CATALAN NATIONALISM: A SHIFT FROM CIVIC TO ETHNIC

Ahmed Elmahdi

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science, Concentration European Governance.

Chapel Hill
2013

Approved by:

Leisbet Hooghe

John Stephens

Gary Marks
ABSTRACT

AHMED ELMAHDI: Catalan Nationalism: A Shift from Civic to Ethnic
(Under the direction of Leisbet Hooghe)

Has the nationalist culture of Catalonia begun to move in the direction of ethnic exclusivity? As a region with a population harboring strong nationalist attitudes, Catalonia is among a unique brand of nationalism which elevates civic participation above ethnic lineage. This thesis will explore whether Catalan identity is truly inclusive and whether it has shifted towards the exclusionary ethnic brand of nationalism in response to political and economic crisis.
DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my father for being an example of dignity, discipline and principle, my mother for teaching me to maintain my essence and Isra for challenging me even when I don’t want to be challenged. Thank you to Sarah Hutchison for being the heart beat of TAM. Thank you to John Stephens, Christiane Lemke, Holger Moroff, Liesbet Hooghe and Erica Edwards. We believe in ourselves because you believe in us.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..............................................................................................................v

Sections

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................1
II. CIU AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN CATALONIA................................................. 2
III. SOURCES OF NATIONALISM ................................................................................................. 4
IV. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF NATIONALISM.............................................................. 5
V. SPAIN UNDER FRANCO........................................................................................................... 8
   a. Franco government and autonomy
   b. Effect on labor movement and the left
   c. Effect on cultural distinctiveness and intellectual life
   d. Opponents and Supporters of Franco: drawing the battle lines

VI. THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION BETWEEN SPAIN AND CATALONIA
    ON CATALAN NATIONALISM.........................................................................................15

VII. THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMY..................................................................................... 19

XIII. EDUCATION AND THE SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION MODEL.............................. 23

IX. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................26
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustrations

1.1 Elections to the Catalan Parliament, 2010 ................................................. 3
1.2 Elections to the Catalan Parliament, 2012 ...................................................... 4
2.1 National Identity in Catalonia, 1979–88 ......................................................... 16
2.2 National Identity and Origins, Catalonia, 1988 ............................................... 17
Introduction

In the central-north of Barcelona sits the famous Gracia district. Predominantly a residential area, it is a world away from the bright lights and resort hotels along the city’s downtown coastline. Its slower paced atmosphere and relatively cheaper cost of living than the tourist trap destinations in El Born or El Gotico, make it an attractive local for families, artists and creative types. Its working class and middle class population make it a hub of political activity. From south to north the medieval churches and architecture gradually morph into cramped apartment buildings displaying Catalonia’s red and yellow or red, yellow and blue national flags; often draped from Victorian era balconies. In the barris of Barcelona one observes a contradiction of culture made noticeable by conservatism founded on Catholic social principle juxtaposed alongside an independent spirit fostered by a long history of self sufficiency. Catalonia and the Basque Country (El Pais Vasco) are the most independent of Spain’s twenty-two autonomous regions. These two regions are unique in their respective national identities which have had repercussions for society at large. Everything from public attitudes on immigration to regional government interaction with the Spanish central government is affected by the construction of national identities. Basque national identity is of course founded on the premise that citizenship in the Basque nation is ascribed depending on one’s ethnic lineage. In contrast, Catalan national identity is based on civic engagement criteria; the most important being functional ability in the Catalan language. It is assumed by many that Catalan civic nationalism is more fluid than the very rigid Basque ethnic nationalism precisely because it gives immigrants to Catalonia a straight
forward path toward assimilation through civic engagement. This thesis will seek to answer the question what are the roots of persistent Catalan nationalism, and in particular, of the persistent civic nature of Catalan nationalism. I will ask the question of whether Catalan nationalism can be considered civic in the first place given some of the anti-immigrant elements in the Catalan nationalist movement today. Before the issue of nationalism can be tackled Catalan nationalism must first be dissected. Catalan nationalism will be treated as an ideology and as a political movement, respectively. I will therefore look into the civic and ethnic aspects of both; providing real world manifestations of each to illustrate any shift from a more inclusive civic to a more exclusive ethnic form of nationalism.

**CiU and Contemporary Politics in Catalonia**

On November 26th of 2012 political analysts and pundits were stumped by what they thought would be a confirmation of the predictions they had been making for months prior to this date. Catalonia’s parliamentary elections took place the day prior on the 25th and political parties running on a platform of patriotism and Catalan independence were projected to win a majority in the Generalitat de Catalunya. For the most part political analysts were correct in their assessment that the Convergencia i Unio or Convergence and Union party, the most dominant political party in Catalonia’s parliament, would win the majority of seats. What was unexpected was the amount of seats lost by the CiU from the previous election. During the two year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2012 the CiU enjoyed a 62 seat majority out of 135 seats in the Generalitat. The parliamentary elections of 2012 gave CiU another majority but the difference this time was their loss of twelve parliamentary seats.
Analysts had expected CiU’s representation to dramatically increase from the previous election. And so the question remains; why the opposite affect?

Figure 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November 28, 2010 Election Results - Catalonia Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Electors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,363,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,152,630 50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid Ballots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,354 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,130,276 99.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank Ballots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91,531 2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ticket</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergencia i Unió (CiU)</td>
<td>1,202,830</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC-PSOE)</td>
<td>575,233</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partit Popular (PP)</td>
<td>397,066</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUA)</td>
<td>230,824</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)</td>
<td>219,173</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (Si)</td>
<td>102,921</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadania (Cs)</td>
<td>105,154</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC)</td>
<td>75,134</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagrupament Independentista (RI.cat)</td>
<td>39,834</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>99,476</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Spain transitioned from a totalitarian state under Franco to a democratic system CiU arose as one of the first mainstream Catalan parties in the country. The party began as a coalition of two smaller parties; Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UCD). The CDC was primarily a socialist party with a history of being staunchly on the side of Catalan autonomy. In the period following the death of Franco there was an upsurge of nationalism in Catalonia. Polling trends showed that voters favored parties with a strong pro-Catalan platform (Balcells, 177). In this respect the CDC was in prime position to take advantage of the upswing in nationalist sentiment but it couldn’t capitalize due to its attachments to Spanish socialists. By toning down its pro-socialist rhetoric and forming an alliance between the UCD and CDC the CiU was able to carve a political space for itself and become the mainstream political party in Catalonia’s parliament. The CiU toed a moderate line between right and left that catered to Catholic conservatism on the right while taking care not to alienate the majority of Catalans who are
suspicious of political forces resembling the fascist Franco dictatorship they had lived under for so many decades.

The Catalan political arena provides several alternatives to the center right CiU. Esquerra Republica de Catalonya or ERC is one of the premier left-wing parties competing for the nationalist vote. In the 1970’s ERC was willing to form an alliance with two other left-wing parties, the PSC and the PSUC (Balcells, 184). In the elections of 2012 ERC’s share of the vote was 13.7 percent, a 6.7 percent increase from the elections of 2010 and an increase from the vote this party has received in previous elections. The ERC’s base constituency is comprised of ultranationalists; increasingly bringing them into competition with parties on the far end of the left-right spectrum. In 2003 the ERC formed a coalition with the socialist PSC; upsetting some of its base voters who viewed PSC as insufficiently pro-Catalan (Pericay Coll, 2012). The far left Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) and even the radical right wing Reagrupament (RI) have worked to gain a greater share of this voting block by increasing the level of nationalist rhetoric. Hard-line nationalists have yet to interrupt the dominance of CiU and PSC. However, as illustrated by ERC’s gains at the expense of those parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections, there is a space for parties that are unwaveringly on the side of Catalan autonomy.

While most agree Catalonia should have the right to self determination, parties differ on other matters such as labor policy. Today parties with strong ties to labor unions are charged with subservience to the central government in Madrid. Their close ties to national socialists made the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) a prime target for accusations of attempting to derail the movement for independence (Balcells, 172-76). The PSC and even its Spanish socialist counterparts were popular in Catalonia precisely because of their resistance to
corporatist powers in Madrid. Like the workers unions and socialists, corporate interests in Catalonia were well integrated with wealthy Spanish business owners. As it became clear that the Franco dictatorship was coming to an end, upper class Spaniards and Catalans began to fear that socialists and communists would capture the central government. Wealthy Catalans were especially frightened by the prospect of labor unions from various sectors of the Catalan economy forming a single unified labor organization independent of Spanish labor (Balcells, 176). PSC represented the specter of socialism to the upper class in Catalonia and so the powerful mobilized against it. CiU provided a safe political party to support although there remained concerns with CiU’s pro-independence stances.

Sources of Nationalism

Put simply, nationalism is a state in which group identity becomes highly entrenched; creating rigid separation between populations and as a result establishing in-groups as well as out-groups within society. Nationalism can come in different forms depending on the history, culture and national context it takes place in. Regional nationalism like that of Catalonia and the Basque Country has the added aspect of a local culture that is different from and at times at odds with that of the larger state of Spain. Sociologists and political scientists often rely on social identity theory to get at the root of nationalism. The premise behind social identity theory is that individuals have a positive perception of the group they belong to (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2009). This positive association with one’s group has led some to theorize that individuals can in turn develop a superiority complex reliant on viewing members of other groups as inferior. Some social scientists differentiate between nationalism that is “civic” and nationalism that is “ethnic”. Civic nationalism would exist in a society in which membership
in the nation hinges on one's civic participation. Ethnic nationalism on the other hand is based on one’s genetic makeup and, theoretically at least, is much more exclusive than civic nationalism (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2009). It is difficult to find a specific case of nationalism which is either only civic or only ethnic so these conceptualizations of nationalism can only help us to categorize it to a certain extent. It can be argued that civic and ethnic identities tend to overlap. It is therefore difficult to categorize Basque or Catalan nationalism as purely ethnic or purely civic.

Historical Foundations of Nationalism

As a geographical region, with its mountains and Mediterranean coastline, Catalonia has provided a contrast to the flat lands of central Spain. Not only has Catalonia provided a geographical opposite to Castile-La Mancha (central Spain) but it has also provided an entire cultural and economic opposite to it. Trade has historically kept the relationship between Spain and Catalonia a competitive yet cordial one due to the mutual benefit each receives from the others economic strengths. Unlike the Spanish Empire, whose great wealth was accumulated through conquest in Europe and the Americas, Catalonia built its wealth through a robust trade network; taking advantage of Mediterranean shipping routes and exchanging goods throughout Southern Europe and North Africa. Historical accounts suggest that a society has occupied what is modern day Catalonia from at least 600 B.C. with the establishment of the Greek city of Empuries (McRoberts, 9-15). Long periods of invasion and occupation marked the earliest recorded history of Catalonia with Roman and Visigoth invaders leaving the most noticeable marks on Catalan culture. The Romans invaded and occupied Catalonia beginning in 218 B.C. and for a short time making it the seat of the
Roman Empire (McRoberts, 9). After the collapse of the Roman Empire the Visigoths ruled Catalonia until the beginning of the eighth century. Like much of Spain, Catalonia was invaded by Moors from Andalusia who were expelled by Charlemagne at the beginning of the ninth century.

For its protection from further invasion Catalonia relied on the Frankish Empire ruled by the Carolingian dynasty under Louis, son of Charlemagne (Balcells, 3). Due to the decline of the Frankish Empire several feudal territories formed the nucleus of what is Catalonia today. This historical period is particularly important to nationalists because they consider it to be the point at which Catalonia as a nation first formed. In 985 A.D. Catalonia was once again invaded by the Moorish Muslims who succeeded in sacking Barcelona (McRoberts, 9-10). Count Wilfred the Hairy, who succeeded in uniting several of the feudal territories developed by the Franks (known commonly as the Hispanic March) to buffer themselves from the Moorish caliphate in the South, abolished Catalonia’s subordinate status under the Franks when it became clear that the Franks were no longer capable of providing Catalonia with protection. Nationalists claim Wilfred the Hairy’s unification of sections of the Hispanic March as the official birth of Catalonia. This is somewhat inaccurate due to the name “Catalonia” being used two hundred years later. Catalan as a language, however, has a much longer history; developing during the period of Roman rule as Latin mixed with local languages. Language became a major export helping the young Catalan state to develop alliances with its neighboring powers.

The development of a symbiotic relationship between Catalonia and the Kingdom of Aragon resulted in the Catalan language becoming the lingua-franca in the Kingdom of Aragon as well as Valencia and the Balearic Islands. It is interesting to note that even today
the flags of Aragon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands share the red and gold stripes of Catalonia. Some Catalan nationalists include these outlying regions as part of their vision of an independent Catalan nation. Of course this is an ambitious conception of a future independent state considering these outlying autonomous communities have their own national self image. In the state of Valencia for example the regional language, although almost identical to Catalan, is described by locals as Valencian. This suggests that Valencians view themselves as a distinct community separate from Catalonia or any other autonomous region for that matter. None the less, history shows that Catalonia was once comprised of these autonomous regions. The Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia proper (or what was called Old Catalonia at the time) were unified through the marriage of nobles from both principalities. The Catalan-Aragon unification into one kingdom was ruled by a hereditary monarchy known as the House of Barcelona and to foreigners they were commonly referred to as the “Catalan Kings” (Balcells, 7).

For the modern nationalist movement the Catalan-Aragon Kingdom is of particular importance because it marks the birth of a unique political tradition essential to modern Catalan national identity. As the process of unification was underway, Catalonia found itself in the dilemma of how to bring together different provinces into one kingdom. Feudal “earldoms” had developed during the period of Carolingian oversight which made Catalonia one of the first feudal systems in Europe and the first to develop something resembling a representative democratic system. The lords of the original Catalan principalities did not want to relinquish all of their power. To calm their fears a series of contractual agreements were developed between the principalities, feudal lords, commoners and king; giving citizens and nobles in the Catalan earldoms some say in how they were to be governed. The Catalan
Usatges was adopted before the Magna Carta making it the first document of its kind (Mcroberts, 9-11). In Catalonia it became the legal framework upon which other contracts were based. Its declaration of equality between “men of honor” (or burghers) and the feudal nobility sets the Catalan Usatges as a unique and innovative experiment in decentralizing power. The affect of a document outlining the limitations of power created pactisme, a culture of contractualism and a preference for expansion through negotiation rather than through violent conquest. The modern Generalitat grew out of the pactisme tradition as Catalan kings began forming councils to mediate between themselves and the general public.

**Spain under Franco**

Recognition of regional identities has existed in various capacities in Spain for quite some time so it is a wonder that Catalonia has been the target of state oppression throughout its history. As an autonomous region today Catalonia boasts one of Spain’s most robust regional economies. Economic self sufficiency based on a strong industrial work force is partly to blame for some of this suspicion from central Spain.

*Precursor: From the de Rivera regime to short lived-democratic rule*

While the Franco dictatorship is remembered as a time of brutal repression, it is not the first instance in which the powers in central Spain have worked to stifle the nationalist ambitions of Catalonia. The military coup that resulted in the dictatorship of general Miguel Primo de Rivera was one such period in which official state policies were enacted specifically to curb Catalan nationalism. De Rivera came into power in 1923 as regionalist entities in Spain began to mobilize against the central government as well as the Spanish monarchy. De Rivera had a special attachment to Catalonia as he had previously acted as its
Captain General in the Spanish military. He had projected himself as a pro-regionalist and in doing so gained the support of regionalist throughout the various autonomous communities of Spain. In Catalonia his main benefactors were the Catalan bourgeoisie who were concerned less with greater autonomy as they were with the activities of the Catalan anarchist organization CNT (Balcells, 79-83). They expected that De Rivera would focus his energies on leftist dissidents and grant them relative freedom to govern as they pleased. Upon seizing power De Rivera outlawed public display of the Catalan nationalist flag along with implementing the infamous ban on the speaking of Catalan in public for the first time (Balcells, 85). The de Rivera dictatorship laid down the blueprint for suppressing the expansion of nationalism by first targeting workers unions along with other socializing institutions such as APEC (Association for the Protection of Teaching of Catalan). The Catalan bourgeoisie assisted and at times directly collaborated with the dictatorship in its efforts to eliminate any opposition to its power. The outcome of this unholy union of upper class Catalans and the military dictatorship was the banning of the CADCI (Autonomist Center of Shop Assistants and Industrial Employees); an organization formed in Barcelona focused on worker’s rights advocacy and development of education programs for manufacturing employees (Balcells, 52-52).

For the powers in central Spain working tirelessly to take a regionally fragmented society and concentrate its resources into the center, the autonomous regional governments needed to be stripped of their political power. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya, the political organization formed by the first Catalan kings with the express purpose of uniting Catalonia’s four provincial communities and now functioning as a regional parliament comprised of one house, worried the de Rivera government greatly. Although it held no
political or economic power and only functioned as a way to strengthen Catalan national identity, de Rivera saw it as a threat that needed either to be subverted or eliminated. His fear was that a strengthened Catalan national identity would eventually lead to a Catalan Republic forming to the east of Spain. The ban on speaking Catalan along with the banning of public service organizations were in direct response to the Mancomunitat’s efforts to develop an inclusive identity transcending often divisive political affiliations. He began by first dissolving the regional councils in all of the antonymous communities of Spain, save that of the Basque Country. The Mancomunitat was reduced to a social organization under the supervision of a state appointed president before eventually being dissolved completely (Balcells, 83). Even the non-political domain of professional sports was adversely affected by the clash of Catalan and Spanish identity politics. The famed Barcelona Football Club was banned from professional competition as it was a rallying point for the expression of nationalist attitudes. Interestingly, another Barcelona football team, known today as Espanyol Football Club, was allowed to continue competing because of its affiliation with the Spanish crown. The upshot is that the de Rivera regime alienated its traditional ideological supporters—the Catalan bourgeoisie—from the central Spanish state.

The nation’s first experience with democracy came during the short lived Second Republic which lasted from 1931 to 1936. It was brought to an untimely end by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War; resulting in the rise of one of the most influential rulers in modern Spanish history. Under the command of General Francisco Franco, Nationalist military rebels went to war with Republican forces fighting for a democratic representative government. The Spanish Civil War brought to the surface many of the issues that lay dormant for many years due to Spain’s regions achieving a relative level of autonomy from the central government.
Many Spaniards saw representative democracy as an ineffective means of maintaining a unified Spanish state as was proven by the failure of the Second Republic period. The instability of the democratic experiment caused divisions along class lines as well as regional lines. Upper class Spaniards tended to side with the Nationalists while lower class Spaniards would support the pro-democracy Republicans (Hamann, 19). Religion was also a topic of division. Even the Catholic Church, which plays such a strong role in the lives of Spaniards and others South Europeans, was debated. For this reason the forty year reign of Francisco Franco is a defining moment in the history of Spain.

*The Franco Regime*

Nationalists and Republicans represented two sides of the Spanish citizenry. Conflict between the two sides caused class warfare in society between upper and lower class Spaniards. After defeating the Republican forces and seizing the government, Franco’s regime became wary of leftist elements in society and reacted by targeting and eliminating those they deemed as a threat to their power. Labor organizations became a prime target for the fascists. This was primarily in response to the labor movement’s support of the Republicans during the Civil War. Franco’s regime used anti-labor tactics such as imposing sanctions on the political activity of working-class organizations to put a check on any viable opposition growing out of the labor movement (Hamann, 19). This focus on limiting labors political activity was used in part to protect Spain’s upper-class elite from a populist labor movement spiraling into violent confrontations between rich and poor. The Franco dictatorship, which functioned as a classical authoritarian government, did allow for some
pluralism. As long as the varying political interests did not pose any opposition to Franco’s rule they were allowed some room for political maneuvering.

Franco’s focus on crushing labor inspired pro-democracy movements was somewhat in vein. Organized labor became a symbol of opposition to Spain’s fascist regime for the simple fact that they provided a contrast to the dictatorship. The attention paid by Franco to the labor movement had the unintended consequence of making organized labor the default venue for the expression of political disagreement. In the words of Seymour Lipset,

“the more and longer-lasting the state repression, the more drastic the consequences. Where the right to combine in the labor market was severely restricted…the decision to act in politics was forced on trade unions. Whether they liked it or not, unions became political institutions; they had first to change the distribution of political power within the state before they could effectively exert power in the market” (Hamann, 20).

Despite Franco’s efforts at breaking the back of working-class movements, organized labor became instrumental in pushing for democratic reform and bolstered the already existing nascent democracy (Hamann, 20). The struggle against state-imposed limitations on their freedom to participate in politics helped Spanish labor and trade unions forge strategies they would later use to secure their position among other forces in politics. Understanding the obstacles faced by Spain’s labor movement is vital in understanding how labor influenced economic policy in the post Franco era.

The relationship between labor and the state under Franco can best be understood by looking at the institutional structure within the government that dealt with labor issues.
General Franco’s policy when dealing with the working class was to entangle labor and other left leaning groups in a web of legal procedures and requirements meant to deter them from even attempting any explicit acts of dissidence. If the inconvenience of jumping through Franco’s hoops was not enough and labor organizers were to act outside of the law, the state would have the legal justification to crush a rebellion. Two institutions were created in order to govern the activities of organized labor during this time. The Labor Charter of 1938 and the Syndical Unity Act of 1940 established the Spanish Syndicate Organization (Organizacion Sindical or OS); a compulsory and unitary organization for workers and producers as part of a corporatist apparatus of the state (Hamann, 21). The Franco regime argued that a consolidated labor organization under the state would create harmony between workers, employers and the state. The reality however was much different. The OS had no role in wage negotiation or collective bargaining. What the OS did do is facilitate state control over organized labor. Rapid industrialization was one of the goals of the Franco regime. An organized corporatist mechanism like the OS was meant to maintain the protective economic policies of Franco by denying the influence of organized labor in increasing the cost of production through wage bargaining. Its stated purpose was to “know the problems of production” and to “represent” the interests of the employer to the government (Hamann, 22).

Franco’s repression hit the labor movement hardest, but it also hit middle-class and bourgeoisie sections of society. Heavy handed treatment by Madrid drove what used to be outwardly expressed nationalist ambition underground, forcing Catalans to innovate new means of expressing themselves as a culturally distinct entity. Strangely the ban on the use of Catalan in public was not applied to Catalan in print. From the beginning of the ban in 1926
to 1930 the number of books in print rose by ten percent. The number of magazines in
Catalan, some of which were published in Madrid, rose by a significant margin during this
period. In a four year span Catalan daily newspapers increased from three to ten (Balcells,
85). Suffice it to say print became an important medium of expression for an increasingly
pressed intellectual class. It should however be noted that books and other Catalan
literature were subject to review by the government before publication, consequently filtering
out any pro-Catalan or anti-dictatorship sentiment.

The de Rivera dictatorship and the successive Franco regime expected the outlawing
of nationalist symbols to demoralize Catalans into submission to the state. Their tactics
proved counterintuitive as traditional classist divisions became less effective in disorienting a
unified movement for independence. The red and gold striped flag, a symbol of
independence, had long been associated with leftists and to a certain extent communists. The
ban resulted in the transcendence of the Catalan flag from being politically divisive to it
becoming a symbol of unity independent of economic or political association. So the net
effect of the two centralist authoritarian regimes—de Rivera and Franco—was the forging of
a cross-class alliance around Catalan autonomy which has mitigated traditional class politics.

Castilian writers, artists and intellectuals saw the crushing of nationalist expression in
Catalonia as a danger to maintaining cohesion between the various autonomous communities
of Spain. They feared that nationalism would morph into violent separatism in Catalonia as
well as cause a retrenchment of regional identities in the other autonomous regions of Spain.
Several initiatives were put forward by Spanish intellectuals in an effort to strengthen the
cultural link between Catalans and their central Spanish counterparts. This lead to a
manifesto which was signed by a number of notable literary figures stating their intention to
propagate the Catalan language (Balcells, 86). This consortium of writers created a national 
exhibition of Catalan literature at the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid in order to celebrate 
Catalonia’s contributions to Spanish culture. Gestures of unity such as this did well in 
conveying a message of peace to Catalans but as a means of providing self determination for 
them it did not prove very practical. The aggression shown toward Catalonia by the Franco 
regime proved to be overwhelming for the peace loving Spanish intellectual class. Franco 
saw thinkers and artists as a chief menace to his vision of a Spain governed by a strong 
centralized power. His remedy for these medaling intellectuals was to make them targets of 
new laws curtailing political activity. Franco struck down Catalonia’s statute of autonomy 
and replaced it with a retroactive law making it illegal to be or have been a member of any 
leftist or Republican party (McRoberts, 41).

The Impact of Immigration between Spain and Catalonia on Catalan Nationalism

Immigration has neither led to an increase in exclusive identities nor has it led to a 
weakening of Catalan identity. This may be surprising because at face value the relationship 
between Spain and Catalonia appears to be an agitated one. Periods of political conflict, and 
at times violence, have marked much of the two nation’s mutual history so it is 
understandable that the outside world view them as adversaries. Moreover, while past central 
governments in Madrid have taken measures to curtail the expansion of Catalan autonomy, 
Catalonia has not retaliated with a similar measure. When speaking to a Spanish compatriot it 
is common for Catalans to switch from speaking in Catalan to Spanish. In academia, teachers 
and professors will respond to inquiries made to them in Spanish also in Spanish. Among 
academics of equal stature this practice of accommodating Spanish counterparts by switching
languages has become an informal part of academic culture (Keating, 136-138). Figure 2.1 below shows that Spanish and Catalan identities are not mutually exclusive. Studies have shown that individuals born inside Catalonia tend to carry dual Spanish or other identities along with their Catalan identity, although there has been a trend showing a strengthening of Catalan identity over Spanish identity.

**Figure 2.1**

![Figure 2.1](image)

This particular time scale marks a shift from exclusive singular identities to inclusive multiple national identity as Spain began membership in the European Union in 1986. When we look at national identification of citizens with family ties outside of Catalonia during this same period (Figure 2.2) the results are similar. Identification as either Spanish or more Spanish than Catalan is prominent among immigrants born outside of Catalonia. This is unsurprising but when we look at first generation Catalans of non-Catalan descent identification with Spain is reduced greatly (Keating, 103-131).
Nationalism can be a stimulant affecting perceptions on immigrants and immigration. This means that national identity often precedes notions on whether immigration is positive or negative. Social identity must first be formed before there can be a distinction between which is the in-group and which is the out-group. Ethnic competition theory attempts to explain the process in which an “other” is identified and judged by a nationalist group (Schneider, 2008). Competition between groups for finite resources is assumed to be the cause of animosity between groups. It is thus the underlying cause for members of a nationalist identity group to exhibit negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. These conclusions on how national identity is developed are based around the realistic group conflict theory which asserts that members of a particular group in essence are socialized into the attitudes and behaviors of the nation they belong to as a response to a “conflict of interest” with another competing group (Schneider, 2008). On an individual level it is saying that members of a social group will tend to reflect the values and attitudes of their group. Members of a group who enjoy a level of privilege or who have the most to lose from the threat of competition are most likely to express hostility toward the out-group whether that means immigrants or minority groups.
In research on perceived ethnic threat there are several factors used to determine who is most susceptible to anti-immigrant sentiment. As is stated above, ethnic competition theory suggests that members of an in-group who have the most to lose are the most likely to harbor negative opinions on immigration. Low skilled workers who feel threatened by what they perceive as cheap labor supplied by an equally low skilled immigrant labor force would as a result be likely to have an unfavorable outlook on immigration. Schneider lists three predictors that help us identify those most likely to have an unfavorable opinion of immigration; income, occupation and education (2008). Those at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder are consequently more likely to express hostility toward the out-group than their more affluent and higher educated in-group counterparts. Hainmueller and Hiscox note that although low skilled workers have the most to fear from a low skilled immigrant workforce; they are the economic beneficiaries when it comes to high skilled immigrant labor (2007). To take it a step further some propose that in times of widespread economic instability individuals who do not fall under the bracket of at risk members of the in-group are likely to express similar anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).

Along with differing stands on economic policy, the majority of Catalonia’s mainstream political parties promote some form of pro-Catalanism in their party platform. This is out of practicality as well as necessity because parties holding an anti-Catalan stance would most likely struggle to remain in existence. Regardless of their support for Catalanism parties were forced to attempt to outdo one another as they navigated a minefield of pro-nationalist sentiment. The Partido Popular or PP, like many of its political adversaries, has maintained a level of support for Catalonia’s status as an autonomous community. What it did not support, however, was an eventual complete separation from the Spanish state.
According to a CIS voter opinion survey taken in 1992 the PP was identified by 31 percent of respondents as a party that they could never vote for (Keating, 133). By being the most outwardly pro-autonomy party CiU was able to capture a large chunk of voters turned off by the PP’s anti-independence stance as well as straddle both sides of the left right political spectrum with a broad appeal transcending economic class. CiU’s political ingenuity is not the only reason behind their success as much of it has to do with the Catalan penchant for centrism. As will be discussed in a later section, racist and bigoted pandering to far right voters has not proven an effective strategy for wide ranging political success. Nationalism in Catalonia may be strong but it diverges greatly from the sort of classic examples of popular nationalism such as that of National Socialist Germany. Hence, nationalism in Catalonia has primarily been inclusive rather than exclusionary, and based on civic commonality rather than ethnic ties.

**The impact of the economy**

The independence movement today has much to do with the economic productivity of the region in the past. Catalonia’s economic prowess has afforded it some leverage in negotiating for greater independence from the government in Madrid but in some circumstances it has been a hindrance to developing closer ties between the two. The Europe wide credit crisis has added another layer of complication to this already complex relationship. The current European crisis is the product of an international downturn triggered by a real-estate collapse in the United States which then spread to other economies. While most of Europe has felt the consequences of the economic crisis; Spain, with what used to be a boom and now a bust in the real-estate market, was one of the most adversely
affected among European Union member states. For Catalonia market instability and austerity measures levied by powers outside of the region have resulted in wide spread dissatisfaction manifested in periodic labor strikes and mass demonstrations. As calls for independence have gained popularity politicians have stoked flames of discontent for their own political ends. The modern economic crisis is ongoing so a complete understanding of its full repercussions will not be known until much later. The current crisis is not the first time Catalonia has dealt with the side-effects of economic decline. Fortunately (or unfortunately) we can look to previous crises for some guidance.

Until the 1970’s and 80’s industrialization by and large seemed to tie Catalonia to the rest of Spain, thus undercutting an economic rationale for Catalan nationalism. Textile manufacturing was Catalonia’s earliest industrial sector to develop and among the first in Spain during the Industrial Revolution. Catalonia’s production flourished as raw material from Spanish and other European colonial properties flowed into Catalan ports to be processed into consumer goods. The textile industry relied on Spain’s domestic consumer market which later became the backbone of a diverse Catalan regional economy. It is important to note that the period of boom in textiles had little to do with international exports as protectionist policies kept products made in Catalonia inside of Spain; in effect making Catalonia dependent on the success of the greater Spanish economy. As former Spanish colonies in Latin America and Africa moved towards greater independence, the price of importing raw materials increased. The result was an economic downturn in all of Spain. Nonetheless industry continued to strive during the two World Wars which provided demand for goods formerly produced in other parts of Europe (Keating, 151).
Franco’s strategy of containment further increased Catalan dependence on capital investment from Spanish firms. When economic crisis hit the Catalan economy was not able to effectively cushion itself from the blow. In response, leaders in the autonomist movement searched for legal avenues for nation building. This happened at a time that nationalist social clubs and political parties were effectively shut down from public activity by the Spanish government; no longer making them a viable option for promoting the nationalist cause. Jordi Pujol who went on to become the first president of the reestablished Generalitat, along with other Catalan leaders, focused his attention on diverting Catalan industry toward reinforcing the regional economy. They expected that stronger networks among Catalan business elites would have the residual effect of granting political leaders more room to maneuver (Balcells, 150). Formed in 1961, Banca Catalana was expected by Pujols and his cohorts to provide the capital investment needed to reinvigorate the stagnating regional economy. However, the failure of the bank during the 1980’s international recession triggered by the 1979 energy crisis meant that Banca Catalana would be under the stewardship of the Spanish Banco de Vizcaya.

In the short term Banca Catalana’s failure was a major loss for Jordi Pujol. During the buildup to the 1984 Catalan elections Pujol was accused of engaging in corrupt practices as former head of Banca Catalana. Calls were made for his arrest and prosecution but the regional court of Barcelona found no grounds for pursuing a case against him. Accusations against Pujol later benefited him politically; making it appear as though their nationalist leader was the target of persecution by anti-Catalan forces. The controversy surrounding the banking collapse put the nationalist vote solidly in the corner of Jordi Pujol’s CiU. However, the PSC (Party of the Socialists of Catalonia), a coalition of the three main socialist parties,
moved away from the nationalist cause and began negatively associating it with Pujol, corruption and CiU. The result was a CiU majority in the Generalitat with Pujol at the helm of the presidency.

The effect of Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986 on Catalan nationalism was double-edged. On the one hand, it did create a dilemma for Catalan economic growth. Protectionist policies of Spain had historically shielded goods produced in Catalonia from having to compete with products made elsewhere. Workers had the added benefit of not having to compete with an influx of cheap labor from neighboring countries. As members of the European Common Market, Spain, and in turn Catalonia, were forced to compete in a globalized economy. For those in search of greater independence this was the opportunity to reverse decades of economic domination by Madrid. Years of dependence on the central government had retarded Catalonia’s technological advancement to the extent that competing within the European market directly would have only served to reinforce their subordinate position under the state. The Generalitat and others in the autonomy movement realized that internal investment in education and research were necessary in order to update an archaic technology sector and a labor force geared toward servicing Spain’s domestic market.

On the other hand, integration into Europe brings with it limitations on the continued dissolution of Catalan national identity by Spain as Madrid surrenders some governmental authority to the European Community. The European Parliament in particular provides a stage upon which Catalans can voice their grievances with the central government; effectively putting pressure on Madrid from the outside. This does not mean the autonomous government of Catalonia somehow seeks to circumvent Spanish authority in the EU. On the
contrary, there is a history of collaboration between Catalonia and Spain on the European stage. One such example is the Patronat Catala Pro Europa, a public-private lobbying organization formed in 1982 to promote Catalan interests in Brussels as well as disseminate information about European accession within Catalonia; both in an effort to strengthen the Catalan position prior to Spanish accession into the EU (Keating, 157). Today this organization works with Spanish bureaucrats inside Brussels in order to enhance Spain’s position in negotiations.

The European Union’s founding principles of peace through economic, political and cultural unity have helped autonomous and culturally distinct regions such as Catalonia, Basque Country, Scotland and Wales loosen the bind to their parent state. Further integration means that central governments will have to take Europe into consideration when dealing with autonomous communities. For Catalan culture, further integration brings the challenge of less insulation from cultures inside as well as outside of Europe. Balcells argues that European collective identity is very weak and disproportionately influenced by American film, fashion, music and other media (197-99). Catalonia along with other European territorial communities, he says, are treated as exotic while culture imported from across the Atlantic is treated as the norm. It is yet to be seen whether this will have a negative effect on Catalonia granted its potential for exporting its own culture.

**Education and the segmented assimilation model**

Education is less obvious as an indicator of pro or anti-immigrant sentiment. In Hainmueller and Hiscox’ study of education preference they find that the level of education achieved by in-group members is a telling predictor of their level of xenophobia or tendency
to be accepting of diversity. They find that more educated respondents to their study were accepting of other ethnic and cultural groups (2007). Education, although it is frequently a byproduct of socio-economic class, is the most important indicator because it gets to the heart of the issue of perception not necessarily leading reality in regard to attitudes toward immigration. Popular culture simplifies immigration as an economic threat to the in-group and presents it as a zero-sum game in which the economic status of in-group members is threatened by a foreign counterpart. Negative economic conditions are the most hospitable environment for this sort of xenophobic reactionary sentiment because it provides the most adversely affected with a convenient scapegoat; immigrants.

Education along with housing, prospects for employment and opportunities within the welfare state are incentives for people to advance beyond the limitations of their native land. The segmented assimilation model is one of the main issues in dispute between those who are for multi-culturalism and those against it. Thomson and Crul would argue that second generation immigrant children who are raised in a household in which the immigrant culture is well pronounced are less likely to assimilate and thus be ill-equipped to deal with life in their adopted home (966). The fear they express is a fear of immigrants becoming an underclass that is doomed to experience long term isolation from economic and social mobility. Turkish immigrant to Europe, they argue, are one of the most difficult immigrant populations to integrate; the reason being closely held cultural traditions such as the expectation for young women to end their educational careers earlier than their male counterparts (Crul and Thompson, 974). Rightly they argue that the singularity of literature in the American context pays little attention to second generation females. As a result, they
say, women are adversely affected by the multi-cultural model leaving them particularly susceptible to falling into the underclass trap.

Much of the research on attitudes about immigration holds high relevance to Catalonia, as Europe continues the process of further integrating the many regions and cultures it is comprised of. As was pointed to in the above section, continuation of foreign cultural practices in a host society often creates tension between native and immigrant populations. The hot topic in the study of immigration and nationalism has been the perceived rise of anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe; targeting specifically Arab and Islamic communities. Laws banning the ritual slaughter of animals in the Netherlands as well as the French ban on the wearing of veils in public settings fuel this speculative rise in anti-foreigner sentiment. In Catalonia’s municipal elections of 2011 the far right PxC (Plataforma per Catalunya) made sizeable political gains running on a platform of stopping what they saw as an invasion by foreign Muslims. The PxC ran a campaign commercial showing three young women in mini-skirts in the Catalan municipality of Igualada skipping to the tune of Catalan folk music. The scene cuts and fades in with the caption “Igualada 2015” to three women in burkas skipping to Arabic music accompanied by the text “You can avoid this nightmare becoming reality”. The local Badalona branch of the Partido Popular adopted similar bigoted rhetoric during its campaign. To the great displeasure of the general PP, some of its members even distributed leaflets describing Romanians and “gypsies” as a plague (Feket). Anti-immigrant sentiment is normal for any society so isolated incidents such as these do not necessarily point to any great shift from inclusive civic to exclusive ethnic identity. Electoral success based on racist and exclusionary rhetoric has also been marginal. Economic crises do have a history of producing anti-immigrant attitudes in other parts of the
world. As far as Catalonia is concerned, we can only know for sure once the consequences of the current economic crisis are fully understood.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to understand the sources of the persistent strength and civic content of Catalan nationalism. I have argued that Catalonia’s long history of autonomy combined with the mobilizing impact of the consecutive authoritarian governments of de Rivera and Franco have laid the basis for an enduring nationalism with broad crossclass roots in Catalan society. I have also shown that this particular history has helped to forge a predominantly civic national identity which continues to prevail despite the challenges of immigration and economic crisis.

Social scientists in the fields of nationalism and immigration studies are in a quandary because it is difficult to decide which one, nations or attitudes, precede and produce the other. Some would argue that an individual’s opinion of an outside group informs their decision to identify with the social group they belong to. Although nationalism is fundamentally exclusionary, the Catalan brand of nationalism cannot be categorized under the ethnic nationalism banner. A CIS survey done in 1996 asking whether respondents considered Catalonia to be a ‘nation’ or a ‘region’ showed 34 percent selecting ‘nation’ while 59 percent chose ‘region’ (McRoberts, 164). This shows that there is a plurality of opinion on what Catalan national identity should look like outside of the simple reactionary anti-Spanish response. Catalan culture has always been cosmopolitan and in some ways there is an unconscious acknowledgment that openness to other people and cultures has helped to preserve it. Only time will tell if the current economic crisis will result in regressive
exclusionary identity politics. Worse circumstances have befallen Catalonia in the past and its culture of openness has persevered.
References


