The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147
and the Protection of Congolese Civilians

By Danielle N. Allyn

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Approved by:

Advisor: Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Second Reader: Dr. Chérie Rivers Ndaliko
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Explanation of Acronyms

- **ADF**: Allied Democratic Forces
- **ADF-NALU**: ADF-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
- **ANC**: Congolese National Army (*Armée Nationale Congolaise*)
- **DDR**: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
- **DPKO**: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
- **DRC**: Democratic Republic of the Congo (*RDC, Republique democratique du Congo*)
- **CAN**: Community Action Network
- **CLO**: Civilian Liaison Officer
- **EU**: European Union
- **FAR**: Rwandan Defense Force (*Forces armées rwandaises*)
- **FARDC**: The Congolese armed forces (*Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo*)
- **FDLR**: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*)
- **FIB**: Force Intervention Brigade, established March 2013
- **FP**: Force Publique
- **ICGLR**: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
- **ICISS**: International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty
- **M-23**: March-23 Movement (*Movement du 23 Mars*)
- **MONUC**: United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo, 2000-2010
- **MONUSCO**: United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, 2010-present
- **ONUC**: UN Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964
- **PNC**: Congolese police force (*Police nationale congolaise*)
- **PSC**: Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (February 2013)
- **POC**: Protection of Civilians
- **R2P**: Responsibility to Protect
- **RCD-G**: Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma
- **UN**: United Nations
- **UNAMIR**: UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
- **UNAMID**: African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
- **UNDP**: United Nations Development Programme
- **UNHCR**: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
- **UNICEF**: United Nations Children’s Fund
- **UNMISS**: UN Mission in South Sudan
- **UNMIK**: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
- **UNSC**: United Nations Security Council
- **UNHCR**: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- **SADC**: Southern African Development Community
Chapter I: Introduction

They [United Nations staff] met with us to discuss their mission and what they were going to do for us. I told them that they don’t do anything. We were expecting them to bring peace but they didn’t. They promised to send the Interhamwe [Rwandan rebel militia] back to their homes but they didn’t. We live in insecurity, since they do not protect us.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) boasts a fourteen-year presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter, the DRC, the DR Congo, or “Congo”). The lives of many civilians in eastern Congo remain punctuated by episodes of violence and instability, often at the hands of foreign and Congolese rebel militias and, at times, as a result of human rights abuses by the Congolese police force (PNC) and military (Cakaj 2010, Oxfam 2014). The Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the exodus of Rwandan genocidaires into neighboring DRC served as a catalyst for Congo’s current instability (Nzongola 2014, BBC 2014). Though not the sole determinant of contemporary violence, the Rwandan refugee crisis exacerbated existing tensions in the Congo. In response to a mushrooming humanitarian crisis and international violation of Congolese sovereignty on the part of rebel militias the United Nations (UN) authorized the UN Organization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) in 2000. Throughout Congo’s contemporary history, a complex web of armed groups relied on local and regional political, economic, and military support to advance their aims in the country’s eastern regions, often with grave consequences for Congolese civilians (Bafilemba and Mueller 2013).

In 2010 the mission changed its name to the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect its objectives: “protect, stabilize, and consolidate peace” (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). In the spring of 2013, the UN Security Council (UNSC) significantly enhanced MONUSCO’s offensive capacity through issuing UNSC Resolution 2098, which created a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) charged with proactively neutralizing armed groups in eastern Congo. The resolution also identified civilian protection as the highest mission priority and granted MONUSCO the authority to use drone technology to monitor human rights abuses.
(UNSC 2013). This thesis surveys MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity as observed in June and July of 2014, fifteen months after the enactment of Resolution 2098.

The central question follows: to what extent has UNSC Resolution 2098 impacted MONUSCO’s capacity to protect Congolese civilians? In the opening text of this analysis, I included a statement from a Congolese community member, in which he laments the UN’s inability to deliver on its promises of peace in eastern Congo. Through literary analysis and qualitative interview data, I construct an argument to explain why Resolution 2098 failed to enhance the UN’s capacity to deliver the peace dividends of civilian protection to Congolese civilians in the fifteen months following its enactment.

Despite the robust legal gains of Resolutions 2098 and 2147, MONUSCO’s capacity to protect Congolese civilians remains limited internally through ambiguity in mandate interpretation, geographically irrational personnel deployment, and troop commitment. Additionally, two characteristics of the mission’s host-state collaboration pose barriers to its success: a preference for consultation with political elites to the exclusion of Congolese community members, and legally binding reliance on the presence of the Congolese military (FARDC).

MONUSCO serves as a crucial test case for the UN’s contemporary peacekeeping philosophy. The legacy of civilian protection as a peacekeeping doctrine in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) dates back to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-1964). Under the authority of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, ONUC became the largest UN peacekeeping operation of the Cold War era and the first operation to authorize the use of force by UN troops (Mansson 2005). According to Mansson, in the eyes of Hammarskjold, humanitarian concerns legitimated the use of force (Mansson 2005). Other analyses, however, depict the Secretary-General as reluctant to employ the UN authority to use force in the context of ONUC, given the ambiguity of a mission with neither a clearly defined
Chapter VI nor Chapter VII mandate.\(^1\) (Findlay 1999). The uncertainty of ONUC’s mandate, with respect to its use of force as peace enforcement, in many ways served to foreshadow the ambiguity that would dominate the mission mandates of MONUC and MONUSCO in the 21st century.

MONUSCO continues to evolve in concert with the evolution of UN peacekeeping philosophy. In the early 21st century, political and scholarly debate produced robust international political support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)\(^2\). R2P doctrine arose from scholarly critique of the failure of collective security in the final decade of the 21st century (ICISS 2001). The UN’s operations in the DR Congo present one of the first examples of this doctrine in practice, as evidenced by increasingly robust civilian protection mandates (Mansson 2005). It is the objective of my research, therefore, to evaluate the efficacy of MONUSCO in light of R2P doctrine. As support for R2P norms grew, the UN granted greater aggressive capacity to its Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC, 2000-2010). These developments took place in the context of waning support for absolute state sovereignty and increased international political mobilization around the ideals of human rights and civilian protection (Boutros-Ghali 1992, Mansson 2005, UNSC 2010, UNSC 2013).

In March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2098. This resolution remains significant not only for the primacy it places on civilian protection, but also because the document authorized the first-ever offensive battalion included in a UN force- the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The resolution also afforded MONUSCO the freedom to employ drone surveillance technology in order to monitor armed groups in the DRC and prevent human rights abuses by militias and the FARDC.

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1 Chapter VII of the UN charter permits a UN force to use “punitive measures” to impose its decisions. Chapter VII is often associated with “peace enforcement,” while Chapter VI concerns traditional peacekeeping (Findlay 1999).

2 According to the United Nations, R2P dictates that “Prevention requires apportioning responsibility to and promoting collaboration between concerned States and the international community. The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people” (UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 2014).
Four components comprise MONUSCO’s current mandate as given in UNSC Resolution 2098: the protection of civilians, the neutralization of armed groups, monitoring the illicit flow of arms across the DRC’s eastern border, and supporting Congolese and international judicial processes (UNSC 2013). In this thesis, I evaluate MONUSCO’s performance with respect to this first component: civilian protection. Following the post-Cold War emergence of R2P doctrine, support mounted for the protection of human rights as a legitimate objective of collective security arrangements such as the UN. After the end of the cold war, the United Nations and other international organizations became increasingly willing to intervene in intrastate conflicts in order to protect the rights of individual citizens (Barnett and Weiss 2008). This development marked a gradual departure from reliance on state sovereignty as the primary threshold for international intervention (Prendergast 2015, ICISS 2001). MONUSCO and its increasingly robust mandates reflect this change in international public opinion and may serve as a test case through which to evaluate the practical implementation of this new perspective on international peacekeeping. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2098 (March 2013) grants MONUSCO power to “use all means necessary” to protect civilians. UNSC Resolution 2147 (2014) additionally affirms MONUSCO’s capacity to offensively target militias and engage in preventative drone surveillance (UNSC 2014). To what extent has this watershed mandate, and the contingent creation of the FIB, impacted the mission’s capacity to protect civilians in South Kivu, DRC?

MONUSCO’s capacity remains limited in ways that constrain the impact of Resolutions 2098 and 2147. These limitations arise internally and through the ways in which the mission chooses to engage local actors. Internally, MONUSCO’s constraints lie in a lack of uniform standards for intervention and “civilian protection,” a geographic discrepancy between the

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3 During the first five decades of its existence, the UN relied primarily on state sovereignty as a threshold for peacekeeping intervention. The principle of state sovereignty dictates that state governments possess complete autonomy over affairs within their national borders, and may govern in any way they choose. While interstate violations of sovereignty necessitate intervention, under this principle intrastate conflict-conflict within states-remains outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations and other collective bodies (ICISS 2001).
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location of MONUSCO resources and the epicenter of Congo’s current conflict, and individual-level shortcomings among MONUSCO troops regarding skill and commitment. Additionally, in collaborating with the Congolese nation, MONUSCO’s continued preference for consultation with political elites at the expense of community inclusion limits the mission’s ability to respond to the needs of Congolese civilians. Collaboration also fails in areas in which Congolese military (FARDC) capacity hinders MONUSCO capacity in cases in which the two forces must legally cooperate in pursuit of armed groups.

This analysis provides a theoretical foundation for understanding international peacekeeping philosophy and the historical origins of today’s more aggressive approach to collective security. Historical analysis also details the development of conflict and instability in the DRC. An overview of colonial and contemporary contributors to the DR Congo’s current political situation provides context for understanding the conflict. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of contemporary peacekeeping ideology and of the origins of violence in Congo.

In Chapters 3 and 4, qualitative interviews provide the basis for the present argument: both internal and collaboration-level factors continue to limit MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity, despite increased authority and capacity afforded to the mission through Resolutions 2098 and 2147. Interviews include conversations with Congolese communities and UN staff (foreign and Congolese). A full description of interview methodology may be found at the conclusion of the present chapter, while interview scripts are included in the appendix.

**Evaluating MONUSCO: 3 Essential Contributors to Peacekeeping Success**

In his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identifies three criteria that he deems foundational for successful peacekeeping: a clear mission mandate, cooperation from local parties, and “buy-in” (operationalized as financial and troop contributions) on the part of UN member states (Boutros-Ghali 1992). My own research identifies Boutros-Ghali’s first two criteria--mandate clarity and local collaboration-- as
limitations to MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians. In the following chapters, I argue that
MONUSCO possesses the requisite financial and material resources to protect civilians in
eastern DRC. Boutros-Ghali’s conditions of mandate clarity and local cooperation, in contrast,
prove stumbling blocks for MONUSCO’s success.

With a personnel total of over 22,000 (including over 19,000 military personnel) and an
annual budget of $1,398,475,300, MONUSCO remains many respects the most robust UN
mission to date (MONUSCO 2015). In November 2013, facing a 3,000 strong FIB, the notorious
March-23 Movement (M-23) surrendered after a twenty-month campaign of terror, vowing to
henceforth pursue purely political means to redress grievances (Maphosa 2013). Given these
factors, it would seem that the UN and others are justified in heralding MONUSCO as a success
for the organization, for R2P, and for collective security as a whole.

MONUSCO possesses a discernable advantage in comparison to previous UN
deployments on the “international support” dimension. This is not to say that the international
community remains unwaveringly supportive (in rhetoric and in practice) of mission success,
but rather that observable progress continues to take place in this realm. In early summer 2013,
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry appointed former Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin to
serve as U.S. special envoy to the Great Lakes region, symbolizing increased commitment to the
DRC peace process on the part of the United States and building upon the appointment of UN
special envoy Mary Robinson in March of that year (Kerry 2013, Bachelet 2013, Myers 2013).
Feingold and Robinson’s positions are not novel, and in fact in the midst of the two Congo wars,
the European Union, the United States, and the U.S. each sent special envoys to the region
(Cayarannis 2009). These developments demonstrate shifting political will in favor of increased
international engagement with the DRC. Additionally, MONUSCO’s 19,000 troops and nearly
1.4 billion USD budget suggest that the mission has, on paper, earned the material support of the international community⁴ (MONUSCO 2015).

In March 2013, the UN afforded MONUSCO the most robust peacekeeping mandate to date. UNSC 2098 authorizes MONUSCO to “use all means necessary” to protect civilians in eastern DRC and even to actively seek out armed militias in the region for the purposes of neutralization. The resolution additionally provides for the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to undertake this new offensive role and allows the UN to use drone technology in DR Congo’s eastern provinces for surveillance and monitoring (UNSC 2013). This most recent mandate evolved from a history of more ambiguous, less robust resolutions on the part of the Security Council. Resolution 1291 (2000) authorized MONUSCO, then MONUC, to use “any action...it deemed within its capabilities” to protect civilians “under imminent threat of physical force” (UNSC 2000, emphasis added). UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003) authorized an Interim Multinational Force (IEMF)- comprised of EU troops- to intervene in eastern Congo following a surge in violence in Bunia in May 2003. The resolution permitted the use of force for civilian protection if the situation required such action (UNSC 2003). In her study of UNSC resolutions on the DR Congo from 2000-2006, Mansson asserts that the language of MONUC’s mandates grew stronger and included more explicit references to the protection of civilians over this period (Mansson 2006).

MONUSCO’s current mandate evolved over a 13-year period. UNSC 2098 is novel in the context of UN peacekeeping for both its clarity and provision for civilian protection. Research by Mansson (2006) demonstrates a trend in increasing clarity and potency for MONUC mandates during the period 2000-2005. Resolutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014) form the foundation

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⁴ In the context of this study, I repeatedly refer to the “international community” as it relates to a global community of nations epitomized by the UN. Two critiques of this specific language, however, necessitate acknowledgement: first, statistical realities dictate that in the UN and many other supranational institutions, a select cohort of wealthy nations exert considerable influence on decisions of global significance (Power 2015, Ferguson 2006, UNSC 2015). A second critique emerges from the history of the idea of an international community. One school of thought dates this concept to colonial-era quests to “civilize” the global South. The modern manifestation of this salvation mindset emerges in the idea that industrialized nations-the “global community”- possess a responsibility to “save” nations and individuals in the midst of conflict (Rieff 2002).
for MONUSCO’s current mandate and build upon this legacy of enhanced clarity and proactive aggression. However, Resolution 2098 (2013) and its successor, Resolution 2147 (2014) lack the clarity sufficient to ensure the uniform protection of civilians in eastern Congo. While MONUSCO does possess enhanced legal authority through which to intervene militarily on behalf of noncombatants, the absence of institutionalized standards for intervention leaves too much to the interpretation of individual UN troops. The end result of this dilemma is that troops often fail to intervene in situations in which Congolese civilians feel that such intervention may be justified (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). Chapter 3 contains a full analysis of MONUSCO’s problems with intervention clarity.

Despite measurable improvement in buy-in from the international community, coordination with local institutions also remains an area of concern in the DRC. It is for this reason that my evaluation renders MONUSCO’s success acutely limited. In particular, avenues for information-sharing and joint operations between the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO are often not exploited (Cakaj 2010). In calling upon MONUSCO to take all means necessary to protect civilians, the UNSC likewise mandates that the mission should

> “Work with the Government of the DRC to identify threats to civilians and Implement existing response plans to ensure the protection of civilians from abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children” (UNSC 2013, p.7).

The failure of the UN to work collaboratively with the Congolese state in an effort to protect civilians is attributable to both minimal state presence and capacity in DR Congo’s eastern regions and to a lack of cohesive integration within the UN mission itself (Brahimi 2000, Maphosa 2013, Cakaj 2010). This research additionally identifies poor collaborative priorities-defined as favoring consultation with political elites above engagement with Congolese communities-as a significant shortcoming in MONUSCO’s current operating model (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). Boutros-Ghali, writing in An Agenda
for Peace, affirms that peacekeeping is most effective at the invitation of the state in question (Boutros-Ghali 1992). If MONUSCO is to truly exemplify the ideals of R2P for the benefit of Congolese civilians, concerted effort must be made by the UN to enlist the support of the Congolese state and Congolese communities more broadly.

**Methodology**

This study focuses on qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with community members from Kalehe, a village in South Kivu, DRC. In addition to these community representatives, I also interview current and former employees of MONUSCO in Bukavu, South Kivu, DRC. Interviews took place during the months of June and July 2014. Through interviewing both UN personnel and Congolese civilians, my aim is to construct a comprehensive picture of MONUSCO’s progress with regard to civilian protection. Qualitative data obtained through interviews provide insight into the perception that both UN personnel and Congolese citizens have of MONUSCO’s effectiveness and may shed light on the ways the mission is impacting local populations in less quantifiably discernable ways.

In conducting interviews, I use March 2013 as a benchmark for measuring progress, attempting to gauge whether UN staff and Congolese community members report any change in MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians in South Kivu province.

Through assessing personal interviews, I shed light on several crucial contributors to MONUSCO’s limited performance that are not readily identifiable within the confines of statistical data. Interview data reveal that MONUSCO’s progress toward efficient civilian protection remains limited by both internal constraints and constraints experienced in the context of host-country collaboration. Internal constraints include a lack of uniform standards

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5 Hereafter, I refer to community member respondents as either “community members” or “community representatives” to signify their role in my study in representing the perspectives of local residents in Kalehe. In Chapter 4, I draw a primary distinction between these “community members” and Congolese political elites. Community respondents were not screened for membership in any formal community or non-governmental organization.
for intervention, a mismatch in the geographic distribution of MONUSCO resources relative to the concentration of violence, and shortcomings in individual troop quality and commitment. Regarding the mission’s capacity to work in tandem with the Congolese state, MONUSCO consistently prioritizes elite-level political collaboration over inclusive consultation with Congolese community members. Additionally, a lack of capacity within the FARDC serves to limit MONUSCO’s ability to protect local civilians, particularly in cases where the mission may not legally operate independently of the Congolese military.

This study draws from a series of fourteen interviews conducted in South Kivu province, DRC. These interviews consist of conversations with nine community members from Kalehe, a village in South Kivu province, as well as six interviews with UN personnel based in Bukavu, South Kivu, DRC.

To identify suitable interview subjects, I used snowball sampling methodology, relying on local key informants to provide appropriate contacts. The numerical discrepancy between community members and UN personnel reflects the nature of the sampling method used and is not a component of research design. Interviews ranged from thirty minutes to one hour in duration, and consisted of twelve or thirteen open-ended questions for UN personnel and community representatives, respectively. Interview questions served to situate each individual in the context of his or her relationship to MONUSCO and the civilian population in South Kivu province, and to assess each subject’s perception of MONUSCO’s effectiveness in protecting Congolese civilians. Questions give special attention to Resolution 2098 (2013) as a marker of time. Following a discussion of each participant’s understanding of the mission’s mandate as defined in Resolution 2098, participations reflect on the mission’s efficacy both before and after the enactment of this resolution. At the conclusion of each interview, participants elaborated on any insights not addressed in the preceding questions. A copy of each interview script is included in the appendix. I recorded each interview session with the use of audio recording
technology. Interview participants chose to participate in recorded interviews or to opt out of audio recording, in which transcriptions consisted of hand-written notes. Two interview respondents chose not to participate in audio recording. Written consent forms included an option to opt out of audio recording. Interviews were conducted in English for all UN personnel. For community interviews, I employed a professional translator to facilitate communication in Kiswahili, French, and Maashi. Copies of written consent forms and interview scripts were available to participants in Kiswahili, French, and English.

While semi-structured interviews offer depth and insight not always present in quantitative research, the methodology employed in this study is limited in several important ways. First, the short-term nature of my fieldwork inhibited the establishment of a rapport with interview respondents, thus potentially precluding full and honest disclosure. Second, my identity as an American university student and researcher complicated the development of a trust relationship with Congolese participants. In the context of this dynamic, Congolese respondents may have perceived an incentive to respond in a manner desirable to a Western audience. Finally, while I employed the services of a professional Congolese translator, interviews conducted in multiple languages inevitably pose a risk of misinterpretation and the loss of nuance.

**MONUSCO: An Experiment in Aggressive Peace Keeping**

MONUSCO’s current presence in the DRC dates to February 2000, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of the UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) to implement the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, which brought a formal end to the Second Congo War. Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe signed the agreement (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999). The UNSC gave MONUC a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing UN troops to use force, to the extent permitted by UN capabilities, to protect civilians in the DRC (Mansson 2005). In a detailed analysis of UNSC resolutions from 2000 to 2004, human rights
researcher Katarina Mansson provides compelling evidence for the increasing influence of human rights and civilian protection concerns on mandates given to UN missions (Mansson 2005). This progression toward a broader understanding of intervention culminated in March 2013 with the authorization of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) under the umbrella of MONUSCO. The FIB’s mandate broke new ground in affording UN troops unprecedented offensive capacity to neutralize armed groups in eastern DR Congo (Nkusi 2013, UNSC 2013).

**The UN in the 1990s: A New Era of Conflict**

In order to understand the political climate that laid the groundwork for MONUSCO in its current state, one must understand the crisis of credibility confronting UN peacekeeping in the immediate post-Cold War period. In 1945, 51 nations signed the Charter of the United Nations (UN), pledging to never again let the world fall victim to the “scourge of war” (Brahimi 2000, United Nations 2011). Between 1945 and 1990, the international community witnessed 100 major conflicts resulting in the loss of 20 million lives. During this time, the UNSC vetoed 279 proposed missions (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In 1993, anarchy triumphed in Somalia as ineffective strategy implementation limited UN success (ICISS 2001). In the spring of 1994, government-backed *Interhamwe* forces slaughtered nearly one million Rwandan civilians as a Security Council resolution reduced the troop size of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,548 to 270 military personnel (United Nations 1997, Dallaire 2004). While a post-Cold War UN proved increasingly willing to intervene in intrastate conflicts, few if any of these interventions brought about the realization of peace (Barnett and Weiss 2008, Bratt 1996).

The immediate post-Cold War period brought about a heightened sense of optimism in the West concerning the UN’s ability to protect against the “scourge of war” and about the prospects of collective action more broadly (Boutros-Ghali 1992, ICISS 2001). By the turn of the 21st century, however, the failures of Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Bosnia caused many to question the efficacy of the UN as a mechanism for collective security (ICISS 2001). Faced with a
crisis of credibility, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-level panel, chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Brahimi to evaluate the status of UN peace keeping (Brahimi 2000). As the UN scrambled to respond to international criticism, momentum built globally for an emerging peacekeeping doctrine referred to as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Debates arose in attempt to strike the proper balance between state sovereignty, on the one hand, and intervention on the basis of grave human rights violations, on the other, in the face of violent conflict. Growing consensus affirmed the purpose of the UN and other collective bodies as guardians of the rights of individual citizens, rather than as merely trustees of international peace and security (ICISS 2001, International Institute of Peace 2014). Though R2P failed to garner acceptance as a legally binding construct, its implicit implications for UN peacekeeping continue to impact the organization’s approach to intervention. Over the past decade, the UN sought to “mainstream” human rights concerns, giving the goal of intrastate civilian protection a place at the table, so to speak, with traditional concern for interstate security and stability (Mansson 2005).

**Human Rights and International Intervention in the DRC: Historical Considerations**

The issue of civilian protection is particularly poignant in the DR Congo, given the nation’s history of exploitation at the hands of external “meddlers.” The Congo basin’s rich natural wealth has long been the product of envy, both on the part of its immediate neighbors and on the part of oppressive colonial subjugators (Hochschild 1998). King Leopold II of Belgium first subjected the nation to such abuse in the late 19th century, when he cunningly obtained the DRC as his own personal territory and proceeded to enslave Congolese civilians, forcing them to procure rubber under threat of murder, rape, and torture. The transfer of Congolese territory from Leopold’s private property into a Belgian colonial possession did little to halt the oppression of the native Congolese (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002). Competition
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for the nation’s resources continued through the 20th century, culminating in the First and Second Congo Wars (Lusaka Agreement 1999). Today, over forty armed groups remain in eastern DRC, pillaging Congo of its resources, with disastrous consequences in the form of civilian casualties and human rights violations (Maphosa 2013). In this context, the effective realization of R2P on the part of MONUSCO remains imperative. The United Nations has a responsibility to protect the DRC from this recurrent “scourge of war.”
Chapter II: MONUSCO and International Peacekeeping Philosophy

Prior to the defeat of the March 23 Movement (M-23) rebel militia in the fall of 2013, media critics and even the UN itself cited MONUSCO as one of the most ineffective peacekeeping forces in the world (Tull 2009, England 2005). Others point out, however, that UN failure in the Great Lakes region, and in the DRC in particular, is partially attributable to the complex political and physical geography of the country (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013, Tull 2009). In fact, Tull (2009) identifies conflict in the DR Congo, by global comparison, as a political environment extraordinarily resistant to peacekeeping (Tull 2009). Tull assesses that the high number of warring factions, the presence of an ongoing (versus a resolved) conflict, the existence of natural resource wealth as a profit source for competing parties (regional and global), the weakness of state institutions, and frequent territorial incursions by neighboring states each contribute to the political volatility of the region (Tull 2009, BBC 2014).

In order to draw any valid conclusions regarding MONUSCO’s efforts to protect Congolese civilians, one must first understand both the historical context for conflict in DR Congo and the evolution of UN peacekeeping philosophy. In what follows, I describe the particular progression of UN peacekeeping philosophy from a nation-centered doctrine to one of increasing concern for individual rights. Additionally, I draw upon Congolese and international scholarship to present the contemporary conflict in the DRC through a historical framework. After laying the groundwork for an understanding of UN peacekeeping, more generally, and UN peacekeeping in the DRC, in particular, I provide commentary on the current state of affairs in eastern Congo. Finally, I review arguments on peacekeeping evaluation, using indicators described in peacekeeping scholarship to evaluate UN operations in DR Congo. This theoretical foundation serves as the framework through which I assess MONUSCO’s progress in terms of civilian protection capacity in the 1.5 years between the enactment of UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013) and the time of data collection (June-July 2014). Interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff aim to answer the following question, as indicated in Chapter
1: to what extent did the enactment of UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) impact MONUSCO’s ability to protect Congolese civilians in the months between March 2013 and July 2014?

**The Evolution of Western Peacekeeping Philosophy**

As the Second World War came to a close, the signatories of the UN charter vowed to never again let humankind fall victim to the “scourge of war” (Simma 1994). This optimism was in fact short-lived. The realities of Cold War geopolitics tainted the international idealism of collective security: between 1945 and 1988, the UNSC only authorized 13 peacekeeping operations (Bratt 1996). 20 million lives were lost during the 100 major conflicts that took place during these four decades (Boutros-Ghali 1992). With the thawing of relations between the East and West, many Westerners looked upon the UN with renewed optimism, confident that in this environment of cooperation the organization could finally realize the aims set forth in its 1945 Charter. In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), former UN-Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali summarizes this ubiquitous optimism:

> “In these past months the conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter- a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 1).

It remains imperative to note, however, that such notions of Cold War era peace and post-Cold War optimism reflect a uniquely Western view of international conflict. As David Rieff notes in *A Bed for the Night* (2002),

> “In this sense, Immanuel Kant’s dream of a world of states in which perpetual peace reigned, while hardly the norm anywhere else in the world, has become part of the political DNA of the West. And so the gap widens between this Western world, in which the primacy of individual rights is taken for granted and in which peace is assumed to be the natural state of things, and that huge part of the world in which war is either an everyday reality or a looming threat.” (Rieff 2002, p. 50).
Global Conflict in a Changing World

As the world entered the final decade of the twentieth century, illusions of post-Cold War harmony shattered as conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa threatened notions of global peace and security as understood by the affluent West. While world peace remained elusive, by 1990 the nature of large-scale violence had begun to change. Writing for *Foreign Policy* in 2011, Joshua Goldstein argues that the interstate wars that defined much of the twentieth century, gave way to “asymmetric guerilla warfare” with the arrival of the new millennium (Goldstein 2011). Eriksson and Wallenstein (2004) echo Goldstein’s argument about the changing nature of conflict: the authors demonstrate that of the 116 active conflicts in the 1989-2003 period, only seven involved nation states warring against one another (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004).

During the post-Cold War period, states and sub-state actors perpetrated violence against their own citizens with increasing frequency, and traditional interstate wars became an exception rather than the rule. This new paradigm for large-scale violence presented an opportunity for the UN to provide collective security uninhibited by the ideological stalemates of the preceding decades (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Goldstein refers to the early 1990s as the “boom years” for UN peacekeeping. 1991-1993 witnessed the authorization of fifteen new peacekeeping missions-two more missions than the UNSC authorized during the entire Cold War era (Goldstein 2011).

Crisis of Credibility: the Early 1990s

Unfortunately for the United Nations, achieving the objectives of the Charter proved unattainably difficult during these “boom years.” In the Horn of Africa, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) failed to fulfill its mandate of “establishing throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance” during a regional famine (Bratt 1996, UNSC 1993, p. 4). At the time of the UN’s exodus from the country in the summer of
1993, cholera and starvation still ran rampant, and peacekeepers found themselves embroiled in a civil war (Bratt 1996). The public massacre of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu in June 1993 further highlighted UNOSOM’s failures and cemented Western aversion to peacekeeping for the remainder of the decade (Bratt 1996, Goldstein 2011, Power 2013, Dallaire 2004).

In the mid-1990s, a crisis of credibility began to undermine public confidence in the UN. The impetus for this plummeting popular legitimacy largely dates to the performance of the UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN arrived in Rwanda—a small central African nation about the size of Maryland—in 1993 to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords, a peace deal ostensibly marking the conclusion of a three year civil war between the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel army comprised largely of exiled Rwandan Tutsi (Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a). On the evening of April 6, the plane carrying Rwanda’s moderate Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down. Immediately following the assassination, the presidential guard and radical Hutu militias known as the Interhamwe began indiscriminately executing Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a). Refusing to heed Canadian General Romeo Dallaire’s warnings of impending political violence, the United Nations reduced UNAMIR’s personnel to a mere 270 troops. Given that the mission’s mandate never moved beyond Chapter VI, UN protocol prohibited these 270 troops from intervening forcefully on behalf of Rwandan civilians (Dallaire 2004, BBC 2014). Over the next three months, the Interhamwe and the Forces armées rwandaises (FAR), the Rwandan national army, succeeded in massacring civilian men, women, and children at rate of killing three times that of the Holocaust (Dallaire 2004, Nzongola 2014a). The Rwandan genocide occurred in the context of an ongoing civil war, in which both the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-a Tutsi rebel militia led by Paul Kagame-and Hutu extremists bore responsibility for committing indiscriminate acts of violence against civilians. Following the victory of the RPF in July 1994 and Paul Kagame’s assumption of power, an influx of Hutu
refugees poured into eastern Congo. This migration included both perpetrators of genocide and Hutus who chose not to participate, but who nevertheless feared what the hypothetical imposition of “victor’s justice” might mean for their chances of survival in the new Rwanda (BBC 2014, Umutesi 2004).

**Peacekeeping in the 21st Century: Evaluation, Debate and Reform**

The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide generated consequences both for the development of civilian-centered peacekeeping philosophy and for regional peace and stability in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. I will speak more specifically on conflict in the Great Lakes region at the conclusion of this chapter. In what follows, I explain how Rwanda, together with the UN’s other boom-era failures, sparked a decade of debate and dialogue on the objectives of international peacekeeping in the 21st century.

The UN as an institution did not emerge unscathed from the early 1990s, and this fact did not escape leadership within the organization. In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-level panel to conduct a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations. Former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi chaired the panel and produced the sweeping Brahimi Report (Brahimi 2000). The report identified many arenas in which the UN preformed unsatisfactorily, including recruitment and retention of skilled personnel, technological innovation, rapid deployment capacity, mandate clarity, and organizational cohesion (Brahimi 2000). While the report leveraged a pointed critique at the UN’s internal structure, the commission also attempted to shift some of its boom-era guilt to the international community. In a final section of the report entitled “Challenges to Implementation,” the commission states,

“Member states must recognize that the United Nations is the sum of its parts and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies with them” (Brahimi 2000, p. 44).
The report continues to denounce the actions of the international community, and of the five permanent members of the security in particular. Brahimi writes,

“[The] Security Council and Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as they failed…” (Brahimi 2000, p. 44).

Brahimi’s pointed critique of UN member states appears justified in the context of the campaign against proactive UN engagement in Rwanda—a campaign led by the United States and championed by much of the Western world (Brahimi 2000, Dallaire 2004, Power 2013, Stearns 2011).

**Breaking New Ground: the “Responsibility to Protect”**

Where the Brahimi commission’s recommendations centered on structural shortcomings within the UN and ambivalence within the world community, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) contested that the problem with international peacekeeping lay not within substandard organizational capacity but with the UN’s failure to adapt to the changing dynamics of international violence in the twenty-first century (ICISS 2001, Goldstein 2011). In this groundbreaking report, the commission attempted to challenge contemporary peacekeeping frameworks, which held state sovereignty as a sacred truth. Where others argued that the intervention of UN peacekeepers violated the territorial and political sovereignty of nation-states, the report presented state sovereignty and collective security as complementary constructs. The commission found that each state bore the primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens. In the event that a state proved unable or unwilling to carry out this duty, however, it became the duty of the international community to provide the state in question with the support necessary to protect the rights of individuals within its borders (ICISS 2001). This new doctrine, henceforth referred to in international relations as the “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P, evolved logically from the UN’s disappointing boom-era performance as a global protector of civilians (ICISS 2001, Bratt 1996). In a world in
which an increasing percentage of civilians suffer atrocities at the hands of their own
governments or non-state actors, ICISS advocates for a paradigm shift in peacekeeping
(Goldstein 2011). According to R2P, the responsibility of UN peacekeepers extends beyond
interstate conflict resolution to the protection of individual civilians (ICISS 2001). Though R2P
never attained de jure legal status, it is increasingly employed as a de facto standard used to
advocate for the authorization of new missions and to evaluate existing operations (Oatley
2013). Reflective of mounting international support for R2P, the UN established an Expert
Group on the Protection of Civilians in 2009. The group reports periodically to the UNSC on the
impact of conflict on civilians in areas in which the UN supports active peacekeeping missions
(International Institute of Peace 2014).

In summary, at the turn of the 21st century, mounting global discontent caused the UN to
undertake a comprehensive evaluation of its peacekeeping operations. At the same time, parallel
momentum built for R2P and a rejection of orthodox conceptions of peacekeeping in favor of a
collective security subservient to the rights of individual citizens. The UNSC authorized its
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) in 1999, in the midst of this dialogue regarding the purpose
and performance of peacekeeping operations (Nzongola 2014a). Thus, two factors—shifting
peacekeeping paradigms and the complex political situation characterizing the Great Lakes
region of Africa—continue to interact to produce an unprecedented and perpetually evolving
dilemma for the UN in DR Congo. The marriage of R2P norms with a complex political dynamic
creates a situation in which the UN is increasingly expected to protect Congolese civilians in a
challenging environment that is often physically and politically not conducive to robust
peacekeeping operations. Having briefly addressed turn-of-the-century epoch of peacekeeping
debate and reform, I now provide a concise historical account of the contemporary conflict in
eastern DRC.
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide and Instability in the Great Lakes Region

Rwanda’s tragic three-month genocide in 1994 continues to pose consequences extending beyond this short time period and beyond national borders. An influx of armed Rwandan *genocidaires* into eastern Congo may be traced to the conclusion of the genocide and the assumption of power by the RPF (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2014a, BBC 2014). In the summer of 1994, DR Congo absorbed an influx of 1.5 million Rwandan refugees, including hundreds of thousands of armed Hutu extremists, in camps near Goma and Bukavu, DRC (Nzongola 2014a, BBC 2014). Congolese citizens cite the presence of the Forces Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (*FDLR*) in particular as a key obstruction to regional peace. Formed in 2000 by a coalition of former *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and *Interhamwe* militants, the FDLR today largely targets ethnic Tutsi civilians in Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces. An estimated 1,500 to 2,000 remaining forces make the FDLR the single largest illegal armed group remaining in eastern Congo today (MONUSCO 2014, Radio Okapi 2014b).

The role of regional actors- Rwanda and Uganda- in perpetuating instability in eastern Congo remains robust (BBC 2014). Though I will later explain these Rwandan and Ugandan incursions in greater detail, a basic understanding of Congolese history is necessary to develop a complete picture of the factors that coalesced at the turn of the 21st century to make the Congo vulnerable to foreign invasion. These factors may be traced to colonial exploitation at the hands of the Belgian state, neocolonial strategies executed by the UN, the U.S., and Belgium to prevent the realization of a unified Congolese democracy, poor governance by an autocratic kleptocracy following independence (De Witte 2001, Haviv 2015). These sources of Congolese state decay are discussed in the following sections.

Belgian Colonialism in the Congo

In the nineteenth century, Congo’s story of incorporation into the global political and economic system began as a narrative of exploitation at the hands of a Western external
“meddler”- namely, Belgium (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002). The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses impressive natural wealth in forest resources, hydropower, and minerals. Opportunistic “investors” across the decades coveted (and continue to covet) Congo’s uranium (a precious Cold War-era commodity used in nuclear weaponry), tantalum (an essential mineral in consumer electronics products), and gold, among many other minerals (Nzongola 2002). In one of the bleakest tragic ironies of modern society, the citizens of DR Congo, among the poorest people in the world, continue to be the victims rather than the beneficiaries of their nation’s wealth (Nzongola 2002).

King Leopold II of Belgium established the Congo Free State (CFS) as his own personal possession in 1885, and proceeded to institutionalize the pillage of the Congo basin (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002). In 1908, colonial authority transferred from Leopold to the Belgian state, while exploitation continued. In 1921, the Belgian minister for colonial affairs stated frankly that Belgium’s Congo colony existed primarily to “develop the economic action of Belgium” (Franck 1921). Beginning in 1891, CFS law mandated that Congolese men and women supply the state with daily quotas of rubber and ivory. Leopold additionally subjected citizens to periods of forced servitude. Colonial administrators used public punishment- torture by the chicotte, or whip, in addition to rape and murder- to enforce quota fulfillment (Nzongola 2002).

**Toward an Independent Congo: Patrice Lumumba and Congolese Nationalism**

In *Lumumba Speaks*, Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s first Prime Minister, describes his nation’s independence struggle as one of the most rapid transfers of power on the whole of the African continent (Lumumba 1958-1960). Lumumba believed wholeheartedly in a strong, unified, and independent Congo structured to economically and politically benefit all Congolese, and he extended an invitation to Belgium and other international “friends of the Congo” to support the newly independent nation in this effort (Lumumba 1958-1960). Belgium, however, sought to maintain a neocolonial relationship with its former colony. Belgium’s ideal Congo
differed markedly from Lumumba’s, and included regional divisions, positions of influence for stalwart colonial administrators, and puppet figures content to preserve Belgian interests and reject Congolese nationalism in favor of concessions from Brussels (De Witte 2001). In the weeks and months following independence, Belgian officials began to recognize that Patrice Lumumba did not fit into their neocolonial portrait of a liberated Congo. As 1960 neared a close, Brussels undertook to eliminate Congo’s independence hero, with the active support of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the United States Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA (Nzongola 2014b, De Witte 2001).

1960-1964: Crisis in the Congo and ONUC Complicity


In response to the mutiny, Belgium deployed troops to its former colony, occupying the mineral-rich territory of Katanga. On July 11, 1960, Moise Tshombe declared Katanga province independent, making himself its first president. Congolese and Belgian scholars depict Tshombe as a “puppet” of Brussels who played into the Belgian desire to sustain neocolonial influence in the Congo through a “divide and rule” strategy (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001). In response to
the crisis in Katanga, Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the UN for support. In his tribute to Lumumba in *Toward An African Revolution*, independence activist and pan-Africanist Frantz Fanon cites this as Lumumba’s grand mistake (Fanon 1969). Lumumba intended for the UN to leverage its international legitimacy to stop Belgium’s attack on Congolese sovereignty. Instead, ONUC prolonged Belgian troop presence in Katanga in the name of “law and order” and later actively participated in Lumumba’s assassination and the Western-sponsored coup led by Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2014b, Nzongola 2002).

**Kleptocracy and State Decline: Mobutu’s Congo**

Joseph Mobutu came to power in 1965, following several years of chaotic post-independence political struggles and neocolonial schemes perpetrated by the UN, Belgium, and the United States (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2014b). At one time endorsed by the Congolese people for the semblance of stability he brought to the country, Mobutu’s popularity declined steadily from 1975, reaching a low point during the final seven years of his reign (1990-1997), as the ruler proved unable to survive the onslaught of political opposition that came with the country’s embrace of multi-party democracy. Scholars of Congolese history and politics accurately refer to Mobutu as a kleptocratic despot (Nzongola 2002).

In 1996, the Congolese government’s budget totaled $300 million US, an amount comparable to the budget of a single U.S. university (Nzongola 2002). Rather than fueling equitable development, infrastructure, and necessary social services such as education and healthcare, under Mobutu’s rule state resources served primarily to line the pockets of Mobutu and his inner circle of friends and relatives (Nzongola 2002). In fact, the term “kleptocracy” arose as a mechanism for describing financially predatory autocracies, in direct response to Mobutu’s reign, and estimates suggest that he stole $12 billion US in a period of 32 years (Haviv 2015, Denny 2004). In Mobutu’s Congo, corruption and mediocrity remained normative
qualities among government personnel. Fearful of any credible threat to his rule, the kleptocrat routinely shuffled administrative posts and fired promising young officers from the state military. Additionally, during the despot’s three decades of rule, the state maintained no less than seven paramilitary organizations, each with blurred and often overlapping mandates. By pitting these forces against one another, Mobutu afforded his soldiers the capacity to silence dissent while ensuring that no one officer or unit could realistically challenge his rule. The security sector under Mobutu remained unfit to defend the nation, as opportunistic senior commanders frequently pocketed the salaries of rank-and-file soldiers. These lower-ranking personnel, desperate to earn a living, took to looting, raping, and extorting money from Congolese civilians (Nzongola 2002, Enough 2010, Evele 2015). In a climate of corruption and desperation, Mobutu’s rule sowed the seeds of state decay through systematically inhibiting the professionalization of the armed forces (Nzongola 2002, Enough 2010).

Though Mobutu’s military strategy certainly limited the development of a professional Congolese defense force, the issues plaguing the nation’s military did not originate with President Mobutu. During the colonial era, King Leopold II created the *Force Publique* (FP) to seize control of Congolese territory and subjugate, enslave and oppress Congolese civilians (Hochschild 1998, De Witte 2001, Lumumba 1961). Forced conscription in the FP, in addition to other forms of forced labor, formed a pillar of Belgium’s colonial domination (Hochschild 1998, Lumumba 1961). Immediately following independence on June 30 1960, Belgian military officers attempted to forcibly retain their colonial-era power, sowing seeds of unrest that would usher in the UN’s first intervention in the Congo (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001).

Throughout the Cold War period, Mobutu remained in the good graces of the United States; a reliable “strongman” far preferable to the less controllable, less predictable Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (Lumumba 1961, Nzongola 2014b, De Witte 2001). U.S. officials perceived Lumumba’s staunch non-alignment philosophy as a threat to capitalism and democracy in Central and Southern Africa. The U.S. thus retained an interest in limiting the true

The withdrawal of U.S. financial and military bilateral aid to the Congo in 1990, corresponding to the fall of the Soviet Union and the thawing of Cold War bipolarity, left Mobutu bereft of international support and unable to sustain his institutionalized thievery. During the 1990s, public opinion fell to such a low that Mobutu could no longer walk freely in Kinshasa for fear of violent protest (Nzongola 2002). Internal political discontent offered Rwanda the perfect opportunity to violate the territorial sovereignty of the Congo.

This section draws attention to Mobutu’s governance as a contributor to state weakness and is not an attempt to analytically chronicle his thirty-year rule. Nzongola-Ntalaja’s The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (2002) provides more informative analysis on the Mobutu presidency and its implications for the Congolese people.

The 2 Congo Wars and International Intervention in DR Congo

In 1994, Hutu extremist refugees, many former leaders within the Interhamwe and the FAR, began using camps in North and South Kivu to launch targeted attacks against the RPF regime in Rwanda. In the eyes of these genocidaires, the civil war with the RPF had yet to witness a conclusion and Rwanda would one day again be theirs (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2014a, Bafilemba and Mueller 2013). The RPF, now at the helm of leadership in Kigali, sought to end these incursions by extremist Hutu refugees. The party identified Laurent Kabila, a longtime critic of the Mobutu regime, to be the Congolese face of the foreign-sponsored rebellion.

In analyzing Congo’s two contemporary wars and the nation’s current political situation, I rely heavily on the work of Jason Stearns and Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja. Stearns, Congo analyst at New York University (NYU) and former MONUC employee, boasts over a decade of experience working in advocacy and research in eastern Congo. Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja is
a Congolese political scientist and scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-Chapel Hill) and has authored numerous books on the contemporary and historical underpinnings of conflict in the Congo.

In his analysis of the two Congo wars, Stearns (2011) dismisses Kabila as, in the eyes of the Congolese, an aging leader with Marxist sympathies whose plans for governance were out-of-touch with Congo’s realities. Nzongola and Stearns agree that Kabila’s fall from the graces of his international backers in Kigali and Kampala, and not the dissatisfaction of Congolese civilians, prompted the second Congo war (Nzongola 2006, Stearns 2011).

Rwanda and Uganda spent a great deal of time attempting to convince Congolese citizens that a laundry list of foreign-sponsored rebel militias were in fact authentically Congolese. Over the course of the two Congo wars and the eleven years of unstable “peace” which followed the conclusion of the second Congo war in 2003, Rwanda maintained tutelage over several independent rebel militias in eastern Congo, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-G), the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). Uganda’s proxies during this period included the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Kisangani (RCD-K), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML), and the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). While Congolese citizens shared with these foreign invaders distaste for Mobutuist rule, in reality “Congolese liberation” and concerns over national security offered an attractive façade through which to disguise the economic plunder of eastern Congo (Nzongola 2014a, Stearns 2011, Committee on International Relations 2000). Between 1999 and 2000, several minor conflicts erupted within the Congo between Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers over access to the gold and diamond trade in Kisangani (Nzongola 2014, Stearns 2011).

In a pan-African alliance led by Rwanda, foreign-sponsored rebels succeeded in toppling Mobutu in 1997. Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed control of DR Congo but lacked the popular
legitimacy to govern with authority. This propelled the leader into paranoia, and he began systematically disposing of his former Rwandan allies. Kigali was predictably indignant at this turn of events, and thus the second Congo war began in 1998. This conflict, again riddled with Rwandan and Ugandan proxies and their Western allies, would last for the next five years (BBC 2014). The assassination of Laurent Kabila propelled his son, Joseph Kabila, to power, though again through an undemocratic and opaque process (Stearns 2011). In 2006, Kabila would go on to win the country’s first democratic elections since 1965. Western observers praised the 2006 elections as success story for MONUC. This assessment notwithstanding, under Kabila’s rule peace and prosperity continue to evade the country (Nzongola 2014, Tull 2009).

Tull (2009) explains that, as in other peacekeeping operations, MONUC personnel viewed the provision of free and fair elections as a foundational benchmark for peace. During the election period in 2006, the European Union provided 1,500 troops to assist MONUC in electoral monitoring. Tull cites the electoral process as a landmark achievement for MONUC, referencing only limited outbreaks of election-related violence and the registration of 25 million (out of an eligible 28 million) Congolese voters (Tull 2009). Tull’s categorization of the 2006 process as a notable success for MONUC, ignores the fact that the political preferences of the Congolese electorate during this period in fact favored Jean-Pierre Bemba, a wealthy politician from Équateur province. Contrary to Congolese public opinion, Joseph Kabila triumphed in the 2006 elections, an outcome suggestive of an imperfect electoral process (Stearns 2011).

Both Rwanda and Uganda enjoyed preferential relationships with the West due to their cooperation with anti-terrorism initiatives and, in the case of Rwanda, due to the West’s “genocide guilt” (Nzongola 2014a, Beswick 2010, Reyntjens 2011, BBC 2014). Warm bilateral relations with the United States and other Western powers enabled the two Great Lakes nations to present the conflict as exclusively civil in nature and motivated by indigenous aspirations for democracy (Stearns 2011). Nzongola (2014a) refutes these claims in the context of Rwandan and Ugandan violations of Congolese sovereignty during both the first and second Congo wars. In so
The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the Protection of Congolese Civilians

doing, Nzongola irrefutably establishes the regional nature of Congo’s contemporary crisis. Rwanda and Uganda used Pan-Africanism, democratization, and security concerns in turn to justify armed intervention in the Congo, while the international community feigned ignorance and refused to abandon the “civil war” label for Congo’s dilemma (Nzongola 2002, Nzongola 2014a, Stearns 2011). Though the second war formally concluded in 2003, violence and instability continued even after the country’s groundbreaking democratic elections in 2006 (Tull 2009).

MONUC, MONUSCO and the FIB: UN Operations in DRC

The UN launched its Operation in the DR Congo (MONUC) in the midst of the second Congo war. The UNSC authorized the deployment of a limited number of military and civilian observers to the region in April 1999 (UNSC 1999). Nearly a year later, in February 2000, the Council authorized a peacekeeping force of 5,537, to include 500 military observers. Resolution 1291 tasked MONUC with overseeing the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement (UNSC 2000). In an analysis of UNSC resolutions from 1999 until 2005, Katarina Mansson reasons that the increasing latitude afforded to MONUC with (respect to the use of force) enabled peacekeeping troops to make substantial gains in the realm of civilian protection (Mansson 2006). According to Mansson, this change in peacekeeping philosophy, as articulated through a progressively more robust succession of mandates, may be understood in the context of a focus shift within the UN whereby individual human rights gained unprecedented importance (Mansson 2006). In speaking on a panel hosted by the International Institute of Peace, representatives from the UN’s expert group on the Protection of Civilians (POC) reflect that the creation of the group enabled increased consistency, with respect to civilian protection, in the text of UN mandates. The group notes, however, that robust civilian protection measures, though consistent in UNSC resolutions, often lack practical force in implementation (International Institute of Peace 2014).
Mansson’s views and reports from UN experts echo the work of commissions such as the Brahimi commission and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which argued for a new framework for peacekeeping centered on the rights of civilians (ICISS 2001). In her study “Use of force and civilian protection: peace operations in Congo” Mansson writes in reference to the evolution of MONUC’s mandates that they “suggest that the UN is inclined to broaden the concept of the use of force when facing a deteriorating human rights situation” (Mansson 2006 p. 3). Mansson points out subtle changes in mandate language during the period 1999-2005 which implies an increased willingness on the part of the UNSC to lower the threshold for the use of force on behalf of civilians (Mansson 2006). While Resolution 1291 (2000) stipulates that the UN “may take necessary action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (UNSC 2000, emphasis added), UNSC Resolution 1565 (2004) mandated the force to “ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat from physical violence” and afforded troops the freedom to use all means necessary to carry out this objective (UNSC 2004). Mansson argues that such subtle language differences convey a reduction in hesitancy on the part of the UNSC to authorize more offensively robust missions. This assertiveness, she concludes, stems from an increased concern for human rights in countries that host UN forces (Mansson).

While I agree with the author’s assertion that the rhetoric of UNSC mandates pertaining to the DRC is observably more robust than at the time of the mission’s establishment, I contest the rather linear nature through which she characterizes this evolution. Though it is true that MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate conveys a much more robust strategy for peacekeeping troops in the DRC, UNSC resolutions over this period did not continually become more assertive or more attentive to human rights but rather oscillated in response to developments in the DR Congo and to international political pressure (Nzongola 2014a). For example, the failure of MONUC troops to protect civilians in Bukavu, DRC during violent clashes between Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) troops and pro-government belligerents caused several
international human rights NGOs to call for a review of MONUC’s mandate. Mounting international pressure and anti-UN demonstrations in Bukavu prompted the UNSC to rethink its strategy for civilian protection (Mansson 2006). Interview data, shedding light on the shortcomings of MONUSCO in its current form, likewise weaken the assertion that UN operations in Congo progress linearly toward a perfectible ideal.

**From MONUC to MONUSCO and the FIB: The UN in the DR Congo Today**

MONUSCO’s current mandate, issued in 2013, diverges from standard UN operating procedures in creating a 3,000-troop Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). According to Resolution 2098, the brigade may actively target armed groups in the DRC that continue to contribute to regional instability and the endangerment of civilians (UNSC 2013). Where previous mandates allow UN troops to act forcefully on behalf of civilians in imminent danger, this resolution allows the UN to take initiative in preventing human rights abuses before they occur.

MONUC operated in DR Congo from 1999 until 2010, when the UN reauthorized the force under a new name: the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). On two occasions during this eleven-year period, supplementary forces augmented UN operations in the region (Maphosa 2013). In 2003, the European Union (EU) initiated *Operation Artemis* to respond to escalating violence in the Ituri district of eastern Congo. Deployed independently of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the operation was the first of its kind (Mansson 2006). The EU intervened in the Congo again in 2006 to reinforce regional security before and after the 2006 presidential elections (Maphosa 2013, Tull 2009).

As indicated above, MONUC became MONUSCO in 2010. In establishing the new mission, the UNSC tasked MONUSCO troops with electoral assistance (at the request of the Congolese government), civilian protection, and the enforcement of an arms embargo (UNSC 2010). Resolution 2098 (2013) retained many of these objectives. This succeeding resolution
differed from its predecessor chiefly in its creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and the allowance for drone surveillance capacity (UNSC 2013).

**Evaluating the FIB**

In November 2013, military pressure from the UN and Congolese forces (FARDC) forced the March-23 (M-23) militia to surrender. The rebels agreed to lay down arms and pursue all future negotiations through purely political means (Maphosa 2013). Writing in a policy brief for the Africa Institute of South Africa, Sylvester Maphosa applauds the defeat of the M-23 and the militia’s commitment to peaceful negotiations as a “step in the right direction” (Maphosa 2013). The author views the M-23’s commitment as promising in that it extends beyond negatively-focused conflict resolution (stopping conflict and violence). Negotiations with the M-23 and frameworks such as the Peace and Security Framework of February 2013, an agreement between the UN, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), are laudable steps toward creating a positive peace. Maphosa characterizes positive peace as a dynamic in which parties not only abstain from violence but also commit to work together to create a peaceful community (Maphosa 2013).

Though he applauds M-23 negotiations as a benchmark on the path to positive peace, Maphosa also recognizes that proclamations of success must be undertaken with caution, citing the over 40 armed groups that remain active in DR Congo (Maphosa 2013). Maphosa reasons that the greatest obstacle to ensuring security and stability in eastern DRC today lies in the Congolese state’s inability to police the country’s vast, sparsely populated eastern regions. He remains hopeful, however, that increased engagement from the state, the international community, and Congolese civil society may translate into tangible security gains (Maphosa 2013).
Drone Surveillance and MONUSCO: A New Horizon for Peacekeeping

In addition to the creation of an explicitly offensive troop component, UNSC resolution 2098 permits MONUSCO to use drone technology to monitor Congo’s eastern provinces for the purposes of protecting civilians in the region. MONUSCO is the first UN force authorized to use drone technology in any capacity (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013). In an article entitled “In the Eye of the Beholder,” Karlsrud and Rosen (2013) provide an analysis of the efficacy of the new technology and the ethical dilemmas it presents. While the authors acknowledge that MONUSCO is a problematic prototype for a drone-capable peacekeeping force, the authors develop a generally positive evaluation of the use of such technology in modern peacekeeping. Karlsrud and Rosen cite geographical complexity as the primary obstacle to effective surveillance in eastern DRC, a factor only partially mitigated by drone surveillance. The authors concede, however, that drone surveillance offers a far superior solution to this dilemma than any other available surveillance option. Of critical importance, Karlsrud and Rosen contest that while human rights activists today on the whole seem to campaign against the use of drone technology, these same organizations will soon advocate for the use of such technology in peacekeeping missions worldwide. If the technology enhances mission capacity to protect civilians and to identify and persecute human rights abusers, the authors argue, the international community must conclude that the omission of drone capacity in peacekeeping mandates does a disservice to civilian populations (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013).

An in-depth overview of MONUSCO’s use of drone technology remains outside the scope of this study. Within the confines of this analysis, I refer to MONUSCO’s use of drone technology as a feature of the mission’s enhanced legal authority to employ force against armed militias and on behalf of armed groups. In interviews with Congolese civilians and UN staff in June and July of 2014, no interview participant raised the issue of MONUSCO’s use of drone technology.
Peacekeeping in Practice: Theories of Evaluation

The case-specific realities of conflict in eastern DRC and the evolution of R2P as a peacekeeping norm created a novel dilemma for the preservation of peace and security in the Great Lakes region. The UN faces an unprecedented dilemma in achieving success in DR Congo. But how is such success to be evaluated?

I have, to this point, briefly addressed analyses of the efficacy of MONUSCO and the FIB. In conclusion, I will present several frameworks contained in the literature through which to measure the impact of international peacekeeping forces. In doing so, I will briefly describe my own frameworks for evaluation and explain the ways in which my methods build upon existing theory.

In An Agenda for Peace (1992), Boutros Boutros-Ghali identifies three components necessary for effective peacekeeping: material and political support from the international community, cooperation with local authorities, and clearly defined mandates (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In a study assessing the success of UN missions from 1988-1996, Duane Bratt offers four dimensions on which to measure peacekeeping success: mandate implementation, conflict resolution, conflict containment, and casualty prevention. She then classifies the UN’s 28 operations during the period 1988-1996 each as a failure, a moderate success, or a complete success (Bratt 1996).

Bratt’s approach to evaluation allows for a more comprehensive assessment of each UN mission, one that is more throughout than analysis using any one of her criteria in isolation. Bratt reasons that mandate implementation alone is not a sufficient measure of mission success, given that the UNSC and its member states often have incentives to set artificially limited or, conversely, impractical and overreaching mandates (Bratt 1996). Conflict resolution as an isolated measure is problematic in that the resolution of conflict depends on a host of factors, many of which lie outside the control of the UN. The chief limitation of the conflict containment
measure, in contrast, is that some conflicts pose little potential for regional escalation, rendering this measure largely irrelevant.

The “limiting casualties” measure attempts to ascertain whether the presence of a UN force limited (rather than contributing to the increase of or having no impact on) the number of conflict-related civilian deaths. The principle limitation of this criterion is that it implies a counterfactual: it is impossible to accurately assess the death toll in an alternate reality in which no peacekeeping force is present (Bratt 1996). Taken together, however, these measures provide a mechanism through which to reach a comprehensive assessment of peacekeeping success.

**Evaluating MONUSCO**

My research evaluates MONUSCO on one component of its mandate: the use of all means necessary to protect civilians (UNSC 2013). As such, I will use two of Bratt’s measures to assess MONUSCO’s impact on civilian populations in eastern DRC: casualty prevention and mandate implementation. I choose here to use mandate implementation given that MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate is intentionally robust with regard to civilian protection. Of critical importance to my investigation, therefore, are items a and b of MONUSCO’s mandate contained in UNSC resolution 2098. These items lay out civilian protection as a key priority for MONUSCO and provide the legal basis for the establishment of a Force Intervention Brigade.

My analysis seeks to build upon that of Bratt’s by including the perspectives of Congolese civilians and UN personnel when evaluating MONUSCO’s impact on civilian populations in eastern DR Congo. In analyzing these perspectives, I construct a model for MONUSCO’s limitations based upon Bratt’s criteria: the inability of the mission to protect civilians, as contained in its mandate, and to prevent civilian casualties.
Chapter III: MONUSCO’s Internal Limitations

In light of MONUSCO’s landmark mandates contained in Resolution 2098 and 2147, this study examines the mission’s effectiveness at protecting civilians in eastern Congo, as measured in June and July of 2014. It is the objective of this study to determine under what conditions the mission may prove effective at preventing civilian casualties. I argue that, despite change in the text of the mission’s mandate, as evidenced by Resolutions 2098 and 2147, the conditions for mission success are not yet fully present in eastern DRC. For the purposes of this study, I will use “mission success” to mean the limitation of civilian casualties and attacks against civilians. In my analysis, I focus on Bratt’s (1996) “casualty prevention” criterion as a yardstick for mission efficacy. It may be noted, however, that as “protection of civilians” features prominently in MONUSCO’s current mandate, there exists some overlap in analysis with Bratt’s “mandate implementation” criterion (UNSC 2013, UNSC 2014, Bratt 1996).

As stated above, this study finds that conditions for mission success do not yet exist in the context of MONUSCO’s operations in eastern DRC. I argue that MONUSCO does not meet sufficient conditions for success on two dimensions. First, internal shortcomings limit MONUSCO’s capacity to protect Congolese civilians. These shortcomings include intervention capacity, geographic mismatch between the epicenter of the conflict and the distribution of MONUSCO personnel, and troop skill-level disparities. Second, problems with host-country collaboration limit MONUSCO’s ability to fulfill the civilian protection components of its mandate. These problems include emphasizing government input over that of Congolese community members, the weakness of the Congolese security sector, tensions between UN civilian and military staff, and the short-term nature of MONUSCO troop placements. In this chapter, I address MONUSCO’s internal failings. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of limiting factors arising from the way that the mission currently collaborates with host-country actors.

Qualitative data contained in this study provides explanation for each of the causal factors listed above as limitations to MONUSCO success. However, before engaging in a deeper
analysis of the necessary conditions for the mission’s success and the lack of these conditions today in eastern Congo, I must first establish that UN forces are currently unsuccessful at protecting civilians in eastern DRC. Much was made in the media of the defeat of the M-23 militia group in the fall of 2013 (Aljazeera 2013, BBC 2013, UN News Centre 2013). By the end of 2013, over 4,000 former combatants in North and South Kivu had surrendered, ushering in an era of optimism in eastern Congo (Oxfam 2014).

Other accounts suggest that such optimism may be premature. In a survey of rural communities in North and South Kivu, DRC from August-December 2013, Oxfam International documents that many villages remain under the control of armed groups and the majority of Congolese civilians in these regions feel that their security did not increase significantly following the defeat of the M-23 (Oxfam 2014). In many villages in South Kivu, this is due to the fact that armed groups in this province retain few if any ties to the M-23 rebels, who operated primarily in North Kivu province. Thus, civilians in South Kivu did not accrue any significant security gains from the M-23’s defeat (Oxfam 2014). In North Kivu, many residents reported an increase in attacks and abuses during the M-23’s decline, as armed groups anticipated upcoming MONUSCO offensives. Militias were aware that, following the M-23’s defeat, MONUSCO would turn its attention to neutralizing other armed groups in eastern Congo. Data from Oxfam suggests that these groups increased their harassment of civilians during this period, in anticipation of MONUSCO’s imminent offensive (Oxfam 2014). Rural Congolese civilians in both provinces report ongoing instances of sexual violence, looting, beatings, murders, and forced taxation. Locals refer to illegal taxes imposed by armed groups as “pay for your life” or “sleep in peace” taxes, alluding to the consequences of noncompliance (Oxfam 2014 p. 8).

Oxfam’s 2014 report suggests that the M-23’s defeat did not systemically restore stability to rural civilians in eastern Congo, many of whom live daily under the threat of violence from armed groups (Oxfam 2014). It bears repeating that over thirty armed groups operate in eastern Congo, in addition to the M-23 (Maphosa 2013). Two of the largest contributors to
contemporary insecurity in eastern Congo are the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Here, I address the impact of these groups on civilian populations in eastern Congo.

MONUSCO estimates that 2,000 FDLR combatants remain active in eastern DRC (MONUSCO 2014). Congolese news source Radio Okapi puts the number at 1,500 as of late September 2014 (Radio Okapi 2014b). As the group’s title implies, its founding philosophy hinged on the overthrow of the Rwandan government. Today, however, the group lacks the capacity to launch any credible attack on the Rwandan state. The FDLR is perhaps best known for crimes committed in Rwanda during the country’s 100-day genocide in 1994 (MONUSCO 2014). Following the genocide, FDLR combatants fled into DR Congo, formerly Zaire. In the two decades that followed, FDLR troops bore substantial responsibility for attacks against civilian populations in the DRC, including killings, looting, and sexual assault (Nzongola 2014a).

At the time of this writing, the UN is currently promoting a program for the voluntary repatriation of FDLR militants. At a joint meeting between the ICGLR and SADC on July 2, 2014, participating governments established a six-month timeframe for FDLR repatriation. On October 2, 2014, marking the halfway point in the repatriation process, the UN Security Council released a press statement expressing concern about delays in FDLR surrender and repatriation. Congolese civil society likewise continues to express frustration regarding the process, which many perceive as unbearably slow (UN News Centre 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c).

In addition to the FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group, remains a threat in North Kivu province. A series of news articles from Radio Okapi, a Kinshasa-based Congolese news source, detail murders, beatings, kidnappings, and displacement resulting from a series of ADF-sponsored attacks in towns and villages in North Kivu (Radio Okapi 2014c). MONUSCO allegedly forced an ADF retreat into Uganda in the spring of 2014, but recent developments suggest that the group remains active in eastern Congo (Radio Okapi 2014c).
As Maphosa (2013) suggests, threats to civilians by armed groups in eastern Congo are not limited to the M-23, the FDLR, or the ADF. These armed groups, in addition to being “major players” in the perpetuation of violence against civilians, serve as examples that illustrate that success, when defined in terms of civilian protection, remains elusive for MONUSCO. These illustrations are particularly potent given that for each of the armed groups mentioned, MONUSCO undertook initiatives to explicitly target the group and, in the case of the M-23 and the ADF, achieved at least some success (Oxfam 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c, BBC 2013, Aljazeera 2013). As the Oxfam survey (2014) suggests, a variety of armed militias outside those mentioned here continue to impact civilian security in eastern Congo, and particularly in South Kivu province (Oxfam 2014). Thus, far from a comprehensive portrait of the current security dynamic in eastern Congo, this analysis of the M-23, ADF, and FLDR provides merely a window into the security situation in the DRC, suggesting that success for MONUSCO is not yet within reach.

**From Brahimi to MONUSCO: Challenges Remain**

In 2000, UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping operations. The report came in response to widespread criticism of UN failures during the 1990s in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Compiled by former Algerian Foreign Minister Brahimi, the “Brahimi Report” identifies key shortcomings that contributed to UN failure in the late 20th century. These shortcomings included several factors explicitly internal to the United Nations: outdated technology, skill-level deficits and a lack of uniformity in skill level among UN staff, and the inability of UN troops to deploy and react quickly in response to crises (Brahimi 2000).

UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2098 (March 2013) attempts to rectify two of the shortcomings contained in the Brahimi report (UNSC 2013). These include technological capacity and rapid-deployment capacity. By authorizing the use of unmanned aerial vehicle technology (UAVs or “drones”) and the creation of an offensive rapid-deployment force, the
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), UNSC Resolution 2098 aims to enhance MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians (UNSC 2013, Karlsrud and Rosen 2013, Maphosa 2013, Oakford 2014). The UN reauthorized these two components a year later in UNSC Resolution 2147 (UNSC 2014). Despite these attempts to enhance MONUSCO force capability, I present evidence that suggests that MONUSCO’s internal capacity remains insufficient to effectively protect civilians in eastern Congo. Eight interviews with current and former UN personnel provide the majority of data for analyzing the UN’s internal capacity shortcomings, though community interviews provide insight on select factors, notably in clarifying MONUSCO’s capacity to rapidly respond to crises.

This study finds fault with MONUSCO’s current operations along three internal dimensions: lack of uniform intervention standards, a geographic mismatch relative to physical geography, and troop-quality shortcomings. I analyze MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity as observed in June and July 2014, 15 months after the UNSC adopted Resolution 2098. Understanding the realities of bureaucratic inertia and the complexities of peacekeeping operations, I do not use full mandate implementation or 100% prevention of civilian casualties as the standard by which to judge MONUSCO. Instead, I base assessments on the reports of UN staff and Congolese community members. If changes contained in Resolution 2098 in fact enable MONUSCO to more effectively protect civilians, one might expect positive interview responses from study subjects.

Neither community members nor UN personnel identified “lack of resources” as a contributing factor to MONUSCO ineffectiveness. To this end, MONUSCO resources such as troop levels and organization budget are not areas of concern in this study. One UN team leader of interpreters, stated in an interview:
“MONUSCO has sufficient resources. The problem is that they do not listen to civil society recommendations.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014)

“To be honest, they have everything they need to stop war. The Pakistani soldiers took us to their camp and they showed us all of the supplies that they have- their weapons, their security cameras, etc. What they do not have is the will to intervene. If they decide to make peace, they are able to make peace.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014)

While the interpreter and community member quoted above offer different explanations for the UN’s failure in Congo, both insist that a lack of resources does not contribute significantly to this failure. With an annual budget of 1,398,475,300 USD and a troop contingent of over 19,000 peacekeepers, I am inclined to agree with the opinions cited above. MONUSCO remains the largest and most expensive UN force on record (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). Of the 16 current UN peacekeeping operations, only two other forces-the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)-boast a budget of over US $1 billion. MONUSCO’s budget exceeds that of the UN’s next most expensive mission, UNAMID, by nearly US $250 million. The average 2015 budget for a current UN mission, according to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is 479,647,649- less than half MONUSCO’s 2015 budget (United Nations Peacekeeping 2015).

UN peacekeeping operations receive funding from institutionalized treaty obligations, under which the U.S. provides 28.4% of the peacekeeping budget. This annual funding is automatic and allocated to specifically designated peacekeeping operations. It is prudent to note, however, that while the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) receives automatic funding annually, other crucial UN components gather funding through ad-hoc mechanisms. These components represent UN bodies that carry out crucial social functions in tandem with a peacekeeping mission in conflict areas, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and civil society engagement (Power 2015).
The geography of eastern Congo is complex and often unforgiving. At 2,344,858 square kilometers, the DR Congo is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and the 11th largest country in the world. Nearly two-thirds of Congolese civilians live in remote rural areas, and dense vegetation in the DRC’s eastern provinces often provides shelter for armed groups (CIA World Factbook 2014). Given these realities, it comes as no surprise that MONUSCO demands a large share of UN peacekeeping resources. MONUSCO possesses adequate resources, financially and in manpower, to meet the demands of a challenging peacekeeping environment. The explanation for the mission’s shortcomings, it appears, must be found elsewhere.

**MONUSCO: Uniformity in Intervention**

While most concede that MONUSCO troops serve at minimum as deterrent or preventative agents, UN staff and community interview participants unanimously agree that MONUSCO in its current state is poorly equipped to respond to crises or actively intervene on behalf of civilian populations. Given this consideration, I shift focus to what I will term “uniformity in intervention capacity.” In my conversations with UN staff and Congolese community members in South Kivu, the many respondents pointed to issues of the “will to protect” among UN troops as an area of concern. In contrast, other UN staffs attribute MONUSCO’s limited ability to protect civilians in South Kivu more to a lack of understanding of the meaning of “civilian protection” rather than unwillingness to protect civilians. These personnel cite variation in human rights norms—and in the internalization of those norms—between nations as an obstacle to mandate execution. One former UN employee, a Swedish professional and member of a joint civilian-police human rights monitoring team, described the problem in mandate internalization through the following example:

“When we went out to the field, we would always get updates from peacekeepers on the security situation. We would ask what they were doing to protect the civilian population. A common answer was, ‘We do patrols on market days.’ They would go in the car and patrol the market on specific days. To my
understanding, this was not civilian protection. There is more to civilian protection than that.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014).

The monitor went on to attribute this apparent discrepancy to a lack of understanding on the part of UN peacekeepers, rather than a lack of will. Both UN Civilian police observers noted that following the implementation of Resolution 2098 in spring 2013, the UN began to take concrete steps to sensitize peacekeeping troops in accordance with international human rights norms regarding the protection of individual citizens. A full description on the nature and historical development of these norms may be found in Chapter 2. One MONUSCO-sponsored troop training series initiated in the fall of 2014 aims to sensitize peacekeepers to the unique human rights dilemmas faced by women and girls in conflict situations (Padovan 2014). This program presents evidence of progress in establishing and uniformly disseminating human rights standards. However, given the absence of evidence to suggest the presence of any uniform, objective conditions to necessitate intervention, I maintain that systematizing such standards must remain a priority for MONUSCO.

Congolese community members and Congolese UN staff, in contrast, tended to cite lack of troop resolve as a major obstacle to MONUSCO’s success. One local leader in Kalehe said,

“The UN lives in the best places. Compared to where civilians are living, they live much more comfortably. They do not seem to care about development or protecting civilians. When they leave, we wonder what we will have to remember them by, because up to this time they have done nothing.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

His peers echoed this concern:

“Often we see situations in which people are fighting near UN troops and the troops do not intervene.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

“They do not go to the places where people are fighting. They do not go into the bush.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

The assessments of these community members reflect broad consensus regarding the UN’s failure to intervene on behalf of Congolese civilians. Some attributed the failure to the UN’s hesitation to consult local leaders, suggesting that a breakdown in communication limits
the UN’s capacity to identify and respond to rural atrocities (Congolese Community Member, Interview, June 2014). Others identified a problem of will, noting that UN troops lacked the will to operate in areas “without access to running water” and that they preferred to live “like tourists” in larger towns and village centers (UN Interpreter, Interview, July 2014; Congolese Community Member, Interview, June 2014).

In the next section, I highlight the geographic mismatch in MONUSCO personnel placement that explains a comparative lack of UN presence in remote rural areas, as one leader above mentioned in referring to “the bush.” On the whole, I agree with respondents in concluding that practical intervention by the UN often falls short of the text of Resolutions 2098 and 2147, which require the proactive protection of civilians. Interviews with UN personnel suggest a discrepancy between the text of Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the steps that UN peacekeepers feel are adequate to “protect civilians” using “all means necessary,” with tangible action on the ground often falling short of the robust rhetoric contained in the security council resolutions (UNSC 2013; UNSC 2014; UN Civilian Observer, Interview, July 2014). Practically, the comparative lack of violent instability in major cities such as Goma and Bukavu alludes to the UN’s failure to effectively police rural conflicts (Oxfam 2014).

Where community members in Kalehe harshly criticized the UN for its failure to intervene on behalf of civilian populations, a failure these individuals attributed largely to indifference, UN staff offered more generous assessments of the apparent non-intervention of MONUSCO troops. However, whether interview respondents explained this reality by criticizing lack of troop willpower or commitment, a lack of consensus regarding the meaning and implications of “civilian protection,” or the inherent limitations of multinational security forces, all agreed that the situation on the ground in eastern Congo to date falls short of the aggressive language found in UNSC Resolution 2098 and its successor, Resolution 2147 (UNSC 2013, UNSC 2014). The resolutions authorize MONUSCO to use all means necessary to protect civilians, as well as to offensively target illicit militias. As one Congolese UN official responded,
“The text of the mandate is fine. Unfortunately, the translation of the text into practical action on the ground does not match.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014).

The UN interpreter quoted above served as a lead interpreter for UN peacekeeping troops in as they conducted training exercises with FARDC troops. His comments reflect majority consensus among interview respondents. No interview participant elected to dispute the validity of Resolutions 2098 or 2147. In other words, interview respondents agreed that the new text of these resolutions, in granting MONUSCO greater freedom and authority to use all means necessary to protect civilians, represented positive progress for the mission. While a few UN personnel conceded practical progress on the ground, even those who identified observable progress since the enactment of Resolutions 2098 and 2147 recognized that such progress did not come at a pace sufficient to meet the needs of Congolese civilians.

All respondents recognized that in order to protect civilians in a manner consistent with the mission’s mandate, intervention must become more robust. To this end, MONUSCO should establish clear guidelines for intervention, including an institutionalized, concrete, and universal set of conditions requiring action on the part of MONUSCO. Such a system would require MONUSCO to respond after given conditions were met and would impose penalties for troops who failed to intervene under the specified conditions. This system would do much to remedy the ambiguity of terms such as “civilian protection” and “all means necessary” contained in the mission’s mandate (UNSC 2013, 2014).

A reluctance on the part of troops to intervene, leaving aside the reasons behind the reluctance, remains a major obstacle to the implementation of Resolution 2147 and, thus, to the effective protection of civilians in eastern DRC.

**MONUSCO’s Geographic Mismatch: East vs. West, Rural vs. Urban**

Nearly all UN staff interviewed referenced the vast, complex terrain of the DRC, and the often-unreliable transportation infrastructure, as major obstacles to MONUSCO success in
eastern Congo. As referenced in the introduction to this chapter, the DRC ranks first in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of land area, and about 66% of its population is rural. This vast and disperse geographic landscape, coupled with the densely forested and mountainous terrain of the nation’s east, present logistical dilemmas for UN peacekeepers (CIA World Factbook 2014).

Proponents of MONUSCO’s drone surveillance technology cite the technology’s ability to facilitate observation in the context of complex geography as justification for the technology’s continued use (Oakford 2014). Karlsrud and Rosen (2013) list the capacity to overcome geographic complexity as a merit of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone technology in the context of the Congo, claiming that the use of drones in eastern Congo poses the potential to greatly enhance the mission’s capacity to monitor armed groups and to detect and prevent attacks against civilians and other human rights abuses (Karlsrud and Rosen 2013).

Other analyses of the conflict additionally point to geography as an inhibitor to mission success in Congo (Tull 2009). The complex geography of the DRC presents a contrapositive scenario, whereby it is impossible to assess the success of a hypothetically identical mission operating in an identical political environment but on more welcoming terrain. Such an argument remains outside the scope of this study.

Here, I attribute MONUSCO’s failure to protect civilians not to geographic obstacles to themselves but to the ways in which the mission’s organization further hinders success given this challenging physical environment. I analyze the mission’s organization in terms of troop presence along two dimensions: East versus West, on one dimension, and rural versus urban, on the second. I conclude that MONUSCO currently operates below optimal capacity given disproportionate troop presence in the western part of the country and in urban areas, relative to the needs of the Congolese population and threats posed to civilians. Only one-third of Congolese civilians live in cities, and in today’s Congo, armed groups operate at far higher frequencies in rural areas (Oxfam 2014, CIA World Factbook 2014).
Evidence from the previous section alludes to the lack of UN presence in some of South Kivu’s rural villages, conceptualized at times by respondents as “the bush.” A Swedish civilian police observer notes here that MONUSCO presence in rural localities is often confined to town centers and marketplaces, areas seldom populated by illicit militia groups. One Congolese UN interpreter reasons that the dearth of MONUSCO troops in rural Congo may be explained by a desire for personal comfort on the part of peacekeepers:

“MONUSCO should go to places where atrocities are actually occurring, rather than remaining in town centers. They remain in the center of town because it is easier to access water there.” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014).

While I do not dispute the importance of personal comfort as a motivator inspiring MONUSCO’s disproportionate urban presence, I argue that the mission’s organization plays a more crucial role in contributing to the discrepancy between the location of militia activity—overwhelmingly rural—and the concentration of troops—disproportionately urban. Here, I use “organization” to mean the geographic distribution of peacekeeping troops and other MONUSCO personnel. Map 1.1 in the Appendix displays the geographic distribution of armed militias currently operating in the DR Congo. It must be noted that armed group activity remains limited to the Congolese provinces of Orientale, North and South Kivu, and to a lesser extent, Katanga. Each of these provinces lines the eastern edge of the DRC. Additionally, with the exception of the Kata-Katanga armed group in Lubumbashi, Katanga province, no armed groups operate in provincial capitals, and the majority of armed groups reside outside major cities. Even in Katanga, armed groups remain concentrated in rural areas while launching only sporadic attacks on major cities like Lubumbashi (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014).

The MONUSCO’s DR Congo headquarters are located in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city, about 1,500 miles from the capitals of North and South Kivu in eastern Congo. This is significant, given that the country’s eastern provinces harbor greater levels of instability. During the two Congo wars, from 1998-2003, Kinshasa itself underwent periods of conflict and occupation by foreign militants (Stearns 2011, Nzongola 2002). However, in the years since the
war’s formal conclusion, relative peace returned to Kinshasa. Epochs of conflict during the 2003-2014 period erupted not in the nation’s capital but in its mineral-rich eastern provinces.

The 1,5000-mile distance alone does not do enough to convey the inherent shortcomings of MONUSCO’s “home base” location. The country’s east is accessible by way of Kinshasa only through air travel, and only on a singular national airline. Road travel incurs delays due to difficult terrain and unreliable roads, and cross-country automobile excursions may take months. In an analysis of the DR Congo, Foster and Benitez (2011) find that due to years of conflict, dense forests, and low population densities in much of the country, the DRC has perhaps the worst transportation infrastructure in the world (Foster and Benitez 2011). This reality serves to illuminate the impracticality of a MONUSCO headquarters located so far from the foci of the conflict in Congo.

It must be noted that although the MONUSCO headquarters retains offices in Kinshasa, MONUSCO’s civilian commander, Martin Kobler, resides in Goma, North Kivu province, in the eastern part of the country. MONUSCO provincial headquarters operate in each of DR Congo’s provinces, including North and South Kivu (MONUSCO 2014). Over the course of my research, I visited MONUSCO’s South Kivu provincial headquarters in Bukavu, DRC. MONUSCO’s geographic organization within the Congo includes a mission headquarters in the capital city and smaller headquarters in each of the country’s ten provinces. I contest the practicality of this model for two reasons.

First, as described above, the location of the mission’s overall headquarters places the office far from the source of conflict in the east. In an interview conducted in July 2014, one UN Political Officer cited the geographic distance as an obstacle to mission communication and information gathering (UN Political Officer, interview, July 2014). Second, until recently, the concentration of UN staff in the western part of the country remained disproportionately large to the extent that operations in the eastern part of the country suffered as a result. Map 1.1 in the Appendix displays the distribution of UN headquarters and peacekeeping camps throughout
the DR Congo. Of note, a disproportionate concentration of leadership offices is found in Kinshasa, the capital city in the far west of the country. These include the MONUSCO headquarters, the MONUSCO force headquarters, the UN Police (UNPOL) headquarters, and the MONUSCO logistics base. In contrast, these offices are not found in North and South Kivu, the provinces with the highest current concentrations of armed militias (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014).

During an interview with George, a Senegalese UN officer in MONUSCO’s political affairs department, I learned that a shift in mission organization began in May 2014. According to George, most of MONUSCO’s operational staff now resides in Goma, North Kivu, DRC. The majority of division heads transferred to Goma during the spring and summer of 2014 as well, and George added that MONUSCO plans to continue this shift in the months to come. Speaking on behalf of the South Kivu headquarters, George stated that the influx of new staff enables MONUSCO troops to deploy deeper into the field, expanding troop presence in rural areas.

One UN interpreter further substantiates George’s assessment of the mission’s increased capacity to operate in more remote areas, citing an increased UN presence in villages such as Kalehe and Chibunda in South Kivu. In areas in which MONUSCO directs a Community Base of Operations (CBO), he reasons, these bases exert a powerful deterrent effect on combatants, to the extent that the mere presence of UN troops goes far in preventing assaults on civilian populations. While Swedish UN staffs concede that MONUSCO’s preventative power does serve to reduce violence in areas with a mission presence, and both Swedish observers applaud the shift in organizational focus on the part of MONUSCO from Kinshasa to eastern Congo, one civilian observer notes:

“MONUSCO needs a stronger presence in the field, not just in Bukavu or Goma. In order to truly protect civilians there definitely needs to be a stronger presence in the field to gather information. We can’t simply have the peacekeepers remain at their bases without communicating with the civilian population.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014)
In mentioning Goma and Bukavu, the observer refers to the provincial capital cities of North and South Kivu, respectively. Recall Map 1.1 shows that armed groups in eastern Congo do not boast a significant presence in either Bukavu or Goma. It must be noted that the high concentration of UN troops in and around these cities may in fact have a deterrent effect and thus justify substantial UN presence in these urban areas. However, the fact remains that, violence clusters in rural pockets of instability with less access to UN protection (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014, Oxfam 2014, Radio Okapi 2014c). This suggests that the UN’s recent reorganization, resulting in a higher proportion of personnel based in eastern provinces, corresponds more closely to the realities on the ground in eastern Congo.

In summary, while recent shifts in organizational structure reflect evolving peacekeeping priorities and constitute a more practical approach to Congo’s conflict-ridden east, I argue that such a transition comes after undue delay. The UN initiated the East-West transition in the spring of 2014, while the western part of the country’s last epoch of conflict occurred over a decade ago. Though interview respondents’ increasingly positive report of UN rural presence following the East-West transition provide evidence for measurable progress, these reports also suggest that the transition should have been made far earlier. Through increasing proportional troop presence in the east, MONUSCO’s restructuring allowed for deeper penetration into rural regions, increasing the mission’s capacity to prevent attacks on civilian communities. While I remain optimistic that the civilians in rural Congo may continue to reap positive dividends from the 2014 troop transition, I maintain that the delay in this transition has done much to constrain the timely achievement of the mission’s mandate.

**MONUSCO and Troop Quality**

Here I briefly discuss the primary problem areas with MONUSCO troop capacity: short-term deployments and lack of skill uniformity. The UN identifies Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh as key troop-contributing countries to its mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO at a
Glance 2014). Peacekeeping troops assigned to serve with MONUSCO receive placements for duration of four to six months. After completing a given placement, troops assigned to the DRC transition to another locality, and such rotations continue until individual troops complete their service in the Congo. The average peacekeeper may serve in the DRC for about one year. This system is identical for all ranks of MONUSCO soldiers, such that commanders and rank-and-file troops alike serve on a rotational basis. One Civilian Police Observer discusses the limitations of such a transient system, describing its potential to undermine civilian trust in MONUSCO troops, as current time constraints do not allow for the building and maintenance of constructive relationships. The Observer adds, however, that she does not see significant change to the troop deployment structure of MONUSCO as a realistic goal:

“I do not think that it is realistic to expect troops to stay for longer than one year. While civilian MONUSCO staff may elect to devote their life’s work to Congo, for most military peace keepers the Congo is simply a posting.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014).

These comments reinforce prior discussion on the role that troop commitment plays in MONUSCO’s effectiveness. One Congolese national, working as a Language Consultant for MONUSCO, expressed frustration that, generally speaking, most incoming MONUSCO troops possess very little background knowledge about the DR Congo. Swedish civilian observers likewise commented that, in contrast to some civilian MONUSCO staff who seem intrinsically motivated to serve in Congo, most peace keeping troops report to the Congo on orders and may stay only for a short-term assignment. Given this lack of commitment, these UN staff reason, it is unrealistic to expect MONUSCO troops to put themselves in life-threatening situations in order to protect Congolese civilians. A Congolese language consultant and a 9-year veteran employee of the UN, touched on a broad philosophical dilemma that continues to confront proponents of international collective security arrangements:

“How can we expect troops to die for a country that is not their own?” (UN Language Consultant 2014).
Other UN staff raised concerns tied to the skill level of UN troops, rather than troop commitment or the duration of individual postings. A Swedish Civilian Observer says that the nature of multinational collective security arrangements ensures wide variation in skill level among troops, and that this variation is largely dependent on the resources available in troop-contributing nations and the quality of the domestic militaries within these nations. Romeo Dallaire, retired Canadian General and former commander of UN forces in Rwanda, depicts the challenges he faced operating during the Rwandan genocide with under-resourced and poorly trained troops (Dallaire 2004). Deficiencies in troop quality or resource readiness force the UN to exert additional time and effort ensuring that troops become “battle-ready” before deployment. One Swedish Civilian Observer confirms a recommendation found in the 2000 Brahimi report in suggesting that enhanced training programs could do much to rectify any skill-level deficiencies among troops. Writing at the turn of the 21st century, Brahimi’s (2000) report documented the need for greater skill-level uniformity among troop-contributing countries. The two civilian human rights monitors from Sweden said,

“The entire purpose of the UN is that it is a multinational organization, but this also makes it very difficult to manage.” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, June 2014).

As a collective security arrangement, multinational troop contributions are foundational to the UN model of peacekeeping. However, assessments by UN staff suggest that such multinational arrangements may present challenges when attempting to ensure uniform levels of skill. The creation of objective criteria for prospective troops, coupled with enhanced pre-deployment training for all troops, presents a viable solution to this current challenge.

**Country-Level Troop Contributions: Structural Racism in Peacekeeping?**

In considering country-level skill disparities among peacekeeping troops, concerns also arise regarding the potential for structural racism embedded in the way in which the UN deploys
peacekeeping forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the nations with the highest military expenditures include, in order of descending expenditure size: the U.S., China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan. Together, these five nations accounted for 1,059 billion USD in military spending (of which the U.S. accounted for over 50%, at 682 billion), or 60% of global military expenditures in 2012. The U.S. alone bore responsibility for nearly 40% of all military expenditures for that same year (SIPRI 2013). Of SIPRI’s top five military spenders, only China breaks UN peacekeeping’s top 15 troop contributing countries as of February 2015 (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). The U.S., first in military spending, ranks at 66 in troop contributions with just 119 total military and police personnel serving in peacekeeping operations globally. According to the UN’s February 2015 report, the top five troop contributing nations include, in descending order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, and Rwanda (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). Of these five nations, only India cracked SIPRI’s top fifteen military spenders in 2012 (SIPRI 2013). In observing military expenditure data from SIPRI and troop contribution data from the UN, a key discrepancy emerges: on the whole, the countries spending the most to train and equip their own troops do not proportionately contribute military personnel to peacekeeping operations.

The statistics cited above further corroborate interview responses from MONUSCO personnel, suggesting that overall discrepancies in troop quality prove a hindrance to optimal mission functioning (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). In addition, the numerical discrepancies between country military spending and country troop contributions also suggest a darker conclusion regarding the structural racism of UN peacekeeping. Of the UN’s 16 active peacekeeping operations, over half-nine of sixteen-remain geographically situated on the African continent. This is twice the amount of even the second densest region in terms of peacekeeping, the Middle East, which currently hosts four active missions. The European continent hosts only one active UN mission—United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)—while North America remains free of any UN operation (UN Peacekeeping
Taking these figures together with SIPRI data, it appears that the UN receives a disproportionate share of troop contributions from countries with relatively low levels of military spending. The UN then deploys these troops to its peacekeeping missions, over 50% of which operate on the African continent. In summary, a phenomenon arises whereby relatively poorly equipped troops bear the primary responsibility for international peacekeeping in an African context.

Despite numerous negative assessments (UN Civilian observer, interview, July 2014; UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014) of troop quality among MONUSCO peacekeepers, some interview respondents did cite progress on troop capacity development. One Congolese professional employed by MONUSCO as a lead interpreter points to MONUSCO’s trainings and capacity-development efforts with the Congolese army (FARDC) as a positive achievement for the mission, suggesting that MONUSCO troops do in fact possess a sufficient level of skill to execute the mission’s mandate. Additionally, other interview respondents cited MONUSCO’s defeat of the M-23 militia group in 2013 as evidence of the battle proficiency of its troops (BBC 2013, Aljazeera 2013). To the extent that troop-level deficiencies persist, however, MONUSCO remains inherently limited in its capacity to protect Congolese civilians. MONUSCO troops function sub-optimally on two distinct dimensions: first, troops appear to lack a dedication to the welfare of Congolese civilians and, by extension, commitment to MONUSCO’s peace building objectives in eastern Congo. Also of concern, the multinational nature of troop contributions, characteristic of UN missions, often serves to undermine practical skill level and battle-readiness among MONUSCO troops.

**Looking Ahead: MONUSCO and Collaborating with the Host Country**

In this chapter, I examined a variety factors internal to MONUSCO that serve to limit the mission’s success in protecting civilians in eastern Congo. These include a lack of uniform standards for peacekeeper intervention, a mismatch between the placement of MONUSCO
personnel in urban and Western areas and the occurrence of conflict in the rural east, and shortcomings in MONUSCO troops attributable to lack of commitment and intra-mission skill-level disparities. In the next chapter, I address MONUSCO’s collaboration with several sectors of Congolese society. I argue that MONUSCO’s success in protecting civilians is limited by the mission’s preference for “top-down” collaborations. I use the phrase “top-down” to refer to initiatives and consultations conducted primarily at the level of political and security-sector elites. Evidence in this study builds the case that the UN prioritizes cooperation with official government actors above collaboration with Congolese communities. By working more closely with community members, the UN may in fact enhance its capacity to protect civilians in eastern Congo.
Chapter IV: MONUSCO and Collaboration Breakdown

In An Agenda for Peace (1992), former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified host-country collaboration as a key determinant of the success of any UN mission (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Interviews with UN staff and Congolese community members served to corroborate Boutros-Ghali’s assertion of the importance of host-country collaboration. In the previous chapter, my analysis focused on success-inhibiting factors internal to the UN mission in the DR Congo. This chapter shifts focus to cooperation dynamics between the UN and various sectors of Congolese society. Here, I make two arguments concerning MONUSCO’s cooperation with local actors in the DRC. First, as indicated above, I argue that the mission prioritizes elite-level collaboration, at the expense of consultations and arrangements involving Congolese community members. I use “elite-level” to denote cooperation between the UN and political elites in the Congo. Reliance on government figures inhibits MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity, as to a large extent Congolese political elites remain detached from the needs of Congolese citizens. The neglect of actors outside institutionalized political office reflects poor strategic judgment, for which MONUSCO bears primary responsibility.

In addition to the UN’s poorly prioritized collaboration strategy, capacity deficiencies in the Congolese security sector present an additional challenge to effective host-country collaboration. To its credit, the UN continues to prioritize capacity development programs for components of the Congolese security sector, including the national army (FARDC) and police force (PNC). These programs will prove essential as the DRC moves to consolidate peace in its eastern provinces (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, 2014, UN News Centre 2014). Currently, however, capacity shortcomings within the FARDC serve to limit the effectiveness of MONUSCO. This occurs as MONUSCO’s collaborative model requires FARDC presence and cooperation in order to conduct military operations. Thus, in areas in which FARDC is unable to operate effectively, the UN is therefore constrained by the national military’s unsatisfactory performance. The first objective of MONUSCO’s mandate charges the mission with protecting
civilians in eastern Congo from rebel militias in the DRC (UNSC 2013). This objective is the subject of the current study. In establishing this mandate, UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) requires that MONUSCO work collaboratively with Congolese authorities to identify and respond to threats to local civilians (UNSC 2013). Thus, in recognizing persistent limitations characteristic of the Congolese security sector, one must recognize subsequent limitations to MONUSCO’s ability to fulfill its primary objective in eastern DRC.

Effective collaboration is imperative not only for the immediate achievement of MONUSCO’s primary objective—the protection of Congolese civilians—but for the long-term peace and security of the DRC. One UN employee mentioned that many locals he encounters believe that the UN should simply replace the FARDC. The officer cited rising trust levels between locals and MONUSCO staff, a trend that stands in stark contrast to persistent levels of distrust between civilians and FARDC soldiers (UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 2014). While increasingly positive attitudes toward MONUSCO perhaps merit recognition, these trends represent the alarming persistence of security-sector limitations in the DRC.

**Consultations with an Undemocratic Government**

In Chapter 2, a historical analysis of governance in the DR Congo depicts over a century of undemocratic leaders who did not sufficiently respond to the needs of the Congolese people. From colonial extraction and forced slave labor to the neocolonial hijacking of post-independence nationalism to the kleptocracy and neglect of a dictatorial Cold-War era regime, the political history of the DRC is one far too often characterized by a citizenry surviving in spite of its leaders rather than progressing through their support (Hochschild 1998, Nzongola 2002, Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001, Fanon 1969). The relationship of the Congolese electorate to its elected leaders is important to understand in the context of the UN’s mission in the country, as highlighted by the previous quotes from Congolese community members. The UN’s current mandate requires personnel to “use all means necessary to protect civilians.” I argue here that
efficient protection becomes impossible when the UN prioritizes cooperation with an undemocratic government over cooperation with Congolese society.

In the DR Congo, the current government is not responsive to the needs of the majority of Congolese citizens. Community members, in contrast, possess a much more comprehensive knowledge of the needs of Congolese civilians and the challenges that they face. Thus, to effectively protect civilians in eastern Congo, the UN must shift focus from high-level consultations with government officials to more frequent, transparent, and substantive collaborations with Congolese communities. The scope of the present study did not allow for consultation with interview respondents on a successful framework for community collaboration. This avenue for future research poses great significance for UN collaboration policy in the DR Congo.

As the 2016 presidential election approaches, the UN lists ensuring a free and fair electoral process as one of the mission’s top priorities, and the mission’s attempt to foster dialogue between political opposition parties and the current government elicit praise from community members and UN Staff (UN Political Officer, UN Team Leader of Interpreters, Congolese Community Members, interviews, June-July 2014). Some UN staff contest that the UN places so much weight on election preparations that resources that may otherwise be used for development projects may be diverted to electoral monitoring for the 2016 cycle (UN Community Liaison Officer, June 2014).

In an analysis of the country’s 2011 elections, however, Stearns (2011) suggests that despite the fact that the process received the international “free and fair” stamp of approval and extensive electoral operations by the UN, the results of these elections did not meaningfully reflect the will of the Congolese people (Stearns 2011). Many Congolese still feel that the current government has not done enough to address the needs of Congolese citizens. Rumors of attempts by current President Joseph Kabila to alter the state constitution—thereby abolishing presidential term limits—do little to remedy public perception of the current authorities. Such
actions, in contrast, convey to many that the Congolese executive cares little about the interests of the nation’s citizens (Stearns 2015, Radio Okapi 2014a).

In the context of this lack of trust between the electorate and those elected to represent their interests, the preference on the part of the UN for high-level political negotiations becomes difficult to understand. While Boutros-Ghali emphasizes the need for collegial relationships between UN personnel and local political officials, such relationships must not come at the expense of an equally collegial relationship with Congolese communities. Theoretically, in a society sufficiently democratic to presume that elected officials, on average, reliably represent the will of that society’s citizens, one might argue that consistent consultation with these elected officials may go far in identifying and responding to the needs of the people. In a country where this democratic link is weaker, however, the relationship between elected officials and the needs of the electorate remains far less clear.

**Collaboration with Government Officials**

“When MONUSCO came, they signed a contract with the government...the government does not know what the Congolese population needs. If they made the contract with us, we could better advise them on what needs to be done.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

The above statement by a Congolese community member reflects consensus among community interview respondents with whom I spoke in South Kivu regarding the detachment of the Congolese government from the needs of its people. Another respondent added,

“If MONUSCO came to us civilians, we could more accurately advise them on what they need to succeed and on what needs to be done. The problem is that they go to the government and the government does not know what we need. We recognize that they are not accomplishing their mission but we do not necessarily know why. The government may have an answer to this question.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).
Statements by Congolese community members reinforce perceptions of the Congolese government as questionably democratic and out-of-touch with Congolese civilians. In such a situation, in which the state remains detached from the will of society, UN consultation with the state proves exclusionary in the sense that Congolese civilians do not feel that MONUSCO gives consideration to their interests.

**Congolese Communities and the Desire for Engagement**

The UN must prioritize engagement with Congolese communities in order to assess and address the needs of the Congolese people. This fact is not lost on Congolese citizens. As one UN employee, a Congolese national, stated,

“Civil society must not stop until their voices are heard. Congolese citizens must continue denouncing atrocities in the presence of MONUSCO and must continue to push the Congolese government to fulfill its role in providing security. They must push for the new mandate to be implemented in practice; they must push for MONUSCO to respect its mandate.” (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014).

This UN official’s comment suggests several characteristics about the nature of the relationship between the UN and civil society in the DRC. First, community members themselves desire more frequent and or effective collaboration with the UN. Interviews with Congolese community members suggest that this belief remains pervasive throughout Congolese society (Congolese Community Members, interviews, June-July 2014).

**Public Perceptions and the Role of the Community Liaison Officer**

The UN interpreter’s comment above also conveys a certain level of knowledge of UN operations on the part of Congolese society. This is evident as the interpreter implies that community members possess adequate knowledge of the UN’s current mandate. To be sure, the community representatives I consulted in Kalehe, South Kivu, possessed knowledge of the current mandate as created by UNSC Resolution 2098, even rivaling the knowledge of many UN
personnel respondents. Multiple local leaders described the difference between MONUC’s observational and defensive roles and MONUSCO’s uniquely offensive capacities as defined in Resolutions 2098 and 2147 (UNSC 2013; Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014). However, on the point of generalized community knowledge of the workings of the UN in eastern Congo, I offer several points of conflicting evidence. Interviews with UN personnel and Congolese community members suggest that there exists a great deal of variation among Congolese citizens regarding level of knowledge about MONUSCO. To address knowledge discrepancies among Congolese civilians, the UN created a new position, the Community Liaison officer:

“In 2010, the Civilian Affairs Unit began to dispatch Community Liaison Officers. In the places where there was a good relationship between the peacekeeping commander and the CLO, it produced very good results.” (UN Civilian Observer 2014).

In an interview with one Community Liaison Officer in June 2014, the officer described his role as fostering open communication between Congolese civilians and UN peacekeepers. The officer said,

“Earlier, locals did not understand MONUSCO’s role. Now, CLOs live within the community and explain the UN’s capacity as well as its limitations.” (UN Community Liaison Officer, June 2014).

The officer describes several misconceptions he frequently encounters regarding the UN mission among Congolese civilians. Regarding the mission’s capacity, the officer states that many locals expect the UN to effectively replace the Congolese military (FARDC), and in his job as a CLO he explains the impracticality of this goal. Regarding the limitations of the UN force, CLOs often find themselves doing “damage control” after peacekeeping troops make false promises to locals. False promises often include offering to give civilians rides to work or to pay for medications (UN Community Liaison Officer 2014).

CLOs prove a progressive step for UN-civilian relations. Despite this progress, however, trust building remains an area of concern that serves to undermine UN operations. During a
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focus group interview with Congolese community representatives in Kalehe, leaders shared views that they themselves held about the nature of the UN presence in eastern DRC. The leaders additionally commented on the perceptions that their communities hold regarding the UN. Several themes emerged, including that UN soldiers continue to collaborate secretly with the Congolese military and rebel soldiers to the detriment of civilians or that mineral wealth extraction is in fact the ulterior motive for many UN operations in the Congo (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014). During interviews with both UN staff and community members, Congolese nationals tended to respond to the question, “Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your community in some way? Please describe these situations,” by citing sexual assault cases involving UN personnel and civilian Congolese women. In 2012, the Women Under Siege project released a piece entitled “When those meant to keep the peace commit sexualized violence” which referenced persistent allegations—substantiated by confidential UN reports—of sexual assault by peacekeepers in eastern DRC (Novick 2012). Likewise, Mayesha Alam, Associate Director for the Georgetown Institute on Women, Peace and Security, notes that sexual violence perpetrated by MONUSCO soldiers against women and girls in eastern DRC remains a barrier to MONUSCO’s credibility. Alam and Naama Haviv, Executive Director of Panzi Foundation USA, contest that MONUSCO often fails to prevent armed groups from using sexualized violence as a tool to fracture Congolese communities and gain control over land, resources, and local power structures. Additionally, Alam notes that MONUSCO’s failure often extends beyond passive complicity when troops themselves commit rape against Congolese men, women, and children (Alam 2015; Haviv 2015).

On a more abstract level, Congolese nationals and foreign UN staff often decried the impact of the UN’s perpetual presence on the housing market, pollution as an artifact of UN facilities, and increases in prostitution as a profitable industry in eastern DRC (UN Team Leader of Interpreters 2014, UN Civilian Observer 2014). While Congolese nationals, whether on the
UN’s payroll or not, tended to express more negative assessments of the UN’s impact on communities in eastern Congo, all respondents acknowledged negative consequences borne by civilian populations. In this context, the practical impact of UN Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) appears limited. Given the fourteen-year presence of the UN in the DRC and the accumulated grievances of Congolese communities, public opinion may be resistant to change.

**The Community Action Network (CAN) as a Framework for Collaboration**

One initiative that emerged during conversation with a UN CLO was the UN’s collaborative human rights and atrocity prevention monitoring system, called the Community Action Network (CAN). In a model similar to that of many civilian police forces, CAN relies on community members to serve as informants. In return for providing data in real time on the occurrence of attacks against civilians, civilians gain access to the UN’s rapid response capacity to deter these and further attacks (UN Community Liaison Officer 2014). As a CLO, a UN employee receives an official UN mobile phone with a pre-approved amount of phone credits for use in the CAN program. CAN divides civilian populations into geographic clusters, with a focal point established within each cluster. Each CLO assumes responsibility over a given focal point, and community members within his or her cluster gain access to the phone number of their assigned CLO. In the event of a rebel attack, civilians may call this number and report the time, date, and location of the event. MONUSCO keeps a daily record of reports and deploys locally based troops as first respondents to the scene of an attack.

During my interview with this CLO, the officer described an increase in the rate of calls to his MONUSCO phone. He attributed this increase to an increased level of trust on the part of Congolese civilians, stating,

“[I receive many alerts, and people have less fear to report. In contrast, they do not trust the FARDC [the Congolese military]. Trust is building between locals and MONUSCO. [Through the CAN program] if civilians see two or three people carrying weapons in their jackets, can anonymously report to MONUSCO” (UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 2014).
While the officer reportedly instructs community members not to abuse the network by reporting minor disputes with family or neighbors, he describes the effectiveness of the system at responding to the violent actions of militia groups or in rooting out corruption within the Congolese military (FARDC). The officer describes one alert he received regarding an illegal roadblock that the FARDC imposed on civilians in South Kivu, requiring locals to pay a bribe before they granted permission to pass through the blockade. Upon receiving the alert, MONUSCO personnel communicated with FARDC, instructing the soldiers to remove the unauthorized blockade by the end of the day (UN Community Liaison Officer). Such open networks of communication pose the potential for building trust and cooperation between MONUSCO, the Congolese security sector, and local communities. However, following over a decade of distrustful relationships, I suggest that such trust-building efforts may not bring immediate results. Long-term analysis may shed light upon the effectiveness of the CAN and CLO systems in improving relationships between the UN and local communities.

**The Nature of Interactions: A Desire for Substance**

Earlier in this chapter, I detailed the reasons why the UN’s decision to prioritize high-level political consultations may inadvertently disempower Congolese communities, to the extent that elected officials in the DRC fail to represent the interests of their constituents. I do not assume, however, that political consultations and collaboration with community members remain mutually exclusive endeavors. On the contrary, for the UN to operate at full capacity in the Congo, reciprocal working relationships must be established and maintained between both state and non-state actors. At the time of this study, the UN was engaged in regular consultations with community members in the DRC. Community members acknowledged the UN’s efforts to foster dialogue, with some even offering positive evaluations of their collaborative encounters with MONUSCO. On the whole, however, many Congolese community
members remain dissatisfied with the content of discussions between UN and community actors. Leaders explained that collaborative meetings often resembled ceremonial affairs with little practical substance (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). While leaders conceded that on several occasions UN Staff did ask for their input, they had yet to see their suggestions integrated into MONUSCO’s practices. Additionally, leaders repeatedly identified government consultations as a priority for the UN, while describing community consultations as a secondary consideration for MONUSCO (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014). Rather than including communities as partners in strategy development, the mission’s approach to collaboration appears reactive, as rural instability pushes MONUSCO staff to enlist the support of rural communities:

“When they arrived, they did not consult us or ask our opinion. They simply came and starting working without asking what the population here needed. That is why they did not succeed” (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014).

“There is also a problem of strategy. Normally they should create a strategy and ask us for our input upon their arrival.” (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014).

Community members recognized that the UN’s default method of operations involved consulting government sources first and local communities only when necessary. Additionally, local leaders did not “buy in” to the nature of these community consultations. Respondents described the meetings as largely ceremonial in nature and lacking in real substance. One leader summarized his distaste for the apparent lack of purpose in many of the consultations:

“I meet them often at ceremonies. They hold different ceremonies where they serve food to people who attend” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

The leader’s response does not depict a congenial relationship between the UN and Congolese communities, but rather a community members savvy to the UN’s use of collaborations to enhance the mission’s public image. Interview respondents cited a lack of
substance in interactions as reasons for the sustained counterproductive relationship between the UN and local residents in rural South Kivu, DRC.

The comments of one Congolese national and UN employee, a language consultant, corroborate the views of community members regarding a lack of meaningful inclusion at the highest level of UN deliberations. Referring to a series of mass rapes in the summer of 2014 in Uvira, a community near Bukavu in South Kivu, DRC, the consultant said,

“If the UN were in touch with those who actually endure these atrocities, they would be better able to develop solutions. As it stands, they develop elaborate strategies in New York. The impacts of these ready-made projects so far are invisible and insignificant” (UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014).

The consultant expresses an opinion shared by Congolese community representatives: in order for consultations with local leaders to be productive and contribute constructively to peace building in the DRC, the UN must include these local leaders early in the strategy-development process and sincerely attempt to integrate community recommendations into UN practice.

In Global Shadows: Africa and the Neoliberal World Order, anthropologist James Ferguson leverages a similar critique against the “governance of Africa from afar” suggesting that the “international imperialism” of such agencies as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, UN agencies, and international NGOs serves to usurp the sovereignty of African states and their citizens (Ferguson 2006). Similarly, in The Grand Strategies of Humanitarianism, Michael Barnett and Jack Snyder address the tendency of peace building agencies to “rely on general models from their most recent experiences” when faced with complex conflict scenarios and tasked with constructing sustainable peace (Barnett and Snyder 2008, p.152). Decades of theory and practice attest to the ineffectual nature of “one size fits all” models developed in the West and transplanted onto African realities. If MONUSCO is to transcend a legacy of peace building failure in Congo, it is imperative that the mission learns to value substantive collaboration with Congolese civilians.
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Working Alongside FARDC

In his comprehensive historical account of the Congo, Dr. Georges Nzongola, details the ways that Mobutu’s authoritarian rule served to disempower the Congolese military. At its height in the Mobutu era, the DRC boasted impressive military prowess, with some elite Congolese soldiers even attending specialized training programs in the United States (Nzongola 2002). However, during the final years of Mobutu’s reign, as the dictator began to sense his loosening grip on power, the military began to decline along with its commander-in-chief.

Mobutu intentionally pitted paramilitary contingents against one another to ensure that no one group posed a threat to his rule (Nzongola 2002). One 2011 report produced by a coalition of international and community-based non-governmental organizations operating in eastern Congo, entitled Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, depicts the ways in which the Congolese security sector continues to operate below capacity. The report cites numerous occasions of FARDC collusion in human rights abuses and attacks on civilians. According to Taking a Stand, FARDC remains incapable of transcending a legacy of inadequacy due to lack of will for reform on the part of the Congolese government and lack of sufficient engagement and support on the part of the international community (Open Society Foundation 2011).

My conversations with UN personnel during qualitative interviews during my fieldwork reinforce this assessment of the FARDC as operating at sub-optimal capacity. When scholars speak of security sector reform in the DRC, they often include both the Congolese military (FARDC) and the national police force (PNC, Cakaj 2010). This study directs attention to the FARDC and the peace-building burden the force shares with MONUSCO. MONUSCO and the FIB remain legally obligated to collaborate with the FARDC in pursuit of armed groups in eastern Congo.

Contributors to the report include the African Association of Human Rights, The Congolese Network for Security Sector Reform, Groupe Lotus, the League of Voters, the Intercultural Institute for Peace in the Great Lakes Region, the Eastern Congo Initiative, the Enough Project, the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Refugees International, the International Federation for Human Rights, the European Network for Central Africa, the Ecumenical Network for Central Africa, and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
eastern DRC. In this manner, capacity shortfalls within the FARDC pose a greater impact on MONUSCO’s efficacy than do any shortcomings within the PNC.

Several MONUSCO staff referenced the poor living conditions of soldiers and the government’s failure to pay troops on a consistent basis. Such a sense of desperation, the respondents reasoned, does much to explain the motives behind FARDC abuse and exploitation of Congolese civilians (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014; UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014; UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 2014). The opinions of these respondents match data cited in a report by the Enough Project detailing army abuses of Congolese civilians in Congo’s northeastern provinces (Cakaj 2010). Capacity development may in fact limit human rights violations on the part of the FARDC and the PNC.

The majority of UN staff, both foreign and Congolese, recognize that MONUSCO’s mission relies on collaboration between the UN and state authorities. (UN Community Liaison Officer, interview, June 2014). Interview respondents also recognize that while collaboration is necessary, it also poses a threat to effective peacekeeping operations, particularly in areas where FARDC capacity is weakest. In assessing MONUSCO’s overall success, a Senegalese political affairs officer working from the mission’s provincial headquarters in Bukavu said,

“An analysis of MONUSCO’s success requires nuance. Most of MONUSCO’s activities are done in collaboration with the national government. MONUSCO has its objectives, but implementation of these objectives requires [cooperation with] local partners. As MONUSCO, we do not determine all of the factors that influence success” (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014).

FARDC inadequacy may in fact offer a convenient scapegoat to deflect attention away from the UN’s own shortcomings. However, given that host-country collaboration remains a crucial predictor of success in peacekeeping initiatives, any failure on the part of the FARDC necessarily affects the work and effectiveness of MONUSCO (Boutros-Ghali 1992). One Swedish civilian observer, who worked with a UN joint police monitoring team in 2010, described how lack of capacity on the part of the Congolese police force (PNC) impacted the work of her team.
“[I was part of a] Swedish-funded project aiming to send civilian observers to work in a joint monitoring team together with the police. We would work with Congolese police and local authorities to follow up on human rights issues. My specific task concerned sexual and gender-based violence. It was my job to ensure that [local authorities] had information about sexual violence. My perspective was more of a theoretical one, as I am a civilian and not a police officer. Our job was to assist MONUC in going out into the field to report on human rights violations, sexual violence, and child protection issues. That was what we were doing in theory. In practice, we had some constraints. For example, we were supposed to be deployed in the field and to actually be based in the field, but we ended up staying in Bukavu. There were police reforms in the Kivus as part of the stabilization plan for eastern Congo. At the time I worked for MONUC, the newly trained police who had been through these reforms had not yet arrived in South Kivu. This meant that there was not actually a counterpart for us to work with. Instead, we went out and prepared for the arrival of the newly trained police. We could not go into the field because we did not have the support of the newly trained police force” (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014).

This observer’s experience highlights the impact that national security-sector shortfalls have on MONUSCO’s ability to operate effectively. In the previous chapter, I addressed shortfalls internal to MONUSCO. Even in the absence of these internal limitations, MONUSCO’s potential would remain limited by security sector shortfalls, given that the mission’s objectives hinge on collaboration with local authorities. Where military operations require cooperative effort between MONUSCO peacekeepers and the FARDC, rural Congolese civilians bear the burden of perpetual violence and instability in areas lacking sufficient FARDC preventative presence (Oxfam 2014, UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014).

As a collective security organization, the UN works through a framework of respect for national sovereignty, only breaching the authority of sovereign states in cases where these states fail to fulfill their protective duties toward citizens (ICISS 2001). Even in cases warranting UN intervention, the UN prizes collaboration with local authorities rather than isolated intervention (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In the short term, MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians depends, at least in part, on its ability to cooperate with local security forces. In the long term, the ability of the Congolese state to protect civilians from internal and external threats also depends on a robust security sector (Nzongola 2002, 2014a).
A two-tier solution may go far in addressing the dilemma of security sector inadequacy in the DR Congo. To address immediate threats to civilians, MONUSCO must attain the freedom to operate unilaterally in contexts in which FARDC shortcomings effectively prohibit the mission from protecting Congolese civilians. This freedom must only apply in emergency situations where FARDC inadequacy presents the only obstacle to MONUSCO’s success in protecting civilians and where unilateral operations pose a near certain probability of success.

Understanding the long-term implications of the health of the Congolese security sector, increased “emergency freedom” for MONUSCO must be granted alongside continuous training and capacity-building efforts for FARDC and the PNC. While the UN’s investment in the Congolese security sector represents years of international concern for reform, it is imperative for this issue to remain a top MONUSCO priority in the coming months and years. Current projects and initiatives to increase national security capacity include military training and human rights sensitization programs for the FARDC and the PNC (UN Team Leader of Interpreters, interview, July 2014; UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014; UN News Centre 2014). While these programs build the long-term capacity of the Congolese security sector and should be sustained and improved, the programs do little to address immediate security threats to Congolese civilians.

As MONUSCO focuses on neutralizing armed groups in Congo’s eastern provinces, such neutralization must not occur at the expense of strengthening local military and police capacity. Should Congo’s immediate security needs-and MONUSCO’s subsequent military response-detact emphasis from security sector development, any military operations by MONUSCO are likely to be counterproductive in the long term. Preliminary evidence for this assertion may be found in the resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel militia in North Kivu in the fall of 2014. While the UN and the FARDC effectively banished the group from Congo in the spring of 2014 following a string of military offensives, the group resurfaced as a potent threat to civilians in Beni, North Kivu several months later. Expressing frustration at persistent instability
in North Kivu, local residents commented that the September and October 2014 ADF attacks occurred in communities that exist in close proximity to FARDC bases (Radio Okapi 2014b). To provide for the long-term stability of Congolese communities, FARDC must possess the capacity to prevent and respond effectively to similar attacks in the future.

**MONUSCO’s Collaboration Dilemma**

Where Chapter 3 addressed MONUSCO’s internal failings, Chapter 4 presented additional key challenges to the mission’s ability to protect civilians. This second set of challenges arises from the mission’s attempts to collaborate with local authorities in eastern Congo. In this analysis, I identified two primary collaborative dilemmas for MONUSCO. The first concerns MONUSCO’s preference for high-level political relationships, at the expense of substantive working relationships with Congolese community members. I stressed the significance of this unfortunate prioritization through detailing the extent to which, given the country’s current political context, one cannot assume that elected officials in the DRC accurately represent the needs of Congolese civilians.

A second and equally challenging limitation concerns capacity shortcomings within the Congolese security sector and the way that these shortcomings transcend national security capacity to impact the success of MONUSCO. MONUSCO’s operations, and in fact UN operations more generally, remain collaborative in nature. The UN’s collaborative model of peacekeeping means that any shortcoming in national capacity poses the potential to prevent the UN from achieving its objectives in any given country. In the case of the DRC, where collaborative civilian protection efforts feature prominently in the UN mission’s mandate in the country, such limitations gain added significance.
Chapter V: Conclusion

MONUSCO remains the UN’s largest, most expensive, and longest-running peacekeeping force (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). With an estimated 5-6 million fatalities since 1994, the conflict in eastern DRC remains the world’s deadliest since the conclusion of the Second World War. MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians-and thus prevent fatalities-is the subject of this study. An analysis of peacekeeping philosophy and a brief overview of the historical roots of the conflict in Congo provide a framework through which to assess MONUSCO’s current operations.

MONUSCO’s current mandate, which dates to UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013), stipulates that the mission must protect civilians, neutralize armed groups, limit trade in illicit arms, and support state judicial processes to uphold the rule of law. The resolution additionally provides for the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) a specialized offensive battalion uniquely tasked to neutralize militias. Finally, the 2013 resolution grants MONUSCO the authority to capitalize on drone surveillance technology to monitor human rights abuses (UNSC 2013). MONUSCO’s four objectives aim at quelling simmering violence in DR Congo’s eastern provinces, conceptualized here as North and South Kivu and Orientale. The UNSC reaffirmed these objectives, and MONUSCO’s expanded authority, by issuing UNSC Resolution 2147 (2014). This study focuses on MONUSCO’s first mission objective: the protection of civilians.

Given the increase in authority afforded to MONUSCO by Resolutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014), this study examines the extent to which greater latitude for MONUSCO translates into peace dividends for Congolese civilians. In addition to external research data and current news from the DRC, I rely on a series of semi-structured interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff (foreign and Congolese). Interviews offer insight into assessments of MONUSCO’s prior and current performance, and address the tangible impact of the 2013 resolution.
In this study, I present the following question: to what extent has an increase in MONUSCO’s peacekeeping authority, as contained in UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), translated into an increased capacity to protect civilians? In response, I argue that while assessments of MONUSCO do in fact reflect observable progress in the mission’s capacity to protect civilians, these capacity developments fall short both of initial enthusiasm accompanying Resolution 2098 and of “peace dividends” - measurable increases in civilian security - that might be reasonably expected in the nearly 1.5 years from March 2013 until the time of data collection (June and July 2014). To explain the gap between expected and observed progress, I offer several characteristics of MONUSCO’s current operations. On one dimension, I contest that the mission possesses three key internal shortcomings that limit its ability to adequately fulfill its primary objective - the protection of Congolese civilians. These limitations include lack of uniformity in the internalization of human rights norms among Congolese troops, a geographic mismatch between the concentration of violence and the concentration of MONUSCO resources, and shortcomings in peacekeeping troop quality.

A second argument addresses problems with the ways in which MONUSCO collaborates with the Congolese state. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) that effective collaboration with the host country serves as a necessary condition for the success of any UN mission (Boutros-Ghali 1992). MONUSCO’s current strategy for collaboration with the Congolese state proves problematic on two levels. The mission’s collaborative efforts ultimately fail because UN staff prioritizes collaboration with Congolese political elites and government institutions at the expense of inclusive consultation with Congolese communities. Secondly, the structure of the UN mission requires that peacekeepers work in tandem with the Congolese military (FARDC) in pursuit of armed groups. To the extent that FARDC lacks the capacity to protect Congolese civilians through confronting and eliminating armed militias, FARDC’s shortcomings thus constrain MONUSCO’s ability to achieve its primary objective.
Internal Limitations: MONUSCO’s Structural Failures

MONUSCO’s civilian protection potential remains limited by three primary internal shortcomings: a lack of uniform standards for the implementation of human rights norms, the seemingly illogical arrangement of MONUSCO resources relative to the nature of the current conflict in the DRC, and limitations related to peacekeeping troop quality.

MONUSCO’s presence in the DRC traces its origins to the early 21st century. At the same time, a flurry of scholarship and activism brought a critical eye to the goals and methods of international peacekeeping, most notably through the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and the development of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P (ICISS 2001, Power 2003). The evolution of MONUSCO’s peacekeeping mandates parallel an evolution in the international peacekeeping conversation, reflecting a transition away from preventing violence between states and toward an imperative to protect individual civilians from human rights abuses committed by states and non-state actors (Mansson 2005, ICISS 2001, Goldstein 2011). MONUSCO’s current mandate, in placing unprecedented emphasis on the protection of civilians, represents the current manifestation of these evolving norms.

Despite the centrality of protecting the human rights of individual civilians as contained in Resolutions 2098 and 2147, and despite growing agreement on the importance of civilian protection, gaps still exist in understanding among UN peacekeepers concerning how such norms might be implemented in eastern DRC. Interview respondents—both UN staff and Congolese community members—express frustration at the lack of uniform standards for UN intervention on behalf of civilians. Respondents add that no accountability mechanism requires peacekeepers to intervene.

The absence of uniform understanding of intervention standards and the definition of “civilian protection” limit the ability of MONUSCO troops to intervene on behalf of civilians. On an organizational level, the mission’s geographic distribution of resources has to date limited MONUSCO’s capacity to effectively protect civilians. The majority of armed groups in today’s
DRC operate in rural, sparsely populated areas in the country’s eastern provinces. In contrast, MONUSCO retains a disproportionately large share of its resources in Kinshasa, the nation’s capital, located in the far west of the DRC. Additionally, mission resources and troops remain concentrated in urban provincial capitals such as Goma and Bukavu (MONUSCO at a Glance 2014). In late spring 2014, the mission began a large-scale shift of resources from Kinshasa to Congo’s eastern provinces (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014). Such a shift represents an overdue development, and the tangible consequences of this shift remain to be seen.

In addition to shortcomings surrounding uniformity in intervention and in geographic organization of resources, troop-level capacity shortfalls continue to limit MONUSCO’s effectiveness. Assessments by UN staff and Congolese community representatives reveal a lack of uniformity in troop skill level and readiness, systemic lack of commitment on the part of UN troops, and a lack of trust between UN troops and Congolese civilians. Regardless of the quality of high-level leadership, the degree of international political will, or the financial resources of the mission, the success of MONUSCO depends at least in part on the quality of peacekeeping troops.

**Collaboration on the Ground: Poorly Placed Priorities**

Contemporary and independence-era criticisms of the UN’s operations in Congo undoubtedly cast doubt on the “neutrality” of the organization, suggesting an allegiance to Western interests (Fanon 1969, De Witte 2001, Nzongola 2012). Potential ulterior motives notwithstanding, however, MONUSCO does in fact expend effort to engage with the host government in the DRC. Rather than an absolute lack of collaboration, problems arise with the way that MONUSCO chooses to prioritize its relationships with stakeholders in the DRC. The mission’s preference for elite-level political consultations reflects the legacy of past UN operations in their deference to host governments (Boutros-Ghali 1992, ICISS 2001). However,
in the Congo, such consultations often serve to systemically exclude Congolese communities. While community members do in fact report efforts by MONUSCO to promote dialogue, these reports reveal that such consultations categorically lack substance. Community members do not witness their recommendations put into practice by MONUSCO personnel. This leads some community members to conclude that the UN’s efforts to collaborate with Congolese communities prove a shallow attempt to feign inclusion.

The political context in today’s Congo renders the UN’s preference for political collaboration particularly shortsighted. Much of Congolese citizens feel that their current government does not adequately reflect the will of the Congolese people and is not responsive to their needs (Stearns 2011, Radio Okapi 2014a).

On a logistical level, substandard performance by the FARDC likewise constrains MONUSCO’s civilian protection capacity. This occurs as the mission must collaborate with FARDC in pursuit of armed groups in eastern Congo. Thus areas where the FARDC lacks resources or capacity necessarily entail limitations for MONUSCO. While MONUSCO may possess the internal capacity to protect Congolese civilians or neutralize an armed group in a given situation, if the FARDC is not present, MONUSCO cannot operate.

**Tourists in Blue Helmets: Shortchanging Congolese Civilians**

This study finds that, despite minor improvements in mission capacity following the release of UNSC Resolution 2098, MONUSCO displays a perpetual failure to meet its primary objective: the protection of Congolese civilians. This failure arises both from the internal limitations of MONUSCO as well as from complexities with the dynamics of collaboration between MONUSCO and the Congolese state. While perpetual shortfalls do cast doubt on the credibility of MONUSCO, UN peacekeeping, and perhaps even the UN as an organization, Congolese civilians stand suffer the greatest losses if MONUSCO’s capacity to fulfill its objectives continue to fall short of the text of its mandate.
“MONUSCO pretends to come and bring peace. What people expect them to do is to come and bring peace, but sometimes they have their own agenda. We are really in need of peace. In the east of Congo, we have a lot of problems and a lot of challenges. When we were told that there would be a mission devoted to all of these problems, we thought that maybe things would change. What we see in the field and what people are expecting are two very different things” (UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014).

This language consultant’s statement reflects a pervasive opinion among Congolese civilians that the UN fails to deliver on its promises. More alarmingly, the consultant suggests a discrepancy between MONUSCO’s explicit objective— to “protect, stabilize, and consolidate peace”— and the mission’s underlying agenda. The consultant’s claims do not lack historical precedent, particularly in the Congolese case. In Toward an African Revolution (1969) Frantz Fanon writes,

“It is not true to say that the UN fails because the cases are difficult. In reality the UN is a legal card used by the imperialist interests when the card of brute force has failed” (Fanon 1969, p. 195).

Fanon here references the complicity of ONUC in Belgium’s neo-colonial occupation of Katanga province and other parts of the Congo in the 1960s. In Lumumba Speaks (1961) and The Assassination of Lumumba (2001), Patrice Lumumba and Ludo De Witte, respectively, additionally implicate the UN as key player in the U.S.-Belgian plot to eliminate Congo’s first prime minister and inspire the rise of General Mobutu. The ONUC mission ostensibly operated in an effort to restore law and order following a succession of post-independence crises in July 1960: the Congolese National Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) mutiny, the secession of Katanga province under Moise Tshombe, and the subsequent occupation of the region by Belgian troops. In his capacity as Prime Minister, Lumumba initially requested UN intervention in response to Belgium’s violation of Congolese sovereignty (Lumumba 1961). The mission quickly deviated from its ostensibly neutral role, prolonging Belgian occupation and undermining Lumumba’s political authority (Lumumba 1961, De Witte 2001).

While perhaps unfair to superimpose the sins of ONUC onto its 21st century successor, MONUSCO, the criticisms of Fanon, De Witte, and Lumumba remain worthy of careful
consideration, particularly given contemporary doubts regarding the UN’s motives in the Congo (Congolese Community Members, interview, June 2014; Nzongola 2012). The fact remains that the interests of powerful, wealthy countries prevail at the United Nations: for its part, the United States funds nearly 30% of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget (Power 2015). 3 out of the 5 permanent seats on the UNSC belong to Western governments (UNSC 2015). In this climate of disproportionate influence, scrutiny must be applied to the motives behind UN peacekeeping decisions.

Whether due to a Western-dominated sub-agenda or more benignly to practical mission shortcomings, the fact remains that MONUSCO represents a perpetual unfulfilled promise to many Congolese civilians. At best, the mission’s well-meaning initiatives fall short of tangibly benefitting Congolese civilians. At worst, MONUSCO represents a 15-year, billion-dollar façade, a mockery of peace where Congolese civilians remain the butt of a cruel joke.

“We can tell you about their mandate because we hear what they tell us in the different meetings we attend. But if you ask other civilians who do not attend these meetings, they will tell you that MONUSCO troops are like tourists. They just come to visit and to steal riches from Congo. They are ‘working’ but they are not doing anything.” (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014).

While the comparison of UN peacekeepers to tourists might exaggerate the nature of MONUSCO’s inadequacy, the reflection by this community member channels years of frustration on the part of Congolese civilians in response to the unfulfilled promise of peace. In the nearly 1.5 years since MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate granted the mission increased power and authority to protect civilians in eastern DRC, the current slow rate of progress suggests that the mission is on track for yet another failed promise. If the international community is to make good on its promise to work with the DRC toward sustainable peace, MONUSCO cannot afford to neglect its internal shortcomings, nor can it fail to reform its strategy for working collaboratively with Congolese institutions.
The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the Protection of Congolese Civilians

References


The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the Protection of Congolese Civilians


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The Promise of Peace: UNSC Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and the Protection of Congolese Civilians


Interview Script: UN Personnel

- How long have you worked for the United Nations (UN)?
- What do you claim as your nationality?
- How long have you worked for the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)?
- Describe your work with MONUSCO. What are your primary responsibilities?
- What is your understanding of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)?
- From your perspective, has MONUSCO been successful in fulfilling this mandate? Why or why not?
- Do you have an opinion on how MONUSCO might become more effective in fulfilling its mandate? Please elaborate.
- What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of MONUSCO?
- Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your community in some way? Please describe these situations.
- In your opinion, what are the most significant positive achievements of MONUSCO to date?
- In your opinion, how have the activities of MONUSCO changed during your time with the mission (if they have not changed, you may state that you do not feel they have changed)?
- In your opinion, has MONUSCO become more or less effective during this time?
Interview Script for Congolese Community Members

- Have you ever had a first-hand encounter with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces? If so, please describe.

- How often would you say that you interact with UN forces? Please describe the nature of these interactions.

- What is your understanding of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)?

- From your perspective, has MONUSCO been successful in fulfilling this mandate? Why or why not?

- Do you have an opinion on how MONUSCO might become more effective in fulfilling its mandate? Please elaborate.

- What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of MONUSCO?

- Have you observed any situations in which UN peacekeepers have harmed your community in some way? Please describe these situations.

- Have you witnessed any positive outcomes from the activities of UN peacekeepers in your community? Please be as specific as possible.

- To the best of your knowledge, how long have UN peacekeeping forces been active in your community?

- Have you noticed any changes in the activities of UN peacekeepers over the course of this time? Please elaborate.

- In your opinion, has MONUSCO become more or less effective during this time? Why?
Map 1.1: UN and Armed Group Presence in the DRC