

Caught in the Vice: Economic Sanctions and State Repression in Developing Nations

Reed M. Wood

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Approved by

Advisor: Mark Crescenzi

Reader: Layna Mosley

Reader: Marco Steenbergen

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ABSTRACT

Reed M. Wood: Caught in the Vice: Economic Sanctions and State Repression in Developing Nations
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi)

Since the Second World War economic sanctions have become a favorite tool of foreign policy. However, the popularity of sanctions has been criticized both because of their mixed success and the collateral damage they inflict on civilian populations. This paper examines the impact of United States and United Nations Security Council-imposed sanctions on human rights conditions in developing nations. I show that declining economic conditions resulting from sanctions contribute to increases in state-sponsored repression of physical integrity rights. I employ Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques to test this relationship in a sample of 126 developing countries between 1976 and 2001. The results reveal that state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights increase following the application of all US sanctions and comprehensive UN sanctions. This study further finds that the severity of the increase in physical repression is dependent on the type of sanctions imposed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
Previous Research: The Efficacy and Effects of Sanctions.....	3
Sanctions and State Repression.....	9
Toward a Theory of Sanctions and State Repression.....	12
Political Institutions and Social Outcomes.....	13
Maintaining the Winning Coalition.....	14
The Logic of Political Repression.....	17
A Note About Sanctions and Democracies.....	22
Scope and Hypotheses.....	23
Hypotheses.....	24
Data and Operational Criteria.....	26
Measuring Human Rights.....	26
Assessing the Severity of Sanctions.....	29
Control Variables.....	31
Methodology.....	34
A Note About Endogeneity and the Causal Arrow.....	37
Results.....	40
Conclusion.....	49
Appendix 1: Countries Included in Sample.....	53

Appendix 2: Detailed Description of PTS Categories.....	54
Bibliography.....	55

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Democracy and US Sanctions.....	23
Table 2: Democracy and UN Sanctions.....	23
Table 3: Sanctions Events 1976-2001.....	30
Table 4: State Repression of Human Rights and US Sanctions.....	39
Table 5: State Repression of Human Rights and UN Sanctions.....	39
Table 6: Results of Ordered Probit Regression.....	41

When you apply that boycott, you have got your hand upon the throat of the offending nation, and it is a proper punishment.

—Woodrow Wilson, 1919 Speech before the US Senate in support of the League of Nations.

Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects.

—Bhoutros Bhoutros-Ghali, 1995 *Agenda for Peace*

Introduction

Following the end of the First Gulf War the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, and other humanitarian organizations increasingly voiced concern over the United Nations Oil-For-Food-Program. International health organizations and human rights NGOs blamed UN-imposed economic sanctions for the impending humanitarian crisis facing Iraq and urged the UN and the United States to reconsider its decision to impose comprehensive sanctions on Iraq (see for example UNICEF, 2003 and WHO, 1996). The graphic evidence from Iraq of the sanctions regime's unintended consequences prompted then UN Secretary-General Bhoutros-Ghali acknowledged the "blunt instrument" of sanctions hampered the work of humanitarian and human rights groups, resulted in long-term reversals in economic development in the target country, unjustly injured neighboring states, and could possibly strengthen the targeted regime (Bhoutros-Ghali, 1995: paragraphs 70-71). By the end of the 1990s, the dismal situation of Iraqi civilians and the failure of sanctions to oust the Hussein

regime led many policy advisors, international lawyers, and scholars of international relations to question both the efficacy and morality of economic sanctions.

While intended as a non-violent foreign policy alternative to war, sanctions have often worsened the human rights situation in the target country and led to increased physical repression. Particularly vulnerable—and most commonly the target of sanctions—are the underdeveloped and developing nations of the global south. Academic researchers and journalists have documented and analyzed the adverse social and economic impact of sanctions, including their deleterious effect on public health systems, the reduction of per capita GDP, rising prices of staple goods, increased unemployment, infant mortality, malnutrition, the spread of infectious disease, migration, and the breakdown of traditional family structures.

This paper examines the relationship between sanctions and increased violations of physical integrity rights—a subset of human rights that includes freedom from abuses such as torture, extrajudicial execution, and disappearance—in the target country. Specifically, this paper reveals that state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights increase following the application of United States or United Nations Security Council economic sanctions on a target country. This analysis offers support for many of the normative claims made by human rights activists and verifies the substantive arguments of previous case studies that have claimed sanctions impose undue political, physical, and social hardship on innocent civilians.

The paper proceeds as follows: I first review prior research in the human rights impact of sanctions. I then construct a theoretical explanation for the observed increase in human rights abuses following the imposition of unilateral or multilateral sanctions. Next, I

conduct a quantitative analysis using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) that provides evidence for the theoretical relationship between sanctions and increased violations of physical integrity rights. In the final sections, I discuss the results of this analysis and describe avenues for future research.

Previous Research: The Efficacy and Effects of Sanctions

While sanctions and other forms of economic statecraft are often presented as a modern, enlightened tool of foreign policy, the implementation of sanctions as a coercive force or punitive measure dates to at least the early Greek city-states (Askari et al., 2003: 5; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, 1983: 4). From the ancient world through the modern day, economic warfare in the forms of embargos, blockades, and sieges has been a common tactic in the conduct of foreign policy (Askari et al., 2003; Hufbauer et al., 1983; Naylor, 2001; Simmons, 1999). During the interwar years of the 20th century, sanctions became a legitimate instrument of international politics under the League of Nations as a perceived less destructive method of punishing rogue regimes and evoking changes in domestic or foreign policies considered threatening to international peace and security.

In spite of the lengthy and colorful history enjoyed by sanctions, only recently have they become a favorite tool of statecraft. According to a 1998 policy brief from the Institute for International Economics, during the late 1990s the United States imposed or continued sanctions against 26 nations (Hufbauer, 1998; see also Weiss et al, 1997). These sanctions ranged from foreign aid retractions to economic embargos, and by some counts affected the lives of nearly half of the world's inhabitants. Sanctions had become such a common tool of US foreign policy by the late 1990s that president Bill Clinton, in a 1998 interview with CBS news, lamented that the United States had become "sanctions happy."

The United States was not unique in this turn toward sanctions as a favorite choice from the foreign policy toolbox. During the 1990s, international organizations and states alike increasingly employed economic sanctions. The United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU), France, the United Kingdom, and Japan imposed economic sanctions on developing states in order to restore or promote democracy, halt civil or international violence, promote basic human rights, or stop nuclear proliferation. This trend toward sanctioning earned the 1990s the dubious title “The Sanctions Decade” (see for example Cortright and Lopez, 2000). Excluding UN cases, the use of sanctions increased 22% during the 1990s as compared to the previous decade (IIE, 2005). More dramatically, prior to 1990 the United Nations Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to impose sanctions on only two nations: Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, since 1990 the Security Council approved sanctions against Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, and Yugoslavia. This represents approximately a 700% increase in the use of sanctions in just over a decade.

Despite the increasing popularity of sanctions, significant debate exists as to their effectiveness. According to Hufbauer et al. (1990), only one in three sanctions events between 1900 and 1990 and only one in four since 1973 achieved their stated goals or resulted in discernible changes in the behavior of the target regime. Other scholars gauge the success of sanctions as even lower. Robert Pape (1997), for example, concludes that the actual rate of success of sanctions in altering policy is likely closer to 5%. Likewise, Cooper Drury (1998) asserts that Hufbauer et al.’s analysis of sanctions and their policy recommendations beg revision, arguing that sanctions are far less effective than the authors

conclude in their study. Other scholars, however, suggests that sanctions may be more effective than earlier empirical research contends. Daniel Drezner (2003) asserts that sanctions are applied only to the toughest cases—that is, sanctions are only considered after negotiations and diplomatic approaches have failed. Moreover, he argues that the lack of observed success in sanctions is the result of a selection bias in the research and not a failing of sanctions themselves. According to his analysis, the threat of sanctions is often enough to prompt changes in the behavior of some states, and that focusing only on cases where sanctions are actually applied ignores the large number of episodes where the threat of economic coercion did result in policy changes (Drezner, 2003). There is also evidence that sanctions may be effective in promoting domestic changes within the target state. Recently, Nikolay Marinov has shown that sanctions successfully destabilize targeted leaders and may positively contribute to transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Marinov, 2005; unpublished manuscript).

A parallel debate has also emerged regarding the unexpected consequences of sanctions. The well-publicized collateral damage caused by sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1990 and 2003 prompted questions regarding the trade off between the possibility of future success and the likelihood of immediate civilian suffering. That is, sanctions may be a successful policy prescription in some cases. However they are perhaps more akin to chemotherapy than strategic surgery—despite the chance of ultimate success, the side effects of treatment may be as unpleasant as the disease itself.

Recently, a number of scholars have addressed this issue. According to one line of thought, sanctions may increase political cohesion within the target state and may result in a “rally around the flag” effect, strengthening the position of the sanctioned regime against

both internal and external political threats (Galtung, 1967; Weiss et al., 1997; Kaempfer et al., 2004). Furthermore, travel bans and other sanctions hinder the ability of NGOs to perform humanitarian services and may undermine political opposition by reducing their contact with international NGOs and other transnational actors (Cortright and Lopez, 2000: 214). Sanctions may bolster the incumbent regime, weaken political and civil society, and endanger potential political opposition. Consequently, the observed effect of sanctions is often quite different from their intended effect.

Similarly, increased nationalist sentiment, support for the incumbent regime, and animosity toward the sender state(s) result because civilians rather than political elites often endure the worst of the negative effects (Galtung, 1967; Haass, 1998: 201-202; Preeg, 1999: 7). Sanctions may also generate support for the regime and strengthen its resolve against the sender nation, leading to diplomatic and political stalemate (Hufbauer et al., 1983: 11; Cortright and Lopez, 2002: 14-15). The upsurge in popular support of Milosevic's government following the application of US and UN sanctions stemmed from the regime's demonization of the US and its allies, the wide-spread belief in UN hidden agendas, and propaganda focused on western imperialist schemes "set upon suffocating the FRY economy" (Heine-Ellison, 2001: 98). Sanctions consequently emboldened the regime to carry out further abuses against minorities and opposition groups and strengthened its resolve against the west.

Previous research demonstrates that sanctions reduce aggregate trade, lead to scarcities in staple goods, stifle economic development, inflate prices, worsen unemployment, erode public health standards, and contribute to higher rates of infectious disease, increased infant mortality, and malnutrition (see for example Ali and Shah, 2000;

Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Crawford, 1997; Garfield, 2002; Garfield and Santana, 1999; Garfield, Devin and Fausey, 1995; Hoskins, 1997; Joyner, 2003; Weiss, Cortright, Lopez and Minear, 1997). While the extent of economic decline and relative privation varies from country to country, sanctions imposed on developing countries exacerbate the already poor economic conditions.

Sanctions may result in detrimental changes in the economic and security structures of the target state. Peter Andreas (2005) demonstrates that arms and fuel embargos and other sanctions imposed on Croatia and Yugoslavia contributed to smuggling, black market trade, crime syndicates, and other aspects of “uncivil society.” In his assessment, sanctions—particularly long-term sanctions—create a symbiotic relationship between the state and organized crime that in time sublimates the natural economy of the country and leads to the creation of black market or shadow economy, replete with severe social and economic ailments (336). The increasingly interconnected relationship between state authorities and crime syndicates produces illegal commodity monopolies, price increases, and rising crime activity in the targeted country (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001; Naylor, 2001: 3-4). Smuggling and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, women, children, and illicit commodities also increase under the shadow economies created by sanctions. Such was the case in Iraq under the much-maligned Oil for Food Program in Iraq where both crime syndicates and the Hussein regime profited mightily from smuggling oil and other commodities and in Yugoslavia and Croatia, where the imposition of sanctions created and fed fuel and arms smuggling rings that extended throughout the Balkans (Andreas, 2005; Hein-Ellison, 2001).

Finally, sanctions produce unintended consequences beyond the target state. Several studies suggest that sanctions may negatively affect the sender nation as well as the target state, leading to millions of dollars of lost revenue annually, job cuts, and price increases. According to some analyses, reductions in bilateral trade caused by unilateral sanctions cost US companies between \$5 and \$20 billion annually (Hufbauer et al, 1997; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003: 311; Lash, 1999: 13). These lost revenues further impacted the American economy through the loss of thousands of export-related jobs during the 1990s (Hufbauer, 1999: 92; Lash, 1999: 15). Recent research also suggests sanctions negatively affect states not directly included in the foreign policy calculus of sanctions. These “innocent bystander” states—typically nations contiguous to the target with a strong trade relationship—experience detrimental economic spill over from the target state (Askari et al., 2003: 186, Ataov, 38: 1997; Haass, 1998: 201; Slavov, 2003). For example, the economic decline brought about by the imposition of US, OAS, and UN sanctions imposed on Haiti resulted in a swell of refugees to the Dominican Republic, the United States, and other neighboring countries. Likewise, US and UN-embargoes imposed against Croatia and Yugoslavia led to fuel smuggling, arms trafficking, and other illicit trade in Romania, Bulgaria, and other Balkan states (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001).

The mixed evidence for the success of sanctions coupled with the potential for adverse consequences have led many politicians and policy makers to questions both the appropriateness and the ethics of imposing sanctions. Policy briefs drafted for the Clinton administration addressed these issues, concluding that current US unilateral sanctions had typically failed to achieve their policy objectives, reduced US prestige as a world power, created rifts between the US and its allies, and at times negatively impacted the populations

of the target countries (Collins and Bowdoin, 1999 and Johnston and Weintraub, 1999). These briefs recommend alternatives to the use of sanctions and significant changes in sanctions when they were imposed.

Other nations and multinational organizations have also turned a more critical eye toward sanctions policy. In 1998, 1999, and 2000 the German and Swiss governments, in association with NGOs, academics, and international lawyers, bankers, and diplomats, sponsored seminars focusing on the development of smarter sanctions policy (Cortright and Lopez, 2002). The Interlaken Process and the Bonn-Berlin Process evaluated the impact of current sanctions and worked to develop more specifically targeted sanctions. The UN has also recently begun to reevaluate its own sanctions policies. A policy assessment prepared in 1999 by the United Nations Sanctions Secretariat encouraged the Security Council to explore “smarter” sanctions (United Nations, 1999). Smart or targeted sanctions—arms embargoes, travel bans, and the freezes on public and/or private assets—are designed to minimize the collateral damage to civilians that often results from traditional sanctions policies while still pinching political elites and limiting their capacity to carry out policies unfavorable to the international community (see also Hufbauer and Oegg, 2000).

Sanctions and State Repression

Sanctions may also contribute to an increase in political repression and the violation of physical security. The imposition of sanctions may create conditions that worsen state-sponsored violations of physical security rights such as political killings, torture, or arbitrary detentions. Thus far, however, research in this field has overlooked the important linkage between the imposition of sanctions and increased physical repression in the target state.

Sanctions are increasingly favored—particularly among Western states—as an alternative to armed intervention in leveraging states toward compliance with international human rights laws and norms. Given their frequent use during the last decade, an expanding number of the world’s citizens are exposed to the effects of sanctions. Establishing a relationship between sanctions and increased political and physical repression by the targeted government runs counter to the perceived legitimacy (and possibly legality) of sanctions as an alternative to military intervention. Evidence of a causal connection places responsibility for increases in state repression at least partially in the hands of the sender nation.

This relationship proves particularly troubling for nations or organizations that use the defense of human rights as a basis for the imposition of sanctions. Western states and the United Nations would then be forced to reconcile their desired foreign policy outcomes with the possibility that the imposed sanctions regime would increase levels of political repression in the target state and might threaten the physical security of its citizens. When sanctions contribute to further violations of physical security in the target state, they should be viewed not only as policy failures but also as morally contradictory policies.

In recent decades the individual states and multinational organizations have applied sanctions to states that have exhibited gross and systematic violations of the human rights provisions enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A cursory review of the case histories of sanctions applied by the United States (see Hufbauer et al., 1990; Hufbauer, 1998; IIE, 2005) reveals that human rights concerns—political repression, political violence, genocide, torture, and unlawful imprisonments—figure prominently as justification for the imposition of sanctions. In 1973 the United States Congress approved legislation that required the retraction of US foreign aid to countries

demonstrating a pattern of blatant disregard for basic human rights.¹ If the promotion or restoration of democracy is included as an aspect of human rights, then such concerns are among the most frequent justifications for the imposition of sanctions by the United States since the mid-1970s. In fact, language regarding human rights appears in roughly 60% of the sanctions legislation imposed between 1975 and 1999.² Similarly, the United Nations Security Council has cited human rights violations committed as the justification for sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Resolutions specifying the legal arguments for the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations frequently refer to the gross abuse of basic physical integrity by the targeted government as one component of that regime's threat to international peace and stability.

While human rights concerns have often been the impetus for imposing sanctions during the past three decades, empirical evidence suggests that rather than altering the behavior of abusive regimes, sanctions may directly and negatively impact human rights conditions in the target state. This presents sender states and institutions with an obvious dilemma—can a policy that impinges upon human rights of citizens be a legitimate tool for the punishment of human rights abusing regimes? The possibility that sanctions could result in greater political repression and declining respect for the physical security of citizens runs counter to the proposed objective of many sanctions imposed by the UN and a number of Western nations. The nature of this relationship deserves consideration. In this paper I examine the effect of sanctions on government respect for physical integrity rights—the

¹ I should note here that this legislation included clauses that exempted many states deemed as important to national security, mostly US Cold War allies. Consequently, a number of serious human rights abusers were never the subjects of the sanctions intended by Congress.

² This count is based on the justifications for the imposition of sanctions as reported in “Chronological Summary of Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Goals, 1914-1999.” I included in this count all mention of human rights, democracy, political repression, political violence, and similar terminology.

subset of human rights that includes freedom from extrajudicial execution, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances.

Toward a Theory of Sanctions and State Repression

While the impact of sanctions depends on factors such as the economic relationship between sender and target, the severity and duration of the sanctions regime, and the availability of substitute trade or aid partners, sanctions almost invariably impose some economic burden on the target state. In less developed states in particular—the targets of most of sanctions events—the imposition of sanctions often results in significant trade reductions, falling GDP, rising prices, and increased unemployment (Crawford, 1997; Garfield and Santana, 1999; Joyner, 2003). Economic decline negatively affects both political elites and citizens alike; however, the distribution of these negative consequences is mediated by the political and social structure of the target country. Specifically, non-democratic political institutions allow political elites to shift costs onto the larger populations, thus shielding themselves from much of the damage.

The ability of incumbent leaders and political elites to transfer the cost of sanctions downward is central to the relationship between sanctions and increased state-sponsored violations of physical security rights. I argue that sanctions promote physical repression in two ways. On the one hand, when the imposition of sanctions creates a “rally round the flag” effect the cost of repressing potential political rivals decreases. The strongly nationalistic environment created by sanctions lowers the cost of repression and allows leaders to more easily pursue policies designed to undermine and eliminate potential challengers. On the other, the public may blame the national leadership for declining economic and social conditions. Public dissatisfaction may then lead to protests, political instability, and

increased support for the opposition. To suppress dissent and enforce loyalty, autocratic leaders increasingly rely on repression. I discuss both scenarios in turn.

Political Institutions and Social Outcomes

The structural differences between autocracies and democracies determine the ability of leaders to redistribute the costs of unfavorable policies such as sanctions. Because of the constraints placed on democratic leaders by the electoral process, democratic leaders cannot easily transfer the cost of sanctions onto the public without facing significant punishment during the next election. While strong nationalistic sentiment may allow a leader to pursue policies that perpetuate sanctions, when economic decline resulting from sanctions exceeds the willingness of the population to support the policies of its leaders, incumbents or their party will face removal from office. Therefore, there exists some limitation on the government's prerogative in democratic systems, preventing leaders from transferring the adverse effects of policy decisions to the population as a whole or onto specific groups within in the country. In non-democratic systems national leaders are often more successful at redistributing the costs of policy choices. Because of the absence of electoral constraints, autocratic leaders often act with impunity and disregard for the negative impact policy decisions may exert on citizens. This is not to say that autocrats act completely independently; leaders of non-democratic regimes must maintain the support and loyalty of some group of political elites in order to sustain their positions of power. Because this core group of political elites rather than the population as a whole maintains the autocrat, the effect of policy choices on this group is a primary concern of autocratic incumbents. Consequently, so long as an autocratic leader can redirect costs to the general population

while shielding this core group of political elites from significant negative effects, then the leader need not fear immediate punitive response.

Maintaining the Winning Coalition

The dynamics of political survival are pivotal in understanding the relationship between economic sanctions and increased political repression. The well-known selectorate model (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) is useful in examining this relationship. According to this model, leaders maintain control by constructing and maintaining a winning coalition made up of members of the selectorate (the total body of persons able to select national leadership). Failing to maintain the continued flow of resources and other benefits to the winning coalition increases the likelihood of defection and thus increases the probability of loss of power. In order to prevent the defection of members of the winning coalition from the incumbent to a challenger—thereby threatening the stability of the regime—the incumbent must credibly promise more to his winning coalition than can the challenger. When an incumbent can no longer commit to “deliver the goods” to his winning coalition, an opportunity for usurpation by a challenger presents itself.

This is exactly the logic behind the application of sanctions. By placing the leadership of a state in the vice of economic sanctions, sender nations attempt to pinch the incumbent to the point that he can no longer provide the necessary incentives to his winning coalition, thereby creating the opportunity for regime change and emboldening domestic political opposition. The effectiveness of sanctions is contingent on the ability of the sanctions to restrict the flow of resources from the incumbent to the winning coalition. Given that the winning coalition in an autocracy, sanctions need to reduce the flow of resources to

enough of the regime's supporters that the size of the opposition's coalition exceeds that of the incumbent's supporters. Sufficient defections tip the balance of power, possibly resulting in the ouster of the incumbent regime.³ The likelihood of the success of sanctions thus increases when sanctions curtail the flow of resources from incumbent to supporters, resulting in some number of defections from incumbent to opposition.

In order to prevent defection from the winning coalition, autocrats must employ some combination of carrots and sticks. In the former, the incumbent regime continues to supply supporters with a flow of resources greater than those that could be promised by any challenger. In the latter, the regime resorts to punitive measures and repression in order to enforce loyalty. The imposition of economic sanctions makes the credible promise of resources more difficult because under sanctions economic constraints tighten and resource availability declines throughout the sanctioned state. Therefore, sanctioned incumbents must either find alternative sources of income or increase their level of repression in order to maintain their coalition.

To maintain the flow of resources to the winning coalition, leaders may turn to alternative sources of revenue such as smuggling and trade in illicit goods. The imposition of economic sanctions may provide a boon for the leadership of the target state. Andreas (2005) shows that sanctions can create symbiotic relationship between the state and organized crime, leading to the sublimation the normal economy of the country and, over time, to the creation of a shadow economy. Collusion between organized crime and the government of the sanctioned state allows the incumbent regime to collect significant rents through smuggling, illegal trade, and sanctions busting. Kaempfer et al. (2004: 38) demonstrate that sanctions

³ This is the argument behind more recent targeted sanctions. That is, when sanctions can specifically target political elites and undermine the flow of goods between incumbents and their winning coalitions, sanctions should be more successful at promoting defections and thus ousting the regime.

allow incumbent autocrats to capture rents without increasing the cost of loyalty in the winning coalition. These rents accrue directly to the regime and its winning coalition, which allows the incumbent to ensure a steady flow of resources and benefits to supporters despite economic decline in the rest of the country (39). Saddam Hussein garnered substantial rents through oil smuggling and taxes and illegal surcharges billed to the UN Oil-for-Food Program while the Iraqi economy collapsed According to a recent *Washington Post* article, the Hussein regime garnered some \$1.7 billion in kickback from companies participating in the Oil-for-Food program and over \$11 billion from oil smuggling (Lynch, 2005). Similarly, during the civil conflicts in the former Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters profited under sanctions through the creation of state-owned monopolies, fuel smuggling, and illicit trade, and in Croatia Tudjman's regime earned rents through fuel and arms smuggling from neighboring countries (Andreas, 2005; Heine-Ellison, 2001; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).

Despite the emergence of a shadow economy tacitly supported by the incumbent regime and its apparatus, financial flows and the distribution of resources are unlikely to remain at pre-sanction levels. Autocrats may then rely on the stick in order to prevent defection and enforce loyalty in both the winning coalition as well as rest of the selectorate. Political elites have access to sanctions rents or may receive side payments from the incumbent.⁴ Most citizens, however, do not enjoy the same captured rents that benefit political elites. The ability of the incumbent to transfer the cost of sanctions from the winning coalition to the rest of the population worsens the economic effects of sanctions in

⁴ Few if any sanctions regimes are 100% effective at restricting the flow of restricted goods. In the majority of cases, smuggling, sanctions busting, and black market trade in restricted commodities are common side effects. Moreover, these activities often provide lucrative sources of rents for political elites. See for example, Alder-Karlsson, 1982 and Kaempfer et al., 2004.

the rest of the country. As costs are redistributed and transferred downward, the negative consequences of sanctions are likely to fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable segment of society (Preeg, 1999: 7).

The Logic of Political Repression

When an incumbent either cannot or will not continue to offer carrots—public goods or side payments—to the selectorate, he will necessarily turn to the stick in order to enforce stability and quash potential challengers. The unequal distribution of costs resulting from sanctions contributes to tensions between the incumbent and some segments of the selectorate. The severity of these tensions and the proportion of the selectorate to which they extend are determined by the ability of the sanctioned leader to direct public blame toward the sender nations. When the leader can successfully shift blame for sanctions externally and toward the sender state, the rally round the flag effect will result in greater support for the incumbent. If instead the public places the blame for its economic hardship at the feet of the incumbent, tensions between the incumbent and the public will increase. In either case, sanctions are likely to contribute to an observable increase in physical repression and violations of personal security rights.

On the one hand, the incumbent is successful in shifting blame for failing economic conditions from the leadership to the sender nation a “rally round the flag” effect will often lower the price of loyalty to the regime. International sanctions undermine political opposition in the target country and may strengthen the winning coalition of the incumbent regime (Cortright and Lopez, 2000: 214; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). The weakening of domestic opposition groups reduces the cost autocrats must exert in order to repress their

potential challengers. Therefore, repression against opposition groups may increase under sanctions. Kaempfer et al. (2004) employ a game theoretic model to demonstrate that when the rally round the flag effect dominates, the power of the regime increases relative to the power of the opposition. As the power of the opposition decreases, the cost of repression decreases as well. Consequently, sanctions may increase the target regime's incentive and ability to repress potential challengers by lowering the cost of repression. Sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia and Iraq produced this effect. In both cases, the incumbent regimes successfully increased repression against their political opponents—Hussein increasingly targeted Kurds and Shiites, and Milosevic ratcheted up repression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. As support for the incumbent regime and contempt for the sanctioning states grew, the power of the opposition declined. Owing to the upsurge of nationalistic sentiment, political opponents became easy targets of state repression and violent reprisals.

On the other hand, sanctions may create tensions between the public and the incumbent, leading to protest and instability and increasing support for the opposition. In this case, the opposition increasingly poses a serious challenge to the incumbent regime. Dictators are typically aware of the degree of repression that is necessary to subdue political challenges. Assuming leaders are rational actors, they are aware of the incentive to increase repression when exogenous shocks provoke a disaffected or dissatisfied public into protest, revolt, or other challenge to the status quo. As costs are increasingly transferred downward from the incumbent and his coalition to the population, loyalty to the regime begins to waver. Correlatively, support for the opposition may increase as a politically and increasingly economically oppressed public examines possible alternatives to the political status quo.

Certainly there exists some threshold for rebellion or mass public demonstration despite the possibility of severe consequences. At some point, the selectorate of a sanctioned state challenges the incumbent regime rather than continuing to endure the hardships imposed by sanctions. This threshold is determined by a number of different factors and varies from country to country. However, that some tipping point exists is a logical assumption. Likewise, the type of response is contingent on a number of structural, social, and historical factors. In countries with some level of respect for free expression citizens are likely to first turn to organized protests or public demonstrations in an attempt to alter the policy choice of incumbent regime. Faced with rising expressions of public dissatisfaction, incumbents may employ more repressive measures in order to halt popular protests, demonstrations, or other signs of political instability. For example, the use of excessive force against public demonstrations, arbitrary detentions of protesters or activists, and the violent attacks against opposition leaders are common responses for transitional regimes and other quasi-democratic regimes that face pressure from a disaffected population.

In states where public expression of disfavor with the incumbent regime is strictly proscribed, support for potential political challengers may begin to increase. As pressure from political opponents increases, reprisals from the incumbent regime also increase. Fearing the increased possibility of civil revolt or defection from the winning coalition to the coalition of the political opposition, incumbents will ratchet-up repression in the hopes of quashing support for potential challengers. According to Bueno de Mesquita et al., “to restore deterrence the intensity of repression should increase with the gains a challenger can expect if he succeeds in becoming a leader” (2003: 340). The greater the divide between the benefits procured by the incumbent regime and potential opponents, the greater the

likelihood of a challenge to the status quo. As this divide widens as a result of sanctions, challenges to the incumbent increase. And as the probability of political challenge increases, the incumbent's incentive to increase repression in order to "restore deterrence" increases as well.

This applies to potential political opposition from both the incumbent's own winning coalition and selectorate as well those disenfranchised by the extant political structure. As the likelihood of defections from the winning coalition increases, the incumbent resorts to violence in order to prevent future defections. The brutal and frequent political killings of military officers and cabinet members in the Hussein government graphically illustrate this point. The same applies to selectors. As the potential benefit derived from unseating the incumbent increase, the leader's incentive to use repression increases.

The disenfranchised have the greatest incentive to oppose the incumbent regime or support political opposition when the regime is based on a small winning coalition and provides few public goods. (Beuno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 342). As sanctions reduce the availability of public resources and contribute to general economic decay, disenfranchised citizens have more incentive to participate in violent opposition. Non-democratic incumbents must in turn increase repression in order to stamp out this opposition.

Past research on the economic sources of revolution, political violence, and civil war supports the theoretical assertion that relative deprivation increases the likelihood of political instability, and therefore repression. Recent studies demonstrate that the likelihood of civil unrest and political violence declines as international trade, foreign investment increase, and economic development increase (Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Krause and Suzuki, 2005; Li and Schaub, 2005; Suzuki and Krause, 2005). It is then reasonable to conclude that when

these indicators decline the reverse is also true. That is, under conditions of negative growth protest, civil violence, and repression are likely to increase.

Similarly, when income inequality increases, the potential for civil violence increases (Cramer, 2003). Sanctions promote an inequitable redistribution of resources: incumbent leaders transfer costs downward in order to protect the winning coalition and prevent defection. The economic divide between elites and average citizens increases under sanctions, which increases tensions and may lead to civil unrest and violence. In response, the incumbent regime resorts to repressive measures in order to combat this unrest, maintain social stability, and prevent the growth of political dissent. This effect is particularly strong in states where one ethnic or religious group receives disproportionate economic benefits (Besancon, 2005). Sanctions against Iraq, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Yugoslavia further exacerbated existing racial, religious, or ethnic tensions and led to increased communal violence in the country and greater state repression during the sanctions years.

To summarize, in order to prevent defection from his coalition to the opponent's coalition (and thus the possible overthrow of the regime), the incumbent must therefore increase the flow of the resources to his own coalition. The budget constraints of the incumbent, however, determine the ability to manipulate resource flows. When insufficient resources exist to maintain the winning coalition or to prevent mass social unrest such as public demonstrations, riots, or, depending on the strength of the opposition, revolt, the incumbent will likely substitute repression for pay offs. That is, when there are not enough available resources to stave off competition and satisfy the demands of the public, an incumbent autocrat augments the level of physical repression in order to extract loyalty from the winning coalition and to quash open dissent from the public. This repression translates in

physical terms into increases in the number of extrajudicial executions and politically motivates assassinations, arbitrary detentions, the use of torture, and disappearances in order to eliminate potential political opponents and to terrorize the public.

A Note about Sanctions and Democracies

Thus far the theoretical model constructed here has assumed that sanctioned states are most likely non-democratic regimes. The theory presented here suggests that sanctions may not exert the same effect in democratic compared to autocratic states. While sanctions contribute to the repression of human rights in autocracies, there is little relationship between repression and economic sanctions in established democracies. This assumption follows logically from the model presented above. Because of the large size of the winning coalition relative to the selectorate in democracies, leaders must pursue policies that benefit the largest number of citizens. Democratic leaders therefore expend resources on public goods as opposed to transferring private goods to political elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). If economic sanctions reduce the level of public goods, voters defect from the incumbent to the challenger, thereby removing the incumbent from office. In this case, the challenger alters policies in order to remove sanctions, thus resuming the flow of public goods to the voters. This in part explains the rarity of sanctions against democrats.

Ideally, a more in depth examination of the relationship between government structure and changes in state human rights performance under sanctions would be included in this paper. However, two factors complicate such as analysis. First, previous research shows that democratic institutions exert a strong positive effect on state respect for human rights, resulting in few violations of physical integrity rights in established democracies (Poe

and Tate, 1994; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). While democracies occasionally commit significant rights abuses, these acts usually coincide with significant communal conflict, civil war, or terrorist violence such as in Colombia in the 1980s and 90s, Turkey in the late 1990s, and Israel during the First and Second Intifada. Moreover, it is often difficult to separate the violence committed by government security forces from those committed by non-state actors.

Table 1: Democracy and US Sanctions (by country year)

Regime Type	Mild Sanctions	Moderate Sanctions	Comprehensive Sanctions	Total
Democracy	32	5	4	41
Non-Democ.	195	142	126	463
Total	227	147	130	504

Table 2: Democracy and UN Sanctions (by country year)

<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>Diplomatic Sanctions</i>	<i>Moderate Sanctions</i>	<i>Extensive Sanctions</i>	Total
Democracy	3	5	3	11
Non-Democ.	13	61	23	97
Total	16	66	26	108

Second, democracies represent a small minority of sanctions cases over the past 30 years. Furthermore, when democracies are subject to sanctions, the duration of the sanctions averages two years or less. Tables 1 and 2 show the relationship between sanctions and governmental structure. The particularly small number of sanctions events against democracies in this sample—less than 10%—makes it difficult to achieve statistical significance using quantitative analysis. In models containing an interaction variable for sanctions and democracy, the term did not approach standard levels of significance and left the other results virtually unchanged.

Scope and Hypotheses

This study uses a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of 126 countries for the years 1976-2001. In order to determine the impact of sanctions on developing nations

specifically, the data set is limited to countries with a population of more than 500,000 persons and a per capita GDP of less than approximately \$10,000⁵ for the majority of years included in the sample. While my analysis is limited to a subset of countries in the international system, I believe that restricting the sample to developing countries is legitimate given that the majority of sanctions events that occurred during this time period were imposed on countries with developing and transitional economies. In fact, each of the US and UN sanctions events imposed during this time frame were directed against countries falling below this threshold. Therefore, the results from this analysis provide generalizable evidence of the relationship between sanctions events and changing human rights conditions.

Hypotheses

According to the theory presented above, sanctions negatively impact the general economic climate of a target state. Economic constraints force incumbent leaders to divert resources from public goods and into the hands of the incumbent's winning coalition in order to prevent defections. Such economic redistribution also increases the opportunity of challengers who can promise an end to sanctions in return for political victory. Furthermore, economic decline may promote dissent among the disenfranchised, potentially leading to violence or revolt. As available resources diminish, incumbents must resort to greater repression in order to deter potential political challengers and quash dissent. This leads to the initial set of hypotheses:

⁵ See appendix for countries in sample. The only states included within both this analysis and in the "high income" nation category are South Korea and Israel. South Korea is included because its per capita GDP only exceeds the \$10,000 threshold during three years in the mid 1990s, and its average GDP per capita for the time period of this analysis falls significantly below \$10,000. Similarly, Israel begins the sample period with a GDP far below the \$10,000 ceiling and only surpasses it in 1989. In both cases the states' GDP per capita exceeds the \$10,000 threshold for fewer than half of the years included in the sample.

H1: The imposition of sanctions by the United States increases the likelihood of repression of physical integrity rights in developing states.

H2: The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations increases the likelihood of repression of physical integrity rights in developing states.

Sanctions events differ significantly in terms of the nature of their constraints. Therefore, their effects on repression should differ based on both their comprehensiveness and their severity. Sanctions that are more successful in restricting the resources available to incumbents are more likely to force incumbents to resort to increased repression compared to sanctions that are less effective in restricting this flow. The ability of sanctions to restrict this flow is dependent on the severity of the restrictions imposed and on the number of countries imposing these restrictions. Here severity refers to the specific constraints imposed by the sanctions, while comprehensiveness refers to the number of countries imposing the sanctions. Severe sanctions such as embargoes impose more constraints on the resources available to incumbents compared to more moderate sanctions such as aid retractions. Therefore, the likelihood of increased repression should be greater the more severe the sanctions. Similarly, the greater the number of nations participating in sanctions events, the less opportunity exists for incumbents to find alternative flows of resources. Unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, for example, still allow sanctioned incumbents to turn to other nations to fill the gap created by restriction on US aid or trade. Multilateral sanctions, on the other hand, such as those imposed by the United Nations, severely limit alternative resource flows. As such, increases in both severity and comprehensiveness should both increase the likelihood of incumbents' resorting to repression. This generates a second set of hypotheses:

H3: Overall, UN-imposed sanctions will be more likely to contribute to increased physical repression than US-imposed sanctions

H4: More severe US-imposed sanctions will result in a greater likelihood of physical repression in developing state compared to less severe sanctions.

H5: More severe UN-imposed sanctions will result in a greater likelihood of physical repression in developing state compared to less severe sanctions.

Data and Operational Criteria

Measuring Human Rights and State Repression

While discussions of human rights-related issues are common in the fields of political science and foreign policy, no consensus as to their appropriate measurement exists. Part of the inherent difficulty in measuring the level of human rights abuses present in a country comes from the ever-widening discourse regarding what are to be considered as human rights. Customary international law, when speaking to the subject to human rights, tends to focus on protection of the physical person from heinous acts such as torture or extrajudicial execution. This notion of human rights was formalized in the United Nations Charter ratified in 1945 and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafted in 1948. Further iterations of “universally” accepted human rights norms were borne out in the two subsequent UN human rights conventions the Convent on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In recent years perceptions of human rights have evolved to include even educational and environmental rights. Therefore, any attempt to accurately measure a states compliance with international human rights norms is necessarily fraught with difficulty and imperfection (see Gibney and Dalton, 1997; Lopez and Stohl, 1992; Poe and Tate, 1994).

I have chosen to focus this analysis on the most clearly delineated aspect of human rights: respect for the integrity of the person or physical integrity rights. This subset of human rights includes freedom from abuses such as torture, unlawful death, disappearance, and political imprisonment. The dependent variable is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). I rely on two existing datasets for the measures of physical repression for the years covered in this analysis.⁶ Gibney's PTS dataset begins in 1980 and is updated annually (see Gibney and Dalton, 1997). Poe and Tate, using the same criteria as Gibney, generated repression data for additional nations not included in the original PTS and expanded the coverage back to 1976 for their own research needs (see Poe and Tate, 1994). I integrate information from the two available datasets to produce data on physical repression in 126 developing states over twenty-six years. The PTS measures the extent of state-sponsored repression and violations of physical integrity rights and is based on the annual reports of Amnesty International and the US State Department. The five-point index of state repression used for the PTS is adapted from the standards developed by Gastil (1980). A country scoring a one is under the secure rule of law and rarely commits acts of torture or political execution against its citizens (i.e. Canada or Costa Rica for most years). A nation scoring a five on the scale places no limits on the "means and thoroughness" with which it pursues its goals. Political executions and/or torture are commonplace, and all citizens regardless of their interest or involvement in political or civic life are subject to severe violations of their physical integrity (i.e. Iraq, 1990-2000 or Rwanda, 1994-1998).⁷

⁶ Gibney's data are available on Mark Gibney's home page: www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html. Last accessed 21 December 2005. Poe and Tate's data are available at www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.thm. Last accessed 16 November 2005. I thank to both parties for sharing their data.

⁷ A complete description of each category is included in appendix 2.

As a final note, the PTS presents two separate measures, one based on Amnesty International Annual Country Reports, the other on the annual reports of the US State Department. Despite the high correlation between the two measures (approximately 0.75 in this sample), there is some evidence of systematic deviation during some years. A recent analysis examining the differences between measures based on the Amnesty International reports and those based on the US State Department reports (Poe, Vasquez and Carey, 2001) found some evidence of bias by the US State Department toward leftist governments during the 1980s. That is, the reports generated by the US State Department were at times more critical of socialist and communist regimes compared to rightist governments or military dictatorships during the Regan and Bush years, but this bias diminishes in the early 1990s.

In the past, both measures as well as averages of the two have been used to measure the severity of physical repression. I rely on the US State Department data because it offers more consistent coverage over the time period of analysis, providing scores for more countries and more years compared to the Amnesty International data. The thoroughness of the State Department reports compared to the Amnesty International reports also suggests that the scores generated from the State Department reports may more accurately reflect the human rights conditions in the country.⁸

Assessing the Severity of Sanctions

I generate the list of US sanctioned countries from Hufbauer et al. (1990), The Institute for International Economics (1999), Hufbauer (1998), and Hufbauer and Oegg

⁸ See Poe, Vasquez, and Carey, 2001 for full description and analysis of variations between Amnesty International and State Department Scores.

In order to compensate for possible bias and to check the robustness of the model, I also test the measures generated from the annual reports of Amnesty International (not reported) as the dependent variable. The results are similar. The exception is moderate UN sanctions, which differs from the original model.

(2000), and the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (2005).⁹ I compile information on UN Sanctions from the web page of the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary General (2005). While the simplest measure of sanctions would be a dummy variable indicating the presence of absence of sanctions, not all sanctions events are equal. The severity of sanctions events can range from diplomatic wrist slaps such as travel bans on key persons or groups to full economic embargoes. As such, differentiation among the various types of sanctions events seems more appropriate than a simple dichotomous indicator. I therefore develop a scale of the severity of US and UN sanctions imposed on the target country. The severity of US-imposed sanctions is measured on a scale of 0 to 3 based on the following criteria:

***Level 0:** No economic sanctions; normal economic relations.*

***Level 1:** The imposition of light sanctions such as the retraction of previously promised or delivered military or development aid.*

***Level 2:** The imposition of moderate sanctions such as arms embargoes, restrictions on the import or exports of primary commodities such as oil or manufactured goods, and/or other limited prohibitions against investment and trade.*

***Level 3:** Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most economic activities between the US and the target nation.*

I include a similar scale to assess the severity of United Nations-imposed sanctions. Despite the differences in the scales, both are roughly congruent in their progression from no sanctions to comprehensive sanctions regime and should capture similar information about

⁹ To check the robustness of this measure I also tested a model using a different sanctions dataset. Marinov (unpublished) has developed a dataset for economic sanctions used to promote democracy. His sanctions data is based on information taken from new reports and includes multilateral and unilateral sanctions events from 1977-2004. The results of the model employing this data set and the substantive interpretation of the results are similar to those of both the models presented here.

the influence of sanctions on a target country. The scale for UN-imposed sanctions is as follows:

***Level 0:** No economic sanctions; normal economic relations.*

***Level 1:** The imposition of light sanctions such as travel restrictions on a nation's leadership, restrictions on air traffic into and out of the target country, or other diplomatic sanctions.*

***Level 2:** The imposition of targeted moderate sanctions such as arms embargoes, restrictions on key commodities such as diamonds or fuel, or the freezing of public and/or private assets.*

***Level 3:** Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most economic activities between UN member states and the target nation.*

Table 3 shows the number of country-years sanctions of each level of severity described here have been applied by the US and the UN.

Table 3: Sanctions Events 1976-2001 (by country year)

Severity of Sanctions Event	US	UN	Total
Level 1: Diplomatic or Mild Economic Sanctions	224	16	240
Level 2: Moderate Economic or Trade Sanctions	150	66	216
Level 3: Comprehensive Sanctions	129	26	155
Total	503	104	607

Though an imperfect measure of the severity of sanctions, these categories provide some information as to the severity of the impact of sanctions on a target state. As the severity of the sanctions regime increases, the level of physical integrity abuse is expected increase accordingly. That is, the retraction of expected US foreign aid should result in a smaller increase in political repression compared to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions or a total US trade embargo. Similarly, while the “sting” resulting from the UN’s imposition of travel restrictions or other primarily diplomatic sanctions on a nation’s

leadership is unlikely to provoke it to severe increases in human rights abuses, imposing comprehensive sanctions and virtually closing a state out of the global economic community is likely to produce a severe response from political elites as they attempt to shift the costs to citizens and ratchet up levels of repression in order to maintain control. Finally, because the negative impact of sanctions on an economy is not generally immediately visible, any adverse effects resulting from sanctions imposed at $t-1$ are likely to produce changes in human rights violations at t or later. Both sanctions variables are therefore lagged for one-year to account for this delay and to control for endogeneity.

Control Variables

The control variables included in this model are international conflict, civil war, democracy, level of economic development, economic growth, and population size. Each of these variables, in some similar form, has previously been employed in models in which human rights or physical integrity was the dependent variable, and each is shown to exert a statistically significant effect on changes in human rights conditions.

Previous studies of the predictors of human rights abuses have found a strong positive relationship between involvement in international conflict and human rights abuse (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Because of national security concerns and the danger posed by internal political division, regimes often employ more severe or repressive security measures than they would during peacetime; moreover, the greater the threat and the longer the duration of the war, the more repression is likely to increase. International conflict is a dummy variable determined here by a score of 5 in the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs)

data set, representing involvement in a conflict that has produced over 1000 battlefield deaths.

Similarly, the presence of civil conflict has consistently demonstrated a strong negative impact on human rights conditions. During a civil conflict, governments place additional restrictions on civil and human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Human rights violations may increase during civil conflicts as governments resort to more severe means in order to secure stability, combat internal dissent, and retaliate against political violence. Consequently, I hypothesize that state repression of physical integrity rights will increase during periods of civil conflict. Civil war is coded as a dummy variable and is taken from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) conflict dataset and reflects the existence of a conflict that produces 1000 battlefield deaths per annum.

Democracy has proven to be among the most significant predictors of respect for physical integrity rights within a nation (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al., 1999). In brief, owing to restraints on government authority and the ability of citizens to sanction government leaders that employ abuses tactics, higher levels of democracies should correlate to lower levels physical integrity abuse. Countries whose institutions provide for popular participation in government, frequent turnover in executive and representative bodies, separation of powers, and the just rule of law typically exhibit a high level of respect for fundamental human rights and only infrequently the rights of their citizens. Most previous quantitative studies of human rights have upheld this proposition. However, Christian Davenport and David Armstrong (2004) demonstrate that the relationship between levels of democracy and violations of physical integrity rights (a subset of human rights) is not linear. Changes in respect for physical integrity do not incrementally

increase in tandem with movements toward democracy; rather, only states that have achieved a high level of democracy (greater than 7 on the Polity scale) show significant differences in their respect for these rights.

I operationalize democracy as a binary variable coded as 0 (non-democratic) for countries scoring 6 and below and 1 (democratic) for countries scoring 7 or higher on the –10 to 10 Polity2 score of the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and Gurr).¹⁰ This simplifies interpretation of the effect of the variable and follows the recommendations of Jaggers and Gurr (1995, 479) and Alvarez et al. (1996). In line with past research, I hypothesize that coded in this manner democracy will have a positive impact on human rights practices.

Several studies have identified a relationship between economic development and human rights standards (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). These studies suggest that higher levels of economic development, measured in GDP or GDP per capita, produce lower levels of physical repression. Economic growth likewise positively affects state respect for human rights (Olson, 1963; Poe et al., 1999). Specifically, as the “pie” increases and citizens have greater access to resources and wealth, instability decreases. As internal threats from disaffected factions of the population decrease, governments reduce repression. Conversely, when GDP per capita falls and the pie shrinks—as is the case in sanctioned nations—instability and internal threat rise, and regimes tend toward greater repression. Economic decline should correlate to an increase in state repression. I log GDP per capita in order to standardize it across the sample. Economic growth is the percent

¹⁰ I choose to operationalize democracy as 7 or higher on the Polity2 scale rather than using the more restrictive 8 demonstrated by Davenport and Armstrong to affect human rights condition. I choose this measure because it is the standard practice in the discipline. However, tests using democracy operationalized as Polity2 > 7 show similar results.

change in the per capita GDP from year to year. Both measures come from the United Nations Common statistics database.

Past studies of human rights and state repression have found that population size contributes to higher levels of state violence and human rights abuses (Poe et al., 1999). This hypothesis is based on the notion that large populations absorb economic growth and increase stress on the government in their demands for public goods. When a government cannot meet these demands civil unrest often occurs. Faced with growing dissent and civil turbulence, governments are likely to resort to measures that are more repressive. Increases in violations of physical integrity rights thus may occur as state security forces attempt to subdue opposition and restore order. Larger populations may also simply provide more opportunities for state security forces or other government agents to repress the citizens of a country.

Finally, human rights reports and indices relying raw events data or failing to control for population may capture total violations rather than risk to an individual. States with large populations such as China, India, or Russia may therefore appear more systematic in their violations than states with smaller populations when in fact the per capita rate of violations is similar. Based on previous research, I include an estimate of population size taken from the United Nations common statistics database. I log this estimate in order to standardize it across the sample. I hypothesize that larger populations will promote the use of physical repression in a developing country.

Methodology

In this paper, I employ ordered probit models to analyze the relationship between the imposition of sanctions and changes in human rights conditions. Most previous research on

the correlates of human rights abuses has relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with control for autocorrelation via a lagged dependent variable (Apodaca, 2001; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Recently however, some scholars have argued that standard OLS models are not well suited to evaluating dependent variables with ordinal or interval scales (see for example Hafner-Burton, 2005; Richards et al., 2001). Given the categorical nature of most existing measures of human rights, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques are more appropriate for such research and improve upon past research that has relied on OLS regressions. In this paper, I employ MLE techniques because it is methodologically appropriate given the categorical nature the nature of the dependent variable, and because it provides information regarding the likelihood that the application of sanctions on a developing nation will lead to an increase in violations of human rights.

MLE methods offer a superior alternative to OLS regression given the nonlinear nature of the dependent variable. However, the common issue of autocorrelation in analyses of time series data remains problematic. In OLS regressions of time-series data, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable has most commonly been used to control for this problem. Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated the effectiveness and appropriateness of this technique as a means to control of autocorrelation in such models, and as a result, the inclusion of an independent variable representing a one-year lag of the dependent variable has become standard practice in quantitative studies of human rights. In addition to controlling for autocorrelation, the lagged dependent variable has also shown substantive importance in human rights studies as it demonstrates the influence of recent history on human rights practices. That is, states do not typically undergo a dramatic change in their human rights practices from year to year; rather, these changes take place gradually over a period of years.

Human rights conditions at $t-1$ are often *the* most significant predictor of human rights conditions at t . The practice of lagging the dependent variable compensates for this path dependent relationship.

Because of the nonlinear nature of the categorical dependent variable used here, however, lagging the dependent variable is not an appropriate method of controlling for autocorrelation (see for example Hafner-Burton, 2005). However, Emilie Hafner-Burton has shown that the use of lagged binary indicators measuring a government's previous level of repression is simple and effective substitute for the standard lagged dependent variable in MLE analyses. This method accounts for "dependence across the categories of the dependent variable over time" and is more appropriate for logit and probit models than the typical lagged dependent variable (615, 2005).

In order to assess the effects of sanctions on physical repression I test two similar models. In the first model I use ordered probit estimation with the independent variables included as a 0-3 measure of severity of sanctions. This shows the general relationship between sanctions and violations of physical integrity rights. I am also interested, however, in the effects of sanctions at different levels of severity. As such, in the second model I create a series of dummy variables to represent each level of sanctions severity independently. This model allows me to examine the individual impact of specific types of sanctions—i.e. foreign aid retractions, moderate sanctions, or comprehensive sanction—on changes in government respect for physical integrity rights. In both models, I use Huber (1967) and White (1980) robust standard errors clustered on the country to control for heteroskedasticity.

Presented in equation form, the models used in this analysis are:

Model 1

$$\text{Physical integrity (PTS)}_{jt} = \text{constant } a + B_1 \text{ PTS}_{4j(t-1)} + B_2 \text{ PTS}_{3j(t-1)} + B_3 \text{ PTS}_{2j(t-1)} + B_4 \text{ PTS}_{1j(t-1)} + B_5 \text{ Severity of US Sanctions}_{j(t-1)} + B_6 \text{ severity of UN sanctions}_{j(t-1)} + B_7 \text{ Democracy}_{jt} + B_8 \text{ Civil War}_{jt} + B_9 \log \text{ GDP per capita}_{jt} + B_{10} \text{ Change in GDP per capita}_{jt} + B_{11} \log \text{ Population}_{jt} + e$$

Model 2

$$\text{Physical integrity (PTS)}_{jt} = \text{constant } a + B_1 \text{ PTS}_{4j(t-1)} + B_2 \text{ PTS}_{3j(t-1)} + B_3 \text{ PTS}_{2j(t-1)} + B_4 \text{ PTS}_{1j(t-1)} + B_5 \text{ US Sanctions}_{1j(t-1)} + B_6 \text{ US Sanctions}_{2j(t-1)} + B_7 \text{ US Sanctions}_{3j(t-1)} + B_8 \text{ UN sanctions}_{1j(t-1)} + B_9 \text{ UN sanctions}_{2j(t-1)} + B_{10} \text{ UN sanctions}_{3j(t-1)} + B_{11} \text{ Democracy}_{jt} + B_{12} \text{ Civil War}_{jt} + B_{13} \log \text{ GDP per capita}_{jt} + B_{14} \log \text{ Population}_{jt} + e$$

A Note About Endogeneity and the Causal Arrow

Before proceeding to the results, it is necessary to discuss endogeneity and the direction of causality. Sanctions are externally imposed; however, the imposition of sanctions is partially endogenous to the actions of the targeted regime. Given that human rights violations are often cited as a justification for sanctions, target states are likely to already commit some significant level of abuse and repression prior to the imposition of sanctions. This then raises the question of causality. One could argue that any observed increase in repression following the imposition of sanctions is simply an artifact of the pre-existing climate of declining respect for human rights rather than related to the sanctions regime itself. That is, sanctions could be caused by increases in political repression and human rights violations, rather than the other way around. I address this assertion in a number of ways.

First, while human rights-related language is frequently used as a justification for sanctions, it is far from the only reason why the UN and US have opted to impose sanctions. Other reasons include international conflicts, disagreements over international borders, failure to implement nuclear safeguards, violations of trade agreements, and complicity in illicit drug or arms trafficking (see Hufbauer et al. 1990; Hufbauer, 1998; IIE, 2005). These issues have little if any direct relationship to state-sponsored violations of human rights; moreover, these are the reasons for the imposition of sanction in the other 40% of cases. As such, if sanctions correlated with an increase in human rights violations only in instances where human rights were already an issue, achieving statistical significance in a model including all sanctions events in a given time period would be particularly difficult. This is precisely the reason for including all sanctions events in this model.

Second, the severity of sanctions seems not to correspond to the severity of abuse. Long before the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Hussein regime proved itself one of the world's most abusive regimes. However, until that point neither the US nor the UN mounted any significant effort to sanction Iraq. Similarly, Burundi and Chad have been plagued by civil violence, repressive governments, and gross violations of human rights for at least the last decade; however, neither the US nor UN have acted to impose substantial economic or diplomatic sanctions. While the US frequently imposed sanctions against the Soviet Union and Eastern Block during the Cold War, since 1992 the US has only imposed sanctions once against a former-Soviet state—Azerbaijan.¹¹ This observation is particularly revealing as violations of human rights have significantly worsened in many post-Soviet Republics since the early 1990s. Most apparent have been the precipitous declines in Russia, Georgia, and

¹¹ These sanctions were imposed in order to halt an ongoing border war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

some Central Asian states. This suggests that the imposition of sanctions is not necessarily directly tied to the severity of human rights violations. In fact, states exhibiting moderate levels of political violence and physical repression are almost as likely to be the target of US sanctions as are more severe abusers.¹² This diminishes the argument that sanctioned regimes are pre-selected based on the severity of abuse and lends support to the argument that sanctions may actually bear some responsibility for increases in human rights violations. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the relationship between sanctions severity and observed level of state repression.

Tables 4: State Repression of Human Rights and US Sanctions (by country year)

Physical Repression	Mild Sanctions	Moderate Sanctions	Comprehensive Sanctions	Total
1	0	0	0	0
2	27	8	1	36
3	86	43	52	181
4	61	64	28	153
5	44	33	31	108
Total	218	148	112	478

Table 5: State Repression of Human Rights and UN Sanctions (by country year)

Physical Repression	Diplomatic Sanctions	Moderate Sanctions	Comprehensive Sanctions	Total
1	0	3*	0	3
2	1	4	1	6
3	3	14	0	17
4	6	16	5	27
5	6	29	16	51
Total	16	66	22	104

* Applies to Arms Embargo imposed against Macedonia as part of a larger sanctions regime against all states of the Former Yugoslavia.

¹² I consider moderate abusers to fall into category 3 of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) while severe abusers would fall into levels 4 and 5. These categories are described more fully in appendix 2.

Finally, even if states exhibiting frequent disregard for human rights are most often the target of sanctions, this does not suggest that sanctions do not contribute to the declining human rights environment. Sanctions may force moderately abusive regimes to adopt even more repressive strategies in order maintain their positions of power. Previous research has demonstrated that the best predictor of human rights conditions at time t are the conditions observed at $t-1$ (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 1999). That is, states typically show little variance in terms of changes in respect for human rights from year to year. As such, we can not assume that any increase in human rights violations is simply a natural degradation of the human rights conditions in the country. Rather, some event or exogenous shock typically triggers the increased use of repression by the incumbent regime. I argue that sanctions could serve as such a shock, prompting the regime to respond with more repressive measures than it employed in the past.

Results

The results of the ordered probit models are presented in Table 6. The results of both tests provide support for the theoretical argument and hypotheses presented above. According to the ordered probit models tested here, the imposition of economic sanctions on developing countries contributes to increased violations of physical integrity rights in the target country. This effect is clear for both United States and United Nations-imposed sanctions—in both cases, the application of economic sanctions on developing countries increases the likelihood of state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights. This result supports Hypotheses one and two.

Table 6: Results of ordered probit regression (with robust clustered standard errors)

	Model 1	Model 2
PTS4	0.245* (0.144)	0.238* (0.144)
PTS3	-0.6069*** (0.143)	-0.608*** (0.143)
PTS2	-1.544*** (0.155)	-1.541*** (0.155)
PTS1	-2.918*** (0.189)	-2.913*** (0.190)
US sanctions	0.246*** (0.053)	
UN Sanctions	0.375** (0.157)	
US Sanct 1		0.377*** (0.117)
US Sanct 2		0.582*** (0.132)
US Sanct 3		0.597*** (0.183)
UN Sanct 1		0.292 (0.328)
UN Sanct 2		0.697* (0.365)
UN Sanct 3		1.306** (0.656)
International War	0.359** (0.180)	0.348** (0.175)
Civil War	1.038*** (0.144)	1.022*** (0.147)
Democracy	-0.369*** (0.095)	-0.370*** (0.096)
Economic Development	0.013 (0.035)	0.012 (0.034)
Economic Growth	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Population	0.172*** (0.218)	0.163*** (0.022)
Pseudo R²	0.313	0.313
Log likelihood	-2908.94	-2906.34
X²	1159.63, 12 degrees of freedom	1272.22, 16 degrees of freedom

***P \leq 0.001 **P \leq 0.05 *P \leq 0.10 (two-tailed test) N=2891 country years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All calculations conducted using Stata 8.0 (StataCorp, 2004).

As expected, the coefficient for sanctions imposed by the United Nations is larger than the coefficient for the United States. Consequently, UN sanctions are more likely to contribute to increased violations of physical integrity rights compared to US sanctions. These findings lend support to Hypothesis 3. This result is not surprising as US sanctions only directly affect trade between two nations: the US and the target state. The target state,

while blocked from certain economic transactions with what is likely a major trading partner, likely has recourse to other trade relationships. For example, when the United States imposed extensive sanctions on Iran during the 1980s, European firms assumed much of the trade in oil previously conducted by US companies. As such, the detrimental impact on the national economy of the target state can be mediated by pursuing trade with nations besides the US. On the other hand, sanctions imposed by the UN apply to all UN member states. The target state thus has no practical alternatives and no legitimate substitute for lost trading partners. Under such conditions, the target state suffers some tangible economic decline.

Previous research has suggested that multilateral sanctions are more successful than unilateral sanctions at achieving foreign policy outcomes. According to this literature, the impact of sanctions on a nation's economic welfare depends on the extent to which the sanctions limit the target nation's total access to trade (Bayard et al, 1983). Multilateral sanctions are more likely to seriously erode the economy of the target state compared to unilateral sanctions. Consequently, the further the economic decline, the more likely the sanctioned regime will increase physical repression. UN sanctions imposed on South African apartheid regime in the late 1960 and strengthened through the 1970s and 1980s severely restricted the access of South African firms to the international market. Continued trade restrictions and declining foreign investment because of UN sanctions (and coupled with unilateral sanctions) led to a 2.8% annual decline in GDP during the sanction period (Hufbauer et al., 1990: 233). This trend only reversed after the retraction of international sanctions following democratic reforms on the part of the apartheid government. Similarly, the UN embargo against Iraq—while not successful in altering the position of the regime—had a dramatic negative impact on the nation's economy. During the more than ten years of

economic sanctions, Iraq's per capita GDP declined from approximately \$2200 in 1990 to less than \$700 by the end of the decade.

The finding that both UN and US-imposed sanctions increase the likelihood of state-sponsored physical repression is revealing. However, it is also important to determine if this relationship occurs at different levels of sanction severity. In order to evaluate the effects of different levels of sanctions on changes in physical repression, I tested a second model in which I disaggregated the different levels of sanctions into three separate dummy variables. These results reveal a more refined picture of the relationship between sanctions and physical repression.

Like the previous model, Model 2 demonstrates that the imposition of sanctions on a developing state increases the likelihood of violations of physical integrity rights. In general, the results show that as the severity of sanctions increase, the likelihood of a state to resort to physical repression also increases. However, this relationship is not uniform between US and UN sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the United States contribute to increases in human rights violations at all levels of severity, from the retraction of previously promised foreign aid (level 1) to complete economic embargos (level 3). In addition, the coefficients for each category increase as the severity of sanctions increases, suggesting that the more severe the sanctions regime imposed by the US on a developing country, the greater the likelihood of violations of physical integrity rights. This provides statistical evidence hypothesis 4.

Turning to UN sanctions regimes, the results reveal that the relationship between sanctions and repression is dependent on the level of sanctions imposed. Overall, the coefficients increase with the severity of the imposed sanction regime. However, the p-value for the first category of UN sanctions does not approach standard levels of statistical

significance. This is perhaps not surprising, as diplomatic sanctions do not directly constrain the resources available to incumbent leaders and their winning coalition. Restrictions such as travel bans serve as clear signal of the international community's dissatisfaction with a regime, but at most, they are likely to inconvenience leaders and political elites rather than constrain them. Regardless of the regime's ease of movement, so long as resource flows remain unimpeded, the cost of low-level UN sanctions to civilians seems low as well.

Moderate UN sanctions such as arms and fuel embargoes and restrictions on specific commodities reach statistical significance at the 10% level, indicating that a relationship between this level of sanctions and increased human rights abuses exists. However, the relative weakness of this relationship raises a number of questions. Alternative specifications of this model (not reported here) reveal the fragility of the results for this level of UN sanctions. When the Amnesty International reports are substituted as the dependent variable in place of the State Department scores, the p-values for moderate sanctions become insignificant at the 10% level. This is also the case for changes in the civil war variable. When the threshold for battlefield deaths is lowered to 25 deaths per annum, the variable for moderate UN sanctions fails to reach statistical significance. On the other hand, when the complete 21-point Polity2 score is substituted for the binary democracy variable, the results become significant at the 5% level. These conflicting results suggest that further research into the effects of moderate sanctions is necessary. The difference in significance may be driven by the introduction of targeted sanctions in the late 1990s. Traditional sanctions likely produce a net negative effect; targeted sanctions may be successful at exerting pressure on incumbents and political elites without adversely affecting civilians. While these results show moderate economic sanctions are somewhat related to an increased likelihood of

human rights violations, this analysis makes no distinction between smart sanctions and other types of import or export restrictions. It is thus possible that this analysis misses the important distinction between targeted sanctions and other moderately severe economic restrictions. Further refinement of the type of sanctions applied could improve our understanding of the effects of targeted sanctions on political repression. Disaggregating smart sanctions from other import or export restrictions may revealing whether more carefully crafted regimes are in fact more sensitive to the human rights and humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

The p-values for comprehensive UN sanctions, on the other hand, are consistently significant at the 5% level regardless of alternative specifications. The substantive interpretation of these results is that while diplomatic sanctions imposed by the UN do not systematically relate to increases in state-sponsored repression, both moderate and comprehensive sanctions do exert some influence. Moreover, the increase in the coefficients between moderate sanctions and comprehensive sanctions supports the hypothesis that increases in sanctions severity translate into greater threats to human rights. In this model, the value of the coefficient for UN sanctions almost doubles between the second and third levels of sanctions, revealing a significant increase in magnitude of effect between the effects of arms and fuel embargos and comprehensive sanctions. This provides support for hypothesis 5.

Finally, the high value of the coefficient for comprehensive sanctions is not surprising as multilateral embargoes backed by international mandate have the effect of virtually locking the target state out of the international economic and diplomatic system. The few high level sanctions regimes imposed on states during the 25 years included in the analysis

(South Africa or Iraq for example) stripped the target states of most forms of development and military aid, barred the states from most international trade, and cost the states even strategic diplomatic and military partners. Under the austere economic conditions imposed by such sanctions, GDP growth slowed or reversed, prices increased, wages fell, and unemployment rose. Thus the impact of such harsh diplomatic and economic constraints was felt by all strata of society, and—initially at least—most heavily impacted the populace as opposed to political elites. As popular support for the regime declines and discontent rises, violations of basic human rights increase as enact harsher measures to suppress political rivals.

The control variables included in this model generally function as expected and correspond to the results produced in previous studies of the correlates of respect for human rights. First, the binary variables accounting for the previous year's level of human rights abuse—the substitute for the lagged dependent used in OLS regressions—show statistical significance and are generally negatively correlated with an increase in abuses for the 1st through 3rd categories of repression. The substantive meaning of this result is that past behavior influences present respect for human rights standards. The absolute value of the coefficients also decreases as the previously observed level of abuse increases. The exception to this is in the 4th category, representing significant physical repression affecting a large portion of the population. This variable only reaches significance at the 10% threshold; more importantly, the sign on the coefficient is positive, revealing an opposite effect from that of lower levels of human rights repression. The difference in the signs of coefficients for levels 1 through 3 and level 4 suggests that states with a recent history of respect for human rights are likely to continue respecting the physical integrity rights of their citizens and even

improve upon them while states with a recent history of violating the physical integrity rights of their citizens are more likely to worsen their behavior. This observation improves upon the findings from previous studies that have relied upon a one-year lag of the dependent variable by illustrating that the direction of effect depends upon the states previous location on the scale of physical integrity abuse.

In both models, international and civil wars are significant predictors of increased human rights violations in terms of both statistical significance and substantive impact. In order to maintain stability, nations at war turn to repression. While significant for both cases the magnitude of effect is greater for civil compared to international conflict. The comparatively large coefficient demonstrates that the presence of a civil war dramatically increases the likelihood of increased state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights. These results are consistent with past research that has demonstrated the significant correlation between both international and civil wars and violations of human rights.

The democracy variable also achieves statistical significance and the sign of the coefficient is negative. In line with past results, democratic nations typically are more likely to respect physical integrity rights. The result is not surprising since democratic governments that abuse the basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens are unlikely to garner the popular support needed to win elections.

Economic growth likewise performed as expected. Its coefficient is negative and it reaches levels of statistical significance. This result suggests that as GDP increases, the likelihood of human rights violations declines. Interestingly, however, per capita GDP does not have a statistically significant effect on violations of physical integrity rights. This result is inconsistent with others analyses of economic factors associated with human rights, which

suggest that as per capita GDP increases, human rights violations decrease. The reason for this inconsistent result may be that this analysis is limited to the developing world. Most previous studies (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al., 1999) used a large sample that included the highly developed nations of Western Europe and North America whereas such nations were omitted from this analysis. Consequently, it is likely that the inclusion of so many highly industrialized states with a long history of respect for human rights resulted in the observed statistical significance of per capita GDP in those and other studies. However, it is still interesting that within the subset of nations included here—those with an average GDP of under \$10,000—per capita GDP does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood state-sponsored physical repression. Future research should perhaps address to what extent per capita income affects human rights, and determine if there exists a threshold for secure human rights similar to that identified for democracy (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Finally, the logged population size of a country is both statistically significant and positively correlated with increased likelihood of violations of physical integrity rights. This suggests that the larger the population of a developing state the greater the probability of increased human rights violations.

On balance, the imposition of economic sanctions on developing states increases the likelihood of increased state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights. For US sanctions, the likelihood of violations increases in tandem with the severity of the imposed regime. UN sanctions, on the other hand, do not necessarily follow the same pattern. The lowest level of UN sanctions—diplomatic sanctions—apparently has no statistical relationship to changes in state repression. Moderate trade sanctions or restrictions on fuel or arms, however, increase the likelihood of physical repression. This observation begs further

research in order to differentiate between smart sanctions and other import-export sanctions. Lastly, comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations significantly increase the likelihood violations of physical integrity rights.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that the imposition of US and UN sanctions frequently contributes to an increase in state-sponsored physical integrity violations. The results reveal some interesting information about the differing effects of sanctions by type and by sender. This demonstration of the adverse and differing effects of sanctions on physical integrity rights is important both for normative and substantive reasons. Both decision makers in the United States and representatives to the United Nations Security Council have a duty to design and implement policies that respect physical integrity and basic human rights whenever doing so is within political and economic limits. It cannot be expected that the United States should attempt to cure all of the world's humanitarian crises; however, as the sole remaining superpower and a self-described champion of human rights, the US should indeed work to reconcile its policy decisions with its stated values. If sanctions inflict unnecessary harm on civilians, the United States should reconsider the imposition of sanctions as a "humane" foreign policy alternative. Likewise, the Security Council, as the executive body of the United Nations, is charged with upholding both the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cornerstone of international human rights law, makes clear the standards to which the United Nations and its member states should aspire. Sanctions that degrade economic and social conditions, deteriorate public health structures, or contribute to repression of basic human rights violate the "critical UN protective

provision” enshrined in the Article 1 of the UN Charter (Joyner, 2003). The Security Council is not above the law, and actions taken by it that infringe upon or contribute to violations of human rights standards—such as comprehensive sanctions—necessarily exceed its mandate (Joyner, 2003; Reinisch, 2001). As such, the Security Council should seek out alternatives to comprehensive sanctions and embargoes as a means of prompting changes in the domestic and foreign policy of states in violations international law.

Furthermore, this analysis illustrates the divide between stated US objectives and actual results. Sender states often couch the objective of sanctions in the language of humanitarianism and protection of human rights. Sanctions, then, should produce these results in at least a substantial number of the cases in which they are applied. Yet the empirical evidence reveals that sanctions rarely succeed in achieving such foreign policy goals. More importantly, the evidence presented herein suggests that not only do economic sanctions often fail to improve the humanitarian situation in the target country, but rather frequently contribute to an increase in human rights abuses and a decline in physical security of the person when they are imposed on developing nations. While sanctions may in fact succeed in some areas, the imposition of sanctions for the protection of human rights should be viewed as a failed or mis-specified policy decision that should be seriously reconsidered.

This paper also reveals a number of avenues for future research. First, while this paper has demonstrated that sanctions can affect the frequency and severity of human rights repression and abuse, the picture is incomplete. A more complex model that can further remove the effects of the endogenous variables could clarify the relationship between sanctions and state-sponsored violations of physical integrity rights. That is, sanctions are applied most often imposed upon states that already exhibit a history of at least some

significant level of systematic human rights violations. Second, to more clearly delineate causal mechanisms and refine our understanding of the relationship between bilateral and multilateral sanctions and changing human rights conditions, a more exact measure of human rights conditions is needed. Currently available indices of human rights violations cannot account for subtle changes in a nation's respect of human rights by states or clearly and consistently identify the actors primarily responsible for violations.¹³ As such, any analysis of human rights conditions suffer from limitations in available quantitative data. The creation of a more refined dataset that accounts for fine changes in human rights conditions and disaggregates state-sponsored violations from violations caused by non-state or extra-state actors could further research in this area and contribute to our understanding of the correlates of human rights abuses. Finally, this model has given partial support for the notion that targeted sanctions may be less detrimental to the civilian population of sanctioned states. Diplomatic sanctions seem to have no statistically significant relationship to changes in levels of state repression. Disaggregating targeted sanctions from other forms of moderate sanctions could provide important information regarding the ability of the United Nations to affect political elites while shielding civilians from the negative impact of sanctions.

Sanctions have increasingly become a tool of foreign policy for both states and the international organizations. Yet given the evidence of their detrimental effects on civilian populations, the need for new tactics or improvements in existing sanction strategies is

¹³ The Political Terror Scale discussed here as well as the CIRI human rights database constructed by Cingranelli and Richards both suffer from similar problems. While the CIRI scale is perhaps more systematic in its assessment and provides more categories of abuse, it is an additive scale of human rights abuses that counts raw events in order to generate country scores. As such, it fails to control for population size and other factors necessary to understand the risk posed to an individual citizen of a given country. The Political Terror Scale implicitly considers violations relative to population size; however, the lack of clearly identifiable coding rules limits the accuracy and reliability of the measure. As well, both indexes focus on abuses committed by state actors. Non-state actors contribute significantly to the overall human rights conditions within a state. The development of a scale that clearly separates the actions of state from non-state actors and includes separate measures of each would therefore be a major advancement in the field of human rights research.

apparent. While sanctions may still provide a positive alternative to armed intervention, policy makers should further refine the stipulations of sanctions in order to minimize the collateral damage inflicted upon civilians and increase the specificity of sanctions to target directly the leadership of a state. Targeted sanctions imposed by the UN may contribute to less humanitarian hardship than more comprehensive sanctions. Smart sanctions regimes may also be able to exert pressure on political elites without expressly leading to increased political repression. However, more research into both the effectiveness of such sanctions and means to control the likelihood of the adverse effects they often cause is necessary before the international community can comfortably adopt economic sanctions as a humane and effective tool of international diplomacy and foreign policy.

Appendix 1: Countries Included in Sample

Afghanistan	Ghana	Pakistan
Albania	Guatemala	Panama
Algeria	Guinea	Peru
Angola	Guinea-Bissau	Papua-New Guinea
Argentina	Guyana	Paraguay
Armenia	Haiti	Philippines
Azerbaijan	Honduras	Poland
Bangladesh	Hungary	Romania
Belarus	India	Russia/USSR
Benin	Indonesia	Rwanda
Bhutan	Iran	Saudi Arabia
Bolivia	Iraq	Senegal
Bosnia	Israel	Sierra Leone
Botswana	Jamaica	Slovakia
Brazil	Jordan	Somalia
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan	South Africa
Burkina Faso	Kenya	Sri Lanka
Burundi	Korea, Democratic People's	Sudan
Cambodia	Republic of	Swaziland
Cameroon	Korea, Republic of	Syria
Central African Republic	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Chad	Laos	Tanzania
Chile	Latvia	Thailand
China	Lebanon	Togo
Colombia	Lesotho	Tunisia
Congo, Democratic	Liberia	Turkey
Republic of / Zaire	Libya	Turkmenistan
Congo, Republic of the	Lithuania	Uganda
Costa Rica	Macedonia	Ukraine
Cote d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Uruguay
Croatia	Malawi	Uzbekistan
Cuba	Malaysia	Venezuela
Cyprus	Mali	Vietnam
Czechoslovakia	Mauritania	Yugoslavia
Czech Republic	Mauritius	Yemen
Dominican Republic	Mexico	Zambia
Ecuador	Morocco	Zimbabwe
Egypt	Mozambique	
El Salvador	Myanmar (Burma)	
Eritrea	Namibia	
Estonia	Nepal	
Ethiopia	Nicaragua	
Gabon	Niger	
Gambia	Nigeria	
Georgia	Oman	

Appendix 2: Detailed Description of PTS Categories

Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

Level 4: The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Level 5: The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

*Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1997.

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