

BEST LAID PLANS: THE IMPACT OF POWER SHARING AND EXTERNAL
SUPPORT ON SEPARATIST VIOLENCE

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ABSTRACT

LUCIA BIRD: Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Power Sharing and External Support on Separatist Violence
(Under the direction of Navin Bapat.)

Secessionist movements, when they resort to violence, can undermine the stability and threaten the security of states. Institutional designs, like power sharing, that mitigate issues associated with secessionism may be instrumental for states that contain potentially violent separatist groups. Strategies to share power include regional autonomy, which diffuses power to local levels, and complex power sharing, which centralizes power among elites at the national level. Support from external actors may prompt or further enable violent rebellious activity from separatist groups, thus derailing the potentially pacifying effects of these power sharing institutions. While past work has considered the impact of secessionist activity on governance and foreign actors' roles in intrastate conflict, this paper considers how these internal and external factors converge to influence rebellion. I contend that secessionist activity is incited by both regional autonomy and complex power sharing, especially when foreign support is involved. To test these propositions, I employ quantitative methods, specifically logistic regression. I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interactions of political institutions with outside aid and secession, which provides evidence for my theoretical propositions.

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Introduction

In early 2015, Crimean residents of eastern Ukraine overwhelmingly voted in favor of a referendum to secede and join Russia. Demonstrations eventually culminated in Crimean separatists' declaration of independence from Ukraine and armed conflict between pro-Russian separatist groups and the Ukrainian military (BBC 2014). After the fall of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence, the central government of Ukraine granted Crimea significant measures of autonomy in 1991 (Taylor 2014). Additionally, although scholarly and policy debate regarding the relationship between Crimean rebels and the Russian state continues, allegations of outside support from Russia to Ukrainian rebels operating in Crimea remain. This recent episode, which includes (likely) externally supported separatists operating under a particular political institution designed to alleviate problems within divided societies, illustrates the puzzle motivating this paper.

Theoretically, states have unchallenged sovereignty within their territory. Borrowing from Weber, this suggests that, at a minimum, the government controls the use of armed force within the legal boundaries of the state (1919). In reality, however, such sovereignty is not always respected or maintained. Specifically, internal threats to sovereignty arise from violent non-state actors that aim to reshape traditional national boundaries and shift some amount of territory away from the central government and to the group itself or some other state.

Separatists have a few options through which to achieve their goals, one of which is to violently challenge the government. Two factors are likely to influence whether the group employs violence in their rebellion efforts. First, the state with the separatist group can enact various power sharing options to maintain societal peace in a territory. Second, external support to groups interested in secession may disrupt the peaceful societal equilibrium established by the power sharing institutions in the state. These two factors will affect whether

separatists opt to violently rebel.

Two power sharing institutional models that governments may enact to face the threat of secession include regional autonomy and complex power sharing. Past scholars in this vein have considered the relationship between secession and power sharing arrangements, but not specifically the impact of outside support and power sharing on outbreak of violence. For example, Horowitz considers federalism in the Swiss context and finds that this form of government is effective at reducing ethnic conflict (1985). Lijphart argues that India under consociationalism was less violent, and conflict between societal groups increased as the mechanisms to share power were undermined (1996). Conversely, Wilkinson directly contradicts this claim by arguing that when violence levels were lower, India's governmental structure was not consociational (2000). As India has become increasingly a consociational government, violence levels have actually increased (Wilkinson 2000). Thus, in addition to failing to agree on which type of power sharing arrangement incites or depresses intrastate violence, scholars have failed to take into account the role of international actors in sparking violent rebellion by separatists involved in such political institutions. So, this paper is motivated by an academically interesting and policy relevant question: when can outside support disrupt the societal equilibrium created by state institutions and trigger intrastate conflict?

Power Sharing Options for the State

Two strategies that states can employ to maintain sovereignty in societies with multiple social groups are repression or co-optation of the group into the polity. Co-optation into the polity requires designing political institutions aimed at pacifying groups that might potentially opt to secede. A government interested in maintaining the territorial and demographic composition of the state can forge a social contract to implement power sharing with the separatist group. Two distinct institutional options to preserve the polity are complex power sharing, which is often associated with consociationalism, and regional autonomy (McGarry 2008).

Complex power sharing refers to a political arrangement that allows some autonomy for the substate group but is generally institutionally engineered to conciliate minority groups in fragmented societies and thus may include elements ranging from consociationalism to integration (Wolff 2009). McGarry observes that scholarship on complex power sharing is closely connected to work on consociationalism (2008). Lijphart, the scholar perhaps most linked with this institutional design, describes this form of power sharing as including one or more of the following characteristics: representation in the government that integrates the various groups in the state, some degree of autonomy for different societal groups, proportional representation and financial allocations to the multiple groups in the state, and the veto that protects groups' basic interests and is to be used sparingly (1977). The confessional democratic system in Lebanon that allows power sharing between Christians and Muslims displays this type of institutional design (Dekmejian 1978). Specifically, complex power sharing consists of a carefully designed distribution of power that prevents establishment of political supremacy by certain religious, ethno-national, or other types of substate groups (O'Leary 2008). This institutional design incentivizes collaboration among group elites that have to work together after elections because they are forced to have a stake in the central government. Conversely, other scholars argue that complex power sharing produces challenges regarding distribution of political benefits between ethnic groups because elites bring their groups' conflicts to a high level in the government and keep inflammatory issues on the agenda (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Wolff asserts that complex power sharing arrangements rely on the good will and capacity of elites, as well as their constituents in respective societal groups, to properly function(2008). This suggests that the success of complex power sharing can be undermined if group members hold extreme views. This design also establishes some inflexibility in the central government because it institutionalizes a normal, structured state of affairs that makes adapting to demographic or political changes difficult (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).

Another form of power sharing that governments may offer to separatist groups is regional autonomy. Ghai defines regional autonomy as a mechanism that provides substate groups agency over issues that are germane to the group but the central state to have some

control over issues that are important to both the state as a whole and the individual group (2000). This may be an effective strategy because it reduces the feelings of insecurity experienced by both members and elites of minority groups. Thus, devolving some authority to the regional level will make these groups feel more secure by minimizing the possibilities for risks associated with belonging to a minority (Posen 1993). Alternatively, Brancati cautions that, while decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism by giving groups control over their own administrative affairs, this may also increase ethnic conflict and secessionism unintentionally by incentivizing the rise of regional parties (2006). Regional parties contribute to outbreak of ethnic conflict and secessionism by emphasizing sectarian identities. Such regional parties may advocate for public policies that show preference for certain ethnic groups and rally these groups into conflict and secession (Brancati 2006). The devolution of power to Scotland from the central government in the United Kingdom exemplifies this power sharing structure (Sorens 2004).

The aforementioned strategies have strengths and weaknesses according to their structuring of power and consequences of their implementation. Ideally, complex power sharing allows for, or at least does not undermine, the legitimacy of the central government. This institutional arrangement also incentivizes cross-group cooperation so that the government can continue to function. For example, Norris notes that consociationalism, an aspect of complex power sharing, leads to elite cooperation that is helpful in achieving stability and democracy in divided societies (2005). Theoretically, this should be beneficial for states trying to integrate separatist groups because it forces them to buy into the idea of the state as a whole. Regional autonomy, conversely, weakens the strength of the central government because power is devolved to groups in certain areas. This provides groups the opportunity to prepare for violent secession by allowing space to mobilize resources and people for the potential ensuing conflict with the central government.

These types of power sharing institutions have varying influences on the nature of secessionist groups. Both complex power sharing and regional autonomy institutionalize societal groups by establishing them as political units. This is because both of these institutions reaffirm individuals' relationships to the primary group with which they identify. Since citizens

are more likely to identify with their group rather than the nation as a whole, the authority of the central government is undermined.

Furthermore, these power sharing structures essentially compel elites to associate with their primary group of identification. Politically, the elites must win the approval and vote of their constituents, who are the members of their groups. Complex power sharing may unintentionally create moral hazard because the generation of political elites after those that created the power sharing arrangement may compete among one another to rise above rivals within their own group (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Such outbidding strategies may include lip service for violent rebellion. For groups with regional autonomy, elites may be forced to the extremes, such as support of violent behavior, to maintain support. Regionally autonomous groups may also face fewer difficulties to mobilize for armed conflict because they are already geographically concentrated and administratively independent, making outbreak of violence likely.

States that contain multiple groups, some of which are interested in secession, may reach a social equilibrium where power sharing institutions reflect the strategic situation between the domestic actors. This social equilibrium, at least from the perspective of the states, consists of peaceful interactions between politically relevant domestic actors. So, states establish structures of regional autonomy and complex power sharing with the goal of relieving pressure on the central government from dissatisfied social groups. Theoretically, each power sharing option influences separatist groups' objectives and strategies differently. Regional autonomy is likely to aggravate existing tensions between different societal groups. While complex power sharing ideally integrates social separatists into the state, this design may also have inadvertent consequences in terms of functionality of the government and bringing intergroup conflict to a high level of the government (Encarnacion 2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005).

External Support for Separatist Groups

While societal peace may be established through institutional design choices made by the state, the resulting nonviolent interactions between domestic actors may be disrupted by outside forces. Specifically, inflows of foreign support for separatist groups can encourage rebellious behavior. Foreign support is aid, which may vary in nature and intensity, from state actors to groups interested in seceding from the state (Byman 2013). Byman et al. assert that the timing of such support is particularly important; for example, providing aid to nascent rebel groups is likely to be significantly more influential than providing aid to mature groups (2001*a*).

Since the end of the Cold War, 75% of violent conflicts have involved monetary and administrative aid from states not directly engaged in the conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the international system encouraged extensive support to rebel groups from the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, however, outside support from the superpowers to violent substate groups decreased significantly, leading to a parallel reduction in such groups' capabilities generally (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Regardless of the recent decrease in aid, Byman et al. suggest that support from states, including those that are not superpowers, continues to be the most significant type of aid that violent substate actors can receive (2013). Such foreign support is likely to significantly increase the capacity of separatist groups, leading to increased violence and duration of the intrastate conflict (Regan 2000, 2002). Similarly, Libicki and Connable observe that insurgents that receive state support are successful in over 50% of conflicts, as opposed to those groups that lack such support and have only won 16.7% of conflicts (2010).

State actors may be incentivized to provide support to secessionist groups due to a number of factors. First, states may support rebels in an effort to undermine their rivals. Since separatist groups have a tendency to weaken regional stability and norms of state sovereignty, they can face difficulty in soliciting external support (Saideman 2002; Byman et al. 2001*a*). Nonetheless, Saideman finds that separatist groups located in stronger states

are more likely to receive support from other states due to the rivalry that characterizes the interstate relationship (2002). Similarly, Maoz and San-Akca find that the existence of an inter-state rivalry makes collaboration between violent substate actors and (rival) states more likely (2012). Furthermore, states may benefit from separatists' local demographic and geographic knowledge, as well as lend credibility to the outside state sponsor's involvement in the intrastate conflict by providing an familiar and easily identifiable front to the state's activities (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008). Additionally, neighboring states are likely to sponsor separatist groups if the host state (of the rebels) has supported neighbors' rebels in the past (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005).

Second, states may support separatist groups in pursuit of geostrategic interests. While geostrategic interests are undoubtedly linked to the presence of rivalries between states, these interests may cover a wider variety of issues, like economic concerns or domestic security issues. Rather than ideological, cultural, ethnic, or religious factors, states opt to aid these groups in pursuit of financial, political, or other strategic interests that will provide low cost benefits to supporters (Heraclides 1990). Other strategic interests may include accruing regional hegemony, triggering regime change, controlling the separatist group, increasing national security, promoting irredentist activity (especially for separatist groups with real or perceived nationalistic ties to the state supporter), and looting the separatist group's host state (Byman et al. 2001a). States' pursuit of geostrategic objectives assumes them to be rational. Regan suggests that states opt to intervene exclusively when they expect success in their endeavors, the time to success is short, and domestic politics allow for the possibility of intervention (2000). Indeed, states may even pursue strategic relationships with violent substate actors in lieu of states when engaged in interstate conflict (Akca 2009).

Third, state actors may support groups interested in secession due to affinity over certain issues, such as ethnicity or political ideology. For example, Byman et al. observe that states undertake support of coreligionists or coethnics (2001a). Support of this nature, however, is nuanced. For example, aid to coreligionists may be in the form of state tacit acceptance of supportive activities by wealthy citizens, meaning aid to coethnics serves as a guise under which stronger states can pursue international political objectives or a

strategy to garner domestic support (Byman et al. 2001*a*). Similarly, the likelihood of interstate violence increases with the presence of politically active minority groups in states considering sponsoring foreign rebels (Davis and Moore 1997).

Separatist groups may receive military and nonmilitary benefits, which is likely to influence their turn to violent activity, from state support. I will first consider previous work on military aid from states to nonstate armed groups. States that sponsor rebels are often willing to train fighters, which may consist of teaching groups to use bombs or light weaponry, or cooperate with rebels to execute attacks (Byman 2005). States may also directly provide violent nonstate groups weapons or valuable intelligence that informs operations (Jenkins 1986). Another option to enhance the military capabilities of separatist groups is to provide technical or logistical expertise that improves the quality of arms and administration of the group (Byman 2013).

Nonmilitary support, which may be in the form of financial, political, diplomatic, or protective aid, to secessionist groups by states is likely to increase these groups' overall efficacy and (possibly) their propensity for violence. State supporters may contribute financially to separatist groups, either by direct monetary transfers or failing to stop money laundering or finance flows from domestic actors inside the state to separatists elsewhere (Byman 2013; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). States are also uniquely positioned to provide political or philosophical guidance by spurring political movements to take action (Byman 2005). For example, Hezbollah, a violent nonstate armed group operating in southern Lebanon, has cited the Iranian revolution as responsible, at least in part, for instigating the group's use of violence (Norton 2007). States may offer diplomatic backing to separatist groups, which involves the use of a state's political or military clout to promote a group's cause on the international stage (Byman 2005). Finally, states may inadvertently (or negligently) aid separatists by providing them with sanctuaries in their territory. Even though states may face some costs for hosting violent substate actors, this also enables separatists' supporters to obtain some bargaining power relative to the host state that proves worthwhile to the state providing the safe haven (Bapat 2007). Separatists frequently take advantage of such safe havens to avoid repression from the central state government and monopolize

on the ability to organize for military action (Salehyan 2007). Salehyan contends that this is particularly beneficial to rebels as they are able to increase their bargaining leverage by raising information asymmetries and accruing credibility as a result of outside sources of support (2007).

Of course, separatists that accept support from states also face certain costs in the form of constraints on their range of choices and behavior. Horowitz notes that secessionist groups may have less agency over their members and actions since state sponsors often have their own limited, and possibly divergent, objectives in the conflict (1985). Additionally, such support may weaken secessionist groups by dividing the movement into ideological factions, lowering the incentives to forge alliances with other nonstate armed groups against the state, and undermining loyalty to the rebels' local leaders (Byman 2013). Weinstein suggests another potential pitfall of state support: when state support is available, rebel groups may be less dependent on the population and eventually alienate and possibly abuse the civilians supposedly under their jurisdiction (2006). Finally, Carter argues that state sponsors are actually less beneficial to nonstate armed groups than conventionally held by scholars (2012). States, although they may be amenable to providing a safe haven or resources, are ultimately unwilling to incur any of the consequences associated with this aid and so be willing to give up information about such groups located in their territory (Carter 2012).

A Theory of External Support

This section presents my argument and hypotheses that will be tested, analyzed, and discussed in the following sections. Secessionist groups in some states may desire to seek formal separation. Although the origin and level of this demand for separation may be unknown, I assume the group will act upon this interest under the appropriate conditions. These conditions may vary, but I argue that external actors and internal institutions contribute to separatists' choice to rebel. In pursuit of the goal of secession, the separatist group may be willing to employ violent tactics. This threatens the traditional sovereign authority and so the political stability of the state to which the secessionist group belongs.




Fig. 1: Frequency of Groups Interested in Secession, 2004-2006

Walter asserts that separatist disputes are the type of conflict most likely to intensify to the point of violence and the most difficult to resolve via negotiation between parties (2009). Bargaining difficulties arise because states engage in reputation building to appear resolute against potential future opposition and separatists hope that violence will force the government to concede (Walter 2009). When the secessionist group believes the benefits outweigh the costs of violence in this bargaining dynamic, separatists will engage in violent activity against the state. For separatist groups, this choice to engage in violence is likely to occur as the allocation of strength changes to favor the separatists instead of the state (Morrow 1989). Such an increase in separatists' capacity is likely when the groups receive support from external actors.

Collier and Hoeffler define separatist groups as movements that have objectives of self-determination and historical internal links that differentiate them from the mainstream population, which may be associated with colonial legacies (2006). These substate groups have the goal of removing the group, and possibly the larger segment of the population represented by the group, from the polity as a whole. These sentiments are expressed via political or violent activity in pursuit of secession. Some illustrations of what I consider to be a recent wave of secessionism are the referenda held in Scotland and violent intrastate conflict in Ukraine. Globally, 57.8% of ethnic minority groups exhibit some degree of secessionist tendencies, as is illustrated by Figure 1.

Support from outside actors that enhances the capabilities of separatists is likely to influence the demand for secession. Horowitz asserts that the capacity of such a group to engage in rebellious activity is contingent upon international actors' choices (1985). The power sharing framework in the state is likely to mediate the impact of such external support, which is particularly useful to separatists because this aid may help balance the traditional power asymmetries that exist between the government and nonstate actors. This support from states may be material, political, or military in nature. Regardless of the different types or goals of groups in conflict with the central state government, separatist groups that enjoy external support are better off than groups without state sponsorship (Heraclides 1990). So, building on a large body of theoretical research, I contend that such external support is beneficial for separatist groups in terms of enhancing their ability to rebel (Saideman 2002; Horowitz 1985; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011).

External aid is likely to lead a separatist group to engage in violent rebellion for three reasons. First, state support is likely to influence separatists' decision to violently rebel because it augments their capacity to use violence, which may result in negotiations with preferable outcomes to those separatists would obtain otherwise (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau and Brannan 2001*b*). Second, outside support increases separatists' focus on foreign political actors that are not the home state or the population the separatists claim to represent, which may lower inhibitions against alienating or injuring the people (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood 2014). Third, separatist groups that receive support from state actors are likely to feel increased legitimacy for their cause, and the resulting inflated confidence may embolden separatists to take risks in pursuit of their goal of secession.

To account for the conditions under which separatists engage in violent rebellious activities, the institutional design present in the state also matters. If a state elects to share power with a separatist group to prevent outbreak of conflict, it can provide a group with regional autonomy or enact structures of complex power sharing at the central level of the national government. State leaders' decision to enact certain political institutions may be endogenous to their perception of the threat of violent secession. When creating such institutions, these leaders are likely considering the threat of secession from separatist groups within

their own sovereign territory, rather than from possible foreign entities that may support separatists. These institutional designs come under varying levels of strain when separatist groups receive support from outside actors. Therefore, I contend that the political institutions present in the state and foreign support for separatist groups interact to influence outbreak of violent secession.

According to theoretical contributions from past scholars, state support to separatist groups should be more likely to spur conflict under certain institutional conditions than others. Regional autonomy is the devolution of power from the central government to regional actors that allows substate groups some degree of political independence (Lapidoth 1997). Regional autonomy, if implemented in areas facing secessionist threats, will increase the salience of sectarian identities and potential for intrastate conflict. In the case of a separatist group that possesses regional autonomy, the devolution of power is likely to be associated with group elites that do not buy into the idea of the state. Mobilization costs of rebellion for these groups that are geographically concentrated and imbued with some administrative and political power will be less than the costs for groups that are dispersed or not autonomous.

Regionally autonomous separatists that receive external support are likely to attempt to violently secede from the state. Under regional autonomy, the commitment problem between the state and the separatist group is alleviated because the state sends a credible signal to not manipulate minority groups by more evenly distributing power between the group and the state (Fearon 1998). With regional autonomy, then, minority groups should be more secure and less likely to rebel. Inflows of external support interrupt this relationship and change separatists' incentives regarding rebellion because the security provided by regional autonomy will no longer be sufficient to satisfy the demand for rebellion. Because such groups increasingly rely on outside actors rather than their home state, inhibitions against violence toward the mainstream population will decrease. This argument is formalized in the following hypothesis:

H₁: Outside support from state actors increases the likelihood of violent rebellion when the state allows separatist groups to have regional autonomy.

An alternative institutional design is complex power sharing, which involves vertical and horizontal construction of state authority that may consist of strategies of autonomy, consociationalism, guaranteed representation, and veto options for groups (2008). According to the majority of scholars, complex power sharing is effective for a state threatened with secession because it reinforces national unity, compels separatists to have a stake in domestic politics, and incentivizes separatist elites to cooperate with other societal elites (Wolff 2009; McGarry 2008). A minority of scholars caution against assuming complex power sharing to be a panacea in all contexts involving separatist groups. For example, Sisk notes that, while power sharing works in some contexts, this arrangement has failed to alleviate conflict in others (Sisk 1996).

While the majority of scholars assume complex power sharing to pacify rebellion, I argue that state support to groups participating in arrangements of complex power sharing is likely to spur violent rebellion. Roeder and Rothchild observe that certain rare circumstances are needed for complex power sharing to work: capacity of state government and group elites to enforce negotiated agreements among the population, willingness and commitment to negotiations among societal groups, relatively equivalent population growth, increasing economic prosperity for all groups in the state, and international actors that help implement power sharing (2005). Convergence of all these conditions is rare, meaning this institution only succeeds and therefore can prevent violence in a narrow window of contexts. In fact, complex power sharing is likely to engender conflict due to internal and external factors. Within the state, elites of separatist groups will continue to fight for their respective contentious issues. Under complex power sharing, however, these elites will be armed with certain political tools, like the minority veto, that will make efforts to redress their grievances more worthwhile. Similarly, states that contain groups interested in secession likely already operate with less capacity than otherwise; thus, governments are unlikely to be able to adequately enforce negotiated settlements between societal groups.

External conditions are likely to further compound the agitating effects of complex power sharing. As Roeder and Rothchild observe, external actors' support of implementation of complex power sharing institutions is crucial to their success (2005). If outside

actors, conversely, are not only refusing to support the state enacting complex power sharing but also supporting separatists financially or materially, intrastate conflict is the likely result. Additionally, as with regional autonomy, elites under complex power sharing still depend on the groups with which they identify. So, inundation of external support to separatist groups will heighten demand for rebellion and deincestivize elites' cooperation with the central government and elites from other societal groups. For example, consociationalism, which shares several important elements with complex power sharing, failed in Lebanon due to interventionist activity by neighboring states Syria and Israel, which encouraged elite dissent and government failure (Seaver 2000). The lack of elite cooperation, due to intrastate tension resulting from complex power sharing and involvement by foreign actors, ultimately contributes to failure of complex power sharing and outbreak of violent rebellion. This argument leads to the second hypothesis:

H₂: External support to separatist groups involved in complex power sharing arrangements is likely to provoke violent rebellion.

Data and Methods

Data

I will now discuss the data and methods I employ to test the hypotheses that arise from my theory. I use data from the most recent Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, which aggregates data on 284 mobilized ethnic groups, for the dependent and independent variables of interest in this analysis (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). I opt to include only those groups that demonstrate separatist tendencies, as identified by the MAR Project. This cross-sectional dataset includes information on a number of quantities of interest for this project, such as presence of violent rebellious activity. The time period of the MAR data ranges from 2004 to 2006. The number of minority groups identified as being inclined toward separatism is 163. The group is the unit of analysis, which I create by collapsing the three years into one aggregate observation. This large sample is optimal for conducting statistical analyses and generalizing from the results. A brief

overview of the major variables of interest for three separatist groups is displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset

Separatist Group	Rebel	Reg. Aut.	Complex P.S.	Sup.	Sup. (Level)	Pot. Ext. Sup.
Scots	0	0	1	0	0	1
Chechens	1	1	0	1	1	1
Palestinians	1	1	0	1	3	1

Table 2: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Models 1 and 2

	Group Pop.	Complex P.S.	Reg.Aut.	Sup.	Repr.	Sup.(Level)	Econ.Discr.
Group Pop.	1	0.129	-0.121	-0.111	0.085	-0.106	0.026
Complex P.S.	0.129	1	-0.237	0.138	0.035	0.131	-0.181
Reg.Aut.	-0.121	-0.237	1	-0.120	-0.065	-0.032	-0.157
Ext.Sup.	-0.111	0.138	-0.120	1	0.133	0.808	0.088
Repr.	0.085	0.035	-0.065	0.133	1	0.177	0.240
Sup.(Level)	-0.106	0.131	-0.032	0.808	0.177	1	0.059
Econ.Discr.	0.026	-0.181	-0.157	0.088	0.240	0.059	1

Table 2 displays correlation between independent and control variables in the first two models. Table 3 displays correlation between independent and control variables in the third model. As illustrated by Tables 2 and 3, very little correlation exists between the independent variables of interest or the control variables in this analysis. In Table 2, which references Models 1 and 2, correlation exists between external support and the index of external support. This is expected given that the index is an ordinal variable to operationalize the level of support (material, political, or military) from state sponsors to the separatist group. I do not employ these variables in the same model, so this is not problematic for my analysis. Table 3 displays no problematic correlation between the variables included in the linear model that deals with possible endogeneity issues by including a variable for potential of outside support rather than presence of outside support.

Table 3: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Model 3

	Group Pop.	Complex P.S.	Reg.Aut.	Repr.	Pot.Sup.	Econ.Discr.
Group Pop.	1	0.129	-0.123	0.087	0.124	0.025
Complex P.S.	0.129	1	-0.235	0.033	0.085	-0.180
Reg.Aut.	-0.123	-0.235	1	-0.089	0.050	-0.172
Repr.	0.087	0.033	-0.089	1	0.124	0.251
Pot.Sup.	0.124	0.085	0.050	0.124	1	-0.030
Econ.Discr.	0.025	-0.180	-0.172	0.251	-0.030	1

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of interest for this analysis is violent rebellious activity by separatist groups against the government. In the original MAR dataset, this is an ordinal variable, which increases with intensity of the violent activity from infrequent acts of terrorism to full civil war. I am interested simply in whether the secessionist group opts to employ violence against the state, so I recode the violent rebellion variable to be dichotomous. The variable is coded positively if any form of violence by the secessionist group occurs. This may include sporadic or sustained terrorism, local rebellions, varying levels of guerilla activity, or civil war (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). As shown in Table 4, fewer groups engage in violent rebellious activity than do not.

Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Dependent Variable

	Frequency of Separatist Groups	Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Rebellion	96	59%
Rebellion	67	41%

Independent Variables

I argue that external support, provided by state actors, influences the likelihood of separatist groups to violently rebel. I operationalize this external support using two strategies. First, I employ a dichotomous variable that is coded positively if a separatist group receives any form of state support (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). As displayed in Figure 2, more separatist groups receive some variant of support

from states than do not. Second, I create an additive index ranging from 0 to 3. The value of the variable increases as the separatist group receives additional forms of aid, including political, material, or military, from state sponsors. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of levels of state support for separatist groups. I expect both variables representing foreign support to be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession when the separatists have regional autonomy or complex power sharing.




Fig. 2: Independent Variables: Outside Support as Dichotomous and Ordinal Variables

Outside actors' choice to provide support to separatists may be endogenous to separatist groups' demonstrated capacity for violence. So, I also include a variable to operationalize the potential for separatist groups to receive external support. To measure the possibility of support, I consider whether the separatist group exists in a country engaged in an interstate rivalry. I employ a dichotomous variable to operationalize interstate rivalry presence.

First, I create a dichotomous variable for rivalry using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dyadic dataset, which spans from 1993 to 2001 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). The dataset I use to test the hypotheses produced by my theoretical argument starts in 2004. Goertz and Diehl assert that a rivalry exists if a pair of states use military force against one another two to four times within a ten year period (1992). Given this proposition, I have a period of eight years, from 1994-2001 in the MID dataset, to draw upon to create the interstate rivalry variable. I require a state to have been engaged in at least two disputes with

the same opponent state from 1994-2001. Starting the count in 1994 ensures that the rivalry will still be intact by the time my own dataset starts (2004) given the ten year life span of a rivalry according to Goertz and Diehl. So, if a state experiences at least two MIDs with the same enemy from 1994-2001, I code the observation positively. As illustrated by Table 5, more separatist groups exist in states that are engaged in interstate rivalries. Therefore, more separatist groups in my dataset have potential to receive state support than do not. As with the variables that actually measure presence of external support, I expect this variable to be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession when separatist groups have regional autonomy or complex power sharing.

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Independent Variable: Potential Outside Support

	Frequency of Separatist Groups	Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Potential Support	45	28%
Potential Support	118	72%

According to my theoretical framework, the effect of outside support on rebellion is conditional on the government's institutional framework. One such independent variable of interest is whether the secessionist group had regional autonomy at any point between 2004 and 2006. This refers to whether the group has administrative authority, which is defined as bureaucratic and political control of an autonomous region (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). The MAR dataset coded this variable as dichotomous, and I employed this in my dataset, as well. As shown in Table 6, more groups do not have regional autonomy than do. I expect that the presence of regional autonomy will be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession by groups with outside support.

Table 6: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Independent Variables: Political Institutions

	Frequency of Institution	Percentage of Institution
Regional Autonomy	136	83%
	27	17%
Complex Power Sharing	128	79%
	35	21%

The second institutional variable relevant to my theory is complex power sharing. To approximate complex power sharing arrangements, I consider whether the group has guaranteed representation in the central state government (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). This operationalization of complex power sharing is justified based on scholars' characterizations of such arrangements as involving guaranteed representation, which is more easily identifiable due to the legal requirements associated with guaranteed representation in states (Wolff 2009; Weller and Metzger 2008). In the few cases in which separatist groups received both regional autonomy and guarantees of representation at the state level, I identify the political institution as complex power sharing rather than regional autonomy. This is valid because proponents of complex power sharing do not rule out some degree of regional autonomy but do recognize the potentially damaging impact of regional autonomy on state unity and the benefit of integration at the level of the central government (Wolff 2009). Therefore, these two institutional designs are mutually exclusive.¹ As illustrated by Table 6, more groups are not involved in complex power sharing arrangements than are. I expect that outside support to separatist groups participating in complex power sharing will be positively and statistically significantly related to rebellion.

¹ These two institutional designs are mutually exclusive even though there is low correlation (-0.235) between the two variables representing regional autonomy and complex power sharing, as indicated in Tables 2 and 3. This occurs because there is overlap in the data for separatist groups that have neither regional autonomy or complex power sharing, indicating that a segment of separatist groups exists in states that have not enacted any political institutions to share power at all. A cross tabulation of these two variables is in Table 14 of the Appendix, which illustrates the overlap.

Control Variables

I include some control variables on which to condition my independent variables of interest. First, I include a measure of the population, recoded in millions of people, of the group in the state (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). This is necessary because the size of the separatist group is likely to have some impact on the group's ability to violently rebel, but the size of groups is outside the scope of my theory. The summary statistics for this control variable can be seen in Table 7.²

Table 7: Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variable

	Minimum	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Maximum
Group Population	29604	5033993	1210732	13985302	136697940

Table 8: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Control Variable: Repression

	Frequency of Separatist Groups	Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Repression	52	32%
Repression	111	68%

I also include a second control variable of repression of the separatist group by the government. To operationalize the variable for repression, I create a dichotomous measure of multiple variables. One such variable is repression of the group civilian population. This population is identified as not participating in violent or nonviolent political activities (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). Another variable is repression of group members that participate in nonviolent collective action, like demonstrations. The third variable is repression of group members involved in violent activities, such as harassment or torture (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). As shown in Table 8, more groups experience repression than do not. If any of these types of repression occurred between 2004 and 2006 to members of the secessionist

² The table displays actual population data rather than the recoded variable so that meaningful values are presented.

group, the observation for repression is positively coded. This is necessary for appropriately analyzing the relationship between my dependent and independent variable of interest because repression of any individuals in the group, including militant and civilian members, is likely to have some effect on whether or not the group engages in violent rebellion.




Fig. 3: Control Variable: Economic Discrimination

Last, I include an ordinal control variable for whether the secessionist group experiences economic discrimination. The variable is coded as 0 if the group does not experience discrimination economically (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). The variable ranges between 1 and 4 as groups experience increasing levels of economic discrimination, including poverty due to neglect, marginalization, social practices, or political restrictions (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). This variable is essential because it illustrates whether separatist groups must contend with economic inequality on the national stage, which may influence their interest in separating from the larger polity. The majority of separatist groups experience some degree of economic discrimination, and the distribution of levels of discrimination is illustrated by Figure 3.

Methods

To test the validity of my hypotheses that (1) external support to regionally autonomous groups will spur violent rebellion and (2) outside support to separatist groups involved

in complex power sharing is also likely to encourage violent secession, I employ three generalized linear models using logistic regression. These models vary due to different operationalizations that I have of my major independent variables. In this way, I am able to more robustly test my theory. The first two models test the impact of political institutions and the actual presence of support on likelihood of violent rebellion by separatist groups. These models can be broadly specified as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Violent Rebellion} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Regional Autonomy} + \beta_2 \text{Complex Power Sharing} + \\
 & \beta_3 \text{External Support} + \beta_4 \text{Regional Autonomy} * \text{External Support} + \\
 & \beta_5 \text{Complex Power Sharing} * \text{External Support} + \\
 & \beta_6 \text{Group Population} + \beta_7 \text{Repression Index} + \beta_8 \text{Economic Discrimination} + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

In the first and second models, I use the variables that measure the actual presence of outside support for the separatist group. In the first model, I use a dichotomous measure of outside support illustrating whether any type of support was received. In the second model, however, I use an additive index of external support that shows the level of support received. The index for external support increases as the separatist group receives more types of external support from states (political, material, or military).

The third model deals with possible endogeneity issues related to outside support and rebellion. So, this model considers the influence of political institutions and the potential for external support on onset of violent rebellion by secessionist groups. This model can be broadly specified as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Violent Rebellion} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Regional Autonomy} + \beta_2 \text{Complex Power Sharing} + \\
 & \beta_3 \text{Potential of External Support} + \\
 & \beta_4 \text{Regional Autonomy} * \text{Potential of External Support} + \\
 & \beta_5 \text{Complex Power Sharing} * \text{Potential of External Support} + \\
 & \beta_6 \text{Group Population} + \beta_7 \text{Repression Index} + \beta_8 \text{Economic Discrimination} + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{2}$$

I use interaction terms in these models because of the likely interactive nature of the effect of existing political institutions and external support on outbreak of secessionist violence. Specifically, the effect of external support on violent rebellion by separatists is likely to be conditioned by the political institution (regional autonomy or complex power sharing) established in the state hosting the separatist group. Similarly, the effect of political institutions on outbreak of violence is likely to be conditioned by the presence of outside support received by the separatists.

To deal with possible endogeneity issues between external support and onset of violent rebellion, I operationalize foreign support variables in two manners. In the first two models, I specifically employ variables that show whether, and to what extent, separatist groups receive support from foreign actors. In the third model, I include a variable, which consists of evidence of interstate rivalry, that illustrates only the potential for outside support to rebel groups. Separatist groups present in host states that are involved in rivalries with other states are likely to receive outside support from the hosts' rivals in an effort to undermine the host state (Maoz and SanAkca 2012; Salehyan 2007; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011). So, without testing whether states actually send aid (which could depend on separatist groups already having credibly displayed their threat to engage in violence), I can appropriately test my hypotheses by using a variable measuring potential for outside support. I expect the results of the third model, which includes potential of outside support, to corroborate the results of the first two models, which employ actual presence of external support.

Analysis

In this section, I will discuss the results of the statistical analyses used to test the validity of my hypotheses. The three models are similar except for the strategies I employ to operationalize the variables to measure external support. In the first two models, I consider the actual presence of foreign support. In the third model, I deal with possible endogeneity problems concerning the relationship between outside aid and separatists' use of violence by considering potential (rather than actual existence of) support. The majority of the re-

sults of the three models are similar. The results of this statistical analysis provide evidence largely in support of the hypotheses derived from my theoretical framework.

I use three logistic regression models that include multiple interaction terms, so the immediate results of the regressions are not extremely informative. I will, however, briefly report the noteworthy results of the logistic regression models. The complete results of the models are displayed in Table 12, which is in the Appendix. While not always statistically significant across the three models, both variables representing power sharing institutions are positively related to separatists' likelihood to use violence. In the second model, which employs an ordinal variable for external support, regional autonomy (even without external support) is statistically significantly related to violent rebellion. Also in the second model, the ordinal variable for outside support is positively and statistically significantly related to rebellious activity. Repression is positive and statistically significant across all three models, indicating that government repression of any member of the separatist group is likely to be associated with secession. Last, the variable measuring group population is positive and statistically significant in the second model.

As previously mentioned, I use several interaction terms in my three models; therefore, I also present and interpret the marginal effects and predicted probabilities of these models. I will now discuss the marginal effects of the first set of models, which considers the impact of actual foreign support and political institution (regional autonomy or complex power sharing) on outbreak of violent rebellion by secessionist groups. It should be noted that the baseline to which I compare regionally autonomous groups is those groups that have neither power sharing institutions³ or are involved in complex power sharing. Likewise, the baseline to which I compare groups involved in complex power sharing is the category of groups that have neither power sharing institution or have regional autonomy.⁴

³ A state lacking power sharing institutions for a separatist group does not imply that the group is operating in a failed state. For example, in my dataset, a separatist group in South Africa would fall into this category. There are 101 of these groups, as indicated by Table 14.

⁴ I also ran the model estimating the impact of complex power sharing against the baseline of regional autonomy and vice versa. The results were largely similar across the various models.

Table 9: Marginal Effects of External Support under Two Separate Institutional Conditions

	Political Institution	External Support
<i>Model 1</i>	Regional Autonomy	2.03 (1.03) *
	Complex Power Sharing	1.43 (0.70) *
<i>Model 2</i>	Regional Autonomy	1.24 (0.65) .
	Complex Power Sharing	0.87 (0.58)
	Political Institution	Potential External Support
<i>Model 3</i>	Regional Autonomy	1.37 (0.71) *
	Complex Power Sharing	1.17 (0.65) .

Standard errors in parentheses
 * indicates significance at $p < .05$
 . indicates significance at $p < 0.1$

Table 9 displays the marginal effects of the interaction terms in Models 1, 2, and 3. In Model 1, the interaction term between regional autonomy and outside support (as a dichotomous variable) is positive and statistically significant. Additionally, in Model 2, the interaction term between regional autonomy and foreign support, operationalized as an ordinal variable, is positive and statistically significant.⁵ The marginal effects of the first two models, therefore, strongly support my hypotheses because the interactions between regional autonomy and outside support (as a dichotomous and as an ordinal variable) is positively related to outbreak of violent rebellion by separatists. The interaction between complex power sharing and outside support is also positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession in Model 1 and positively (but not statistically significantly) related to rebellion in Model 2. So, the marginal effects of the first two models provide some support for my hypothesis regarding the positive impact of the interaction of complex power sharing with external support on secession.

The third model, which I employ to check for endogeneity issues, also displays positive and statistically significant effects of the interactions between political institutions and

⁵ The interaction term in Model 2 is significant at the .057 level, meaning it is only slightly above the .05 statistical significant level and therefore remains important in the analysis of my models.

potential outside support on violent rebellion. Like the first two models, the effect of the interaction between regional autonomy and potential external support is positive and statistically significantly related to violent rebellion, which further confirms my hypothesis regarding regional autonomy and aid from foreign actors. Also like the first model, the interaction term between complex power sharing and potential external support is positively and statistically significantly related to violent rebellious activity.⁶ This provides further evidence in support of the second hypothesis regarding complex power sharing and outside aid. The third model generally replicates the results of the first two models. This addresses issues of endogeneity related to the impact of foreign support on the outbreak of violent rebellion because the potential of outside support for the most part parallels the actual presence of external support.




Fig. 4: Predicted Probabilities of Political Institutions and External Support (Model 1)

Because I employ logistic regression, I also present the predicted probabilities associated with each model in Table 13, which is located in the Appendix. In Model 1, both interaction terms achieve statistical significance, so I will interpret the substantive implications

⁶ The interaction term in Model 3 is significant at the .072 level, meaning it also is only marginally above the .05 statistical significant level and therefore remains important in the analysis of my models.

of this model by discussing a bar chart associated with its probabilities, presented in Figure 4. As I previously mentioned, the baseline of comparison for groups that have regional autonomy is groups without any power sharing institutions or those with complex power sharing. Similarly, the baseline of comparison for groups participating in complex power sharing is groups lacking power sharing institutions or regionally autonomous groups. Because of the dichotomous variables of interest included in the first model, I display the results in a bar chart in Figure 4. Separatist groups with regional autonomy that also receive outside support are more likely to engage in violent secession than regionally autonomous separatist groups that do not receive outside support, as indicated by the relative height of the blue bar to the yellow bar in Figure 4. The same holds true for groups involved in complex power sharing. The solid black lines indicate uncertainty around the point estimates. For example, there is more certainty on the estimate for groups participating in complex power sharing arrangements that receive external support. Generally, this substantive analysis is supportive of both hypotheses.

I present the predicted probabilities associated with Model 2, which includes an ordinal independent variable of interest, in Figure 5. In this model, the interaction term between regional autonomy and external support achieves statistical significance, so I will substantively interpret this by considering associated predicted probabilities. Figure 5 illustrates the effect of outside support and regional autonomy on the likelihood of rebellious violence. Since probability can only range from 0 to 1, the Y-axis, which has the “Predicted Probability of Rebellious Violence,” is bounded between 0 and 1. External support, which is an independent variable in the model I am estimating, can range from 0 to 3 since this variable is ordinal. This is why the X-axis, which shows outside support, varies between 0 and 3.

As illustrated by the rising solid lines (indicating the point estimates), as outside support increases, so does the likelihood of engaging in violent rebellion. This is supportive of the first hypothesis generated by my theory. Regional autonomy is another variable that may have an impact on the likelihood of separatist groups’ participation in violent rebellion. So, when a separatist group is granted regional autonomy, the likelihood that the group violently rebels increases. This is shown by the solid red line, which indicates regional




Fig. 5: Predicted Probability of Rebellion Given Regional Autonomy and External Support (Model 2)

autonomy for a group, being associated with a higher probability of rebelling than the solid blue line, which indicates a lack of regional autonomy. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates. The 95% confidence intervals indicate that, in repeated sampling, 95% of the intervals calculated would contain the population mean.⁷

I present the predicted probabilities associated with the third model in Figure 6. Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of outbreak of rebellious violence given political institutions and potential of foreign support (using the MID rivalry variable for potential external support). As with Figure 4, I display these predicted probabilities using a bar chart because the models include dichotomous variables. Regionally autonomous groups with the potential to receive outside support are more likely to rebel than groups that have regional autonomy but lack external support potential. Separatist groups participating in complex

⁷ As indicated by Table 9, only the interaction of regional autonomy and external support achieves statistical significance in Model 2. I acknowledge that the interaction between complex power sharing and external support is not statistically significant in this model. However, I include the predicted probability of rebellion given complex power sharing and external support to indicate the substantive implications of this condition for separatists in Figure 7 in the Appendix. The likelihood of engaging in violent rebellion increases as external support from states increases. When separatists are involved in arrangements of complex power sharing with the state, the probability that groups will engage in violent secession increases.




Fig. 6: Predicted Probabilities of Political Institutions and Potential External Support (Model 3)

power sharing governments with potential to receive outside support are similarly more likely to violently secede than those without such potential external aid. This parallels the findings related to the impact of actual support and political institutions on the likelihood of violent secession (from Models 1 and 2). Again, this provides support for my hypotheses and deals with possible endogeneity issues between support and rebellion.

Table 10: Variance Inflation Factors for Models 1, 2, and 3

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Regional Autonomy	1.90	1.91	4.72
Complex Power Sharing	2.89	2.28	3.90
External Support	1.55	1.54	1.46
Group Population	1.15	1.14	1.10
Repression	1.05	1.06	1.04
Economic Discrimination	1.22	1.18	1.17
Regional Autonomy:External Support	1.76	1.93	4.78
Complex Power Sharing:External Support	3.00	2.39	4.20

Finally, I conduct some diagnostic tests to evaluate the performance of my models. In addition to the tests for problematic correlation (in Tables 2 and 3), I calculate variance inflation factors, which indicate how serious of a problem multicollinearity is, for the three models. As indicated by Table 10, the VIF levels are not above 5, which is recommended (Rogerson 2001). Lower levels of VIF are preferred because the VIF shows the size of the inflation of standard errors that are due to multicollinearity. Also, Herron recommends calculating an expected percent correctly predicted as an alternative to simply the percent correctly predicted, which may imply more precision of estimates than is correct (Herron 1999). As illustrated by Table 11, the majority of the predictions were correctly predicted in all three models.

Table 11: Expected Percent Correctly Predicted for Models 1, 2, and 3

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted (ePCP)	0.70	0.60	0.59

Discussion

In this section, I present the substantive implications of this statistical analysis for my theory, possibilities for further scholarship, and relevant policy recommendations. The results of the statistical analysis provide broad support for the propositions stemming from my theory. I find a positive, statistically significant relationship between the regional autonomy-external (or potential external) support interaction term and violent secession in all three models. This strongly supports my first hypothesis, which predicts that outside support to regionally autonomous separatist groups will contribute to their use of rebellious violence. Additionally, the estimate for the impact of the interaction between complex power sharing and outside support on violent rebellion is positive and statistically significant in two of three models. This provides some evidence for my second hypothesis, which suggests that outside support is likely to influence separatist groups involved in complex power sharing to violently secede. This analysis indicates that regional autonomy and complex power sharing, commended by scholars and policymakers for allowing opportunities for representation, do not necessarily mitigate rebellion under specific conditions, like provision of

external aid to participating substate groups.

As previously discussed, the interaction between regional autonomy and external support is positively and statistically significantly related to outbreak of violent secession across the three models. This empirical finding supports my theory and is intuitively logical. Separatists granted regional autonomy are likely well positioned to violently rebel, and these groups will be further enabled and emboldened by receiving support from state actors. Such outside aid is likely to improve separatists' logistical capabilities, as well as to provide legitimacy for their goals of self determination from established actors in the international community.

Furthermore, this positive, statistically significant relationship is present in the first two models, which include variables for outside support indicating separatists' actual reception of aid from states, and in the third model, which includes a variable for outside support indicating the mere potential of separatist groups to receive outside aid. Because this relationship is constant across all three models, I can fairly confidently reject the null hypothesis that the interaction between external support and regional autonomy is unrelated to outbreak of violent rebellion. Additionally, the relative stability of this finding across the three models, which include both presence of actual support and potential for such aid, addresses the possible endogeneity problem regarding external support and secessionist violence.

The findings related to complex power sharing and outside support are largely consistent with my theoretical predictions. In the three models, which indicate actual presence of and potential for outside support, the interaction of complex power sharing and external aid is positively related to violent rebellion, but only statistically significant in the first and third models. So, my statistical analysis produces some evidence in support of my second hypothesis. Conventional wisdom on complex power sharing praises this institution as a cure all for divided societies (Wolff 2009; Weller and Metzger 2008). Nonetheless, complex power sharing is still likely to provide enabling conditions for separatist groups, especially those receiving aid from outside actors, to violently rebel. This is likely due to some combination of the internal and external factors that increase separatist group members' interest in rebellion and make elite cooperation challenging.

This analysis also provides one unexpected, though not illogical, insight. The three models indicate that, as repression against any member of the group increases, separatists are more likely to engage in rebellious violence. This is unsurprising given that repression, regardless of against whom it is directed, spreads general grievance throughout the group and may spark violence. This variable is not specifically included in my theoretical framework, which focuses on the impact of power sharing structures and foreign support on intrastate conflict. The possibility that repression lowers inhibitions against violence and positively influences rebellion, however, is reasonable.

Future work in the study of the impact of external support and power sharing institutions on violent rebellion will be improved by theoretical and methodological expansion. For example, I do not consider aid from non-state actors, such as nongovernmental organizations or transnational terrorist groups, in this analysis. Support from such groups, conditional on the political institution present in the state, may influence whether separatists employ violence in rebellion. So, including this in future work may present a more complete story regarding the internal and external factors influencing secessionist violence. Additionally, this study involves some endogeneity issues between the power sharing institution established in the state, the decision by outside actors to support separatists, and the use of violence by separatist groups. To deal with some of these issues, I include a third model that operationalizes outside support simply as potential for aid from foreign actors (measuring whether the separatist group's home state is involved in a rivalry with another state). When more nuanced data become available, the ideal statistical analysis would include a time series that could deal with some of these endogeneity issues, as well.

The findings of this analysis are informative to academics, by contributing to the larger debates on the impact of outside support and power sharing on secessionist violence, and policymakers, by providing knowledge of techniques that may stabilize divided societies and reduce political violence. This analysis represents a unique test of hypotheses regarding what types of governing structure and external aid are most likely to provide the conditions favorable to violent rebellion by groups interested in seceding from the larger polity. While the majority of scholars contend that complex power sharing is the preferred method by

which to integrate separatists, this study suggests that complex power sharing, like regional autonomy, may incite violent rebellion, especially when external actors become involved. So, I, along with a very few other scholars, argue against viewing complex power sharing as a panacea for states facing secessionist threats. For policymakers, the substantive results are also important. This analysis serves to caution those policymakers that would enact complex power sharing and expect an automatic reduction in violent rebellion. Indeed, when separatist groups receive outside support, regional autonomy and complex power sharing produce similar probabilities of intrastate conflict. Thus, more work is needed to establish what conditions are most likely to reduce separatist violence.

APPENDIX

Table 12: Logistic Regression Results of Models 1, 2, and 3

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	-5.09* (1.16)	-5.52* (1.18)	-5.00* (1.18)
Regional Autonomy	0.86 (0.83)	1.64* (0.81)	0.95 (1.27)
Complex Power Sharing	0.33 (0.89)	0.58 (0.81)	0.60 (1.02)
External Support	0.03 (0.51)		
Group Population	0.06 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Repression	4.44* (1.07)	4.42* (1.07)	4.43* (1.06)
Economic Discrimination	0.20 (0.17)	0.17 (0.17)	0.19 (0.16)
Regional Autonomy: External Support	1.17 (1.29)		
Complex Power Sharing: External Support	1.09 (1.11)		
External Support (Level)		0.58* (0.28)	
Regional Autonomy: External Support (Level)		-0.40 (0.61)	
Complex Power Sharing: External Support (Level)		0.30 (0.65)	
Potential External Support			-0.02 (0.55)
Regional Autonomy: Potential External Support			0.43 (1.42)
Complex Power Sharing: Potential External Support			0.57 (1.20)
<i>N</i>	158	162	162
<i>AIC</i>	159.06	158.53	165.25
<i>BIC</i>	269.32	269.69	276.41
<i>logL</i>	-43.53	-43.27	-46.63

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 13: Predicted Probabilities of Violent Rebellion by External Support and Political Institutions

	Regional Autonomy	Complex Power Sharing
No External Support		
<i>Model 1</i>	0.66	0.54
<i>Model 2</i>	0.66	0.61
<i>Model 3</i>	0.66	0.61
External Support		
<i>Model 1</i>	0.84	0.77
<i>Model 2</i>	0.76	0.73
<i>Model 3</i>	0.77	0.73

Table 14: Cross Tabulation of Regional Autonomy and Complex Power Sharing

	No Political Institutions	Complex Power Sharing
No Political Institutions	101	35
Regional Autonomy	27	0




Fig. 7: Predicted Probability of Rebellion Given Complex Power Sharing and External Support (Model 2)

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