DIGITAL FEMINIST ACTIVISM & THE NEED FOR MALE ALLIES: ASSESSING BARRIERS TO MALE PARTICIPATION IN THE MODERN-DAY WOMEN’S MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Sydney K. Nicolla: Digital Feminist Activism & the Need for Male Allies: Assessing Barriers to Participation in the Modern-Day Women’s Movement
(Under the direction of Lucinda Austin)

Typically, women instigate and drive participation in digital feminist activism, but research has suggested that male activists could play a valuable role as allies for the digital women’s movement. Social media reduce some traditional barriers to activism – time, financial resources – and force us to consider social and emotional factors that may interfere with outward male support for feminism. Results of a U.S. based digital survey demonstrated the following among men who have yet to participate in digital feminist activism (DFA): (1) support from and characteristics of those in their social networks may play an important role in their willingness to engage with DFA in the future; (2) there is still a disconnect between support for feminism and feminist identification, which may affect willingness to participate in DFA; and (3) strong masculine gender identity may correspond to higher willingness to support abstract, but lower willingness to support concrete, feminist objectives.
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Introduction

Historically, feminism has been defined in many different ways, these variations marked by the differences in the supposed primary cause of inequality for women (Schneider & Pham, 2017). Despite and because of the elusiveness of a true ‘definition’ of feminism, feminism may be best defined by its adaptability. Through many iterations and ideological perspectives that helped to shape the waves of feminist thought, feminism’s (and feminists’) commitment to pursuing an inclusive and meaningful feminist movement endured (Thompson, 1994). The current paper relies on and expands on this adaptability to ask a question that goes largely unaddressed in scholarly literature – why, exactly, does our intersectional and flexible feminist movement seem to lack visible support from men?

Public feminist activism can be traced back to the abolitionist movement, and it may be unsurprising that the women who organized to rally against slavery were many of the same women who championed women’s suffrage (DuBois, 1978; McConnaughy, 2017). Later, second wave feminists organized to challenge social inequity – work and paygrade discrimination, women’s reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and assault (Arnold, 2017; Boris & Elias, 2017; Goldner, 2017; Staggenborg & Skoczylas, 2017). These issues – in particular sexual harassment, assault, and violence – remain on the feminist docket in present-day.

Feminists today have harnessed the power of digital media to increase connectivity among women with shared experiences and broaden visibility for feminist efforts (Mendes, Ringrose, & Keller, 2019). Social media provide a space and a platform where women can speak out against prejudice and connect in solidarity (Turley & Fischer, 2018). “Hashtag activism” has become a staple for modern feminism, facilitating efforts to expose gender-based violence and
other gendered inequities through social media movements like #MeToo and #YesAllWomen.
The merging of voices through hashtag activism makes women’s experiences of sexual injustice seem almost unimaginably prevalent – and appropriately so; according to the CDC, 1 in 3 women will experience sexual assault in their lifetime, and women are twice as susceptible to sexual violence compared to men (Smith, 2017).

The prevalence of this injustice is reflected in digital harassment experienced by women online. Digital feminist activists are more likely to be targets of digital harassment, usually by men, and the most common threats made to women online are rape threats (Cole, 2015). Though women’s experiences of harassment online and off occur in huge numbers – emergent studies suggest that 20-30 percent of adult U.S. women experience some kind of digital cyber abuse (Beran & Li, 2007; Winkelman, Early, Walker, Chu, & Yick-Flanagan, 2015) – not all men are perpetrators of harassment. This study proceeds with the opinion that, in order for feminism to truly eliminate inequality, particularly when it comes to experiences of gender-based violence, men must be recruited to the ranks of feminism.

Performing feminist activism in digital spaces reduces the physical barriers to activism, such as financial and geographic limitations (Fernandez & McAdam, 1998), that may prevent physical activism. Therefore, this study will evaluate emotional and social barriers that may discourage men from engaging with digital feminist activism (DFA). Drawing from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the situational theory of publics and situational theory of problem solving (Grunig, 1977; Kim & Grunig, 2011), and social network theory (Tolsdorf, 1976), variables such as identification with masculinity, situational motivation, and factors of social support will be assessed as potential barriers to DFA. The following review of literature will expand on the evolution of feminist definitions and activisms, the need for male allyship in
feminist efforts, and the theories that guide research questions that will provide valuable answers about the potential to mobilize male support for the feminist movement.

Literature Review

Defining Feminism

It is perhaps the lack of one agreed-upon and enduring definition of feminism that makes it easy to dismiss the term ‘feminism’ as self-evident and easily understood (Delmar, 1986). Though existing research does not necessarily illuminate one definition of feminism, scholars have paved the way for us to arrive at a better understanding, of feminism, by understanding it in its many forms (Hoffman, 2001).

The journey to defining feminism can be started by considering feminism in terms of the least common denominator. Rosalind Delmar proposes the following to characterize supporters of the women’s movement in her essay, “What is feminism?”:

“At the very least…someone who holds that women suffer discrimination because of their sex, that they have specific needs which remain negated and unsatisfied, and that the satisfaction of these needs would require a radical change (some would say a revolution even) in the social, economic and political order,” (Delmar, 1986, p. 8).

For some, this definition may serve to represent contemporary feminism well – but for many, it may be exclusive, overreaching, too radical, too moderate, too narrow, or too broad. The general inability of women, organizations, and society to come to an agreement about what constitutes feminism is one way in which we must define feminism.

It is possible to consider feminism in terms of the many schools of feminist thought that have occurred throughout history. Liberal feminism focused on women’s rights, freedom to choose, and ability to make personal achievements (Schneider & Pham, 2017). But for many women, this focus was too limited, and fell short of the full potential of feminism. In response to, and as a critique of, liberal feminism, social, radical, and lesbian feminisms emerged (Schneider & Pham, 2017). Despite a shared opinion that liberal feminism simply was not enough, these
feminist movements did not act in unison. However, there is an essentially similar critique of each of these types of feminism: separately, they do not, and cannot, include and work to satisfy the needs and positionality of all women.

Early feminists struggled to find a definition of feminism that would unify the women’s movement. That struggle continued throughout the 19th century and still exists in present-day feminist efforts. There are two themes that make true unity in definition and mobilization of feminism yet unattainable: (1) Diversity among women (in race, class, sexual orientation, gender, to start); and (2) Contradictions among feminists (in feminist and social perspectives, among other things) (Zaretsky, 1988).

Delmar’s definition of feminism, then, may in fact be too narrow, in that it positions ‘women’ in a way that is too homogeneous, and thus exclusive. In order to extend the reach of feminism, its definition must explicitly and continuously acknowledge and include women who are not ‘homogenous.’ To be clear: in order to make any movement towards a cohesive understanding, and more singular definition of feminism, feminism must directly and continuously acknowledge and include women who are not straight, not white, and not middle-class (Zaretsky, 1988; Thompson, 1994).

In order to achieve the broadest and most meaningful success, the definition of feminism must be intersectional. Intersectionality addresses the interactions between gender, race, sexual orientation, and other differences in individual’s lives, social settings, and cultural ideologies – as well as how these interactions affect an individual’s social power and collateral (Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1989; Davis, 2008). Modern feminist literature tends to agree that an intersectional perspective is the correct perspective, and contemporary women’s studies scholars have quickly and agreeably adopted intersectionality (Davis, 2008). This adjustment, and all those before it, illuminate a promising dimension of the definition of feminism – its adaptability.
Feminism has seen many iterations and many contradictions, but feminism’s ability to endure is not easily contested. Denise Thompson wrote the following in support, and defense, of feminism and its many forms:

The feminist willingness to acknowledge and grapple with the contentious issues of race and class (and of disability, age, bodily size, etc.) is admirable. It is also one of the strongest indications that, whatever mistakes are made, however many times we fail to live up to our own exacting standards and fall back into the old male supremacist patterns, feminism itself is not ‘racist’ or ‘classist’. It is not a ‘white, middle-class’ movement, devoted solely to the interests of relatively privileged women, but a moral and political commitment available to any woman who cares to engage herself with it. (Thompson, 1994, p. 187)

I, like Thompson and many others, believe that feminism is adaptable and open enough to accommodate all women, and, furthermore, all people who care to engage with it. The present study intends to highlight the continued need for recruitment of supporters of feminism and will use the terms ‘feminism’ and ‘women’s movement’ to characterize collective feminist efforts. In order to understand modern feminist activism, the review of literature will first describe how feminist activism has evolved throughout history, including the first and second waves of feminism and the driving forces behind women’s movements throughout the 20th century.

**Historical Feminist Activism**

If defining feminism can be tricky, defining the ‘waves of feminism’ and the activisms associated with the women’s movement is potentially more complex. The emergence of the women’s movement (at least to the public) can be traced to mid-19th century abolitionist efforts (McConnaughy, 2017). Though the fight to abolish slavery may not be an obvious push towards women’s rights, DuBois (1978) suggests that the abolitionist movement connected early feminist activists in a particular way – that their participation in the anti-slavery movement was “the key that unlocked the political potential of women’s discontent” (McConnaughy, 2017). It is no surprise that many women active in the anti-slavery movement were also the first women active in the fight for suffrage.
If these are considered the first two instances that demonstrated women organizing strategically and deliberately, then these instances could be considered the first ‘wave’ of feminism. The second ‘wave’ of feminism came around half a century later, and its goals were less political, more social, and less concrete than the wave that came before it (Goss, 2017). The second wave of feminism is often described in terms of the different approaches feminist groups were taking in the fight for equality. Each school of second wave feminist thought was a critique on and an expansion of another – and the differences between them can be explained, most simply, by the differences between what each group of feminists identified as the primary driver of inequality (Schneider & Pham, 2017). Liberal feminists thought fighting for (and obtaining) rights and choices would balance gender inequity, without much considering the oppression that led to women’s status and condition. Marxist feminists thought class oppression was the root of all oppression, while socialist feminists believed a woman’s position in society was based on economic factors and gender oppression – or the ‘patriarchy.’ Radical feminists saw the patriarchy as the primary reason for all oppression (Schneider & Pham, 2017).

It would be remiss to articulate the conflicts within the second wave of feminism without discussing the activisms that motivated second wavers. Second wave feminism brought activisms to combat issues in the workforce: workplace and paygrade discrimination and sexual harassment (Boris & Elias, 2017). Women’s health and women’s reproductive rights also became a central focus during second wave feminism (Goldner, 2017; Staggenborg & Skoczyłas, 2017). Even anti-rape and domestic violence awareness efforts saw their beginning during the 1960s and 1970s, as part of second wave feminism (Arnold, 2017). These activisms continued throughout the third wave of feminism, beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the 2010s, and are a focus of the present-day women’s movement, often but not consistently described as
the ‘fourth wave’ (Mclaran, 2015). No other feminist era has had a more pronounced fight against sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence.

Protesting gender discrimination has become mainstream in the modern feminist era, no doubt and in no small part due to media in their many forms (Hurwitz, 2017). Feminist activists have historically stayed cutting edge in their efforts, taking advantage of traditional media like print, especially newspapers, to “build solidarity, and create cultural change” (Hurwitz, 2017, p. 5). As media have evolved, so has the women’s movement. A large part of today’s feminist activism takes place online – a result of the prevalence and reach of the internet and social media. Let’s look now at the most contemporary form of feminist activism: DFA.

**Digital Feminist Activism**

Following the history of feminist activism to present day comes the inevitable intersection of feminism, activism, and the internet. The internet, and particularly social media, involve a mass organization of networks of people, groups, organizations, governments, and similar types of actors. The ease of connection and networking offered by social media make them not only appropriate but also opportunistic platforms for strategic activist mobilization. In their aptly titled book, *Digital Feminist Activism*, Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller (2019) describe the recent broadened visibility, or mainstreaming, of feminist activism. In no uncertain terms, Mendes et al. credit digital networks for the mainstreaming of these feminist conversations, citing social media movements like “#YesAllWomen, “Hollaback!” and of course, “#MeToo” as driving forces in this progress (2019, p. 2).

The connectedness of social media as a tool for feminist progress is a sentiment echoed in much emergent research dealing with DFA (Baer, 2016; Titus, 2018; Turley & Fisher, 2018). “Hashtag feminism” has created a space in the digital sphere, particularly on Twitter, where women can expose the prejudice they experience on a daily basis by sharing their stories,
reacting to others’ stories, and provoking responses (Turley & Fisher, 2018). Because of the hashtag feature and its interface optimized for sharing fast-paced, connected content, Twitter may be the social media platform most often used for activism (Mendes et al., 2019).

Additional literature corroborates the sentiment of “connectedness” as an advantage of social media feminism that goes beyond the hashtag. Social media has been described as a tool for linking specific, local stories of individual women to larger narratives of inequality (Baer, 2016). Social media may serve as a “gateway for young feminists” – in one instance, communities of feminist support on social media in India grew, spread, and even resulted in media attention (Titus, 2018). This connection between social and news media – the ‘mainstreaming’ of feminist messages – may be the best evidence of DFA’s impact.

The national media attention received by “#MeToo” and other hashtag activism suggests some success in obtaining broadened visibility for the digital feminist movement. But even if the successful mainstreaming of DFA can be confirmed, in some ways, the question still remains: where is the value? For Mendes et al. (2019), the value is in the documentation – documentation of experiences with sexism or harassment and the emotions related to these experiences. Documentation of the harm that these experiences caused, and of the strength and labor required to share these experiences in the name of educating others (Mendes et al., 2019). The value is in sharing common experiences, having those experiences validated by others, and hopefully, making an impression on those who are not privy to, or who refuse to acknowledge, the devastating frequency with which women face sexism, harassment, and assault.

The frequency with which women face sexism and harassment is reflected in online interactions between activists and observers. In some ways, women who participate in DFA, and particularly those who paved the way for these digital discussions, are increasing their risk of verbal assault. Continued threats to feminist progress that plague society are made apparent
through the actions of those who disagree with the efforts and sentiments of digital feminist activists. Next, the literature review will address the importance of mobilizing additional allies for the digital feminist activist movement.

The Case for Allyship

In the United States, the CDC found that about 1 in 3 women (36.3 percent) experience sexual assault during their lifetime. The same study found that for men the frequency of experienced sexual assault is more like 1 in 6 (17.1 percent). Furthermore, the Association of American Universities’ 2015 nationwide survey found that on college campuses, cisgender men are the primary perpetrators of sexual assault: for example, physically forced penetration was perpetrated by cisgender men in 93 percent of reported cases (Cantor et al., 2015). These numbers should be illuminating, but may also not be totally representative, as underreporting of sexual assault is a known problem among both male and female populations (Cantor et al., 2015). Therefore, I include these numbers not to trivialize the threat of sexual assault for men, but rather to illustrate that despite fervent and prolonged efforts by women, gender makes women twice as susceptible to sexual violence, while men remain responsible for the vast majority of sexual assaults.

With these prevalence and perpetration rates in mind, it seems neglectful to focus feminist research efforts on women’s ideologies alone; clearly, much of the work feminism has left to do requires the cooperation of men. Scholars have demonstrated an interest in understanding both the prevalence of and the traits or circumstances that may lead to female participation in feminist activism, online and off (Jackson, 2018; Keller, 2012; Swank & Fahs, 2017). However, even contemporary feminist literature overlooks and neglects the importance of assessing the barriers to involvement, particularly male involvement (Wiley et al., 2013), in feminist activism. The present study intends to correct that.
What feminist scholars have demonstrated is that those who oppose the feminist movement respond with resistance, threats, and intimidation tactics in the face of DFA. Kirsti Cole describes anti-feminist sentiments shared on social media as “disciplinary rhetoric,” meant to intimidate and silence women who choose to speak up (2015, p. 357). She identifies rape as the most frequently used threat to intimidate women online (Cole, 2015). Cole is not alone in documenting instances of violent anti-feminist sentiments shared on social media. Other scholars have documented the violence experienced by women speaking up about gender inequality online, highlighting the fact that anti-feminist reactions to digital feminists, and sometimes women online in general, almost always use a woman’s gender against her (Sobieraj, 2018). These anti-feminists employ commentary about a woman’s appearance or sexual behaviors to get the insult across (Sobieraj, 2018).

In some instances, violent anti-feminist rhetoric can transcend the internet and pose a real, physical threat. Threats can often spill over into offline life through digital intimidation tactics like ‘doxxing,’ in which attackers collect and publish personal information about the individual they wish to intimidate (Sobieraj, 2018). This can include publishing the victim’s home address or employer information, and encouraging other harassers online to threaten the victim’s safety in their own home or workplace (Mantilla, 2013). Accounts from victims’ experiences of doxxing are far from harmless: one woman had her home address, floor plans, and photos of her car and pets published online in an attempt by her digital harassers to further escalate her fear of physical violence (Sobieraj, 2018). In some cases, perpetrators of gender-based harassment will let the target know that they have her personal information in less obvious ways, such as sending her a pizza or package (Mantilla, 2013).

These are not isolated incidents. Threats and slurs in response to feminist activism online are so common that women attempted to expose and increase visibility about digital harassment
through the hashtag “#mencallmethings” (Megarry, 2014). Megarry, like the other scholars mentioned above, speculated that the goal of those opposing feminist progress was to silence female voices – to maintain the imbalance of power between the genders by trying to halt conversations about it (2014). Additionally, these obstacles for women are not limited to the internet. Men in leadership positions may resist or refuse mentoring their female colleagues for fear of a misstep in the “#MeToo” era, effectively limiting the career advancement and growth opportunities for women due to a misunderstanding of, or perhaps a fear of, the goals of feminism (Soklaridis et al., 2018).

But of course, not all men outwardly oppose DFA or feminist activism in general. Research suggests that men who reject status-legitimizing ideologies may be more likely to see and recognize sexism directed at women (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Additionally, men who experience unfair treatment themselves as a result of characteristics like race or sexual orientation may be more likely to reject status-legitimizing beliefs, and in turn more willing to acknowledge sexism (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Men who endorse feminist beliefs may be those who are more aware of sexism (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). And when men do confront sexism, they may be taken more seriously because confronting sexism does not seem to directly benefit men (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). These findings indicate a serious opportunity for male allies to advance feminist activism and combat sexism.

Despite the need for male allies in the digital feminist activist movement, encouraging men to acknowledge, much less denounce, sexism poses a large challenge (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Men may face stigma-by-association and may be perceived as more feminine, weak, and likely to be gay when they align themselves with gender egalitarianism (Rudman, Mescher, & Moss-Racusin, 2013). Along these lines, emergent research has found that loyalty to a male
ingroup may relate strongly to an unwillingness to embrace feminism (Precopio & Ramsey, 2017). This relationship, while intriguing, is vague.

The present study will expand on specific ‘ingroup’ loyalties by assessing the strength of an individual’s gender identity, specifically identification with traits typically representative of masculinity and femininity, willingness to acknowledge or participate in DFA. In the next section, the literature review will cover social identity theory and gender identity, the first of two theoretical bases for this study.

Social Identity and Gender

Social groups, or collections of individuals who perceive themselves as members of the same social category, allow individuals to identify themselves in social terms (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social groups provide parameters within which individuals can define and understand their place in society. Acknowledging that an individual’s comprehensive identity is multi-faceted and complex, Tajfel and Turner’s theory of social identity deals with the part of an individual’s self-concept that derives from their knowledge of, as well as the value and emotional significance placed on, membership of a social group or groups (1979).

Through a social comparison process, social identity behavioral tendencies lead to in-groups and out-groups: those who are similar to the self and fit within the social group, and those who do not (Stets & Burke, 2000; Spears, 2011). Individuals who are a part of the social in-group may feel a strong attachment to the group, may feel protective against perceived threats or slurs against the group, and may feel motivated to defend the group identity when necessary (Saucier, Till, Miller, O’Dea, & Andres, 2015; Spears, 2011). One widely accepted social group identity is gender identity (Spears, 2011).

The present study, following an example set by Glick, Wilkerson, and Cuffe, will conceptualize masculinity using a social identity perspective (2015). Si(Glick et al., 2015, p. 2).
Masculinity in this case can also be considered stereotypical or ‘traditional’ male behavior; whereas, femininity refers to behaviors stereotypically expected of women (Glick et al., 2015). Examples of stereotypically masculine characteristics include assertiveness and competitive nature, while examples of stereotypically feminine characteristics include sensitivity and compassion (Schertzer, Laufer, Silvera, & McBride, 2007). Individuals who dichotomize men and women by expected gender behaviors may be more likely to perceive feminism as challenging traditional ‘femininity,’ and thus threatening masculinity as its complement (Glick et al., 2015).

Research has shown that men who associate strongly with masculinity as part of their gender group identity seem particularly sensitive to threats against the masculine element of the group identity (Falomir-Pichastor, Berent, & Anderson, 2019; Gangadharan, Jain, Maitra, & Vecchi, 2016; Netchaeva, Kouchaki, & Sheppard, 2015; Saucier et al., 2015). Additionally, research has suggested that men may regard femininity, feminine adjectives, or female superiority as slights against masculinity (Netchaeva et al., 2015; O’Neil, Helms, Gable, David, & Wrighstman, 1986; Saucier et al., 2015). This does not bode well for encouraging male participation in feminist efforts – as mentioned previously, stigma may cause men who present as more egalitarian to be perceived as less masculine and to have their sexuality questioned (Rudman et al., 2013).

With research evidence, it is not surprising that studies have suggested a strong male ingroup identification may interfere with support for feminism (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000). The present study will extend these findings by considering participants’ strength of masculine or feminine identification alongside motivation to engage with feminist activist efforts. To better understand individuals’ motivations in the realm of activism, the literature review will now address the second of the theories that guide this study, the Situational Theory of Publics (STP).
The Situational Theory of Publics and Problem Solving

The STP, generally referenced in public relations research, defines a ‘public’ as a group of people who share a common problem or issue (Grunig, 1997). STP proposes three variables that explain and predict communication behavior for these publics: problem recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition (Kim & Grunig, 2011). STP also proposes two corresponding dependent variables: information seeking and attending to the information (Kim & Grunig, 2011).

In proposing a more generalized version of STP, the Situational Theory of Problem Solving (STOP), Kim and Grunig expanded “information seeking and attending” to a more versatile dependent variable: communicative action in problem solving (2011). Communicative action in problem solving describes an individual’s heightened activeness in information taking, selecting, and giving as one engages in problem solving (Kim & Grunig, 2011). STOP also offers updated and more generalized definitions of the three independent variables: (1) problem recognition, as “one’s perception that something is missing and there is no immediately applicable solution to it,” (p. 128); (2) level of involvement, as “a perceived connection between the self and the problem situation,” (p. 130); and (3) constraint recognition, as “people perceive that there are obstacles in a situation that limit their ability to do anything about the situation,” (p. 130) (Kim & Grunig, 2011, p. 130). Finally, STOP introduces situational motivation as a mediating concept of the independent variables of STP (problem recognition, level of involvement, constraint recognition) and the dependent variable, communicative behavior (Chang & Kim, 2019). Situational motivation is defined as “the extent to which a person stops to think about, is curious about, or wants more understanding of a problem,” and is considered a more immediate predecessor to communicative action (Kim & Grunig, 2011).
Because the STP and STOPs seek to explain when and why individuals become active in communication behaviors, these public relations theories have also been applied to evaluations of tendencies of individuals to engage in activist communications (Chang & Kim, 2019; Chon & Park, 2019; Dozier, Shen, Sweetser, & Barker, 2016; Illia, 2003; Xifra, 2016). The situational theories have been successfully incorporated in advocacy research dealing with climate change activists and climate change deniers (Xifra, 2016), social media political activism by youth actors (Velasquez & LaRose, 2015), and advocacy and willingness to speak out against genetically modified foods (Chang & Kim, 2019).

The present study will expand the theoretical applications of STP and STOPs to individuals’ communication behaviors surrounding DFA. In addition, and related, to social identity and situational motivation, the present study will investigate one final variable that may explain an individual’s tendency not to engage with DFA – the behaviors and ideologies of those who make up the closest inner circle of the individual’s personal network.

**Social Relationship Networks**

The old adage “we are the company we keep” is true in many ways. Research in the social sciences has established that social networks are extremely influential on human behavior, and that the characteristics of a social network may be useful for predicting social behavior of those within the network (Tolsdorf, 1976). Tolsdorf describes two types of social networks – functional and nonfunctional – and classifies a functional network as one that is “supportive, receptive, empathetic and understanding” (1976, p. 2). A functional network is more likely to receive attention and maintenance, and thus likely to be more intimate (Tolsdorf, 1976). These intimate support networks can have a great deal of influence on our behaviors (Eggens, van der Werf, & Bosker, 2008). The present study will focus on the potential influence of an individual’s functional, or supportive, network.
Social network characteristics have been linked to a number of behaviors – political participation, academic achievement, purchase decisions, and even criminal behavior (Eggens et al., 2008; Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Ikaheimo, 2008; Staton-Tindall, Royse, & Leukfield, 2007). Social networks have also been found to be effective predictors of recruitment into social activism – individuals may be more likely to engage in activism if they have friends or family members who are themselves activists (Crossley, 2008). It follows that researchers have identified an effect of social networks on feminist identification and associated feminist activism (Nelson et al., 2008). Specifically, having a feminist mother has been proposed as an antecedent to feminist identification, and feminist identification in turn may be predictive of participation in collective action (Nelson et al., 2008).

As is the case with most feminist scholarship, researchers thus far have primarily explored social network influence on feminist identification and tendency to engage in collective action for women. However, Rudman and Phelan’s study investigated whether feminism was at odds with happiness in heterosexual relationships as prior research had suggested (2007). Rudman and Phelan did not find support for the supposed conflict caused by feminism in heterosexual relationships (in fact, they found the opposite); additionally, and of particular interest for the present study, Rudman and Phelan found an individual’s reported feminism to be highly related to their partner’s (2007). With existing knowledge about social networks and their influence, it’s important to consider the gender equity stance of family members, friends, and romantic partners alongside the individual’s.

**Summary**

This study takes a step in the direction of understanding barriers to support for DFA and identifying the characteristics of individuals who may be valuable (though yet uninvolved) potential allies for the women’s movement. Through online survey, the role of an individual’s
supportive and influential social network, their social identity and ingroup identification, and corresponding situational motivation towards DFA will be considered. Findings will expand a limited body of literature that addresses characteristics of individuals who do not become feminist activists; and ideally, serve as a stepping stone for the important work of overcoming these barriers and gaining powerful allies for the women’s movement and supporters who will speak up online when they see harassment and digital threats of violence toward women.

Research Questions

Digital activism may not have as many of the physical and logistical barriers that come with traditional activism (Fernandez & McAdam, 1988). Therefore, the present study will focus on emotional and social barriers to support and participation. Keeping in mind the influence social support networks can have on ideology and behavior, I pose the following initial research question:

RQ1: Among men with Twitter accounts who have not yet participated in DFA, is their willingness to engage in DFA in the future (assessed by the collective action measure) associated with:

(a) Perceived social support from their:
   i. Partner?
   ii. Family?
   iii. Friends?

(b) Social and economic political orientation of their partner, family, and friends?

(c) Reported outward feminist identity of their partner, family, and friends?

Though there is limited research that addresses barriers to male participation in feminist activism, borrowing theories used in more general activism research can guide formation of additional research questions. STP proposes three different variables that explain and predict
communicative behavior: problem recognition, constraint recognition, and level of involvement (Kim & Grunig, 2011). STOPS proposes situational motivation as a mediator between these three variables and an individual’s communicative behavior (Kim & Grunig), and studies have demonstrated a positive association between an individual’s level of involvement with an issue and corresponding situational motivation (Chon & Park, 2019, Kim & Grunig, 2011). Therefore, following research question seeks to evaluate the relevancy (i.e., situation motivation) of DFA for participants and their corresponding acknowledgement of or engagement in DFA:

**RQ2:** Among men with Twitter accounts who have not yet participated in DFA, how does situational motivation toward feminism associate with willingness to participate in DFA in the future (assessed by collective action measure)?

The previous research question will address whether situational motivation plays a role in willingness to participate in DFA, and the following research question will begin exploring why, if situational motivation is indeed low, that may be the case. Strong male ingroup identification – regarded here as masculinity (Glick et al., 2015) – may interfere with support for feminism (Burn et al., 2000). This interference can potentially be attributed to fear of breaching ingroup conduct due to the stigmatization of egalitarian men as more feminine or gay (Rudman et al., 2013). The following research question will explore this possibility further:

**RQ3:** For men with Twitter accounts who have not yet participated in DFA, how does the strength of their identification with masculine or feminine traits associate with situational motivation toward feminism?

In order for an individual to act in accordance with their group identity, that identity must be made salient (Spears, 2011) – or, activated, for lack of a better term. Research has addressed identity salience with respect to recruitment into a social movement; it has been proposed that unsuccessful recruitment may be a result of conflicting identities and perceived pressures from
more-salient identity groups (McAdam & Paulson, 1993). Hypothetically, then, a male individual with generally positive sentiments toward the ideals of gender equality may still abstain from feminist advocacy because of perceived pressure from ties to a group identity. With the pressures of masculinity in mind, I pose the following final research question:

**RQ4:** Among men with Twitter accounts who have not yet participated in DFA, how does the strength of their identification with masculine and feminine traits associate with:

(a) covert support for feminism (assessed by the LFAIS);
(b) overt feminist identification; and,
(c) willingness to participate in DFA in the future (assessed by the collective action measure)?

**Methods**

In their 2012 research methods paper, Miner, Jayaratne, Pesonen, and Zurbrügg acknowledged that survey has not traditionally been a preferred feminist research method: It has been criticized for being too positivistic and, thus, in contradiction with feminist methodologies (2012). However, in disagreeing with this perspective and defending survey as a femininst methodology, Miner et al. describe three principles of feminist research: (1) to be conducted with the goal of producing knowledge that is for, rather than on, women, (2) to use a research method that is not oppressive, and (3) to continually challenge dominant knowledge paradigms (2012). Survey methodology does not, by itself, stand in the way of any of these three principles. In fact, surveys can be a valuable tool in research aimed to create social change.

Miner et al. describe the importance of survey as a tool for influencing policy and public opinion because it has the unique ability to identify large-scale patterns and to make recommendations that can inform social movements as a result (2012). Positioning surveys as a
tool for initiating social change make this methodology especially relevant in the case of the present study, in which I utilized survey in an attempt to reveal broad-scale patterns, ones that indicate potential social and emotional barriers to feminist activism among men.

**Procedure**

Participants aged 18 and older were invited to participate in a paid, nationally representative web survey via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk is a digital labor platform on which workers are first vetted by being asked to complete Human Intelligence Tasks before being redirected to complete online surveys for payment offered by survey creators (Boas, Christenson, & Glick, 2008). The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform and distribution of the survey, confirmation of completion by verified participants, and payment for the survey all took place within the mTurk platform. Several academic studies have found support for the quality of responses from mTurk’s participant pool (Boas, Christenson, & Glick, 2018; Ibarra, Agas, Lee, Pan, & Buttenheim, 2018).

mTurk allows Requesters to specify certain demographic characteristics that survey respondents should meet. Some of these specifications are free but most require additional fees. Two of mTurk’s free screening categories, specifically (1) workers located in the U.S. and (2) with a Lifetime Approval Rating of 90 percent or higher, were selected to filter initial respondents for this study. mTurk workers who met these two criteria were eligible to begin the survey, but were further vetted by initial survey questions that screened out (a) women, (b) those who did not have or did not use Twitter (to ensure participants were familiar with the platform and could accurately respond to questions about future participation in DFA on Twitter), and (c) those who reported previous participation in DFA. Participants who met all of the inclusion criteria were compensated at U.S. $1.50 for completed questionnaires.
I collected data in two stages – the first ‘test run’ generated 30 completed surveys in an hour and the second stage generated 373 completed surveys in approximately 24 hours for a total of 403 completed questionnaires.

Participants

Four-hundred and three eligible participants who ranged in age from 20–73 (M=33.6, SD = 8.90) completed the survey in exchange for compensation offered. Participants included 373 men, 28 genderqueer/gender non-binary persons, and 2 persons who reported another gender identity. Participants self-identified with the following racial backgrounds: 75.9% White/Caucasian (n = 306), 11.9% African American (n = 48), 4.5% Asian (n = 18), 2.2% Native American (n = 9), 2.8% selected multiple backgrounds (n = 12), and 2.5% reported another racial background (n = 10). Also, 17.4% of respondents (n = 70) reported a Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin. Participants’ reported education levels included 8.7% with a high school diploma (n = 35), 17.9% who had completed some college (n = 72), 57.8% with a college degree (n = 233), and 15.6% with more than a college degree (n = 63).

Measures

Multidimensional scale of perceived social support. The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) is a self-report measure designed to assess perceived emotional support from family, friends, and relationship partners (Zimet, G., Dahlem, Zimet, S., & Farley, 1988). Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale their feelings about each of 12 items. The 12 items are able to be broken down into subscales for family, friends and romantic partners. Sample items include: (a) I have a partner who is around when I am in need (romantic partner subscale), (b) my family really tries to help me (family subscale), and (c) I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows (friendship subscale). The items were combined to form comprehensive scores of perceived social support, where a high score
indicated more perceived support from partners ($\alpha = 0.947$, $M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.74$), families ($\alpha = 0.868$, $M = 5.36$, $SD = 1.25$), and friends ($\alpha = 0.868$, $M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.19$).

**Support network interpreters.** Name interpreters are questions designed to collect information about individuals in a participant’s social network (Burt, 1984; Saffer, Yang, & Qu, 2019). In the present study, the MSPSS was followed by a series of name interpreters administered to assess potentially important characteristics of those closest to the participant in their social support network. Participants were asked to consider first their closest romantic partner, then closest family member, and finally closest friend. Name interpreter questions asked about gender, political affiliations, and outward feminist identification for each identified social support network member.

**Overt feminist identification.** A single item was used to measure outward identification with feminism for participants as well as for their closest partner, family member, and friend. A version of the following closed-ended question adapted from Morgan (1996) was administered: “To what extent do you consider yourself/this person a feminist? Please choose the answer that best describes your stance” (Burn et al., 2000, 1084). The question was answered by choosing one out of eight options ranging from “(1) I do not consider myself a feminist at all and believe feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women” to “(8) A committed feminist currently active in the women’s movement,” where a high score indicated strong feminist identification ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.70$).

**Covert support for feminism.** Discrepancies between an individual’s overt willingness to self-identify with feminism and covert support for the goals of feminism have been recorded time and time again (Burn et al., 2000; Jackson et al., 1996; Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004). In order to leave room for this discrepancy to show itself in the present study, participants completed a short-form of the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS) to serve as
a covert measure of feminist support separate from identification. The 11-item short-form of the LFAIS, which asks for agreement on a 5-point scale, was developed to measure attitudes towards gender roles, the goals of feminism, and feminist ideology (Morgan, 1996). Sample items include: “Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of the United States,” and “Doctors need to take women’s health concerns more seriously.” The items were combined to form a single score of covert support for feminism, where a high score indicates more support ($\alpha = 0.793$, $M = 3.52$, $SD = 0.624$).

**Gender role identity scale.** The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) is commonly used to measure self-perceived masculine and feminine gender identity (Schertzer et al., 2008). Schertzer et al. found support for the efficacy of a 20-item short version of the BSRI called the Gender Trait Index (GTI), and recommended eliminating four of the items based on their findings (2008). Therefore, the 16-item modified version of the GTI validated by Schertzer et al. was used in the present study to assess participants’ masculine and feminine gender identities through stereotypic gender traits. Participants were asked to “indicate to what extent each of the following characteristics” described them on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) never to almost never true, to (7) always or almost always true, where a high score indicated higher masculine/feminine gender identification.

Eight items assessed masculine identification (including the sample item “Have leadership abilities”) and were combined to form one masculine identification score ($\alpha = 0.887$, $M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.13$). Eight different items assessed feminine identification (including the sample item “Sensitive to others’ needs”) and were combined to form one feminine identification score ($\alpha = 0.925$, $M = 5.06$, $SD = 1.13$).
Situational motivation. This study considered the situational motivation variable of STOPs for male non-activists faced with the problem of gender inequality. Participants were re-oriented to the ‘problem’ with the following text:

“As a reminder, digital feminist activism attempts to facilitate conversations and promote awareness about gender inequality. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements with regards to the problem digital feminist activism calls attention to, gender inequality.”

Eleven items followed to measure participants’ situational motivation of problem solving (Kim & Grunig, 2017). Respondents rated their level of agreement on a 7-point scale with a series of statements such as “I am curious about this problem,” and “I am determined to fix this problem as soon as possible.” The items were combined to form a single score for situational motivation, where a high score indicated high situational motivation ($\alpha = 0.954$, $M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.45$).

Collective action measure. A four-item collective action tendency measure, adapted from Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2012), was administered to help explore the link between situational motivation and communicative action in the instance of DFA. Respondents rated their level of agreement on a 7-point scale with the following four statements: (a) “I would create a tweet using a feminist hashtag, such as #TimesUp,” (b) “I would retweet a tweet using a feminist hashtag, such as #TimesUp,” (c) “I would like to join forces with other activists to help the women’s movement,” and (d) “I would like to do something to help solve inequality.” The items were combined to form a single collective action score, where a high score indicated more willingness to engage with DFA ($\alpha = 0.890$, $M = 4.11$, $SD = 1.58$).

Political orientations. Participants were asked to report their political leanings by the statement: “Please rate the orientation of your political ideology in terms of economic and social issues.” Respondents rated their political orientations first on economic, then on social issues on 7-point
scales ranging from (1) consistently conservative, to (7) consistently liberal, where a high score indicated a more liberal political leaning.

Results

Descriptive and Exploratory Analyses

To start first with some descriptive data, 78.9% of respondents (n = 318) reported familiarity with the concept of digital feminist activism (DFA). Of those who were familiar with the concept of DFA, 94.3% responded that they had not “ever used Twitter to share or respond to feminist sentiments, such as hashtag activism (like #MeToo) or general thoughts on gender inequality,” while 5.7% responded “Not sure” to this question. The collective action measure results showed willingness to engage with or participate in DFA in the future to be fairly neutral, with a mean collective action score of M = 4.11, just over the midpoint.

Ideologically, participants as a whole reported neutral but slightly more liberal social (M = 4.58, SD = 1.85) than economic (M = 4.27, SD = 1.88) political orientations. Participants scored above the midpoint for covert support for feminism (as measured by the LFAIS) (M = 3.52 on a 5-point scale) and scores for overt feminist identification were more conservative (M = 3.44 on an 8-point scale). Table 1 presents the zero-order correlations between participant’s reported ideological standpoints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Ideological orientation variables correlation coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Feminism (LFAIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political_Econ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political_Social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Reported values are Pearson’s r. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A regression model indicated a significant association between participants’ ideological orientations and collective action scores (F(4, 397) = 17.5, p < .001, R² = 0.15); individually,
social political orientation ($B = -0.18$, $SE_B = 0.07$, $\beta = -0.21$) was a significant negative predictor of collective action ($p < .05$) and covert feminism ($B = 0.31$, $SE_B = 0.14$, $\beta = .12$) was a significant positive predictor of collective action ($p < .05$). Overt feminist identification was the most significant positive predictor of collective action ($B = 0.31$, $SE_B = 0.05$, $\beta = .34$, $p < .001$).

Demographic and ideological variables with significant statistical influence on dependent variables were assessed for confounding effects and controlled for in regression analysis as advised by Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Nizam (2014).

**RQ1: Social Network Characteristic Associations with Collective Action Measure**

RQ1 asked whether, among men who have not yet participated in DFA, there was an association between the independent variables of (a) perceived social support, (b) social and economic political orientations among those in their closest social network, and, (c) the outward feminist identity of those in their closest social network and the dependent collective action variable measuring willingness to engage with DFA in the future. A hierarchical multiple regression controlling for ideological orientations showed a significant association between perceived social support (from partners, family members, and friends) and the collective action measure ($F(7,393) = 13.6$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = 0.20$). Perceived social support from friends ($p < .05$) and partners ($p < .01$) were significant individual positive predictors in the model. Perceived social support from a family member was not a significant individual predictor.

Considering political orientations of those within social networks, hierarchical multiple regression revealed a significant association between social and economic political orientations of participants’ closest partner, family member, and friend and the collective action variable ($F(10, 340) = 12.8$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = 0.27$); partners’ social political leaning was a significant negative predictor in the model ($p < .01$). Finally, outward feminist identification among social network members was significantly associated with the collective action variable ($F(7, 343) = \ldots$)
11.4, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.19$), with family members’ outward feminist identification serving as a significant individual positive predictor in the model (p < .01). See Table 2 for RQ1 $B$ values.

Table 2. Regression coefficients for social network variables predicting collective action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>SE $B$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Perceived Social Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSS_Partner</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSS_Family</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSS_Friend</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Social Network Political Orientations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner_PoliticalSocial</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner_PoliticalEconomic</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family_PoliticalSocial</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family_PoliticalEconomic</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend_PoliticalSocial</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend_PoliticalEconomic</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Social Network Feminist Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Feminist ID</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Feminist ID</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend Feminist ID</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

RQ2: Situational Motivation Association with Collective Action

Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess whether situational motivation was associated with willingness to participate in DFA in the future (collective action measure) for men with Twitter accounts who do not currently participate in DFA. After controlling for participants’ ethnicity, education, and ideological orientations, results of the regression (F(9, 391) = 82.1, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.65$) supported situational motivation as a significant positive predictor of collective action ($B = 0.79$, SE $B = 0.04$, $\beta = .72$, p < .001, $\Delta R^2 = 0.41$). As a reminder, situational motivation in this study is “the extent to which a person stops to think about, is curious about, or wants more understanding of” gender inequality, and the collective action measure represents future willingness to engage with DFA.
RQ3: Masculine and Feminine Identification Associations with Situational Motivation

RQ3 proposed exploration of variables that may influence situational motivation. Regression analysis was again used to reveal associations between masculine and feminine identification and the dependent variable of situational motivation. A hierarchical multiple regression controlling for age and ideological orientations indicated that there was a collective association between gender identification and situational motivation (F(7, 392) = 30.9, p < .001, R² = 0.36). Individually, masculine identification (p < .001) and feminine identification (p < .001) were each significant positive predictors of situational motivation (See Table 3).

Table 3. Regression coefficients for gender identity predicting situational motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminine Identification</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine Identification</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

RQ4: Gender Identity Associations with Feminist Tendencies

The final research question posed a series of queries to investigate whether, for men who have not yet participated in DFA, there were associations between the strength of their masculine and feminine gender identities and variables of feminist tendencies. RQ4 first asked whether there was an association between masculine and feminine identification and covert support for feminism. The regression model, controlling for political orientation, indicated a significant positive association between strength of gender identities and covert support for feminism (F(4, 396) = 27.5, p < .001, R² = 0.23). Feminine (p < .001) and masculine (p < .001) identification were significant positive and negative predictors in the model, respectively (See Table 4).

Table 4. Regression coefficients for gender identity predicting covert support for feminism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminine Identification</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine Identification</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Next, a hierarchical multiple regression controlling for political orientation indicated a significant association between strength of gender identification and overt feminist identification \( F(4, 396) = 9.62, p < .001, R^2 = .09 \). Individually, feminine (p < .05) and masculine (p < .05) identification were significant positive and negative predictors in the model, respectively (See Table 5).

**Table 5. Regression coefficients for gender identity predicting overt feminist identification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Identification</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminine Identification</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine Identification</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* *p* < .05, **p* < .01, ***p* < .001

A final regression model controlling for political orientation and overt feminist identification indicated a significant association between strength of masculine and feminine gender identities and the collective action variable (\( F(5, 395) = 25.3, p < .001, R^2 = 0.24 \)). Masculine identification (p < .001) and feminine identification (p < .001) were each significant positive predictors in the model. (See Table 6).

**Table 6. Regression coefficients for gender identity predicting collective action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Identification</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminine Identification</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine Identification</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.21***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* *p* < .05, **p* < .01, ***p* < .001

**Discussion**

The data provide evidence of men who have not yet participated in DFA despite awareness of digital feminist activists’ efforts and generally favorable covert support for feminism, or liberal feminist attitudes and ideologies (Morgan, 1996). Covert support for feminism was strongly correlated with overt feminist identification, but overt feminist identification overall fell below identification as a “feminist,” placing most participants’ self-reported feminist identification somewhere between “I agree with some of the objectives of the
feminist movement, but tend to be somewhat traditional,” and “I agree with most of the objectives of the feminist movement, but do not consider myself a feminist.” The collective action score, representing male non-activists’ willingness to engage with DFA in the future, hovered around neutral. Additionally, while covert support for feminism was a significant predictor of collective action, the association between overt feminist identification and collective action was much stronger. These findings support prior research evidence that feminist identification may precede and predict collective action (Nelson et al., 2008).

The Influence of Social Networks

The findings of this survey extend network research literature that describes the influence those in our social networks have on our thoughts and behaviors (Eggens et al., 2008; Tolsdorf, 1976). Specifically, the data suggest that, for men who have yet to participate in DFA, perceived social support from partners and friends and the outward feminist identification of a close family member correspond to higher willingness to engage with DFA in the future. Alternatively, a lack of perceived social support from partners and friends, or a close family member who abstains from feminist identification may correspond with lower willingness to engage with DFA. The association between perceived social support and collective action may be attributed to a number of things, among them (1) the possibility that more social support indicates closer relationships (Tolsdorf, 1976), and closer relationships may provide more opportunities to discuss sensitive topics like gender inequality; and (2) that more social support leads to more personal confidence, and, in turn, more confidence that change is possible through collective action. The association between a family member’s outward feminist identification and mens’ collective action tendencies may also be a reflection of previous network research findings that suggest an association between family members’ activisms (Crossley, 2008).
Interestingly, among the population of men who had yet to participate in DFA, their partner’s social political orientation was a significant negative predictor of willingness to engage with DFA in the future. More specifically, among men who had not yet participated in DFA, those with more liberal partners were less likely to report future willingness to join collective action efforts. One potential explanation is that those with more socially liberal partners have more exposure to liberal activist movements and either feel that they have no place in feminist movements or feel intimidated by the labor involved in activism. Alternatively, those with more socially liberal partners may have already been presented with the opportunity to engage with feminist activism and declined, so were more honest in their reported willingness to engage with DFA in the future. This possible explanation – that exposure to liberal activism discourages reported willingness to engage with it in the future for male non-activists – is supported by the negative association between participants’ own socially liberal political orientations and collective action. Additional research is called for to better understand the influence of social networks on male non-activists’ choices to participate in or abstain from DFA.

**Masculinity, Femininity, and the Role of Situational Motivation**

As a reminder, situational motivation is “the extent to which a person stops to think about, is curious about, or wants more understanding of a problem,” (Kim & Grunig, 2011). In accordance with STOPS literature, the data suggest that among men who have not yet participated in DFA, experiencing situational motivation is a strong positive predictor of collective action, or future willingness to engage with DFA. Likewise, experiencing less situational motivation is associated with less future willingness to engage with DFA. Additionally, the data demonstrate that both masculine and feminine gender identification may be strong predictors of situational motivation.
The positive association between masculine identification and situational motivation was unexpected. Previous literature positions masculine identification as potentially interfering with support for feminism (Glick et al., 2015). Since the data supports the association between situational motivation and collective action, based on the literature, masculine identification might be expected to have a negative association with situational motivation. However, considering the language of the BSRI items used to measure strength of masculine identification (i.e., have leadership abilities, assertive, willing to take a stand, ambitious, act like a leader; Schertzer et al., 2008) it may follow that those who reported higher levels of these characteristics would also report higher willingness to participate in efforts geared towards change. More nuanced measures to assess gender identification, particularly those traits that may interfere with support for feminism, are necessary in order to properly evaluate masculine identification as a potential barrier to experienced situational motivation (when faced with the problem of gender inequality). The

**The Consequences of Masculine Gender Identification**

Much like the association between masculine gender identification and situational motivation, the data suggest that among men who have yet to participate in DFA, masculine identification is a positive predictor of reported willingness to engage in collective action in the future. However, contradictory evidence suggests that the role of masculine identification in support for DFA is not that simple. Masculine identification was a significant negative predictor of both covert support for feminism (measured by the LFAIS) and overt feminist identification. Put differently: for men who have not yet participated in DFA, the stronger their masculine gender identity, the less likely their covert support for feminism, and the less likely they are to outwardly identify as feminists. These findings support prior research proposing a disconnect
between masculinity and feminism (Burn et al., 2000, Glick et al., 2015) and suggest this phenomenon’s persistence in the digital world.

Abstract Activism

The inconsistencies among this study’s findings are curious. Strong masculine identification was a positive predictor of situational motivation, which in turn was a positive predictor of collective action; and yet, strong masculine identification significantly interfered with support for feminism and overt feminist identification. Thinking about the differences between these concepts as measured in this study, the results might suggest that their tangibility is a driving force behind the apparent inconsistent influence of masculinity.

For example, the collective action measure asked men to indicate how much they “would like to do something to help solve inequality,” and the situational motivation measure asked how much they’d “like to better understand this problem.” Meanwhile, the LFAIS, which measured covert support for feminism, asked men to respond to statements like “women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of the United States,” and “American should pass the Equal Rights Amendment.” And of course, the outward feminist identification measure explicitly asked men whether they were feminists.

As demonstrated by the examples above, the measures that were positively predicted by strength of masculinity are much less concrete. Perhaps when more masculine male non-activists think abstractly about engaging in feminist activism they feel vaguely supportive of the movement. On the other hand, when more masculine male non-activists are presented with concrete, proposed action meant to advance feminism, support for the movement dwindles or comes with more considerations and reservations. Future research should dig deeper into the idea of abstract activism by exploring masculinity and male support for different feminist objectives.
Practical Implications

This study demonstrated the positive association between a number of variables and collective action tendencies. The knowledge that social support from friends and partners, situational motivation, and strong identification with gender groups are positive predictors of reported willingness to engage with DFA in the future provides us with a basis upon which we may identify current male non-activists who are most able to be mobilized as allies for the digital women’s movement. Additionally, the conflicting evidence about masculinity gender identity’s influence on male support for feminist objectives presents an interesting starting point for additional research to clarify the path to gaining additional male allies for the digital feminist movement.

Conclusion

Despite years of progress for the women’s movement and the recent mainstreaming of feminist activism due to the visibility and popularity of DFA, gender inequity and gender based-violence persists. There is an opportunity for male allies to contribute to feminist progress by serving as allies for the women’s movement, and by using their supposed impartiality to legitimize women’s experiences of prejudice. The first step to recruiting men to publicly support feminism through DFA is identifying characteristics of males who may be willing to participate, as well as identifying the barriers that currently stand in the way of their participation.

This study has demonstrated the influence that support from and characteristics of those in our closest social network may have on our willingness to engage with DFA. Additionally, this study suggests that while some elements of masculine and feminine identification may make male non-activists more inclined to report situational motivation and willingness to engage in collective action, a strong masculine gender identity may also interfere with both covert support for feminism and outward feminist identification. More research is called for to expand on the
idea of abstract activism and to gain a better understanding of how our social relationships influence ideological orientations among men who have not yet participated in DFA.

**Limitations and Future Research**

Though the sample in this study was largely white, it was not a misrepresentation of the non-female composition of the U.S. In 2019, the U.S. Census population race and Hispanic origin estimates were: 76.5% White, 13.4% Black or African American, 1.3% American Indian, 5.9% Asian, 2.7% two or more races, and 18.3% Hispanic or Latino (2019). Still, we have to consider that those who did not qualify for this study (i.e. those who reported prior participation in DFA) may have been more racially and heterogeneously diverse, especially considering literature suggesting racial and sexual minorities may be more likely to recognize sexism (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). An additional limitation may be the reported gender identification of this sample – participants had stronger feminine identities, overall, which may be a result of the sample itself or of the instrument used to measure gender identity.

Future research should explore other measurements of gender identity that may capture more of the ‘toxic’ masculine characteristics and provide a clearer assessment of the relationship between masculine identity and willingness to engage with DFA. Future research should also expand the target population and continue to explore the inconsistencies between reported support for feminism, feminist identification, and reported willingness to engage in digital collective action among those who have not as well as those who have participated in DFA.
## Survey Codebook

### SECTION A: Consent and Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Variable Labeling</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Response scale</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A01 Consent | Consent | **Consent to Participate in a Research Study**  
**Title of Study:** Understanding Barriers to Participation in Digital Activism | I consent to participate in this study (1)  
[Survey flow: Branch If: “I consent to participate in this survey” is NOT selected - > END OF SURVEY. ] |        |
|           |        | The purpose of this research study is to explore different elements that may serve as barriers to participation in digital activism. We are interested in understanding your awareness and involvement with digital activism, who you talk to about social issues, and learning about your self-identification with personal attributes. Your participation in this study will last approximately 15 minutes. |                                                                                           |        |
|           |        | If you are uncomfortable with the content or any of the questions, you may discontinue your participation at any time. Your identity will not be linked to the questionnaire you complete during participation. |                                                                                           |        |
|           |        | Please do not take this survey from a mobile device. |                                                                                           |        |
|           |        | This research has been reviewed and approved by the IRB at the University of North Carolina. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a research participant, you may contact the IRB Office at 919-966-3113 or IRB_subjects@unc.edu. |                                                                                           |        |
|           |        | Please indicate your voluntary agreement to participate in this study by clicking “I consent to participate in this study” below. |                                                                                           |        |
| A02 Gender_Qual | Qualifier 1 | **What is your gender?** | (1) Man  
(2) Woman  
(3) Genderqueer/gender non-binary  
(4) Other |        |
### SECTION B: Twitter Use

| B01_TwitterQual | Qualifier 2 | To begin, please indicate whether you currently have and use a Twitter account. | (1) Have and use  
(2) Have but don’t use  
(3) Do not have Twitter account  

[Survey flow: Branch If: “Have and use” is NOT selected - > END OF SURVEY.] |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B02 DFA Awareness</td>
<td>Digital feminist activism is the collective effort of individuals on social media to share experiences of gendered prejudice and harassment; in these efforts’ individuals attempt to facilitate conversations and promote awareness about gender inequality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B03 DFA_Qual</td>
<td>Have you ever used Twitter to share or respond to feminist sentiments, such as hashtag activism (like #MeToo) or general thoughts on gender equality?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| B04 Twit Use | Please select all the ways in which you currently use Twitter:  
Information Sharing:  
Share information  
Share information that is useful for my friends  
Share information about my interests  
Self-Documentation:  
To record what I do in life  
To record what I have learned  
To record where I have been  
Social Interaction:  
To connect with people who share some of my values  
To connect with people who are similar with me |

*Note – pass final block/code generator. Respondents are not paid if they do not pass these qualifications.*

[Multiple Choice, Single answer]  
(1) Yes  
(2) No  
(3) Not sure  

[Survey flow: Branch If: “Yes” is selected - > END OF SURVEY.]  
See list of options.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION C: Perceived Social Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>C01</strong> PSS_1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the next few pages, we are interested in how you feel about the proposed statements. Please consider each statement carefully and indicate how you feel on the 7-point scale. [Include scale for each statement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I have a partner who is around when I am in need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I have a partner with whom I can share joys and sorrows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My family really tries to help me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I get the emotional help &amp; support I need from my family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I have a partner who is a real source of comfort to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. My friends really try to help me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Very strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Mildly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Mildly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Very strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*High score indicates high social support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **C02** PSS_2                      |
| [Include scale for each statement] |
| 7. I can count on my friends when things go wrong. |
| 8. I can talk about my problems with my family. |
| 9. I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows. |
| 10. I have a partner in my life who cares about my feelings. |
| 11. My family is willing to help me make decisions. |
| 12. I can talk about my problems with my friends. |
| (1) Very strongly disagree |
| (2) Strongly disagree |
| (3) Mildly disagree |
| (4) Neutral |
| (5) Mildly agree |
| (6) Strongly agree |
| (7) Very strongly agree |
| *High score indicates high social support |

*Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, Zimet et al., 1998*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C03 PSS_Partner</th>
<th>The series of statements you just completed generally describe three types of relationships you might have: partner/significant other, family, and friend relationships. Thinking about your partner/significant other relationships, please answer the following questions about the romantic partner who you consider yourself to be closest to.</th>
<th>“Continue →”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C04 Partner_gender</td>
<td>Describe the gender of the romantic partner with whom you consider yourself to have the closest relationship.</td>
<td>Man (1) Woman (2) Genderqueer/Gender non-binary (3) Other (4) Not applicable (5) [Survey flow: Branch If: “Not applicable” is selected - &gt; END OF BLOCK.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C05 Partner_PoliSocial &amp; Partner_PoliEcon</td>
<td>To the best of your ability, please rate the orientation of the same partner’s political ideology in terms of economic and social issues: [Include separate scales for economic and social]</td>
<td>(1) Consistently conservative (2) Mostly conservative (3) Slightly more conservative (4) Neutral (5) Slightly more liberal (6) Mostly liberal (7) Consistently liberal *High score indicates more liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C06 Partner_equality</td>
<td>To the best of your ability, please indicate which of the following options most accurately describes the extent to which you consider this partner a feminist:</td>
<td>(1) I do not consider this person to be a feminist at all and they believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women (2) I do not consider this person a feminist at all. They are quite traditional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C07: Family

**Describe the gender of the person in your family with whom you consider yourself to have the closest relationship.**

- Man (1)
- Woman (2)
- Genderqueer/Gender non-binary (3)
- Other (4)

### C08: Gender

*High score indicates strong feminist attitudes. Some scores reflect traditional gender norms.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feminism</th>
<th>Please answer the following questions about the family member you consider yourself to be closest to.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) This person agrees with some of the objectives of the feminist movement, but tends to be somewhat traditional and does not consider themselves a feminist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) This person agrees with most of the objectives of the feminist movement, but does not consider themselves a feminist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) This person agrees with all the objectives of the feminist movement, but does not consider themselves a feminist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Feminist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) A committed feminist currently active in the women's movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) A feminist who considers themselves a feminist but does not consider themselves a committed feminist currently active in the women's movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Now, I'll ask you to consider familial relationships. Please answer the following questions about the family member you consider yourself to be closest to.*

*Continue ➔*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C09 Fam_PoliSocial &amp; Fam_PoliEcon</th>
<th>To the best of your ability, please rate the orientation of the same family member’s political ideology in terms of economic and social issues: [Include separate scales for economic and social]</th>
<th>(1) Consistently conservative (2) Mostly conservative (3) Slightly more conservative (4) Neutral (5) Slightly more liberal (6) Mostly liberal (7) Consistently liberal *High score indicates more liberal</th>
<th>Bauer et al., 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C10 FamEqual</td>
<td>To the best of your ability, please indicate which of the following options most accurately describes the extent to which you consider this family member a feminist:</td>
<td>(1) I do not consider this person to be a feminist at all and they believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women (2) I do not consider this person a feminist at all. They are quite traditional (3) This person agrees with some of the objectives of the feminist movement, but tends to be somewhat traditional (4) This person agrees with most of the objectives of the feminist movement, but does not consider themselves a feminist (5) This person agrees with all the objectives of the feminist movement, but does not consider themselves a feminist (6) Feminist (7) A committed feminist (8) A committed feminist currently active in the women’s movement</td>
<td>Burn et al., 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C11 PSS_Friend</td>
<td>Now, I'll ask you to consider your friendships. Please answer the following questions about the friend who you consider yourself to be closest to:</td>
<td>“Continue →”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C12 Friend_gender | Describe the gender of the friend with whom you consider yourself to have the closest relationship. | Man (1)  
Woman (2)  
Genderqueer/Gender non-binary (3)  
Other (4) |
| Bauer et al., 2017 |
| C13 Friend_PoliSocial & Friend Poli_Econ | To the best of your ability, please rate the orientation of the same friend’s political ideology in terms of economic and social issues:  
[Include separate scales for economic and social] | (1) Consistently conservative  
(2) Mostly conservative  
(3) Slightly more conservative  
(4) Neutral  
(5) Slightly more liberal  
(6) Mostly liberal  
(7) Consistently liberal |
| *High score indicates more liberal |
| Burn et al., 2000 |
| C14 Friend_equality | To the best of your ability, please indicate which of the following options most accurately describes the extent to which you consider this friend a feminist: | (1) I do not consider this person to be a feminist at all and they believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women  
(2) I do not consider this person a feminist at all. They are quite traditional  
(3) This person agrees with some of |

*High score indicates strong feminist attitudes.
| C15_AttCheck | Before we continue, we'd like to get a sense of how you're feeling.  
|             | To show that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead check only the "none of the above" option as your answer.  
|             | Please check all the words that currently describe how you are feeling.  
| C16_PSS_TY  | Thank you for completing the preceding questions.  
|             | In the next section if this survey, you’ll be asked to complete statements that may describe your personal characteristics. Please click “→” to continue.  

*High score indicates strong feminist attitudes

**SECTION D: Shortened BEM Scale**
For the next few pages, we would like you to indicate to what extent each of the following characteristics describes you.

1. Have leadership abilities
2. Assertive
3. Willing to take a stand
4. Ambitious
5. Competitive
6. A strong personality
7. Forceful
8. Act like a leader

(1) Never or almost never true
(2) Usually not true
(3) Rarely true
(4) Occasionally true
(5) Often true
(6) Usually true
(7) Always or almost always true

*Higher score indicates more masculinity

9. Affectionate
10. Tender
11. Sensitive to others’ needs
12. Sympathetic
13. Warm
14. Eager to soothe hurt feelings
15. Gentle
16. Compassionate

1) Very uncharacteristic of me
(2) Somewhat uncharacteristic of me
(3) Neither characteristic or uncharacteristic of me
(4) Somewhat characteristic of me
(5) Very characteristic of me

*Higher score indicates more femininity

Thank you for completing those personal characteristic statements.

In the following brief sections of this survey, you’ll be asked about awareness of, and agreement with, a series of statements pertaining to digital activism. Please click “→” to continue.

“Continue →”

SECTION E: Situational Motivation Measure
As a reminder, **digital feminist activism attempts to facilitate conversations and promote awareness about gender inequality**.

Please indicate on the 7-point scale your level of agreement with the following statements with regards to the problem digital feminist activism calls attention to, gender inequality:

1. I am curious about this problem.
2. I frequently think about this problem.
3. I would like to better understand this problem.
4. I often stop what I’m doing to think about this problem.
5. I make this problem a priority these days.
6. I work hard to develop a better understanding to solve this problem.
7. I consider this problem a very important issue today.
8. This problem/issue has made me more determined to fix it than other problems have in the past.
9. I am determined to fix this problem as soon as possible.
10. I am willing to expend any effort to solve this problem.
11. This problem is the top priority in my life today.

**SECTION F: Collective Action Measure**

**F01**

Digital feminist activism efforts often include a hashtag, such as #YesAllWomen.

Please indicate on the 7-point scale your level of agreement with the following four statements about your willingness to engage with digital feminist activism:

1. I would create a tweet containing a feminist hashtag.
2. I would retweet a tweet containing a feminist hashtag.
3. I would like to join forces with other activists to help the women’s movement.
4. I would like to do something to help solve inequality.

**SECTION G: Demographics & Ideologies**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G01 Demo Intro</th>
<th>Thank you. For the remainder of this survey, you will be asked to answer questions about your general demographic information. To complete the final questions, please click “→” to the bottom right.</th>
<th>“Continue →”</th>
<th>G01 Demo Intro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G02 Age</td>
<td>What is your age? [Text entry]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G03 Education</td>
<td>What is the highest level of education you have completed? (1) less than high school (2) a high school diploma (3) some college (4) a college degree (5) more than a college degree Kenny et al. 2017; Beggs et al. 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G04 Race</td>
<td>What is your race? [multi-select] White/Caucasian (1) African American (2) Asian (3) Native American (4) Pacific Islander (5) Other (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G05 Ethnicity</td>
<td>Are you of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin? Yes (1) No (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G06 &amp; G07 Political</td>
<td>Please rate the orientation of your political ideology in terms of economic and social issues: [Include separate scales for economic and social] (1) Consistently conservative (2) Mostly conservative (3) Slightly more conservative (4) Neutral (5) Slightly more liberal (6) Mostly liberal (7) Consistently liberal *High score indicates more liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G08 Covert_Feminism</td>
<td>Please indicate on the 5-point scale your level of agreement with the following statements about women in society:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of the United States.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Although women can be good leaders, men make better leaders. (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>A woman should have the same job opportunities as a man.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Men should respect women more than they currently do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Many women in the work force are taking jobs away from men who need jobs more. (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Doctors need to take women’s health concerns more seriously.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Women have been treated unfairly on the basis of their gender throughout most of human history.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Women are already given equal opportunities with men in all important sectors of their lives. (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Women in the U.S. are treated as second-class citizens.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Women can best overcome discrimination by doing the best that they can at their jobs, not by wasting time with political activity. (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-point scale</td>
<td>Strongly disagree → Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*High score indicates strong feminist attitudes, (R) items are reverse coded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G09 Overt_Feminist</th>
<th>To what extent do you consider yourself a feminist? Please choose the answer that best describes your personal stance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I do not consider myself to be a feminist at all and I believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men and women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I do not consider myself a feminist at all. I am quite traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I agree with some of the objectives of the feminist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Form of the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale</th>
<th>Morgan, 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
(4) I agree with most of the objectives of the feminist movement, but do not consider myself a feminist.

(5) I agree with all the objectives of the feminist movement, but do not consider myself a feminist.

(6) Feminist.

(7) A committed feminist.

(8) A committed feminist currently active in the women’s movement.

*High score indicates strong feminist attitudes.

| G10 Contact | A few select participants may be contacted for a follow-up interview. If you are willing to share your opinions in an interview on this research, please enter your email address below. Entering your email address is optional and is not required to receive credit for participating in this survey. If you would like to be contacted for future research on this topic, please enter your email address below. This is entirely optional. If you choose to share your email address it will be stored separately from your survey responses and will not be associated with your responses. | [Text entry] |
REFERENCES


