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## **Dedication**

To my family, by birth and by choice, without whom none of this would be possible.

## **Acknowledgements**

Technically my thesis began in the fall of 2016, but the idea for this project originated with an early interest in human rights. I have worked with many people over the years that have helped cultivate this passion and contribute to this project. First and foremost I would like to thank the kindness of the survivors I have met over the years. In Poland, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Germany I have been welcomed with open arms. These experiences began in my hometown of Boston with the Lost Boys and Holocaust survivors that I encountered. I am grateful for their ability to humanize these conflicts and their patience while I learned their history.

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## Chapter One: Introduction

Pancrace would rise in the morning, eat a breakfast of brochettes, meet his friends, and walk to work. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this routine remained relatively normal. Instead of a traditional job, Pancrace worked as a civilian genocidaire (perpetrator of genocide). His day consisted of a series of attacks where he was expected to machete Tutsi-Rwandans. “Rule number one was to kill. There was no rule number two,” he remembers.<sup>1</sup> To most people living in peaceful societies, his behavior seems insane. He killed people he knew. He murdered his neighbors. Surely he is monstrous. Pancrace, like many civilian participants in genocide, is not evil. He is a human being who was persuaded to believe certain versions of truth, and whose innate morality was corrupted with propaganda. This is one of the major misconceptions of genocide: everyone who kills must be “bad.” History and this research show otherwise. Pancrace is not an anomaly of human nature; rather his fate is a possibility for every person who feels an emotional connection to their designated identity.

Pancrace was not an outlier. He participated in killings that were orchestrated by his local government and the Interhamwe.<sup>2</sup> The civilians were armed with machetes and ordered to begin killing. The organizers were purposefully vague with their assignments and did everything in their power to dehumanize the victims. Civilians did not see themselves as murderers, but as civil servants carrying out a duty to their nation. When some of the men in Pancrace’s group pressed for more details, one of the leaders told them, “The only worthwhile plan is to start straight ahead into the bush.”<sup>3</sup> And so they did. The men, with little or no experience of violence, began killing. Most of them do not remember their first

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<sup>1</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

<sup>2</sup> The Hutu extremists and government paramilitary force

<sup>3</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

kill. Instead Pancrace remembers the first person that he made eye contact with. To him, “the eyes of someone you kill are immortal...they have a terrible black color.”<sup>4</sup> These moments aside, the killings blended together.

Pancrace and the other genocidaires developed ways to cope with the violence. Their violent acts were not only fatal but also brutal and at times exhibitionist. One common practice, was killing females by taking a six-foot sharpened pole and driving it through the woman’s genitals until it went through her brain.<sup>5</sup> Some embraced this process of death and dehumanization while others attempted to distance themselves from the more grotesque parts of the work. Killing was tiring and men psychologically simplified the process by transitioning their guilt. Killers would internally rationalize why they were not responsible for their actions. Pancrace explains “if you have been properly prepared, if you feel yourself pushed and pulled, if you see that the killing will be total and without disastrous consequences for yourself, you feel soothed and reassured.”<sup>6</sup> An individual’s ability to justify their behaviors helps them remain human in their own minds. This research asserts that it is important to keep people like Pancrace in mind while studying genocide, not to sympathize with them, but instead to humanize them. Through this process we can better understand their decision-making and how they ended up with a machete in their hands.

The rationale of civilian perpetrators is too large of an undertaking for one project, but social science is best equipped to understand the process by focusing on specific area of influence. Therefore, this research seeks to understand how social homogeneity and hate speech impact civilian decision-making during genocide, specifically the case of Rwanda.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>6</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

Social homogeneity (or the qualities of sameness that a group possesses) and hate speech are both factors that motivate violence but each operate in different ways. Social homogeneity is a condition under which the group exists, where as hate speech is a mechanism distributed by the elites. By understanding this relationship, we can better understand Panrace's motivation. In genocide studies, the majority of research is devoted to those who orchestrate the violence, but it is equally important to understand the individuals who comply with and execute it. Focusing on social homogeneity and hate speech helps to explain the societal influence which would subconsciously affect a civilian's decision. As Raul Hilberg, a genocide survivor and scholar observed "At crucial junctures, every individual makes decisions, and... every decision is individual."<sup>7</sup> Genocide is not handed down from above, but accepted and even embraced by the masses. Within the civilian decision-making process there are many variables at play. Here I focus on a single and crucial component: the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech.

This research is concentrated on civilian behavior at the community or village level, and the way that social interactions influence a person's decision in crisis. There is a wide range of opinions, even controversy, on the role that social homogeneity plays in conflict. Many of these causal mechanisms vary at the level of conflict operationalization whether it be international, the state, counties, or villages. At the state level, socially homogeneous societies are successful, since homogeneity and conformity limit conflict. There is research at the community level suggesting that social diversity encourages individuals to question

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<sup>7</sup> "How Was the Holocaust Possible?"



authority.<sup>8</sup> The research discussed here will only address social homogeneity at the sector or village level, which averages a population of 5,000.

The study of hate speech and propaganda is far less controversial. There is general consensus that propaganda impacts decision-making; the question is to what degree.<sup>9</sup> This research argues that hate speech is a key step in creating a strong national narrative to garner civilian support for genocidal violence. I hypothesize that high levels of social homogeneity and hate speech will lead to high levels of civilian participation in violence. This is tested through a quantitative and qualitative exploration of the relationship between the social homogeneity and hate speech. The discovered relationship is statistically significant, and reinforces the original hypothesis. This research discovers an interesting relationship between the two independent variables that calls for further extensive research.

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<sup>8</sup> Levine et al., “Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles.”

<sup>9</sup> DellaVigna and Gentzkow, “Persuasion.”

## **Chapter Two: A Brief History of Rwanda**

In 1994 the Hutu extremist population of Rwanda persecuted the Tutsis in what many consider the most efficient genocide in human history. However the roots of the genocide began decades prior to 1994, when colonialists cast Hutus as inferior to Tutsis. The geopolitical history of Rwanda shaped the conflict, which developed following the establishment of independence from the Belgians. This conflict was entrenched in an ideology constructed by the different regimes and a stream of propaganda intended to create a chasm between Hutus and Tutsis. This environment built a perceived threat to the basic human needs of Hutu Rwandans who were then able to dehumanize their Tutsi counterparts for what the ideology allowed them to define as altruistic purposes, making it morally feasible to carry out genocidal violence. The specific structure of Rwandan history outlined in this chapter helps to frame the theory, the research, and the genocide itself.

### **The Birth of a Violent Ideology**

The modern territory of Rwanda has been inhabited for nearly two thousand years. In the beginning, the society operated under a single culture, language, and religion with a common history. Prior to colonization, Hutu and Tutsi were permeable social structures meant to delineate material worth. Cattle were the primary monetary system of exchange, so the size of one's herd directly translated to wealth. Tutsis were those who were rich in cattle, whereas Hutu were their subordinate laymen.<sup>10</sup> People married within their social class, which provided each group with a phenotypic identity over a series of generations. To

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<sup>10</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*; Totten, Parsons, and Charny, *Century of Genocide*; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*.

clarify, the origin of the Hutu and Tutsi identity groups have no base in genetics, race, or ethnicity. (Therefore the complex separation of the two groups will be referred to as a “social division” and not as an issue of ethnicity.) In the years leading up the colonization rates of inter-marriage fluctuated and the groups lived harmoniously.<sup>11</sup> Rwandans had a complex tribal structure of government that the colonizers could not comprehend.

In 1884, at the Berlin Conference, the territory of Rwanda was allocated to Germany. The Germans maintained the existing political structure and gave Rwandans nearly autonomous political control. Then, during WWI, the Belgians took control of Rwanda and changed local power structures. The Belgians struggled to understand the traditional modes of governance and instead exacerbated the social divisions to create an oppressive social hierarchy. The Belgians reorganized and simplified the state into chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms, removing the “competing hierarchies” which acted as a system of checks and balances.<sup>12</sup> Colonizers decided to focus on the Hutu/Tutsi social dynamic, which they perceived as ethnic.

Tutsis were put into positions of power, even though Hutus were the majority. Beginning in the 1920s, only Tutsis could participate in government. Belgium’s political favoritism was not meant to create a divide-and-rule system. Instead they believed that one “ethnic” group was fundamentally superior to the other. The Tutsis in power exploited this perception and created a version of history to support the Belgian narrative. This historical representation showed Tutsis as the naturally superior leaders in a feudal structure of power. The Tutsis promoted the theory that lighter-skinned Africans were the main force civilizing

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<sup>11</sup> Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

<sup>12</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

Africa.<sup>13</sup> “Ethnic” categories were solidified in the 1930s when all Rwandans were forced to register their category. From that point the separation was concrete and a person’s ethnicity was assigned at birth. This bureaucratic decision would prove to be catastrophic.

Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962 and the path to post-colonial power created further social divisions between groups. The two groups vied for power over the emerging state. The Tutsis were initially guaranteed power, since they were politically and socially dominant. Historically, the emperors of Rwanda were Tutsi, so the colonists believed there was precedence for leadership. In 1961, at the height of the colonial transition, Kigeli V Ndahindurwa, the last emperor of Rwanda, died. Simultaneously there were incidents of Tutsi violence against Hutu. These two events created a window for the Hutu majority to seize power from Tutsis, claiming they were no longer fit for leadership.<sup>14</sup> Half of the Tutsis in the political system were replaced with Hutus. Hutus effortlessly won the first free election. The rhetoric of freedom and independence was deeply entrenched in the social divisions. The false feudal history that the Tutsis used to justify their social dominance was now used against them. The new government was characterized by Hutu power and anti-Tutsi attitudes. Hutu sought to “reclaim” power, territory, and wealth from their Tutsi “overlords.”<sup>15</sup> In the months following the first free election Tutsis were removed from their land and property and over 10,000 were exiled from the country. Tutsis living in exile started to organize against the sitting government, which reinforced Hutus’ negative perceptions of Tutsis.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.; Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*.

<sup>14</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

The postcolonial period saw the creation of a socially divisive and violent national ideology. The Tutsis in exile started organizing attacks against Rwandan nationals and the sitting government. This rebel activity encouraged the idea that Tutsis were not only dangerous, but that the Hutu majority had the right to rule over Tutsis. Vilifying Tutsis had financial benefits, since the government could claim the exiled person's land and goods. In the late 1960s the state carried out a series of attacks against the Tutsis civilians hoping to suppress the exiled rebel movement. An estimated 20,000 were killed and 300,000 were forced into exile. Once again the falsified history of Rwanda, helped to reinforce an anti-Tutsi ideology.<sup>17</sup> Classification measures, such as identity cards, were created so social differences could easily be identified and institutionalized. These policies of discrimination and violence persisted into the 1990s. By 1991, due to both exiles and killings, the Tutsi population was down to 8.4% of the country's total population, but this was just the beginning.<sup>18</sup>

In the 1990s the conflict between the ethnic groups intensified. Juvénal Habyarimana, of the MRND (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development – conservative party), was the president and authoritarian leader. The government was on the defensive, as Tutsi exiles militarized in neighboring countries. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was the Tutsi political organization that opposed the sitting regime in Rwanda. They also had a militarized wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which was led by Paul Kagame.<sup>19</sup> In October of 1990, the RPA invaded Rwanda and captured territory within 45 miles of Kigali. Then on October 4<sup>th</sup> the RPF allegedly shelled Kigali causing Habyarimana

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

to arrest over 13,000 Tutsis who were perceived to be a threat to the state.<sup>20</sup> They were tortured held under inhumane conditions. It was revealed after the genocide that Habyarimana staged the shelling as an excuse to make arrests, gain popular support, and create a climate of fear. The RPF was forced back into surrounding countries such as Uganda and Burundi. The escalation of violence also increased the presence of NGOs and government-watch agencies. They forced Habyarimana to change the constitution and create a government, which included both social groups.<sup>21</sup>

Following the constitutional changes, the first coalition government came to power in 1992, and Habyarimana remained president. The MRD (Republican Democratic Party) gained a significant amount of power and elected Agathe Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister, under Habyarimana.<sup>22</sup> The MRD was the moderate Hutu opposition party who favored Hutu/Tutsi integration. Early in her term, Uwilingiyimana announced new policies such as a quota-free education system that gained her public support. Simultaneously the MRD started an intense propaganda campaign to increase their popular support. Habyarimana's power was threatened both internally by the coalition government and externally by the rebels. He feared that the Tutsis could take control because power in the capital was fractured. Habyarimana slowed the growing power of the opposition through both soft and hard power techniques. Multiple political parties in Rwanda organized militarized youth groups. At the same time the Interhamwe<sup>23</sup> emerged. They were the paramilitary arm of Habyarimana's regime. The MRND, MRD, and the Tutsi minority violently battled for power. The rule of law was absent as Habyarimana and the MRND tried to usurp power from the MRD. Citizens did not know

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<sup>20</sup> Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*; Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>21</sup> Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*; Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>22</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*; Totten, Parsons, and Charny, *Century of Genocide*.

<sup>23</sup> This translates to "those who work together"

whom to trust, but it was clear that they were in danger when the government began indiscriminate attacks against the population.<sup>24</sup>

Less than a year later, in August of 1992, the Habyarimana regime and the domestic Hutu opposition signed the Arusha accords, which provided short-term peace.<sup>25</sup> Neither side wanted to demobilize and less than a month later Habyarimana privately rejected the accords and redefined the new enemy. The focus was no longer Hutu opposition, but the threat of Tutsi control. The enemy was separated into two categories: the principal and the partisan. The principal was:

The Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who NEVER recognized and will NEVER recognize the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to re-conquer power by all means necessary including arms.<sup>26</sup>

The partisan was anyone who supported the principal. In these defining documents, ‘Tutsi’ was used interchangeably with the word ‘enemy,’ and Hutus could also be members of the enemy. The MRND deftly combined two different enemies, Tutsi and Hutu opposition, into one abstract force that jeopardized the security of the Rwandan state and its people. From decades of violence and misinformation, a singular ideology was born, which defined the threat and gave the people something to fight for.

### **Broadcasting the Perception of Threat**

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<sup>24</sup> Straus, *The Order of Genocide*; Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*.

<sup>25</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*; Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*.

<sup>26</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

The core ideology for the Rwandan genocide was delivered through national radio programs. Beginning in 1992, the government created “free press,” which was a guise for anti-Tutsi propaganda. The government manipulated the social divisions to their advantage. The regime employed common stereotypes of Tutsis to dehumanize them in the eyes of the average Hutu citizen. Once they were perceived as sub-human it was easier to justify violence against them. The state could paint this violence as altruistic or noble, since civilians were being violent towards non-humans to protect the safety of their nation and families. The dehumanization process was carried out through statewide propaganda and hate speech. The national radio stations of RTLM and Radio Rwanda were the main modes of delivery.

Blatant anti-Tutsi media hit the airwaves in 1991 and intensified in the following years. Propaganda, like social divisions, was not the absolute cause of the genocide, but it was a catalyst. Broadcast from RTLM and Radio Rwanda, the two government-controlled stations, focused on creating broad differences instead of focusing on one specific political, racial, or ethnic quality. The vague messages allowed civilians to interpret the message of discrimination and dehumanization to fit anyone who was different in their community. Pre-genocide Rwanda had low rates of literacy and multilingualism so radio was the primary way to distribute news and information. In the early 1990s, RTLM was only distributed in the Kigali area whereas Radio Rwanda was distributed through the country. Habyarimana aided this process by distributing radios to all regions of the country.

Radio messaging and hate speech has been previously linked to civilian violence during the genocide. Scholars have conducted studies of the specific rhetoric in radio



broadcasts and their influence.<sup>27</sup> This research highlights that the genocide was not a conflict between two social groups, which had complex roots that were deeply intertwined with the country's colonial and feudal history.<sup>28</sup> Elizabeth Baisley, a political scientist at Princeton University, elaborates that “rebellious against wealthy people” was a key element in the MRND's hate-speech messaging. Her analysis of hate speech focuses on status and occupational differences between the two groups. “It was said that Tutsi could not farm, they were often accused of stealing food produced by Hutu or living off the work of Hutu cultivators.”<sup>29</sup> Propaganda mechanisms created the imagery that Tutsis were a scourge on society, with no right to be superior since they relied on Hutus for food production and other key resource systems.<sup>30</sup>

The radio stations started to refer to Tutsis as Indirizi or Inyenzi, which translate to “parasite” and “cockroach,” respectively. The classification as insects rendered Tutsis as sub-human: *dehumanization*. They were parasites on society who had to be eliminated for the greater good: *altruism*. Killing Tutsis was a service to the greater good of the nation and those who participated in the violence could compartmentalize their actions with less guilt, since their victims were not human.

## Political Organization

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<sup>27</sup> Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory”; Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda.”

<sup>28</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda”; Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory.”

<sup>29</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda.”

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

The propaganda descended from the elites and was predominantly distributed through the government-supplied radios, but civilians were organized and encouraged by the local government. At the local level, the Rwandan government operated a system called Burgomasters. The Rwandan state was divided into ten prefectures and the prefectures were subdivided into communes, which averaged around 50,000 people, controlled by Burgomasters. Communes were separated into sectors, each of which averaged 5,000 people and were controlled by a councilor. Then the sectors were partitioned into cells that contained 1,000 people and were controlled by a group of five leaders. There was a person in power at each level, but the Burgomasters had the most influence.<sup>31</sup> This system harkened back to the pre-colonial Rwandan governmental structure, except that Tutsis were now excluded from the political system.<sup>32</sup> Habyarimana selected the Burgomasters. This structure allowed the state to permeate all aspects of life. Citizens were forced to participate in Umuganda (days of community service) and animation sessions (propaganda meetings for the MRND). The church network reinforced political messaging from the pulpit, since the archbishops were Hutu.<sup>33</sup>

The Burgomasters held power and authority in the communities. They were considered a high court, so if problems could not be resolved at the cell or sector they would go to the commune. The key public duty of the Burgomaster was to hold “court once or twice a week to receive citizens and explain the latest news from the capital;” they also “determined land use, mediated property conflict, settled family disputes, placed children in

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<sup>31</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>32</sup> Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

<sup>33</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

secondary schools, and decided which cases ought to go to higher court.”<sup>34</sup> The Burgomasters were imperfect since their allegiances and judgments could be bought.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, Burgomasters held positions of moral absolutism in society and their words were essentially commands. When the genocide began, the orders came from the Burgomasters, which the church and the media reinforced. This made it easy for civilians to rationalize their violent decisions.

### **Executing the Violence**

The genocide began in full on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994. That day President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and he was killed, along with most of his MRND cabinet. Tutsis and the RPF were blamed for his death and this was used as an excuse to begin the killings. By the next morning all Tutsis had been removed from power and the government was replaced with Hutu extremists (those who favored the most the violent solutions to the social divisions).<sup>36</sup> The Hutu civilian population was quickly organized to implement the violence and in the following 100 days between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsis were killed, which was 75% of the country’s Tutsi population.<sup>37</sup> Motivated by the murder of the president and the perceived threat of quickly approaching RPF forces, the violence was intense and incredibly efficient.<sup>38</sup> Habyarimana’s assassination reinforced the idea that Hutus were innocent victims of Tutsi violence. The MRND tried to disseminate this message world-wide, telling the international

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<sup>34</sup> Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*. 67.

<sup>35</sup> Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

<sup>36</sup> Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*.

<sup>37</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>38</sup> Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*.

community that the Tutsis were preparing to commit genocide.<sup>39</sup> All the pieces of the government's genocidal ideology came together and Burgomasters, churches, as propaganda enlisted civilians into violence.

On the morning of April 7<sup>th</sup>, the MRND and General Bagosora began assassinating political dissidents. The moderate Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a Hutu who supported integration, was among the first killed. General Bagosora, a core member of the Hutu extremists, oversaw the killings. The network of Hutu extremists advocating for violence was integrated across the political, military, and civilian sectors. In 1993 Bagosora had imported a large number of machetes to Rwanda, some hypothesize as a planning step in the killings.<sup>40</sup> A skilled military leader, he published military press releases which ordered political stabilization, while simultaneously sending internal memos that encouraged the Interahamwe to violence. Under his command, the violence intensified.

Many of the massacres annihilated entire villages, so that the names and identities of the victims could not be recovered. This fact alone makes it one of the most effective genocides in history. Some scholars suggest that over one million people, including military personnel, participated in some form of violence during the genocide. The death tolls are widely debated and they do not include the hundreds of thousands of Hutu deaths at the hand of the RPF. The genocide tells a one-sided story of struggle, since the Tutsi RPF forcibly took office after the genocide and wrote the history of the conflict. In the twenty-two years since the conflict, the country has splintered and struggled to recover from a legacy of violence and distrust. The trajectory of this country, the conflict, and the aftermath influence the way in which research is conducted.

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<sup>39</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>40</sup> Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*.

In my study, I look at civilian participation in the Rwanda to understand how the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech impacted decision-making. The history outlined in this chapter takes a unique approach to the development and escalation of events in Rwanda, which informs how I conduct this research. This historical perspective is not only the basis for the research, but imperative to interpreting the claims that I make. The structures of social homogeneity and hate speech in Rwandan society dictated the events leading up to the genocide.

### **Chapter Three: Research Question and Theory**

This work began with the research question: why do civilians participate in violence during genocide? There are innumerable factors, psychological and societal, that impact an individual's decisions. Genocide research examines many different factors that motivate civilian violence from economics, to geopolitics, class, coercion, social context, external threats, and a myriad of other issues. This research focuses on the relationship between two factors: a) social homogeneity and hate speech; and b) civilian violence. These two components have been investigated independently but not in combination. The relationship between these elements cannot absolutely answer the question of why civilians kill, but it is an important part of the puzzle.

When civilians live in socially homogeneous communities, I hypothesize they are more susceptible to hate speech, since they do not have a significant volume of personal relationships with the out-group. Individual interactions with members of the out-group have the potential to dispel stereotypes and misconceptions propagated through hate speech. The relationship between diversity and hate speech is a crucial area to focus on, because of its immediate policy and research implications.

Studying genocide collectively helps to illuminate the universal behaviors of individuals that can lead to violence. This research seeks to interpret one aspect of genocide by understanding the characteristics of that population in that place and time. Historically, genocides are studied as a series of individual cases, instead of comparatively, which makes it challenging to identify and understand patterns of violence. Genocide is a specific type of violence orchestrated by elites under certain economic, social, and political conditions. There

is a tendency in genocide studies to focus on the elites since they hold the power, but low-level civilian actors make up the social majority. They play an important role both as collaborators and active bystanders. So why do civilians accept genocidal ideology disseminated by elites? Through conditions and mechanisms, this research builds a picture of a genocidal environment.

Social homogeneity measures the quality of sameness in a society or how many individuals are alike based on certain measures of identity.<sup>41</sup> In the case of Rwanda, the social homogeneity refers to a quality of sameness between the social groups of Hutu and Tutsi, but in other genocidal societies social homogeneity could be a quality of religion, race, or nationality. This term is meant to delineate between the dominant in-group and the persecuted out-group. Therefore understanding the demography of communities prior to genocide is important. Demography directly influences who will become victims and how much of a community will be killed.<sup>42</sup> In addition, hate speech colors the way these divided populations understand one another. Both variables can be easily manipulated by elites, but they still have a direct impact on genocidaires.

In socially homogenous communities, members of the in-group provide emotional and physical support to one another as they attack the out-group.<sup>43</sup> The group mentality towards the out-group is also affected by the status of the out-group in society. One must examine how much the propaganda or anti-out-group rhetoric has permeated society and how the in-group civilians become complacent with the idea that the victimized out-group is a threat to society. The different perceptions of the out-group are directly related to the

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<sup>41</sup> Friedkin, "Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social Homogeneity."

<sup>42</sup> Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

<sup>43</sup> Staub, *The Psychology of Good and Evil*.

presence of propaganda. In order to be effective, propaganda must have strong messaging and wide distribution. These mechanisms explain the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech.

Civilian participation in violence does not exist in a vacuum and it is important to understand what other conditions are at play. While designing this research, I considered other measurable factors that could influence a civilian in a village in Rwanda. Mapping this research question helps to hone the understanding of the conditions under which violence is perpetrated. The two independent variables (social homogeneity and hate speech) easily develop and branch into other areas of study, suggesting further questions to be answered. To better understand the dynamics of the variables, we must also look at the target audience, the content of the propaganda, the dynamics of the inter-group relationship, the modes of oppression, and the legacy of colonialism in the communities.

Examining the relationship between a condition of violence (social homogeneity) and a mechanism of genocidal violence (hate speech) has the potential for direct impact on policy and civil society. Research on the effects of social homogeneity could influence national policies towards diversity and inclusion. Governments can take preventative measures to avoid creating or encouraging dangerous intergroup dynamics, which have a high tendency towards discrimination. This research could also inform the need to monitor socially homogenous populations earlier, if in fact, they are more susceptible to out-group propaganda and consequently violence. Hate speech research helps militaries, Non-governmental organizations, and governments understand the influence of messaging. Media has been used to convince populations of dangerously false versions of history. Delving critically into the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech helps us



understand which communities are at the highest risk of violence for genocidal or identity-based conflict.

In a broader sense, the field of genocide research is essential for both academic and political progress. Genocide is not the most common form of violence against civilians, but it does have a unique impact on society. There is no merit to comparative suffering, so this is not to say that the violence of genocide is worse or more intense than another conflict. But the intentionality of genocide is unique. It aims to eliminate a whole group and their respective culture from society. Genocide deprives both the in-group and the out-group of the development that is born out of interaction. There is both an empirical and a moral argument that diversity improves the development and achievements of society. Genocide seeks to exterminate civilians over inalienable and non-elective aspects of their identity. Those killed in genocide do not choose to be born Tutsis Yazidis, Jews, disabled, or Buddhists, nor can they disavow these associations. The perpetrators assign negative value to these groups and we must try to understand why.

Genocide theory is interconnected with issues of economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. To analyze this research, we first must understand the associated theory and terminology. It is challenging to lay out a singular theory about the development and inflammation of genocide. Instead, the following section defines the terminology used to discuss the principles of hate speech and social homogeneity and outlines a theory about the intersectionality of these topics.

## Theoretical Approach

### *Defining Genocide*

The definition of words is crucial not only for academic research, but also for the political and social interpretations of international events. Raphael Lemkin invented the word genocide in 1945 in reaction to the events of World War II. The multicultural etymology derives from the Greek root “genos,” which means people, and the Latin root “cide” which means murder. The word “genocide” literally translates to the murder of a people.<sup>44</sup> Lemkin’s original definition was broad and inclusive, arguing that the intentional destruction of any social or cultural group should constitute genocide.<sup>45</sup> “Genocide” was intended to describe the intentional annihilation of a group as perceived and defined by the perpetrators so that mass identity-based violence could be prosecuted.

When the United Nations legally adopted the word in 1948, they edited the definition substantially. The “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” defines genocide as

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such

- a. Killing members of the group
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group<sup>46</sup>

This is the legally accepted definition of genocide, and it limits the protected groups to only race, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. The legal and academic communities struggle to

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<sup>44</sup> Irvin-Erickson, “Genocide, the ‘Family of Mind’ and the Romantic Signature of Raphael Lemkin.”

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide.”

agree which international incidents qualify under these terms. In the sixty-seven years since the convention was ratified, only two genocides have been legally recognized.<sup>47</sup> The most challenging aspect to prove in a court of law is the intent to commit genocide, which is where many cases fall apart. This is not the main issue for the academic community; instead they struggle to agree about the protected groups.

The definition for the legal framework is widely debated in the field of social sciences.<sup>48</sup> This research maintains the legal definition of genocide, except for the list of protected identity groups.<sup>49</sup> The term ‘genocide,’ and the penalties associated with it, should not be limited to acts against the conventionally defined ethnic, racial, national, or religious groups. In the dynamic of mass violence, the perpetrators have the decision-making power, whereas the victim has none. The perpetrators have the ability to define the parameters of out-group. They also have the capability to create perceived social groups regardless of their victims’ qualities of birth.<sup>50</sup> For example, a group in power could decide to kill all blue-eyed member of a population; while this would not qualify as genocide in the legal classification, it would conform to the more reasonable standard of the intentional eradication of a group based on their characteristics. Therefore I contend that genocide should be defined as the attempted destruction of a social group as determined by the perpetrators. The definition of genocide for this paper is *the intentional destruction in whole or in part of a group as perceived and determined by the perpetrators.*

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<sup>47</sup> This measurement depends on which United Nations body has recognized the genocide. The UN Security Council has only recognized the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide. Others feel as though the organization and oversight of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, counts as a form of recognition. The Secretary General of the United Nations has also called for a trial of genocide crimes in Cambodia, which does not necessarily constitute recognition.

<sup>48</sup> Jensen, “Evaluating Genocidal Intent.”

<sup>49</sup> “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide.”

<sup>50</sup> Chalk, Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide.*

### *The Terminology of Conflict*

To establish a theoretical argument, one must first establish and define the terms associated with research. This section addresses theories of social homogeneity, hate speech, the Asch paradigm, social identification theory, intergroup categories, othering, groupism, and civilians.

The two independent variables in this research look at the ways in which society is structured and influenced. *Social homogeneity* is a quality of sameness between members of a community, as they relate to their various social categories, whether it be class, race, religion, or ethnicity etc.<sup>51</sup> *Hate speech* is a contested term, but the American Bar association defines it as “speech that offends, threatens, or insults groups, based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits.”<sup>52</sup> This can be executed through a number of different means such as personal interactions, propaganda, and elite manipulation. Both these variables have the capability to impact civilian decision making.

Decision-making is often thought of as an individual process, but psychological studies show that it can be easily influenced. *The Asch Paradigm* tests decision making in diverse populations. In a seminal study, social psychologist Solomon Asch found that individuals are highly likely to support an opinion they know is incorrect if the majority of the group has already supported it. Asch’s work provides evidence for in-group decision conformity.

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<sup>51</sup> Friedkin, “Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social Homogeneity.”

<sup>52</sup> “Debating the ‘Mighty Constitutional Opposites:’ Hate Speech.”

*Social identification theory (SIT)* maintains that group membership influences relationships and self-esteem, as well as conflict in extreme situations.<sup>53</sup> Similarly psychology suggests that group association is driven by a desire to fulfill certain human needs.<sup>54</sup> In this school of thought, social interests between two (racially, nationally, ethnically etc.) different groups emerge and people will tend to focus on the needs of their membership group and simultaneously “ignore or even disparage out-group members.”<sup>55</sup> This differentiates from personality theory, which focuses on how the psychology of individuals, instead of the group, influences decision-making.<sup>56</sup> Differences can lead to privileges and group perception of superiority or entitlement. As a result the in-group can “[classify] the out-group as possessing a set of dangerous and morally bankrupt characteristics.”<sup>57</sup> In turn, the in-group members receive certain benefits or positive character traits assigned to their person, even if they are not merited. The belief and participation in these representations of group dynamics permeate the culture and become engrained into societal modes of operation – often through media.

The terms *intergroup categories*, *othering*, and *groupism* refer to relationships between the in and out-groups. *Intergroup categories* are the characteristics or traits that individuals assign to themselves and other social groups. This can also be understood as the tendency towards “us vs. them” categorizations. Intergroup perceptions develop into

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<sup>53</sup> Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLTM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory”; Reynolds et al., “The Role of Personality and Group Factors in Explaining Prejudice.”

<sup>54</sup> Staub, *The Psychology of Good and Evil*.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLTM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory.” 166

<sup>56</sup> Reynolds et al., “The Role of Personality and Group Factors in Explaining Prejudice.”

<sup>57</sup> Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLTM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory.”<sup>167</sup>

stereotypes and subconscious assumptions.<sup>58</sup> *Othering* is a sociological term which refers to an individual's tendency to distance or separate those perceived as 'other,' specifically the process of mental separation or distancing from the out-group. *Groupism* is a term invented by Raphael Lemkin at the same time that he developed the word genocide. It is the idea that people belonging to a certain race, ethnicity, nationality or social group is attributed with associated principles and morals resulting in a synthesized (and prosecutable) collection of individuals.<sup>59</sup>

We must also define the actors in conflict. According to the customary International Humanitarian Law established by the Geneva Convention, "Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces."<sup>60</sup> Therefore civilian *genocidaires* are those who have no military affiliation or background. Instead they operate separate from the structure and rank of the military. Civilians can be perpetrators (those who contribute to or commit the violence), bystanders (people who make the active choice to be passive in the face of conflict), or resisters (people who take actions contradictory to the violence to protect the persecuted population). The three categories of civilians in conflict are both malleable and permeable, in that civilians have the agency to transition between these different categories. With the terminology defined we can discuss the theories of participation in violence.

### **Theoretical Explanations of Violence**

Independently, social homogeneity and hate speech have known impacts on individual decision making at the village level. In socially homogeneous populations, people

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<sup>58</sup> Baumeister and Vohs, *Encyclopedia of Social Psychology*.

<sup>59</sup> Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 22.

<sup>60</sup> Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, "Customary International Humanitarian Law."

feel as though they have control over the power dynamic. Through this they find the strength and confidence to participate in violence. Members of socially homogenous populations feel safe with one another and have a tendency to easily come to consensus, even if an opinion is incorrect, as highlighted by the Asch paradigm.<sup>61</sup> This is often referred to as the mob mentality. A recent study found that living in conditions of ethnic diversity causes individuals to make more accurate decisions during educational exercises, which illustrates the positive potential of social heterogeneity.<sup>62</sup> Diversity can cause societal friction, but it also leads to individualized cognitive processes, instead of a reliance on messages from the in-group.

Civilians who feel as though they have control or dominance also gain a sense of safety from their intergroup category. When they feel dominant in the power dynamic, they can perform the violence instead of deferring to the military. In socially heterogeneous communities it is unclear who would prevail in a conflict, therefore it is in the in-group's best interest to wait for the military to carry out the violence. When the in-group has safety in numbers, they can be assured that the out-group will not dominate. Intergroup violence in socially homogenous situations is low risk/high reward. There is a low likelihood that there will be violence of retaliation and civilians are rewarded with the material and property goods of the victimized group.<sup>63</sup> Studies show that in Rwanda the government and Burgomasters motivated civilians to violence, as they were promised ownership of the land and material possessions of the Tutsis they attacked.<sup>64</sup> Social homogeneity has the capacity

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<sup>61</sup> Levy, "Considerations on the Connections between Race, Politics, Economics, and Genocide"; Levine et al., "Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles."

<sup>62</sup> Levine et al. 2014

<sup>63</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*; Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*.

<sup>64</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

to strengthen in-group membership and exclusion as highlighted by the Robbers Cave Experiment.

The Robbers Cave Summer Camp Experiment, shows how easily social homogeneity and ideology can foster an environment of persecution. During the experiment a group of social psychologists studied the intergroup relations between young children. In the experiment, twenty-two boys were brought to a remote campsite.<sup>65</sup> The children were unfamiliar with one another and were members of similar descriptive categories. The boys were separated into two arbitrary groups and then pitted against one another in a series of competitions. Teams that won competitions were rewarded and the rivalry between the two factions intensified to the point where they engaged in physical aggression and defaced one another's property.<sup>66</sup>

The researchers created intense feelings of groupism between the two factions, even though they were based on random differences. The psychologists then tried to diffuse the tension and remedy the relationships, but this proved extremely challenging. The Robbers Cave Experiment shows the intensity of intergroup dynamics, their durability, and how expectations of social homogeneity can be built from any category regardless of basis, such as the social division of Hutu and Tutsi.<sup>67</sup> The boys at Robbers Cave Summer camp did not exist in a perpetual state of conflict, like those living in a genocidal society. Social homogeneity and conflict are not based in ethnicity, but arbitrary social divisions that are exploited.

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<sup>65</sup> Baumeister and Vohs, *Encyclopedia of Social Psychology*.


<sup>66</sup> Sherif, *The Robbers Cave Experiment*.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



The decision to engage in violence is not a binary; it is more effectively explored and understood as a spectrum. Civilians in violence do not operate exclusively as victims, perpetrators, or bystanders. These categories are flexible and individuals will transition between the categories during periods of conflict. A person who kills does not tend to exist exclusively as a killer, but rather vacillates between different types of behavior. Figure 1 shows the spectrum of civilian responses to genocidal violence

Fig. 1.<sup>68</sup>



Civilians can fluidly move through these categories in a way that militants cannot, so the question persists – what motivates a person to go to, and stay at, the far end of the violence spectrum? When conceptualizing the behavior, brutality, and humanity of the perpetrator it is important to retain this spectrum, the capacity to move through this scale, and to understand that these civilians did not exist exclusively in a space of violence. Movement between these categories helps a perpetrator to justify their actions as well as separate themselves from the identity of a killer. This research assumes that civilians are not predicated into a specific category of genocidal violence, and instead they can be motivated by outside forces to behave in certain ways.

I hypothesize that social homogeneity creates an environment for the spectrum of violence, but it requires an additional spark to ignite conflict. In the case of the Robbers Cave, the competition between the boys was the escalating factor of violence. In more

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<sup>68</sup> Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*. 30

complex situations, such as genocide, there are multiple stimuli. Propaganda or hate speech has the capacity to be a powerful instigator of conflict, but it must be carefully planned and executed.

Hate speech desensitizes civilians to the out-group and intensifies the belief that the out-group are a threat to society that must be eliminated. In many genocidal or violent societies, the distribution of information is controlled to maintain the image and ideology of the dominant social group. Propaganda describes the out-group as a threat or dehumanizes them so that civilians can justify their killings. Many civilians are able to convince themselves that their participation in violence not only protects their family and their basic human needs, but also has an altruistic nature.<sup>69</sup> Through violence and self-sacrifice, civilians can protect the integrity of their nation. Effective propaganda is founded in a strong narrative. Scott Straus, a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, studied both positive and negative cases of mass violence against civilians. He examined how national ideologies and elite leadership affected the progression of conflict in already hostile nations. Straus found that nations with thorough and convincing ideologies against the out-group had a higher propensity for violence.<sup>70</sup> Nations with weak hate ideologies or national narratives of heterogeneity were less likely to participate in mass violence. Hate speech centered around a negative national narrative promotes unrestrained behavior towards the out-group.

Hate speech cannot be randomly executed; instead it must be planned through covert and overt means. For political elites to implement successful propaganda they must make the conscious decision to use it; therefore it is intentional and they believe it will be effective in motivating conflict. In the years leading up to a conflict, when the in-group is building their

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<sup>69</sup> Charny and Staub, "Ideology of Genocide."

<sup>70</sup> Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

narrative, more subversive tactics are effective. This includes changing national monuments, historical records, school curriculums, academic research, and muted comments by political leaders. Once violence and public hatred begins in earnest, regimes can transition to overt hate speech. This is done through media platforms, such as newspapers, television, radio broadcasts, and visual campaigns. Overt hate speech publicly reinforces ideas that were distributed through the subversive propaganda. For the propaganda to be successful, the out-group cannot challenge this ideology or hate speech. Ideology builds a message which constructs an environment where genocide is possible. According to the psychologists Staub and Charny, “an ideology is a conception of social arrangements in a society or in the world that for the creators of the ideology are the desirable, ideal forms of life.”<sup>71</sup> For civilians, killing is easier to rationalize when the political narrative has established one group as superior and dehumanized the other.<sup>72</sup> These ideologies are disseminated from the founding elites through education and propaganda so that the sense of other is an ingrained idea instead of something that must be forced. Under a strong ideological construction, perpetrators sincerely believe that they are behaving with good intentions.

By the time the overt hate speech begins, the out-group must be removed from politics and positions of power. For example, in Nazi Germany subversive hate speech began with academic studies of racial inadequacies. Then Jews and other out-groups were removed from schools and they were scapegoated for German social issues. The chosen method of dehumanization for Jews was an image of money-grubbing, horned, tailed, devil-like creatures stealing the success of hardworking Germans. This was coupled with the systematic legalization of discrimination through the Nuremburg laws. By the time the Nazis were

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<sup>71</sup> Charny and Staub, “Ideology of Genocide.”

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.; Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*.

directly violent towards Jews, they had convinced the public that, as a people, Jews were a stain on society. This kind of messaging is only possible through propaganda. In Nazi Germany and Rwanda alike, the radio was one of the most effective distributions of propaganda. As the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels observed, radio is “the most important instrument of mass influence that exists anywhere.”<sup>73</sup> Civilians, regardless of literacy, education, or economic status, could listen to the radio for information about the conflict at hand. The radio was both an informant and a distraction from violence. It is also an easy method to deliver mobilization orders to civilians.

This research theorizes that social homogeneity and hate speech work in tandem to create an environment where civilians can commit violence against the out-group. In socially homogeneous populations, not only have the out-group been removed from public life, but they have also been removed from personal life. Civilians have no individual anecdotes or personal interactions to challenge the ideology of the hate speech, especially in homogeneous communities. Civilians in villages in Rwanda heard over the radio that the cockroach Tutsis were coming to take their freedom and their country. If they had no close Tutsi acquaintances, then it was hard to refute a message coming from the government. Paul Slovic, a researcher at the University of Oregon, studies how compassion impacts individual decision-making in conflict. He finds that civilians need a singular strong relationship to empathize or relate to an individual. In high-conflict situations where a civilian’s basic needs are threatened, it is much harder to find evidence to support the out-group’s humanity than it is to find justifications for violence against them.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Welch, *The Third Reich*. 184.

<sup>74</sup> Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”; Slovic et al., “Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity.”

In my research, I looked at micro-data of violent civilians in Rwanda to explore if the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech impacted their decisions. I hypothesize that high levels of social homogeneity and hate speech will lead to high levels of civilian participation in genocidal violence.

## **Chapter Four: Research Design and Data Analysis**

This research examines civilian participation in genocide in 1,019 of the 1,506 sectors across Rwanda. The data focuses on the count of prosecuted civilian killers in each sector (dependent variable), the percentage of Tutsis in 1994 and the availability of radio broadcasts (independent variables). Additional features such as the wealth, education, and literacy of the sectors are included. One of the inherent problems with studying genocide is the reliability of data. The current Rwandan regime is governed by the RPF, one of the warring parties from the conflict, therefore the information released by the state is both limited and biased. It is difficult to access accurate data from the genocide, but it should not be a deterrent. Understanding local level decisions in genocide is an important and under-researched aspect of political science. As a result, there are flaws in this research, which must be acknowledged. This chapter discusses the data used for this research, its faults, and how they can be overcome.

### **Research Design**

Earlier I posited that together social homogeneity and hate speech will produce higher rates of participation. This research examines the case of Rwanda. I have created a data set analyzing the majority provinces of Rwanda. I look at how many Hutus in those communities perpetrated “individual” violence, ie. persons who were not part of local or national militias. From here I examine the distribution of RTLM radio broadcasts, the primary radio station, in the village, the primary mechanism for distributing hate speech. This is coupled with the social homogeneity of the communities that is calculated from the 1991 national census, and 1994 projected population estimates. The data includes descriptive qualities, such as the

average age and gender of the participants, as well as the literacy rates of the communities. I predict that high rates of social homogeneity and hate speech will produce higher rates of individual violence. The data set is supported by qualitative research based on interviews with perpetrators of violence and the style of information being disseminated through the broadcasts. The four possible predictions of my hypothesis are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1:

	Low homogeneity	High homogeneity
Low hate speech	a)	b)
High hate speech	c)	d)

Table 1 shows the expected relationship between the two variables. Proposition d) represents the primary hypothesis and would produce the highest rates of civilian violence. Proposition b) and c) would produce potentially similar rates of violence, but markedly lower than proposition d). The relationship between proposition b) and c) would additionally help to show which of the two variables is more influential. Finally proposition a) would have the lowest individual participation rate. Falsification of this hypothesis would show varying and uncorrelated rates of violence across the variables. In addition it could show the rate of influence operates in a different direction. There is a logical connection between these two factors, but that does not mean it will be represented in the data. Falsification would still provide important information, since it would further explain the relationship between propaganda and diversity.

The information collected, distilled, and discussed in this research can be broken down into two categories. There is both qualitative and quantitative analysis of civilian behavior in Rwanda, which provide different types of supporting evidence. The data set I created articulates the relationship between the dependent variable: civilian violence and the

independent variables: hate speech and social homogeneity. The data is available on the prefecture, commune, and then sector level. This research focuses on behavior at the sector or the smallest and most focused possible level. The data encompasses the entire state. It is worth noting that the northern provinces were close to the capital and exposed to the direct violence between the RPF and the government. These factors would have an unquantifiable effect on a civilian's behavior in conflict.

The social homogeneity data comes from the 1991 census. Social homogeneity is described the percent of Tutsis in the community. Some of the social homogeneity data is negative, since there was underreporting of Tutsis residents in 1991 and very thorough information on the Tutsi deaths following the genocide. As a result, some Tutsi populations have a negative value. The information on hate speech is drawn from the location of radio towers in Rwanda, and the subsequent availability of RTLM broadcasts. Availability is categorized by radio coverage in village, village altitude, and distance to transmitter.

The research is reliant on the dependent variable – civilian violence. This is from prosecutions from the Gacaca courts, a semi-traditional communal justice process that was established following the genocide. In addition the data set notes different demographic pieces of information. This helps to create a profile of the individuals who participated in the violence. The data offers information about the gender, population density, age, literacy, housing, distance from major city, number of deaths in the community, household size, and percent killers in the home. This additional information isolates the conditions under which social homogeneity and hate speech influence civilian violence.

The data, although important and well-developed, is not without flaws. There are three core issues with the data for this research, which all focus on the political transition



after the genocide.

### *1. Sealed Records*

Following the conflict, Paul Kagame and the RPF took power. They created stable peace and widespread development, but they also created systematic political oppression.<sup>75</sup> The internal narrative of the conflict foists all responsibility on the Hutus. National memorials, museums, and sites of remembrance do not acknowledge Tutsi participation in violence. Recent research estimates that the death toll from RPF retaliation violence may rival that of the Hutu extremist regime during the genocide.<sup>76</sup> The government classified and obscured much of the information from the genocide as a way to build peace and avoid further social tensions.

### *2. Interference & Climate of Fear*

The Tutsi government in Rwanda has a heavy hand in limiting what information leaves the country, which restricts the capabilities of free and honest academic research. This has created a climate of fear surrounding information-sharing. The first area this affects is social homogeneity data. The Habyarimana regime took a population census in 1991, which some hypothesize was a map for planning genocidal violence, following the genocide access to the census was privatized. The government believed that the information was inflammatory. A few researchers have gained access to copies of the census but they have

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<sup>75</sup> Straus, *The Order of Genocide*; Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>76</sup> Davenport and Stam, "What Really Happened in Rwanda?"

chosen to keep their sources anonymous.<sup>77</sup> These copies of the census have been critiqued for potential inaccuracies, seeing as the government or the sources may have altered the data, but it is the only available information on social homogeneity. The second issue is related to hate speech. The content of the RTLM broadcasts and the radio reach/availability is available, but no information about listenership is available nor the number of radios distributed by the Habyarimana regime.

### *3. Inaccurate Data*

The third and most complex issue with this data is the list of convicted civilians, the validity of the convicted civilian data which has deep implications for measurement, since the prosecuted civilians may not accurately reflect the number of perpetrators. In Rwanda there were three main forms of reconciliation: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Gacaca courts, and Ingandos. In the beginning the state attempted to prosecute per the local judiciary, but when prosecutions began in 1996 judges could not keep up with the high number of cases. Prisons were overcrowded, 20% of cases were given the death penalty, and there were deep strains of corruption, which lead to widespread international concern. As a result in 2002, the state instituted Gacaca courts, which were based on traditional justice systems that focused on forgiveness and shorter sentences for those who spoke honestly.<sup>78</sup> Many victims were forced to participate in the Gacaca courts, and participants were put in danger.<sup>79</sup>

Gacacas suffered from serious structural issues that impeded the reconciliation or

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<sup>77</sup> McDoom, "Predicting Violence within Genocide"; Straus, *The Order of Genocide*; Verpoorten, "Leave None to Claim the Land A Malthusian Catastrophe in Rwanda?"

<sup>78</sup> Sarkin, "The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide."

<sup>79</sup> Thomson and Nagy, "Law, Power and Justice."

justice process. During the proceedings a victim would tell their story before a panel of nine community judges and a minimum audience of one hundred people. Then the perpetrator would share their experience and ask for forgiveness. In the end a verdict would be decided upon. Due to the autonomy of the courts, there were no guaranteed rights of prosecution. Gacacas were “essentially political rather than judicial proceedings... The result in any one community will be determined by the local balance of power.”<sup>80</sup> The verdicts were at the mercy of an individual’s popularity, instead of a standard of law. The only prosecutions and convictions of civilian perpetrators came from the Gacacas. The data uses Gacaca verdicts as the measurement for civilian participation. It is important to recognize the political nature of the Gacaca and therefore the political nature of the convictions, which results in data that does not completely reflect civilian participation.

The issues in this data should not discourage the research nor jeopardize the legitimacy. The Rwandan genocide is often described as one-sided, with the in-group attempting to annihilate the out-group, a paradigm that leaves no room for the discussion of revenge or intergroup violence. History does not tell the stories of violence against Nazis sympathizers in Poland, or against Serbs in Bosnia. Following genocide, the group that takes political control is either part of the out-group or embarrassed by the actions during the genocidal period. This causes new regimes to obscure evidence from the conflict, deny discretions by minority groups, or refuse to address the internal history. Finding quality data and honest information from genocidal periods is challenging.

The current flaws in data from the Rwanda genocide exist because of the intentional withholding of information, not from flaws in the research. The issues with data from

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<sup>80</sup> Sarkin, “The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide.”

Rwanda create a bias towards Tutsi victims and the narrative of the RPF military force. This is problematic, but it does not favor my argument. This research is based on social homogeneity, hate speech, and civilian participation in the Hutu extremist violence towards the Tutsi minority. The current government in Rwanda is trying to limit the international understanding of their violence towards Hutus, which does not show a direct impact or sympathy towards this research.

Data from Rwanda only tells half the story. The Rwandan national perspective does not address RPF violence towards Hutus, but the information about Hutu violence towards Tutsis is legitimate. Continuing this research is imperative while living memory of participants' permits. The data available helps us understand the behaviors of Hutu civilians and all understanding advances the cause. This thesis acknowledges and accepts the limiting conditions of available data, but simultaneously recognizes the importance of understanding the information that is available.

The qualitative data helps to explain the perpetrators motivations and humanize them. Jean Hatzfeld, a war correspondent, has made a career out of interviewing both perpetrators and victims from Bugesera, a province in the north, to better understand the events that transpired. His two books on perpetrators focus specifically on civilians that joined the violence. Hatzfeld's journalistic approach is supported by the work of Lee Ann Fujii, who conducted survey work with perpetrators in Rwanda. Fujii's interviews focus on social dynamics and how community relationships were used to motivated violence. Collectively their interviews help to balance the data on social homogeneity. The interviews create a more holistic understanding of the civilians and how they understood their own motivations and reasons for participating in the violence. These interviews, conducted anonymously, were

beyond the reach and limitations of the Rwandan regime's censorship.

The limitations of the hate speech data are supported by two studies of the vocabulary in Rwandan hate broadcasts. Elizabeth Baisley analyzed eighty-four broadcasts from Radio Rwanda and RTL, all of those that are available in English, to better understand the role of ethnicity in the dialogue. She looked for speech patterns and the frequency with which positive and negative vocabulary appeared. Her research on the content of the broadcasts shows the complexities of the conflict and what kind of hate speech was actually being disseminated. The data illustrates what sort of hate was being distributed and what civilians were being encouraged to do. Similarly Roozen and Shulman look at word frequency to understand how positive and negative messages were used in the social identity framework. Though there is a lack of data on listenership, this investigation of broadcast content establishes how civilians could be targeted and manipulated through the medium of radio.<sup>81</sup>

To overcome some of the methodological hurdles that complicate my investigation, the topic will be addressed quantitatively and qualitatively. The qualitative portion focuses on balancing shortcomings in the data and explaining the behaviors of civilians. The intention of the following study is to dissect the connection between social homogeneity and hate speech. I hypothesize that social homogeneity combined and distribution of propaganda will lead to higher rates of civilian participation in violence.

### **Data Analysis:**

#### *Variables:*

The study was comprised of two independent variables and one dependent variable. The dependent variable, civilian participation, comes from David Yanagizawa-Drott's data

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<sup>81</sup> Baisley, "Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda."

set. The variable is represented as count of individuals who were convicted of category two violence by the Gacaca courts. Individuals were persons not affiliated with the militia organizations and category two violence were violent crimes under the supervision, planning or orchestration of others. This means that the perpetrators were civilians with no leadership capacity in the violence. The prosecution information was sourced from the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions. There were 433,000 individuals convicted of this type of violence.<sup>82</sup>

The two independent variables are radio presence and social homogeneity. The measure of radio reception also comes from Yanagizawa-Drott. In his research, he recreates the RTLM transmitters and their broadcasting reach. He then predicts signal strength and the degree of radio coverage per sector during the conflict. This variable is continuous and represents the percent of time that the broadcasts were available in the sectors. The measure of social homogeneity is the most unreliable due to the issues with census reporting. As a result, I used two different reports of social homogeneity. The first is the percent of Tutsis, per sector, according to the 1991 census, as reported by Yanagizawa-Drott (referred to as Social Homogeneity 1991). The second is a projected measure of percent Tutsis per sector prior to 1994 violence. Marijke Verpoorten obtained access to a copy of the 1991 census from an anonymous source and projected the population of Tutsis per sector and the total populations of the sector in 1994. I generated a new continuous variable, representing social homogeneity, by dividing the number of Tutsis by the total population (referred to as Social Homogeneity 1994). Between the two data sets, the mean number of Tutsis is comparable, but the standard deviation differs. Social Homogeneity 1994 is more accurate, since it represents the population within the year that the conflict began. Whereas the Social

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<sup>82</sup> Yanagizawa-Drott, "Propaganda and Conflict." 12

Homogeneity 1991 shows the population three years prior to the conflict and shows an inaccurate estimate of the Tutsi population, since results have been repeated within certain communes.<sup>83</sup>

Additional variables are included in the data set to act as limiting conditions for violence. Measured variables, are rates of Hutu literacy, the number of Hutus with cement floors (a measurement of wealth), the population of the sector, and the number of Tutsi deaths per sector. Table 2 shows the summary statistic for all relevant variables. Of the 1,503 sectors in Rwanda, 1,019 sectors are represented in the data. This is based on the overlap between the two data sets. Social Homogeneity 1994 and Tutsis deaths are lower, with only 981 sectors represented. The census that Verpoorten obtained did not cover all sectors, but the sectors that it did cover provided more thorough information.<sup>84</sup>

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std dev	Min	Max
<b>Civilian Part.</b>	1,019	329.71	282.59	0.9999	2,808
<b>Radio Presence</b>	1,019	0.1828	0.2235	0	1
<b>Social Homogeneity, 1991</b>	1,019	0.09997	0.0853	0	0.4446
<b>Social Homogeneity, 1994</b>	981	0.0953	0.1211	0	0.8046
<b>Hutu Literacy</b>	1,019	50.32	5.684	34.22	70.60
<b>Hutu Cement Floors</b>	1,019	0.099	0.0853	0.0242	0.5150
<b>Population of Town</b>	1,019	4,657	2,203	555	32,686
<b>Tutsi Deaths</b>	981	306.79	448.58	-141.77	3,134.2

### *Findings:*

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.; Verpoorten, "Leave None to Claim the Land A Malthusian Catastrophe in Rwanda?"

<sup>84</sup> Verpoorten, "Leave None to Claim the Land A Malthusian Catastrophe in Rwanda?"

The different models in this research attempt to explain the individual influence of social homogeneity and hate speech on civilian participation in genocide, as well as their collective impact. This model uses the variable “Social Homogeneity 1994,” Verpoorten’s measure of social homogeneity is expressed as the percentage of Tutsis in each sector. The results in Table 3 and Table 4 show that hate speech and social homogeneity, independently, correlate with civilian participation. These results differ slightly from Yanagizawa-Drott’s original research, which focused on the direct impact of Radio RTLM broadcasts. He measured the log of civilian participation and ran an OLS regression, whereas in this study I use the count of civilian participation and run a Poisson regression. I use the same measures of RTLM distribution and count of civilian participation that Yanagizawa-Drott reports, and a different, more accurate, measure of the Tutsi population.

The tables show the receptivity of RTLM broadcasts has a statistically significant relationship with civilian participation. In addition the volume of Tutsis has a statistically significant relationship with civilian violence. The tables also show three different interaction terms: Hutu literacy, Hutu wealth, and Hutu education. These three additional terms act as limiting interaction terms to legitimize the connection between social homogeneity and hate speech. These three interaction terms were chosen, due to their connection to the construction of Rwandan history. A Hutus educational and financial standing in society would impact their understanding and attitudes towards Tutsis.

Table 3: Poisson Test with Interaction Terms of RTLM Distribution

Variable	Coefficient	Std Er	z	P-value
<b>RTLM</b>	4.620509	0.2157715	21.41	0.000
<b>Percent Tutsi</b>	0.3257	0.0216668	15.03	0.000
<b>RTLM * Tutsi</b>	-0.3874731	0.0819632	-4.73	0.000



<b>RTLM * Hutu Education</b>	-0.0588511	0.0060508	-9.73	0.000
<b>RTLM * Hutus Cement Floor</b>	6.374541	0.3578657	17.81	0.000
<b>RTLM * Hutu Literacy</b>	-0.0335387	0.0068752	-4.88	0.000

Table 4: Poisson Test with Interaction Terms of Tutsi Presence

Variable	Coefficient	Std Er	z	P-value
<b>RTL</b>	0.1770648	0.0202122	8.76	0.000
<b>Percent Tutsi</b>	-1.730791	0.2260587	-7.66	0.000
<b>Tutsi * RTL</b>	-0.6065504	0.0843955	-7.19	0.000
<b>Tutsi * Hutu Education</b>	-0.0237247	0.0076761	-3.09	0.002
<b>Tutsi * Hutus Cement Floor</b>	-1.549776	0.454483	-3.41	0.001
<b>Tutsi * Hutu Literacy</b>	0.0717539	0.0091089	7.88	0.000

Table 3 and 4 describe the interactions between the two variables. Yanagizawa-Drott was originally studying the impact of Radio reception on civilian participation and had the Tutsi population acting as an exogeneity check – not one of the primary variables. He does not focus on or address the potential impact of social homogeneity on the effectiveness of hate speech. Yanagizawa-Drott simply states that “The coefficient ... is negative and statistically significant, implying that the greater share of the population that were Tutsi, the weaker were the effects of RTL on violence.”<sup>85</sup> In other words, his results show that higher social homogeneity and a higher radio presence leads to higher civilian participation. This conclusion fits within my original hypothesis and my models provide similar results.

This research shows that high rates of hate speech and high rates of social homogeneity produce the highest rates of civilian participation. Graph 1 shows the conditional marginal effects of social homogeneity on hate speech, with the conditional effects of the count of Hutus with a primary education; the percent of Hutus with a cement floor in their homes; and the count of literate Hutus. These additional variables help to limit


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<sup>85</sup> Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Conflict.” 29


the conditions of civilian participation in violence, so that we can better understand the relationship between the two independent variables.

The data shows that as the relative size of the Tutsi population decreases, the effect of radio presence increases. This result is conclusive with the original hypothesis. Graph 1 shows the conditional marginal effects of the Tutsi population on hate speech, considering the three interaction terms with RTLM distribution. Graph 2 shows the conditional marginal effects of the Tutsi population on hate speech, considering the three interaction terms and their relationship with Tutsi proportion of the population.

Graph 1:



Graph 2:



Graphs 1 & 2 reflect similar relationships, except that the effects are more pronounced when the interaction terms are related to the factor of social homogeneity. Social homogeneity has conditionally marginal effects on hate speech and civilian participation. In other words, hate speech has a greater impact on civilian participation in violence in the more socially homogenous the community. As the social homogeneity increases, the impacts of hate speech become more pronounced. These findings agree with my original hypothesis and Yanagizawa-Drott's reported results. This relationship shows the predicted dynamic between the two variables, that social homogeneity acts as a societal condition and hate speech is an mechanism or instigator of conflict.

These models produced the hypothesized relationship. Both social homogeneity and hate speech have strong effects on civilian participation in genocidal violence. The relationship between the two independent variables highlights the connection posited in the theoretical section of this project. The mechanism of hate speech is most effective in

neighborhoods where there are high rates of social homogeneity. There are a few different reasons that the data could produce these results, but a full explanation requires further research. Table 1 shows the breakdown of multi-collinearity between the two independent variables. As predicted, proposition d) produced the highest rate of civilian participation, but this data does not provide sufficient information to test the other propositions. One limiting factor of the data, is that we do not have a large sample for each of the propositions in Table 1. In an ideal testing scenario, we would have equal data points for all four potential relationships between the variables. However, since this study is observational and not experimental, I could not control the distribution of the variables. Instead, the majority of the communities had high radio distribution and high social homogeneity. This means that the core variable of interest is represented, but other areas of measurement are not.

This study considered social homogeneity as a condition and hate speech as a catalyst of violence. Some theories purport that socially homogeneous communities do not have to address issues of group tensions, whereas more integrated communities are faced with more constant intergroup interaction, but these results maintain the original hypothesis.<sup>86</sup> To better understand the impacts and repercussions of civilian violence in socially heterogeneous communities we would require more diverse data.

To further understand the relationship between these variables I also tested the death rates in the sectors. I measured the number of Tutsi deaths per sector and the percent of pre-genocide Tutsi population that was killed to understand the percent of the population which was killed. I measured the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech against the dependent variable of the percent of the total population. (It is worth noting, this

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<sup>86</sup> van der Windt, "The Political Economy of Heterogeneous Communities."

measurement revealed that in the sectors tested the mean death rate, was 59% of the pre-genocide Tutsi population. In addition, in 22% of sectors more than 95% of the Tutsi population was killed. In other words the Hutu extremists successfully eliminated the Tutsi population in 22% of cases.) Table 5 shows the impact of hate speech and social homogeneity on proportion of Tutsi deaths.

Table 5: OLS Regression of Percent Tutsi Deaths

	RTL	Social Homogeneity 1994
<b>Coefficient</b>	0.0490509	-0.5794802
<b>Standard Error</b>	0.0603069	0.1628072
<b>Z</b>	0.81	-3.56
<b>P-value</b>	0.416	0.00

The data shows that there is no significant relationship between hate speech and the proportion of Tutsis killed in each sector. It does show a statistically significant relationship between social homogeneity and the percent of the population that was killed. The data implies that a larger percent of the Tutsi population was killed in socially homogenous sectors. The data tells a story, that the genocidal violence was most effective in socially homogenous communities – for both civilian participation and rates of Tutsi deaths. The highest proportion of the Tutsi population was killed in the socially homogenous neighborhoods. This information provides an important perspective on the relationship between social homogeneity; hate speech distribution, and civilian participation.

The results of this study highlight a fascinating connection between social homogeneity, hate speech, and civilian participation – as well as the need for further and more accurate quantitative information on micro level behavior in genocide. The data shows that the highest rates of Tutsi deaths were in the socially homogenous communities, and that the highest rates of civilian participation were in socially homogenous communities. This is a

logical conclusion since populations with high social homogeneity of the in-group feel more comfortable participating in the violence to eliminate the out-group. This shows the effects of interaction terms. When convincing civilians to participate in violence in higher stress situations, where there is a greater presence of the out-group, the distribution of hate speech could be an effective motivator, literacy, education, and wealth of the population are important. The hate speech articulates the urgency and capacity of the threat from the out-group. The limitations of the data pose interesting questions for further research, so the next chapter will discuss the additional evidence to explain the relationship between hate speech, social homogeneity, and civilian violence.

## **Chapter Five: A Qualitative Approach**

Genocide is best understood through holistic interpretation. The results of the study show that high levels of social homogeneity and hate speech lead to higher levels of civilian participation. The previous section discussed the quantitative portion of this study; this section reviews and discusses the additional evidence to explain the data and the findings that are conducive with my original theory. It also provides a robustness check for the research as well as humanizing the perpetrators. The information represented here, as with much of information from conflict, is susceptible to complicating factors. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1991 Rwandan census is considered an under representation of the population; the Rwandan government has not released radio listenership from the time of the genocide; and the Gacaca courts were a series of politically motivated prosecutions. Flaws like these produce inaccurate data. The qualitative evidence helps support the conclusions made in the quantitative research.

There is a tendency to vilify the perpetrators of mass atrocity. People like Pancrace are portrayed as monsters predestined to engage in this type of behavior. It is easy to fall prey to this fallacy while doing quantitative research. The qualitative perspective in this chapter is primarily based on perpetrator interviews. These interviews help to humanize the civilian perpetrators – making them appear as more rational and relatable actors. It is important to note that the interview research is not meant to empathize with the experiences or decisions of genocidaires. Genocide is not the stuff of folklore, but a legitimate problem faced in modern society. We must accept that the violent actors in genocide are very similar to us, that it is possible for us to become them in extreme situations, and that it is our responsibility to



understand the factors that stimulate this behavior. It is also important to remember that social homogeneity is not a determinant of violence, but a factor. It will not dictate whether or not a Hutu is guaranteed to behave in a certain way.

The qualitative research centers on the arguments from five scholars: Elizabeth Baisley, Brittnea Roozen & Hillary Shulman, Lee Ann Fujii, Philip Gourevitch, and Jean Hatzfeld. Baisley and Roozen & Shulman studied word repetition in Rwandan radio broadcasts. The radio was seen as a key catalyst of violence in Rwanda. Many scholars argue that the broadcasts promoted social tensions, focusing on national stereotypes.<sup>87</sup> Fujii conducted survey research in two communities over the course of nine months. She focuses on the concept of “local” behavior and interviews a wide range of subjects to try and understand why neighbors committed violence towards one another during the Rwandan genocide. Gourevitch and Hatzfeld are both journalists, whose work centers on the Rwandan genocide. Gourevitch focuses on the experiences of Rwandan genocide survivors, tangentially discussing the experiences and decisions of perpetrators. Hatzfeld has written a number of books on Rwanda, but hones in on the behavior of civilian perpetrators in the district of Bugesera. These accounts start to create an image of civilian perpetrators, and the information that was disseminated to them.<sup>88</sup>

### **Motivations: Murder from the Perspective of the Perpetrators**

Research from Hatzfeld and Fujii focuses on the perspectives of perpetrators in conflict. Hatzfeld’s work concentrated in Nyamata in the Bugesera district, while Fujii’s research focuses on two different communities in Rwanda: Kimanzi and Ngali. This

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<sup>87</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda.”

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.; Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory”; Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*; Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*; Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

prolonged and intimate work with civilian perpetrators is not descriptive of the whole country but it offers insight into how the killers justify their actions and explain their motivations.

Qualitative, survey-based research suffers from the limitations of human memory. Memory is fickle and unreliable. One cannot rely solely on individual memory to provide a true account of historical events, yet but we can depend upon it for a record of the experiences of an individual. Memory is inherently subjective and it changes over time. Psychological studies of political science methodology show that individual historical accounts struggle to provide strong impartial reports.<sup>89</sup> The memories of perpetrators, especially those who have lost power, are subject to the influence of different ulterior motivations. Perpetrators could be trying to justify their actions, receive shorter sentences, or write their own legacies. They have a strong desire to alter history. Nevertheless, perpetrator interviews provide another perspective on why civilians are willing to commit genocidal violence.

Hatzfeld, a war correspondent, has made a career out of interviewing both perpetrators and victims from Nyamata , a northern district near Kigali, to better understand the events that transpired. Violence began sporadically in Nyamata on April 9<sup>th</sup>. It was incited by the Interahamwe, and supported by local civilians. The victims were Tutsis and Hutu sympathizers. A few days later, on April 11<sup>th</sup> widespread killings began in daylight. During this period, the civilian involvement in the killings were organized and planned by the Interahamwe. The killings in Nyamata took place from April 14 -17. Besides gun and grenade use, the majority of killings were done with machetes. The violence of Nyamata

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<sup>89</sup> Hirsch, *Genocide and the Politics of Memory*.

happened over a succinct three-day period, then on May 14<sup>th</sup> the RPF took control of the town and Hutus extremists fled the community.<sup>90</sup>

While they may seem simple on paper, these three days come down to a culmination of a series of decisions made by individuals. Hatzfeld's interviews with the perpetrators reflect the influence of social homogeneity, hate speech, and the governmental structure – as well as the mental process for accepting genocide. A few days after Habyarimana's plane crashed, the only whites in the town, nuns working at the local hospital, were evacuated. The day after “the last white witnesses” left, RTLM and Radio Rwanda began their broadcasts in earnest.<sup>91</sup> The broadcasts were a mix of reassuring religious music, nostalgic for “ordinary Sundays” (the pre genocide period that is represented through religious idealism) and anti-Tutsi rhetoric from Kigali.<sup>92</sup> In his interviews, Philip Gourevitch noted that these radio broadcasts provided a gentle and constant vocalization of violence.<sup>93</sup>

Men who willingly participated in the killings were verbally encouraged by bystanders and materially rewarded by the Interahamwe. Ignace, another civilian perpetrator, summarized the experience

There was never any need to talk about it among ourselves. The thoughtfulness of the authorities ripened it naturally, and then it was proposed to us. As it was their only proposal, and it promised to be final, we seized the opportunity. We knew full well what had to be done, and we set to doing it without flinching, because it seemed like the perfect solution.<sup>94</sup>

The men go on to explain that their early killings were incentivized but as they became accustomed to killing they needed no encouragement. After the three days of killings, the

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<sup>90</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*.

<sup>94</sup> Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*.

men celebrated – feeling as though they had done their country a service and now, they would finally be safe from the threat of Tutsis.

Hatzfeld's narrative of violence from Nyamata is strikingly common. Men were sent to "work," and the results were brutal. The Bugesera district experienced two of the most infamous massacres of the conflict. Just as it is important to humanize the perpetrators, it is also important to recognize the magnitude of the violence that they committed. In Nyamata roughly 10,000 Tutsis were murdered in the town's church and another 35,000 in the surrounding area. Victims sought refuge in their church, but their pastor locked them inside. The Interhamwe showered the church with grenades and machine gun rounds. Genocidaires followed with their machetes to clean up the stragglers. The massacre successfully killed the community's Tutsi population. Today, the church still stands, but now it is guarded by RPF soldiers. Inside the church pews are lined with the brown and bloodied clothes of the victims. The walls and ceilings remain pockmarked with bullet holes and brain matter.

Fujii's research tries to rationalize how individuals could participate in the type of violence that occurred at Nyamata. She finds that the strength and power of local power politics are at the core of the killers decision making process. Fujii is clear to dismiss the theory of ethnic conflict, instead referring to the complexity of the Hutu and Tutsi identities. The village level power hierarchy is reinforced through the strict political structure of the Burgomaster system. As Dina Temple Raston, a journalist who studied the propaganda structures in Rwanda, commented, "The communities were so successfully hierarchical, so parsed and divided and subdivided again, that they were easily mobilized. The men...listened to those in authority with bovine obedience."<sup>95</sup> The systematic sectioning of society helped

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<sup>95</sup> Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*.

to create predominantly homogeneous communities and a sense of order in chaotic violence. From her interviews, Fujii explains that the violence in the villages was not hectic, savage, nor tribalistic. Instead civilian violence was normalized as a “very ordered and structured process.”<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, in socially homogenous communities there is a sense that civilians are working together. The narrative of inherent differences distributed through the hate speech exaggerates the strength and influence of the in-group communities. The Hutus were fighting a dominant power that was trying to steal their freedom and they had no choice but to fight in order to maintain the status quo against the perceived threat of the Tutsis.<sup>97</sup>

### **Building the “Other:” Modes of Radio Messaging**

Hate Speech in Rwanda was carefully planned to send a message of separation and violence to the civilian population. The research of Elizabeth Baisley, Scott Straus, and Brittnea Roozen, and Hillary Shulman show the othering process of Rwandan hate speech. Their work collectively points to a dismissal of the ‘ethnic hatred’ explanation of violence. Instead their findings show how inter-group social dynamics were developed to encourage social homogeneity and prejudice towards the out-group. These dynamics were then exacerbated by hate speech. Print media was publishing anti-Tutsi messages as early as 1991. This propaganda, which escalated in subsequent years, was not a determinant of the conflict but it was an important catalyst that helped to reinforce the messages from local leaders. Baisley argues that the broadcasts were focusing on othering instead of targeting a specific out-group. They sought to exaggerate the dynamics of the social divisions, but they were not

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<sup>96</sup> Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*. 161

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

focused on specific factors. This runs counter to the established paradigm we have come to accept. They were *not* trying to specifically divide the society based on existing definitions of ethnicity, politics, or race. Instead the broadcasts tried to incite group divisions based on whatever social factors were available. This dismisses the idea of ethnic hatred or age-old conflicts as the motivation for genocide.<sup>98</sup>

In the early days of the conflict, propaganda worked to create a climate of fear and mistrust. Documents found after the genocide reveal that the “free press” had two main motivations: create news events that gave legitimacy to the threat of the Tutsis and to create accusation in a mirror (AIM).<sup>99</sup> AIM is a propaganda technique where an actor accuses their enemy of planning violence when they are in fact planning violence themselves. AIM propaganda allows for the actor’s attack to be explained as defensive and preventive. The secondary effect of AIM is that it prevents the enemy from planning any related attacks, as they would seem retaliatory and reinforce the concept that they are a threat to civilians.<sup>100</sup> This tactic is an extremely common propaganda technique for genocidaires. It had the dual effect of reinforcing the threat against the population’s basic human needs, while assuring the international community that the violence was being initiated and driven by the enemy. Habyarimana used AIM propaganda leading up to the genocide, he claimed that Tutsis were arming a youth militia after he had already armed the Interhamwe; that Tutsis were neo-Nazis when Nazi documents were later discovered in his office; and that Tutsis were

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<sup>98</sup> Straus, *The Order of Genocide*; Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory”; Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda”; Straus, “Organic Purity and the Role of Anthropology in Cambodia and Rwanda.”

<sup>99</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>100</sup> Marcus, “Accusation in a Mirror.”

planning an attack on Kigali so he could justify preventive violence. Hutu extremists used AIM to develop the narrative that they were on the defensive.

Hutu extremists wanted to ensure that the population would receive these messages. While Habyarimana was still alive, his regime distributed transmitters to the different communes to increase radio listenership. According to Allison Des Forges, an authority on Rwandan history, only 29% of the population had radios in 1991.<sup>101</sup> In the subsequent years leading up to the genocide, the Rwandan government distributed free radios to civilians and burgomasters to increase listenership.<sup>102</sup> Scholars hypothesize that the distribution of radios continued throughout the genocide.<sup>103</sup> The government worked to make sure they had the capacity to speak to their population as well as and a monopoly on the information being distributed. This is an incredibly important piece of evidence. It shows both the intentionality of distributing a message of violence, as well as the fact that the Hutu extremists believed that the messaging would have an impact. Radio propaganda was particularly impactful with the illiterate population of Rwanda, since they had not other medias sources to contradict these messages.<sup>104</sup>

This pattern continues with print media. *Kangura* was the main Hutu extremist newspaper which showed intentionality with its content and distribution. Aware of the large portion of illiterate civilians in the population, many of the paper's anti-Tutsi messaging included images and negative caricatures of Tutsis. At times, *Kangura* would distribute the paper for free. Readers would then photocopy the issues and distribute the copies to their friends. In a testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Marcel Kabanda

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<sup>101</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*. 67.

<sup>102</sup> Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, 2007; Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>103</sup> Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, 2007; Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*.

<sup>104</sup> Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, 2007.

(a Rwandan historian) explained that “It was common practice for a person...to read it to his neighbour who could not read and read it in public places for people to listen.”<sup>105</sup> Charity Kagwi-Ndungu, a prosecutor at the ICTR, compared *Kangura*’s tactics to the behavior of the infamous Nazi paper *Der Stürmer*. The structure of the hate speech messaging connects to the interaction terms in the quantitative data. Propaganda from the government targeted civilians who were low-income, uneducated, and illiterate. *Der Stürmer* and *Kangura* were both carefully constructed vehicles of hate speech that delivered messages of violence against the out-group.<sup>106</sup>

The messaging behind the broadcasts was intentional and carefully planned. Ferdinand Nahimana, later convicted of genocide by the ICTR, was the mastermind in developing radio messaging. Prior to working at RTLM and Radio Rwanda, Nahimana was a professor of history at a local university, where he had studied propaganda.<sup>107</sup> He popularized RTLM by making it the first radio in Rwanda where listeners could call in and make song requests or comments on the broadcasts. He also experimented with different ways to influence public opinion and he was considered an agent of the state. Despite the international misconception that these messages were purely rooted in ethnicity, the parameters of Hutu and Tutsi identity are far more nuanced and complex.<sup>108</sup>

The social construction of Hutu and Tutsi identities were focused on a myriad of different aspects, with a deep historical element of permeability between the groups that predates the period of the genocide. Historically Tutsis were wealthier than Hutus since they

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<sup>105</sup> Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, 2007. 332

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, 331.

<sup>107</sup> Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 71.

<sup>108</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda”; Thompson, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, 2007.



were given political and social favoritism during the colonial period. As a result the two groups had occupational and status dynamics closely related to their social stratification. In the 1990s, President Habyarimana was trying to create political distance between his regime and the colonial mindset - Tutsis were the perfect target for this project. Pro-genocide propaganda focused on the real and perceived feudal dynamics between Hutus and Tutsis. The Hutu majority was encouraged to believe that they were “rebellious against wealthy people” and reclaiming their rights to the nation.<sup>109</sup>

Baisley studied eighty-six different Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts from 1990 to 1994 to look at the messages and their internal structure. The extremist radio messaging began in October of 1993. The owners and operators of RTLM were affiliated with MRND and Radio Rwanda was state operated. In the beginning, Radio Rwanda had a further broadcasting range than RTLM because of state funding, but closer to the naissence of the conflict the two broadcasts began sharing airwaves. While there was a third radio station operated by the Tutsi radicals, broadcast from Uganda, Baisley excluded it from her research since it had extremely low availability. Traditionally these broadcasts are rationalized as ethnic motivators of conflict, but Baisely’s findings contradict this theory. Of the eighty-six broadcasts that Baisley analyzed, only one focused on the ethnic dynamics of Hutu and Tutsi relationship. When the lens is exclusively trained on ethnicity, other important factors are excluded from the discussion.

Baisley argues that feudal class dynamics were the core messages of the radio propaganda. She offers the example of one broadcast, which said, “The cockroaches Inkotanyi who came killing us and eating our things saying they will take power...asked the

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<sup>109</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda.” 46.

assistance of children, white men and sorcerers... So I think that Inkotanyi will continue to die in our potatoes.”<sup>110</sup> In this brief excerpt the broadcaster does four things to dehumanize Tutsis:

- Refer to them as cockroaches;
- Disparage Tutsis as a feudal groups who violently abused their power;
- Other them by associated them with colonialists;

Rwanda was a primarily agricultural country, so the radios targeted Tutsis as elitists who were incapable of agricultural tasks or leeches dependent for survival on Hutu resources.

The use of feudal and racial dynamics points to the Hamitic hypothesis, a racial theory that was first applied to Rwanda in the 1950s. The Hamitic perspective was developed as a part of colonial scientific racism. This pseudo science, developed by the likes of Franz Boaz and William Ripley in the early 1900s, used phrenology and cephalic index to argue of hierarchy of Caucasoid superiority – a system that prioritized Aryan features.<sup>111</sup> When applied to Rwanda, scientists of the time concluded that Tutsis were more Caucasian and therefore superior. They gained the moniker “Black Europeans.”<sup>112</sup> Scholars such as Baisley and Straus purport that the Hamitic hypothesis played a role in developing the messaging during the genocide. Hamitic anti-Tutsi language began as early as 1959, the year of independence, when president Gregoiré Kayibanda stated that “The Hutu have been insulted, humiliated, and scorned by the Tutsi invader...we are here to restore the country to its proprietors; this is the country of the Hutu. The little Tutsi came with the big one. The forest

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid. 47.

<sup>111</sup> Painter, *The History of White People*.

<sup>112</sup> Baisley, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda.” 48

was cleared.”<sup>113</sup> This message would endure until the outbreak of genocide in 1994: Tutsis were inherently different and socially incompatible to Hutus. The Hamitic interpretation explains why Hutus “maintained the ideas of fixed homogenous groups and of a foreign Tutsi invasion as a way to establish a legitimate, democratic, political community.”<sup>114</sup> Refuting the ethnic hatred thesis and focusing on the intersectionality of Hutu and Tutsi identities shows the importance of social proportions and the ways that hate speech reinforced these messages.

Roozen and Shulman come to similar conclusion about hate speech and intergroup relationships, but from a different perspective than Baisley. Their research is based in Social Identification Theory. It posits that group membership influence relationships in extreme situations. When societal interests diverge, people focus on the needs of their membership, which motivates individuals to single out the similarities between the different groups and create a belief of superiority. They examined the pattern of radio broadcasts over the course of the genocide to try and understand how group identities were leveraged to encourage distrust. The research was motivated by four hypotheses: that the use of the dehumanization term “cockroach” would increase over time; that radio references to group “solidarity” would also increase; that direct references to killing would decrease; and that references to the RPF would also decrease during the course of the conflict.<sup>115</sup> Fifty-nine RTLM broadcasts were analyzed from the period of 1993 to 1994 for this study.

Hate speech traditionally changes over the course of a conflict, so they were looking at the trajectory of vocabulary through the genocide. The radio broadcasts were broken into

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<sup>113</sup> Straus, “Organic Purity and the Role of Anthropology in Cambodia and Rwanda.” 58

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Roozen and Shulman, “Tuning in to the RTLM Tracking the Evolution of Language Alongside the Rwandan Genocide Using Social Identity Theory.” 171-172

three periods: pre-genocide, early-genocide, and late genocide. They found that the use of the word cockroach increased through the three periods of time. It was verbalized 44 times in the pre-genocide broadcasts, 187 in the early-genocide, and 518 in the late genocide period. This created a significant linear trend. The motivations to group solidarity were measured through the use of the word friend, which actually significantly decreased over time. This points to a decrease in the manipulation of group dynamics. There was also a decrease in references to Tutsi deaths as the conflict proceeded over time. Finally they could not find a statistically significant relationship about the use of the phrase RPF in the broadcasts.<sup>116</sup> In general Roozen and Shulman looked to the prevalence of the words: cockroach, friend, strength/courage, death/dead/kill, and RPF/Inkotanyi. Throughout the course of the conflict, Inkotanyi was the most referenced term of group membership, followed by cockroach.<sup>117</sup>

These findings help to provide evidence for the relationship between social proportions and hate speech. The dehumanization of Tutsis increased through the course of the broadcast. Positive reinforcement of the in-group, with the use of the word friend, decreased over time. It is impossible to make a conclusion from the initial research, but one could infer that this shows a transition away from positive messaging towards violent or out-group messages. There was a decrease in references to the murder of Tutsis over time; which could suggest that this behavior was at the point where it was ingrained. The Tutsis had been painted as inherently different through hate speech and targeted social identification messaging. There may be less of a need to motivate people towards violence as the conflict gains momentum and the behavior is normalized. There was not a pattern to how the word RPF/Inkotanyi was used through the broadcasts, but it was the most frequently used word.

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid. 175-176

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. 74

This hate speech message helps to intertwine the Tutsi identity with the RPF. This is part of the intersectional relationship between Hutus and Tutsis. It is not just ethnicity, but also race, class, feudalism, and now politics. The use of the RPF only increases the threat to the Hutu majority. This helps to “classify the out-group as possessing a set of dangerous and morally bankrupt traits.”<sup>118</sup> Social homogeneity, intergroup-relations, and hate speech work together to make the out-group a reasonable target of violence for civilians.

There is substantial evidence to support the claim that hate speech and social homogeneity increases civilian participation in genocide, but also the idea that there is an important relationship between social heterogeneity and hate speech. Research into radio and print media show intention to incite violence. Hutu extremists used tactics such as AIM, free media distribution, feudal messaging, other, and a vocabulary of violence to motivate civilian support of the conflict. The long-term planning and thoughtful structure of the hate speech demonstrates the intended effect. In addition, the broadcasts relied on a number of different identity factors to motivate social division. There is a clear connection between the social structure in Rwanda prior to the conflict and the construction of radio messages. The content of programs was deeply connected to the social construct and homogeneity of the communities. The hate speech relies on the communal perception of an external threat. This unites the population against a common out-group. As discussed in the Chapter Three, socially homogenous populations develop a mob mentality, but this could also occur in socially heterogeneous populations. Social homogeneity creates an environment for conflict and hate speech escalates civilians to violence.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid. 166



## **Chapter Six: Conclusion**

Social homogeneity and hate speech are two factors of conflict that play an important role in civilian participation in genocidal violence. During genocide each civilian is faced with the individual choice of how to respond. This decision is heavily influenced by the civilians' environment and their perception of the out-group. This research suggests that the predicted relationship between hate speech, social homogeneity and civilian violence is significant.

In the fields of political science, sociology, history, and psychology there are many competing theories to explain the phenomenon of genocide. The Rwandan genocide has been over simplified to an issue of ethnic tensions, which does not represent the intricacies of the conflict. The complex social dynamics in Rwanda in 1994 far surpass the classification of ethnic divisions. Furthermore, the classification of Hutu and Tutsi are arbitrary social categories developed by Belgian colonizers. This research dismisses the theory of ethnic hatred. The social dynamics that were fostered in Rwanda created a group mentality, a sense of safety, and an affiliation with social categories, all of which allowed civilians to feel comfortable committing violence. This is directly connected to propaganda, as since the hate speech messaging was dependent on the categories of social division.

Social homogeneity is a condition of the society and the hate speech is the mechanism to motivate the violence. Social Identification Theory (SIT) reinforces the relationship between these two variables. SIT contests that group membership influences relationships and self-esteem, as well as conflict in extreme situations. When in jeopardy, a civilian's connection to their identity membership intensifies. When this relationship is challenged or attacked through hate speech, individuals are more likely to violently respond.

The quantitative research shows that both social homogeneity and hate speech have an impact on civilian violence and that the hypothesized relationship between the two independent variables is correct. Radio distribution has the highest impact on civilian participation in more socially homogenous communities. This is impacted by the interaction terms of Hutu literacy, Hutu wealth, and Hutu education per sector. Logically, the largest proportions of Tutsis were killed in the socially homogenous communities. This reinforces the original hypothesis that it is easier to perpetrate violence in socially homogeneous communities.

The conclusions in the data, as well as a need for further research, are supported by the qualitative research. The development of the social division, the distribution of homogenous communities, and the propaganda messaging show a significant relationship between these variables. Hate speech is based on the construction of social identity and is meant to exacerbate those relationship. The Burgomaster system was used to enforce social sameness and keep the groups separate and legitimize the external threat. The messages of hate speech exploited feudal dimensions, physical differences, and the Hamitic hypothesis between the two groups. The actions of the government, radios, and print media showed intentionality in the production of hate speech. Not only does this prove one of the key tenants of genocide, but it also shows that the elite organizers in Rwanda thought that out-group hate speech would affect civilian behavior in the conflict. Civilians faced the communal external threat of Tutsis. This qualitative evidence suggests that there is an important interaction between social homogeneity and hate speech as it relates to civilian participation.



The quantitative and qualitative structure of this research has shortcomings because of the nature of the conflict. Genocidal conflict tends to limit the availability of information. The regime that takes power following the conflict usually creates a one-sided version of history and there is an unwillingness to release information that contrasts the story or incites further violence. In the case of Rwanda, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took power after the genocide. They have failed to release extensive census and propaganda data in the hopes to quell further conflict and maintain a façade of RPF innocence. Collecting information from post-genocide communities is complex and full of limitations. In the case of this research, the RPF government has not made the rates of radio listenership nor the original 1991 population census available to the public. As a result the information on social homogeneity and hate speech are both subject to error. Additionally, the perpetrator prosecutions following the conflict were subject to politicization, so the information regarding civilian genocidaires has a strong connection to intra-community tensions.

Despite shortcomings, this research still provides an important perspective on civilian decision making during genocide. The imperfections of the field should not be a deterrent to research, but instead should act as an interesting academic challenge. This research overcomes the limitations of the information by adopting a holistic approach. The quantitative section synthesizes the data of two different scholars. The qualitative research then serves as a robustness check to the findings in the quantitative section: it provides an in depth analysis of the breadth and impact of these variables, as well as humanizing and explaining the civilian perpetrators.

These conclusions, although significant, require further research. Historically, genocide studies are examined at the case level. Ever since the fascination with the Holocaust

and the inception of the word genocide, scholars have studied genocide as case studies as opposed to correlated events of persecution.<sup>119</sup> There is a divide in genocide studies since many perceive comparative genocide studies an exercise in proportional suffering – a competition of who agonized more.<sup>120</sup> Instead of comparing the pain of the victims, the suggested approach looks to the organizers, structures, and modes of operation that contribute to the conflict. This approach allows for analysis of similarities between the political, social, and economic conditions that supersede historical context. In this burgeoning literature, the role of low-level perpetrators is often overlooked.

I suggest a study of the role of social homogeneity and hate speech in other instances of genocide, as well as a comparative analysis of their impacts across history. I hypothesize that this relationship will continue across cases of genocide as well at the comparative level. This more in depth understanding of the roles of hate speech and social homogeneity will provide invaluable insight on policy implications for genocide prevention. If we can understand the factors that motivate a civilian's decision to be violent, then we can very well deter them.

The next logical case for study is the Holocaust, as it is one of the most well-known and systemized cases of genocide. The information for this study is available, however it is not easily accessible. The German Minority Census of 1939 provides the only existing information about social homogeneity in pre-war Germany. The document however, has limited availability, and is still on the original 350,000 pages of microfilm. These scanned handwritten German pages would need to be catalogued and translated before they can be

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<sup>119</sup> Charny, "Comparative Study of Genocide."

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

incorporated into this body of research. This is a large undertaking, but a critical step in understanding the relationship between social homogeneity and hate speech.

Comprehending the connection between social homogeneity, hate speech, and civilian violence is an imperative step in explaining the process of genocide. This research concentrates on the decision making process of individual civilians and how that can be manipulated by different social factors. To understand the success of genocidal violence, we first need to recognize and analyze micro level motivations. Widespread conflict does not persist without the consent and support of in-group civilians. Research on this topic allows us to recognize when populations are being manipulated towards hate and to take preventative steps against mass violence. The research presented here is in no way a complete answer to these complex problems, but I hope that in a small way, it can contribute to a better understanding of a civilian decision-making in these circumstances. One of the questions that we need to ask as we reevaluate this research, is for the genocidal regimes, what does success look like? What are their aims and motivations for civilian participation and compliance? And how do they accomplish this? Once we can understand the individualized desire to engage civilians in conflict, we can also measure whether or not the government was effective in engaging them, and how we can create social deterrents against civilian violence.

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## Data Appendix

*cementfloor\_hutu*: The share of Hutus in each sector that have a cement floor, which is seen as a baseline measurement of wealth

*civpart*: The count of individual civilian participation per sector

*Commune*: The name of each commune, which is one size larger than sector

*District*: The name of each prefecture, also called district, which is one size large than the commune

*education\_hutu2*: The share of Hutus in each sector that have a primary education

*idsector*: The unique number assigned to each measured sector

*literacy\_hutu2*: The share of Hutus in each sector that are literate

*lpro2x*: The log of prosecuted person for individual violence per sector

*female\_survivors*: The count of female Tutsi genocide survivors in each sector

*male\_survivors*: The count of male Tutsi genocide survivors in each sector

*new\_commune*: A dummy variable to account for the relationship between sectors, communes, and positions of radio transmitters

*pop91*: The count of the total population per sector in 1991

*pop94*: The projected total sector population in 1994

*pro2x*: The share of prosecuted persons per sector, represented as a continuous variable

*propdeath*: The share of the total pre-genocide Tutsi population that was killed during the genocide

*proptutsi*: The share of the sector population in 1994 that was Tutsi

*rtlm*: The share of radio coverage of the RTL station, per sector, shown as reception

*tutsi*: The share of sector population that is Tutsi

*tutsideaths*: The estimated count of Tutsi deaths per sector

*tutsipop94*: The project Tutsi population of each sector in 1994

*tutsisurvivors*: The total number of Tutsi survivors in each sector

## **Key Sources**

### *Verpoorten Data Set*

Dr. Marijke Verpoorten, a professor at the University of Amsterdam, created a data set to explore the implications of the Malthusian thesis at the micro-level in Rwanda. She studied the factors which influence the Tutsi death toll in 1,294 sectors in Rwanda. She found that increases population density and a lack of financial opportunities for young men increased the rates of Tutsi death in the different sectors. This data set is unique, since Verpoorten gained access to a copy of the 1991 census and projected it forward to 1994.

### *Yanagizawa-Drott Data Set*

Dr. David Yanagizawa-Drott, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, assembled this data set as a way to examine the direct impacts of radio broadcasts on violence during the Rwandan genocide. His data examines both militia and individual engagement in violence. The goal of his data is to understand the direct effects of Radio broadcasts, their spillover effects, and the conditional impact of a wide range of interaction terms. This data encompasses 1,065 observations of different sectors in Rwanda.