ingest cdrApp 2017-07-05T20:20:04.945Z d36eae88-cb6b-42c1-ba08-197eadfa9868 modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:44:13.058Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:44:21.026Z Setting exclusive relation addDatastream MD_TECHNICAL fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:44:29.275Z Adding technical metadata derived by FITS modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:44:44.826Z Setting exclusive relation addDatastream MD_FULL_TEXT fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:44:53.004Z Adding full text metadata extracted by Apache Tika modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT fedoraAdmin 2017-07-05T20:45:08.733Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue RELS-EXT cdrApp 2017-07-06T11:39:06.378Z Setting exclusive relation modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-01-25T07:34:57.132Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-01-27T07:59:44.762Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-03-14T04:27:15.699Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-05-17T16:08:12.678Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-11T02:54:02.813Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-07-17T23:13:33.579Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-08-15T19:22:58.903Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-09-21T19:43:41.569Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-09-26T23:03:16.253Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2018-10-11T23:35:44.574Z modifyDatastreamByValue MD_DESCRIPTIVE cdrApp 2019-03-20T17:25:03.310Z Eric Sampson Author Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. Spring 2017 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. Spring 2017 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. Spring 2017 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017-05 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Degree granting institution Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism; Disagreement; Epistemic Peer; Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Degree granting institution Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism, Disagreement, Epistemic Peer, Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Eric Sampson Creator Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of Conciliationism, too. 2017 Epistemology Conciliationism; Disagreement; Epistemic Peer; Rationality eng Master of Arts Masters Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Graduate School Degree granting institution Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Thesis advisor Russ Shafer-Landau Thesis advisor Ram Neta Thesis advisor text 2017-05 Sampson_unc_0153M_16930.pdf uuid:0366cf63-878f-41ee-a1e5-ebf517ac978f proquest 2017-04-12T18:54:32Z 2019-07-05T00:00:00 application/pdf 435593 yes