SECURITY FIRST: THE RESPONSE OF THE IRAQI POPULATION TO COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

DAVID A. UTHLAUT: Security First: The Response Of The Iraqi Population To Counterinsurgency Strategy
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Given the U.S. military's current engagement with insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is possible and prudent to test the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in practice. This article tests the predictive power of access to essential services, unemployment, perceptions of improved security, insurgent attacks, and demographic characteristics upon Iraqi citizens' confidence in the counterinsurgent forces and the Iraqi insurgency. It also tests the predictive power of confidence in the various counterinsurgent and insurgent forces, as well as the aforementioned variables, upon future attacks. In the first test, survey respondents' perceptions of improved security and their ethno-sectarian community are the most consistent predictors of confidence in counterinsurgent and insurgent forces, while the rest are inconsistent or insignificant predictors. In the second test, survey responses from a specific district were insufficient to consistently predict future attacks in that same district.

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CERP	Commander's Emergency Relief Program
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
FM	Field Manual
HN	Host Nation
IIACSS	Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies
PSU	Primary Sampling Unit

INTRODUCTION

"All insurgencies, even today's highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people."
– U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency

Nearly a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. military remains entangled with a resolute and recalcitrant insurgency in Afghanistan. For nearly seven of those years, the U.S. military also fought against a stubborn insurgency in Iraq, with varying levels of success over time, yet with enough overall success to encourage significant reductions in manpower and resources, enabling a deliberate shift from a "combat" role to a "combat advisory" role. While every militant insurgency is a product of its particular environment and place in time, there are certain threads that have remained constant throughout the history of insurgencies and revolutionary war (Galula [1964] 2006, United States 2006). With this in mind, an examination of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency doctrine and its effectiveness in Iraq may provide a helpful framework for how to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and in future insurgent conflicts. For clarity, U.S. military doctrine describes *insurgency* both as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (United States 2001) and as "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control" (United States 2006).

In this article I will review literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and legitimacy before testing the predictive power of certain variables upon citizens' confidence

in the counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency in Iraq, as well as the power of certain variables in predicting insurgent attacks. The purpose of testing these variables is to assess whether or not current strategies based upon U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine are effective on the ground. While no strategy will be perfect, the goal is to find and implement one that minimizes the bloodshed of combatants and civilians and sets the conditions for peace, liberty, and prosperity.

INSURGENT STRATEGY

To understand the progression of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is useful to reference Mao Tse-Tung's conception of the phases of insurgency (Mao 1961). Mao, as one of history's most successful insurgents, included phase descriptions in his strategy to overthrow the government in China, and they remain a widely accepted framework for understanding how insurgencies can progress, as well as when and why counterinsurgents choose to implement particular strategies to defeat them. During the first phase, the Strategic Defensive phase (sometimes called the Latent and Incipient phase), insurgents are generally focused on surviving and gaining support for their cause from among the greater population. Insurgents hope to gain enough popular support and military strength to move into the Strategic Stalemate phase (sometimes called Guerrilla Warfare), where they can often hold their ground against the government in small-scale conflicts, while inflicting as much damage as possible upon the government forces (personnel, infrastructure, and morale) using guerrilla tactics. At this point it is possible the insurgents can convince the population that they have the military capability to succeed in eventually overthrowing the government. The final phase is the Strategic Counteroffensive (sometimes called the War of Movement); this

generally occurs when the insurgents have surpassed the military strength of the government and are able to engage and defeat them in conventional battles (Mao 1961). Based upon this framework, most would agree that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan contain guerrilla warfare elements at the tactical level primarily, while perhaps not achieving enough military parity to be fully classified as in Phase II at the strategic level.

COUNTERINSURGENT STRATEGY

The writers of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, with guidance from senior military leaders and political officials, have an array of strategies from which to choose, considering the course of armed conflict throughout history and past insurgent conflicts (such as Vietnam) in which the U.S. has been directly involved. These strategies generally fall into three categories: attrition, negotiation, and legitimization.

Attrition

A strategy focused strictly on attrition contains two separate sub-strategies, either of which may be employed separately or in concert. The first sub-strategy is akin to what other authors have described as "repression" (Karstedt-Henke 1980, Walter 1997, Tarrow 1998, Almeida 2003, Bapat, 2005, Davenport 2007) such that the counterinsurgents seek to wipe out the insurgents completely, or their leadership at the very least, either by killing or capturing them. The second sub-strategy is attrition of resources (Enders & Sandler 2002), where the counterinsurgents target the insurgency's logistical and financial sources of support, assuming that the movement will subside (or terminate) without external resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977).

Counterinsurgents will often attempt attrition early in the insurgency, especially attrition of personnel, as they consider their reputation (Walter 2006) on the international stage and the precedent of a weak response to internal rebellion. Phase I is also where the strategy of attrition has its greatest chance of success, due to the relative weakness of the insurgency, and before its political objectives become diffuse and gain strength (Minkoff 1997, Andrews & Biggs 2006) throughout the majority of the population. Killing or capturing the leadership of an insurgent organization serves as a warning to other members of the organization, or to anyone considering leading a separate insurgency, and the removal of a charismatic leader has the potential to topple a nascent organization (Weber 1947). Had the U.S. succeeded in killing or capturing Osama Bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001 (Burke 2004, Fury 2008), at the very outset of the insurgency in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda would have certainly lost steam; perhaps it would have capitulated entirely.

It seems certain from history that insurgencies in Phase II – or those that have at least gained a mass of support and the capability to conduct destructive guerrilla attacks – cannot be defeated by attrition alone. The Russian experience in Afghanistan, and the U.S. experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide evidence of that. What may also be certain is that the effectiveness of attrition alone, even in Phase I, is limited to Host Nation (HN) governments. Third-party intervening forces, such as the United States, are so vastly limited by their lack of knowledge on the terrain, culture, language, history, and insurgent grievances during the early stages of the insurgency that they have a very small chance of hasty victory. For strategies of attrition to work, counterinsurgents must know how to identify the insurgents as well as where to find them, and the same applies to eliminating the support network (Nagl [2002] 2005). In many insurgencies, however, this ideal situation is

simply not a reality. Insurgents and their supporters often become adept at blending in with the rest of the population and conducting covert operations, as their survival depends upon it. Furthermore, if the insurgency can consistently outmaneuver and outwit a superior military force determined to conduct a concerted attrition campaign, it can give the insurgency a somewhat mythical status in the eyes of the population, engendering more support for its cause and depleting the credibility of the counterinsurgents attempting to destroy them (Nagl [2002] 2005). It is likely that U.S. military strategists have recognized all of these factors working against an attrition-only strategy and have rejected it in favor of one that only includes attrition as a small portion of the overall strategy.

Negotiation

If we assume that insurgents are rational actors as participants in a social movement (Olson 1965, Oberschall 1993, Lake 2002), a possibility exists that counterinsurgents can negotiate successfully with elements of the insurgent organization. Counterinsurgents very rarely initiate or agree to negotiations at the outset; to do so would give the insurgency a measure of credibility, which states attempt to avoid. Counterinsurgents will also be hesitant to negotiate with insurgents in Phase I due to the same reputational concerns mentioned above (Walter 2006).

Some counterinsurgents do not seek to negotiate because of a common mischaracterization of insurgents. Political commentators and politicians have often projected a certain deviant psychological profile on insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the wake of a hideous terrorist (perhaps suicide) attack. If insurgents employing these sorts of tactics are either insane or irrationally disaffected members of society, there is

no use trying to negotiate with them; they must be killed or captured because they can no longer be productive members of society. However, many scholars have rejected this notion (Crenshaw 2000, Pape 2003, Atran 2003), and the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State has concluded in their "Psychology of Terrorism" workshop that terrorists do not suffer from a mental disorder and do not fit a specific psychotic profile (Horgan 2008).

The most radical factions of the insurgency, despite their supposed rationality, are not likely even to approach the negotiation table, but the more moderate factions may agree to compromise the total accomplishment of their political objectives for a partial achievement plus an assurance of security (Koopmans 1993, Tarrow 1998, Bueno de Mesquita 2005). If the counterinsurgents can get past the potential embarrassment of negotiating with insurgents, they may be successful in defeating the entire insurgency. Bapat (2005) uses empirical data to show that it takes an average of four years for counterinsurgents to reach the point where they are willing to negotiate with insurgents. At this point, they have recognized the failures of attrition and assess that it may be in their best interest to reach a settlement to achieve lasting peace. The irony, as Bapat notes, is that the insurgents (as a whole) may not want to negotiate at this point because they believe that they have the upper hand, giving credence to the assumption that even the most extreme insurgents exercise "rational choice." Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Koopmans (1993) suggest that moderate insurgents may be willing to negotiate if it suits their personal needs, and that counterinsurgents may choose to negotiate with them because of the information of intelligence value that moderate insurgents can provide about the remaining radical faction of the insurgency. The respective collapses of the Irish Republican Army and the Front de

Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) were largely due to negotiations and valuable intelligence exchanged between moderates and the counterinsurgent forces.

Despite the potential value of negotiations, sometimes there remain many roadblocks to success. If no moderates are willing to negotiate, if the information they provide is not credible or valuable enough to bring down the remainder of the insurgency, or if the counterinsurgents cannot adequately protect moderates from revenge-seeking insurgents, counterinsurgents may have to seek yet another alternative strategy. The likelihood of a third-party intervening force encountering any of those negotiation roadblocks, especially the difficulty of protecting moderates from radicals on foreign soil, has no doubt influenced U.S. military strategists' decision to eschew a negotiation-only strategy.

Legitimization

What remains is the legitimization strategy under which current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine falls. In 2006, General David Petraeus used some of his own lessons learned (Petraeus 2004) to spearhead the creation of the U.S. Army's new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (United States 2006), and to inspire its more recent complement, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (United States 2009), in an effort to provide military leaders with a greater understanding of insurgents and insurgency, in a particular framework for conducting counterinsurgency operations. The primary framework the authors prescribed depends on the dual assumptions that a) the Host Nation (HN) population determines the *legitimacy* of the counterinsurgents and the insurgents, and b) whichever side gains this *legitimacy* will achieve military victory and perhaps establish a regime of relative permanence. *FM 3-24*

repeats this theme on multiple occasions: "The long-term objective for all sides remains acceptance of the *legitimacy*[1] of one side's claim to political power by the people of the state or region"; "Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government's *legitimacy* and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency"; "The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and *legitimacy*"; "Success requires the government to be accepted as *legitimate* by most of the uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides"; and "The primary objective of any COIN [counterinsurgency] operation is to foster development of effective governance by a *legitimate* government" (United States 2006).

What is legitimacy?

Legitimacy, according to Weber ([1946] 1958), is an "inner justification" that compels the voluntary obedience of the population to the state. Similarly, Lipset's widely accepted definition of legitimacy "involves the capacity to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society" (Lipset [1959] 1981). Elsewhere, he refers to legitimacy as "an accepted systemic 'title to rule,'" the alternative to force among a regime's options for creating stability (Lipset 1994). Dogan (1992) believes that institutions must not only be appropriate, they must also be considered "morally proper" to be legitimate. Linz presents a slightly more cynical view of legitimacy, that "in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others that might be established and therefore can demand obedience" (Linz 1988). As an example, he makes the case that the Nazi movement gained legitimacy in Germany because a

[1]Italics on "legitimacy" or "legitimate" in this paragraph are not included in the original text.

tumultuous economic and political situation had left them with two options: "chaos or Hitler" (Linz 1978). Kurzman would appear to support Linz' minimalist definition, suggesting that support for a regime may be more akin to "grudging acquiescence" due to the lack of any other "viable option" (Kurzman 2004).

Where does legitimacy come from?

Weber's ([1946] 1958) framework for the sources of legitimacy remains a strong touchstone in contemporary literature. He saw three basic categories of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal, the latter of which has also been called "rational-legal" (Lipset 1994). When a population accepts the authority of its rulers because countless previous generations have done the same, as with modern European monarchies, this is known as traditional legitimacy. Charismatic legitimacy arises when the people collectively conceive of a particular leader as having (perhaps divine) gifts and abilities to lead, rendering him better suited or more deserving than any other to assume the mantle of leadership. Rational-legal legitimacy generally comes from adherence to a written code of laws, such as a Constitution, and becomes continually reinforced by the demonstrated competence of the regime (Weber [1946] 1958). In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, or other newly emergent regimes, it is clear that they cannot rely upon the past for traditional authority, narrowing the options to charismatic and legal-rational legitimacy. And while charismatic authority may be effective immediately following a revolution or other regime change, its dependence upon a leader's personal characteristics is inherently unstable and temporary, leaving only legal-rational authority for those seeking long-term stability (Lipset 1963). It is therefore incumbent upon new regimes to draft a governing document, such as a Constitution, and seek

its ratification rapidly (Ackerman 1992, Weingast 1993, Lipset 1994). When a regime subjects itself to the constraints of a Constitution, particularly when the Constitution grants the people the ability to periodically elect new leaders (Lipset 1963, Lipset 1994), it is reasonable to assume that the people would grant the regime more authority.

A document alone cannot create legitimacy and stability for a regime, however. Continual demonstrated competence is the only way for a new regime to build legitimacy; it must "deliver the goods" (Brogan 1948). Various authors have noted that this competence includes the *objective* capacity to provide essential services (Schumpeter [1950] 1975, Weil 1989), maintain "civil order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a minimum of predictability in the making and implementation of decisions" (Linz 1978), and nurture a productive economy (Lipset 1994). Others have stressed that competence has a *subjective* component – that legitimacy comes from the regime's ability to provide what its people want (Lipset [1959] 1981, Diamond et. al. 1990) – and that may differ from population to population.

Legitimacy is not an absolute condition that a regime must attain and maintain; there exists instead a scale or continuum upon which legitimacy slides (Hertz 1978, Dogan 1992, Kurzman 2004), often dependent upon the perceived competence of the regime. Kurzman (2004) also observes that a new movement may gain enough legitimacy to challenge an existing regime at a point of "critical mass," but there has been no reliable way to measure exactly when this occurs or what conditions must first be in place. Similarly, there may be a point of "critical absence" for an existing regime, at which time the balance has undeniably shifted and it no longer has enough legitimacy to maintain authority. It seems that an appropriate, yet theoretically lacking, description of when a regime has reached either critical

mass or critical absence matches the equally appropriate and equally theoretically lacking definition of terrorism: “We’ll know it when we see it.”

The framework presented in *FM 3-24* for achieving legitimacy consists of seven “Logical Lines of Operation” or “Lines of Effort”: combat operations, civil security operations (also called civil control), developing Host Nation (HN) security forces, delivering essential services, providing governance, fostering economic development, and managing perceptions through information operations (United States 2006).



Figure 1: Example Counterinsurgency Framework from *FM 3-24*

Figure 2 below, taken from *FM 3-24.2*, provides concrete examples of the sorts of tasks involved with each of the seven Lines of Effort (United States 2009). The prescription of the counterinsurgency framework, therefore, is that success in each of seven Lines of Effort will create legitimacy for the Host Nation government and thus set the conditions for

victory over the insurgency. This strategy runs counter to traditional military norms of conventional force-on-force, and past conflicts have shown how the U.S. military has struggled to become a "learning organization" and adapt to unconventional conflict (Nagl [2002] 2005).

These more recent manuals do not mark a distinct theoretical or strategic break from the two preceding documents, however. *Field Manual (FM) 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations* defines counterinsurgency as "the program which addresses both the populace and the insurgent" and notes that "counterguerilla operations are geared to the active military element of the insurgent movement only" (United States 1986). Furthermore, it exhorts commanders to recognize "the fact that neutralization of the guerrilla is only one-third of the COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy," that "balanced development of the country and mobilization of the populace against the insurgents must occur simultaneously for the insurgency to be defeated," and "the primary consideration when planning counterguerrilla operations is the effect operations will have on the populace…commanders must attempt to win the active support of the population for the government" (United States 1986). In the same vein, *Field Manual (FM): Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict* states that "legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict" and "the insurgent must have either the active or passive support of the populace to succeed" (United States 1992).

Despite the theoretical congruence between the old and the new manuals, the majority of the pages in *FM 90-8* are dedicated to counterguerilla operations, akin to the "Combat Operations" Line of Effort (United States 1986). It appears that the authors of both *FM 90-8* and *FM 7-98* never envisioned a scenario where combat commanders and ground troops

would be responsible for other Lines of Effort, such as the delivery of essential services or improving the local economy; they saw this more as the role of the Host Nation government, or perhaps specially trained "Civil Affairs" Soldiers (United States 1986, United States 1992). By contrast, *FM 3-24* and *FM 3-24.2* dedicate much more space to theoretical legitimacy and specific non-lethal means of "winning the population," reflecting the reality combat commanders and ground troops have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan – that they are responsible for all seven Lines of Effort.



Figure 2: Operationalized Counterinsurgency Framework, from *FM 3-24.2*

Practical Considerations

Beyond the somewhat abstract concept of legitimacy, there are some very practical reasons for counterinsurgents to adopt a strategy centered on meeting the needs of the population. The tangible power citizens possess can be considerable, especially when large portions of the population agree to take a stand together on one side, at one particular point in time. A great example of this is the impact of the Sunni moderates' "Awakening" in Iraq in 2007 (Long 2008). David Galula's[2] book on counterinsurgency warfare (Galula [1964] 2006) and *FM 3-24* both provide compelling reasons why the weight of the civilians is so important, especially as the loss of one element of power usually means that the enemy has gained it, doubling the impact. Here are just a few of those elements:

Recruits

The fighters among the insurgents generally have a high attrition rate, and therefore they need to replenish their ranks quickly to sustain the organization. By the same token, defeating an insurgency requires a strong and capable Host Nation (HN) security force to protect the population, and manning this force requires a steady flow of recruits as well. Members of the population can vote with their feet by joining the armed ranks of either side, increasing the numerical strength of their chosen force.

Intelligence

In an environment where the insurgent looks just like any other person among the civilian population, accurate intelligence is absolutely critical for the counterinsurgent. With

[2] Galula was a Colonel in the French Army at the time of the Algerian insurgency.

good intelligence, the counterinsurgent can deny the enemy safe-haven and freedom of movement in a particular area, while also ensuring freedom of movement for his own force. Intelligence certainly helps the insurgent as well, but he still maintains an advantage if he can merely keep the civilian population from speaking to either party.

Financial and Logistical Support

Insurgencies, like other social movements, require external resources to succeed (McCarthy & Zald 1977). External support is more critical to the insurgent than to the counterinsurgent, as insurgencies generally do not have a state economy upon which to depend for financial support – save those insurgencies buoyed by transnational state sponsorship (Bapat 2009, Bapat 2010) – and the necessity for them to remain covert requires both active and passive logistical support from the civilian population. Winning over the population and convincing them to turn off their financial and logistical support for the insurgency is a much more indirect approach than targeting and eliminating the sources of support (as in the attrition strategy), although it accomplishes the same purpose.

Method

Throughout the remainder of this study, I will be using Iraqi citizens' confidence levels as a measure of the success and legitimacy of the counterinsurgents. Some have cautioned that public confidence in particular institutions may not be analogous to confidence in a particular regime type (Citrin 1974, Lipset & Schneider [1983] 1987, Dogan 1992, Kurzman 2004), such as democracy in Iraq. However, confidence levels do tend to be a positive indicator of political stability (Useem & Useem 1979), and where there are very low levels of regime legitimacy, such as is the case with new regimes (Lipset 1994), the survival of the regime in a time of crisis likely depends upon the performance of the institutions in the regime and the perceptions thereof by its constituents (Dahl 1971).

Using survey data and attack data collected in Iraq from 2004 to 2006, I will test: 1) which factors are most predictive of citizens' confidence in counterinsurgents and insurgents, and 2) which factors are most predictive of attacks in a particular area. The results should inform us as to which Lines of Effort were the most effective at "winning hearts and minds" and reducing attacks in Iraq from 2004-2006, while potentially offering a prescription for future counterinsurgency operations. Specifically, I will test three of the seven Lines of Effort presented in *FM 3-24* and *FM 3-24.2*: Restore Essential Services, Support Economic and Infrastructure Development, and Establish Civil Security.

Essential Services

Addressing deficiencies in the delivery of essential services is not only a way for counterinsurgents to demonstrate legitimacy and good will towards the civilian population, it

may also address particular grievances exploited by the insurgents to defame the legitimacy of government. Berman, et al. have written extensively on strategies that the U.S. military has employed in Iraq, strategies meant to address potential roots of the insurgency instead of simply eliminating the fighters. In their forthcoming article "Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq" (Draft 2009) they analyzed the effects of applied Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds on levels of insurgent violence. Combat commanders at all levels have access to these funds, and they often use them to address deficiencies in essential services, usually with the added benefit of contracting Iraqi civilians to carry out the work. The authors found, not surprisingly, that U.S. commanders spent CERP funds more liberally in areas where attacks had been more frequent. They also found that attacks tended to decrease in areas where essential services had improved, and that the impact of CERP funds tended to be greater in areas that were less self-sustaining (and thus more dependent). A separate study conducted by the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division in Sadr City at the end of 2004 also found a "direct correlation between enemy actions and lack of basic services" (Chiarelli & Michaelis 2005).

Unemployment

Lack of employment may also be a source of grievance for the civilian population, and one might also make an argument that employed men are less likely to become involved in an insurgency. Empirical tests have thus far not supported this hypothesis, however. In an article called "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines," Berman, et al. (2009) used district-level data to compare World Food Program unemployment statistics with district-level attack data in Iraq, and they actually find a

negative and significant relationship. This relationship exists, the authors argue, because: 1) in the hopes of receiving monetary reward, unemployed individuals may be more likely to share information about enemy activity, which could lead to a decrease in attacks; 2) areas that have stricter security, in the form of checkpoints, may in fact constrict trade and supply routes, thereby causing a loss of jobs; or 3) unemployed individuals may desire to participate in attacks, but they may feel a stronger urge to provide for their families first, and therefore they spend their time seeking work instead of planning and conducting attacks.

Security

Some would argue that the best way to win the support of the population is to protect them (Galula [1964] 2006). If the people do not believe that the counterinsurgents can protect them from insurgent attacks or from being victims of criminal activity, they may turn to the insurgents for protection. Under the heading of security would also be the topic of collateral damage. In a counterinsurgency fight, it is of the utmost importance for counterinsurgents to limit collateral damage. This takes concerted effort and potentially substantial restraint on the part of the counterinsurgents, but excessive collateral damage has devastating impacts on the ability of the counterinsurgents to gain the trust and support of the population. In a recent study of collateral damage in Iraq, Condra and Shapiro (Draft 2010) found that where counterinsurgents are responsible for collateral damage, insurgent attacks will increase, and where insurgents are responsible for collateral damage, insurgent attacks will decrease. They attribute this effect to information sharing, such that civilians uninvolved directly in the insurgency will withhold information about enemy activity from counterinsurgents when they have caused collateral damage, leading to higher insurgent

attacks; conversely, they will readily provide information to counterinsurgents when insurgents are to blame for collateral damage, leading to a decrease in attacks (Condra & Shapiro, Draft 2010).

Survey Data

Due to the largely prohibitive environment of an ongoing insurgency, few researchers have been able to compile credible or large-scale opinion surveys in Iraq. However, from September 2004 until September 2006, the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS)[3] administered monthly surveys in Iraq and coded the data. From September 2004 to September 2005, researchers limited the surveys to Baghdad Province; from October 2005 to September 2006, the interviewers expanded their target population to include all eighteen provinces in Iraq. The U.S. Army sponsored the study and also worked closely with the director of IIACSS in Iraq to create the survey questions from month to month.

There are two months during this time period, November and December 2004, where there is no survey data available. According to the IIACSS director, Mr. Munqith Daghir, the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for his interviewers during these two months, so they did not conduct the interviews. This is certainly understandable when one considers two major events with impacts in Baghdad: 1) Operation Phantom Fury[4], also called the Second Battle of Fallujah, spanned from November 7 to December 23, 2004,

[3] http://www.iiacss.org/

[4] See Dick Camp's 2009 book, *Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq*, Minneapolis, MN, Zenith Press.

highlighting a time of intense fighting between Sunni insurgents and counterinsurgents; 2) the first post-Saddam Hussein election, well-advertised to occur at the end of January 2005, made the two preceding months a critical time for the insurgents to intimidate the general population.

Interviewers

The IIACSS hired interviewers on a part-time basis, and they selected them from among the Iraqi populace to cover regions about which they had intimate knowledge. Nearly all of the interviewers had completed four years of university education and a Bachelor's Degree in the social sciences, and Mr. Daghir referred to all of them as "very experienced professionals."[5]. The IIACSS also had a system of supervisory checks in place to ensure the veracity of the interviewers' work, including having at least one auditor responsible for each region to check 100% of the questionnaires for accuracy and completeness, and the auditors would visit at least twenty residences per region per month to monitor the interview process. Interviewers worked in two-person teams, one male and one female, to encourage a higher response rate from women; this precaution was especially important in the more rural and conservative areas.

As mentioned above, interviewers faced significant threats from militias, terrorists, and other insurgent factions. The methodology report states, "many interviewers have been captured or threatened by militias…they have been accused as spies for the Americans." The fortunate ones were forced by Sharia courts to quit their jobs. Others were not quite so

[5] Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010

fortunate. Mr. Daghir reported[6] the following: "On [*sic*] June 2006 I have [*sic*] lost 3 interviewers in the North of Baghdad when they were doing their interviews. We found two of them 7 days later beheaded, and the third one is still not found. Not less than 60-70% of my interviewers [were] either sent to Gail [*sic*], kidnapped or beaten one time or more."

Sampling Design

For the waves of interviews specific to Baghdad only, from October 2004 to September 2005, the target population was all adults (above age eighteen) in Baghdad Province, while the waves of interviews from October 2005 to September 2006 targeted all adults (above age eighteen) in Iraq. The sampling frame consisted of all adults with residential listings in Baghdad Province from the 1997 Population Census in Iraq (for the waves October 2004 – September 2005) and within all of Iraq (for the waves October 2005 – September 2006).

To select specific individuals for the interviews, the researchers used a "multi-stage probability-based sample," with a five-stage process to narrow down the sampling frame. For the first and second stages, they used the 1997 Census to determine the population-weighted sample for urban districts (*qadas*) and sub-districts (*nahias*). Inside of the *nahias*, the researchers chose blocks (urban areas) and villages (rural areas) as their primary sampling units (PSUs) from the census data, planning thirty interviews per PSU. Within the PSUs, interviewers selected the particular street on which they would conduct their interviews using a "simple random method," and once inside each household, they selected the adult to interview using the "last birthday method." If an older Iraqi citizen did not know

[6] Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010

his or her birthday, interviewers assigned a birthday to that individual from a list of random dates carried by all interviewers. Interviewers also used simple rules to choose a residence at random in the event that the address to the pre-planned household was incorrect once they arrived at the location.

Prior to the recorded survey data, the researchers conducted a pilot survey on twenty households from different areas of Baghdad, and they modified their questionnaire to reflect this feedback.

Strengths and Weaknesses

In regard to the IIACSS data, the greatest strength is the sheer effort and human cost expended to conduct the interviews in the midst of an ongoing insurgency. Additionally, the sample selection method appears to be probability-based, the sample is quite large, and there was a very high response rate.

The first set of waves, in Baghdad Province only, sampled all nine *qadas* in the city proper and an additional *qada* covering the rural portion of the province, simply called "Rural Baghdad." However, the second set of waves sampled only forty-eight *qadas* (districts) of the 106 nationwide. While there is no data available to determine the population of each of these *qadas*, the surveyed *qadas* do contain all of the major population centers in Iraq, mainly along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers (see Figure 15 on pg. 37 for a map), and there is at least one *qada* included from each of the eighteen provinces in Iraq.

Another potential limitation of using these data is the possibility that respondents may have felt pressure, whether intentional or unintentional, to answer questions in a certain way.

Mr. Daghir reports[7] that interviewers "present themselves as interviewers working in an independent research institute. Mostly they belong to the same geographical area that they survey and got different permissions from different formal and informal sides. They show these legal permissions to the respondents to make them sure that we are [a] legal entity." Even with these assurances from the interviewers, respondents may have still been suspicious or fearful of their intentions, given Iraq's history of repression for those who vocalize dissenting opinions (Folsche 2007, Atwan 2008, Dworkin, et. al., 2008).

Additionally, a respondent may have recognized an interviewer from her geographic area, which may have biased her answers. The methodology report made no mention of this particular issue, however.

Mr. Daghir reports they have found some mistakes in the data, even with their system of multiple checks, and after having made necessary corrections he feels "80-90% comfortable with the data." While these statistics and the other limitations are certainly not ideal, I believe they are acceptable given the dangerous environment, large sample size, and the potential value of such a rare data set.

Prior Research

I know of two previous empirical studies that have employed these survey data. Schnack used data from a single month to support her "case for the separation of hearts and minds" in Iraq, in which she conceptualized "winning hearts" as tolerance for the presence of Coalition Forces and "winning minds" as support for a democratic form of government. She concluded that the U.S. military had succeeded in winning the minds of the Iraqi people, but

[7] Email correspondence sent March 30, 2010

had not yet won their hearts. (Schnack 2006). A second study using these data focuses on the effects of war on the Iraqi people, specifically the youth, reminding us that the perils of war impact many lives beyond just those of the combatants (Carlton-Ford, et. al. 2008).

Historical Background

Chaos and uncertainty characterized the time period in which the surveys took place. The Sunni Arab portion of the insurgency had already left its mark, brazenly capturing, killing, and mutilating the bodies of four U.S. contractors on March 31, 2004 (Frederick 2010), and the Shia Arab militants under the leadership of Moqtada al-Sadr joined the insurgency around the same time (Fattah 2009). On June 28, 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by L. Paul Bremer of the United States, ceded authority in Iraq to the Interim Government, led by former Iraqi exile Ayad Allawi (Frederick 2010). These events helped set the stage for a predictable struggle between the Sunni insurgents seeking to oust the Coalition Forces and regain power in Iraq, the Sadrist militants seeking to oust the Coalition Forces and place their adherents in positions of power, and the fledgling Iraqi government supported by the Coalition Forces. The following timeline shows the major events that took place in Iraq from September 2004 – September 2006, the time frame in which the surveys were administered.

*Nov. 8, 2004: U.S. assault on Fallujah begins

*Nov. 14, 2004: U.S. forces declare Fallujah liberated

*Jan. 30, 2005: First Free National Elections in Iraq

*May 3, 2005: Transitional Government succeeds the Interim Government

*Jul. 17, 2005: Formal charges brought against the captured Saddam Hussein

*Oct. 15, 2005: Iraqi Constitution ratified by national referendum

*Feb. 22, 2006: Askaria Shrine bombing in Samarra

*Jun. 30, 2006: Rape/murder of Iraqi girl in Yusafiya (by U.S. Soldier) reported

Initial Analysis

I created a “community” variable to distinguish Sunni Kurds from Sunni Arabs, as well as Sunni Arabs from Shia Arabs, and to assign sects to those who only listed that they were “Muslim” when asked about their religion. To do this I looked at particular regions, proceeding from the province to the *qada*/city to the block (largest region to the smallest region). Where there was greater than a 5 to 1 ratio of respondents in that area who classified themselves as either "Sunni Arab" or "Shia Arab", I classified “Muslim Only” respondents as the majority sect. Where there was less than a 5 to 1 ratio, I classified that community as "Mixed Arab". The results of this classification method (depicted in Figure 3 at the provincial level) accurately reflect publically available ethnic maps of Iraq, as well as my working knowledge from nearly three years spent in Iraq. The fifth category for the community variable is “Other”, consisting of the ethnic and religious minorities such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turks, Christians, Sabees, and Yazidis, and for the purposes of the models I separated the community variable into dummy variables. The largest community among the respondents was Shia Arab (49%), followed by Sunni Arab (20%), Mixed Arab (18%), Kurdish (10%), and Other (3%).



Figure 3: 5 to 1 Community Distribution at the Provincial Level

The graphs below show the average level of confidence each of the communities have in each of the counterinsurgent and insurgent groups over time, and I created two separate graphs for each of those categories. Since the first half of the survey waves were only conducted in Baghdad, one graph shows the average level of confidence for Baghdad all the way through both waves, and the other graph just shows the second half of the waves, but it includes all provinces. I have also included major events in Iraq at the bottom of the graphs, to see if there are any discernable patterns potentially tied to those events.

The first pair of graphs (Figures 4 & 5) shows that the Arab population remained relatively consistent in their reported confidence in Coalition Forces, and that the Shia Arabs have the greatest confidence (albeit very low) in Coalition Forces, the Sunni Arabs have the lowest confidence in Coalition Forces, and the Mixed Arab communities fall in between. It

is also apparent from the second graph that there is a vast disparity between the Kurdish[8] and Arab communities in their level of confidence in the Coalition Forces.

In Figures 6 & 7 we see that Kurds and Shia Arabs have high level of confidence in the Iraqi Government, while the Sunni Arabs' level is quite low, with the Mixed Arab communities in between. The Kurds likely considered the new government of Iraq a step up from the previous regime. Likewise, the Shia Arabs, as the majority sect in Iraq, also made up the majority of the Iraqi Government at the time of the survey, so it is no surprise that they were much more confident in the Iraqi Government than the minority Sunni Arabs. I also appears there is more variation by community in Baghdad, a trend that continues through all of the graphs.

[8] There is an extremely small number of Kurds living in Baghdad (0.9% according to the later waves), which is why their line is not distinguishable in the graphs of the Baghdad waves throughout.



Figure 4: Confidence in Coalition Forces, Baghdad Only, Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 5: Confidence in Coalition Forces, Nationwide, Oct '05 – Sep '06



Figure 6: Confidence in the Iraqi Government, Baghdad Only, Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 7: Confidence in the Iraqi Government, Nationwide, Oct '05 – Sep '06



Figure 8: Confidence in the Iraqi Police, Baghdad Only, Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 9: Confidence in the Iraqi Police, Nationwide, Oct '05 – Sep '06



Figure 10: Confidence in the Iraqi Army, Baghdad Only, Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 11: Confidence in the Iraqi Army, Nationwide, Oct '05 – Sep '06



Figure 12: Confidence in the Insurgency, Baghdad Only, Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 13: Confidence in the Insurgency, Nationwide, Oct '05 – Sep '06

Figures 8 through 11 are remarkably similar in their patterns, suggesting that confidence levels in the Iraqi Police are probably tied to the same variables as confidence levels in the Iraqi Army. As with the Iraqi Government, the Kurds and Shia Arabs are on the high end of the confidence scale, the Sunni Arabs are on the low end, and the Mixed Arabs are in the middle. This makes sense, as the Kurds are most likely considering the police and army ("Peshmerga") forces in Kurdistan, which are made up of fellow Kurds. By the same token Shia Arabs make up the majority of the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army in Arab regions, which could account for their high confidence levels – and the low levels from the Sunni Arabs.

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency)[9] follows a relatively predictable pattern along ethno-sectarian lines, as shown in Figures 12 and 13. At the national level more than half of the Sunni Arabs expressed confidence in the Sunni-dominated insurgency, while only 15-20% of the other communities are confident in the insurgency. Sunni Arabs' confidence in the insurgency inside of Baghdad is more variable from month to month, however, and in Baghdad less than half of the Sunni population expressed confidence in the insurgency on average across the waves.

Interestingly, a cross-tabulation of the confidence variables shows that an individual's confidence in a counterinsurgent group does not necessarily preclude that same individual from having confidence in the insurgency at the same time. While only 4% of respondents reported confidence in both Coalition Forces and the insurgency, that number is not inconsequential because only 10% of the respondents reported confidence in Coalition Forces to begin with. The percentages for respondents who reported confidence in both an

[9] There was a codebook error with this question in the June 2006 wave, and I made the necessary adjustment.

Iraqi counterinsurgent force and the insurgency are much higher, with 19% confident in the Iraqi Government and the insurgency, 22% confident in the Iraqi Police and the insurgency, and 20% confident in the Iraqi Army and the insurgency. This seems to suggest that there may be competing loyalties within the population, and that institutional confidence is not an absolute quantity belonging to one side or the other.

Attack Data

The second data set included in this study contains counts of insurgent attacks against Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and civilians over the same period of time. The Multi-National Corps—Iraq headquarters collected the point data, and in its current form the data contains aggregate attacks per month, per *qada* (district). As mentioned above, the survey data only sampled forty-eight of 106 *qadas*, so I dropped the attack data from *qadas* not included in the survey. However, the remaining *qadas* accounted for approximately 68% of the total attacks in Iraq during the period the survey was conducted. The following graph shows the number of insurgent attacks across all *qadas* and months in which the surveys were conducted.



Figure 14: Insurgent Attacks Across All of Iraq, Sep '04 – Sep '06

Among the forty-eight *qadas* in which surveys were conducted, I used the survey data to determine which community made up the highest percentage of the population in each one. Shia Arab *qadas*, in Baghdad and southern Iraq, accounted for twenty-eight of the forty-eight *qadas*; Sunni Arab *qadas*, mostly in western and northern Iraq, accounted for twelve; Mixed Arab *qadas*, in Baghdad and Diyala provinces, accounted for five; and Kurdish *qadas*, in the northernmost part of Iraq, accounted for the remaining three. To show the location and volume of insurgent attacks over the two-year period, I created the two maps below. The graphs below the maps depict the number of insurgent attacks over time, separated by community, with community based upon the *qadas* where that community makes up the highest percentage of the population.



Figure 15: Insurgent Attacks in Iraq from Sep '04 - Sep '06



Figure 16: Insurgent Attacks in Baghdad proper from Sep '04 - Sep '06



Figure 17: Insurgent Attacks in Shia Arab *Qadas* from Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 18: Insurgent Attacks in Sunni Arab *Qadas* from Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 19: Insurgent Attacks in Mixed Arab *Qadas* from Sep '04 – Sep '06



Figure 20: Insurgent Attacks in Kurdish *Qadas* from Sep '04 – Sep '06 – Large Scale



Figure 21: Insurgent Attacks in Kurdish *Qadas* from Sep '04 – Sep '06 - Small Scale

TEST I

Dependent Variables

Given both the counterinsurgents' and insurgents' imperative to win the support of the population, whether for legitimacy or for other practical reasons described above, my dependent variables for the first test are measures of respondent confidence in the various elements of the counterinsurgent force in Iraq, as well as confidence in the "Armed National Opposition" (insurgency) in Iraq. The counterinsurgent force is made up of the Coalition

Forces[10], Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi Government. I coded the confidence for each variable as "yes" if respondents reported that they had either "some" or a "great deal" of confidence in the particular organization and "no" if they had "not very much" or "none".

Independent Variables

To test the effects of essential services, unemployment, and feelings of security on confidence in particular groups or institutions, I used responses to survey questions most nearly approximating each category. For clean drinking water ("water"), cooking fuel ("cookfuel") and vehicle gas ("gas"), I coded the variable as "yes" if the respondent reported being "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the availability of the service, or if they reported that their family can access the service "most of the time" or "always"[11]. I coded the variable "no" if the respondent reported being "somewhat dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with the availability of the service, or if they reported that their family can access the service "some of the time," "not very often," or "never." For electricity ("elec"), I coded the variable as "yes" if the respondent reported having access to electricity for thirteen hours a day or more and "no" otherwise. For unemployment ("unemployed"), I coded it "yes" if the respondent or anyone in his/her household was not only unemployed but also did not identify as a student, a housewife, a retiree, or disabled. For security ("security"), I coded the variable as "yes" if the respondent reported that the conditions for security and

[10] "Coalition Forces" here refers to the military forces of a wide range of nations who supported efforts in Iraq, but most nations limited their military's presence and roles in Iraq. The militaries of the United States and Britain conducted the vast majority of the street patrols in Iraq, and therefore it is highly probable that respondents would associate the term "Coalition Forces" with either the militaries of the United States or Britain, with the latter only likely in the city of Basrah.

[11] This reflects a slight difference in the verbiage of the question in the second half of the waves.

peace had improved over the past three months and "no" if conditions had worsened or stayed the same.

All of the previous independent variables applied to the individual level. The final independent variable I used in this test was the number of attacks per *qada*-month. Within the attack data set, there are two separate attack variables. The first variable ("sigact") lists the count for all significant activities (attacks) in the *qada*-month, including attacks against both military and civilian targets. The second variable ("sig1") lists the count for all attacks that could be positively identified as against a military target, including Coalition Forces, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army elements. Since the level of overall violence, irrespective of the target, is likely to impact respondents' confidence levels in either the counterinsurgents or insurgents, I used the "sigact" data for this test. Additionally, since the surveys were given at different times throughout the month, I used attack data from the previous month as the most accurate measure of violence that might impact a respondent's confidence levels. Finally, I took the natural log of the lagged attack variable to give a more normal distribution of the error term, creating the variable I ultimately used in the model: "l1_ln_sigact". Four of the survey waves, from October 2005 to January 2006, did not record the *qada*, so I aggregated attacks up to the provincial level for a separate analysis of those four waves.

Control Variables

My control variables in this analysis are sex, age, education, community, and month. For sex, I coded "male" as 1 for men and 0 for women. The age range for survey respondents was 18 to 100; I created a binary variable ("over40") for use in the model, coding those from age 40-100 as 1 and from age 18-39 as 0. I chose this age distinction

primarily because those over 40 years of age at the time of the survey would have lived through at least three separate regime changes: the Ba'athist regime takeover from the Aref regime in 1968, headed by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr; the regime takeover by Saddam Hussein and the creation of the *Mukhabarat* (Intelligence) State in 1979; and the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 (Fattah 2009). The older age group would also have a distinct memory of at least three wars: the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988, the war with the U.S./Coalition in 1991 ("Operation Desert Storm"), and the war with the U.S./Coalition beginning in 2003 (Fattah 2009). For education, respondents had the choice of "none," "primary," "intermediate," "secondary," "diploma," "baccalaureate," and "post-graduate." I created the variable "collgrad" to distinguish those who had completed at least a bachelor's degree, coding "baccalaureate" and "post-graduate" as 1 and the rest as 0 ("diploma" refers to a high school diploma in Iraq). Approximately 10% of the respondents reported that they had graduated from college. I also included the "community" variable as described in the initial analysis portion above. Finally, I created dummy variables for each month ("yrmo") in which the survey was conducted to control for external fixed effects from that particular month.

Test I Hypotheses

The following hypotheses reflect the assumptions of legitimacy theories and U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine:

*H1a: Individuals with greater access to clean drinking water, cooking fuel (propane), vehicle gas, and electricity will have greater confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (positive and significant relgationship).

*H1b: Individuals with greater access to clean drinking water, cooking fuel (propane), vehicle gas, and electricity will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) (negative and significant relationship) .

*H2a: Individuals who are unemployed will have less confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (negative and significant relationship).

*H2b: Individuals who are unemployed will have greater confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) (positive and significant relationship).

*H3a: Individuals who believe that security has improved over the previous three months will have greater confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (positive and significant relationship).

*H3b: Individuals who believe that security has improved over the previous three months will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) (negative and significant relationship).

*H4a: Individuals who experience a higher level of attacks in their *qada* (district) in the previous month will have less confidence in Coaliton Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army (negative and significant relationship).

*H4b: Individuals who experience a higher level of attacks in their *qada* (district) in the previous month will have less confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency) (negative and significant relationship).

Test I Results

Using a logistic regression and clustering at the *qada* (district)[12] level produces the results in Figures 22-29 below[13]. I ran separate regressions for confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the Armed National Opposition (insurgency), omitting the "Mixed Arab" community variable for each. The Mixed Arab community represents 18% of the respondent population, and their confidence levels appear to represent the most moderate of all of the communities. With each confidence model I created four sub-models to control for various internal and external characteristics. The first sub-model covers all waves and all communities, with no restrictions. In the second model, I limited the regression to only those *qadas* in which the Sunni Arab community represented the highest percentage of the respondent population, since Sunnis made up the majority of the violent insurgency in Iraq. There were four of these *qadas* in Salahadin Province (Tikrit, Samarra, Ad-Daur, and As-Shirqat), two in Anbar Province (Fallujah and Ramadi), one in Diyala Province (Al-Muqdadiyah), three in Ninewa Province (Mosul, Tal Afar, and Al-Hatra), and two in Ta'mim Province (Kirkuk and Al-Hawija). I limited the third sub-model to Baghdad only, which included all survey respondents in the first half of the waves, and just those living in Baghdad from the second half of the waves. Finally, I limited the fourth sub-model to the second half of the waves, which would include a nationwide sample of respondents during the same period of time, excluding the Baghdad-only first set of waves

[12] Results of the four-wave model clustered at the province level supported these results.

[13] Full regression tables for both *qada* level and province level models are included in Appendix A.

Confidence in Coalition Forces[14]

Confidence in Coalition Forces - Qada Level Comparison				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	0	0	0	0
Age 40 and over	0	0	0	0
College graduate	+	++	+	0
Shia Arab	0		+	0
Sunni Arab	--		--	0
Kurd	++		0	++
Other	+		++	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	+	0	+	++
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	+	0
Access to vehicle gas	++	0	+	++
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	++	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	-	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	++	++	++	++
Attacks against all targets in the previous month	-	0	-	--
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 22: Test I Regression Results - Coalition Forces

The results of these models give only partial support for H1a, as access to essential services is predictive on an inconsistent basis, and no particular service proves uniformly predictive. Unemployment proves insignificant to all but the Sunni Arab communities, offering very limited support for H2a. The most consistent predictor of confidence in Coalition Forces is a positive perception of security over the three months prior to the survey, offering strong support for H3a. The level of attacks in respondents' *qada* in the previous month proves negative and significant for all but the Sunni Arab *qadas*, providing support for H4a.

Among the demographic characteristics, the respondents' community appears to have some predictive power when compared to the moderate Mixed Arab community. Controlling for all of the other variables, Sunni Arabs are highly likely to lack confidence in Coalition forces in two out of three models including community variables, while the Kurds and the minority "Other" category are likely to have confidence in Coalition Forces in two

[14] The inclusion of dummy variables for wave month did not affect the substantive findings throughout Test I, so I have omitted those variables for each of the confidence models.

out of three. The predictive power of the Shia Arab community is not as strong, appearing in only one of the models, but in the positive direction.

Confidence in the Iraqi Government

Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Qada Level Comparison				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	--	--	--	--
Age 40 and over	++	0	++	++
College graduate	0	0	--	0
Shia Arab	++		++	++
Sunni Arab	--		--	--
Kurd	0		++	0
Other	0		+	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	++	+	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	++	-	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	++	++	++	+
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	+	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	--	0	--	--
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	++	++	++	++
Attacks against all targets in the previous month	--	0	--	--
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 23: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Government

As with the Coalition Forces models, these models offer only partial support for H1a, since the relationship of the various essential services is significant in some models and insignificant in others. Access to vehicle gas is the most consistent, proving significant in all four models. H2a (unemployment) and H4a (attacks) receive a great deal of support in these models, registering insignificant only in the Sunni Arab model. Like the previous set of models, perception of security is significant in the positive direction in all four models here, giving additional support to H3a. The demographic characteristics appear to have a greater impact in this model, especially the Shia Arab and Sunni Arab communities and being male.

Confidence in the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army

Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Qada Level Comparison				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	--	--	--	--
Age 40 and over	0	0	+	0
College graduate	--	--	--	-
Shia Arab	++		++	++
Sunni Arab	--		--	0
Kurd	++		++	++
Other	0		++	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	++	--	++	0
Access to vehicle gas	++	0	++	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	--	0	--	--
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	++	++	++	++
Attacks against all targets in the previous month	--	--	-	--
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 24: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Police

Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Qada Level Comparison				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	--	--	--	--
Age 40 and over	++	0	++	0
College graduate	0	0	0	0
Shia Arab	++		++	++
Sunni Arab	--		--	--
Kurd	++		++	++
Other	0		++	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	++	0	++	0
Access to vehicle gas	++	0	++	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	-
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	++	++	++	++
Attacks against all targets in the previous month	--	-	0	--
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 25: Test I Regression Results - Iraqi Army

The results of these two model sets are remarkably similar to each other, and they support the same substantive findings as the Iraqi Government model set.

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Qada Level Comparison				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	++	0	++	++
Age 40 and over	--	0	0	--
College graduate	--	0	--	--
Shia Arab	--		--	--
Sunni Arab	++		++	++
Kurd	--		--	0
Other	0		-	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	++	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	--	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	--	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	--	0	0
Attacks against all targets in the previous month	0	0	0	0
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 26: Test I Regression Results - Armed National Opposition (Insurgency)

These models did not offer the same level of support for our hypotheses as the previous models. Access to essential services, unemployment, and attacks in the previous month appear to have little bearing on one's confidence in the insurgency, as these turn up consistently insignificant. The only possible exceptions are access to cooking fuel and vehicle gas for the Sunni Arab *qadas*, and the perception of security for the Sunni *qadas* and the all-inclusive first model. Demographic characteristics seem to be the best predictors, and they generally fall in the opposite direction as the previous models.

Because the preceding models predicting confidence in the insurgency did not produce the hypothesized results, and because our earlier cross-tabulation showed a portion of the population had confidence in both the insurgency and the Iraqi counterinsurgent forces (government, police, and army), I extended this test further. This time, I included confidence in the Iraqi counterinsurgent forces as an independent variable to predict confidence in the insurgency, while controlling for the same demographic variables and counterinsurgency Lines of Effort as the rest of the Test I models. The results of these new models are shown below in Figures 27 through 29.

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	++	0	++	+
Age 40 and over	0	0	0	--
College graduate	--	0	--	-
Shia Arab	--		--	--
Sunni Arab	++		++	++
Kurd	--		--	--
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	-	++	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	--	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	--	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	--	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Government	---	---	---	---
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 27: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	++	0	++	+
Age 40 and over	-	0	0	-
College graduate	--	0	--	--
Shia Arab	--		--	--
Sunni Arab	++		++	++
Kurd	--		--	--
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	++	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	--	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	--	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	--	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Police	-	0	--	0
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 28: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police

Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	++	0	++	+
Age 40 and over	0	0	0	-
College graduate	--	0	--	--
Shia Arab	--		--	--
Sunni Arab	++		++	++
Kurd	--		--	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	-	++	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	--	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	---	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	--	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Army	--	-	--	--
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 29: Test Ia Regression Results - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army

In these model sets, unemployment is a poor predictor of confidence in the insurgency across the board, while essential services are once again only significant for the Sunni Arab *qadas*. Perceptions of security are only predictive in four of the twelve models above. The most consistent and significant predictors of confidence in the insurgency appear to be confidence in the Iraqi government and Iraqi Army, both in the negative direction. Confidence in the Iraqi Police is also a significant predictor in two of the four models, and also in the negative direction.

Test I Discussion

Essential Services

Test I provides only partial support for the overall hypothesis that reported access to essential services predicts confidence in the counterinsurgent force. I propose two reasons this could be the case. First, the Iraqi population may have grievances with all or part of the counterinsurgent force that have nothing to do with their access to essential services. If they

view the Coalition Forces as occupiers with a questionable agenda, or if they view the Iraqi Government and Iraqi Security Forces (including the Police and Army) as inherently corrupt, it may take more than an increase in access to essential services to build their confidence in the counterinsurgent forces. Second, it is likely that access to essential services is not randomly distributed throughout Iraq, which could affect the regression model. Perhaps those with greater income or family connections could gain access to essential services on their own, which would likely have no effect on their confidence levels in other institutions.

Access to essential services appears to have little power in predicting confidence in the insurgency. The only indication that it might have an impact is in the Sunni *qadas*, and that is limited to cooking fuel and vehicle gas. It is certainly possible that backing for the Iraqi insurgency may be more tied to ideological, nationalist, sectarian, or other loyalty than to grievances from a lack of essential services. In any case, it seems clear from these results that while increasing access to essential services may *increase* confidence in the counterinsurgent forces in certain cases, doing so is guaranteed to *decrease* confidence levels in the insurgency.

Unemployment

The only groups for which unemployment is a significant predictor, in the negative direction, are the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Police. The first finding is not altogether surprising, given that the population is more likely to hold the government responsible for the creation of jobs than any of the armed forces. The second finding is still significant in the direction we would expect, but it is not clear why unemployment is a negative predictor of confidence for the Iraqi Police but not the Iraqi Army or Coalition Forces. It is possible that

the population views the Ministry of the Interior (under which the Iraqi Police falls) as a closer arm of the national government than the Ministry of Defense (under which the Iraqi Army falls), and thus more responsible for job creation. Another possibility is that the Iraqi Police may have more stringent or exclusive hiring practices that have caused the unemployed among the population to lose confidence in them. Based upon these results, it is possible that increasing jobs for the Iraqi population would increase their confidence in the Iraqi Government and Iraqi Police. However, these results would suggest that creating more jobs for Iraqis would not necessarily decrease their confidence in the insurgents.

Security

By far the most consistent predictor of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces is respondents' perception of security in their neighborhood over the three months prior to the survey. This is the only finding that remains true for confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army. What this tells us is that people want safety for themselves and their loved ones, and assurance of this will cause them to have more confidence in those whose stated duty is to protect them. What this does not tell us is how those particular areas became safe in the first place. I have noted above that winning over the population may encourage them to provide military intelligence to counterinsurgents, which could lead to greater security, but the findings in Test I would seem to suggest the reverse – that creating secure conditions is the best way to win over the population. Indeed, *FM 3-24* stresses that creating a secure environment is the first and most important step, since the imminent threat of violence tends to be a deterrent to creating

governance, establishing a working economy, delivering essential services, and the like (United States 2006).

Perhaps a more intriguing finding is that the perception of security is an insignificant predictor of confidence in the insurgency, except in the Sunni *qadas*. One might assume that where feelings of security are low, the population would lose confidence in the insurgency, but it seems that the population is more likely to hold the counterinsurgent forces responsible for their perceptions of security than the insurgents.

Prior Attacks

Coming in right behind perceptions of security, the level of attacks in one's *qada* (district) the month prior to the survey is the second-most consistent non-demographic predictor of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces. The relationship is negative and significant in the majority of the models above, meaning that when attacks in the previous month are higher, respondents are less likely to have confidence in the counterinsurgent forces. One might expect prior attacks to be a less consistent predictor of respondents' confidence than the respondents' perception of security, as perceptions may not always mirror reality, but this finding shows that perception and reality for the Iraqi respondent were not far off. Nevertheless, the results further support the previous finding that security appears to be the most important issue determining confidence in counterinsurgent forces. Similar to the findings above, the level of attacks from the prior month does not accurately predict one's confidence level in the insurgency.

Community

Another relatively consistent predictor of one's confidence in both the counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency is one's ethno-religious community. While the Shia Arab community variable does not significantly predict confidence in Coalition Forces, it does consistently predict confidence in the Shia Arab-dominated Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army, while being a negative predictor of confidence in the Sunni Arab-dominated insurgency. These findings are not surprising, if one considers that Shia Arabs could be very optimistic about an Iraq in which their ethno-religious community dominates the government and security forces after many years of exclusion under the Ba'athist regime. The insignificant finding relating to confidence in the Coalition Forces could reflect a combination of gratitude for ousting the Ba'athist regime along with strong distrust for the intentions of Coalition Forces, the latter of which was fomented by Shia leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr (Bapat 2005). The Shia Arabs' lack of confidence in the Sunni Arab-dominated insurgency is also relatively intuitive, as they likely viewed the insurgency as a threat to their newfound dominance in the Iraqi government and security forces.

On the other side, the Sunni Arab community variable predicts a lack of confidence in all four counterinsurgent forces, while predicting confidence in the insurgency. None of these findings are surprising either, for the same reasons listed above – except in the opposite direction. The Sunni Arabs, as a minority sect in Iraq, may lack confidence in all of the counterinsurgent forces because they quickly lost power after the fall of the Ba'athist regime and they do not trust a regime that does not represent their interests. Marginalization of minorities can lead to low levels of legitimacy (Spencer 1991, Lipset 1994), making the success of other Lines of Effort that much more difficult.

The Kurdish community variable predicts that one will have confidence in the Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi Army, and it predicts that one will lack confidence in the insurgency, but it is an insignificant predictor of confidence in the Iraqi Government. The traditionally strong relationship between the Kurdish people and the United States makes the first finding rather intuitive, and the majority presence of fellow Kurds in the Iraqi security forces in the Kurdish regions is likely responsible for the second two findings. As for confidence in the Iraqi Government, the Kurds are probably torn between feelings of relief that the Ba'athist regime no longer excludes them from power entirely and feelings of caution because their minority status may mean they will continue to be marginalized in the new government.

TEST II

Dependent Variable

For the second test, the dependent variable is the number of attacks in a given *qada*-month for one set of models, and the percentage of total attacks in a given *qada*-month for the second set. Since attacks against civilians are likely more indicative of a terrorist attack, versus an insurgent attack, I will use the "sig1" variable for this model, which contains the count for all attacks that could be positively identified against a military target, including Coalition Forces, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army elements. I once again took the natural log of the attacks in the first set of models to give a more normal distribution of the error term, and I used attack data from the month *after* the survey was taken, giving us the variable "f1.ln_sig1".

Independent Variables

Inherently, what we want to test is whether or not a lack of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces in a particular area, in a particular month, can predict a higher level of attacks in that area in the next month, so for these models I collapsed the confidence variables to their means by *qada* and month. I will also include the *qada*-month means for access to essential services, unemployment, perceptions of security, confidence in each of the counterinsurgent forces, confidence in the insurgency, and respondent community in these models to test their effects. Finally, I will include several time variables in the regression to control for time effects.

Test II Hypotheses

*H5a: In *qada*-months where confidence in Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army are greater, the following month will see fewer attacks in the same *qada* (negative and significant relationship).

*H5b: In *qada*-months where confidence in the Armed National Insurgency is greater, the following month will see more attacks in the same *qada* (positive and significant relationship).

*H6: In *qada*-months where individuals have greater access to clean drinking water, cooking fuel (propane), vehicle gas, and electricity on average, the following month will see less attacks in the same *qada* (negative and significant relationship).

*H7: In *qada*-months where individuals have a lower unemployment average, the following month will see less attacks in the same *qada* (positive and significant relationship).

*H8: In *qada*-months where the average perception of security is higher, the following month will see less attacks in the same *qada* (negative and significant relationship).

Test II Results

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per Qada-Month

Using a cross-sectional time-series regression with fixed effects produces the results shown in Figures 30 through 34 below.[15] The clear trend shown in each of these five sets of models is the lack of significance of any variable other than time; in fact, the only variable other than time that registers significance is Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (insurgency), and that only occurs in one of the models. These results offer no support for H5a, H5b, H6, H7, or H8.

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in Coalition Forces	0	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	--	(omitted)	--	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	--	0	--	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	+
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 30: Test II Regression Results – Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces

[15] Full regression tables are included in the Appendix.

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Government	0	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	--	(omitted)	--	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	--	0	--	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	+
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 31: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Police	0	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	--	(omitted)	--	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	--	0	--	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	+
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 32: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Army	0	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	--	(omitted)	--	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	--	0	--	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	+
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 33: Test II Regression Results - Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	0	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Armed National Opposition	-	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	--	0	--	0
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 34: Test II Regression Results – Number of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency

Predicting the Percentage of Total Future Attacks per Qada-Month

The next group of models predicts the percentage of the total future attacks per *qada*-month, a slightly different measure for attacks than the previous models that predicted the future number (count) of attacks per *qada*-month. Regression results are shown below in Figures 35 through 39. Fortunately, the time variables do not cancel out all of the other variables in these models, although they remain significant throughout, but there is again very little support for our hypotheses from the other variables. One possible exception to this is unemployment (H7), which is a positive and significant predictor for percentage of total attacks in half of the models below. Access to electricity is significant in only a few of the sub-models within the Baghdad-only set, but not consistently enough to give partial support to H6. And while confidence in Coalition Forces is not a significant predictor, confidence in the Iraqi Government is significant in half of the models, and confidence in the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army is significant in three out of four. In each of these cases the relationship with attacks is positive, in the *opposite* direction I predicted in H5a. Confidence in the insurgency is not consistently predictive in the models, as it is only significant in two of the models and those are in opposite directions. Perceptions of security (H8) do not carry the same predictive power as in the models predicting respondent confidence, but it is still significant in several of the models below. The only other variables that are significant in any of the models are the Shia Arab and Sunni Arab community variables, but again these do not appear consistently enough to be considered good predictors.

Predicting the Percentage of Total Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	+
Sunni Arab	0		0	--
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	--	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	++	0	++	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in Coalition Forces	0	0	0	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	++	(omitted)	++	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	0	0	0	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	++
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 35: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces

Predicting the Percentage of Total Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	--
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	--	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	++	0	++	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Government	++	0	++	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	++	(omitted)	+	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	0	0	+	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	0
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 36: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government

Predicting the Percentage of Total Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	-
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	--	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	++	0	++	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Police	++	0	++	+
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	++	(omitted)	+	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	0	0	+	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	0
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 37: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police

Predicting the Percentage of Total Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	0
Sunni Arab	0		0	--
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	--	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	++	0	++	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	0	0	0
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Iraqi Army	++	0	++	+
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	++	(omitted)	++	(omitted)
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	0	0	0	0
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	(omitted)	0	(omitted)	0
"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant				

Figure 38: Test I Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army

Predicting the Percentage of Total Attacks per *Qada*-month - Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency				
	All waves & communities	*Sunni Arab qadas*	*Baghdad only*	*Nationwide only*
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS				
Shia Arab	0		0	++
Sunni Arab	0		+	0
Kurd	0		0	0
Other	0		0	0
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES				
Access to clean drinking water	0	0	0	0
Access to cooking fuel (propane)	0	0	0	0
Access to vehicle gas	0	0	0	0
Average 13hrs of electricity a day	0	0	0	0
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT				
Unemployed	++	0	++	0
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY				
Perception that security has improved	-	0	0	--
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENTS				
Confidence in the Insurgency	0	++	--	0
TIME VARIABLES				
After the Fallujah Assault (Nov '04 - Feb '06)	++	0	0	++
After the Askaria Shrine bombing (Mar-Jun '06)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
After the Yusafiyah rape/murder (Jul-Sep '06)	0	0	0	++
				"++" & "--" p<.01; "+" & "-" p<.05; "0" insignificant

Figure 39: Test II Regression Results - % of Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Insurgency

Test II Discussion

Predicting the Number of Future Attacks per Qada-Month

One of the weaknesses of attempting to predict attacks in a certain area from respondent characteristics and survey responses is the necessary assumption that the residents will have some level of control over the number of attacks in their *qada* – either as ones who resort to (or resist the draw of) violence themselves, or as ones who have the power to facilitate or thwart attacks with passive support to either side. The former case relies on related assumptions that if residents conduct attacks, they would do so in their own *qadas*, and in the following month. If the null impacts of *qada*-internal variables from these models are accurate, however, it suggests that attacks are a function of either different or external variables not addressed in this study. It may further suggest that insurgents conduct attacks arbitrarily in *qadas* not their own, and that residents are either powerless or unwilling to thwart the attacks themselves by active or passive means.

Predicting the Percentage of Total Future Attacks per Qada-Month

If models predicting the percentage of attacks are more accurate than the models predicting the number of attacks, it would suggest that attacks are less arbitrary and could potentially be tied to variables internal to the *qada* in which attacks occur.

Confidence

Hypotheses H5a and H5b were based on the assumption that residents have some level of control over the occurrence of attacks in their *qadas*, either as active or passive participants. I took an additional step to assume that confidence in one side or the other would cause residents to actively or passively support one side or the other when it came to attacks, but it appears from the results here that residents may not have as much control over the occurrence of attacks as I assumed. The results showing a positive and significant relationship between confidence in counterinsurgent forces and future attacks further suggest that insurgent attacks are not completely arbitrary; insurgents may in fact be targeting districts or individuals with high levels of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces as a punitive measure or as a warning to others.

Essential Services and Unemployment

The null findings concerning essential services fail to confirm the Berman, et al. (Draft 2009) finding that increasing access to essential services in a particular area will necessarily reduce attacks. The finding of partial support for unemployment as a predictor of attacks runs contrary to the finding of Berman, et al. (2009), although there may be other factors involved. For instance, it is possible that a rural area with high unemployment could also be an area highly conducive to covert attacks due to its terrain and low volume of traffic. Given these potential discrepancies in academic research to date, further research is required

to determine the true impact of essential service delivery and unemployment upon attacks in a given area.

Security

Perceptions of security do not have the same predictive power in Test II as they did in Test I. This null finding may be evidence of the uncertainty typical in an insurgency, as it did not appear that areas in which respondents perceived their area as secure necessarily predicted a low percentage of attacks in the following month, nor did it necessarily predict a higher percentage of attacks for areas in which respondents perceived their area as less secure. This should serve as a warning against complacency for counterinsurgent forces.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have described various insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies before narrowing my focus to the U.S. military's current counterinsurgency strategy, a population-centered approach that hangs upon the concept of building legitimacy for the counterinsurgent regime. My purpose throughout was to test the effects of this strategy as implemented in Iraq from 2004-2006, with the goal of providing feedback for future counterinsurgency strategy formulation and implementation.

Clearly, individuals' perceptions of security are the most predictive of confidence in the counterinsurgent forces, including Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army. Although most counterinsurgent forces are well aware of their duty to protect the population at-large, the findings in Test I should give added emphasis and urgency to the task of securing the population. By contrast, perceptions of security in a particular *qada* (district) do not appear to be consistently predictive of attacks in that *qada* the following month, given the results of Test II. This finding is potentially indicative of insurgents' agency, of residents' relative inability or unwillingness to control violence where they live, and of the uncertain environment following a regime change.

With only partial support for the positive effects of access to essential services on respondents' confidence in counterinsurgent forces, it is safe to say that simply increasing the delivery of essential services is not enough to gain the confidence of the people. Individuals may have other subjective grievances or doubts about the regime that essential services fail to address, so it is incumbent upon the counterinsurgent forces to determine the true source of grievances. Nonetheless, increasing the delivery of essential services demonstrates objective effectiveness at meeting particular needs of the population, and the population may also see it

as a gesture of good will. Of particular note, access to cooking fuel and access to vehicle gas are negative predictors of confidence in the insurgency in the Sunni *qadas*, but this finding is inconsistent across the rest of Iraq. As with the delivery of essential services, increasing employment may not be enough to gain the confidence of the people outright, but counterinsurgents would still be wise to address this issue after establishing security.

The power of one's ethno-religious community in predicting his confidence in the counterinsurgent forces and the insurgency should be a poignant reminder for counterinsurgents to understand the historical and cultural context in which they operate. While hindsight tends to be near-perfect, it does not seem a stretch to realize that establishing a representative democracy in Iraq would strongly favor the Shia Arab majority while stripping the Sunni Arab minority of considerable power. This spurned minority, many of whom nonetheless despised the previous Ba'athist regime, could not have been expected to accept this forfeiture of power without a fight. For individuals in this position, it is not hard to imagine that security, essential services, and employment would not satisfy them entirely. U.S. policy makers and military strategists should strongly consider the historical and cultural context of any given region prior to military invasion with the purpose of regime change.

One final point of consideration from these findings: at the margins, it does not appear that there was a legitimacy tug-of-war between the insurgents and counterinsurgents, such that legitimacy gains by one side meant legitimacy losses for the other. The issue of support for insurgents or counterinsurgents in Iraq is complex, and it does not appear to boil down to "who can best meet my needs." Once again, this requires counterinsurgents to

understand the specific grievances of the insurgents and the "neutral" population, as well as *competing loyalties*, and to modify their strategy accordingly.

I have highlighted some of the weaknesses of this study throughout, and I reiterate them here. First of all, this study does not constitute a comprehensive review of U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine, as it only tests three of the seven prescribed Lines of Effort: Establish Civil Security, Restore Essential Services, and Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development. Furthermore, this study only addresses the employment portion of Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development. As another weakness, I have operationalized and analyzed three Lines of Effort separate from the other four, but the Lines of Effort from U.S. military doctrine are meant to work together as a mutually supporting counterinsurgency framework. Future research should test the additional four Lines of Effort (Establish Civil Control, Support Host Nation Security Forces, Support to Governance, and Conduct Information Engagement) in concert with the three I tested here. Additionally, the findings of this study are only as reliable as the data itself. The director of IIACSS could not say with complete confidence that the survey data collected by his organization was error-free, which could cast some doubt upon the statistical results. And finally, without accurate population statistics for *qadas* or the geographic size of the *qadas*, I was not able to control for either of those variables when predicting attacks.

Much has changed in Iraq since September 2006. Future studies in Iraq might analyze more recent survey and attack data to see if the same trends found here continue to emerge. Of particular interest would be the time frame of the troop surge in Iraq from 2007-2009, and the perceptible momentum change in favor of the counterinsurgents during that period.

APPENDIX A: TEST I REGRESSION TABLES

Table 1: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_CF	(2) conf_CF	(3) conf_CF	(4) conf_CF	(5) conf_CF
conf_CF	male	-0.0103	0.00190	-0.00935	-0.0152	0.0196
		(0.0373)	(0.0374)	(0.0403)	(0.0408)	(0.0421)
	over40	0.0542	0.0544	0.0449	0.0487	0.0143
		(0.0481)	(0.0467)	(0.0455)	(0.0444)	(0.0439)
	collgrad	0.111	0.111*	0.144**	0.153**	0.0669
		(0.0681)	(0.0656)	(0.0629)	(0.0599)	(0.0540)
	Shia_Arab	0.102	0.103	0.0687	-0.120	0.158
		(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.182)	(0.188)	(0.137)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.965***	-0.969***	-0.860***	-0.836***	-0.421***
		(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.203)	(0.183)	(0.125)
	Kurd	2.844***	2.858***	2.753***	2.335***	3.001***
		(0.379)	(0.379)	(0.350)	(0.261)	(0.240)
	Other	0.469**	0.464**	0.489***	0.438**	0.619***
		(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.189)	(0.173)	(0.134)
	water	0.218**	0.213**	0.186**	0.182**	0.185***
		(0.0916)	(0.0932)	(0.0893)	(0.0848)	(0.0570)
	cookfuel	0.0968	0.0969	0.0778	0.0622	0.0323
		(0.0658)	(0.0639)	(0.0565)	(0.0562)	(0.0636)
	gas	0.475***	0.475***	0.404***	0.421***	0.285***
		(0.0887)	(0.0886)	(0.0842)	(0.0861)	(0.0742)
	elec	0.246**	0.236*	0.254**	0.227*	0.146
		(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.102)	(0.118)	(0.148)
	unemployed		-0.0960	-0.120*	-0.127*	-0.103*
			(0.0647)	(0.0681)	(0.0658)	(0.0565)
	security			0.870***	0.796***	0.739***
				(0.104)	(0.0989)	(0.113)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.160**	-0.228***
					(0.0642)	(0.0639)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					0.406
						(0.250)
	541.yrmo					0.864***
						(0.221)
	542.yrmo					0.543**
						(0.247)
	543.yrmo					0.271*
						(0.143)
	544.yrmo					0.0814
						(0.190)
	545.yrmo					0.217
						(0.135)
	546.yrmo					-0.0536
						(0.296)
	547.yrmo					-0.170
						(0.242)
	548.yrmo					-0.0796
						(0.179)
	553.yrmo					-1.066***
						(0.241)
	554.yrmo					-0.729**

					(0.297)
	555.yrmo				-1.154**
					(0.488)
	556.yrmo				-0.741**
					(0.298)
	557.yrmo				-0.713**
					(0.290)
	558.yrmo				-0.734**
					(0.300)
	559.yrmo				-0.373
					(0.342)
	560.yrmo				-0.567*
					(0.320)
	Constant	-2.703***	-2.696***	-2.849***	-2.226***	-2.014***
		(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.277)	(0.339)
	Observations	90,199	89,755	88,534	88,534	88,534

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-Model Comparison

		All	Sunni qadas	Baghdad	Nationwide
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_CF	conf_CF	conf_CF	conf_CF
conf_CF	male	-0.0152	-0.116	-0.0403	0.0532
		(0.0408)	(0.0860)	(0.0668)	(0.0362)
	over40	0.0487	-0.151	0.0594	-0.00731
		(0.0444)	(0.137)	(0.0584)	(0.0644)
	collgrad	0.153**	0.321***	0.108**	0.0389
		(0.0599)	(0.115)	(0.0528)	(0.114)
	Shia_Arab	-0.120		0.187	-0.322
		(0.188)		(0.125)	(0.283)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.836***		-0.646***	-0.499
		(0.183)		(0.117)	(0.325)
	Kurd	2.335***		-0.467	2.554***
		(0.261)		(0.381)	(0.274)
	Other	0.438**		0.489***	0.497
		(0.173)		(0.130)	(0.355)
	water	0.182**	0.630*	0.125**	0.292***
		(0.0848)	(0.342)	(0.0494)	(0.0815)
	cookfuel	0.0622	0.481	0.104**	-0.0352
		(0.0562)	(0.373)	(0.0411)	(0.129)
	gas	0.421***	0.253	0.142**	0.360***
		(0.0861)	(0.273)	(0.0570)	(0.125)
	elec	0.227*	0.666***	0.112	0.237
		(0.118)	(0.0641)	(0.113)	(0.206)
	unemployed	-0.127*	-0.467**	-0.0184	-0.108
		(0.0658)	(0.200)	(0.0675)	(0.0992)
	security	0.796***	2.211***	0.713***	0.832***

		(0.0989)	(0.214)	(0.101)	(0.166)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.160**	-0.00973	-0.142**	-0.261***
		(0.0642)	(0.163)	(0.0613)	(0.0853)
	Constant	-2.226***	-3.850***	-2.077***	-2.414***
		(0.277)	(0.510)	(0.270)	(0.366)
	Observations	88,534	12,102	49,061	51,745

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov
conf_gov	male	-0.294***	-0.282***	-0.295***	-0.296***	-0.276***
		(0.0451)	(0.0442)	(0.0464)	(0.0466)	(0.0477)
	over40	0.171***	0.169***	0.157***	0.160***	0.124***
		(0.0287)	(0.0290)	(0.0284)	(0.0294)	(0.0261)
	collgrad	-0.0413	-0.0403	-0.0218	-0.0211	-0.0993**
		(0.0657)	(0.0655)	(0.0648)	(0.0637)	(0.0441)
	Shia_Arab	0.666***	0.665***	0.632***	0.479***	0.796***
		(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.108)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.718***	-1.720***	-1.644***	-1.617***	-1.316***
		(0.368)	(0.367)	(0.358)	(0.338)	(0.277)
	Kurd	0.262**	0.249**	0.0173	-0.351	0.255
		(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.107)	(0.214)	(0.187)
	Other	-0.339	-0.345	-0.336	-0.377	-0.179
		(0.360)	(0.361)	(0.353)	(0.336)	(0.250)
	water	0.124	0.123	0.104	0.117	0.0626
		(0.0845)	(0.0849)	(0.0832)	(0.0774)	(0.0661)
	cookfuel	0.347***	0.348***	0.318***	0.287***	0.248***
		(0.0733)	(0.0728)	(0.0732)	(0.0744)	(0.0634)
	gas	0.509***	0.508***	0.434***	0.439***	0.297***
		(0.0880)	(0.0880)	(0.0807)	(0.0811)	(0.0772)
	elec	0.122	0.128	0.121	0.0777	0.000297
		(0.0915)	(0.0900)	(0.0919)	(0.103)	(0.109)
	unemployed		-0.140**	-0.155***	-0.162***	-0.174***
			(0.0583)	(0.0534)	(0.0560)	(0.0544)
	security			1.397***	1.330***	1.188***
				(0.128)	(0.113)	(0.104)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.141**	-0.132**
					(0.0562)	(0.0515)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					0.639***
						(0.131)
	541.yrmo					1.134***
						(0.114)
	542.yrmo					0.614***
						(0.163)
	543.yrmo					0.146
						(0.148)
	544.yrmo					0.210*
						(0.111)
	545.yrmo					-0.116

					(0.241)
546.yrmo					-0.0606
					(0.170)
547.yrmo					-0.229
					(0.140)
548.yrmo					-0.444**
					(0.188)
553.yrmo					-0.474***
					(0.182)
554.yrmo					-0.360*
					(0.205)
555.yrmo					-0.580***
					(0.203)
556.yrmo					-0.421**
					(0.180)
557.yrmo					-0.450**
					(0.202)
558.yrmo					-0.653***
					(0.200)
559.yrmo					-0.791***
					(0.161)
560.yrmo					-0.863***
					(0.202)
Constant	0.846***	0.855***	0.731***	1.286***	1.379***
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.240)	(0.300)
Observations	87,140	86,751	85,624	85,624	85,624

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_gov	Sunni qadas conf_gov	Baghdad conf_gov	Nationwide conf_gov
conf_gov	male	-0.296***	-0.614***	-0.141***	-0.384***
		(0.0466)	(0.115)	(0.0404)	(0.0534)
	over40	0.160***	0.0764*	0.0911***	0.108***
		(0.0294)	(0.0449)	(0.0327)	(0.0406)
	collgrad	-0.0211	-0.0305	-0.213***	-0.0480
		(0.0637)	(0.125)	(0.0399)	(0.0874)
	Shia_Arab	0.479***		0.526***	0.780***
		(0.102)		(0.111)	(0.142)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.617***		-0.577***	-2.132***
		(0.338)		(0.0778)	(0.396)
	Kurd	-0.351		0.690***	-0.0320
		(0.214)		(0.162)	(0.213)
	Other	-0.377		0.224*	-0.618
		(0.336)		(0.122)	(0.385)
	water	0.117	0.903***	0.210**	0.0540
		(0.0774)	(0.337)	(0.0957)	(0.0756)
	cookfuel	0.287***	-0.372**	0.129	0.0767
		(0.0744)	(0.173)	(0.0876)	(0.105)
	gas	0.439***	0.599***	0.285***	0.335**
		(0.0811)	(0.163)	(0.0563)	(0.162)
	elec	0.0777	0.978**	-0.0916	0.0861
		(0.103)	(0.440)	(0.0876)	(0.152)
	unemployed	-0.162***	-0.190	-0.202***	-0.198***
		(0.0560)	(0.254)	(0.0730)	(0.0746)

	security	1.330***	3.322***	1.068***	1.435***
		(0.113)	(0.416)	(0.113)	(0.169)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.141**	-0.232	-0.109**	-0.120**
		(0.0562)	(0.242)	(0.0481)	(0.0568)
	Constant	1.286***	-1.302	1.279***	1.080***
		(0.240)	(0.895)	(0.289)	(0.229)
	Observations	85,624	11,482	47,028	50,395

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_IP	(2) conf_IP	(3) conf_IP	(4) conf_IP	(5) conf_IP
conf_IP	male	-0.336***	-0.318***	-0.328***	-0.321***	-0.312***
		(0.0384)	(0.0361)	(0.0365)	(0.0326)	(0.0320)
	over40	0.0481*	0.0459	0.0384	0.0387	0.0280
		(0.0285)	(0.0287)	(0.0300)	(0.0307)	(0.0253)
	collgrad	-0.251***	-0.252***	-0.251***	-0.264***	-0.282***
		(0.0697)	(0.0696)	(0.0697)	(0.0750)	(0.0596)
	Shia_Arab	0.915***	0.916***	0.898***	0.623***	0.751***
		(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.163)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.122***	-1.123***	-1.047***	-1.004***	-0.858***
		(0.315)	(0.314)	(0.309)	(0.292)	(0.272)
	Kurd	1.615***	1.613***	1.498***	0.840***	1.002***
		(0.247)	(0.250)	(0.239)	(0.240)	(0.250)
	Other	0.235	0.234	0.252	0.183	0.272
		(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.274)	(0.261)	(0.236)
	water	0.0619	0.0597	0.0423	0.0725	0.101
		(0.0718)	(0.0717)	(0.0699)	(0.0632)	(0.0625)
	cookfuel	0.391***	0.393***	0.365***	0.322***	0.274***
		(0.0638)	(0.0640)	(0.0624)	(0.0613)	(0.0595)
	gas	0.294***	0.296***	0.241***	0.249***	0.199***
		(0.0901)	(0.0902)	(0.0868)	(0.0861)	(0.0709)
	elec	-0.0151	-0.0140	-0.0282	-0.117	0.0116
		(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.126)
	unemployed		-0.181***	-0.193***	-0.205***	-0.204***
			(0.0599)	(0.0585)	(0.0557)	(0.0564)
	security			1.028***	0.921***	0.865***
				(0.127)	(0.120)	(0.102)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.273***	-0.281***
					(0.0604)	(0.0599)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					0.308**
						(0.136)
	541.yrmo					0.884***
						(0.158)
	542.yrmo					0.728***
						(0.233)
	543.yrmo					0.475**
						(0.196)
	544.yrmo					0.406**
						(0.192)
	545.yrmo					0.550***
						(0.173)
	546.yrmo					0.756***
						(0.191)

547.yrmo					0.556***
					(0.143)
548.yrmo					0.457***
					(0.137)
553.yrmo					0.289
					(0.193)
554.yrmo					0.388**
					(0.189)
555.yrmo					0.266
					(0.197)
556.yrmo					0.415**
					(0.168)
557.yrmo					0.441**
					(0.186)
558.yrmo					0.122
					(0.242)
559.yrmo					0.180
					(0.170)
560.yrmo					0.252
					(0.189)
Constant	1.044***	1.053***	0.954***	2.040***	1.582***
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.307)	(0.298)
Observations	93,920	93,473	92,107	92,107	92,107

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_IP	Sunni qadas conf_IP	Baghdad conf_IP	Nationwide conf_IP
conf_IP	male	-0.321***	-0.465***	-0.252***	-0.358***
		(0.0326)	(0.0546)	(0.0253)	(0.0455)
	over40	0.0387	-0.0340	0.0628**	-0.0201
		(0.0307)	(0.0821)	(0.0284)	(0.0370)
	collgrad	-0.264***	-0.338***	-0.269***	-0.209**
		(0.0750)	(0.0725)	(0.0718)	(0.106)
	Shia_Arab	0.623***		0.563***	1.070***
		(0.141)		(0.109)	(0.270)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.004***		-0.867***	-0.902*
		(0.292)		(0.130)	(0.484)
	Kurd	0.840***		0.701***	0.998***
		(0.240)		(0.198)	(0.366)
	Other	0.183		0.486***	0.253
		(0.261)		(0.160)	(0.372)
	water	0.0725	0.240	0.0817	0.0208
		(0.0632)	(0.241)	(0.0627)	(0.0882)
	cookfuel	0.322***	-0.192***	0.279***	0.0489
		(0.0613)	(0.0487)	(0.0674)	(0.121)
	gas	0.249***	-0.101	0.253***	0.0108
		(0.0861)	(0.0731)	(0.0569)	(0.146)
	elec	-0.117	-0.0227	-0.204	0.0233
		(0.133)	(0.447)	(0.145)	(0.188)
	unemployed	-0.205***	-0.206	-0.240***	-0.295***
		(0.0557)	(0.171)	(0.0600)	(0.0914)
	security	0.921***	2.227***	0.711***	1.295***
		(0.120)	(0.776)	(0.0922)	(0.164)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.273***	-1.000***	-0.144**	-0.341***
		(0.0604)	(0.327)	(0.0572)	(0.0762)

Constant	2.040***	4.258***	1.625***	2.088***
	(0.307)	(1.508)	(0.276)	(0.492)
Observations	92,107	12,041	51,582	53,164

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA
conf_IA	male	-0.269***	-0.259***	-0.267***	-0.262***	-0.241***
		(0.0348)	(0.0330)	(0.0340)	(0.0318)	(0.0316)
	over40	0.0952***	0.0935***	0.0852***	0.0877***	0.0651**
		(0.0245)	(0.0248)	(0.0254)	(0.0272)	(0.0255)
	collgrad	-0.0906	-0.0903	-0.0825	-0.0887	-0.139**
		(0.0734)	(0.0728)	(0.0737)	(0.0786)	(0.0692)
	Shia_Arab	0.890***	0.890***	0.868***	0.622***	0.784***
		(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.177)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.597***	-1.597***	-1.521***	-1.489***	-1.303***
		(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.284)	(0.264)	(0.232)
	Kurd	1.424***	1.438***	1.290***	0.709***	1.005***
		(0.267)	(0.271)	(0.254)	(0.259)	(0.244)
	Other	0.172	0.169	0.188	0.131	0.243
		(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.280)	(0.266)	(0.218)
	water	-0.0104	-0.0124	-0.0346	-0.0100	0.0136
		(0.0827)	(0.0832)	(0.0819)	(0.0749)	(0.0719)
	cookfuel	0.445***	0.446***	0.414***	0.372***	0.320***
		(0.0591)	(0.0596)	(0.0586)	(0.0625)	(0.0719)
	gas	0.511***	0.515***	0.457***	0.465***	0.396***
		(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.0995)	(0.107)
	elec	0.129	0.126	0.114	0.0419	0.0796
		(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.122)
	unemployed		-0.0927	-0.104	-0.114*	-0.124*
			(0.0682)	(0.0670)	(0.0674)	(0.0718)
	security			1.177***	1.080***	0.990***
				(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.0933)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.236***	-0.241***
					(0.0617)	(0.0588)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					0.250
						(0.211)
	541.yrmo					0.769***
						(0.207)
	542.yrmo					0.649***
						(0.245)
	543.yrmo					0.153
						(0.375)
	544.yrmo					0.146
						(0.317)
	545.yrmo					0.259
						(0.287)
	546.yrmo					0.484**
						(0.214)
	547.yrmo					0.340*
						(0.179)

548.yrmo					0.348**
					(0.177)
553.yrmo					-0.0160
					(0.167)
554.yrmo					0.0236
					(0.165)
555.yrmo					-0.118
					(0.186)
556.yrmo					-0.192
					(0.149)
557.yrmo					0.00147
					(0.197)
558.yrmo					-0.109
					(0.198)
559.yrmo					-0.107
					(0.181)
560.yrmo					-0.132
					(0.165)
Constant	0.932***	0.935***	0.824***	1.762***	1.568***
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.294)	(0.315)
Observations	91,979	91,549	90,209	90,209	90,209

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_IA	Sunni qadas conf_IA	Baghdad conf_IA	Nationwide conf_IA
conf_IA	male	-0.262***	-0.465***	-0.197***	-0.281***
		(0.0318)	(0.0870)	(0.0303)	(0.0421)
	over40	0.0877***	0.000102	0.106***	0.0146
		(0.0272)	(0.0464)	(0.0366)	(0.0272)
	collgrad	-0.0887	-0.187	-0.176*	-0.00385
		(0.0786)	(0.147)	(0.0946)	(0.0948)
	Shia_Arab	0.622***		0.580***	1.016***
		(0.155)		(0.149)	(0.237)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.489***		-1.007***	-1.580***
		(0.264)		(0.150)	(0.407)
	Kurd	0.709***		0.519***	0.912***
		(0.259)		(0.130)	(0.333)
	Other	0.131		0.521***	0.0515
		(0.266)		(0.179)	(0.315)
	water	-0.0100	0.340	-0.00407	-0.0374
		(0.0749)	(0.347)	(0.0801)	(0.0855)
	cookfuel	0.372***	-0.0600	0.303***	0.0452
		(0.0625)	(0.135)	(0.0752)	(0.0999)
	gas	0.465***	0.348	0.391***	0.141
		(0.0995)	(0.367)	(0.0721)	(0.186)
	elec	0.0419	0.314	-0.152	0.209
		(0.108)	(0.345)	(0.119)	(0.150)
	unemployed	-0.114*	-0.0229	-0.117	-0.204**
		(0.0674)	(0.243)	(0.0814)	(0.103)
	security	1.080***	2.692***	0.893***	1.227***
		(0.108)	(0.497)	(0.101)	(0.154)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.236***	-0.547**	-0.125*	-0.286***
		(0.0617)	(0.272)	(0.0666)	(0.0656)
	Constant	1.762***	1.280	1.457***	1.737***
		(0.294)	(1.081)	(0.312)	(0.397)

Observations	90,209	12,046	49,975	52,723

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.168***	0.164***	0.165***	0.162***	0.174***
		(0.0297)	(0.0298)	(0.0294)	(0.0297)	(0.0283)
	over40	-0.0655**	-0.0657**	-0.0644**	-0.0635**	-0.0713**
		(0.0291)	(0.0288)	(0.0284)	(0.0287)	(0.0296)
	collgrad	-0.195***	-0.192***	-0.202***	-0.198***	-0.222***
		(0.0524)	(0.0525)	(0.0521)	(0.0554)	(0.0536)
	Shia_Arab	-0.833***	-0.832***	-0.822***	-0.746***	-0.672***
		(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.134)
	Sunni_Arab	1.201***	1.200***	1.180***	1.168***	1.264***
		(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.226)	(0.214)	(0.205)
	Kurd	-1.232***	-1.240***	-1.182***	-0.969***	-0.753***
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.235)	(0.248)
	Other	-0.202	-0.202	-0.208	-0.178	-0.129
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.185)
	water	0.0697	0.0701	0.0828	0.0746	0.0768
		(0.0570)	(0.0565)	(0.0561)	(0.0577)	(0.0524)
	cookfuel	-0.0674	-0.0669	-0.0627	-0.0556	-0.183***
		(0.0762)	(0.0761)	(0.0733)	(0.0771)	(0.0580)
	gas	-0.0299	-0.0298	-0.0177	-0.0196	-0.138
		(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.0896)
	elec	0.0600	0.0596	0.0595	0.0885	0.0179
		(0.0811)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)	(0.0863)	(0.103)
	unemployed		0.0261	0.0300	0.0292	0.0301
			(0.0753)	(0.0752)	(0.0750)	(0.0752)
	security			-0.220***	-0.183**	-0.215***
				(0.0847)	(0.0829)	(0.0799)
	l1_ln_sigact				0.0751	0.0826
					(0.0596)	(0.0602)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					-0.141
						(0.171)
	541.yrmo					-0.330
						(0.222)
	542.yrmo					-0.261
						(0.226)
	543.yrmo					0.456**
						(0.201)
	544.yrmo					0.0702
						(0.173)
	545.yrmo					0.0721
						(0.168)
	546.yrmo					-0.0779
						(0.101)
	547.yrmo					-0.322**

					(0.144)
	548.yrmo				-0.464***
					(0.138)
	553.yrmo				-0.317*
					(0.185)
	554.yrmo				-0.560***
					(0.165)
	557.yrmo				-0.158
					(0.228)
	558.yrmo				-0.329
					(0.203)
	559.yrmo				-0.296*
					(0.172)
	560.yrmo				-0.422**
					(0.168)
	Constant	-0.710***	-0.711***	-0.682***	-0.980***	-0.798***
		(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.251)	(0.284)
	Observations	64,098	63,864	63,121	63,121	63,121

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.162***	0.0546	0.135***	0.159**
		(0.0297)	(0.111)	(0.0416)	(0.0618)
	over40	-0.0635**	-0.0835	-0.0412	-0.0978***
		(0.0287)	(0.0896)	(0.0358)	(0.0377)
	collgrad	-0.198***	0.0635	-0.132***	-0.299***
		(0.0554)	(0.0613)	(0.0450)	(0.112)
	Shia_Arab	-0.746***		-0.580***	-1.071***
		(0.126)		(0.0807)	(0.353)
	Sunni_Arab	1.168***		0.549***	1.793***
		(0.214)		(0.144)	(0.407)
	Kurd	-0.969***		-1.577***	-0.629
		(0.235)		(0.323)	(0.465)
	Other	-0.178		-0.389**	0.108
		(0.167)		(0.191)	(0.447)
	water	0.0746	-0.464*	0.177***	0.0455
		(0.0577)	(0.242)	(0.0568)	(0.0955)
	cookfuel	-0.0556	-0.434***	0.0681	-0.131
		(0.0771)	(0.115)	(0.0640)	(0.108)
	gas	-0.0196	-1.048***	0.0363	-0.329
		(0.108)	(0.183)	(0.0925)	(0.242)
	elec	0.0885	-0.156	0.0118	0.155
		(0.0863)	(0.184)	(0.0803)	(0.173)
	unemployed	0.0292	0.247	0.0710	0.125
		(0.0750)	(0.227)	(0.0805)	(0.119)

security	-0.183**	-1.891***	-0.0824	-0.166
	(0.0829)	(0.410)	(0.0600)	(0.177)
l1_ln_sigact	0.0751	0.0120	-0.0946*	0.102
	(0.0596)	(0.176)	(0.0487)	(0.0765)
Constant	-0.980***	1.458**	-0.507**	-1.262**
	(0.251)	(0.632)	(0.237)	(0.495)
Observations	63,121	7,754	38,601	32,501

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_CF	conf_CF	conf_CF	conf_CF	conf_CF
conf_CF	male	0.0560	0.0498	0.0333	0.0285	0.0235
		(0.0758)	(0.0749)	(0.0811)	(0.0806)	(0.0755)
	over40	-0.0221	-0.0223	-0.0120	0.0152	0.0163
		(0.0738)	(0.0710)	(0.0664)	(0.0610)	(0.0598)
	collgrad	-0.0778	-0.0794	-0.0131	0.0286	0.0172
		(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.171)	(0.171)
	Shia_Arab	0.357**	0.351**	0.0249	-0.651	-0.681
		(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.200)	(0.434)	(0.440)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.460	-0.470	-0.354	-0.622	-0.559
		(0.436)	(0.433)	(0.398)	(0.405)	(0.391)
	Kurd	3.966***	3.964***	3.629***	2.781***	2.752***
		(0.392)	(0.391)	(0.356)	(0.275)	(0.261)
	Other	1.123***	1.109***	1.086***	0.783***	0.801***
		(0.297)	(0.290)	(0.284)	(0.187)	(0.195)
	water	0.0679	0.0635	0.0102	-0.0183	0.0796
		(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.136)
	cookfuel	0.369***	0.383***	0.336***	0.317***	0.193
		(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.126)
	gas	0.443**	0.437**	0.404***	0.407***	0.460***
		(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.124)
	elec	-0.252	-0.253	-0.264*	-0.214*	-0.370***
		(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.157)	(0.120)	(0.129)
	unemployed		-0.0214	-0.0365	-0.0692	-0.0743
			(0.0871)	(0.0854)	(0.0900)	(0.0899)
	security			0.939***	0.768***	0.784***
				(0.187)	(0.142)	(0.126)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.206***	-0.221***
					(0.0767)	(0.0766)
	549b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	550.yrmo					-0.345**

					(0.137)
	551.yrmo				-0.669***
					(0.107)
	552.yrmo				-0.832***
					(0.136)
	Constant	-3.213***	-3.205***	-3.387***	-2.130***	-1.643***
		(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.386)	(0.351)
	Observations	24,929	24,836	24,436	24,436	24,436

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: Predicting Confidence in Coalition Forces - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_CF	Sunni Provinces conf_CF	Nationwide conf_CF
conf_CF	male	0.0285	-0.368**	0.0285
		(0.0806)	(0.145)	(0.0806)
	over40	0.0152	0.00719	0.0152
		(0.0610)	(0.148)	(0.0610)
	collgrad	0.0286	-0.149	0.0286
		(0.171)	(0.336)	(0.171)
	Shia_Arab	-0.651		-0.651
		(0.434)		(0.434)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.622		-0.622
		(0.405)		(0.405)
	Kurd	2.781***		2.781***
		(0.275)		(0.275)
	Other	0.783***		0.783***
		(0.187)		(0.187)
	water	-0.0183	0.839***	-0.0183
		(0.125)	(0.160)	(0.125)
	cookfuel	0.317***	0.363**	0.317***
		(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.100)
	gas	0.407***	0.664***	0.407***
		(0.138)	(0.197)	(0.138)
	elec	-0.214*	-0.334**	-0.214*
		(0.120)	(0.162)	(0.120)
	unemployed	-0.0692	0.203	-0.0692
		(0.0900)	(0.239)	(0.0900)
	security	0.768***	2.807***	0.768***
		(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.142)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.206***	0.0457	-0.206***
		(0.0767)	(0.186)	(0.0767)
	Constant	-2.130***	-4.332***	-2.130***
		(0.386)	(0.888)	(0.386)
	Observations	24,436	5,143	24,436

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov	conf_gov
conf_gov	male	-0.259***	-0.257***	-0.287***	-0.286***	-0.280***
		(0.0594)	(0.0587)	(0.0557)	(0.0541)	(0.0531)
	over40	-0.00267	-0.00476	-0.0252	-0.0164	-0.0136
		(0.0474)	(0.0489)	(0.0516)	(0.0497)	(0.0489)
	collgrad	-0.314***	-0.314***	-0.279***	-0.265***	-0.265***
		(0.0607)	(0.0613)	(0.0651)	(0.0674)	(0.0683)
	Shia_Arab	1.230***	1.231***	0.881***	0.668***	0.648***
		(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.146)	(0.0983)	(0.0989)
	Sunni_Arab	-2.050***	-2.050***	-1.947***	-2.029***	-2.058***
		(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.271)	(0.272)
	Kurd	0.857***	0.850***	0.214	-0.118	-0.157
		(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.255)	(0.265)	(0.265)
	Other	-0.782*	-0.782*	-0.854*	-0.946*	-0.959**
		(0.459)	(0.458)	(0.452)	(0.489)	(0.487)
	water	0.238*	0.235*	0.181	0.183	0.167
		(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.127)
	cookfuel	0.383***	0.386***	0.333***	0.313***	0.233**
		(0.0992)	(0.0997)	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.110)
	gas	0.128	0.127	0.0811	0.0853	0.121
		(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.0763)	(0.0755)	(0.0782)
	elec	-0.232*	-0.236*	-0.299***	-0.284***	-0.285***
		(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.0878)	(0.0877)	(0.0908)
	unemployed		0.00915	-0.0115	-0.0328	-0.0472
			(0.0585)	(0.0578)	(0.0574)	(0.0621)
	security			1.755***	1.689***	1.634***
				(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.129)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.0840**	-0.101**
					(0.0403)	(0.0415)
	549b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	550.yrmo					0.295**
						(0.121)
	551.yrmo					0.355***
						(0.101)
	552.yrmo					-0.00758
						(0.0491)
	Constant	0.940***	0.940***	0.752***	1.243***	1.222***
		(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.185)	(0.180)
	Observations	24,547	24,443	24,054	24,054	24,054

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_gov	Sunni Provinces conf_gov	Nationwide conf_gov
conf_gov	male	-0.286***	-0.524***	-0.286***
		(0.0541)	(0.0744)	(0.0541)
	over40	-0.0164	-0.145*	-0.0164
		(0.0497)	(0.0775)	(0.0497)
	collgrad	-0.265***	-0.00302	-0.265***
		(0.0674)	(0.172)	(0.0674)
	Shia_Arab	0.668***		0.668***
		(0.0983)		(0.0983)
	Sunni_Arab	-2.029***		-2.029***
		(0.271)		(0.271)
	Kurd	-0.118		-0.118
		(0.265)		(0.265)
	Other	-0.946*		-0.946*
		(0.489)		(0.489)
	water	0.183	0.290***	0.183
		(0.123)	(0.0747)	(0.123)
	cookfuel	0.313***	0.665***	0.313***
		(0.113)	(0.0802)	(0.113)
	gas	0.0853	0.324**	0.0853
		(0.0755)	(0.133)	(0.0755)
	elec	-0.284***	-0.208**	-0.284***
		(0.0877)	(0.0834)	(0.0877)
	unemployed	-0.0328	-0.0410	-0.0328
		(0.0574)	(0.121)	(0.0574)
	security	1.689***	2.654***	1.689***
		(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.122)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.0840**	-0.128	-0.0840**
		(0.0403)	(0.0871)	(0.0403)
	Constant	1.243***	-0.736*	1.243***
		(0.185)	(0.414)	(0.185)
	Observations	24,054	4,780	24,054

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_IP	conf_IP	conf_IP	conf_IP	conf_IP
conf_IP	male	-0.345***	-0.340***	-0.374***	-0.374***	-0.375***
		(0.0683)	(0.0651)	(0.0619)	(0.0621)	(0.0595)
	over40	-0.0331	-0.0365	-0.0469	-0.0326	-0.0326
		(0.0342)	(0.0352)	(0.0360)	(0.0388)	(0.0372)
	collgrad	-0.343***	-0.345***	-0.313***	-0.290***	-0.287***
		(0.0543)	(0.0531)	(0.0519)	(0.0520)	(0.0530)
	Shia_Arab	1.390***	1.394***	1.074***	0.682**	0.694**
		(0.392)	(0.395)	(0.339)	(0.286)	(0.282)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.947*	-0.947*	-0.781	-0.942	-0.956
		(0.541)	(0.542)	(0.550)	(0.580)	(0.583)
	Kurd	1.439***	1.453***	0.893***	0.286	0.303
		(0.400)	(0.398)	(0.321)	(0.347)	(0.343)
	Other	-0.352	-0.347	-0.388*	-0.553**	-0.555**
		(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.243)
	water	0.134*	0.135*	0.0848	0.0877	0.0844
		(0.0729)	(0.0738)	(0.0669)	(0.0644)	(0.0560)
	cookfuel	-0.189*	-0.183	-0.267***	-0.314***	-0.294***
		(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.0966)
	gas	0.162	0.164	0.136	0.151	0.137
		(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.108)
	elec	0.0379	0.0406	0.00282	0.0370	0.0902
		(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.0807)	(0.0871)	(0.0985)
	unemployed		-0.0531	-0.0829	-0.124**	-0.124**
			(0.0667)	(0.0601)	(0.0553)	(0.0575)
	security			1.643***	1.527***	1.531***
				(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.114)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.157***	-0.152***
					(0.0332)	(0.0315)
	549b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	550.yrmo					-0.0235
						(0.0998)
	551.yrmo					0.148**
						(0.0710)
	552.yrmo					0.122
						(0.107)
	Constant	0.885***	0.886***	0.699***	1.626***	1.533***
		(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.129)	(0.332)	(0.333)
	Observations	26,016	25,915	25,477	25,477	25,477

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_IP	Sunni Provinces conf_IP	Nationwide conf_IP
conf_IP	male	-0.374***	-0.477***	-0.374***
		(0.0621)	(0.0599)	(0.0621)
	over40	-0.0326	-0.126**	-0.0326
		(0.0388)	(0.0621)	(0.0388)
	collgrad	-0.290***	-0.0491	-0.290***
		(0.0520)	(0.140)	(0.0520)
	Shia_Arab	0.682**		0.682**
		(0.286)		(0.286)
	Sunni_Arab	-0.942		-0.942
		(0.580)		(0.580)
	Kurd	0.286		0.286
		(0.347)		(0.347)
	Other	-0.553**		-0.553**
		(0.245)		(0.245)
	water	0.0877	0.0252	0.0877
		(0.0644)	(0.0602)	(0.0644)
	cookfuel	-0.314***	-0.526***	-0.314***
		(0.102)	(0.0670)	(0.102)
	gas	0.151	0.534***	0.151
		(0.101)	(0.119)	(0.101)
	elec	0.0370	0.0449	0.0370
		(0.0871)	(0.0675)	(0.0871)
	unemployed	-0.124**	-0.0925	-0.124**
		(0.0553)	(0.0966)	(0.0553)
	security	1.527***	2.078***	1.527***
		(0.109)	(0.137)	(0.109)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.157***	0.269***	-0.157***
		(0.0332)	(0.0665)	(0.0332)
	Constant	1.626***	-1.178***	1.626***
		(0.332)	(0.317)	(0.332)
	Observations	25,477	5,164	25,477

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA	conf_IA
conf_IA	male	-0.276***	-0.281***	-0.315***	-0.316***	-0.315***
		(0.0611)	(0.0598)	(0.0546)	(0.0552)	(0.0541)
	over40	-0.0207	-0.0214	-0.0353	-0.0170	-0.0164
		(0.0266)	(0.0273)	(0.0279)	(0.0289)	(0.0276)
	collgrad	-0.192***	-0.196***	-0.161***	-0.130***	-0.129***
		(0.0459)	(0.0459)	(0.0440)	(0.0443)	(0.0443)
	Shia_Arab	1.454***	1.457***	1.134***	0.682**	0.681**
		(0.460)	(0.464)	(0.407)	(0.321)	(0.312)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.579***	-1.579***	-1.434***	-1.629***	-1.638***
		(0.312)	(0.314)	(0.302)	(0.361)	(0.364)
	Kurd	1.425***	1.428***	0.857***	0.135	0.131
		(0.393)	(0.393)	(0.310)	(0.357)	(0.350)
	Other	-0.340	-0.336	-0.373	-0.570**	-0.566**
		(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.237)	(0.281)	(0.276)
	water	0.0894	0.0927	0.0410	0.0447	0.0439
		(0.0986)	(0.0991)	(0.0942)	(0.0908)	(0.0886)
	cookfuel	0.0676	0.0701	-0.00434	-0.0600	-0.0847
		(0.0849)	(0.0852)	(0.0867)	(0.119)	(0.0958)
	gas	0.0288	0.0357	-0.0100	0.00397	0.0112
		(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.0969)	(0.0919)	(0.0962)
	elec	-0.0908	-0.0832	-0.141	-0.105	-0.0815
		(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.118)
	unemployed		0.0209	-0.00111	-0.0519	-0.0572
			(0.0724)	(0.0630)	(0.0604)	(0.0614)
	security			1.691***	1.555***	1.542***
				(0.146)	(0.118)	(0.125)
	l1_ln_sigact				-0.188***	-0.192***
					(0.0366)	(0.0349)
	549b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	550.yrmo					-0.0208
						(0.0718)
	551.yrmo					0.142*
						(0.0764)
	552.yrmo					-0.0154
						(0.120)
	Constant	0.803***	0.798***	0.607***	1.719***	1.719***
		(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.365)	(0.336)
	Observations	25,695	25,597	25,167	25,167	25,167

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: Predicting Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

EQUATION	VARIABLES	All conf_IA	Sunni Provinces conf_IA	Nationwide conf_IA
conf_IA	male	-0.316***	-0.532***	-0.316***
		(0.0552)	(0.0656)	(0.0552)
	over40	-0.0170	-0.0270	-0.0170
		(0.0289)	(0.0682)	(0.0289)
	collgrad	-0.130***	0.0507	-0.130***
		(0.0443)	(0.150)	(0.0443)
	Shia_Arab	0.682**		0.682**
		(0.321)		(0.321)
	Sunni_Arab	-1.629***		-1.629***
		(0.361)		(0.361)
	Kurd	0.135		0.135
		(0.357)		(0.357)
	Other	-0.570**		-0.570**
		(0.281)		(0.281)
	water	0.0447	0.128*	0.0447
		(0.0908)	(0.0661)	(0.0908)
	cookfuel	-0.0600	0.0575	-0.0600
		(0.119)	(0.0721)	(0.119)
	gas	0.00397	0.374***	0.00397
		(0.0919)	(0.123)	(0.0919)
	elec	-0.105	-0.133*	-0.105
		(0.101)	(0.0740)	(0.101)
	unemployed	-0.0519	-0.0298	-0.0519
		(0.0604)	(0.107)	(0.0604)
	security	1.555***	2.418***	1.555***
		(0.118)	(0.129)	(0.118)
	l1_ln_sigact	-0.188***	0.198***	-0.188***
		(0.0366)	(0.0744)	(0.0366)
	Constant	1.719***	-1.703***	1.719***
		(0.365)	(0.355)	(0.365)
	Observations	25,167	5,081	25,167

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.138*	0.133	0.139	0.137	0.138
		(0.0789)	(0.0881)	(0.0869)	(0.0861)	(0.0886)
	over40	-0.0217	-0.0223	-0.0218	-0.0346	-0.0354
		(0.0265)	(0.0264)	(0.0278)	(0.0294)	(0.0290)
	collgrad	0.00957	0.00725	0.000751	-0.0189	-0.0211
		(0.0690)	(0.0680)	(0.0719)	(0.0705)	(0.0747)
	Shia_Arab	-1.286***	-1.289***	-1.159***	-0.817***	-0.834***
		(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.243)	(0.194)	(0.188)
	Sunni_Arab	1.922***	1.922***	1.876***	2.021***	2.048***
		(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.281)	(0.323)	(0.323)
	Kurd	-1.073***	-1.060***	-0.838**	-0.281	-0.319
		(0.406)	(0.399)	(0.368)	(0.366)	(0.357)
	Other	0.249	0.251	0.275	0.436	0.435
		(0.377)	(0.375)	(0.371)	(0.398)	(0.399)
	water	-0.0121	-0.00975	0.0171	0.0234	0.0523
		(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.147)
	cookfuel	-0.0606	-0.0609	-0.0262	0.00940	-0.0356
		(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.122)
	gas	0.0366	0.0371	0.0470	0.0357	0.0604
		(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.108)
	elec	0.283*	0.283*	0.287*	0.276	0.202
		(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.168)	(0.176)
	unemployed		0.0485	0.0464	0.0855	0.0850
			(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.128)
	security			-0.495***	-0.378***	-0.373***
				(0.119)	(0.0947)	(0.104)
	l1_ln_sigact				0.135***	0.126***
					(0.0424)	(0.0425)
	549b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	550.yrmo					-0.177
						(0.158)
	551.yrmo					-0.292*
						(0.175)
	552.yrmo					-0.324**
						(0.135)
	Constant	-0.743***	-0.745***	-0.680***	-1.488***	-1.251***
		(0.248)	(0.244)	(0.240)	(0.314)	(0.310)
	Observations	20,851	20,773	20,473	20,473	20,473

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Three-Model Comparison (Oct '05 - Jan '06: Province Cluster)

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_ANO	(2) conf_ANO	(3) conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.137	0.0364	0.137
		(0.0861)	(0.0779)	(0.0861)
	over40	-0.0346	-0.0835	-0.0346
		(0.0294)	(0.0796)	(0.0294)
	collgrad	-0.0189	-0.308*	-0.0189
		(0.0705)	(0.160)	(0.0705)
	Shia_Arab	-0.817***		-0.817***
		(0.194)		(0.194)
	Sunni_Arab	2.021***		2.021***
		(0.323)		(0.323)
	Kurd	-0.281		-0.281
		(0.366)		(0.366)
	Other	0.436		0.436
		(0.398)		(0.398)
	water	0.0234	-0.162**	0.0234
		(0.154)	(0.0786)	(0.154)
	cookfuel	0.00940	-0.251***	0.00940
		(0.135)	(0.0849)	(0.135)
	gas	0.0357	-0.470***	0.0357
		(0.101)	(0.133)	(0.101)
	elec	0.276	0.0314	0.276
		(0.168)	(0.0876)	(0.168)
	unemployed	0.0855	0.306**	0.0855
		(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.120)
	security	-0.378***	-1.521***	-0.378***
		(0.0947)	(0.117)	(0.0947)
	l1_ln_sigact	0.135***	0.237***	0.135***
		(0.0424)	(0.0887)	(0.0424)
	Constant	-1.488***	0.435	-1.488***
		(0.314)	(0.422)	(0.314)
	Observations	20,473	4,246	20,473

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX B: TEST IA REGRESSION TABLES

Table 21: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_ANO	(2) conf_ANO	(3) conf_ANO	(4) conf_ANO	(5) conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.168***	0.164***	0.165***	0.137***	0.156***
		(0.0297)	(0.0298)	(0.0294)	(0.0315)	(0.0317)
	over40	-0.0655**	-0.0657**	-0.0644**	-0.0476	-0.0637**
		(0.0291)	(0.0288)	(0.0284)	(0.0306)	(0.0309)
	collgrad	-0.195***	-0.192***	-0.202***	-0.193***	-0.240***
		(0.0524)	(0.0525)	(0.0521)	(0.0500)	(0.0538)
	Shia_Arab	-0.833***	-0.832***	-0.822***	-0.776***	-0.648***
		(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.122)
	Sunni_Arab	1.201***	1.200***	1.180***	0.952***	1.106***
		(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.226)	(0.165)	(0.174)
	Kurd	-1.232***	-1.240***	-1.182***	-1.200***	-0.852***
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.162)
	Other	-0.202	-0.202	-0.208	-0.261	-0.171
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.162)	(0.186)
	water	0.0697	0.0701	0.0828	0.0919	0.0926*
		(0.0570)	(0.0565)	(0.0561)	(0.0615)	(0.0533)
	cookfuel	-0.0674	-0.0669	-0.0627	-0.0151	-0.162***
		(0.0762)	(0.0761)	(0.0733)	(0.0667)	(0.0559)
	gas	-0.0299	-0.0298	-0.0177	0.0377	-0.0854
		(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.0914)	(0.0810)
	elec	0.0600	0.0596	0.0595	0.0874	-0.0102
		(0.0811)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)	(0.0850)	(0.106)
	unemployed		0.0261	0.0300	0.0159	0.0163
			(0.0753)	(0.0752)	(0.0763)	(0.0750)
	security			-0.220***	-0.0794	-0.107
				(0.0847)	(0.0684)	(0.0694)
	conf_gov				-0.772***	-0.858***
					(0.0985)	(0.0990)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					-0.0538
						(0.140)
	541.yrmo					-0.169
						(0.215)
	542.yrmo					-0.226
						(0.235)
	543.yrmo					0.402**
						(0.205)
	544.yrmo					0.0623
						(0.180)
	545.yrmo					0.0472
						(0.148)
	546.yrmo					-0.105
						(0.0812)
	547.yrmo					-0.359**
						(0.154)
	548.yrmo					-0.535***
						(0.161)
	553.yrmo					-0.541***
						(0.196)
	554.yrmo					-0.720***
						(0.174)
	557.yrmo					-0.266
						(0.239)

558.yrmo					-0.513**
					(0.215)
559.yrmo					-0.500***
					(0.177)
560.yrmo					-0.638***
					(0.183)
Constant	-0.710***	-0.711***	-0.682***	-0.172	0.139
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.141)	(0.181)
Observations	64,098	63,864	63,121	57,437	57,437

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 22: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.137***	-0.0692	0.125***	0.128**
		(0.0315)	(0.0700)	(0.0413)	(0.0645)
	over40	-0.0476	-0.102	-0.0277	-0.101***
		(0.0306)	(0.0861)	(0.0405)	(0.0373)
	collgrad	-0.193***	-0.0147	-0.145***	-0.261**
		(0.0500)	(0.0626)	(0.0544)	(0.104)
	Shia_Arab	-0.776***		-0.474***	-1.035***
		(0.133)		(0.0695)	(0.354)
	Sunni_Arab	0.952***		0.485***	1.542***
		(0.165)		(0.148)	(0.349)
	Kurd	-1.200***		-1.426***	-0.813**
		(0.126)		(0.338)	(0.395)
	Other	-0.261		-0.319	0.0187
		(0.162)		(0.216)	(0.403)
	water	0.0919	-0.324**	0.166***	0.0415
		(0.0615)	(0.141)	(0.0634)	(0.0945)
	cookfuel	-0.0151	-0.496***	0.0968	-0.148
		(0.0667)	(0.162)	(0.0670)	(0.117)
	gas	0.0377	-1.059***	0.0619	-0.250
		(0.0914)	(0.242)	(0.0746)	(0.245)
	elec	0.0874	-0.0628	0.0743	0.110
		(0.0850)	(0.0809)	(0.0645)	(0.179)
	unemployed	0.0159	0.285	0.0691	0.0876
		(0.0763)	(0.237)	(0.0912)	(0.115)
	security	-0.0794	-0.803***	0.00726	-0.0441
		(0.0684)	(0.257)	(0.0387)	(0.160)
	conf_gov	-0.772***	-1.717***	-0.571***	-0.841***
		(0.0985)	(0.544)	(0.0966)	(0.155)
	Constant	-0.172	1.741***	-0.478***	-0.389
		(0.141)	(0.155)	(0.134)	(0.369)

Observations	57,437	7,256	34,387	30,323	

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 23: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_ANO	(2) conf_ANO	(3) conf_ANO	(4) conf_ANO	(5) conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.168***	0.164***	0.165***	0.149***	0.161***
		(0.0297)	(0.0298)	(0.0294)	(0.0285)	(0.0278)
	over40	-0.0655**	-0.0657**	-0.0644**	-0.0591**	-0.0678**
		(0.0291)	(0.0288)	(0.0284)	(0.0282)	(0.0284)
	collgrad	-0.195***	-0.192***	-0.202***	-0.212***	-0.240***
		(0.0524)	(0.0525)	(0.0521)	(0.0499)	(0.0478)
	Shia_Arab	-0.833***	-0.832***	-0.822***	-0.782***	-0.708***
		(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.131)
	Sunni_Arab	1.201***	1.200***	1.180***	1.115***	1.219***
		(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.226)	(0.215)	(0.209)
	Kurd	-1.232***	-1.240***	-1.182***	-1.122***	-0.919***
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.158)
	Other	-0.202	-0.202	-0.208	-0.179	-0.127
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.158)	(0.181)
	water	0.0697	0.0701	0.0828	0.0873	0.0961*
		(0.0570)	(0.0565)	(0.0561)	(0.0559)	(0.0530)
	cookfuel	-0.0674	-0.0669	-0.0627	-0.0468	-0.181***
		(0.0762)	(0.0761)	(0.0733)	(0.0722)	(0.0569)
	gas	-0.0299	-0.0298	-0.0177	-0.00321	-0.114
		(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.0899)
	elec	0.0600	0.0596	0.0595	0.0643	0.0161
		(0.0811)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)	(0.0786)	(0.0963)
	unemployed		0.0261	0.0300	0.0177	0.0193
			(0.0753)	(0.0752)	(0.0722)	(0.0718)
	security			-0.220***	-0.181**	-0.207***
				(0.0847)	(0.0817)	(0.0769)
	conf_IP				-0.289**	-0.297**
					(0.124)	(0.129)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					-0.0568
						(0.152)
	541.yrmo					-0.196
						(0.204)
	542.yrmo					-0.201
						(0.220)
	543.yrmo					0.515**
						(0.205)
	544.yrmo					0.138
						(0.171)
	545.yrmo					0.174
						(0.150)
	546.yrmo					0.00819
						(0.0905)
	547.yrmo					-0.227
						(0.152)
	548.yrmo					-0.371***
						(0.140)
	553.yrmo					-0.306*

					(0.184)
554.yrmo					-0.515***
					(0.167)
557.yrmo					-0.0753
					(0.240)
558.yrmo					-0.261
					(0.211)
559.yrmo					-0.214
					(0.181)
560.yrmo					-0.328*
					(0.188)
Constant	-0.710***	-0.711***	-0.682***	-0.485***	-0.351*
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.181)
Observations	64,098	63,864	63,121	62,323	62,323

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 24: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.149***	0.0306	0.124***	0.147**
		(0.0285)	(0.0704)	(0.0372)	(0.0605)
	over40	-0.0591**	-0.0808	-0.0290	-0.0916**
		(0.0282)	(0.0852)	(0.0360)	(0.0356)
	collgrad	-0.212***	0.0497	-0.135***	-0.289***
		(0.0499)	(0.0678)	(0.0470)	(0.109)
	Shia_Arab	-0.782***		-0.486***	-1.150***
		(0.128)		(0.0639)	(0.343)
	Sunni_Arab	1.115***		0.493***	1.782***
		(0.215)		(0.124)	(0.392)
	Kurd	-1.122***		-1.522***	-0.853**
		(0.129)		(0.333)	(0.390)
	Other	-0.179		-0.305*	0.127
		(0.158)		(0.176)	(0.423)
	water	0.0873	-0.461*	0.162***	0.0405
		(0.0559)	(0.243)	(0.0589)	(0.0969)
	cookfuel	-0.0468	-0.459***	0.0988	-0.157
		(0.0722)	(0.104)	(0.0638)	(0.109)
	gas	-0.00321	-1.038***	0.0625	-0.322
		(0.105)	(0.207)	(0.0903)	(0.244)
	elec	0.0643	-0.170	0.0700	0.125
		(0.0786)	(0.177)	(0.0539)	(0.180)
	unemployed	0.0177	0.239	0.0520	0.104
		(0.0722)	(0.227)	(0.0856)	(0.110)
	security	-0.181**	-1.848***	-0.0215	-0.236
		(0.0817)	(0.307)	(0.0439)	(0.173)
	conf_IP	-0.289**	-0.116	-0.292***	-0.163

		(0.124)	(0.433)	(0.106)	(0.195)
	Constant	-0.485***	1.563***	-0.686***	-0.738*
		(0.139)	(0.198)	(0.130)	(0.393)
	Observations	62,323	7,637	38,101	32,112

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 25: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves

EQUATION	VARIABLES	(1) conf_ANO	(2) conf_ANO	(3) conf_ANO	(4) conf_ANO	(5) conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.168***	0.164***	0.165***	0.139***	0.153***
		(0.0297)	(0.0298)	(0.0294)	(0.0286)	(0.0277)
	over40	-0.0655**	-0.0657**	-0.0644**	-0.0494*	-0.0592**
		(0.0291)	(0.0288)	(0.0284)	(0.0286)	(0.0291)
	collgrad	-0.195***	-0.192***	-0.202***	-0.216***	-0.245***
		(0.0524)	(0.0525)	(0.0521)	(0.0500)	(0.0494)
	Shia_Arab	-0.833***	-0.832***	-0.822***	-0.730***	-0.644***
		(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.120)	(0.120)
	Sunni_Arab	1.201***	1.200***	1.180***	0.993***	1.111***
		(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.226)	(0.180)	(0.183)
	Kurd	-1.232***	-1.240***	-1.182***	-1.038***	-0.801***
		(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.158)
	Other	-0.202	-0.202	-0.208	-0.145	-0.0825
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.150)	(0.176)
	water	0.0697	0.0701	0.0828	0.0853	0.0985**
		(0.0570)	(0.0565)	(0.0561)	(0.0547)	(0.0489)
	cookfuel	-0.0674	-0.0669	-0.0627	-0.0103	-0.153***
		(0.0762)	(0.0761)	(0.0733)	(0.0684)	(0.0525)
	gas	-0.0299	-0.0298	-0.0177	0.0363	-0.0818
		(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.0865)
	elec	0.0600	0.0596	0.0595	0.0853	0.0278
		(0.0811)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)	(0.0806)	(0.0949)
	unemployed		0.0261	0.0300	0.0218	0.0228
			(0.0753)	(0.0752)	(0.0707)	(0.0707)
	security			-0.220***	-0.117	-0.145**
				(0.0847)	(0.0733)	(0.0713)
	conf_IA				-0.678***	-0.693***
					(0.128)	(0.126)
	537b.yrmo					0
						(0)
	540.yrmo					-0.105
						(0.159)
	541.yrmo					-0.258
						(0.192)
	542.yrmo					-0.206
						(0.203)
	543.yrmo					0.479***
						(0.178)
	544.yrmo					0.104
						(0.155)
	545.yrmo					0.140
						(0.146)
	546.yrmo					-0.0134
						(0.0855)

547.yrmo					-0.244*
					(0.138)
548.yrmo					-0.387***
					(0.128)
553.yrmo					-0.347*
					(0.184)
554.yrmo					-0.581***
					(0.165)
557.yrmo					-0.142
					(0.229)
558.yrmo					-0.326
					(0.206)
559.yrmo					-0.279
					(0.172)
560.yrmo					-0.420**
					(0.177)
Constant	-0.710***	-0.711***	-0.682***	-0.255*	-0.0785
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.143)	(0.175)
Observations	64,098	63,864	63,121	61,214	61,214

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 26: Predicting Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EQUATION	VARIABLES	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO	conf_ANO
conf_ANO	male	0.139***	-0.0165	0.118***	0.134**
		(0.0286)	(0.0644)	(0.0364)	(0.0622)
	over40	-0.0494*	-0.102	-0.0186	-0.0961**
		(0.0286)	(0.0878)	(0.0358)	(0.0373)
	collgrad	-0.216***	0.0166	-0.144***	-0.280***
		(0.0500)	(0.0927)	(0.0497)	(0.109)
	Shia_Arab	-0.730***		-0.454***	-1.001***
		(0.120)		(0.0543)	(0.342)
	Sunni_Arab	0.993***		0.444***	1.575***
		(0.180)		(0.109)	(0.351)
	Kurd	-1.038***		-1.444***	-0.671*
		(0.123)		(0.320)	(0.394)
	Other	-0.145		-0.269	0.155
		(0.150)		(0.179)	(0.397)
	water	0.0853	-0.414**	0.158***	0.0346
		(0.0547)	(0.205)	(0.0605)	(0.0897)
	cookfuel	-0.0103	-0.434***	0.121**	-0.150
		(0.0684)	(0.151)	(0.0610)	(0.109)
	gas	0.0363	-1.046***	0.0889	-0.320
		(0.102)	(0.155)	(0.0878)	(0.227)
	elec	0.0853	-0.168	0.0870	0.137
		(0.0806)	(0.145)	(0.0576)	(0.169)
	unemployed	0.0218	0.262	0.0550	0.102

	(0.0707)	(0.230)	(0.0844)	(0.105)
security	-0.117	-1.414***	0.0107	-0.124
	(0.0733)	(0.351)	(0.0434)	(0.162)
conf_IA	-0.678***	-0.887**	-0.503***	-0.790***
	(0.128)	(0.428)	(0.153)	(0.173)
Constant	-0.255*	1.767***	-0.569***	-0.381
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.350)
Observations	61,214	7,654	37,073	31,900

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX C: TEST II REGRESSION TABLES

Table 27: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.477*	0.455*	0.394	0.391	0.113
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.245)
Sunni_Arab	0.292	0.299	0.210	0.203	-0.0763
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.301)	(0.302)	(0.295)
Kurd	1.807***	1.708***	1.527**	1.539**	0.948
	(0.623)	(0.631)	(0.626)	(0.627)	(0.620)
Other	1.046	1.018	1.138	1.181	1.106
	(1.017)	(1.018)	(1.006)	(1.013)	(0.974)
water	-0.535***	-0.544***	-0.456**	-0.448**	-0.287
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.193)
cookfuel	-0.00825	-0.0138	-0.137	-0.131	0.0938
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.200)
gas	-0.287	-0.260	-0.0526	-0.0530	0.0354
	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.225)
elec	-0.312	-0.260	-0.299	-0.304	-0.401
	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.319)
unemployed		-0.705	-0.567	-0.550	-0.492
		(0.691)	(0.684)	(0.686)	(0.674)
security			-0.582***	-0.562***	0.111
			(0.194)	(0.201)	(0.241)
conf_CF				-0.184	-0.423
				(0.459)	(0.445)
post_Fallujah					-0.600***
					(0.118)
post_Askaria					-0.302***
					(0.0749)
Constant	2.397***	2.478***	2.586***	2.597***	2.965***
	(0.206)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.226)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.087	0.090	0.116	0.116	0.189
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 28: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.ln_sig1	Sunni qadas F.ln_sig1	Baghdad F.ln_sig1	Nationwide F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.113		0.430*	-0.189
	(0.245)		(0.256)	(0.313)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0763	-1.673	-0.442	0.181
	(0.295)	(1.839)	(0.276)	(0.404)
Kurd	0.948	-0.587	1.093	0.954
	(0.620)	(1.782)	(1.475)	(0.686)
Other	1.106	-0.0610	-0.0363	0.670
	(0.974)	(2.271)	(1.228)	(1.105)
water	-0.287	-0.0971	-0.102	-0.314
	(0.193)	(0.278)	(0.224)	(0.244)
cookfuel	0.0938	0.502	-0.271	0.412*
	(0.200)	(0.679)	(0.315)	(0.246)
gas	0.0354	-1.133	0.377	0.0984
	(0.225)	(0.924)	(0.292)	(0.310)
elec	-0.401	-0.706	0.322	-0.334
	(0.319)	(0.570)	(0.625)	(0.344)
unemployed	-0.492	1.856	0.230	-0.0448
	(0.674)	(1.148)	(1.313)	(0.730)
security	0.111	-2.073*	0.384	-0.130
	(0.241)	(1.094)	(0.470)	(0.282)
conf_CF	-0.423	-1.103	-0.887	0.0706
	(0.445)	(1.756)	(0.821)	(0.526)
post_Fallujah	-0.600***		-0.835***	
	(0.118)		(0.163)	
post_Askaria	-0.302***	-0.0711	-0.511***	0.0277
	(0.0749)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.130)
post_rapemurder		0.0202		0.323**
		(0.142)		(0.155)
Constant	2.965***	5.494***	4.037***	2.359***
	(0.226)	(1.850)	(0.242)	(0.289)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.189	0.287	0.392	0.126
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 29: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.477*	0.455*	0.394	0.376	0.123
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.245)
Sunni_Arab	0.292	0.299	0.210	0.120	-0.0654
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.301)	(0.306)	(0.298)
Kurd	1.807***	1.708***	1.527**	1.727***	0.960
	(0.623)	(0.631)	(0.626)	(0.638)	(0.639)
Other	1.046	1.018	1.138	1.190	1.025
	(1.017)	(1.018)	(1.006)	(1.004)	(0.972)
water	-0.535***	-0.544***	-0.456**	-0.370*	-0.299
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.203)	(0.197)
cookfuel	-0.00825	-0.0138	-0.137	-0.131	0.0749
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.200)
gas	-0.287	-0.260	-0.0526	-0.0337	0.0385
	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.225)
elec	-0.312	-0.260	-0.299	-0.258	-0.381
	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.321)
unemployed		-0.705	-0.567	-0.542	-0.514
		(0.691)	(0.684)	(0.683)	(0.675)
security			-0.582***	-0.488**	0.0674
			(0.194)	(0.203)	(0.238)
conf_gov				-0.460	-0.0700
				(0.302)	(0.306)
post_Fallujah					-0.585***
					(0.121)
post_Askaria					-0.287***
					(0.0779)
Constant	2.397***	2.478***	2.586***	2.861***	2.972***
	(0.206)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.284)	(0.276)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.087	0.090	0.116	0.122	0.187
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 30: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.ln_sig1	Sunni qadas F.ln_sig1	Baghdad F.ln_sig1	Nationwide F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.123		0.476*	-0.200
	(0.245)		(0.255)	(0.314)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0654	-1.631	-0.530*	0.190
	(0.298)	(1.779)	(0.280)	(0.406)
Kurd	0.960	-1.524	1.389	0.896
	(0.639)	(1.857)	(1.436)	(0.712)
Other	1.025	-1.445	-0.375	0.664
	(0.972)	(2.369)	(1.206)	(1.099)
water	-0.299	-0.0609	-0.0677	-0.324
	(0.197)	(0.274)	(0.222)	(0.246)
cookfuel	0.0749	0.337	-0.432	0.411*
	(0.200)	(0.644)	(0.318)	(0.246)
gas	0.0385	-0.966	0.531*	0.0956
	(0.225)	(0.901)	(0.293)	(0.310)
elec	-0.381	-0.865	0.415	-0.346
	(0.321)	(0.574)	(0.623)	(0.342)
unemployed	-0.514	1.476	-0.172	-0.0599
	(0.675)	(1.108)	(1.312)	(0.732)
security	0.0674	-2.184*	0.317	-0.135
	(0.238)	(1.074)	(0.447)	(0.273)
conf_gov	-0.0700	1.042	-0.597*	0.122
	(0.306)	(0.777)	(0.341)	(0.371)
post_Fallujah	-0.585***		-0.803***	
	(0.121)		(0.162)	
post_Askaria	-0.287***	-0.0480	-0.504***	0.0317
	(0.0779)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.127)
post_rapemurder		0.0940		0.338**
		(0.150)		(0.154)
Constant	2.972***	5.392***	4.417***	2.293***
	(0.276)	(1.792)	(0.332)	(0.353)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.187	0.318	0.401	0.126
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 31: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.477*	0.455*	0.394	0.393	0.130
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.245)
Sunni_Arab	0.292	0.299	0.210	-0.0111	-0.133
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.301)	(0.321)	(0.312)
Kurd	1.807***	1.708***	1.527**	1.606**	0.971
	(0.623)	(0.631)	(0.626)	(0.624)	(0.623)
Other	1.046	1.018	1.138	1.442	1.142
	(1.017)	(1.018)	(1.006)	(1.014)	(0.984)
water	-0.535***	-0.544***	-0.456**	-0.410**	-0.299
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.192)
cookfuel	-0.00825	-0.0138	-0.137	-0.109	0.0801
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.199)
gas	-0.287	-0.260	-0.0526	-0.0425	0.0382
	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.225)
elec	-0.312	-0.260	-0.299	-0.231	-0.358
	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.321)
unemployed		-0.705	-0.567	-0.514	-0.490
		(0.691)	(0.684)	(0.682)	(0.675)
security			-0.582***	-0.508**	0.0699
			(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.235)
conf_IP				-0.618*	-0.243
				(0.322)	(0.323)
post_Fallujah					-0.572***
					(0.121)
post_Askaria					-0.278***
					(0.0769)
Constant	2.397***	2.478***	2.586***	3.049***	3.103***
	(0.206)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.326)	(0.316)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.087	0.090	0.116	0.126	0.188
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 32: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.ln_sig1	Sunni qadas F.ln_sig1	Baghdad F.ln_sig1	Nationwide F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.130		0.439*	-0.175
	(0.245)		(0.262)	(0.313)
Sunni_Arab	-0.133	-1.333	-0.436	0.126
	(0.312)	(1.835)	(0.308)	(0.414)
Kurd	0.971	-0.355	1.406	1.012
	(0.623)	(1.841)	(1.454)	(0.687)
Other	1.142	0.308	-0.236	0.826
	(0.984)	(2.426)	(1.222)	(1.120)
water	-0.299	-0.0707	-0.160	-0.300
	(0.192)	(0.284)	(0.219)	(0.245)
cookfuel	0.0801	0.448	-0.315	0.409*
	(0.199)	(0.662)	(0.314)	(0.246)
gas	0.0382	-1.165	0.425	0.0902
	(0.225)	(0.931)	(0.290)	(0.310)
elec	-0.358	-0.645	0.223	-0.312
	(0.321)	(0.565)	(0.621)	(0.344)
unemployed	-0.490	2.072	0.128	-0.0221
	(0.675)	(1.269)	(1.320)	(0.731)
security	0.0699	-2.044*	0.229	-0.107
	(0.235)	(1.095)	(0.451)	(0.269)
conf_IP	-0.243	-0.276	-0.0339	-0.220
	(0.323)	(0.443)	(0.375)	(0.375)
post_Fallujah	-0.572***		-0.831***	
	(0.121)		(0.165)	
post_Askaria	-0.278***	-0.0742	-0.496***	0.0286
	(0.0769)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.127)
post_rapemurder		-0.0366		0.310**
		(0.166)		(0.153)
Constant	3.103***	5.254***	4.036***	2.522***
	(0.316)	(1.837)	(0.347)	(0.399)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.188	0.287	0.386	0.127
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 33: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.477*	0.455*	0.394	0.400	0.122
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.245)
Sunni_Arab	0.292	0.299	0.210	0.149	-0.0473
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.301)	(0.315)	(0.306)
Kurd	1.807***	1.708***	1.527**	1.550**	0.921
	(0.623)	(0.631)	(0.626)	(0.627)	(0.622)
Other	1.046	1.018	1.138	1.170	1.009
	(1.017)	(1.018)	(1.006)	(1.008)	(0.972)
water	-0.535***	-0.544***	-0.456**	-0.447**	-0.310
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.192)
cookfuel	-0.00825	-0.0138	-0.137	-0.130	0.0762
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.200)
gas	-0.287	-0.260	-0.0526	-0.0500	0.0359
	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.225)
elec	-0.312	-0.260	-0.299	-0.265	-0.393
	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.324)
unemployed		-0.705	-0.567	-0.505	-0.531
		(0.691)	(0.684)	(0.691)	(0.682)
security			-0.582***	-0.547***	0.0551
			(0.194)	(0.202)	(0.238)
conf_IA				-0.195	0.0261
				(0.299)	(0.292)
post_Fallujah					-0.593***
					(0.119)
post_Askaria					-0.294***
					(0.0753)
Constant	2.397***	2.478***	2.586***	2.719***	2.918***
	(0.206)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.300)	(0.292)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.087	0.090	0.116	0.117	0.186
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 34: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.ln_sig1	Sunni qadas F.ln_sig1	Baghdad F.ln_sig1	Nationwide F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.122		0.379	-0.194
	(0.245)		(0.263)	(0.314)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0473	-2.386	-0.325	0.185
	(0.306)	(1.819)	(0.296)	(0.407)
Kurd	0.921	-1.744	1.359	0.953
	(0.622)	(1.821)	(1.450)	(0.687)
Other	1.009	-1.792	-0.232	0.679
	(0.972)	(2.333)	(1.214)	(1.099)
water	-0.310	-0.111	-0.194	-0.318
	(0.192)	(0.267)	(0.221)	(0.246)
cookfuel	0.0762	0.512	-0.324	0.413*
	(0.200)	(0.634)	(0.313)	(0.246)
gas	0.0359	-0.962	0.419	0.100
	(0.225)	(0.884)	(0.289)	(0.310)
elec	-0.393	-0.856	0.210	-0.347
	(0.324)	(0.554)	(0.619)	(0.348)
unemployed	-0.531	1.455	-0.169	-0.0579
	(0.682)	(1.084)	(1.354)	(0.737)
security	0.0551	-2.935**	0.116	-0.123
	(0.238)	(1.166)	(0.463)	(0.271)
conf_IA	0.0261	0.686*	0.330	0.0457
	(0.292)	(0.397)	(0.362)	(0.349)
post_Fallujah	-0.593***		-0.833***	
	(0.119)		(0.163)	
post_Askaria	-0.294***	-0.0746	-0.509***	0.0322
	(0.0753)	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.127)
post_rapemurder		0.0738		0.331**
		(0.140)		(0.152)
Constant	2.918***	6.079***	3.830***	2.331***
	(0.292)	(1.811)	(0.314)	(0.366)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.186	0.343	0.390	0.126
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 35: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1	F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	0.407	0.409	0.323	-0.0128	-0.160
	(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.347)	(0.352)	(0.349)
Sunni_Arab	0.416	0.409	0.322	0.667	0.395
	(0.429)	(0.432)	(0.423)	(0.424)	(0.426)
Kurd	7.024***	6.954***	5.984***	4.569***	3.197*
	(1.681)	(1.716)	(1.710)	(1.716)	(1.752)
Other	2.062	2.049	2.780*	2.392	1.886
	(1.686)	(1.692)	(1.672)	(1.626)	(1.602)
water	-0.460	-0.462	-0.271	-0.285	-0.244
	(0.290)	(0.291)	(0.292)	(0.283)	(0.277)
cookfuel	0.0674	0.0599	-0.104	-0.0943	-0.0529
	(0.382)	(0.385)	(0.380)	(0.369)	(0.361)
gas	-0.122	-0.113	0.168	0.339	0.390
	(0.384)	(0.387)	(0.391)	(0.382)	(0.375)
elec	-0.728	-0.708	-0.613	-0.452	-0.566
	(0.567)	(0.576)	(0.564)	(0.549)	(0.539)
unemployed		-0.301	-0.456	-0.528	-0.519
		(1.362)	(1.331)	(1.291)	(1.263)
security			-0.769***	-0.868***	-0.203
			(0.269)	(0.263)	(0.353)
conf_ANO				-1.344***	-1.076**
				(0.418)	(0.421)
post_Fallujah					-0.437***
					(0.159)
Constant	2.274***	2.307***	2.468***	3.073***	3.315***
	(0.297)	(0.332)	(0.330)	(0.371)	(0.374)
Observations	199	199	199	199	199
R-squared	0.178	0.178	0.221	0.272	0.308
Number of qada	42	42	42	42	42

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 36: Predicting the Number of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	(1) F.ln_sig1	(2) F.ln_sig1	(3) F.ln_sig1	(4) F.ln_sig1
Shia_Arab	-0.160	-4.140	0.0740	-0.561
	(0.349)	(9.938)	(0.337)	(0.612)
Sunni_Arab	0.395	25.11	-0.0848	0.789
	(0.426)	(17.01)	(0.384)	(0.909)
Kurd	3.197*		4.031	2.313
	(1.752)		(2.480)	(2.364)
Other	1.886	22.08	0.0456	3.037
	(1.602)	(16.86)	(1.709)	(3.030)
water	-0.244	0.358	-0.0787	-0.328
	(0.277)	(0.748)	(0.264)	(0.529)
cookfuel	-0.0529	-0.877	-0.282	0.845
	(0.361)	(2.041)	(0.434)	(0.681)
gas	0.390	-2.837	0.584	0.483
	(0.375)	(3.643)	(0.416)	(0.804)
elec	-0.566	3.148	0.220	-0.369
	(0.539)	(2.565)	(0.903)	(0.836)
unemployed	-0.519	15.12	-0.0393	1.136
	(1.263)	(7.958)	(1.588)	(1.908)
security	-0.203	42.04	0.000508	-0.650
	(0.353)	(31.42)	(0.538)	(0.539)
conf_ANO	-1.076**	3.093	-0.665	-0.630
	(0.421)	(2.451)	(0.406)	(0.850)
post_Fallujah	-0.437***	-0.164	-0.685***	-0.138
	(0.159)	(0.279)	(0.197)	(0.259)
Constant	3.315***	-23.67	4.123***	2.626***
	(0.374)	(18.21)	(0.319)	(0.736)
Observations	199	21	110	119
R-squared	0.308	0.840	0.449	0.231
Number of qada	42	8	10	42

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 37: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0341**	-0.0293**	-0.0283**	-0.0280**	-0.0132
	(0.0142)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0177	-0.0194	-0.0179	-0.0173	-0.00618
	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0168)
Kurd	-0.0154	0.00628	0.00938	0.00849	0.0478
	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0353)	(0.0354)	(0.0353)
Other	0.0414	0.0475	0.0454	0.0422	0.0379
	(0.0581)	(0.0568)	(0.0568)	(0.0572)	(0.0554)
water	0.00224	0.00421	0.00270	0.00209	1.59e-05
	(0.0112)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)
cookfuel	0.0200*	0.0212*	0.0233**	0.0228**	0.0139
	(0.0115)	(0.0112)	(0.0114)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)
gas	0.0302**	0.0244*	0.0209	0.0209	0.0144
	(0.0127)	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0128)
elec	-0.0139	-0.0253	-0.0246	-0.0242	-0.0204
	(0.0189)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0181)
unemployed		0.155***	0.153***	0.151***	0.123***
		(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0388)	(0.0383)
security			0.00997	0.00843	-0.0286**
			(0.0110)	(0.0113)	(0.0137)
conf_CF				0.0141	0.0153
				(0.0259)	(0.0253)
post_Fallujah					0.0274***
					(0.00674)
post_Askaria					0.00165
					(0.00426)
Constant	0.0532***	0.0355***	0.0336***	0.0329***	0.0221*
	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0125)	(0.0126)	(0.0128)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.118	0.162	0.164	0.165	0.223
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 38: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in Coalition Forces - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.pctatks	Sunni qadas F.pctatks	Baghdad F.pctatks	Nationwide F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0132		0.00186	0.0114**
	(0.0139)		(0.0244)	(0.00556)
Sunni_Arab	-0.00618		0.00984	-0.0220***
	(0.0168)		(0.0263)	(0.00719)
Kurd	0.0478		0.114	0.0101
	(0.0353)		(0.141)	(0.0122)
Other	0.0379		0.152	0.000496
	(0.0554)		(0.117)	(0.0196)
water	1.59e-05	-0.000369	0.00646	0.00395
	(0.0110)	(0.0139)	(0.0214)	(0.00434)
cookfuel	0.0139	-0.000492	0.0158	-0.00324
	(0.0114)	(0.0329)	(0.0301)	(0.00438)
gas	0.0144	0.00836	0.000758	0.00466
	(0.0128)	(0.0465)	(0.0279)	(0.00551)
elec	-0.0204	0.0316	-0.174***	0.00109
	(0.0181)	(0.0234)	(0.0597)	(0.00611)
unemployed	0.123***	0.00393	0.573***	0.00532
	(0.0383)	(0.0518)	(0.125)	(0.0130)
security	-0.0286**	-0.00686	-0.00861	-0.00705
	(0.0137)	(0.0484)	(0.0449)	(0.00501)
conf_CF	0.0153	0.00698	-0.0162	-0.00547
	(0.0253)	(0.0605)	(0.0784)	(0.00935)
post_Fallujah	0.0274***		0.0399**	
	(0.00674)		(0.0155)	
post_Askaria	0.00165	-0.00968	0.0219*	-0.00391*
	(0.00426)	(0.00621)	(0.0125)	(0.00231)
post_rapemurder		-0.0135*		-0.00362
		(0.00692)		(0.00275)
Constant	0.0221*	0.0527***	0.00401	0.0226***
	(0.0128)	(0.00786)	(0.0231)	(0.00514)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.223	0.182	0.370	0.121
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 39: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0341**	-0.0293**	-0.0283**	-0.0263*	-0.0135
	(0.0142)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0138)	(0.0137)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0177	-0.0194	-0.0179	-0.00782	0.000601
	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0171)	(0.0167)
Kurd	-0.0154	0.00628	0.00938	-0.0129	0.0240
	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0353)	(0.0356)	(0.0358)
Other	0.0414	0.0475	0.0454	0.0396	0.0334
	(0.0581)	(0.0568)	(0.0568)	(0.0561)	(0.0545)
water	0.00224	0.00421	0.00270	-0.00688	-0.00673
	(0.0112)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0114)	(0.0111)
cookfuel	0.0200*	0.0212*	0.0233**	0.0227**	0.0157
	(0.0115)	(0.0112)	(0.0114)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)
gas	0.0302**	0.0244*	0.0209	0.0188	0.0127
	(0.0127)	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0126)
elec	-0.0139	-0.0253	-0.0246	-0.0292	-0.0261
	(0.0189)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0185)	(0.0180)
unemployed		0.155***	0.153***	0.150***	0.118***
		(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0382)	(0.0379)
security			0.00997	-0.000567	-0.0330**
			(0.0110)	(0.0114)	(0.0133)
conf_gov				0.0514***	0.0498***
				(0.0169)	(0.0172)
post_Fallujah					0.0227***
					(0.00681)
post_Askaria					-0.00245
					(0.00437)
Constant	0.0532***	0.0355***	0.0336***	0.00300	-0.00313
	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0125)	(0.0159)	(0.0155)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.118	0.162	0.164	0.189	0.243
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 40: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Government - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.pctatks	Sunni qadas F.pctatks	Baghdad F.pctatks	Nationwide F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0135		-0.00671	0.0107*
	(0.0137)		(0.0231)	(0.00556)
Sunni_Arab	0.000601		0.0325	-0.0209***
	(0.0167)		(0.0253)	(0.00718)
Kurd	0.0240		0.123	0.00410
	(0.0358)		(0.130)	(0.0126)
Other	0.0334		0.175	-0.00286
	(0.0545)		(0.109)	(0.0195)
water	-0.00673	0.000259	-0.0142	0.00321
	(0.0111)	(0.0132)	(0.0201)	(0.00436)
cookfuel	0.0157	0.00707	0.0395	-0.00336
	(0.0112)	(0.0315)	(0.0287)	(0.00436)
gas	0.0127	0.00522	-0.0209	0.00449
	(0.0126)	(0.0443)	(0.0265)	(0.00549)
elec	-0.0261	0.00145	-0.217***	0.000868
	(0.0180)	(0.0265)	(0.0564)	(0.00607)
unemployed	0.118***	0.0158	0.636***	0.00417
	(0.0379)	(0.0495)	(0.119)	(0.0130)
security	-0.0330**	-0.0266	-0.0307	-0.00922*
	(0.0133)	(0.0462)	(0.0405)	(0.00484)
conf_gov	0.0498***	0.0385*	0.125***	0.00948
	(0.0172)	(0.0206)	(0.0308)	(0.00656)
post_Fallujah	0.0227***		0.0337**	
	(0.00681)		(0.0147)	
post_Askaria	-0.00245	-0.00881	0.0236**	-0.00416*
	(0.00437)	(0.00592)	(0.0117)	(0.00225)
post_rapemurder		-0.0112		-0.00319
		(0.00666)		(0.00272)
Constant	-0.00313	0.0464***	-0.0809***	0.0172***
	(0.0155)	(0.00820)	(0.0300)	(0.00626)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.243	0.260	0.442	0.127
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 41: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0341**	-0.0293**	-0.0283**	-0.0281**	-0.0152
	(0.0142)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0138)	(0.0137)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0177	-0.0194	-0.0179	0.00191	0.00947
	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0180)	(0.0175)
Kurd	-0.0154	0.00628	0.00938	0.00232	0.0390
	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0353)	(0.0350)	(0.0350)
Other	0.0414	0.0475	0.0454	0.0183	0.0142
	(0.0581)	(0.0568)	(0.0568)	(0.0568)	(0.0553)
water	0.00224	0.00421	0.00270	-0.00136	-0.00148
	(0.0112)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)	(0.0108)
cookfuel	0.0200*	0.0212*	0.0233**	0.0208*	0.0138
	(0.0115)	(0.0112)	(0.0114)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)
gas	0.0302**	0.0244*	0.0209	0.0200	0.0140
	(0.0127)	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.0129)	(0.0126)
elec	-0.0139	-0.0253	-0.0246	-0.0307*	-0.0272
	(0.0189)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0185)	(0.0180)
unemployed		0.155***	0.153***	0.148***	0.117***
		(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0382)	(0.0379)
security			0.00997	0.00335	-0.0291**
			(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0132)
conf_IP				0.0552***	0.0513***
				(0.0180)	(0.0182)
post_Fallujah					0.0230***
					(0.00679)
post_Askaria					-0.00185
					(0.00432)
Constant	0.0532***	0.0355***	0.0336***	-0.00771	-0.0123
	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0125)	(0.0183)	(0.0178)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.118	0.162	0.164	0.189	0.242
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 42: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Police - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.pctatks	Sunni qadas F.pctatks	Baghdad F.pctatks	Nationwide F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0152		-0.0128	0.0106*
	(0.0137)		(0.0239)	(0.00553)
Sunni_Arab	0.00947		0.0504*	-0.0187**
	(0.0175)		(0.0281)	(0.00730)
Kurd	0.0390		0.107	0.00640
	(0.0350)		(0.133)	(0.0121)
Other	0.0142		0.118	-0.00912
	(0.0553)		(0.112)	(0.0198)
water	-0.00148	-0.00224	0.000465	0.00312
	(0.0108)	(0.0140)	(0.0200)	(0.00433)
cookfuel	0.0138	-0.000280	0.0145	-0.00307
	(0.0112)	(0.0326)	(0.0287)	(0.00434)
gas	0.0140	0.0110	-0.00289	0.00515
	(0.0126)	(0.0462)	(0.0265)	(0.00547)
elec	-0.0272	0.0233	-0.179***	-8.37e-05
	(0.0180)	(0.0246)	(0.0567)	(0.00608)
unemployed	0.117***	-0.0112	0.603***	0.00396
	(0.0379)	(0.0545)	(0.121)	(0.0129)
security	-0.0291**	-0.00878	-0.0254	-0.00862*
	(0.0132)	(0.0469)	(0.0413)	(0.00475)
conf_IP	0.0513***	0.0138	0.111***	0.0132**
	(0.0182)	(0.0176)	(0.0343)	(0.00661)
post_Fallujah	0.0230***		0.0330**	
	(0.00679)		(0.0151)	
post_Askaria	-0.00185	-0.00948	0.0195	-0.00403*
	(0.00432)	(0.00616)	(0.0120)	(0.00224)
post_rapemurder		-0.0106		-0.00295
		(0.00771)		(0.00271)
Constant	-0.0123	0.0475***	-0.0702**	0.0128*
	(0.0178)	(0.0103)	(0.0317)	(0.00704)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.242	0.196	0.417	0.134
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 43: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0341**	-0.0293**	-0.0283**	-0.0301**	-0.0166
	(0.0142)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0177	-0.0194	-0.0179	0.00117	0.00974
	(0.0173)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0174)	(0.0170)
Kurd	-0.0154	0.00628	0.00938	0.00235	0.0396
	(0.0356)	(0.0352)	(0.0353)	(0.0347)	(0.0346)
Other	0.0414	0.0475	0.0454	0.0355	0.0304
	(0.0581)	(0.0568)	(0.0568)	(0.0558)	(0.0541)
water	0.00224	0.00421	0.00270	3.37e-05	-0.000626
	(0.0112)	(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)
cookfuel	0.0200*	0.0212*	0.0233**	0.0212*	0.0138
	(0.0115)	(0.0112)	(0.0114)	(0.0112)	(0.0111)
gas	0.0302**	0.0244*	0.0209	0.0201	0.0139
	(0.0127)	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.0129)	(0.0125)
elec	-0.0139	-0.0253	-0.0246	-0.0354*	-0.0317*
	(0.0189)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0185)	(0.0180)
unemployed		0.155***	0.153***	0.134***	0.104***
		(0.0386)	(0.0387)	(0.0383)	(0.0380)
security			0.00997	-0.00101	-0.0343**
			(0.0110)	(0.0112)	(0.0133)
conf_IA				0.0608***	0.0580***
				(0.0166)	(0.0163)
post_Fallujah					0.0241***
					(0.00664)
post_Askaria					-0.00103
					(0.00419)
Constant	0.0532***	0.0355***	0.0336***	-0.00764	-0.0140
	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0125)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)
Observations	362	362	362	362	362
R-squared	0.118	0.162	0.164	0.199	0.253
Number of qada	44	44	44	44	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 44: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Iraqi Army - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	All F.pctatks	Sunni qadas F.pctatks	Baghdad F.pctatks	Nationwide F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0166		-0.0161	0.0105*
	(0.0137)		(0.0241)	(0.00553)
Sunni_Arab	0.00974		0.0425	-0.0200***
	(0.0170)		(0.0271)	(0.00719)
Kurd	0.0396		0.105	0.00644
	(0.0346)		(0.133)	(0.0121)
Other	0.0304		0.152	-0.00340
	(0.0541)		(0.111)	(0.0194)
water	-0.000626	-0.000172	-0.00522	0.00307
	(0.0107)	(0.0138)	(0.0202)	(0.00433)
cookfuel	0.0138	0.00337	0.0120	-0.00313
	(0.0111)	(0.0332)	(0.0287)	(0.00434)
gas	0.0139	0.00924	0.000312	0.00523
	(0.0125)	(0.0463)	(0.0265)	(0.00547)
elec	-0.0317*	0.0241	-0.180***	-0.000807
	(0.0180)	(0.0253)	(0.0567)	(0.00613)
unemployed	0.104***	-0.000683	0.472***	0.00187
	(0.0380)	(0.0517)	(0.124)	(0.0130)
security	-0.0343**	-0.0189	-0.0472	-0.00920*
	(0.0133)	(0.0512)	(0.0425)	(0.00478)
conf_IA	0.0580***	0.0119	0.108***	0.0122**
	(0.0163)	(0.0184)	(0.0332)	(0.00615)
post_Fallujah	0.0241***		0.0398***	
	(0.00664)		(0.0149)	
post_Askaria	-0.00103	-0.00949	0.0180	-0.00395*
	(0.00419)	(0.00618)	(0.0120)	(0.00224)
post_rapemurder		-0.0122*		-0.00318
		(0.00713)		(0.00269)
Constant	-0.0140	0.0495***	-0.0564*	0.0146**
	(0.0162)	(0.00933)	(0.0288)	(0.00645)
Observations	362	51	150	282
R-squared	0.253	0.191	0.418	0.134
Number of qada	44	9	10	44

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 45: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - All Communities, All Waves

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks	F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0362*	-0.0337*	-0.0335*	-0.0375*	-0.0230
	(0.0206)	(0.0199)	(0.0201)	(0.0207)	(0.0204)
Sunni_Arab	-0.0237	-0.0178	-0.0176	-0.0127	0.00725
	(0.0252)	(0.0245)	(0.0247)	(0.0255)	(0.0252)
Kurd	-0.0955	-0.0262	-0.0238	-0.0392	0.0664
	(0.0911)	(0.0904)	(0.0930)	(0.0952)	(0.0960)
Other	0.0488	0.0472	0.0461	0.0446	0.0800
	(0.0888)	(0.0861)	(0.0868)	(0.0870)	(0.0846)
water	0.00647	0.00865	0.00822	0.00805	0.00683
	(0.0164)	(0.0159)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0159)
cookfuel	0.0199	0.0203	0.0206	0.0216	0.0296
	(0.0196)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0195)
gas	0.0249	0.0209	0.0203	0.0218	0.00513
	(0.0210)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0212)	(0.0214)
elec	0.00338	-0.0175	-0.0177	-0.0160	-0.00927
	(0.0309)	(0.0305)	(0.0306)	(0.0307)	(0.0298)
unemployed		0.234***	0.234***	0.237***	0.205***
		(0.0647)	(0.0650)	(0.0651)	(0.0643)
security			0.00182	0.00119	-0.0467**
			(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0200)
conf_ANO				-0.0168	-0.0323
				(0.0217)	(0.0214)
post_Fallujah					0.0344***
					(0.00930)
post_rapemurder					0.00133
					(0.00690)
Constant	0.0653***	0.0378**	0.0373*	0.0440**	0.0247
	(0.0174)	(0.0185)	(0.0190)	(0.0209)	(0.0210)
Observations	240	240	240	240	240
R-squared	0.119	0.176	0.176	0.179	0.242
Number of qada	43	43	43	43	43

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 46: Predicting the Percentage of Future Attacks, Controlling for Confidence in the Armed National Opposition (Insurgency) - Four-Model Comparison

VARIABLES	(1) F.pctatks	(2) F.pctatks	(3) F.pctatks	(4) F.pctatks
Shia_Arab	-0.0230		-0.0215	0.0209**
	(0.0204)		(0.0302)	(0.00819)
Sunni_Arab	0.00725		0.0606*	-0.0363***
	(0.0252)		(0.0353)	(0.0122)
Kurd	0.0664		0.137	0.00362
	(0.0960)		(0.211)	(0.0295)
Other	0.0800		0.205	-0.0128
	(0.0846)		(0.137)	(0.0333)
water	0.00683	0.0161	0.0240	0.00861
	(0.0159)	(0.0163)	(0.0244)	(0.00634)
cookfuel	0.0296	-0.0589	0.0460	0.0211***
	(0.0195)	(0.0455)	(0.0403)	(0.00728)
gas	0.00513	0.0882	-0.0125	-0.0113
	(0.0214)	(0.0520)	(0.0386)	(0.0104)
elec	-0.00927	0.108	-0.152*	-0.0123
	(0.0298)	(0.0629)	(0.0798)	(0.00961)
unemployed	0.205***	0.0783	0.573***	-0.00575
	(0.0643)	(0.0616)	(0.146)	(0.0201)
security	-0.0467**	0.129	-0.0269	-0.0203***
	(0.0200)	(0.101)	(0.0492)	(0.00691)
conf_ANO	-0.0323	0.0885***	-0.0996***	0.0154*
	(0.0214)	(0.0241)	(0.0359)	(0.00803)
post_Fallujah	0.0344***	0.0128*	0.0423*	0.0158***
	(0.00930)	(0.00658)	(0.0214)	(0.00341)
post_rapemurder	0.00133	0.00132	-0.0118	0.00637***
	(0.00690)	(0.00540)	(0.0169)	(0.00196)
Constant	0.0247	-0.0483**	0.0241	0.00524
	(0.0210)	(0.0219)	(0.0277)	(0.00885)
Observations	240	28	120	160
R-squared	0.242	0.748	0.390	0.347
Number of qada	43	8	10	43

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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