Theory versus Practice: An analysis of the beliefs, strategies and practices of political consultants in a dynamic campaign environment

Jason Adam Johnson

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of   Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science

Chapel Hill
2008

Approved By

George Rabinowitz
Donald Searing
Marco Steenbergen
Daniel Gitterman
Kerry Haynie

Abstract

Jason Adam Johnson
**Theory versus Practice: An analysis of the beliefs, strategies and practices of
political consultants in a dynamic campaign environment
(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz)**

This work focuses on the beliefs, strategies and practices of American political

consultants. This analysis proposes to look at three main areas of modern political

campaigns, negative advertising, candidate selection and candidate positioning, and

compare existing political science theory in this areas to the results of a survey of

political consultants actively working in the field. The results of this work show that

many of the factors that political science theory suggests have a significant impact on

campaign strategy, especially in the area of negative advertising, are not significant in the

minds of consultants when they formulate and implement strategy. The work concludes

with suggestions for improving political science knowledge of consultants as well as

implications of this research.

Acknowledgements

While this work will have my name listed, it would not have been possible without the support of many other people. My friends, family both living and passed on, the students and staff of Hiram College, the Graduate School of UNC Chapel Hill, my dissertation committee and a special thanks of Dr. NJ Scheers, the best "shadow" dissertation chair a scholar could have.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Introduction

Political campaigns are one of the most studied and analyzed areas in political science. Arguably, everything from the behavior of members of congress on legislation to the implementation of policy on the state level stems from how elections are run, managed and perceived by the public (Mayhew 1974, Randon Hershey 1984; Johnson, Cartee – Copeland 1997; Thurber, Nelson and Dulio 2000; Nelson Dulio and Medvic 2002, Sabato 2006). However, one aspect of the political process that has thus far received short shrift in political analysis is the political consultant, the individuals behind many aspects of modern day campaigns. While some political scientists have argued that new more empirical theory and study should be focused on campaigns and campaign theory, political consultants, the actual practitioners of campaign politics are still often a missing part of the equation (Johnson-Cartee – Copeland 1997, Thurber 1998; Jamieson and Waldman 2001; Craig 2006). Arguably, the current state of political science work on consultants is akin to having a large literature on policy outcomes but little or no research on the attitudes and beliefs of the members of Congress who create the policy. It is the goal of this dissertation to initiate an analysis of political consultant's attitudes, beliefs and behaviors and how they relate to existing theories in political science on campaigns.

The purely political science literature on political consulting and campaign management is limited, in large part because much of the original works were not done by political scientists but actually former and current campaign professionals (Perry 1968, Pritchell 1958) . The first works were written as professional histories focusing primarily on what 'political consulting' was, and how some intrepid businesses and individuals were beginning to assist in the campaign process (Shaddeg, 1960; Kirwan, 1964; Shadegg, 1964; Kirwan and Redding 1964; Scott 1968). Again, most of this work focused on political professionals and very few works were written by trained political scientists although occasionally works were written by members of the business academia (Ross and Baus, 1968)

The 1970's saw the advent of books discussing the profession of political campaigning as opposed to just the personal case study histories of certain managers. Much of this work sought to establish exactly what political consulting was, and what would be the nomenclature of these new political entrepreneurs. They were described as the campaign managers (Nimmo 1970), implementers of campaign strategy (Parkinson, 1970; Shadegg, 1972; Napolitan,1972) and generally seen as organizers. By and large the 1970's literature spoke to the increasing professionalization of the field of political campaigning (Wilson 1966; Nimmo 1970; Hiebert et. al 1971; Rosenbloom 1973). It would not be until the next decade that the impact of this new profession started to receive serious analysis in political science.

Through the work primarily of Larry Sabato (1983; 1987; 1989 and 1989) and Paul Herrnson (1986; 1988 and 1989; 1989) the impact of political consultants was beginning to be noticed in political science, coinciding with discussions of the decline of

party influence and the increasing money required to run for public office (Blumenthal 1980, p. 1; *Paying for Elections*, 1989; and Campaigns & Elections 1989; Salmore and Salmore, 1989; Petracca, 1989) In addition, during this era the first surveys of political consultants on a large scale (Herrnson 1988) as well as the first survey of public attitudes towards political managers (Petracca 1989) were conducted for purely research and academic purposes.

The next major era of consultant literature began in the 1990's and ran into the early part of the new century. This era of consultant research coincided with an explosion in the public role that political consultants began to play in American politics. With popular political consultants working as pundits, commentators and authors, their own personal and political lives became not only a part of campaign politics but popular and political culture in general. For most of the 1990's and early 2000's there was an increase in the focus on campaign politics, both in popular culture with movies like "The War Room" (1992); "Wag the Dog" (1997), "Primary Colors" (1998) and "Bullworth" (1998) and a spate of personal memoirs and semi-academic books on campaigning strategy and politics. (Matalin & Carville 1994; Carville 1996; Morris 1999; Perlmutter 1999; Strother 2003; Moore & Slater 2003; Bailey, Faucheux, Herrnson, Wilcox, 2000; Watson and Campbell, 2003). However, the amount of disciplinary based scholarship work that focused on political consultants during this time was still fairly sparse (Kolodny and Logan 1998; Thielen and Wilhite 1998; Novotny 2000). Moreover while there was some work on consultants as a profession, political managers were still not being connected to existing theories and strategy in any meaningful way.

In 1998, James Thurber of the Center of Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University let out the clarion call for aggressive and empirical work on political consulting. In his aptly titled article "The Study of Campaign Consultants: A Subfield in Search of a Theory" (1998) Thurber throws down the proverbial gauntlet to political science to investigate further this key part of the discipline.

> *"Though professional political consulting outside of political party organizations has been around since the 1930's, it has only recently sparked interest among some political scientists. Why have consultants been ignored by political scientists? Why have consultants ignored political scientists? Why is there little or no theory related to political consultants? Why do we know so little about the profession of political consultants? What subfield houses the study of political consulting?: Elections and voting behavior, political parties, political communications, political advertising, campaign management?"* (Thurber 1998; p. 1)

The argument can be made that now, almost 10 years after this critical article, political science does know a little more about political consultants as a whole, a cottage industry of sorts has arisen based on the work of a few key researchers, many of whom spring from the research center of Thurber (Thurber & Nelson 2000; Thurber 2001; Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000; Nelson, Dulio and Medvic 2002; Alterman 2003; Rampton and Stauber 2004). However, much of this research still fails to connect the consultant to political science and general consultant strategy. While the discipline is certainly more capable of answering questions about campaign ethics, and consultant business practices today than before Thurber's call, critical questions such as consultant views on negative advertising, candidates and even policy positions still remain largely untouched.

This dissertation seeks to remedy the existing gap in political science literature on political consultants, in particular in regards to critical strategies and theories about campaign strategy. Advancements in political science analysis often spring from using new data sets to examine existing theories and concepts. New data on public viewing patterns changes analyses of campaign advertising strategy, National Election survey data is used to re-examine candidates every election year, and new congressional voting pattern data changes our views of candidate positioning. Much of campaign positioning work in political science is based on examining data from Congressional voting behavior and public voting patterns and applying that to existing theories. This analysis proposes to take this same method of advancement in political science and apply it to discover greater information about political consultants. This analysis will survey political consultants to discover their beliefs relating to existing theories in political science on campaigns. Not only will this research advance our knowledge of political campaigns in general, but will hopefully be a step towards greater understanding of political consultants as independent and crucial actors in American politics.

Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

Political consultants' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors towards election campaigns are important to study because these consultants influence how a candidate behaves and the overall strategy of political campaigns. In this dissertation, three major aspects of political campaigns, candidate traits, negative advertising and ideological positions of the candidates were selected to examine consultants' attitudes, beliefs and behaviors and relationships to various predictors. The importance of these three areas is well documented in both academic and professional campaign literature (Baus and Ross 1968; Blumenthal 1980; Salmore and Salmore 1989; Johnson 2000; Bailey, Faucheux, Herrnson and Wilcox 2000; Nelson et. al 2002). Research on consultants themselves is somewhat limited, in particular studies based on surveys of political consultants (Herrnson 1988; 1992 and Thurber 1999), none of which are focused on in-campaign strategy and attitudes.

This chapter is organized by the three political campaign areas. The "Candidate Traits" section reviews the research literature for five candidate traits; the relationships of candidate traits with various predictors; and differences in candidate traits for

campaigning compared to governing. The "Negative Ads" section reviews definitions for

negative advertising and factors that predict the use and content of negative advertising.

The "Candidate Positioning" section analyzes what existing models in political science

best describe the positioning strategies of political candidates and the factors that predict

the importance of issues and what position candidates take during a race.

Candidate Traits

No previous analyses of political consultants have actually looked at what

consultants consider to be important attributes in the candidates that they work for, or for

candidates in general (Herrnson (1988); Thurber (1999)). However, political scientists

have long assessed how voters evaluated political candidates using a series of traits

established in the American National Election Survey that is conducted during major

election years in the United States (Kinder, 1985, 1992). The four major traits upon

which voters have evaluated political candidates are "Empathy," "Competence,"

"Leadership" and "Integrity." Various political scientists have studied these four traits

and attempted to assess what predictors if any have a significant effect on how these traits

are viewed, or if the increase or decrease in any predictor influences the direction of

feeling towards these traits (Keeter 1987; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Funk 1996,

1997, 1999; Fox and Smith 1998; Hayes 2005).

Along with the four traits listed above, there is an additional trait, "Ambition,"

that is critical to analyze in this research. While political scientists have occasionally

studied the political ambition of candidates for office (Mezey 1970; Rohde 1979;

Terrelonge-Stone 1980; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1987; Constantini 1990;

Schlesinger 1991; Fox and Lawless 2005), no research has been done on political

consultant's attitudes towards the ambitions of their candidate. Arguably, political consultants should be very concerned that the candidate that they work for actually has ambition to seek office and campaign since that attitude is directly related to their ability to be successful as consultants (Dickerson, Jan 22nd, 2008, Slate.com).

The political science literature has shown that certain predictors may influence how a trait is viewed by a potential voter. The major models in Table 1 provide a general outline of the effects of several major predictors on the importance of candidate traits when evaluating candidates. This is by no means a complete listing of all political science work on traits, but includes significant works that represent general trends and conclusions in political science on candidate traits. The most consistent result is that context matters, whether it is the election year, the district, or the political events occurring at the time of the campaign, the evaluation of traits is often influenced by many outside factors and they are not assessed by voters in a vacuum. Each of these predictors is discussed in turn.

Party. Partisanship seems to play a critical role in the evaluation of candidate traits, with the campaign context often influencing how partisanship interacts with such traits (Stoker 1993, Goren 2002, Klein & Ahluwalia 2005). In many cases, studies only focused on the traits of candidates in specific election years. For example, Alvazrez and Glasgow (1998) found that while Democrats evaluated Clinton high on all traits, and Republicans evaluated Dole high on all traits, leadership was most important to Democrats in evaluating Clinton while Integrity and Leadership mattered equally in evaluating Dole amongst Republicans. Similar results were found in Klein and Ahulawa's (2005) work where they found that for strong Republican and Democratic

partisans, Bill Clinton received somewhat different ratings on candidate traits. Democrats weighed Clinton's intelligence and empathy very high in their final vote evaluations while strong Republican partisans rated him very low in intelligence but about equal to Democrats in empathy.

Hansen and Otero (2007) found not only was partisanship the best predictor of how people will vote but also a stronger predictor of the weight placed on candidate traits. Leadership and Compassion seemed to be the most important traits to both parties from 1988 to 2004, with the candidate rated highest in one or both of those categories by Democratic and Republican partisans usually winning the day. This suggests that partisanship might not only matter as an individual predictor on the candidates but that the partisan leanings of a district might come into play as well.

All of these works more or less confirm the research of Funk (1999) who argues that major candidate traits must be decoupled and studied separately because the campaign context can influence how different traits are evaluated (see also Goren 2002 and Doherty and Gimpel 1997). In general it appears that the traits of Empathy and Leadership are the two most important traits in candidate evaluation especially to strong partisans for each party.

While those traits rise to levels of importance in most campaign contexts, there are differences in how they are perceived by different parties. Republicans tend to weigh leadership more heavily when evaluating the quality of a candidate and Democrats tend to look more at Empathy. The other major traits according to Kinder (1980) and Funk (1999) (Competence and Integrity) tend to vary in importance depending on the candidates running and the electoral context (Goren 2002, Hansen and Otero 2007). Only

Colleau et. al (1990) seemed to find that partisanship was not the strongest predictor in the difference of how a candidate's general traits were evaluated, which was due, in large part, to the candidate's race being a more influential than party in how traits were evaluated.

Table 1
Predictors of Candidate Traits

Study	Dependent Variable	Predictor	Results
Goren 2002	Evaluation of Candidate	Partisanship, Incumbent or Challenger	GOP cares less about empathy than DEMs; DEMs care less about leadership than GOP, incumbents judged on weakest trait, especially from opposing party supporters
Stoker 1993	Evaluation of Gary Hart after 1988 Scandal	Partisanship, Education/Voter Sophistication	Strong partisans evaluated Gary Hart's morality less importantly than opposition or weak partisans, More sophisticated weak partisans cared more for competence than integrity morality
Klein & Ahluwalia 2005	Feelings toward candidate positive of negative	Partisanship Negative feelings Rating of candidate on traits	Strong supporter of a candidate evaluates opposition on traits they are weakest on; not a strong supporter weighs candidate traits for both candidates similarly
Funk 1999	Candidate preference	Partisanship, Challenger or Incumbent	Different candidates are evaluated on difference traits, depending on campaign context. So each predictor may have an impact but not in every campaign.
Kinder et. Al 1980	Evaluation of Candidates	Education/political sophistication, concept of ideal president, evaluation of traits	Candidates not judged equally on all traits; more educated voters more importance placed on competence – less educated more on empathy; ideal view of president only affects how incumbents are evaluated
Arnold and Hawkins 2002	Candidate electoral success	Open-Seat, Challenger, Minority Population in District, Position being Sought, Campaign expenditures	From 1970's to 1990's percentage of minorities in district has increased in likelihood of candidate being elected for Democrats, also affects how campaigns are run, In open seat races candidate money matters more, and all traits are more important since no incumbent
Rapoport, Metcalf & Hartman 1989	Direction of inferences	Ratings of candidate traits, Issues candidate stands for	Voters more likely to infer from issues to traits than vice versa; voter assessment of traits have low correlation to actual policy views of candidates, candidates rated high in compassion/empathy voters infer most about their issue positions
Sanbonmatsu 2002	Candidate preference	Voter beliefs about Gender traits, Issue positions, Partisanship	Voters with stereotypes about women are likely to question women candidate's competence, Democrats slightly prefer women candidates, campaigns that focus on women issues – women do better

Study	Dependent Variable	Predictor	Results
Alvarez & Glasgow 1998	Evaluation of candidate, positive or negative	Race, Gender, Education/ political sophistication, Party Identification, Challenger or incumbent	The more sophisticated and certain of candidate traits the more positive the evaluation, less certain less favorable, Candidates perceived as having low Integrity or Leadership are evaluated lower than others, Challengers are judged more on competence than incumbents
Alexander 2006	Number of women on CA City Councils	Gender, minorities in district	Traits being equal, women are less likely to run for office than men, Minority population does not affect rate of women being elected
Clayton and Stallings 2000	Electoral success black women candidates (case study)	Race, Gender, Money raised by candidate	Black candidate are often judged more on competence by white voters and assumed to be less competent, more on empathy from black voters, more money better chance of election
Hansen and Otero 2007	Vote Choice post 9/11	Gender, Partisanship Post 9/11 voting	Women candidates expected to be more empathetic and empathy mattered more, Partisanship more important in trait evaluation than gender, importance of leadership lessened since 9/11 especially in women candidates
Gimpel 1997	Candidate Preference	Partisanship, Race, Political sophistication/education, gender, Ideology	Race, Ideology, Gender and concern for economic issues all influenced "Trust/Integrity" evaluation of candidates at different times in campaign, timing of assessment and individual candidate (Clinton, Bush and Perot) affect trait assessment
Miller and Miller 1975	Candidate Evaluation	Race, Region	Blacks rate Kennedy high and Wallace low, care about ideological integrity and concerns for themselves (empathy), explains drift from Democrats in 1960's, Southerners vary importance of traits depending on candidate
Pierce 1993	Candidate Preference	Political sophistication/education	The more politically sophisticated the voter the more important competence is in candidate evaluation, less sophisticated more integrity matters – Leadership and Empathy are important across all types
Burden 2002	Chances of being elected president from U.S. Senate	Recent or current Senate incumbent, Race, Gender, position sought	Women, Minorities seen as not having traits needed to be president, Running from Legislative position to executive position (Senate to President) is harder than executive to executive
Colleau, Glynn et. al 1990	Evaluation of black candidates by white voters	Race of candidate, education of voters, partisanship, region	White voters are more likely to question competence and integrity of black candidates, but strong character traits may dull anti-black attitudes, issues and partisanship may be more important in some cases

Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, or Incumbent). There are three ways in which a candidate starts a race: they are either seeking an open seat, they are challenging the current seat holder, or they are the incumbent defending their seat. Depending on what position one is in, political science research has shown that how traits are evaluated can change significantly. Initially, Funk (1999) argues that it is individual candidates that matter, and her research shows that there are no specific effects for incumbents or challengers, but there can be effects for specific candidates like Bob Dole or Bill Clinton. However Kinder et al (1980) demonstrated that there are differing trait evaluations based on incumbency. He found that on key traits such as Integrity and Leadership, voters evaluated the incumbent first, and often more harshly than the challenger. Continuing along this theme Alvarez and Glasgow (1998) suggest that evaluations of the ability to get things done, or competence, fall more heavily on challengers than incumbents, in part because voters have already had the chance to evaluate the incumbent's competence on key issues. Goren (2002) as well concluded that mixed with partisan bias, a challenger's weakness amongst key traits was weighted differently than an incumbent's weakness on key traits. Arnold and Hawkins (2002) find that in the case of open seat races, candidate trait evaluations are based on the unique campaign circumstances, and therefore it is difficult to predict which traits will weigh more heavily on voters' minds.

Finally, in addition to what kind of position a candidate is in at the beginning of the race, the position they seek, be it a legislative or executive, can influence how their competence is viewed as well as their leadership ability (Neimi et. al 1995; Burden 2002; Atkeson and Partin 2001; Arnold and Hawkins 2002). Atkeson and Partin (2001) find that voters view the responsibilities and competencies of Gubernatorial and Senatorial

candidates differently. Whereas Governors are seen as being more caring about and responsible for the poor, Senators are seen as more likely to take strong leadership and stands on international issues. Burden's (2002) work discusses the difficulties facing Senate candidates in their pursuit of the Whitehouse in part due to how they are evaluated differently on traits and issues from those running from executive positions. There is evidence to suggest that since those seeking and serving in executive positions are viewed and evaluated differently than those serving in and seeking legislative positions that the traits upon which they are evaluated would differ as well.

While the political science research thus far has not presented any traits upon which all challengers or all incumbents or open-seat races are evaluated, there are tentative conclusions as to the influences of these differing campaign positions. Challengers and Incumbents are not evaluated equally on traits, and in some cases the campaign context, or the individual candidates may override the importance of candidate position (incumbent, challenger etc.) in how traits are evaluated.

Gender. Most political science research on gender and candidate traits focuses on the degree to which either the gender of the candidate or the voter influences how certain traits are evaluated. In many cases this is evaluated through vote choice, and in some cases while specific traits are not mentioned, some studies have shown that there is no consistent discernable difference in the likelihood of voters choosing female candidates compared to male candidates (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Eckstrand and Eckert 1981). However, most recent studies come to a different conclusion; gender plays a unique role in trait evaluation, while also mixing in the influence of specific candidate issues. For example, Rosenwasser et. al (1987) found that women were deemed as highly

'competent' on 'feminine' issues such as education and civil rights while they were evaluated as being less competent on issues such as foreign affairs and the military. Sanbonmatsu (2002) found similar results in that female candidates were found to be generally more empathetic than men, and that empathy also played a larger role in how they were evaluated by voters. Further, that while women were found to be just as competent as men, this evaluation varied according to what issues were placed before the public. Thus women candidates who focused on a few issues that were seen as their inherent strengths may actually be more successful than male candidates (Clayton and Stallings 2000, Hansen and Otero 2007). Continuing on this theme, women candidates' traits are also more positively evaluated for certain positions more than men. Hedlund et al (1979), Huddy and Terkilson (1993) and Alexander (2006) find that women candidates are found to be more competent when seeking legislative positions, such as for the school board or city council, as opposed to more 'leadership' oriented positions as judge or mayor.

Since the vast majority of political candidates running for high office are men (governor, president) sometimes gender plays a role in trait evaluation from the demographics of the voter not the candidate. Doherty and Gimpel (1997) found that women tended to trust Bill Clinton more than George Bush across the board, especially on economic issues and despite knowledge of his extra-martial affairs. Alvarez and Glasgow (1998) found similar results with Clinton leading both Dole and Perot in both leadership and integrity across the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, but men found Clinton's leadership less impressive.

In summary, how male and female candidates are viewed on key traits appears to be a mixed result in the current literature. While women can be evaluated just as positively as male candidates in general, unlike men, they appear to be limited in the realms to which they are positively evaluated. Women are generally seen as less able to demonstrate leadership than male candidates, and yet across the other key traits of integrity, empathy and competence women fare as well if not better than their male counterparts depending on the campaign context.

Race. Both the race of the candidate and the race of the voters have an impact on how candidates and candidate traits are evaluated. The research suggests that white voters tend to have harsher evaluations of black candidates, rating them lower on traits such as competence and leadership depending on the campaign environment and the policies being presented. (Colleau, Glynn etc. al, 1990; Wright 1995; Hajnal 1999; Jeffries 2002, Burden 2002; Liu 2003; and Abranjo 2005). This general negative affect towards black candidates in particular can be lessened if the candidate focuses on certain issues, or has already been able to establish their competence via previously held office or being an incumbent (Colleau et al 1990; Gimpel 1997; Hajnal 1999; Clayton and Stallings 2000).

Continuing with the importance of race in trait evaluation the number and voting behavior of minority voters in a district can also impact the degree to which certain traits are focused on. In most cases when dealing with African American voters, it is difficult to find large samples of black voters in the last several decades that aren't pre-disposed towards the Democratic candidate, (Miller and Miller 1975, Tate 1994; Lublin 1999). However, some studies have shown that black and minority voters weigh some traits more heavily than others. Alvarez and Glasgow (1998) and Doherty and Gimpel (1997)

16

found that black voters tended to trust Clinton more than Dole, and found him more competent and likely to accomplish things even when political sophistication was taken into account. Latino votes as well have been found to have unique evaluations of candidates and those seeking office that often differ from the white majority and occasionally from African Americans (Alvarez and Badola 2003; Leal 2004) Minorities in a district also affect how traits are evaluated. A large or small minority population in a campaign district can affect which traits a candidate focuses on, what issues they bring to the table and in some cases which candidates are more likely to be elected (Alexander 2006; Arnold and Hawkins 2002; Burden 2004).

In summary, it would appear that race does play a role in how candidate traits are perceived, both from the perspective of the voters and from the perspective of the candidates themselves. While existing stereotypes about minorities and women might influence what traits a candidate is perceived to posses, the population of the district they are running in may equally influence whether these traits are viewed in a positive or negative light.

Education. Research on trait evaluation has led to the discovery of several other potential predictors, some dealing exclusively with voters and others dealing with the campaign environment. In general political sophistication plays a major role in how candidates are evaluated. In some cases political sophistication is simply measured as education level (Kinder 1980; Alvarez and Glasgow 1998; Gimpel et al.) and in other cases was measured as an actual amount of political interest or knowledge (Pierce 1993; Goldthwaite 2002). Regardless of the measurement, there seemed to be a general consensus that the more sophisticated the voter, the more heavily they weighed a

candidates' competence, and the less sophisticated the voter the more they focused on the candidate's empathy or integrity. The importance of leadership seemed to vacillate with particular candidates and campaign year (Kinder 1980; Pierce 1993; Doherty and Gimpel 1997; Alvarez and Glasgow 1998; Goldthwaite 2002; Bartels 2002).

Fundraising. The amount of money that a candidate can raise, or that they believe the opposition could raise has been shown to have a significant impact on campaign outcomes. (Jacobson 1978; Stonecash 1988; Squire and Wright 1990; Herrnson 1992; Clayton and Stallings 2000, Heberlig 2003; Stone et. al 2004). Stone et. al (2004) found that incumbents who were able to raise great sums of money were evaluated as stronger overall candidates on many traits and could deter potential challengers. Along the same lines Squire and Wright (1990) found that successful fundraising for non-incumbent challengers was dependant on the size of campaigns districts and ultimately led to candidate success. Herrnson (1992) found that more professional campaigns raised more money, and congressional candidates were viewed better. Finally, Heberlig (2003) found that fundraising has an impact on the long term political ambitions and success of candidates once in office. Ultimately it would appear that the ability to raise funds can impact how a candidate can get out their message, their ideas and even their voters on election- day. While previous literature has already linked fundraising to candidate ambition while running or governing (Heberlig 2003) it is also possible that other traits such as competence, or even leadership could be influenced by how much a consultant is able to raise for their candidate and how. Therefore the amount of money that a candidate has compared to the competition will be evaluated to determine if this influences how consultant's look at candidate traits.

Governing vs Campaigning. In his seminal work, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974), David Mayhew argued that legislator's primary motivation in all activities was to be re-elected. In claiming that all legislators are 'single minded seekers of re-election', he detailed how this primary focus affected everything from the policies initiated to the structure of Congress itself and suggested the major conflict between voters and elected officials (and by extension political consultants) was the tension between governing and campaigning. Consultants want candidates who exhibit traits needed to get elected whereas voters seek candidates with traits to be good elected officials and as Mayhew suggested years ago, these traits and motivations may not overlap. This is compounded by the fact that consultants, especially for elite (federal, national) campaigns, seldom live and work exclusively in the same geographical area, and consequently may not care about the actual governing of the candidate since they likely will not have to live under the consequences.

In one of the few prior consultant surveys conducted by James Thurber (1999) found that consultants often did actually regret helping to get candidates elected if they later found out that those candidates did not serve well. "*Almost 51% of all consultants said that they have helped a candidate get elected only to regret it later....Overall this indicates that many consultants who helped elect a candidate they were later sorry to see serve felt that way because their candidate seemingly pandered to voters, and told the public what they wanted to hear, instead of what the candidate intended to do....Our analysis demonstrates that consultants are not pleased to see a client elected at any cost. Indeed consultants hope their candidates truly mean what consultants help them to say.*" (Thurber, *Campaigns and Elections,* May 2000, p. 2).

Further some works by consultants have suggested that this difference in skills sets may actually have electoral consequences. Jim Jordan, John Kerry's campaign manager during the 2004 presidential campaign commented that, "*John's not an instinctive politician. He doesn't understand the rhythms of a campaign. He's a very gifted man in ways that are more analogous to being a good president than a good campaigner.*" (p. 14, Thomas, 2004)

Even if we were to accept the notion that consultants do care one way or another about how a candidate may eventually serve it does not change the fact that the attributes needed to run a successful campaign may or may not automatically mesh with what it takes to serve in office. Obviously with presidential campaigns starting earlier and earlier we have entered the era of the permanent campaign where the lines between serving in office and running are blurred (Jones, Brookings Review, Winter 2000, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 12-16 and Tenpas, PSOnline 2003). Nevertheless it remains an interesting question as to what if any differences there are in a campaigner rather than a governor.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Major predictors of candidate traits from the preceding review of the research literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships with political consultants' ratings of the importance of these traits. Each predictor will be analyzed in multivariate models to control for other variables.

Research Question #1: What traits do consultants find important in the candidates that they work for?

Hypothesis #1: There will be a difference in what traits are rated as important by consultants based on the partisan identification of the consultant.

Research Question #2: Do political consultants see a relationship between the attributes

needed for a candidate to campaign and the attributes needed for a candidate to govern?

Hypothesis #2: The majority of political consultants will see a positive relationship

between how candidates campaign and how they will eventually govern.

Research Question #3: What relationship do the major predictors from the literature

have on candidate trait evaluations while running or serving?

Hypothesis #3: The following table lists the predicted relationships between predictors

and candidate trait evaluations when running or governing.

Table 2
Hypotheses for Significant Predictors by Candidate Trait Model for Analysis

Model	Significant Predictors	Interpretation: Trait Very Important if
Integrity while running	Type of Race Race Win – Lose WarChest	Running as a Challenger Candidate is racial minority Candidate Lost Candidate has less money
Integrity while governing	Race	Candidate is racial minority
Empathy while running	Gender	Candidate is female
Empathy while governing	Gender	Candidate is male
Leadership while running	Type of Race Position Sought Party	Candidate running as incumbent Candidate is running for executive position Candidate is Republican
Leadership while governing	Party District Preference	Candidate is Republican District leans Republican
Ambition while running	Type of Race Gender Win – Lose	Candidate running as Open Seat or Challenger Candidate running is female Candidate Won
Ambition while governing	None	
Competence while running	Race Gender Party Education	Candidate is racial minority Candidate is Female Candidate is Republican District is highly educated
Competence while governing	Minority Percentage Education	District has high minority percentage District is more educated

Negative Ads

In political science the study of negative ads, or attack ads, has been focused on two main areas of research, the implementation (Hale et. al 1996; Thielen and Wilhite 1998; Thurber et. al 2000; West 2005) and the effect (Biocca 1991; Wayne and Wilcox 1992; Kahn and Geer 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Wattenberg and Brians 1999; Lemert et. al 1999; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Hughes 2003; Stevens 2005). In their effective review of the major methodologies of negative advertising research (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 2006) demonstrate that most negative advertising research is done through content analysis of ads, experiments, and simple surveys, though the majority of these surveys are done with regular voters, or even undergraduate students. Little survey work on negative advertising in political campaigns is done with actual creators or purveyors of negative ads as part of the research model. This section proposes to analyze the definition and the implementation of negative advertising in political campaigns and the circumstances that predict the use of negative advertising in political campaigns.

One of the reasons that negative advertising remains an interesting and yet fairly inconclusive area in political science is because there are few if any operational definitions of what actually constitutes negative advertising. In fact, the majority of political science literature on negative advertising fails to provide any *actual* definition of negative or attack advertising. Some of the most seminal works in negative advertising research actually do not have definitions of what negative or attack advertising is, but simply continue with their research as if the definition is a given. (Geer, 2006; Theilmann and Wilhite, 1998; Schultz and Pancer 1997; Hale, Fox and Farmer, 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 1994). Given that negative advertising is said to influence everything from voter

turnout, (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), to voter information (Stevens 2005) to partisan polarization (Iyengar 2006) and voter cynicism (Kolodny, Dulio and Thurber 2000, C&E 2000), it is problematic that so little work has been done on finding a consistent definition of the phenomenon.

The actual lack of definition for negative advertising in political science literature is seldom addressed, and when it is in practice, more often than not the failure to provide a clear definition is blamed on practitioners: *"Not surprisingly, most journalists and political practitioners do not define the term (negative advertising) explicitly, but the above definition clearly fits the way that they use term in their speeches and writings."* (p. 440 Mayer. 1996) The problem with this lack of a definition is clear. How can negative advertising be analyzed across the discipline if there is no general definition of what negative advertising is?

Some political scientists have offered their own definitions of negative or attack advertising (West, 2005, Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995, Stevens, 2005, Mayer, 1996), and yet there is little or no consistency in these definitions, ranging from the very general to more specific (see Table 3).

As can be seen in the definitions below, there is a wide and ultimately unsatisfying range of definitions for negative advertising. West's definition for example, implies that negative attacks have to include deception, but there are various attacks that politicians can lobby at each other that do not require untruths, but may be considered 'negative' by the other definitions listed. Even 'personal attacks' are ill defined since the line between personal and political can be blurred for one running for office. Ultimately there does not appear to be much of an operational definition in the discipline.

Table 3
Definitions of Negative Advertising

Author	Definition
Darrell West, 2005	Substantive manipulation, whereby leaders deceive citizens about policy matters. (p. 169)
Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995	"Adapting terminology from Surlin and Gordon, we use the term negative campaigning to refer generally to that which 'attacks the other candidate personally, the issues for which the other candidate stands, or the party of the other candidate'" (p.49)
Stevens, 2005	"…Talking about the opponent-his or her programs, accomplishments, qualification, associates, and so on-with the focus, usually, on the defects of these attributes."
Mayer, 1996	"Most people who use the term seem to have in mind a definition such as the following: Negative campaigning is campaigning that attacks or is critical of an opposing candidate." (p.440)
Haynes and Rhine, 1998	"We define 'attack' politics as a candidate's strategic use of intermediated anti-rival statements. The purpose of using such negative messages is to weaken support for and thus eliminate the targeted rival." (p.695)
Lau and Pomper 2002	"Negative campaigning is talking about the opponent – his or her programs, accomplishments, qualifications, associates and so on, with the focus, usually on the defects of these attributes" (p. 48)

There is a precedent for this research in political science. James Thurber has conducted a survey of political consultants semi-annually since 1999 for the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. In his research the goal is to understand the standards and practices amongst campaign managers in order to create a functional and enforceable code of ethics. While that research agenda does not specifically seek a definition of negative advertising from consultants, it does lay the groundwork for one of the only other surveys conducted of political consultants. This work provides examples of what may constitute negative campaigning in practice but no general definition of negative advertising emerged from his respondents. When asked, "What ethical problems do you see in negative advertising," respondents gave examples such as:

- One candidate's staff member put up a fake web site for the opposition with false negative information.

- Blind mailings that are negative, with no disclaimers. You don't know where the source is [since] there is no return address. (Thurber 1999)

While negative advertising may all be in the eye of the beholder (Lau and Pomper p.48, 2002), political consultants may draw a distinction between types of attack ads in a way that academics may or may not recognize (Nelson, Dulio and Medvic p. 49 2002; Alvarez and Hall, p. 86, 2004).

Factors Predicting the Use of Negative Advertising

Political advertising can be as varied as the campaigns where they are employed. Some ads focus on positive traits of the candidate, others highlight key issues, and some are a variation of several types. However, ads that are focused against another candidate will generally target one of two areas, either that candidate's policy positions or their personal characteristics. It is in fact the supposed dearth of policy attacks and focus on personality in negative ads that has sparked the majority of the consternation both in political science and political commentary (Geer 2007).

Verbal or commercial attacks may be common in political campaigns but the reasons and circumstances under which these attacks occur is anything but common and consistent. There are several existing models of what political environments are more likely to elicit highly negative campaigns than others.

Table 4 presents a wide cross-section of political science works dealing specifically with negative advertising strategy, and when and how attacks ads are actually employed in a political campaign. The table lists some of the most consistent predictors gleaned from political science research about when how and under what circumstances negative advertising is employed during a political campaign. The first column is the

author of the particular model of negative advertising, the second column represents the dependent variable, the third column represents some of the main predictors for the use of negative advertising from each study and the third column presents the effect of negative advertising strategy found from the predictor in column three.

Position in Polls. Likely the most consistent predictor of the use of negative advertising is where the candidate falls in the polls. Generally the studies suggest that candidates who are behind in the polls are more likely to attack than candidates who are ahead, assuming they have the funds to do so (Skaperdas & Grofman 1995; Sigelman &Shiraev 2002; West 2005; Peterson & Djupe 2005). However the distance that a candidate is in the polls, and the type of candidate they are, all have an impact on how much polling influences their likelihood of attacking. Candidates who are trailing by single digits are much more likely to attack than those far behind in the polls (Haynes & Rhine 1998; Damore 2002). Further, challengers are more likely to attack than incumbents, especially when polls are taken into consideration (Hale et. al 1996; Lau and Pomper 2002; West 2005; Peterson & Djupe 2005). In general all the studies suggested that polls play a significant role in when and how attack ads are launched and that while other factors such as party and timing also have an effect, polls play a compelling role in attack strategy.

Party. The role of party, both in the district's political leanings and in the partisan identification of candidates has an impact on negative advertising strategy as well. Most researchers found that Republicans were much more likely to engage in negative attacks than Democratic candidates (Thielen & Wilhite 1998; Lemert et al. 1999; Benoit 2004). This seemed to hold true even when Republicans had less money to spend than their

Table 4
Predictors and Use of Negative Advertising

Author	Dependent Variable	Predictor	Effect
Darrell West, 2005	Candidate won or lost	Polls, (Challenger, Incumbent, Open Seat)	Challenger more likely to attack, attack if behind in polls
Peterson & Djupe, 2005	Amount of negativity in campaign ads	Polls, (Challenger, Incumbent, Open Seat), Funds raised, Primary or General Election, Timing	More likely to be negative early if challenger behind in polls, Incumbent in the primary increases negativity in opposing party primary and general election, More negative at beginning and end of campaign
Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995	Likelihood of using negative ads	Position in the polls	Candidates more likely to attack when behind in the polls
Stevens, 2005	Level of information learned from negative ads	Amount of exposure to negative advertising; level of political sophistication; Education; Race; Sex	Negative advertising works better for political sophisticates, More sophisticated, more learned from negative ads, Exposure to negative ads lowers political knowledge of women and minorities
Benoit, 2004	Likelihood of using character attacks in campaign	Party	Republicans more likely to attack character than Democrats
Johnson,-Cartee & Copeland, 1997	Whether attack ads appear in the campaign and how many	Population, Money, Level of interest, Candidate Status	District's unique make-up influences use of negative ads, Negative ads are more likely in low interest/education races, Challengers and Open Seats use more negative ads
Damore 2002	Use of Positive or Negative ads	Candidate Position in Polls, Days till election, Incumbent, Challenger, Partisanship, Issue Ownership, Attacked first	Candidates behind in the polls will attack more; Candidates who are attacked, attack back

Table 4, Continued
Predictors and Use of Negative Advertising

Author	Dependent Variable	Predictor	Effect
Haynes & Rhine 1998	Probability of candidate launching negative attack; attack reported by news	Position in polls, Candidate has been attacked	If you are behind in the polls but by a small amount, more likely to attack, Candidates are more likely to attack when there are fewer people in the race, More likely to attack when attacked first and more likely to attack early in the campaign
Sigelman & Shiraev 2002	Amount and strategy of negativity in Russian presidential election	Polls, Time in the campaign, Incumbent vs Challenger, Voter awareness/education	Incumbents less likely to attack, Challengers more likely to attack, Attacks come before important milestones in campaign, Sophisticated voters lead to more attacks
Hale, Fox and Farmer 1996	Presence of negative ads in a campaign	Candidate Status, Competitiveness of race, District population	Each of these should have a significant effect on when negative ads are used, challengers attack more than incumbents, close races are more negative than non-competitive races
Thielen & Wilhite, 1998	Decision to launch negative ads	Challenger, Incumbent, Partisanship, Money, Position in Polls	GOP more likely to attack than Democrats, More likely to attack with less funds, More funds candidate more likely to attack, wide difference in polls no diff between GOP and Dems, closer the campaign gets more likely that GOP will attack, Challenger more likely to attack
Lau and Pomper 2002	Success in election polls	Challenger; Incumbent; Money; Party; Position Sought	Challengers improve in polls when they attack incumbents; Incumbents do better to use positive ads than attack ads, attack ads may actually lower their votes; Candidates with huge money advantage or disadvantage more likely to attack; District partisan preference has impact on tone of negativity and candidate success; Senators seeking re-election have differing chances if facing challenger governors, or major office holders.
Lau and Pomper 2004	Likelihood of attacking	Polls; Challengers; Money; Republicans	Candidates behind in the polls more likely to attack, candidates in close races are more likely to attack; Challengers more likely to attack than incumbents; Candidates with fewer funds will attack more; Republican Candidates more likely to attack than Democrats

Democratic opponents. Previous research on negative advertising effects has suggested that partisanship plays a role in how negative advertising is processed (Ansolabehere and Iyenger 1995) and by extension the make up of the election district, whether the voters lean Republican, Democratic or Independent also plays a role in when and how negative advertising is employed (Johnson – Cartee & Copeland 1997). Partisanship appears to have two roles in negative advertising strategy: on the one hand current research suggests that there is an inherent partisan motivation that leads Republicans to be more aggressive than Democrats; on the other hand, the voter's beliefs and behaviors also influence the degree to which negative ads are used and perceived.

Type of Race (Open Seat, Incumbent or Challenger). The literature on negative advertising factors seems to suggest that the status of the candidate as a challenger, incumbent or open seat competitor has an impact on the use and amount of negative advertising in a campaign (Haynes and Rhine 1998; Damore 2002; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland; Peterson and Djupe 2005), although the effects vary. Generally challengers are expected to attack more, (Hale et. al 1996; Hughes 2003; Lau and Pomper 2004) since they have little to lose and often are facing daunting odds. The general consensus in the literature suggests that incumbents are also less likely to attack, or even respond if attacked (Damore 2002; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002). In fact attacking as an incumbent may actually harm one's success at the polls (Lau and Pomper 2002). As far as open seat races, there are mixed assessments as to their overall impact on the likelihood of using negative ads. Some suggest that open seat elections are neither more nor less negative than other campaigns and that other factors such as the political environment or money play a greater role (West 2005). Other works both academic and

otherwise suggest that that open seats are more likely to elicit negative advertising (Lau and Pomper 2002, Lau and Pomper 2004; Walker and Seacrest 2002; Belier 2002). Overall it would appear that challengers are much more likely to attack than incumbents, incumbents attack under rare circumstances, or only in response to attacks from others in the race and open seat races' levels of negativity may be very much contextually based.

Position Sought. Many of the works on negative advertising focused on levels of negativity in various types of elections. Some research has focused on the Senate and legislative positions (Pfau and Burgoon 1989; Lemert et. al 1999; Pinkleton et. al 2002) and others focus mostly on the presidency or executive positions (Haynes and Rhine 1998; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002; West 2005). What is apparent in both of these literatures is that the type of attacks that may occur and the likelihood of attacks may actually differ depending on the campaign. Many legislative positions are over small distinct areas such as congressional districts and thus negative advertising may be more effective or more targeted than on the national stage like a presidency or even a state-wide campaign such as the governor. Consequently the type of position being sought in a campaign may actually influence the use of negative ads as well.

In conclusion the literature seems to suggest that there are several key areas that may influence how likely a candidate is to actually use negative advertising during a political campaign. However, while knowing what leads to candidates attacking is important, the content of such ads is almost as critical as the ads themselves, which leads to the next discussion.

Policy vs Character. While political science research into negative advertising has provided a number of potential predictors that influence when negative advertising is

employed, there is another aspect of negative advertising research that is almost equally important; content. While 'campaign advertising' is often divided in political science into either contrast, attack, or positive ads (Hughes 2003; Geer 2006) with varying definitions, this research focuses on the two main content themes of attack ads, policy and character. Benoit (2000) discusses in detail how there are multiple forms of attacks but they mostly revolve around either issues of the candidates' character and or their policy positions. This distinction is critical since not only can voters potentially react differently to these two strands of attack but can often make policy inferences from character ads either positively or negatively (Hacker et. al 2000.) It still subject to debate which strand of attack is used more often by candidates (Pfau and Burgoon 1989; Thurber, Nelson and Dulio – Chapter 3 - 2000), however Jamieson found that…"This *analysis demonstrates that the majority of verbal content in political advertisements is not discussion of policy.*" (p. 60 – Thurber, Nelson and Dulio 2000). Homer and Batra (1994) found that there were substantive differences in attack content on the campaign environment. Attacks on a candidate's character proved to have a greater influence on voter evaluations of a candidate than attacks on competence (policy/accomplishments).

In terms of who is using which type of content more, journalistic and academic sources suggest that Republican party candidates are much more likely to use character attacks than are Democrats, regardless of the race. "*Republicans are planning to spend the vast majority of their sizable financial war chest over the final 60 days of the campaign attacking Democratic House and Senate candidates over personal issues and local controversies, GOP officials said.*" (VandeHei and Cillizza, Washington Post, Sept 10th, 2006; see also Rosenthal, Washington Post, October 29th 1992; Berke, New York

Times, August 14th 1996; Crowley, the Observer, April 20th 2008;). In fact, research conducted at the University of Missouri on presidential television campaign spots showed that *"…from 1952-2000, 44% of Republican attacks concerned character and 56% were about policy. For Democrats, on the other hand, only 33% of their attacks were on character and 67% addressed policy."* (Benoit 2004). Consequently while studying the predictors of campaign attacks is important the content of the ads is important as well, and the likelihood of divergent strategies based on political affiliation.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Major predictors of negative advertising from the preceding review of the research literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships with political consultants' ratings of the predictors. Predictors will be analyzed in multivariate models to hold constant the effects of the remaining predictors.

Research Question #1: How do political consultants define negative advertising?

Hypothesis #1: The definition of negative advertising advanced by political consultants will vary from definitions in the literature.

Research Question #2: What impact does a candidate's position in the polls have on the extent to which consultants report they used negative ads?

Hypothesis #2: Those consultants whose candidates behind in the polls will be more likely to report they used negative ads than those candidates who are ahead in the polls

Research Question #3: What impact does the position that a candidate is seeking have on the extent to which consultants report they used negative advertising?

Hypothesis #3: Consultants whose candidates seeking executive positions will be more likely to report the use of negative advertising than those seeking legislative positions.

Research Question #4: What impact does partisanship have on the likelihood of a consultant employing negative advertising?

Hypothesis #4: Democrats will be less likely to employ negative advertising than Republicans

Research Question #5: What impact does the type of election (Challenger; Incumbent, or Open Seat) have on likelihood of consultants using negative advertising?

Hypothesis #5: Consultants for challengers are more likely to employ negative advertising than consultants for incumbents and open seat races.

Research Question #6: Do Democratic or Republican political consultants differ in their strategies to attack character or policy?

Hypothesis #6: Republican consultants are more likely to admit to attacking character than consultants who work for Democrats, and the there will be no difference in willingness to attack on policy.

Candidate Positioning

Campaigns are dynamic environments and in some cases candidate positions are changed, altered or shifted during the course of the election. This analysis proposes to look at two of the main theories in political science on candidate positioning and determine how reflective these theories are of actual positioning strategies of political consultants. Further, we will examine how and under what circumstances consultants believe in altering positions during a political campaign.

In Down's seminal work 'An Economic Theory of Democracy' (1957) he suggests some basic rules about when, how and why a citizen chooses to vote in an election and by extension how candidates place themselves to win elections. Citizens evaluate the utility they will receive from re-electing the sitting party (incumbent) versus their expected utility in electing the other party (challenger). On a given issue, assuming a uni-dimensional scale from right to left ideologically, the ideal position of most voters will be the political center. The candidate positioned closest to the centrist or median issue position without alienating their base is most likely to win those voters.

This theory makes several key assumptions about both the voters and the candidates running for office. First, that the voters have 'perfect information' and thus know exactly where the candidates stand on every given issue; second, that the voters will eventually vote sincerely for the issue that they believe in; and finally, that the positions taken by the candidates are stable and will not change during the campaign period. While a number of these assumptions are uncommon in the real world of campaigning, the prevailing notion of the theory, that voters huddle in the middle of

policy space, and that the candidate who positions closest to them wins, is the key part of the theory for this research.

Directional theory is the most significant alternative to the Downs' Proximity or Spatial model of candidate and positioning behavior. The directional model incorporates two key elements in the campaign position and theory argument: direction and intensity. Rabinowitz, and MacDonald (1989) argue that successful positioning in a campaign is taking a policy stand on the right 'side' of key issues. "*If we think in symbolic politics terms, the directional prediction makes sense. The voter who prefers one side of a debate to the other but cares little about the issue would not generally be expected to support the candidate who favors the opposite side and says little*" (p. 97 Rabinowitz, MacDonald, 1989). While the Downsian model argues that the distance between the voter's position and the candidate's stance is the ultimate determinant of vote choice, the directional model argues that direction and intensity of the stance that both the voters and candidates show for a given issue is the determinant of vote choice. The median voter remains important in the directional model but in a different manner. The goal of a candidate in this model is to place themselves in the position to capture the median voter by being intense in the direction of that voter without moving outside the region of responsibility where they would be perceived as being too extreme. a place to capture those voters who care for the issue in the direction in which the candidate stands, without moving outside of the 'region of acceptability' wherein they will be seen as too extreme for most voters. "*The more intense a candidate is on an issue, the more the candidate generates intense support or opposition with regard to that issue. By taking clear, strong, stands, candidates can make an issue central to judgments about themselves.*" (p. 98, Rabinowitz

These two theories have elicited considerable research as other researchers have examined, refuted and in some cases augmented the conclusions reached in the Directional (Spatial or Proximity) models of candidate positioning. For example, Anders Westholm has consistently argued that in fact the proximity model is the model more reflective of candidate positioning and that the directional model is fundamentally flawed Westholm 1997; 2001). Lewis and King (1998) argued that under some circumstances both models can be correct, and Grofman (2004) argues that there are so many assumptions that apply to the proximity model that it's effectiveness is powerful but limited to certain circumstances. This research does not attempt to wade into the debate over the superiority of one model over another, merely to assess which model might be more reflective amongst this data set of positioning behavior. Table 5 presents a brief summary of some of the main theories re-examining directional and proximity theory. The key to this table is the focus on the model and the 'predictors' analyzed from each study. The 'model' listed for each work is the model that is the focus of the research. Also listed is the data used to create the analysis. In some cases there is no 'data' because the research focuses on formal models, and in these cases the term formal model is used. The 'predictor' column explains what factors the researchers conclude have an effect on the directional or proximity models.

Party. In many models the strength of partisanship of the individual voter, the candidate or the aggregate partisan leanings of the entire voting district are key to how

Table 5
Predictors of Candidate Positioning

Author	Model	Predictor	Result
Gershtenson 2004	Proximity Model	Senate Races; Polls Open Seat Races; Party	Other factors must be taken into consideration as to whether or not the proximity model really reflects the candidate's strategy
Gershtenson 2003	Proximity Model – Congressional Elections only	District Partisanship; Party; Polls; Election Year; Voter perception of economy; Incumbency	The proximity model is not the key determinant of electoral success, other factors have greater influence, close elections increase likelihood of proximity model
Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001	Spatial Model/ Downsian Model National Political Awareness Test analyzed	District Partisanship; Time of election; Type of Races Position Sought; Polls	The median voter model varies depending on district and level of race candidate is seeking; the closer the election the more likely incumbents do not seek median voter, "Open seats contestants are on average more extreme than incumbents, although they are less extreme than other challengers." (p.153) Downs is weakened convergence does not happen district or national
Francis and Kenny (1996)	Americans for Democratic action scores analyzed to establish 'winning policy position'	Party; Position Sought	Different winning positions on the median depending on party
Bernstein 1995	Critiques Proximity model using ANES data	Party; Party Affect; Issues Election Year	"..the optimal political strategy in multi-issue campaigns is not to appeal to the center on issues offering concentrated benefits, but instead to adopt positions closer to those favored by proponents of the benefits" (p. 499)
Glazer and Grofman 1989	Formal Models no data	Feasibility point	Voters may not chose the candidate who places themselves closest to their policy preferences, unless they believe such policies are feasible and that the candidate can achieve them
Conover and Feldman 1982	Analysis of 1976 CPS National Election Survey and 3 models of vote choice	Issue Voting Inference Voting Projection Voting	Voters are not likely following the strict proximity model since issue positions are often vague, more likely to infer the position than project
Franklin 1991	NES Data from 1988 Senate Election Study	Party; Challenger attacks positions; Incumbent focus on issues; election year	Assumes Proximity model of right to left, candidates chose positions but attacks from opponent and party identification affect how clear positions are median voter not always best option to win campaign
Bergen	Proximity model	Incumbent; Challenger; Campaign donations	Incumbents more likely to take moderate positions, Challengers more likely to take extreme positions, incumbents moderate to raise funds

Table 5, Continued
Predictors of Candidate Positioning

Author	Model	Predictor	Result
McGann, Koetzle and Grofman 2002	Proximity Model- position information from Americans for Democratic Action and American Conservative Union.	Number of candidates running, sequential elections, run-off elections, plurality elections	Winning position is between the median and the mode, not the median voter, especially when voter preferences are skewed, run-off and sequential elections more likely to pick median position candidate
Wuffle, Feld, Owen and Grofman 1989	Spatial Model	Incumbency Issue Positions	There is a 'finagle' point such that there is a perfectly defensible space in a two person election battle, but this position can vary depending on the race
Francis and Kenney 1996	Spatial Model	Position Being Sought	As candidates seek higher office they veer away from the middle, to more extreme positions, both parties do this and winners have a greater likelihood of engaging in this behavior
Adams, Bishin and Dow 2004	Discounting Theory of Voters Directional Model Pooled Senate Election Study 1988-1992	Party; Race; Education; Income; Incumbency; Challengers; Money spent	Policy discounting and directional effects are more common than proximity effects in candidate positioning, single elections cannot be used only must be looked at across elections, individual and aggregate voting more resemble the directional model in senate races
Platt, Poole and Rosenthal 1992	Directional-Spatial Model Comparison	NES Data; Partisanship Voter Awareness	The Spatial model is more reflective of informed voters, the directional model is more reflective of uninformed voters

and where candidates chose to position themselves in the policy space. (Glazer and (2002), Gershtenson (2003) and Bernstein (1995). In fact, many of the studies analyzed Grofman 1989; Franklin 1991; Bernstein 1995; Francis and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 2001; McGann et. al 2002; Gershtenson 2003; Adams et. al 2004). In some studies the effect of party comes in the form of the general disposition of the community. For example, Ansolabehere et. al (2001) finds that regardless of the leanings of particular local communities, there has been increased divergence from the spatial mean in candidates for the United States Senate. Similar results were found by McGann et. al seem to come to a similar conclusion, which is that the spatial model is less reflective of the real world of candidate issue positioning in large part due to the lack of proper consideration for partisan intensity and voting behavior. Whether directional or proximity models are discussed however, it would appear that partisanship on the individual or aggregate level plays a key role in candidate positioning.

Minorities. An extension of the partisanship concept is the idea of 'passionate' minorities in a district. These can be minority groups based on issues or ethnicity. In the case of ethnic minorities, studies have suggested that large concentrations of minority voters can have a significant impact on the positions taken by candidates running for office, or at least the generalized voting behavior of the district (Wright 1977; Morris 2000, Shotts 2001). Minorities often present a unique and concentrated group of voters, especially if they are motivated to turn out and thus could conceivably have an impact on either model of candidate positioning. Moreover, political consultants are uniquely attuned to the demographics of their campaign districts and thus might be affected by large or active minority populations.

Type of Race (Challenger, Incumbent, Open Seat). Whether one is an incumbent, challenger or in an open seat election plays a significant role in candidate positioning as well. Incumbents, especially those facing weak challengers, are more inclined to take moderate stances, and in some cases, work their base over the median voter in elections. (Franklin 1991; Ansolabehere et. al 2001;Gershtenson 2003; Aragones and Palfrey 2004). Further, incumbents can often benefit from being able to control the issue agenda in the campaign and thus determine where and how the opposition positions themselves on key issues. Challengers, on the other hand may or may not have a moderating influence on the issue positions taken in campaign, but this is usually a reflection of how competitive the election is. The more competitive the election, the more candidates will not chose the center and will attempt to distinguish themselves in the electoral policy space (Bernstein 1995; Francis and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 2001). Finally, open seat races seem to have a middle effect on candidate positioning during a campaign. While open seat candidates are more extreme in their position taking than incumbents, they are often less extreme than challengers, assuming that the race is reasonably competitive.

Position Sought. One of the most important elements of candidate positioning is the position the candidate is seeking. The vast majority of works on candidate positions focus on candidates running for, or serving in, legislative office (Platt et al 1992; Francis and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 2001; Adams et al, 2004), while relatively few focus on executive office seekers that aren't the presidency (Bernstein 1995). In some cases, this difference in position being sought leads to conclusions about the value of the proximity model over the directional model (Platt et. al 1992) but the majority of the

works suggest the success of legislative candidates making issue appeals to intense minorities, or seeking not the median voter but some other key position in the policy space (Wuffle et. al 1989; Lublin 2003).

In conclusion, there are several key factors that seem to influence how likely the proximity or directional model is to reflect candidate positioning. The type of candidate running, their party, the closeness of the election, the district demographics and even the position being sought all seem to have an impact on which model might be more reflective. Political consultants, charged with organizing and marketing position strategy for campaigns may be influenced by these predictors as well. Moreover, these factors likely influence candidate positioning during a campaign regardless of what overall election model is being suggested.

Issue Ownership. Issue ownership is a concept focused on initially by Petrocik (1996) and Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994); Norpoth and Buchannan (1992). The core of the concept is that throughout the lives of voters, parties become inextricably linked to certain policies and further to certain policy stances. This impacts how political campaigns should be run according to Ansolabehere et. al (1994), where candidates should focus their political advertising on those issues where they are perceived to have a comparative advantage against the opposition. The core concept of 'issue ownership' literature is that since these parties are so strongly linked to certain concepts, attempts to veer from these set policy spaces can have serious consequences during the campaign.

Norpoth and Buchannan (1992) argue that 'issue trespassing,' where a candidate attempts to take a position that is similar to their opposition or stake out territory in a policy area they are not associated with, is almost impossible. In most cases voters are

too set in their views about policy positions for parties to believe that the issue change

has actually occurred. Holian (2004) argues that such 'trespassing' is possible but only

with candidates of great rhetorical skill and in many cases these attempts can harm a

candidate's chances if voters perceive them to be moving too far away from their base.

Issue ownership and issue trespassing literature seem to agree on the issues that

are owned by each political party, with foreign affairs, and national defense often owned

by the GOP, and domestic affairs, education, and more recently the economy often

owned by the Democrats (Aldrich et. al 1989; Ansolabehere 1994; Petrocik 1996 and

Egan 2006). Nevertheless each of these studies has been based on data from national

election surveys focusing on voter perspectives. It is not clear if political operators

themselves have the same degree of belief in just what issues are owned by which parties.

It is entirely possible that Republican voters and Republican consultants may perceive

positions on key issues differently, if the consultants believe that position changes can be

made palatable.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Major predictors of candidate positioning from the preceding review of the

research literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships

between consultants and position behavior. Each predictor will be analyzed in

multivariate models to hold constant the effects of the remaining predictors.

Research Question #1: Which theory of candidate positioning, the directional or

proximity theory most approximates how consultants organize candidate positioning

during a campaign?

Hypothesis #1: The Directional model is more reflective of consultant's attitudes of candidate positioning than the proximity model

Research Question #2: What factors influence whether a consultant moves towards a directional or more proximity like model during a campaign?

Hypothesis #2: There most significant factor will be the partisan identification of the candidate.

Research Question #3: What issues do campaign consultants feel the most comfortable changing positions on, what positions do they feel the least comfortable changing positions on?

Hypothesis #3: There will be a difference in the issues on which consultants for Republican and Democratic candidates will feel comfortable changing positions.

Conclusion

This chapter has established some of the key areas in political science regarding campaigns, and moreover how political consultants view their role and influence may provide some key insight into these existing theories. Having established the current research questions and hypotheses based on the existing literature, we now move to the research design, methods and then analysis sections.

Chapter 3

Research Design: Methods, Data and Data Collection

This chapter describes the methods used to develop the survey of political consultants that will comprise the primary data for this dissertation and will help test the hypotheses established in chapter 2. The chapter presents: a brief overview of previous studies of political consultants whose methods informed the research methods of this dissertation; a discussion of how the main themes of this survey were confirmed and how the questions for the survey were developed; a description of the creation and implementation of the pilot survey; and a description of the implementation of the final survey.

There are a relatively limited number of studies that provide analyses of political consultants and from which this dissertation could use as a guiding model. The majority of studies on political consultants relied almost exclusively on interviews with campaign professionals or case studies that relied on observation (Thielen and Wilhite 1998; Bailey et al 2001; Jamieson and Waldman 2001). While there is a value in case studies and constructed interviews for political theory building (Johnson Cartee Copeland 1997), the research questions for this analysis require a level of data that is subject to statistical and empirical analysis.

Three of the most prominent surveys of political consultants analyzed in political science were conducted by *Campaigns and Elections* magazine (1993); Herrnson 1986, and Thurber (a series of surveys beginning in 1999).

Campaigns and Elections magazine, the premier trade magazine for political consultants has conducted at least one extensive survey of consultants primarily focused on the winning and losing records of consultants (Mundy, Campaigns and Elections, January 1993). Medvic and Lenart (1997) used this data to analyze the degree to which having a professional political consultant on staff actually increased non-incumbents' chances of winning house elections. The original data was collected by the *Campaigns and Elections* staff, they contacted all of the consultants who advertised within their magazine and asked for a list of their clients. There were problems with this approach:

*"We thought it would be simple -- just call up consulting firms, ask them for their client lists. But when we started looking at the lists they supplied, we noticed something strange. Virtually every consultant claimed a winning percentage of more than 90 and almost no losers.... A scrutiny of more than 1000 FEC candidate disbursement records revealed that fewer than a dozen of 184 firms had provided us with a complete and accurate list. The rest had failed to submit complete information or had, shall we say, embellished." (*Mundy, *Campaigns and Elections*, January 1993).

Eventually a list of clients for campaign firms was complied using data from the Federal Elections Commission and a list of which campaigns had more winners and losers was established. Medvic and Lemert (1997) looked at which campaigns for non-incumbents hired political consulting firms and whether they won or lost and how much did they win or lose by. They compiled the remainder of their information from final

election results and what demographic information they could compile for certain areas. While this method of finding consultants through looking at official lists in *Campaigns and Elections* magazine was helpful, it was clear that this data was used almost exclusively to determine winners from losers rather than strategy.

Herrnson's research in 1986 focused on the role of political action committees and their increasing role in changing the level and power of political parties in the United States campaign process. His research began with an interview with Democratic and Republican political leaders and party chairs in 1984 in order to establish what types of questions he should ask regarding the role of parties and outside organizations to congressional campaigners and activists. He then sent out a mail questionnaire to the staffs of all Republican and Democratic candidates for the House in 1984 asking them to rate how influential political action committees and outside interest groups were to fundraising, campaign management and voter turnout activities for the election campaign. A total of 734 questionnaires were mailed, resulting in 385 usable surveys for his analysis, a response rate of about 52%, The results were categorized according to party, candidate status (incumbent, challenger and open seat) and competitiveness of the race. Herrnson's results provide an indicator of the help and services provided by different groups during a campaign; however they do not necessarily provide much information into campaign strategy or attitudes towards campaign strategy.

James Thurber's work on political consultants began in 1999 with a survey of political consultants as well as structured interviews. Thurber's work was part of a larger research agenda initiated by the American Association of Political Consultants and the Pew Charitable trusts. The stated goals of their survey were to:

- *Examine the roles of political consultants and political parties in the electoral process,*

- *Understand consultant's perception of political campaigns and candidates, and*

- *Observe the frequency of unethical campaign practices in the political consulting industry including: (1) examples of ethical problems in recent campaigns and (2) the necessity for a code of ethics.*

The first survey was conducted in 1999 from April 5th and May 14th of 1999 through structured interviews with a list of political consultants compiled by American University with the assistance of the American Association of Political Consultants. A total of 505 interviews were conducted and interview answers were then used primarily in survey form without statistical analysis. The survey was re-administered in 2002 from November 6th to December 12th via telephone and with on-line interviews with 204 consultants who had participated in the previous study. These results were used to find out information on campaign ethics and professionalism. Again, as with Herrnson's work, Thurber's questions seldom dealt with strategy, aside from some questions regarding negative advertising, but mostly-dealt with what consultants believed was right and wrong in the campaigning process.

Survey Development

Three themes were prominent in the literature regarding political campaigns and likely consultant attitudes: (1) Candidate Traits, the unique or valuable abilities of a candidate that may help them during a campaign; (2) Negative Advertising, or attack advertising; and (3) Campaign Positions, the extent to which a candidate takes a centrist

or middle-of-the-road policy. Taking a cue from Herrnson's confirmatory interviews with party leaders, to confirm that the themes identified in political science literature comport with the themes common to political consultants, analyses of case studies in *Campaigns and Elections* magazine were conducted to ensure that the themes were actually reflective of the concerns and used terminology that would be familiar to the survey respondents. If the survey was developed and implemented using only themes from political science without having been compared to themes familiar with consultants, the survey might be confusing, poorly received and ineffective.

 Campaigns and Elections articles continue to be used by the vast majority of both journalists and academics seeking to study or inform themselves about political consultants. While the American Association of Political Consultants does send out pamphlets and information, the depth, consistency and reliability of information on consultants that is collected from *Campaigns and Elections* cannot be matched. The magazine has been in publication for 25 years, moving from quarterly to bi-monthly in 1986 and then to monthly publication in 1990.

 The primary procedure to confirm the themes was a content analysis of *Campaigns and Elections* magazine articles from July to November of the election years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to determine the frequency of the listed themes in the literature.[1] The specific years of *Campaigns and Elections* magazine were chosen because they are all election years, both on and "off," and provide a diverse array of presidential and congressional victories. All articles with headings of 'Electioneering,' 'Politics…practical,' or 'Advertising, Political' from the EBSCOhost electronic journal's database at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were examined in the content

analysis. These subject headings were selected because the articles they contained focused most consistently on consultants' views on campaigns and strategy. A total of 22 case studies were produced by this method and these were examined to determine and identify consultant beliefs. Excluded from this analysis were case studies that focused on non-candidate centered races and referendums (n=4). Of the remaining 18 case studies, six focused on challenger vs. incumbent races, 10 focused on open seat races, and two focused on campaigns where two incumbents faced each other because of re-districting.

There were two main content analysis programs that could have been employed for this analysis: *Atlas ti* (atlasti.com), and *NUD*IST* (Kerlin 2002). While both programs are powerful and used in many social science works (Barry 1998) *Atlas ti* gives the researcher more freedom in creating the categories for searching documents and media and the units of analysis are much smaller than *NUD*IST* in most cases, thus capturing more information. *Atlas it* can analyze almost any type of material that can be downloaded into a computer. The researcher then creates 'hermetic units' for the program to follow. The hermetic unit is essentially the key words, or concepts the researcher is searching for to define a theme or term in the content being analyzed. For example, to locate the consistency of the theme, "Candidate traits" in the data, the following hermetic unit was created: ability, skills, speaker, connect, empathy, communication, constituent, leadership, honesty. Therefore, sections of text that have these words or similar words in them will be collected under the theme of 'candidate traits' for this analysis. [1]

---

[1] The words used for the hermetic units were derived from the initial analysis of the case studies. The hermetic units were the following: (Candidate Traits: ability, skills, speaker, connect, empathy, communication, constituent, leadership, honesty); (Negative Advertising: attack, attack

All of the *Campaigns and Elections* articles from a particular year were placed

into the *Atlas ti* program to be reviewed. The results of the program were collected into

paragraphs based on how linked the program finds the phrases to be. Consequently this

may result in a one sentence packet of information or several sentences. Table 6 provides

examples of the data output for candidate traits from *Atlas ti*, by the year of the article

from *Campaigns and Elections*.

Table 6
Content Analysis Results Using *Atlas it*

Year	Output
2000	P 4: Aug2000Vol21Is7p38.txt - 4:8 (303:306) (Super) Codes: [Candidate traits] [Racial Issues] When a candidate must appeal to many groups – ethnic groups, age groups, socio-economic groups and the like-he or she is more likely to turn to a focus group to learn how to communicate better.
2002	P21: Jul2002Vol23Is6p65.txt - 21:1 (132:133) (Super) Codes: [Candidate traits] The two most important are perceived electability and a candidate's ability to make a credible, persuasive ask (sic).
1998	P 8: Aug98Vol19Is8p46.txt - 8:36 (192:194) (Super) Codes: [Candidate traits] She says, "Anyone who doesn't connect with voters by phone should be prepared to lose." Julia Emmons used it in the summer of 1997 to establish name recognition.
1996	P 4: Aug96Vol17Is8p37.txt - 4:20 (144:147) (Super) Codes: [Candidate traits] Because the Democratic candidates agreed on most issues Alioto's simple visual and compelling personal story were getting traction where the other candidates were having trouble connecting with voters.

As shown, the data provides general pieces of information that can make scanning

through large sums of information more efficient and the coding methodology more

ads, advertising, negative, negative advertising); (Candidate Position: outside, extreme, stand

moderate, center, centrist, mainstream, middle, median)

reliable. Each section of information lifted from the document is labeled based on how it was imputed into the program. For example, the first output listed has the heading: P 4: Aug2000Vol21Is7p38.txt. The article was downloaded into the *Atlas ti* program from *Campaigns and Elections* magazine; it was the 7th issue of the magazine to be released in the year 2000; and the information was gleaned from page 38 of the magazine.

Atlas ti is not the perfect content analysis program however. Many times results can be obtained that contain large paragraphs that have key phrases from the hermetic unit and yet have nothing to do with the overall research goal. It is during these times that it's important to look at the context of all content analysis survey results to make sure that the information is valid.

The results of the content analysis show that each theme was consistently mentioned in the *Campaigns and Elections* articles each year (Table 7). This lends additional support to the importance of the three themes for the survey development. Note that no attempt was made to rank these themes as to frequency because the terms used in the content analysis varied from very general to specific.

Table 7
Frequency of Appearance for Themes
by *Campaigns and Elections* Publication Year

Theme	1996	1998	2000	2002	Total
Candidate Traits	25	20	56	66	167
Negative Advertising	32	89	82	33	236
Campaign Position	56	45	109	82	292
Total	113	154	247	181	695

Finding that the campaign themes discovered in the analysis did in fact overlap with existing dialogue of political professionals it seemed reasonable to conduct a survey

around these themes. Survey questions were also based on analysis provided in chapter 2. The final survey had 80 questions (Table 8) with 12 questions concerning candidate traits, 21 questions concerning negative advertising, and 15 questions concerning campaign positions. Other questions included consultant demographics (8 questions), district demographics (15 questions) and questions about race and gender (4 questions).

Table 8
Number of items by Survey Area

Survey Questions	N
Consultant Information	8
District Demographics	15
Candidate Traits	12
Negative Advertising	21
Campaign Positions	15
Message, Definition	5
Racial Issues	4
Total	80

Pilot Study

A pilot study is an initial test of an idea or concept on a small sample before administering it to a larger population. This survey was pilot tested in two phases: (1) students in political science classes completed the paper survey during class time, and (2) knowledgeable political science experts reviewed the survey after it had been developed

The first phase of the pilot study was conducted at the Bliss Institute at the University of Akron and the George Washington School of Political Management. Faculty at each institution gave permission for the survey to be administered in their classes (one class from each institution). The pilot was conducted in the fall of 2005 and the spring of 2006 and resulted in 57 completed surveys out of a total of 64 students who started the survey. It was clear that there was respondent fatigue, since the survey was long (88 questions), it had to be done by hand, and took about 35 minutes to complete.

However, the survey also held the students' interest and based on students' comments only 7 questions were eliminated from the survey and several questions were re-written.

Final Survey

In order to create the final survey for this dissertation that would actually go into the field (see appendix for final survey), the responses and concerns from the pilot were taken into consideration. Given how long it took for respondents to complete the pilot by hand, it was decided to use one of the on-line survey sites that provided user-friendly, visually appealing surveys that respondents could simply link to and use. The on-line survey program that was eventually selected was *Surveymonkey.com* for several reasons. It provided the basic tools necessary for the analysis: the ability to filter and sort the information by relevant categories, download the survey results into SPSS or Stata statistical programs, and was the most affordable service with comparable resources (20 dollars a month).

Before administering the survey to the total survey population, four political experts known to the author tested the survey and provided final commentary and suggestions. These four experts were: two faculty members from political science departments, one speechwriter, and one political campaign consultant. They recommended wording changes but did not recommend a reduction in the length of the survey. The survey, on average, took the expert respondents 25 minutes to complete, a full 10 minutes less than the paper pilot survey delivered earlier. The following are examples of the main suggestions by the experts. All suggestions were implemented.

- A speechwriter for several Democratic Congressional and gubernatorial candidates suggested changes in the vocabulary of the Negative

Advertising section to make sure that respondents knew what was meant by attack ads.

- A communications director for a long term Democratic incumbent from a major urban district suggested that the respondents be reminded throughout the survey how much of the survey was left to be completed. She also suggested changing the color scheme from black and white for the background to something more appealing.

- A faculty member at the University of Akron's Bliss Institute for Political Management and former vice president of the American Association of Women Political Consultants suggested that the questions about political messages should not lead anyone into giving particular answers and further recommended reducing the number of open-ended questions.

- A professor of Political Science at Emory University and former professional pollster advised that reminders be added at the beginning of the email that people did not have to complete the survey in one sitting.

The primary consideration in selecting subjects was that they were operating as political consultants and managers in the U.S. Taking a cue from the Thurber surveys, initially the register of the American Association of Political Consultants was considered as a potential universe for selecting survey subjects. The organization boasts over one thousand active members and is the only organization that purports to represent political professionals. Several calls to firms on the register found that they had little or nothing to do with the day-to-day management of campaigns but only became involved when media

buying or GOTV (Get out the Vote programs) were necessary. In addition the member

list was often woefully out of date with many of the listing no longer operating or having

changed their addresses.

The second approach, and the one adopted, was to identify campaigns in all 50

states that would be conducted in the fall of 2006 and telephone each campaign to

identify their political consultants. The names, campaign addresses, and phone numbers

of all citizens qualified to run in a general election in the fall were identified through the

websites for each state board of elections or the Secretary of State. With this information

campaigns were called by a trained survey team, the managers or consultants for the

campaigns were identified and surveys were sent to them once they agreed to participate.

This process was done in the summer and fall of 2006. This method had a much better

chance of finding the consultants who were not necessarily easily found through

conventional means or party organizations. Many men and women who work as

consultants have other types of employment such as lawyers, teachers and even party

activists who cannot be found in conventional drag-net searching methods.

Survey Implementation

The calls to political campaigns began in May of 2006 and proceeded into the fall

of 2006. Using a listing of the primary dates for all states, the lead researcher (the

dissertation author) was able to call campaigns throughout the nation and make contact

with many political teams right after the state primaries were over in order to better

capture as many respondents as possible. However, it was expected that many campaigns

would be too busy during the summer to fill out the survey and thus the main thrust of the

survey was timed for implementation during the two week period after the 2006 general

elections when campaign teams would have time to answer calls but before all offices were closed for the holidays. There were calls made during the summer but the goal was that these calls would simply bolster the majority that would be obtained after the election.

A team of three undergraduate students were trained with a script as to how to call political campaigns across the nation and implement the survey. These undergraduate students were instructed to call the campaign headquarters and ask for the head manager or consultant. Upon contacting that person, or other high ranking campaign official they would briefly explain the survey, ask permission to send the survey link via email and send it to the appropriate person or persons (to see a copy of the email sent to consultants, see appendix).

The response rate was 53% for surveys with some questions answered and 34% for surveys with all questions answered, 193 surveys were completed. All respondents who agreed to have the survey sent to them were sent a reminder email two weeks after receiving the survey and encouraged to complete or finish the survey if they had not by that point (to see a copy of the reminder email, see the appendix).

Ethical Considerations

This research study was reviewed and approved by the university's *Institutional Review Board*. (Copy of approval available upon request) The personal identities of the subjects in this study were keep secure and will be destroyed once the study is completed. The subjects were volunteers and were told by the survey team that their participation was voluntary. The confidentiality of each respondent was protected as part of the IRB requirements at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. There was no

identifying information associated with the consultants who responded to the survey outside of the ISP address from the computer where the response was sent from. Given that the surveys could have been completed from any location, from the campaign office to a public library to an I-phone it would be impossible even from that information to identify any individual respondent.

Limitations of Research Design or Methods

This survey was conducted via sending an electronic survey over the internet. Consequently it is important to take into consideration the following potential weaknesses found in any results from this survey. First, once sent, it is not possible to track who actually completed the on-line survey. Most larger or state wide political campaigns have many managers, GOTV, and communications workers, so it is possible that the initial person who received the survey did not in fact complete the survey. Moreover, many campaigns required a screening of the survey, meaning the head consultant agreed to take the survey first, and would send it out to other members of the staff once they were able to see that the questions were legitimate and would not put the campaign at a strategic disadvantage. The survey itself is quite self selective, and given the questions about campaign position, length of time in the profession and strategy those who were not qualified to answer the survey were likely screened out, however one cannot totally discount the possibility of errant respondents.

---

[1] *Phrases used for the content analysis included: (1)"* Candidate traits" in the data, the following hermetic unit was created: ability, skills, speaker, connect, empathy, communication, constituent, leadership, honesty *(2) Negative Advertising* – "attack, attack ads, advertising, negative, negative advertising;" and *(3) Campaign Position-* "strong, strength, outside, extreme, stand, moderate, center, centrist, mainstream, middle, and median."

Chapter 4

Results

In this chapter, the results describing the demographics of the consultants, the candidates and campaign environments that formed the basis for these survey results are presented, followed by results for the three political campaign areas: "Candidate Traits," "Negative Advertising," and "Candidate Positioning." The "Candidate Traits" section summarizes consultants' identification of important candidate traits by party and analyzes the relationships of various predictions with consultants' ratings of five candidate traits identified in the literature. The "Negative Advertising" section reviews definitions for negative advertising and predictors of the use and content of negative advertising. The "Candidate Positioning" section analyzes what existing models in political science best describe the positioning strategies of political candidates and the factors that predict the importance of issues and what position candidates take during a race.

Demographics

Consultant Demographics. Consultant characteristics include the campaign year that they worked, their campaign job, their experience or the number of years they have worked for political campaigns, and their level of education (Table 9). The majority of

the consultants surveyed provided responses to the survey questions about campaigns

they worked for in recent years. Overall, the results show that consultants answered about

races run as recently as 2006 and as far in the past as 1971. Nevertheless 79.5% were in

the campaign years from 2004-2006 and 95.1% were in the campaign years from 2000 to

2006, providing a good look as to how these modern consultants view the world they

work in. Since the majority of respondents (50.2%) were campaign managers as well,

followed by candidates/managers (11.8%) and "Get Out The Vote" (GOTV) specialists

(14.1%), the survey results should provide a good overall view of the strategies and inner

workings of the campaigns in this sample. Finally, almost a majority of the consultants

were relatively new; about half of the respondents claimed to have worked in campaigns

for 1 to 4 years, and 77.8% worked in campaigns from 1 to 10 years. The consultants

were mostly college educated (57.0%), and 30.4% reported a post bachelor's education.

Table 9
Consultant Demographics by Party

Consultant Demographics	Republicans N (%)	Democrats N (%)
Campaign Year		
2006	40(39.6)	62(38.3)
2005	3(3.0)	12 (7.4)
2004	39(38.6)	53(32.7)
2003	0	5 (3.1)
2002 and earlier	19 (18.9)	30 (18.6)
Campaign Job		
Political Director	3 (3.0)	10 (6.2)
Manager	56(55.4)	76(46.9)
Media	6 (5.9)	10 (6.2)
Get Out the Vote (GOTV)	5 (5)	32 (19.8)
Fundraiser	9 (8.9)	10 (6.2)
Consultant	8 (7.9)	7 (4.3)
Candidate	14 (13.9)	17 (10.5)
Experience		
1 – 4 years	52 (51.5)	75 (46.3)
5 – 10 years	30 (29.7)	46 (28.4)
11 – 15 years	14 (13.9)	16 (9.9)
16 – 20	0	12 (7.4)

More than 20 years	5 (5.0)	13 (8.0)
Level of Education		
High-School or Associates Degree	19(18.8)	14 (8.7)
Bachelors	62 (61.4)	88 (54.3)
Master's Degree	13 (12.9)	44(27.2)
Ph.D.	1 (1.0)	4 (2.5)
Professional Degree	6 (5.9)	12 (7.4)

There were some differences between the parties regarding the consultant's backgrounds. More consultants in Democratic campaigns (19.8%) worked as GOTV compared to Republican consultants (5.0%) while somewhat more Republican consultants (55.4%) worked as campaign managers compared to Democratic consultants (46.9%). More consultants for Democratic campaigns reported post graduate degrees (32.1%) compared to Republican consultants (19.8%) and slightly more Republican consultants (51.5%) had experience of 1-4 years compared to Democratic consultants (46.3).

Candidate Demographics. Table 10 provides results for the characteristics of the candidates as reported by the consultants who responded to the survey. The value of the questions in this section is that we are able to see the types of candidates that the consultants were working with and how this may play out in later analyses in how consultant's strategies might be affected.

There was a fairly good mix of Republican (N=85) and Democratic (N = 138) candidates overall which should assist in the generalizability of the results obtained from the rest of the survey data. In total, consultants reported that their candidates were less likely to be an Incumbent (28.1%) compared to a Challenger (38.0%) or in an Open Seat race (33.8%); candidates and their opposition were more likely to be White (84.0% candidate, 82.9% opposition) and Male (73.8% candidate, 82.9% opposition); most

sought an executive position (70.0%); war chest funds were similarly distributed between

the candidates (41.0% and opponents 47.3%); and most reported winning (59.6%).

There were differences along party lines. More of the Republicans candidates

(36.6%) were reported to be incumbents compared to Democrats (22.8%), fewer of the

Republican candidates were reported to be female (16.8%) compared to Democrats

(32.1%) while opposition candidates were reported to be equally distributed between the

parties. Fewer of the Democratic candidates (78.4%) were reported to be White compared

to Republicans (93.1%); more of the Republican candidates sought an Executive position

(75.2%) compared to Democrats (66.7%); more of the Republican candidates (51.2%)

Table 10
Candidate Demographics by Party

Candidate Demographics	Republicans N (%)	Democrats N (%)
Position Sought		
Challenger	34 (33.7)	66 (40.7)
Incumbent	37 (36.6)	37 (22.8)
Open Seat	30 (29.7)	59 (36.4)
Gender, My Candidate		
Male	84 (83.2)	110 (67.9)
Female	17 (16.8)	52 (32.1)
Gender, Opposition		
Male	83 (82.2)	135 (83.3)
Female	18 (17.8)	27 (16.7)
Race, My Candidate		
White	94 (93.1)	127 (78.4)
Black	2 (2.0)	25 (15.4)
Hispanic	4 (4.0)	7 (4.3)
Other	1 (1.0)	3 (1.8)
Race, Opposition		
White	83 (82.2)	135 (83.3)
Black	10 (9.9)	17 (10.5)
Hispanic	7 (6.9)	7 (4.3)
Other	1 (1.0)	3 (1.9)
Type of Position Sought		
Executive	76 (75.2)	108 (66.7)
Legislative	25 (24.8)	54 (33.3)
War Chest		

Your Opponent	33 (39.3)	72 (53.2)
About Even	8 (9.5)	18 (13.0)
Your Candidate	43 (51.2)	48 (34.8)
Win		
Yes	58 (68.2)	75 (54.3)
No	27 (31.8%)	63 (45.7)
Total	85 (100.0)	138 (100.0)

were reported as having more funds in their war chest than the Democrats (34.8%); and

more of the Republican candidates were reported as winning (68.2%) than the Democrats

(54.3%).

  The District. District characteristics are shown in Table 11. These questions

were included in the survey to get an idea as to how diverse the regions were that would

be analyzed in the dissertation. In general the consultants in the survey were from the

Midwest (25.2%) and the northeast (18.3%), and the vast majority of them reported

working in a mixed rural and urban area (42%) more so than in cities (19.6%) or the

country (11.4%). The majority of the consultants were in districts with 25% or fewer

ethnic minorities (62%) but the largest minority in most of their electoral districts were

African Americans (46.9%) followed relatively closely by Latinos (38%). The

consultants seemed to be in districts of varying partisan intensity, with (45.7%) reporting

working in slightly to highly Democratic districts and (43.6%) reporting working in

slightly to highly Republican districts. Finally, consultants were asked to show where

they were they were in the polls right after the primary, at the midway point of the

election and how much they won or lost the final election by. The answer ranged from 1

= "Ahead of their opponent by double digits," to 5 = "Behind their opponent by double

digits." In all three questions the consultant answers skewed towards the extremes.

Almost equal numbers of consultants reported they were either far ahead or far behind in each question including the final polling results.

Differences appeared across party lines. From Table 11, it would appear that many of the Republican and Democratic consultants were working in highly hostile political territory. Roughly an equal number of Republican consultants reported working in slightly Republican (28.9%) and highly Democratic (27.7%) districts. On the Democratic side almost 40% of the consultants reported working in slightly to highly Republican leaning districts. This suggests two things, primarily for the Democrats. This comports with our early survey results that show close to 70% of the Democratic consultants in this sample are working for challengers or in open seat races. With only 22% of the Democratic consultants working for incumbents it stands to reason that many of them are not working in particularly supportive areas.

Further, there appears to be a rural versus urban difference in the survey respondents. More Republicans reported working in rural or mixed areas whereas Democratic respondents were often working in the suburbs or city areas. This might explain why Democrats reported working in districts with a minority population of 40% or more much more often than Republicans (16 to 23%).

The respondents were primarily from the mid-west although the distributions differ considerably between the parties. Democrats mostly came from the mid-west, Pacific Northwest and West, whereas outside of the large number of mid-western respondents Republican consultants were fairly evenly distributed.

Finally the last section of the table provides a sample of the polling questions in the survey. About equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats reported being behind or

ahead in the polls right after the primary election was over. So in this sample, there is a fairly diverse collection of campaign positions and circumstances that might affect consultant strategy. The question of poll position was actually asked to consultants three times, 'poll position after primary', poll position at midway point, and 'how much your candidate won or lost by'.

Table 11
District Demographics by Party

District Demographics	Republicans N (%)	Democrats N (%)
Geographic Region		
South	17 (20)	13 (9.4)
West	22 (25.8)	61 (36.9)
Northeast	11 (12.9)	11 (8.0)
Mid-Atlantic	8 (9.4)	11 (8.0)
Mid-West	27 (31.8)	30 (21.7)
District Type		
Rural	21 (25.3)	22 (15.7)
Mixed Rural and Urban	35 (42.2)	56 (40.0)
Suburban	17 (20.5)	29 (20.7)
Urban	10 (12.1)	33 (23.6)
Minority Percentage		
Less than 10%	28 (33.0)	37 (26.8)
10 -25%	29 (34.5)	44 (31.9)
26 – 40%	13 (15.5)	25 (18.1)
Over 40%	14 (16.6)	32 (23.1)
Largest Minority		
Black	40 (47.6)	72(52.2)
Latino	35(41.7)	50 (36.2)
Asian	7 (8.3)	9 (6.5)
Other	2 (2.4)	7 (5.0)
District Preference		
Very Democratic	24 (28.6)	47 (34.1)
Slightly Democratic	7 (8.3)	25 (18.1)
About Even	10 (11.9)	13 (9.4)
Slightly Republican	24 (28.6)	29 (21.0)
Very Republican	19 (22.6)	24 (17.4)
Position in Polls After Primary		
Behind by single to double digits	38 (44.7)	53 (38.4)
About Even	10 (11.8)	23 (16.7)
Ahead by single to double digits	37 (43.5)	62 (44.9)

Now that we have established the major characteristics of the consultants, the districts they worked in, and the types of candidates that they worked for, the remainder of this chapter will look at the specific questions posed to consultants about Candidate Traits, Negative Advertising, and Candidate Positioning.

Candidate Traits

Consultants' ratings of candidate traits was explored in two ways: (1) in an open-ended question, consultants were asked to identify the traits that they found to be most important in the candidates they worked for and (2) consultants were asked to rate the importance of specific traits from the research literature on a five point scale.

Open-ended Question Results. The open-ended question method was used in the hope that the survey results would give consultants more freedom than the trait specific questions they would answer later in the survey. Some consultants can choose which candidates they work for, and some are simply saddled with candidates based on where the state or national party directs. In many instances consultants are working for spouses or relatives; thus with such a wide range of circumstances it was important to see what consultants found as valuable as far as candidate traits.

The most important traits ranged widely, with the ability to communicate, honesty and personality being the most often quoted traits. What was compelling about this question was that there did not appear to be any major differences in what candidate traits consultants considered important based on the type of election that was being run or the level of the election or even the years that the person has worked as a consultant. The only discernable difference in how consultants viewed candidate traits was based on their partisan identification. It was interesting to note that without prompting, many

consultants responded with the traits Kinder (1983) identified even before reaching those questions.

Democrats. Of the 113 Democratic consultants that answered this question, integrity and the ability to communicate and connect well across many different types of voters were the most important character traits. This applied across democratic challengers and incumbents and open seat consultants. Why might this be the case? One answer might be the Democrats are generally dealing with a more diverse constituency than are Republicans and thus find the candidates ability to communicate across constituencies to be important. But communication as an attribute could have many meanings in the minds of consultants. A candidate's ability to communicate might be the ability to stay on message, the ability to articulate policy stances or even the ability to make persuasive arguments to the public. Regardless of the meaning, communication seems to be an unprompted important attribute in the minds of Democratic consultants in describing the best aspects of their candidates.

Table 12 presents the most cited "best" candidate traits for Democrats. The categories and codes developed for their open ended responses were as follows:

- Good Communicator: Any reference to the candidate's speaking, or expression of ideas, policy or feelings.

- Integrity: The specific use of the word 'integrity' to describe the candidate

- Resume: Any reference to the work that the candidate had done in the past that was viewed positively by the consultant. This includes life achievements that may have had nothing to do with elective office.

- Intelligence: Any use of the word brains, intelligence, brilliance etc.

- Personality: Any reference to the candidate's general demeanor, friendliness, charisma or personal ticks that made them valuable in the consultant's eyes.

- Honesty: The specific use of the word honesty.

Clearly there were a large number of miscellaneous responses since with so many respondents developing effective codes would cut out some significant answers. However the main themes of the Democratic consultants' views do come across.

Table 12
Most cited 'Best trait of candidate':
Democratic Consultants

Traits	Count	Percent
Good Communicator	30	26.5
Integrity	20	17.7
Resume	15	13.3
Intelligence	14	12.4
Personality	10	8.8
Honesty	4	3.5
Misc	20	17.7
Total	113	100%

The second most frequently cited attribute amongst the Democratic consultants in the survey was integrity. There were few descriptions of what integrity meant, and as we will see in the discussion of the Republican consultants later, there is a difference between integrity and honesty, at least in vocabulary.

One other important note to mention about consultants open ended responses to this question, Democrats were more likely to comment on the consultant's interaction with the candidate in regards to positive traits. In answering the question two consultants mentioned.

- *"A bottomless money bucket and a handler who was smart enough not to let his candidate engage in public debates or public venues where he would have to*

*respond to unscripted questions." (*A consultant/candidate in an open seat state legislature race in the West. The candidate lost.)

- *"He does what he's told, and believes in the team that brought him to the party."(*A consultant in an open seat race for state legislature in the West. The candidate won.)

This suggests at least that consultants view their role in what makes a good candidate may be somewhat symbiotic. In the first comment it's clear that the consultant's statement is primarily that the candidate had a great deal of money but what's more, the consultants argued that it was their ability to keep the candidate out of dangerous situations that helped the candidate perform well. In a similar fashion the second consultant suggests that the candidate was simply smart enough to let their team lead them.

Republicans. Out of the 70 Republican consultants who answered this question in the survey (Table 13) the trait most often mentioned was "Resume" and there were several mentions of the fact that candidates were former military veterans or had worked in the community for years or even that candidates had successful business experience prior to running for office. This tendency amongst GOP consultants to mention the resume of their candidates might suggest stronger party ties in the candidate selection process. Generally, when the state or national party has a more active role in the selection of candidates for office resumes are more important than when candidates are more self selected. Note that Consultants for Republican candidates tended to mention resume and experience more than Democrats.

Interestingly enough, honesty was the other key word for consultants, not 'integrity' which was the word of choice for Democrats. Honesty in many respects may have more to do with direct communication with voters, i.e.: "*This politician will give honest answers to tough questions*" whereas integrity may have more to do with the actions that a candidate takes in office, in their personal life and even during the campaign. The distinction in these definitions is unclear, however the consistency of the results is interesting. No Democratic consultant mentioned honesty as their candidate's most important attribute.

The general categories listed above were derived from an overall review of the best traits that consultants listed for their candidates. They were then distilled into the categories that Democratic and Republican answered were placed into. Consequently the categories are the same except for on additional phrase used by one Republican consultant (Ambition). These initial results seem to confirm the Hypothesis # 1, that consultants of differing partisanship would weigh the importance of traits differently.

Table 13
Most cited 'Best Trait of Candidate:'
Republican Consultants

Traits	Count	Percent
Resume	17	24.3
Honesty	11	15.7
Personality	8	11.4
Intelligence	7	10.0
Good Communicator	6	8.6
Ambition	1	1.4
Misc	20	28.6
Total	70	100

The notion of governing versus campaigning is a driving force behind many of the candidate questions in the survey. There is very little academic research analyzing

this subject, and thus it seemed useful to obtain an assessment from consultants about this concept. Consultants were asked if they saw a correlation between the traits a candidate needed to run for office and the traits a candidate needed to actually govern (Table 14).

While a majority of consultants (61%) saw a correlation between how someone runs a campaign and how someone will serve in office, it is hard to ignore the 37% of respondents who saw no correlation at all. This is a surprising number considering the amount of public scrutiny that campaigns often receive and the perception promoted by the press and punditry of a campaign being a template for the candidate's governing style. Either way, these results seem to confirm Hypothesis # 2 from the trait section, theorizing that consultants see a positive relationship between how a campaign is run and how an elected official will actually behave once in office.

There is no statistically significant relationship between how consultants answered this question and their partisan identification, the type of campaign they were running of the position they were seeking. However, though there was no statistically significant relationship, the percentages between Republican and Democratic consultants were about the same, with both stating they felt there was a strong correlation (59% to 64%). The results do however comport with Thurber's earlier work (1999) which suggests that most consultants have an opinion at least about the connection between campaigning and governing as opposed to simply working as brand managers.

Table 14
Frequency of Consultants' Opinion about the Relationship of Candidate Traits: Running and Serving

Survey Options	Frequency	Percent
They have a very strong correlation, the way they run and behave in a campaign says a lot about how they will govern.	122	61.3

They have no correlation, being a great campaigner says little about how you will actually govern.	74	37.2
I don't know, I don't keep up with candidates after the race is over.	3	1.5
Total	199	100.0

Predictors of Consultants' Ratings of Candidate Traits. Having reviewed what consultants expressed were the most important traits in their candidates in general, as well as how consultants viewed the relationship between campaigning and governing, the multivariate analyses allow for exploration of what factors influence how consultants evaluate traits. Using the predictors from the literature, as well as the context of running or serving in office, multivariate models were constructed to identify the characteristics that predict consultants' attitudes about the importance of candidate traits in this sample.

Consultants were asked to rate the traits of "Integrity," "Leadership," "Empathy," "Competence," and "Ambition" on a scale of 1 to 5, with "1=Very Unimportant" to "5=Very Important." Survey results showed that very few consultants rated *any* of the traits as not important, which makes sense. Not many campaign managers would ever admit to, let alone actually believe that Empathy or Leadership didn't matter when consultants were running for office or serving as elected officials. Since most consultants considered all of these traits to be important resulting in results that was highly skewed, each variable was dichotomized into a 1, 0 variable with 1="Very Important" and 0= "Important to Unimportant". This recoding was performed for all candidate trait variables for both 'running' and 'governing.'

Binary logistic regression models were developed to identify significant predictors of candidate traits ratings under two conditions: the candidate is running for office or governing, for a total of 10 models. The predictors were: Party (GOP = 0,

Democrat = 1); Party Preference in District (Very Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 5); Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) dummy coded with "Incumbent" as the comparison group; Position Sought (Executive = 1 or Legislative = 0); War Chest District (1 = Your opponent, 2 = Even, 3 = Your candidate); Minority Percentage (Less than 10% = 1 to Over 55% = 5), Candidate race (1 = White, 0 = Minority); Candidate Sex (1 = male, 0 = female); District Education Level (1= Highly Educated to 5 = Not very educated); Win (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Results for the 10 models are summarized in Table 15 (see Appendix tables A – J for the complete statistical results of each model). The initial hypotheses for significant predictors established for Hypothesis # 3 received some support, although by and large, fewer predictors were found to be significant than initially anticipated. There were significant predictors for six of the ten models. Minority percentage in a district was found to be an important predictor for several candidate traits. Clearly in this sample, minority communities demand more leadership and empathy from their candidates than the more mainstream majority white constituency.

Table 15
Significant Predictors by Candidate Trait Model
from Logistic Regression Analyses

Model	Significant Predictors	Interpretation: Trait Very Important if
Integrity while running	War Chest	Candidate has fewer funds
Integrity while governing	None	
Empathy while running	Minority Percentage Sex, Candidate Education Level	District is a higher percent minority Candidate is female, education is higher
Empathy while governing	Win-Lose	Candidate lost
Leadership while running	War Chest Minority Percentage	Candidate has fewer funds District is a higher percent minority
Leadership while governing	Minority Percentage	District is a higher percent minority
Ambition while running	Education Win-Lose	District more educated Candidate wins
Ambition while governing	None	

Competence while running	None	
Competence while governing	None	

War Chest or funding also emerged as a predictor for two candidate traits. In each case, fewer funds were associated with "Very Important" ratings for "Integrity" while running and "Leadership" while running. This is to be expected; a candidate who doesn't have much money, can essentially only run on their 'leadership' and 'integrity'. In fact, depending on the campaign environment, the candidate with less money will often use this fact as a way to prove to voters that they are more sincere and less beholden to 'special interests' than the candidate who leads the way in fundraising.

Two additional predictors were significant for different models. Win-Lose was a significant predictor for "Empathy" while governing. Consultants for winners report that governing with empathy is very important, perhaps indicating that they feel that once an election is over, the victor should set about the task of building bridges between who actually elected them and who worked for the opposition. Sex was a significant predictor for "Empathy" while running. Consultants who worked for women candidates deemed empathy as very important more often than those who worked with male candidates. As mentioned in the candidate section of the literature review, women are often seen as more empathetic by voters than men, but moreover, they have to work to show these traits as well, or they might be considered too 'cold' or heartless to serve.

Note that the position the candidate was seeking did not have a significant relationship with any of the traits. Literature suggests that those running for executive positions would care about demonstrating leadership, or integrity at least, more than legislative candidates but this variable was not significant in any of the models.

Finally, it was very surprising that party did not have a statistically significant relationship with any of the candidate trait variables. Republican and Democratic consultants work very hard to present certain brands and archetypes about their characters, usually taking the lead from the president or the national party. One would expect leadership or integrity to come forth as significant for the GOP but neither did. At the end of the day this may demonstrate to us that perhaps it is not inherent traits amongst consultants but environmental factors (who your candidate is or their district) that drives belief systems.

Negative Advertising

This section reports results for (1) consultant reports of the extent of negative advertising in their campaigns and the extent to which they and their opponents attacked on character or policy; (2) consultants' definition of negative advertising, and (3) predictors of negative ad use.

Extent of Negative Advertising in Research Sample. To even begin a discussion of negative advertising strategy by consultants, it is first necessary to establish how much if any negative advertising was employed during the course of the campaigns covered in the survey. This question was organized into two distinct questions to cover not only the negative advertising run by individual campaigns but also the total ad environment which might include ads run by outside groups.

A majority of consultants reported that they were operating in a negative campaign environment (Table 16). About 62% of the consultants reported that negative advertising was run during their campaign, although not surprisingly most consultants claim that they were the victims (46.2%) rather than the initiators of such conflicts

(16.0%). About 80% of the consultants who claimed to have attacked first were either in open seat races or they were challengers (data not shown). When queried about others outside their campaign running negative ads, only 31% reported that no negative ads were run by outside groups; 30% reported outside groups ran attacks against their candidate; 12% reported attacks against their opponents and 24% reported attacks against their candidate and their opponent.

Table 16
Were any negative ads run during your campaign?

Question Options	Frequency	Percent
No negative ads run	85	37.8
Yes, Opponent attacked us first	104	46.2
Yes, Attacked our opponent first	36	16.0
Total	225	100.0

Not surprisingly few consultants admit to attacking character during campaigns (24.0% mostly or always, Table 17) and yet they are much more comfortable saying that the character of their candidate was attacked (52.0%, mostly or always). Clearly this suggests that attacks on character might be a matter of interpretation, or that consultants simply don't want to admit to how they are engaging their opponents. On policy issues, consultants reported that opponents attacked their policy (43.2%, mostly or always) less than they attacked their opponent's policy issues (54.4%, mostly or always).

With this in mind, the survey was then examined with an analysis of feelings about negative advertising content distributed over party. While the results showed that Republicans attacked Democrats on character more than Policy the survey showed that a majority of the consultants reported that they "Seldom or Never" attacked their opponent's character (Democrats, 54.7%; Republicans, 56.0%). About equal numbers of

consultants who were campaigning for an incumbent (51.6%), a challenger (55.3%) or

were in an open seat race (58.0%) reported they seldom or sometimes attacked their

opponent's character. These initial results might suggest that Hypothesis # 6 which

posited that Republicans would be more apt to admit to character attacks than Democrats

was incorrect. However, none of these crosstabs elicited a significant relationship

between party and the dependant variable of character or policy attacks, so at least in the

current models these results provide little substantive evidence.

Table 17
Frequency of Attack Ads for Candidate or Opponent:
Character and Policy Positions

Question Options	Your Attack Ads		Your Opponent's Attack Ads	
	Opponent's Character N (%)	Opponent's Policy Positions N (%)	Candidate's Character N (%)	Candidate's Policy Positions N (%)
Never	53 (42.4)	26 (20.8)	15 (12.0)	23 (18.4)
Seldom	15 (12.0)	9 (7.2)	14 (11.2)	21 (16.8)
Sometimes	27 (21.6)	22 (17.6)	31 (24.8)	27 (21.6)
Mostly	14 (11.2)	27 (21.6)	37 (29.6)	39 (31.2)
Always	16 (12.8)	41 (32.8)	28 (22.4)	15 (12.0)
Total	125 (100.0)	125 (100.0)	125 (100.0)	125 (100.0)

From the survey results above there are a few simple observations. The first is that the majority of consultants in the survey claim that they don't engage in character attacks on their opponents during the campaign. This transcends party, and even campaign position. An analysis of responses to the question: "How often did your *opponent* focus on your candidate's character" with response options from "never" to "always," provided some key insight into these results. About 52% of Democratic consultants and 50% of Republican consultants reported that their opponents "mostly" to "always" attacked their candidate's character. So clearly we have an example of the inconsistencies that can result from self-reporting on an issue as volatile as negative advertising. Obviously someone is engaging in personal attacks during campaigns, a phenomenon that has been reported by academics in the literature review as well as citizen groups. However, consultants in this sample seem sure that all of the attacking must come from the opposition since they report that they are not a part of this problem in public discourse.

Further analysis of the relationship between "Party" and policy attacks shows that about 30% of GOP consultants claim that they never attack their opponents' policy

positions and 44% of Democrats claim they *always* attack their opponent's policy

positions. Clearly one side has a unique view of their own position-taking. For

Republican consultants a curious result is found; many of them claim to never attack their

opponent's policy positions, and even more claim to never attack their opponent's

character, so the question remains what do they actually criticize their opponent about?

Moreover, Democratic consultants seem much more emphatic in claiming they

consistently focus on policy. It is highly likely that Republicans are either attacking

character more often than they admit or attacking policy more often than they admit,

because they are definitely saying something in their negative ads that, by and large they

are not admitting to collectively in this sample.

Consultants' Definitions of Negative Advertising. The first goal of this section

of the research was to determine if there was more consistency in the definition of

negative advertising among political consultants, so as to possibly better explore the

various definitions in the political science and more applied literature. In most respects

Hypothesis # 1, for negative advertising, that consultant definitions of negative

advertising would differ from the political science literature was supported. However in

some cases the variations in defining negative advertising amongst consultants was

almost as wide as that in political science.

Out of a total of 344 respondents who initially started the survey, there were 197

responses to the question on negative advertising, a response rate of 57% to an optional

and open-ended question on the survey. There were three main themes that were distilled

from these responses about negative advertising: the first was the distinction between

'attack' and 'negative advertising', the second, a distinction between 'contrast' and

'attack' advertising and finally some divergence amongst consultants about what actually constituted a 'personal or character' attack. Beyond these content themes, there were no differences in consultant attitudes based on party, type of race being run, or even region of the country. To the degree that negative advertising was defined consistently, consultants seemed uniform in their beliefs regardless of their place in the campaign fabric.

The distinction between 'attack' advertising, and negative advertising is one that is not often specifically stated in the political science literature but was replete in the responses from the consultants. Consultants in the survey made a distinction between the two types of ads, although the distinction often fell on the same definition. For example:

- "Ads that emphasize negative attributes about one's opponent. I would not, however, characterize these as 'attack' ads, which stand on their own, attacking the personal character of a candidate" (Media Consultant for Incumbent Federal Senator in the Northeast)

- "Negative advertising exists on two planes. The first is ads which point out negative aspects of your opponent – his stand on an issue, failure to address an issue, residency, etc. The second is attacks on the opponent's character, often twisting facts or only partially stating the facts to make the opponent appear other than he is." (Campaign Manager for White Challenger for Federal House seat in Midwest)

These two responses are reflective of the general attitude expressed by consultants in the survey. Arguably, ads that make the distinction between the personal and the professional are critical in the minds of most consultants. Some refer to unethical ads as 'attack' ads,

and acceptable ads as 'negative' and in the case of the respondents above the roles are reversed. Regardless the notion that there are acceptable and non-acceptable types of ads, is helpful in finding a possible definition.

The second theme and perhaps most consistent was the definition of what constitutes a negative ad. Some consultants felt they could determine negative advertising in the field but that it lacked a specific definition:

- "You know it when you see it." (Manager for Female Incumbent in State Legislature in the West)

- "It's like pornography, I'm not sure, but I know it when I see it." (Manager for Male Open Seat State Legislature Candidate in Pacific Northwest)

Most consultants viewed negative advertising as either attacking the personal life and character of a candidate or lying.

- "Character Assassination" (Manager for Male Challenger for City Council Seat in Southeast)

- "Negative advertising is the use of exposing certain embarrassing facts about a candidate's personal life, whether true or untrue. Also can be the intention distortion of fact in order to cast the candidate in a negative light. By negative I mean in a way that is distasteful to the community and community norms." (Manager for Male Open Seat Candidate for State legislature)

What is interesting however is that this is a critical distinction in negative advertising definitions on the part of managers and political consultants. A campaign can

put many things in ads that are demonstrably true but personal in nature about the opposition. While many consultants seem to believe this is unfair, there were at least a number who believed sincerely in the personal behavior being a significant part of the campaign attack strategy so long as the words were true.

- "Negative Advertising is only 'negative' when it is untrue. Otherwise, it's all fair game." (GOTV organizer for Incumbent President)

- "If an opponent has committed acts that are immoral or illegal, etc., then bringing that to the attention of voters is justified. Negative attacks ads are otherwise immoral and corrupt the system. I would not use such false attacks in order to win votes. " (Candidate/ manager for Open Seat race in State Legislature in the West).

It would appear that any other aspect of the candidate is considered fair game, from their past associations, to their voting records, but personal attacks are deemed off limits by just about all consultants.

Finally consultants were adamant about explaining the difference between attack ads and contrast ads. Contrast ads were generally deemed as fine, no matter how harsh they became because the ads included both candidates. In fact, when using contrast ads, personal character traits were often mentioned, as candidates attempted to define themselves as having shown more integrity, or character throughout their careers.

So, with the results above there are a few key conclusions that can be made. Political consultants may not be any more exact in their definition of negative advertising than political scientists but there are some consistent themes in the profession. Lying about one's opponent, and mentioning any personal or family issues that have no direct

bearing on the campaign at hand are deemed as out of bounds or negative advertising. Most other topics, and of course variations on those topics are deemed within bounds. More importantly, while issues may be the topic that most consultants say is the most appropriate for negative advertising, it is nonetheless character attacks and concerns about them that drive more of consultant behavior.

Predictors of Negative Advertising Use. Consultants for candidates responded to questions about the extent to which they used negative ads to attack the character or policy of their opponent, as well as the extent to which their opponents used negative ads to attack their candidate. The goal of this section is to analyze the relationship between predictors established in the literature review and the beliefs and attitudes of political consultants in this sample. More importantly the goal is to assess how these results relate to the hypotheses established in Chapter 2. Significant predictors were identified in a series of binary logistic regression models with each dependent variable measuring the extent to which consultants reported they used negative ads to attack, coded as 1= Mostly to Always and 0 = Seldom to Never.

The predictor variables were Party type (GOP = 0, Dem = 1), Position Sought (1 = Executive, 0 = Legislative), the extent to which the polls showed the consultant's candidate was ahead (1 = "Behind by double digits" to 5 = "Ahead by double digits") at the beginning of the campaign (Primary) and midway through the campaign. The "Type of Race" (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) was dummy coded so that "Incumbent" was the comparison group for both "Challenger" and "Open Seat" candidates.

Several binary logistic regression models used the same predictor variables described above, but included a new predictor variable to focus on the impact of attacks

themselves on candidates' and consultants' attack strategies. The survey asked consultants to answer not only whether they attacked character or policy, but also whether they were attacked with character or policy themed ads. Regressions were performed with the 'attack' variable included as a predictor for a more realistic view of attack strategy when other campaigns are in play and to determine what if anything might drive policy attacks during campaigns. The variables "Opponents attack Character" and "Opponents attack Policy" (Coded 1 – 5) were added to hold constant the extent to which consultants reported their candidate was being attacked.

The first three regression models focus on character attacks (Tables 18, 19, 20). Table 18 presents the results of a logistic regression on the dependant variable of how likely a candidate is to attack their opponent's character. The only significant predictor associated with character attacks is where the candidate found themselves in the polls at the midway point of the political campaign. Consultants for candidates who were further ahead in the polls were less likely to report that they attacked their opponent on character. This suggests that those candidates who feel that they have a comfortable lead may feel less inclined to pay any attention to their opponent, let alone launch negative attacks on them. More importantly polls drive negative advertising behavior, and the fact that candidates who find themselves ahead in the polls tend not to attack character might suggest that those who are far behind consider character attacks a key part of their arsenal.

Several predictors were not significant, although it was predicted they would be. For example, "Party," (GOP/DEM) did not have any relationship as to whether or not a campaign attacked the opposition on character, at least in these results. This goes against

both anecdotal and some academic research on content of negative ads in many political campaigns.

Table 18
Predictors for How Likely A Candidate is to Attack
Their Opponent's Character

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	-.165	.473	.121	1	.728	.848
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	-.268	.503	.285	1	.594	.765
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.906	.718	1.593	1	.207	.404
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.152	.598	.064	1	.800	.859
Polls Midway	-.910	.356	6.528	1	.011*	.402
Polls Primary	.449	.304	2.179	1	.140	1.566
Constant	1.093	1.092	1.003	1	.316	2.984

Table 19 provides results for the model of how likely a candidate is to attack their opponents' character when controlling for policy attacks by their opponent. The only significant predictor was "Polls Midway," with candidates more likely to attack the further behind in the polls they were at midway in the campaign.

Table 19
Predictors of How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Character
When Their Policies Were Attacked

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	-.279	.484	.333	1	.564	.756
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	-.437	.526	.692	1	.405	.646
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.898	.721	1.551	1	.213	.407
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.034	.618	.003	1	.956	1.035
Polls Midway	-.995	.373	7.106	1	.008*	.370
Polls Primary	.430	.311	1.903	1	.168	1.537
Opponent Attacks Policy	.274	.200	1.867	1	.172	1.315
Constant	.765	1.128	.460	1	.497	2.150

Table 20 presents results for the model of how likely a candidate is to attack their opponents' character when controlling for character attacks by their opponent. Similar to

the previous models, the only significant predictor was "Polls Midway," with candidates more likely to attack the further behind in the polls they were at midway in the campaign. Holding constant opponents' attacks on character or policy did not have an effect on the predictors in the regression model.

Table 20
Predictors of How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Character
When Their Character Was Attacked

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	-.155	.474	.107	1	.744	.856
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	-.241	.509	.224	1	.636	.786
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.872	.728	1.433	1	.231	.418
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.191	.607	.099	1	.753	.826
Polls Midway	-.890	.362	6.037	1	.014*	.411
Polls Primary	.441	.312	1.996	1	.158	1.554
Opponent Attacks Character	-.188	.172	1.196	1	.274	.829
Constant	1.637	1.213	1.820	1	.177	5.137

The next three regression models focus on policy attacks (Tables 21, 22, 23). Table 21 presents the results of a logistic regression on the dependant variable of how likely a candidate is to attack their opponent's policy. Three predictors were significant: "Party," with consultants for Democratic candidates more likely to report using negative ads to attack their opponent's policy; "Polls Primary," with candidates who were ahead in the polls less likely to attack policy; and "Polls Midway" where candidates who were ahead in the polls at the midway of the campaign were more likely to say that they attacked policy. These results comport with the research literature that suggests that the primacy of poll positions in how attack strategies are formulated.

Table 21
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate is to Attack
Their Opponent's Policy

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	1.207	.441	7.511	1	.006	3.344
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	.494	.469	1.108	1	.292	1.639
Challenger vs Incumbent	.691	.644	1.150	1	.284	1.995
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.060	.529	.013	1	.910	1.062
Polls Midway	.879	.382	5.291	1	.021	2.410
Polls Primary	-1.005	.340	8.747	1	.003	.366
Constant	-1.129	1.031	1.199	1	.274	.323

Table 22 has added the variable "Opponents Attack Character" as a predictor to determine if holding this variable constant had an effect on the regression model. In this model, the predictors from the previous model were significant and two additional predictors were significant.

As with the previous model, two significant predictors were "Party," with Democrats more likely to attack their opponent's policy when their character is attacked, as well as "Polls Primary," with candidates who were behind in the polls at the beginning of the campaign more likely to attack their opponent's policy when their character was attacked. One additional predictor was also significant and "Polls Midway," with candidates behind in the polls midway through the campaign less likely to attack their opponent's policy when controlling for character attacks.

Table 22
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Their Opponent's Policy
When attacked on Character

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	1.211	.441	7.538	1	.006	3.358
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	.501	.470	1.137	1	.286	1.650
Challenger vs Incumbent	.705	.646	1.189	1	.275	2.023
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.049	.530	.009	1	.926	1.051
Polls Midway	.885	.382	5.358	1	.021	2.423
Polls Primary	-1.006	.339	8.797	1	.003	.366
Opponent Attacks Character	-.053	.160	.108	1	.742	.949
Constant	-.979	1.127	.755	1	.385	.376

Table 23 has added the variable "Opponents Attack Policy" as a predictor to

determine if holding this variable constant had an effect on the regression model. Three

predictors were significantly associated with how likely a candidate is to use policy

attacks when they, themselves, are attacked on policy. The results for "Party" showed

that Democrats attacked on policy more than Republicans when controlling for policy

attacks by opponents. "Polls Primary" showed that being behind in the polls at the

beginning of the campaign was associated with more policy attacks by the candidate,

controlling for policy attacks by opponents. "Polls Midway" showed that being behind in

the polls at the midway point in the campaign made a candidate less likely to attack on

policy. Note that this model is very similar to the initial "policy" model (Table 21) that

does not hold opponents' policy attacks constant.

Table 23
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate Is to Attack Their Opponent's Policy
When attacked on Policy

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/Dem)	1.160	.446	6.768	1	.009	3.190
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative)	.426	.477	.798	1	.372	1.531
Challenger vs Incumbent	.698	.646	1.167	1	.280	2.009
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.149	.544	.075	1	.784	1.161
Polls Midway	.859	.383	5.034	1	.025	2.361
Polls Primary	-1.031	.344	8.968	1	.003	.357
Opponent Attacks Policy	.135	.182	.548	1	.459	1.144
Constant	-1.314	1.058	1.542	1	.214	.269

In summary, character attacks by the candidate, whether controlling for attacks by opponents or not, consistently showed one significant predictor – "Polls Midway" (Tables 18, 19, 20). Candidates behind in the polls midway through their campaigns were more likely to attack the character of their opponents. This result reaffirms Hypothesis # 2 which posited that being behind in the polls would drive campaigns to employ more negative advertising.

However, policy attacks did not show as consistent a pattern (Tables 21, 22, 23). "Party," was a significant predictor in all three models, with Democrats more likely to attack policy whether or not their opponents' attacks were held constant. "Polls Primary" was significant in all three models, with candidates who were behind in the polls at the beginning of the campaign more likely to attack policy whether or opponents' attacks were held constant. Finally, "Polls Midway" was significant in all three models with candidates behind in the polls less likely to attack on policy at the midpoint than candidates who are ahead.

Comparing the results from these regressions models adds some insight to what may actually motivate policy attacks in the campaign environment. First, it would appear

that there is some support for the main hypothesis posited for negative advertising in Chapter 2. By and large Hypothesis # 2 was supported, those candidates who found themselves behind in the polls, tended to attack their opponents more whether it was on policy or character. Hypothesis # 3, that the position candidates were seeking would have an impact on their negative advertising strategy received no support from the results, which is surprising given the increased scrutiny that often comes in campaigns for high executive offices. Hypothesis # 4 received mixed support from the results. Overall Democrats are less likely to attack than Republicans, but when Democrats do attack they are more likely to attack on policy. Hypothesis # 5, which posited that the type of election, be it Challenger, Incumbent or Open Seat, would have an impact on negative advertising strategy, was not supported by the results. Finally, Hypothesis # 6, which was similar in some respects to Hypothesis # 2 received mixed support from the data. The hypothesis posited that Republicans would be more likely to admit to character attacks and there would be no difference in policy attacks. Which some results suggested that Republicans likely are more inclined to attack character, there were not statistically significant. Moreover, there was a significant difference in how differing partisans attacked policy, which Democrats being more policy oriented in their attacks that Republicans.

Having delved specifically into hypothesis relationship to the results we now turn to general discussions of these results and how they relate to negative advertising. Consultants for Democratic candidates still report that they are more likely to attack policy than Republicans and those campaigns that were ahead of their opponents in the polls are generally less likely to launch any kind of attack against their opponent.

However when putting more of a focus on policy attacks, in particular when character attacks are controlled for provides some interesting insight into current attack theory in political science. Moreover the importance of policy attacks seems to be highest at the beginning of the race in this sample. Political consultants in the sample consistently reported being more likely to attack on policy when behind right after the primary, but less likely to attack on policy as the race goes to the midway point. Perhaps this suggests that campaigns are more likely to need to define who they are early in the campaign process, and when the polling situation might become more dire later on, they resort to more poignant attacks on character. When controlling for character attacks, several predictors become significant suggesting that character attacks may have a more significant impact on the campaign environment than policy attacks. This is of particular note since in many cases research has suggested that voters are more likely to make inferences about policy from character, than they are to make inferences about character from policy.

Candidate Position

The analysis of consultant beliefs on candidate position strategy relied on two unique but related aspects of campaign politics, how strongly wedded political consultants feel to policy positions in certain areas, and how consultants envision their candidate position strategy. This results section analyzes: consultant beliefs about issue ownership; the impact of this concept on candidate positioning; and the degree to which the directional or the proximity model reflects the campaign position strategies of political consultants.

Issue Ownership. Issue ownership literature is based on the basic proposition that there are certain issues that voters believe one party 'handles' better than another party, and therefore 'owns' that particular issue. This ownership however is composed of several factors; a party does not simply own an issue in voters' minds by making public policy statements on that particular issue.

There are more or less four components commonly referred to in issue ownership literature. The first is that the party has a record of 'success' in the minds of voters when handling problems associated with that issue (Norpoth and Buchannan, 1992). For example, successful military ventures by the United States have often come under Republican presidencies and therefore the GOP is more often thought to 'own' that particular issue. The next two elements are the amount of time a particular party spends, and media attention paid to a party's stances on a particular issue. The Democratic Party has consistently championed raising the minimum wage and increasing social spending for the last 40 years and the press coverage of Democratic efforts in this area are fairly consistent. Thus Democrats tend to 'own' domestic policy issues.

Finally, the consistency with which a party takes a position on a particular problem or issue is the component of issue ownership that is most important for this research. Parties, and by extension consultants, have an advantage when the problems that concern the public fall within their perceived 'owned' issues (Petrocik, 1996). And part of this stems from how consistent the party has been in not only successfully handling the issue but in how consistent those positions and successes have been. Consequently an issue that is 'owned' by a particular party is one that candidates and consultants in that party should feel particularly wedded to and thus less likely to stray

from their party's perceived stances on that issue. In short, if a particular party 'owns' an issue they should be less willing to alter their positions on that issue than a party that does not 'own' the issue.

It was assumed in this research that movement in the campaign on issues should be rare, because it carries political consequences. Therefore the first question of this analysis is whether or not candidates actually moved on issues during the campaign. The question was asked three different ways in order to capture as much information as possible. The questions were: (1) "Occasionally candidates adjust policy stances during the general election campaign. Which of the following best describes your candidate?" (Table 24); (2) "What were the main reasons why your candidate shifted on issues?" (Table 25); and (3) "If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign which of these policy areas did they shift positions on? (Table 26)."

There was one resounding answer to all three questions: Candidates *did not* shift positions on issues. With corresponding responses of 83.6% (Table 24), 84.1% (Table 25) and 82.5% (Table 26), consultants answered each of these questions with "My candidate did not shift on any issues during the campaign". This seemed to hold fast regardless of party and type of election as well. In the few instances where consultants admitted that their candidates adjusted on issues it was usually cultural issues and having to explain votes.

For example, in an optional answer to the second question, one consultant wrote: *"His campaign staff advised him to change 55 answers on an on-line survey because they thought he might look 'too liberal."* Another consultant admitted *"We did have to 'reframe' how he explained some votes, like voting against the gay marriage*

amendment." Some consultants responded to this question and spoke more of their

message than their positions per say. One consultant admitted that they didn't so much

change positions as focus on another issue since discussing trade policy polled better

amongst voters than discussing tax policy.

Table 24
Frequency of Policy Stance Adjustment

Policy Stance Adjustment	Frequency	Percent
Moved Far Left	2	1.1
Moved Slightly Left	13	6.9
Stayed same throughout the race	158	83.6
Moved Slightly Right	15	7.9
Move Far Right	1	.5
Total	189	100.0

Table 25
What were the main reasons why your candidate shifted on issues?
Reasons for Change in Position

Reasons	Frequency	Percent
Presented with new information that changed our position	11	5.8
The opposition took a new position and we changed to counter it	6	3.2
Our stance was unpopular and hurting us in the polls	11	5.8
My candidate did not shift on any issues	159	84.1
Other	2	1.1
Total	187	100

Table 26
If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign,
which of these policy areas did they shift positions on?

Policy Area Shift	Frequency	Percent
Foreign Policy	6	3.2
Jobs	2	1.1
Taxes	7	3.7
Social Cultural issues	16	8.5
No Position Changes	156	82.5
Other	2	1.1
Total	189	100

Predictors for Difficulty in Changing Policy Positions. After a review of

campaign literature on issue ownership five key issue categories which are common in

political campaigns were chosen as the focus of this analysis: Foreign Policy; Social and

Cultural Issues; Jobs; Taxes; and Education. On each of these issues, consultants were

asked to scale how problematic it would be for a candidate to change policy positions on

that issue on a scale of 1 = Not problematic at all to 5 = Extremely problematic.

Five models were examined to consider how problematic consultants felt it was to

move on particular policy issues. The dependant variable in each case was dichotomized,

with 'Extremely Problematic" = 1 and "Somewhat to Extremely Unproblematic" = 0.

The predictors in the models were established by the literature review of

positioning in chapter 2: Party (GOP = 0, Democrat = 1); Type of Race (Challenger,

Open Seat, Incumbent) dummy coded with "Incumbent" as the comparison group;

Position Sought (Executive = 1 or Legislative = 0); Party Preference in District (Very

Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 5); and Poll Midway (1 = Behind by single or

double digits; 2 = about even;, 3 = Ahead by single or double digits); and whether the

candidate won (=1) or Lost (=0). The results of the models are presented in Table 27 and

the entire set of tables can be viewed in the Appendix.

The results suggest that issues on which parties most resist position changes are

issues that the party is normally thought to 'own'. Party identification was a significant

predictor for three issues (Table 27). Consultants for Republican candidates are more

likely to report that changing on foreign policy, taxes or social and cultural issues is

extremely problematic controlling for other factors. While this work is exploratory in

nature, this result seems to comport with commonly held beliefs about the Republican

Party. Much of the national and local party has staked its political fortune on positions

about the war in Iraq and therefore changing on homeland security or other key issues

would likely be seen as a major problem.

District preference was significant for two issues, Education and Jobs, while Type

of Race (Challenger vs Incumbent) was a significant predictor for one issue, Education.

Consultants in Democratic leaning districts were more likely to report that changing

positions on Jobs or Education was very problematic compared to those in Republican

leaning districts, and challengers were more likely than incumbents to report that it was

very problematic to change positions on Education. Clearly partisanship either, of the

consultant's campaign or of the campaign district comes into play when it comes to issue

ownership, but the pressure of partisanship seems to differ in how it manifests. On

Republican issues it appears that the partisanship alone is enough to make changing

positions on 'owned issues' a risk, while for Democrats it is the district preference that

holds more sway. This might suggest that while Republicans as a party seem to have

more ideological discipline within their campaigns Democrats may have more freedom,

or be more constrained by district context.

Table 27
Significant Predictors by Difficulty of Changing Policy Stances Model from Logistic
Regression Analysis

Model	Significant Predictors	Interpretation: Very Problematic to change policy if
Foreign Policy	Party Identification	The candidate is Republican
Taxes	Party Identification	The candidate is Republican
Social/Cultural Issues	Party Identification	The candidate is Republican
Education	District Party Preference Type of Race	In a Democratic -leaning District The candidate is a Challenger
Jobs	District Party Preference	In a Democratic - Leaning District

Directional vs Proximity. Having established that movement on issues carries

some consequence in the minds of political consultants we will now move to a discussion

of the two main theories of political positioning (Directional and Proximity models). The

underlying assumption based on the literature is that the role of the median is significant

to both models though for differing reasons. The proximity model argues that the primary

determinant in gaining votes is the distance between the candidate's policy positions and

that of the median voter. The shorter the distance, the more likely to gain those votes, the

further the distance, the less likely they are to gain those votes. The directional theory

argues that the median voter is basically neutral on most policy issues and does not hold

particularly intense feelings one way or another. The only issue that they are deeply

concerned about is whether the policy proposed by the candidate is 'responsible'.

The importance of these two theoretical views of the median voter, and voters in general truly play out in three very specific types of election districts, centrist districts, and those that lean slightly to the right (and where a Republican is running) and districts that lean slightly to the left (where a Democrat is running.) In a centrist district where most of the voters are assumed to be around the center, proximity theory would argue that the way to win the election would be to place oneself as close to the median as possible, and consequently there would be a great deal of tension between seeking one's base and pleasing the median voter. The directional theory, which posits that the median voter is fairly neutral, suggests that a candidate can be successful taking an intense stand to the left, right or close to the median voter so long as they policy and candidate are viewed as responsible. Ultimately, the directional theory suggests there should be no tension between seeking the median voter and pleasing the base.

In the case of districts that lean only slightly to the left, or slightly to the right, the directional theory would suggest that candidates place themselves intensely in the direction that the district leans. The proximity model would advise that candidate try to position themselves as close to the center as possible. The amount of tension that consultants feel should be a good indicator of which theory most approximates their behavior. Both theories would suggest real tension when Democrats are running in right of center district, or Republicans are running in left of center district. And finally, neither theory would suggest marked tension in districts that are clearly left with Democrat candidates or clearly right with Republican candidates.

To capture as much information about consultant's behavior in relation to the directional or proximity models, questions comparing the two models were asked three different ways. The first question sought out consultant's general beliefs about directional versus proximity theory,"

In planning a campaign strategy some consultants feel there is a clear tension between developing a strategy that pleases the base and one that can win over the swing voter. Others feel that these goals are entirely compatible. In general how much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases the base and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter? "

The second question sought out consultant's beliefs about directional versus proximity positioning strategy in their own campaign,

"*Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between pleasing the base and winning over the swing voter?*"

These questions were scaled 1 -5 with 1 = "No tension these goals are entirely compatible" and 5 = "Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates swing voters."

The last question sought a shorter less nuanced answer on seeking out the median or one's base voters. The two options for this question were 1 = Cater to one's base and 2 = seek the centrist voter.

What was your candidate's strategic motivation on most issue positions?

The results from the first two survey questions (Tables 28, 29) showed no significant relationship between Party and responses to the survey options. Republican and Democratic consultants showed almost identical answers regarding the tension between pleasing their based and alienating swing voters. In general, Republican

consultants expressed less concern about catering to their base and alienating the swing

voter, but expressed slightly more tension in their own campaigns. Similarly, Democratic

consultants expressed that there was slightly more tension between catering to their base

and swing voters than the Republicans but the differences were relatively small and not

statistically significant.

Table 28
Responses to Survey Question:
In general how much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases the
base and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter?

| | Party | | |
| | GOP | Dem | Total |
Survey Options	**N (%)**	**N (%)**	**N (%)**
No tension, these goals are entirely compatible	10 (11.9%)	13 (9.4%)	23 (10.4%)
Little tension, trade-offs exist, but by and large the goals are compatible	34 (40.5%)	40 (29.0%)	74 (33.3%)
Modest tension, clear trade-offs exist, but they are not severe	30 (35.7%)	63 (45.7%)	93 (41.9%)
High tension, strong trade-offs exist	9 (10.7%)	19 (13.8%)	28 (12.6%)
Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates swing voters	1 (1.2%)	3 (2.2%)	4 (1.8%)
Total	84 (100.0%)	138 (100.0%)	222 (100.0%)

Chi-square = 4.277, df= 4, p< = .370

Table 29
Responses to Survey Question:
Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between pleasing the base and winning over the swing voter?

Survey Options	Party		Total N (%)
	GOP N (%)	Dem N (%)	
No tension, these goals were entirely compatible	18 (21.4%)	30 (21.7%)	48 (21.6%)
Little tension, trade-offs existed, but by and large the goals were compatible	38 (45.2%)	51 (37.0%)	89 (40.1%)
Modest tension, clear trade-offs existed, but they were not severe	20 (23.8%)	41 (29.7%)	61 (27.5%)
High tension, strong trade-offs existed	6 (7.1%)	13 (9.4%)	19 (8.6%)
Incompatible, any effort to please the base, alienated swing voters	2 (2.4%)	3 (2.2%)	5 (2.3%)
Total	84 (100.0%)	138 (100.0%)	222 (100.0%)

Chi-square = 1.884, df= 4, p< = .757

As shown in Table 30, there is an amazing symmetry to the responses among consultants to this question. With almost precisely the same percentages Republicans claim to have sought out their base (61.9%) while Democrats sought out centrist voters (61.9%). This may speak to an overall belief in the reliability of Democratic voters; many studies have shown that in general, the Democratic base is not necessarily as reliable when it comes to voter mobilization as the Republican base. Results showed a significant relationship between party and positioning. Democrats sought out the swing voter, and Republicans sought out their base, consonant with the more nuanced questions presented before. Thus far the results seem to suggest that partisanship might incline candidates to one model or another.

Table 30

Did you seek your base or the centrist voter by Party

	Party	
	GOP	Dem
Position	N (%)	N (%)
Seek the Centrist Voter	24 (38.1)	65 (61.3)
Cater to the Base	39 (61.9)	41 (38.7)
Total	63 (100.0%)	106 (100.0%)

Chi-square = 8.55, df= 1, p< = .003

Predictors of Candidate Positioning. The literature on political consultants provides several potential predictors of consultants' reports about how they positioned themselves during campaigns. The first two positioning questions which were initially scaled from 1 to 5 with 1 = little or no tension and 5 = that pleasing the base and the swing voter was an incompatible goal were re-coded. This variable was re-coded to a dichotomous variable in which 1 = Little or no tension and 0 = Moderate tension to incompatible. The second question was similarly recoded (1 = cater to the base, 0 = centrist position).

Binary logistic regression models were developed to measure the relationship of the following predictors with the dependant variables on position strategy. The predictors were: Party (GOP = 0, Democrat = 1); Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) dummy coded with "Incumbent" as the comparison group; Position Sought (Executive = 1 or Legislative = 0); Minority Percentage (Less than 10% = 1 to Over 55% = 5), Party Preference in District (Very Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 5); and Poll Midway (1 = Behind by single or double digits, 2 = about even, 3 = Ahead by single or double digits).

When controlling for other factors, there were some slight differences in the assessments of consultants depending on if one was talking about their particular election and elections in general (Table 31). In the unique elections that consultants worked in, few of the major predictors, particularly party were significant. But the indirect party measure, the partisan preference of the district was significant. Consultants that worked in Republican-leaning districts reported that they were less likely to see tension between pleasing the base and seeking the swing voter than were consultants working in more Democratic-leaning districts.

Table 31
Directional versus Proximity In Your Campaign
Consultants' Perception of Tension in Pleasing the Base and Swing Voter

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Challenger vs. Incumbent	-.559	.417	1.796	1	.180	.572
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.175	.376	.217	1	.641	.839
Party Preference District	.280	.108	6.692	1	.010	1.323
Minority Percentage	.178	.126	1.995	1	.158	1.195
Party (GOP/Dem)	-.275	.304	.821	1	.365	.759
Poll Midway	.122	.193	.400	1	.527	1.130
Constant	-.521	.744	.490	1	.484	.594

When looking at the results for campaigns in general the results were somewhat similar to the campaign specific question with more significant predictors (Table 32). Only two predictors were significant at the .05 level. Consultants working in districts with higher minority populations expressed they felt less tension, and consultants working in districts that trended Republican in partisan preference expressed there was less tension between pleasing their base and seeking the swing voter. While slightly nonsignificant, (p<.057) consultants working for Democrats were more likely to report that there was tension between pleasing the base and the swing voter than consultants

working for Republicans, which comports with the univariate models and the initial

survey responses.

Table 32
Directional versus Proximity in General
Consultants' Perception of Tension in Pleasing the Base and Swing Voter

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Challenger vs. Incumbent	-.035	.449	.006	1	.937	.965
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.602	.388	2.409	1	.121	.548
Party Preference District	.232	.119	3.823	1	.051	1.261
Minority Percentage	.501	.144	12.172	1	.000	1.651
Poll Midway	.065	.205	.101	1	.751	1.067
Party (GOP/Dem)	-.625	.328	3.629	1	.057	.535
Constant	-1.333	.811	2.700	1	.100	.264

The results in Table 33 suggest how the consultants managed their candidates on

the key issue of catering to the base or the centrist voter. The dependent variable for this

analysis, was: "Cater to the Base" = 1, else = 0. Controlling for other variables,

Democrats were less likely than Republicans to cater to their base, which is consonant

with the univariate table presented earlier in this chapter. This gives more credence to the

suggestion that Republicans might have a stronger or more consistent base to turn to

during elections than Democrats even when controlling for type of election and other key

elements. The lack of significance for election type is surprising, given that one would

expect incumbency and challenger status to make a difference in how candidates position

themselves.

A second predictor, minority percentage, was significant. The more minority

voters in the district the more likely the candidate is to cater to their base. Perhaps this is

because minority voters can be trusted to vote more in a block than white voters, or

perhaps these results are capturing candidates that have particularly strong GOTV efforts

and thus know that they can turn out large voters. The importance of the minority

percentage of voters in various models suggests that perhaps further study might examine

consultant strategies in districts with large minority populations.

Table 33
Predictors for "Cater to the Base"

Model	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-1.146	.365	9.856	1	.002	.318
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.790	.500	2.492	1	.114	.454
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.277	.434	.407	1	.523	.758
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.000	.378	.000	1	.999	1.000
Minority Percentage	.372	.145	6.598	1	.010	1.451
District Party Preference	-.047	.202	.055	1	.814	.954
Poll Midway	.351	.231	2.306	1	.129	1.420
Constant	-.541	.933	.336	1	.562	.582

Divergent Theory Predictions in Specified Districts

The initial discussion above was focused on the main hypothesis of the position

section, namely whether or not there was any statistically discernable relationship

between established predictors in the literature and consultants' tendencies to seek the

center voter or please the base. Having established that there are statistically significant

relationships between some predictors and the tendency towards one strategy or another,

this section will focus on one particular predictor, the partisanship of the district in which

the consultant's are operating.

Directional and proximity theories primarily diverge on their issue position

predictions based on the type of district in which a candidate/consultant is operating. The

districts where the theories differ most noticeably are in districts that are about evenly

balanced in partisanship and those districts that lean slightly in favor of the candidate. In

a district that is evenly split in partisanship, the Proximity model argues that the

104

candidate should place themselves precisely at the median (swing voters) position so as to capture that voter and thus guarantee victory, whereas the Directional model argues that it does not matter what issue strategy a candidate follows leaving candidates free to seek the base

In the case of candidates/ consultants finding themselves in districts that are only slightly in their favor, again the theories make different predictions for candidate position success. The proximity model would again argue that the candidate place themselves at the median voter position, even if that median position has shifted slightly in their favor. The directional model suggests that the candidate should take a strong position in the direction of their own party so long as they do not step outside the region of responsibility. These predictions are sensitive to the types of districts in large part because of the fundamentally different way in which the two theories predict voters are motivated to select one candidate, and by extension their policy positions, over another. The directional model is a stimulus based theory where more intense parties have greater effect on voters and are more likely to move them in one direction or another so long as they are deemed as responsible. The proximity model assumes that voters are primarily concerned with the distance between themselves and the candidate's position and therefore, whether the district was split evenly amongst partisans or slightly favored one partisan or another the absolute median position would still place a candidate closest to all voter preferences.

As reflected in table 34, crosstabulations examine which of the two major theories was more reflective of Republican and Democratic consultants in the very districts where the theories make different strategy predictions. The column variables are the

dichotomous dependant variables from the previous regression models, determining the

amount of tension consultants feel between catering to their base and seeking the swing

voter -- the less tension the more directional their position strategy, the more tension they

feel the more proximity-oriented their strategy. They are asked their view of this tension

both within their own campaigns and in campaigns in general. The row variables are

Democratic candidates in slightly Democratic or evenly split districts, and Republican

candidates in slightly Republican or evenly split districts.

Table 34
Consultants' perception of the amount of tension in their campaign
for pleasing the base and swing voter in specified districts by Party

| Party | Amount of Tension in Campaign | | Total |
	None to Little	Modest to Incompatible	
GOP	79.4% (27)	20.6% (7)	100.0% (34)
Dem	57.9% (22)	42.1% (16)	100.0% (38)
Total	68.1% (49)	31.9% (23)	100.0% (72)

Chi Square = 3.822, df = 1, p = .051

Table 35

Consultants' perception of the amount of tension in general
for pleasing the base and swing voter in specified districts by party

| Party | Amount of Tension in General | | Total |
	None to Little	Modest to Incompatible	
GOP	58.8% (20)	41.2% (14)	100.0% (34)
Dem	26.3% (10)	73.7% (28)	100.0% (38)
Total	41.7% (30)	58.3% (42)	100.0% (72)

Chi Square = 7.802, df = 1, p = .005

From the results above (Tables 34 and 35), it is clear that there does appear to be a difference in how consultants for Democrats and Republicans positions themselves on issues in the two key district types focused on in the directional and proximity theories. When asked about their own campaigns, Republican and Democratic consultants appear to be fairly directional in their approach to positioning. However, when asked about campaigns in general, Democratic consultants appear to position themselves more along the lines of the proximity model.

What is compelling about these results are that not only does there appear to be confirmation of the earlier analysis that there is an actual difference in how consultants from both parties envision campaign position strategy, but that there is a demonstrable difference between their ideal in positioning and their actual behavior in their own campaigns. In order to test to see if there is any statistically significant difference between the Republican and Democratic consultants' responses to their perception of tension, a t-test was performed to see if these differences were significant. The results suggest that there is a very real difference in how these two parties are viewing their positioning strategy.

Table 36

Consultants' perception of the amount of tension for pleasing the base and swing voter
In specified districts by campaign type

Consultants' Perception of Tension	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Their Campaign	.3194	72	.46953	.05534
Campaigns in General	.5833	72	.49647	.05851

t = -4.024, df = 71, p = .000

The results above show that consultants for both parties perceive significantly more tension in campaigns in general than in their own campaigns for the two crucial district types focused on by the directional and proximity theories. However, given that we have already seen a difference in the level of tension between parties, and there is a difference in tension between the general and the specific campaign it leads to our next two tests. Is there a statistically significant difference within parties based on position theories in general or in their specific campaigns?

Table 37

Republican consultants' perception of the amount of tension for pleasing
the base and swing voter in specified districts by campaign type

Consultants' Perception of Tension	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Their Campaign	.2059	34	.41043	.07039
Campaigns in General	.4118	34	.49955	.08567

t = -2.028, df = 33, p = .051

Table 38

*Democratic consultants' perception of the amount of tension for pleasing
the base and swing voter in specified districts by campaign type*

Consultants' Perception of Tension	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Their Campaign	.4211	38	.50036	.08117
Campaigns in General	.7368	38	.44626	.07239

t = -3.706, df = 37, p = .001

The results above (Tables 37 and 38) suggest that there is still a difference in the level of tension felt between the general and specific campaigns of consultants, even within their own parties. Republican consultants experience significantly more tension when speaking of campaigns in general versus their own campaigns (.412 and .201 respectively). Democrats showed a similar pattern of significantly more perceived tension for campaigns in general than their own campaigns (.736 and .421 respectively). However, Democratic consultants rated the tension for campaigns in general much higher than Republican consultants (.736 compared to .412).

The larger story being told by the tests above and the preceding tables is twofold. First, that when the directional and proximity theories predict a different positioning strategy, both Republican and Democratic consultants tend to operate as if the directional model holds sway. Second, in all situations Republican consultants were more inclined to please their base than Democrats.

Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusions

The results of this research will be discussed as follows: for each of the three

major research areas, candidate traits, negative advertising, and candidate positioning

there is a discussion of the significant results, as well as the implications of the results for

our current understanding of political consultants and campaigns in general. A

discussion of improvements that could be made on this research will also be discussed

and finally an analysis of the long term implications of this dissertation.

Candidate Traits

The analysis of consultant's ratings of candidate traits suggest that there are some

key elements in the campaign environment that have an impact on how political

consultants view the importance of candidate traits, although in many cases they were not

necessarily the predictors assumed by current research.

The results find support for hypotheses 1 (predicting a relationship between the

consultants' party and the importance of candidate traits). Generally political consultants

found similar traits to be important in candidates, but Republican and Democratic

candidates differed in the importance they placed on the experience a candidate had prior

to running for office and their ability to communicate. What is significant in many respects about the differences between Republican and Democratic consultants is that the traits deemed important were fairly similar between the parties but they differed in ranking.

The results also found support for hypothesis 2 (predicting consultants' beliefs about a relationship between how candidates campaign and govern). Political consultants did find a link between how a candidate runs a campaign and how they will eventually govern. This comports with existing literature in Thurber's research that shows consultants do often care about the behavior of their clients as elected officials but also has a larger implication for campaign research in general.

Hypothesis 3, predicting relationships between the consultants' ratings of the importance of the five traits and predictors from the literature (type of race; race and gender of the candidate; party and party preference in the district; education and minority percentage in the district; whether the candidate was running for an executive or legislative position; whether the candidate had more money than his/her opponent; whether the candidate won or lost.), was given some support by the results. While all candidate traits were deemed important by most consultants in the sample, their determination of the most important traits often did not have a statistically significant relationship with established predictors from the literature. According to political consultants in this sample, many of the predictors that voters and by extension political science has employed to determine the importance of candidate traits do not weigh heavily on political consultant's evaluation of candidate traits. Almost all of the inherent traits that current political science literature suggests are significant in evaluating

candidate traits were not deemed important by consultants in this sample in favor of more contextual variables. Predictors such as the race, gender or even the partisan identification of the candidate and district meant little to consultants as they found the specifics of the campaign context to have a stronger grip on their evaluations. The amount of money the campaign had to spend, and the number of minorities in the district seemed to matter most in what traits were important in a candidate while running for office or even governing. So, according to consultants while there may be some universal traits such as honesty and integrity that they consider to be the best traits of a candidate, when in the midst of the campaign what they deem important will ultimately be determined by what resources they have at their disposal to promote the candidate's traits and how the local population's unique needs might be met by such traits.

Overall, it would appear that consultants have preferences in candidates, and see a relationship between the campaigns they work on and what victorious officials will do once in office. However, it is also clear that consultants appear to be contextually driven when it comes to evaluating candidates, they are concerned with what the local constituency desires, and then alter their campaign (with resources they have available) to cater to that constituency. This should give heart to those concerned about a potential disconnect between political professionals and the voters they are working to engage. If anything these results might suggest that consultants are totally beholden to campaign context and lack any overarching thoughts on candidates.

Negative Advertising

The analysis of consultants' use of negative advertising suggests that there is some support for the hypothesis that political consultants will have a more consistent

definition of negative advertising (hypothesis 1). Political consultants in the sample described negative advertising in various ways, and in some cases provided fairly consistent beliefs about what negative advertising entails which is helpful for future analysis of the subject. Political scientists hoping to study negative advertising in the future should consider more input from political consultants given that they are not only actively involved in the development of many 'negative' ads, but also they may provide heretofore under examined views on the definition of 'negative'.

Consultants in general drew sharp distinctions between 'going negative' and 'attacking' in ads, something that is occasionally captured in current political science discussions of negative advertising definitions but not with consistency. In general, consultants in the sample were fairly adamant about the fact that outright lying in campaign attacks was wrong. Also, while a candidate's professional life was open to any criticism, when it came to a candidate's personal life, more consultants expressed that personal issues were reasonable in negative ads if they had some clear relevance to the position being sought or policy issues at play in the campaign. Which stands to reason; a political opponent's extra-martial affair and subsequent divorce may have no real bearing on their ability to be State Attorney General, unless their campaign is predicated on a theme of family values and integrity, in which case personal foibles become legitimate political questions. The results from this analysis do provide enough information to create what might be a consistent definition of negative advertising that is useful and actually applicable to many areas for future political science research:

"Negative advertising is defined as any ads or messages directed at one's opponent during the campaign that are either untrue, or related to personal issues that do not have some obvious relevance to the position they are seeking."

The multivariate analyses showed that the most consistent and powerful predictors for the use of attack advertising either on policy or character by political consultants are the poll numbers during the campaign (hypothesis 2). While those seeking executive positions are slightly more likely to attack than those seeking legislative positions (hypotheses 3), and Democrats appear to be more policy oriented in their attacks than Republican candidates (hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 6), it is the campaign context, the political polls that drive when and on what themes consultants chose to attack. However, no significant relationship was found between the use of negative attack ads and the type of race (challenger, open seat, incumbent) (hypothesis 5)

Character attacks are less frequent but seem to elicit more concerns from consultants than policy attacks, and thus are more driven by poll numbers in all situations. This suggests that in a perfect campaign world the only issues worth attacking one's opponent on would be their voting record and policy initiatives, but when the stakes are high and loss might be imminent, in the mind of political consultants, there may be no better way to bring down the opposition than to throw as much mud as possible and hope that something brings down their lead.

What is interesting also about these results is that again, contextual variables tend to have more weight in general than inherent variables. A candidate's position in the polls, and what position they are seeking tend to weigh more, at least in the realm of policy attacks, than whether they are a challenger, incumbent or in an open

113

seat race. Partisan identification related to policy attacks, and not at all to character which made sense given the penchant for consultants to not want to admit that they attacked on anything other than policy in the survey. Finally these results suggest again that context is the key to determining consultant behavior, when the types of attacks that a campaign is subjected to are controlled for the results show that various aspects of the campaign environment become more important, from the positions being sought to even what polls matter. It is becoming more and more clear that while consultants have general ideas about how campaigns work, the world that they live and theorize in is moved by the whims of the voters and campaign peculiarities rather than overarching themes.

Candidate Position

This section began with a discussion of issue ownership, where issue ownership was looked at through the prism of consultants should be more reluctant to alter issue positions on issues that their party 'owned'. Hypothesis 3 (predicting party differences in tension for changing position) was supported but only weakly. The results did not suggest that there was a clear split between issue ownership for Republican and Democratic consultants, although the results did provide some evidence that changing policy positions while resisted by both parties was resisted on some issues more than others by the two party consultants. In every category, from Foreign affairs to Education, consultants who were working for Republican candidates or consultants that were working in Republican leaning districts stated that it was problematic to change their issue stances. In no category did being a Democratic consultant or working in a Democratic leaning district have any impact on concerns about issue ownership.

There was some support for all three hypotheses regarding consultant attitudes on candidate positioning. The results suggest that the directional model is more reflective of at least consultants for Republican candidates (hypothesis 1). Consultants working for Democrats appear to see much more tension between pleasing their base and the swing voter.

In the subsection of research focusing solely on those districts in which the directional and proximity models predict different strategies for success with voters again there appeared to be a general tendency towards the directional model amongst consultants in this sample. When asked about the tension between catering to their base and seeking the centrist voter in the abstract, Republicans appeared to be more directional in their position strategy and the proximity model seemed more reflective of Democratic consultant strategy. However, when asked about the tension in their own campaigns, consultants for both parties appeared to be much more directional in their strategy although Republicans were moreso than Democratic consultants.

In all three questions regarding candidate positioning Democrats seemed to have the most difficulty reconciling a need for swing voters and their base, and Republicans were much less concerned. There are several potential reasons for this, particularly in the minds of political consultants. Democrats by and large have more trouble in getting out their voters than Republicans, so perhaps they must consistently seek out swing voters to shore up what might be an unreliable base. Moreover, the ideological range of Democrats in Congress and throughout the United States is wider, and thus a pro-life Democrat in Texas may have trouble galvanizing their base whereas Republican candidates remain more ideologically consistent throughout the United States.

When determining what factors influenced which of these models were more reflective of consultant beliefs, again the campaign context became significant. While Democrats did tend to lean more towards the proximity model, the number of minorities in a district, and the partisan leanings of the district weighed heavily on how a consultant chose to position their candidate in the regression models. Consultants in districts with high minority populations and that leaned Republican reported less tension between pleasing the base and seeking the swing voter. This comports with the previous parts of this analysis. In districts with a large minority voting population, one can potentially galvanize this group and win elections with a plurality without having to win many swing voters. In the general models, the Republican consultants were less concerned about constituent tension than Democrats and thus it stands to reason that GOP leaning districts were places that consultants were less likely to see tension. Again, the campaign context reigns supreme in the determination of consultant attitudes.

Conclusions and Future Research

This dissertation has explored the attitudes and beliefs of political consultants, and suggests that those attitudes and beliefs may have some relevance to the existing political science literature. It has been surmised that political consultants do have statistically significant and measurable beliefs about candidate traits, negative advertising and positioning strategy during a campaign, a result that, prior to this research, may have been assumed but had seldom been assessed. Data on consultant attitudes could potentially add value to studies of campaign politics above and beyond the three major issues discussed in this dissertation. Message formation, turnout strategy and even policy

formation studies that form a part of political science work on campaigns could all be enhanced by introducing the role and attitudes of political consultants. Further, while this work was limited in the number of campaign years covered in the survey responses, future work could potentially compare consultant attitudes towards strategy across campaign years, or across different types of campaigns, Congressional, Presidential, and state-wide, and determine if there are any overarching themes when the focus of the analysis is more specific. In addition, there is a potential predictive value to the analysis of consultants for future campaigns, it is clear that many of the results in this analysis overlap well with current strategies being employed by the two major presidential candidates in 2008, perhaps with a larger data set, predictors of future campaign behavior could be estimated.

This analysis has also shown that consultant's attitudes are often the result of their unique campaign environment, and that there may be consistency in attitudes within certain circumstances but not across campaign circumstances. Although beyond the scope of this particular analysis, this work does not establish the 'theory of political consultants' called for by Thurber and Johnson / Cartee-Copeland, however this work, and the results from it might begin to move the discipline in that direction. If consultant strategy is moved by circumstance and less on general principle the discovery of consistent overall theory might be a daunting task indeed. However, at this point we can at least begin to understand that consultants do have unique ideas and beliefs and the long term implications of these are just beginning to be understood, which leaves the study of political consultants in an excellent place for future work.

Appendix

I. Logistic Regression Models for "Candidate Traits"

Table A
Importance of Integrity While Running
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.541	.310	3.057	1	.080	.582
Win/Lose	-.488	.381	1.638	1	.201	.614
War Chest District	-.442	.205	4.650	1	.031	.643
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.034	.310	.012	1	.912	.966
Race of Candidate	.239	.218	1.196	1	.274	1.270
Sex of Candidate	.357	.333	1.145	1	.285	1.428
Minority Percentage	.233	.135	2.975	1	.085	1.262
Education Level District	.041	.153	.072	1	.789	1.042
Party Preference District	.037	.104	.128	1	.720	1.038
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.523	.439	1.417	1	.234	.593
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.206	.369	.312	1	.576	.814
Constant	.971	1.240	.613	1	.434	2.639

Table B
Importance of Integrity while Governing
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.402	.339	1.409	1	.235	.669
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.172	.328	.276	1	.600	.842
Race of Candidate	.142	.238	.358	1	.550	1.153
Sex of Candidate	.325	.343	.897	1	.344	1.383
Minority Percentage	.050	.146	.119	1	.730	1.051
Party Preference District	-.139	.111	1.559	1	.212	.870
Challenger vs Incumbent	.002	.460	.000	1	.996	1.002
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.052	.385	.018	1	.893	1.053
Win/Lose	.135	.403	.113	1	.737	1.145
War Chest District	-.164	.208	.623	1	.430	.849
Education Level District	.220	.167	1.719	1	.190	1.246
Constant	.603	1.299	.215	1	.643	1.827

Table C
Importance of Empathy while Running
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	.001	.347	.000	1	.999	1.001
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.333	.352	.893	1	.345	.717
Race of Candidate	.199	.224	.792	1	.373	1.221
Sex of Candidate	-.795	.356	4.994	1	.025	.452
Minority Percentage	.313	.148	4.498	1	.034	1.368
Education Level District	.371	.174	4.561	1	.033	1.450
Party Preference District	-.015	.117	.016	1	.898	.985
Challenger vs Incumbent	.688	.448	2.354	1	.125	1.989
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.211	.408	.268	1	.605	1.235
Win/Lose	-.523	.384	1.858	1	.173	.593
Constant	-1.702	1.112	2.342	1	.126	.182

Table D
Importance of Empathy while Governing
Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	.537	.340	2.499	1	.114	1.711
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.085	.337	.064	1	.800	.918
Race of Candidate	.395	.223	3.124	1	.077	1.484
Sex of Candidate	-.117	.354	.110	1	.740	.889
Minority Percentage	.183	.142	1.667	1	.197	1.201
Education Level District	.103	.163	.398	1	.528	1.108
Party Preference District	.080	.115	.488	1	.485	1.084
Challenger vs Incumbent	.292	.465	.396	1	.529	1.340
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.552	.407	1.838	1	.175	.576
Win/Lose	-1.106	.414	7.125	1	.008	.331
War Chest District	-.378	.217	3.036	1	.081	.685
Constant	-.032	1.299	.001	1	.980	.968

Table E
Importance of Leadership while Running
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.119	.318	.140	1	.709	.888
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.083	.321	.066	1	.797	.921
Race of Candidate	.137	.213	.410	1	.522	1.146
Sex of Candidate	.343	.348	.968	1	.325	1.409
Minority Percentage	.428	.140	9.409	1	.002	1.534
Party Preference District	-.037	.106	.120	1	.729	.964
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.445	.457	.947	1	.331	.641
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.341	.385	.783	1	.376	.711
Win/Lose	-.402	.391	1.056	1	.304	.669
War Chest Dist	-.664	.214	9.674	1	.002	.515
Educational Level District	.192	.159	1.448	1	.229	1.211
Constant	.207	1.269	.027	1	.871	1.230

Table F
Importance of Leadership while Governing
Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.359	.322	1.247	1	.264	.698
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.167	.326	.262	1	.609	1.182
Race of Candidate	.183	.236	.603	1	.437	1.201
Sex of Candidate	.131	.340	.148	1	.700	1.140
Minority Percentage	.275	.143	3.721	1	.054	1.316
Party Preference District	-.081	.106	.584	1	.445	.922
Challenger vs Incumbent	.177	.449	.156	1	.693	1.194
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.296	.381	.603	1	.437	1.344
Win/Lose	.040	.389	.011	1	.918	1.041
War Chest Dist	-.032	.204	.024	1	.876	.969
Educational Level District	.159	.160	.990	1	.320	1.173
Constant	-.792	1.266	.391	1	.532	.453

Table G
Importance of Ambition while Running
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.064	.320	.039	1	.843	.938
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.099	.325	.093	1	.761	.906
Race of Candidate	.219	.212	1.064	1	.302	1.245
Sex of Candidate	.271	.355	.584	1	.445	1.312
Minority Percentage	.077	.137	.319	1	.572	1.080
Party Preference District	.031	.108	.083	1	.773	1.032
Challenger vs Incumbent	.397	.458	.753	1	.386	1.487
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.616	.389	2.504	1	.114	1.852
Win/Lose	.772	.401	3.711	1	.054	2.163
War Chest Dist	.353	.212	2.764	1	.096	1.423
Educational Level District	.377	.161	5.520	1	.019	1.458
Constant	-4.543	1.347	11.382	1	.001	.011

Table H
Importance of Ambition while Governing
Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.158	.364	.188	1	.665	.854
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.043	.370	.013	1	.908	.958
Race of Candidate	-.043	.256	.028	1	.868	.958
Sex of Candidate	-.230	.388	.352	1	.553	.794
Minority Percentage	.179	.156	1.323	1	.250	1.196
Party Preference District	.037	.123	.089	1	.765	1.038
Challenger vs Incumbent	.101	.503	.040	1	.841	1.107
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.122	.431	.080	1	.777	.885
Win/Lose	.116	.453	.065	1	.798	1.123
War Chest District	.227	.234	.940	1	.332	1.255
Educational Level District	.010	.181	.003	1	.956	1.010
Constant	-2.131	1.459	2.133	1	.144	.119

Table I
Importance of Competence while Running
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	.106	.316	.112	1	.738	1.112
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.282	.322	.767	1	.381	.754
Race of Candidate	.349	.213	2.681	1	.102	1.418
Sex of Candidate	.279	.348	.644	1	.422	1.322
Minority Percentage	.252	.135	3.506	1	.061	1.287
Party Preference District	-.070	.108	.421	1	.517	.932
Challenger vs Incumbent	-.325	.446	.530	1	.467	.723
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.113	.378	.090	1	.765	.893
Win/Lose	-.320	.385	.689	1	.407	.726
War Chest District	-.222	.207	1.147	1	.284	.801
Educational Level District	-.035	.158	.049	1	.824	.966
Constant	-.113	1.254	.008	1	.929	.894

Table J
Importance of Competence while Governing
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	.084	.314	.072	1	.789	1.088
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.133	.317	.177	1	.674	.875
Race of Candidate	.106	.222	.229	1	.632	1.112
Sex of Candidate	.355	.335	1.125	1	.289	1.427
Minority Percentage	-.090	.137	.432	1	.511	.914
Party Preference District	-.200	.106	3.544	1	.060	.819
Challenger vs Incumbent	.108	.438	.061	1	.805	1.114
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.469	.375	1.560	1	.212	1.598
Win/Lose	-.118	.386	.093	1	.761	.889
War Chest District	-.188	.201	.882	1	.348	.828
Educational Level District	.023	.156	.021	1	.884	1.023
Constant	1.327	1.246	1.134	1	.287	3.770

II. Logistic Regression Models for "Changing Policy Stance"

Table K
How problematic would it be to change policy position on *Foreign Policy*
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-1.251	.373	11.218	1	.001	.286
Challenger vs Incumbent	.579	.539	1.153	1	.283	1.784
Open Seat vs Incumbent	-.321	.493	.423	1	.516	.726
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.124	.401	.096	1	.757	1.132
Party Preference (District)	-.054	.118	.208	1	.649	.948
Win/Lose	.075	.512	.021	1	.884	1.078
Polls Midway	.022	.176	.016	1	.900	1.022
Constant	-.533	1.388	.147	1	.701	.587

Table L
How problematic would it be to change policy position on *Jobs*
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.238	.344	.480	1	.489	.788
Challenger vs Incumbent	.500	.493	1.029	1	.310	1.648
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.454	.428	1.120	1	.290	1.574
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	-.225	.366	.379	1	.538	.798
Party Preference (District)	-.235	.110	4.591	1	.032	.791
Win/Lose	.029	.466	.004	1	.950	1.030
Polls Midway	.198	.161	1.515	1	.218	1.219
Constant	-.421	1.238	.116	1	.734	.656

Table M
How problematic would it be to change policy position on *Education*
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.507	.376	1.813	1	.178	.602
Challenger vs Incumbent	1.231	.546	5.083	1	.024	3.423
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.807	.488	2.733	1	.098	2.242
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.242	.385	.393	1	.531	1.274
Party Preference (District)	-.233	.121	3.725	1	.054	.792
Win/Lose	.019	.496	.001	1	.970	1.019
Polls Midway	.120	.175	.472	1	.492	1.127
Constant	-1.534	1.347	1.296	1	.255	.216

Table N
How problematic would it be to change policy position on *Taxes*
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.939	.365	6.628	1	.010	.391
Challenger vs Incumbent	.779	.512	2.322	1	.128	2.180
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.489	.440	1.231	1	.267	1.630
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.224	.378	.353	1	.553	1.252
Party Preference (District)	.008	.110	.005	1	.945	1.008
Win/Lose	-.527	.485	1.178	1	.278	.591
Polls Midway	-.018	.163	.013	1	.911	.982
Constant	1.184	1.277	.859	1	.354	3.266

Table O
How problematic would it be to change policy position on *Social and Cultural Issues*
Variables in the Equation

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Party (GOP/DEM)	-.759	.339	5.005	1	.025	.468
Challenger vs Incumbent	.429	.483	.789	1	.374	1.535
Open Seat vs Incumbent	.183	.421	.188	1	.664	1.201
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative)	.205	.357	.331	1	.565	1.228
Party Preference (District)	.021	.106	.037	1	.847	1.021
Win/Lose	-.121	.456	.070	1	.791	.886
Polls Midway	.242	.158	2.353	1	.125	1.273
Constant	-.888	1.225	.525	1	.469	.412

III. Position Strategy when in Different Partisan Preference Type Districts

Table P
GOP candidate position strategy (directional or proximity)
when in different partisan preference type districts.

Partisan Preference Type Districts	Proximity % (N)	Directional % (N)	Total % (N)
Very Democratic with GOP candidate	52.9% (9)	47.1% (8)	100% (17)
Slightly Democratic with GOP candidate	42.9% (3)	57.1% (4)	100.0% (7)
About evenly split with GOP candidate	30.0% (3)	70.0% (7)	100.0% (10)
Slightly Republican with GOP candidate	40.9% (9)	59.1% (13)	100.0% (22)
Very Republican with GOP candidate	33.3% (6)	66.7% (12)	100.0% (18)
Total	40.5% (30)	59.5% (44)	100.0% (74)

Chi-square = 1.950, df= 4, p< = .745

Table Q
Democratic candidate position strategy (directional or proximity)
when in different partisan preference type districts.

Partisan Preference Type Districts	Proximity % (N)	Directional % (N)	Total % (N)
Very Democratic with Dem Candidate	41.0% (16)	59.0% (23)	100.0% (39)
Slightly Democratic With Dem Candidate	79.2% (19)	20.8% (5)	100.0% (24)
About Even with Dem Candidate	54.5% (6)	45.5% (5)	100.0% (11)
Slightly GOP with Dem Candidate	52.0% (13)	48.0% (12)	100.0% (25)
Very GOP with Dem Candidate	52.9% (9)	47.1% (8)	100.0% (17)
Total	54.3% (63)	45.7% (53)	100.0% (116)

Chi-square = 1.816, df= 4, p< = .066

Table R
Democratic candidate position strategy (cater-to-base vs seek-the-center)
when in different partisan preference type districts.

Partisan Preference Type Districts	Seek the Centrist Voter % (N)	Cater to the Base % (N)	Total % (N)
Very Democratic with Dem Candidate	28.9% (11)	71.1% (27)	100.0% (38)
Slightly Democratic With Dem Candidate	71.4% (15)	28.6% (6)	100.0% (21)
About Even with Dem Candidate	88.9% (8)	11.1% (1)	100.0% (9)
Slightly GOP with Dem Candidate	90.5% (19)	9.5% (2)	100.0% (21)
Very GOP with Dem Candidate	70.6% (12)	29.4% (5)	100.0% (17)
Total	61.3% (65)	38.7% (41)	100.0% (106)

Chi-square = 28.721, df= 4, $p < = .000$

Table S
GOP candidate position strategy (cater-to-base vs seek-the-center)
when in different partisan preference type districts.

Partisan Preference Type Districts	Seek the Centrist Voter % (N)	Cater to the Base % (N)	Total % (N)
Very Democratic with GOP candidate	55.0% (11)	45.0% (9)	100% (20)
Slightly Democratic with GOP candidate	50.0% (3)	50.0% (3)	100% (6)
About Evenly Split with GOP candidate	37.5% (3)	62.5% (5)	100% (8)
Slightly Republican with GOP candidate	23.5% (4)	76.5% (13)	100% (17)
Very Republican with GOP candidate	25.0% (3)	75.0% (9)	100% (12)
Total	38.1% (24)	61.9% (39)	100% (63)

Chi-square = 5.187, df= 4, $p < = .269$

IV. Political Consultant Survey

A. Questionnaire

This survey is a critical part of dissertation research on political consultants. The purpose of this research is to compare and contrast how political consultants think and operate in the field with what most political science theory says about how elections are won. The results of this research will also really help the general public understand better what political consultants do and how their work is not only important but essential to how elections work in the United States today.

You are one of about 250 participants in this survey. The survey has 10 sections and should take about 30 minutes, however you do not have to complete the entire survey in one sitting. Just leave the survey open on your screen until you are finished. We ask that you complete the survey within 1 week of activating the link through your email. Questions marked with an asterisk must be answered in order to continue with the survey, questions without an asterisk are optional.

The entire process is voluntary and you have the right to stop at any point. This survey program guarantees your privacy and there is no way that answers can be traced back to any individual survey respondent. If you have any questions or concerns feel free to contact the primary investigator. Thank you for your time.

Jason Johnson
Phd Candidate in Political Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Dissertation Fellow, Hiram College
330-569-7887
johnsonja@hiram.edu

Q1. Do you agree with / understand the terms written above?
Yes
No

Q2. Some questions on this survey ask about specific campaigns that you have worked on, others ask about your general views. When answering survey questions about specific campaigns please answer in terms of one or two important campaigns that you have worked on in your career, even if you are a general consultant. Also, complete the survey based COMPLETED campaigns, not ones you are currently working on. With that in mind, in what year did you work on the campaign that you will refer to most often in this survey?
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
Other (please specify)

Q3. What was your campaign position during the election?
Manager
Fundraiser
Media
GOTV
Other (please specify)

Q4. How long have you worked as a consultant or campaign organizer?
1-4 years
5-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
More than 20 years

Q5. What is your level of education?
High school diploma
Associates Degree or certificate
Bachelor's Degree
Masters Degree
PhD
Professional Degree

Q6. What was your candidate's Party Identification?
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other (please specify)

Q7. What were the genders of the candidates running?

	Male	Female
My candidate was		
The opposition's candidate was		

Q8. Your candidate was:
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other (please specify)

Q9. Your opponent was:
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other (please specify)

Q10. Your candidate's position at the beginning of the race was:
Incumbent
Challenger
It was an open seat race

Q11. Which of the following best describes the position sought by your candidate?
President
Governor
Federal Senate
Federal House
State Legislature
Mayor/City Manager
School Board
Other (please specify)

Q12. Did your candidate win the general election?
Yes
No

Q13. In what region of the country was the campaign you were involved in taking place?
Northeast
Mid-Atlantic
Southeast
South
Midwest
Southwest
West
Pacific Northwest

Q14. Immediately after the primaries took place your candidate was:
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by double digits
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by single digits
About even with their opponent
Behind their opponent in the polls by single digits
Behind their opponent in the polls by double digits

Q15. Midway through the campaign your candidate was:
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by double digits
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by single digits
About even with their opponent
Behind their opponent by single digits
Behind their opponent in the polls by double digits

Q16. At the end of the campaign your candidate:
Won by double digits
Won by single digits
Had a runoff election
Lost by single digits
Lost by double digits

Q17. Which of the following best describes the region you campaigned in?
Mostly rural
Somewhat rural
Mixed rural and urban area
Suburban
Urban

Q18. Which of the following best describes the minority demographics of your campaign region?
Less than 10%
between 10 and 25%
between 26-40%
between 41-55%
Over 55%

Q19. What was the largest ethnic or racial minority in your campaign area?
African American
Asian American
Latino American
Other (please specify)

Q20. On average about 84% of Americans graduate from high school, 26% have a college degree and around 15% have graduate or professional degrees. Which of the following do you think best describes the education level of voters in your campaign area?
Far above average
Above average
Average
Below Average
Far below average

Q21. The median household income across the United States is about $45,000 a year. Which of the following would you say best describes the average income in the area where you campaigned?
Far above average
Above average
Average
Below average
Far below average

Q22. What was the general party preference in your campaign area?
Overwhelmingly Democratic
Slightly Democratic
About evenly split between Republicans and Democrats
Slightly Republican
Overwhelmingly Republican

Q23. At the beginning of the general election which candidate had more money in their campaign war chest?
Your candidate
Your opponent

Q24. *What was the turnout of eligible voters in your campaign area in the election?*
Less than 35%
36-45%
46-55%
56-65%
Over 65%

Q25. *In planning a campaign strategy some consultants feel there is a clear tension between developing a strategy that pleases the base and one that can win over the swing voter. Others feel that these goals are entirely compatible. In general how much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases the base and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter?*
No tension, these goals are entirely compatible
Little tension, trade-offs exist, but by and large the goals are compatible
Modest tension, clear trade-offs exist, but they are not severe
High tension, strong trade-offs exist
Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates swing voters

Q26. *Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between pleasing the base and winning over the swing voter?*
No tension, these goals were entirely compatible
Little tension, trade-offs existed, but by and large the goals were compatible
Modest tension, clear trade-offs existed, but they were not severe
High tension, strong trade-offs existed
Incompatible, any effort to please the base, alienated swing voters

Q27. *In your opinion, in general, how effective is the use of negative advertising in winning a political campaign?*
Highly effective
Effective
Neither effective or ineffective
Ineffective
Highly ineffective

Q28. *Under each of the following circumstances how likely would you be to launch a negative advertising campaign against your opponent?*

	Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Neither Likely nor Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Unlikely
Your candidate is far behind in the election					
Your candidate is slightly behind in the election					
Your candidate is even with their opponent					
Your candidate is slightly ahead in the election					
Your candidate is way ahead in the election					

Q29. Some argue that negative advertising has an adverse affect on voter turnout, which of the following best describes your opinion on this issue?

Negative advertising greatly increases turnout
Negative advertising somewhat increases turnout
Negative advertising has a neutral impact on turnout
Negative advertising somewhat decreases turnout
Negative advertising greatly decreases turnout

Q30. During a heated campaign attack advertising can become harsh. In general how important are each of the following in constraining the negative tone of attack ads?

	Extremely Important	Somewhat Important	Neither Important nor Unimportant	Somewhat Unimportant	Extremely Unimportant
Community reaction					
The candidate					
Your standing in the polls					

Q31. What is your definition of negative advertising?

Q32. Were any negative advertisements run during your campaign?

Yes, our opponent attacked us first
Yes, we attacked our opponent first
No, there were no negative ads run

Q33. Did any outside groups run attack ads during the campaign?

Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my candidate
Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my opponent
Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my candidate and the opponent
No, outside groups did not run any attack ads

Q34. There are several types of political ads that campaigns run. About how often did you run each of the following types of ads?

	Very Often	Often	Occasionally	Seldom	Never
Attack Advertising					
Comparison Advertising					
Endorsement Advertising					
Positive Bio Advertising					

Q35. In trying to understand your opponent's strategy, what was their motivation for running attack ads?

Q36. What were the major themes of your opponent's attack ads against your candidate?

Q37. What were the major themes of your attack ads against your opponent?

Q38. In YOUR attack ads, which of the following best describes how often you focused on your opponent's CHARACTER?
Always
Mostly
Sometimes
Seldom
Never

Q39. In YOUR attack ads which of the following best describes how often you focused on your opponent's POLICY POSITIONS?
Always
Mostly
Sometimes
Seldom
Never

Q40. In your OPPONENT'S attack ads, which of the following best describes how often they focused on YOUR candidate's character?
Always
Mostly
Sometimes
Seldom
Never

Q41. In your OPPONENT'S attack ads, which of the following best describes how often they focused on YOUR candidate's policy positions?
Always
Mostly
Sometimes
Seldom
Never

Q42. Many consultants argue that attack ads can have differing effects on candidates. Sometimes the ads can highlight the negative traits associated with a candidate, sometimes attack ads can diminish the positive traits a candidate promotes about themselves. The following questions address this aspect of negative advertising.

	Increased	Slight Increase	No Impact	Slight Decrease	Decrease
Positive Rating					
Negative Rating					

Q43. How did attack ads aimed at your candidate impact the following ratings of your candidate?

	Increased	Slight Increase	No Impact	Slight Decrease	Decrease
Positive Rating					
Negative Rating					

Q44. In general did your ads use humor?
Yes, they were mostly humorous
Yes, some were humorous some serious
No, they were mostly serious
No, they were all serious

Q45. In general did your opponent's ads use humor?
Yes, they were mostly humorous
Yes, some were humorous some serious
No, they were mostly serious
No, they were all serious

Q46. In general do you think that the ads that were run by your opponent against your candidate were unfair?
Yes, virtually all were unfair
Yes, more were unfair than fair
They were mixed, about half were fair and half were unfair
No, More were fair than unfair
No, virtually all were fair

Q47. In general, do you think that any of the ads that you ran during the campaign against your opponent were unfair?
Yes, virtually all were unfair
Yes, more were unfair than fair
They were mixed, about half were fair and half were unfair
No, More were fair than unfair
No, virtually all were fair

Q48. What were the top two groups that your campaign targeted?

Q49. Defining your opponent is a very critical part of the campaign process. Which of the following best characterizes how you tried to define your opponent during the campaign?
Out of touch
Incompetent
Inexperienced
Corrupt
Too Old, too long in office
Other (please specify)

Q50. Which of the following best characterizes how your opponent tried to define YOUR candidate?
Out of touch
Incompetent
Inexperienced
Corrupt
Too Old, too long in office
Other (please specify)

Q51. Would you say that your candidate
Always stayed on message
Mostly stayed on message
Frequently was not on message
Never stayed on message

Q52. When or if your candidate did veer from the campaign's main message what were the usual reasons?

Q53. How would you classify the level of political awareness of voters in your campaign area?
Very aware
Aware
Somewhat aware
Hardly aware
Not at all aware

Q54. Turnout is a key part of any election campaign, in your experience is it easier to suppress or increase voter turnout?
Increase
Suppress

Q55. About what percent of your job in a campaign is dedicated to voter turnout?
90%
70%
50%
25%
Less than 10%

Q56. If there is bad weather on election day which party will be most affected?
Poor weather has a greater impact on Democratic turnout
Poor weather has a greater impact on Republican turnout
Poor weather doesn't have a greater impact on the turnout for either party

Q57. If you thought it would help your candidate would you engage in legal activities that are known to depress turnout?
Yes
No

Q58. Have you ever engaged in activities designed to lower turnout of the opposition's supporters during an election?
Yes
 No

Q59. Did your opposition engage in any activities designed to lower turnout in favor of YOUR candidate?
Yes
No

Q60. Despite a recent uptick during presidential election years American voter turnout is still fairly low. Why do you think most Americans don't bother to vote?

Q61. *Which would you prefer as a consultant?*
A small margin of victory in a race with voter turnout above 55%
A large margin of victory in a race with voter turnout below 30%

Q62. *Which of the following do you think has a greater impact on whether or not citizens come out to vote?*
Structural factors (close election, easy registration, major public issues)
Psychological factors (civic responsibility, trust of politicians, interest in politics)

Q63. *Which of the following best describes the voter registration process in your campaign area?*
Same day registration
30 Day registration in advance
Other (please specify)

Q64. *In general how helpful are the following tactics in turning out the vote?*

	Extremely Effective	Effective	Neither Effective or Ineffective	Ineffective	Extremely Ineffective
Door to Door					
Phone calls					
Emails					
Mail reminders					
Rallies					

Q65. *Which of the following best describes the employment or office your candidate held prior to running?*
President
Governor
Federal Senate
Federal House
State Legislature
Mayor/City Manager
School Board
Other (please specify)

Q66. *What would you say was your candidate's best attribute?*

Q67. *How important are the following traits for a candidate running for office?*

	Very Important	Important	Neither Important nor Unimportant	Somewhat Unimportant	Very Unimportant
Integrity					
Leadership					
Empathy					
Competence					
Ambition					

Q68. How important are the following traits when actually governing and serving as an elected official?

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Neither Important nor Unimportant	Somewhat Unimportant	Very Unimportant
Integrity					
Leadership					
Empathy					
Competence					
Ambition					

Q69. How do you think the traits that someone has as a candidate relate to how they will actually govern?

They have a very strong correlation, they way they run and behave in a campaign says a lot about how they will govern.

They have no correlation, being a great campaigner says little about how you will actually govern.

I don't know, I don't keep up with candidates after the race is over.

Q70. List the top three policy issues your campaign dealt with in order of importance

Q71. What was your candidate's position on the most important policy issue you faced in the campaign?

Q72. Which of the following best describes your candidate's position on most issues?

Conservative
Slightly conservative
Moderate
Slightly liberal
Liberal

Q73. Which of the following best describes how your opposition positioned his or herself on most issues?

Conservative
Slightly conservative
Moderate
Slightly liberal
Liberal

Q74. Now think of the campaign through the eyes of the voters, how did your candidate's positions compare to the opposition?

Much more conservative
More conservative
About the same
More Liberal
Much more liberal

Q75. Occasionally candidates adjust policy stances during the general election campaign. Which of the following best describes your candidate?
Moved markedly to the left
Moved slightly to the left
Remained in the same position throughout the campaign
Moved slightly to the right
Moved markedly to the right

Q76. What was the main reason why your candidate shifted positions on issues?
New information was presented that changed our position
The opposition took a new position and we changed to counter them
Our stance was unpopular and hurting us in the polls
My candidate did not shift on any issues

Q77. What was your candidate's strategic motivation on most issue positions?
To cater to their base
To seek the centrist
voter

Q78. If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign which of these policy areas did they shift positions on?
Foreign Policy
Jobs
Taxes
Education Policy
Social/Cultural Issues
No policy position
changes
Other (please specify)

Q79. If a candidate changes positions on issues during a campaign, it can confuse voters, or even worse make you look inconsistent. In general, on which of the following issues would it be the most problematic for a candidate to change their position?

	Extremely Problematic	Somewhat Problematic	Neither Problematic nor Non-Problematic	Not Problematic	Extremely Not Problematic
Foreign Policy					
Jobs					
Taxes					
Education Policy					
Social / Cultural Issues					

Q80. Which is more important in the minds of voters?
That a candidate have a strong plan and vision for the future
That a candidate have a strong past record and experience

Q81. Which of the following best characterizes your feelings towards the following statement?
"The general election is a referendum on the incumbent."
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

B. Survey Request Email

Dear Campaign Staffer,

Thank you for agreeing to take this survey. My name is Jason Johnson, I'm a Phd candidate in Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I'm doing my dissertation on political consultants/managers, specifically: I'm comparing what political science theory says you're supposed to do to win a campaign with what political consultants actually do in the field. What I am looking for are people who have been campaign managers or political organizers. Even if your specific title was not 'campaign manager', or if you ran your own political campaign, if you worked on a race from beginning to end, such that you knew about how the whole campaign worked, this applies to you as well. I'm interested in respondents at all levels and experience, so if you've worked on anything from school board to city council to a presidential level campaign I'd appreciate you filling out the survey.

In addition, If you complete the survey yourself <u>feel free to send this link on to anybody that you know who fits the criteria.</u> It is a simple link, and the entire internet survey only takes about 30 minutes to complete. It does not have to be completed in one sitting, just leave the window open. My hope is that people will fill out the survey within a week of receiving it so that I can start working on my results as soon as possible. Also, it is completely confidential, the program prevents me from tracing any individual response to any particular respondent. Here is the link. Please click on the link to the survey below, <u>if you have any problems clicking the link simply cut and paste it into your url.</u> <u>http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=563791676156</u>

Thank you so much for any help or people that you can send my way for this research (including yourself!) and if you or anyone else has any questions feel free to contact me.

Jason Johnson
Phd candidate in Political Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Dissertation Fellow Hiram College
330-569-5399 EST

C. Survey Follow-Up Email

Dear Campaign Staffer,

A questionnaire on political consultants was sent to you on November 15th. If you have already filled out this survey thank you very much for your time. If you have not completed the <u>entire</u>

survey, please do so by December 18th, so that your answers can be included in survey results. The response so far to the survey has been fantastic, but it is critical to this research that as many diverse opinions are included as possible, including yours.

As a quick reminder this survey is for PhD research comparing how political science suggests you win political campaigns to how consultants actually behave in the field. The results will be used in a research project and for academic purposes. If you have already filled out the survey, or have not but know of others whom you feel are more qualified to answer the survey please feel free to forward this link to them. Thank you for your time,

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=563791676156

Jason Johnson
PhD Candidate Political Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Dissertation Fellow, Hiram College, Hiram Ohio
330-569-5399

Works Cited

Adams, James. "A *Theory of Spatial Competition with Biased Voters Party Policies Viewed Temporarily and Comparatively*." <u>British Journal of Political Science</u> Volume 31.No. 1 (2001).

Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. "***Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz before A Blind Audience?***" <u>The American Political Science Review</u> Volume 83.Issue 1.

Alvarez, Michael R., and Lisa Garcia Bedolla. "The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election." <u>Journal of Politics</u> Volume 65.No. 1 (February 2003).

Alvarez, R. Michael, and Garrett Glasgow. "Do Voters Learn from Presidential Election Campaigns?" Southern Political Science Association.

---. "Uncertainty and Candidate Personality Traits." <u>American Politics Quarterly</u> 28.1 (January 2000): 26-49.

Alvarez, R. Michael, and Thad Hall. **<u>Point, Click, and Vote : The Future of Internet Voting</u>** . Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, et al. "***Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?***" <u>The American Political Science Review</u> 88.4 (1994).

Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate* . Free Press, 1995.

Ansolabere, Stephen, Snyder, Jr., James M., and Charles Stewart III. "***Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections*** ." American Journal of Political Science Vol 45.No 1 (January 2001).

Aragones, Enrique, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "***The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study***." American Political Science Review Vol. 98.No. 1 (February 2004).

Arnold, Benjamin, and Larycia Hawkins. "**Candidate Quality Properly Understood**." American Political Science Association. Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28th, 2002.

Atkeson, L. R., and R. W. Partin. "***Candidate Advertisements, Media Coverage, and Citizen Attitudes: The Agendas and Roles of Senators and Governors in a Federal System.*** " Political Research Quarterly.54 (2001): 795-813.

Bailey, Michael, et al, eds. *Campaigns and Elections : Contemporary Case Studies* .Congressional Quarterly, 2000.

Barker, Lucious, and Linda F. Williams. "***Black Electoral Politics* : *White/Black Perceptions of the Electability of Black Political Candidates*** ." National Political Science Review Volume 2 (1990).

Barry, Christine A. "***Choosing Qualitative Data Analysis Software: Atlas/ti and Nudist Compared.***" Sociological Research Online. 1998. <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/3/4.html.>.

Baus, Herbert M., and William B. Ross. ***Politics Battle Plan*** . New York: McMillan, 1968.

Beam, Christopher. "*Barack in the Middle: Keeping tabs on Obama's shifts toward the center*.." slate.com. July 2nd, 2008. <http://www.slate.com/id/2194758/>.

Benoit, William. "**A Functional Analysis of Political Advertising Across Media, 1998**." Communications Studies (2000).

---. "Political Campaigns the Messages and thier Analysis." 2004. <http://presidentialcampaign2004.coas.missouri.edu/general/rep_and_character.html >.

Bernstein, Robert A. "***Directing Electoral Appeals Away from the Center: Issue Position and Issue Salience*** ." Political Research Quarterly Vol 48.No. 3 (September 1995).

---. "***Why are there so Few Women in the House?***." The Western Political Quarterly Vol 39.No 1 (Mar., 1986).

Biocca, Frank, John Boiney, and David Paletz, eds. ***Television and Political Advertising Volume 1:*** In Search of the Model Model: Political Science Versus Political Advertising Perspectives on Voter Decision Making . Psychological Processes Center for Research in Journalism and Mass Communication University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ed.N.J. : L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

Blumenthal, Sidney. ***The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Elite Political Operatives***. Beacon Press Boston, 1980.

Boiney, John, and David Paletz. "In Search of the Model: Political Science Versus Political Advertising Perspectives on Voter Decision Making." ***Television and Political Advertising Volume 1 Psychological Processes Center for Research in Journalism and Mass Communication University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill***. Ed. Frank Biocca. Hillsdale N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991.

Bowler, Shaun and Farrell, David M. *__Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing__* . St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Burden, Barry C. "*United States Senators as Presidential Candidates*." Political Science Quarterly Volume 17.1 (2002).

Burton, Michael. "Political Marketing Matters: Identifying the Effect of Candidate Positioning in Congressional Elections." Journal of Political Marketing: Political Campaigns in the New Millennium Volume 6.No. 4 (2007).

Burt-Way, Barbera, and Rita Mae Kelly. "*Gender and Sustaining Political Ambition: A Study of Arizona Elected Officials.*" Western Political Quarterly Volume 45.No. 1 (March 1992).

Chang, Won Ho, Jae Jin Park, and Sung Wook Shin. "*Effectiveness of Negative Political Advertising*." Web Journal of Mass Communication Research. December 1998. <http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/wjmcr/vol02/2-1a-B.htm>.

Clayton, Dewey M., and Angela M. Stallings. "*Black Women in Congress: Striking the Balance* " Journal of Black Studies 30 (2000): 574.

Colleau, Sophie M., et al. "*Symbolic Racism in Candidate Evaluation: An Experiment*." Political Behavior Volume 12.Issue 4 (1990).

Constantini, Edmund. "*Political Women and Political Ambition: Closing the Gender Gap*." American Journal of Political Science Volume 43 (1990).

Craig, Stephen C., ed. The Electoral Challenge: Theory Meets Practice. Congressional Quarterly Press, 2006.

Damore, David F. "***Candidate Strategy and the Decision to Go Negative***." <u>Political Research Quarterly</u> 55.3 (2002): 669-686.

Darcy, R., and Sarah Slavin Schramm. "***When Women Run Against Men***." <u>The Public Opinion Quarterly</u> Volume 41.No 1 (1977).

Davies, Frank. "Anger on Left: Obama Shifts to the Center: CAMPAIGN CONFLICT PLAYS OUT ONLINE." <u>San Jose Mercury News,</u> July 20th, 2008 1:33 a.m. PDT.

Dean, John. ***<u>The Making of a Black Mayor</u>***. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1973.

Doherty, Brendan, and Melissa Anderson. "*"Presidential Message Tailoring: Courting Latino Voters in the 2000 Presidential Advertising Campaign."* Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia PA, August 27th, 2003.

Doherty, Kathryn, and James G. Gimpel. "***Candidate Character Vs. the Economy in the 1992 Election***." <u>Political Behavior</u> Volume 19.No. 3 (September 1997).

Ekstrand, Laurie E., and William A. Eckert. "***The Impact of Candidate's Sex on Voter Choice*** " <u>Western Political Quarterly</u> 34.1 (1981).

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer Lawless. "***To Run Or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition***." <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> Volume 49.No. 3 (2005).

Franklin, Charles H. "*. **Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents***." <u>American Political Science Review</u> Vol 85.No. 4 (1991).

Fridkin Kahn, Kim, and John G. Geer. "***Creating Impressions: An Experimental Investigation of Political Advertising on Television***." Political Behavior Volume 16.No. 1 (March 1994): pp. 93-116.

Fridkin Kahn, Kim, and Patrick J. Kennedy. "***Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize Or Supress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation.***" The American Political Science Review Volume 93.No. 4 (December 1999).

Fridkin Kahn, Kim. "***Gender Differences in Campaign Messages: The Political Advertisements of Men and Women Candidates for U.S. Senate***." Political Research Quarterly Volume 46.No. 3 (1993).

Friedenberg, Robert V. ***Communication Consultants in Political Campaigns*** . Praeger, 1997.

Funk, Carolyn. "***The Impact of Scandal on Candidate Evaluations: An Experimental Test of the Role of Candidate Traits.***" Political Behavior 18.1 (1996).

Funk, Carolyn. "***Bringing the Candidate into Models of Candidate Evaluation***." The Journal of Politics Volume 61.No. 3 (August 1999).

Geer, John G. *in Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns.* . University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Gershtenson, Joseph. "***Ideological Centrism and the Electoral Fortunes of U.S. Senate Candidates***." Social Science Quarterly Volume 85.No. 2 (2004).

Glazer, Amihai, and Bernard Grofman. "***Must Liberals always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate always be Preferred?***." <u>British Journal of Political Science</u> Volume 19.No. 1 (January 1989).

Goldstein, Ken, and Paul Freedman. "***Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence for a Stimulation Effect***." <u>Journal of Politics</u> Volume 64.No. 3 (August 2002).

Goldthwaite, Dannagal. "**Pinocchio v. Dumbo: Priming Candidate Caricature Attributes in Late-Night Comedy Programs in Election 2000 and the Moderating Role of Political Knowledge**." *American Political Science Association.* Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, August, 28th, 2002.

Goren, Paul. "***Character Weakness, Partisan Bias, and Presidential Evaluation***." <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> 46 (2002): 627-641.

Grofman, Bernard. "***Downs and Two Party Convergence***." <u>Annual Review of Political Science.</u> 2004. <<u>http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711?cookieSet=1</u>>.

---. "***Downs and Two Party Convergence***." 2004. <<u>http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711?cookieSet=1.</u>>.

Groseclose, Tim. "***A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate has a Valence Advantage***." <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> 45.4 (2001).

Hacker, Kenneth L., et al. "***Components of Candidate Images: Statistical Analysis of the Issue-Persona Dichotomy in the Presidential Campaign of 1996.***" <u>Communication Monographs</u> 67.3 (2000): 227-238.

Hajnal, Zoltan. "***The Puzzle of Black Incumbent Success: Why White Support Increases Dramatically After Black Candidates Win Office.***" American Political Science Association. September 1998.

Hale, Jon F., Jeffrey C. Fox, and Rick Farmer. "***Negative Advertisements in U.S. Senate Campaigns: The Influence of Campaign Context.***" Social Science Quarterly 77.2 (1996).

Hall Jamieson, Kathleen, and Paul Waldman, eds. Electing the President 2000: The Insiders View Election Strategy from those Who made it. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.

Haynes, Audrey, and Staci L. Rhine. "***Attack Politics in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: An Examination of the Frequency and Determinants of Intermediated Negative Messages Against Opponents*** ." Political Research Quarterly Volume 51.No. 3 (September 1998).

Heberlig, Eric S. "***Congressional Parties Fundraising and Committee Ambition***." Political Research Quarterly Volume 56.No. 2 (June 2003).

Hedlund, Ronald D., et al. "***the Electability of Women Candidates: The Effects of Sex Role Stereotypes***." The Journal of Politics Volume 41.No. 2 (1979).

Herrick, Rebekah, and Michael K. Moore. "***Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Behavior: Schlesinger's Typology Reconsidered and Revisited.***" Journal of Politics August 1993.No. 3 (August 1993).

Herrnson, Paul S., and Atiya Kai-Stokes. "Black and Latino Candidates: Successful Strategies? – News Feed." Campaigns and Elections Magazine November 2001.

Herrnson, Paul S. "***Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in Congressional Elections.***" <u>Journal of Politics</u> Volume 54.No. 3 (August 1992).

---. "***Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising in Congressional Elections***." <u>Journal of Politics</u> Volume 54.No. 3 (August 1992).

---. "***Do Parties make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections.***" <u>The Journal of Politics</u> Volume 48.No. 3 (August 1986): pp. 589-615.

---. "***The Importance of Party Campaigning.***" <u>Polity</u> Volume 20.No. 4 (Summer 1988).

---. "***National Party Decision Making, Strategies and Resource Distribution in Congressional Elections.***" <u>The Western Political Quarterly</u> Volume 42.No. 3 (September 1989): pp. 301-323.

---. ***<u>Party Campaigning in the 1980's</u>*** . Harvard University Press, August 22nd, 1988.

Hiebert, Ray, et al, eds. ***<u>The Political Image Merchants (the Campaign Workers Handbook) : Strategies in the New Politics</u>*** .Acropolis Books LTD, 1971.

Homer, Pamela M., and Rajeev Batra. "***Attitudinal Effects of Character – Based Versus Competence Based Negative Political Communications.***" <u>Journal of Consumer Psychology</u> Volume 3.No. 2 (1994).

Howell, Susan. "***Local Election Campaigns: The Effects of Office Level on Campaign Style***." <u>The Journal of Politics</u> 42.4 (1980).

Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. "***Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates*** ." <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> 37.1 (1993): 119-147.

---. "***The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office*** ." <u>Political Research Quarterly</u> 46.3 (September 1993): 503-525.

Hughes, Andrew. "*Defining Negative Political Advertising: Definition Features and Tactics*." 2003. <http://smib.vuw.ac.nz:8081/WWW/ANZMAC2003/papers/ADV21_hughesa.pdf.>.

Iyengar, Shanto. "Negative Ads Turnoff Voters, Enthrall News Media." Washingtonpost.com. Wednesday November 15th, 2006 <http://pcl.stanford.edu/press/2006/wp-negative.pdf.>.

Jacobson, Gary. "*The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections* " The American Political Science Review Vol. 72.No. 2 (Jun., 1978): pp. 469-491.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Paul Waldman. Electing the President 2000: The Insider's View - Election Strategy from those Who made it. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.

Jeffries, Judson L. "*Press Coverage of Black Statewide Candidates: The Case of L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia*." Journal of Black Studies 32 (July 2002): 673-698.

Jelen, Ted G. *Ross for Boss: The Perot Phenomenon and Beyond*. State University of New York, 2001.

Johnson-Cartee, and Copeland. Inside Political Campaigns. Praeger, 1997.

Johnson, Dennis W. *No Place for Amateurs: how Political Consultants are Re-Shaping American Democracy* . Routledge, 2000.

Kahn, Kim Fridkin, and John G. Geer. "*Creating Impressions: An Experimental Investigation of Political Advertising on Television.*" Political Behavior 16 (1994): 93-116.

Kinder, Donald R., et al. "***Presidential Prototypes*** " <u>Political Behavior</u> 2.4 (1980): 315-337.

Kerlin, Bobby A. "Why NUD*Ist."
<u><http://kerlins.net/bobbi/research/nudist/intro/why.html.></u>.

King, Anthony, ed. *<u>Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections</u>. -* <u>the Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections</u>.Oxford University Press, 2002.

Kirwan, Michael J., and Jack Redding. ***<u>How to Succeed in Politics</u>*** . McFadden-Capitol Hill, 1964.

Klein, Jill, and Rohini Ahluwalia. "***Negativity in Evaluation of Political Candidates.***" <u>Journal of Marketing</u> (January 2005): 131-142.

Kolodny, Robin, and Angela Logan. "***Political Consultants and the Extension of Party Goals***." <u>Political Science and Politics</u> Volume 31.No. 2 (June 1998).

Kolodny, Robin, James A. Thurber, and David A. Dulio. "***Producing Negative Ads: Consultant Survey - Statistical Data Included.***" <u>Campaigns and Elections Magazine.</u> August 2000.
<u><http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2519/is_7_21/ai_64995007></u>.

Kraus, Neil, and Todd Swanstrom. "***<u>Minority Mayors and the Hollow-Prize Problem</u>***." <u>Political Science and Politics</u> Vol. 34.No. 1 (Mar., 2001): pp. 99-105.

Lau, Richard R., and Gerald Pomper. "**Effectiveness of Negative Campaigning in U.S. Senate Elections** " <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> 46.1 (January 2002): 47-66.

---. Negative Campaigning: An Analysis of U.S. Senate Elections. Rowan and Littlefield, 2004.

Lau, Richard R., Lee Sigelman, and Ivy Brown Rovner. "***The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic Reassessment."*** The Journal of Politics 69.4 (2007).

Leal, David. *Latino Public Opinion*. Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 2004.

Lee Kaid, Lynda, and Dianne G. Bystrom. The Electronic Election: Perspectives on the 1996 Campaign Communication. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999.

Lee Kaid, Lynda, and Christina Holtz-Bacha. ***The SAGE Handbook of Political Advertising***. Sage Publications, 2006.

Lemert, James B., Wayne Wanta, and Tien-Tsung Lee. "***Party Identification and Negative Advertising in a U.S. Senate Election."*** Journal of Communication (1999).

LeMieux, Dotty E. ""Plan of Attack: how to respond to campaign attacks,"." August 2004. Campaigns and Elections Magazine. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2519/is_7_25/ai_n6240738.>.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Gary King. "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting." (1998).

Leuthold, David A. ***Electioneering in A Democracy: Campaigns for Congress***. , John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1968.

Lewis, Charles, Alejandro Benes, and Meredith O'Brien. ***Buying of the President***. Avon Books, 1996.

Liu, Baodong. "***Deracialization and Urban Racial Context***," <u>Urban Affairs Review</u> 4.38: 572-591.

Lublin, David. "***Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?***" " <u>American Political Science Review</u> (March 1999).

Luntz, Frank I. ***Candidates, Consultants & Campaigns:, the Style and Substance of American Electioneering*** . B. Blackwell, 1988.

Maraniss, David, and Ellen Nakashima. ***The Prince of Tennessee: Al Gore Meets His Fate***. Touchstone, 2000.

Mayer, WG. "***In Defense of Negative Campaigning***." <u>Political Science Quarterly</u> 111.3 (1996): 437-455.

Mayring, Philip. <u>Qualitative Social Research Forum Qualitative Content Analysis</u>. Vol. Volume 1; No. 2., June 2000.

McGann, Anthony J., William Koetzle, and Bernard Grofman. "***How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-Off and Sequential Elimination Elections***." <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> Volume 46.No. 1 (2002).

Medvic, Stephen K. ***Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections*** . Ohio State University Press, 2001.

Medvic, Stephen K., and Silvo Lenart. "***The Influence of Political Consultants in the 1992 Congressional Elections.***" Legislative Studies Quarterly Volume 22.No. 1 (February 1997).

Mezey, Michael L. "***Ambition Theory and the Office of Congressmen***." Journal of Politics Vol. 32.No. 3 ((Aug., 1970)): pp. 563-579.

Miller, Arthur, and Warren Miller. *" **Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election** ."* • British Journal of Political Science 5.4 (1975): 393-434.

Moore, James, and Wayne Slater. ***<u>Bush's Brain how Karl Rove made George W. Bush Presidential</u>***. Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley, 2003.

Mundy, Alicia. "Victory Has A Thousand Fathers…." Campaigns and Elections Magazine. January 1993. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2519/is_n5_v13/ai_13975242?tag=artBody;col1>.

Nelson, Michael. The Elections of 2004. Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005.

Niemi, Richard G., Harold W. Stanley, and Ronald J. Vogel. "***State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?***" American Journal of Political Science Volume 39.No. 4 (November 1995).

Nimmo, Dan. ***<u>The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns</u>*** . Prentice Hall, 1970.

Norpoth, Helmut, and Bruce Buchanan. "***Wanted: The Education President: Issue Trespassing by Political Candidates***." <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u> Volume 56.No. 1 (1993).

Novotny, Patrick. "***From Polis to Agora: The Marketing of Political Consultants***." <u>The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics</u> Volume 5.No. 3 (Summer 2000): pp. 12-26.

Ornstien, Norman, and Thomas E. Mann. ***The Permanent Campaign and it's Future*** . American Enterprise Institute, Brookings Institution, 2000.

Palmer, Barbera, and Dennis Simon. "***Political Ambition and Women in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1916 -2000,***" <u>Political Research Quarterly</u> Volume 56.No. 2 (June 2003).

Parkinson, Hank. ***Winning Your Campaign: A Nuts-and-Bolts Guide to Political Victory***. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970.

Perlmutter, David D. ***The Manship School Guide to Political Communication*** . Louisana State University Press, 1999.

Perry, Heuy L., ed. In <u>*Race, Politics and Governance in the United States*</u>, <u>Ed.</u> Gainesville Florida: University of Florida Press, 1997.

Perry, James. ***The New Politics : The Expanding Technology of Political Manipulation*** . Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Peterson, David A., and Paul Djupe. "***When Primary Campaigns Go Negative: The Determinants of Campaign Negativity.***" <u>Political Research Quarterly</u> 58.1 (2005).

Petrocik, John R. "***Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case,***" <u>American Journal of Political Science</u> Volume 40.No. 3 (1996).

Pfau, Michael, and Michael Burgoon. "***The Efficacy of Issue and Character Attack Message Strategies in Political Campaign Communication***." <u>Communications Reports</u> 2.2 (1989): 53-61.

Pierce, Patrick A. " **Political Sophistication and the use of Candidate Traits in Candidate Evaluation** ." <u>Political Psychology</u> 14.1 (1993): 21-35.

Pinkleton, Bruce E., Nam-Hyun Um, and Erica Weintraub Austin. "***An Exploration of the Effects of Negative Political Advertising on Political Decision Making***." <u>Journal of Advertising</u> 31.1 (2002): 13.

Rabinowitz, George, and Stuart Elaine MacDonald. "***A Directional Theory of Issue Voting***." <u>The American Political Science Review</u> Volume 83.No.1 (1989).

Randon Hershey, Marjorie. <u>Running for Office: The Political Education of Campaigners</u>. Chatham House Publishers, 1984.

Rapoport, Ronald B., Kelly L. Metcalf, and Jon A. Hartman. "***Candidate Traits and Voter Inferences: An Experimental Study*** ." <u>Journal of Politics</u> 51.4 (1989): 917-932.

Rice, Tom W. "***an Examination of the Median Voter Hypothesis***." <u>The Western Political Quarterly</u> Volume 38.No. 2 (1985).

Richardson, Glen W., and Richardson Jr., Glen W. Pulp Politics: How Political Advertising Tells the Stories of American Politics. Rowan and Littlefield, 2002.

Rohde, D. "***Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives.***" American Journal of Political Science.23 (February 1979): 1-26.

Rohde, David, Paul Abramson, and John Aldrich. Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections. Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987.

Rosenbloom, David Lee. ***The Election Men Professional Campaign Managers and American Democracy*** . Quadrangle Books, 1973.

Rosenwasser, Shirley M., et al. "**Attitudes Toward Women and Men in Politics: Perceived Male and Female Candidate Competencies and Participant Personality Characteristics** ." : Political Psychology 8.2 (June 1987): 191-200.

Sabato, Larry J., and Scott Foresman. The Party's just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future. Little/Brown College Division, 1987.

Sabato, Larry J. Campaigns and Elections: A Reader in Modern American Politics. Scott Foresman and Company, 1989.

---. Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election. Pearson Education Inc., 2006.

---. ***Paying for Elections the Campaign Finance Thicket*** . New York: Priority Press Publications, 1989.

---. "***Political Influence, the News Media and Campaign Consultants***." Political Science and Politics Volume 22.No. 1 (1989).

---. ***Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees*** . W.W. Norton & Company, 1984.

---. *The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections* . Perseus Books Group, 1983.

Salmore, Barbara, and Stephen A. Salmore. ***Candidates, Parties and Campaigns: Electoral Politics in America (2^{Nd} Edition) .*** . Congressional Quarterly, 1989.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. "***Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice***." American Journal of Political Science Volume 46.No. 1 (2002).

Schaeffer, Adam B. "Negative Advertising and African American Turnout: Republican Negative Ads in 2002." Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference in Atlanta Georgia 2006. <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/8/6/1/pages68610/p68610-1.php.>.

Schultz, C., and S. M. Pancer. "***Character Attacks and their Effects on Perceptions of Political Candidates.***" Political Psychology 18 (1997): 93-102.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. ***Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States***. Chicago Illinois: Rand McNally, 1966.

Scott Jr., Hugh. *How to Run for Public Office and Win!*. Washington D.C.: National Press, 1968.

Sigelman, Lee, and Eric Shiraev. "***The Rational Attacker in Russia? Negative Campaigning in Russian Presidential Elections*** " Journal of Politics 64.1 (February 2002): 45-62.

Shadegg, Stephen C. ***How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory*** . New York: Taplinger Publishing, 1964.

Shaw, Catherine M., and Michael E. Holstein. ***the Campaign Manager: Running and Winning Local Elections*** . 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1999.

Shea, Daniel M., and Michael John Burton. ***Campaign Craft the Strategies, Tactics and Art of Political Campaign Management***. Praeger, 2001.

Skaperdas, Stergios, and Bernard Grofman. "***Modeling Negative Campaigning***." American Political Science Review (1995).

Smith, Ben and Martin, Jonathan. "*McCain takes aim at Obama's character*." July 28th, 2008. <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0708/12092.html>.

Squire, Peverill, and Christina Fastnow. "***Comparing Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections.***" Political Research Quarterly 47.3 (1994).

Squire, Peverill, and John R. Wright. "***Fundraising by Nonincumbent Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives***." Legislative Studies Quarterly Volume 15.No. 1 (February 1990).

Stevens, Daniel. "***Separate and Unequal Effects: Information, Political Sophistication and Negative Advertising in American Elections.***" Political Research Quarterly 58.3 (2005).

Stoker, Laura. "***Judging Presidential Character: The Demise of Gary Hart***." Political Behavior Volume 15.No. 2 (Jun., 1993): pp. 193-223.

Stone, Walter J., Sandy L. Maisel, and Cherie D. Maestas. "Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence." American Journal of Political Science Volume 48.No. 3 (July 2004).

Stonecash, Jeffery M. "***Working at the Margins: Campaign Finance and the Party Strategy in New York Assembly Elections*** ." <u>Legislative Studies Quarterly</u> Volume 13.No. 4 (November 1988) .

Strother, Raymond. *Falling Up how a Redneck Helped Invent Political Consulting, .* Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 2003.

Swain, William M., Gary A. Copeland, and Karen S. Johnson-Cartee. "***If My Commercial Makes Fun of My Political Opponent, Do My Race and My Gender Make a Difference?***" <u>The Web Journal of Mass Communication Research.</u> September 2000. <<u>http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/wjmcr/vol03/3-4a.htm</u>>.

Tate, Katherine. <u>From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections</u>. Cambridge, MA Havard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1994.

Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn. "***Campaigning to Govern: Presidents Seeking Reelection***." <u>PSOnline</u> (2003).

Terrelonge Stone, Pauline. "***Ambition Theory and the Black Politician***." <u>Western Political Quarterly</u> Vol. 33.No. 1 (March 1980): pp. 94-107.

Theilmann, John, and Allen Wilhite. "**Campaign Tactics and the Decision to Attack** " <u>The Journal of Politics</u> 60.No. 4 (Nov., 1998).

Thomas, Evan. <u>Election 2004: How Bush Won and what You can Expect in the Future</u>. Public Affairs, 2004.

Thurber, James A. <u>Consultant Surveys Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies Consultant Survey 2002.</u>, 2002.

---. Consultant Surveys Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies Consultant
    Survey 1999.

Thurber, James A., and Candice J. Nelson. Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in
    Elections. Brookings Institute Press, 2000.

Wattenberg, Martin P., and Leonard Brians. "*Negative Campaign Advertising:
    Demobilizer Or Mobilizer?*" American Political Science Review Volume 93.No. 4
    (December 1999).

Wayne, Francis L., and Lawrence W. Kenney. "*Position Shifting in Pursuit of Higher
    Office* ." American Journal of Political Science Vol 40.No. 3 (August 1996).

Wayne, Stephen. The Quest for Office: National Electoral Politics. New York: St.
    Martins Press, 1992.

Weisman, Jonathan. "*Republicans Ramp Up Attacks on Obama's Character*." The
    Washington Post. July 30th, 2008. <http://blog.washingtonpost.com/the-
    trail/2008/07/30/republicans_ramp_up_attacks_ob.html>.

West, Darrell M. Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns, 1952-2004.
    Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005.

Westholm, Anders. "*Distance Versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity
    Theory of Electoral Choice.*" American Political Science Review 91.4 (1997): 865-
    883.

---. "*On the Return of Epicycles: Some Crossroads in Spatial Modeling Revisted*." The
    Journal of Poltics 63.2 (2001): 436-481.

Whitney, Carol. "Chapter 6 Wolves Or Watchdogs?." Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics. Ed. Candice Nelson, David A. Dulio, and Stephen K. Medvic.Brookings Institution, 2002.

Wright, Sharon D. "*The Deracialization Strategy and African American Candidates in Memphis Mayoral Elections.*" Race, Politics and Governance in the United States. Ed. Huey Perry. University Press of Florida, 1996. pp. 151-164.

Wuffle, A., et al. "***Finagle's Law and the Finagle Point, a New Solution Concept for Two-Candidate Competition in Spatial Voting Games without a Core,*** ." American Journal of Political Science Vol. 33.No. 2 (May 1989).