνεγκεν· προσεκλίθητε γὰρ ἀποστόλοις µεµαρτυρηµένοις καὶ ἀνδρὶ δεδοκιµασµένῳ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς.

  “Take up the epistle of the blessed Apostle Paul. 2 What did he write to you at first, at the beginning of his proclamation of the gospel? 3 Truly, he sent you a letter in the Spirit about himself and Cephas and Apollos, because even then you were divided into parties. 4 But that partisanship brought you to a lesser sin, for you were inclined toward approved apostles and a man recognized by them.”

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2 Peter 3.15b-16

καθὼς καὶ ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἡµῶν ἀδελφὸς Παῦλος κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ σοφίαν ἔγραψεν ύµῖν, ὡς καὶ ἐν πάσαις ἐπιστολαῖς λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων, ἐν αἷς ἐστὶν δυσνόητα τινα, ἃ οἱ ἀµαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι στρεβλοῦσιν ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφὰς πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν ἀπώλειαν.

“Just as our beloved brother Paul wrote to you according to the wisdom given to him, speaking about these things as he also does in all his letters, in which certain things are hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable distort to their own destruction, as they also do with the rest of the Scriptures.”

Ignatius, Ephesians 12.2

πάροδός ἐστε τῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀναιρουµένων, Παύλου συµµ ύσται, τοῦ ἡγιασµένου, τοῦ µεµαρτυρηµένου, ἀξιοµακαρίστου, ὃς γένοιτό µοι ὑπὸ τὰ ἴχνη εὑρεθῆναι, όταν θεοῦ ἐπιτύχω, ὃς ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ µνηµονεύει ύµῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

“You are a passageway for those condemned to death for God; you are fellow initiates of Paul, the sanctified, the martyred, the most worthy of blessing, at whose feet may I be found when I attain to God, who in every letter mentions you in Christ Jesus.”

Polycarp, Philippians 3.2

οὔτε γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε ἄλλος ὁµοίος ἐµοὶ δύναται κατακολουθήσαι τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ µαχαρίου καὶ ἐνδόξου Παύλου, δς γενόµενος ἐν ύµῖν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων ἐδίδαξεν ἀκριβῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸν περὶ ἀληθείας λόγον, δς καὶ ἀπὸν ύµῖν ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολάς, εἰς ὃς ἐπὶ ἐγκύπτητε, δυνηθήσετε οἰκοδοµεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν δοθεῖσαν ύµῖν πίστιν.


“For neither I, nor another like me, can approach the wisdom of the blessed and glorious Paul. When he was among you, he carefully and reliably taught the word of truth before those alive at that time. When he was absent, he also wrote you letters, in which, if you look closely, you will be able to be built up in the faith given to you.”

- Polycarp, *Philippians* 11.2-3

  "Qui autem non potest se in his gubernare, quomodo alii pronuntiat hoc? Si quis non se abstinuerit ab avaritia, ab idolatria coinquinabitur et tamquam inter gentes iudicabitur, qui ignorant iudicium domini. Aut nescimus, quia sancti mundum iudicabunt? Sicut Paulus docet. Ego autem nihil tale sensi in vobis vel audivi, in quibus laboravit beatus Paulus, qui estis in principio epistulae eius. De vobis etenim gloriatur in omnibus ecclesiis, quae deum solae tunc cognoverant; nos autem nondum cognoveramus.

“For if one cannot govern himself in such things, how will he proclaim this to others? If one does not abstain from covetousness, he will be defiled by idolatry and will be judged among the peoples who are ignorant of the judgment of the Lord. Or do we not recognize that “the saints will judge the world?,” as Paul teaches. But I have neither sensed nor heard of any such thing in your midsts, among whom the blessed Paul labored and who are mentioned in the beginning of his Epistle. For he magnified you among all the churches, which alone knew God at that time; but we had not yet known Him.”

Behind each of these honorific titles, “our beloved brother,” “the blessed [Apostle],” “the most worthy of blessing,” “the approved Apostle,” “the sanctified,” “the martyred,” and “the glorious,” stands a mental image of the Apostle, an image that is part of a particular narrative about the Apostle’s significance within early Christian history and identity. These titles, like all of those outlined in Table 1 (cf. Chapter One), are descriptive handles for a larger set of traditions, mostly oral, about the Apostle that were developing into the second century. But the traditions were apparently already in contact and being combined with Pauline letters, as each of the texts above suggests. Even the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, which provides the earliest detailed attempt to provide a fixed image of Paul

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384 A discussion of mental imagery follows below.
(cf. Chapter Two), also appears to be in dialogue with earlier Pauline texts (e.g. – the Pastoral Epistles and 1 Corinthians).\(^{385}\) The data suggest that the reception of the Pauline Epistles was intimately bound up with developing, authoritive images of Paul. For scholars of the early Pauline tradition, both aspects, text and image, must be held together and brought into dialogue in order to provide a thick description of Paul as a \textit{persona} in the second century.\(^{386}\) Creative and fresh readings of authoritive Pauline literature worked to undergird particular pre-conceived constructions of Paul, but given their early collection and dissemination, the Pauline literature was also an important vehicle for carrying “the Apostle” into Christendom.\(^{387}\) The processes of image construction and textual reception and interpretation were and continue to be synthetically related. We cannot divorce, then, the earliest written Pauline traditions from the earliest orally-traditioned images of the Apostle. Nowhere is this clearer than at the end of Book Four of Irenaeus’ \textit{Adversus haereses} (4.14.4; \textit{ll.} 86-9, 91-3), cited in full in Chapter One, where he laments that “heretics . . . have altogether misunderstood what Paul has spoken” (\textit{et quaecumque ab haerticis in totum non intellegentibus quae a Paulo dicta sunt alias acceperunt}).\(^{385}\)


\(^{386}\) Cf. Aageson, \textit{Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church}, 8: “it is not just Paul’s letters or his theology that are significant for the early church but also his personal legacy and the authority that brings to bear.” Again, a “thick description,” as opposed to a “thin description,” attempts to describe individual performances (in this case, a citation or echo of a Pauline text) within larger networks of meaning (in this case, a total understanding of Paul as a \textit{persona}).

\(^{387}\) Cf. Chapter Two on the collection of the Pauline letter corpus.
interpretations explanare). In his assessment there were egregious misinterpretations of Pauline texts that had gone unchallenged and needed refutation. In this same passage, Irenaeus promises to “expound the Apostle” (*Apostolum exponere*) and to show that, in fact, Paul was a “preacher of the truth and that he taught all things agreeable to the preaching of the truth” (*Apostolum vero praedicatorem esse veritatis et omnia consonantia veritatis praecoonio docuisse*). The image of Paul as “preacher of the truth” was at stake in the interpretation of his texts. More important, providing an image (*Bild*) of the apostle that fit within the bounds of the received “rule of faith” (cf. Chapter Five below) played a critical part in preserving proto-orthodox tradition/culture (*Bildung*). It appears, at least in the case of Irenaeus and arguably others, that images of the Apostle that fit within perceived theological norms seem to be primary, while textual interpretation served to achieve this desired end. This latter suggestion both advances and pushes beyond the current consensus, ordering the various comingled elements (theology, image, text) of any given Pauline tradition in an attempt to move past the wrangling over particular Pauline texts in the second century and ask about the larger contexts in which the hermeneutical task occurs.

Each of the developing Pauline traditions of the second century, whether simple or complex, whether based in oral or textual materials or both, ultimately provides a particular image of Paul. These images of the Apostle were the primary means through which his significance was transmitted in early Christian cognition. In what follows, I survey both modern as well as ancient theoretical work on orality, textuality and mental imagery as a way of informing my particular claims here about the priority of images in the contestation over Paul’s legacy in early Christianity.

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In exploring the production of traditioned images, it will be helpful first to
dissolve any particularly dichotomous understanding of the relationship between
(written) texts and (oral) tradition. Pauline texts and oral traditions about the Apostle
worked together in the production of Pauline images. Written texts are snapshots in time
of a particular living, oral tradition. Despite the rhetoric of fundamentalist, textually-
driven communities, who view texts as inspired points within the flux of human tradition,
texts do reflect wider communal traditions at the time of their writing (in addition to the
unique contributions of their authors). They function as materially fixed communicative
expressions of tradition, or what Gadamer, citing Johann Gustav Droysen, calls
“enduringly fixed expressions of life.”

But even as objectified and “fixed expressions” of a community’s traditions,
authoritative texts can only continue to communicate through a “hermeneutical
conversation” with later interpreters, whose own subjectivity/historicity is the decisive
factor in understanding. This fusion of horizons between text and interpreter, to use
the language of Gadamer, results in the destruction of rigid boundaries between text and
tradition, between something fixed and something in flux. The text is part of the tradition
and, as experience teaches us, is open to updated readings within the community. In this
sense, it is not fixed. Michael Fishbane reminds, “Indeed, it is a commonplace in
traditional Judaism and Christianity (Roman and Orthodox) to affirm that revelation is

Methodologie der Geschichte (ed. R. Hübner; Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1937), 63. Cf. Gross, Past in
Ruins, 102: “If they [texts] come from the past, they capture and crystallize not tradition as such but a
certain moment in the tradition. That moment is etched into the text and then passed down exactly as it
was, with the same sentences, statements, and meanings that were there at the instant it was written.” Cf.
also Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 18: “But the memory of manuscript culture
represented less an opening into history (conceived as an appreciation of the reality of change) than an
attempt to hold onto the wisdom of time immemorial derived from oral tradition.”

comprehensible only through the authoritative tradition of interpretation. To the
historically minded, this transformation – and it occurred early – is nothing short of
remarkable. The protest of the Reformers, ‘sola scriptura’, stands out in sharp relief
against this background.”

On the other side of the false dichotomy, oral traditions are often informed by
written texts. The introduction of written texts into oral/aural communities does not
cause oral traditions to cease. “Rather, people incorporated them [texts] into their
traditions just as some literate persons incorporated traditions into writings.”
“Textual communities” arise, according to Brian Stock, when oral/aural communities begin to
grapple with the increasing presence of authoritative, written texts in their midst.
Whereas previous studies posited a linear, evolutionary development from orality (fixed,
resistant to change) to literacy (progressive, open to change), Stock argues that even in
largely literate societies there exists a symbiotic relationship between writing and orality,
linked together by a more broadly conceived vision of “textuality.”

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391 Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, 2. Cf. Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: a Study of
Memory in Medieval Culture (2nd ed.; Cambridge Studies in Medieval Culture; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008 [1990]), 13: “True fundamentalism understands words not as signs or clues but
takes them as things in themselves . . . Fundamentalism denies legitimacy to interpretation.”

392 Jan Vansina, the great ethnographer of Africa, describes oral traditions as “verbal messages which are
reported statements from the past beyond the present generation . . . There must be transmission by word of
mouth over at least a generation” (Oral Tradition as History, 27-8).

393 Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, 156.

394 Brian Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past (Parallax: Re-visions of Culture and

395 For earlier studies on literacy cf. Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977); The Interface between the Written and the Oral (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the
Word (London: Routledge, 2002 [1982]).
reflection. Oral performances, then, including the public reading of written texts, contribute to the construction of textual communities through aural reception. Stock conceives of culture as “more like a game, in which a central place is reserved for interactive play” and works to show the interdependence between oral and written texts in the construction of medieval culture, which has often been wrongly characterized as a predominantly oral culture. The introduction of written traditions into largely oral societies is a technological advance, but Stock insists that “societies that lack writing nonetheless record, remember, and transmit verbal texts whose grip on norms, values, and traditions is no less tenacious than that of writing.”

Mary Carruthers argues similarly. For Carruthers, antiquity (including the Middle Ages) was a “memorial culture.” While books (written texts) were important, “in a memorial culture, a ‘book’ is only one way among several to remember a ‘text,’ to provision and cue one’s memory with ‘dicta et facta memorabilia.’” She reminds us that the Latin textus comes from a verb meaning ‘to weave’ and argues that “it is in the institutionalizing of a story through memoria that textualizing occurs.” The mode of memorializing, whether written or oral or some combination of the two, makes little significant difference. Carruthers’ project is concerned with the praxes whereby memory was trained in the Middle Ages. She is particularly interested in deconstructing the oft-held position that the rise in literacy meant a concomitant decline in the importance of

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396 Listening for the Text, 7.
397 Listening for the Text, 10.
398 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 9-10.
399 Carruthers, Book of Memory, 14.
memory within a given culture. Rather, she shows how written texts (books) work to train memory in a variety of ways.  

Carruthers’ work is deeply indebted to classical theories of memory and cognition, which have been corroborated by modern cognitive scientists. Beginning as early as classical antiquity (Plato and Aristotle), the mind and its perceptions were viewed as a wax tablet upon which the senses impressed images:

Imagine . . . that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is comparatively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of just the right consistency . . . Let us call it the gift of the Muses’ mother, Memory, and say that whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might stamp the impression of a seal ring. Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as the image remains; whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in leaving an impression we have forgotten and do not know. (Plato, Theaetetus 191D-E);

The change that occurs marks [the body] in a sort of imprint, as it were, of the sense-image, as people do who seal things with signet-rings. (Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscencia 450a);

[M]emory . . . is in a manner the twin sister of written speech [litteratura] and is completely similar to it [perisimilis], [though] in a dissimilar medium. For just as script consists of marks indicating letters and of the material on which those marks are imprinted, so the structure of memory, like a wax tablet, employs places [loci] and in these gathers together [collocate] images like letters. (Cicero, Partitiones oratoria 26).  

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400 Carruthers, Book of Memory, 18: “In none of the evidence is the act of writing itself regarded as a supplanter of memory, not even in Plato’s Phaedrus. Rather books are themselves memorial cues and aids, and memory is most like a book, a written page or a wax tablet upon which something is written.”

401 Translations from Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 18, 19, 24. Emphases hers.
The inscription of sensory stimuli upon the mind brings writing and memory quite closely together from a conceptual standpoint, which is Carruthers’ driving thesis.\textsuperscript{402} For these Greek and Roman authors, the senses impress a “mental picture” on the brain.\textsuperscript{403} Vision, being the keenest of the senses, causes all sensory impressions, whether visual, aural, or otherwise, to be stamped as images on the mind for later recall.\textsuperscript{404} In Cicero’s \textit{De oratore} 2.86-87, Antonius declares that the mind best retains oral/aural experiences or other impressions about the world if “also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes.” But in the event that visual impressions are not also available, the mind registers these stimuli for recall by transforming them into “a sort of image or figure” (\textit{quasi et imago et figura}).\textsuperscript{405} In the Greek tradition these mental pictures were called \textit{phantasmata} (“representations”), or \textit{eikones} (“images”).\textsuperscript{406}

The classical tradition was carried forward into the medieval period in the work of writers like Richard de Fournival, whose \textit{Li Bestiaire d’amours} (a picture-book of animals) combined both \textit{painture} (painted images for the eye) and \textit{parole} (written descriptions for the ear) for the aid of memory.\textsuperscript{407} In its introduction he writes, “And it is the same thing with hearing a text, for when one hears a story read aloud, listening to the

\textsuperscript{402} Cf. also Jocelyn Small, \textit{Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity} (London: Routledge, 1997), who shows how classical theories on training memory and the production of books in antiquity were related.

\textsuperscript{403} Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 19.

\textsuperscript{404} Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 20, 26.

\textsuperscript{405} Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 25-6.

\textsuperscript{406} Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 20, 276.

\textsuperscript{407} Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 277. Modern French of \textit{painture} is \textit{peinture}. I have retained the older spelling of Fournival, through Carruthers.
events one sees them in the present." Both reading, whether silent or aloud, and hearing, whether one’s own voice or the voice of another, produce *painture* in the mind’s eye. Carruthers expands:

*Painture*, as Richard de Fournival’s comments make clear, is a function of words themselves, not only of what we think of as painting. Through ekphrasis and related figures, one could paint with words alone, making imaginary pictures that never seem to have been realized in what we would consider to be a pictorial way... The author is a painter, not only in that the letters he composes with have shapes themselves, but in that his words paint pictures in the minds of his readers.  

These classical and medieval notions of mental imagery have now been reaffirmed by the majority of modern theorists of cognition, despite some serious challenges along the way. Eighteenth-century philosophers (e.g. Thomas Reid) began to question the quasi-metaphysical claim that images of the world exist within our brains. By the early-twentieth century behaviorist psychologists (e.g. J.B. Watson followed by B.F. Skinner), on account of the “inherently private nature” of mental images, tried to marginalize theories based on them as unscientific. In the last fifty years a minority of cognitive psychologists (e.g. Zenon Pylyshyn) have further argued that the brain only processes information propositionally/descriptively. In this view, depictive representation is not fundamental to the process of human cognition and


410 I use the term “majority” here based on the survey results published in D. Reisberg, D.G. Pearson, and S.M. Kosslyn, “Intuitions and Introspections about Imagery: The Role of Imagery Experience in Shaping an Investigator’s Theoretical Views,” *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 17 (2003): 147-60. As of 2003, only 6% of respondents among leading psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers who had published widely-used work on mental imagery adhered to a propositional theory of mental representation alone.


internal representation. Mental images are merely epiphenomenal.\footnote{Cf. Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 3-59, for a history of recent claims against mental imagery.} What is at issue here is the format by which the brain encodes data for later recall (memory).\footnote{Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 8. Most of the relevant bibliography for mental imagery from the perspective of cognitive psychology can be found in \textit{The Case for Mental Imagery}. In addition to the bibliography found there, cf. also John T.E. Richardson, \textit{Mental Imagery and Human Memory} (New York: St. Martins, 1980); Robert G. Kunzendorf, ed., \textit{Mental Imagery} (New York: Plenum Press, 1991); Cesare Cornoldi, Robert H. Logie, Maria A. Brandimonte, Geir Kaufmann, and Daniel Reisberg, eds., \textit{Stretching the Imagination: Representation and Transformation in Mental Imagery} (Counterpoints: Cognition, Memory, and Language; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines, and Peter Slezak, eds., \textit{Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation} (Perspectives on Cognitive Science; Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004). For a philosophical defense of mental imagery, cf. Mark Rollins, \textit{Mental Imagery: on the Limits of Cognitive Science} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).}

Criticism of theories of mental imagery is often driven by the assumption that mental images $=$ mental photographs. But proponents of mental imagery make no such equation. Cicero, it will be remembered, calls them “a sort of image or figure” (\textit{quasi et imago et figura}). Carruthers, while using the misleading phrase “mental pictures” on occasion, later clarifies that mental images are only \textit{“quasi-pictures, ‘representations’ in the sense that the information stored causes a change in the brain that encodes (the modern word) or molds (the ancient one) it in a certain way and in a particular ‘place’ in the brain.”}\footnote{Carruthers, \textit{Book of Memory}, 27. Emphasis hers.} Cognitive psychologists Stephen Kosslyn, William Thompson and Giogio Ganis, representing the majority position among cognitive psychologists, which affirms the foundational nature of mental imagery in human cognition, have recently shown how neuroscientific data support the theory that the cortex has particular areas “that are specifically designed to depict patterns. These areas are \textit{topographically organized} – they preserve (roughly) the geometric structure of the retina.”\footnote{\textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 15. Emphasis theirs.} But even these
proponents of mental imagery carefully qualify what they mean by such language: “a mental image occurs when a representation of the type created during the initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually being perceived; such representations preserve the perceptible properties of the stimulus and ultimately give rise to the subjective experience of perception.”\textsuperscript{417} Like Carruthers, they understand mental images to be “quasi-pictorial,” though this in no way diminishes their ability to “depict information,” particularly spatial information.\textsuperscript{418}

Even Ludwig Wittgenstein had to clarify his “picture-theory” of language as found in the \textit{Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus}, wherein he described a proposition as “a picture of reality . . . a model of reality as we imagine it” (\textit{Tractatus} 4.01) and as “a likeness of what is signified” (\textit{Tractatus} 4.012). Verbal imagery, consequently, “like a tableau vivant . . . presents a state of affairs” (\textit{Tractatus} 4.0311).\textsuperscript{419} But as W.J.T. Mitchell reminds, Wittgenstein spent the rest of his career undoing what he believed to be false inferences from his “picture theory” of language.\textsuperscript{420} The mental images produced by language obscure reality no less than do graphic (material) images and/or language itself.\textsuperscript{421} This seems to have been recognized as early as Aristotle, who described mental images as having two features: they are both objects in their own right as well as representative images:

\textsuperscript{417} \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 4.

\textsuperscript{418} \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 38, 41-2.


\textsuperscript{420} Mitchell, \textit{Iconology}, 15.

\textsuperscript{421} Mitchell, \textit{Iconology}, 26. This same point is made by Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis, \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 41-2, for both graphic and visual imagery. Imagery, regardless of the species (graphic, optical, perceptual, mental and linguistic, to use the categories found in Mitchell), is somewhat deceptive.
Once more, if what is retained is like the original in the fashion of an impression or a copy, why is the perception of this very thing the memory of some other thing and not of it itself? It is the modification of consciousness which one engaged in remembering has present to the mind, and it is this that he perceives. How then can one remember what is not present to one? One might as well see or hear what is not present. But perhaps there is a way in which this can occur and it does really come about? That is so, for, as the animal depicted on the panel is both animal and representation, and, while remaining one self-identical thing, is yet both of these, though in aspect of existence the two are not the same, and we can regard it both as animal and as copy, so too the image in us must be considered as being both an object of direct consciousness in itself and relatively to something else an image, so far as it represents something else it is a copy and a souvenir (De memoria et reminiscencia 450b).

Much like language, images function as signs and are not identical with the objects they represent. Aristotle seems concerned not to commit the “intentional fallacy” that modern anti-depictivists try to pin on defenders of mental imagery. Mental images are a frustration to those who desire immediacy. From a Foucauldian perspective, Mitchell concludes, “instead of providing a transparent window on the world, images are now regarded as the sort of sign that presents a deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of representation, a process of ideological mystification.”

Mental imagery, then, like language, should be understood “functionally rather than mimetically.” It does not offer an unmediated picture of reality, but encodes complex information into schemes whereby simpler pictograms and/or ideograms function as a synecdoche or metonymy for a particular subject, object or scene. Take, for

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instance, Mitchell’s example of a man.\textsuperscript{425} Various kinds of signs can represent “man.” On the one end of the spectrum (say, on the farthest left) is a photograph of a man (best case scenario) or at least a detailed drawing and/or painting of a man. Further to the right is a common stick-figure drawing of a man (a pictogram). Further to the right still is the common ideogram for a man (♂). In this case, the phallus represents what it means to be “man.” We have a synecdoche. On the farthest right-hand side of the spectrum is the word “man.” What each of these means as a signifier and as an image of a man is socially negotiated and part of a complex web of cultural “practices, disputes, and agreements,” or, what we might call in the context of this chapter, “tradition.”\textsuperscript{426} Proponents of mental imagery do not deny that language is inherent to this signification process. “In fact, each point in the depiction may be accompanied by a set of propositions that codes additional information . . . Rather, the issue is whether only propositional representations are used in imagery, or whether depictive representations also play a role.”\textsuperscript{427} Each mode of internal representation works with the others to “make different sorts of information explicit and accessible.”\textsuperscript{428}

Mental images, then, give us simple ways of characterizing complex realities. While neither the amount of data stored in an image nor the total storage capacity of the brain can measured, our experience teaches us that vast quantities of unprocessed information cannot stay in our minds very long. “Perception,” then, “is a process of information reduction whereby a welter of sensations is reduced into a simpler and more

\textsuperscript{425} Mitchell, \textit{Iconology}, 26-27.

\textsuperscript{426} Mitchell, \textit{Iconology}, 30.

\textsuperscript{427} Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 19. Emphasis theirs.

\textsuperscript{428} Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, \textit{Case for Mental Imagery}, 12.
organized form.” Mental images, as signs, are “composed from highly processed perceptual encodings” and thus are efficient in storing information. They allow us to envision quickly and remember long-term. They are the biological and cognitive *ars memoria*. So while mental images do obscure, they are all we have as meaningful representations of the outside world.

In the second century, written and oral Pauline texts/traditions participated in and contributed to the process of constructing and transmitting in memory mental images of the Apostle. Oral forms of the Pauline tradition carried just as much weight as Pauline (written) texts. This was certainly the case for the author of the Acts of the Apostles in the late first century, as well as the second-century author of the *Acts of Paul*. Pauline letters were just beginning to circulate widely as collections of texts and enter into the larger Pauline tradition. Ostensibly from Paul himself, they gained authoritative status quickly. But many of the “oral histories” of members of the Apostle’s communities were still alive in this period as well.

Like Papias’ famous preference for “a living and abiding voice” (ζώσης φωνῆς καὶ μενούσης) over “books” (τῶν βιβλίων) in the construction of his *Expositions of the Sayings of the Lord* (frag. 3; Eus., *Hist. eccl.* 3.39),

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429 Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, *Case for Mental Imagery*, 43.

430 Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis, *Case for Mental Imagery*, 44.

431 Cf. Chapter Two above.

authoritative, orally transmitted stories about the apostle continued into the second
century.

Each of the images produced in these early Pauline traditions encodes information
about his *particular* significance for the early Church. In this sense, they are synecdochic
or metonymic in nature, providing handles for grasping his primary importance in the
midst of a sea of Pauline material. They are the more complex sets of tradition that stand
behind the epithets for Paul that are outlined at the beginning of this section and in
Chapter One. They are the kinds of images that De Boer and others have described in
their work on early Pauline images (cf. Chapter Two). These textually mediated images
of the Apostle (in the broad sense of textuality as seen above in Stock and Carruthers)
should not be viewed as completely transparent portrayals of Paul, but as traditions that
helped provide meaning and stability for early Christian communities as they negotiated
their early histories and cultures; histories and cultures that were intimately bound up in
communal memories of the apostolic age. Already bearing an interpretive framework,
these images frustrate access to the “real” Paul, if by that rhetoric one means a Paul
denuded of tradition. On the other hand, as traditions, images of persons always retain
some significant degree of continuity with the past, so that the rhetoric of “invention”
also loses some of its power here. Finally, from a methodological standpoint, given the
explicitly polemical contestations over Paul’s legacy found in 2 Peter, Irenaeus, Marcion,
the *Gospel of Philip* and Tertullian, scholars of early Christianity need to give
considerably more attention to the way that controlling images of the Apostle shape and
then are shaped by the interpretation of Pauline texts, with which they connected.
At the same time that Paul was taking on specific images within individual communities, he was also becoming “the Apostle,” in a broader sense, not just to Marcion, the Valentinians, and classical Gnostic texts like the *Reality of the Rulers*, but to proto-orthodox thinkers like Irenaeus and Tertullian (cf. Chapter One). Peter, James, John, Thomas and others were certainly apostles in the early Christian tradition. But Paul was “the Apostle” for a variety of often competing Christian groups. The second half of this chapter explores the theoretical material necessary for appropriately connecting these developments: the elevation of Paul in comparison with other Apostles in much of second-century Christian tradition and the specific, meaningful images of the Apostle that appear in the various Christian groups who memorialize him. In discussing the nature of tradition as well as the image-producing power of written and oral texts, we have begun to approach what is really at stake in the construction of Pauline images: early Christian memory-making. Memory, which we have already encountered in the work of Carruthers, is the necessary conceptual heuristic both for tying together these developments into a plausible narrative of the rise of “Paul” among the various fragmented trajectories of tradition that carried him to any number of Christian communities as well as for describing how particular synecdochic Pauline image traditions are constructed within the bounds of perceived authoritative norms. There will be very little direct application of theoretical materials to the Pauline material of the second century until the last section of the chapter, once all of the requisite theoretical pieces are in place; and then, we can only provide a suggestive framework for understanding the regnant Pauline Fragmentation narrative as a whole (cf. Chapter Two).
The attempt to trace one particular trajectory of the Pauline tradition in 3 Corinthians (cf. Chapter Four) and Adversus haereses (cf. Chapter Five) will supply examples of the kind of robust exegesis necessary for beginning to fill out the frame.

As a normative version of the past, memory is, conceptually, quite close to tradition. The recent explosion of interest in the study of memory among psychologists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, artists, philosophers and theologians suggests that, like tradition, it is now “the quintessential interdisciplinary interest.” In the view of Patrick Hutton, anyone who is interested in “habit, recollection, commemoration, image-making, representation, and tradition” must consider the role of memory. Of particular interest for this study are the social factors that shape individual memory. As members of Christian communities, those who wrote about Paul and/or interpreted his texts for their communities were facilitated by the formative memories/traditions of those same communities.

All memory is, to some degree, socially conditioned. This was the great contribution of Maurice Halbwachs, the father of collective memory studies, to whom we will return shortly. Halbwachs, writing in the first half of the twentieth century, was

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435 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 1.

436 Cf. Shils, Tradition, 263: “The boundaries of a tradition are in one respect the boundaries of adherence of collectivities defined by their community of beliefs; in another respect they are the boundaries of symbolic constructions.”

part of the burgeoning field that we now call the sociology of knowledge. As a realm of inquiry, Karl Mannheim described the sociology of knowledge as the attempt “to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence.” It has “set itself the task of solving the problem of the social conditioning of knowledge by boldly recognizing these relations and drawing them into the horizon of science itself and using them as checks on the conclusions of our research.” Writing almost four decades later, though still heavily indebted to Mannheim, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann described the sociology of knowledge as being “concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.”

Mannheim is considered the father of a strict sociology of knowledge because he pushed beyond Marx. While Marx argued that ideologies are false constructs perpetuated by the political elite to ensure their own economic prosperity, Mannheim went one step further. He argued for what he called a “total conception of ideology,” which “does not criticize thought on the level of the assertions themselves, which may involve deceptions and disguises, but examines them on the structural or noological level, which it views as not necessarily being the same for all men, but rather as allowing the

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440 Other important figures for the sociology of knowledge, in addition to Marx and Mannheim, include Nietzsche, Max Scheller, who coined the term “sociology of knowledge” in his Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (1925), and Wilhelm Dilthey. Cf. Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality, 1-19, for a short history of these figures.
same object to take on different forms and aspects in the course of social development." Ideology, in this total conception, is void of moralizing inferences (contra Marx). All individual perceptions of the world (of “reality”), of our smaller communities within it, and of members inside the community (including ourselves), both past and present, are shaped by our social relationships. None are excluded from the clutch of social forces. Epistemology must reckon with the social fact. Mannheim emphasized the simple observation that “it is not men in general who think, or even isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations characterizing their common position.” Humans are not just *homo sapiens* but, more fundamentally, “*homo socius*.” All knowledge is existential. But existence only happens in groups. In Appendix One, I will argue that modern, interested discourses on the “real” Paul have not yet moved out from under Marx.

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441 *Ideology and Utopia*, 238. Emphasis his. Mannheim also pushed past Marx in arguing that other factors beyond social class are responsible for how one perceives the world (248).

442 Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 249, surmises that Marx never made the final step to a total conception of the sociology of knowledge because of a “subconscious reluctance to think out the implications of a concretely formulated insight to a point where the theoretical formulations latent in it would be clear enough to have a disquieting effect on one’s own position.”


444 *Ideology and Utopia*, 3.


446 Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 51, describe humans as possessing, biologically and existentially, “world-openness,” yet at the same time encountering “world-closedness” through their relationship to others.
Much like tradition, ideological change occurs when one’s social realities shift either horizontally (physical location) and/or vertically (social class).\textsuperscript{447} The “symbolic universes” that once legitimized reality no longer obtain in light of these new conditions.\textsuperscript{448} But clean breaks from prior networks are rare, creating situations in which multiple versions of reality exist, symbolic universes clash, and changes to regnant constructions of reality must occur in order to survive. For Mannheim, this tension between ideology (conservatism) and utopia (progressivism) increases as societies begin the democratization process, resulting in the presence of diverse interpretive traditions of reality as groups compete for power.\textsuperscript{449} This last observation helps explain, for example, the diversity of the Pauline traditions in the second century. As long as Christians were an assorted, yet growing, web of minority cultures in the Ancient Mediterranean world, the Apostle was bound to be a contested figure. There was not yet an institutionalized mechanism whereby his image could be controlled. These developing, shifting and sometimes intermingling Pauline image traditions were products of communal memories of the Apostle. By “communal memories,” I mean, like Halbwachs, that individual memories (as evidenced in texts) are formed within the frames of social interaction. Communities, technically, do not remember. Individuals do. But the content of individual memory is collectively shaped.\textsuperscript{450} It is born in the midst of mnemonic

\textsuperscript{447} Ideology and Utopia, 6.

\textsuperscript{448} Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality, 95-108.

\textsuperscript{449} Ideology and Utopia, 7, 241-2. Mannheim understood ideology to be the preservation of tradition (conservatism) and utopia to be the urge for progress/change. The constant tension between ideology and utopia is what figures the historical and epistemological fields. One sees in this basic tension the influence of Max Weber.

\textsuperscript{450} Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 53; The Collective Memory, 48. Cf. Jan Assmann, Religion and Cultural Memory, 1. There is a rapidly growing set of basic modern introductions to issues involving
communities and reinforced through story-telling, communally sanctioned commemorative events and rituals, material reminders (*lieux de mémoire*), and other elements of the *ars memoria*. 451 Neophytes, whether through birth or conversion, must go through the socialization process of learning the community’s authoritative myths and traditions. 452 As such, memory has identity and culture forming power.

Largely influenced by Immanuel Kant and Emile Durkheim, Halbwachs held, like Mannheim, that memory is organized by the frames (or conditions) of time and space (plus language), and that these frames are not just matters of individual cognition, but are socially constructed. 453 Time and space are the pegs, if you will, for hanging our communally-shaped mental stuff:


451 Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 20-1, has helpfully categorized the various means of memory: 1) mimetic memory (memory through repetition); 2) material memory (memory preserved in objects and places); 3) communicative memory (memory preserved in language and communication); and 4) cultural/bonding memory (memory as connectedness and identity-formation).


But if a truth is to be settled in the memory of a group it needs to be presented in the concrete form of an event, of a personality, or of a locality. A purely abstract truth is not a recollection; a recollection refers us to the past. An abstract truth, in contrast, has no hold on the succession of events; it is of the order of a wish or of an aspiration.\footnote{On Collective Memory, 200.}

Much like for tradition and ideology, the alteration of social frameworks results in the alteration of memory. Memories, like all knowledge, are reflections of social realities, which are almost always in flux.\footnote{Cf. Jonathan Boyarin, “Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory,” in Remapping Memory 26: “What we are faced with – what we are living – is the constitution of both group ‘membership’ and individual ‘identity’ out of a dynamically chosen selection of memories, and the constant reshaping, reinvention, and reinforcement of those memories as members contest and create the boundaries and links among themselves.”} For Halbwachs, memory tells us more about our present social situation than it does about what really happened in the past.\footnote{Cf. On Collective Memory, 40, 49: “everything seems to indicate that the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present . . . at the moment of reproducing the past our imagination remains under the influence of the present social milieu.” Cf. also Kirk, “Social and Cultural Memory,” 11.}

own story is mapped is the family.\textsuperscript{459} In most cases the autobiographical and episodic memories of our childhood are formed in the context of this primary social relationship and without continued reinforcement from the outside (through looking at pictures and home-movies, listening to others tell stories about us, etc.), memories of our own past will fade.\textsuperscript{460} A variety of studies have shown that, over time, individual recollections of events, even among adults, become increasingly schematized to reflect elements of the past that were significant for all group members. These are the elements that are continually shared within the community.\textsuperscript{461}

But the same is true for the memory of events that we have not experienced and of people with whom we have had no contact. Halbwachs worked to demolish the boundaries normally erected, theoretically, between “autobiographical” and “historical” memory.\textsuperscript{462} In his \textit{La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte} (1941), Halbwachs analyzed the account of Jesus’ life found in the writings of the fourth-century Pilgrim of Bordeaux, concluding that the Pilgrim’s memory of the life of Jesus had been largely shaped by his visit to Jerusalem in 333 C.E. – a Jerusalem that now, in time and space, distorted the Jewish environment in which Jesus had actually lived and

\textsuperscript{459} Zerubavel, “Social Memories,” 286.

\textsuperscript{460} Cf. Vansina, \textit{Oral Tradition as History}, 8-10, on how personal reminiscences are shaped by the community. Halbwachs, \textit{On Collective Memory}, 41-2, viewed dreams as a sort of anti-memory, inasmuch as they are individually perceived and lack the organization and coherency that comes from social reinforcement. They are inaccessible, as experiences, to others.


\textsuperscript{462} \textit{The Collective Memory}, 52.
breathed. The canonical Gospel accounts, as products of Christian communities many decades after the actual life of Jesus, had already begun this process of telling the life of Jesus with an eye to the present situation. The Gospels, birthed in anonymous communities, contain only a portion of the memories of Jesus’ original followers – those relevant to community needs at the end of the first century – and were shaped in their final form to give the impression that Jesus’ ministry was nothing but an inevitable march to the cross. Only the original followers of Jesus could have correctly identified the places where Jesus had performed miracles. By the time that the Gospels had been written, Jerusalem had been destroyed and his original followers were long gone. And by the time that the Pilgrim from Bordeaux visited the Holy Land, Jerusalem had been completely reconfigured as Aelia Capitolina. For Halbwachs, this change in space meant a change in memory. The life of Jesus, then, as portrayed in the Pilgrim’s account, exhibits multiple layers of community memory from various periods, stretching from the trace elements of the earliest memories of Jesus’ original followers in the first century C.E., through the memories of Jesus communities crystallized in written gospels at the

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463 On Collective Memory, 216-22.

464 Halbwachs saw a large chasm existing between Jesus’ followers and the late, first-century church (On Collective Memory, 199-200).


466 Cf. On Collective Memory, 204, 225: “Yet there was the image of the holy city – an image that the universal Christian community had slowly construed . . . This outline of holy places is a construction. One clearly wished to make Jerusalem the center of Christian attention since it had been the theater of the Passion.”
end of the first century, and ultimately filtered through fourth-century visits to Jerusalem.  

All histories, as accounts of the past, are necessarily selective, depending on the present needs and biases of their authors and their communities. As a corollary, whatever is not selected for narration is consigned to oblivion. All historical memory, then, like imagery, is to some degree a distortion of the past – it obscures what actually happened in favor of what is useful for present circumstances. But at what point can memories be labeled “false”? The phenomenon of false memory, particularly as it relates to personal autobiography, has been well documented among a variety of disciplines (cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neurobiology, and sociology). But distortion, like “invention,” is a sliding-scale and hard to define. Not even eyewitnesses provide the sort of information about “what exactly happened in the past” that we as historians would like.

Frederic Bartlett has shown that, from a cognitive standpoint, schemas, or mental representations of “x” or “y” based on previous experience, shape the way that we

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467 Cf. The Collective Memory, 69: “As I have said many times, a remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered.”


encounter the world. Much like pictograms or ideograms (cf. previous section), schemas represent what has been essential to a particular set of situations in the past and prejudices what we see in any new event that appears similar.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{Remembering}, 199-204.} Inasmuch as all memory contains elements of distortion, then, all memory is false memory. To throw around language like “invention,” “distortion,” and “false memory” and position it against “real,” “historical,” and “true” conceptions of the past covers over the complexity of the issue, as I am afraid has become the case in both ancient and modern contestations over Paul’s authoritative charisma.

Halbwachs himself did not disparage the social frames of memory or the present interests in preserving the past. But a certain strain of modern memory studies known as the “politics of memory” or “presentist” and/or “strong constructionist” theories of memory has brought attention to the way that elites and majority cultures program memory for the sake of their own power.\footnote{Cf. J. Assmann, \textit{Religion and Cultural Memory}, 93-4, on the differences between Halbwachs and Nietzsche. Some of the more important voices in the politics of memory movement are: Maurice Agulhon, \textit{Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-1880} (trans. J. Lloyd; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Pierre Nora, ed., \textit{Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past} (trans. A. Goldhammer; 3 vols.; European Perspectives; New York: Columbia University Press, 1996 [1984-1992]); Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., \textit{The Invention of Tradition}; David Lowenthal, \textit{The Past is a Foreign Country}; John Bodnar, \textit{Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and the essays found in Gillis, \textit{Commemorations: the Politics of National Identity}. Particularly good in this last volume is Yael Zerubavel, “The Historic, the Legendary, and the Incredible: Invented Tradition and Collective Memory in Israel,” 105-23, in which she shows how some periods of Israel’s history are elevated in the service of modern Zionist interests, while others (such as living in exile) are forgotten.} The constant wrangling over U.S. History textbooks and how much room should be given to Christopher Columbus and George Washington, on the one hand, versus the native Americans and Crispus Attucks, on the other, is just one of numerous examples that could be given to highlight the connection
between the training of memory and politics. More apropos to our own subject, one might poll the number of mainline Protestant divinity schools that offer courses on Romans versus the number of institutions that also offer courses on the Pastoral Epistles and/or 2 Thessalonians. “Out of sight, out of mind,” as the proverb goes. The “politics of memory” is concerned with “rhetoric about the past mobilized for political purposes.” Presentist theories of memory rely heavily on Halbwachs in combination with the social and economic theories of Marx, the denigration of tradition found in Nietzsche, and the concern for power relations expressed by Foucault. While all communities (from the family to the nation-state) are mnemonic by nature and require narrations of the past for the sake of identity and cohesion, only some members of a given community control the commemorative rituals necessary for perpetuating a given set of narratives. In an attempt to expose the hegemony of official memory, activist historiographers like Hobsbawm and Ranger (mentioned earlier in this chapter), John Bodnar, Pierre Nora, and others, comb the material record for evidence “from below,” or for the “hidden transcripts” of the past. They write “social history as an alternative to


476 Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, xvi.


478 Each of the contributors to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s *The Invention of Tradition* attempts to show how the political winners of the revolutions in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries invented traditions for the purpose of social cohesion in a period when traditional authorities were being overturned. On the American side, John Bodnar’s *Remaking America* tracks the “official memory” of our nation’s past as preserved in publicly sanctioned *lieux de mémoire*, or “sites of memory.” Using the political struggle over the construction of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington, D.C. as an *entrée* into “official” and “vernacular” memory, Bodnar details how those in power (normally white Protestants) in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries preserved that power through rhetorically shaped commemorations of our nation’s past that emphasized national unity and loyalty. This was done in the face of increasingly
political history; the history of collective mentalities (attitudes toward everyday life) to that of the history of ideas (elite culture); women’s history to that of men’s history; non-Western history to that of European history; global history to that of national history.”

Pierre Nora, the French historiographer, has been the most prolific chronicler of how lieux de mémoire, or “sites of memory,” such as textbooks, monuments, museums, archives and holidays function to shape communal and national memories. Nora has shown how French identity and memory in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were created out of the memorial practices of the winners of the democratic Revolution. Various attempts to “record” the history of the Revolution were in effect attempts to shape a normative memory of the past. Nora sees a deep chasm between milieux de mémoire (“real environments of memory”) and lieux de mémoire. The existence of the latter point to a “collapse of memory” and a shift toward “history” in the face of radical social breaks with the past (e.g. the industrial and democratic revolutions in France bringing an end to peasant culture). “Real memory” has been replaced by “nothing more in fact than sifted and sorted historical traces.” Elite memory is a mere


479 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, xxiv.


481 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 150.

“representation of the past,” subject to the commemorative practices of those in charge of helping us remember such things.⁴⁸³

In cultures that no longer have a living connection to the past through tradition and memory, *lieux de mémoire* function as handles for the appreciation of the past in the midst of change. They are the “archive” of modern memory – material sites that prod us to remember the past.⁴⁸⁴ They are intended to “stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things.”⁴⁸⁵ As *lieux de mémoire*, monuments, museums, archives, and the like must serve symbolic and functional roles.⁴⁸⁶ They encode formative narratives about the past as a means of socializing group members into the community’s identity-forming myth.⁴⁸⁷ They are sites where communities go to hear the sacred story, to remember their origins and to reinforce mental images of the past.⁴⁸⁸ For our purposes, we should emphasize that normative texts, as sacred and canonical indicators of authoritative tradition, function as *lieux de mémoire*. They are material sites to which a community returns over and over again to hear a particular version of the past, rather than some other. As we will see in subsequent chapters, continued appeals to certain Pauline texts over others in second-century Christian writers were part of a larger phenomenon of


⁴⁸⁴ “Between History and Memory,” 13.

⁴⁸⁵ “Between History and Memory,” 19.

⁴⁸⁶ “Between History and Memory, 18-19.

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, 8-9: “Such aides-mémoires are also the *lieux de mémoire*, memory sites in which the memory of entire national or religious communities is concentrated, monuments, rituals, feast days and customs. In short, the entire panoply of things that go to make up what Halbwachs called tradition and which he contrasted with *mémoire vécue* can be understood as a system of memory sites, a system of markers that enables the individual who lives in this tradition to belong, that is, to realize his potential as the member of a society in the sense of a community where it is possible to learn, remember, and to share in a culture.”

remembering the Apostle rightly. Without the ability to read the collected letters, most Christians were at the mercy of the literate elite to provide for them a meaningful portrayal of Paul.

The politics of memory, however, only tells half of the memory story. Patrick Hutton, Jan Assmann and Barry Schwartz, much like Gadamer and Shils for tradition, and Mannheim for ideology, have offered more balanced approaches to memory, tying it closely to culture and tradition, and thus to the unconscious.489 Schwartz concludes, for example, that images of Lincoln in American memory (discussed in greater detail in the next section below) possess unique combinations of continuity with and departure from the past. Assmann argues that the enculturation/traditioning process, in which the concept to memory should be placed, has an “enabling aspect, which does not just mutilate people and knock them into shape, . . . but which also (and we would like to say above all) develops forms of life, opens up possibilities in which the individual can invest and fulfill himself.”490 Borrowing from the work of Aleida Assmann, he describes this as the “bonding” element of memory, which involves “cultural efforts that aim to establish connections and consolidate togetherness.” Memory is not just “collective,” but “connective.”491 Cultural memory connects us synchronically and diachronically with

489 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory; Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis; Religion and Cultural Memory; Barry Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration”; Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory; Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era: History and Memory in Late Twentieth-Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, xxv, is exemplary: “History draws on both sides of the memory puzzle. It seeks to reconstruct the past through an act of recollection. But the past that prompts the historian’s consideration is borne in the present by oft-repeated habits of mind.”

490 Religion and Cultural Memory, 6.

491 Religion and Cultural Memory, 11. The major works on cultural memory by Aleida Assmann are Schrift und Gedächtnis: Beiträge zur Archäologie der literarische Kommunikation (ed. A. Assmann, J. Assmann, and C. Hardmeier; Munich: Fink, 1983); Mnemosyne: Formen und Funktionen der kulturellen Erinnerung (ed. Assmann and Harth; Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1991);
those on whom we are dependent through meaningful symbol systems, thereby connecting the past with the present, with an eye to the future.\textsuperscript{492} Like tradition and contra Nietzsche, socially and culturally determined identities allow us to be “rescued from oblivion.”\textsuperscript{493} Both Hutton and Schwartz concur, with Schwartz concluding that “Culture solves the problem of meaning, I believe, by providing perspectives explaining otherwise enigmatic, stressful, and disorganizing happenings.”\textsuperscript{494}

Assmann also emphasizes that culture, as part of the traditioning process, is constantly evolving and possesses at any given time layers of memory from various periods of time. It is a “continuous negotiation” of past and present, as James Clifford reminds.\textsuperscript{495} Patrick Hutton has criticized the “politics of memory” theorists on this very point: “Commemoration acknowledged the limits of memory’s restorative powers. But in appreciating the reality of a discrete past, what one wanted to remember were connections with it. The present might be different from the past, yet remained linked to it through developmental lines of continuity.”\textsuperscript{496} The tension between “repetition” (“the presence of the past”) and “recollection” (“present efforts to evoke the past”) is the crux


\textsuperscript{493} Religion and Cultural Memory, 92.

\textsuperscript{494} Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, xi. Cf. also Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, xv: “Postmodern historians were interested in memory as a resource in the mobilization of political power, and they were dismissive of the intrinsic value of tradition itself.”

\textsuperscript{495} Cf. the first section in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{496} Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 20.
of the social memory problem. Memory, then, is a storehouse of the past just as much as it is a reflection of the present. It has two horizons – the ancient text (loosely defined) and its modern reception. Linking the two is a history of interpretive tradition. There is no perfect homeostatic congruity between tradition/memory and society. Like Rome, which is “an inextricable tangle of old and new, of obstructed and buried material, or detritus that has been reused or rejected,” memory, as Assmann reminds, is a complex web of cultural negotiations between the past and the present, between social realities that are constantly in flux. He likens it to Derrida’s “archive” and to the more broadly construed understanding of tradition found in Gadamer. For politics of memory theories to retain their rhetorical power, historical continuity cannot exist and the force of tradition must be denied. Aleida Assmann describes cultural memory as the interaction between “canon” and “archive.” Cultural forms of memory store not only elitist visions of the world (canon), but also “the age-old, out-of-the-way, and discarded,” as well as “the noninstrumentalizable, heretical, subversive, and disowned” (archive). Material resistance from below (marginalized texts and archaeological finds) eventually

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497 Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, xx-xxi.


500 Zelizer, “Reading the Past Against the Grain,” 227. Cf. Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, 94: “as all messages from tradition are uttered in the present, when they are recorded they are strongly influenced by the social present . . . Some sociologists go further and hold that the total content of oral tradition is only a social product of the present . . . This is exaggerated. Where would social imagination find the stuff to invent from? How does one explain cultural continuities?”


502 Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory*, 27.
challenges the dominant memory of the past.\textsuperscript{503} Schwartz reminds: “Given the constraints of a recorded history, the past cannot be literally constructed; it can only be selectively exploited.”\textsuperscript{504}

**Reputation and Image: Abraham Lincoln in American Collective Memory**

Schwartz’s work on Abraham Lincoln’s place in American memory offers a particularly compelling example of how images of an authoritative individual develop among various (and often competing) communities. These images of Lincoln reflect not only the present concerns of a given community, but also exhibit strong elements of continuity with the past. Images of persons, it should be remembered, are traditions.\textsuperscript{505} They are the visual and mental images that typify and encode information about individuals from the past whose reputation has been viewed worthy of remembrance by particular groups. In wrestling with the data on Paul in the second century, particularly where polemical contestations over Paul’s legacy are apparent and it is clear that his literary legacy is wrapped up in the larger attempts to preserve particular images of the Apostle, I have found that Schwartz’s work provides a helpful model for understanding Paul’s own reputational entrepreneurs. A brief description of Schwartz’s work will help

\textsuperscript{503} Cf. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 224-5: “To be sure, collective memory reconstructs its various recollections to accord with contemporary ideas and preoccupations. But it encounters resistance in the form of material vestiges and written texts as much as in what has become embodied in rites and institutions.”

\textsuperscript{504} “The Social Context of Commemoration,” 396.

\textsuperscript{505} Cf. the first two sections of this chapter. Cf. also Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, 137; “The collective representations of a culture include not only substantive matter, data of cognition, but also of imagery. To the historian it is important to understand not only intended meanings as they have been discussed in chapter three, but also what can be called the context of meaning: the imagery and its impact.”
tie together the various sections of this chapter and provide the framework for beginning
to narrate the rise of various fragmented Pauline image traditions in the second century.

Memory*, charts the developing images of the sixteenth president among various social
and political groups from the date of his assassination in 1865 to the dedication of the
Lincoln Memorial in 1922. Some fifty years after his death, Lincoln’s *persona* was
invoked by immigrants, progressives, capitalists, socialists, African Americans, white
Southerners, and women’s rights advocates. He went from being one of the most
controversial figures in American politics in his day to a charismatic totem for nearly
every interest group of the early-twentieth century.

Schwartz convincingly shows that, despite Lincoln’s contentious tenure as
President, his tragic death on Good Friday, just days after Robert E. Lee had surrendered
and ended a protracted and costly war, provided an initial narrative whereby it was
viewed as martyrdom for the sake of the Union. According to Schwartz, “his
assassination was an occasion for ritual acts of national affirmation and national
communion.” Abraham Lincoln was immediately keyed, in a variety of ways, to
George Washington, the father of the Union. Lincoln was the great preserver of
Washington’s legacy. Keying, according to Schwartz, “transforms the meaning of
activities understood in terms of one event by comparing them with activities understood

 moves from the Great Depression into the late twentieth century. I am mainly dependent on his first
 volume because I see the sort of initial fragmentation of Lincoln’s image in the fifty or so years after his
death as paralleling, in many ways, what we find with the Apostle Paul’s image in the fifty or so years after
his own death.

507 Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*, 33. He is dependent here on
Durkheim’s *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

in terms of another . . . arranges cultural symbols into a publicly visible discourse that flows through the organizations and institutions of the social world.\textsuperscript{509}

But even a tragic death and an attempt to tie Lincoln to Washington could not overcome years of entrenched opposition. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century, when most of his political antagonists had passed on, were the conditions right for broad and diverse memorializations of Lincoln. The initial emotional outpouring over his death was strong and widespread enough to bridge the decades of the late-nineteenth century. The outcomes of the Civil War had also become settled results: the Union had been preserved and slaves had been emancipated. Lincoln was responsible for both. And the stronger the linkage between Washington and Lincoln was pushed by his later supporters, the greater his reputation became.\textsuperscript{510}

As a new cult of America began to grow in the wake of the Spanish-American War (1898), the status of the presidency was elevated and Lincoln, as protector of the union, continued to gain prominence in the early-twentieth century. The centennial celebration of Lincoln’s birth in 1909 became a widespread “occasion not only for expressing feelings about his personal accomplishments but also for performing ritual acts of national affirmation and national communion.”\textsuperscript{511} It was during this period that just about everyone took up Lincoln for their cause. Immigrants saw an inclusive Lincoln; progressives viewed the sixteenth president as the strong hand of the state against sub-human economies; capitalists invoked Lincoln as a defender of the free-

\textsuperscript{509} Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 226. For a later example, Woodrow Wilson was keyed (through various media) to both Lincoln and Washington during WWI, which is quite suggestive of the way many viewed America’s participation in that war (231-2).

\textsuperscript{510} Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 91, 103.

\textsuperscript{511} Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 116-17.
market; socialists understood him to be a friend of labor; African Americans and women viewed the former president as an advocate for minority rights; Jews read Lincoln in light of Moses and the prophets.

These preferred Lincolnian images were propagated by “reputational entrepreneurs.”

The role of the reputational entrepreneur is “to make an ordinary person great, or, more commonly, to bring the person’s greatness to public attention.” But such apologists do not work on an island. Each of Lincoln’s eulogists, biographers, sculptors, and political defenders, among others, reflected as well as contributed to the line of Lincolnian traditions in which they stood. As members of communities, reputational entrepreneurs offer “collective representations – images that existed in the mind of the entrepreneur because they first existed in certain segments of the society.” They are unable to escape the force of tradition, which, as we have mentioned, is itself a thing in flux. Furthermore, individual entrepreneurs and their communal interests were kept from having any sort of corner on the Lincolnian image-market by the decentralized character of Lincolnian memory-making in the early-twentieth century.

Schwartz challenges “politics of memory” approaches, fixated as they are on issues of power and on the ability of elites to shape memory for present concerns alone,
by showing how each of the variety of images that Lincoln took on during the early twentieth century was a mixture of elements, rooted both in the historical record of Lincoln’s own day as well as in the present situation/needs of communities that required him as authentication for their ideologies.516 The historical Lincoln could not control these images, but his own life and writings in some sense limited them. The images of Lincoln as the “Man of the People,” “The Great Emancipator,” the “The Savior of the Union,” or the “Father of Civil Rights,” were not invented out of thin air.517 Schwartz understands collective memory as “a representation of the past embodied in both historical evidence and commemorative symbolism.”518 Lincoln’s later reputational entrepreneurs, those who had something to benefit from a particular image of Lincoln, offered constructions of the past that were both domineering and desired; “domineering” in the sense that commemorations of Lincoln were often stages for political and social influence, and “desired” in the sense that any commemoration must provide compelling continuities with earlier forms of widely accepted tradition. To use the language of Geertz (which Schwartz does), Lincoln was both a “model of” as well as a “model for”


518 Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*, 9. Emphasis his. In another place, he defines collective memory as “sense-making through time” (98). Cf. Blasi, *Making Charisma*, 10: “An appropriate scientific stance toward this kind of phenomenon requires our not forgetting either pole of the dialectic. Lincoln would not be Lincoln if he were not revered, but he would not be revered if he were not the individual who became famous.”
Images of Lincoln reflected (as a mirror) the mores of various communities, while also serving as a light for further illumination (as a lamp). Shils reminds, “It is not within the powers of any single active generation to replace most of what it has begun with . . . no generation, even those living in this present time of unprecedented dissolution of tradition, creates its own beliefs, apparatus, patterns of conduct, and institutions.”

Selection from the Lincolnian corpus was the art of public memory. What was not selected was forgotten. That is, until some competing interest, through the act of retrieval, was able to remind us of the forgotten elements of the Lincolnian tradition. Lincolnian texts, then, provided the material resistance for other Lincolnian texts. I highlight here one example from Schwartz of the kind of ambiguity that existed in Lincoln’s record, thereby allowing him to become “a conductor through which these conflicts were expressed rather than a fuse that muted them.” On the one hand, socialists pointed to statements in the record where Lincoln seemed to support their efforts to mitigate differences between labor and capital distribution:


520 On the mirroring function of Lincoln, cf., for example, Schwartz’s comments on the “progressive Lincoln”: “When twentieth-century economic progressives invoked Lincoln, they were mirroring their own generation’s perspectives” (Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 141). More generally, cf. Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era, xi, 266.

521 Shils, Tradition, 36, 38.

522 Cf. Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 222: “Different memories result, however, from a common method of making them meaningful: selecting the elements of Lincoln’s life to be included in its representation and translating these into a form that will maintain their relevance.”

523 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 298: “Some might say that Progressive era entrepreneurs ‘constructed’ a new Lincoln or ‘reconstructed’ an old one, but it would be more precise to say that this era accentuated aspects of Lincoln’s life no previous or subsequent era could see as vividly.”

524 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 211.
[It] has so happened in all ages of the world that some have labored, and others have, without labor, enjoyed a large proportion of the fruits. This is wrong and should not continue. To secure each laborer the whole product of his labor, or as nearly as possible, is a worthy object of any good government.  

On the other hand, the capitalists could point to other kinds of statements:

If any continue through life in the condition of the hired laborer, it is not the fault of the system, but because of either a dependent nature which prefers it, or improvidence, folly, or singular misfortune.

Appeals to Lincoln’s words, then, functioned within larger networks of ideology, each of which tried to establish, through various forms of media, an image of Lincoln that was amenable for their own purposes, yet still tied, rhetorically, to Lincoln himself. This kind of ambiguity in Lincoln (or some might say he was just a pragmatist) seems to have been a characteristic trait, even of his early professional life.

These kinds of disparate statements in the Lincolnian record raise larger questions. Was Lincoln “really” a socialist or a capitalist? Was he “really” a civil rights advocate or a supporter of the southern status quo? What about memory distortion? Was the log-cabin Lincoln of the progressives a figment of their imagination, a distortion, a politically expedient Lincolnian self-construction during his own election that was exploited again by a later movement? In order to talk about image “construction,” as if

525 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 206, citing Lincoln’s words as given in the Congressional Record, February 12, 1908, HR 2282.

526 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 210, citing Lincoln as recorded in a 1920 publication of the National Industrial Conference Board.

527 Cf. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 251-2: “For each of the participants the ‘object’ has a more or less different meaning because it grows out of the whole of their respective frames of reference, as a result of which the meaning of the object in the perspective of the other person remains, at least in part, obscure.”

528 As a lawyer, even though Lincoln was personally against slavery, he “represented both escaped slaves and owners seeking their capture.” (Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 149).

it is significantly different from historical “reality,” one must believe that “reality” can be known.\footnote{Cf. Schwartz, \textit{Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era}, 11: “Lincoln in text and picture is certainly ‘constructed’ in the sense that writers and artists represent him one way rather than another, but to assert that the episodes of his life are no more than ‘representations’ presumes knowledge of how reality differs from appearance. Without such knowledge, one can demonstrate that perceptions of Lincoln change, but one cannot determine which of those changes distort reality and which do not. Without knowing the past as it was, one cannot estimate how significantly perception distorts reality or how it affects Lincoln’s place in American memory.”} Is it possible to talk about the “real” Lincoln and what do we mean when we use this kind of language? On the former, Schwartz thinks so:

Americans imagined that Abraham Lincoln embodied their belief in equality in God’s sight, but the \textit{real} Lincoln was not an altogether satisfactory model of egalitarian ideals.

In a democratic society where more and less credible versions of the past compete for acceptance, the stories and pictures of Lincoln that are “externalized” must be consistent with Lincoln’s \textit{actual} accomplishments, failures, and personality. The \textit{real} Lincoln could not determine, but did limit, the range and quality of his representations.

Diverse images of Lincoln appears (sic) as different “utterances” of the same language. They refer to different aspects of the \textit{real} Lincoln, matters of liking or disliking him in different degrees, of emphasizing different parts of his life.\footnote{Schwartz, \textit{Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory}, 144, 187, and 223, respectively. Emphases mine. Cf. also 254: “But the exaggeration of Lincoln’s virtues does not explain why he had become a model in the first place. Lincoln, in fact, was not a model because he was idealized; he was rather idealized because he was already a model. And he was already a model because of \textit{real}, not imaginary, that is, constructed, accomplishments and traits.”}

In this final statement, Schwartz is dependent on the distinction between \textit{langue} (language) and \textit{parole} (speech) in Saussure. He continues:

As different sentences enact the unseen reality of a single language, so different depictions of Lincoln enact one of the many sides of the same man. This does not mean that some groups were more justified in identifying with Lincoln than others; it means that Lincoln himself was ambiguous, complex, and many-sided, and that different communities, according to their experiences and interests, saw one side more clearly than others.\footnote{Schwartz, \textit{Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory}, 223.}
The “real” Lincoln, then, was not a fixed entity. His views and goals developed over years of controversy and contestation. Take slavery and emancipation, for instance. Over the course of four years, Lincoln moved from 1) wanting a constitutional amendment whereby slavery would be protected in southern states who rejoined the Union; to 2) seeking a “gradual, compensated emancipation of slaves accompanied by the emigration both of former slaves and free blacks from the United States”; to 3) finally, issuing the Emancipation Proclamation and supporting the framework of what would become the Thirteenth Amendment. After emancipation, he readily admitted that the accompanying plan for black colonization of Central America (or Texas, or Florida) was “wrong.” In his final public address, just four days before his assassination, Lincoln promised “to make some new announcement to the people of the South.” We can attribute each of these positions, despite their differences, to the “real” Lincoln. But this, of course, flattens the rhetorical advantage of using such language. In the end, we can only talk about the Lincoln of particular texts at particular times (i.e. – “Which Lincoln?”). To speak of the “real” Lincoln, as if he were some static entity, is to blur history. The textual and historical evidence lends itself to any number of “Lincolns,” as his early twentieth-century reputational entrepreneurs so acutely show.


534 Cf. Lind, *What Lincoln Believed*, 209. On the shifting thoughts of the late Lincoln, cf. Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era*, 13: “Realizing in the last years of his life that blacks would remain permanently in America, he favored their having equal political rights, but the prospect of integrating them into society on the basis of complete social equality was to him, as to most Americans of his time, problematic.”

“The (Variegated) Apostle”

The idealizations of Lincoln in the first 50-75 years after his death are a particularly constructive lens for understanding Paul’s charisma in the early second century. In a variety of ways, the early development of Pauline traditions was “like” the early development of Lincolnian traditions. I use the word “like” here because new knowledge is always produced on recognizable patterns and turns on the power of metaphor. ⁵³⁶ First, and most generally, just as we see Lincoln being invoked by nearly every interest group in the Progressive era, in the same way Paul was “the Apostle” for the proto-orthodox, the Valentinians, the Marcionites, and various Gnostic and Enchatite groups of the second century.

Second, in Lincoln and Paul we have men who were the instigators of the most dramatic social shifts of their day. Lincoln not only preserved a fragile Union, but delivered the Emancipation Proclamation (intentions aside), while Paul was the key figure in moving a predominantly Jewish sect toward a Gentile-dominated religion (intentions aside here, as well). This guaranteed that he, like Lincoln in American cultural memory, would be secured a place of commemorative importance for later generations of Christians. ⁵³⁷ The single most unifying aspect of the early layer of the Pauline tradition appears to have been that Paul engaged in a wide and far-flung mission to the Gentiles. The Pauline Epistles (cf. 2 Tim 4.17 – “But the Lord stood by me and strengthened me, in order that through me the message might be fully accomplished and


⁵³⁷ Cf. Shils, *Tradition*, 229: “Christianity in the lifetime of Jesus could still be considered by Jews and Gentiles and even by the first Christians as a deviant Jewish sect. Within fifty years of the death of Jesus, it was clear that it was much more than that.”
that *all the Gentiles* might hear it*”), the canonical Acts of the Apostles (cf. Acts 13.47 –
“For thus the Lord has commanded us, ‘I have set you as a light for the Gentiles, in order
to bring salvation to the ends of the earth’”), 1 Clement 5.7 (“Paul . . . taught
righteousness to the *whole world*”), and the Acts of Paul 11.3 (“we enlist soldiers . . .
from the *whole world*”) reflect an image of a Paul who was in and out of many
communities across a broad geographical expanse, often times staying in any individual
city for only a short period of time.\footnote{538} This “broad impression” about Paul, which is
“recurrently attested” throughout the sources, to use the language of Dale Allison in his
recent monograph, *Constructing Jesus*, does not require us to fill it in with any more
specificity in order to posit that, within the complex, multi-layered Pauline traditions of
the late-first and early-second centuries, this element has the greatest likelihood of
correspondence with Paul of Tarsus (cf. Appendix One).

His martyrdom was eventually connected to this role as a “herald in both the east
and the west” (1 Clem. 5.5-7):

> On account of envy and discord, Paul displayed the reward for
> endurance, having been bound seven times, made to flee, and stoned.
> After becoming a herald in both the east and the west, he received the
> suitable fame for his faith. He taught righteousness to the whole world
> (ὅλον τὸν κόσµον), came to the boundary of the west and suffered
> martyrdom before the rulers. In this way he was released from the
> world and taken up to the holy place, having become the greatest
> example of endurance.

In the trial scene in the *Acts of Paul* (11.3), Nero, just before beheading the Apostle, asks,

> “Man of the great king, but (now) my prisoner, why did it seem good to thee to come
> secretly into the empire of the Romans and enlist soldiers from my province?”  Paul

responds, “Caesar, not only from thy province do we enlist soldiers, but from the whole world (ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης πασῆς). For this charge has been laid upon us, that no man be excluded who wishes to serve my king.”

Paul was remembered as “the Apostle” in the second century because of his decisive and active role in this social shift in the Church. A martyr’s death in the capital of the Roman Empire only solidified this image of the Apostle in the commemorative space of early Christian hagiography and memory. Moreover, in Paul’s ministry there was a “sensitive dependence on initial conditions,” a “point at which,” according to John Lewis Gaddis, “small shifts at the beginning of a process produced large consequences at the end of it.”

His ubiquitous memorialization in early Christian communities was but one of these consequences.

Third, like Lincoln, Paul evidently had numerous enemies during his own lifetime. Several of the Pauline Epistles (esp. Gal and 2 Cor) depict the Apostle on the brink of losing his congregations to various “false apostles” (2 Cor 11.13), some of whom preached “another gospel” (Gal 1.7) or “another Jesus” (2 Cor 11.4). The ethnic unity that these texts try to forge between Jew and Greek in the Pauline ekklesiai was fragile, at best. Throughout, Paul’s apostleship was questioned and/or denied. He had not known the earthly Jesus. He had previously been a persecutor of the church (1 Cor 15.9; Gal 1.13; Phil 3.6; 1 Tim 1.13; Acts 7.58; 8.1-3; 9.1-2; 22.4, 19; 26.9-12). And a small


540 Gregory Sterling, “From Apostle to the Gentiles to Apostle to the Church,” 74-5, characterizes both Ephesians and Acts as late-first century C.E. memorializations of Paul’s singular influence in creating the church as it was known at that time.


542 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 120.
element of anti-Paulinism continued to exist into the second and third centuries (cf. Chapter Two).\footnote{The relevant primary sources are Iren., \emph{Haer.} 1.26.2; Origen, \emph{Hom. Jer.} 19.12; \emph{Cels.} 5.66; Eus. \emph{Hist. eccel.} 3.27.1-6; Epiphan., \emph{Pan.} 28, 30; \emph{Clem. Rec.} 1.70-71; \emph{Epitula Petri} 2; \emph{Clem. Hom.} 17.13-19.} But none of this could keep him from being memorialized among communities across the Mediterranean. If there is any truth to the image of Paul as missionary to the world, and, again, I believe that beyond all of the problems that we have in uncovering the “real” or “historical” Paul this is the most probable aspect of his ministry, then it is quite understandable how remembrances of the Apostle were not controlled by any one community, region, or ideology. In the diverse and unorganized world of second-century Christianity there were “no precise rules and no custodianship” for the transmission of the Pauline traditions, whether oral or written (cf. on Mannheim above).\footnote{Citation from Shils, \emph{Tradition}, 266: “Where there are no precise rules and no custodianship which takes to itself, or has assigned to it and is acknowledged to possess, the powers of regulating and stipulating the tradition, as in the telling of fairy tales and legends, a great variety of possibilities of transmission of the tradition exists.”} Each community that encountered Paul had a different experience with him, needed different things from him, and passed on different stories about Paul’s apostolic interactions with them. As “group accounts,” communally traditioned narrative portrayals of the Apostle were woven into the foundation stories of early Christian communities.\footnote{Vansina, \emph{Oral Tradition as History}, 19-21.} These early oral traditions would have lacked “a single line of transmission . . . Rather, most oral tradition is told by many people to many people . . . Hence the transmission really is communal and continuous. There are no neat lines of communication reserved for all oral traditions.”\footnote{Vansina, \emph{Oral Tradition as History}, 30.} In almost all cases, multiple versions of a particular tradition exist and often interpenetrate one another.\footnote{In almost all cases, multiple versions of a particular tradition exist and often interpenetrate one another.}
Fourth, the apparent complexity of Paul’s own views (regardless of how many letters we now want to attribute to him) and the variety of images that he would have had to self-construct to meet his rhetorical goals, as with Lincoln, meant that he could be idealized by a variety of reputational entrepreneurs. The seven so-called “undisputed” letters of Paul alone provide a bewildering assortment of theological perspectives that often defy systematization. When “Pauline” epistles combined with Acts and the oral traditions standing behind the *Acts of Paul*, this large and early layer of Pauline tradition provided the kind of initial variety that aided and abetted the developing trajectories of Pauline image memory in communities throughout the Mediterranean world.

Traditioned Pauline images and texts worked together to provide “collective representations” of the Apostle. Until institutions developed that could control how the diverse early tradition was to be interpreted, memories of the Apostle were almost always handed down tacitly. Some constellations of tradition achieved dominance over others, but dominance never guarantees the ability to enforce uniformity. As we have noted, traditions are like canons, “internally diverse” and “never fully coherent,”

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548 Cf., for example, Ernst Benz, “Das Paulusverständnis in der morgenländischen und abendländischen Kirche,” *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 3 (1951): 291, who characterizes the later Eastern reception of Paul as a reception of the Paul of the Corinthian correspondence, while the reception of Paul in the West was dependent on the Paul of Romans.

549 Cf. Froehlich, “Which Paul?,” 290: “Pauline pluralism was fed, on the one hand, by an appropriation of his legendary image with regional variations. On the other hand, more importantly, it was fed by the many unreconciled strands and the general versatility of Paul’s own theologizing in the surviving remnants of his correspondence. What the historical Paul fervently desired but never accomplished the epistolary Paul finally achieved: It was he who became ‘all things to all people’ (1 Cor. 9:22).”


and thus are susceptible to change.\textsuperscript{553} The early Pauline tradition in the second century was no exception. Rhetorical attempts to provide a fixed image of Paul, to freeze the “real” Paul, on the basis of one or several passages from this corpus of material was always “subject to challenge and revision” from within the corpus itself.\textsuperscript{554} The historiographer John Lewis Gaddis reminds:

The megalosaurus you see modeled in a museum, for example, is a static representation. Biographers can’t content themselves with this, because biography must not only flesh out bones but animate them. It’s like time-lapse photography: our sources are our snapshots; but the sequence in which we arrange them and the significance we attach to the gaps between them are as important as what anyone of them shows. We rerun whole lives, not single moments in them.\textsuperscript{555}

It is not possible, at least here, to scratch the “historical” Paul itch beyond what we have suggested. Categories like tradition and memory, as complex and nuanced as they are, are often pitted against the would-be certainties of “history.”\textsuperscript{556} Modernist historians often want to know what the “historical” Paul was \textit{really} like and who best represented the Apostle and his thought in the second century. While I would argue that the basic contours of Paul’s ministry that I have just outlined in very general terms provide some \textit{adequate} frameworks for talking about Paul of Tarsus, I do not think that the critical first step of ideological self-reflection (the consistent application of the sociology of knowledge as Mannheim has suggested) has become fully integrated in the historical methods of modern scholars of Paul. It was certainly not on the radar screen of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Marcion, and the authors of 2 Peter and the \textit{Gospel of Philip} (cf.

\textsuperscript{553} Brown, “Limitation and Ingenuity,” 219.

\textsuperscript{554} Brown, “Limitation and Ingenuity,” 220.

\textsuperscript{555} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 115. Cf. Appendix One for more on Gaddis.

\textsuperscript{556} Cf. Halbwachs, \textit{The Collective Memory}, 78, 86; Zelizer, “Reading the Past Against the Grain,” 216-17.
Chapter One). For them, the “real” Paul was self-evident and unproblematic. Recent historiographical trends (cf. Appendix One below), however, in combination with the rise of the sociology of knowledge, should at least force us to become scholars of Pauline traditions first (including those traditions that birthed the “historical” Paul in nineteenth-century Protestant Germany). After that, I suspect that we will never arrive at the measure of certitude that ideologies require for their rhetoric of the “real” Paul to have a significant degree of power.

Rooted in ideology, and equipped by a positivist historiography, much of the scholarship on “Paul in the second century” has been dominated by concerns over “Who got Paul right?” Nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars, as we will see in Chapter Five, thought that Irenaeus had misinterpreted Paul. Questions like “Do the Pastoral Epistles or the Acts of Paul and Thecla better represent the ‘historical’ Paul?” (cf. Chapter Two above) suggest that there is some Archimedean point from which we as twenty-first century scholars can reconstruct an untraditioned Paul (cf. Chapter One). But we are confronted by the fact that already in the second century the Apostle had become “all things to all people” (cf. 1 Cor 9.22). In our own period, it has taken a prophet or two to deconstruct the lenses through which Paul has seemed “natural” to us. These prophets normally have an elevated perspective, with at least one foot outside of the tradition. The so-called “New Perspective” on Paul, for instance, has sensitized us to what it calls “Lutheran” readings of Paul. It has disabused the field of Pauline studies of a regnant image of the Apostle, but must also be introspective enough to acknowledge its own “Post-Holocaust” reading of Paul. Methodologically, we must be rigorists like Mannheim. In doing so, several more nuanced questions can be asked of Paul’s
interpreters, whether Tertullian, Marcion, or us: “Which Paul?”; “What communal rules of faith have shaped your reading of Paul?”; “Which Pauline texts have been invoked to substantiate your image of the Apostle?”; “How have they been interpreted?”; and “What is the precise mixture of past and present in a given memorialization?” These are the questions that we will now submit to 3 Corinthians and Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses as a way of tracing the relationship between discourses on the “real” Paul and the nature of tradition and memory in one trajectory of the Pauline tradition of the second century.
CHAPTER FOUR
Reclaiming Paul: The Image of Paul in 3 Corinthians

In the midst of a process whereby a number of fragmented and sometimes overlapping trajectories of Pauline reception were developing in the second century, several of his reputational entrepreneurs appear to have written specifically in order to “reclaim” the Apostle from some other stream of interpretation, as Dennis MacDonald and Elaine Pagels have argued (cf. Chapter Two). Irenaeus, whom we will consider in the next chapter, for instance, laments that his opponents trumpeted 1 Corinthians 15.50 in support of their anthropology: “This is the passage which is adduced by all the heretics in support of their folly, with an attempt to annoy us, and to point out that the handiwork of God is not saved” (Haer. 5.9.1). The heresiologist then sets out an interpretation of the text that is amenable to his position: that flesh and blood can inherit the kingdom of God. This process of reclaiming Paul and his texts for the proto-orthodox, however, was not limited to long apologetic defenses of the faith like Irenaeus’. A simple letter authored in the name of the Apostle himself, such as 3 Corinthians, could correct any number of perceived mis-readings of Pauline texts. Both 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses, though different in genre, are windows into one particular stream of collective

557 Portions of this chapter first appeared in Benjamin L. White, “Reclaiming Paul?: Reconfiguration as Reclamation in 3 Corinthians,” JECS 17 (2009): 497-523. Permission to reproduce some of that article has been granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press and the North American Patristics Society.

558 Cf. Tertullian, Res. 48.1.
The interplay of image construction and textual interpretation in the Pauline traditions of 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses can be shown by examining several shared features of their portrayals of Paul: each works with earlier Pauline materials to mitigate differences between Paul and the other Apostles, providing an image of Paul that is keyed to the wider “apostolic” tradition; each programmatically invokes the language of the Pastoral Epistles, which serve as framing lieux de mémoire for this apostolic tradition; and each displays similar hermeneutical moves in its readings of 1 Corinthians 15.559 None of these elements has to be linked with the others. As Edward Shils reminds, “A tradition of belief contains constituent beliefs about many particular things.”560 These constituent pieces “are parts of interconnected sets of traditions of judgments of particular objects. They were heterogeneous in the past, and their diversified lines of development linking and separating them from each other over time makes the pattern of effectively accepted beliefs at any one time extraordinarily differentiated.”561 The specific combination of these elements in 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses, however, does work to form a more complex Pauline tradition and to memorialize an image of Paul that, to use the language of Geertz and Schwartz, was both a “model of” (“mirror”) as well as a “model for” (“lamp”) proto-orthodox receptions of Paul.562 This chapter explores the resultant image of Paul in 3 Corinthians. The next

559 Cf. Chapter Three on “keying,” “framing,” and “lieux de mémoire.”

560 Shils, Tradition, 217.

561 Shils, Tradition, 268.

562 Cf. Chapter Three.
These two chapters offer examples of the kind of “thick description” of Pauline traditions that are necessary for understanding how and why the Apostle was memorialized as he was in the second century.

3 Corinthians: Introduction

3 Corinthians, a second-century pseudepigraphon extant in Latin, Armenian, Coptic and Greek manuscripts, has received relatively less interest from twentieth-century scholars than have many other early Christian apocryphal texts. This may be due to its proto-orthodox viewpoint, which has not been as sexy as other forms of “heretical” Christianity in the field of early Christian studies in the past century. More likely, however, is the fact that since the publication of PBodmer X in 1959, a certain scholarly consensus on 3 Corinthians has emerged: it is a second-century pseudepigraphic refutation of either “Gnostic” or Marcionite thought; its origin must be sought outside of the Acts of Paul, in which it is found in several of the manuscript traditions; and PBodmer X (our single Greek version) is not only the earliest witness (ca. third-century C.E.), but also the closest witness to the original text of the letters.

PBodmer X, unlike the later Syriac, Coptic, Armenian and (part of the) Latin traditions, contains only the letter from the Corinthians to Paul and his response without any

563 Several centuries ago, William Whiston, A Collection of Authentick Records Belonging to the Old and New Testament, Part II (London, 1728), and Wilhelm Rinck, Das Sendschreiben der Korinther an den Apostel Paulus und das dritte Sendschreiben Pauli an die Korinther (Heidelberg: E.I. Winter, 1823), argued for the authenticity of 3 Cor. It is found between 2 Cor and Gal in most of the Armenian manuscripts. Zohrapian’s edition of the Armenian Bible in 1805 placed the text in an appendix between the Rest of the Evangelist John and the Prayer of Manasseh.

564 The editio princeps of PBodmer X was published by Michel Testuz, Papyrus Bodmer X-XII (Cologny-Geneva: Bibliotheca Bodmeriana, 1959). The contents of this papyrus codex include: I and II Peter, Jude, Psalms 33-34, Nativity of Mary, 3 Corinthians, the eleventh Ode of Solomon, a fragment of a liturgical hymn, and the Easter homilies of Melito of Sardis.
preceding or intervening narratives (cf. Appendix Two for my translation of PBodmer X). It also lacks some of the later textual expansions that elevate Mary and the Church even more than are already the case in PBodmer X. At some point in the third or fourth century, 3 Corinthians was absorbed into the expanding Acts of Paul literature, only to be later extracted, but with some of the surrounding narrative of the Acts of Paul still intact. I take these positions as a settled starting point and will not address them here.

PBodmer X is a set of letters. The first provides the context for the second. Stephanus and the presbyters of Corinth (Daphnos, Euboulos, Theophilos and Zenon) write to Paul for advice on how to deal with the recent arrival of Simon and Cleobius, who are “upsetting the faith of some with destructive statements” (3 Cor 1.2). The Corinthians describe six aspects of their teaching (3 Cor. 1.10-15):

They say
that we ought not use the prophets; and
that God is not Almighty; and
that there is no resurrection of the flesh; and
that the formation of humanity is not from God; and
that the Lord did not arrive in flesh nor was he born from Mary;


566 The shorter text of the letters is also found in the Heidelberg Papyrus (Coptic), the Armenian translation of Ephraim’s Syriac commentary on 3 Corinthians, and in part of the Latin tradition (manuscript “L”: Cod. Laon 45).


568 The citations of 3 Cor. throughout this chapter will follow the traditional enumeration of the verses, but will be preceded by either a 1 (Letter from the Corinthians) or a 2 (Letter from Paul). All English translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
that the world is not from God, but from the angels. They request that Paul either visit or write so that the influence of these two might be checked. Paul, of course, replies with a letter, addressing the various false teachings and reminding the Corinthians of what he had originally passed on to them as the proper standard of doctrine.

The only significant remaining question about 3 Corinthians involves the determination of a more specific historical location (both provenance and date). Typical approaches to this last issue have involved the identification of the particular heresy against which the author is writing. Assuming that the letter from the Corinthians to Paul reflects the positions of a single, targeted individual or group, standard treatments have mined the Fathers for evidence that might help whittle down the potential candidates.569 Proposals have included the Marcionites, Valentinian or Ophite groups, Saturnilus, and Simon Magus.570 Others view the polemic as directed toward “Gnostics” in general because the teachings mentioned are quite common among the various systems.571

569 The use of the Fathers rather than Nag Hammadi as a starting point is justified inasmuch as 3 Cor. is a proto-orthodox text that attempts to construct its opponents, as we will show, in typical heresiological fashion.


Rather than trying to reconstruct the identity of a particular opponent in 3 Corinthians, we will analyze its portrayal of Paul as well as its interpretive tendencies toward earlier Pauline material, in particular its reading of 1 Corinthians 15. This approach will allow us to explore and to emphasize the general polemical thrust of the work, to situate its portrayal of Paul within the context of other similar, firmly dateable, construals of Paul, and to understand the ways in which the proto-orthodox were attempting to reaffirm Paul as their own at the end of the second century.  

I will argue that 3 Corinthians is a late second-century, proto-orthodox invocation of the “Pastoral” Paul (i.e. the Paul of the Pastoral Epistles), who stands as the defender of apostolic teaching (διδασκαλία) in the face of “deviant views” (ἀστοχήµατα) of a generally “Gnostic” variety. Yet in this pseudepigraphic attempt to reclaim Paul, we encounter a reconfiguration of the Pauline tradition wherein, among other things, Paul ironically becomes a defender of σάρξ. This last conclusion stands in contrast with Vahan Havhanessian, who, in the only monograph written on 3 Corinthians in the last 100 years, asserts, “The similarity of the author’s message to that of the apostle Paul, affirmed in 3 Cor, supports the author’s intention [i.e. – to reclaim Paul from the Gnostics].”

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573 The text of PBodmer X, corrected by both Testuz (the editor) as well as Thomas W. Mackay, “Observations on P. Bodmer X (Apocryphal Correspondence Between Paul and the Corinthian Saints),” *Papyrologica Bruxellensia* 18 (1979): 119-28, can be found with accentuation in Rordorf, “Hérésie et orthodoxie,” 60-2.

574 Havhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 137.
Paul and His Opponents

The two letters that make up 3 Corinthians present a single, targeted picture of Paul. He is the quintessential defender of apostolic teaching (διδασκαλία) against “heresy.” Absent are the ethical and cultural issues, as well as the eschatological urgency, that are so prevalent in 1-2 Corinthians, Galatians, and 1 Thessalonians, for instance.\(^{575}\) The letter from the Corinthians functions as a list of “destructive statements” (φθοριµαίοις λόγοις) that have been proffered by the arch-heretics Simon and Cleobius (cf. below) and that stand in contrast to the apostolic “statements” (λόγους) of Paul and others (1.2, 4). Paul responds as if he had anticipated the letter, stating that he is “not astonished (Οὐ θαυµάζω) at how quickly the doctrines (δόγµατα) of the Evil One are advancing” (2.2) through the ones who are “counterfeiting his [Jesus’] words (τὰ λόγια αὐτοῦ)” (2.3). This is in marked contrast to the rhetorical strategy of Galatians 1.6: “I am astonished (Θαυµάζω) that you have so quickly deserted the one who called you by the grace of Christ for another gospel.” Paul calls on the Corinthians to “flee from their [Simon and Cleobius’] teaching (διδασκαλίας)” (2.21) and to “remain in the standard (κανόνι) that you received through the blessed prophets and the holy Gospel” (2.36). These admonitions are sprinkled throughout Paul’s paratactic refutation of the heresies.

The “destructive statements” of Simon and Cleobius and the attendant rhetoric over sound teaching should be viewed as a defense of apostolic teaching over and against heresy in the most general sense. Simon and Cleobius appear together as the first heretics

While little is known of Cleobius, Simon Magus emerges as the father of the “Gnostics” and the foil for proto-orthodox dogma throughout early Christian literature. He is first in the genealogy of early Christian heresy as early as Justin’s now lost Syntagma (I Apol. 26). Irenaeus, likely drawing from Justin, commences his catalogue of the history of heresy with Simon (Haer. 1.22-23) and later calls him “the father of all heretics” (Haer. 3.pref.1). Hippolytus likewise calls Simon the “starting-point” of heresies that later masqueraded under other names (Haer. 6.2-15). The author of 3 Corinthians, by positioning Paul against the supposed father of heresy and his sometime sidekick, portrays his response as a definitive uprooting of the various claims at their source.

That Paul’s words are to be viewed as a panacea to all varieties of theological error can be understood from the description of his situation at the beginning of his letter:

“Paul, the prisoner of Christ Jesus, in the midst of many deviant views (ἐν πολλοῖς ὤν ἀστοχήµασι) – to the brothers in Corinth – Greetings” (2.1). Previous translations have not satisfactorily rendered the Greek ἀστόχηµα. Schneemelcher and Rordorf read

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576 Cf. also the later Apostolic Constitutions 6.8, which has taken over much of the Didascalia.


578 Cf. Haer. 3.12.12.

579 Cf. Origen, Cels. 6.11.
“tribulations.” J.K. Elliott renders as “afflictions.” More recently, both Vahan Hovhanessian and Bart Ehrman translate as “failures.” These readings, which go back to Testuz (“échecs”), portray Paul in a state of weakness, possibly physical.

“Failures,” in particular, suggests that the problem may originate from Paul. His health and strength are failing. While certainly possible in the context of Paul’s self-described imprisonment, they are ultimately too dependent on the later narrative context of the *Acts of Paul* (PHeid.), which has the Apostle authoring the letter from a Philippian prison, close to death. In addition to the difficulties surrounding the Philippi narrative in the Coptic PHeidelberg, there are strong arguments for viewing the letters as originally independent of this larger framing story. Excluding this later narrative context, a better rendering of the rare word ἀστόχηµα in PBodmer X is “deviant view.” This reading is already suggested by Danker: “since I must deal with numerous errors (in teaching).”

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583 Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X-XII*, 35.

584 Cf. Rordorf, “Hérésie et orthodoxie,” 22-35, and Hovhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 47-56. Hovhanessian marshals out strong manuscript, patristic, contextual, theological and stylistic evidence against the claim that 3 Cor. was initially authored as a part of the *Acts of Paul*.

Plutarch, who provides the first attestation of this nominal form of the verb, ἀστοχέω (“to miss” or to “fail”; literally, “to be off target”), uses it twice in De curiositate. In speaking of curious “busybodies” (οἱ πολυπράγµονες), he likens them to a grammarian who spends his time collecting “headless lines in Homer and solecisms in the tragedians and the unbecoming and licentious language applied to women by which Archilochus makes a sorry spectacle of himself” (520B). Such a compilation of the faults (ἁµαρτηµάτων) of others is “unbecoming and useless,” according to Plutarch. In the same way, “busybodies” are fixated with “gleaning and gathering the blunders and errors and solecisms, not of lines or poems, but of lives” (520B; οὐ στίχων οὐδὲ ποιµάτων, ἀλλὰ βίων ἀστοχήµατα καὶ πληµµελήµατα καὶ σολοικισµοὺς ἀναλεγόµενοι καὶ συνάγοντες). Ἀστόχηµα, then, is semantically related to both ἁµάρτηµα and πληµµέληµα, with a sense of “fault,” “error,” or “missing the norm.”

Plutarch also likens the busybody to one who enters Rome in search of a prodigy, bypassing its beautiful statuary and people in favor of the bodily deformed: “those who have no calves, or are weasel-armed, or have three eyes, or ostrich-heads” (520C). From these comparisons with the grammarian and the prodigy-seeker, he concludes: “so let those who are curious about life’s failures (τὰ περὶ τὸν βίου ἀστοχήµατα), the blots on the

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587 The Greek texts and translations of Plutarch’s *De curiositate* are from William Hembold, *Plutarch’s Moralia, Vol. 6* (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). I have given the individual English translations of the Loeb editions for Plutarch, Athenaeus, 2 Clement, and the Didache to show how in other contexts multiple translators have rendered this tricky word (group), none of which approaches the sense given by the translators of 3 Cor.
scutcheon, the delinquencies and errors in other people’s homes (διαστροφάς τινας ἐν ὀίκοις ἀλλοτρίως καὶ πληµµελείας), remind themselves that their former discoveries have brought them no favour or profit.” While Hembold translates ἀστοχήµατα as “failures” here, it is clear that Plutarch understands τὰ ἀστοχήµατα to represent those things that are faulty, erroneous, or otherwise abnormal. Again, they are synonymous with πληµµέλειαι.

Our only other known use of the term in a somewhat contemporaneous context comes from Athenaeus (early-third century C.E.). He uses ἀστόχηµα in the sense of historical “error” when commenting on the anachronisms in Xenophon (Deip. V.216f; τὸ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἀστόχηµα λεκτέον).

The verbal form, ἀστοχέω, can be found in several Christian texts either pre-dating or contemporaneous with 3 Corinthians. Within the New Testament the verb is found only in the Pastorals, where it implies “wandering” or “deviating” from the faith (1 Tim 1.6; 6.21; 2 Tim 2.18; cf. Tables 2 and 3 below), thus “being in error.” A similar usage appears in 2 Clement 17.7:

But those who are upright, who have acted well, endured torments, and hated the sweet pleasures of the soul, when they observe how those who have deviated from the right path (ἀστοχήσαντας) and denied Jesus through their words or deeds are punished with terrible torments in a fire that cannot be extinguished, they, the upright, will give glory to their God, saying, “there will be hope for the one who has served as God’s slave from his whole heart.”

588 The Greek text of Athenaeus is from S. Douglas Olson, The Learned Banqueters, Books III.106e-V (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 536.

589 Translations of 2 Clem. and the Did. are from Bart D. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers.
This contrast between faithful slavery to God on the one hand and being in a state of “deviation” from the faith on the other is remarkably similar to 3 Corinthians 2.1, where Paul is the prisoner who combats his theological opponents on all sides. While lacking the doctrinal context, Didache 15.3b also exhorts, “Let no one speak with a person who has committed a sin against his neighbor (παντὶ ἀστοχοῦντι κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου), nor let him hear anything from you, until he repents.” Like Plutarch, the author of the Didache understands ἀστοχέω as semantically equivalent to ἁµαρτάνω.

This evidence, combined with the doctrinal polemic of 3 Corinthians, supports Danker’s reading of ἀστοχήµασι in 3 Corinthians 2.1 as “errors (in teaching).” Contextually, I render it as “deviant views.” And whether one reads ἐν πολλοῖς ὄν ἀστοχήµασι before or after χαίρειν makes little difference for my understanding of the phrase. 590 Read with 2.1, it is an existential description of Paul’s situation. When read with 2.2, as Danker has suggested, it is a causal clause. Because Paul finds himself amidst many theological opponents, he is not surprised that the Corinthians are as well.

Either way, Paul is pictured as one who is currently surrounded by numerous “errors” or “deviations” from the faith. He is the defender of proto-orthodox theology against every kind of teaching that is “not” (ἀ +) “on target” (στόχος), including those gaining influence at Corinth. His response to Simon and Cleobius is a cure-all for the many (πολλοῖς) heresies that found their origin in the figure of Simon Magus.

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590 Cf. Testuz, PBodmer X-XII, 34, for the manuscript evidence.
Paul and the Apostles

Yet the author of 3 Corinthians is quick to emphasize that Paul’s own teachings came from the other apostles. In a passage that closely parallels 1 Corinthians 11.23 and 15.3, Paul says, “For I entrusted to you in the beginning what I also received from the apostles who came before me, and who spent all their time with Jesus Christ’ (2.4):

Ἐγὼ γὰρ παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου, ὃ καὶ παρέδωκα ὑµῖν ὅτι (1 Cor 11.23);

παρέδωκα γὰρ ὑµῖν ἐν πρῶτοις, ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον ὅτι (1 Cor 15.3);

Ἑγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ παρέδωκα ὑµῖν ὅτι παρέλαβον ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸ ἐµοῦ ἀποστόλων γενοµένων τῶν πάντα χρόνον µετὰ Ἰησοῦ ὅτι (3 Cor. 2.4).

But a subtle reconfiguration of these passages has occurred. The source of the received traditions (double underline) has moved away from Paul’s unique relationship to the risen Christ and toward his dependence upon the previous apostles, who importantly, unlike Paul, spent time with the fleshly Jesus before his crucifixion and resurrection. In 1 Corinthians 11.23 Paul stresses that the subsequent Eucharist tradition came from the Lord. The source of the traditions underlying 1 Corinthians 15.3b-7 is left unstated. J.


592 His authority as an Apostle of Christ, unmediated by the Jerusalem apostles, is also the subject of his rhetoric in Galatians 1-2. Note the similarities in language, but differences in rhetorical context, in Gal 1.17 (οὐδὲ ἀνήλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυµα πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐµοῦ ἀποστόλους) and 3 Cor. 2.4. (τῶν πρὸ ἐµοῦ ἀποστόλων γενοµένων).

593 Cf. David M. Moffitt, “Affirming the ‘Creed’: The Extent of Paul’s Citation of an Early Christian Formula in 1 Cor 15, 3b-7,” ZNW 99 (2008): 49-73, for a persuasive argument that the full appearance list is part of the pre-Pauline tradition.
Christiaan Beker has argued that the tradition comes from the Antiochene church.\footnote{J. Christiaan Beker, \textit{Paul the Apostle: the Triumph of God in Life and Thought} (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 125.} Joseph A. Fitzmyer, following C.H. Dodd and Martin Dibelius, posits its origin in “the primitive proclamation of the Jerusalem community.”\footnote{Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, \textit{First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary} (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 541. Cf. also Anders Eriksson, \textit{Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians} (ConBNT 29; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998), 90-1.} Others have settled for generalizations like a “Palestinian”/“Semitic” or “Hellenistic” context.\footnote{Cf. Hans Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians} (Hermeneia; trans. J.W. Leitch; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975 [1969]), 252-4; Raymond F. Collins, \textit{First Corinthians} (SP 7; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 531.} Still others emphasize the generality of the tradition, making it suitable for any number of early Christian contexts.\footnote{Cf. Anthony Thistleton, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians} (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 1189.} The question, for our purposes, is not where the tradition ultimately comes from, but where does Paul say it comes from. But, of course, he does not indulge us here. We cannot just assume that because the tradition itself includes references to Cephas, James, and the Twelve that Paul intends for his readers to locate the tradition’s origin among them as well. This initial ambiguity about the tradition’s origin should be viewed in light of Paul’s later claim that his own vision of the resurrected Jesus spurred him to “work harder than all of them [the previously named apostles]” (1 Cor 15.8-10). While 1 Corinthians 15.3b-11 certainly works to establish continuity between Paul and other apostolic ministers (cf. also 1 Cor 1.12-13; 3.4-17), he in no way states that his teaching or ministry is dependent upon them.\footnote{Cf. Collins, \textit{First Corinthians}, 532: “Paul is concerned that his apostolate be considered as similar to that of those who were among the earliest witnesses to the resurrection, the leaders of the Jerusalem community, Cephas and James, and the Twelve of earliest Christian memory.” Notice that Collins uses “similar” and not “dependent.”} His dependence on specific
human authorities is left blank, at least from a rhetorical standpoint. The Corinthians might have any number of teachers, but they have only one father, Paul himself (1 Cor 4.14-15).

3 Corinthians 2.4, however, squarely places Paul’s message in continuity with and dependence upon the original apostles. He does not operate de novo, but in line with the “others.” The Corinthians say to Paul: “For we have not heard statements such as these from you or from the others” (3 Cor. 1.4). PBodmer X does not specify here who the “others” are, though later Coptic, Latin and Armenian manuscripts uniformly have “other apostles.” Paul’s response in 3 Corinthians 2.4 suggests that the later manuscripts have correctly interpreted the “others” in 3 Corinthians 1.4. Hovhanessian, however, understands the “others” as Paul’s co-workers who had been in Corinth, potentially Timothy, Apollos, Stephanus, Fortunatus and/or Achaicus. He argues that “others” cannot refer to the apostles because there is no evidence of apostolic presence in Corinth besides Paul. This is wrong on one major count: the particular historical events relating to the original Pauline mission in Corinth are not in view in 3 Corinthians. The author certainly mimics Pauline language throughout the letter, but there is no attempt to fit the letter within the historical framework of earlier Pauline letters. Rather, Paul’s relationship to the apostolic tradition is what is at stake throughout the presentation, so that the “others” seems to be a reference to the apostles, as Paul’s response and the tradition’s later translators made clear. Furthermore, the verbs παραλαµβάνω (1.5; 2.4;


600 Rordorf, “Hérésie et orthodoxie,” 45; Hovhanessian, Third Corinthians, 140.

601 Hovhanessian, Third Corinthians, 63,
2.36), \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta'\delta\omega\mu\imath\) (2.4), and \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta'\chi\omega\mu\alpha\iota\) (2.34), strategically placed at the beginning and end of the pseudepigraphical letters, act as a frame, creating a picture in which the theological assertions of Paul fall within the boundaries of the transmitted apostolic tradition.\(^{602}\)

This second-century construction of Paul as the quintessential defender of the gospel has its roots in the earliest Pauline tradition, where a number of texts portray the Apostle defending his gospel against community disturbers (Rom 3.8; 2 Cor 11; Gal 1.6-9; Phil 3.2; Col 2.16-23; 1 Thess 1.15-16; and the Pastoral Epistles). In fact, the more one looks at the language and polemic of the last of these, the Pastoral Epistles, the more one notices the numerous connections between the Paul of \(3 \text{ Corinthians}\) and the Paul of 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus. It is to those connections that we now turn.

\(3 \text{ Corinthians}\) and the Pastoral Epistles

The pseudepigraphical techniques of the author of \(3 \text{ Corinthians}\) include, as many have noted, the use of language and concepts found in the letters circulating under Paul’s name.\(^{603}\) We have just mentioned the transformation of 1 Corinthians 11.23 and 15.3. Of the numerous correspondences in language, there is a disproportionate dependence upon the polemical language of the Pastoral Epistles; so much so that the Paul of the Pastorals

\(^{602}\) Paul is never directly referred to as an apostle in these letters, as Penny, “Pseudo-Pauline Letters,” 303, has reinforced. However, given that “the others” (1.4) probably means “the other apostles” and that Paul is presented as the defender of apostolic faith, there is no reason to make too much of this point. On the technical language for the transmission of tradition, see Anders Eriksson, \textit{Traditions as Rhetorical Proof}, 73-134.

has become the hermeneutical lens through which the author of 3 Corinthians envisions his own Paul.

Of course, the author of 3 Corinthians knew nothing of the modern scholarly trend that groups these texts together under this name. Each would have simply been a Pauline letter belonging to the Apostle’s larger corpus. These three texts, however, were already being viewed together for thematic purposes by the turn of the third century. In both Tertullian (Marc. 5.21) and the Muratorian Canon (ll. 60-3) they are grouped together not only because they were written to individuals, but also for their emphasis on “ecclesiastical discipline” (Muratorian Canon: ecclesiasticae disciplinae; Tertullian: ecclesiastico statu). These same passages also suggest that 1-2 Timothy and Titus first circulated separately from a group of Paul’s letters to (seven) churches, likely causing their thematic unity to be easily recognizable. Aside from this ancient evidence, their common, unflagging concern for “healthy teaching” (1 Tim 1.10; 2 Tim 4.3; Titus 1.9; 2.1; ὑγιαινοῦση διδασκαλία), just one of numerous unique phrases and words shared among the Pastoral Epistles, gives further reason for viewing these texts together, even if recent sensitivity to some of the stark differences among the three (particularly between 2 Tim and 1 Tim/Titus) has partially deflated the heuristic value of the designation “Pastoral Epistles.”

Despite a range of differences, these three texts present a unified picture of Paul as heresy-fighter.

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604 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.11.


606 Cf. William D. Mounce, Pastoral Epistles (WBC 46; Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2000), cxii, for comprehensive lists of the so-called “non-Pauline” language of the Pastors. Some recent studies on the Pastors have questioned the heuristic value of viewing the Pastoral Epistles as a literary and
The overarching concern of both the Pastorals and *3 Corinthians* is the transmission of and adherence to correct teaching. Of the nineteen uses of διδασκαλία in the canonical Pauline letter corpus, fifteen come from the Pastorals. As was just mentioned, within the Pastorals διδασκαλία is sometimes modified by the adjectival participle υγιαινούση (“sound” or “healthy”), so that the “Paul” of 2 Timothy 4.3 can predict, “For there will be a time when they will not uphold sound teaching (τῆς υγιαινούσης διδασκαλίας).” The battle over fitting διδασκαλία is readily apparent both in the various other adjectives that modify this noun, including “demonic” (δαιμόνιον; 1 Tim 4.1), “good” (χάλος; 1 Tim 4.6), “pious” (ἐυσέβεια; 1 Tim 6.3), and “incorruptible” theological unity. Cf. Michael Prior, *Paul the Letter-Writer and the Second Letter to Timothy* (JSNTSS 23; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 61-90; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “2 Timothy Contrasted with 1 Timothy and Titus,” *Revue Biblique* 98 (1991): 403-18; Luke Timothy Johnson, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy: a New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 35A; New York: Doubleday, 2001); *Letters to Paul’s Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* (Valley Forge, Pa: Trinity Press International, 1996); James D. Miller, *The Pastorals Letters as Composite Documents* (SNTSMS 93; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); William Richards, *Difference and Distance in Post-Pauline Christianity: an Epistolary Analysis of the Pastorals* (Studies in Biblical Literature 44; Bern: Peter Lang, 2002); Rüdiger Fuchs, *Unerwartete Unterschiede: müssen wir unsere Ansichten über “die” Pastoralbriefe revidieren?* (Bibelwissenschaftliche Monographien 12; Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 2003); J. Herzer, “Abschied vom Konses?: Die Pseudepigraphie der Pastoralbriefe als Herausforderung an die neutestamentlich Wissenschaft,” *TLZ* 129 (2004): 1267-82; Gerd Häfner, “Das Corpus Pastorale als literarisches Konstrukt,” *TQ* 187 (2007): 258-73; and James W. Aageson, *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 57-89, among others. I am sympathetic to this growing trend, but regardless of where the scholarship leads on this issue, the “Pastoral Epistles” are undeniably homogeneous in their portrayal of Paul as the defender of “sound teaching.” Cf. Aageson, *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church*, 63-4, 69-70.

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608 1 Tim 1.10; 4.1, 6, 13, 16; 5.17; 6.1, 3; 2 Tim 3.10, 16; 4.3; Titus 1.9; 2.1, 7, 10.

609 Cf. also 1 Tim 1.10; Titus 1.9; 2.1.
(ἀφθορία; Titus 2.7), as well as in the ostensible creation of the verb ἑτεροδιδασκαλέω, “to
teach something different,” found in 1 Timothy 1.3 and 6.3.610

The same could be said about the use of the term λόγος in the Pastorals, which is
variously modified as “trustworthy” (πιστός; 1 Tim 1.15; 3.1; 4.9; 2 Tim 2.11; Titus 1.9;
3.8), “sound” (ὑγιαινώσχ/ὑγιής; 1 Tim 6.3; 2 Tim 1.13; Titus 2.8), “of truth” (ἀληθεία; 2
Tim 2.15); “of God” (θεός; 1 Tim 4.5; 2 Tim 2.9; Titus 1.3; 2.5); and “of faith” (πίστις; 1
Tim 4.6). In one case it is made absolute, where “Paul” says, “Preach the word” (2 Tim
4.2; κήρυξον τὸν λόγον). Negatively, one finds “frivolous speech” (1 Tim 1.6;
ματαιολογία) and “going to battle over words” (2 Tim 2.14; λογομαχέω). In 2 Timothy
there is a further contrast of “their words” (2.17; ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν) and “our words” (4.15;
τοῖς ἡμετέροις λόγοις), a move that forces a boundary between two different sets of
teaching.

The “Paul” of 3 Corinthians, so concerned with proper διδασκαλία (2.21), λόγουία
(1.2, 4; 2.3), δόγματα (2.2), and κανών (2.36) (cf. above), is the “Paul” of the Pastorals:
the Apostle who stands against teaching that is “other.”611 Yet the similarities between 3
Corinthians and the Pastorals are not confined to this conceptual level alone. Upon
closer inspection one finds that 3 Corinthians is littered with the language of 1 and 2

610 See BDAG, 399.
611 Cf. also Pervo, Making of Paul, 104: “In conclusion, this text is an attempt to say what the Pastor would
have said had he lived in the second half of the second century.”
Timothy and Titus. I lay out here in tabular form the similarities in language, arranged according to certainty of dependence.\textsuperscript{612}

Table 2: Certain Dependence of \textit{3 Corinthians} on the Pastoral Epistles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>\textit{3 Corinthians} (PBod X)</th>
<th>Pastorals (NA 27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ύπνεις τήν τινων πίστιν ἀνατρέπουσιν (1.2) “who are upsetting the faith of some”</td>
<td>ἀνατρέπουσιν τήν τινων πίστιν (2 Tim 2.18) “they are upsetting the faith of some”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Of Simon and Cleobius</td>
<td>• Of Hymenaeus and Philetus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• who are upsetting whole houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Of rebellious men, especially from the circumcision party, who should be silenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>καὶ τούτων ἡ ἄνοια γένηται (1.16) “and their foolishness might become evident”</td>
<td>ἡ γὰρ ἄνοια αὐτῶν ἔσται πᾶσιν (2 Tim 3.9) “For their foolishness will be evident to all”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Of Simon and Cleobius</td>
<td>• Of unnamed “seducers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ἐκ σπέρματος ∆αυίδ (2.5) “from the seed of David”</td>
<td>ἐκ σπέρματος ∆αυίδ (2 Tim 2.8) “from the seed of David”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tradition that Paul has passed on</td>
<td>• One of two parts of Paul’s gospel (the other is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Also found in the confessional fragment in Rom 1.3 and in Ign. (\textit{Eph. 18.2; Rom. 7.3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Παῦλος ὁ δέσµιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ (2.1) “Paul, the prisoner of Christ Jesus”</td>
<td>ἐμὲ τὸν δέσµιον αὐτοῦ (2 Tim 1.8) “me, his prisoner”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Εγὼ γὰρ τὰ δεσμά εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔχω (2.35) “For I have the bonds on my hands”</td>
<td>ἐν ὧν κακοπαθῶ µέχρι δεσµῶν ὡς κακοῦργος (2 Tim 2.9) “on account of which I suffer evil, to the point of receiving bonds, as if I was a criminal”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• We have already discussed the proper translation of the noun ἀστόχηµα above. Our translation as “deviant views” fits</td>
<td>• While the prison setting is not unique to 2 Tim, it does play a large role in both this letter and \textit{3 Cor.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ἐν πολλοῖς ὡν ἀστοχήµατι (2.1) “in the midst of many deviant views”</td>
<td>ὄν τινες ἀστοχήσαντες ἐξετράπησαν εἰς ματαιολογίαν (1 Tim 1.6) “Some, deviating from these things, have turned aside to frivolous speech”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• We have already discussed the proper translation of the noun ἀστόχηµα above. Our translation as “deviant views” fits</td>
<td>• Of false teachers of the Law with their</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{612} I do not think it is plausible to suggest that the language of the Pastorals might be dependant upon \textit{3 Cor.}

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well with the use of the corresponding verb in the Pastorals.

| οὐστίνας ἀποτρέπσευθε (2.21) | καὶ τούτως ἀποτρέπου (2 Tim 3.5) |
| “Turn away from these kinds of people” | “Turn away from these people” |
| • Of those who deny the creation of the world by the Father | • Of those who “hold to a form of godliness, but deny its power” |
| | • Only use of ἀποτρέπω in the NT and is rare in second-century Christian texts |
| | • In addition to ἀνατρέπω (see above) and ἀποτρέπω, the author of the Pastorals also uses ἐκτρέπω (1 Tim 1.6; 5.15; 6.20; 2 Tim 4.4). |

**Table 3: Uncertain Dependence of 3 Corinthians on the Pastoral Epistles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Corinthians (PBod X)</th>
<th>Pastorals (NA 27)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν σάρκα ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐδέσµευεν (2.11)</td>
<td>Ἦμεν γὰρ ποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπειθεῖς, πλανώμενοι, δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυµίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ποικίλαις (Titus 3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“And he imprisoned all human flesh to lust”</td>
<td>“For we ourselves were also at one time foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various desires and lusts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As opposed to “true piety”, the [“unjust ruler”] has enslaved “all flesh” to “lust”</td>
<td>• The interesting point here is the connection of ἡδονή with the concept of slavery.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
καὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπλάσθη (2.7)
“and that humanity was formed by his Father”
- In response to the teaching of Simon and Cleobius that “the formation (τὴν πλάσιν) of humanity is not from God”

Ἄδαμ γὰρ πρῶτος ἐπλάσθη, εἶτα Εὕα (1 Tim 2.13)
“For Adam was formed first, then Eve”
- This linguistic connection is tenuous, given that πλάσσω is used by several Christian writers of the second-century to describe God’s creation of humanity (Just., dial. 19.3; 1 Clem. 33.4; 38.3; Barn. 2.10; 19.2; Diogn. 10.2)

καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας αὐτῶν ἀποφεύγετε (2.21)
“and flee from their teaching”
- A reaffirmation of the call to “turn away from these kinds of people”

ταῦτα φεῦγε (1 Tim 6.11)
“flee from these things”
- Of “the love of money”

Τὰς δὲ νεωτερικὰς ἐπιθυµίας φεῦγε (2 Tim 2.22)
“flee from youthful lusts”
- Paul tells the Corinthians to flee from “immorality” (1 Cor 6.18) and “idolatry” (1 Cor 10.14)

Ὅτι τὴν ἀπλάνη θεοσέβειαν ἐκήρυσσόν χρόνοις πολλοῖς (2.10)
“who proclaimed the true piety for a long time”
- Of the prophets

ὁίτινες τὴν ἀπλάνη θεοσέβειαν ἐκήρυσσον χρόνοις πολλοῖς (2.10)
“which is fitting for women who profess piety”
- Of the proper adornment of women
- Again, θεοσέβεια, is a frequent second-century Christian attribution, so the potential connection here is noted in light of the more certain borrowings.

Of these parallels, I consider the first six to have certainly come from the Pastorals, whether through direct literary dependence or secondary orality. Numbers seven through ten are less likely, but have been included to show further potential correspondences in language and concept, if not dependence.


614 The authoritative work on the use of the Pastorals in the second century is Carsten Looks’ Das Anvertraute bewahren: Die Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe im 2. Jahrhundert (Münchner Theologische Beiträge; München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 1999). Looks examines the entire range of second-century evidence, dividing potential instances of dependence into the following categories: sicher = safe/secure; sehr wahrscheinlich = very probable; gut möglich bis wahrscheinlich = good possibility to probable; möglich, aber unsicher = possible, but uncertain; unwahrscheinlich = unlikely; ausgeschlossen = impossible. In the case of 3 Cor., he labels numbers 1, 2, and 6 from my chart above as “very probable.”
The Pastorals, then, provide the author of *3 Corinthians* not only with a fixed
image of Paul as defender of sound teaching, but also a language set for constructing his
own work. A third connection might also be present. The author of 2 Timothy
summarizes Paul’s gospel as two-fold: “Remember Jesus Christ, who has been raised
from the dead and who is from the seed of David, according to my gospel” (2 Tim 2.8). It contains an affirmation of the resurrection of the dead (Jesus’) and a declaration of the
continuity of the God of Israel with the God of Jesus. Appropriately, these are the two
overarching theological concerns of *3 Corinthians*, whose author has mimicked the Paul
found in the Pastorals in an attempt to fend off various teachings that he believes
threatened the Church.

*3 Corinthians* vs. *1 Corinthians 15*

Yet in fending off perceived threats to the Church in the name of apostolic
tradition, we find the Paul of *3 Corinthians* espousing views that are in some degree of
tension with the very Pauline texts he invokes. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
pseudepigrapher’s use of *1 Corinthians 15* to defend the resurrection of the flesh. In
PBodmer X, his rebuttal to Simon and Cleobius is prefaced with the title, “Paul, to the
Corinthians, concerning the flesh (περὶ σαρκὸς).” Whether or not this title accompanied
the letters at composition, by the third-century C.E. they were recognized chiefly as a
rejoinder to false teachings on the flesh, which were the root and cause of all sorts of

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615 On 2 Tim 2.8 as a creedal formulation incorporated by the author, cf. Martin Dibelius and Hans

“deviant views.” But we must briefly push aside this polemical context in order to see the contrast between 1 Corinthians 15 and 3 Corinthians with respect to σάρξ. 1 Corinthians makes anthropological distinctions between the body (σῶµα) and the flesh (σάρξ) that the author of 3 Corinthians cannot.

It would be tempting here to dive headlong into the chaotic sea that is the anthropology of the “historical” Paul. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we will focus primarily on 1 Corinthians 15, the passage from which 3 Corinthians actually draws. The next chapter will discuss more of the data since Irenaeus draws from various places within the Pauline corpus to defend his reading of 1 Corinthians 15.50. But as a way of prefacing our discussion of 1 Corinthians 15, a few things should be said about recent studies of Pauline anthropology inasmuch at 1 Corinthians 15 factors heavily in these discussions.

On the one hand are those who understand Paul’s anthropology, or at least his terminology, to have been unstable. Robert Jewett, for instance, has argued that Paul’s anthropological terminology was shaped by the particular polemical settings in which he found himself. Jewett worked meticulously through Paul’s terms (σῶµα, σάρξ, πνεῦµα, πνευµατικός).

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617 Hovhanessian, Third Corinthians, 66, argues for the originality of the title. He suggests that PBod X represents the pre-canonical 3 Cor. and that the title was dropped as it entered the canon of the Syriac church and was assimilated to Paul’s other letters, which don’t have titles.

ψυχή, νοῦς, ἔσω/ἔξω ἄνθρωπος, etc.), showing how they were used, circumstantially, in each of his letters. If he is right, then the prospects of identifying a single “Pauline anthropology” are quite grim.

More than a few, on the other hand, have attempted to bring coherence to the anthropology of the “undisputed” Pauline letters. Bultmann famously argued, for instance, that Paul had a consistently neutral view of the body (σῶµα). The body signifies personhood and is the arena in which flesh (σάρξ) and Spirit (πνεῦµα) do battle, where σάρξ represents the limitations of life without God (particularly self-righteous boasting) and πνεῦµα indicates the assistance of divine power leading to freedom from σάρξ. One could live either κατὰ σάρξα or κατὰ πνεῦµα (Rom 8.4-5) and the resultant fruit of either life would be evident (Gal 5.19-26).

While Bultmann’s views were dominant for several decades in the mid-twentieth century, his primarily moral and existential characterization of the σῶµα eventually came under scrutiny. Daniel Boyarin, for instance, has questioned Bultmann’s consistently pejorative interpretation of κατὰ σάρξα in Paul. He notes passages like Romans 1.4 (“[Christ] who was born of the seed of David κατὰ σάρξα”) and 9.5 (“The Messiah κατὰ σάρξα”), which certainly do not mean “The Christ who lives without reference to God” or “The Christ who seeks justification by works.” Rather, κατὰ σάρξα is “morally neutral,


although always subordinated to κατὰ πνεῦμα.”

Boyarin goes on to emphasize that the phrase becomes pejorative only when living “according to the flesh” has “the negative social effects in Paul’s eyes of interrupting the new creation of the universal Israel of God.”

Robert Gundry, also working against Bultmann, argued that σῶµα always implies the “physical body,” whether in classical Greek thought, the Old Testament, early Judaism or early Christianity. Bultmann was wrong to suggest that it signified the whole person. Moreover, Gundry found little distinction between σῶµα and σάρξ in Paul. Both represent “the whole body, substance-cum-form without differentiation.”

Gundry’s work was positioned not only against Bultmann, but also against late nineteenth-century “idealistic” scholarship (cf. C. Holsten and H. Lüdemann), which viewed the distinction between σῶµα and σάρξ in 1 Corinthians 15 (on which, cf. below) in light of Aristotle’s distinction between form (µορφή) and substance (ὕλη).

While the present body is stamped on σάρξ, the resurrection body will be stamped on πνεῦµα, which in Stoic and medical writers was a thin, vaporous material (again, cf. below).

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622 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 73.


624 Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology, 162.

But Gundry was too quick to declare this latter position “passé.” In fact, an increasing chorus of recent scholars has returned to the basic position of Holsten and Lüdemann: the subordination of flesh to spirit in Paul ultimately stems from Greek philosophy. Even Bultmann conceded that Paul employed Greek categories in 1 Corinthians 15, but that he was “misled” into adopting his opponents’ way of talking about the body. Paul’s normally existential characterization of the σῶµα gave way to metaphysical distinctions that he would not otherwise normally make. For some recent scholars, Paul’s anthropology is ultimately indebted to Plato. The self, or to use

626 Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology, 161.


a Pauline term, “the inner person” (2 Cor 4.16; Rom 7.22; ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), is housed within a body of σάρξ. This fleshly body is “the outer person” (2 Cor 4.16; ὁ ἔξω ἡµῶν ἄνθρωπος) or “earthly tent” (2 Cor 5.1; ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡµῶν οἰκία) that will perish. It is characterized by “mortality” (2 Cor 4.11; θνητός) and “weakness” (Rom 6.19; 8.3; Gal 4.13; ἀσθενεία) and will face “destruction” (1 Cor 15.15; Gal 6.8; φθορά). This is not to say that the flesh, as a creation of God (1 Cor 15.39), is inherently evil. Paul was no Gnostic. Rather, through its mortality and weakness the flesh becomes the house of Sin (cf. Rom 7.17, 18; 8.3), viewed as a hostile power ruling over humanity.

The Paul of the Hauptbriefe holds these Platonic categories together, according to Boyarin and others, with his Jewish eschatological hope in the resurrection, looking forward to a New Creation in the “age to come.” The apocalyptic nature of Paul’s eschatology only serves to heighten whatever anthropological dualism he had received from popular Greek philosophy. The “age to come” is the age of the Spirit and is in a strange way already present among those who are “in Christ” (2 Cor 5.17). Those who “walk in the Spirit” will no longer find themselves being controlled by the Sin in their flesh (Gal 5.16). Σάρξ, which typifies the age that is passing away, has no place in the

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630 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 77; Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology, 137-8.


632 Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 463.
New Age, the Kingdom of God. Paul firmly states, “Flesh and blood (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα) cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15.50).

Others have argued that popularized Stoicism (rather than a dualist Platonism) provides the best lens for understanding the language and argument of 1 Corinthians 15, regardless of how successful it is for explaining other Pauline passages. Jewett is likely right. The Pauline letters do not employ anthropological terms consistently, suggesting that Paul’s views might have been in flux. This will become apparent in Chapter Five. But we are only interested here in how 3 Corinthians reads 1 Corinthians 15, the text that the former invokes within its pseudepigraphic guise. The firm statement in the latter, that “Flesh and blood (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα) cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15.50), must be read within the broader context of the argument in 1 Corinthians, where a distinction is drawn between σὰρξ and σῶµα, contra Gundry and, as we will see in Chapter Five, contra Irenaeus. While σὰρξ might not inherit the kingdom of God, the σῶµα certainly will: “It is sown as a physical body (σῶµα ψυχικόν), but it is raised as a spiritual body (σῶµα πνευµατικόν)” (1 Cor 15.44). Paul, at least here, is no classical Platonist. Very few in the first century C.E. were. He denigrates σὰρξ while at the same time valuing σῶµα. Pharisaic belief in the resurrection from the dead and/or the

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633 Cf. Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 123-9; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Complete and Incomplete Transformation in Paul – a Philosophical Reading of Paul on Body and Spirit,” in *Metamorphoses*, 123-46; and Økland, “Genealogies of the Self,” 91, 94: “The fact that he does not do so faithfully, or does not always appear as a Stoic philosopher does not prevent him from sometimes doing it. This just means that his texts must be interpreted on a text-to-text basis . . . Still among the options available, I see Paul as coming closest to an Aristotelian/Stoic line of argument on this topic – which of course does not prevent him from sounding more like a Platonist elsewhere.”

influence of Stoicism must account for this distinction.  

Dale Martin, in his important study on concepts of the body in Greco-Roman antiquity, characterizes the basic Stoic position, which was also the position of most ancient medical philosophers, as follows:

Flesh, blood, and pneuma are all parts of the body – or rather, different forms of substance that together make up a body. When Paul says that the resurrected body will be a pneumatic body rather than simply a psychic body or a flesh-and-blood body, he is saying that the immortal and incorruptible part of the human body will be resurrected – or, to put it more accurately, that the body will be raised, constituted (due to divine transformation) only by its immortal and incorruptible aspects, without its corruptible and corrupting aspects such as sarx. No physical/spiritual dichotomy is involved here, much less a material/immaterial one . . . Paul would have thought of all of it as “material” – if, that is, he had been able to think in such a category without a material/immaterial dichotomy. At any rate, all the “stuff” here talked about is indeed stuff.

For Paul, as an eschatological thinker, future ideal corporeality will be characterized only by πνεῦµα, not the more corruptible σάρξ.

Gundry disagreed with this basic tack, particularly as it relates to 1 Corinthians 15. The σῶµα πνευµατικόν “is not a bodily form with spirit as its substance” since the σῶµα ψυχικόν “is not a bodily form with soul as its substance.” Paul would have posed a σῶµα σαρκικόν to the σῶµα πνευµατικόν if he had meant what Martin and others have

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argued. Paul also seems to alternate between σῶµα and σάρξ in 1 Corinthians 15.35-40. Gundry, however, seems to be talking past his opponents at this point. He argues that “Paul avoids ‘flesh’ in writing about the resurrection of human beings simply because the term would connote weakness, not because he wants to avoid a physical resurrection.” By “physical” Gundry means “material.” But Martin and others who argue for a σῶµα πνευµατικόν at the resurrection do not deny that the σῶµα πνευµατικόν is material/physical, as problematic as these terms are. The σῶµα πνευµατικόν takes up space and is composed of what we would call “stuff.” Furthermore, there is no real alternation between σῶµα and σάρξ in 1 Corinthians 15.35-40. The primary distinction within these verses is between heavenly (ἐπουράνιος) and earthly (ἐπίγειος). Just as there is a variety of earthly bodies, each composed of a different kind of flesh, there is also a variety of heavenly bodies, each having its own glory (δόξα). But the heavenly bodies are distinct from earthly bodies for this precise reason. They are not said to possess flesh. The resurrection body, by implication, will be a heavenly body, possessing its own kind of glory, but stripped of its flesh.

Andy Johnson, more recently, has tried to tackle Martin head-on, arguing that “flesh and blood” in 1 Corinthians 15.50 does not refer to a particular kind of materiality (or “stuff”), but rather to “living people who are capable of dying.” He contends that

639 Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 454, calls this the “traditional Judaic use of σάρξ.”
640 Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology, 167.
“flesh and blood” in the few known uses of the phrase pre-dating 1 Corinthians means nothing more than “living people” and is normally used to distinguish that which is only human from that which is divine. The most relevant of these data is found in Galatians 1.16. Johnson disassociates “flesh and blood” in Galatians 1.16 from the “those who were apostles before me” in Galatians 1.17. He does this to make “flesh and blood” square generally with the ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος in 1 Corinthians 2.14, which has an epistemological thrust. The Jerusalem apostles of Galatians 1, for Johnson, are not mere “flesh and blood” because they “did make sense of the world in terms of a crucified Messiah.”

Johnson, however, ignores the “immediately” (εὐθέως) of Galatians 1.16 in relationship to Paul’s subsequent narration of trips to Jerusalem. I find it more probable that “flesh and blood” in this passage is a general statement about consultation with humans in general, whereas Galatians 1.17 is a specific statement about the apostles in Jerusalem. If so, “flesh and blood” includes the apostles and most certainly describes even those who have the Spirit. And as with Gundry, it does not seem as if Johnson has really understood Martin when he states that “The net effect of this [his study] is to remove 1 Cor 15:50 as a ‘trump card’ from the hands of those who use it to argue that Paul holds to a more ‘spiritual’ concept of resurrection as opposed to what they might term a more ‘physical/material’ one.” Again, Martin’s whole point is that for Paul, as with the Stoics, everything is what we would call “material.” The key question is “What kind of material?”

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Despite a growing movement that sees Paul’s anthropology as heavily influenced by Greek philosophy, and I believe that Martin and Engberg-Pedersen offer the most satisfying reading of 1 Corinthians 15, we should remember that the Apostle might not have had a consistent, highly crystallized anthropology. The exact measure of continuity and discontinuity between life in this age and the next is remarkably unclear from letter to letter. Terms could be flexed and stretched in a variety of directions, either by himself, or by his later interpreters. This also means that it might be a bit naïve to ask whether or not a second-century author “got Paul right.” If the “historical” Paul was not a static entity, then it would be more advisable to ask about how individual second-century writers interpreted particular Pauline letters and passages. In 1 Corinthians 15.35-58, for instance, Paul seems to posit a significant discontinuity between the present and future bodies in an attempt to answer the nervous question of his opponents: πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροὶ; ποίῳ δὲ σῶµατι ἔρχονται; Paul’s answer in 1 Corinthians 15.50 suggests that σάρξ was the sticking point.

Given the rather negative appraisal of σάρξ in 1 Corinthians, the reader of 3 Corinthians should be surprised to find its Paul saying quite positive things about σάρξ. Vestiges of the Hauptbriefe remain, such as the imprisonment of the flesh to “lust” (2.11; ἡδονή) and its “perishing” state (2.15; σαρκός ἀπολλυµένης). Yet through his fleshly birth to Mary (2.5, 6, 13, 15) and subsequent resurrection in the flesh, Jesus acted to “set all

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645 Cf. Lehtipuu, “Transformation of the Flesh,” 150: “However, both Paul and other early traditions of resurrection were ambiguous enough to allow for diverging views to develop.”
flesh free by his own flesh” (2.6; ἐλευθερώσῃ πᾶσαν σάρκα διὰ τῆς ἰδίας σάρκος). His resurrection in the flesh serves as a model for the future fleshly resurrection of believers (2.6; τύπος). Because Christ has saved the flesh, σάρξ becomes an integral part of the resurrection body. Mankind is raised from the dead “as those with flesh (σαρκικούς)” (2.6), a point that is presented as being so deeply entrenched in the apostolic tradition that “Paul” says, “Now those who say to you ‘There is no resurrection of the flesh,’ for them there is no resurrection” (2.24).

The pseudepigrapher bolsters his argument for the resurrection of the flesh by weaving together several Scriptural illustrations, each of which emphasizes the continuity of the flesh, pre- and post-resurrection. The first and most important for our inquiry (2.26-28), concerning the sowing and rising of the seed, comes from Paul’s own discussion of the resurrection body in 1 Corinthians 15.36-38. A number of specific terms (σπέρµα; σῶµα; and γυµνός), as Hovhanessian has noted, connect these passages.

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646 Cf. 2.16 – “For Christ Jesus saved all flesh by his own body” (τῷ γὰρ ἰδιῷ σῶµατι Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς πᾶσαν ἔσωσε σάρκα).

647 Cf. 2.31-2 and 1 Cor 15.20.

648 I take this as meaning that there will be no resurrection of the flesh for those who deny such an event. Their fate is fiery damnation (2.37). Hovhanessian, Third Corinthians, 123, seems to disagree. He takes the phrase to mean that “there is no resurrection according to the teachings of those who reject the resurrection of the flesh.”


651 Hovhanessian, Third Corinthians, 123.
The logic of *3 Corinthians*, however, runs counter to what we find in *1 Corinthians*. In *1 Corinthians* 15 Paul uses the image of the seed because the transformation that it undergoes while in the ground approximates his own conception of the resurrection body. As Paul argues, “that which you sow, *you do not sow* the future body (*σῶμα*), but a bare grain (*γυµνὸν κόκκον*)” (1 Cor 15.37). At the resurrection God endows what was formerly a bare grain with a “body” (*σῶµα*) of his own choosing (1 Cor 15.38). This new body stands in distinction from the former body.\(^{652}\) Paul offers a series of contrasts (1 Cor 15.42-44). No longer being characterized by “perishability” (*φθορά*), “dishonor” (*ἀτιµία*), “weakness” (*ἀσθενία*) and “soulishness” (*ψυκικός*), the resurrection body will be characterized by “imperishability” (*ἀφθαρσία*), “glory” (*δόξα*), “power” (*δύναµις*), and “spirituality” (*πνευµατικός*), because Christ has “given life” to the mortal body (1 Cor 15.45).\(^{653}\) There is an unstated connection here between the flesh and the pre-resurrection body. The pre-resurrection body is characterized by terms that have been applied to flesh elsewhere in Pauline letters precisely because it continues to be limited by the qualities of the flesh (cf. above).

There is also no distinction here between the bodies of believers and non-believers, as well as no suggestion that the flesh has been redeemed from slavery to sin, as is stated in *3 Corinthians*. In order for the body to “inherit the kingdom of God,” it


\(^{653}\) Dale Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 127, argues that these contrasting qualities should be viewed hierarchically, not ontologically. One set of bodily qualities is superior to the other.
must be rid of the flesh (1 Cor 15.50). This ridding of the flesh occurs through the spiritual transformation of the body in the future. Paul continues: “The dead will be raised incorruptible and we will be changed (ἀλλαγησόµεθα)” (1 Cor 15.52). This transformation is described similarly in Philippians 3.21: “[He] will transform (μετασχηµατίσει) the body of our humiliation into conformity with the body of his glory.”

But it is this necessary transformation of the body that the author of 3 Corinthians misses in taking this illustration from 1 Corinthians 15. He begins:

For they [Simon and Cleobius] do not know, O Corinthian men, about the sowing of wheat or of the other seeds, that they are cast naked onto the earth, and after altogether perishing below are raised by the will of God, and have also been clothed with a body (2.26).

This is essentially the argument of 1 Corinthians. Yet the parable serves only as a window into the conversation of that text, and the author quickly diverges from its line of thought, reconfiguring it along the way. He continues, “So that not only is the body that has been thrown down raised, but it has been blessed with abundant prosperity” (2.27). This is a rather different interpretation of the image of the seed, for the pseudepigrapher suggests that the body that is raised is nothing more than a now vindicated version of the body that has died. That the body has not undergone any significant transformation is evident from the pseudepigrapher’s subsequent example of Jonah, who escapes from Hades with his hair and eyelashes intact (2.30). The argument is similar to that of Tertullian, who uses the wandering children of Israel in the wilderness and the salvation of Jonah as topoi for bodily resurrection:

That the raiment and shoes of the children of Israel remained unworn and fresh from the space of forty years; that in their very persons the exact point of convenience and propriety checked the rank growth of the nails and hair, so that any excess herein might not be attributed to indecency . . .
that Jonah was swallowed by the monster of the deep, in whose belly whole ships were devoured, and after three days was vomited out again safe and sound . . . to what faith do these notable facts bear witness, if not to that which ought to inspire in us the belief that they are proofs and documents of our own future integrity and perfect resurrection? (Res. 58; cf. Res. 35).654

Tertullian then legitimates these comparisons via Paul himself, referencing 1 Corinthians 10.6.

The complete continuity, and thus permanence, of the flesh is ultimately driven home by the author of 3 Corinthians through a reference to 2 Kings 13.20-21, where Elisha’s bones give life to a dead Israelite corpse. “Paul” follows the allusion with a question: “then what about you, upon whom the body and the bones and the Spirit of Christ have been cast, will you not be raised in that day having healthy flesh (ἔχοντες υγιὴ τὴν σάρκα)?” (2.32). The cryptic quality of the question should not cause us to miss the pseudepigrapher’s final statement regarding σάρξ: it is to be raised “healthy.”

We have, then, two different “Pauls.” The first is the Paul of 1 Corinthians 15, whose estimation of the flesh is decidedly negative. Σάρξ is an anthropologically and eschatologically inferior quality of “this age,” and thus “cannot inherit the kingdom of God.” The σῶµα is in need of transformation, which means the stripping off of the flesh and the final putting on of the Spirit. The second is the Paul of 3 Corinthians, who invokes a key image from 1 Corinthians 15 but has reconfigured it (knowingly or unknowingly) so as to attribute language and thought to the Paul of 1 Corinthians that is

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The distinction between σῶμα and σάρξ is clearly absent, leaving us with a stunning twist of fate. The Paul of 3 Corinthians has ostensibly denied the resurrection of the Paul of 1 Corinthians. As noted above, the Paul of 3 Corinthians vehemently states, “Now those who say to you ‘There is no resurrection of the flesh,’ for them there is no resurrection” (2.24). The first half of this statement closely parallels 1 Corinthians:

πῶς λέγουσιν ἐν ὑµῖν τινες ὅτι ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐχ ἔστιν; (1 Cor. 15.2);

dὲ οἱ ὑµῖν λέγουσιν ἀνάστασις οὐχ ἔστιν σάρκος (3 Cor. 2.24).

In each passage the phrase “those who are saying” refers to a group that has caused trouble within the Corinthian church because of aberrant views of the resurrection. Paul’s interlocutors in 1 Corinthians are those who deny a resuscitation of dead corpses. He clarifies his position, coming quite close to the modified Platonism of his day, by affirming the pneumatic (not sarkic) nature of the resurrection body. His adversaries in 3 Corinthians likewise deny a “fleshly” resurrection. In this case, he not only directly refutes their position but also denies their participation in the resurrection. One problem: Paul of 1 Corinthians appears to have agreed with Simon and Cleobius:

σάρξ καὶ αἷµα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονοµῆσαι οὐ δύναται (1 Cor 15.50);

οὐδὲ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι σαρκός (3 Cor. 1.12).


Excursus: The Resurrection of the Flesh in Early Proto-Orthodox Christianity

Belief in the resurrection of the flesh amongst the proto-orthodox had its origins in several intertwined factors. Of utmost importance was the debate over the nature of Jesus’ own body, already visible in the Johannine (John 1.14; 1 John 1.1-3; 4.2-3; 2 John 7) and Ignatian (Eph. 7.2; 18.2; 20.2; Magn. 1.2; 11.1; Trall. 8.1; 9.1-2; Rom. 7.3; Philad. 4.1; 5.1; Smyrn. 1.1-2; 3.1-3; 7.1; 12.2) literature. This debate, of course, included not only the nature of Jesus’ pre-crucifixion body, but also the nature of his post-resurrection body. The use of σάρξ to describe Jesus’ resurrected state is found as early as the Gospel of Luke:

“Look at my hands and feet to see that it is I, myself. Touch me and see. For a spirit does not have flesh (σάρκα) and bones, as you see that I have.” (24.39).

The general resurrection of the flesh is found as early as 1 Clement, where Job functions as proof for the resurrection:

“And again, Job says, ‘And you will raise up this flesh (σάρξα) of mine, which has suffered all these things.’” (26.3).

Except for these two passages, the “resurrection from the dead (νεκρῶν)” is the overwhelming, default language of our earliest texts. But “resurrection from” says

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658 J.G. Davies, “Factors Leading to the Emergence of Belief in the Resurrection of the Flesh,” JTS 23 (1972): 448-55, describes four factors leading to the belief in the resurrection of the flesh: 1) early resurrection appearance stories combined with the concept of Jesus as “first-fruits”; 2) millenarian thought among many Christian thinkers of the second century; 3) reaction to Gnostic denigration of the flesh; and 4) the acceptance of an increasingly Hellenistic anthropology.

659 The LXX of Job 19.26 reads: ἀναστήσαι τὸ δέρµα µου τὸ ἀνατλῶν ταῦτα παρὰ γὰρ κυρίου ταῦτά µοι συνετελέσθη. Note the switch in 1 Clement from δέρµα to σάρξ.

660 Matt 10.8; 11.5/par.; 14.12/par.; 17.9/par.; 22.31/par.; 27.64; 28.7; Luke 16.31; 24.46; John 2.22; 5.21; 12.1,9,17; 20.0; 21.14; Acts 3.15; 4.2,10; 10.41; 13.30,34; 17.3,31,32; 23.6; 24.21; 26.8,23; Rom 1.4;
nothing about “resurrection to.” The resurrection from the dead could result in resurrection to angelic-like status according to one layer of the triple tradition (Matt 22.30; Mark 12.25; Luke 20.36). Because this latter tradition approaches the notion of astral immortality, it is hard to imagine that it conceives of the post-resurrection existence as fleshly. Procreation, certainly, is out.661 A.H.C. van Eijk has shown how flexible the verbs ἐγείρω and ἀνίστηµι were within early Christian post-mortem hope. The object with which you pair them makes all the difference. “You must qualify them,” and neither the “ecclesiastical” nor the “Gnostic” qualifications were distortions of some natural use of these verbs.662 Dale Martin, contrasting the post-resurrection accounts in the canonical gospels and the Gospel of Peter, suggests that there was “no fixed tradition” about the nature of Jesus’ resurrection body in the first century C.E.663 And as we will see in the following chapter, anthropological ambiguity exists in the Pauline letter corpus as well.664

4.17,24; 6.4,9,13; 7.4; 8.11; 10.7,9; 11.15; 1 Cor 15; 2 Cor 1.9; Gal 1.1; Eph 1.20; 5.14; Phil 3.11; Col 1.18; 2.12; 1 Thess 1.10; 4.16; 2 Tim 2.8; Heb 6.2; 11.19,35; 13.12; 1 Pet 1.3,21; Rev 1.5; 20.5.


It is likely that the seemingly anti-material and docetic beliefs of some late first-century Christians provoked the counter-emphasis on Jesus’ *fleshly* resurrection that we see beginning in Ignatius (ἐν σαρκί: Smyrn. 3.1).\(^{665}\) According to proto-orthodox logic, since Jesus’ resurrection was in the flesh and he was the “first-fruits” (1 Cor 15.20; cf. 1 Cor 6.14; 2 Cor 4.14) and the “first-born” (Col 1.18; Rev 1.5), then his followers, too, will be raised with flesh (*I Clem.* 24.1; Ign., *Trall.* 9.2).\(^{666}\)

**Summary and Conclusion: Constructing the “Paul” of 3 Corinthians**

In order to reclaim the Paul of 1 Corinthians from opposing readings like the one we find in the *Gospel of Philip* 56.26-57.1 (cf. Chapter Two), the pseudepigrapher of 3 Corinthians paints a complex textual image of the Apostle. He does not merely offer a competing interpretation of 1 Corinthians. Rather, through the use of a variety of techniques, the pseudepigrapher goes several steps further in order to present a Paul who is more than prepared (2.2 – “I am not astonished”) to confront teaching that stands outside of the perceived apostolic norm. Even more, the Paul of 3 Corinthians not only defends, but is dependent on the traditions of the apostles. This particular portrayal of Paul develops in a number of ways. First, it positions Paul against Simon, the “father of all heretics” (Iren., *Haer.* 3.pref.1) and his sometime right-hand-man (Cleobius). For Paul to defeat Simon was to overthrow the “many deviant views” (2.1) of the author’s own day.

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\(^{666}\) Davies, “Factors,” 448.
Second, the Paul of *3 Corinthians* describes his own relationship to the apostolic tradition, the “canon” of the prophets and the Gospel (2.36), as one of dependence: “For I entrusted to you in the beginning what I also received from the apostles who came before me, and who spent all their time with Jesus Christ” (2.4). The use of language from 1 Corinthians works to establish continuity with this earlier Pauline tradition, while at the same time adding to and altering the tradition in order to clarify the legitimizing source of Paul’s teaching. This is similar to another second-century text, the *Epistula Apostolorum*, where the risen Jesus predicts the conversion of Paul, invoking the language of both 1 Corinthians 15.8 and Galatians 1:16 (“The last of the last will become a preacher to the Gentiles”). But it is the eleven who will heal Paul’s blindness, not Ananias, as in Acts 9. Furthermore, Jesus exhorts the eleven to “Teach and remind (him) what has been said in the scriptures and fulfilled concerning me, and then he will be for the salvation of the Gentiles” (31). The original apostles provide the legitimizing force for and doctrinal content of Paul’s ministry.

The earlier layer of Pauline material (1 Corinthians and Galatians) itself exhibits a certain tension with respect to Paul’s relationship with the other Apostles. 1 Corinthians 15 uses technical terminology (15:1, 3 – παραλαµβάνω and παραδίδωµι) to place Paul within the context of a larger framework of early Christian experience (15:8) and apostolic calling (15:10-11), though it is strangely, if not purposefully, silent on the origin of Paul’s gospel. On the other hand, Galatians 1, which has been combined with 1 Corinthians 15 in the *Epistula Apostolorum*, uses the same technical terminology to

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differentiate Paul’s gospel from human authorities, particularly those who “appear to be pillars” (2.9) in Jerusalem:

“For neither did I receive it from a human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gal 1.12);

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτό ὡστε ἐδιδάχθην ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Gal 1.12).

This ambiguity allows the early Pauline tradition to be stretched in either direction, depending on which text is allowed to be the interpretive filter for the other. It is not a matter of “Who gets Paul right?” The tradition resists systematization here. Rather, it is a matter of “Which Paul?” Which Pauline texts are employed to construct a particular image of Paul that is helpful for any particular reputational entrepreneur? How are the texts used and what place do they have in the entrepreneur’s ideological program? 3 Corinthians finds 1 Corinthians most helpful, but in deploying its language, the author has pushed beyond what the text actually says. In 3 Corinthians, Pauline teaching is not only consistent with the other apostles, but has been “received from” them (2.4). This is an example of what Shils calls an “endogenous” change in the tradition (cf. Chapter Three). The traditum possesses some element of mystery that must be resolved.

“Imagining, reasoning, observing, expressing are the activities which go beyond the tradition as it has been presented . . . There is something in tradition which calls forth a desire to change it by making improvements in it.” But the endogenous change, in this case, is likely the result of an exogenous change: the rise of competing Pauline traditions that read the same texts within a different framework.

668 Shils, Tradition, 214.
Third, in constructing an image of a Paul who is concerned for dogmatic and apostolic tradition and who can be most helpful in the reclamation of 1 Corinthians 15, the author of 3 Corinthians programmatically employs the language of the Pastoral Epistles. The Pastoral Paul functions as a site of memory in 3 Corinthians; as a lieu de mémoire, to use the language of Pierre Nora (cf. Chapter Three). Nora describes a site of memory as “any significant entity, whether material or nonmaterial in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community.” Communal sites of memory organize and frame the recollection of the past and provide commemorative symbols for constraining the tradition into the future. Memories are nothing but theoretical abstractions, devoid of meaning, unless they have a location, or what Halbwachs called a “landmark.” The material landmark (inclusive of texts) fixes the collective memory for the future, as long as it is still accessible.

Barry Schwartz describes this active attempt to remember one thing in light of another as the process of “keying” and “framing” (cf. Chapter Three). Keying, it will be remembered, “transforms the meaning of activities understood in terms of one event by comparing them with activities understood in terms of another . . . Keying arranges cultural symbols into a publicly visible discourse that flows through the organizations and institutions of the social world.” Schwartz is dependent here on Clifford Geertz, who

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669 Nora, Realms of Memory.

670 Nora, Realms of Memory, 1: xvii.

671 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 222.

672 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 224-5.

concludes that “Every conscious perception is . . . an act of recognition, a pairing in which an object (or an event, an act, an emotion) is identified by placing it against the background of an appropriate symbol.” The author of 3 Corinthians has certainly keyed Paul to the other Apostles, asking us to view him in light of their wider contributions. But he has also framed his own portrayal of Paul within the bounds of a particular material/textual site (the Pastorals), programming his readers to envision the polemical Paul of the Pastorals as the primary reference point for their memory of the Apostle. Marcion did the same with Galatians (Tertullian, Marc. 3.4.2; Epiphanius, Pan. 42.9.4; 11.8). The Valentinians preferred 1 Corinthians (Irenaeus, Haer. 3.2.1; 5.9.1; Tertullian, Res. 48.1). Origen found the heart of Pauline theology in Ephesians (Hom. Ezech. 7.10; Princ. 3.2.4; Cels. 3.20), as Luther would later elevate Romans. Each of Paul’s entrepreneurs works to frame their image of Paul by keying him to particular sites in the earliest layer of the Pauline tradition.

The keying of 3 Corinthians to the Pastoral Epistles is the ultimate means of providing an authoritative image of Paul as the defender of the “deposit,” the apostolic tradition (1 Tim 6.20; 2 Tim 1.12, 14). His opponents in Corinth are “upsetting the faith of some” (3 Cor. 1.2; cf. 2 Tim 2.18; Titus 1.11). Paul must intervene so that “their


675 On Marcion and the Valentinians, cf. Chapter Two above.

676 On the importance of Ephesians for Origen, cf. Richard A. Layton, “Origen as a Reader of Paul: A Study of the Commentary on Ephesians” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1996), 305-11, 331-5; “Recovering Origin’s Pauline Exegesis: Exegesis and Eschatology in the Commentary on Ephesians,” JECS 8 (2000): 374; and Ronald E. Heine, The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 48. Luther’s Preface to St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans begins: “This letter is truly the most important piece in the New Testament. It is purest Gospel. It is well worth a Christian’s while not only to memorize it word for word but also to occupy himself with it daily, as though it were the daily bread of the soul. It is impossible to read or to meditate on this letter too much or too well. The more one deals with it, the more precious it becomes and the better it tastes.”
foolishness might become evident.” (3 Cor. 1.16; cf. 2 Tim 3.9). He finally asks the Corinthians to “Turn away from these kinds of people” (3 Cor. 2.21; cf. 2 Tim 3.5). As we will see in the next chapter, by the end of the second-century, the proto-orthodox regula veritatis had come to include a definitive statement about the resurrection of the flesh. This communal confession was one of the primary constraining forces in how the proto-orthodox read and remembered Paul’s texts. For Paul to defend the deposit, then, was for him to speak in favor of the fleshly resurrection.

The reading of 1 Corinthians 15 that 3 Corinthians offers, then, does not stand on its own, but is part of a larger web of signification whereby a Paul is being constructed whose biography and texts can bear the burden of second-century proto-orthodox theology. James Aageson is quite correct when he states that “If the image of Paul and the theology of his letters were thoroughly interwoven in the early church, as they undoubtedly were, the adaptation of Paul and his words by the early Christians was more than an issue of simple textual reinterpretation. It was also a matter of an evolving Pauline image merging with the developing concerns of the day.”

The similarities between 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses in their independent constructions of the Pauline tradition, as we will see, suggest that their authors are living in the same generation and that they did not operate de novo, but participated in a common stream of Pauline reception. These second century texts, then, are just as much mirrors of this tradition of Pauline memory as they are attempts to further illumine the Apostle for their readers/hearers. Reputational entrepreneurs, as Schwartz reminds, offer “collective representations – images that existed in the mind of the entrepreneur because they first

677 Aageson, Paul, the Pastorals, and the Early Church, 1-2.

678 Cf. also Pervo, Making of Paul, 102.
This wider tradition, represented by 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses, finds anthropological continuity between this age and the next in 1 Corinthians 15 (at least in the case of believers), whereas 1 Corinthians itself posits discontinuity: “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (15.50). But since the early Pauline texts, as a group, do not display a consistent anthropological terminology, Irenaeus, as we will see, is able to gain some traction for his defense of 1 Corinthians 15.50 by surrounding it with a complex interpretive web, constructed mainly of other Pauline texts. To his work we now turn.

679 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 22.
CHAPTER FIVE

Expounding Paul: The Image of Paul in Irenaeus’ *Adversus haereses*[^680]

Irenaeus of Lyons concludes Book Four of his *Adversus haereses* with the following anticipatory statement:

> But it is necessary to subjoin to this composition, in what follows, also the doctrine of Paul after the words of the Lord, to examine the opinion of this man, and expound the apostle, and to explain whatsoever [passages] have received other interpretations from the heretics, who have altogether misunderstood what Paul has spoken, and to point out the folly of their mad opinions; and to demonstrate from that same Paul, from whose [writings] they press questions upon us, that they are indeed utterers of falsehood, but that the apostle was a preacher of the truth, and that he taught all things agreeable to the preaching of the truth. (4.41.4).[^681]

As we saw in Chapter One, this passage is one of several windows into the polemical discourse of the second century over the proper interpretation of Pauline texts specifically, and the Pauline legacy in general.[^682] This discourse was necessitated by the rich variety of “Pauline” texts and traditions that were available by the late-second century and the concomitant diversity of Christian authors who wrote about Paul or interpreted his texts for their communities. Tertullian would shortly thereafter lament that the followers of Marcion had “adopted” Paul as their own Apostle (*haereticorum*[^680] portions of this chapter are forthcoming in print as “How to Read a Book: Irenaeus and the Pastoral Epistles Reconsidered,” *VC* 65 (2011). Permission to reproduce portions of that article has been granted by E.J. Brill.

[^681]: Emphases mine.

[^682]: Cf. D. Jeffrey Bingham, “Irenaeus Reads Romans 8: Resurrection and Renovation,” in *Early Patristic Readings of Romans*, 114: “He [Irenaeus] studied Paul’s material within the context of an exegetical controversy.”
In order to defend a particular image of Paul as a “preacher of the truth,” Irenaeus, as we will see, feels compelled to “expound the apostle” in ways that are consonant with his own *regula veritatis*. Image construction and textual interpretation are intimately related here, as they were in *3 Corinthians*. And while the proper memory of Paul is what is ultimately at stake, it must be formed and transmitted within the given ideological (social) constraints.

During the past twenty years, the use and interpretation of Paul in Irenaeus has been ably studied at length by Rolf Noormann and in brief by Richard Norris and David Balás.\(^{683}\) In what follows I will briefly summarize the state of Irenaean studies as it relates to the Pauline tradition, and then explore several aspects of the portrait of Paul found in *Adversus haereses* that have important affinities with the Pauline tradition in *3 Corinthians*.\(^{684}\) These similarities allow us to understand both texts as participants in a wider trajectory of Pauline reception (a particular stream of proto-orthodox memory

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tradition) at the end of the second century. The size of Irenaeus’ project will also help us understand the larger ideological boundaries within which his Paul fits. As such, we will observe the social forces that shape his memory of Paul and that drive his own claims about the “real” Paul.

Paul in Irenaeus: a Brief Modern History

Johannes Werner’s *Der Paulinismus des Irenaeus*, published in 1889, was the first modern, scholarly attempt at a comprehensive statement about the reception of Paul in Irenaeus. Werner identified 206 Pauline citations in *Adversus haereses*, excluding 18 instances where Irenaeus relayed information about his opponents’ use of Paul. All of the now canonical Pauline letters were cited except Philemon, resulting in Paul being the most frequently cited Biblical author in Irenaeus. Werner concluded that since Irenaeus never referred to a Pauline text as Scripture (*γραφή*), his letters had less authority for the heresiologist than did the Jewish Scriptures. Irenaeus even appears to differentiate between Scripture and Paul’s letters: *quoniam enim sunt in caelis spiritales*

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687 Werner, *Paulinismus*, 8: Rom – 54 citations; 1 Cor – 68; 2 Cor – 13; Gal – 24; Eph – 16; Col – 7; 1 Thess – 2; 2 Thess – 9; 1 Tim – 2; 2 Tim – 2; Titus – 2.

conditiones, uniuersae clamant Scripturae, et Paulus autem testimonium perhibet quoniam sunt spiritalia (Haer. 2.30.7; 140-2)." Despite this distinction, it was clear to Werner on the basis of Irenaeus’ actual argumentative use of Pauline texts that they held theological authority for him. Yet, he concluded that Irenaeus’ use of Paul was entirely incongruous with Paul’s own meaning on most occasions and served merely as proof-texts for his own theological polemic (e.g., Irenaeus’ use of 2 Cor 4.4 in Haer. 3.7.1-2). Werner held the “theology of the cross” to be Paul’s central doctrine, and inasmuch as Irenaeus took little notice of this aspect of Pauline teaching, he had neglected (for Werner) the heart of the Apostle. He also charged Irenaeus with incipient Pelagianism and with deviating from Paul’s teaching on salvation through faith and grace. Likewise, Irenaeus’ view of faith as assent to the “rule of truth” seemed too distant from Paul’s emphasis on faith as trust in God’s unconditional means of salvation. Finally, Werner held that Irenaeus felt constrained to use Paul only in light of the Apostle’s authority among his theological opponents.

Werner’s work was done in the era when Protestant scholars posited a second-century Pauline captivity to the “heretics” (see Chapter Two). When Irenaeus finally took up Paul for the proto-orthodox, a large interpretive gulf of some 125 years lay

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690 Paulinismus, 46-58, 214. Irenaeus marks, for Werner, a transitional phase in the acceptance of the Pauline letters as Scripture.

691 Paulinismus, 96-103.

692 Paulinismus, 212.

693 Paulinismus, 131, 137.


695 Paulinismus, 47, 214.
between Paul and the earliest serious proto-orthodox reflection on his letters. Naturally, for these scholars, Irenaeus got the “historical” Paul all wrong. We saw how Adolf Harnack and Hans von Campenhausen, among others, viewed Irenaeus’ Paul as being an elaborate comingling of the “historical” Paul with the non-Pauline Acts and Pastoral Epistles. Of course, by the “historical” Paul, they really meant Paul as interpreted through developing Lutheranism. As Ernst Dassmann says,

> Werner mißt Irenäus an einem eingeengten Paulinismus entsprechend dem Paulusverständnis seiner Zeit, ohne eine legitime Weiterentwicklung und die Übersetzung paulinischer Gedanken im Hinblick auf neue theologische Fragen gelten zu lassen.

Or, Hoh from an earlier period: “wenn man lutherische Prinzipien mit Paulinismus gleich setzt, kann W[erner] allerdings sagen, daß Ir[enaeus] dem Verständnis Pauli meilenfern geblieben ist.”

Aside from the simple fact that Irenaeus does refer to Pauline texts as γραφή (cf. the use of Gal 5.21 in Haer. 1.6.3) and places the testimony of the Apostle (Haer. 3.6.5-7.2) between the Prophets (3.6.1-4) and the Savior (3.8.1-3) in his defense of the unity of God in Book Three, signs of a shift in the narrative undergirding Werner’s broader conclusions could already be seen in the early-twentieth century and finally came to full

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696 Cf. Eva Aleith, *Paulusverständnis in der alten Kirche*, 70-81, where she concludes that “Die Mißverständnisse sind zwar unleugbar” (80) and that Irenaeus answers many theological problems “in nicht paulinischem Sinne” (81). Cf. the conclusion of Schneemelcher, “Paulus in der griechischen Kirche,” 19: “Allerdings darf nicht verschwiegen werden, daß trotzdem der Abstand zwischen Irenäus und Paulus vielfach erstaunlich groß ist.”


698 Der Stachel im Fleisch, 312.

fruition in the 1970s on two fronts. The first was described in Chapter Two.

Lindemann, Dassmann and Rensberger each showed separately that the proto-orthodox never ceded Paul to the “heretics” and that the presence of Pauline pseudepigraphy, the collection and distribution of Pauline letters, and the use of Paul in the Apostolic Fathers was indicative of Paul’s authority among their ranks.

The second line of attack came from scholars who argued for more continuity between the “historical” Paul and Irenaeus’ use of Paul. Andrew Bandstra argued that Irenaeus’ teaching on redemption (particularly his emphases on Christ’s victory over sin, death and Satan, as well as the infusion of immortality through the Spirit) closely parallels Paul, though he noted some differences. Mark Olson declared that Irenaeus “grasp[ed] the essential elements of Paul’s thought” and that he normally arrived at the

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700 The Greek of *Haer.* 1.6.3 (fr. gr. 1.630-3) reads: Διὸ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπειρημένα πάντα ἀδεῶς οἱ τελειότατοι πράττουσιν αὐτῶν, περὶ ὧν αἱ γραφαὶ διαζεζαιοῦνται τοὺς ποιοῦντας αὐτὰ βασιλείαν Θεοῦ µὴ κληρονοµήσειν. In the early-twentieth century, cf. Hitchcock, *Irenaeus,* 223-4, and Hoh, *Die Lehre des Hl. Irenäus,* 64-5, 90-1. Hoh, 64, concedes that Werner did make note of *Haer.* 1.6.3, but that “sucht sie daher in die Ecke zu drücken.” Cf. now André Benoit, *Saint Irénée,* 136-41; Pierre Nautin, “Irénée et la canonicité des Épîtres pauliniennes,” *RHR* 182 (1972): 113-30; Dassmann, *Der Stachel im Fleisch,* 301-5; Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 317-18, 320; Olson, *Irenaeus,* 62-3; Warren, “The Text of the Apostle,” 298-9; and Denis Farkasfalvy, “Theology of Scripture in St. Irenaeus,” *Revue bénédictine* 78 (1968): 331-2, the latter of whom shows how the Spirit is said to have spoken through Paul in the same ways that it had to the prophets and other Apostles (*Haer.* 3.7.2; 4.8.1). The Pauline Epistles may also be deemed “Scripture” in *Haer.* 1.8.2-3; 1.9.1; 3.12.12; 4.pref.1; and 5.14.4. The debate over whether or not Irenaeus ever calls Paul’s letters γραφή is marginalized, to some extent, however, by the variegated way in which Irenaeus uses this term for a whole range of writings, from his own (*Haer.* 3.6.4; 3.17.4; 5.pref.1) to his opponents’ (*Haer.* 1.20.1; 3.3.3). Cf. Hitchcock, *Irenaeus,* 226.

701 Cf. Dassmann, *Der Stachel im Fleisch,* 305-13, for a short review of Werner and the shift occurring in the 1970’s.

702 Andrew J. Bandstra, “Paul and an Ancient Interpreter: a Comparison of the Teaching of Redemption in Paul and Irenaeus,” *CTJ* 5 (1970): 43-63. Cf. the earlier conclusion of Lawson, *Biblical Theology,* 187-8: “In reply we may say that S. Irenaeus was nearer to an understanding of S. Paul’s estimate of Christ’s death than were many later Latin and Reformation theologians.”
“natural sense of Paul’s letters.” John Coolidge argued that Irenaeus’ defense of the unity of Scripture was rooted in Pauline themes and that Irenaeus made “consistent inferences from [Paul’s] thought.” Irenaeus, for example, defends the unity of the Jewish Scriptures and the canonical Gospels and Paul through an appeal to the Pauline image of the unified body of Christ (Haer. 4.20.6; 4.32.1; 4.33.10). Moreover, the unity of Scripture and the history it portrays (pointing to Christ) is described throughout Adversus haereses with the language of Ephesians 1.10: ἀνακεφαλαίωσις/recapitulatio (cf. 3.18.1, 7; 3.22.3; 4.6.2; 4.38.1; 5.23.2). The Pauline declaration of cosmic unity wrought in Christ (“the summing up of all things in him” – Eph 1.10) became such a fixed part of Irenaeus’ thought that it can be described by Coolidge as “the key to his whole biblical theology.” Irenaeus understood Ephesians 1.10, however, in light of Romans 5.12-21. Christ’s recapitulation of all things is both a summation of humanity

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703 Olson, Irenaeus, 2, 81. Olson, however, ends up making too many concessions throughout his book to take these statements with full weight (cf. 84-5 on Irenaeus’ readings of 2 Cor 4.4, 1 Cor 3.7 and Eph 5.30). He hedges, importantly, on Irenaeus’ reading of 1 Cor 15.50 as well (96).


706 Coolidge, “Pauline Basis,” 11. Irenaeus can, of course, use other apostolic writings to defend his Christocentric reading of Scripture and history. Cf. E. Scharl, Recapitulatio mundi: Der Rekapitulationsbegriff des Hl. Irenäus und seine Anwendung auf die Körperwelt (Freiburger theologische Studien 60; Freiburg: Herder, 1941); Paul Potter, “St Irenaeus and ‘Recapitulation,’” Dominican Studies 4 (1951): 192-200; Benoit, Saint Irénée, 225-9; Farkasfalvy, “Theology of Scripture in St. Irenaeus,” 319-33; Noormann, Irenäus, 379-466; and Fantino, La théologie d’Irénée, 203-382.
under Adam and “a reversal of its outcome.” He interprets it in the context of salvation-history and not the cosmos. In most of these investigations, differences in emphasis between Paul and Irenaeus are chalked up to “der Verschiedenheit der jeweiligen Situation.” This is the case particularly for Irenaeus’ emphasis on the Incarnation, rather than the cross.

Rolf Noormann’s *Irenäus als Paulusinterpret* (1994) is a full-scale attempt to look at the data again, 100 years after Werner, and to redraw how we view Irenaeus’ Paulinism. Paul is ὁ ἀπόστολος for Irenaeus (cf. Chapter One), who cites him more than any other New Testament writer. Noormann argues that Irenaeus’ use of Paul is not original, but part of a burgeoning interpretive tradition. He may have been the first to author a text in which Paul’s letters were so extensively used, but his views about Paul and his interpretation of Pauline texts were largely traditioned to him. His reception of Paul may have been partially mediated through “the certain presbyter” mentioned in

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707 Coolidge, “Pauline Basis,” 13-14. On the similarities between Paul and Irenaeus on Adam/Christ and recapitulation, cf. Maurice Wiles, *The Divine Apostle*: “But the basic understanding of Christ’s work and person which Irenaeus develops from the concept seems to be a true interpretation of Paul’s meaning” (73); “But despite such illegitimate overpressing of detail Irenaeus’ main idea is true to that of Paul and shows both the depth and the range of the Pauline conception” (74). For a fuller treatment of this theme in Irenaeus, cf. Jan Tjeerd Nielsen, *Adam and Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons* (Van Gorcum’s Theologische Bibliothek 40; Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1968). Nielsen, 68-86, sees greater differences with Paul than does Wiles: “In Rom. 5.12-21 Paul sets the Adam-Christ typology in the context of the redemption of sin. For Paul sin is a deep, intensive crack in creation... Christ, the second Adam, came to conquer and destroy sin. There is tension between ‘now already’ and ‘not yet’. For Irenaeus sin is no more than an intermezzo. Adam was a child, when he was disobedient. There is no arc of tension for Irenaeus between ‘now already’ and ‘not yet’” (92-3). In addition, overcoming guilt and death appear to be more important to Irenaeus than the deep weight of Sin (Dassmann, *Der Stachel im Fleisch*, 309).

708 Cf. Fantino, *La théologie d’Irénée*, 240-64, for Irenaeus’ understanding of recapitulation in relationship to another important term: ὑιοποιία. In Appendix 2, 410-13, he gives an exhaustive list of Irenaeus’ use of the “economy” language, finding 135 uses in *Adversus Haereses*.


Haer. 4.27.1. Harnack posited that this presbyter was the source for much of Irenaeus’ anti-Marcionite polemic in Adversus haereses 4.27-32, including the bevy of references to Pauline letters in this section, one of which (Rom 11.17, 21) is clearly said to have come directly from “the presbyter” (Haer. 4.27.2). Noormann also notes Irenaeus’ relationship to Polycarp, who makes wide use of the Pauline literature in his Epistle to the Philippians. He challenges the assertions by Harnack, Bousset and von Campenhausen that Paul had been ceded to the heretics in the first half of the second century, relying on the more recent work of Lindemann, Dassmann, and Rensberger. He determines that the sheer breadth of Pauline texts invoked by Irenaeus and the variety of ways in which Irenaeus makes use of the Pauline literature mitigates any claims that he dealt with Paul only because of his opponents’ affinity for the Apostle. The reception of Paul in Irenaeus is “ein vielfältiges Phänomen.” As such, Irenaeus was the inheritor of a proto-orthodox theology that had fully assimilated Paul, even if Paul was not foundational within this inheritance. Furthermore, the Deutero-Paulines and Acts were

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714 *Irenäus*, 520.

715 *Irenäus*, 520.

716 *Irenäus*, 520-1.

717 *Irenäus*, 517.

718 This point had been made earlier in Benoit, *Saint Irénée*, 135.
not the hermeneutical lens, or gate-keeper, of the Pauline tradition. 1 Corinthians, Romans, and Galatians are much more frequently cited.

Noormann scrupulously works through every instance of a Pauline citation/allusion in Irenaeus, often invoking modern scholarship on Paul to measure how close or far Irenaeus’ invocation of the Apostle was from the Apostle’s “true” meaning. Noormann concedes that in many places Irenaeus does not have Paul “right.” Rather than reading Paul in light of the Jew/Gentile issue, or the eschatological tension and apocalyptic dualism so prevalent throughout Paul’s letters, Irenaeus invokes Pauline literature to undergird three central themes: salvation history (unity of the Creator with the God of Jesus Christ); Christology (Christ’s divine incarnation as Second Adam who restores humanity to immortality); and anthropology (the resurrection of the flesh). On the whole, however, Noormann, while noting differences, sees much greater continuity in Irenaeus’ use of Pauline texts than did Werner.

Richard Norris and David Balás, writing at the same time as Noormann (early 1990’s), corroborated several of his findings. Norris argues that Irenaeus normally used Paul constructively, showing how Paul’s texts were frequently invoked by Irenaeus as evidence against heretical teaching, in general, or to support his own broad theological agenda. They were not cited solely for the purpose of ironing out false readings of particular Pauline texts (though this did happen on occasion – cf. below on 1 Cor

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719 Irenäus, 530.
720 Irenäus, 70-375.
722 Irenäus, 518-19.
Romans and 1 Corinthians appear throughout Books Three and Four of *Adversus haereses*, but it is the Pauline language of “the fullness of time” in Galatians (Gal 4.4-6) that provided a way for Irenaeus to speak of the unity of God, the unity of Jesus Christ, and the unity of salvation-history (cf. *Haer.* 3.16.3, 7; 3.22.1). Norris argues that the language of this one text creeps into Irenaeus’ work at least thirteen times (mainly in Books Three and Four), making it hard to distinguish whether or not one is reading a citation of allusion to Paul or whether the Pauline text has so saturated Irenaeus’ theological vocabulary that he unconsciously returns to it time and again.

Balás, broadly agreeing with Norris, shows how Paul’s texts fit within the larger literary structure of *Adversus haereses*. Balás makes several important conclusions. First, when Irenaeus describes the texts adduced by his opponents in Book One, there appears to be no excessive dependence on Paul by any of them, excepting Marcion. Second, like Noormann and Norris, Balás holds that Irenaeus has received a theological tradition where Paul was already “an integral and substantial part of the apostolic witness to Christ.”

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*Cf. also the discussion of Irenaeus’ defense of the unity of God in 2 Cor 4.4 (Haer. 3.7.1-2; 4.29.1) in light of his opponents’ reading of this text in Norris, “Irenaeus’ Use of Paul,” 82-3. This general point is also noted by Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 328.*

*Norris, “Irenaeus’ Use of Paul,” 89-91.*

*Norris, “Irenaeus’ Use of Paul,” 89, n. 20.*

*Balás, “The Use and Interpretation of Paul,” 31.*

*Ibid., 38.*
I am in broad agreement with Noormann, Norris and Balás about the place of Paul in Irenaeus’ thought and polemic. While I will have various quibbles with them in the pages below, they have succeeded in prying Irenaeus from the clutches of the Pauline Captivity narrative. The remainder of this chapter pushes the conversation further, asking, in particular, about how Irenaeus envisioned the Apostle. What image of Paul does he construct in *Adversus haereses*? What is at stake in this image? How are Pauline texts used and interpreted to aid in its production? There are, of course, numerous aspects of the Pauline tradition in Irenaeus that could be addressed. I have isolated here Irenaeus’ portrayal of Paul’s relationship to the other apostles, his programmatic use of the Pastoral Epistles in crafting his heresiological tome, and the hermeneutical moves he makes in reading 1 Corinthians 15 as a defense of the resurrection of the flesh. The latter two have not been sufficiently treated in Noormaan or others. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the specific constellation of these three aspects of the Pauline tradition also appears in *3 Corinthians*, allowing us to peer into one stage of one particular trajectory of Pauline reception from at least two angles. Finally, each of these aspects of Irenaeus’ use of earlier Pauline materials is different in kind. The portrayal of Paul’s relationship with the apostles attempts to provide a particular narrative of Paul. The programmatic use of the Pastorals envisions Paul through the lens of a particular set of Pauline texts. And the extended reading of 1 Corinthians 15.50 offered in Book Five shows how the canon of Pauline literature, as well as Irenaeus’ own *regula veritatis*, shapes his reading of any one Pauline text. Each of these elements works together to provide a complex image of the Apostle. By taking them together, we can offer a thick description of the Pauline tradition in Irenaeus. We begin with Paul’s relationship to the Apostles.
Like *3 Corinthians*, Irenaeus attempts to bind Paul to the other Apostles, and thus the wider “apostolic tradition.” The results of the so-called “Jerusalem Council” in Acts 15 and Galatians 2 are particularly important for him. From Luke’s version, Irenaeus recounts the theological harmony between Paul, James, and Peter (3.12.14). But approval from the Jerusalem apostles was not enough. Irenaeus reminds his readers that from Paul’s side there was a willing subjection to them: “For an hour we *did* give place to subjection” (3.13.3; 49: *ad horam cessimus subiectioni*). Although this reading of Galatians 2.5 is paralleled in certain “Western” witnesses of Paul (D* b d; cf. Tert; MVict* ms; Ambst; Hier* ms; Pel; Aug; Prim), it stands at odds with the reading preserved in the rest of the tradition: “to whom we *did not* yield in subjection for even an hour!” (*οἷς οὐδὲ ὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαµεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ*). This latter reading, preferred by the editors of Nestle-Aland/UBS and by major commentators, is supported by Marcion, whom Tertullian accuses of doctoring the text: “For let us pay attention to the meaning of his [Paul’s] words, and the purpose of them, and *your* falsification of scripture will become evident . . . they did give place because there were people on whose account concession was advisable. For this was in keeping with faith unripe and still in doubt regarding the observance of the law, when even the apostle himself suspected he might

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have run, or might still be running, in vain . . . Of necessity therefore he gave place, for a time” (Marc. 5.3.3).  

Irenaeus’ Pauline text, whether stemming from a manuscript or from his own pious invention, presents an Apostle who is more than ready to subject his own ministry to the Jerusalem church. Not even Paul’s boast to have “worked harder than all of them [the other apostles]” (1 Cor 15.10) is allowed to stand as a potential wedge between Paul and the others. Irenaeus explains this statement in light of the special difficulties Paul had in ministering to Gentiles, who lacked both the prophetic oracles about Christ in the Jewish Scriptures as well as any notion of the resurrection of the dead (4.24.1). Citing Galatians 2.8 in another location, Irenaeus reminds his readers that “one and the same God” (unum et ipsum Deum) worked in Peter and Paul for their apostleships (Haer. 3.13.1; 3-4). And Peter and Paul stand together not only in Jerusalem, but also in Rome, where they are described as co-founders of that eminent church (3.3.2).  

Irenaeus’ argument seems to be directed against opponents who claim that “Paul alone knew the truth, and that to him the mystery was manifested by revelation” (3.13.1; 1-3: solum Paulum vertitatem cognovisse, cui per revelationem manifestatum est

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731 Cf. Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 91; J.L. Martyn, Galatians (AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 197-8. Marcion’s version, however, did leave out ὅς, so that Paul yielded to neither the “pillars” nor the “false brethren.” According to Victorinus (Rome) and Ambrosiaster, certain Greek and Latin manuscripts also had this reading. Ephraem and the Peshitta also lack ὅς.


733 Cf. Markus Bockmuehl, “The Icon of Peter and Paul between History and Reception,” in Seeing the Word, 121-36, for a critique of Baur’s narrative of Pauline/Petrine opposition in earliest Christianity. Bockmuehl points to the overwhelmingly early picture of Pauline/Petrine cooperation/coordination (Acts, 1 Clement, Ignatius of Antioch, 2 Peter).
mysterium). Wagenmann remarks, “Dies zu unternehmen sah sich auch Irenäus deshalb genötigt, weil die Gegner von allen Seiten gegen die Katholizität und Apostolizität des Paulus Sturm liefen.” In refutation, Irenaeus immediately points to Pauline texts where the Apostle sees his own ministry as part of the larger apostolic movement (3.13.1):

“For the One who worked in Peter for apostleship to the Circumcised also worked in me for apostleship to the Gentiles” (Gal 2.8);

“And how will they preach if they are not sent? As it is written, ‘How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news’” (Rom 10.15; emphasis mine);

“Whether, then, it was I or they, so we preach and so you have believed” (1 Cor 15.11).

Paul’s relationship with Luke, discussed first in Haer. 3.1.1 (“Luke also, the companion of Paul, recorded in a book the Gospel preached by him [Paul].”), is perhaps the most important connection that Irenaeus can make. He emphasizes it, on the one hand, in order to attack the selective use of Luke by Marcion and the Valentinians, claiming that Luke was privy to Paul’s simple teaching and thus knew the truth of the gospel (3.14.1-4). Those who reject the Lukan post-resurrection accounts are, by default, rejecting their own Apostle, Paul. On the other side of the theological equation, Irenaeus uses the reverse argument against the Ebionites. If the Ebionites

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734 There is some disagreement over whom Irenaeus has in mind here. Cf. Lindemann, Paulus, 97, who posits either Marcion (following Harnack) or the Valentinians (following Pagels).

735 Wagenmann, Die Stellung des Apostels Paulus, 217.

736 Wiles, The Divine Apostle, 18-19; Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church, 163.

737 The “we” passages in Acts are key to Irenaeus’ link between Luke and Paul, as well as 2 Tim 4.10-11 and Col 4.14.

738 Cf. Balas, “The Use and Interpretation of Paul,” 33-5.
accept the Lukan writings, then they must also accept Paul as a Christ-ordained Apostle (3.15.1). Luke, for instance, narrates Paul’s apostolic call on three occasions (Acts 9, 22, 26). In a variety of ways, then, “Luc justifie Paul et Paul justifie Luc.”

As in 3 Corinthians, the relationship between Paul and the apostles in Adversus haereses is one of subordination and dependence. The author of 3 Corinthians uses the language of an earlier Pauline text (1 Cor 11.23; 15.3) to say something quite different from that text. Irenaeus also employs Pauline texts to substantiate the narrative of Acts 15. His version of Galatians 2.5 was particularly helpful. It substantially muted the tension of Galatians 2. In both cases we can see how Pauline language and texts were interpreted and employed by his reputational entrepreneurs to produce a preferred image of the Apostle.

Irenaeus and the Pastoral Epistles

A second similarity exists between the construals of Paul in Irenaeus and 3 Corinthians. I argued in Chapter Four that the author of 3 Corinthians constructs a Paul whose linguistic and theological world is bathed in the Paul of the Pastoral Epistles. The polemical Paul of the Pastorals has become the hermeneutical lens through which the entire Pauline tradition is framed in 3 Corinthians. The same appears to be true for Irenaeus. I give much more attention below to this aspect of the Pauline tradition in Irenaeus because recent studies have misjudged the importance of the Pastorals for Irenaeus.

Eusebius of Caesarea provides the original Greek title of what we now call Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses. But if we did not have Eusebius, we could intuit it from the

739 Benoit, Saint Irène, 130.
prefaces to Books Two, Four and Five of Irenaeus’ tome. The title contains a clear invocation of 1 Timothy:

"Ἐλεγχος και ἀνατροπή τῆς ψευδωνύµου γνώσεως (Hist. eccl. 5.7.1);

Ὦ Τιµόθεε, τὴν παραθήκην φύλαξον ἐκτρεπόµενος τὰς βεβήλους κενοφωνίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύµου γνώσεως (1 Tim 6.20).740

There is little to suggest that the phrase “falsely-named knowledge” had become standard polemical language by the late-second century and that there is no connection here with its use in 1 Timothy. In fact, Clement of Alexandria is the only other second-century Christian writer to use this phrase (Strom. 2.11; 3.18; cf. 7.7) and the related ψευδωνύµοι γνωστικοί (Strom. 3.4).741 His first use of the phrase in the Stromateis (2.11) is a direct citation of 1 Timothy 6.20, signaling the specific location from where he is drawing this language.

Aside from the exact verbal correspondence between 1 Timothy 6.20 and Irenaeus’ title, the connection with 1 Timothy is further signaled by the later, explicit citation of this verse in Adversus haereses 2.14.7, as well as by the reinforcing, explicit citation of 1 Timothy in the opening lines of the preface to Book One:

Certain people are discarding the Truth and introducing deceitful myths and endless genealogies, which as the Apostle says, promote speculations rather than the divine training that is in faith (1 Tim 1.4). By specious argumentation, craftily patched together, they mislead the minds of the more ignorant and ensnare them by falsifying the Lord’s words. Thus they become wicked interpreters of genuine words (Haer. 1.pref.1);


741 Cf. also Strom. 3.4; 4.4; 7.16 and Protr. 2.25 for additional uses of the adjective ψευδώνυµος.
With these clear uses of 1 Timothy in mind, Carston Looks has pointed out other resonances of the language of the Pastoral Epistles in Irenaeus’ title. Ἐλέγχω (cf. ἔλεγχος) occurs five times in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 5.20; 2 Tim 4.2; Titus 1.9, 13; 2.15), and two of the three New Testament uses of ἀνατρέπω (cf. ἀνατροπή), are from the Pastoral Epistles (2 Tim 2.18; Titus 1.11).

The prominent position that 1 Timothy (and, if Looks is correct, the other Pastoral Epistles) takes at the opening of Irenaeus’ tome once garnered significant attention from scholars. As we have recounted in numerous places already, Adolf von Harnack, Walter Bauer, and Hans von Campenhausen, among a broad swath of scholars, built on the narrative of a second-century Pauline captivity to Marcion and the Valentinians by arguing that it was only with the pseudonymous Pastoral Epistles that a Paul emerged who could be useful for the proto-orthodox church in its fight against the “heretics.” Irenaeus, in particular, was only able to reclaim Paul through his invocation of the Pastorals.

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742 Cf. Noormann, *Irenäus*, 73 n. 20, for Irenaeus’ use of a “Western” text here. Irenaeus’ citations of the Pastorals deviate, textually, a bit more from the manuscript tradition than does his use of the other Pauline letters. Cf. Ernst Dassmann, *Der Stachel im Fleisch*, 296-7.

743 Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 335.

744 Cf. above in this chapter, as well as Chapter Two.
The more recent studies by David Rensberger, Rolf Noormann, and James Aageson, discussed in broad outline above and in Chapter Two, however, downplay the role of 1 Timothy and the other Pastorals in Irenaeus. Against the trend in these more recent appraisals (whose specific arguments about Irenaeus are summarized below) and building on the work of the literary theorist Gérard Genette, I believe that, in fact, this double use of 1 Timothy at the beginning of Irenaeus’ tome suggests a programmatic, intertextual relationship between *Adversus haereses* and the Pastoral Epistles. The bishop of Lyons then returns over and over again to all three of these letters in a way that is uniquely consonant with the initial invocations of 1 Timothy. As is the case with 3 Corinthians, the polemical Paul of the Pastorals provides a vocational analogue through which Irenaeus can view and construct his work. He has taken up the literary mantle of the Apostle, as particularly portrayed in the Pastorals, and sets out to overturn any theological speculation that falsely represents itself as privy to divine γνῶσις.

*The Extent, Nature, and Origin of Irenaeus’ Use of the Pastorals*

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745 Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches”; Noormann, *Irenäus*; and Aageson, *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles and the Early Church*.


747 D.H. Warren, “The Text of the Apostle,” 315, comes closest to what I propose when he says, “In his partial quotation of 1 Tim 1:4 above, Irenaeus has in mind not just the twelve words he explicitly quotes from Paul but the entire situation which Paul is addressing.” But rather than making a case for the importance of the Pastoral Epistles, in particular, in Irenaeus’ polemics, Warren concludes that the citation of 1 Tim shows that “Paul is his main authority. Paul is the person he tries to imitate.” This may be the case from Irenaeus’ standpoint. But from my standpoint, I am interested in answering the question: “Which Paul?” Or, “Which Pauline texts provide for Irenaeus an image of Paul that he can imitate in his own heresiological efforts?”
In opposition to the aforementioned giants of German New Testament scholarship, recent studies of the Pauline tradition in Irenaeus tend to diminish the role of the Pastorals in *Adversus haereses*. Neither Richard Norris nor David Balas takes special notice of them in their articles on the use of Paul in Irenaeus. Norris ignores them completely. Rensberger’s dissertation (cf. Chapter Two) concludes that “The Pastoral Epistles are an utterly negligible factor in Irenaeus’ use of Paul.” The paucity of direct references to and the lack of any sustained treatment of particular passages from the Pastoral Epistles were key in Noormann’s rejection of the position proffered by Harnack and others. For Noormann, Irenaeus merely laces his polemic with the occasional tip of the hat to the Pastorals. In discussing Irenaeus’ use of 1 Timothy 6.20 in *Adversus haereses* 2.14.7, for instance, he says that the heresiologist has taken from this text “nicht mehr als den polemischen Ausdruck.” James Aageson, following Noormann, concedes that Irenaeus opens *Adversus haereses* with a citation from 1 Timothy 1.4, only to conclude that “the Pastorals play only a small exegetical role in Irenaeus’ attempt to interpret Paul. On the surface they appear to serve as little more than a source for the author’s polemical statements.” For Aageson, the broader theology of the Pastorals represents, in seed, the kinds of full blown appeals to church order, creedal statements, and the “rule of truth” that we see in Irenaeus. The stream of Pauline tradition that led to the Pastorals ultimately found its way into Irenaeus’ own theology, but he has been

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749 Rensberger, “As the Apostle Teaches,” 321.


751 Noormann, *Irenäus*, 73.

influenced by them only indirectly. The “deposit” (παραθήκη) of the Pastorals (1 Tim 6.20; 2 Tim 1.14), for instance, can be compared with Irenaeus’ description of apostolic truth being deposited in a bank called the Church, from which all could withdraw (Haer. 3.4.1). 753

Because the Irenaean use of the Pastorals factored so heavily in the older scholarly narrative of a Pauline captivity to the “heretics,” and because Rensberger, Noormann, and Aageson are not convinced that Paul was enslaved to Marcion and the “Gnostics” in the second century, one senses a certain reticence in these authors to give other parts of the narrative, in particular the importance of the Pastorals to Irenaeus, their full due. It is as if ceding the programmatic nature of Irenaeus’ use of the Pastorals equals confirming the Pauline captivity narrative in toto. But this does not have to be the case. The well-worn story of a Pauline captivity to the “heretics” in the second century can and has been dismantled, as we have seen (Chapter Two). But we should not throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. Irenaeus does make widespread, variegated, and programmatic use of the Pastoral Epistles in Adversus haereses.

Scholars differ on the number of identifiable Irenaean references to the Pastoral Epistles. Since Johannes Werner, it is widely agreed that there are six direct uses of the Pastoral Epistles in Adversus haereses (two from each of the three letters). 754 These are introduced by “The Apostle says,” “Paul says,” or some similar formula:

καθὼς ὁ Ἀπόστολος φησιν (1.pref.1; fr. gr. 1, 4; citing 1 Tim 1.4);

753 Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church, 159, 167-70.
754 Cf. Werner, Paulinismus, 8-9; J. Hoh, Die Lehre des Hl. Irenäus, 44; and Noormann, Irenäus, 521 n. 34, 571.
Οὕς ὁ Παῦλος ἐγκελεύται (1.16.3; fr. gr. 10, 579; citing Titus 3.10);
bene Paulus ait (2.14.7; 135; citing 1 Tim 6.20);
Παῦλος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Τιµόθεον ἐπιστολαῖς (3.3.3; fr. gr. 3, 4; citing 2 Tim 4.21);
ὡς καὶ Παῦλος ἐφησεν (3.3.4; fr. gr. 5, 30; citing Titus 3.10-11);
Paulus manifestavit in epistolis dicens (3.14.1; 36-7; citing 2 Tim 4.9-11).

The number of indirect, or implicit, uses of the Pastorals is less certain. J. Hoh counts an additional thirteen “indirect” uses of the Pastorals, resulting in nineteen total uses.⁷⁵⁵

Noormann’s overall total, including the direct (six), indirect (six) and other likely uses of the Pastorals (twelve), is twenty-four.⁷⁵⁶ Mark Olson lists nineteen references to the Pastorals (undifferentiated between direct and indirect uses).⁷⁵⁷ Carsten Looks, in his comprehensive analysis of the use of the Pastorals in the second century, settles on six “secure” and twenty-four “very probable” uses in *Adversus haereses*.⁷⁵⁸ The difficulty in calculating the exact number of textual references to the Pastorals is directly related, I will argue below, to how natural their language and contents have become for Irenaeus.

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⁷⁵⁵ Hoh, *Die Lehre des Hl. Irenäus*, 198.

⁷⁵⁶ Noormann, *Irenäus*, 521 n. 34, 571.

⁷⁵⁷ Olson, *Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God*, 141. Olson seems to get his data from the footnotes and indices of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers* version of *Adversus haereses*, though he does not state this. In several places he appears to have corrected the indices there. He has also missed one reference given in that volume (*Haer*. 4.9.3, citing 2 Tim 3.7; *ANF* 1: 473).

⁷⁵⁸ Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 361. There is one additional use of 1 Tim 1.9 in *Epid*. 35. Looks’ *Das Anvertraute bewahren: Die Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe im 2. Jahrhundert* (1999) is the authoritative work on the use of the Pastorals in the second century. This is a much neglected book which does not fall prey to the aforementioned simplistic conclusions of Rensberger, Noormann, and Aageson. Though published ten years prior, it is not listed in the bibliography of Aageson’s *Paul, the Pastoral Epistles and the Early Church*. Looks finds only nine “safe/secure” uses of the Pastorals in the second century, and they all come from Irenaeus and Tertullian. But as the footnotes throughout the remainder of this section reveal, he identifies numerous passages where Irenaean use of the Pastorals is either “very probable” or “good possibility to probable” (cf. Chapter Four above for his classificatory system).
The opening uses of 1 Timothy are enough to show us, however, that he definitely has the Pastorals “on the brain,” so-to-speak. The language of these letters pops up explicitly at times, implicitly and allusively at others. Each of the data marshaled forth in this chapter is, in my view, a probable use of the Pastorals. By “probable use” I mean that the language probably comes directly from Irenaeus’ knowledge of and affinity for the Pastoral Epistles. This amounts, in my count, to thirty-seven probable uses of the Pastorals, divided quite evenly throughout Adversus haereses. In the end, the probability of any given “use” is in the eye of the beholder and develops more or less likelihood in light of a larger network of use.

While Rensberger, Noormann, and Aageson have tried to pigeonhole Irenaeus’ use of the Pastorals into nothing more than a borrowing of its polemical language at points, Irenaeus actually makes use of these letters in several other ways. First, he cites 2 Timothy to establish key biographical elements of Paul’s ministry, particularly as they are concerned with his relationship to the wider apostolic tradition. The connection between Paul and Luke, as we saw above, was important for Irenaeus’ argument. 2 Timothy 4.11, “only Luke is with me,” along with Colossians 4.14, “Luke, the beloved physician, greets you,” are explicitly cited in making this connection (3.14.1; 3627: Paulus manifestavit in epistolis dicens). In addition to the connection with Luke, 2 Timothy also provides the foundation for the episcopal line in Rome. Irenaeus reminds

759 Title: once; Book One: eight uses; Book Two: eight uses; Book Three: nine uses; Book Four: five uses; and Book Five: six uses.

760 In addition to the biographical, theological, and polemical uses of the Pastorals, which I will enumerate below, Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 364-6, also notes the ethical and missionary aspects of Irenaeus’ use of the Pastoral. He calculates that of the sixty-five “possible” to “safe/secure” uses of the Pastoral in Irenaeus, 60% are dedicated to “polemische or antihäretische Formulierungen,” 20% to “christologische or systematische-theologische Wendungen,” and 10% to the “christlich-ethischen und missionarischen Bereich.”
his readers that Paul knows and mentions Linus in 2 Timothy 4.21 (Haer. 3.3.3; fr. gr. 3, 4: Παῦλος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Τιµόθεον ἐπιστολαίς).

Second, Irenaeus uses the language of the Pastorals for constructive arguments of his own. In Book Four, Irenaeus cites 1 Timothy 1.9 to answer why the Law was not given to the forefathers of Moses:

Quoniam lex non est posita justis (Haer. 4.16.3; 50);

ὅτι δικαίω νόμος οὐ κεῖται (1 Tim 1.9).\footnote{Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 342-3, rates this use as “very probable,” and Noormann, Irenäus, 571, registers it as “implicit.” Irenaeus also uses this verse in Epid. 35.}

He then explains that by “righteous” Paul meant that “the righteous fathers had the meaning of the Decalogue written in their hearts and souls, that is, they loved the God who made them, and did no injury to their neighbour.”\footnote{Noormann, Irenäus, 199-200, 390-2, uses this clarification of 1 Tim 1.9 as a way of pointing out the stark difference between Irenaeus’ use of the Pastorals and the “historical” Paul (cf. Rom 4.13).}

In Books Three and Five, Irenaeus uses the language of 1 Timothy 2.5 to explain the restoration of humanity to God:

"Εδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἱδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὑμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφότερους συναγαγεῖν (Haer. 3.18.7; fr. gr. 26, 8-11);

μεσίτης θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων γεγομένος (Haer. 5.17.1; fr. gr. 15, 32-3);

eἰς γὰρ θεός, εἰς καὶ μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς (1 Tim 2.5).\footnote{Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 339-41, rates these uses as “very probable,” and Noormann, Irenäus, 571, registers them as “implicit.”}

In both Irenaean texts, the mediation language of 1 Timothy 2.5 is connected to the restoration of friendship between God and man through Christ. In Book Three the
mediation comes through Christ’s “kindred relationship” (οἰκειότητας; fr. gr. 26, 10) to both parties. While this is different from the “ransom” (ἀντίλυτρον) language of 1 Timothy 2.6, Irenaeus comes closer in Adversus haereses 5.17.1 when he explains this mediation with the language of “propitiation” (propitians; l. 8), “forgiveness” (remitto; ll. 12, 21-29), and the “cancelling of our disobedience” (nostram inobaudientiam . . . consolatus; ll. 9-10). The closest that Irenaeus comes to 1 Timothy 2.6 is in Adversus haereses 5.1.1:

redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his qui in captivitatem ducti sunt (Haer. 5.1.1; 20-22);

ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ύπὲρ πάντων (1 Tim 2.6).765

From this same passage, Irenaeus uses the language of 1 Timothy 2.4 in defense of both the universality of God’s salvation (Haer. 1.10.2), as well as his own desire to speak truth in light of Valentinian speculation on the Ogdoad (Haer. 2.17.1):

καὶ φωτίζει πάντας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς βουλομένους εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἔλθειν (Haer. 1.10.2; fr. gr. 1, 1143-4);

qui velimus omnes homines ad agnitionem veritatis venire (Haer. 2.17.1; 7-8);

ὃς πάντας ἀνθρώπως θέλει σωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἔλθειν (1 Tim 2.4).766

764 Noormann, Irenäus, 141, 337-8.

765 Noormann, Irenäus, 267-8. Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 345-6, deems this a “very probable” use of the 1 Tim 2.6. Cf. also the close relationship between the redemption language of Titus 2.14 and Haer. 3.5.3 (cf. Looks, 353).

766 Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 336, marks these uses as “very probable,” while Noormann, Irenäus, 571, registers them as “implicit.”
While Irenaeus is the first Christian writer to cite the Pastorals with introductory formulae (cf. above), the variety of more subtle ways in which he deploys these texts suggests that they already fit comfortably within the Pauline tradition he inherited (contra Harnack, Bauer, etc.).

We cannot deny that the dearth of evidence from the Apostolic Fathers and Justin, combined with the ambiguity of the evidence from Marcion and P46, gives an unclear picture of the Pastorals’ influence in the early- to mid-second century. Following Carsten Looks, however, I think that we begin to see in Polycarp and Justin some “very probable” uses of the Pastorals in the generation before Irenaeus. In Justin we are dealing with short correspondences in language (three to four words). For example:

\[
\text{'Η γὰρ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀμετρον τοῦ πλοῦτον αὐτοῦ (Dial. 47.6);}
\]

\[
\text{ὅτε δὲ ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία ἐπεφάνη τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ (Titus 3.4).}
\]

Polycarp gives us a more significant portion of 1 Timothy 6.7, working in language from surrounding verses (1 Tim 6.10):

767 Cf. Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 335, who argues similarly that the repeated use of 1 Tim 6.20 in Adversus haereses (cf. below) means that the Pastorals had gained quite a bit of authority in the church before their use by Irenaeus.


769 Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 156-7; 252-5. All Greek and Latin texts cited in the remainder of this section come from Looks.

770 Cf. also Dial. 7.3 and 35.2, citing 1 Tim 4.1.
Ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων χαλεπῶν φιλαργυρία εἰδότες οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰσηνέγκαμεν εἰς τὸν κόσµον ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐξενεγκεῖν τι ἔχομεν ὁπλισώμεθα τοῖς ὅπλοις τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ διδάξωμεν ἑαυτούς πρῶτον πορεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐντολῇ τοῦ κυρίου (Phil. 4.1);

οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰσηνέγκαμεν εἰς τὸν κόσµον, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐξενεγκεῖν τι δυνάμεθα (1 Tim 6.7);

ῥίζα γὰρ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ φιλαργυρία (1 Tim 6.10).

In neither author, however, is there any particular indebtedness to the polemical language of the Pastorals.

In addition to Justin, Polycarp and 3 Corinthians, the Acts of Paul, the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs, and Theophilus of Antioch are further witnesses to the fact that, by the last few decades of the second century, the Pastorals had become comfortably situated within the Pauline tradition of the proto-orthodox. As we saw in Chapter Two, the Acts of Paul (and Thecla) are in dialogue with the traditions represented in the Pastoral Epistles, although the exact nature of this relationship has been debated. In the Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs, Speratus defies the request of Saturninus (Roman proconsul at Carthage) to swear by the genius of Caesar by borrowing language from 1 Timothy:

Ego imperium huius seculi non cognosco; sed magis illi Deo servio quem nemo hominem vidit nec videre his oculis potest. Furtum non feci, sed siquid emero teloneum redo quia cognosco dominum, imperatorem regum et omnium gentium (Act. Scil. 6);

Quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et solus potens rex regum et Dominus dominantium qui solus habet inmortalitatem lucem habitans inaccessibiliem quem vidit nullus hominem sed nec videre potest cui honor et imperium sempiternum amen (1 Tim 6.15-16).  

771 Looks, Das Anvertraute bewahren, 459-60, deems this a “very probable” use of 1 Tim.
Speratus later confesses to having *libri et epistulae Pauli viri justi* (12).\footnote{On the various interpretations of this phrase, cf. Harry Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers*, 150-1.} We can surmise, given his knowledge of 1 Timothy, that the Pastorals were included among these Pauline works.

Theophilus, in his *Ad Autolycum*, conscripts the Pastorals in at least two ways.\footnote{Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 265-7, deems each of the following instances as “very probable.” He gives several others as “possible to probable” (268-9). F. Loofs, *Theophilus von Antiochien ‘Adversus Marcionem’ und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus* (TUGAL 46.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1930), 67-75, argued that Theophilus’ now lost *Adversus Marcionem* (cf. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.24) was a source for Irenaeus’ work.} Like Irenaeus, he opens his apology with the polemical language of the Pastorals. He immediately applies the “depraved mind” of 2 Timothy 3.8 (\textit{ἀνθρώποι κατεφθαρµένοι τὸν νοῦν}) to his opponent (*Autol. 1.1.1: ἀθλίοις \textit{ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσιν τὸν νοῦν κατεφθαρµένον}†). In a different context, Theophilus invokes \textit{ὁ θεῖος λόγος}, stringing together language from 1 Timothy 2.122 and Titus 3.1 to ensure that his accuser knows that Christians are subject to the authorities (3.14.4).

Each of the three Pastoral Epistles seem, then, to have been used in multiple ways by different authors leading up to and including the era in which Irenaeus wrote. Irenaeus received them as firmly planted within a broad stream of proto-orthodox tradition.\footnote{Cf. also now Frisius, “Interpretive Method and Theological Controversy,” 42-64, on Tertullian’s use of the Pastorals.} He, himself, puts these texts to use in equally variegated ways. But more than any other before him, Irenaeus finds in these three texts a bountiful supply of polemical phrases that can sustain his own attempts to marginalize the views of his opponents. *3 Corinthians*’ use of the polemical language of the Pastorals is a witness to this specific, later developing use. Before laying out this sustained connection between

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\footnote{On the various interpretations of this phrase, cf. Harry Y. Gamble, *Books and Readers*, 150-1.}

\footnote{Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 265-7, deems each of the following instances as “very probable.” He gives several others as “possible to probable” (268-9). F. Loofs, *Theophilus von Antiochien ‘Adversus Marcionem’ und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus* (TUGAL 46.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1930), 67-75, argued that Theophilus’ now lost *Adversus Marcionem* (cf. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.24) was a source for Irenaeus’ work.}

\footnote{Cf. also now Frisius, “Interpretive Method and Theological Controversy,” 42-64, on Tertullian’s use of the Pastorals.}
the polemical language of the Pastoral Epistles and *Adversus haereses*, however, we must ask about how the initial uses of 1 Timothy in the title and preface of Book One function in relationship to later polemical invocations of the Pastorals.

*The Pastoral Epistles as Paratext and Hypotext in Adversus haereses*

Titles and prefaces, according to the French literary theorist Gérard Genette, function as paratextual signifiers.\(^{775}\) By “paratext,” Genette means those aspects of a text that “surround it and extend it, precisely in order to *present* it.”\(^{776}\) Paratexts include both “peritexts” (those proximate, printed signifiers surrounding the main text) and “epitexts” (elements distant from the publication, including public and private communications by the author about the text). Paratexts act as a “threshold,” inviting readers to enter into the text, but also offering them the opportunity to withdraw.\(^{777}\) More important, they not only invite, but they also attempt to condition:

Indeed, this fringe, always the conveyor of a commentary that is authorial or more or less legitimated by the author, constitutes a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of *transaction*: a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an influence on the public, an influence that – whether well or poorly understood and achieved – is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it (more pertinent, of course, in the eyes of the author and his allies).\(^{778}\)

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\(^{775}\) Cf. *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*.

\(^{776}\) *Paratexts*, 1. Emphasis his.

\(^{777}\) *Paratexts*, 2.

\(^{778}\) *Paratexts*, 2. Emphasis his.
Paratexts attempt to “ensure for the text a destiny consistent with the author’s purpose.” Not even the post-Structuralist Roland Barthes could avoid efforts to condition (as author) the reading of his texts. As Genette reminds, *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes* has the following admonition within the front cover: “It must all be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel.”

Literary titles and prefaces are among the various peritexts that Genette explores, in addition to dedications, inscriptions, epigraphs, intertitles and notes. Formally, literary titles can possess up to three parts: title; subtitle; and genre indication. Not all titles display all three features. Functionally, titles can fulfill either “thematic” (e.g. – *War and Peace* by Tolstoy) or “rhematic”/“generic” (e.g. – *Unfashionable Observations* by Nietzsche) purposes, or both (e.g. – *Treatise of Human Nature* by Hume). Irenaeus’ title, ”Ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως, serves both functions. Its theme: “falsely-named knowledge.” Its genre: “a refutation and overthrow.” References to this title in subsequent prefatory material (Haer. 2.pref.1; 4.pref.1; 5.pref.1) and at various points in Books One (1.22.2; 1.31.3) and Two (2.24.4) secure it for both the initial publication of Book One, as well as the later installments. Based on a papyrus-roll fragment of *Adversus haereses* (P.Oxy. 405) dated to around 200 C.E., it is likely that

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779 *Paratexts*, 407.
781 *Paratexts*, 56.
782 *Paratexts*, 78-89.
783 Eusebius characterizes several early Christian works as Ἐλεγχοι: Agrippa Castor’s κατὰ Βασιλείδου Ἐλεγχος (*Hist. eccl*. 4.7.6); Justin’s Ἐλεγχος, directed πρὸς Ἑλληνας (4.18.4); and Dionysius of Alexandria’s Ἐλεγχος ἀλληγοριστῶν (7.24.2). Cf. also Hippolytus’ heresiological tome (κατὰ πασῶν αἵρεσεων Ἐλεγχος).
Irenaeus published his work as a set of rolls.\textsuperscript{785} The title would have appeared at any number of locations at publication: at the end of the text in a colophon and/or on the outside of a roll (either written directly on the roll or on a papyrus or parchment tag, a \textit{syllabos}, affixed to the roll at a right angle).\textsuperscript{786} Regardless of its physical location, whether attached to a \textit{syllabos}, or reiterated in prefaces throughout the five-volume work, Irenaeus’ title is an attempt to influence the reading of \textit{Adversus haereses}.\textsuperscript{787} But does this influence go beyond mere significations of genre and subject matter? Before turning to this question in particular, we must briefly explain the paratextual role of prefatory material, particularly in relation to titles.

According to Genette, like other paratextual material, the “original preface, has as its chief function to ensure that the text is read properly.”\textsuperscript{788} It answers the questions of “why” and “how.” The preface puts “the (definitely assumed) reader in possession of information the author considers necessary for this proper reading.”\textsuperscript{789} In relation to the title, the preface acts as an explanation, a commentary.\textsuperscript{790} The explicit citation of 1 Timothy 1.4 in the preface to Book One serves as a commentary on what Irenaeus means

\textsuperscript{785} Cf. Gamble, \textit{Books and Readers}, 80-81.


\textsuperscript{787} On the significance of the use of 1 Tim 6.20 in the title to Irenaeus’ work, cf. Looks, \textit{Das Anvertraute bewahren}, 335: “Dies alles spricht in entschiedenem Maße gegen einem geringen Stellenwert der Pastoralbriefe für Irenäus.”

\textsuperscript{788} Genette, \textit{Paratexts}, 197. Emphasis his.


by “falsely-named knowledge”: it is nothing but “endless genealogies, which as the Apostle says, promote speculations rather than the divine training that is in faith.”

These two proximate uses of 1 Timothy in the most important paratextual sites surrounding Adversus haereses have a reinforcing effect.

Paratextual material can, on occasion, serve functions beyond the “thematic” and “rhematic.” In particular, they can sometimes signify an important interpretive “hypotext” for the author. In his Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, Genette describes the relationship between hypertext (text B) and hypotext (text A) as a “graft[ing]” of two texts “in a manner that is not that of commentary.” Intertextual signification in the most privileged of literary positions, the title, often indicates an extended hypertextual relationship with the source-text, a relationship which has “contractual force.” While all texts are, by their participation in “literarity,” hypertextual, evoking a variety of earlier texts, Genette is particularly concerned with the “sunnier side” of hypertextuality, where the “shift from hypotext to hypertext is both massive . . . and more or less officially stated.” Homer’s Odyssey, for instance, is the programmatic hypotext for Joyce’s Ulysses. Invoking Umberto Eco (“A title, unfortunately, is in itself a key to interpretation”), Genette asks how we would read

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791 In antiquity, the preface was not separated spatially from the main text. The first lines of a given text serve this function. Genette, Paratexts, 163, speaks of a certain “economy of means” within ancient manuscripts.

792 Genette, Palimpsests, 7, argues that the five types of transtextuality (hypertextuality, paratextuality, intertextuality, metatextuality, and architextuality) are not “separate and absolute categories,” but rather “their relationships to one another are numerous and often crucial.”

793 Palimpsests, 5.

794 Palimpsests, 8.

795 Palimpsests, 9.
Joyce’s *Ulysses* if it had a different title. As a title, *Ulysses* has a “symbolic value.” Leopold Bloom’s movements are to be read in light of the travels of Odysseus. Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* is a hypotext for T.S. Eliot’s “The Hollow Men,” as its epigraph invokes this earlier text: “Mistah Kurtz – he dead.” Conrad’s shadowy Kurtz serves as a robust literary depiction of the kind of men Eliot intends in his poem. And while *Palimpsests* deals solely with works of fiction, Genette readily asserts that “the hypertext can be nonfictional, especially when it derives from a work that is itself nonfictional.”

Like a palimpsest, where one text has been written over by another, a hypertext is writing in the “second degree.” Its existence is a covering over of a previous text. The hypertext can be related to the hypotext in a number of ways: pastiche, parody, or travesty, to name a few. The reader comes closest to realizing the intended meaning of the hypertext only when he/she recognizes the hypotext and then intuits the relationship between the two (either transformation or imitation, broadly).

Intertextual signifiers in a title are often more implicit and allusive than the example from Joyce suggests. According to Jörg Helbig, the “privileged position” of titular intertextual “traces,” however, shows that these connections are purposefully

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797 *Paratexts*, 83.


799 *Palimpsests*, 397.

800 *Palimpsests*, 8.

“marked” by the author. He/she relies on the “collective knowledge” of their recipients, particularly their “competence for allusions.” Occasionally, the author will help clarify the intertextual echo, often times through a later, more direct citation of a larger portion of the intended source-text, including a reference to its author (cf. Irenaeus’ explicit citation of 1 Tim 6.20 in *Haer.* 2.14.7).

In the manner of both Joyce and Eliot, the paratextual invocations of 1 Timothy at the outset of *Adversus haereses* function as an invitation for the reader to view Irenaeus’ project in light of this earlier text. But not just this text alone. Each of the “Pastoral Epistles” contributes to the polemical characterizations of Irenaeus’ opponents in ways that are both consonant with these initial invocations as well as unique within his larger use of the Pauline tradition. The “Pastoral Epistles,” of course, is an etic designation, a modern heuristic construction. In light of this latter fact, one might argue that Irenaeus only intended 1 Timothy as a programmatic hypotext for his own work. But, as mentioned in Chapter Four, there is evidence that by the turn of the third century these three texts were already viewed as a thematic group. This same evidence suggests that 1-2 Timothy and Titus first circulated separately from a group of Paul’s letters to (seven) churches, likely causing their thematic unity to be easily recognizable. Most important, because they present a unified picture of Paul as heresy-fighter, Irenaeus returns over and over again to their polemical language in his own battle against “falsely-called knowledge.” The Paul of the Pastorals seems to have programmatic and symbolic value

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for Irenaeus. He understands his own heresiological task in light of the Paul that he finds in these texts.

*Hypotextual Resonances of the Polemical Paul of the Pastorals in Adversus haereses*

The initial uses of 1 Timothy in the paratexts of *Adversus haereses* serve to indicate Irenaeus’ literary program. They are his attempt to control the reading of his book. These opening forays into the polemical language of the Pastoral Epistles are sustained throughout, suggesting that these paratexts also indicate an important hypotext for Irenaeus. It remains for me to lay out these continued points of contact, make several comparative observations, and then draw some conclusions about the specific nature of Irenaeus’ relationship to the Pastoral Epistles.

Of first importance is the extension of the appellation “falsely-named knowledge,” generally applied in the title, to a range of specific opponents throughout *Adversus haereses*. 804

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polemical Language from 1 Timothy</th>
<th>Usage in Adversus haereses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“falsely-named knowledge” (1 Tim 6.20) τῆς ψευδωνύµου γνώσεως</td>
<td>• Simon Magus (<em>Haer.</em> 1.23.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Valentinians (<em>Haer.</em> 2.pref.1; 2.14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cerinthus and the Nicolaitans (<em>Haer.</em> 3.11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Marcion (<em>Haer.</em> 3.12.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The related designation, “falsely named Gnostics” (ψευδωνύµοι γνωστικοί), is used similarly. 805

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804 The phrase also appears at 2.pref.1, 4.pref.1, 4.41.4, and 5.pref.1 in summary statements about the work as a whole.
Table 5: “Falsely-Named Gnostics” in *Adversus haereses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polemical Language from 1 Timothy</th>
<th>Usage in <em>Adversus haereses</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“falsely-named Gnostics” (cf. 1 Tim 6.20) Ψευδωνύµοι γνωστικοί</td>
<td>• Followers of Carpocrates (<em>Haer.</em> 1.11.1, anticipating <em>Haer.</em> 1.25.6)&lt;br&gt;• Followers of Basilides and others (<em>Haer.</em> 2.13.10; 2.35.2)&lt;br&gt;• Followers of Saturninus, Basilides, Carpocrates and others (<em>Haer.</em> 2.31.1)&lt;br&gt;• Marcion, Valentinus, Basilides, Carpocrates, Simon and others (<em>Haer.</em> 4.35.4)&lt;br&gt;• Valentinus, followers of Marcion, and others (<em>Haer.</em> 5.26.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The constant tagging of his opponents with this moniker from the Pastoral Paul is a way of challenging aberrant knowledge claims with the apostolic tradition. Frequency is also one of many ways that an author can “mark” key intertexts for their project.  

The polemical use of 1 Timothy is not limited to 1 Timothy 6.20. We have already seen how Irenaeus directly cites from 1 Timothy 1.4 in the initial preface to *Adversus haereses*. A variety of other expressions from 1 Timothy can also be added.

Table 6: Other Polemical Language from 1 Timothy in *Adversus haereses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polemical Language from 1 Timothy</th>
<th>Usage in <em>Adversus haereses</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“unhealthy desiring for speculations” (1 Tim 6:4) νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεως</td>
<td>Allegorizing opponents (<em>Haer.</em> 3.12.11; 393) aegrotans circa quaestiones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“seared conscience” (1 Tim 4.2) κεκαυστηριασμένων τὴν ἰδίαν συνείδησιν</td>
<td>Marcosians (<em>Haer.</em> 1.13.7; fr. gr. 10, 123) αἵτινες κεκαυτηριασμέναι τὴν συνείδησιν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“old wives’ tales” (1 Tim 4.7) γραῶδεις µύθους</td>
<td>• Marcosians (<em>Haer.</em> 1.16.3; fr. gr. 10, 578) γραώδεσι µύθους&lt;br&gt;• Valentinians (<em>Haer.</em> 1.8.1; fr. gr. 1, 797) γραῶν µύθους</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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805 Noormann, *Irenäus*, 72 n.13. The interchange between “falsely-named knowledge” and “falsely-named Gnostics” can also be seen in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 2.11; 3.4; 3.18).

806 Helbig, *Intertextualität und Markierung*, 100-1.

807 Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 347-8, gives a “good possibility to probable” rating to the uses of 1 Tim 4.2, 7. He gives a “possible but uncertain” to the use of 1 Tim 6.4, while Noormann, *Irenäus*, 571, gives it an “indirect.”
Inasmuch as 2 Timothy and Titus contain similar kinds of heresy-hunting language, Irenaeus also finds these texts congenial to his literary task. He employs them in a similar fashion to his use of 1 Timothy.  

Table 7: Polemical Language from 2 Timothy and Titus in *Adversus haereses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polemical Language from 2 Timothy and Titus</th>
<th>Usage in <em>Adversus haereses</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“who have deviated from the truth” (2 Tim. 2.18) οἵτινες περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠστόχησαν</td>
<td>• Descendents of Basilides and Carpocrates (<em>Haer. 1.28.2; 31-33</em>) non est numerum dicere eorum qui secundum alterum et alterum modum exciderunt a veritate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“itching ears” (2 Tim. 4.3) κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοὴν</td>
<td>• Against those who do not understand the importance of the flesh (<em>Haer. 5.3.1; fr. gr. 4, 49-51</em>) παρεδόθη τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἁσθενείᾳ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἵνα µὴ ἐπαρθείς ποτε ἁστοχήσῃ τὴν ἀληθείας</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“always learn but can never come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. 3:7) πάντοτε μανθάνωντα καὶ μηθέτου εἰς ἐπιγνώσιν ἀληθείας ἐλεῖθεν δυνάμενα</td>
<td>• Those who “desert the preaching of the Church” (<em>Haer. 5.20.2; 36-7</em>) semper quaerentes et numquam verum invenientes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Gentile philosophers” (<em>Haer. 2.27.2; 21</em>) semper inquiret, numquam autem inveniet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Heretics in general et quaeere quidem semper in excusatione habent, . . . , invenire vero numquam possunt (<em>Haer. 3.24.2; 42-4</em>) quaearet quidem semper, inveniet autem numquam Deum (<em>Haer. 4.9.3; 91-2</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Decline a heretic after the first and second warning” (Titus 3.10) ἀἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον μετὰ μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νουθεσίαν παραιτοῦ</td>
<td>• Marcosians (<em>Haer. 1.16.3; fr. gr. 10, 579-80</em>) μετὰ μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νουθεσίαν παραιτεῖσθαι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Marcion (<em>Haer. 3.3.4; fr. gr. 5, 30-31</em>) Ἀἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον μετὰ μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νουθεσίαν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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808 Looks, *Das Anvertraute bewahren*, 349-52, lists each of the following uses of 2 Tim as “good possibility to probable.” Cf. Noorman, *Irenäus*, 275 n. 77. The uses of Titus are direct citations from “Paul.”

809 On the importance of this language for 3 Corinthians, cf. Chapter Four.
The polemical language of all three of the “Pastoral Epistles” has become such an ingrained part of Irenaeus’ lexical stock that it is his default setting for the characterization of his opponents and their “falsely-named knowledge.” In most instances he does not formally cite these texts.\(^8\) The language merely bubbles to the surface of all five books, though the programmatic use of 1 Timothy at the beginning of Adversus haereses (in its paratexts) suggests that there is a conscious deployment of this language throughout. The Pastorals serve as a programmatic intertext that constantly lurks under (hypo) the surface of Irenaeus’ tome.

The unique nature of Irenaeus’ employment of the Pastoral Epistles can be seen through a comparison with his use of several other Pauline letters. The polemical language of the highly combative Galatians, for instance, is never used in this fashion. In fact, as we have seen, Irenaeus reads Galatians in ways that mitigate the combativeness of its Paul. 2 Thessalonians, of which Irenaeus is well aware and cites more often than 1 Thessalonians, is also full of combative language, but, as with his use of Galatians, he does not turn to this text for polemical characterizations of his opponents. This is also true for his treatment of Romans, 1 Corinthians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and 1 Thessalonians. The closest we come to Irenaeus’ employment of the polemical vocabulary of the Pastoral Epistles is his use of 2 Corinthians 11.3 in the preface to Book Four of Adversus haereses:

\(\textit{Quemadmodum enim serpens Evam seduxit, promittens ei quod non habebat ipse, sic et hi praeitendentes majorem agnitionem et mysteria inenarrabilia (Haer. 4.pref.4; 44-46);}\)

\(^8\) Cf. above for the six instances where he offers a formal citation.
Irenaeus takes the language from 2 Corinthians, “the serpent deceived Eve,” originally directed at the “super apostles” (2 Cor 11.5), and transfers it to his own opponents. But this is an isolated incident.

At thirty-seven instances (twenty-six of which are polemically oriented), I freely admit that the Pastorals are not the most frequently used Pauline texts in Irenaeus. 1 Corinthians and Romans are cited much more often.\footnote{Cf. Hoh, \textit{Die Lehr des Hl. Irenäus}, 198, for instance, who counts 95 citations from Romans and 109 from 1 Corinthians.} They are also not the contested sites of Pauline interpretation that so plagued Irenaeus (cf. his defenses of 2 Cor 4.4 in \textit{Haer}. 3.7.1-2 and of 1 Cor 15.50 in \textit{Haer}. 5.9.1-3). Romans 5.12-21, Galatians 4.4-7 and Ephesians 1.10 appear to have had the greatest constructive influence on his own theology, particularly his views on the economy of salvation and the recapitulation of all things in Christ, the Second Adam (cf. above).

\textit{Keying and Framing the Apostolic Tradition to the Pastoral Paul}

In what way, then, are the Pastoral Epistles significant for Irenaeus? The breadth of use to which Irenaeus puts the Pastorals, as well as the ways in which the Pastorals were being used by other authors in the second century, suggests that they already fit comfortably within the proto-orthodox tradition by the time that Irenaeus writes. Because of this, Irenaeus knew that his use of their disparaging characterizations of theological opponents would have traction amongst his own readers. But 1-2 Timothy and Titus, as a group, appear to have functioned in this \textit{unique} way for him for an even
deeper reason. In Chapter Four I argued that the author of 3 Corinthians “keyed” his own version of Paul to a particular *lieu d’mémoire*, the Pastoral Epistles, in an attempt to memorialize a certain image of Paul as heresy-fighter. Something related, yet slightly different, appears to be going on in *Adversus haereses*. The invocation of 1 Timothy in the paratextual material of *Adversus haereses* (its first two intertexts) is, as I have already indicated, significant and reinforcing. The unique and sustained use of the polemical language of the Pastoral Epistles throughout all five of Irenaeus’ books suggests that they offer a particularly useful set of language for Irenaeus’ own heresiological tome. More important, the Paul that Irenaeus finds in these texts – Paul, the Defender of the Faith and the Protector of the Deposit – provides a vocational analogue through which he can envision his task.

This is the specific hypertextual relationship that Irenaeus forges with the Pastorals. Hypertexts and their corresponding hypotexts can be related in any number of ways. The key to unlocking an author’s preferred reading of their hypertext is to locate this relationship. Broadly, there are imitative and transformational relationships between an original text and its palimpsest, with subsets of possibilities within these. Irenaeus establishes an imitative hypertextual relationship to the Pastorals through his paratextual signifiers. More specifically, this imitative relationship seems to be vocational. Irenaeus, like the Paul of the Pastorals, and like the Pastoral Paul of 3 Corinthians, is the “protector of the faith.” He takes up the mantel of the Apostle as he is pictured in 1-2 Timothy and Titus, writing from within the world of these texts, all the while guarding the deposit and marginalizing his opponents through his *Refutation and Overthrow of Falsely-Named*


Gnosis. As a title, Against Heresies shields the reader from the depth of Irenaeus’ intertextual program.

Of course, a hypertext can be read on its own, possessing “a meaning that is autonomous and thus in some manner sufficient.” Ultimately, however, it “invites us to engage in a relational reading.” The hypertext “stands to gain” through the recognition of its relationship to a hypotext, particularly when this union is forged in paratextual material. When we read the Refutation and Overthrow of Falsely-Named Gnosis in relationship to the Pastoral Epistles, we not only understand how important the Paul of these texts was for Irenaeus’ own polemical task, but we also begin to perceive the extent to which Irenaeus sees himself as waging an Apostolic battle. The synecdochic function of Irenaeus’ use of 1 Timothy 6.20 in his title draws us into the world of that text’s Paul, who in the same passage encourages Timothy to “guard the deposit” (τὴν παραθήκην φύλαξον; cf. 2 Tim 1.14). Irenaeus, as protector of the “rule of truth” (ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας/regula veritatis: Haer. 1.9.4; 1.22.1; 3.2.1; 3.4.2), viewing himself in the line of authorized defenders through his relationship to Polycarp (Haer. 3.3.1-4; Eus., Hist. eccl. 5.20), inveighs against his own opponents with the force of the Apostolic polemics of the Pastoral Paul. The Pastorals provide an important image of Paul from which he can construct his own work. This fore-fronting of particular Pauline texts over others creates a hermeneutical frame within which the rest are read, including 1 Corinthians, to which we now turn.

814 Genette, Palimpsests, 397.
815 Genette, Palimpsests, 399.
816 Genette, Palimpsests, 398. Emphasis his.
Irenaeus and 1 Corinthians 15.50: “Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God”

Leading directly out of the confident braggadocio of the end of Book Four, where Irenaeus states that he will “expound the Apostle” in light of the “other interpretations” of his enemies, much of Book Five of Adversus haereses, like 3 Corinthians, is concerned with Paul’s teaching on the flesh. As such, it serves as an extended apology for 1 Corinthians 15.50, which, according to Irenaeus, was a particularly contested site in the Pauline corpus. As we saw in Chapter Two, he laments: “This is the passage which is adduced by all the heretics (π[άντων αἱρετικῶν] omnibus haereticis) in support of their folly, with an attempt to annoy us, and to point out that the handiwork of God (πλασματωμ ἡλεος πλάσματος Dei) is not saved” (Haer. 5.9.1; 3-5; Jena papyrus).

Irenaeus alludes to or quotes this passage on at least twelve occasions throughout Adversus haereses, beginning as early as Book One in his discussion of the Ophites (Haer. 1.30.13).

We should say something brief about Irenaeus’ anthropology in general, before turning to his defensive interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15.50. Irenaeus opens Book

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817 Cf. Tertullian, Res. 48.1.

818 Haer. 1.30.13; 5.9.1,3,4; 5.10.1-2; 5.11.1; 5.12.3; 5.13.2; 5.13.5; 5.14.4. The data come from Mark Olson’s Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God, 138, the only full-length monograph on the interpretation of 1 Cor 15.50 in both Irenaeus and the Valentinians. On the “Gnostic” use of 1 Cor 15.50, cf. Chapter Two above; Olson, Irenaeus the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God, 11-56; and Christoph Markschies, “A Response to Jeffrey Bingham and Susan Graham,” in Early Patristic Readings of Romans, 152-8.

819 The secondary literature on this topic is voluminous. Cf. Ernst Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hl. Irenaeus: eine dogmenhistorische Studie (Kirchengeschichtliche Studien 2.3; Münster: H. Schöningh, 1894); Wingren, Man and the Incarnation; Godehard Joppich, Salus carnis: Eine Untersuchung in der Theologie des hl. Irenäus von Lyon (Münsterschwarzacher Studien 1; Münsterschwarzach: Vier-Türme, 1965); Wiles, The Divine Apostle, 43; J. Bentivegna, “Pauline Elements in the Anthropology of St.
Four with the following: “Now man is a mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness of God, and moulded by His hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom also He said, ‘Let Us make man.’” (Haer. 4.pref.4). In other places he equates this mixture of soul and flesh with the ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος (1 Cor 2.14; 15.44, 46), ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος (1 Cor 15.45, 47) and ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος (Rom 6.6; Eph 4.22; Col 3.9) of the Pauline literature. The ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος possesses the πνοὴ ζωῆς, the “breath of life,” but not the πνεῦµα ζωοποιοῦ, the “vivifying Spirit” (Haer. 5.12.2; fr. gr. 11.1-3).

Salvation comes to the ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος through the bestowal of God’s Spirit, which is available through the incarnation and bloody death of the divine Son of God:

Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit, and, on the other hand, attaching man to God by His own incarnation, and bestowing upon us at His coming immortality durably and truly, by means of communion with God, - all the doctrines of the heretics fall to ruin (Haer. 5.1.1).

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820 The key passages for the following summary of Irenaeus’ anthropology are Haer. 3.22.1-4; 3.23.7; 5.6.1; 5.8.2; 5.9.3; 5.10.2; 5.12.2-4.
Or again:

But when the spirit here blended with the soul is united to [God’s] handiwork, the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit, and this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation, but not receiving the similitude through the Spirit; and thus is this being imperfect (Haer. 5.6.1).

The one who is bestowed with God’s Spirit is being transformed into Paul’s ὁ πνευματικός (1 Cor 2.15; 3.1; 15.44, 46), being conformed to ὁ ἐσχατος Αδὰμ (1 Cor 15.45) and taking on the identity of a καινός ἄνθρωπος/καινὴ κτίσις (2 Cor 5.17; Gal 6.15; Eph 2.15; 4.24). The flesh is perfected by the Spirit, but is in no way abolished since it is the handiwork of God (πλάσµα/πλάσις τοῦ θεοῦ). This is the most important aspect of Irenaeus’ understanding of the flesh. Its equation with πλάσµα/πλάσις can be found throughout Adversus haereses. In Book Five, his defense of σάρξ is a defense of the Creator God and the value of His entire creation. Furthermore, everyone, as God’s creatures, is capable of receiving the Spirit and becoming ὁ πνευματικός. Irenaeus opposes the fatalistic distinctions between the πνευματικός and the ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος of his Valentinian opponents.

821 Noormann, Irenäus, 509-10.

822 For the identification of σάρξ with πλάσµα/πλάσις/πλάσσω cf. 1.9.3 (fr. gk. 1, 1025-41); 3.21.10-3.22.1 (fr. gk. 33, 4-13); 3.22.2 (fr. gr. 34, 18-20); 4. pref.4; 4.31.2; 5.1.1 (fr. gk. 3, 13-17); 5.3.3 (fr. gk. 5, 47-54); 5.12.3 (fr. gk. 12, 9-15); 5.12.4 (Jena 12, 74-81).

Irenaeus defends the resurrection of God’s “handiwork” (πλάσµα/plasmatio) from a number of angles in Book Five, most of which, as Maurice Wiles has shown, involve some appeal to Pauline texts:

1) Paul (1 Thess 5.23) prays for the body (τὸ σῶµα) to be preserved along with the spirit (τὸ πνεῦµα) and the soul (ἡ ψυχὴ) at the Parousia (Haer. 5.6.1);

2) Paul cannot be talking about either the spirit or the soul when he says that God “will give life to your mortal bodies” (Rom 8.11: ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώµατα ύµῶν). In Irenaeus’ tripartite anthropology, that only leaves the σάρξ (Haer. 5.7.1-2; 5.13.3);

3) Since Paul speaks of the Christian, who in the present possesses flesh, as being “in the spirit” (Rom 8:9) and as having “received a spirit of adoption” (Rom 8:15), then the flesh must be capable of inheriting the kingdom of God (i.e. – capable of resurrection) (Haer. 5.8.1; 5.13.4);

4) Christ’s redemptive work on the cross involved his own flesh and blood (Eph 2.13, 15), which must mean that it is our own flesh and blood that will be redeemed (Haer. 5.14.3). 824

These arguments immediately surround Irenaeus’ comments on 1 Corinthians 15.50 itself and provide what D. Jeffrey Bingham describes as the proper “interpretive network” or “canonical connection” for understanding its apparent denigration of flesh and blood. 825 Rather than starting with 1 Corinthians 15.50 and interpreting it within the context of 1 Corinthians 15 itself, Irenaeus builds toward it from other Pauline materials. As Mark Olson notes, “he interprets Paul by Paul.” 826 Irenaeus accuses his opponents of “keeping fast hold of the mere expressions by themselves, . . . , overturning as far as in them lies

824 Wiles, Divine Apostle, 43-44.

825 D. Jeffrey Bingham, “Irenaeus Reads Romans 8: Resurrection and Renovation,” in Early Patristic Readings of Romans, 129.

826 Olson, Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God, 80.
the entire dispensation of God” (5.13.2).\textsuperscript{827} Tertullian describes this strategy when he states that “although our opponents place it [1 Cor 15.50] in the front of the battle, we have intentionally reserved the objection until now, in order that we may in our last assault overthrow it, after we have removed out of the way all the questions which are auxiliary to it” (Res. 48.1).

For Irenaeus, the intertextual connection with Romans 8 is the most important link in his defense of 1 Corinthians 15.50.\textsuperscript{828} Romans 8, with its emphasis on the present possession of the Spirit by those who are still in the flesh, is an indication of the kinds of continuities that we should expect in the final consummation of the kingdom. Irenaeus says, “If, therefore, in the present time, fleshly hearts are made partakers of the Spirit, what is there astonishing if, in the resurrection, they receive that life which is granted by the Spirit?” (Haer. 5.13.4). The anthropological differences between present and future ages for the believer are only in “degree not substance.”\textsuperscript{829} The “mortal bodies” (\(τὰ \ θνητὰ \ σώµατα\)) of Romans 8.11, already being “made alive” (\(ζῳοποιήσει\)) through the Spirit, are equated with the “flesh” (\(σάρξ\)) of 1 Corinthians 15.50 through texts like 2 Corinthians 4.10\textsuperscript{21} (Haer. 5.13.4\textsuperscript{25}). Note the parallel language:

\begin{quote}
“in order that that life of Jesus might also be manifest in our bodies”
\(\text{ἐν \ τῷ \ σώµατι \ ἡµῶν \ φανερωθῇ}\) (4.10b);
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“in order that the life of Jesus might also be manifest in our mortal flesh”
\(\text{ἐν \ τῇ \ θνητῇ \ σαρκὶ \ ἡµῶν}\) (4.11b).\textsuperscript{830}
\end{quote}

827 Emphasis mine.

828 Cf. his use of Rom 8 in Haer. 5.7.1; 5.8.1-2; 5.10.2.

829 Bingham, “Irenaeus Reads Romans 8,” 119.

The process of immortality, whereby the “perishable” (τὸ φθαρτὸν) and “mortal” (τὸ θνητὸν) put on the “imperishable” (ἀφθαρσίαν) and “immortal” (ἀθανασίαν) (1 Cor 15.53) is already afoot in those whose flesh is being perfected by the Spirit (Haer. 5.13.3-4). Those who are “in the Spirit” (Rom 8.9) and have “received the Spirit of adoption” (Rom 8.15; “Spirit of God” in Irenaeus), are rendered “spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality” (Haer. 5.8.1: jam spiritales efficit et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate; cf. 2 Cor 5.4).831

The “canonical connection” between Romans 8 and 1 Corinthians 15 is made not merely at the anthropological level, but extends even to cosmology (Rom 8.19-22), as Bingham notes.832 Both of these texts find their way into the closing section of Irenaeus’ tome (Haer. 5.36.2-3), in which he reminds his readers for one final time that death is the final victim of Christ’s rule (1 Cor 15.25-28) and that even the creation will be set free from the bondage of corruption (Rom 8.21). In this way, the entire plasmatio of God is preserved and transformed in the end.

Having established the appropriate interpretive frame, Irenaeus can quite confidently circumvent the seemingly plain meaning of “flesh and blood” in 1 Corinthians 15.50. Throughout Adversus haereses 5.9 Irenaeus reads 1 Corinthians 15.50 with “mere” (καθ’ ἑαυτὴν/solam/tantum) before “flesh and blood.” He implies this at first: “those then, as many as they be, who have not that which saves and forms us into life eternal, shall be, and shall be called, flesh and blood (erunt et vocabuntur caro et

831 Emphasis mine.

He later explicitly states: “he [Paul] exclaims, that flesh in itself (carnem solam/τὴν σάρκα καθ' ἑαυτὴν), and blood, cannot possess the kingdom of God” (5.9.3; 59; fr. gr. 9.6). There is no manuscript evidence for this reading. Through this interpretive strategy we find a reading of 1 Corinthians 15 similar to that of 3 Corinthians 2.32, where the flesh can be saved and enter into the Kingdom of God through the work of the Spirit (5.9.3). Irenaeus continues, “If, however, we must speak strictly we would say that the flesh does not inherit, but is inherited” (5.9.4; fr. gr. 9.8-9: οὐ κληρονομεῖ ἀλλὰ κληρονομεῖται ἡ σάρξ). In the end, he contends that 1 Corinthians 15.50 is actually a warning against heresy and the dissipated lifestyle that results from such errors in thought. In Targumic fashion, he re-reads the passage to say: “Do not err; for unless the Word of God dwell in you, and if ye shall live frivolously and carelessly as if ye were this only, viz., mere flesh and blood (tantum caro et sanguis), ye cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (5.9.4; 96).

In some ways, Irenaeus and Bultmann would have made strange, but congenial bedfellows on this issue. This final reading of “flesh and blood” as a primarily moral and existential and not a metaphysical category allows Irenaeus to skirt the rather direct language of 1 Corinthians 15.50, which appears to make no distinctions between the “flesh and blood” or “perishibility” of believers and non-believers. Through intertextual alliances he links a text with a metaphysical focus (1 Cor 15:35 – “But

833 I have slightly adjusted the translation of ANF, which includes “mere” in square brackets. The key language (καθ' ἑαυτὴν/solam/tantum) is absent in this instance. Cf. Haer. 5.9.3-4.

834 Wiles, Divine Apostle, 28-29.
someone will say, ‘How are corpses raised? With what sort of body do they come?’”) to
texts with moral foci (Rom 8.8-13; 1 Cor 6.9-10; Gal 5.19-21), reading the former in light
of the latter and answering “all the heretics” in one fell swoop (Haer. 5.10.2-5.11.1).835
The “kingdom of God” language that 1 Corinthians 15, 1 Corinthians 6 and Galatians 5
share provides a further linguistic and conceptual link for Irenaeus.836 That there are two
distinct ways of reading 1 Corinthians 15.50, one metaphysical, the other moral, is clear
to Irenaeus: “For thus they will allege that this passage refers to the flesh strictly so
called, and not to fleshly works, as I have pointed out, so representing the apostle as
contradicting himself” (Haer. 5.13.3).

Bultmann, at least, recognized the tension in Paul’s anthropological language. 1
Corinthians 15.50 does appear incompatible with some of Paul’s other statements, like 2
Corinthians 4.10-11. In the former, σάρξ and σῶµα are distinct, representing substance
and form, whereas in the latter they are synonymous. For Bultmann, Paul had been
surreptitiously duped into adopting the metaphysical language of his Platonic opponents
(cf. Chapter Four). For Irenaeus, however, Paul could have never been so careless or
contingent. The Pauline Epistles were a unified testament to the salvation of the σάρξ,
which is normally read in place of σῶµα.

But what caused Irenaeus to read 1 Corinthians 15 in light of 2 Corinthians 4 and
a modified version of Romans 8, where σάρξ is often read in place of σῶµα (cf. his
reading of Rom 8.11 above), and not the other way around, giving priority to 1

835 Cf. Lawson, Biblical Theology, 231-2; Noormann, Irenäus, 504, 510; Bingham, “Irenaeus Reads
Romans 8,” 123-4.

836 Noormann, Irenäus, 505.
Corinthians 15.50, as apparently did his opponents? For Irenaeus, the apostolic “rule of truth” (ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας/regula veritatis: Haer. 1.9.4; 1.22.1; 3.2.1; 3.4.2) was the final filter through which Scripture should be interpreted. Together, Scripture and rule provide a coherent, unified tradition for the church:

Since, therefore, the tradition from the apostles does thus exist in the Church, and is permanent among us, let us revert to the Scriptural proof furnished by those apostles who did also write the Gospel, in which they recorded the doctrine regarding God, pointing out that our Lord Jesus Christ is the truth, and that no lie is in Him (Haer. 3.5.1).

This tradition was passed down through apostolic succession at important sees (Haer. 3.3.3-3.4.1). Inasmuch as the apostolic rule looked backward to the “ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus” and forward to the return of the same “to raise up anew all flesh of the whole human race,” the Pauline Epistles must have taught similarly (Haer. 1.10.1). After all, Paul “taught all things agreeable to the preaching of the truth” (Haer. 4.41.4). J. Bentivegna summarizes, “By means of this intelligent investigation, done under the guidance of the Canon of Truth, Irenaeus is sure that he will be able to discover an organic body of doctrine about man [in Paul].”

Tradition, or what we might call collective apostolic memory, caused Irenaeus to read 1 Corinthians 15.50 in the way that he does, dispensing (consciously or not) with the

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837 Cf. Philip J. Hefner, “Theological Methodology and St. Irenaeus,” JR 44 (1964): 296, and Fantino, La théologie d’Irénée, 16, for the range of synonyms used by Irenaeus for this basic concept.

838 Emphasis mine. I give the translation of ANF rather than Unger here because Unger obscures Irenaeus’ use of σάρξ/carne in Haer. 1.10.1; 10; fr. gr. 1, 1111: “the bodily ascension into heaven of the beloved Son.” Cf. Haer. 1.22.1; 1, 28, where Irenaeus, in explaining the regula veritatis, condemns his opponents to a resurrection “in the flesh” (in carne) unto judgment.

actual metaphysical concerns of 1 Corinthians 15 itself.\textsuperscript{840} We find here the same sort of textual maneuvers that were needed by the author of \textit{3 Corinthians} to transform 1 Corinthians’ hope for “the resurrection from the dead” in a “spiritual body” into an endorsement of the “resurrection of the flesh.” Irenaeus’ attempt to systematize Pauline anthropology, accusing his opponents of “representing the apostle as contradicting himself” (\textit{Haer}. 5.13.3), only uncovers the ambivalence of the language in the Pauline tradition, as Jewett and others have shown. But where 1 Corinthians 15 clearly posits discontinuity, Irenaeus wants to read as much continuity as possible. He harmonizes the Pauline language to fit his community’s rule. And the intertextual web of signification needed to make such a move seems quite similar to the practices of which Irenaeus accuses his opponents. Despite his frequent accusations that it is his opponents who “do violence to the good words [of Scripture] in adapting them to their wicked fabrications” (\textit{Haer}. 1.3.6), who pervert the “natural” (\textit{naturam}/\textit{κατὰ φύσιν}) sense of the Scriptures (\textit{Haer}. 1.9.4; 78; fr. gr. 1.1051), and who “disregard the order and the connection of the Scriptures . . . transfer passages and rearrange them; and, making one thing out of another, they deceive many” (\textit{Haer}. 1.8.1), we are sometimes left with the suspicions of Maurice Wiles, who concluded that Irenaeus and the Apostle’s later proto-orthodox commentators have themselves “oversimplified the pattern of Paul’s thought at the cost of complicating the exegesis of his words.”\textsuperscript{841}

\textsuperscript{840} Cf. Olson, \textit{Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God}, 96.

\textsuperscript{841} Wiles, \textit{Divine Apostle}, 132. Cf. Lawson, \textit{Biblical Theology}, 230, who acknowledges an “element of truth” to the differences between Irenaeus and Paul on anthropology, but then praises Irenaeus’ “master-stroke which prevented the annexation of S. Paul to Gnostic dualism, with its world-denying salvation.”
Irenæus’ reading of 1 Corinthians 15 raises important questions about what we mean as modern scholars when we ask “Who got Paul right in the second century?” Is it possible to ask, for example, “Did Irenæus get Paul’s anthropology right?” Or, “Do the Valentinians understand the nature of Pauline anthropology better than the proto-orthodox?” Olson concludes that there is only a “slight difference” between Paul and Irenæus’ reading of 1 Corinthians 15.50: “Paul emphasizes that the transformed bodies will no longer be composed of corruptible elements of flesh and blood, whereas Irenæus stresses that the bodies will still be composed of flesh and blood even though they are in some way transformed and rendered incorruptible.”

For Noormann, the differences between Irenæus and Paul are merely “terminologische.” He sees Irenæus using σάρξ in ways that are germane to his own situation, but which are not in fundamental disagreement with the Apostle. The Irenaean concept of the flesh “paulinischen Konzeption ungleich näher steht als die gnostische Vorstellung eines inneren pneumatischen Kerns des Menschen.”

To ask and answer “Who got Paul right?” on any number of issues, as we have seen, is a complicated matter. It presupposes a certain modern understanding of the “historical” Paul, which often imagines the Apostle as a static entity (cf. Chapters One

843 Olson, Irenæus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God, 96.
844 Noormann, Irenäus, 509.
845 Noormann, Irenäus, 510.
846 Noormann, Irenäus, 512. Noormann is dependent on Selin, Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten, 72ff., and Joppich, Salus carnis, 37, who argue that Paul does not understand σάρξ as “die rein physische Substanz unseres materiellen Leibes.” Cf. Chapter Four for a discussion on σάρξ in 1 Corinthians 15. Even Noormann, Irenäus, 511, admits that σάρξ as a cosmic power opposing the Spirit is hardly found in Irenæus.
and Three). It passes over the tensions that exist in the earliest layer of Pauline material and pretends to be able to measure the Pauline “tradition” against the “real” Paul. In reality, each side of this polemical battle over 1 Corinthians 15 has taken a diverse tradition and, as is always necessary when “true” or “real” inheritance is at stake, has fronted some pieces while consigning others to the back, making the tradition appear unified and frozen (cf. Chapter Three). Each is in danger of having “oversimplified” Paul, to use the language of Wiles. Furthermore, given the nature of tradition and collective memory, both sides of this second-century debate display a mixture of continuity with and change from the earlier layer of the Pauline tradition. Each individual portrayal of Paul and/or his texts is shaped within a mnemonic community that exerts its own social pressures on how individual pieces of tradition should and should not be remembered. Irenaeus’ *regula veritatis*, reflective of his own social location, constrains what he sees in 1 Corinthians 15.50. The same is true for the author of the *Gospel of Philip* (cf. Chapter Two above). The markedly Platonic language that leads into that text’s citation of 1 Corinthians 15.50 frames how the text is read:

> No one would hide a precious expensive object within an expensive thing, yet often someone has kept vast sums in something worth a penny. Such is the case with the soul; it is a precious thing, and it has come to reside in a lowly body. Certain persons are afraid that they may arise (from the dead) naked . . . (*Gos. Phil.* 56.20-28).

And despite the different ideological starting points and the attendant polemical rhetoric of Irenaeus and the author of the *Gospel of Philip*, one might wonder whether or not they have, in the end, offered such different readings of 1 Corinthians 15.50. The *Gospel of Philip* does retain hope for the salvation of a certain kind of flesh and blood: Jesus’, which those destined for salvation share. After denying the resurrection of human
flesh and blood, the author goes on to affirm a qualified salvation of flesh and blood in the future:

What is this flesh that will not inherit it? The one that we are wearing. And what, too, is this flesh that will inherit it? It is Jesus’ flesh, along with his blood. Therefore he said, “He who does not eat my flesh and drink my blood does not have life within him.” What is meant by that? His “flesh” means the Word, and his “blood” means the holy spirit: whoever has received these has food, and has drink and clothing. For my part I condemn those others who say that the flesh will not arise. Accordingly, both positions are deficient. You say that the flesh will not arise? Come now, tell me what element is going to arise, so I can congratulate you! You say it is the spirit that resides within the flesh, and also the light that is within the flesh? This thing “that also is within the flesh” is the Word; for what you are talking about is none other than flesh! It is necessary to arise in this kind of flesh, since everything exists in it. In this world those who wear garments are superior to the garments; in the kingdom of heaven the garments are superior to those who put them on (Gos. Phil. 56.34-57.22).

Modern interpreters have, with difficulty, tried to explain the internal tensions of the text. Though cryptic, we find here more continuity between this life and the next than in classic Platonic anthropology. This is a continuity in his opponents’ reading of the text that Irenaeus would certainly not want to admit, for to do so would lead to the kind of “embarrassment” that Shils describes when competing traditions come to recognize that they possess a number of similarities at the edges (cf. Chapter Three).

As we saw with 3 Corinthians’ use of Pauline traditions, another set of questions seems to be fundamental. Which Paul? Which Pauline texts are employed to construct a

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847 Cf. Lehtipuu, “‘Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God’,” 163: “The author goes beyond Paul in claiming that actually a certain kind of flesh and blood shall inherit the kingdom of God, namely, the flesh and blood of Jesus.”

848 Cf. Olson, Irenaeus, the Valentinian Gnostics, and the Kingdom of God, 28-32.

particular image of Paul that is helpful for any particular reputational entrepreneur? How are the texts used and what place do they have in the entrepreneur’s ideological program? Tertullian was right. It was and is a matter of ordering. His and Irenaeus’ opponents put 1 Corinthians 15.50 “in the front of the battle,” where it became the *sine qua non* of Pauline anthropology. The heresiologists, on the other hand, left it for their “last assault . . . after [they] have removed out of the way all the questions which are auxiliary to it” (*Res*. 48.1). Trying to answer these more fundamental questions helps us begin to offer a thick description of Paul’s legacy in the second century – a legacy where Pauline texts were the contested sites for preserving a community’s image of the Apostle and where each community saw their own memory of Paul as being “natural.”

Conclusion: *3 Corinthians, Adversus haereses*, and Proto-Orthodox Memory of Paul

The Paul of *Adversus haereses* is a complex web of earlier Pauline traditions. By invoking, specifically, the Pastoral Paul in the opening paratexts of Book One, Irenaeus shows his hand: he views Paul through the lens of heresy-hunting. His Paul is ultimately concerned with rooting out “falsely-named knowledge” (1 Tim 6.20), which itself leads to nothing but “speculations rather than the divine training that is in faith” (1 Tim 1.4). Irenaeus further sharpens this image in Book Three through narratives of Paul’s ministry that show his dependence on the Jerusalem apostles (both in Acts and in his Western version of Galatians). His Pastoral Paul, then, is waging an apostolic war. Since

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Cf. Jouette M. Bassler, “A Response to Jeffrey Bingham and Susan Graham,” 142: “Yet the path of Pauline interpretation is littered with the textual debris of this drive toward theological consistency. Thus the mirror Irenaeus holds up reveals an Irenaeus in each of us. We grant interpretive authority to a master narrative or grid; on the basis of this we prioritize certain verses in our interpretation; we strive toward an ideal of consistency. The crucial point is the degree of openness to alternative readings. Irenaeus rejects them, but the text itself pushes us toward openness. There is a resilient level of indeterminacy to Paul’s language, especially his anthropological language. It resists definitive packaging.”
Irenaeus’ apostolic *regula veritatis*, a proto-orthodox *traditum* shaped in the context of early Christian disagreements over the nature of Jesus’ incarnation and resurrection (cf. Chapter Four), confesses a *fleshly* resurrection of both Jesus and all the rest of humanity, he offers in Book Five what he believes to be a “natural” reading of 1 Corinthians 15.50.

This Paul is substantially similar to the Paul of *3 Corinthians*. Although we consciously avoided a comprehensive, descriptive theological analysis of *3 Corinthians* in the previous chapter, Peter Dunn draws attention to the fact that *3 Corinthians* shares the following “commonalities” with Irenaeus’ own rule of faith (*Haer.* 1.10.1):

1) God, the *Pantocrator*, as maker of heaven and earth;
2) Salvation through incarnation of Jesus born of Mary (*3 Cor.*) or of the virgin (Iren.);
3) The apostasy of the prince, who thinks he is God (*3 Cor.*), or of the fallen angels (Iren.);
4) Eternal judgment of the wicked in fire;
5) The resurrection of the flesh, for which Jesus is the model;
6) The inspiration of the prophets of Israel by the Holy Spirit.852

These near identical portrayals of Paul and rules of faith suggest that the two works were products of the same developing trajectory of the Pauline tradition. It is possible, if not likely, that the “Paulinism” of these two texts reflects a developing constellation of authorized memories of the Apostle among proto-orthodox communities in western Asia Minor in the second half of the second century. Irenaeus grew up in western Asia Minor and was influenced heavily by two of its leading proto-orthodox thinkers: Polycarp of Smyrna (*Haer.* 3.3.1-4; Eus., *Hist. eccl.* 5.20), who makes widespread use of a variety of Pauline texts and traditions, including 1 Timothy, in his *Epistle to the Philippians*, and

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851 Cf. Nielsen, *Adam and Christ*, 94: “In the ‘apocryphal correspondence between the Corinthians and the apostle Paul’ typical Gnostic questions are dealt with, and the answers give to them are more after the manner of Irenaeus than after the manner of Paul.”


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the unnamed “presbyter” (*Haer*. 4.27.1), from whom Irenaeus draws much of his anti-
Marcionite polemic and who certainly knew and used Pauline materials.\(^853\) Irenaeus’
own Paul, as Bultmann, Lindemann, Rensberger, and Noormann have asserted, was at
least partially traditioned to him by these individuals (cf. above). Asia Minor is also the
likely provenance of *3 Corinthians*, which displays a number of resemblances in
language, theology, and argument to Ignatius and Polycarp.\(^854\) This provenance would
also explain how *3 Corinthians* was quickly assumed into the *Acts of Paul* (whose
authorship Tertullian places in “Asia” at the end of the second century) and transmitted in
a variety of directions within a century or two, both as an individual text and as part of
the *Acts of Paul* (eastward into Syria and Armenia; southward into Egypt; westward into
Italy and North Africa). Furthermore, given its *general* polemic against a number of
“Gnostic” heresies, its familiarity with the Simon and Cleobius tradition, and its
polemical use of the Pastorals, the latter of which appears to be a development of the late-
second century, *3 Corinthians*, like *Adversus haereses*, should be dated to the latter half
of the second century.\(^855\)

The fact that both texts portray the same Paul, yet differ in the exact way that they
get there, suggests that they are independent witnesses to this one broad stream of proto-
orthodox memory of the Apostle in Asia Minor in the latter half of the second century.
Reputational entrepreneurs do not invent traditions whole cloth, despite what the politics

Polycarp’s *Epistle to the Philippians*, cf. Chapter Two above.

\(^854\) Cf. Johnston, “La Correspondance apocryphe entre Paul et les Corinthiens,” 223-4; Rordorf, “Hérésie et

Corinthians*, 126-31; and Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X-XII*, 23.
of memory school asserts. They are members of communities and experience the force of tradition. But in a canon as variegated as was the earliest layer of the Pauline tradition, entrepreneurs can easily shift pieces of the tradition forward and backward, bringing into conscious view particular elements, eliminating others from public memory, and introducing new bits that must cohere with those that already have currency. The Paul standing behind 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses developed with a view to the needs of proto-orthodox communities and their regula veritatis, exhibiting a mixture of continuity with and changes from earlier layers of Pauline tradition. Through its hermeneutical arrangement of the earlier layer of Pauline texts, in addition to its rationalization of mysterious and potentially problematic Pauline language, the Pauline tradition in Irenaeus and 3 Corinthians has developed beyond what it has received. Of course, this rarely was and continues rarely to be visible to those who stand within a particular developing tradition. As Shils (cf. Chapter Two) notes, “Such modifications of the received occur even when the tradition is regarded as sacrosanct and the innovator might in good conscience insist that he is adhering to the traditions as received.”

Irenaeus conceives of his exposition of the Apostle as “sacrosanct,” to use the language of Shils, or “natural,” to use his own, unable to recognize (except for in his opponents) that “[e]very major tradition is a product of the confluence of contributory traditions, not

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856 Cf. Shils, Tradition, 198: “But it should also be pointed out that no situation is made by a single human being.”

857 Schwartz, Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory, 222: “Different memories result, however, from a common method of making them meaningful: selecting the elements of Lincoln’s life to be included in its representation and translating these into a form that will maintain their relevance.”

858 Shils, Tradition, 45.
only at its origin but in the course of its history.”

Irenaeus fronts and combines Pauline materials of varying age (e.g. – 1 Cor and 1 Tim, regardless of the authorship of the latter) and reads them in light of a still later and developing second-century rule of faith that includes statements about the resurrection of the flesh. As Assmann has argued (cf. Chapter Three), tradition and memory is constantly evolving and possesses at any given time layers from various periods of time.

We can now narrate the particular trajectory of Pauline tradition (traditio) that led from Acts to Irenaeus and 3 Corinthians. Luke’s depiction of the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15) is an endorsement of Paul’s Law-free gospel. Writing from a pro-Gentile perspective, the author of Acts has cast the story of the earliest church as a preparatory scene for the arrival of the Pauline gospel and has turned Peter into a transitional figure, who was already pushing for Paul’s Law-free gospel before the council ever met (Acts 10.1-11.17), but only after Paul’s calling (Acts 9.1-30), at least according to Luke’s narrative. By the early second century, whether through the influence of Acts, the circulation of Pauline letters (cf. Gal 1.18; 2.7-9; 1 Cor 3.22; 9.5; 15.5), or through oral traditions about the apostles, or some combination of all three, Peter and Paul were widely viewed as apostolic brothers in the proto-orthodox tradition (cf. 1 Clem. 5.1-7; Ign. Rom. 4.3; 2 Pet 3.15-16). One could argue that Paul still stood taller, however, than Peter. But as 2 Peter attests, Paul’s letters eventually became contested sites of

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859 Shils, Tradition, 97.
861 Cf. Andreas Lindemann, “Paul, ‘Clement’, and Ignatius,” 10, and Pervo, Making of Paul, 132. Cf. also Dionysius of Corinth (ca. 170 C.E.) for the co-joining of Peter and Paul as fellow martyrs in Rome (Eus., Hist. eccl. 2.25.8).
interpretation and it was he that needed to be pulled toward Peter, the prized disciple of
the earthly Jesus and father of the Roman church, not the other way around. The *Epistula
Apostolorum*, originating from Asia Minor in the early-to-mid second century and clearly
concerned with combating theologies that deny the salvation of the flesh (*Ep. Apos.* 12,
21, 24, 26, 39), was the first to portray emphatically Paul’s dependence on the teaching of
the other Apostles (cf. Chapter Four).862

This stream of Pauline tradition eventually merged with the others found in 3
*Corinthians* and *Adversus haereses* as the Pastoral Epistles gained wider circulation and 1
*Corinthians* 15.50 became a highly contested Pauline text.863 The Pastorals were
particularly useful for portraying a Paul who was concerned for “the deposit” and
“healthy teaching.” The image of Paul reflected in these texts, particularly due to the
influence of Irenaeus’ *Adversus haereses*, would then later find its way into the Pauline
memorials that were the earliest proto-orthodox commentaries on his letters (Origen,
Chrysostom, and Theodore on the Greek side and Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster,
Jerome, Augustine and Pelagius on the Latin side).864

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863 Cf. Shils, *Tradition*, 47: “an individual possesses a culture of which the constituent elements are of
different ages.” Furthermore, “A society is a “trans-temporal” phenomenon” (327).

864 Wiles, *The Divine Apostle*, 44.
CHAPTER SIX  
Remembering Paul

Two sets of data from the second century have driven this dissertation, each of which is described in Chapter One. On the one hand, a wide-ranging set of Christian texts in the second century provide honorific titles to Paul of Tarsus: Paul, “the apostle of the resurrection” (Theodotus); Paul, “the divine apostle” (Clement of Alexandria); Paul, “the great apostle” (*Reality of the Rulers*); Paul, “the sanctified, the martyred, the most worthy of blessing” (Ignatius); etc. Along with these more specific appellations, Paul also attained in that century the highest of all tributes; he was “the Apostle” (Heracleon; *Treatise on the Resurrection; A Prayer of Paul the Apostle*; Athenagoras; Irenaeus; Tertullian; Clement of Alexandria). On the other hand, and developing at the same time as Paul’s charisma, discourses on the “real” Paul were beginning to play out in early Christian rhetoric; discourses that often centered around the proper interpretation of Pauline texts. Tertullian accused Marcion of “falsifying” and “mutilating” Paul’s epistles. Marcion returned the favor. The lawyer from Carthage also indicted a presbyter from Asia for “thinking to add of his own to Paul’s reputation” by putting forth the fabricated *Acts of Paul*. Likewise, the author of 2 Peter blamed “the ignorant and unstable” for “distorting” Pauline texts. The *Gospel of Philip* rebuked “certain persons” for misreading 1 Corinthians 15.50. The “certain persons” here included those who, like
Irenaeus, were at the same time rebuffing “heretics” for “misunderstanding” the same passage.

Tertullian has provided the key language for tying these two sets of data together: “thinking to add of his own to Paul’s reputation” (Bapt. 17.5: quasi titulo Pauli de suo cumulans). By the second century, Paul had become a widely traditioned figure; a charismatic totem through which any number of early Christian communities could understand their own apostolic foundation. The aforementioned diversity of Pauline images (or reputations) and textual interpretations that are displayed in the literary evidence from the second century is directly correlated with two factors: the broad range of Christian theologies available in the second century, combined with the sheer variety of Pauline material (oral and written) coming from the first. Paul’s reputation became a pliable entity and could be shaped and formed through the invocation of different pieces of the highly diverse canon of early Pauline traditions, assimilated to prior ideological networks to produce meaningful images and symbols. What was at stake in the competitive second century was remembering Paul rightly.

At this nascent stage of Christianity, because there were very few mechanisms that could prevent the kind of diversity from developing that makes today’s varieties of Christianity look quite tame, the early Christian culture-making process was bound to be a contested matter. To a significant degree, the rhetoric of this process was directed at the apostolic age. Apostolic legends, writings and figures became the grammar by which Christian communities made their existence meaningful. They were part of the “enabling

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865 As a reminder, translations of De baptismo come from Ernest Evans. Cf. n. 1.

866 In a similar vein, cf. Markus Bockmuehl’s recently published, The Remembered Peter: in Ancient Reception and Modern Debate (WUNT 262; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).
aspect” of early Christian cultural memory, to use the language of Jan Assmann (cf. Chapter Three). But because ideologically and socially distinct communities shared some of the same apostolic traditions (e.g. – the Pauline letters), the “proper” understanding of these traditions was always at stake. Elizabeth Castelli reminds:

Since Christianity in its formative stages (and beyond) engaged in a series of contests over how the past should be understood and who should possess the legitimate claim to tradition (and the authority that accompanied it), it should not be surprising to discover that Christian memory work also participated in the process of contestation.867

Tertullian, for instance, was afraid that some progressive-minded Christians might claim the right for women to teach and baptize based on the Acts of Paul and Thecla. In an attempt to ward off such a claim and ensure that both the proper image of Paul and the proper power dynamics within early Christianity remained intact, he tells his readers that this text was a fabrication; a fanciful attempt by an Asian presbyter to “add of his own to Paul’s reputation.” Tertullian then pits the Acts of Paul and Thecla against 1 Corinthians 14.34-5, claiming that the “real” Paul, represented by the latter, would have never allowed such a thing.

Paul, more than any other apostolic authority, had to find a proper home within the matrix of early Christian memory. The Pauline texts and traditions coming from the first century universally provide the impression that his far-flung mission to the Gentiles was the single most disruptive and formative social force in the nascent decades of Christianity. This very early characterization guaranteed him commemorative significance in subsequent Christian memory. Canonical and non-canonical pseudepigrapha, various Acts of Paul traditions, Pauline apocalypses, martyrdom

867 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 24.
legends, theologically redacted Pauline letter collections, and a wide variety of exegetical traditions attest to this.

The work of reputational entrepreneurs was important for ensuring that Paul remained both intelligible and manageable within the cultural memory of their communities. The authors of 1 Clement, 2 Peter, the Acts of Paul, 3 Corinthians, the Coptic Apocalypse of Paul, and the Prayer of Paul the Apostle, along with Ignatius, Marcion, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and many others had something to gain or lose in their attempts to provide and defend meaningful images of the Apostle for their communities, from which they had received much of their understanding of his significance in the first place. Individual memory is socially constrained. The Pauline image traditions that they received, shaped, constructed, and to some degree altered were models of (acting as mirrors) as well as models for (acting as lamps) their communities. In their work, the vital task of preserving apostolic authority was at stake. Power relations within a competitive Christian world were involved. Hard positions had to be taken, as the accusations of “misunderstanding,” “distortion,” and “falsification” suggest.

But when we measure the shared image of Paul that appears in 3 Corinthians and Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses against such rhetoric, we find that something else was happening on the ground. In trying to provide a thick description of the Pauline tradition in these two texts, we discovered that they display elements of continuity with and change from the earlier layers of the Pauline tradition that they invoke. It is difficult, despite Irenaeus’ claims to the contrary, to ask whether or not these texts provide an “accurate” or “correct” reading of the “real” Paul. What we can say, however, is that their authors have constructed complex images of the Apostle that capture his
significance for one strain of proto-orthodoxy by elevating, fronting, and combining some elements of the diverse earlier Pauline tradition, while obscuring others. In particular, both texts work to construct and preserve a Paul who is the defender of the proto-orthodox rule of faith (cf. Haer. 1.10.1).

Many other second-century texts will need to be explored from this vantage point in the future. Michael Kaler’s work on the Apocalyptic Paul of both the Coptic Apocalypse of Paul and Marcion is exemplary, in my view. Areas of particular need are studies on the “Paul” of the Montanists and of Clement of Alexandria. I know of no work on the former, while studies on the latter have been limited to the use of individual Paul texts and passages. Particularly fruitful would be attempts to locate constellations of Pauline traditions that develop regionally, as I have tried to intimate in locating the particular Pauline tradition of 3 Corinthians and Adversus haereses in Asia. Are there commonalities that exist, for instance, between the Pauline traditions in Marcion and the Montanists, both of whom represent apocalyptic theologies in central and northern Anatolia in the mid- to late-second century? Also useful would be attempts to trace diachronic receptions of Pauline traditions, as I have done with the relationship between Paul and the Apostles among the proto-orthodox, particularly where personal or textual connections can be made. To what degree, for instance, is Origen’s interpretation of Paul traditioned to him by Clement? Outside of these particular kinds of examinations, the early Pauline manuscript traditions (P, in particular, for the second century) should also

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868 Cf. Chapter 2, n. 117.

be explored more intentionally, not just for tendentious readings, but for ways in which their organization and overall contents might say something about how their copyists understood Paul. These kinds of studies would help continue to flesh out the history of Paul in the second century, filling in gaps within the Pauline Fragmentation narrative.

In subtle and not so subtle ways I have tried to make the case for a paradigm shift in Pauline studies. To some degree the shift is already happening (cf. Chapter One). Before we can talk about the “real” or “historical” Paul, we must become scholars of Pauline traditions. Shils’ “substantive traditionality,” Gadamer’s “historically effected consciousness,” Assmann’s “cultural memory,” and Schwartz’s “collective memory” provide the theoretical frameworks for getting there. Each of these argues for the ubiquity of tradition and explores tradition and memory as complex phenomena that exhibit strong connections with the past as well as innovation for the present, thereby neutralizing and marginalizing fundamentalist rhetorics that speak of the “invention” of tradition or, in our case, of the “misrepresentation” of Paul in the second century.

The problems endemic to answering a question like “Who got Paul right in the second century?” are the result of the way that communities actually remember and pass down these remembrances (tradition) to successive generations. Once the subject of “Paul in the second century” becomes thoroughly vetted through the heuristics of tradition and memory (cf. Chapter Three), categories much more amorphous and nuanced

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than those handed on to us by the historiographers of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, a different set of questions than those traditionally asked takes center stage.

“Who got Paul right in the second century?,” loaded with the freight of modern ideology in the guise of positivist historiography, is replaced by a more fruitful and, in my view, honest kind of question, “Which Paul?,” as De Boer, Froehlich, and Grappe have argued (cf. Chapter Two). This single question cuts two ways. First, we should ask about continuities with the past. “Which Pauline (written) texts and (oral) traditions have been invoked to provide a particular portrayal of the Apostle?” “How have they been ordered and interpreted?” Second, we should ask about the role of the present in shaping the past. “What is the social location of a given author?” “What communal rules of faith have shaped an individual author’s (conscious or unconscious) selection of individual pieces from within the broad and diverse early layer of Pauline traditions?” “Is there a homeostatic relationship between particular Pauline traditions and their tradents’ ideological location, as Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann have suggested?”

Finally, and from a methodological standpoint, the question “Which authors knew and used which Pauline texts in the second century?” does not go nearly far enough in providing a thick description of Paul’s influence in the second century. Not only were Pauline texts coming into wide circulation during this period, but oral traditions, some of which may have been rooted in communities that Paul founded, other times possibly stemming from Paul’s opponents, were also making their way into the stream of early Christian memory. In fact, the use and interpretation of Pauline texts were often in the service of the defense of particular Pauline images that functioned synecdochically, where “Paul” was signified by the piece of the tradition that a particular writer wanted to
fix in the memory of his or her community as particularly “Pauline”: Paul, “the Apostle
of the Resurrection” (Theodotus); Paul, “the sanctified, the martyred, the most worthy of
blessing” (Ignatius); Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles (Acts; 2 Tim; 1 Clem; Martyrdom
of Paul); Paul, the Orthodox Teacher (Irenaeus; 3 Corinthians); Paul, the Apocalyptic
Visionary (Coptic Apocalypse of Paul; Marcion); etc. As images, these portrayals of the
Apostle should not be viewed as completely transparent, as though any one of them gives
us access to the “real” Paul. Already bearing an interpretive framework, they obscure
and frustrate access to the “real” Paul, if by that rhetoric one means a Paul denuded of
tradition and frozen in time. But just as important, if not more, each imago Pauli in the
second century provided handles for grasping the Apostle’s importance for individual
communities in the midst of a sea of diverse apostolic material.
APPENDIX ONE

History, Tradition, and Memory

As I have noted throughout this dissertation, one of the questions that have dominated scholarship on “Paul in the second century” is “Who got Paul right?” Throughout the dissertation I have tried to expose the naïvete of such a question, which is largely based on a positivist, nineteenth-century historiography and tries to produce a rather frozen image of the apostle, much like his second-century reputational entrepreneurs have done. Chapter One noted recent attempts to move away from the quests for the “historical” Jesus and Paul. At the heart of these works lie a deep suspicion of Enlightenment-influenced historiography and the epistemic certainty with which it often proceeded. The personal about-face described in Dale Allison’s recently published Constructing Jesus is exemplary of the kinds of theoretical and methodological shifts that are occurring in scholarship on Christian origins. Allison’s most recent book does away with the traditional historical Jesus criteria, firmly grounding his exploration of early Christian gospels in memory theory, which immediately muddies the waters and leaves him trying to establish “broad impressions” based on “recurrent attestations.” Like traditional “Questers” for the historical Jesus, however, many modern scholars of the “historical” Paul still continue to try to peel away layers of tradition (whether whole texts or interpolations within authentic texts) in order to expose the authentic Pauline core; the “real” Paul. This, in spite of the fact that the philosophy, language and practice of “scientific history” was challenged in the twentieth century as often times nothing more than wishful thinking driven by socially conditioned “self-evident” truths. Wayne Meeks

\[\text{\textsuperscript{871}}\] Constructing Jesus, 1-30.
has recently criticized the “physics envy,” to use the language of John Lewis Gaddis, of historical Jesus Questers.\textsuperscript{872} This appendix addresses some recent trends in historiography in order to give context to those Pauline scholars who are increasingly dubious about categories like the “real” Paul. By de-centering positivist conceptions of history, we are able to link the problems of defining the “historical” Paul of the first century with the problems of asking “Who got Paul right?” in the second century. With new theories and methodologies come new questions for early Christian texts. Alternatively, inasmuch as memory, tradition, and historiography have drawn closer together among cultural theorists, and the retention of some elements of the past continue to persist within personal, historical, and collective memory, the question of continuity between first- and second-century remembrances of Paul must be raised. How much about the “historical” Paul can be known through later Christian tradition, and to what degree?

F.C. Baur (cf. Chapter Two), the first substantial advocate of the “historical” Paul, theorized and wrote at the height of a trend in European historiography that viewed narrations of the past as objectively and undeniably attainable. The proper conceptual framework for doing history was science, not literature. Archaeology, philology, and the other tools of the historian were brought to bear on ancient texts and artifacts to describe the past “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (Leopold von Ranke).\textsuperscript{873} Forgeries and imposters

\textsuperscript{872} Wayne Meeks, \textit{Christ is the Question}, 15, citing Gaddis, \textit{The Landscape of History}, 89.

were exposed.\textsuperscript{874} Historiography was “rigorously inductive.”\textsuperscript{875} Gadamer characterized the historiography of this period as follows:

Nineteenth-century historiography is its [Romanticism] finest fruit and sees itself precisely as the fulfillment of the Enlightenment, as the last step in the liberation of the mind from the trammels of dogma, the step to objective knowledge of the historical world, which stands on a par with the knowledge of nature achieved by modern science.\textsuperscript{876}

Several factors ultimately led to the demise of such positivism. First, two World Wars shook the foundation of European confidence in the discernible connection and causality of events. How could one explain such massive bloodshed? Some tried, others gave up.\textsuperscript{877} Hegel’s historical philosophy in the hands of European nation-states took a battering. Second, conceptual frameworks in the physical sciences were shifting. Newtonian physics gave way to Einstein’s theory of relativity.\textsuperscript{878} The Heisenberg uncertainty principle unsettled earlier atomic theories. But earlier theories did not go down without a fight. Science was exposed as tradition-driven and often resistant to change.\textsuperscript{879}

Increased attention to language, rhetoric and power in cultural studies provided the basic theoretical tools for the “linguistic turn” in historiography: causation was out;
discourse and narrative were in.\textsuperscript{880} George Macaulay Trevelyan, the great historian of England, anticipated this turn when he admitted that the research of discrete events was scientific to a degree, but causality was not. According to Richard Evans, history was for Trevelyan “a mixture of the scientific (research), the imaginative or speculative (interpretation) and the literary (presentation).”\textsuperscript{881} R.G. Collingwood, the last of the great Historicists, pushed further, noting the contemporary concerns found within all narrations of the past.\textsuperscript{882} He still believed, however, that we could actually get inside the minds of figures of the past, describing accurately and objectively their perceptions about the world.\textsuperscript{883} E.H. Carr, the great mid-twentieth-century historiographer, argued that the historian should write with concern for how the past might help inform the future that he or she preferred.\textsuperscript{884} From a methodological standpoint, and in order to guard against ideological narrations of history cloaked in objectivity (e.g. Marxism), Karl Popper insisted that would-be statements about reality should be clear about the circumstances under which they might be discounted.\textsuperscript{885}

Hayden White has been the most vocal and rigorous apologist for the identification of history with literature, in general, and rhetoric, in particular.\textsuperscript{886} The


\textsuperscript{881} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 25.


\textsuperscript{883} Hutton, \textit{History as an Art of Memory}, 157.

\textsuperscript{884} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 228.

\textsuperscript{885} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 31.

\textsuperscript{886} His most important works are \textit{Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); \textit{Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism}
closer that history can be shown to correspond to rhetorical convention, poetry, and fiction, the farther its relationship to supposedly objective science appears. History-telling is built on the enthymeme (rhetoric), not the syllogism (logic). In his foundational *Metahistory* (1973), White argued that there are strong poetic and rhetorical foundations to the narration of the past. Every history is written with a particular “historiographical style,” which consists of choices that must be made about emplotment (romance, comedy, tragedy and satire), formal argument (formism, organicism, mechanism, and contextualism), and ideological implication (anarchism, conservatism, radicalism, and liberalism). These choices are not made in a vacuum, however, but reflect *tropological* constraints, or modes of consciousness that provide linguistic protocols for prefiguring the historical field. These constraints are poetic in nature, producing histories that turn on metaphor (representation), metonymy (reduction), synecdoche (integration), or irony (skepticism/relativism). Discrete events from the past can and should be narrated in any number of ways depending on the social and philosophical location of the historian. White himself narrates the transitions from the ironic mode of Enlightenment and early nineteenth-century historiography to the synecdochic style of Hegel and mid-nineteenth century historians, among whom F.C. Baur belongs, back to the ironic mode at the turn of the century as practitioners became

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888 White, *Metahistory*, 1-42.
disillusioned by the numerous “scientific” ways to represent the same events.\(^{889}\) If there is a prescriptive aspect to White’s work, it is his final plea to see irony and skepticism as only one of several ways to narrate the past. It is not the “necessary perspective” from which historians must operate.\(^{890}\) Narrative form is a deeply ethical task and historians should be conscious of the shape of their histories and the potential consequences of their tropological choices.\(^{891}\) Tropology is “moralistic and didactic.”\(^{892}\) Or,

When it is a matter of choosing among . . . alternative visions of history, the only grounds for preferring the one over another are moral or aesthetic ones . . . One must face the fact that, when it comes to the historical record, there are no grounds to be found in the record itself for preferring one way of construing its meaning rather than another . . . We can tell equally plausible, alternative, and even contradictory stories . . . without violating rules of evidence or critical standards . . . One can imagine not only one or two but any number of alternative stories of . . . any . . . culturally significant event, all equally plausible and equally authoritative by virtue of their conformity to generally accepted rules of historical construction.\(^{893}\)

The positivists of the nineteenth century, according to White, could not avoid the constraints of rhetoric in their work, despite their claims to the contrary. They merely switched from one rhetoric to another: “they failed to recognize that their own plain style was itself a rhetorical strategy, as artificial as, and no less dependent upon figures, tropes, and topoi or rhetorical commonplaces than, the florid style against which they had

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\(^{891}\) White, *Content of the Form*, 1-25.

\(^{892}\) White, “Rhetoric and History,” 16.

Desiring transparency, they hid their practices and mystified their ideological program. White’s numerous essays published since *Metahistory* continue to tear down the wall between history and rhetoric/poetry/art that was erected already in antiquity (cf. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.21; and Lucian, *The Way to Write History* 7-8) and continued to be reinforced in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European historiography. For White, historiography is discourse, and “troping is the soul of discourse.” The interpretive process cannot be separated out from the discovery of neutral “facts.” Rhetorical, poetic, and thus interpretive frameworks prefigure how we see the data in the first place. They function through what we might call, colloquially, “common-sense.” Gadamer would call it tradition. Form (structuralism) leads to content. Narrative provides meaning to the past; it is not found there. Chronicles and annals differ from narratives at this very point. The logic for advancing from event to event must be supplied by the historian to form a coherent narrative, a history. Events take place, but facts, or literary presentations of events, are completely constructed by the historian. White encourages historians to write eloquent and engaging prose, full of

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894 White, “Rhetoric and History,” 5.

895 White, “Rhetoric and History,” 6, 8.

896 White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 3. Or, “Rhetoric and History,” 7: “all historical discourse . . . can be shown on analysis to be a set of figurative statements.” Cf. also “Rhetoric and History,” 16: “But all such professions of antirhetoric are always themselves a rhetorical ploy, the substitution of the rhetoric of antirhetoric for the rhetoric of rhetoric.”


899 White, *Content of the Form*, 26-57.

900 White, *Content of the Form*, 42-4.

901 Evans, *In Defence of History*, 78.
rhetorical flourish. To do so is to consciously recognize that “the differences between a
history and a fictional account of reality are matters of degree rather than of kind.”

While Hayden White has been lumped in with other theoretical constructionists
(such as Foucault, Nietzsche, and Derrida), he tries to distance himself from their strictly
ironic/pessimistic mode of consciousness. Some, however, as we will see below, have
criticized White for not taking his theories to their logical and pessimistic conclusion:
history is reflexive and solely in the mind of its beholder. But that was the early Hayden
White. History itself has caused White to rethink some elements of his original thesis.
The Holocaust, for instance, resists some kinds of emplotment. In response to Holocaust
deniers, White was forced to concede that the historical imagination comprised “both the
real world from which one has launched one’s enquiry into the past and the world that
comprises one’s object of interest.” Richard Evans characterizes White’s about-face as
his “abandoning his central theoretical tenet.”

Several more recent works have tried to chart a middle path between the Scylla of
Historicism and the Charybdis of the more nihilistic forms of postmodern historiography.
Richard Evans encourages: “Historians should approach the invading hordes of
semioticians, post-structuralists, New Historicists, Foucauldians, Lacanians and the rest
with more discrimination. Some of them might prove friendlier, or more useful, than

902 White, Tropics of Discourse, 78 n. 27. Cf. also “Rhetoric and History,” 3: “My thesis is that the
principal source of a historical work’s strength as an interpretation of the events which it treats as the data
to be explained is rhetorical in nature. So too the rhetoric of a historical work is, in my view, the principal
source of its appeal to those of its readers who accept it as a ‘realistic’ or ‘objective’ account of ‘what
really happened’ in the past.” Emphasis his.

903 White, Tropics of Discourse, 261-82.


905 Evans, In Defence of History, 125.
they seem at first sight.”

For Evans, history is the quintessential interdisciplinary field. It is at the same time an art form, a certain kind of science, as well as a rhetorical discourse. John Lewis Gaddis agrees, fruitfully comparing historiography with art, cartography, and science, while calling for historians to be more explicit about their methodology and its limits. Gaddis builds on John Ziman’s suggestion that most conceptual progress in science occurs through the use of metaphor (such and such scientific process/phenomenon is “like” some other process/phenomenon in another field). Like art, cartography, and science, history is representation. It can never be the thing in itself, and thus there is “no ‘correct’ interpretation of the past,” but it can produce increasingly adequate and accurate depictions of the past, particularly when the historian is somewhat removed from the events themselves.

Caspar David Friedrich’s The Wanderer above a Sea of Fog, depicting a man standing on an elevated rocky ledge, peering across the foggy landscape before him, is the primary comparative image for Gaddis. The historian’s task is to look from his or her “expanded horizon” and “interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to managing the future.” Similar to Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” (cf. Chapter Three above), for Gaddis, historiography is

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906 Evans, In Defence of History, 9. Evans positions himself between the “relativistic” work of E.H. Carr (What is History?) and the positivist approach of Geoffrey Elton (The Practice of History).


908 Gaddis, Landscape of History, xi, 51.


910 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 10.

911 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 4, 10.
a “reiteration loop,” to use the language of Jane Azevedo, where data, representations, and interests constantly inform the process.\textsuperscript{912}

History is like art, according to Gaddis, because historians, like artists, can manipulate both time and space. They are abstractionists, not literalists.\textsuperscript{913} He offers Joyce’s \textit{Ulysses} as an example of the number of pages that it would take to narrate the events of one person’s life in the course of a single day.\textsuperscript{914} Through selectivity, simultaneity, and the shifting of scale, historians represent the past, resulting in the “rearrangement of reality to suit our purposes.”\textsuperscript{915} Hayden White is correct, then, in his distinction between chronicle and history. History is a fictional narrative, where events are reordered to provide a beginning, middle and end.\textsuperscript{916} He was also right, according to Gaddis, in making the basic observation that modes of representation “determine whatever it is we’re representing.”\textsuperscript{917}

But history also trades in evidence and thus can also be properly compared to science, contra White, as long as one compares it to the right kind of science and does not overstate the nature of scientific methodology. Like historiography, astronomy, geology, paleontology, and evolutionary biology attempt to explain present realities through the narration of past processes. The former are the structures produced by non-repeatable


\textsuperscript{913} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 17.

\textsuperscript{914} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 27.

\textsuperscript{915} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 20, 22.

\textsuperscript{916} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 19; Cf. Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 74.

\textsuperscript{917} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 29.
past events that can only be deduced through imaginative reconstruction.\textsuperscript{918} Intuition and judgment are necessary. These branches of science are non-empirical, yet clearly based on evidence. “Virtual replicability” stands in places of “actual replicability.”\textsuperscript{919} Historical work proceeds similarly: “A historical fact is an inference from the relics.”\textsuperscript{920} Because of the relationship between structures and processes, historians cannot escape the issue of causation. But unlike social scientists, who often reduce causation to a single independent variable (in order to predict the future), historians have an “ecological view of reality,” where causation is a complex web of factors.\textsuperscript{921} Gaddis compares historical causation to a congested highway, where micro-responses are predictable, but macro-level results are hard to predetermine. He also likens it to mathematics, where linear and non-linear relationships can exist within the same system.\textsuperscript{922} Evans agrees:

Most historians will go to some lengths to avoid a ‘monocausal explanation.’ Almost all historians are used to the idea that historical events are frequently \textit{overdetermined}, that is they may have several sufficient as well as necessary causes, any one of which might have been enough to trigger the event on its own. Generally, however, they see it as their duty to establish a \textit{hierarchy} of causes and to explain if relevant the relationship of one cause to another.\textsuperscript{923}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{919} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 43.
\textsuperscript{921} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 54, 64.
\textsuperscript{922} Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 74-6.
\textsuperscript{923} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 158.
\end{flushleft}
This characterization leaves ample room for epistemic uncertainty, while at the same time recognizing that there is some causal connection between sets of events that can and should be explained by evidence.924

Both Evans and Gaddis heartily embrace the postmodern dictum that “the act of observation alters what’s being observed.”925 But while one’s point of view changes the appearance of a mountain, for instance, it does not mean that the mountain “has objectively either no shape at all or an infinity of shapes.”926 Eric Hobsbawm, the Marxist historian whose work on the politics of memory we have already encountered (cf. Chapter Three), concurs:

> it is essential for historians to defend the foundation of their discipline: the supremacy of evidence. If their texts are fictions, as in some sense they are, being literary compositions, the raw material of these fictions is verifiable fact . . . If history is an imaginative art, it is one which does not invent but arranges *objets trouvés*. 927

For Hobsbawm, the task of the historian is activism. He or she must look for evidence “from below” that would shatter the hegemonic “invented” memories of the cultural and political elite. The importance of securing evidence lies in its ability to provide liberation.928

Evans and Hobsbawm agree on the scientific nature of history-work, while differing on the relative merit of elites and their ideological histories. Like Schwartz and

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924 Evans, *In Defence of History*, 249.


others who have critiqued the politics of memory, Evans believes that “history can only provide reliable support for social and political empowerment in the present if it can convincingly claim to be true, and this in turn demands a rigorous and self-critical approach to the evidence on the part of the historian.”

The relationship between rhetoric and proof is positive, as in Aristotle, and not negative, as in Nietzsche. Attention to issues of subjectivity and power relations, or “discourse,” to use the short-hand language of cultural and literary theorists, can and should benefit the historian: “Postmodernism . . . has led to a greater emphasis on open acknowledgement of the historian’s own subjectivity, which can only help the reader engaged in a critical assessment of historical work.”

The present is always involved in the narration of the past (Gaddis compares it to a funnel where the unknowable future is collected and locked into an organized and meaningful past), but the recognition of historical situatedness is a further aid, not an obstruction, to better knowledge of the past. Gaddis concludes:

"History is constantly being remeasured in terms of previously neglected metrics: recent examples include the role of women, minorities, discourse, sexuality, disease, and culture . . . But the history these representations represent has not changed."

Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob also lament the perceived distance between research methodologies in science and the humanities. They argue that total skepticism about knowing the past is the result of the increased democratization

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929 Evans, *In Defence of History*, 223.


933 Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History*, 283.
and multicultural expansion of American culture.\textsuperscript{934} They see a homeostatic relationship between trends in historiography and the shifting demographic landscape, offering a deconstruction of the deconstructors. Like Hobsbawm, these authors view “skepticism and relativism as two-edged swords. They can be wielded against the powers that be to promote a greater inclusiveness, but they can also wound those committed to pursuing any kind of knowledge whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{935} Like Evans and Gaddis, these authors exhibit “openness to the interplay between certainty and doubt,” which they believe “keeps faith with the expansive quality of democracy.”\textsuperscript{936} Rather than an obstacle to increased degrees of certainty about the past, the social nature of knowledge in a democracy results in the exact opposite: “The system of peer review, open referencing, public disputation, replicated experiments, and documented research – all aided by international communication and the extended freedom from censorship – makes objective knowledge possible.”\textsuperscript{937} “Telling the truth takes a collective effort.”\textsuperscript{938} The use of “objective knowledge” here is unfortunate. Ultimately, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacobs are advocates of a Peircian pragmatism (or, practical realism), concluding that:

Within Western philosophical traditions sympathetic to democracy only pragmatism promotes the criticism and debate, dissent and irreverence vital to the kind of history we are advocating. yet pragmatism makes a distinction we consider crucial: all knowledge can be provisional, in theory, without eliminating the possibility of some truths prevailing for centuries, perhaps forever.\textsuperscript{939}

\textsuperscript{934} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 3.

\textsuperscript{935} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 8 (cf. 276).

\textsuperscript{936} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 11.

\textsuperscript{937} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 281.

\textsuperscript{938} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 309.

\textsuperscript{939} Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, \textit{Telling the Truth about History}, 284.
In this same vein, Gaddis uses set theory (“the part is as great as the whole”) to explain how time and space are “infinitely divisible.”\footnote{Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 27.} Like the work of a cartographer, whose maps represent but cannot ever replicate the physical terrain, the historian provides the right amount and kind of information to establish a good “fit” between known facts and his or her own purposes.\footnote{Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 32-3.} The “fit” comes closer and closer to (but never arrives at) replicating the terrain as “the landscape [whether physical or historical] is investigated.”\footnote{Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 34, 104.} Like Evans, Hobsbawm, Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Gaddis sees the task of the historian as establishing an “adequate” fit:

\begin{quote}
It would be most unwise for a sailor to conclude, simply because we cannot specify the length of the British coastline, that it isn’t there and that they can sail self-confidently through it. So too it would be imprudent for historians to decide, from the fact that we have no absolute basis for measuring time and space, that they can’t know anything about what happened within them. \footnote{Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 34.}
\end{quote}

The best that a historian can hope for is “a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible field.”\footnote{Gaddis, \textit{Landscape of History}, 38.}

As noted at the end of Chapter Three, categories like tradition and memory, as complex and nuanced as they are, have often been pitted against the would-be certainties of positivist history. Constructionist/presentist theorists of memory and history, like Halbwachs, Nora, and Bodnar, tend to see memory and history as conceptually and methodologically dissimilar, as well as often competing against one another. Elites shape
social memory of the past on the basis of their own interests, resulting in dominant portrayals that have little to do with the actual past. They produce images that obscure reality. These kinds of skeptical postmodern historiographers, writing in the ironic mode, then, are to a large degree responsible for the ubiquity of “image” language in modern cultural studies.

If Gaddis and Evans, among others, are right, this sensitivity to the ideological nature of knowledge can actually aid the historiographical process; particularly when Gadamer’s theses on tradition and history and Mannheim’s observations about the sociology of knowledge are fully acknowledged in one’s own work. None can escape the force of their social networks and their traditions. But ideological self-criticism is the first and most important step in trying to scratch the historical itch and provide the kind of elevation that is needed in order to survey the foggy historical landscape. Mannheim’s strict sociology of knowledge, as we saw in Chapter Three, asked of Marx what Marx was unwilling to ask of himself. Constructionist theorists have provided us with the most important first questions of historical research, but have very seldom turned the “you” of these questions into an “I.” Each of us must ask why we view the data one way

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945 Cf. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 22: “It [the presentist approach] makes of rhetorical practice itself a level of reality that intervenes between historians and the events, personalities, and ideas of the past that they would study.”

946 Cf. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 23, 157-60.

947 Cf. Louis Wirth, preface to Ideology and Utopia, xx, xxii, on the lasting positive influence of Karl Mannheim on the field of history: “If the earlier discussion of objectivity laid stress upon the elimination of personal and collective bias, the more modern approach calls attention to the positive cognitive importance of this bias . . . In fact, the most recent view maintains that the object emerges for the subject when, in the course of experience, the interest of the subject is focused upon that particular aspect of the world . . . [xxii] He [Mannheim] has succeeded in showing that ideologies, i.e. those complexes of ideas which direct activity toward the maintenance of the existing order, and utopias – or those complexes of ideas which tend to generate activities toward changes of the prevailing order – do not merely deflect thought from the object of observation, but also serve to fix attention upon aspects of the situation which otherwise would be obscured or pass unnoticed.”
and not some other: “What formative traditions cause me to elevate some data over others, treating them unequally and potentially unfairly?”; “In the service of what perceived social good am I making statements about how the past really was?”; and “Is this past the past I want?” As Hayden White reminds, “by concentrating on history writing as rhetorical exercise, we can identify more clearly the ideological biases or perspectives which inform the discourse.”948 The deconstruction of rhetorical practices offers the opportunity to observe, enter into, and fully confess the “reiteration loop” of historiography, where data, representation and interests are reinforcing, yet distinct (cf. above).

Evans and Gaddis, along with Hutton (cf. Chapter Three) and others, are also probably correct in warning against rhetorical attempts to divide off some disciplines of knowledge from others, whether the division of history from science (cf. above), or the division of history from memory. All knowledge is interdisciplinary and makes use of metaphor, inference, rhetoric, tradition, and evidence to represent the world in which we live. Only by recognizing the interdisciplinary nature of historiography can we understand the deep connections between history, memory, and tradition. Hutton argues:

> The end of a consensus about what is worth remembering in our present situation paradoxically has opened up to us once more history’s hidden roots in tradition, covered over in modern historiography in the name of positivist science.949

The conclusions of Schwartz, Aleida and Jan Assmann, Gadamer, Hutton, Polanyi, Kuhn, Gaddis, and Evans in their respective fields look so similar because of their refusal to divide and conquer the disciplines. Each has given serious consideration to the force of

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tradition/ideology in relationship to ever-evolving social arrangements and needs.

Whereas strong constructionist theorists and historiographers expose the ideologies that have driven particular narrations of the past, Schwartz and these others provide a meaningful way to move forward as they trace continuity and change among all representations of the past, both those from “above” and those from “below.” They offer the kind of rigorist use of Mannheim that, when transferred to scholarship on Paul, should force us to become scholars of Pauline tradition and memory first, before we can begin to ask about the “historical,” or “real,” Paul. It remains to be seen whether or not Pauline Studies will be able to embrace such a position, at least for a period of time. Until we can fully admit that the prevailing modern discourse on the “real” Paul comes from a long-standing tradition that elevates the Hauptbriefe to the front and center of the Pauline canon, not just materially (they stand at the front of ancient manuscripts merely because of their length), but theologically and hermeneutically, we will never approach the kind of deconstructive position that would be necessary for developing more transparent methodologies for reconstructing the “real” or the “historical” Paul. If we were serious about this task, and not merely interested in using Paul as a pawn for modern rhetorics, we would begin to view the whole lot of Pauline Epistles, for instance, as Pauline “tradition”: various diverse images of Paul mediated to us through historically and socially conditioned texts and manuscripts.
The Corinthians, to Paul,

1 Stephanus and the presbyters with him, Daphnos and Euboulos and Theophilos and Zenon, to Paul, who is in the Lord, greetings.  2 Two men, a certain Simon and Cleobius, have arrived in Corinth, who are upsetting the faith of some with destructive statements, 3 which you must test for yourself.  4 For we have not heard statements such as these from you or from the others.  5 But we keep what we received from you and from them.  6 Therefore, because the Lord has shown mercy to us, you are still in the flesh in order that we might hear from you again.  7 Either come yourself, 8 for we believe as it was revealed to Theonoe, that the Lord saved you from the hand of the Lawless One, or write back to us.  9 For what they are saying and teaching is this:

10 they say that we ought not use the prophets;
11 and that God is not Almighty;
12 and that there is no resurrection of the flesh;
13 and that the formation of mankind is not from God;
14 and that the Lord did not arrive in flesh nor was he born from Mary;
15 and that the world is not from God, but from the angels.

16 Therefore, brother, display all earnestness to come here in order that the assembly of the Corinthians might remain without a cause of stumbling and their foolishness might become evident.

Farewell in the Lord.

Paul, to the Corinthians, concerning the flesh,

1 Paul, the prisoner of Christ Jesus, in the midst of many deviant views, to the brethren in Corinth, greetings.  2 I, myself, am not astonished at how quickly the doctrines of the Evil One are advancing, 3 because the Lord Christ, who is rejected by those who are counterfeiting his words, will make his noble appearance quickly.  4 For I entrusted to you in the beginning what I also received from the apostles who came before me, and who spent all their time with Jesus Christ:

5 that our Lord Christ Jesus was born from Mary, from the offspring of David, when the Holy Spirit was sent from heaven by the Father into her, 6 in order that he might advance into the world and set all flesh free by his own flesh and in order that he might raise us from the dead as those with flesh, in the same way he
showed himself as an example; 7 and that mankind was formed by his Father. 8 Therefore, while also perishing, he was sought after in order that he might be made alive through adoption. 9 For then God, who is over all things, the Almighty, who made the heavens and the earth, sent prophets to the Jews first in order that they might be torn away from their sins, 10 for he determined to save the house of Israel. Therefore dividing from the Spirit of Christ, he sent it into the prophets, who proclaimed the true piety for a long time. 11 [But the unjust ruler,] who was seeking to be [God], laid hands on them, and imprisoned all human flesh to lust. 12 God, the Almighty One, being righteous and not wanting to invalidate his own creation, 13 sent down the Spirit through fire into Mary the Galilean, 15 in order that the Evil One might be defeated through the same perishing flesh over which he had rights, and might be shown not to be God. 16 For by his own body Christ Jesus saved all flesh, 17 in order that he might display in his own body a temple of righteousness, 15 by which we have been set free.

19 Therefore, they are not children of righteousness, but children of wrath, who push back the providence of God by saying that the heavens and the earth and everything in them are not the works of the Father. 20 For they have the cursed faith of the serpent. 21 Turn away from these kinds of people and flee from their teaching.

24 Now those who say to you “There is no resurrection of the flesh,” for them there is no resurrection – 25 those who thus also do not believe in the one who was raised. 26 For they do not know, O Corinthian men, about the sowing of wheat or of the other seeds, that they are cast naked onto the earth, and after altogether perishing below are raised by the will of God, and have also been clothed with a body. 27 So that not only is the body which has been thrown down raised, but it has been blessed with abundant prosperity. 28 Now if we are prohibited from constructing the parable from the seeds, 29 you know that Jonah, the son of Amathias, because he would not preach in Nineveh, was thrown to a sea monster, 30 and after three days and three nights God heard the prayer of Jonah from the lowest part of Hades and no part of him was destroyed, neither a hair nor an eyelash. 31 O you of little faith, how much more will he raise you, who believe in Christ Jesus, in the same way that he himself was raised. 32 And if, when a corpse was thrown from the sons of Israel onto the bones of the prophet Elisha, the body of the man was raised, then what about you, upon whom the body and the bones and the Spirit of Christ have been cast, will you not be raised in that day having healthy flesh?

34 Now if you accept something else, do not cause me troubles. 35 For I have the bonds on my hands in order that I might gain Christ and the brands on my body in order that I might come to the resurrection of the dead. 36 And if anyone remains in the standard that he received through the blessed prophets and the holy Gospel, he will receive a reward. 37 If anyone oversteps these things, then the fire is with him, as was also with the rejecters of God who walked before them, 38 who are the children of vipers. 39 Turn away from them by the power of the Lord.

40 And may peace be with you.
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