EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION

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ABSTRACT

C. HAKEEM SMITH, III: Europeanization and EU-ization
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins)

The concept of Europeanization in Political Science literature has been used to explain two separate processes; Europeanization and EU-ization. Conflating Europeanization and EU-ization can be both incorrect and misleading. By defining each process and identifying the separate mechanisms this paper seeks to encourage the use of EU-ization to study the process of European integration in the context of the European Union. The concept of Europeanization is then the longitudinal processes occurring throughout Europe.

EU-ization is approached by identifying the mechanisms that affect states entering the European Union. The states selected are Serbia and Croatia. Europeanization is approached by identifying the mechanisms that affect European states both within and separate from the European Union. The states selected here are Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine. This paper concludes that Europeanization and EU-ization are distinct processes, and further research can benefit from approaches that study the separate dynamics.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>FULL FORM</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Candidate State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People's Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>European State</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>European Value Survey</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G17+</td>
<td>G17 Plus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSLS</td>
<td>Croatian Social Liberal Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Potential Candidate State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“What this continent has achieved is truly fantastic, from being a continent of war to becoming a continent of peace. In this process the European Union has figured most prominently.” (Jagland 2012).

Any question about Europeanization requires a thorough understanding of the concept. The study of Europeanization has followed the ebb and flow of European Integration, and as the EEC has transformed into the EU, throughout the subsequent enlargements, Europeanization has evolved from a simple explanation of the diffusion of norms and values throughout western Europe into a nebulous term both more complex and discrete than the current usage allows. Only recently has the literature concerning Europeanization widened to include Candidate States. Moreover, the focus of Europeanization continues to be between the interaction of the EU and Member States or Candidate States as either a top-down\(^1\) or bottom-up\(^2\) process. This paper seeks to identify measurable mechanisms of Europeanization by first developing a workable definition that is distinguished from European Integration studies and the more EU-centric usages; hereby designated as EU-ization. In other words, a succinct definition of Europeanization is important in any empirical analysis of its effects.

Following the definition of Europeanization, the separate process of EU-ization is

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1 Top-down refers to the EU as the supranational institution influencing national policies and practices and the domestic or national response.

2 Bottom-up refers to Member States influencing EU administration and governance by exporting preferences to the supranational level.
identified and defined as a driving mechanism of European integration. Moreover, because other scholars have argued that the challenge of explaining the political, social, and legal integration of the EU is one best solved by modeling not definitions (Olsen 2002, p.943), this paper will also devise a model for identifying mechanisms of Europeanization and EU-ization. The model discussed in a later section seeks to outline the dynamics of the interaction between Europeanization and EU-ization and to identify how European states interact with each other, with supranational and international institutions, and with members of those institutions. The development of this model serves two purposes; first, it directly challenges Olsen's (2002) assumption that a definition of Europeanization is not analytically useful, and second it allows identification of possible mechanisms of Europeanization and EU-ization to be measured. 

Finally, this essay will apply the models and definitions derived above to two distinct inquiries. The first will identify mechanisms of Europeanization across four states: an EU member state, Hungary; an EU Candidate State, Serbia; a EU Candidate State with an accession agreement signed, Croatia; and a European non-member country, a state outside of the EU and the EU accession process; Ukraine. These four states have been selected to highlight the mechanisms of Europeanization that affect different states along three particular various points of a European Integration continuum. The second will seek to identify the process of EU-ization in two EU Candidate States; specifically the Stabilization and Association Process. The Stabilization and Association Process developed within a very short time into the mechanism by which the EU prepares the Balkan states for candidacy status.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZING AND DEFINING EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION

The concept of Europeanization is applied in most of the literature to the European Union and its member states (Börzel 2002; Börzel and Risse 2000; Ladrech 1994; Radaelli 2000). Although there is a growing literature that has undertaken an analysis of Europeanization in regards to candidate states, the interaction studied is largely situated among a literature regarding the influence of the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Sedelmeier 2012; Vachudova 2005). In other words, the majority of research concerning Europeanization is with a decidedly EU-centric perspective and focuses too narrowly on European Integration theory; what this paper terms as EU-ization. Even within this body of literature there are competing and conflicting definitions of Europeanization. This section seeks to identify the relevant differences between Europeanization and European Integration and the distinction between an EU-centric and a Euro-centric perspective. In so doing, two distinct processes will emerge. The first process is Europeanization and is constantly interacting with European States. The second process is EU-ization and is concretely situated in time and space.

Of the various theories concerning European integration, social constructivism offers the most balanced and nuanced approach to understanding the development of Europeanization. Social constructivism takes into account the rules, norms, identities, and cultures at an individual and international level. Although there is no real unanimity
among scholars about all that social constructivism implies, researchers can agree that
social constructivism is decidedly geared toward interactions and the construction of
reality as intrinsically connected to agents and vice versa (Omelicheva 2010, p.472). By
utilizing a social constructivist approach, any causal relationship concerning
Europeanization and EU-ization can be disregarded, and the processes identified for the
role played in constructing a European community.

The usage of the term Europeanization was developed from the German
Europäisierung in the 1970s to denote historical European migration to and colonization
of the Americas and has since been co-opted and misused by political scientists to
identify western European integration up until the mid-1990s (Headley 2012). Even
among researchers the term was not used to describe a specific research area until the
1990's, when it was then applied primarily to the EU's effects on Member States
(Sedelmeier 2011, p.5). With the hindsight of history and the understanding that the
European Union has emerged from a deeper European integration project, the term
Europeanization now suggests something broader than the Western European perspective
that has conflated so many ideas into one concept (Flockhart 2012).

The section below will detail some of the concepts of Europeanization in the
current literature, outline how Europeanization has been misused to conflate two distinct
processes, identify those researchers who have made a clear distinction between
Europeanization and EU-ization, and develop from those scholars a set of definitions to
use in analyzing European states. The following section outlines the development of the
working definitions of Europeanization and EU-ization in this paper. Europeanization, in
the analytical framework of this essay, is the process of diffusing and internalizing norms, values, and beliefs over time and space throughout Europe states, including the EU, and European citizens. EU-ization, retains the analytical focus on the EU and the transfer of rules, policies and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate states (CS), potential candidate states (PC), and their actors.

A number of scholars and researchers continue to make distinctions between Europeanization and EU-ization as separate and discretely occurring processes (Flockhart 2010; Vachudova 2005; Wallace 2000). As distinct as the two terms may be however, they are not mutually exclusive. At this point in time, EU-ization in particular cannot be completely separated from Europeanization (Radaelli 2000).

Ladrech (1994) approached Europeanization from a decidedly western European perspective; a posture adopted by many researchers in the mid-1990s. Ladrech (1994) defined Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (p. 69). By focusing almost exclusively on the effect of the European Community (EC) on national institutions, Ladrech (1994) only hinted at the effect of national institutions and policies on the EC and other states. Furthermore the analysis all but ignored the effect of norms, values, and beliefs at the individual, as opposed to organizational, level. As will be shown in a later section, the mechanism of the process outlined above is associated with downloading. This top-down perspective permeated the research on Europeanization and is part of the fundamental misapplication of the term. By retaining a focus exclusively on the domestic
response of Member States to EU policy, the literature all but ignores the effect international organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE may have on Member States and non-member countries.

Börzel (2002), reflecting a broader change in the literature away from focusing entirely on EC institutions, defined Europeanization in terms of the effects EU institutions and Member State domestic political structures have on each other, a “bottom-up” and a “top-down” dynamic. By conceptualizing Europeanization as a process that works toward both Member States and the EU, Börzel (2002) outlines a dynamic and interactive multidimensional process. Instead of simply one force acting “down” toward Member states, Europeanization could be opened “up” to include Member State policy preferences as well. However, adding a new dimension continues to maintain the focus on the EU for Europeanization and, in particular, on policy preferences. The mechanism of Member States preferences being transferred to the EU level will be identified, in a later section, as uploading.

Table 2.1: Use of Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Integrated Elements</th>
<th>Identification in Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ladrech (1994)</td>
<td>EC Policies</td>
<td>EU-ization termed Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Börzel (2002)</td>
<td>EU &amp; MS Policies</td>
<td>EU-ization termed Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace (2000)</td>
<td>EU, MS, &amp; European Policies, Practices, Norms, Values</td>
<td>EU-ization termed Europeanization and globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flockhart (2010)</td>
<td>EU, State, &amp; European Policies, Practices, Norms, Values over time</td>
<td>Europeanization and EU-ization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Radaelli (2000), capitalizing upon the deepening perspective of Europeanization,
broadened the process:

(A) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedure, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic, domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (p.4).

This conceptual leap into socially constructed identities contributed to allowing variables outside of policy and institutions to be attributed to Europeanization, such as norms values and beliefs concerning democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Moreover, this understanding is central to utilizing a social constructivist perspective in studying mechanisms within the process of Europeanization, and the variable outcomes of those processes. However, although Radaelli (2000) fails to disconnect the process from the EU, he does allow for the EU to affect non-member countries. For example, the EU transport policy rules have been adopted by Norway and Switzerland, and the railway cross border connections with Ukraine and the Balkans could initiate similar policy changes as well. However, there is no mention of any reciprocal process. As will be discussed in a later section, the EU policy adaptations by non-member countries is a form of crossloading.

Wallace (2000) argued that globalization and the development of the EU are two separate processes. However, the distinction Wallace (2000) makes is between globalization and Europeanization with EU-ization implied although conflated in the definition. By making a distinction between Europeanization and the EU, Wallace (2000) allows for the identification of two separate processes. EU-ization therefore is the EU-centric process, primarily resulting from transfers of organizational and institutional
practices and policies between the *sui generis* European Union polity and representatives of the Member States. Europeanization therefore must be defined separately and is the interaction of European states with a broader European dimension, Europeans with each other, and includes norms, values, belief systems, and the construction of a European identity.

What must be understood clearly, moreover, is that EU-ization does not exist without the prior process of Europeanization, and Europeanization, in its current iteration, should, in the case of EU Member States and Candidate States, include the process of EU-ization. As Flockhart (2010) writes:

> EU-ization is the result of past structures of social power, identity constructions, norms and processes of social exclusion...Europeanization is an ongoing process across time and space, which has changed over time in response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities. Europeanization therefore is a continuously reconstituted phenomenon, which is constructed in the relationship between the European 'Self' and the non-European 'Other'.” (p.793)

In short, Europeanization is much broader than is normally limited to the confines of the European Union and EU-ization. Europeanization is the process of diffusing and internalizing norms, values, and beliefs over time and space throughout Europe states, including the EU, and European citizens. In a later section a selection of European norms, values, and beliefs will be analyzed: democracy, human rights, and rule of law. EU-ization, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with the transfer of rules, policies and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate states, and potential candidate states. The rules and policies are primarily encapsulated within the *acquis communautaire*, but are incrementally changed over time; for example,
international trade agreements and common policies. Moreover, EU-ization is a process that occurs within a certain time and space. In other words, EU-ization primarily involves transfers within the EU or directly interacting with the EU; especially those transfers that are predominantly regulatory and situated within the historical scope of states' accession to the EU.
CHAPTER 3
MODELING: A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION

This section develops a framework utilizing an novel integrated approach based on the research of Olsen (2002) and Wong (2011) as a method for identifying instances of Europeanization and EU-ization in selected European states. This framework acknowledges that the two methodologies discussed developed based on an attempt to study EU policy-making. However, the frameworks developed by Olsen (2002) and Wong (2011) fails to distinguish between Europeanization and EU-ization; this paper seeks to remedy what previously has been overlooked.

Olsen (2002) identified a number of different phenomena to enumerate Europeanization. There are five phenomena identified: changes in external boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization, and a political unification project (Olsen 2002, pp.923-924). Changes in external boundaries refers to the territory of the EU as a polity and the extent to which the European continent can be governed (Olsen 2002, p.923); as has been termed in this paper, this phenomenon is an aspect of EU-ization. Developing institutions at the European level is a direct result of legitimizing supranational authority and institutions (Olsen 2002, p.923); again an instance of EU-ization. Central penetration of national systems of governance is concerned with multi-

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3 EU-ization here refers to the definition as established by this paper. Olsen (2002) applied the phenomenon or “faces” discussed in this section to Europeanization.
level governance, and social and political harmonization (Olsen 2002, pp. 923-924); EU-ization once more. Exporting forms of political organization is the EU's policy toward non-member countries (Olsen 2002, p.924); in terms of this essay, a conflating of Europeanization\(^4\) and EU-ization. Finally, as a political unification project Europeanization is conceptualized as the formative process of the EU as a polity; which can both include and/or exclude the previous four phenomena outright or in various stages (Olsen 2002, p.924); again referring to EU-ization.

However, Olsen (2002) fails to identify Europeanization and EU-ization as distinct processes, and even goes as far as to suggest “questions of the properties, mechanisms and explanations of European transformations should not be turned into definitional issues...the challenge is to model the dynamics of change.” (p.944). As pointed out in earlier sections, definitions of Europeanization and EU-ization are critically important especially when a framework attempts to measure and analyze those processes. Furthermore, by establishing the phenomena based on institutional dynamics, Olsen (2002) leaves little room for developing mechanisms that interact at the individual level.

Wong (2011) likewise identifies five categories of Europeanization: *national adaptation*, *national projection*, *identity reconstruction*, *modernization*, and *policy isomorphism* (p.150-151). However, Europeanization is presented in the context of EU Member States' foreign policy. Therefore the framework is limited to institutions and the

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\(^4\) Europeanization here refers to the definition established in this paper and discussed in the previous section.
conflates the processes of Europeanization and EU-ization as well.

*National adaptation* focuses on a reactive process that occurs incrementally within the confines of the EU. As a top-down process, *national adaptation* affects EU Member States by requiring an adherence to EU policies. *National adaptation* is therefore an instance of *downloading* and is attributed to EU-ization. The simplest iteration of *downloading* is the adoption of EU rules and regulations, *acquis communautaire*, for Candidate States seeking EU membership.

*National projection*, is a bottom-up process and the focus shifts to the EU Member States as national policies are exported to the EU level; again a clear mechanism of EU-ization. *National projection* is therefore *uploading* and must be intrinsically connected to EU membership. Environmental policy is an often cited example of *uploading* policy preferences to the EU level (Börzel 2002).

Wong's (2011) final three categories are *identity reconstruction*, *modernization*, and *policy isomorphism*. In these three mechanisms the dialogue between supranational and national within the EU broadens to include non-member countries. In *identity reconstruction*, or *crossloading*, policy-makers, powerful domestic actors, norm entrepreneurs, and citizens realign beliefs and identities to EU MS norms. Researchers often analyze EU institutions and the reformulation of the identities of national actors and EU officials working together. *Elite socialization* is often linked with *identity reconstruction*. However, the focus remains on the EU and actors in EU institutions and how their interactions affect EU MS policies (Wong 2011). Thus, when encapsulated within the EU
crossloading remains a mechanism of EU-ization. Alternatively, when a broader European policy is reflected, non-member state actors' identities are affected, and European institutions are the focus, the mechanism belongs to the Europeanization process. Rieker (2004) examined the neutrality of Sweden and Finland, and attributed changes in the national constitutions to the influence of the EU.

Modernization is ostensibly concerned with the development and consolidation of liberal democracy and democratic institutions (Goetz 2001). Wong (2011) contextualizes modernization by the EU’s effect on the policy and economics of prospective Member States through EU accession; EU-ization or downloading. However, if applied to beliefs, values, norms, and identities of Europe, and applied to a non-member state, a country outside of the EU, modernization is clearly a mechanism of Europeanization. In modernization, the focus of the individual or state is on Europe as a collective or an identity. Agh (1999) for example, associated this process with democratization and membership in European institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Thus, modernization can be separated from the EU-ization process of downloading, and reconstituted, in the parlance of this paper, as the Europeanization process of frontloading. Frontloading refers to the process of non-member states developing European norms, such as democracy and liberal values, despite any orientation toward to the EU.

Finally, when states adopt policies and norms which have proven successful for other European states, it is is called policy isomorphism and can occur in any
policy area, either directly through “regulation” or indirectly by “ emulation” (Wong 2011, p.153). Unfortunately this attempt to further qualify instances of policy isomorphism conflates Europeanization and EU-ization. For the purposes of keeping the categories distinct, when policy isomorphism occurs as a direct result of EU regulation it is EU-ization (downloading) and when it is indirect it is through Europeanization; termed here as reloading. Reloading is most often discussed in terms of emulation, and is the mechanism by which norms are diffused indirectly among Europe states. As states and actors continue to interact in a European space, norms, beliefs, policies and values are constantly in flux at every level. Thus, as states change to emulate change Europe preferences, they are doing so through reloading. In fact, reloading, is such a dynamic process that one expects to find the most divergence among European states. Reloading exists at all levels of analysis from the individual, to the state and to supranational institutions.

**Table 3.1: Mechanisms of Europeanization and EU-ization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Emphasis</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Downloading</td>
<td>EU Policy</td>
<td>MS/CS</td>
<td>EU-ization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uploading</td>
<td>MS Policy</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU-ization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossloading</td>
<td>MS Policy &amp; EU Norms</td>
<td>MS/CS/PC</td>
<td>Europeanization/EU-ization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontloading</td>
<td>European Norms</td>
<td>European State</td>
<td>Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reloading</td>
<td>European State Norms</td>
<td>European State</td>
<td>Europeanization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this context, downloading and uploading are fundamentally mechanisms of EU-ization. These two mechanisms exist solely within the dynamic interaction between the EU, Member States, and states within the EU accession process; Candidate States and Potential Candidate States. Crossloading occurs primarily
within the EU, but involves non-member countries as well, and represents conforming policies to a developing EU Member State standard. Although *crossloading* is identified at the Member State level, the mechanism occurs within both EU-ization and Europeanization, and represents the nexus of these two distinct processes. Often studies into the EU's influence of democracy promotion outline the impact of the EU on domestic structures and EU conditionality (Vachudova 2005). In such cases the influence of the EU is relatively weak and contingent upon domestic actors and norm entrepreneurs to promote reform. A “return to Europe” is usually the accompanying phrase. For example, the “rhetorical action” that spurred the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 was driven by EU member states (Schimmelfennig 2001).

*Frontloading* removes the institutional structure of the EU. The emphasis in *frontloading* is on the European community, and the influence of the European community on European states. Finally, *reloading* emphasizes the state level. In *reloading* the emphasis is on the interactions of self-identifying European states with one another, and in applying the norms, values, beliefs, and policies that seem to be successful in other European states.

By classifying instances of Europeanization separately from EU-ization, an analysis of the phenomena can be studied in states of varying categories: inside the EU, Member State (MS); in the accession process, Candidate State (CS); seeking to enter the accession process, Potential Candidate States (PC); and non-member states removed from the accession process altogether.
As this paper argues, Europeanization and EU-ization are quite distinct processes that interact across multiple dimensions. In order to operationalize these concepts two distinct approaches will be utilized. This section will begin with the approach for Europeanization and finish with EU-ization.

In order to measure Europeanization three variables will be identified and evaluated. The variables are **Democracy**, **Human Rights**, and **Rule of Law**. This variable represents the basic quality an ES should possess in order to be aligned with the current makeup of the European community. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent democratization that followed through Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 is indicative of this growing European quality; it is a trend toward liberal democracy. As the foundation of acceptance to the process of Europeanization this variable is also reflective of the mechanism of *frontloading* identified in a separate section.

**Democracy**, **Human Rights**, and **Rule of Law** can be quite complex to identify and measure, and difficult to approach from other than a decidedly Western perspective. These variables will be measured using data gathered from Freedom House and the European Values Study. Freedom House was chosen based on a data collection technique that employ a mix of sources: “foreign and domestic news reports, nongovernmental organization publication, think tank and academic analysis, and individual professional
contacts” (Freedom House 2001). Furthermore, the definition of democracy employed by Freedom House takes into account non-Western perspectives and the rating system evaluates the conditions in the countries analyzed rather than simply the governments and legislation therein. The European Values Study was selected because the research project is comprehensive, including forty-seven European states, and longitudinal, from 1981 to 2008.

The Freedom House survey includes ratings along two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. Political Rights includes the ability of people to freely engage in the political process and affect decision making at every level of government from running for office to policy-making. Civil Liberties includes both the institutional element and the personal freedoms to develop, organize, hold, and express views outside of the state. The Political Rights and Civil Liberties surveys are conducted separately and along two different checklists (see Appendix I). The Political Rights checklist is used to answer questions concerning “the extent to which the system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates, and to what extend the candidates are chosen independently of the state...the more people suffer under [autocratic] domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for self-determination” (Freedom House 2001). The questions are scored, the totals tabulated, and then assigned a score from 1 to 7, with 1 being the closest to the ideal situation for political rights.

The Civil Liberties checklist is made up of four categories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Association and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law and Human
Rights, and Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights (see Appendix I). Again, Freedom House analyzes the conditions of civil liberties rather than assigning a rating based on the existence of legislature guaranteeing those freedoms. Like the Political Rights dimension above, Civil Liberties scores countries on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most ideal freedom.

The countries analyzed in the Europeanization section have been assigned scores based on the Freedom House data. The data for the EU values were taken by averaging the annual ratings for the EU Member States for the years the ratings represent. For example, the ratings for the EU before 2007 do not reflect the scores for Romania and Bulgaria. The ratings for Europe reflect all EU MS and member states of the Council of Europe; a total of forty-seven Europe states.

The data will be compared across a temporal dimension to identify any trend away from the ideal Political Rights and Civil Liberties score. The data will also be compared against a European and an EU average to measure national change to broader trends and the effectiveness of frontloading; especially in the case of Ukraine. One of the fundamental assumptions herein is that Europeanization begins by developing European States that can engage with and be engaged by the mechanisms identified in the previous section. If European States are not characterized by these basic rights and freedoms, then they remain outside the further Europeanization process until enough European norms and values have been acquired through frontloading.

The European Values Study (EVS) is a longitudinal, cross-national survey of basic values in Europe. “It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes,
values and opinions of citizens all over Europe” (EVS, GESIS 2010, p.4). The EVS conducted face-to-face interviews of national residents over 18 years or older to compile the results. The responses to the EVS questions used to identify democracy as a normative value and measure how close the selected countries are to that norm. The results are taken from across forty-seven European countries and represent surveys taken between 2008 and 2010. Specifically the dates for the data collection for the case countries selected in the next section: Croatia, 31-04-2008 to 31-10-2008; Hungary, 26-11-2008 to 28-01-2009; Serbia, 14-07-2008 to 31-07-2008; Ukraine, 12-07-2008 to 09-10-2008 (EVS, GESIS 2010).

As mentioned in a previous section, EU-ization is primarily concerned with the dynamic process occurring between Member States and the EU, and between EU Member States. Furthermore, those mechanisms that can most readily be identified as EU-ization are uploading and downloading. Downloading is the most salient of these two processes and is initiated primarily through adoption of the acquis communautaire for Candidate States, and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), specifically for the Potential Candidate States in the Balkans. Thus the discussion of EU-ization in a later section, will focus on the SAP in two Balkan states; Croatia and Serbia. Croatia and Serbia have been selected to emphasize the variance that can occur within regions during the EU-ization process. Moreover, in the analysis of selected case countries, the temporal nature of EU-ization is exposed in the case of Serbia.
CHAPTER 5
MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION

The countries in this section were selected specifically to indicate how little Europeanization is connected to convergence and how dissimilar the process of Europeanization is from EU-ization. In other words, whereas EU-ization is ostensibly focused on the preparation of states to join the EU, the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* and other EU administrative processes, Europeanization reflects a state's interaction with a European identity over time. Therefore, although EU-ization can affect states at different rates, states can also experience Europeanization along different levels across a European dimension. Four European countries will be analyzed to reflect this diversity: Serbia and Croatia to identify variance within a region; Hungary and Ukraine to highlight any variance across an EU dimension. The starting assumption of this section being that Europeanization is primarily a normative process and can continue to affect a state regardless of its position along a EU-ization continuum. As Ukraine is a non-member state, Serbia is a Candidate State, Croatia is set to become a Member State in July 2013, and Hungary has been a Member State since 2004, this essay expects an array of Europeanization across the selected dimensions. The assumption being that EU MS, CS and PC have closer levels of Europeanization that non-member states.

The first variables to be analyzed are those most often intended to identify EU-ization, but are more indicative of the basic values of shared among the European
community: democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Following along the same line, the countries will be analyzed according to the population's perception of the EU. Finally, this essay seeks to identify other connections to engagement with the development of a European identity.

**Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law**

Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law in this context are far from simple “yes” or “no” answers. However, in order to identify the process of Europeanization in the selected countries, Freedom House data will be used to score and quantify the development of these values over time. Freedom House uses a rating system based on political rights and civil liberties, assigning countries scores on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 being the most free and 7 being the least. Furthermore, Freedom House subsumes Human Rights and Rule of Law within the civil liberties score. Therefore, for the purposes of measuring Europeanization in this context, Democracy will be measured by a combination of political rights and Human Rights and Rule of Law measured by civil liberties.

The majority of the scores in Table 5.1 are between 1 and 4. For both political rights and civil liberties, 1 is the best score available. In the political rights category a 1 is indicative of competitive political parties, inclusion or allowances for minority groups, free and fair elections where the elected candidate rules, and freedom for a contributing opposition. A score of 2 indicates the presence of corruption, limitations on opposition groups, and outside interference on politics. Finally, scores from 3 to 5 are indicative of the presence of pronounced inequalities in political rights and more prevalence of the
corruption, limitations, and negative influences described above.

In terms of civil liberties a rating of 1 is indicative of freedom of expression, religion, and assembly, and promote equality. Countries with a 1 rating also have fair rule of law, an independent judiciary, and economic freedoms. A rating of 2 is again indicative of limitations, for example a lack of independent media, trade unions, and minority discrimination. Scores ranging from 3 to 5 are symptomatic of the same flaws, but include civil war, military influence, unfair elections, and one-party rule.

Table 5.1: Freedom House Scores - Civil Liberties & Political Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European average for both civil liberties and political rights has held steady at 2, and likewise the average for the EU has remained steadily at 1 since 2003 (Table 5.1). Reliable data for the selected countries provides information for the time frame between 2006 and 2012; data from Freedom House are retroactive from the previous year. From the data there are two success stories and two clear instances of backsliding. The
successful states are Croatia and Serbia, the two Balkan countries. Both countries have
evidenced an increase in Human Rights and Rule of Law since 2007. The traditional
approach to Europeanization, i.e. EU-ization, would attribute the success directly to the
EU's involvement in the region. However, as the previous section outlined, the EU-
ization process is primarily the transfer of rules and laws in the form of the *acquis
communautaire*. Instead, this change can be attributed to Europeanization and the shift
toward a basic European political structure. In the case of Croatia factors contributing to
the shift were improvements concerning minority representation in the parliament, and
developments in pre-school education, especially for the Roma minority group. For
Serbia the positive change is due to the stability of the government over several election
cycles after Milošević.

On the other hand, Hungary and Ukraine both evidence a decidedly negative shift
away from a basic European framework. The change in civil liberties score for Hungary
comes on the heels of a major shift after the parliamentary elections of 2010. Fidesz
gained a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and thereby the power to amend
the Hungarian constitution (Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele 2012). Within the first year,
the Fidesz parliament entrenched power gains by amending the constitution to allow
parliament to elect constitutional judges, removed economics from the purview of the
Constitutional Court and gained control of the Election Commission (Bánkuti, Halmai,
and Scheppele 2012). Moreover, the Fidesz government has all but muzzled the domestic
media with new reforms and has so far been successful in keeping the EU sidelined
(Jenne and Mudde 2012). It should be noted that the change in civil liberties puts only
Latvia behind Hungary in terms of Big Bang enlargement member states; Latvia scored 2 for both categories.

Ukraine has evidenced a negative change in both civil liberties and political rights since 2011. Being wholly removed from the EU accession process, Ukraine has yet to meet any sort of basic European norm in terms of democracy, human rights, or rule of law despite the gains of the Orange Revolution in 2006 (Kubicek 2009). Moreover, Ukraine has consistently scored in the low mid range and decidedly unresponsive to the process of Europeanization. After the Yanukovych government gained power in 2010, Ukraine has become oriented toward a pro-Russian stance and Yanukovych has continued to implement reforms that are more in line with an authoritarian rule (Menon & Motyl 2011). Furthermore, Yanukovych's Party of the Regions has amassed wealth and power in Ukraine, stymied economic reform, and allowed corruption to remain entrenched in politics and administration (Menon and Motyl 2011).

Contributing to the focus on democracy, data concerning democracy were tabulated from the European Value Study (Table 5.2). Although the data do not show change in values across time, they are representative of the national populations of the countries selected. Respondents were asked about levels of satisfaction concerning the development of democracy in their country of residence. Clearly Europeans as a group are satisfied with democracy, but with varying levels. The nuances of the question allow for a broad interpretation of the results, and this paper accepts the results as indicative of Europeanization having a correlation with democracy. At over 80 percent, the EU and European averages are quite close. The values position Croatia as closest, of the selected
countries, to the European average followed by Hungary, Serbia, and Ukraine respectively.

**Table 5.2: Satisfaction With How Democracy is Developing in Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Satisfied</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Satisfied</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied at All</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, to elicit data more closely to related to democracy as a European norm, data were analyzed according to respondent's reaction to democracy as the best form of government (Table 5.3). Once again the results for an EU and European average are close, this time above 90 percent. Again the results from Croatia are closest, but followed in this case by Serbia, then Hungary and finally Ukraine.

**Table 5.3: Democracy Best Form of Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of underlying factors contributing to the difference in values and it is tempting to draw conclusions. For example, during the time of the survey Croatia was invited to begin accession talks and had signed accession protocols with NATO, and as will be developed in the next section, deeply entrenched in the EU-ization process. Serbia likewise had moved forward in the EU-ization process and made
significant strides in complying with the ICTY. From this perspective it seems that orientation toward the EU could have some affect on satisfaction with democracy. As tempting as that conclusion is however, it does not alone explain Hungarians value democracy lower. As MS Hungary's position behind Croatia in terms of satisfaction with democracy could be a based on the break-up of the ruling coalition and cabinet reshuffle that took place in the early months of 2008 (BBC 2012). The international financial crisis may also have been a large factor was Hungary became the first MS to turn to the IMF and the EU to avoid financial collapse (Hieronymi 2011). The domestic political climate in Ukraine could have also contributed significantly to the low values on democracy. The infighting between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko certainly contributed to an already dismal view of democracy in Ukraine (Hale 2010).
CHAPTER 6
ANALYZING EU-IZATION: SAP IN SERBIA AND CROATIA

In order to utilize the concept of EU-ization as empirical analytical category, it is important to identify which measurable variables can be identified. These variables can be attributed to the *acquis communautaire*, and form the basis of EU-ization in terms of CS and PC. By focusing on the transfers of rules and policies generated within the EU, EU-ization can be separated from the normative driven process of Europeanization (Flockhart 2010, p.791). This section details that process in the cases of Serbia and Croatia.

The story of Serbia and Croatia's relationship with the EU begins during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia when the EU was the European Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed. However, in order to analyze EU-ization it is best to situate Serbia, Croatia, and the EU post-conflict. The EU proposed, in 1999, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans. SAP began as a progressive approach to stabilizing the region and eventually led to establishing a free-trade area. The year following the start of the project, the European Council announced that all SAP countries would be considered potential candidates (PC) for EU membership.

The Zagreb Summit in 2000 recommitted the EU to promoting democracy, rule of law, regional reconciliation and cooperation in the Balkans as conditions for possible EU
accession. Moreover, the Commission initiated preferential trade agreements with the Western Balkan states, and implemented the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program (European Commission 2012). This approach was a means for the EU to implement policy change and to promote rule adoption from the top down; i.e. *downloading*.

The CARDS program supported SAP and reinforced the EU’s democratic, human rights, rule of law, minority protection, and other conditional reforms. Subotic (2010) likewise identified a similar process in *issue linkage*, but placed a caveat on the success of such a strategy:

> Issue linkage is a powerful tool for policy change, but it can produce the opposite effect from the one intended if it is not followed by a comprehensive package of broader social transformation and not mechanistic compliance that ends up being not much more than policy lip service (p. 612).

Following the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, Serbia and Croatia were both potential candidate states for EU accession; Croatia having signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001 and Serbia still waiting to complete ratification of an SAA to officially start the SAP.

However, the EU-ization process for Croatia and Serbia would proceed at a markedly different pace for each country. By 2006, the EU Commission had already approved Croatia's membership application, two years earlier in 2004, Croatia's SAA had entered into force and the first chapter of EU accession negotiations were opened. By contrast, on May 3, 2006 Serbia's SAA negotiations were called off due to noncooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Cooperation by Serbia was not complete, consistent or expeditious...no progress was made on...the remaining fugitives, all of whom have connections to Serbia [d]espite... promises and deadlines passed [and the] independence of Montenegro...did not have... negative impact on cooperation... [t]he Office of the Prosecutor continued to have direct... positive cooperation with the Government of Montenegro” (United Nations 2006, 20).

Subotic (2010) attributes this stalling in EU-ization to the two-level gaming of local political elites and identifies it as an impetus for Serbian leadership change. Although the negotiations had slowed in 2005 due to Serbia's decreased cooperation with the ICTY, the EU resumed the process a short time later; thereby initiating EU-ization through downloading. The fact that the negotiations stalled again just another year later was enough for Serbia to be locked in a “trap of the unfinished past” with the Hague, and for the EU to stop further assistance until Serbians could become more Europeanized.

While EU-ization stalled in Serbia, between 2005 and 2007, Croatia was fully entrenched in EU-ization. During this time span, Croatia had arrested their last remaining war criminal for the ICTY, reloaded European norms and values, and began preparing to download preparations for the acquis communautaire (Subotic 2011). In fact, by 2006 the screening process for accession negotiations had finished and the first chapter of the acquis communautaire was opened and provisionally closed. Croatia, it seems was the model state for the successful Europeanization and EU-ization. “All major political stakeholders saw Croatia's future in Europe, and they were all willing to manipulate the domestic political environment in order to achieve this goal” (Subotic 2011, p.320).
Croatia was able to maintain such a successively smooth path through EU-ization largely in part due to the death of the then President Franjo Tudjman in 1999, and the subsequent defeat of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in the 2000 elections. Under Tudjman and his dominant HDZ, Croatia had been exemplifying characteristics of authoritarianism and non-liberal tendencies. After the elections in 2000, control of the parliament shifted from one dominant party, HDZ, to a leading coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS). The change in leadership of the Croatian parliament would last only one election cycle, but the HDZ's defeat at the hands of the SDP-HSLS coalition generated support for European integration, signaled an intolerance for corruption, and an impetus within the HDZ to revitalize their platform (Fink-Hafner 2007).

Leveraging public support for the so-called “Homeland War”, the Tudjman government's narrative for the conflicts that took place in Croatia in the 1990's, the HDZ garnered enough votes to retake the Croatian parliament in 2003 with 43.4 per cent of the vote (Jović 2009). Although this support was generated by a rhetoric against ICTY cooperation, the new HDZ-led government under Ivo Sanader repositioned itself as pro-EU and began to comply with the ICTY. Perhaps most tellingly, General Mirko Norac, who Sanader had called a hero in 2000, was sentenced to prison in Croatia and indicted by the ICTY in 2003 (Jović 2009).

In Serbia, Prime Minister and President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Koštunica was involved in SAA negotiations, but was even more responsible for those negotiations being suspended (Orlovic 2007). Koštunica had relied on the principle
of “voluntary surrender” on the part of ICTY indictees, and his nationalist government had made no moves to arrest Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžić, both of whom were wanted by The Hague (Orlovic 2007). As a result of the stalled SAA negotiations, the party dynamics inside of Serbia began to shift.

This shift can be attributed to frontloading as Serbia began to reflect more of a European identity and accept an accountability to the ICTY. The shift in party dynamics was toward European parties and federations or, Europarties. The Democratic Party (DS), not to be confused with Koštunica's DSS, was admitted to the Party of European Socialists (PES), a social-democratic, socialist, and laborist federation of EU parties (Orlovic 2007). Likewise the DSS and G17+ became associate members of the European People's Party (EPP), a conservative, Christian-democratic and people's EU party federation (Orlovic 2007). This shift allowed the parties to gain European legitimacy, increased lobbying power with the EU, and indicated the growth of pro-EU sentiment on the part of the Serbian people and leaders. The Europarties thus facilitated frontloading in Serbia. In other words, where Serbia's government before 2007 was highly nationalist and anti-European; after negotiations stalled with the EU SAA, the elections showed a shift toward a pro-EU alignment.

After the 2007 elections the government was split between a pro-EU coalition consisting of the DS, G17+, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the nationalist coalition with the DSS, SPS, and SRS (International Crisis Group 2007, p.2). The pro-EU coalition took 37.6 per cent of seats in parliament and the anti-European coalition took 58 per cent (International Crisis Group 2007, p.2-3). In an effort to support the
growing pro-EU sentiment in Serbia, the EU restarted SAA negotiations on June 13, 2007 (European Commission 2012). Later in November 2007 the SAA with Serbia was officially initiated along with the implementation of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement which allowed the simplification of the visa application process, especially for business purposes.

On April 29, 2008 the EU and Serbia signed the SAA and the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues in Luxembourg, and the agreement was then ratified by the National Assembly of Serbia on September 9 (European Commission 2012). The decision came after the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, reported positively on Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY (Europa 2013). Moreover, on December 19, 2009 the EU implemented visa liberalization for Serbian's traveling in the Schengen area, a significant step to increase EU-ization which was reflected by Serbia officially submitting its application for EU membership on December 22, 2009.

The ratification process for the SAA solidified Serbia's entrance into EU-ization as ratification was required by each member state and by the EU. The ratifications began in June 2010 and on January 19, 2011 the European Parliament voted to ratify the EU-Serbia Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Parliament 2011, 13). As part of the condition for continuation on the path to potential EU candidacy, the European Parliament required Serbia to continue cooperating with the ICTY, to work toward a resolution with Kosovo, and to ensure Serbians do not misuse free travel through Schengen (European Parliament 2011, 13).

Croatia, on the other hand, remained locked in the EU-ization process. Moreover,
Croatia closed the final chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, signed an accession treaty with the EU and on 1 July 2013 will become the 29th EU Member State. Serbia is still far behind Croatia in terms of EU-ization, but as a confirmed EU Candidate State Serbia is highly Europeanized, and poised to remain so. The EU-ization of these two countries affirms the assumptions, set in the paper earlier, that the process is separate from Europeanization and can be studied as such. Clearly EU-ization was most pronounced in Croatia. Serbia has continued through EU-ization at a much slower pace so there is a level of diversity in this bounded process.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The research here shows that there may be more quantifiable and empirical methods of identifying and measuring Europeanization when Europeanization is distinguished from EU-ization. For example quantifying the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* of time and analysis of EU rule adoption post-accession for studies of EU-ization. Likewise, more longitudinal studies concerning variables connected to a European identity and European norms like minority rights, gender equality, and environmental policy can bolster research in Europeanization. Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law serve well as baseline variables for Europeanization in this study, but should be quantified across Europe over time. In this way states can be measured in distinct categories of Europeanization.

By identifying the separate processes at work on CS, PC, and non-member states researchers can gauge the implications of larger European trends separate from the European integration project that characterizes EU-ization. This essay argues that the two processes do work separately and with differing dynamics. EU-ization is bounded by the EU and seems more active during the accession process. Europeanization is not bound by such temporal restraints and constantly affects the norms, values, and belief systems of European states despite any orientation toward the EU.

EU-ization seems to be fundamentally a process of EU rule transfer to CS, PC, non-member states. As evidenced by both Croatia and Serbia, EU-ization occurs mostly
through downloading. From the discussion in terms of the ICTY, EU-ization may have slowed or stalled in Serbia, but like in Croatia the process continued despite rhetoric otherwise. Data concerning administrative and bureaucratic processes between the EU and actors in Croatia and Serbia during the slowdowns in SAA negotiations could provide more insight into the pace of downloading and evidence for crossloading.

Hungary was decidedly absent from discussions on EU-ization and further research into uploading and crossloading could include Hungary. Clearly if downloading is concerned primarily with the process of EU accession it has little affect on Hungary. However, as evidenced by the survey results discussed above, it is unclear which mechanisms are at work in Hungary. The case is the same for Ukraine and more detailed research into crossloading and reloading could provide insight as to how these mechanisms change over time and MS and non-member countries influence and are influenced by Europeanization.

Furthermore research agendas constructed around candidate states, potential candidate states, and non-member states have an ability to contribute the growing study of Europeanization. Moreover, more longitudinal studies of CS, PC, and non-member states can solidify the existence and support the capacity of the mechanisms described above to measure the distinct concepts of Europeanization and EU-ization.

Because of the confines of this analysis, further research undertaken utilizing detailed rhetorical analysis and thorough discourse analysis would elucidate this phenomenon further and serve to pluck Europeanization from the divisive nature of European Integration Theory. Moreover, a thorough redefinition of Europeanization can
provide researchers with a clearer understanding of the modeling needed and the processes to identify. Because of the ebb and flow of Europeanization literature to date, this essay recommends a in-depth analysis of the Europeanization literature over time that can more aptly explain the emergence of EU-ization as a subset of Europeanization. Such a detailed review of the literature cold serve to establish a new area of research that is far less EU-centric.

Perhaps there is room for this discussion in the “widening” and “deepening” literature concerning the EU. Europeanization could also be used to explain the formation of different political systems in European states outside of the EU, and to compare European political organizations to other international or supranational systems. What this essay does hope to do however is to strictly separate Europeanization and EU-ization and place the latter as a phenomenon that occurs within a certain time and place of the former. Furthermore it is important to note that Europeanization could benefit from a Foucauldian genealogy approach. Such a thorough examination may prove the underlying assumptions of this essay to be presupposing or tautological.

Finally, Europeanization and EU-ization have been reviewed in the context of select states. The dearth of material available concerning the variables this essay seeks to analyze leaves further research to be completed. Further research into the mechanisms described could help to generate more accurate models that included interactions between Europeanization and EU-ization. This essay holds that the distinction between the processes of Europeanization and EU-ization is necessary. Furthermore, this essay posits that EU-ization has occurred along a specific path for Serbia and Croatia, and that
Europeanization continues to occur outside of the EU. However, it is clear that identifying the mechanisms of Europeanization remain far more difficult than pointing to the instances of EU-ization through the EU's most recent series of enlargements.
Appendix I:

Freedom House Basic Checklist Questions

Political Rights Checklist

A. Electoral Process

1. Is the head of the government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?

2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?

3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation

1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?

2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?

3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?

4. Do cultural, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?

C. Functioning of Government

1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?

2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?

3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?
Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions

A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?

B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

Civil Liberties Checklist

D. Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)

2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?

3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?

4. Is there open and free private discussion?

E. Associational and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?

2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)

3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

F. Rule of Law

1. Is there an independent judiciary?

2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?

4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?

2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?

3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?

4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
## Appendix II:

### Croatia and Serbia Consolidated EU-ization Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The EU proposes the new Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of South-Eastern Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>First year of the new CARDS program specifically designed for the SAP countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 Jun</td>
<td>Feira European Council states that all the SAP countries are “potential candidates” for EU membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 Oct 29</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement Signed with Croatia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Feb 21</td>
<td>Croatia applies for EU membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Jun</td>
<td>Thessaloniki Summit, SAP confirmed as EU policy for the Western Balkans and EU accession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Apr</td>
<td>European Commission issues positive opinion on Croatia’s application for EU membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Jun</td>
<td>European Council confirms Croatia as EU candidate country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Oct</td>
<td>Council conclusions open up a process for SAA with Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Dec 20</td>
<td>European Council sets official date, 17 March 2005, to begin accession negotiations with Croatia, provided full cooperation with the ICTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Feb 1</td>
<td>Croatia SAA comes into force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Mar 16</td>
<td>EU postpones start of accession negotiations with Croatia due to failure to capture Ante Gotovina and send to the ICTY; instead adopts a framework for further negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Apr 26</td>
<td>First meeting of Stabilization and Association Council; meeting of extended “EU troika” on Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Oct 3</td>
<td>ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte assesses Croatia as fully cooperating with the ICTY. Council begins accession negotiations the same day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Oct 10</td>
<td>EU begins negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Oct 20</td>
<td>Beginning of the screening process, analytical overview and review of the degree of harmonization of Croatian legislation with the acquis communautaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 May 3</td>
<td>Serbia SAA negotiations called off due to lack of progress on co-operation with the ICTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 May 21</td>
<td>Montenegro declares independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Jun 15</td>
<td>Serbia officially recognizes Montenegro as an independent state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Oct</td>
<td>Croatia finalizes screening process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Jun 13</td>
<td>SAA negotiations with Serbia resumed after proving a commitment to full cooperation with the ICTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Nov 1</td>
<td>SAA with Serbia officially initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Jan 1</td>
<td>Entry into force of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement between Serbia and the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Feb 12</td>
<td>The European Council adopts new Accession Partnership with Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Feb 17</td>
<td>Assembly of Kosovo declares independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Apr 29</td>
<td>SAA and Interim Agreement with Serbia signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Jul 21</td>
<td>Arrest of war crime indictee Radovan Karadžić</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Sep 9</td>
<td>SAA and Interim Agreement ratified by National Assembly of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Sep 15</td>
<td>Netherlands freezes SAA and trade part of SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Oct 30</td>
<td>The meeting of the Accession Conference for Croatia; 4 negotiation chapters provisionally closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Jan 1</td>
<td>Serbia implements Interim Trade Agreement with EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Oct 2</td>
<td>5 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Nov 27</td>
<td>3 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Dec 7</td>
<td>European Commission implements Interim Trade agreement with Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Dec 19</td>
<td>Visa-free regime for Serbia enters into Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Dec 21</td>
<td>2 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Dec 22</td>
<td>Serbia officially applies for EU membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Feb 1</td>
<td>Interim agreement with Serbia enters into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Feb 19</td>
<td>2 chapters opened for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Apr 19</td>
<td>1 chapter provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Jun 14</td>
<td>European Commission starts ratification of Serbia SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Jun 21</td>
<td>Spain ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Jun 30</td>
<td>Final 3 chapters opened for Croatia and 2 chapters closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Jul 6</td>
<td>Malta ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Jul 27</td>
<td>2 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Aug 12</td>
<td>Bulgaria ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Aug 19</td>
<td>Estonia ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Oct 25</td>
<td>European Council forwards Serbia's membership application to the European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Nov 5</td>
<td>6 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Nov 11</td>
<td>Slovakia ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Nov 16</td>
<td>Hungary ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Nov 26</td>
<td>Cyprus ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Dec 7</td>
<td>Slovenia ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Dec 8</td>
<td>Czech Republic ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Dec 22</td>
<td>3 chapters provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jan 6</td>
<td>Italy ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jan 13</td>
<td>Austria ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jan 19</td>
<td>European Parliament ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jan 21</td>
<td>Luxembourg ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011 Jan 26</td>
<td>Greece ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Feb 10</td>
<td>Germany ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Apr 19</td>
<td>2 chapters closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 May 26</td>
<td>Former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić arrested and later extradited to the Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jun 6</td>
<td>1 chapter provisionally closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jun 30</td>
<td>Final 4 chapters closed for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Jul 20</td>
<td>Final war crimes fugitive, Goran Hadžić, arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Oct 12</td>
<td>European Commission recommend Serbia to become a candidate country for European Union membership and to recommend that the country will be ready to start accession negotiations as soon as further good progress is made in one key area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Oct 26</td>
<td>Finland ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Nov 24</td>
<td>France ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Dec 1</td>
<td>European Parliament approves EU accession for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Dec 25</td>
<td>European Council approves EU accession for Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Jan 22</td>
<td>Referendum on Croatian EU membership: 66.27% of voters said YES for the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 1</td>
<td>Slovakia ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 13</td>
<td>Hungary ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 15</td>
<td>Italy ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 17</td>
<td>Bulgaria ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 28</td>
<td>General Affairs Council recommends granting Serbia candidate status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Mar 1</td>
<td>The European Council grants Serbia candidate status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Mar 5</td>
<td>Malta ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Mar 9</td>
<td>Croatia ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Mar 22</td>
<td>Latvia ratifies the Treaty of Croatia's Accession to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Apr 19</td>
<td>Romania ratifies Serbia's SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Apr 25</td>
<td>Czech Republic ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Apr 26</td>
<td>Lithuania ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 May 3</td>
<td>Cyprus ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Jun 19</td>
<td>Ireland ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Jun 26</td>
<td>Romania ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Jul 4</td>
<td>Austria ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Sep 12</td>
<td>Estonia ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Sep 14</td>
<td>Poland ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Sep 21</td>
<td>Portugal ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Oct 9</td>
<td>Luxembourg ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Oct 11</td>
<td>Spain ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Oct 31</td>
<td>Greece ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Nov 7</td>
<td>Sweden ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Dec 18</td>
<td>Finland ratifies Croatia’s Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Jan 15</td>
<td>French Senate Ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Jan 21</td>
<td>UK ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Jan 24</td>
<td>Belgium ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Mar 2</td>
<td>Netherlands ratifies Croatia's Accession Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


checklist-questions.


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