

THE EFFECT OF ONE-AND-DONE PLAYERS ON DIVISION I MEN'S COLLEGE
BASKETBALL PROGRAMS

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ABSTRACT

S. BRANDON FANNEY: THE EFFECT OF ONE-AND-DONE PLAYERS ON DIVISION I MEN'S COLLEGE BASKETBALL PROGRAMS

Under the direction of Barbara Osborne J.D.

In 2006, the NBA instituted a rule that required players to be one year removed from high school before they were eligible to enter the NBA draft. As a result, many of the nation's top high school basketball players decided to play NCAA Division I college basketball for one season, until they could enter the draft. These players became known as one-and-dones and this study was created to determine their impact on college basketball. Their impact was measured with five variables: winning percentage, NCAA tournament games, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover. Of the five variables only NCAA tournament games was found to be significantly different with a one-and-done player. However, because of the popularity and importance of the NCAA tournament, it can be concluded that one-and-done players have had a significant effect on Division I Men's College Basketball Programs.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the National Basketball Association instituted an age limit stating a player is not eligible for the NBA draft until one year after his graduating class. Before this rule was instituted, many players elected to forego college and declare for the NBA draft straight out of high school. Since 1995, when Kevin Garnett became the first modern player to go straight from high school to the NBA, forty-seven high school players have attempted to make the jump (The draft review, 2008). However, the NBA's age limit means that now "the great high school players have little choice but to do time in college for a season at a high-profile college" (Rhoden, 2008, ¶6).

Consequently, the age limit has caused a rapid increase in the number of college basketball players deciding to leave school after their freshman year. In the two years that the NBA age limit has been in place, twenty-one college freshmen have declared for the draft; by comparison, only twenty-seven college freshmen declared for the draft in the eleven years preceding the NBA age limit. (The draft review, 2008) This new dynamic has greatly impacted college basketball and has created what is known as the one-and-done player, who comes to college only intending to stay for one year. College coaches must now decide if it is worth the risk to recruit the elite high school players who will most likely only be at their university for one season. One theory is that having an elite freshman, even only for a year, can elevate a college basketball program both on and off the court. A one-and-done superstar can lead a team to prominence, attracting new fans and revenue streams. On the other hand,

losing your best player after only one year could cause a lack of cohesion and ultimately set a program back. The presence of one-and-done players might deter future recruits from joining a program, because of the threat of a sharp decline in talent or the potential lack of playing time.

Before the age limit, college coaches had a good understanding as to which athletes were most likely to make the jump to the NBA...Now college coaches are faced with a new challenge; deciding whether to add high-caliber athletes that will bolt after one year, or signing players with less stature that are intent at receiving a college degree (McGrath, 2007, ¶8).

In addition, one-and-done players often have little interest in going to college. As Brandon Jennings, an incoming freshmen who initially signed to play at the University of Arizona, pointed out,

College is like, OK, we'll do this one year, but our real mind-set is that we're trying to get to the league, take care of our families. They're making us do college so we feel like, let's do one year, go to class half the time (Infante, 2008, ¶6).

Some one-and-done players may adopt even more hostile feelings towards their universities.

The coach receives adulation, the university receives tournament money, the nonrevenue sports receive funding. What does an elite player get? An 'extra benefit' could land the program on probation and have the player declared ineligible. You can't say the player receives a free education because he is leaving after a year (Rhoden, 2008, ¶ 9).

This type of thinking could be cancerous to a team. Coaches have to decide if it is worth the risk to bring in supremely talented one-and-done players, who may only be looking out for their own best interests.

The increasing number of one-and-done players may also force universities to re-examine their missions.

After all, that is the purpose of attending a university, to attain a higher education. With the arrival of highly talented athletes that have no intention of staying past their freshman year, the title student-athlete begins to hold little legitimacy (McGrath, 2007, ¶9).

“University presidents are forced to sit back and watch 18-year-olds make the college institution merely a stepping-stone to fame and riches in the NBA” (McGrath, ¶10). Does compromising the integrity of higher learning guarantee extra wins on the court and additional revenue for the athletic department? Can a university compete in the new era of college basketball without one-and-done players?

This study attempts to examine these issues by considering the success of the university’s basketball program in the seasons immediately before and after a one-and-done player, as well as the success of the university during the season with a one-and-done player. Program success includes both on and off-court success. On-court success is determined from (a) team’s regular season winning percentage and (b) number of NCAA tournament games in which the team played. The team’s annual regular-season winning percentage gives a standard of comparison that is not affected by the number of games the team played, which varies from season to season and from team to team. The number of games played in the NCAA tournament also offers a measure of success for the teams that would remain

constant. The number of NCAA tournament games played is also a determinant of the monetary rewards received from the NCAA for postseason performance. Therefore, number of NCAA tournament games is useful when looking at a program's off-court success in terms of revenue generation. The program's off-court success is additionally derived from (a) attendance, the percentage of stadium capacity for team's home games and (b) the amount of revenue generated by the team's merchandise sales. Reporting attendance as a percentage of total stadium capacity attempts to eliminate any discrepancies in stadium size between universities and give a more accurate comparison. Measuring merchandise sales in terms of revenue dollars nullifies price variations between products and universities. One final variable, percentage of roster turnover is used to analyze if having one-and-done players may be related to the composition of college basketball teams.

Statement of purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect that one-and-done college basketball players have on the success of college basketball programs in terms of (a) regular season winning percentage, (b) NCAA tournament games played, (c) attendance, (d) merchandise sales, and (e) roster turnover.

Research questions

When compared to their peers, is there a significant difference in the success of men's college basketball programs at identified colleges or universities in the seasons before, during which, and after one-and-done players compete for such universities as measured by the following variables:

1. winning percentage,
2. number of NCAA tournament games played,
3. attendance,
4. merchandise sales, and
5. roster turnover?

Research hypotheses

At identified “one-and-done” colleges or universities, there will be a significant difference between the men’s basketball programs’ success during one-and-done players’ careers and the programs’ success in the year before and after the players’ careers. However, there will not be a significant difference between the success of college basketball programs before a one-and-done player’s career and the success of college basketball programs after a one-and-done player’s career. At peer schools, the basketball programs’ success will remain unchanged regardless of season.

1. One-and-done programs’ winning percentages will increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done player. The season after a one-and-done player, the programs’ winning percentages will decrease by the same significant amount. Peer programs’ winning percentages will be unchanged over the course of the study.
2. For one-and-done programs, the number of NCAA tournament games played will increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done player. The season after a one-and-done player, the NCAA tournament games played will decrease by the same significant amount. For peer programs, the number of NCAA tournament games played will remain consistent for all three seasons.
3. Attendance will increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done player for one-and-done programs.

Attendance will not significantly change from the season with a one-and-done player to the season after a one-and-done player, as the one-and-done programs will enjoy continued success based on the previous season with the one-and-done player. It is expected that there will be no significant change in the attendance at peer programs over the same period of time.

4. At one-and-done institutions, merchandise sales will increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done player. Merchandise sales will not significantly change from the season with a one-and-done player to the season after a one-and-done player, as the one-and-done school will experience a carry-over effect. Merchandise sales at peer institutions will not fluctuate significantly in any of the three seasons.
5. The percentage of roster turnover will be higher for the season after a one-and-done player than in either of the other two seasons for one-and-done schools. There will be no difference in the percentage of roster turnover for peer schools during the seasons.

Delimitations

This study analyzes players who left college after one season beginning in 1995. This year was chosen because 1995 was the first year since 1975 that a player elected to bypass college and go straight to the NBA from high school. This trend became increasingly popular, and forty-seven high school players were selected in the NBA Draft between 1995 and 2006. (The Draft Review, 2008) In 2007, the NBA age limit went into effect, and high school players were no longer able to go straight to the NBA from high school. As a result, many of these players elected to play college basketball for one year, until they were eligible for the NBA draft. By analyzing the players from 1995 until the present, this study accurately represents the impact of one-and-done players on the changing climate in college basketball.

Some players who left college after their freshmen seasons were not included in this study. Stephen Jackson attended Butler Community College for one year before entering the NBA Draft. Community Colleges are not governed by the NCAA and information on the program's performance was not readily available. Additionally, players who left school after one year but were not drafted by an NBA team were also not included in this study. Those players were assumed to have not made a significant impact on their college program, since they were not talented enough to be drafted by an NBA team.

Limitations

This study was limited by the number of subjects available for analysis. Since 1995, forty-eight players have been drafted by a NBA team after their freshmen year of college. While this number may seem relatively small, the fact that twenty-one of these one-and-done players entered the draft in the two years since the NBA instituted its age limit suggests that the one-and-done phenomenon is an increasing trend. The thirteen freshmen eligible for the 2008 NBA draft were included in this study, but because statistics were not available on their programs' performances for the season following their departure, they were only used to measure roster turnover.

This study's effectiveness was also limited by the ability to gain all the necessary information about the programs which had one-and-done athletes. While winning percentage and NCAA tournament games played were readily available statistics, it was more difficult to get ticket and merchandise sales for less recent seasons. Therefore, incomplete data were not used in the analysis.

This study was unable to address the question of whether one-and-done players also impact college basketball programs by hurting the institution's academic standing with the NCAA. John Calipari, head basketball coach at the University of Memphis, noted "that the demands of the NCAA academic reform legislation, and eventual penalties for schools whose players do not progress toward degrees, will add pressure to decisions on potential one-year players" (Moran, 2005, ¶8)

Coaches now have to weigh the pros and cons of adding a "one and done" player to their roster and whether a deep run in March is worth the possible

retributions from the NCAA when graduation rates fall below par (McGrath, 2007, ¶9).

However, because the NBA's age limit has only been in place for two seasons, it was not possible to see the effect that one-and-done players have on programs' graduation rates.

While Academic Progress Rates (APR), do offer a snapshot of a basketball team's academic standing, the numbers are reported collectively as a team, so it was not possible to distinguish the effect of one-and-done players from the rest of the team.

Assumptions

For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that:

- Attendance information provided by universities was accurate.
- A team played a schedule of equal strength for the three years observed.
- Other factors like coaching changes and new arenas had minimal effect on the dependent variables.
- Members of the teams, other than the one-and-done player, were of comparable skill for the three years observed.
- Merchandise offerings for the teams were equivalent for the three years observed.

Definition of Terms

- Attendance: In one season, the actual number of tickets sold by a team for its home games, divided by the maximum number of tickets that could have been sold for its home games.
- Merchandise sales: In one season, the monetary value of merchandise sales for a team, expressed in dollars.
- NBA (National Basketball Association): The top professional basketball league in the world with 30 teams in the United States and Canada.
- NBA draft: An annual event, where NBA teams are allowed to select new players from the pool of eligible entrants from United States colleges and other professional leagues.
- NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association): The major governing body of intercollegiate athletics in the United States.
- NCAA tournament: An annual sixty-five team tournament that determines the national championship for NCAA men's college basketball.
- NCAA tournament games: In one NCAA tournament, the number of basketball games that a particular team participated in.
- One-and-done player: An elite basketball player who plays one season of college basketball before becoming a professional basketball player in the NBA.
- Peer institution/school: A university in the same athletic conference that has many factors in common with a university that has had a one-and-done basketball player. These factors include total enrollment, total number of varsity sports offered, regular season men's basketball winning percentage, and annual athletic department budget.

- Program: Everything encompassed by a university's men's basketball team; including but not limited to coaches, players, university basketball facilities, games, and revenues and expenses.
- Roster turnover: The number of new players on a team divided by the total number of players on that same team for any given season.
- Success: Determined by five different statistics that evaluate a college basketball programs performance: winning percentage, NCAA tournament games, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover.
- Winning percentage: In one regular season, the number of games won by a team divided by the total number of games that same team played.

Significance of the study

The findings of this study may aid college basketball coaches in their recruitment of high school players. This study will help to provide a clearer picture of the effect that a one-and-done player has on a college basketball program. It could show that a program may benefit significantly during the one season that the player is on the team, but those benefits disappear as soon as the player leaves. Alternatively, it could show that having a one-and-done player actually elevates the program's status in the future as well as the present. Conversely, it could show that a one-and-done player's departure leaves the program in a bind, and that an erosion of success occurs. The actual findings may help coaches decide if it is worth the risk of recruiting a highly skilled prospect that is likely to only play college basketball for one year before making the jump to the NBA.

Athletics directors may also find this information useful when they look to hire basketball coaches. They can refer to this study and compare its findings with the practices of potential candidates. If athletic directors know that one-and-done players tend to hurt programs in the long run, they may want to avoid candidates who have a history of recruiting those players. Conversely, if they want an immediate boost in their program, they may want to hire a coach who has successfully signed several one-and-done players. Either way, athletic directors can use the findings of this study to help the direction of their basketball programs objectively.

In terms of future research, the findings of this study could also be beneficial when considering the issue of paying collegiate athletes. Those in favor of paying the athletes argue that the players bring in huge amounts of revenue for their athletic departments, but receive severely inadequate compensation in a full scholarship (Wertheim 2007, ¶46). If this

study shows one-and-done players significantly increase a school's revenue associated with NCAA tournament games, ticket sales, and merchandise sales, it would strengthen the argument that college athletes deserve to be compensated beyond a full scholarship. Conversely, if it is shown that one-and-done players do not significantly increase revenue, then this argument would be weakened because it can be said that the fans attend to support the university team rather than any individual athlete. In other words, the name on the front of the jersey is more important than the name on the back of it.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

This study examines the impact of the one-and-done basketball players on NCAA college basketball. These elite players played NCAA college basketball for only one season before entering the NBA draft. In order to fully understand the issue, a brief history of the NBA and the NBA draft is provided. Then, a discussion on the potential impact of one-and-done players on college basketball programs is derived from previous research. Much of this research pertains to professional sports. However, the research is still applicable to this study as men's college basketball teams generate revenue for the NCAA and athletic departments, in the same manner that professional teams generate revenue for their leagues and individual team owners. Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the differing opinions concerning the impact of the NBA age limit on other parties.

History of NBA and NBA Draft

The NBA began in 1946, when the owners of major ice hockey arenas in the Northeast and Midwest United States decided to form a professional basketball league (History of the NBA, 2008, ¶1). Despite the presence of other professional Basketball leagues, the NBA gradually evolved into what is today considered world's premiere basketball league. One area of transition for the NBA has been the introduction of new players into the league through its annual draft.

When the NBA draft originated in 1947, many teams were struggling to develop loyal fan bases in their communities (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶1). In an effort to counter, before the draft even started the league “allowed a team to forfeit its first-round pick and select a player from its immediate area, presumably with a strong local following” (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶1). The draft continued in this manner until 1966. At that time, the league instituted a policy of flipping a coin between the last place teams in each division to decide who got the first overall pick in the draft; the rest of the teams picked in opposite order of their won-lost records (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶3).

The modern NBA draft began to take shape in 1985, when the NBA created the lottery system. Under the lottery system, all teams that did not make the league's playoffs had their first round draft order determined by a random drawing, with each team having an equal chance of receiving the first overall pick (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶7). Just two years later, the league modified the lottery format so that only the first three picks were determined in the drawing and the remaining lottery picks were assigned according to won-lost records (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶10). Then in 1990, the NBA

adjusted the lottery to a weighted system; thereby giving teams with the worst records a better chance to win one of the first three picks.

Selection order was not the only change in the NBA draft over the years. The size of the draft itself has changed numerous times. When the draft first began, teams simply kept picking players until they ran out of prospects (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶12). It was shortened to twenty-one rounds in 1960, then to ten in 1974, and again to seven in 1985; finally in 1989, the draft was condensed to its current two-round version (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶12). With the thirty teams currently in the NBA, there are a total of sixty players selected annually in the NBA draft.

In the 2005-2006 collective bargaining agreement between the league and the players union, the NBA instituted an age limit, which changed the number of players eligible for its draft. In order to be eligible for the NBA draft, players had to be at least 19 years old and one year removed from high school (McGrath, 2008, ¶3). This meant that starting in 2006 players would no longer be able to go straight from high school to the NBA. Instead, they had to pursue other options like playing in the NBA Developmental League, playing internationally, or playing college basketball for at least one year.

NBA Draft Eligibility

In 1975, the Philadelphia 76ers used the fifth pick in NBA Draft to select Darryl Dawkins out of Maynard Evans High School in Orlando, Florida (The draft review, 2008). Dawkins was the first player to ever go straight from high school to the NBA. That same year, the Atlanta Hawks selected high-schooler Bill Willoughby in the second round (The draft review). It was twenty years until another high school basketball player, Kevin Garnett, decided to bypass college and declare for the NBA draft. Garnett's decision turn professional was controversial, and many questioned if a high school player was emotionally and physically mature enough to endure the grind of the NBA (The best thing for me, 1999, ¶11).

However, once Garnett made the jump many other elite high school players began to skip college and declare for the NBA draft. From 1995 to 2006, forty-seven high school players were selected in the NBA draft (The draft review, 2008). Along with Kevin Garnett, this group also included future NBA stars like Kobe Bryant, LeBron James, Dwight Howard, Jermaine O'Neal, and Tracy McGrady. Some argued that this trend robbed college basketball of marquee talent and depleted the college game. As Mike DeCourcy of *The Sporting News* pointed out in 2006, it became fashionable to enter the NBA draft early, and increasingly younger and less developed players elected to forego college eligibility to pursue their professional careers. The net effect was that NCAA college basketball suffered a mass exodus of talent that left its products somewhat diluted (DeCourcy, 2006).

College basketball was not the only institution hurt by this epidemic; many NBA teams invested millions of dollars in high school players who never developed in the NBA. Michael Schwartz (2007) pointed out, "For every Kobe Bryant there's a Korleone Young, for

every Kevin Garnett a Leon Smith, and for every Amare Stoudemire a Kendrick Perkins” (¶1). Since 1995, nine players declared for the NBA draft straight out of high school, only to go undrafted and never make the league; another eight high school players were drafted but are already out of the NBA (The draft review, 2008). Roughly thirty-six percent of the high school players who entered the NBA draft from 1995 to 2006 never developed into NBA players. These young men never realized their potential, and NBA teams had little to show for the money they invested in them.

In 2006, the NBA instituted an age limit. By requiring players to be 19 years old and at least one year removed from high school, the league hoped to prevent players from making the mistake of turning professional before they were ready, and also hoped that its teams would benefit from drafting more mature, developed basketball players who had an extra year of basketball experience (McGrath, 2007, ¶4). Since 2006, almost all of the elite players who might have gone to the NBA straight out of high school have chosen to hone their skills in NCAA college basketball. As DeCourcy (2005) suggested when analyzing a one-and-done prospect O.J. Mayo, “college crowds would be larger, the pressure greater, the opposition more sophisticated. Opponents have time to scout you in college. For Mayo to become the best player he can be, he needs that” (¶11) Mayo did elect to go to college at the University of Southern California, and like many contemporary stars, he decided to enter the NBA draft after his freshman season. From 1995 to 2006, twenty-seven freshmen were drafted; since 2006, twenty-one freshmen have been drafted. (The draft review, 2008)

The net result has been an increase the number of talented players in college basketball, even if only for one season. Leonard (2006) contends the year of college basketball allows players to mature both physically and mentally, which increases their

likelihood of having a successful NBA career. Conversely, it also denies them of one year of potential multi-million dollar earnings. The age limit improves the NCAA's talent, which makes the game more popular and thereby more profitable; in contrast, it denies one-and-done players financial benefit and offers little in exchange (Leonard, p. 168). This study attempted to quantify the financial implications of one-and-done players by determining the revenue they generate for their schools in terms of increased NCAA tournament games, attendance, and merchandise sales.

Potential Impact of NBA Age Limit on NCAA College Basketball

The NBA age limit has created a trend in college basketball known as the one-and-done, when an elite high school player comes to college for only the one required season before leaving for the NBA. This trend has forced college coaches to consider the pros and cons of recruiting elite talent that they will only have for one season.

College basketball teams generate revenue from ticket sales, television contracts, and merchandise sales (Wimmer, 2002, ¶1). Since television contracts are usually set by the conference office for an extended period of time, this study analyzed only attendance and merchandise sales. These can both be impacted by one-and-done players. In 2005, Braunstein and Zhang studied the relationship between athletic star power and Generation Y sports consumption. They determined the factors of professional trustworthiness, likeable personality, athletic expertise, social attractiveness, and characteristic style were predictive of sport consumption of Generation Y consumers. As Braunstein and Zhang noted, “an athlete’s position in the public eye offers him/her the opportunity to exert referent power due to his/her ability to make others want to be like him/her or be associated with him/her” (p. 243). In college basketball, a large percentage of a team’s fan base is made up of the university’s student body, members of Generation Y. These students can associate with a player on the team by purchasing tickets to his team’s games or by buying merchandise like his jersey. Therefore, this study examined the impact of one-and-done players on both attendance and merchandise sales.

In 1974, Roger G. Noll attempted to determine the factors that influenced fan attendance at Major League Baseball games. Noll used t-tests to calculate the effects of local population, income, ticket price, stadium age, and number of star players, team quality, black

population, team batting average, team earned run average, annual sunny days, and league on attendance for the 1970 & 1971 baseball seasons. He found that team quality, ticket price, number of star players, population, black population, stadium age, and per capita income were all significant factors in determining attendance (Noll, 1974, p. 122-7). Because this study seeks to determine potential impact of one-and-done players, of the factors Noll found to be significant, only team quality and the number of star players on the team are relevant. Therefore, the other factors were not considered in this study.

Other studies have suggested the mere presence of star players is not enough to affect spectator attendance. In 2002, Rivers and DeSchriver formulated a study on the effect of star players and payroll distribution on Major League Baseball (MLB) attendance. To determine this effect, they created a multiple regression economic demand model that measured the relationship between seventeen explanatory variables and the dependent variable, spectator attendance. Ultimately, the model explained 83.64 percent of the variation in attendance at MLB games, and eight of the seventeen explanatory variables were found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha- level (Rivers & DeSchiver, p. 171).

Interestingly, the presence of a star player who did not contribute to better on-field performance was not statistically significant in determining spectator attendance (Rivers & DeSchiver, 2002). For this reason, it was necessary to determine the effect of one-and-done players on teams' on-court success, measured in terms of winning percentage and NCAA tournament games played in this study.

In Rivers and DeSchriver's study, the number of years since a team's last playoff appearance was found to be statistically significant in determining attendance (2002). Therefore, a college basketball program that has not made the NCAA tournament for a

number of years may want to consider recruiting a one-and-done player in attempt to make the postseason. Perhaps, playing in the NCAA tournament with a one-and-done player could increase a basketball program's attendance even after the player leaves. To measure the effect of postseason play, this study included the number of NCAA tournament games played by a team in the season before, the season with, and the season after a one-and-done player.

Even if a one-and-done player elevated a team for one year, he may not have a long-term positive impact on a men's basketball program. In 1997, Kahane and Shmanske studied the effect of roster turnover on attendance in Major League Baseball. They calculated roster turnover as the percentage of players on a team who played in 60 percent of the team's games in a season and were not on the team's roster the following season. The study also looked at the effect of winning percentage, income, population, a new stadium, and ticket price had on spectator attendance. Winning percentage, income, population, and a new stadium were all found to have a positive impact on attendance. Conversely, ticket price and roster turnover were found to have a negative effect on attendance. For every percentage point of roster turnover, a team lost 0.72 percent in average attendance (Kahane, 1997). Kahane and Shmanske theorized that if fans are not familiar with the players on the team, then they do not enjoy the game as much and, therefore, do not attend as often.

If roster turnover has the same negative effect on college basketball attendance, then programs may want to consider this when recruiting one-and-done players. Fans of the team have little time to become familiar with one-and-done players and this could in turn have a negative impact on attendance. This study noted the percentage roster turnover associated with one-and-done players and sought to discover the relationship of such roster turnover to changes in attendance for the seasons before, with, and after a one-and-done player. It also

investigated the relationship of teams' winning percentages to the presence of a one-and-done player. As noted by Kahane and Shmanske, losing a productive player and failure to replace that player with an equally productive player resulted in decreased winning percentage and consequently, decreased attendance (1997). Therefore, this study tried to determine if a team's winning percentage drops the season following a one-and-done player. Kahane and Shmanske's factors of income, population, a new stadium, and ticket price will not be used in this study because they are all beyond the control of one-and-done players.

In 2008 Morse, Shapiro, McEvoy and Rascher published a similar study that sought to explain the effects of roster turnover on attendance in the National Basketball Association (NBA). This study looked at roster turnover as a percentage of team salary as well as a percentage of players. This was done in an attempt to estimate the quality of the players leaving the team (Morse et al., 2008). Ultimately, Morse et al. determined that neither roster turnover variable significantly altered spectator attendance at NBA games, provided the team continued to have on-court success. If the same holds true for college basketball, then a team's attendance may not decline with the departure of a one-and-done player and roster turnover would not significantly affect college basketball programs' off-court success.

However, the challenge for a college men's basketball coach becomes finding a way to maintain the level of on-court success after the loss of a one-and-done player. A program may experience a surge in attendance and merchandise sales with a one-and-done player, but risk losing those benefits if it does not keep winning after that player leaves. Therefore, coaches looking for a quick fix for their program may want to recruit one-and-done players, while those looking to build long term may be better off recruiting players who will stay in college longer and improve gradually.

Other Potential Impacts of the NBA Age Limit

College programs are not the only ones who have been affected by the NBA age limit. NBA teams, as well as NBA players, have had to adapt. Many NBA teams say that the emergence of one-and-done players has made player evaluation and drafting strategy much more difficult. One NBA general manager said,

These players used to come out of high school or even after two years of college. Now the rule is that they have to play one year of college, and that's what a lot of them are doing. We aren't allowed to watch them in high school anymore and so we're trying to judge them based on one year of college. It's not enough. Not being able to watch the high school players is really hurting us. Otherwise, we'd all have better knowledge (Thomsen, 2008, ¶5).

The age limit was designed to help NBA teams, but this comment appears to indicate that the rule is having the opposite effect.

The rule also may as have had an effect on revenue in NCAA basketball. In an effort to determine the revenue generated by one-and-done players, this study looks at teams' postseason success (NCAA tournament games), ticket sales, and merchandise sales. If teams generated significantly more revenue with one-and-done players than without them, then it can be argued that these elite athletes are responsible for the increase. "The players that are leaving early for the pros are the ones generating a lot of revenue," (Wimmer, 2002, ¶9) and, "You can't say the player receives a free education because he is leaving after a year" (Rhoden, 2008, ¶9).

Others argue that one-and-done players receive other compensation from for their one year stint as a college student. They receive one year of high-quality instruction that

improves both their basketball technique and physical abilities. The NCAA itself notes such basketball tutelage helps these players prepare for their futures as professional athletes (NCAA – Press Room – Current Issues, 2008, ¶5). Additionally, the one-and-done players receive invaluable exposure as they play in nationally televised games and gain notoriety with basketball fans (King 2008). Jason King depicted this phenomenon when he compared Kansas State’s Michael Beasley and USC’s O.J. Mayo to Dwight Howard, who turned pro straight out of high school. King noted while Howard was just as talented as Beasley and Mayo, it took him years to establish the same name recognition that the other two already possessed from playing just one year of college basketball (2008, ¶25). This name recognition could in turn lead to major sponsorship dollars, which would not have been available to those players if they had not played college basketball for one season. Therefore, it could be argued that one-and-done players benefit financially as do the colleges and coaches that they play for.

Opponents to the NBA age limit have started to look for alternatives to playing college basketball. Brandon Jennings, the number one rated point guard coming out of high school in 2008, originally committed to play basketball at the University of Arizona. Recently, Jennings announced that he had changed his mind and instead decided to sign a contract to play professional basketball in Europe for the one year that he is required to wait before he is eligible for the NBA draft (Whitlock, 2008, ¶13). This could be the beginning of a new trend, where one-and-done players realize their immediate earning potential in other leagues and again elect to skip college all together.

This is just another instance of the college athletics version of the inevitable law of unintended consequences. By creating a rule to prevent a viable and

lucrative career choice for superstar high school basketball players, the NBA and NCAA may have unwittingly paved the way to Europe for high schoolers who don't want to – or cannot – wait a year (Infante, 2008, ¶7).

If this becomes a reality, then college coaches and administrators may once again have to re-evaluate their programs and recruiting ideology.

Conclusion

The developments of the NBA and the NBA draft have had a direct impact on NCAA college basketball. When the NBA instituted an age limit in 2006, it resulted in a huge increase in the number of players who went to college for only one season. Before the age limit rule was in effect, many of these one-and-done players elected to declare for the NBA draft straight out of high school, bypassing college all together. This has created a dilemma for NCAA college basketball programs. Is it beneficial to have a star player, who only plays for one season? Drawing from previous research, this study attempted to measure the one-and-done player's impact on the program by looking at winning percentage, NCAA tournament games played, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover for the teams with and without the one-and-done players.

Chapter III

METHODOLOGY

Methods

The method of research for this study was to collect information from pre-existing databases. This study collected statistics regarding winning percentage, NCAA tournament games played, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover for the season before, the season with, and the season after a one-and-done college basketball player. The website for each university that has had a one-and-done player from 1995-2007 was searched for archived statistics (most basketball media guides contain these data). If the information was not available through the website, then the sports information director (or an athletic administrator who serves this role) was contacted directly regarding winning percentages, NCAA tournament games played, attendance, and rosters for the seasons pertaining to this study. An athletics business manager or ticket sales director was contacted for ticket sales data as needed. Merchandise sales were identified through the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC).

Additionally, the same data were collected for a peer institution that did not have a one-and-done player during the same time period. Peer institutions were selected based on their similarity to the one-and-done institutions in the factors of total enrollment, number of sport teams, regular season winning percentage in men's basketball, and annual athletic budget. Every attempt was made to identify a peer institution that mirrored each one-and-done institution as closely as possible. These peer institutions served as a control in the study.

This was done in an attempt to determine if changes in the variables at one-and-done schools were due to external factors like inflation or economic trends instead of the presence of a one-and-done player.

Sample

The sample for this study included all NCAA division I men's college basketball programs that have had a one-and-done player from 1995 to 2007 and their peer college basketball programs. This period was selected because 1995 was the beginning of the trend for elite high school basketball players to bypass college basketball and enter the NBA Draft. In response to this trend, the NBA passed an age limit in 2006, which resulted in most of these players electing to play NCAA college basketball for one season before entering the NBA Draft. The teams with one-and-done players during the 2007-2008 season were included in this study. However, because there are currently no data on the season after the one-and-done player for these teams, this study only analyzed the differences in roster turnover at these schools.

Data Collection

The majority of the data were collected directly from the universities that have had one-and-done players and their peer universities. An extensive search of the universities' websites was conducted to determine teams' on-court statistics. When such searches did not yield the desired results, then the universities' sports information offices were asked for the teams' win-loss records, number of NCAA tournament games played, and the complete team roster for each season. In order to determine teams' winning percentages, the number of wins during a regular season was divided by the total games played during the same regular season. For each season, a team's roster was compared to the previous season's roster. The number of players on the current season's roster that were not on the previous season's roster was divided by the total number of players on the current season's roster. The resulting percentage was reported as the roster turnover for the current season.

As needed, the universities' ticket offices were asked for the teams' season-ticket sales figures and their arena's total capacity. The season-ticket sales figure was divided by the number of home games to get the team's average ticket sales of a home game. The average ticket sales were then divided by the arena's total capacity to determine the team's attendance for the season (expressed in terms of percentage of capacity).

Data concerning merchandise sales for each team were requested from the Collegiate Licensing Company and the universities themselves. These data were reported in the study as a dollar amount for each team and each season pertaining to the study.

Data Reduction and Analysis

After the winning percentages, NCAA tournament games played, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnovers for all the seasons pertaining to one-and-done players since 1995 were collected, descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the mean of each variable in the seasons before, with, and after a one-and-done player. The same was done for the peer institutions that served as the control for comparison. These means were then analyzed using SPSS version 16.0 statistical software. The two (Classification) by three (Year) repeated measures ANOVA output was used to determine if there was a significant difference between the winning percentages, NCAA tournament games played, ticket sales, merchandise sales, and roster turnovers of one-and-done schools and their peer schools in the seasons before, during, and after a one-and-done player. When there was a significant difference between the one-and-done schools and their peers, Post Hoc testing was also run to determine exactly where the significant differences occurred. To determine where the significant differences were between years at one-and-done schools, independent sample t-tests were run. To determine where the significant differences were between one-and-done schools and peer schools, paired samples t-tests were run. Based on these results, the effects of one-and-done NCAA division I players on college basketball programs were concluded.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Winning Percentage

This study found no significant difference in the regular season winning percentages of schools with a one-and-done player and the regular season winning percentages of peer institutions as the interaction effect for year (before, with, or after) by classification (one-and-done or peer) was non-significant ($F = .879$, $p\text{-value} = .418$) (See Table 1).

Table 1.

Regular Season Winning Percentage

	Season Before			
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	65.28%	68.36%	27.59% to 93.10%	17.15%
Peer Schools	61.23%	62.07%	30.00% to 86.21%	13.45%
Season With				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	70.40%	69.97%	32.14% to 96.77%	16.48%
Peer Schools	65.34%	65.45%	37.04% to 87.10%	13.38%
Season After				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	65.95%	67.82%	34.62% to 93.55%	15.97%
Peer Schools	64.92%	62.96%	37.04% to 90.32%	14.55%

NCAA Tournament Games Played

This study a significant difference between the number of NCAA tournament games played for one-And-done schools and their peer institutions based on the interaction effect year (before, with, or after) by classification (one-and-done or peer) ($F = 3.227$, $p\text{-value} = .043$).

Post Hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference occurred between the number of NCAA tournament games played by one-and-done schools for the season before and the season with a one-and-done player ($t = 3.258$, $p\text{-value} = .003$).

Post Hoc independent samples t-tests showed a significant difference occurred between the one-and-done schools and peer schools for the number of NCAA tournament games played during the season “with” a one-and-done player ($t = 3.055$, $p\text{-value} = .003$). There was a disparity in the average number of NCAA games played for all three seasons between one-and-done schools and peer schools. That disparity significantly increased for the season with a one-and-player. (See Table 2)

Table 2.

NCAA Tournament Games Played

Season Before				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	1.52	1.00	0 to 6	1.75
Peer Schools	1.02	1.00	0 to 4	1.21
Season With				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	2.32	2.00	0 to 6	2.28
Peer Schools	1.23	1.00	0 to 4	1.26
Season After				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	1.59	1.00	0 to 6	1.68
Peer Schools	1.19	0.00	0 to 6	1.55

Attendance

The interaction effect between year (before, with, or after) and classification (one-and-done or peer) was non-significant for attendance ($F = .852$, $p\text{-value} = .429$). In addition, there was found no significant difference in attendance of one-and-done institutions and peer institutions over the same time periods (See Table 3).

Table 3.

Percentage of Capacity For All Home Games (Attendance)

Season Before				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	79.96%	81.07%	43.48% to 100.00%	15.82%
Peer Schools	78.95%	82.19%	44.72% to 100.00%	16.05%
Season With				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	83.94%	86.01%	39.46% to 100.00%	14.08%
Peer Schools	80.53%	83.85%	49.92% to 100.00%	14.43%
Season After				
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	83.23%	87.79%	41.64% to 100.00%	15.03%
Peer Schools	79.07%	80.03%	38.85% to 100.00%	16.69%

Merchandise Sales

During data collection, the researcher was unable to obtain revenue figures for the Merchandise Sales variable. This information was classified as confidential and neither the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) nor the schools themselves were willing to disclose their revenue figures. The researcher then tried to use the CLC merchandise sales rankings to determine the relative impact of one-and-done players on Merchandise Sales. However, because not all schools in the study are clients of the Collegiate Licensing Company, CLC rankings did not provide enough data to accurately judge changes in Merchandise Sales. The data for all other variables were collected in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter III.

Roster Turnover

This study found no significant difference between the percentage of new players on the rosters of one-and-done schools and the percentage of new players on the rosters of peer institutions (See Table 4). Roster turnover was determined to be non-significant according to the interaction effect of year (before, with, or after) and classification (one-and-done or peer) ($F = 2.685$, $p\text{-value} = .071$).

Table 4.

Percentage of New Players (Roster Turnover)

	Season Before			
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	38.47%	38.46%	20.00% to 66.67%	12.32%
Peer Schools	40.13%	40.00%	14.29% to 66.67%	13.70%
<hr/>				
	Season With			
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	40.81%	42.86%	15.38% to 66.67%	14.34%
Peer Schools	34.68%	35.71%	7.14% to 64.29%	12.94%
<hr/>				
	Season After			
	Mean	Median	Range	Std. Deviation
One-And-Done Schools	41.59%	35.71%	15.38% to 86.67%	14.71%
Peer Schools	33.51%	30.77%	0.00% to 53.85%	12.56%

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of one-and-done Division I basketball players on the success of college basketball programs both on and off the court. Success was measured with four variables: (a) regular season winning percentage, (b) number of NCAA Tournament games played, (c) attendance, reported as a percentage of total capacity, and (d) roster turnover. To gauge the impact of a One-And-Done player, data were collected for developed variables for the season before, the season with, and the season after the player attended college. Additionally, the same data were collected for a group of peer institutions with similar profiles. This group of peer institutions was used as a control to help differentiate variance that resulted from factors others than the presence of a one-and-done player.

With the institution of the NBA Age Limit Rule in 2006, the best high school players were no longer eligible to enter the NBA draft in the year after they finished high school. Since then, many have chosen to go to college for only one year and then enter the draft. During that season, they do not play for millions of dollars, but ostensibly for the opportunity to obtain a college education while honing their basketball skills. At the same time, the college athletic departments and the coaches for whom they play receive a premium player and all the benefits such an elite player provides.

This study sought to investigate possible benefits a one-and-done player might bring to a NCAA men's basketball program during the season he played and immediately he departed for the NBA. Once these benefits have been determined and an investigation of whether such benefits accrue to a basketball program that obtains a one-and-done player, coaches and administrators may utilize such information to make informed decisions regarding their basketball program. Quantifying the impact of one-and-done players in this study, may then make it possible for future research to consider issues like the compensation of student-athletes.

Discussion

Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference in the winning percentage of one-and-done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player's career when compared to the winning percentage of peer institutions during the same seasons?

There is not a significant difference between the winning percentage of one-and-done basketball programs in the season before, the season with, or the season after a one-and-done player's career. Both one-and-done schools and peer schools saw a fairly large increase in winning percentage from the season before to the season with. Both classifications of schools also saw a decrease in winning percentage from the season with to the season after.

There was an increase of about five percent for the season with a one-and-done player at one-and-done institutions. Winning more games could translate into gaining a bid to a postseason tournament, which in turn could generate more revenue for the one-and-done basketball program and trigger performance bonuses in coaches' contracts. For example, Head Coach Jimmy Collins of the University of Illinois-Chicago receives a bonus of seven percent of his base salary in any year of his contract in which his team receives at at-large or automatic bid to the NCAA tournament (Board of Trustees, 2008). On average, the head coaches in the 2006 NCAA tournament made \$800,000 annually (Wieberg, 2007, ¶5). This could be a strong motivator for a coach, who is having trouble getting his team into the NCAA tournament, to recruit a one-and-done player who might be able to win help the team win 5 percent more games and qualify for the tournament.

Research Question 2: Is there a significant difference in the number of NCAA tournament games played by one-and-done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player's career when compared to the number of NCAA tournament games played by peer institutions during the same seasons?

There is a significant difference in the number of NCAA tournament games played by one-and-done basketball programs during the season with a one-and-done player. On average one-and-done schools play 0.75 more NCAA tournament games in the season with a one-and-done player than they do in the season before or the season after that player. The same significant increase is not experienced by peer schools, who play significantly fewer NCAA tournament games than one-and-done schools during the “with” season. These same peer schools do not play significant fewer NCAA tournament games than one-and-done schools during with the “before” or “after” seasons.

It is thereby concluded in this study, that a one-and-done player can help a college play 0.75 more NCAA tournament games for the season that he is on the team. In 2008, the NCAA payout for each NCAA tournament game played was \$206,020 (NCAA – Budget & Finances, 2008). Therefore, a one-and-done player can minimally generate roughly \$155,000 ($\$206,020 * .75$) in NCAA payouts for his university and/or conference, depending on how the school's conference divides NCAA revenues.

Coaches can also benefit financially from an extra NCAA tournament game. Again citing Coach Collins' contract with the University of Illinois-Chicago, “The Coach will receive a seven percent bonus of base salary for each game the men's basketball team wins in the NCAA tournament in any contract year” (Board of Trustees, 2008). For Coach Collins, that means a \$21,000 bonus for winning an NCAA tournament game.

This financial boost could be motivation to recruit one-and-done players, who significantly increase the number of NCAA games in which his team plays. This type of performance bonus is common in coaching contracts and many of the bonuses are worth significantly more than Coach Collins'. In 2008, Memphis and one-and-done player Derrick Rose lost the national championship game in the NCAA tournament to Kansas. If they had been victorious, Memphis Head Coach John Calipari would have earned a \$400,000 bonus (Wieberg, 2007, ¶9).

While wins in the NCAA tournament can bring a coach immediate reward, they can also bring him long term financial security. In 2007, six of the eight coaches who reached the NCAA tournament "Elite Eight" received contract extensions and earned an average increase of \$322,000 in their annual salaries (Weiberg, 2007, ¶4). Any coach looking for long-term job security, would be wise to consider this when he decides which high school players to recruit.

Recently, it has been speculated that Georgia Tech Head Coach Paul Hewitt saved his job by simply signing a probable one-and-done player, Derrick Favors.

No NCAA tournament wins, one NCAA tournament appearance, and not even any NIT appearances, only add to the poor showing of the last three years. Barring a miracle this will be Hewitt's third season out of four missing the NCAA's, and it's quite likely to be his third losing season out of the last four seasons. It's doubtful that Hewitt doesn't finish this season though, as Georgia Tech's head coach regardless of final record...has put together one of the best classes in America headed by consensus top five player Derrick Favors (Fann, 2009, ¶7).

This will not go unnoticed by other coaches on the hot seat. Some may begin focusing their recruiting efforts on one-and-done players like Favors in a calculated attempt to save their jobs.

To analyze the effect of one-and-done players on coaches' tenure, one needs only to compare the average stay of coaches who have had a one-and-done player at their school to the average stay of coaches who have not had a one-and-done player at their school. If coaches are recruiting one-and-done players in an attempt to save their own jobs, then it could be argued that they are completely disregarding the educational mission of the university itself. The same allegations could be made of athletic directors and university presidents who hire coaches with a record of recruiting one-and-done players.

Research Question 3: Is there a significant difference in the attendance at one-and-done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player's career when compared to the attendance of peer institutions during the same seasons?

The differences in attendance at one-and-done schools and peer schools over the course of the study were found to be statistically non-significant. At one-and-done schools, average attendance increased by almost four percent from the season before to the season with a one-and-done player. During the same two year period, the sample of peer institutions experienced an increase of about 1.6 percent. For the season after the one-and-done player, the one-and-done schools' average attendance fell by approximately 0.71 percent. The decrease in average attendance at peer schools was about 1.46 percent.

The increase in attendance coincided with an increase in roster turnover at one-and-done schools. This implies that findings of Kahane and Shmanske, which showed that increased roster turnover resulted in decreased attendance for Major League Baseball teams, do not apply to NCAA Division I college basketball.

To further explore the effect of one-and-done players on attendance, the attendance figures for all peer institutions should be compiled. Including all Division I schools would eliminate sampling error. The statistics could then be run again to see if anything changed. Future research could also attempt to see if one-and-done players can affect attendance through helping their team reach the NCAA tournament for the first time in a number of years. If Rivers and Deschiver's study relating the number of years since a team's last post season appearance to fan attendance in Major League Baseball is applicable to college basketball, then a program may experience an increase in attendance

in the season following its appearance in the NCAA tournament with the one-and-done player.

Some may argue that if a one-and-done player is shown to have increased attendance and generated additional revenue for his university, then he will benefit financially when he enters the NBA. The one-and-done player could receive endorsement deals because of his marketability. The income from these endorsements could be seen as the one-and-done player's earnings from playing Division I basketball, because his revenue-generation abilities would have been unknown if not for year he spent in college. To test this theory, the average endorsement deals signed by one-and-done players that entered the NBA should be compared to the average endorsement deals signed by high school players that entered the NBA. These figures should be adjusted according to the inflation rate, so that the comparison will be more accurate. If it is determined that one-and-done players get significantly more endorsement money than the high school players who by-passed college and went straight to the NBA, then it would strengthen the argument that one-and-done players receive more than just a one year scholarship for playing college basketball.

Research Question 4: Is there a significant difference in the merchandise sales of college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player's career when compared to the merchandise sales of peer institutions during the same seasons?

The answer to this question could not be determined because the institutions in this study wished to keep their merchandise sales figures confidential. The researcher also attempted to use the Collegiate Licensing Company's merchandise sales rankings to analyze this variable, but was unsuccessful because not all the schools in the study are clients of the CLC. Future attempts to determine the impact of one-and-done players on merchandise sales could look at the footwear and apparel contracts that these players sign when they turn professional and compare them to those signed by other players coming out of college. If the one-and-done players receive significantly more money, then it could be inferred that the apparel companies believe they will produce more revenue. The same may be true for the season these players spent in college basketball.

Research Question 5: Is there a significant difference in the roster turnover of one-and-done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player's career when compared to the roster turnover of peer institutions during the same seasons?

It was found that there was no significant difference in roster turnover for the season before, the season with, or the season after a one-and-done player. Additionally, there was no significant difference between roster turnover at one-and-done schools and roster turnover at peer schools. At one-and-done schools, roster turnover increased each season. Conversely, roster turnover at peer schools decreased each season. This could signal a trend of more players leaving college early at one-and-done schools. It could also be that one-and-done schools have more NBA prospects and therefore players tend to leave school earlier.

Athletic directors and university presidents at one-and-done schools may want to take a closer look at this. Have their schools turned into a NBA training ground within an educational institution? In an effort to answer this question, future researchers should continue to monitor the roster turnover at one-and-done schools. If the percentage continues to increase to the point that there is a significant difference between roster turnover at one-and-done schools and peer schools, it may signal that these programs have replaced some of their student-athletes with only athletes.

Conclusions

Of the five variables analyzed in this study, one-and-done players only had a statistically significant effect on the number of NCAA tournament games played. However, because the NCAA tournament is such an important part of college basketball, this study can still conclude that one-and-done players have a definitive positive on success in college basketball programs both on and off the court. It has been shown that programs and coaches can both financially benefit from having a one-and-done player. When these benefits are compared directly to the value of the scholarship the player receives, it appears that the one-and-done players' scholarships are not equitable compensation. However, before this can be concluded it is recommended that future research be done to determine the impact that playing one year of college basketball has on a player's marketability. If one-and-done players receive significantly more endorsement money than their high school predecessors, then perhaps one-and-done players are eventually compensated for playing Division I college basketball. It is also recommended that future research be done to study the effect of one-and-done players on coaches' compensation and tenure. That study could potentially help further efforts to quantify the financial impact of one-and-done players on NCAA men's Division I college basketball.

Appendix A: List of one-and-done players

Season played	One-And-Done player	School
1995-96	Stephon Marbury	Georgia Tech
1995-96	Shareef Abdul-Rahim	California
1996-97	Tim Thomas	Villanova
1997-98	Larry Hughes	Saint Louis
1997-98	Ricky Davis	Iowa
1998-99	Corey Maggette	Duke
1999-00	DerMarr Johnson	Cincinnati
1999-00	Donnell Harvey	Florida
1999-00	Jamal Crawford	Michigan
2000-01	Rodney White	Charlotte
2000-01	Gerald Wallace	Alabama
2000-01	Zach Randolph	Michigan St.
2000-01	Eddie Griffin	Seton Hall
2000-01	Alton Ford	Houston
2000-01	Omar Cook	St. John's
2001-02	Dajuan Wagner	Memphis
2001-02	Jamal Sampson	California
2002-03	Chris Bosh	Georgia Tech
2002-03	Carmelo Anthony	Syracuse
2003-04	Kris Humphries	Minnesota
2003-04	Luol Deng	Duke
2003-04	Trevor Ariza	UCLA
2004-05	Marvin Williams	North Carolina
2005-06	Shawne Williams	Memphis
2005-06	Tyrus Thomas	LSU
2006-07	Thaddeus Young	Georgia Tech
2006-07	Brandan Wright	North Carolina
2006-07	Greg Oden	Ohio St.
2006-07	Kevin Durant	Texas
2006-07	Javaris Crittenton	Georgia Tech
2006-07	Daequan Cook	Ohio St.
2006-07	Mike Conley Jr.	Ohio St.
2007-08	Bill Walker	Kansas St.
2007-08	Derrick Rose	Memphis
2007-08	Anthony Randolph	LSU
2007-08	O.J. Mayo	Southern Cal
2007-08	Kevin Love	UCLA
2007-08	Kosta Koufos	Ohio St.
2007-08	DeAndre Jordan	Texas A&M
2007-08	J.J. Hickson	N.C. State
2007-08	Donte Greene	Syracuse
2007-08	Eric Gordon	Indiana
2007-08	Michael Beasley	Kansas St.
2007-08	Jerryd Bayless	Arizona

Appendix B: List of peer institutions

Year	School	Conference
1995-96	Clemson	ACC
1995-96	Oregon	PAC-10
1996-97	St. John's	BIG EAST
1997-98	Charlotte	C-USA
1997-98	Wisconsin	BIG TEN
1998-99	Wake Forest	ACC
1999-00	Memphis	C-USA
1999-00	Kentucky	SEC
1999-00	Penn State	BIG TEN
2000-01	Saint Louis	C-USA
2000-01	Tennessee	SEC
2000-01	Minnesota	BIG TEN
2000-01	Providence	BIG EAST
2000-01	Marquette	C-USA
2000-01	Villanova	BIG EAST
2001-02	South Florida	C-USA
2001-02	Oregon	PAC-10
2002-03	Clemson	ACC
2002-03	Pittsburgh	BIG EAST
2003-04	Ohio State	BIG TEN
2003-04	Wake Forest	ACC
2003-04	Arizona State	PAC-10
2004-05	Maryland	ACC
2005-06	Alabama Birmingham	C-USA
2005-06	Tennessee	SEC
2006-07	Boston College	ACC
2006-07	Maryland	ACC
2006-07	Wisconsin	BIG TEN
2006-07	Kansas	BIG 12
2006-07	Boston College	ACC
2006-07	Wisconsin	BIG TEN
2006-07	Wisconsin	BIG TEN
2007-08	Oklahoma	BIG 12
2007-08	Alabama Birmingham	C-USA
2007-08	South Carolina	SEC
2007-08	Washington State	PAC-10
2007-08	Stanford	PAC-10
2007-08	Minnesota	BIG TEN
2007-08	Oklahoma	BIG 12
2007-08	Virginia	ACC
2007-08	Villanova	BIG EAST
2007-08	Purdue	BIG TEN
2007-08	Oklahoma	BIG 12
2007-08	Oregon	PAC-10

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