ingest cdrApp 2017-08-15T23:11:39.888Z d91e81c8-5a8a-4e8a-976c-cad4e396e5ee modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:12:31.725Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:12:41.060Z Setting exclusive relation addDatastream MD_TECHNICAL fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:12:50.595Z Adding technical metadata derived by FITS modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:13:08.826Z Setting exclusive relation addDatastream MD_FULL_TEXT fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:13:18.313Z Adding full text metadata extracted by Apache Tika modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-08-15T23:13:19.155Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT cdrApp 2017-08-22T13:59:20.092Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2017-11-06T16:12:50.732Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-01-25T04:16:35.868Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-01-27T04:47:39.218Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-03-14T00:46:12.515Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-05-16T22:16:16.794Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-10T23:21:13.479Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-17T19:24:31.918Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-08-08T18:51:42.935Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-08-15T15:59:56.981Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-08-16T19:02:45.034Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-09-21T16:28:53.624Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-09-26T19:37:28.196Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-10-11T20:17:04.528Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2019-03-20T13:28:27.427Z Neil Hester Author Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences THE IMMORALITY BIAS: WHY “JOHN FLURBED MARY” SEEMS WRONG Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. Summer 2017 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text Neil Hester Author Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. Summer 2017 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. Summer 2017 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. Summer 2017 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017-08 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor B. Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor B. Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Degree granting institution Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias; dual processes; intentionality; morality; moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences The Immorality Bias: Why “John Flurbed Mary” Seems Wrong Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias, dual processes, intentionality, morality, moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Psychology and Neuroscience Kurt Gray Thesis advisor B. Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Neil Hester Creator Department of Psychology and Neuroscience College of Arts and Sciences Seven experiments reveal the immorality bias: in morally ambiguous situations, people automatically jump to conclusions of wrongdoing. In Experiment 1, ambiguous acts (e.g., “A woman leaves work early to meet a man who is not her husband”) were rated as more immoral when people reported initial interpretations rather than most likely explanations. In Experiments 2-5, neutral nonsense actions (e.g., “John flurbed”) were judged as immoral to the extent that their context matched the dyadic moral template through the presence of a patient (“John flurbed Mary”; Experiments 2 and 3), intentionality (“John intentionally flurbed Mary”; Experiment 4), and suffering (“John intentionally flurbed Mary, who cried”; Experiment 5). The immorality bias is stronger under time pressure (Experiment 6), and process-dissociation reveals its automaticity (Experiment 7). The immorality bias suggests that intuitive moral judgment can be understood as a heuristic—one that hinges upon the dyadic moral template. 2017 Social psychology bias; dual processes; intentionality; morality; moral judgment eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Kurt Gray Thesis advisor B. Keith Payne Thesis advisor Peter Gordon Thesis advisor text 2017-08 Hester_unc_0153M_17227.pdf uuid:363b23d0-99d8-4163-b71b-a516a8a7545e proquest 2017-07-14T15:15:18Z 2019-08-15T00:00:00 application/pdf 569227 yes