Lessons From Bosnia: The Birth of the ESDP

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Abstract

Cynthia Vanessa Palmerin: Lessons From Bosnia: The Birth of the ESDP
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The handling of the Bosnian War was a complete failure and humiliation for the EU. They were forced to face the tragedies that were caused by their inability to act more decisively. The events surrounding the war convinced EU leaders that it was time to rethink European security. They created the European Security Defense Policy, designed to unify the diverse opinions of member states under one common foreign security policy. The new policy was to provide the EU with the necessary tools to prevent or manage regional conflict should it arise again. Fifteen years after Bosnia, the ESDP continues to grow and is showing signs of success. With a few more years of continued support it can become a fully effective foreign policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The republic of brotherhood and unity that Josip Broz Tito, the man who brought about the unification of Yugoslavia, worked so hard to establish and cultivate began to unravel with his death in 1980. By 1991, the delicate equilibrium that existed within the Republic of Yugoslavia was rapidly deteriorating. With Slovenia and Croatia’s declaration of independence in the summer of 1991, the country was on the brink of civil war. Nationalistic rhetoric was used to fuel ethnic conflict by Serbian and Croatian governments alike, each looking to seize and consolidate a political power base amidst the turmoil (Silber & Little, 1996). By 1992, Slovenia had settled its territorial disputes with Yugoslavia—having gained its independence virtually unharmed—while the Croatians and the Serbians on the other hand, were preparing themselves for a full-scale military conflict. Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman used nationalist sentiment to mobilize extreme elements among their respective minority groups in both Croatia and Bosnia (Carmichael, 2002). The goal was to seize land and carve out an ethnically homogenous “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Serbia” on the basis of ethnic claims. In addition to reclaiming what were previously considered Croatian and Serbian territories, both sides were looking to annex Bosnian lands. Meanwhile, European powers were actively seeking a diplomatic resolution to these deep-seated territorial disputes. In their attempts to avoid a full-scale war, European powers underestimated Milosevic’s aspiration for a “Greater Serbia” his
willingness to use and promote ethnic violence. This paper will focus on the inadequate intervention of European powers in this conflict and, in may instances, their utter failure to proved any response or support whatsoever.

The wars triggered by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the events surrounding these wars were regarded by many as Europe’s opportunity to display its ability to negotiate peace and promote democracy. Instead, a political disaster ensued, which caused the European powers to rethink their approach to regional security. In this paper, I will examine the futile attempts made by European powers to intervene in the Bosnian War. I will argue that the events that transpired in Bosnia forced European leaders to recognize that their attempts to end the war were utter failures. Not only could they not agree on an effective strategy for the region, but they also lacked the military capability to carry out such a plan.

The crisis in Bosnia demonstrated the importance of working together to the European nations, and it underscored the necessity of developing a common security policy that, in the future, could unilaterally deal with such conflicts. Europe’s inability to bring about a peaceful resolution in this situation reiterated the need to overhaul their security structures, which, in turn, led to the inception of a new security policy: the CFSP/ESDP. The aim of the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) was to prevent another regional conflict from occurring and to provide the European Union (EU) with the capabilities to deal with a conflict – sans the aid of the U.S. and NATO – should one occur. I argue that the events surrounding the Bosnian war helped shape the CFSP/ESDP. I further assert that the strength of the policy has been rendered weak
due to the EU’s inability to bridge the gap between the security policies of each individual state and the common foreign security policy of the collective. Furthermore, as the EU works toward improving the coherence between the individual and common policy, the scope of the ESDP continues to change. However it must still grapple with the lack of support it receives from EU members.

This thesis is divided into five parts. Before I move on to the core of the paper, it is imperative to first examine the events that led up to the Bosnian conflict in order to illustrate the reasons why Europe’s attempts to mediate in the conflict failed. I will then argue that these failures provided the foundation to move toward a cooperative European security policy. In the second section, I discuss, the roles of the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the conflict and their influence over the direction that European powers took following the outbreak of war in Bosnia. The EU, after all, is not solely to blame for the military and political failures during the Bosnian War. The shortcomings of the UN and NATO during the conflict also had a direct impact on how Europe would reshape its security policy. In the third section, I explore the consequences of Europe’s actions in Bosnia and how they shaped some of the new policies that emerged, such as the CFSP and the ESDP. In understanding the new policies enacted by Europe, I am able to analyze why the CFSP/ESDP is ineffective in dealing with future problems in the region. In the fourth section, I discuss the changes that the CFSP/ESDP has undergone since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, I conclude with the EU’s role in the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and examine the function of the CFSP/ESDP in these situations.
Chapter 2
UN, NATO Role in Bosnia

The role of the UN and NATO had a significant impact on the development of the CFSP/ESDP. The events that unfolded in Bosnia under the supervision of the UN and NATO contributed to Europe’s new perspective on security after the initial failings of the EU, as regards the Bosnian conflict. Thus, it is important to fully understand how the Bosnian war led to the creation of a new security policy. In order to gain full perspective on the conflict, references will not be limited to journal articles, books and news media but will also include a CNN film documentary that includes interviews with some of the key players involved in the Bosnian conflict.

Europe was not the only political force in the international community with their credibility at stake. This was also the time for NATO and the UN to demonstrate their efficacy as international institutions capable of handling conflict and mediating peace agreements. Yet, much like the individual European states and the collective EU, neither NATO nor the UN was capable of handling the situation unilaterally. Both institutions were unable or lacking the capabilities to handle the dilemma that Bosnia presented. The UN and NATO did not realize that the relationship they had was a symbiotic one. Without resolutions and the mandates from the UN, NATO would not have a legitimate reason to intervene in the conflict. Likewise, without NATO, the UN would not have the military capabilities to enforce any of their resolutions or mandates. Together, they had the means to step in and intervene in
conflicts, but as demonstrated in Bosnia, the process is slow and often ineffective. Every decision must be passed down from one chain of command to the next. For example, the first UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that brought the UN into the conflict was UNSCR 713 (United Nations, 1991), it was signed on September 25, 1991, and called for an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. However, NATO forces were not brought in until 1992 by the UN – initially to help monitor the compliance of UN resolutions, including UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 713, 757 and 781 (NATO, 2009).

Bosnia required a quick and decisive response to what was occurring on the ground, namely the mass murder of Bosniaks that had been left nearly defenseless by the 1991 arms embargo. The UN, however, was slow to respond and when it did, it passed mandates that would simply be ignored by the Bosnian Serbs who had learned early on not to fear any retribution. These mandates had been limiting, providing the UN and NATO neither the troops nor the power to do anything other than strongly “condemn” or “reaffirm” the unlawfulness of acts of ethnic cleansing and other violent acts aimed at civilians (United Nations, 1993). The UN would pass one mandate to reaffirm another mandate, neither of which would grant NATO authority to act. These unnecessary delays cost innocent lives and gave the Serbs many opportunities to gain ground.

UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan would later comment in a UN report that “the UN was wrong to declare it would only use NATO air power against the Serbs as a last resort…the UN Security Council should have approved more decisive and forceful action to prevent the unfolding horror…” (BBC-World, 1999). NATO—
mainly the U.S. who did not want to commit ground troops (BBC, 1995) was initially hesitant to play a role greater than to monitor the compliance of UN resolutions. Although, even if NATO had been more eager to engage, it still would not have had the authority to act without a UN resolution. The UN-NATO intervention, in particular the disastrous events surrounding the Srebrenica massacre, indicated a need for a cohesive security policy. After the failures of the UN-NATO, the EU realized it would not always be able to depend on outside institutions to get the job done efficiently or step forward willingly. It was evident that they needed to work on creating a common security body within itself that could deal with future conflicts more effectively.

On February 21, 1992 the UN passed resolution 743 for UN peacekeepers to intervene and carry out missions; this group was known as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), but the UN failed to provide them with the tools to effectively carry out their missions. Beginning in 1993, the UN established “no-fly” zones and “safe havens” through UNSC resolutions 781 and 819, respectively, beginning in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and later extending it to five other Bosnian towns. The UN mandate, however, was very limited, the UNPROFOR was unable to use force either in self-defense or for the defense of UN “safe areas.” By the end of the war, Serbs had attacked three of these areas: Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica, despite the fact that they were under the protection of the UN (Glenny, 2001, p.641). The first of the areas that the UN and NATO failed to protect was Srebrenica. A primary factor for their joint failure was their lack of support in the enforcement of UNSCRs. UNSCR 836, which was passed June 4 1993 called on NATO to provide closer air
support to UNPROFOR in and around the UN safe areas (NATO, 2009). Yet, the implementation of UNSCR 836 turned out to be a contentious matter with the U.S. favoring air strikes as a means of enforcement and the European Powers, in particular Britain and France, were reluctant to utilize air strikes for fear of further exposing the already vulnerable peacekeepers they had on the ground (Beale, 1996). This would be a recurring theme that would later only make the UN and the European Governments look weak and easily manipulated.

In 1994, the Bosnian Serbs launched a new offensive by bombing a market in Sarajevo and killing 68 civilians with the blast (BBC, 1995). In response to this act of terror, NATO presented the Serbs with an ultimatum; either they pull back their heavy artillery from the Sarajevo area or face comprehensive airstrikes (Pomfret, 1994). The Bosnian Serbs willfully ignored the mandates and continued their offensive, forcing NATO’s hand. But before NATO could respond, Russia made a unilateral decision to intervene in the conflict by sending in troops of their own. The presence of the Russian troops made it impossible for NATO’s strike plan to come to fruition (BBC, 1995). As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia used its veto power to oppose aggressive military intervention, such as air strikes; they argued “to enter…on one side…would mean to come into conflict automatically with others, inside and outside Yugoslavia. And the conflict would grow into an all-European one” (Weller, Marc p.575). Although the Bosnian Serbs were forced to retreat from Sarajevo because of Russia’s actions, NATO and the rest of Western Europe lost their credibility to handle conflicts within their regional jurisdiction and came across as a weak peacekeeping entity.
Shortly thereafter, the Serbs began shelling Gorazde, the first of three UN designated “safe areas” they would lay siege upon. The UN Bosnian commander in charge, General Rose, chose to do nothing as the town suffered heavy fire, arguing that the Security Council Resolution only gave him the authority to deter attacks, not defend against them (Silber & Little, 1996). Serbs began to move in on Gorazde, at which point the UN no longer sat idly by. NATO finally responded with the first airstrike in its history, enabled under UNSCR 816, which directed UN participating countries, as well as NATO, to respond to violations of the no-fly zone that was established in Bosnia (NATO, 2009). This did not stop the Serbs; instead, the infuriated Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb General, retaliated by taking 150 UN soldiers hostage. In response to Serbia’s repeated transgressions, then current U.S. President Bill Clinton demanded that further NATO air strikes be carried out immediately. Conversely, UN special envoy Yashusi Akashi pushed to continue peacekeeping negotiations.

In spite of the fact that thousands of Bosnians were being murdered, the UN was still attempting to broker a ceasefire through diplomatic channels (BBC, 1995). By this time, the Serbs had learned to give little credence to the sanctions imposed by the international community, so they continued with their campaign against Bosnia undeterred. By the summer of 1995, the Serbian Army had taken control of Zepa and Srebrenica without causing much more international reaction than verbal indignation and the threat of air strikes, should Serbia assault any of the remaining designated safe areas (Hoffman, 1998).
The Bosnian Vice-President, Ejup Ganic stated in response to the role of the UN in Bosnia, “We were so happy when the UN arrived, but 10,000 civilians have been killed in Sarajevo alone, the UN stood by and watched…” (BBC, 1995). A similar incident occurred in the case of Srebrenica, which was the last of the major Bosnian towns taken over by the Serbs. The UN underestimated the resolve of the Bosnian Serbs, as it had before, thinking the UNPROFOR’s presence was enough to deter an offensive against the “safe-area.” Once again, the UN was powerless to deter violence in the Bosnian region when Mladic and his men moved into Srebrenica in early July of 1995. After a few days, the Bosnian Serbs were able to triumph and take control of the UN-protected area through the use of considerable force (van der Meulen & Soeters, 2005). Meanwhile, the 400 Dutch peacekeepers that the UN had in place to protect the people of Srebrenica were forced to look on, due to their lack of authorization to intervene, as 8,000 Muslim boys and men were rounded up and murdered (Herman, 2006). The genocide that took place in Srebrenica, as the nations of the UN fought amongst themselves and forced NATO troops to stand by idly awaiting orders, has been the worst in Europe since the second World War (BBC-World, 1999).

Unfortunately, it would take the Bosnian Serb offensive against Srebrenica to make the UN and the rest of the international community finally realize that a more aggressive approach was necessary. Sixteen nations met at the London conference to discuss new options for Bosnia and as a result of this conference, NATO was granted greater flexibility in operation and power to react to perceived threats. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali authorized UN military commander General Bernard
It was further agreed upon that NATO air strikes would be used in response to any future attacks on UN “safe havens,” as well as acts of Serb aggression. After years of inefficient bureaucratic protocol, the decision-making process between the UN and NATO was streamlined. By authorizing NATO troops to act independently from the UN, the obstacle that Russia presented to any future UNSCRs that would sanction air strikes was circumvented (Beale, 1996). Russia vehemently opposed the airstrikes against the Serbs, as they felt it would set a dangerous precedent for future conflicts (Carpenter, 1996). With plans in place to deal with the continuing transgressions of the Bosnian Serbs, both the UN and NATO were finally prepared to act. In early August of 1995, NATO launched a massive bombing campaign code named “Deliberate Force” against the Serbs (NATO, 2009). “Deliberate Force” would be the first of several air strike operations that would help bring the conflict to an end and open the door to peace negotiations.

Shortly after NATO’s intervention, the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians sat down to talks with the U.S. not the EU, UN or NATO. The negotiations were led by the American delegation under Richard Holbrooke and have been commonly referred to as ‘Pax Americana’ (Schwegmann, 2000, p. 6). After intense pressure from the international community, the three warring states signed the Dayton Peace Agreement in December of 1995. The failures of the UN and NATO, like those of the European Powers, provided the additional impetus that the EU needed to be convinced that a common security and foreign policy plan was necessary. Due to the repeated initial failures of the UN and NATO during the Bosnian conflict, the EU realized that they
not only lacked the capabilities to handle crises within their own region, but that
without an overhaul of the current peacekeeping institutions, like the UN and NATO,
they were ill prepared to handle future conflicts alone. A more effective and
organized security structure was necessary if the European region was to be a truly
independent power. What was born out of this necessity was the ESDP.
Chapter 3
Conflict and European Failures of Intervention

The conflict in Bosnia spans over four years, during which time the EU was heavily involved. The course of action taken by the Serbs, Croats and, to a lesser degree, the Slovenians, in 1991, led to the beginning of the EU’s involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts. It is from this point that I begin my description of the events surrounding the Bosnian War, including how and when the EU intervened. This section gives a detailed account of what transpired during those four years and examines the EU’s associated failures. There were multiple attempts to broker agreements among the warring factions, but the EU was unsuccessful in all its efforts. I then analyze how the miscalculations of EU member states caused them to miss the opportunity to deal with conflict in their own region without the aid of the United States. This is significant in that it establishes why the EU1 was finally able to recognize the need to institute new common security policies.

In 1991, the chairman of the European Council of Ministers, Jacques Poos, stated during his visit in what was then Yugoslavia, “this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans” (Dempsey, 2006). This was the time for the EU to show that they could handle conflict in their region without the intervention of the U.S or NATO. It is no secret that the Yugoslavia incident was in fact handled quite disastrously by the

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1 In order to remain clear and consistent throughout the paper I use the current name European Union (EU), although it was not formally changed from the European Community (EC) until 1993.
EU, and in the end it was the U.S military intervention via NATO that brought the war to an end. Still, before critiquing the EU too harshly, there are a few points to consider. When the conflict first surfaced, Europe was not the unified institution we think of today, as it had yet to make the leap from European Community (EC) to European Union (EU). It was not until this change was implemented that provisions were made for a unified and common foreign security policy. However, the necessary changes within the EC—not yet EU—would come in 1993 with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, a topic I will return to with greater detail.

In the second half of 1991, just as Slovenia and Croatia were declaring independence from Yugoslavia, the EU was preoccupied with its own internal negotiations over the treaty of Maastricht (BBC, 1995). Nevertheless, they split their attention and sent representatives to ascertain the many aspects of the Bosnian situation. The EU and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) exercised expedience in their involvement following the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence. However, these representatives were unable to deliver a common European strategy, due mainly to their inability to compromise effectively and, in part, because each individual state had differing national interests, thus undercutting the efforts of the rest. In short, these representatives failed to present a cohesive front. This was most apparent in 1991, when Germany disregarded the deliberations that were being carried out by the EU countries. Before the rest of the EU governments were able to make a collective decision, Germany stepped in and unilaterally recognized the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia (Hoffman, 1998). While Slovenia was able to walk away with very little opposition
to their newfound independence, Croatia had to face the Yugoslav army (JNA) and heavy political opposition.

The EU drew up various plans to settle the conflict, but they underestimated the willingness of the Serbian and Croatian governments to use force to settle their differences. Another issue that perhaps the EU had not expected was to have Croats and Serbs include Bosnian lands in the territory they were planning on carving out for themselves. The ethnic, nationalist rhetoric had been tossed around and was now being used by both Croats and Serbs to justify the occupation of Bosnian land, kick-starting another major conflict (Carmichael, 2002).

Bosnia began to make plans for secession from Yugoslavia shortly after Slovenia and Croatia’s move toward independence (Silber & Little, 1996). Their first move was to announce the referendum on independence that was to take place on February 29, 1992 (Burg & Shoup, 1999). One month prior, the representatives of the three nationalist parties had met to discuss the wording of the referendum. Among those representing the parties was Radovan Karadzic for the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Vlado Pandzic for the Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ) and representing the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the man who would become the first Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic.

Looking back now, it was evident from the beginning that an agreement would not be reached so easily, if at all. The Croats wanted to leave Yugoslavia completely, whereas the Serbs wanted to remain a part of the federation and Muslims were looking to secure Bosnia’s sovereignty (Silber & Little, 1996, p.211). The three sides also had a different idea as to how Bosnia should be governed, and whether or not the
three ethnic regions should be granted sovereignty. In addition, a debate erupted over
whether a constitutional agreement should accompany the referendum (Burg &
Shoup, 1999). Yet, before they could reach a consensus on any of the issues, the SDS
withdrew from the talks. The Serb withdrawal did not deter the SDA and HDZ from
adopting the proposal set forth by the SDA; namely, that Bosnia was a sovereign state
of its citizens, not of its ethnic groups (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 106). The SDS called
on all Serbs to boycott the referendum. Nevertheless, it passed with 62.8 percent of
total voters in Bosnia—not including Serbs—voting in favor of independence. The
referendum led to a declaration of independence; a move, which, from the Serb point
of view, was a step toward war (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.117). Two days after the
voting, a Serb wedding party was attacked, the father-in-law of the groom died and
another was wounded. The Serbs used it as a pretext to start barricading the streets
and cutting neighborhoods off from each other, ultimately paralyzing Sarajevo (Silber
& Little, 1996).

There is a dispute between the Serbs and Croats as to which group incurred the
first casualty of the Bosnian War, and consequently, who initiated what would
become the worst conflict in that region since World War II. The Serbs claim that the
Serb who was killed at the wedding in early March was the first casualty of the war,
while the Muslims argue that the first victim was Suada Dilberovic, a 21 year-old
medical student from Dubrovnik, studying at the University of Sarajevo (Silber
& Little, 1996). On April 5, Suada, along with thousands of Sarajevo citizens, gathered
in a peace march through Sarajevo, heading toward the town of Grbavica. Before
they could reach the town, they were met by Serb paramilitaries who opened fire on
the unarmed group. The next day, the EU recognized Bosnia’s independence, prompting Karadzic to proclaim the independent “Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (now Republika Srpska) (Silber & Little, 1996). A few days later, bombing began in Sarajevo.

In late April, after the outbreak of the Bosnian war, Europe made plans for a peace conference where they would propose the Carrington plan, named after its author, Lord Peter Carrington, which entailed a loose association among the Bosnian republics and arrangements for the protection of their respective minority groups. It would be the first of four plans that would be drafted and rejected before the final resolution of the Dayton agreement (Hoffman, 1998). The three opposing sides met in Lisbon to discuss the agreement, but after three days of futile negotiations, the talks ended and war ensued.

From the outset of the war, the Muslims of Bosnia were militarily at a disadvantage. As early as 1991, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 713, calling for an embargo on arms and military equipment to all of Yugoslavia (United Nations, 1991). Croatia was able to smuggle arms through the coast and the Serbs simply inherited the JNA’s arsenal, but the Muslims were left with very little resources. They urged the international community to either lift the ban or step in to defend the Muslim people who were left virtually defenseless (Silber & Little, 1996, p.198). Many of the EU countries and Russia were opposed to lifting the ban; they had troops on the ground and did not want the situation to escalate. Eventually, the international community would intervene in their defense; unfortunately it would be approximately three years too late.
In an attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement through diplomatic channels, the EU (in particular Britain and France) was very reluctant to declare the Serbs the aggressors. In order to avoid American pressure for an air campaign, they went to great lengths to downplay the atrocities and violations of the Bosnian Serbs (Williams, 1999, p.378). Meanwhile, thousands of civilians were being rounded up and murdered. U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke called it “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s” (Holbrooke, 1995, p.40). In 1994, while thousands of lives were claimed during egregiously brutal campaigns enacted by the Bosnian Serbs, in places like Gorazde and Zepa, (Williams, 1999) the European Union stood by and turned a blind eye, insisting upon remaining impartial and maintaining its neutrality. It wasn’t until 1995 that the EU finally agreed with NATO, taking a more aggressive stance against the Serbs in Srebrenica. Prior to this, EU members, in particular France and Britain who had troops on the ground in Bosnia, opposed hard-hitting responses such as air strikes.

Unfortunately EU intervention came too late, by the time a decision to act was made at least 8,000 Muslim men and boys had already been rounded up and slaughtered by the Serbs (European Union, 1996). It took three years of unadulterated violence and bloodshed culminating with one of the largest and most heinous massacres since the atrocities of World War II to finally spur the international community into action.

The EU’s—and UN—inability to recognize the severity of a crisis, and insist on using only diplomatic means when military action was necessary, resulted in complete and utter failure. They were unable to agree on a common position early
on, such as with the recognition of Croatia. Then, even when it was clear that Bosnian Serbs would stop at nothing, still the EU maintained its position of neutrality.

A common foreign policy during the war could have also helped save lives. At the very least the indiscriminate force they saw the Bosnian’s use against civilians, should have been cause for the EU to step in and insist on lifting the arms embargo. Again this is where a common strategy during the war could have helped bring a better outcome. Instead EU members acted individually and perhaps without carefully considering the consequences blocked NATO strikes that might have saved lives. By the end of a war where civilians had been the primary targets and victims, over 200,000 people had died, 20,000 were missing and 1.2 million were internally displaced (United Nations, 2011). What was supposed to be “the hour of Europe”, turned out to be the EU’s moment of humiliation and utter failure.
Chapter 4

The Origins of the CFSP and ESDP

Security in Europe falls within the realm of several regional and international organizations comprised of: NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and before the conflicts in Bosnia, the Western European Union (WEU) — whose functions and capabilities were transferred to the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) after the conclusion of the Bosnian War. The need for a common European defense policy became evident after the EU’s foreign policy and military capabilities fell short of deterring or stopping violence in Bosnia. The newly established CFSP would consequently pave the way for the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). I will look specifically at the CFSP and ESDP in order to illustrate the major security changes that occurred as a result of the Bosnian war.

References will be made to speeches and statements from EU leaders that discuss the failures of previous foreign policies, delineating potential reasons why the EU took the road that led them to the CFSP and ESDP. It is also helpful to draw on journal articles in order to describe the development of the CFSP/ESDP following the conflict that arose in Bosnia. These sources provide vital information in determining why these policies are ill-suited to dissuade future unrest.

The Origins of the CFSP

With the end of the Cold War, Western Europe entered a long debate over what direction it should take to maintain the defense and security of Western
Europe (Wouters & Neart, 2001). Meanwhile Yugoslavia was in the early stages of disintegration. After long talks and negotiations, they drafted the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty, as it is commonly referred to. It was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993 (European Union-Europa, 2007). The treaty created the European Union that consequently established the CFSP. Along with the European Community and the police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (PJC), the CFSP was one of the three pillars within the EU. This was one of the first efforts to reinforce the EU’s international position and attempt to create greater unity. Prior to this point, their foreign policy was left to individual member states. Foreign diplomacy and policies were left up to each individual country; therefore, getting all countries to agree upon a common approach was an extremely difficult undertaking. This was especially true after the start of the Yugoslav Wars, when European powers were looking to strengthen their own foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty designated the CFSP as the principle foreign security body of the EU, which facilitated defense cooperation among the various member states of the EU. Following the events of the Bosnian War, Europe delved deeper into its attempts for security consolidation, thus providing the CFSP greater strength with the creation of the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP).

As the tragedies of the war in Bosnia came into focus, it was evident that the “hour of Europe” had long run out. The terrible failures of the EU and the rest of the international community were further highlighted by a condemning UN report the Secretary General, Kofi Annan wrote in 1999 (BBC News, 1999). He criticized UN actions and said they stood by while genocide took place. The people of the enclaves
that were under the protection of UN “safe haven” resolution, thought the UN and NATO would protect them from mass murder. Instead, the UN allowed the Bosnian Serbs to over run them and take over towns like Srebrenica. He stated in his report that “[m]any of the errors the United Nations made flowed from a single and no doubt well-intentioned effort: we tried to keep the peace and apply the rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep” (BBC News, 1999). Despite the good intentions that the UN and NATO might have had, Bosnia still turned out to be a huge humiliation for them.

The Annan report was not just a reflection of the failure of the UN and NATO, but of the EU as well. The tragedy of the genocide in Srebrenica will haunt EU’s history forever. The only thing left for the EU to do at this point is to look at the grave errors they made and ensure that they never make the same mistakes. The first step toward keeping another Bosnia from occurring was to agree on a common security policy. British Prime Minister, John Major confirmed this during an interview when he was asked whether Europe’s failures in Bosnia was an issue that should be addressed through closer coordination among European countries. He agreed stating, “…this [Europe’s failures in Bosnia] is an important matter…it illustrates the kind of areas where the common foreign and security policy [CFSP] can exercise more influence than any country individually” (Major, 1995). It was clear after Bosnia that the direction the EU needed to take was toward a cohesive CFSP.

Since the Cold War, NATO has been the dominant military force that has overshadowed other single-security structures within Europe. It was not until the
Bosnian conflict that Europe realized the need to have an independent European security organization in place. Prior to the Bosnian War, Britain and France had been at odds as they were unable to agree upon what role a common defense policy should take within the framework of European foreign politics (Howorth, 2000). Then after the catastrophe surrounding Bosnia, which stemmed largely from their failure to act more decisively, both sides were forced to reexamine the EU’s shared security structure. It was evident that as the two European states with the greatest defense capabilities, they would have to come to some kind of agreement (Parry, 2008) if anything were to be done to improve the security structures of the EU.

It was not until the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 that Britain and France ultimately agreed to cooperative military action (Penksa & Mason, 2003). The summit was between Britain and France alone and did not involve the EU as an institution. It sent a clear message to the other members that it was time to step up the efforts in building an effective defense policy (Hoghton-Carter, 2009). It was a turning point in European security. The statement they issued reiterated the need to provide the EU with the resources necessary to act autonomously in future conflicts. The EU needed to be placed in a position where it could play its full role on the international stage (European Union, 1998). This was the first step toward establishing European military capabilities and means to administer security to the region outside of the NATO framework (European Union, 1998).

The cooperative efforts that followed the St. Malo summit allowed Europe to identify important areas of shared security and these once disparate countries began to work closely together. Arguably a direct consequence of the St. Malo declaration
(Hoghton-Carter, 2009), the Treaty of Nice signed and adopted in 2001 would also help the CFSP progress further along. The treaty allowed for the ratification of the CFSP, which provided the foundation for a common European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). It also reinforced the provisions that were set by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (to be explained later in detail) and extended them to the ESDP, who had yet to be established when the latter treaty was signed.

The Treaty of Nice is also significant, as it was the first treaty following St. Malo that brought closer and more decisive co-operation among all the member states. The EU was finally ready to make the changes necessary for a more cohesive security policy that would in the future be better equipped to handle conflict. Bosnia was a disaster, but the only way to avoid another catastrophe like it was to be better prepared. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder reiterated this sentiment during a speech stating, “Europe has become a model to show that after decades of blood enmity and murderous war, political and economic questions cannot be solved to the benefit of all by hegemony or national means, but only by working constantly together” (Schroder, 2001). The Treaty of Nice also further showed the EU’s commitment in establishing a stronger common security policy.

**Birth of ESDP**

The groundwork that would facilitate the emergence of the ESDP was set as early as 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Although the ESDP would not come into existence until 1999 with the adoption of the ‘Headline Goal,’ the former treaty had already placed the necessary tools that the ESDP would need to strengthen and help it

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2 Its name has since been changed to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP); however, for purposes of clarity and consistency throughout the paper it will continue to be referred to as ESDP.
move closer to its goals (Missiroli, 2003). The Amsterdam treaty incorporated new
tasks that were reinforced within the ESDP’s framework by the Treaty of Nice.
These tasks included humanitarian peacekeeping and rescue operations, in addition to
the use of combat forces in crisis management.

The ESDP was put in place to frame a common defense policy that could, in time,
lead to a more effective common security policy. Its aim was to develop civilian and
military capacities for conflict prevention and crisis management at the international
level. The arrival and growth of the ESDP was an indication of the EU’s readiness to
move toward more aggressive measures, marking a stark contrast to the stance they
took during the Bosnian War.

The next step the EU took was to develop military capabilities equipped with the
necessary resources and personnel. The ESDP would need a ready and able force that
it could deploy without having to consult the UN or NATO. This was important in
order to give the EU the ability to react quickly in a regional situation that required a
swift response. Such was the case in Bosnia, but the EU had failed to deliver in part
due to its own delayed response and due to the UN process that was stalled by
multiple countries. If the EU’s humanitarian and rescue operations were ever to be
effective in the future, it would need a response force that fell under the jurisdiction
of the ESDP.

In 1999, the “global objective,” or Helsinki Headline Goal, was established by
which “…the Union must be able to deploy up to 60,000 persons within 60 days and
for at least one year” (European Union, 2010). The idea was to get the member states
to commit to an ESDP force, also referred to as Rapid Reaction Force. It would not
only need to be deployable in a matter of days, but had to also be sustained for the period of time that was necessary for the success of a given mission. A commitment by the members meant supplying troops and resources for the military infrastructure such as tanks, aircraft, ships, command, control centers, unified logistics and supply systems (Hoghton-Carter, 2009). The initial political sentiment following the Headline Goal was that EU-led peacekeepers would be deployed ‘in and around Europe’ centering mostly in the Western Balkans (Missiroli, 2003). If it were necessary to send those same troops further away, then it would be purely for humanitarian operations and under the banner of the UN, not the EU.

The EU was able to meet the headline goals by 2003, but not without first turning to NATO for assistance. In December 2002, with the establishment of the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangement, the Rapid Reaction force of the ESDP was granted the use and release of NATO assets for EU-led operations (Missiroli, 2003). However, this did not mean that due to the utilization of NATO resources to fund operations that the EU peacekeeping organization would continue to be reliant on the U.S.; rather, that its identification of the type of security structure that is best suited to fit the needs of Europe as a collective set of states is similar to the collaborative strategy which is employed by NATO. To achieve such an end requires the type of infrastructure that will allow for the attainment of an organized military, by drawing on the capabilities of the various countries that comprise the EU.

So long as Europe continues to rely on NATO, it would never be able to deal with conflicts in the European region or obtain a capable native security system without the direct involvement of the United States. The Europe Union realized that it did not
posses the military capabilities to dispatch a force or pose a threat of any consequence when attempting to dissuade conflict (Gunning, 2001), a problem that the EU was looking to resolve by adding it to its expanding security agenda. They wanted to have the capacity to act in situations that US/NATO does not need to and does not want to get involved in. The idea of always being reliant on NATO and consequently the U.S. in regional conflicts became one of the driving forces that prompted closer cooperation among EU members on security matters. The EU wanted to have the capacity to act in conflict necessary and/or if NATO/U.S. or where they simply did not want to get involved.

Despite the responsibility and power each EU member grants the CFSP/ESDP, each state still retains the sovereign right to act independently in foreign affairs. Therefore, how much power the ESDP is granted has been a matter of much debate within the EU, in particular with Britain who has been a reluctant supporter of a common EU foreign policy (Howorth, 2000). Agreeing and implementing decisions made by the ESDP becomes troublesome, since national interests often supersede the common interests of the EU. Often, there are also varying relations between individual members and other countries or regions such as with Russia, the U.S., China, and the Middle East. Russia for example, can have a very different relationship with Germany than it does with Poland or any of the Baltic countries. There may even be a competition between the members for some of Russia’s resources, such as oil and gas, (Bitterlich, 2007) creating obstacles for the CFSP/ESDP to pass a common European policy as regards Russia. This is also the case with the alliance between the U.S. and Europe.
While the ESDP has met its Headline Goal of deploying 60,000 troops in a matter of months, the question still remains as to whether it will be able to sustain such a high volume of troops deployed in the field. The troops fielded by the ESDP, as well as any other EU-led security operations units, are provided based on voluntary cooperation among the member states (European Union, 2010). While it is in their interest to get the ESDP off the ground and functioning properly, countries are not obligated to commit to sending a specific number of men and women to serve in the ESDP operations. In 2009 Javier Solana, the then High Representative for the CFSP, addressed this issue before the EU defense committee stating:

> We need a sustainable solution for the medium to long term. We need to be systematic and go beyond ad-hoc searches for volunteers every time there is a new task. We are working hard on this at the EU level, as are the Member States at national level. I hope that this will soon bear fruit. (Solana, 2009)

Convincing 27 states, which have varying national laws pertaining to the recruitment of men and women to the military, that they should increase their military support for the purposes of this international coalition is not an easy task and, unfortunately, is the Achilles Heel of the ESDP.

In addition to not having a set military force, the ESDP also lacks a set budget within the EU, yet another issue the EU has been unable to resolve in a definitive manner. Invariably, the national interests of the member states have trumped those of the EU as a whole. Inevitably, in times of fiscal duress when countries find themselves having to make substantial cuts to their budgets in order to curb spending they will ultimately eliminate what they feel are unnecessary expenditures, such as the funds allocated to the ESDP. As a result of the inadequate funding used to outfit
the ESDP, it is evident that they are not appropriately equipped to handle conflict. The EU’s defense policy is an expensive venture that members have not fully committed to, nor is it likely that they will be prepared to do so in the near future. It is therefore evident that the countries of Europe are not committed financially to employing a fully autonomous defense policy such as the ESDP.

The idea behind the CFSP and ESDP was that Europe would finally speak as a unified voice, the lack of which was one of the central issues the EU faced when attempting to address the initial conflict of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The problem arose when Germany unilaterally recognized Croatia’s independence before the other EU countries could consider the ramifications of making such a decision. Thus, when one country steps out and chooses sides in a conflict, it further weakens the EU, and consequently the ESDP, which is then forced to adopt the same position of that country or risk appearing internally divided. The decision-making process is already difficult on its own without the various member states being at odds with one another.

It is unlikely that the ESDP will ever gain sufficient strength when its members are unable to put their differences aside for the benefit of a unified cause. Even on the very nature of the ESDP, an important factor in running an effective defense policy, there are diverse opinions. On one hand, there are countries, like Sweden, who favor a more passive approach and view the ESDP only as a means to stabilize Europe’s region and support employing less aggressive policies to police peace enforcement missions. Then there are countries such as Britain and France who perceive the role of the ESDP as not just a regional stabilizer, but also as a global
player with expanding responsibilities that should have a strong military at its
disposal (Howorth, 2003, p. 208). These ideological discrepancies lead to a general
discord within the ESDP that only helps to fragment and weaken the institution in the
face of future conflict.

One of the biggest points of contention within the ESDP has centered on
involvement in the 2003 campaign in Iraq. Difficult when you have the stronger
countries opposing what could be a common agreement. In an interview foreign
minister Jacques Poos commented on why the EU was unable to adopt a common
policy on Iraq,

[ESDP] did not succeed in adopting a common position on
non-participation in the US President’s war against Iraq,
because there was effectively a state of vassalage in a
number of Member States — particularly among the
British, who obstructed any expression of the European
will (Poos, 2004).

There were simply too many opposing views when it came to Iraq and it was an issue
that fell outside of the ESDP’s capacity. That is, even if it had wanted to intervene,
support for Iraq meant a commitment to a military campaign that it simply did not
have the resources to support. Also, on bigger issues where the people will hold its
government accountable, the decision to intervene is left to each individual country.
They do however share a common perspective on other issuers that are within the
ESDP’s ability to handle, such as policing missions in Bosnia and Macedonia (Sari,
2008).

The inception of the ESDP is in and of itself a great achievement and a step in the
right direction; however, the EU has been unable to give it the kind of strength to put
it on par with NATO. Although the ESDP is still in its infancy and has a long way to
go before it catches up to an institution that has the full support and backing of the
state with the largest defense budget—the U.S. Nevertheless, all the countries under
the banner of the ESDP need to be fully invested in its support if they ever expect to
have a different outcome than the one they faced during the Bosnian War.

2003-2007 Mission failures and successes

Despite the set backs and limitations the ESDP has faced since its creation, it has
managed to see its share of success. The participation of its Rapid Reaction Forces as
mediators and peacekeepers in various conflict situations has facilitated some of its
accomplishments. Between 2003 and 2007 alone, the ESDP launched eighteen
operations: five were military based, twelve civilian based, and one a military-civilian
mixed operation (Sari, 2008). In this section, I look at the first three missions enacted
under the ESDP in order to demonstrate some of its strengths and weaknesses. The
missions that I will examine commenced in 2003, which saw the deployment of over
2,000 EU policy and military personnel in operations to Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Bosnia), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia), and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Missiroli, 2003). These missions have seen
the successful transfer of responsibility go from the UN to the EU, although only two
of these missions demonstrated the EU’s capabilities to independently handle
conflicts. With the third mission the EU, in the end, was unable to unilaterally handle
the situation and returned responsibility to stronger UN forces.

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia was the EU’s first crisis
management operation, a non-military operation, under the ESDP. It was launched
January 1, 2003 and took over for the UN police task force that had been in place
since the Dayton agreement of 1995. Through monitoring, mentoring, and inspection of activities, this currently ongoing mission aims to establish local law enforcement capabilities in an effort to create greater stability in the region (EU-CSDP, 2010).

The EUPM’s key tasks are to help enhance police-judicial cooperation, strengthen the penitentiary system, and strengthen the capacity and capability of local law enforcement to fight against organized crime and corruption (EU-CSDP, 2011).

Some of EUPM’s achievements have come in developing sustainable policing methods for local law enforcement. The task force has also been instrumental in helping establish state-level institutions, such as a ministry of security and the Border Police (EU-CSDP, 2011). After a six year effort, which has resulted in significant progress in the region and has been considered a successful undertaking, the European Council decided to extend the operation until December 31, 2011. Given the length of the mission, it will be a true test of the ESDP’s support. If the EU member states continue to fund and provide the personnel in the area it will signify the ability of the EU to police its member countries without the resources of the UN or NATO.

On March 31, 2003, the EU launched its first military mission, known as ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia (Sari, 2008), which consisted of 350 lightly armed personnel to which all but two EU countries contributed. As was the case in Bosnia, this task force took over from the UN force that had previously been put in place. Its assignment was to promote stability and ensure the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which settled the conflict between the Slavs and Albanians of Macedonia (EU-CSDP, 2003). The ‘Concordia’ mission was the first
time the EU drew on NATO assets and capabilities per the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangement (Missiroli, 2003). In the end, the operation was instrumental in helping to bring a stable and secure environment where, after only a few short months, international security presence was no longer a necessity (EU-CSDP, 2003). The mission came to a successful conclusion after only a short period of intervention on December 15, 2003. While military presence was no longer required, the work of the ESDP’s civilian force in the area was far from over. The same day, ‘Concordia’ ended the EU Police Mission ‘Proxima’ was launched in Macedonia (Council of the EU, 2003). ‘Proxima’ had the same objectives as the EUPM effort in Bosnia, but unlike the Bosnian mission this operation was terminated after its initial two-year mandate.

The third undertaking was staged in the DRC, known as ‘Artemis’, was a response to the UNSCR 1484 (Missiroli, 2003). The EU’s expedient reaction when called to act by the UN demonstrated the effectiveness and speed with which the ESDP Rapid Reaction Forces could mobilize. The EU Council approved the Congo operation within a week and within a few days of that had troops on the ground. In an effort to lend aid to the people living in the unstable DRC capital of Bunia, the EU commenced the joint humanitarian and security operation ‘Artemis’ on June 12, 2003 (EU-CSDP, 2003). With France at the helm of military operations, the force that was sent in consisted of 1800 (mostly) French soldiers. Upon their arrival in the DRC, the peacekeeping forces dispatched were faced with escalating acts of violence and civil unrest. The presence of the ‘Artemis’ force was brief, lasting only a few months, before transferring all responsibility for the region to the UN Organization Mission (MONUC). The MONUC was a stronger and larger force, which, unlike that
provided by the EU through the ESDP, was equipped to handle the rapidly escalating situation over a prolonged period (Solana, 2003). Although the Rapid Reaction Force of the ESDP was unable to unilaterally handle the situation in the Congo, this mission did demonstrate an instance in which the EU was finally “…able to speak with one voice and bring the necessary pressure to bear on the warring factions to defeat the resistance put up by the enemies of peace”, as CFSP High Representative Javier Solana stated in his address to the UN Security Council (Solana, 2003).

Presently, there are ten ongoing civilian and three ongoing military operations under the direction of the ESDP (EU-CSDP, 2011). While the EU, through the ESDP, is capable of agreeing and handling missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and even outside of Europe, as was the case in Congo, its members continually disagree on courses of action concerning issues of a larger scale, such as the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Complex cases like that of Iraq and, the more recent uprisings in Egypt and Libya, have caused greater disputes among the EU constituency and, consequently, a singular, unified response from the European Union has proven to be quite difficult to achieve.
Chapter 5
ESDP After Libson Treaty

It was evident to the European Union that in order to achieve a more effective communal security policy the ESDP required some reform, even though the initial missions led by the EU under the ordinance of the ESDP showed early signs of success. The opportunity to strengthen and secure the ESDP came in 2009 with the inception of the Lisbon Treaty, which consequently allowed for the ESDP to become the foremost common security policy employed by the EU. In this section I will analyze the effects that the Lisbon Treaty had on the ESDP by referring to journal articles as well as speeches and documents released by the EU. The European political atmosphere has continued to evolve since the end of the Bosnian War. The ESDP has also considerably changed since its establishment. It is therefore imperative to examine the shifting ramifications of these changes on the policy.

The Lisbon Treaty, which was the amendment of two pre-existing treaties: the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome went into effect on December 1, 2009. As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP underwent substantial changes, including a change in name from the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It also replaced the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs with that of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), a post to which Baroness Catherine Ashton was appointed. In an effort to garner improved coordination and consistency between the ESDP and the other
institutions of the EU, the HR was also granted the post of the Vice President of the European Commission (European Parliament, 2009). The Lisbon Treaty also created the European External Action Service (EEAS) to serve as a foreign ministry, which would provide invaluable assistance to the HR. The ESDP was not only allocated a greater scope of influence following the Lisbon Treaty, but was also provided with a greater pool of resources with which the EU could handle new tasks. One such example is the Petersberg Tasks, which were expanded from humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks to encompass combat roles in “…joint disarmament, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization” (ESDP, 2008, p. 72).

Since the installation of the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP has been responsible for launching three missions in Africa, two of which have been brought to a resolution, while one is still ongoing (EU-CSDP, 2011). The nature of the operations enacted under the ESDP, as well as the goals of the policy, are similar to those found in previous individual military and civilian missions prosecuted by individual EU countries. While the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the ESDP in many ways, and has helped improve cooperation between the varying EU institutions, it still has not been effective in facilitating agreement of the member states on certain issues. Although the ESDP, through the High Representative, is supposed to embody the EU’s common foreign security policy, it has been largely silent during the recent democratic uprisings in the Arab world.
December 2010 marked the start of the first of many civil protests across the Muslim world, starting with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. Shortly after the ousting of longtime Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, a flood of protests began in the neighboring state of Egypt and flowed into Libya. After decades of despotic rule, both Tunisia and Egypt overthrew their old regimes and ushered in a new political era, which will hopefully result in truly democratic systems. Meanwhile, Libya continues its political struggle as its situation deteriorates at an alarmingly rapid rate. Given the heavy involvement of the international community, in particular that of the EU, in Libya’s ongoing struggle the circumstances surrounding the events present ample opportunity to examine the measures currently being taken to mediate the conflict. While the events occurring in Tunisia and Egypt are significant, they most likely be relegated to a historical backdrop to the Libyan insurrection.

The situations in Bosnia and Libya are different, yet many leaders have still used the failures of the former as a reminder not to let history repeat itself in the latter. Bosnia was about ethnic cleansing by one group against another in hopes of carving out an independent state. Libya, on the other hand, is a pro-democracy uprising whose dictator has used brutal military force against protesters and civilians. Still, in both situations, indiscriminate violence was aimed at individuals who without
international intervention would be left without the means to protect themselves. Leaders today are, therefore, urging the international community not to sit idly by lest they want to repeat the blunders of Bosnia.

Due to the nature of these recently occurring events shaping the political atmospheres of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the sources of this section are limited to current news articles and speeches given by heads of state and government organizations. Furthermore, the situations in these countries are still developing and may radically change around prior to and following the date that this thesis is submitted. Nevertheless, the incidents leading up to this point in time are exceedingly relevant, as there is much that can be drawn from the incidents that have transpired.

Tunisia is widely considered one of the most modern countries in North Africa and prior to the ousting of President Ben Ali was also known as one of the most repressive and corrupt governments of the region (Picket, 2011). Brutal oppression coupled with high unemployment, inflation of food prices, and poor living conditions was enough to spark the uprisings that would successfully see the harsh 23-year rule of Ben Ali come to an end.

The EU’s involvement in the turmoil has only come after the fall of an administration it blindly supported. Through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the EU and Tunisia have had close relations. The ENP is a policy that provides struggling countries with aid and trade in return for progress on democracy and human rights. It was first developed in 2004 and enacted in Tunisia in 2005 (European Commission, 2010). In order to be eligible for the technical and financial
support there are requirements or conditions that must be met. The conditionality or ‘Action Plan’ as it is referred, is tailored to each country, based on its individual needs and capacity. The ‘Action Plan’ covers a wide range of areas that the countries must comply with, including: “democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development” (European Commission, 2010).

The support of the Ben Ali regime continued despite its repeated disregard for democracy, human rights and rule of law, among other things. It was no secret that Ben Ali was lining his pockets by selling parts of Tunisia to friends and family (Witney, 2011) nor was it a secret that he ruled his people with an iron fist (Picket, 2011). Although the regime made no attempts to abide by the political provisions of the agreement the EU continued implementing the policy in Tunisia.

Now that the dust has settled on the revolution and that the old government has been removed, the EU is stepping up its efforts to support Tunisia’s transition to a democratic government. Shortly after the government was toppled, the European External Action Service that works as an aid to the High Representative Lady Ashton has been dispatched on a mission to Tunisia (European Union, 2011). The purpose of the EEAS mission is to provide political, legal, technical and material support to the democratic transition of Tunisia and the preparation of its first national election.

The events in Egypt unfolded in a similar fashion to those of Tunisia. After initial resistance, the regime led by President Hosni Mubarak eventually ceded to the pressure from protesters and wisely stepped down from office a mere eighteen days after their commencement (BBC News, 2011). As was the case in Tunisia, the EU
has expressed its support and continued commitment to helping Egypt transfer to a democratic form of government (Council of the European Union, 2011).

The revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were the catalyst needed to spark similar unrest in Libya. Protests began on January 15, 2011, but unlike the cases in Tunisia and Egypt the government has yet to cede power to the whim of the masses. On the contrary, the regime under Muammar Gaddafi has escalated the situation by responding with considerable force and violence hoping to quash his opposition under a deadly onslaught.

Gaddafi’s use of indiscriminate violence against his own people has focused the attention of the international community directly on Libya. On February 28, 2011 the EU agreed upon imposing sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, including a freezing of assets, an embargo of arms, ammunition and equipment that could be used for the forceful repression of protesters, as well as a visa ban on Gaddafi himself and any other persons responsible for the violent crackdown (Witney, 2011). Unfortunately, even pressure from the international community has not stopped Gaddafi from striking against his own people.

On March 17, 2011 the UN demanded an immediate ceasefire in the region. Less than a day later, Gaddafi and his forces broke the agreement with another violent outburst. As a response to Gaddafi’s continued transgressions against civilians, the UN adopted resolution 1973 that approved a ‘no-fly zone’ and authorized member states to use ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by a vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions (UN-Security Council, 2011). On March 19, 2011 the UN Coalition
directly involved itself when it officially announced it would enforce the UN resolution through air strikes.

Countries like the UK and France are taking an active military role to bring an end to the violence aimed at civilians while the ESDP forces have stepped into Libya under humanitarian auspices. Countries like Russia and China, who have traditionally vetoed military intervention by the United Nations, have now abstained from deciding one way or another allowing the UN resolution to move forward. In a similar fashion Germany has also abstained from military intervention but has expressed its full support with Chancellor Angela Merkel stating, “We unreservedly share the aims of this resolution. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality” (BBC, 2011).

France and the UK have taken the most assertive positions, with France having dealt the first airstrike against Gaddafi and his forces and the UK following closely behind. The U.S., Canada, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Qatar have all offered their military support in resolving this conflict (BBC, 2011). Although, as of March 27, 2011 NATO has taken full command over the military operations in Libya. It has pledged to “…implement all aspect of the UN Resolution…[n]othing more, nothing less” (Staff Writers Brussels (AFP), 2011), in order to protect civilians that are under attack by Gaddafi and pro-Gaddafi forces. It has, however, been granted the use of ground assets such as artillery and tanks which goes beyond the initial airstrike measures. The ground forces that NATO has been granted use of will increase its capacity to protect civilians.
From the beginning it was clear that the operation in Libya would require involvement beyond the EU. Like the issue of Iraq, Libya has presented itself as a case in which the EU member states have differing points of view on what the course of action should be. There are some countries like Germany, who may support the operation but are reluctant to directly get involved. Therefore, the decision to intervene has been left to each individual country. As for the ESDP the contribution of its forces will be solely in a humanitarian capacity. Although, the CFSP High Representative Lady Ashton has been instrumental in bringing together the EU institutions and discussing what should be done to help restore peace and stability in Libya. She expressed her hopes that Colonel Gaddafi would step down soon, thus opening up discussions about democratic government in Libya. “’That’s, where we come in,’ she says, adding that the EU is prepared to give long-term help to build democracy” (BBC, 2011).

The role of the EU and ESDP in Libya is still developing. The EU has already pledged 30 million Euros in aid for humanitarian assistance; however, Lady Ashton stressed the importance of the EU providing not only monetary assistance, but also taking the lead in the international efforts to restore peace and stability in Libya. In her address to the European Parliament on March 9, 2011 she stated, “…we should be ready to step up assistance to the Libyan population itself…Once we have secured an end to the violence, we have to work to support the emergence of a new Libya where leaders are democratically chosen and people's rights are respected” (Ashton, 2011). The High Representative has also established a task force that will use the EU’s existing instruments and resources to help the countries of North Africa with the
objective of providing measures that are tailored to the needs of each country in the region (Council of the European Union, 2011).

Given the swift response of the international community, in particular that of the UK and France who had opposed airstrikes during the Bosnian War, it seems that the lessons they learned from the fiasco in Bosnia have been taken into account. However, the common security policy has been once again marginalized in favor of unilateral decision-making. The UK and France have taken the lead in military intervention, while Germany has abstained from acting militarily thus allowing the CFSP only a limited role in this ordeal. Still it is clear the EU has not forgotten the lessons from Bosnia. While there are countries that may not want to take part in the intervention they are behaving quite differently than they had in Bosnia—when they blocked military intervention.

The UN has also not forgotten the failure and humiliation of its intervention in Bosnia. The UN quickly realized that, as high representative to Bosnia Lord Ashdown stated

> …as with Bosnia, we must calculate not just the risks of action, but also the risks of inaction. Here too, the risks of standing by and doing nothing are greater than those that would be incurred by a careful, graduated and proportionate response designed to assert the primacy of international law and enable the people of Libya to make their own choice about their government (Bagehot, 2011).

The UN has stepped up its response by issuing a single mandate that authorizes all necessary measures to protect civilians, unlike when it issued one weak resolution after another in the Bosnian War (UN-Security Council, 2011). One of the issues that frequently arose during the Bosnian War was that the UN resolutions were not
enforced, which served to weaken the position of the international community. At the
time, the Serbs used this to their advantage, as it was clear that they could continue
with their offensive without repercussions from the UN or EU.

In Libya, the UN and the coalition heading the operation, has taken a greater
stance. Rectifying their mistakes a clearer and assertive mandate (UNSCR 1973) has
been passed and is being enforced in order to stop the massacre of civilians. As
events continue to unfold, it will be a test of the resolves of both combatants, Gaddafi
and the international community – who has come under considerable criticism for its
decision to involve in what is seemingly a domestic issue.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

The events surrounding the Bosnian War convinced the EU leaders that it was time to rethink European security. They created a policy designed to unify the opinions of the various members under one common foreign security policy. The new policy was to provide the EU with the necessary tools to prevent or deal with regional conflict, should it arise again.

I have argued that the initial change and move toward a concrete security defense policy was a result of the failures in the Bosnian war. The EU was forced to see the limitations that the absence of a common foreign security policy posed to their status as a foreign power. It also became evident that without a common defense strategy, the EU would be poorly equipped to handle another regional crisis should another one ensue. One of the challenges they faced, however, was attaining the resources and support to forge the type of defense body that could handle conflict without the aid of the UN and NATO.

The weaknesses and failures of the UN and NATO during the Bosnian War also served to bring a more coherent policy that helped shape the ESDP. The EU realized the difficulties of reaching effective strategies when you have so many countries like Russia, blocking potential solutions. What Bosnia required was quick, strong and decisive action, but neither the UN, NATO nor the EU was able to provide this course of action. It was clear that what the EU would need to include within their security
structure was a military force that could act autonomously. The Helsinki ‘headline goal’ provided them with the resources and men to unilaterally handle not just military missions, but also those of a humanitarian nature. The police force in Bosnia and military forces in Macedonia and the Congo are examples of what the ESDP has been able to accomplish since its inception. The EU is now able to extend support to areas beyond its own region, exceeding their goal of handling regional conflict.

Having shown signs of success, the ESDP was given the opportunity to be strengthened and secured through the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The treaty solidified the ESDP’s position within the EU. Its role was expanded from humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks to conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization. The current events in North Africa, namely the ousting of two leaders in Tunisia and Egypt and ongoing struggle in Libya will demonstrate its capabilities post-Lisbon. While still in its developing stages, it has already been given greater authority to be the voice of the EU. The creation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy post, as well as the European External Action Service are both expressions of the EU’s commitment to improve their common foreign security policy. However, the ESDP continues to be underfunded and must rely on countries to volunteer troops. A lack of resources will make future EU foreign policies ineffective, as the ESDP will be unable to provide the level of assistance needed for their missions.

The EU, however, has managed to forge a cohesive foreign policy. The EU’s reaction during the Libya conflict demonstrates just how far they have come since the Bosnian War. It is evident that the lessons from Bosnia are still fresh in the psyche of
the EU and larger international community. The actions taken in Libya have come quicker and with the kind of decisive response that was needed fifteen years ago. The situation in this fragile region is still unraveling, but it seems the ESDP has already assertively placed itself in the position to step in and handle the post-conflict stabilization and rebuilding efforts.
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