

TRANSATLANIC INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

ANDREA LYNNE DRABOT: Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing and the Fight Against Terrorism (under the Direction of Don Searing)

The 9/11 attacks against the United States shed light on the growing threat of international terrorist networks. Before 9/11, the US and its European allies were ill prepared to deal with the international nature of today's terrorist organizations, which utilize modern technologies such as the internet, advanced communication networks, and social media to finance, plan and execute attacks. Although traditional US-European alliances remain strong, they are unable to adequately combat global terrorism. As a result, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination between the US and Europe has increased significantly since the 9/11 attacks. The US and the EU are developing complex, and sometimes controversial, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism relationships. This paper addresses the dynamic nature of the US-EU counterterrorism and intelligence sharing relationship. In addition to US-EU relations, this paper also addresses the "special" US-UK relationship in relation to intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination in the post 9/11 era.

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List of Abbreviations

ASG	Abu Saayaf Group
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
BRUSA	British-American SIGINT Agreement
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTG	Counter Terrorism Group
DGSE	General Directorate for External Security
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IC	Intelligence Community
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MI5	British Security Services, Military Intelligence 5
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency

ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PNR	Passenger Name Record
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIS/MI6	Secret Intelligence Service/Military Intelligence 6
SitCen	Joint Situation Center
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
TFTS	Terrorist Finance Tracking System
TREVI	Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, et Violence Internationale
UK	United Kingdom
UKUSA	United Kingdom- United States Agreement
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks the United States has combatted terrorism aided by allies in the West. In the wake of the 2001 attacks global terrorist networks have become an area of growing concern for western governments. Historically, the main terrorist threat in Europe has derived from the presence of political, social, and religious groups operating within the borders of a single state. For example, groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque region of Spain have been traditionally viewed as ethnic or nationalist terrorist groups. The IRA, ETA and other similar groups have caused massive damages in their respective countries. In the last 30 years, there have been over 5,000 deaths due to terrorist activities in Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom alone (Lugna 2006, 103). The main target of groups such as the IRA and ETA is usually a single nation, confining terrorist activities within that nation. However, in recent years there has been a growing threat from international terrorist organizations. The 2004 attacks in Madrid highlighted the international nature and structure of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. On July 7, 2005 three bombs tore through the London Underground, followed an hour later by a fourth bomb on a bus. Although preceded by attacks in Madrid, the London “7/7” bombs were the first time Islamist attacks in Europe utilized suicide bombers, marking a grave escalation in both the threat level and damage created from the attacks. The frequency and escalation in the complexity of the attacks solidified the need for Europe to combat international terrorism (Svendson 2010, 39). With the utility and availability of technologies such as the internet, social media, and advanced

communications networks, terrorist organizations exist within a complicated international network which allows them to obtain weapons and supplies, finance their organizations, and recruit new members from all over the globe. To combat these international terrorist organizations, and the attacks they plan, constant investigation and monitoring are necessary.

Although maintaining traditional alliances have been essential to combating terrorism, the pre-9/11 approaches to counterterrorism have proven to be insufficient in combatting emerging and growing terrorist networks. As a result there has been an increasing level of counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing between the US and the European Union. The US and the EU are responding to the challenge of growing global terrorist networks with complex, though sometimes controversial, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing agreements and legislation. The sharing of counterterrorism information and related intelligence has been a hot button topic in negotiations between the US and the EU over the last few years. This paper will address the dynamic and controversial nature of the US-EU counterterrorism and intelligence sharing relationship. Furthermore, I will examine US-UK intelligence sharing “special relationship” that has existed since World War II as a case study of the dynamic nature of the counterterrorism and intelligence sharing relationship between the US and the EU.

9/11, Counterterrorism, and the US Intelligence Machine

The US is no stranger to global terrorism. While its European allies were battling domestic terrorism, such as ETA and IRA, the US was experiencing the beginning of its battle against global terrorist networks. Starting in the late 1970's US embassies and

diplomatic buildings abroad have been the target of terrorist groups. While attacks against US diplomatic buildings have occurred worldwide in response to various US policies, multiple attacks by Islamist groups have occurred in Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and deadly attacks have also been carried out in Kenya, India, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and various other locations. In response to these attacks, and additional threats to national security, the US developed a complex intelligence community designed to monitor, analyze, and act upon threats to the US homeland, and American interests abroad. Despite the efforts of US intelligence agencies, they were unable to stop the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001. As a result, the US launched into what President Bush labeled a “War on Terror.” As a foreshadowing of the decade to come, the US’s 2002 National Security Strategy stated that

“The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.” (The White House 2002, 29).

Since 9/11, and the subsequent National Security Strategy, the US intelligence community has expanded drastically- both domestically and internationally. Perhaps one of the most important changes made to the US intelligence community was the creation of an entirely new division- the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was created through the absorption of all, or part of, 22 different federal departments and agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and parts of the US Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy, creating the complex hierarchy seen in *Table 1* (US Department of

Homeland Security). The DHS's number one purpose is to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce vulnerability to attacks, minimize damage from attacks, and aid in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur (Homeland Security Act 2002, Sec. 101 1A).

Table 1. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart




Image source: Department of Homeland Security: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf>

Although DHS may seem like a comprehensive agency, it is only one of seventeen agencies in the US Intelligence Community (IC). In 2004 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act organized and unified the various agencies under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). As demonstrated in *Table 2* it is easy to see the complexity and reach of the IC. Despite its breadth, the DHS is often overshadowed by its more established and active counterparts such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (Intelligence.gov). All members of the US intelligence community may take actions in regard to specific threats at the request of the President of the United States, and regularly collect and assess information regarding “international terrorist and narcotic activities; other hostile activities by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents; and foreign intelligence activities directed against the United States (U.S.)” (Intelligence.gov).

Table 2. US Intelligence Community Organizational Chart



Image Source: Intelligence.gov: <http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/structure.html>

While the US is unmatched in military spending and has a formidable and seemingly omnipotent intelligence community, it still relies heavily on allies throughout the world. The US had little choice but to respond to 9/11 with drastic actions, such as creating DHS, but many of its allies were slow to address the changing threats of a globalized world. With the ongoing battle against insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US relies on allies that are not only geographically closer to foreign enemies, but have access to intelligence that the US does not through social, political, and historical connections. For this purpose, Europe has been a vital resource for the US intelligence and counterterrorism community.

Past EU Terrorism Policy

Although preceded by the intelligence sharing organization of the Berne Club, the EU's first real policy on terrorism was its 1975 TREVI forum (TREVI forum (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme, et Violence Internationale), which focused on creating an open dialogue between member states. Although there was little need for supranational counterterrorism policy, a forum through which member states could discuss problems and solutions and exchange information regarding terrorism and other international criminal activities such as a drug and weapons trafficking was necessary (Casale 2008, 50). TREVI was the primary method of counterterrorism coordination among member states until 1992, when it was replaced with Pillar 3 of the Maastricht Treaty (Casale 2008, 50).

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty brought significant changes to counterterrorism policy in the EU. The third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty covers areas including immigration and asylum, policing, customs, and legal cooperation among member states. Perhaps the most important counterterrorism institution that came out of the Maastricht Treaty was the creation of the EU's office of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which functions as a forum for monthly meetings for national ministers to discuss policies that facilitate cross-border cooperation law-enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies. A European police force, known as Europol, was also initiated with the Maastricht Treaty. In addition to JHA and Europol, a Working Group on Terrorism and a Counter Terrorism Group were created in 1993 (Casale 2008, 50). However, although there was significant structural change with Maastricht, beyond Europol and several working groups there was very little coordination among EU member states in the realm of counterterrorism. For most member states, the

ability to have control over their internal security and foreign affairs were, and continue to be, an important part of sovereignty. Eventually, the Pillar system of Maastricht was completely replaced by the office of JHA (Lugna 2006, 106).

Post 9/11 Policy Changes in the EU

After the 9/11 attacks in the United States, international terrorism moved to the top of the EU agenda. Although the attack was aimed specifically at the US, the EU recognized that international terrorist groups posed a threat to the free and democratic western world. During a meeting of the European Council on September 21, 2001, the Council stated that “Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe and that the fight against terrorism will be a priority objective of the European Union” (Casale 2008, 51). In addition to the increased awareness that came with the 9/11 attacks, the elimination of many national border controls and creation of common security and defense policies has left the EU vulnerable to a distinct set of threats unique to its circumstances. The “free circulation of goods, capital and people” is a matter of pride for members of the EU. Easing border restrictions served as a catalyst for unprecedented levels of trade and cooperation among EU member states and serves as a force for integration. However, despite the plethora of benefits that reduced border restrictions allows, one negative effect is that open borders and a common currency benefits criminal and terrorist groups as well as law abiding citizens. Organized criminal groups have been able to increase the scale and intensity of their operations with a reduced risk of detection at international borders (Walsh 2010, 90). As a result of the increased levels of general criminal activities there has been a corresponding increase in criminal activities associated with financing terrorism such as trafficking in drugs and people, counterfeit

goods, and the possible transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the EU moved to a single currency it became easier for terrorists, and those supporting terrorist activities, to move funds and launder money for illicit activities. Finally, free movement of people and capital allows easier communication between criminal and terrorist cells, and easier passage between countries to avoid arrest, prosecution, and extradition (Walsh 2010, 90). These challenges, along with the increased awareness of the threat of terrorism, thrust the EU into a rush of new policies and practices for counterterrorism coordination and intelligence sharing.

In addition to recognizing al Qaeda as a common threat, the EU was expected to respond to the 9/11 attacks accordingly- as part of the Coalition of the Willing, as individual members of NATO, and as individual allies to the US. As a result of the threat of terrorism, and the EU's role as an ally to the US, the 2002 Framework Decision was adopted. Whereas it had previously been undefined, the 2002 Framework Decision specifically defines terrorism as a criminal act that is committed with

“the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international organization” (Terrorist Offences 2010).

The 2002 Framework Decision also defined specific acts as terrorist offences such as “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment and training for terrorism; aggravated theft, extortion and falsification of administrative documents with the aim of committing a terrorist offence” (Terrorist Offences 2010). The 2002 Framework Decisions sets standards that require EU members to establish jurisdiction over terrorist offences, establish jurisdiction over indictment and extradition of terrorist offenders in EU or non-EU states, and coordinate prosecution related activities with the aim of centralizing prosecutions in a single

country, even when several member states are involved (Terrorist Offences 2010).

Compared with pre-9/11 EU policy, the 2002 Framework Decision presented broad and sweeping changes to EU policy on terrorism. Previously, each member state had its own definition of terrorism and plan of action to combat terrorist activity within its borders. After the 2002 Framework Decision EU member states had finally begun to truly integrate policy and to work together in defining, investigating, and prosecuting terrorist activity.

Within the EU, there are four main counterterrorism institutions - Europol, Eurojust, The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), and the border control agency Frontex. Combatting terrorism is not the primary goal of any one of these organizations, but crimes related to terrorism fall within their jurisdictions. For example, EMCDDA and Frontex play a crucial role in monitoring and preventing drugs from Central Asia from being trafficked into Eastern Europe. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's 2007 Report, Afghanistan's 2006 opium harvest had an estimated value of \$3.1billion. Just a fraction of the profits from an opium harvest could fund the planning and execution of many terrorist attacks. In fact, during the planning of the 2004 Madrid bombings, drugs were used as currency during the initial planning stages (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013). Each of these agencies is vital to combatting terrorism within the EU, and one of the first changes the EU made immediately after 9/11 was provide more funding to Europol so that it could set up a counterterrorism task force. Together, EMCDDA, Frontex, Europol, and Eurojust cover the bulk of EU counterterrorism strategy. However, despite their vital and irreplaceable tasks, like all other EU institutions they rely on

voluntary cooperation and coordination between member states. Thus, there are few repercussions for non-compliance.

Another major institution through which member states share intelligence and counterterrorism information is the Joint Situation Center (SitCen), which was established in 2002. SitCen is based in Brussels, and is staffed with over 100 people including approximately 20 analysts. SitCen operates 24/7 to monitor and assess global events and situations, focusing on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation. Not all member states participate in SitCen, though all receive the intelligence reports it generates. Formally, SitCen does not participate in operations or policy formation but it collects and analyzes the intelligence it receives from member states. Although the specifics are not public, SitCen is known to receive information from French, German and Italian spy satellites, diplomatic reports, US commercial satellite imagery, and open sources such as internet chat rooms, media, and on the ground reports (Davis Cross 2011, 5). SitCen is an excellent example of member states successfully coming together to share intelligence through formal EU structures. Although SitCen has no formal legal status and participation is voluntary, many scholars have suggested that the SitCen could eventually be transformed into a single EU intelligence service mirroring the CIA (Davis Cross 2011, 4). While this notion is both controversial and unlikely in the near future, it presents an interesting perspective on the future of EU counterterrorism strategies.

In addition to the aforementioned policies, the EU issued the European Security Strategy (ESS) - *A Secure Europe in a Better World* in 2003. The ESS labels Europe as both a target and a base for international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. The ESS offers

several initiatives for increasing the international security of the EU by emphasizing the importance of the EU's participation in multi-lateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the importance of the relationships between the EU and the US, and the role that international trade plays in maintaining positive relationships with allies. In doing so, ESS also recognizes the connection between the illicit trade markets for drugs, weapons, and human trafficking and the roles they play in funding terrorism (European Security Strategy 2003). Much like SitCen, ESS provides an example of the EU offering suggestions and options for coordination among the member states in the realm of counterterrorism rather than actual enforceable policy or integration.

Although there was progress in counterterrorism strategy in the EU in the immediate post 9/11 era, it was not sufficient enough to prevent further attacks. On March 11, 2004 four commuter trains exploded in Madrid in coordinated attacks. Ten backpack bombs, spread over four crowded trains, killed 191 people and injured an additional 1,800. Spanish investigators originally suspected its known domestic enemy, the Basque separatist movement, ETA. However, ETA denied responsibility for the bombings, and ongoing investigations produced evidence pointing towards radical Islamist groups. The group al Qaeda in Europe later claimed credit for highly coordinated attacks. By the time Spanish police tracked down the specific source of the bombs almost a month had passed. As the seven bombing suspects were surrounded by Spanish police, they blew up their apartment, killing themselves and a nearby Special Forces soldier. By mid-April, 29 people were indicted over the attacks. The suspects were from five different countries - 15 Moroccans,

nine Spaniards, two Syrians, one Algerian, and one Lebanese (Associated Press 2007). As previously mentioned, drugs were used as currency in the planning of the Madrid train attacks. This fact, and the international origins of the attack suspects, highlights the failures of the EU's counterterrorism policy. In response, EU adopted the European Action Plan. The EU Action Plan identifies measures such as joint investigation teams, routine exchange of counterterrorism information between member states and establishes strategic objectives for combating and preventing terrorism (Casale 2008, 52). Its purpose is to address the international nature of terrorism with an expansive and international approach- targeting not only the execution of terrorist attacks, but their planning and financing as well. Unfortunately, however comprehensive and seemingly applicable the measures of the EU Action Plan are, its purpose is merely to identify measures and objectives, and it does not create policy through which the EU can take real counterterrorism action. It wasn't until 2005 after the London 7/7 bombings that several of the EU Action Plan initiatives were acted upon and a European Arrest Warrant was created. Additionally, the border controls under the Schengen agreement were reviewed and revised, biometric data was added to EU passports, and trade restrictions on hazardous materials were strengthened (Casale 2008, 53).

Later in 2005, yet another EU counter-terrorism initiative was passed, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The main goals of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy are to *protect* EU citizens, *prevent* terrorist attacks and the recruitment of EU citizens by terrorist groups, *pursue* and prosecute those involved in terrorist activities, and to prepare for and *respond* to terrorist attacks to minimize damages. Within the four main objectives of the EU Counter-

Terrorism Strategy, more than 200 separate measures for meeting these goals are identified (Casale 2008, 53).

Table 3 details the history of counterterrorist and intelligence sharing policy within the EU, both before and after the 9/11 attacks. As briefly discussed above, the post 9/11 policies and practices enacted provide a more stable basis from which EU member states can actually operate and act upon counterterrorism initiatives, rather than simply creating a forum for communication between states. 9/11, and the attacks in Madrid and London, led to more actionable practices between EU members.

Table 3. Major EU Counterterrorism and Intelligence Structures and Policies

Year	Name	Purpose
1971	Club of Berne	Forum for communication between EU member states' security and intelligence services, plus Norway and Switzerland, meets on a regular basis to discuss intelligence and security matters. The Berne group has no formal charter and operates outside the jurisdiction of the EU. There is no formal commitment or expectation to share relevant intelligence with members (Walsh 2006, 631, Federal Office of Police 2004).
1975	TREVI	Created a forum through which member states could discuss problems and solutions and exchange information regarding terrorism and other international criminal activities such as a drug and weapon trafficking (Lugna 2006, 105).
1992	Maastricht Treaty/ Justice and Home Affairs	Created a forum and monthly meetings for terrorism discussions, created Europol and Working Groups on Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Casale 2008, 50).

1993	EMCDDA	European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction was first created to provide EU members with a factual overview of European drug problems, now it also provides information about drug trafficking information in relation to financing of terrorist activities (EMCDDA 2010).
1995	Europol	European Police force priorities include: illegal trafficking in drugs, human beings and vehicles; illegal immigration; terrorism; and forgery, money-laundering and cybercrime that cross national borders. Europol's objective is to improve intelligence sharing in regards to these matters, rather than engaging in directly in security, intelligence, and counterterrorism operations (Walsh 2006, 632).
2001	EU Military Staff	Contains an intelligence division of about 30 people who are responsible for early warning, assessment and operational support on external security matters including terrorism. Reports to the Military Committee, the High Representative for foreign policy and other EU bodies with risk assessments (European Union 2006).
2002	Framework Decision	Specifically defined terrorism and defined acts that facilitate or promote terrorism as crimes eligible for prosecution (Terrorist Offences 2010).
2002	Joint Situation Center	Created to monitor and assess events and global situations 24/7, focuses on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation. The Joint Situation Center has no formal legal status, member states participate voluntarily (Davis Cross 2011, 2).
2002	Eurojust	Facilitates coordination of investigations, prosecutions and extraditions between member states concerning cross border crimes, including terrorist activities (European Union 2012).
2003	European Security Strategy	Recognized Europe as a base for and target of terrorist activity, emphasized relationships with international organizations (UN, WTO), recognized the crime-terror nexus, offered suggestions for coordination among member states (European Security Strategy 2003).
2003	Counter Terrorism Group (CTG)	Part of the Club de Berne, EU member States and the US produce and share common threat assessments between the membership and with some EU committees (Van Buuren 2009).

2004	Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, main goal is to reinforce and streamline coordination between national border authorities. Frontex often assists in tracking illicit criminal activities such as drug and/or human trafficking as well as terrorist activities (Frontex 2012).
2004	European Action Plan	Goals included: Deepened international consensus on measures to combat terrorism, reduction of terrorist financing, maximize members' abilities to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks, identifies measures and objectives which the EU and the international community can act upon to reduce the risk of terrorism (Casale 2008, 52).
2005	EU Counter terrorism Strategy	Focused on the EU's ability to protect, prevent, pursue, and respond to terrorist activities and attacks, identified over 200 measures to enable meeting aforementioned goals (Casale 2008, 53).

US-EU Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing Policy and Practice

As demonstrated above in *Table 3*, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing within the EU consists of a complex web of policies and institutions that are meant to facilitate greater cooperation between the member states. However, even with official common policies on security and defense, these institutions merely facilitate coordination and do not necessarily make intelligence sharing mandatory. None of the institutions listed *Table 3* dictate what kind and how much intelligence member states are required to share with each other or enforce counterterrorism coordination. None have mechanisms for enforcing intelligence sharing, and none have ways through which to punish a lack of sharing or the sharing of incorrect or biased intelligence (Walsh 2010, 97). As with most EU policies, the ability of member states to control their own counterterrorism and intelligence is a grave matter of sovereignty. That being said, many states within the EU seek external intelligence relationships and participate in bilateral agreements with the US. As with member states

within the EU, states coordinating intelligence activities with the US must carefully weigh the pros and cons of tying their intelligence services to another state. Participating states must carefully decide what information to share, and what intelligence must remain confidential. Furthermore, when participating in coordination or exchange of intelligence, both within the EU and elsewhere, states accept that their counterparts may not abide by the same standards of quality control, security standards, or human rights conventions. Additionally, some states invest more heavily in intelligence and counterterrorism actions than others, bringing the question of burden sharing to light (Walsh 2010, 90). These tensions have routinely risen to the surface during EU intelligence sharing operations as well as in trans-Atlantic relationships between EU states and the US. Despite these issues, the US and EU states cannot ignore the enormous benefits they receive from transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination.

The US and EU member states have long been bound together by trade agreements and military alliances. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London brought the threat of international Islamic terrorism into the spotlight. As the ESS highlighted, Europe was not only a target of terrorist activities, but it also served as a base for the strategic planning of terrorist activities. After the 9/11 attacks, European law enforcement tracked down suspects in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain who were involved in the planning of the attacks (Archick 2012, 2). As a new era of global threats and terrorism became more apparent the US, the EU, and individual member states significantly increased their levels of intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation and coordination. While the majority of the details of policies for intelligence sharing between

the US and the Europe remain classified and therefore unavailable to the public, the increase in intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination has been publicly acknowledged by government officials and well documented in the media. In his testimony before the Senate Joint Intelligence Committee Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that

“Probably the most dramatic improvement in our intelligence collection and sharing has come in bilateral cooperation with other nations – those we considered friendly before 9/11, and some we considered less friendly. This is a marked change, and one that I believe results not just from collective revulsion at the nature of the attacks, but also the common recognition that such groups present a risk to any nation with an investment in the rule of law” (Armitage 2002)

While many of the details and specifics of intelligence sharing remain classified, the official acknowledgement of cooperation represents a distinct increase in the level of intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination between the US and the EU. Foreign intelligence services in Britain, France and Germany, along with several smaller states, regularly collect and share information with the US. With colonial ties in South Asia, Africa, and ties with the Arab world, the British and French intelligence services have a distinct advantage over US intelligence agencies in collecting intelligence regarding Islamic terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. In return, the US exchanges information and intelligence from other parts of the world (Walsh 2010, 115). Since 9/11 the coordination between American and European intelligence services has steadily increased, despite hotly contested political debates such as opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Walsh 2010, 11). Although the US often establishes a hierarchy and control over intelligence sharing in bilateral relationships, it has yet to do so with its European bilateral relationships. The common interests, history of successful coordination, and built up trust between American

and European intelligence agencies has left them on essentially equal footing and operating bilaterally as needed (Walsh 2010, 115).

The level of contact and communication between US and EU officials regarding police, judicial, and border control policy as significantly increased since 9/11 (Archick 2012, 18). Coordination that has traditionally been bilateral has shifted towards multilateral and new dialogues between law enforcement and security agencies have opened. There have been numerous developments in the realm of US-EU intelligence and counterterrorism agreements, including information sharing agreements between EU and US police and judicial bodies, two treaties on extradition and legal assistance, and accords regarding maritime security and airline data, including Passenger Name Records (PNR) (Archick 2012, 19).

In 2001 and 2002 new agreements legalized strategic information sharing between US law enforcement agencies and Europol. With these new accords, US law enforcement and Europol can now share strategic information such as tips on threats, criminal patterns, statistics and risk assessments as well as personal information which was previously unavailable, such as names, addresses, and criminal records. Negotiations for the exchange of personal information provided a distinct challenge, as many European states view the right to privacy of personal information as a human right. However, an agreement was eventually reached and now the US and EU share personal information, including PNRs. Personal data is not transferred on a bulk scale, but rather on an as needed basis. The accords on information sharing between Europol and US law enforcement were later followed in 2007 by agreements on common standards for the security of classified information. Once these

arrangements and agreements had been made, the US and EU then moved forward towards two new treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance in 2010 (Archick 2012, 4). By clarifying and simplifying legal proceedings, the US and EU have made it easier to share information, protect classified information, and track and investigate terrorist suspects. When the suspects have been apprehended, new US-EU arrangements facilitate legal proceedings including the extradition process and prosecution. Through these arrangements the US and EU have raised the bar on the quality and efficacy of international intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. With greater levels of transatlantic cooperation, combatting terrorism and international crimes such as drug trafficking and financial fraud is streamlined (Archick 2012, 4).

Since 2001 the US and EU have worked together a great deal in harmonizing their lists of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). Currently, the US Department of State has over 50 groups formally recognized as terrorist organizations on its Foreign Terrorist organization list. By naming and recognizing these groups as terrorist organizations the US hopes to 1) curb the financing of terrorism 2) stigmatize and isolates the groups internationally 3) deter donations, contributions and financial transactions with the named organization 4) heighten public awareness of the organization and 5) signal foreign governments about the named organization (US Department of State 2012). According to EU laws, all EU member states must freeze the assets of organizations listed and ensure that supporting financial resources are cut off. Harmonizing the list of FTOs allows the US and EU to combat terrorist threats deriving from these organizations more effectively and in unison (Archick 2012, 5). While the US and EU are in agreement on the majority of organizations listed as “terrorist,” there

are several notable exceptions, including Lebanese based Hezbollah and Hamas related charities (Archick 2012, 5). Although the differences in groups named on the FTO list persist, US and EU regularly communicate and work together on combatting and disrupting listed terrorist groups and networks.

In addition to the aforementioned coordination and cooperation between the US and EU, a controversy erupted in 2006 when it was revealed that the US had been granted access to data in the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, known as SWIFT. SWIFT serves as a medium through which banks and various other financial institutions worldwide exchange messages regarding financial transactions, which often contain sensitive information. After 9/11, SWIFT managers had covertly granted the US access to secretly exchanged messages regarding worldwide financial transfers. US access to SWIFT was eventually exposed. After a fair amount of public uproar, the EU and Belgian governments ruled that the US's access to SWIFT violated privacy laws. Although it is likely that most EU governments were aware of message sharing between SWIFT and the US, most recognized its importance in disrupting the finances of terrorist and organized crime networks and therefore allowed it to continue. However, after it was made public they had no choice but to demand concrete legislation and specific regulations on what information could legally be shared. Following its public exposure the US and EU took steps to place the US-SWIFT Accord on secure legal footing (Walsh 2010, 118). A series of negotiations occurred between 2006 and 2010, when the European Parliament approved the most recent form of the agreement. As part of the new arrangement the US pledged to support the EU should it develop its own terrorist finance tracking program and agreed to

possible renegotiations of the US-SWIFT Accord in the future. Since then, the EU has taken steps towards creating a European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS) with the main objectives of limiting data transferred to the US under the SWIFT Accord, and stemming terrorist financing worldwide (Archick 2012, 8). Thus far, both the US and EU have benefitted immensely from the US-SWIFT Accord, as more than 1,550 leads regarding terrorist financial activity have been shared and investigated (Archick 2012, 5)

The intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination between the US and EU has increased steadily since 9/11. In 2004 US and the EU signed and adopted a joint “Declaration on Counterterrorism” which aims to deepen preexisting counterterrorism and intelligence sharing relationships between the US and EU member states. In President Obama’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism he asserted the importance of bilateral relationships with European states, and with European governing bodies, in maintaining mutual security and protecting the citizens of all nations (Archick 2012, 3). Although the collaboration between the US and EU is impressive and rapidly deepening, there are many critics of US-EU collaboration. Although the list of common policies and practices is growing daily it must be noted that, as with many EU institutions, Europol and other EU counterterrorism and intelligence mechanisms lack enforcement capabilities. EU counterterrorism institutions rely on the participation of member states and their respective national services. As Belgian Justice Minister Laurette Onkelink phrased it,

“there are informal intelligence exchanges at the European level, both bilateral- between two states exchanging intelligence from several countries- and among all the members of what we call the Club of Berne. But this is all informal, there is no obligation, for example, to provide intelligence to a fellow member, there is no obligation to deal with such intelligence at the European level.” (“EU Intelligence

Sharing Must Be Mandatory”, BBC Monitoring Service, as quoted in Walsh 2010, 99)

Additionally, some EU members have complained that while they share information with EU institutions, and therefore with 26 other member states and the US, the US does not always readily hand over its intelligence. While EU states are essentially normatively bound to sharing with each other within the confines of the EU, the US can readily withhold intelligence and information as it sees fit (Archick 2012, 5). However, regardless of what intelligence sharing occurs within the boundaries of governing EU bodies, the US maintains a high level of bilateral relationships with European states that are outside the bounds of EU institutions.

Although there are not many specific details on what and how intelligence is shared, transatlantic intelligence sharing has become so routine that the CIA and FBI have several European liaison offices, and the US has access to law enforcement and intelligence data and analysis collected by Europol. The transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism relationship deepens even further upon delving into the NATO alliance and operational abilities (Walsh 2010, 115). In numerous cases, transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination has foiled active terrorist plots and led to the arrest of both terrorists and their enablers. For example, in 2006 British authorities discovered a plan to blow up transatlantic flights between the UK and the US. All 24 arrested on terrorism charges surrounding the plot were British born men with ties to al Qaeda. British intelligence, in coordination with the FBI, then pursued additional leads within Europe and the US (Cowell and Filkins 2006). In 2007 US intelligence services intercepted phone calls

and emails from a terrorist cell planning an attack in Germany. Using emails and phone calls between Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan US intelligence agencies tipped off German intelligence services and law enforcement of the plot (Schmitt 2007).

Perhaps one of the most complex and effective examples of transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination is the existence of the Alliance Base in Paris. As early as 2002, a top secret facility in Paris called Alliance Base was set up by the French intelligence agency General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) and the CIA (Baylis and Roper 2006, 134). The primary function of the Alliance Base is to analyze the movement of terrorist suspects and to plan and execute operations to spy on and capture them (Priest 2005, 1). Although the base is predominately funded by the CIA it has officers from Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the US. In order to downplay the CIA's financier role and encourage cooperation between the various intelligence offices the spoken language at Alliance Base is French, rather than English. (Priest 2005, 2) In addition to its international nature Alliance Base is extraordinarily unique because it not only serves as a way to share intelligence, but because the case officers working there plan and *execute* operations. As Dana Priest states,

“Alliance Base demonstrates how most counterterrorism operations actually take place: through secretive alliances between the CIA and other countries' intelligence services. This is not the work of large army formations, or even small special forces teams, but of handfuls of U.S. intelligence case officers working with handfuls of foreign operatives, often in tentative arrangements.” (Priest 2005, 1)

In keeping with Alliance Base's tradition of cooperation, cases are chosen carefully and each operation has a “lead country” whose intelligence service takes the lead in the current operation (Priest 2005, 2).

In addition to hosting the Alliance Base, France has stepped up its aggressive counterterrorism role in the post-9/11 era and has played an integral part in US counterterrorist operations abroad. The French Justice Department has extensive powers, and intelligence sharing among government sectors is highly encouraged. Anti-terrorism units can legally detain people suspected of “conspiracy in relation to terrorism” before official charges are filed and while evidence against them is gathered (Priest 2005, 2). Jean-Louis Brugiere, a top anti-terrorism magistrate, has regularly coordinated with US authorities to arrest terrorist suspects and has publicly stated “I have good connections with the CIA and FBI,” (Priest 2005, 2). France’s aggressive counterterrorism tactics do not stop with the Justice Department. France has coordinated with the US and other European intelligence agencies to lure terrorist suspects into its sovereign territory so they can be arrested. Most notably, an operation out of Alliance Base lured German Islam convert and al Qaeda operative Christian Ganczarski into Paris for a layover on a trip to Germany. French authorities, in coordination with the CIA, whisked him into custody (Priest 2005, 1). Additionally, despite the international controversy surrounding Guantanamo Bay, France has previously sent interrogators to interrogate detained French citizens. In several cases, French authorities continued to detain prisoners from Guantanamo Bay when they were turned over to French custody. France also allowed the CIA to launch its controversial Predator Drone from French territory in order to kill al Qaeda operatives living in the Djibouti. While France’s aggressive behavior may seem somewhat at odds with French public opinion, it has long practiced extensive intelligence sharing with its western allies. After a failed 1994 plot to crash a plane into the Eiffel Tower, then President Jacques Chirac made clear that he viewed jihadist campaigns as a threat to Western civilization and French intelligence services

were instructed to share terrorism information with the US “as if they were your own service” (Baylis and Roper 2006, 134). France’s intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination has aided the US in making some of its biggest arrests, including Ahmed Ressam, who was attempting to blow up Los Angeles International Airport, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person in the US to have pleaded guilty to aiding in the 9/11 attacks (Priest 2005, 3).

Although many European governments have publicly criticized the war in Iraq, declassified reports reveal that the US’s decision to wage war in Iraq was based on intelligence from German source named Rafid Ahmen Alwan, also known as Curveball. Curveball provided evidence that Saddam Hussein was in the possession of, and in the process of making more, WMDs. According to a 2005 report to the President of the US by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction “Virtually all of the Intelligence Community’s information on Iraq’s alleged mobile biological weapons facilities was supplied by a source, code- named “Curveball” (Silberman et al. 2005, 48). The German intelligence service, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), made it clear that there were numerous reasons why intelligence from Curveball was considered risky. Although Curveball’s intelligence proved to be devastatingly faulty, it is representative of the complex intelligence sharing between the US and Germany. Ultimately, a German source was key to a major a US foreign policy decision. Despite the fact that he provided faulty intelligence, Curveball highlights the intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Germany. Intelligence from a German source was passed smoothly to the US intelligence community, and that intelligence helped formulate the US’s major foreign policy decision to invade Iraq.

In addition to the traditional military powers of Great Britain, France, and Germany, smaller and newly accepted EU members have played key roles in transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have transformed from mere struggling Soviet States to functioning members of NATO and the EU. By taking active roles in world and regional politics smaller states are also responsible for global intelligence coordination and cooperation with allies in NATO and the EU. Although these small states may not have the intelligence infrastructure of their larger European neighbors, they have played a complicated but vital role in the transatlantic intelligence and counterterrorism relationship. Numerous European countries played an active part in the US's controversial and much disliked rendition program. The UK, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Denmark and Italy aided the rendition program by allowing CIA rendition operations to utilize airports or pass through sovereign air space, participating in interrogations or torture of prisoners, or assisted in or allowed renditions to take place within their sovereign territory. Involvement in the US's rendition program goes even deeper for Poland, Lithuania and Romania, which all hosted secret CIA prisons and detention centers (Open Society Foundations 2013, 61-119). The CIA's rendition program is under intense fire from the international human rights community. However, regardless of legality, these actions are highly demonstrative of the increased intensity and frequency of transatlantic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination between the US and member states of the EU.

The Evolving US-UK Special Relationship

In addition to the rest of the average US-European bilateral relationships, one of the longest standing and most well-known intelligence sharing and counterterrorism relationships in the world is between the US and the UK. Rooted in the US's entrance into World War II, Churchill and Roosevelt began cultivating a relationship that would last through the war and into the reconstruction of Europe. As an odd foreshadowing of the US-UK relationship that continues to deepen and grow more than 60 years later, Churchill once privately stated that "No lover ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt" (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 264). As American troops withdrew from their European posts, and the world entered into the beginning stages of the Cold War, Churchill called for a revival of the US-UK relationship that began during the battles of World War II. In a 1946 speech in Missouri, Churchill

"Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States ... Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers ... It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world." (Churchill 1946)

As Churchill so eloquently explained, the US and English speaking nations of the British Commonwealth were nations with common interests, values and goals the US and UK together could begin to secure an everlasting peace. After the 1946 speech, the US and UK nailed down their special relationship in the form of the UKUSA Agreement, which also includes the British Empire states- Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (also known as Five Eyes) (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 265). After Britain took the lead in negotiating

sovereignty for West Germany it fortified its place as the US's most important ally (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 265).

The special UKUSA relationship was heavily tested in its early years, through the UK's economic struggles, the creation of the European Economic Community, and a shift in US foreign policy to a focus on East Asia. However, the relationship persisted and the substructure of the UKUSA Agreement remained in place (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 266). Ties between the UK and US moved closer during yet another war, the first Gulf War, when Britain provided a higher level of support for the US than any other European nation. In fact, the British have led Europe in wooing American favor and maintaining the special UKUSA relationship by throwing support behind the first Gulf war, the intervention in Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Throughout this period, British military staff continued to reiterate the importance of maintaining the special relationship with the US. During 1990's the US began to focus on jihadist terrorism, and the UK was dealing with the IRA in Northern Ireland. Although their target groups were different, the US and UK found unique ways to work together for mutual benefits. The FBI monitored and reported on Irish-Americans suspected of providing financial support to the Real IRA, and the UK passed along 30 years of counterterrorism experience and advice on dealing with terrorism to US organizations (Svendson 2010, 48). A 2003 British White Paper outlined the importance of maintaining the special UKUSA relationship to British military forces.

“The significant military contribution the UK is able to make to [US-led coalition operations] means that we secure an effective place in the political and military decision-making processes. To exploit this effectively, our Armed Forces will need to be interoperable with US command and control structures, match the US operational tempo and provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating alongside the US.” (*Delivering security in a changing world: defence white paper*,

Cm. 6041-I (London: SO, Dec. 2003), 8. as quoted in -Wallace and Phillips 2009 277).

One of the most important and lasting creations of the initial stages of the UKUSA Agreement is the practice of sharing signals intelligence (SIGINT). What started as the British-American SIGINT Agreement (BRUSA) during the World War II era as a collaboration to intercept, decode, and analyze German and Japanese electronic communications has evolved over the decades into a modern day “spy network” known as Echelon (Rudner 2004, 571). Although Echelon is not formally recognized by participating governments, it is known to consist of an advanced network of electronic spy stations that eavesdrop on electronic communication such as phones, computers, faxes and satellites. Based at Fort Meade in Maryland, Echelon also has a headquarter office in Cheltenham, England (Perrone 2001). Echelon, a modern epitome of “intelligence sharing” has come under fire several times from the European Parliament as an invasion of the privacy of ordinary citizens. However, the Echelon system, which is not formally recognized by any of the participating governments, remains primarily unchanged (Perrone 2001). The participating governments effectively diffuse the accusations of the European Parliament by denying Echelon’s existence. Almost like a common internet search engine, to use Echelon, a user requests data within the network by entering keywords and the information is transmitted to the requester. Although it seems simple enough, Echelon was created before most of the world had internet access, and the ability to search for and request specific information was revolutionary. With millions, perhaps billions, of emails being sent every day and new technologies such as video chat systems and social networks, Echelon is

struggling to keep up with modern technology and avoid an “information overload” (Svendsen 2010, 14).

On a similarly large scale, the US and UK share a large amount of open source intelligence (OSINT). In fact, majority of intelligence shared between the US and UK is OSINT. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and CIA’s information broadcasting branch, along with a large number of private organizations, constantly monitor and translate foreign media and news sources (Svendson 2010, 19). Given the aforementioned colonial ties between the UK and its commonwealth and former colonies, OSINT is vital to US intelligence agencies for the large volume of translated intelligence it provides. As an interesting and more international side note, both the US and UK contribute to the International Open Source Working Group with more than 160 countries including Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Israel, Australia, Norway, France, and Belgium. Through the International Open Source Working Group an enormous amount of open source intelligence, translated into more than 80 languages, is organized quite simply, through an online portal- opensource.gov, which is managed by the US intelligence community (Svendson 2010, 20).

While SIGINT and OSINT represents a high volume of intelligence transfer between the US and the UK, as well as the Five Eyes, human intelligence HUMINT represents a more guarded exchange of intelligence on a significantly smaller scale. Whereas SIGINT includes the Commonwealth, HUMINT exchanges are almost exclusively on a case by case basis between select individuals working the US’s CIA and the UK’s Secretive Intelligence

Service (SIS/MI6). Although HUMINT sharing occurs on a smaller scale, it is recognized that although there is a low volume of intelligence, it is generally considered to have an extremely high value (Svendson 2010, 15).

Significant levels of cooperation and coordination have also occurred between US and UK law enforcement agencies. In 2006 the UK formally launched its Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), dubbed the “British FBI.” As a combination of the UK National Crime Squad, National Criminal Intelligence Service, and Her Majesty’s Customs and Home Office Immigration Service, SOCA is a “single UK agency with which the various US agencies can liaise” (Svendson 2010, 20). Cooperation also occurs regularly between various other law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, British Security Services (MI5), US and UK customs agencies and port authorities, and US and UK police forces (Svendson 2010, 21).

Despite the in depth coordination between the US and UK, it is not without its tensions. Given the enormity of the US military and intelligence machine, its budget and technological developments, maintaining close ties affords the British military access to US technologies. Although operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have dangerously overstretched UK budgets, the benefits of such coordination with the US are tenfold. British civilian forces have access to US defense planning, Ministry of Defense teams have played active roles in developing the US’s defense reviews and strategies, and the British have maintained positions at the US Central Command in Afghanistan, US Naval headquarters in Norfolk Virginia, as well as positions in many US research and development projects. The British are

also the sole “Level One” partners in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and the largest foreign investors and beneficiaries in the US Defense industry (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 268).

In addition to budgetary restrictions, the UK has competition in maintaining a place as an American ally. Although the UK has long been a trusted ally, it is not alone. In recent years the US has propagated its relationships with allies that are geographically and politically closer to its jihadist enemies such as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines. The US has had a relationship with Saudi Arabia based on the mutual interests of oil production and the containment of communism. Although the rise of al Qaeda activity in Saudi Arabia has produced extreme strain on the relationship, Saudi Arabia continues to be a vital ally to the US in the Middle East. President Obama has emphasized the increasing importance of an alliance with Saudi Arabia, and signaled engagement with Saudi Arabia as a strategic ally. In 2010, Saudi Arabia arrested over 110 people suspected of al Qaeda activities. Additional, energy exports have strengthened Saudi Arabia’s global position, making them a vital ally against Iran (Blanchard 2010, 3).

The Philippines have been a vital resource for the US, even allowing the US to use Philippine as a base for military operations and to provide support for US operations throughout Asia (Lum 2012, 14). As a base for violent South East Asian Islamist organizations such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front the Philippines have taken part in joint operations with the US and reduced the size and scale of these organizations (Lum 2012, 15). In addition to Saudi Arabia and the

Philippines, the US also maintains delicate but highly valuable alliances with Malaysia, Russia, and Pakistan (Steinberg 2002, 5). With allies in the Middle East and Asia, the UK becomes less important as a US ally. The US no longer relies solely on UK and Five Eyes as strategic allies and competition from nations such as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines effectively dilute the “specialness” of the UKUSA relationship.

The UKUSA special relationship does not end with generic military and intelligence support. After the 2006 Mutual Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes the UK was granted access to US warhead designs, has access to over 50 missiles held at the US Strategic Weapons Facility at King’s Bay, Georgia (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 269). To tally up the benefits, the UK has gained exclusive access to US technology, nuclear designs, and US missiles at enormously discounted rates (Wallace and Phillips 2009, 270). However when examining the UK-US special relationship it becomes glaringly apparent that the UK depends on the special relationship for security and defense cooperation more than the US. The US intelligence machine dwarfs the UK’s, with a greater number of organizations, employees, and resources. Although the UK arguable benefits *more* from the relationship, both definitely benefit from the relationship. The US gains a strong European ally, support on international missions, and a firm ally in the EU and the UN, and the UK gains access vital defense resources such as new technologies and advanced weaponry. Although the US continues to propagate allies throughout the world, the value of the UK as a strategic ally is still far greater than any new ally. Over the years the UK-US alliance has continued to deepen exponentially. In fact, some have argued that it has become difficult to determine what intelligence comes from the US, and what

comes from the UK. While this creates democratic obstacles, such as the ability to hold intelligence activities to account, the increasing intensity of the relationship is unquestionable (Svendson 210, 31).

Conclusions

Since 9/11 the world has drastically changed. Technology and globalization have been driving factors in the modernization of society, as well as the growth of terrorism. The pre-9/11 approaches to combatting terrorism, both in the US and abroad, were insufficient to handle the emergence and growth of international terrorist networks. As a result, both the US and its Western allies have made sweeping changes. Although some methods are controversial, such as the sharing of personal information, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing arrangements in and between the US and the EU have increased tenfold to meet the challenges of modern terrorism. As former Director of MI5 Stella Rimington stated:

“Secret services are not usually associated with cooperation and sharing. It sounds like a contradiction. But in a world where the threats get more sophisticated and more global, the intelligence task gets more difficult, and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital and grows ever closer” (Rimington 2002, 205)

This sentiment is echoed both in secretive practice and in public by notable figures such as Robert Mueller, former director of the FBI, who stated that “In this era of globalization, working side-by-side is not just the best option, it is the only option” (Mueller 2005). Despite the political tensions and the numerous other obstacles that strain the relationship between US and its European allies, the dynamic nature of intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination has become a complex and integral part of today’s transatlantic relationship.

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