FROM LAND TO TERRITORY: NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF AMAZONIAN STRUGGLE

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ABSTRACT

(Under the direction of Wendy Wolford)

This dissertation examines the relationship between new regimes of governance and resistance in the Brazilian Amazon in the contemporary context, where the “progressive” government that came to power with the support of anti-neoliberal social movements, continues to pursue commodity-driven, extractive development as a primary strategy of economic growth. Given that the Amazon region holds many of Brazil’s natural resources, in this moment, Amazonia has once again been re-imagined as the key to Brazil’s future. I sketch out the contours of contemporary strategies of and struggles over this “neo-extractivism” through an analysis of the issues raised by one particular project – the proposed (and ongoing) paving of the nearly 1000 kilometer stretch of the Santarém-Cuiaba highway (BR-163) that passes through Western Pará State (Brazil’s second largest state). Embedded in issues of soy, timber, and cattle expansion, land zoning and property rights, indigenous, traditional, and migrant struggles, and the re-making of all of these issues by the progressive state, the BR-163 traverses, both literally and figuratively, the terrain of neo-extractivism.

I argue that this neo-extractivism is made possible by a territorial re-organization that re-maps the entire region according to particular spatial, social, and development logics. This re-mapping happens in response to and overlaps already existing forms of territorial organization by traditional, indigenous, and migrant smallholder communities.
even as it partially incorporates their demands, namely through the granting property rights. Some Amazonian indigenous and traditional movements, however, increasingly recognize that attaining land rights within the field of the state does not meet their desires for justice or self-determination and in response are articulating new territorial strategies of struggle. I draw on ethnographic research from the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River and the Movement in Defense of Renascer in the lower Brazilian Amazon to argue that their shift – from the demand for property and the right to economic productivity, to the demand for life and the production of subjects – is not simply the expression of a new form of discourse, but of new forms of territoriality that simultaneously invoke and transcend the categories of political economy and the state, giving rise to new tensions with previous forms of politics and political mediators.
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Preface

The late 1980s and 1990s in Latin America was an era of unprecedented privatization, elimination of trade regulations, opening of markets to foreign investment, cutting of social programs and an escalation in the presence of transnational corporations. These neoliberal measures, justified as part of an effort to counteract economic crisis, generated a massive increase of wealth concentration in a region already defined by extreme inequality. Simultaneously, it was an era of massive social mobilization marked by a series of uprisings across the region and the re-activation and formation of strong, mass social movements seeking to break with the violence of neoliberalism and construct “another world.” Across Latin America, these uprisings and movements forced out neoliberal regimes, and brought to power new governments that were “progressive” to varying degrees. Over the past decade or so, these governments constructed a new regional geopolitical architecture, both literally through regional infrastructural planning (Iniciativa para la Integracion de la Infrestructura Regional Suramericana, IIRSA) and institutionally through the formation of organizations such as the Banco del Sur, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and holding their own alternative summits (ALBA), establishing a degree of unprecedented independence for Latin America (especially South America) with regard to world politics and economy.

As an economic and political actor in the region, Brazil has arguably emerged as one of the most powerful and most politically tepid across the heterogeneous field of progressivism in Latin American governments. The rather spectacular rise of Brazil in
terms of economic and political power is based in its “neo-developmentalist” program.¹ That is, both the Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations, have pursued “change with stability,”² by linking neoliberal macroeconomic policies and the expansion and consolidation of an export-oriented, industrial, extractive development model with a progressive social agenda based in poverty reduction and the inclusion of social movements in institutional politics. During this time, the Brazilian economy has grown to be the sixth largest in the world, Brazil has become a major international investor (especially within Latin America), its multi-national corporations have become some of the largest and most powerful, and simultaneously, social policies lifted millions of Brazilians out of poverty and into the middle class, all of which shored up administration approval ratings, which were near 90% by the end of Lula’s presidency.

The political strength of a government that has continued an uncompromisingly capitalist model of development based in natural resource exploitation and exportation, or neo-extractivism, led by the Workers’ Party, which historically represented a more radical left – the left of the “new unionism” and the very mass, anti-systemic movement organizations that forced a rupture with neoliberalism - has complicated the relationships among social movements and government and led to something of a crisis for social movements (Zibechi 2008), or what others have called, an “impasse” (Collectivo Situaciones 2009; Reyes 2012). In Brazil specifically, this debate has focused on the

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¹ Neo-developmentalistism emerged across Latin America with the crisis of neoliberalism as a heterodox policy response that incorporated monetary and fiscal policies of neoliberalism along with state policies to nurture the growth of national firms and social programs based in economically distributive programs. Despite substantial modifications to the neoliberal program, neo-developmentalistism does not depart from a programmatic focus on expanding productive capacity and increasing accumulation (Katz and Haine 2006; Acosta 2008; Escobar 2010; Ricci 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011a; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011b).

phenomenon called “lulismo” or “petismo” (Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; Ricci 2010a; Ricci 2010b; Andres Singer 2010), which in the simplest terms is inclusion – of the poor into the consumer class, of marginalized actors into governance and of political opponents into a coalition government – as the basis for an economic program that includes expanding neo-extractivism. This inclusion, which was not simply implemented from the top-down, but rather has been crafted in response to movement demands, has had the effect of creating political legitimacy for progressive government at all levels (federal, state, municipal) while, critics argue, glossing over some of the more substantive asymmetries in relations of power (de Oliveira 2006; Zibechi in Hardt and Reyes 2012) and has had some demobilizing effects on movements.³ Scholars that favor Lula, and now Dilma, call the linking of anti-poverty measures and extractive intensification a “new social contract” (Guimarães 2004), while critics argue that it has made poverty “functional” to a continued neoliberal program (de Oliveira 2006). Regardless, it is clear that the arrival of progressive government in Brazil and the country’s rapid economic growth raises complex questions about the relationships among movements, civil society, economy and state and, in fact, the very nature of politics in this new moment.

In this context, an examination struggles over neo-extractivism itself is paramount, both because it is such a key element of contemporary state and market strategies and because this exploitation of raw materials has increasingly brought the (western) developmentalist project into direct conflict with largely indigenous and

³ For what has arguably been the most dramatic example of this argument within Brazilian movements, see the “Carta de saída” (letter for resignation) written by 50 militants from some of the country’s most prominent social movements - the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST), Unemployed Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Desempregado, MTD), Via Campesina and Consulta Popular. Available at http://cspconlutas.org.br/2011/11/militantes-do-mst-mtd-consulta-popular-e-via-campesina-divulgam-cartas-da-saida-de-suas-organizacoes/ [accessed July 22, 2012].
traditional people who inhabit the territories that hold these resources, making neo-extractivism a primary site of struggle within this moment of apparent “impasse.” In Brazil, such an examination leads us to the Amazon, which, because of its wealth of natural resources has, once again, been reimagined from the symbol of Brazil’s backward hinterlands into the conditions of possibility for its future. Today, development enters the region much differently than in the colonial and recent neo-colonial past, within a paradigm that emphasizes sustainability, renewability, participation, broad-based economic growth, and corporate responsibility. Geographically, neo-extractivism reaches well beyond the old frontier – the “arc of deforestation” – that skirts the edge of the biome and has for decades marked the slow advance of modernity and devastation into the region (Fearnside 2008). Today, sites that were formerly far from the circuits of capital have become strategically central because of their biological capacity, their potential to generate energy, or their location along key transport lines. That means that the ongoing intensification of mining, dam building, agro-industrial expansion, road and water-highway construction, and carbon storage, along with the re-working of property rights and the escalating presence loggers that precedes almost all of these processes, is once again re-mapping Amazonia, drawing places and people from the margins of development into its center.

This developmentalist intensification has been met with a series of uprisings and protests both within and outside of Brazil in response to Brazilian development projects. The most visible of these have been the protests against the Belo Monte Dam, the Madeira River Dams at Jirau, the road through TIPNIS in Bolivia, controversies over the paving of the Santarém – Cuiaba highway and the expansion of industrial soy agriculture
into the Amazon, and the changes to the forest code, as well as a proliferation of smaller
conflicts and struggles across the region as a whole.

This dissertation attempts to sketch out the contours of contemporary political
struggles in Amazonia around neo-extractivism through a detailed investigation of the
wide-ranging issues – soy and logging expansion, land titling and regional zoning,
protected areas, rights of indigenous and traditional people, and environmental
governance – that were raised by the proposed (and currently ongoing) paving of the
nearly 1000 kilometer stretch of the Santarém-Cuiaba highway that passes through
Western Pará State (Brazil’s second largest state). I place a detailed knowledge of
struggles over this development project, gained through two years of ethnographic
research, into conversation with theories of governance, environment, and political
change across the region in order to contextualize the specific issues encountered in the
two primary struggles – in Gleba Nova Olinda and the Renascer Extractive Reserve –
taken up here. My analytic is territorial. That is, I argue that in order to understand the
stakes of these conflicts and the potentiality within these struggles we must first,
following the work of many contemporary Brazilian and Latin American scholars,4
recuperate the concept of territory and unhinge it from the nation-state.

A substantive literature on the concept of territory in Anglophone human
geography has done much work to de-naturalize the assumed “container”–like (Giddens
1985) relationship between nation-states and territory (Agnew 1994; Agnew 2009;

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4 (See, for example, Porto Gonçalves 2001; Haesbaert and Porto Gonçalves 2006; Porto
Gonçalves 2006; Zibechi 2008; De Souza 2006; Fernandes 2005; Ramirez 2006; Ceceña
2012; Reyes and Kaufman 2011; Almeida 2011).
Crampton and Elden 2006; Elden 2005; Elden 2007). It has worked to theorize the state’s “territory effect,” that is, its tendency to represent state space as given, masking its own transformative effects on social relationships, and its function of normalizing and maintaining a particular “spatial order of things” (Elden 2010b, 760). This approach has produced a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work geared toward analysis of historically and geographically specific processes of state “territorialization” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Li 2007; Sikor and Lund 2009; Corson 2011) (a body of work to which this dissertation contributes).

The major limitation of this work, I will argue, is that it proposes hegemonic conceptions of territory as the only conception of territory. For example through his historical analysis of the etymological and genealogical history of the term “territory” itself and the co-evolution of conceptions of both territory and the nation-state, Stuart Elden has done much work to build a theory of territory that frees it from its “politically fixed and conceptually static” condition (Elden 2010b, 760). Yet, within this conceptual framework, “territory,” however contingent, dynamic, and produced, remains a form of state space, constituted through mechanisms such as law, measurement techniques, and property. Territory is political space, but only according to a narrow conception of the “political” as co-extensive with the “state,” which is itself a liberal, western concept, and thus a rather colonial notion of the political. Even work in this vein that explicitly de-links state and territory, such as Saskia Sassen’s (2006) Territory, Authority, Rights, which provides a genealogy of the relations among these three elements pre, and arguably post (e.g. globalization) nation-state, maintains the concept of territory as an expression of the dominant organizing logic. In other words, territory may be produced by
something other than the state, but always from the position of “authority,” or what other authors have called “from above” (Porto Gonçalves 2006).

This conception of territory belies a particular understanding of politics as located in, and only in, the realm of the state. That is, these arguments re-produce the very “territorial trap” that they are trying to escape. Although they may shed light on the “processes through which territorially configured political-economic formations have been produced and transformed historically” (Brenner and Elden 2009, 354), the final point of arrival is always already decided. It is always pre-determined as state space. Following from this, territorial struggle can only be understood as a struggle over the terms of incorporation into the state. In other words it can only be either a struggle “from above” to tame and integrate the “frontier,” or “from below” to access property (a subdivision of the state), to control the state itself (take the position of power), or, in its most radical form, to destroy the state.

An alternative conception of territory begins from the premise that that territorialization is not only a process of producing space, but it is also one of producing subjects (e.g. one does not precede the other). That is, following Reyes and Kaufman’s (2011, page 519) elaboration of Porto Gonçalves’ “triadic notion,” we can understand territory as physical location, territorialization as the way of taking hold of that space, and territorialities as the subjectivities created in the process of that taking hold. Following from this, “state” territorialization takes on the significance not only of making resources calculable and controllable (Scott 1998; Elden 2007), but also of creating subjects through its process of creating and maintaining a given order (Foucault 1982; Foucault 2009). However, this dissertation will demonstrate that the process of subject-
making through everyday, grounded practices of creating and maintaining a spatial and social order is not (or not only) defined by the structures of the state. The making of territory, and of territoraility, through both everyday practices of living and social relations and struggles for territorial control also happens from below. Following from this, territorial struggles are not only struggles over land and resources, or over meanings, but struggles over subjectivities (territorialities) (Guattari and Rolnik 2008) (of which “state,” “civil society” and “citizen” are only one of many possible configurations).

Once we recognize that we cannot separate territory from the society that creates it, and thus, cannot reduce it to the state, we have a concept that nonetheless is also more useful for helping us to understand the state. That is, the state is arguably the hegemonic construction of territory, but there are moments when the link between state and territory become tenuous, (e.g. moments of territorial crisis of the state, see Port Gonçalves 2009). This dissertation will explore the ways that what Brazilian geographer Bernardo Mançano Fernandes (2005) calls socio-territorial movements both force these moments, become visible within them, and are made through them.

The overarching argument of this dissertation is that an analysis of conflict over neo-extractivism in Amazonia today must understand it as fundamentally territorial. I explore the multi-faceted contours of neo-extractivism as an expression of tensions between what we might call a territoriality of “above” (Porto Gonçalves 2001; Becker 2005) that is re-constituting itself to maintain the given order and a territoriality (or territorialities) of “below” or resistance that is also strategically re-constituting itself to break with that order at a historical moment when relationships among, and in fact the very categories of, movement, civil society, state and capital have become unclear.
The introduction foregrounds the moments of confrontation, using an ethnographic description of two moments of rebellion to move through a history of Amazonian development and to frame the more specific arguments that will be made in each chapter that follows. The rest of the dissertation is divided into two sections that delve more deeply into the content of two different forms of territoriality. Part Two begins by outlining the key elements of neo-extractivism, and then chapters two and three each explore in more depth the practices and mechanisms through which it manifests. Part Three explores each of the struggles presented in the introduction in more detail. Chapter Four focuses explicitly on the shift, in movement strategies, from what I call a struggle for land to a struggle for territory, through a discussion of this history of struggle in an area in the Arapiuns River Basin called Gleba Nova Olinda. Chapter Five recounts the struggle for the Renascer Extractive Reserve in order to look more closely at tensions among movements, historic movement organizations, and government. Together, these chapters work together to sketch out the processes that constitute the territories and territorialites of below.
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List of Abbreviations

ABOIVE: “Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Óleos Vegetais,” Brazilian Association of Industrial Vegetable Oils.


CI: Conservation International


CNS: “Conselho Nacional de Seringueiros,” National Rubber Tappers Council

CPT: “Comissão Pastoral da Terra,” Pastoral Land Commission

CUT: “Central Única dos Trabalhadores,” Workers’ Central Union

ENGOs: Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

FETAGRI: “Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura,” the Federation of Agricultural Workers

FDA: “Frente em Defesa da Amazônia,” Amazon Defense Front

FNO: “Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte,” the Constitutional Fund for the North

FUNAI: “Fundação Nacional do Índio,” National Indian Foundation

IBAMA: “Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais,” the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Resources

ICMBio: “Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade,” the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation

INCRA: “Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária,” the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform
INPA: “Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia,” National Institute for Environmental Research

IPAM: “Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia,” the Amazon Environmental Research Institute

ISA: “Instituto Socio-Ambiental,” Socio-environmental Institute

ITERPA: “Instituto de Terras do Pará,” the Land Institute of Pará

IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature)

MAPA “Ministerio da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento,”

MPEG: “Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi,” The Emílio Goeldi Paraense Museum

MDA “Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário,” the Ministry for Agrarian Development

MDR: “Movimento em Defesa da Renascer,” the Movement in Defense of Renascer

MST: “Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra,” the Landless Workers’ Movement

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

PAC: “Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento,” Accelerated Growth Program


PMDB: “Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro,” Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PRONAF: “Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar,” National Program to Promote Family Agriculture

PSA: “Projeto Saúde e Alegria,” the Health and Happiness project. A Santarém-based

PSDB: “Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira,” Brazilian Social Democracy Party

PMDB: “Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro,” Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PNMA: “Programa Nacional do Meio Ambiente,” National Program for the Environment (PNMA),
PT: “Partido dos Trabalhadores,” Workers’ Party

SECTAM: “Secretaria Executiva de Ciência, Tecnologia e Meio Ambiente – PA,” The Executive Secretary of Science Technology, and Environment.

SEMA: “Secretaria de Estado de Meio Ambiente,” the State Environmental Secretary

STR: Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais

TNC: The Nature Conservancy

UFPA: “Universidad Federal do Pará,” Federal University of Pará

UNEP: United Nations Environment Program

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

WWF: WorldWide Fund for Nature

ZEE: “Zoneamento Económico Ecológico,” Ecological Economic Zoning
Chapter One. Introduction. Born in Fire

INTRODUCTION

On October 12, 2009, the Santarém Rural Worker’s Union (STTR) sponsored a coordinated symbolic action, mobilizing union members to block rivers, roads, and air – the flow of commerce – to draw attention to the struggles of rural people and to urge the state to speed the process of land regularization. At the end of the day, at the Praia de Pedraão (Big Rock Beach), in the community of São Pedro on the Arapiuns River west of the city of Santarém, the indigenous and traditional communities that had participated in the action ignored the union’s directive to re-open the river and instead embarked in their rabetas (canoes with outboard motors) and took hostage two barges hauling millions of dollars worth of illegal timber from their territory. They held these barges, with the river closed to commercial traffic, for 45 days. During that time, a revolving group of between 80 and 1200 people remained camped at the riverside, fishing, cooking, creating nightly entertainment, and guarding the wood and the river. They demanded an end to industrial extractivism on their lands, vast indigenous and traditional territorial rights in Gleba Nova Olinda to the west, self-determination, and above all, the protection of their life and culture. Despite a series of requests by the movement for audiences with state and federal officials at the riverside encampment, the government agencies refused to negotiate. The movement set fire to the barges. They burned for four days.

5 The first day, participants came from the traditional communities of Atodi, Bom Futuro, Cutilé, Curi, Novo Gurupá, São Francisco, Atrocal, Santo Antônio, São Pedro, Pascoal, São José I, São José II, Monte Sião, Mentá, Mariazinha, Prainha, São Marcos, Piquiá, and the indigenous communities of Aminã, Aningualzinho, Arapiranga, Braço Grande, Nova Vista, São José III, Novo Lugar, Cachoeira do Maró. Eventually participants came from over 100 communities.
A month later, and two hundred kilometers to the east, in the early morning hours of November 27th, two groups of ten people each set out by rabeta from opposite ends of the recently created Renascer Extractive Reserve (Reserva Extractivista in Portuguese or, more commonly, Resex).\(^6\) Silent and tense the small group met at the entrance to the reserve, cleared a small area on the river bank to sit, and waited, planning to block the descent of two barges of illegal wood leaving the reserve. As dawn approached, word arrived that the barge pilot had feared confrontation and returned to port. Elated, the small group set up camp. More people began to arrive and over the next few months the small group on the muddy bank grew into a village.

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\(^{6}\) A Resex, or Extractive Reserve, is a conservation area dedicated for use by traditional, populations whose subsistence is based in small-scale extractivism and complementarily, in subsistence agriculture and small animal husbandry, [created] with the basic objective of protecting the way of life and culture of these populations and securing the sustainable use of the natural resources of the Unit [of Conservation].” (Article 18 of Federal Law 9.985 of 2000, National System of Units of Conservation defines an Extractive Reserve)
encampment. They demanded only what they had already been granted in law – control over their territory, expulsion of armed loggers from their lands, the closure of the illegal lumber mill inside of the Resex, and the establishment of the community association that would govern the area. For almost three months, although the loggers unleashed violence and intimidation on the leaders and on the encampment, no loggers’ barges passed the mouth of the Tamuatai River where they were camped. Then, just before dawn on January 11, six barges descended from the upriver mill. As they approached the encampment, they opened fire. Two people were wounded, and the rest fled into the forest. The next day, the community assembly met in the camp for the last time. They decided it was time to disband.

![Image: Shooting victim, Renacer January 2010]
For the past several decades, Amazonian scholars have proposed a series of explanations for the seemingly endemic and enduring violent “land conflict” between rich and poor, landed and landless, latifundia and camponês or developers and “people of the forest” in the Brazilian Amazon, particularly, the state of Pará (Amazonia’s most violent state). Such violence, rooted in colonialism, is not limited to the Amazon. The 1850 federal land law -- which linked property ownership to the financial ability to develop it and created a sizeable landless peasantry who initiated a national “struggle for land” (Scott 1976; M. Watts 1984; Mallon 1995; Sayer 2004) – intensified the already endemic conflict and violence over land nationally. Scholars generally theorize the particularly Amazonian land conflict as a product of the “frontier,” and thus as part of the violence of incorporation into capitalism (Foweraker 1981; Cleary 1993; Maryanne Schmink and Wood 1992; Fearnside 2001a; Perz, Walker, and Caldas 2006; Simmons et al. 2007).

Although representations of Amazonia as a place with infinite land are exaggerated in the national imaginary of the region, it is also true that Amazonia does have an abundance of land as compared to the south or northeast of Brazil. The problem of land in Amazonia is better understood in terms of constraints on access rather than land concentration per se (Simmons 2004). As a result, Amazônia has always fit somewhat awkwardly into a national narrative of resistance that defines land concentration and the corresponding landlessness as the material expression of relations of exploitation and inequality endemic to Brazilian society. Simultaneously, the vast and varied peoples of Amazonia have also fit somewhat uncomfortably into the socio-
political category of “peasant” that was so central to the articulation of a national struggle of marginalized rural people. That is not to say that there has not been a “struggle for land” – in fact struggles over land access, control, and use are the primary form of conflict in the region - but that in Amazonia, they tend to take on a different form, which will be explored in this dissertation.

Some Amazonian scholars have thus traced a somewhat different but not unrelated genealogy of particularly Amazonian “land conflict” that finds its roots in the Cabanagem revolt of 1835-41, where thousands of gente de cor (people of color that included ex-African and African descendant slaves, indigenous people, mestiços and others) rose up against their oppressors in the longest, largest, bloodiest, and most successful rebellion (the rebels held the regional cities of Belém and Santarém for several months), followed by the most violent suppression – in Brazilian history (Di Paolo 1986; Cleary 1998; Simmons et al. 2007; Harris 2010). This history continues most visibly, and in popular memory, in the slaughter of the Maoist rebels of Araguaia (1972), the empates of the rubber tappers in Acre (1980s), the murder of Chico Mendes (1989), the massacres at Corumbiara in Rondonia (1996) and of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement, MST) demonstrators at Eldorado de Carajás (1997), the murder of Sister Dorothy Stang (2006), and more importantly, although perhaps less visibly, in the everyday conflicts and violence pervasive in the region (see for example the Comissão Pastoral da Terra’s annual publication, Conflitos no Campo, Brasil, now its 27th edition).7

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7 Pará is the Brazilian state with the largest number of deaths and conflicts related to land conflict. According to the CPT (2004) between 1994-2004 there were 837 conflicts, 173 assassinations and 501 death threats. Historically, much of this conflict has been along roads and also concentrated in the region known as the “South of Pará,” located in Pará’s southeast between landless migrant farmers and ranchers.
This “perennial” (Little 2001; Simmons et al. 2007) violence became the subject of intense research beginning in the late 1970s/early 1980s when it became a focus of government intervention (Almeida 1992; Sauer 2005). At that time, the environmental devastation wrought by the military government’s modernization programs was also becoming a national and international preoccupation and consequently, much of the land conflict literature is concerned in one way or another with the intersection of violent conflict and environmental issues. Analyses of Amazonian land conflict variously attribute its causes to the absence of the state, the effect of economic actors competing to capture rents (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999), or the intersection of a series of mechanisms in particular places (Simmons et al. 2007). Most Earlier work in this vein points to antagonistic relations between large landholders and (landless) peasant farmers (Foweraker 1981; Schmink 1982; Wood 1983). For these authors, land conflict is an expression of class struggle, but it is a class struggle that results explicitly from contradictory state policies – policies that on the one hand stimulate capital accumulation by incentivizing peasant migration, and that on the other hand, seek to maintain the dominant class structure by incentivizing large-scale capitalist investment – that have made the same land desirable for two opposed classes, a proposition further explored in Chapter Four (Schmink 1982; Schmink and Wood 1992).

More explicitly institutionalist accounts of land conflict within the “frontier” literature point to failures or inconsistencies within land tenure institutions themselves.
(e.g., property rights) as the cause of violent conflict over land. This argument suggests that the failure of land tenure assignment to keep pace with “frontier” development creates conflict as people compete for access to valuable land (Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1996; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999; Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 2000). It also suggests that these conflicts lead to deforestation because people deforest land in order to claim it. Competing tenure policies (namely agrarian reform and the right of posse) incentivize both “squatting” and forced eviction. Violence thus emerges as a result of independent actors, through their own “cost-benefit analyses,” deciding that violent action would work to their advantage (assumedly because the non-violent, legal options are nearly non-existent). Following from this logic, rapid and expansive assignment of private property rights would ameliorate conflict by reducing incentive to deforest along with enforcement costs, providing collateral for long-term investment in land, and promoting the development of land markets, thereby producing wealth (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 2000). This philosophy undergirds most contemporary titling initiatives discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

The most recent analysis of Amazonian land conflict by geographers is one of the few to demonstrate the limitations of the frontier concept as an explanatory framework, which they do by developing quantitative measures for identifying the actual location of the “frontier” and demonstrating even as the frontier passes through places such as the South of Pará, violent land conflict continues (Simmons 2004; Simmons 2005; Simmons et al. 2007). They propose, instead, a “place-based” theorization of Amazonian land conflict, based in a Masseyian conception of place as “the site where economic, social, and political processes interact across scales, creating the conditions of daily life, where
meanings and values crystallize, creating community identities and resistance performativity” (577) - to generate an explanatory framework of the different mechanisms that condition and constrain “contentious” (e.g. extra-legal) social movement action.

This work draws on a comprehensive literature review of Amazonian land conflict to map out various processes that intersect in the “place” known as the South of Pará, schematizing them into categories based in the “contentious politics” literature (Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow 2001). The authors argue that cognitive (e.g. individual identity-based) relational (individuals connect to larger groups of individuals) and environmental (natural and institutional context) mechanisms intersect in place (the south of Pará) to create enduring conflict. In other words and more specifically, they argue that in an ambiguous and violent context creates, frustrated, scared and even violent individuals, who make the decision to link up to larger forces – either social movements or latifundia networks – in order to better their individual situation. Place, they argue, is a “product” of the interaction of these processes and a “medium” for their interaction (582).

This analysis provides an excellent overview of the many processes that intersect within land conflict, however, their superimposition of a contentious politics framework onto the concept of place merges two philosophically opposed frameworks and results in a very structural analysis that theorizes conflict as the outcome of rational, individual actors making decisions, based in a logic of comparative advantage, to link up to more powerful forces. In this analysis where, in their words “populations of landless individuals [create] a community of interest” (582), their conception of “relational
mechanisms” is quite literal – individuals join, thereby relating to, a group, or, the MST “possesses” a network that allows it to link up to interested parties in the developed world.

This is substantively different from Massey’s (2004; 2005) conception of relational, which is foundational to her theorization of place, as mutually constitutive (e.g. places, processes, and subjects are constituted in and through each other). It is what makes place, for her, a site of “becoming” and for the formation of subjects, rather than for the linking of objects (Massey 2005). Ultimately, and likely as a result of this, their overall argument, while significantly more nuanced and complex, does not depart significantly from the previous causal accounts, with their overall assessment being that at the conjuncture of these mechanisms is a “tragic” and perennially violent place.

This raises a second and more substantive issue for the geographic analysis of struggle around the usefulness of the concept of place and specifically, what many authors a “politics of place” (Escobar 2001; Escobar 2008; Moore 1998; Moore 2005; Gibson-Graham 2002), as a theoretical framework for analyzing what I am calling, following the movements’ conceptualization, “territorial struggle.” An expansive and careful literature on the relation between space and place and on place more generally has undone what was a rather pervasive place-space dichotomy (place as grounded, local, lived, and particular and space as abstract, global, and universal). This literature (most centrally Massey 1994, 2004, 2005) poses these two concepts as different, but not opposed, nor as expressions of scale. Place here tends to be represented as a “sedimented” site for the “articulation” or “assemblage” of disparate trajectories, practices, of processes, of social relations (both Moore 2005 and Escobar 2008 use some
combination of these two concepts), or as a node in a network (Raffles 1999; Latour 2005). These are processes and relations that must be “negotiated”, and it is within this often conflictual negotiation where we encounter a “politics of place” (Massey 2004, 6).

These authors understand the politics of place as a struggle over the identity of a given place, that is, over its “hegemonic identity” (Massey 2004) or what Escobar (2002, 2009) and Gibson-Graham (2002) call the defense of a particular construction of or “imaginary” of a given place. Thus, we have a place as constituted through myriad, intersecting, sedimented, processes and politics as the struggle to imbue it with meaning.

Territorial struggle, on the other hand, as was briefly outlined in the introduction and I will argue in this dissertation, is not (or not only) a struggle over meaning but over the construction of a new reality – that is, over the creation of new forms of organization, subjects, and spaces. This is a substantive difference. The conception of place-based struggle as a struggle over meaning is based in a philosophy of politics that assumes that discourse shapes our perception, which affects our ways of being (e.g. following Laclau and Mouffe 2001). In other words political struggle in this vein proposes that change in the modes of classification, or signification has the effect of changing relations of force. The territorial approach locates the power of such meanings in the fact that they are expressions of particular forms of social organization, practices of exclusion, relations of power, et cetera, of which meaning-making is but one. Thus it is the content of a space that manifests its expression, and not vice versa. In that sense, territory is the space of the political, its construction does not precede struggle; it happens through it.
Finally, returning to the existing body of work on Amazonian land conflict, there are two further limitations in terms of the applicability of existing frameworks to contemporary Amazonian struggles for two primary reasons. First, with a few exceptions (Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn, 2011) this theorization is derived from analyses of relationships between recent migrants to Amazonia (both landless farmers and capitalized developers, usually from struggles in southeastern Pará), and extrapolated as an explanatory framework for smallholder/capital conflict across Amazonia. This is not, I will argue in this dissertation, an analytic failing per se. Rather the peasant/latifundia opposition was an analytic and strategic framing of struggle adequate to a particular time and place (largely from peasant struggles elsewhere in Brazil), but over the past few decades (particularly the last decade) there has seen a substantive shift in both the mechanisms of exploitation and the relations and subjects of struggle. In other words, there is a conjunctural shift that requires an analytic shift.

Second, the environmental turn in Amazonian studies in the late 1980s and 1990s was pervasive (Nugent, Harris, et al. 2004) and as a result, the environmental effects of conflict have constituted central questions of recent studies. As a result, much of the more recent research on conflict remain bound in a largely technocratic analysis of conflict and violence that locates their source in bad policy and the issue as largely an environmental one.\(^8\) As such, they tell us a lot about environmental change and its relation to social process, but little about the encounter of differences, strategies of struggle, or the potential for social-political change expressed in those conflicts. They are descriptions of

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\(^8\) This is less true of the earlier literature on the contradiction between peasant/latifundia, which I find more useful and explore in greater detail in Chapter Four.
social relations as seen from above, and as a result they make visible only solutions that emerge from and within that perspective (e.g., policy solutions).

**On Method**

My broad aim in this dissertation is to examine recent Amazonian conflicts through a wider lens that draws into view not simply the institutional, economic, and environmental drivers of conflict (the usual explanations), but also the political – and, I will argue, territorial – practices and strategies of the social movements involved. This requires a methodological shift away from much of the recent literature on land conflict and social movements in the Amazon, which, because of its technocratic and conservationist focus, tends to mandate a particular set of questions and methods to describe, explain, and predict the relationship between conflict, social movements, and conservation. This literature largely evaluates social movements in terms of their ability to achieve conservation and to affect the state, to ask whether or not they effectively move “to conservation from chaos” (Schwartzman et al. 2010), from incoherent to articulated, from uncivil to civil (Kolk 1998; Perz 2002; Scholz 2005; Campos and Nepstad 2006; Simmons 2005; Alencar 2005; Cronkleton et al. 2008; Shanley, Da Silva, and MacDonald 2011; Machado 2009; Kröger and Nylund 2011).⁹

Rather than evaluating movements in terms of their capacity to engage with the dominant political logic, I draw on work generated on and from Brazilian and other Latin American movements and movement scholars that engage in a debate on how to think and understand political struggle (de Souza 2006; Porto Gonçalves 2009; Almeida 2011;...

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⁹ There are also, of course, exceptions to this generalization and there has been excellent recent work on Amazonia published in English, largely in Anthropology, that departs from this framework (Raffles 1999; Raffles 2002; Harris 2010; Campbell 2009), although not necessarily focused on political struggle (with an exception here being some of David Cleary’s work 1993). There is also a largely Portuguese-language body of work that departs from this technocratic, conservationist claim and that my work engages with more directly, discussed in more detail here and cited throughout this dissertation.
Broadly, these scholars shift the study of social movements from an objective and temporal description and assessment of social movements (e.g., as in the above cited literature) to a study of “movement” from a particular location within relations of domination (See especially Porto Gonçalves 2009; Zibechi 2010; and Reyes 2012 on "societies in movement"). Following this line of thinking, this dissertation is an attempt to forge what Raquel Gutierrez calls a “theoretical strategy,” (2012, 53) that makes the acts of insubordination described above (and below) intelligible and theorizes the possibilities that they open up, offering not an objective account of events but a “practical comprehension” (53) of them. This means generating an analysis of the situation that movements are responding to, presenting a detailed description of the events and forms of struggle enacted, and providing concepts that help us to critically reflect on their meanings and potentials.

That is not to imply that this research does not engage “traditional” research methodologies. This research is based on nearly two years of primarily ethnographic fieldwork in the city of Santarém and three sites near the city (Belterra, Gleba Nova Olinda, Prainha, see Figure 1). I also travelled up and down the BR-163, visiting roadside communities and agrarian reform settlements as well as the cities of Itaituba and Novo Progresso, and I made several trips to the state capital of Belém. In the settlements, which were largely colono communities (migrant or descendents of migrant subsistence farmers from the south and northeast), I spoke with people regarding the paving of the BR-163, community histories, and conflicts. In the urban centers, where I interviewed NGO,
church, Rural Workers’ Union representatives, and government representatives on the same topics.

Figure 3: Location Map

Overall, I conducted 164 semi-structured or open-ended interviews, approximately half of which were recorded, and approximately one-third of which were transcribed. Early on, my position as a white foreigner provided relative ease of access to government officials and even to soy farmers and loggers, an access that became less possible as I began working more closely with the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT), my partner organization, and with the social movements. The Pastoral Land Commission is an organization within the Catholic
Church that documents violent surrounding land conflicts and facilitates the struggles of social movements for land rights across the country. In Santarém, they function as a key site and key people in social movement organizing. I developed my research plan in partnership with the CPT and accompanied much of their work for my entire time in Santarém. During hundreds of hours of boat rides, I engaged in innumerable informal conversations on the topics discussed here. I conducted focus groups in three communities who had the majority of their residents displaced by soy farming to determine the process of displacement, where people had gone, and did follow-up interviews with 21 displaced families. I spent several months, usually in one or two week visits, living in indigenous aldeais (indigenous community) and traditional communities, in order to gain a better understanding of everyday life. I traveled frequently with agents from the CPT and accompanied and participated in meetings with them in different communities. I read and analyzed dozens of government planning documents regarding soy development, road development, territorial planning, as well as assessments and surveys of traditional and indigenous communities. At the request of the two movements that I was working with, I mapped illegal logging in two locations and produced reports on the findings that were submitted to the relevant government organization.\footnote{These maps are not included in the dissertation because they belong to the movements and legal battles continue over this logging.} I generated maps and wrote a pamphlet on industrial extraction and its relationship to community-based struggles, conducted community meetings to discuss research questions, took photos, video, wrote press releases, engaged in strategy sessions, and gave public presentations at CPT and University-based workshops. I was part of and often acted as a delegate for the Frente em Defesa da Amazônia (Amazon Defense Front,
FDA), a movement network organization based in Santarém (not an NGO). I sat in on confidential meetings and closed judicial appearances between movements, government agencies, and loggers. I reviewed and summarized the logging the management plans approved for Gleba Nova Olinda at the request of the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River (*Movimento em Defesa da Vida e Cultura do Rio Arapiuns*, MDVCA), and I witnessed and documented human rights abuses, acts of insubordination and rebellion, and protest rallies for MDVCA and in the Renascer Extractive Reserve, in Santarém and Iatituba.¹¹

**TERRITORIAL STRUGGLE IN BAIXO AMAZONAS**

The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining Amazonia’s “land conflict” in the contemporary moment by contextualizing the two moments of rebellion in the encampments described above. I begin from the premise that insurrectional moments are particularly revealing of the intention and capacity of movements to break with the given order, that they are based in existing practices and that they, following Ana Ester Ceceña (2012), “add new features and possibilities to the struggle,” as they are literally “moments of movement” (Reyes 2012) that shift the order of relations of power. I examine these moments to draw out several key concepts articulated in and through these rebellions regarding the contours of the current, neo-extractivist, political moment in Amazonia, contemporary technologies of governance and ordering, the relationship between territory, ecology, and political subjectivities, and the overlaps and disjuncture between and among social movements, political organizations, and government. Each of

¹¹ Note that this dissertation is treating two different and opposed forms of “extraction.” Industrial extraction is the extraction associated with large-scale, commodity producing, mining, timber industries, agro-industry, energy production etc. The word “extraction” is also used in Amazonia to refer to people who depend on forest products for their livelihood. These types of livelihoods, based in *subsistence-oriented* extraction are protected in “Extractive Reserves.”
these topics will be broadly outlined through this discussion and taken up more substantively in the rest of this dissertation. I argue that the existing frameworks discussed above that theorize these acts of rebellion as desperate cries for help from the state, strategies of accumulation, or as the conjunctural effects of “tragic” situations provide us with only a partial understanding of these conflicts. Rather, the argument of this chapter is that such moments of rupture indicate the need to reframe an analysis of Amazonian politics from the given notion of “land conflict” to a processual analysis of antagonisms and “territorial struggle.” Far from being tragic effects of frontier or place-based processes, these conflicts are protagonized by actors who through struggle are cultivating both a different social and territorial order, as well as themselves as (collective) subjects.

In what follows, to make this argument, I first trace some of the key events that I witnessed at each of these encampments over the course of their several months in existence. While the genealogy of territorial struggle in Amazonia extends historically for centuries, this chapter provides an overview of the regional, national, and international contexts of the past four decades, when such conflict has been most intense. I begin with the military government’s modernization projects, because these projects intentionally, drastically re-territorialized the region, re-composing political realities in ways that are central to understanding these contemporary struggles. I interweave the micro-level events in the encampments with a broader discussion of the shifting regional and national relations among resistance, development, and governance in order to

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12 I move back and forth between the two events. For the reader to more easily follow the thread of each story, they are both italicized, but the conflict at Renascer is represented in bold and at Gleba Nova Olinda in italics. I also include the name of each in parantheses at the beginning of each section to help guide the reader.
highlight, on the one hand, how both past histories of struggle and the experiences in these spaces of resistance constitute contemporary political strategies, and on the other hand, to locate within these micro-level experiences some of the themes that are being expressed on a larger level across the region and explored in this dissertation.

After offering up a detailed account of the facts events of these rebellions, and discussions of the broader issues that they raise, I will draw on the work of several movement scholars to elaborate concepts expressed in these spaces of resistance that help us to better understand them. This will entail an analysis that explores, on the one hand how these rebellions express and intensify ongoing processes and dynamics – both in that they force pre-existing tensions to a greater level of intensity, and that they are based in and sharpen and strengthen pre-existing forms of collectivity. On the other hand, I will argue that events that occur in these spaces and moments open new horizons of struggle (e.g., they create new forms of politics and political subjects). In the final section, I will provide a brief outline of the remaining dissertation chapters.

**The Myth of Development**

*(Renascer)* Alcilene’s daughter called on November 26th instructing me to get on the next boat to Santa Maria and to bring recording equipment. “What’s happening?” I asked. “Just come” she responded. After nearly a year of accompanying the struggle for Renascer Extractive Reserve, I had become the movement’s default documentarian – taking pictures and doing audio and video recording of rights violations, violence, and resistance. I called Judith, my friend and colleague from the CPT, and we ran home to collect our things and rushed to the boat. It was well into the

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13 All individuals throughout this dissertation who are named, other than people who hold official (governmental, non-governmental, etc.) positions, are given pseudonyms.
dry season and the rivers were low. Our boat ran aground so many times that we lost count, and I laid for hours in my hammock wishing that sometimes, things in Amazon moved just a little bit faster. When we finally got to Santa Maria (a logging town on the periphery of the reserve), Alcilene (a social movement militant and leader) was distraught. “The barges passed already, two hours ago” were her only words. This meant that the loggers’ barges had descended from the sawmill upriver, passed our meeting place in Santa Maria, and were headed for a confrontation with the small group assembled at the mouth of the Tamuataí. It also meant that some of the most fearless militants were not there (as they had been waiting for us), and that we had no way to know what was going on.

We scrambled to find a rabeta (canoe with outboard motor) to take us the four hours up the Ururará River to its junction with the Tamuataí where two groups made up of people from communities from two different sides of the Resex were converging to confront the logging boats. The streets of Santa Maria – a town whose entire economy is based in the logging industry - grew silent as we walked by, except for three young girls who came up behind us to pick a fight with Alcilene. After what seemed like hours but was likely only about 45 minutes, we found a boat and a boat driver, loaded up our backpacks and hunkered down for four hours of a wet, freezing, and tense ride to the meeting point. After three hours, from under the towels where Judith and I were huddled for warmth, I heard Rosa give a hoot and start to laugh. “Well would you look at that!” she yelled pulling our soaked towels off of our heads, “I told you they were afraid of us.” Two barges loaded with timber were docked on the riverbank. We pulled out our cameras and started to snap pictures of them as they
snapped pictures of us. It was clear that they had stopped in order to avoid confrontation with the protesters ahead. Miraculously and appropriately, the sun came out, and laughing, we dried off and, relieved, began recounting the events of the last several hours over and over to each other.

Soon we came upon the small clearing that the two groups - who had already heard the news themselves from a passing boat - had begun to construct at the mouth of the Tamuatai. Exhausted, we stumbled out of the rabeta and collapsed on the shore. Someone handed us plates of fish and farinha (the region’s staple grain) and we began to exchange stories. There were only about 20 muddy, exhausted but elated people there and I wondered how they would have held up against the loggers’ hired guns, but didn’t ask.

Somehow – in ways I often cannot understand - word travels fast in this world where everything else seems to travel so slow. Hearing that the danger of immediate confrontation had passed, people start arriving from the communities of the Tamuatai and the Uruará. Some brought nothing more than a few mangos for the boat ride. Others were equipped with hammocks, salted meat, and bags of farinha. Someone spread a tarp and started to play the guitar. Others cleared a small area on the shore and people debated what would happen next. The atmosphere was quite festive.

As night fell, a speed boat pulled up to the shore and Manoel do Pão (a.k.a Manoel Viegas, advisor to the Mayor Sérgio Pingarilho, the PMDB candidate who had partnered with the Worker’s party to win the mayorship which had been held by the Hage family of the PSDB for 40 years), stepped out. Manoel was a logger himself, but “a good logger” who had run a small operation out of Santa Maria for decades,
had supported the actions that residents of Santa Maria and the traditional communities of the Renascer Extractive Reserve had made against the logging corporation three years prior – acts that had galvanized the movement for the reserve, as well as inspired similar actions across the region. He was not associated with the recent wave of speculative development. He reprimanded the people on the shore, telling them that what they were doing was dumb, unreasonable, and overly absolutist. Everyone has to negotiate with the logging companies he said. Even the Mayor, who was on their side, he said, had taken 230 thousand reais from the loggers in order to win the election. Even he himself (Manoel) had management plans outside of the Resex that he used as a ruse to take wood illegally from within it. That is simply how it is, he insisted. That is how everyone survives here. I turned on a video camera. His demeanor changed. He told them politely that the mayor would be out tomorrow to negotiate their departure from that spot. He left. Someone started re-strumming a guitar. People settled into their hammocks for the night.

By the morning assembly, there were approximately 170 people on the riverbanks and it quickly became clear that people’s expectations varied wildly for what this occupation might mean or what resolution might look like. Those closest to the sindicato argued for a compromise with the loggers – splitting the felled wood with them in exchange for their departure from the Resex. Others demanded the loggers leave immediately and the wood be returned to Resex communities. Most hoped that the mayor or managers from the federal agency responsible for the reserve, ICMBio (the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation) would arrive and resolve
their problems. After all, all that they wanted was enforcement of existing laws and the demarcation of the reserve. No one expected to be there for more than a week.

“The first interaction that most Amazonian peasants had with modernity,” (the concept of “peasant” will be further explored in Chapter Three) says Brazilian sociologist José da Souza Martins, “was the electric shock of torture” (quoted in Porto Gonçalves 2010) referring to the effects of the military governments’ (1964-1985) modernization project, which made territorial integration of the Amazon a key regime policy. It was thought, following modernization theory in vogue at the time, that technocratic, statist interventions would catapult this “backward”, “empty,” “land without men” into the very center of the modernizing project and Brazil into the modern world. The “National Development Plans” (1971) re-ordered Amazonian territory, organizing it around “development poles” linked by “integration corridors.” They cut roads through primary forest, nationalized millions of square kilometers of land along those roads and along national borders, offered fiscal (tax credits) and institutional (land rights) incentives to draw state and national developers and to stimulate foreign direct investment in mining, cattle production and logging and created massive “colonization” programs that offered Amazonian homesteads to hundreds of thousands of landless peasants from Brazil’s south and northeast in order to bring “men without land” to a “land without men.” Land values skyrocketed as land became a vehicle for capturing incentives, credits, and speculative cash gain (rather than, say, used for agriculture) (Schmink and Wood 1992; Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn 2011; Foweraker 1981; Becker 1995).
It turned out that Amazonia, however, was not a “land without men.” The encounter of the military government’s colonization project with regional inhabitants, as well as the encounter of highly capitalized developers with the new migrant landless peasant population erupted into a series of what looked like land wars but what are actually more like culture wars or, more aptly, territorial struggles. The myth of development – a myth that promised that Amazonia would be the salvation and redemption for the country, a resolution for both the misery of generations of dispossession and national underdevelopment – could only be realized through near-total regional re-organization. It was a re-organization explains Brazilian geographer Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves (2001) that transformed Amazonia from a region oriented in countless micro-territories around rivers to a single state-space integrated through roads, made legible (Scott 1998) and colonized through new property regimes (land nationalization, agrarian reform, and grilagem [land grabbing through fraud]) and thus re-organized according to the logic of mineral, timber, and ranching-based extraction. The superimposition of new property regimes on existing, collective ones is necessarily a violent process of exclusion (Blomley 2003). Their institution through the introduction of hundreds of thousands of landless peasants, the advance of timber, ranching, mining, and integrating infrastructure, and the infiltration by developers onto traditional lands, meant that the processes of structural violence grew deep roots, “geo-graphing” (Porto Gonçalves 2001) a new Amazonian territory that was rife with contradiction and conflict.

By the early 1980s, the destruction wrought by the advance of industrial capitalism into the Amazon was increasingly clear – deforestation rates were

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14 It is also important to note that national integration of the Amazon was never simply a national project. All of this was implemented with the support and funding of multi-lateral organizations and international businesses.
skyrocketing, levels of rural violence were at an all-time high, and the great development programs, suffering from a lack of funding due to the continent-wide and in fact global economic crisis had ground to a halt, marking another retreat of the state (Bunker 1985; Cleary 1993; Kohlhepp 1992; Simmons et al. 2007). The intensification of conflict over land was met by a reconfiguration of the forms of resistance. Across the region, Amazonia’s diverse peoples engaged in direct and violent confrontations with developers expanding into their territories (Hecht and Cockburn 2011; de Paula and da Silva 2008). In the interest of building a movement adequate to face the existing threat of the expansion of extractive industries and the corresponding land takeovers by southern Latifundia and national and international corporations, the practice of subsistence agriculture, overwhelming shared by most regional inhabitants (including new migrants and historical residents) became an intentional, strategic, objective category around which the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers’ Unions (Sindicatos dos Trabalhadores Rurais or STR) constructed a political category, the “rural worker” (a remnant category of the corporatist state re-imagined by social movements but never divorced from a state-making project – see Chapter Four for a more substantive discussion of this category). Nationally, rural workers organized broadly into a multifaceted “struggle for land,” as part of the rural component of the “new unionism,” which was key to the formation of the Workers’ Party in rural areas) (Grzybowski 1990; Leroy 1991; Houtzager 2001).

Of course, the “struggle for land” had existed since colonization. In this moment, it was re-articulated as a struggle for agrarian reform, which itself most commonly indicated a struggle for the expropriation of Latifundia’s land and its re-distribution to the
landless (Fernandes 1999). In much of Amazonia, however, this struggle was largely for collective and/or individual land rights by *posseiros* seeking to defend their territories from incursion by loggers, ranchers, miners, et cetera. The actions taken in defense of this land took on two different forms. The first was direct and often violent confrontation with developers, embodied most emblematically in the Rubber Tappers’ *empates*, where the tappers first tried to reason with the employees of developers and then, if that failed, forcibly expelled them (Keck 1995). The second, and more common form, organized more often through the union, was demand-based direct action – occupying streets, buildings, rivers, or roads until their demands for land rights were met. Land rights thus became, and to this day remain, the strategic focus of struggles for rural stability (Leroy 1991; Little 2001; Hecht and Cockburn 2011). The overlaps, tensions, and disjunctures between struggles that sought redistribution and those that sought to protect existing occupations, which, I will argue led to new and explicitly territorial forms of resistance will be further explored in Chapters Four and Five.

**Territorial Struggle Goes “Green”**

*(Gleba Nova Olinda)* We walked in a single file line through the forest for hours. There hadn’t been any food to take with us from the village, so we snacked on palm fruits and small sips of the two liters of water that we had brought for seven people. Our stomachs growled. It seemed like we were walking in circles. Even with my GPS I doubted that I could have found my way back to the village, but they didn’t call our guide “*bicho do mato*” (a play on words that means both shy person and creature of the forest) for nothing and I wasn’t worried. People that make their lives in the forest know the forest much better than I know the streets of my town.
The forest was littered with signs of loggers – felled hardwood trees, roads, clearings, signs saying “keep out” or with permit numbers from the state government, and stakes - lines of stakes that went on and on - marking out the loggers claims and designating which trees to fell. The stakes, bicho do mato told us, hadn’t been there the day before. They were topped with red paint that was still wet. It was one week into the occupation at São Pedro and the loggers may not have been moving timber out of the Gleba, but they were clearly speeding up their work in the forest. We speculated that they were likely feeling unsure of the repercussions of the protest and thus felling as much wood as possible. According to the law as everyone understood it, loggers would have the right to all of the wood that they had felled prior to the time that the area was designated as “protected.” In other words, everything on the ground would be considered to be theirs. By the end of our two days, everyone had learned how to use the GPS, I had learned every type of edible palm in the forest, and we had grown bold, unafraid of the loggers.
Figure 4: Mapping Logging in Gleba Nova Olinda
The day after we finished, I was back at the Praia de Pedrão and another day and a half later I was in Santarém, downloading our points and mapping the logging activity. The area where we had done most of our mapping in a community called Vista Alegre, a traditional community that had petitioned ITERPA, the state land agency, to grant them a collective land claim in the form of an Agroextractive Settlement (PAE) that covered 25,000 hectares. When the settlement was created in law, contrary to the agreement, the area was diminished to 5,000 hectares along the river (most of the forest was eliminated). When I downloaded the points, it became apparent why. The new settlement line corresponded perfectly with the periphery of the area staked out as the loggers’ “management plan”.

**Figure 5: Mapping Logging in Gleba Nova Olinda**
One week later, back on the beach at Praia de Pedrão, in a meeting with the Ministerio Publico, the MP gave the people a usual line – we know that you say the loggers are working in the Gleba, but there is nothing we can do for you without proof. “You want proof?” yelled one of the movement leaders, “Here’s your proof,” he said, throwing our report and maps on the table. “Who made this?” she asked. “Bicho do mato” someone yelled out and everyone laughed. It felt like victory. But it would quickly become apparent that victory could never be that easy.

(Renascer) One month later, I found myself trekking through a different forest with another group of people. This time, we were in the Resex Renascer, outside of the community of Floresta, near the edge of the Reserve, where loggers were felling trees as fast as they could, working on the assumption that by the time ICMBio (the federal agency responsible for conservation areas) got around to demarcating the reserve boundaries, they would have the right to all already-felled wood. The Jaraú logging company was logging in Floresta’s common lands and Floresta’s residents had been not-so-gently warned that they should stay away. We had to visit the community two different times to find a guide to take us to the logging area, because no one from the community had wanted to enter the area, except, eventually, for a young man named Edival whose great-grandparents had founded the community.

This time, no one was chatting or joking. The leader of the line gasped as he almost stepped on a snake. Bad omen. We stopped and watched him break its neck and toss it into the woods and took sips of water. With the sounds of our legs moving through the understory momentarily quieted, we realized that we could already hear
the distant buzz of chainsaws. Ten more minutes along the path and chainsaws were working all around us. Moving as silently as possible through the forest, we could see and hear massive trees falling not 75 meters away.

![Image: Mapping Logging in Renascer](image)

There is a time lapse between the fall and the thunder-like crash of the snapping trunk of the rainforests’ massive trees and it is incredibly disorienting to not be certain which voluminous crack is related to which tree. We stood, paralyzed in awe for a few minutes before it occurred to me to flip on the audio recorder to try to capture the sound of the saws working and trees falling (it didn’t work). The spaces that these giant trees leave empty provide perfect access to a clear sky for the 3rd rate hand-me-down GPS that I had thrown in my luggage as an afterthought when packing for my
“fieldwork” and that had now turned me into the lower Amazon’s unofficial mapper of illegal logging. With the saws working so close, it was tempting to try to get a photo of a man with a chainsaw in his hand, but we thought better of it and left quickly.

Adrenaline propelled us back to Floresta in what seemed like minutes. We had a cafezinho, took a quick “bath” in the crystal waters of the upper Uruará – as yet uncontaminated by logging boats and cattle - and loaded into our rabetas for the six-hour ride back to the encampment. We were exhausted and starving, but the euphoria of success made the ride fun rather than tedious, and our successful endeavor had even inspired a few of Floresta’s residents to come and join the encampment.15

Since colonization, the Amazon has been a repository for outsiders’ dreams, but these dreams were generally of wealth gained through control over land and raw materials. It was only as recently as the 1980s that environmental activists, NGOs, international agencies, and government policies began to target this region as an environmental resource needing conservation (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). The re-signification of the Amazon as environment changed the nature of Amazonian politics in two substantive ways. First, it gave the entire nation, and in fact the entire planet, a stake in Amazonian preservation, nationalizing and internationalizing regional governance. Second, it shifted the content of debates over land and resources to

15 The movement used the maps that we compiled to pressure the forest enforcement agency IBAMA to implement an enforcement operation. It led to what was at that time the largest bust of an illegal logging operation in Brazilian history. For English language press on this story, see http://www.wwf.org.br/?26243/Historic-seizure-of-illegal-timber-at-Renascer-Extractive-Reserve [accessed 7 July 2012].
debates about environment – on all sides of struggle, valid claims to Amazonian space had to be made in terms of the greater environmental good.

Northern environmentalists, led by the major international Environmental NGOs (what Alcorn [2005] calls “Big Conservation” – Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, and World Wildlife Fund, and, with a slightly different mission, Greenpeace) launched national and international campaigns targeting “tropical deforestation,” a concept that had not even existed in name prior to the 1970s (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the Amazon, forest-dwelling traditional people, most famously the rubber tappers, forged strategic alliances with the international environmental community. The assassination of rubber tapper leader Chico Mendes in 1989 set off a chain of events that initiated new collaborations between the Brazilian state, national and international environmentalists, multilateral development institutions, foreign governments, and localized civil society organizations. International funding for conservation and conservation-oriented development flooded into the region (most notably through the World Bank, G-7, Brazilian government partnership called the Pilot Program to Conserve Brazilian Forests, PPG-7) firmly entrenching the new “sustainable development” model, professionalizing social movements (Buclet and Leroy 2002) and thus effectively moving their engagement with the state “from conflict to cooperation” (Kolk 1998), shifting development strategies in the Amazon to focus on conservation through protected areas on the one hand, and increased efficiency of expanded production on the other (Keck 1995; Hecht and Cockburn 2011). Nature became “the environment” and “the environment” central to any (institutional) political conversations about the region.
The rise to hegemony of the sustainable development paradigm and what would come to be called “environmental governance” did not entail a simple re-orientation of discussion, but the strategic deployment of a particular, positivist, conception of nature that posits nature as external, pre-given, knowable, and thus, manageable (Smith 1984; E. Leff, Valenzuela, and Vieira 2001; E. Leff 2005). This rendering of regional issues as environmental and technical (e.g., management-based), meant the prioritization of technical – as opposed to say, political – solutions (Porto Gonçalves 1989; Porto Gonçalves 2006; Pinton 1997; Mitchell 2002; Tsing 2005).16 The high level of international funding for conservation and the shrinking of the state under what was then the neoliberal 1990s meant that many of these techniques were increasingly outsourced to NGOs. Chapter Two will examine an example of this NGO-led environmental governance in an examination of the responsible soy and soy moratorium programs that fit within the sustainable development paradigm and embody more specifically the phenomenon increasingly called “Green Capitalism” by regional social movements.

The primary state-led strategy for resolving the contradictions of developmentalism and conservation was through re-territorialization. State projects geared toward developing the Amazon historically focused on imposing order through industrial extracivism, infrastructure construction, and to a lesser extent, land rights. The re-signification of Amazonia as environment required new forms of territorialization. This was, I, will argue in Chapter Three and have argued elsewhere (Baletti 2012), largely achieved through Ordenamento Territorial, a technology of ordering that

16 I include citations to authors writing on other parts of the world to gesture to the fact that this is not simply an Amazonian issue, although the Amazon is a key place where many of these strategies were devised.
integrated different forces (repressive, economic, administrative), techniques (scientific, calculative, legal), and devices (property titles, development credits, conservation payments) to regulate territorial relationships. While Ordenamento Territorial is a primary mechanism for constructing Amazonia’s contemporary political reality, it is not simply an idealized concept imposed by “the state” onto space, but a technology employed by a range of actors including, in Western Pará, state federal and local government organizations, private actors, NGOs, and historically grassroots actors. An effect of this was that communities struggling against territorial appropriation increasingly made their claims in terms of deforestation and environmental destruction and articulated them in the language of the state – GIS maps and denunciations through the federal attorney (ministério publico).

**Challenging the Multicultural Territorial State**

_Gleba Nova Olinda_ Since loggers first arrived in the lower Tapajós-Arapiuns region in the 1980s, the people there, largely working with and through the Rural Workers’ Union had been seeking collective land rights to protect themselves from predatory industry. They had fought for, and gotten, an extractive reserve – the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex – and an agrarian reform settlement – the Lago Grande Agro-extractive Settlement. These acquisitions were considered to be great successes, but they also

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17 Specifically, in Western Pará, government actors include the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio), the Ministry of the Environment, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), the State Environmental Secretary (SEMA), the Institute for Forest Development of Pará (IDEFLO), and the Land Institute of Pará (ITERPA). Examples of private actors include Vale do Rio Doce and Cargill. The primary NGOs involved are Conservation International (CI) The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Institute for Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM) and the Health and Happiness Project (PSA). Grassroots actors include the Rural Workers’ Union (STR).
brought great change – the historically fluid modes of inhabiting a specific, but not bounded, territory gave way to a property regime that was still collective, but also clearly demarcated, usually bounded by rivers. Cartographically, rivers are logical natural boundaries for territorial movements, but socially, they are problematic because river-dwelling communities always straddle rivers, and thus these new regimes cut divided river-dwelling communities down the middle.

Each time one of these protected areas was created, loggers were expelled (if not immediately, eventually). This did not end logging in a given area, it simply displaced it to a nearby one. Loggers, excluded from one area, simply jumped the boundary and moved into the unprotected areas. In what residents characterize as a government compromise with developers, Gleba Nova Olinda, a state-held area repeatedly “left out” of the boundaries of the protected areas, was effectively opened to loggers and soy farmers through a series of government land agreements (complex property rights negotiations further explored in Chapter Four) as well as a zoning plan that encouraged “expansion” of extractive development. As is common practice, the loggers bribed some of the families and communities of GNO, providing them with small cash payments, motors for electricity, and short term work, in exchange for permission to build roads, remove timber, and to seeking private (rather than collective) property (which would allow them to sell their land or logging rights), creating tension among communities.

That several communities within Gleba Nova Olinda were demanding an indigenous territory also created tension. Three of the Gleba’s 13 communities, all of whom share lives and histories that are overlapping and in common, had initiated a

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18 A “Gleba” is a name for an undesignedated territorial unit held by the state.
movement to re-claim their indigenous identity – an identity destroyed by centuries of repression against the region’s indigenous communities. This “resurgent” indigenous movement was contentious – and press manipulation of public opinion, differential economic incentives, and age-old racialized prejudices fostered tension not only between those who sided with the loggers and the indigenous communities, but also between the indigenous and traditional communities, who, through their different identity claims had access to different sorts of rights and resources.

For several years now, the people of the Arapiuns region had watched barges of wood – up to 30 in a single week according to inhabitants—descend the Arapiuns River from Gleba Nova Olinda. According to the many stories repeated nightly in the encampment, despite years of organizing themselves as part of the Resex or part of the Agro-extractive Settlement (essentially a Resex that is managed by a different government agency) or part of the Indigenous Movement, watching the barges pass and meeting and talking together, it became clear that their territory, as one of the beach protesters explained to me, “did not have any relation to the lines on the maps [of the extractive reserves, the logging permits in the Gleba, etc.]” Rather, the hundreds of communities of the Arapiuns River share “a life and a culture,” to which Gleba Nova Olinda is essential. “Gleba Nova Olinda” another inhabitant said, echoing similar statements by many others, “is ours - all of us who live on the Arapiuns, and we needed to protect our patrimony, our land, our life.” They waited for the right opportunity, and they decided to mobilize. They called their movement, the Movement in Defense of the Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River (MDVCA).
People came from inside and outside of the Gleba, from indigenous and traditional communities. Those that couldn’t come followed the events intently on the local low power radio station “Radio Rural,” sent fish, farinha, gas, or messages of good will. During its more than one month-long duration, the group on the beach swelled to 1200 people at its largest. State agencies came immediately as well – not to negotiate their demands, but to obtain the release of the wood. First the State Environmental Secretary came (notoriously logger-friendly) with police escorts to order the wood released. Then ten police officers came alone. Then other state environmental enforcement agents (Ideflor) came. During each appearance, they tried to force the movement to take an action. First they simply ordered the barges released, then they said they would take them elsewhere to determine the wood’s legality, then they threatened to arrest people. Each time, the movement refused, and the officials left in frustration.

In the beginning, the movement demands were quite specific and oriented around what was possible within the law – that state and federal agents work together to inspect the ongoing management plans in the Gleba, that the two traditional settlements (Vista Alegre and Aruã), be enlarged to their originally negotiated size of 25,000 hectares, that the indigenous territory be demarcated, that current management plans be suspended until they could be checked for legality, that the wood auctioned and profits distributed to the communities, and that illegal activities in the Gleba be ended. By the end of the protest, their demands had become more expansive – an end to extractivism in all of the Glebas (there are three), a return of the stolen resources to the communities, and the establishment of the indigenous/traditional territories – the areal size of which grew with every government audience.
1985 marked the return to democracy in Brazil and the official end of the military dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1964. On the one hand, this time tends to be characterized as one of political opening that saw the rise of New Social Movements and the emergence of a cultural politics in Brazil that opened the door to a valorization of difference (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998). On the other hand, it is also the point of departure for tracing the rise of the neoliberal state, with its aggressive structural adjustment programs and the wealth concentration and the associated increasing poverty and inequality (Amann and Baer 2002). Among the fruits of the counterhegemonic struggle waged throughout Brazilian civil society was the “pluralist” state, which provided new openings for “citizenship” for previously disadvantaged and marginalized groups - new forms of inclusion in the re-articulated/re-articulating state. This “pluralism” was enshrined in the preamble to the 1988 constitution, a constitution that also formally recognized the rights of indigenous people, the social function of property, and even had a chapter dedicated to “the environment,” creating several legal avenues to rectifying that emblematic expression of inequality in Brazil – land concentration.

As a result, the 1990s and early 2000s saw the development of a new property regime granting recognition to these different identity categories and legally formalizing a particular relationship to land for each (largely under the banner of Agrarian Reform), either through land re-distribution or through the granting of collective land rights. In the Amazon, this has led to new mosaics of conservation areas and indigenous territory (even if often only on paper) - and a proliferation of new land claims for groups such as *quilombolas*, indigenous peoples, rubber tappers, river-dwellers, *babaçu* breakers, and
others. Scholars have argued that legal solutions, however, tend to recognize difference and incorporate it into the given system, not to rethink that system itself and that this “neoliberal multiculturalism” (Hale 2005) has often served the purpose not of recognizing and protecting difference, but of (re)drawing it in a way that is legible to and thus subsumed into state logics.

Thus, state pluralism, functions as what Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) calls an “aggregating meta-discourse,” that renders difference equivalent and exchangeable and gathers it into the single, organizing logic of the state, maintaining the status quo, albeit with the appearance of “inclusion.” In this vein, we see a now well-documented process of re-subjectification when groups render themselves legible to the state as particular kinds of subjects, according to state criteria, as part of a process to access particular kinds of rights, often to land (e.g., traditional people seeking Resex present themselves as environmental stewards) which itself leads to myriad, complex problems, not the least of which are struggles over management or governance of these spaces, criminalization of key livelihood practices and/or destruction of resources (further discussed in Chapter Five).19

Twenty years of neoliberal multi-culturalism, however, has also given movements time to assess its impacts and increasingly, we see recognition by movements that simply attaining land rights within the field of the state does not meet their desires for justice. As a response, I argue in Chapter Four, movements are shifting their demands for land, to demands for territory – from the demand for property and the right to economic productivity to the demand for life and the production of their world. This shifting

19 For examples of different analyses of these phenomenon, see, for example, Hale 2005, French 2009.
demand is not only expressed in new forms of discourse (e.g., in the name – the movement in defense of life and culture), but in new kinds of territorial claims that break with linear notions of traditional and modern (that we see, for example, in descriptions of indigenous people who “still” speak their indigenous language or “still” practice shamanistic rituals), and redefine the concept of the “authentic” indigenous or traditional subjectivity. They do this not by claiming territory through a simple reference to a primordial past, or to kinship networks, but rather the re-forging of explicitly collective subjects as explicitly socio-political (Castro 2008), territorial (Porto Gonçalves 2010a), and constantly produced.

These new claims that have emerged over the past two decades move away from a construction of struggle in terms of economic production and toward a struggle organized around the concepts of ecology, ethnicity, and collective self-determination. In Chapter Four, I will argue that these new forms of struggle challenge the administrative (technical) categories of the state and thus the political economy of state order that they express and also the paradigms of sustainable development and green capitalism that this ordering makes possible.

The Contradictions of Neo-extractivism

(Gleba Nova Olinda) On the morning of November 4th, 2009, before the sun’s first rays struck the snow-white sand on the beach of the Arapiuns river community of Sao Pedro, most of the 200 or so people camped out on the beach were already staring east down the river, scanning the horizon for signs of a motorboat. As the cooking crew began brewing the coffee and rationing out crackers – four per person – rabetas from nearby communities packed with families began to arrive. The usual near-festive atmosphere of
what was now a 42-day protest was strained as people whispered their predictions as to whether or not representatives of the federal government would show up to negotiate. For over a month now, the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns river had been blocking the river to commercial traffic and holding two barges with what was estimated to contain at least one million reais of wood that they believed had been illegally taken from their land - the as yet un-demarcated indigenous and traditional territories up the river in Gleba Nova Olinda.

![Figure 7: Movement in Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River](image)

Despite previous demands and promises, the first time the government had come to negotiate, they had sent only the Ministerio Publico and the meeting had not gone well. The Ministerio Publico believed they were acting in good faith, there to support the movement, but many people on the beach saw only more government bureaucrats delivering the ambivalent message that their hands were tied. A revolving group of leaders had spent the past few weeks going back and forth to the Santarém to register complaints and demand attention from the numerous government agencies that should...
have been able to address their concerns, but who, one by one claimed that GNO was somebody else’s responsibility. The movement had given a public ultimatum – meet our demands or the barges would burn, but the last word that they had gotten was that no one was coming. A frustrated contingent of us, who had been engaged in these negotiations in the city had arrived from Santarem the night before with this news and now, as some people stared tensely at the horizon, others began to set off in canoes and rabetas for the opposite shore to begin collecting kindling.

At around 11 o’clock someone gave a shout. Looking east we could make out a speedboat headed for the encampment. Three government representatives arrived, but it was clear that they were not people with decision-making power – the Ministerio Publico, a representative from the municipality, and a functionary from Ideflor, along with two marina police. They disembarked looking disheveled, nervous, and sweating in the near mid-day sun. Everyone huddled into the shaded tent in the center of the beach and after introductions, the Ideflor representative began to talk. His statements were vague, but the questions that he received were pointed and when pressed he responded that he had no decision-making power but was there to take people’s complaints back to his superiors. No surprise. With that statement, the entire crowd jumped angrily to their feet and walked away. A contingent, composed of many different people, but largely those not identifiable as leaders and whose participation surprised me, piled into rabetas and set off to where the barges were being guarded. Within twenty minutes, one million dollars worth of wood was going up in flames. The barges burned for four days.

Back on the beach, people sat for a long time and watched the blaze, and then slowly began to break down the camp, pile into their rabetas and head back to their
communities. Sitting beside Seu Francisco, one of the members of the MDVCA current representative body I asked, “How do you feel?”

“What do you mean?”

“Now that this has all ended.”

“Ended?” He asked, “No, my dear, now it has begun.”

(Renacer) After 45 days, the muddy, precarious, temporary encampment on the banks of the Uruará River had grown into a small village. It was organized like any rural village, but composed of people from all across the reserve. There were several different “streets” (small paths) running through different “neighborhoods” (groups of makeshift tents) organized according to the communities that people had come from (so there was the Espírito Santo neighborhood, the Santo Antonio neighborhood etc.). There was a shared encampment barracão in the center, where different groups took turns cooking, fishing, and holding watch. There were daily school lessons for the children, and even energy – a boat motor used to power a light and occasionally a TV for a soccer game or novella screening. Aside from a visit from the Mayor on the second day of the encampment, government officials never came, although several representatives from the group were constantly going between the encampment, Prainha, and Santarêm for meetings and audiences with various state agencies.

Passenger boats passed, and there were often harsh words or nasty looks exchanged between the encampment and people from Santa Maria connected to
the logging industry. The loggers also intimidated the encampment, for example, by buzzing their assemblies with low-flying planes, and paying some of the newer participants for information when they returned to Santa Maria. They threatened violence against the members of the encampment that came from Santa Maria (the logging town), threatening their lives, their children, their jobs, and even setting fire to Rosa’s house. In the everyday life of the camp, however, a certain rhythm was established that was not colored by fear, but rather by the heightened sense of interconnection that comes from struggling together, and also the connection that comes from sharing the more mundane aspects of life – passing the time through conversation, card games, and watching the river go by.

Figure 8: Meeting at the Encampment at Renascer

In the early morning hours of January 11, Edival, the lookout, saw some disconcertingly large boats making their way down the river. He rubbed his eyes
and looked again. There were six barges loaded with timber making their way towards them. He grabbed his rifle, shouted to wake the encampment, jumped into a rabeta and headed upriver. When the barges came into range, their gunmen opened fire. Edival was shot in the chest and Ivanaldo coming up in a canoe behind him was shot in the leg (photo here). As they passed, they continued to fire on the camp, but most of the unarmed group fled into the forest. No one else was hurt. The barges passed.

The next morning, after a visit from the Prainha police and politicians who promised that the situation would be taken care of, the encampment assembly decided that their action had served its purpose and it was time to disband. They discussed what they had learned in this process. Over the 45 days of the encampment, it had become clear to everyone that neither the mayor, nor the union, nor the ICMBio were going to come and solve their problems for them, that in their words “the reserve was not a solution to [our] problems, but a tool we can use to meet [our] goals” – the goal of living the lives that they wanted to live in the place that they considered to be their own. The goal, we might say, of self-determination.

They formed a 12-person group of delegates who would represent what they called “the Movement in Defense of Renascer” (MDR). This group, it was decided would spend the next few months visiting every community in the Resex to discuss how a Resex-wide democratic governance might be structured, how rules could be agreed on that would suit everyone’s needs and more broadly, the meaning of democracy. At the end of the process, all would be invited to an
assembly where a Resex-wide association (called the Associação Mãe) would be formed. At that point, MDR would be dissolved and the association would carry out the will of the people. The next phase had begun.

After decades constructing a nationwide base, largely through the building of they syndical (both rural and urban) movement, the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) took the presidency in 2002 with the election of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Over this past decade, the party also won a significant number of municipal mayorships, seats on city council and in state legislatures, and governorships. Along with these elected positions came a host of appointed positions and many former social movement militants moved into government. Over the decade or so that saw the workers’ party gain significant power and space within the field of electoral politics, the rural syndical movement held in tension its function to, as one syndicalista described, “[bring] together many different leftist politics who debated each other to set the party line” with another function increasingly “organized around the office, the group of deputy X or councilman Y, pursuing strategies only to secure the next term.” The tension expressed in both of theses struggle between the rural workers union and emerging political actors outside of the party speaks to the fact the movement of the PT into government was not an unqualified victory of the movements, but a historical shift that gave rise to new tensions.

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20 Beginning in the mid-1970s and becoming firmly entrenched in the 1980s, the rural workers’ union (STR), and by extension the workers’ party had become practically synonymous with political representation for rural people. The STRs were not only the primary place to access government benefits (from health to retirement to small loans through FNOs, the program to finance sustainable rural development, and then PRONAF, the National Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture), but they were the mediators who helped people to secure their access to land. The vast majority of people interviewed across the greater Santarém region were union members (even if their reasons for being members were largely for the economic benefits).
An analysis of progressive government and its tensions and contradictions in Brazil is an extremely complex topic that cannot be adequately addressed in any single text; however, as stated in the introduction, one of the arguments of this dissertation is as one of the primary sites for the intensification of extractive, commodity-oriented development, Amazônia it presents an particularly key location from which to examine some of the most significant tensions that have emerged along with the progressive state. The neo-extractive model embodies a developmentalism reminiscent of the military dictatorships’ projects, which the Workers’ Party and syndical movement founded itself explicitly in opposition to (and which evolved to an opposition to neoliberalism more generally). Although there are similarities to previous developmentalisms, the structure of neo-extractivism is also substantively different – funded through public private partnerships and the Brazilian Development Bank rather than multi-lateral organizations, environmentally sensitive, and linked to anti-poverty programs (Dilma even calls her Accelerated Development Plan, or PAC, the PAC against Misery) – based in a “progressive” or “neo-extractivism” that holds within it new or re-deployed conceptions of nature, development, and politics that will be explored in the following chapters.

While Amazonia is certainly not the only site of industrial extraction in Brazil, it is one of the regions that these contradictions are particularly evident for a number of reasons. The Amazon houses the vast majority of extractive wealth (other than petroleum and including bauxite, gold, iron and other minerals and precious stones), as well as potential sources of energy to fuel that industry or itself to be sold internationally (in the form of hydroelectric dams), and ports for the transport of agro-industrial products produced in Brazil’s remote center-west region, and a road network that has the potential
to link Brazil to the rest of South America (The BR-163 is also part of the IIRSA development). The growth in soy production to the south along with the development, in the early late 1990s, of heat and moisture tolerant varieties of soy has pushed soy production into the region, inspired the production of massive infrastructure projects, and also displaced cattle production further into the region. The cattle industry itself has also grown substantially. In 2003, cattle illness outbreaks in Europe, the eradication of foot and mouth disease in much of the Amazon, trade liberalization in beef markets and a devaluation of Brazilian currency all combined to set the conditions for Brazil to became the world’s largest beef exporter and beef production expanded into the Amazon. These combined processes resulted in a rapid expansion of the logging industry in the region and especially in Western Pará (deforestation rates spiked there after 1997 and into the early 2000s) (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006). This development stimulates the expansion of the logging industry, which is usually the first form of extraction (forest clearing precedes almost all other forms), and as a result is often the first industry to move into more undeveloped territories. That these newer development areas are already inhabited by traditional people and migrant smallholders who have also been making new demands for self-determination means that we see a new wave of struggles emerging over this New Extractivism.21 Conflicts that appear to be, in their most immediate sense,

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21 Pará State is the largest timber producing and exporting region in the Amazon, accounting for 40% of production and 60% of international exports. Imazon reported that in a one-year period between 2009 and 2010, 65% of the wood in the state of Pará was harvested illegally (Pereira et al. 2011). International exports go primarily to the US, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, France, and Japan. Logging is the second most lucrative state export (next to mineral extraction),21 45% of which comes from Western Pará, an area encompassing approximately 1/5th of the state in a “buffer zone” around the Santarém-Cuiaba highway (the BR-163). Because it controls such a large and shifting territory, is deeply imbricated with all other extractive industry, and generates so much income itself, Politicians from all parties are deeply tied to the logging industry (this will be further addressed in Chapter Five), which has direct effects on loggers’ ability to attain permits in areas where they should technically be illegal, to have their areas prioritized for access creation (through various forms of property rights creation, see Chapter Three), and to avoid enforcement.
over logging are actually inextricably intertwined with all of these processes and thus an important window onto contemporary territorial struggles.

These new struggles occur on a macro and micro political level – from the national and international controversies that pit developmentalism against environmentalism discussed above (an oversimplified and misleading dichotomy, I will argue in Chapter Three), to localized breaks between movement, social mediator organizations, and party. Traditional social mediator organizations, which have opted for more conciliatory positions toward government, find themselves in a complex position. On the one hand, they are seen by people as movement leaders, and yet are reluctant -- and by this I mean there is an institutionalized reluctance -- to take oppositional positions (for an excellent discussion of these same tensions within the Rubber Tappers’ movement in Acre, see de Paula and da Silva 2008). Actions are beginning to be taken across the region, such as the ones discussed here, independent of these traditional social mediators, which themselves, I will argue in Chapter Five, have begun to function, in some cases as the state, as they are deeply invested in maintaining given order, namely hierarchical relations of control. Chapter Five will explore this complex, shifting relationships among social movements, social mediator organizations historically aligned with social movements, and the state in a context where these very categories have become uncertain.

**BORN IN FIRE**

Moments of rupture, which appear in various forms and go by many names – acts of insubordination, deinstitutionalized revolt, insurrection, and spontaneous rebellion, to

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Heads of government agencies that have tried to intervene in unethical processes have been summarily dismissed (Daniel Cohenca, former head of IBAMA being a case in point).
name a few – have been alternatively dismissed as reactionary or overemphasized for their revolutionary potential. As an alternative and following recent work in and on Latin American social movements,22 in this chapter I have privileged an examination of these moments in order to, in the words of Raul Zibechi (2010), “encounter what lies behind and below the established forms,” treating them as “lightening rods” to illuminate the specific issues and concepts that become visible within them. In this last section, I analyze these moments along three different horizons – the issues that they embody, the pre-existing relations that make these moments possible and the political potential that they in turn open or make visible. First, the events recounted above bring into sharp relief the stakes of contemporary political conflict and help us to understand its historical and geographical specificity. As such, these particular struggles have much to tell us about the continuities and discontinuities that the current Neo-extractivist moment in Amazonia has with prior historical periods, about the dynamic relations among territory, ecology, and political subjectivities, and about the overlaps and disjunctures among social movements, political organizations, and government, all of which will be elaborated in turn in the remainder of this dissertation (see chapter summaries below for these specific arguments).

It is not that these issues were fully formed, yet latent or unspoken and in these moments it is as if we shine a light on them in the dark. Rather, within these moments of explicit oppositionality, ongoing tensions and contradictions present within the current socio-political relations are forced to a greater level of intensity. In both of these struggles, we see the argument made explicit that the intensification of extractive industry simply cannot occur in these areas without the destruction of the already-existing form of life

22 See, for example, the Winter 2012 issue the South Atlantic Quarterly on Autonomy and Emancipation in Latin America.
there. We see that over the course of the occupations, there is a growing recognition that only making demands on government would be insufficient to meet movement demands. In consequence, there is a shift in the nature of movement objectives from, we might say, those directed primarily outward (that the government might meet), to those directed inward (that the people might develop a strategy to meet themselves). We also see, as discussed above, increasing tensions between older forms of political organization and the new strategies and voices that protagonize these struggles.

Next, we can also read these events as expressions, and intensifications, of ongoing processes and dynamics within the communities that participate in them. EP Thompson (1970, 1971, 1990), James Scott (1976, 1985, 1991), Ranijit Guha (1988, 1997, 1999) and Ana Esther Ceceña (1995, 2012) have all illuminated the existing structures of organization and the more subtle expressions of resistance hidden in the every day. EP Thompson’s work has taught us that while “riots” may be triggered by specific, conjunctural events, they are not reducible to those events alone. They have their origin in historical, culturally specific, structural relations of force on the one hand, and, in what he called the crowd’s “moral economy” on the other. James Scott’s (1990) work has taught us to be attentive to the “infrapolitics,” or the daily struggles that are “invisible by design,”

23 Chapters Four and Five will both briefly treat the concept of “community” more substantively, both its political history in Amazonia as related to the Catholic Church (Chapter Four), and conflicts and contradictions among groups that self-identify as communities (Chapter Five). I would like to flag here that I do not mean to present “community” as a unified whole (in fact, one of the primary effects of these conflicts is to exacerbate pre-existing tensions). People engaged in these struggles will often invoke their communities and speak for their communities as communities precisely because of the concept’s vague yet powerful referent to a collective political subject. That does not mean that any particular community representation is not uncontested. (On the complexities of “community” see for example Li 1996; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Schroeder 1999; M. J. Watts 2004).

24 Several scholars have taken up a more substantive analysis and extension of the concept of moral economy. For examples see (Scott 1976; Watts 1984; Mallon 1995; Sayer 2004). For a review of all of these authors and a re-theorization of this concept, see Wolford 2005.
of subordinate groups that he argues make such acts of rebellion possible. These everyday, often symbolic, acts of resistance, for Scott, are the infrastructure (e.g., form the basis for) the visible acts of political action that receive more attention. Thus, the conditions of possibility for open rebellion is the accumulation of smaller acts of transgression that slowly shift the relations of force by creating an opening for more confrontational and visible rebellion.\textsuperscript{25} Rebellion is a question of intensity and it is an accumulation of negative, transgressive force that leads to a moment of rupture.

The limitations of this framework are that it supposes that there is a structure of domination, and subordinate subjects who reject or resist that structure. It lacks an analysis of the production of subjects (as Thompson certainly would have argued for). Guha on the other hand, highlights the fact that there is a creative or productive element to the subaltern domain located, he argues, in autonomous spaces for the construction of resistance and rebellion. Ana Esther Ceceña (2012) engages all of these authors to argue that it is not only intentionally resistant practice but rather the daily strategies of survival, the practices and exchanges of everyday life, and also spaces of struggle from which “the new world springs.” (118).

Within the episodes outlined above, we can see that the very existence of these moments and spaces of rebellion – temporary spaces outside of the rhythms of daily life – at Renascer and São Pedro were only possible because they were based in the dense networks of existing relationships and the ongoing practices of community life. The 1200 people who arrived at São Pedro with almost no resources, could create an encampment that could feed, house, entertain, guard, negotiate, and, in fact, re-forge themselves as a

\textsuperscript{25} In his words, “the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like snowflakes on a steep mountainside, set off an avalanche (192).”
movement. Similarly, the small crew on the banks of the Tamuatai could erect a village that was a microcosm of a 150,000 hectare reserve with little more than fishing lines, hammocks, farina and some wood-cutting tools, because of the existing social relations that provide the capacity to self-organize. The near seamless establishment of these encampments demonstrates that the organization and relations crafted through the functioning of daily life is what I would call another form of pre-figurative “infrastructure” (a la Scott) that creates the conditions of possibility for such acts of insubordination. In Chapter Four, we will further explore the way these forms of organization is a key element (what I will call there production of “convention”) in processes of territorialization.

Finally, while these events are made possible by ongoing relationships and social organization, the changes that we see within the demands and strategies of the people engaged in or inspired by these events is evidence that they open new horizons of struggle. They are key spaces of political subject formation. The occupations on the beach at São Pedro or on the banks of the Uruará disrupted the rhythms of daily life, creating time and space to reflect on conflict itself, forcing actors on both sides to act, and as a result, analyze and adjust the strategic and tactical objectives of resistance. The adrenaline of conflict, the euphoria of victory, however temporary, along with the daily practices of community life within a temporarily constituted community on the beach at São Pedro, or on the banks of the Uruará, as well as the stories of these places and events that traveled throughout the region, galvanized hundreds, if not thousands, of people to participate in both of these movements after the dispersal of the camps.
The value of these spaces and events is not simply catharsis, but also the opportunity for innovation that is based in forms of struggle. For several weeks and months, at both of these encampments, residents of the region organized themselves into a temporary community and different forms of organization supplanted and exceeded the organizational and territorial categories of the state (e.g., traditional and indigenous people became a movement for life, people inside and outside of the reserve became a movement in defense of its territory). The traditional political organizing structures and hierarchies were sidelined or adapted (namely the community presidents, religious leaders, and union representatives were not prominent). Most significantly the sindicatos (unions), at the center of “grassroots: mobilization for decades, played no central role and in some ways played an antagonistic role to these rebellions. Instead, the non-institutionalized organization that exists within communities formed the basis for the organization of the occupations themselves.

An element of spontaneity became a strategy for intervening in the status quo. Such acts of resistance must be unanticipated if they are not to be crushed by loggers or law enforcement, or discouraged or obstructed by social mediators and NGOs whose own position within the relations of force is such that they discourage any act of open conflict. The people at São Pedro, for example, turned their participation in the union’s symbolic action into an act of concrete oppositionality using resources – both the organizing that had been done, and the literal resources such as gasoline and food – from the Rural Workers’ Union and NGOs to initiate a mobilization that was only ever allowed to occur in the first place because it was pre-coded as symbolic, as not truly adversarial, and as existing within the field of state politics. From this position, they were able to build the
momentum to force a rupture with the given order, from which the new possibilities of a current and future politics became visible, both to those directly involved in these events and to their spectators.

While the title “born in fire” refers to the literal fact that the act of setting fire to loggers’ barges was a galvanizing moment for both the struggle for Renascer (an event that had happened several years prior to the ones described above) and for Gleba Nova Olinda, it is not meant to suggest that this particular tactic is necessarily central to these struggles. Rather, to argue that these movements are “born in fire” is to suggest that the categories and actors of political change are not pre-given, but rather that struggle is central to the formation of political subjects and their territories of resistance, as will be further elaborated in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This dissertation is an analysis of territorial struggles over neo-extractivism, arguably the phenomenon defining contemporary Amazonian politics. I ground this analysis in a study of some of the wide-reaching effects of one of the decade’s most controversial development projects – the paving of the BR-163, the “soy highway”. That both the road and soy production itself, are somewhat de-centered in much of this analysis is testament to the way that Amazonian development proceeds. The effects of mega-projects are incredibly far-reaching (in this case the BR-163 paving project re-worked territory in the entire western portion of the state of Pará) and in areas that have standing forest, logging precedes or works in conjunction with most extractive development, especially agricultural. The state of Pará and the territorial re-organization associated with the BR-163 are particularly key sites for analyzing neo-extractivism for a number of reasons. Pará is Brazil’s second largest state – twice the size of France – and
the “area of impact” of the BR-163, also known as “western Pará” is vast, encompassing what the federal government identified as “one of the most important regions in the Amazon, from the point of view of economic potential, biological diversity, natural wealth, and cultural and ethnic diversity” (Brasil 2005). Further, the development of the region in anticipation of this road paving is the first attempt to operationalize the “Sustainable Amazon Plan,” (Brasil 2006) addressed in Chapter Three which, explicitly brings together extractive development, conservation, and anti-poverty programs, which is precisely the neo-extractive model that the first half of this dissertation will sketch out more substantively.

This introduction (and preface) should be thought of as a presentation of the themes and concepts that organize this dissertation and an argument for how their analysis should proceed. The following four chapters are divided into two sections. In a brief introduction to Part One I briefly outline the primary elements that I argue constitute Amazônian neo-extractivism. Chapters Two and Three each explore different aspects of the governance structure created to address the arrival of soy into Amazônia and its “dragging effects,” namely the proposed paving of the BR-163. Chapter Two, examines two voluntary certification programs for soy produced in the Amazon, to analyze the emergence, functions, and effects of what I call, following Urlich Brand, “business-as-usual neoliberal governance,” itself part of what regional social movements are increasingly calling “Green Capitalism.” I argue that such programs actually make soy production in the region possible and produce new networks and relations among social mediator organizations like the rural workers unions, regional and international environmental NGOs, corporations and the state. At best, I argue, they have questionable
environmental benefits. At worst, they work to re-enforce the hegemony of international Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), to legitimize agri-business multinationals such as Cargill, and to destabilize strategies of resistance—reproducing the very dynamics of inequality and domination that governance seeks to eradicate.

I then turn to an analysis of the re-territorialization of the entire western half of the state of Pará implemented through what I call the ordering technology of Ordenamento Territorial in order to facilitate the paving of the BR-163. While Chapter Two examined the immediate policies that made the territorial expansion of soy agriculture possible, Chapter Three turns to the question of state (broadly conceived) ordering. I argue that although the mechanisms for ordering have changed substantively over the past several decades, the rationality – to reproduce a given order and relations of power – has not. The majority of the chapter is dedicated to a detailed study of the mechanisms for re-producing that order and a characterization of the substantive shifts in state territorialization within the current moment.

Part Two, examines the way that the changing dynamics of state and market in Amazonia meet changing strategies of resistance. My overall argument is that struggles have become explicitly territorial and that this shift is not simply a shift in the framing of movement struggles, but in the production of a different kind of collective subject. This has implications for the kind of claims that are made and for the nature of movement representation. Chapters Four and Five treat these two facets of shifting strategies of resistance through a recounting and analysis of the two struggles introduced in this chapter.
Chapter Four, examines the concept of territory as articulated by the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River (MDVCA) by sketching out a sort of genealogy of the shift, in the lower Amazon, from the enunciation of struggle as a “struggle for land” to a “struggle for territory” over the past few decades. I argue in this chapter that this concept of territory, as conceived by the movement, actually marks a substantive and strategic shift from previous strategies of struggle that unhinges both the concept of territory from the territorial state and control over land and resources from the idea of property. In doing so, they simultaneously transcend the categories of state and political economy, while also deploying them in order to meet their strategic goals. At the core of this argument is a conception of territory created in and from below, that treats particular territories and subjects as co-produced and that, as a practice of resistance, is forged through a combination of everyday practices and struggle.

The politics of the progressive state and the emergence of “socio-territorial movements” (Mançano 2005) explored in Chapter Four will raise the questions explored more explicitly in Chapter Five, of how these changing dynamics of power and resistance manifest in the relationships between social mediator organizations (namely the rural workers’ union), movements, and progressive government. I delineate how the intertwining of clientalist and counterhegemonic strains within the rural workers’ union manifests in their tendency to perform the work of the state (albeit a re-constituted one). That is, they function as the state both institutionally, in that members of Rural Workers’ Union (STR) leadership simultaneously hold municipal and state offices, and effectively, in that they are deeply invested in maintaining given order, namely hierarchical relations of control. I highlight, in contrast, the nascent emancipatory impulses of the Movement in
Defense of Renascer (MDR) to break with institutional politics-as-usual and how those impulses are acted on by these organizations to fold them back into the dominant political logic.

While Chapter Four explicitly explores the concept of territory in the emergence of the Movement for the Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River, and Chapter Five explores the tensions between traditional mediator organizations and emerging movements in the struggle for Resex Renascer. Although I focus on the question of territory more explicitly in the chapter on the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River and the question of tensions between movements, mediators and the state more explicitly in the chapter on the struggle over Renascer, this separate treatment is not meant as a comparison, nor is it meant to suggest that MDVCA only embodies this territorial shift and Renascer the tensions of progressive government. Rather, both struggles express multiple and overlapping aspects of the shifts explored here, but I found the elements of these struggles to be particularly expressive of the specific dynamics discussed in each respective chapter and developed them accordingly. More broadly, I argue that these two movements together express a larger shifting regional dynamic and, further, they are linked. They are part of a loose regional network of movements that has included anti-soy mobilization, the growing mobilization against the damming of the Tapajós, among others. They are connected, in part, through their relationships with organizations such as the Pastoral Land Commission, the movement of those affected by Dams (MAB), and the Amazon Defense Front in Santarém and their participants frequently meet, support each others struggles, and remain in ongoing conversation.
I will conclude by returning to the proposition put forward in this introduction that a research program adequate to the complexities of the new political moment in Amazonia requires a processual notion of antagonistic struggle. This means, I will argue, a move away from technocratic assessments of conflict, from a frame of analysis that measures the effectiveness of movements purely by their capacity to affect the state or to protect “the environment,” and requires a shift in methodologies, including a more substantive engagement with the work of Brazilian scholars.

The re-emergence of commodity-oriented industrial extractive development as a primary strategy for economic growth, justified on a national level through links to anti-poverty programs, is a key element of the neo-developmentalist program among “progressive” governments across Latin America. This section traces the parameters of this “neo-extractivism” (Gudynas 2010) in Brazilian Amazônia. The argument is that Amazônia’s vast wealth of extractive resources (timber, minerals, agricultural land, water-based energy) and its large, economically depressed population makes it the emblematic site for neo-extractivism. The potential environmental devastation associated with the exploitation of “natural resources” necessary for this extractivism, however, means that it encounters concerted resistance from the global environmental community as well as from traditional, indigenous, and migrant smallholders (the latter is addressed more substantively in Part Three). As a result, in addition to the links to anti-poverty programs that justify industrial extractivism in much of the country (e.g. that render it socially progressive), for these projects to be implemented in the Amazon, they must also be “greened.” Further, because of the historical links forged between local social movements and international environmentalists (an assumed alliance that these chapters

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26 Neo-developmentalistism emerged across Latin America with the crisis of neoliberalism as a heterodox policy response that incorporated monetary and fiscal policies of neoliberalism along with state policies to nurture the growth of national firms and social programs based in economically distributive programs. Despite substantial modifications to the neoliberal program, neo-developmentalistism does not depart from a programmatic focus on expanding productive capacity and increasing accumulation (Katz and Haine 2006; Acosta 2008; Escobar 2010; Ricci 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011a; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011b).
seek to de-naturalize) into socio-environmental movements on the one hand and sustainable development policies on the other, this “greening,” I argue, not only incorporates environmental concerns into the dominant development model, but also functions to capture or coopt many of the more emancipatory impulses of regional movements.

This section identifies and explores what I argue are the three primary strategies for neo-extractivism in the Amazon through the particular case of industrial soy expansion and its associated infrastructure development, namely the paving of the Santarém-Cuiabá Highway (the BR-163), through Western Pará State. Rather than arguing that neo-extractivism marks a definitive break with a prior development period or model, in this section I identify both the continuities and discontinuities that contemporary approaches to “managing” environment and development have with previous approaches and explore their implications.

First and most centrally, as described above, there is an intensification of extractive development. This intensification is driven by state policies, specifically the Lula and Rousseff administrations’ various Accelerated Development Programs (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC) that focus on investment in energy, transport, infrastructure to support extractive industry through direct public sector investment, significant lending through the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDS),27 and public private partnerships (with Brazilian and multi-national corporations), along with tax rebates and credit rate controls and monetary and other

27 According to a personal communication from Katherine Hoschstetler (April 26th 2012), BNDS gives over 95% of its funding to development that is within the national boundaries of Brazil itself. In the year 2010-2011 BNDS lent more money than the IMF and the World Bank combined.
policies to open export markets in order to stimulate private sector investment in industry and infrastructure (Barbosa and Souza 2010; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011; Morais and Saad-Filho 2011). Across Latin America and perhaps most successfully in Brazil, this development is linked to (and justified by) anti-poverty social programs, such as *Bolsa Familia, Fome Zero*, and more recently, *Bolsa Verde*. The sheer number of new development projects in western Pará alone is striking and include, most prominently, the paving of the BR-163, the recently opened Alcoa Bauxite mine in Jurutí, and the eleven planned dams for the *Tapajós* River basin, among many others.  

The second component is what Urlich Brand (2009) calls a *business-as-usual neoliberal* approach to conservation, which proposes to resolve the contradiction of perpetual growth and preservation of the basic means of production (and survival) through some institutional innovation, and by incentivizing efficiency in production and consumption through the production of “green” markets. This approach, is based in the “sustainable development” model established at the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and institutionalized in Amazônia during the 1990s when Amazonian policy was largely driven by international funding under the UN Pilot Program for the Conservation of Rainforests (PPG-7, 1994-2005) (Lemos and Roberts 2008). It is based in ecological modernization theory (Leff 2001; McCarthy and Prudham 2004), which assumes that the economic system can internalize all economic and social costs, and therefore looks to the

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29 In emerging literature on New Extractivism, scholars, and namely Eduardo Gudynas (2010) argue for ten features of this project, which include the following: extractivism remains the pillar of development projects in South America; the appearance of a progressive purpose; state captured surpluses fund poverty programs; “trickle down” economic assumptions; a more active state; export oriented production; geographic fragmentation through the creation of enclaves; the externalization of social and environmental costs; the weakening of resistance; and that this approach is the central version of development. My analysis builds on his broad argument regarding continent-wide trends to more fully explore specificity and implications of neo-extractivism in Brazilian Amazônia.
market to increase efficiency in production and consumption largely through the
development of “green” markets, conservation incentives etc., processes largely that have
largely been outsourced to environmental NGOs. One example of these types of practices
is explored in Chapter Two’s discussion of the Responsible Soy and Soy Moratorium
initiatives. Other similar initiatives in this vein across the region, although not addressed
in this dissertation, are timber certification programs, the creation of carbon markets and
other forms of payment for environmental services. Although these practices are largely
continuous with a neoliberal logic, I argue that they must be understood within a larger
context that includes the re-territorialization that is explored in Chapter Three. Taken
together, we see one of the key differences between these “business-as-usual” practices
under neo-extractivism and the Donor-led period, is that that previously, market-oriented
conservation was coupled with a territorial strategy that focused on creating protected
areas (e.g. taking land out of the market). Today, in Western Pará state, the creation of
protected areas is diminishing, and existing areas are being reduced in size and opened
through legislation to exploitation so that these types of market-based approaches are
becoming the primary conservation mechanism.

The territorial re-organization associated with this extractive development, and
explored in Chapter Three, combines new and old state territorialization strategies to, in
the Ministry of National Integration’s words, “re-instate the [developmentalist] State in
new places” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006). In the wake of re-democratization
and the emergence of strong, new socio-territorial actors, an attempt at a simple return to
developmentalism (e.g. top-down appropriation of land and resources) generated
conflicts that indicated a certain “loss of control” by the state over national territory, and
especially territory containing the resources vital to national economic growth. In response, territorialization re-emerged as an explicit state strategy in the early 2000s, but now operating with a new situation with new actors and demands (namely justice and environmentalism). Thus, old forms of territorial organization such as road and dam building, mining etc. are accompanied by the new property and territorial regimes that prioritize the creation of private property, limits sizes of protected areas and opens both protected resources and private property to managed exploitation (e.g. resources, be they mining, timber, carbon etc. can be sold whether on private or protected public land), thereby de-linking land rights from resource (and territorial) control and facilitating resource access on all land by capital and the state.  

Finally, these three elements of neo-extractivism stand in contrast to a fourth. That is, while the first three strategies tend toward the recognition and incorporation of the elements that challenge or disrupt the functioning or legitimacy of the given development model, there are also emerging strategies that more fully reject that model, and/or move beyond it, as expressed in the rebellions explained in chapter one. The final section of the dissertation will explore these in more detail.

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30 I would argue that these components are not only true of the particular case explored here, but region-wide. Regionally, there is also arguably a fourth, repressive, component. This has been seen in the rapid police action taken against larger revolts against particular neo-extractive projects at the Belo Monte dam on the Xingu River and the and Jirau dam on the Madeira River, but this element is not explored in this dissertation. Criminalization of movements may be a secondary element of such repression, and is explored to a limited extent in Chapter Five.
Chapter Two: Saving the Amazon? Responsible Soy as Green Governance

INTRODUCTION

On July 14th 2010, one thousand people gathered in Santarém’s Yacht Club for a public audience regarding the soy port that multi-national agricultural corporation Cargill built on the Amazon River in 2000. The meeting, a mandatory part of the federal environmental compliance process, was held to solicit public feedback on the Port Environmental Impact Assessment that Cargill had just completed. Protocol dictates that such assessments be completed prior to licensing major construction, although in this case, the assessment was being considered nine years after ground was broken for port construction and six years into its operation. In 2000, the federal court in Santarém mandated that Cargill comply with Brazilian federal law and complete the environmental compliance process, which it had not implemented prior to construction and which, by 2006, it still had not begun. In 2006, on appeal, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça—Brazil’s second highest court—upheld this decision. Despite the federal mandate, Cargill continually avoided completing the assessment through a series of provisional agreements with the notoriously corrupt and industry-friendly State Environmental Secretary, who, regardless of the sentiment expressed at the public audience, remains the regulatory agency responsible for final approval of Cargill’s license.

Outside of the Yacht Club, people from the Amazon Defense Front (Frente em Defesa da Amazônia, FDA), the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da
Terra, CPT), and the general public protested the public audience, arguing that it made a farce of the process of participation. Protesters preferred to make their statement from outside of the public audience, arguing that their presence inside such events gives the appearance of their participation in a decision-making process about development where their views and positions have no possibility of changing the real nature of the project. It is, they argued, the social version of “green-washing”—making private development decisions appear democratic. In other words, by “participating” in the public audience, they would be sanctioning their own elimination from the democratic process. Rather than doing so, they remained outside, to express that which had no space inside.

Amazonian neo-extractivism, manifest in the advance of the Cargill Corporation, soy production, and its wide range of what “dragging effects” (Fearnside 2007a), namely the energy, port, and road construction developed to serve the industry, into the region, began in the late 1990s. Initiating a return to a developmentalism within the region (and the country), then-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s multi-year (2000-2007) development plan, AvançaBrasil (Forward Brazil, discussed in more detail in Chapter Three) promised to invest US$43 billion to support extractive development in Amazonia with US$20 billion of that earmarked for infrastructure, primarily roads. AvançaBrasil’s Amazonian components encountered vehement opposition because of the potential environmental effects of such large-scale development (Fearnside 2001b; Soares-Filho et al. 2006; Steward 2007), generating a series of ecological studies predicting massive and widespread environmental destruction and sparking debate in academic journals, national and international press, and outrage in the international environmental community.31

31In 2001, two conservation organizations (INPA, and IPAM/ISA) released results of predicted scenarios for Amazonian deforestation associated with Forward Brazil. IPAM’s estimates, limited to major road
These debates coalesced around the advance into the region of industrial soy agriculture, a new form of “extractive” industry, and its “dragging effects,” primarily associated with the infrastructure development necessary to transport soy (See, for example, Veja, November 12, 2003, Steward 2007). The most controversial of these programs was by far the paving of the Santarém-Cuiaba Highway (the BR-163), a road built but never paved by the military dictatorship in the early 1970s. Paving this “highway” would effectively connect one of Brazil’s major soy-producing regions in Mato Grosso to a port on the Amazon River (a port which Cargill quickly built), during a worldwide commodity boom that meant that industrial agriculture was poised to (and subsequently would) expand as one of the major economic bases for the country. Proponents argued that road paving would reduce high commodity transport costs, the primary obstacle to Brazil’s agro-industrial expansion. However, the BR-163 passed through the largely undeveloped region of western Pará state often referred to as “outside the rule of law” (Fearnside 2007a, 601) and ecologists argued that paving the road under the given socio-political “business-as-usual” scenario would lead to rapid and widespread environmental devastation (Laurance et al. 2001).

Responding to this criticism made by communities, academics, and environmentalists, Amazonia’s conservation policy advisors (namely Dan Nepstad and

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paving, projected 120,000-270,000 square kilometers of deforestation (4.2% of the Amazon) in twenty to thirty years following the plans’ initiation (Nepstad et al. 2001). The INPA team’s analysis covered forest impacts for all planned Forward Brazil infrastructure projects in an “optimistic” scenario that predicted 28% of the Amazon would be destroyed or heavily damaged by 2020 and a ‘non-optimistic’ scenario predicted 42% (Laurance et al. 2001). This was hugely controversial with the national and international press jumping on the controversy (see, for example, Jacquacu 2001) and both Nepstad et al. and government officials severely criticized INPA’s predictions, even, it is rumored, urging Science not to publish the results. The negative press forced the government to act, and the Ministries of the Environment and of Planning decided to integrate new protective measures into the development project—namely environmental impact assessments.
his team, formerly of the environmental NGO IPAM—the institute for Amazonian Research—who are also the scientists who made the most conservative predictions for future deforestation in the public debates over *AvançaBrasil* posed the region’s “emerging governance” as the “most promising” solution to the conundrum of Amazonian soy (e.g. soy is good for the economy but bad for the environment). They argue that governance can “insure the conservation of most of the forests...while also fostering sustainable development.” The formalized relationships being instituted among “government agencies, private enterprise, and civil society” are, for them, “evidence of an expanding political will in Brazil to manage Amazonia’s abundant natural resources...” These relationships, if adequately supported, will “defend public interests in the region’s natural resources” and by default, eliminate the violence and injustice associated with a lack of government presence in the area (Nepstad et al. 2002).32

Alongside the links that the Lula administration was making between the growth of agro-industry to anti-poverty programs as well as to the nation’s overall economic growth on a national level, I argue that conservation-oriented governance thus became another necessary, prerequisite for neo-extractivism to form part of a program of progressive government. This “greening” happens through a variety of mechanisms. First, multi-stakeholder participation has been legally formalized as part of the environmental review process through a mandate for public audiences. This is combined with a series of NGO-led initiatives to incorporate “grassroots” positions into regional development projects by organizing localized forums for communities to express their opinions, or through “partnerships” where local organizations sign onto conservation and

32 This position, while dominant, is controversial. See the debate between Amazon conservation scientists in the Policy Forum in the April 2002 issue of *Science.*
development projects with corporations, often mediated by NGOs, one example of which will be discussed in this chapter (Hall 1997; Perz et al. 2008; Alencar 2005).

This participation-oriented governance, which hinges on direct incorporation of previously marginalized actors into the development planning process, coincides with a second instance of governance—the devolution of government functions to (NGOs), where NGO’s “help” (in their own language) the government to implement already-existing laws, based on the assumption that such NGOs are working for the “public good.” In other words, such interventions are in the public good both in that they seek to uphold the law (e.g. provide justice) and that they are implemented by an NGO, a non-corporate, not for profit entity. In reality, as this chapter will demonstrate, the relationship between law and justice is tenuous and the interests that many mainstream environmental NGOs may serve, intentionally or unintentionally, are not those of a vaguely defined public, but rather of the private actors with whom they work.

In this chapter, I use the case of Amazonian soy to analyze the emergence, functions, and effects of what I referred to in the introduction to this section as “business-as-usual neoliberal governance.” I argue that the effect of Amazonian soy-related governance is not to create more inclusion and justice, but rather to render “the public good” productive for private interests. I focus this argument on two separate but related programs designed to mitigate the effects of Amazonian soy: Responsible Soy and the Soy Moratorium. I argue that such programs actually make soy neo-extractivism possible, that they have questionable environmental benefits at best and at worst work to re-enforce the hegemony of international Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), which then legitimize agri-business multinationals such as Cargill, and that they work to destabilize
strategies of resistance—reproducing the very dynamics of inequality and domination that governance seeks to eradicate.

My premise is that governance, which has been defined as “a search for consensus among all those with a distinct opinion on the matters at hand” (Verweij and Josling 2003), presents a technical solution that should serve as a mechanism for creating power-neutral relationships (Borras and Franco 2010). Yet inequality is endemic to, and indeed the very basis for, contemporary liberal capitalism, prohibiting the effectiveness of such an approach (Smith 1984; Harney 2006). Put differently, bringing multiple actors to the table and letting them speak does not negate the unequal power relationships that underlie and determine the terms of contemporary development (Escobar 1995).

Governance, implemented either from above or for above, in other words, does not exit the logic of the given political economy of power, where subjects participate in the (re)production of inequality. Following Foucault (2008), this power is diffuse, not emanating only from the location of the “state,” but through these very procedures, existing in a capillary-like fashion immanently. This governmentality is the mechanism by which contemporary governance operates so that subjects implement discipline on and through themselves.33 Governance, then, functions as the coming together of these self-disciplining subjects (individuals, NGOs and other civil society, state agencies, multinationals etc.) to fabricate the public good—in the case of Brazil poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability—that nonetheless remains inextricable from the goals of accumulation. Governance agreements, such as those that are aimed at “sustainable

33The “neoliberal governmentality” literature explores more specifically how both the devolution of state functions to non-state actors and the extension of market-logic to state functions constitute a particular form of Power (Rose 1999; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Hart 2004; Li 2007). An extensive and explicitly geographic literature also elaborates on the concept of neoliberal environmental governance (See, for example Castree 2008; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; McCarthy 2004; Heynen 2007; Mansfield 2004).
development” then, should be understood not as the creation of power-neutral participatory spaces, but rather as a particular exercise of power where actors and objects come into new political relationships modeled on the principles of a market economy (Foucault 2008). Rather than functioning as a method for dispersing or decentralizing power, representation in governance, in this re-worked political relationship, becomes another manifestation of domination (albeit a rather sophisticated one) (Zibechi 2010).

Environmental, or “green” governance, especially surrounding issues of land and land use, increasingly focuses on the promotion of individual private land rights (addressed in Chapter Three) and certification of sustainable extractive methods (Klooster 2005; Oliveira 2006; Akram-Lodhi, Borras, and Kay 2007). Although justified through the language of participation and democracy, environmental governance focuses more on the processes by which “the environment” (both the fictitious commodities that constitute it and the socialities that produce and govern it) can be brought into the process of capital accumulation than on the democratization of environmental access and control. The underlying assumption is that any solution to ecological problems lies in liberalism, with its focus on “frugal government,” the market as a site of justice, and liberal economics—emphasizing the ability of the individual consumer to direct the market through her consumptive practices. In other words, environmental governance presumes that elements of capitalist modernity can be harnessed to solve environmental problems (McCarthy 2004).

In this chapter, I argue that in posing the market as a neutral site of regulation and democracy as its method, such environmental governance effectively defuses opposition, creates new (green) markets for commodified nature, and secures the position of the
ENGOS and corporations that enact it. I offer a detailed analysis of how the emergence of a particular governance regime in the lower Brazilian Amazon has reconstituted political relationships. I use the example of agribusiness (Cargill), International Environmental NGOs (The Nature Conservancy or TNC, Conservation International or CI, and WWF) (henceforth ENGOs) and Amazonian soy specifically to underscore the intimate relationship between market-oriented conservation, neo-extractivism and governance. In the final section, I use empirical data from the highlands near Santarém, Pará, to demonstrate that this new political configuration has questionable effects for conservation, but concrete and deleterious effects for rural life. By examining governance in its capillary form—in the actual programs and practices through which it works—I illuminate how the broad construct of governance is mediated through the categories of participation and conservation.

THE EMERGENCE OF AMAZONIAN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

In Amazonia today, the most common argument for “environmental” governance, which fit within the larger framework of “participatory,” “pro-poor,” or “good” governance, is that development is inevitable and therefore must be done “sustainably.” Further, nearly everyone, from developmentalists to development critics, argue that Brazil has sophisticated, progressive laws regarding both citizenship and the environment that are simply not enforced because the state lacks the capacity to do so (Benatti 1998; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Holston 2008). Many of these “perfect laws,” however, were written into the Brazilian constitution as the result of compromises struck between

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34 For examples of these governance models, see the FAO on food security ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/018/k6367e.pdf, or the World Bank (IRBD 1992). For Amazonian examples, see The Nature Conservancy, 2006, or Nepstad et al., 2006.
government and the social movements that took power during the transition to
democracy, with the awareness that they were largely symbolic because their
implementation would be impossible within the existing government structure (Holston
2008). In other words, unenforceable laws were a state strategy to simultaneously
appease both the left and the right. In the framework of governance, the logic that
follows from the assertion of “good but unenforceable laws” is that there is a failure of
the state that can only be solved through external assistance (e.g. private business and
NGOs). In effect, the “failure of the state” becomes the primary justification for law
enforcement through partnerships with non-governmental organizations and private
parties.

This section contextualizes the emergence of Amazonian environmental
governance with particular attention to ENGOs (also often referred to as “Big
Conservation” (Borras and Franco 2010). I focus on how mandates to govern
“environment and development” incorporated critiques of modernization-style
development into governance and introduced new structures of funding that contributed
to the hegemony of ENGOs in regional governance and the ideology of “participatory
sustainable development” in Amazonia. Finally, I argue that the hegemonic institution of
“sustainable development,” along with the rise of a progressive government, set the stage
for the governance paradigm that makes neo-extractivism possible.

**From Developmentalism to Environmentalism**

By the early 1980s, high rates of deforestation associated with the military
government’s colonization projects (explored more fully in Chapter Three) garnered
worldwide attention. From localized resistance by indigenous and traditional people to a
national environmentalist movement newly concerned with forest conservation, to
international environmentalists and multilateral agencies, new networks of global
environmental politics emerged in response to and as a critique of the military
government’s developmentalism (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Northern environmentalists—led by what would become the major international
ENGOs (Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund,
and Environmental Defense Fund, among others)—had come to see “tropical
deforestation” (a concept that did not even exist prior to the 1970s) associated with
modernization-style development as emblematic of environmental problems caused by
and located in the third world (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Those ENGOs were also faced
with increasing opposition from the business community in northern countries and were
seeking new, international markets (Corson 2010). Simultaneously, in the wake of
decolonization, the new southern majority within the UN promoted a pro-development
agenda for the global south. These positions came to a stand-off at the 1972 UN
conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, where Brazil itself took a firm
“pro-development” stance and the conference remained mired in an “environment versus

International environmentalist networks were simultaneously deepening and
expanding and several global institutions were formed, funded largely by private donors
and Scandinavian governments (the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and the United Nations Environment Program worked in conjunction with the World
Wildlife Fund) who developed a strategy linking environment and development. These
alliances created a new, global, institutional, conservation framework marked by a series
of international conferences, papers, and programs implemented by the UN also in conjunction with international multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the US USAID, and the ENGOS. Additionally, during the 1980s, membership and private funding for the ENGOs, many based in the US, also skyrocketed, and these organizations put international environmental issues visibly on the agenda of international political concerns (Adams 2001; Corson 2010).

The 1980s also marked the decade of democratic transition in Brazil, where social movements, including the environmental movement, were claiming new political space (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Social movements in the Amazon, most famously the Rubber Tappers in Acre, were mobilizing against the military regime and specifically around land conflict generated by developers moving on to traditional and indigenous lands. To garner worldwide support for their cause, they recast a struggle over land conflict to one for conservation. The assassination of rubber tapper leader Chico Mendes in 1989 set off a chain of events that initiated new collaborations between the Brazilian state, national and international environmentalists, multilateral development institutions, foreign governments, and localized civil society organizations (Keck 1995; Hecht and Cockburn 2011).

This alliance will be explored in more detail in Chapters Four and Five. For our purposes here, it is important to note that it had substantive effects for both Amazonian

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35 Researchers locate the origins of the international environmental networks in the attempt to begin developing international institutions through the 1968 Biosphere Conference, the UN 1972 UN conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (where NGOs received significant support through the funding of a parallel conference to avoid alienating their governments), the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), the 1988 Bruntland Report (Our Common Future), the 1992 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) conference in Rio, and the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Adams 2001).
politics broadly, in that it made conservation a key issue in any future considerations of Amazonian policy, and for conservation approaches broadly, as it was one of several key episodes in a global political moment in which the export of the American “fortress conservation” model to the developing world was undergoing severe criticism. International conservation activists and practitioners argued that conservation projects were not successful because they did not incorporate “local people.” These critiques resulted in a shift to a conservation approach that specifically integrated “local people” and their “economic development,” giving rise to the Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs), or Community-based Conservation, which became the leading conservation paradigm advocated by environmental NGOs and major donors by the mid 1990s (Adams 2001; Browder 2002).

This international/localized environmentalist alliance also drew significant attention to the devastation wrought by some of the national development projects financed by multi-national organizations such as the World Bank and USAID. In response, these organizations radically shifted their positions and therefore the terms on which they lent money—mandating environmental evaluations, accountability for money spent, and specific goals be met as terms for lending for development projects (Becker 1997). On a national scale, the federal government responded to harsh critiques from the international community and burgeoning national environmental movement by initiating new environmental actions, policies, and agencies, including the end of the PoloAmazonia development program, the creation of CONAMA (the National Environmental Commission), the National Program for the Environment (PNMA), and the Nossa Natureza Program. The government launched these initiatives with great
fanfare that included a comprehensive program geared toward the organization of environmental protection on a national level, environmental education, territorial ordering, and the protection of indigenous and traditional people. Article 225 of the new constitution (1988) was completely dedicated to the issue of “the environment;” it specifically designated entire parts of the country (the Pantanal, the Mata Atlantica, and the Amazon) as areas of National Patrimony to be protected.

This was the context in which the concept of “sustainable development” emerged. Following several years after the publication of *Our Common Future* in 1987 and the establishment of the debt-for-nature swaps that first established the international ENGOs as key international environmental brokers, the “Earth Summit” or UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 marked the institutionalization of the concept of “sustainable development” in the Brazilian Amazon through the launching of the Pilot Program for the Conservation of Brazilian Rainforests (1995-2009) (PPG7). The PPG7 was an international partnership between G7 countries, various Brazilian government environmental and social agencies, and international, regional, and local NGOs. Originally proposed by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the program provided US$250 million to meet its stated goals of reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon and Atlantic Forests, conserving biodiversity, and demonstrating the feasibility of sustainable development and the possibility of north-south collaboration on environmental issues (Millikan et al. 2002).

Combining technical forest management with a larger project to restructure civil society through the creation of a professional network of environmental NGOs and through a territorial re-ordering based in ecological-economic zoning (see Chapter Three
for a more detailed discussion of this), the PPG7 effected a shift in civil society that Hochstetler and Keck (2005, 170) describe as moving from “adversarial (blocking)” to “collaborative (enabling) relations” with national and international policy makers. It responded to critiques of international multilateral institutions by local actors by requiring program participation from the sectors of society affected by the proposed projects. This meant that program financing targeted capacity-building in and by NGOs.

Hundreds of new environmental or “socio-ecological” (sustainable development “from below”) NGOs were formed to capture some of the large sums of money flowing into the region for conservation projects, forming the *Grupo de Trabalhosobre Amazonia* (the Amazon Working Group), a consortium of over 600 NGOs and movement organizations.

At the same time that financing for state initiatives and state agencies was shrinking under the aggressive neoliberal policies in Brazil in the 1990s, multi-lateral loans increasingly carried environmental stipulations. This created a market for environmental research and conservation projects with a large, external source of funding available through the PPG7, thereby shifting most conservation work to NGOs. The region saw the proliferation of “research NGOs” as producers of basic, scientific, information (IPAM, environmental research institute IMAZON, the Socio-environmental Institute or ISA, Friends of the Earth or Amigos da Terra, among others) who work alongside the region’s traditional university-affiliated research organizations (The National Institute for Space Research or INPE, the National Institute for Amazonian Research or INPA, the Emílio Goeldi Pará Museum MPEG, the Institute for Applied Economic Research IPEA), but are generally funded through the multilateral institutions and other foreign donors (Leite 2005).
It also meant a professionalization of movements. To access the money available from PPG7 and similar programs, movement actors had to become formal organizations. The stipulations on funding to NGOs (who prior to the 1980s largely functioned as political organizers rather than implementers of development projects) mandated technical protocols that forced organizational restructuring as government simultaneously began to contract out provisions of service to NGOs through partnerships (parcerias) (Buclet and Leroy 2002). They also had to implement projects with “outcomes” that could be measured as opposed to their more traditional practices such as political education, consciousness building, and organizing.

Territorially, this meant an explosion of “sustainable development” projects implemented through NGOs and state and federal agrarian reform agencies (The Pará state land institute, ITERPA, and the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform, INCRA), working with individuals or with communities to intensify their economic production—often requiring communities and individuals to take out loans to engage in these projects. The technical assistance, community investment, and localized knowledge of NGOs implementing projects was (and is) highly variable. The scope of these projects was striking; even in the most remote villages one encounters the legacy of one or another abandoned project. The subjective legacy is also clear—the project participants (most of the rural Amazon) became adept in the language of sustainability that accompanied these projects, which almost always contained both a technical and

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36 NGOs, as part of “civil society,” are often depicted as representatives of “the people” based in their emergence alongside social movements as mediators who defended and represented marginalized people. Many of these NGOs were associated with the Catholic Church and the liberation theology movement and dominated Amazonian social organizing for decades (Landim 1998). Technification and competition for funding, however, meant that NGO work was/is increasingly driven by market/state forces/desires. So while NGOs often discursively retained this position as representative organizations—e.g. stand in for “civil society”—they no longer necessarily enacted a practice of representative organizations (Buclet and Leroy 2002).
consciousness-building element.

Thus the conservation landscape in the 1990s generally favored both “community-based conservation projects,” which sought to make the traditional, indigenous, and peasant populations of the Amazon economically viable and conservation conscious, and the creation of protected areas (of various kinds, from “integral” to areas for “sustainable development,” in order to open other areas for development). Economic viability strategies included accessing agrarian reform benefits, which focused largely on people considered to be traditional or peasant (and primarily organized as rural workers through the rural workers’ unions), as well as land regularization and small loans for production projects (through the Constitutional Fund for the North or FNO and then the National Program for Family Agriculture or PRONAF) oriented largely by NGOs. The primary institutions for the implementation of agrarian reform were INCRA, under the Agricultural Ministry or ITERPA on state lands or the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) under the environmental ministry. These latter institutions enacted agrarian reform largely through the creation of “sustainable use” protected areas, which, along with Indigenous Lands (also considered key conservation sites), proliferated throughout the 1990s.

This principal strategy in the 80s and 90s of creating protected areas ultimately limited economic development because, whether in fortress conservation or its community-based successor, it ultimately meant taking land out of the market.37 As Brazil’s economy recovered from crisis and resources became available for internal,

37 That is not to imply that Units of Conservation are not also central to the process of accumulation. See Brockington and Duffy for a discussion (2008).
extractive-based development, keeping land out of the market “made less sense,” as the president of Pará’s land agency put it in an interview, and a new conservation-development strategy became necessary.

**Neo-extractivism under the Workers Party**

During the 1990s, the agro-industrial agricultural model that had intensified alongside and in opposition to the smallholder struggle for land in the 1980s, consolidated “agri-business” into a political-economic block that included the agrarian, cattle-raising, industrial, mercantile, mineral, and timber sectors and their associated technological and ideological systems controlled by state partnerships with national and international financial interests (Fernandes 1999; Porto Gonçalves 2010a). In 2003, soy and sugar prices spiked and the federal government began to intensively-support rapid expansion of export-oriented industrial agricultural production (soy exportation alone grew 35% that year and agro-industrial expansion continued to grow at a rate of 22% per year). In a 2007 speech, Lula even went so far as to hail agribusiness leaders as Brazil’s “heroes” (*Folha de São Paulo*, March 20, 2007).

The Lula administration largely devoted development and funding priorities to agribusiness, especially for soy and sugar cane production and transport, over smallholder agriculture. Agribusiness and smallholder agriculture are each served by a separate agency within the federal government (*Ministerio da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento*, MAPA for agribusiness and *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário*, MDA for smallholder agriculture). Agribusiness received 85% of the government-

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38 The strongest expression of which is in the Bancada Ruralista, the multi-partisan congressional group whose mission is to defend the interests of large rural landholders and typically controls approximately one quarter of congressional seats, making it the largest special interest group in Congress (INESC 2007).
extended rural credit despite the fact that subsistence agriculture supports over half of the Brazilian population, and his administration continued to support territorial policies that maintained the distribution of land as one of the most unequal in the world, with agribusiness controlling 76% of arable land (Mançano Fernandes 2012). Other mechanisms for supporting agribusiness expansion included embracing the agribusiness policies of the WTO and World Bank, continuing tax-exempt status for export-oriented agribusinesses, legalizing transgenic soy, granting financial credits for agribusiness projects, creating new territorial zoning projects to facilitate development, and planning a series of infrastructure projects nationwide to facilitate agro-industrial exports, implementing “Agrarian Reform” largely in the Amazon where land “regularization” was prioritized over expropriation and re-distribution, and later, privatization over Agrarian Reform (Fearnside 2007a; Jepson, Brannstrom, and Filippi 2010; Mançano Fernandes 2012).

In the Amazon, the support for agribusiness expansion worked in conjunction with a host of other policies that supported other types of extractivism explored further in the following chapter. Similarly, the growth of agro-industry as a part of the national economy had implications for the Amazon both in terms of actual monocultural production moving into the biome and through the infrastructure necessary for transport (the extensive impacts of infrastructure construction are treated in Chapter Three), as well as the displacement of other production systems (such as ranching) from soy producing areas in the south into the Amazon. As discussed in the introduction to this section and

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39 Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, one of the foremost scholars on Brazilian Agrarian Reform, defines “agribusiness” as bringing together industrial cattle and agricultural production, along with finance, market-based strategies, and technological innovation within one group of corporations.
explained in more detail below, national and international controversy over the effects of soy in the Amazon generated largely through a campaign launched by Greenpeace, paralyzed the process of this expansion. In response, this neo-extractive project was forced to address and incorporate environmental concerns. In other words, it needed to be “greened.” In the last decade series of “partnerships” between Brazilian and multinational corporations, and civil society organizations, mediated by Environmental NGOs, and often funded either by the multinational corporations or by foundations such as Ford and Moore have proliferated across the Amazon Region. In what follows, I analyze one such project to “green” soy agriculture in Amazonia. Through an empirical discussion of this project’s effects, I demonstrate how it compromises the livelihoods of the rural poor and the Amazonian environment.

SOY IN THE AMAZON: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT or GREEN CAPITALISM?

Poor transportation infrastructure in the north and center-west is one of the major obstacles to expansion of Brazil’s agricultural commodity production in those regions. Paving the Santarém–Cuiaba highway (BR-163), built but not paved by the military government, could solve the problem of expensive transportation for exporters Bunge and Cargill, which purchase millions of tons of soybeans annually from the region, by providing a direct route from MatoGrosso in the center-west to the Amazon River in

40 There are innumerable examples of this phenomenon, including individual projects such as the TNC project for Green Municipalities that is funded by Vale or the “Forum for the Sustainable Amazon,” the most recent iteration of non-governmental sustainable development planning is funded by the Ford Foundation, has over two hundred member organizations, and its Executive commission is composed of Agropalma [an agroindustrial palm production corporation], the National Council of Rubber Tappers; Coiab; the Federation of indigenous organizations of the Rio Negro, the Avina Foundation [an organization that connects civil society and industry]; Grupo de Trabalho Amazonico (the Amazon working group of over 600 NGOs that came out of the PPG7); The institution for Business ethics and social responsibility; the Center of Life Institute; Imazon; the International Finance Coroporation; ISA; PSA; Vale (one of the world’s largest mining companies); and Walmart Brazil.
Santarém in the north, reducing transport costs by up to 40%. Cargill built its Santarém port in 2000, anticipating that BR-163 would be paved through one of Brazil’s recent public/private partnerships as part of the national development project.\footnote{Avança Brasil, Brazil’s US$48 billion development plan for 200-2007, as well as the Accelerated Growth Program (PAC, US$503 billion) and PAC II (US$872 billion), all include funding earmarked for paving the BR-163 (Brazil, MPOG 1999, 2010).}

Prior to the port construction, but in anticipation of Cargill’s arrival BR-163’s paving, Santarém’s then-mayor (now federal deputy), Lira Maia, commissioned the federal agricultural agency to test soy-growing viability in the region and to map soil potential for agro-industry (EMBRAPA 2008), and launched a public relations campaign to attract farmers to the region, touting its low transport costs and cheap land. In the late...
1990s, farmers began to come in waves to the new “soy frontier,” purchasing tens of thousands of hectares in soy-viable areas from the smallholder migrant farmers who live along the dirt highways in the Amazon uplands.\footnote{According to a compilation of sources including soy farmer interviews, Embrapa 2005, MPF denunciations (for example Santarém Federal Justice number 2003.39.02.001236-5), voided Incra land titles, and press releases by the Attorney of the republic (2005 and 2009) both Lira Maia and INCRA’s superintendent at the time also traveled to MatoGrosso to make land deals with soy farmers; eleven INCRA employees, an employee of the \textit{MinisterioPublico}, INCRA Belém’s superintendent and later Federal Deputy José Roberto Oliveira Faro, along with several lawyers were implicated in the production of fraudulent titles for illegal sales of land from Agrarian Reform Settlements over the internet (tens of thousands of hectares) to soy farmers and loggers.}

Environmentalists were concerned with the potential direct and indirect impacts of soy (rapid deforestation in an area with a lot of primary forest), because the international market price for soy was skyrocketing and land tenure is largely disputed in the state of Pará. The combined desire for regional agricultural development and concern for its environmental effects led to calls for “governance.” This governance took on two forms. One form, addressed in the following chapter, was through a complete territorial re-organization, based in Ecological Economic Zoning, implemented in order to address the “dragging effects” of soy development. These programs, however, do not directly address the issue of monoculture production in an area valued for its standing forest. This was a problem taken up by the NGO-corporate alliances through voluntary licensing programs.

In what follows, I explain how a network of NGOs discursively rendered Amazonian soy a problem that could be solved (by them) through the production of a different type of environmental value: soy, unable to be sold because of its environmental image, was rendered “green” through environmental licensing. I highlight the difference between program rhetoric—which argues that stopping deforestation is an apolitical,
universal public good, that markets have a natural ability to provide conservation incentives, and that justice may be attained through existing laws—and program logistic—which equate private needs with the public good, which manipulate markets, and which re-write laws. I then examine the environmental, social, and political effects of these programs in the highlands near Santarém in the state of Pará.

**Voluntary licensing: Responsible Soy and the Soy Moratorium**

Voluntary licensing is one of many types of food certification programs, which function as a Polanyian “double movement” against neoliberalism, modulating the effects of forcing “fictitious commodities” into the market by redistributing profits or re-embedding ethics in product value so as to change the terms of exchange (Mutersbaugh 2005). TNC with Cargill, and a group of transnational corporations with ENGOs, created two programs (Responsible Soy and the Soy Moratorium respectively) that address soy production in the Amazon. To understand how they address the problem, we must first understand how they define it. The problem with soy, according to Greenpeace and TNC, was its potential to cause deforestation of virgin forest for soy production as had happened in *MatoGrosso* (Jepson 2003; Wolford 2008).

Soy growers’ union leaders reported that they and Cargill partnered with TNC to “green” their image following Greenpeace’s 2006 public relations campaign against Cargill Santarém and Amazonian soy. TNC works in over 30 countries and is the US’s third largest nonprofit by assets and its largest environmental nonprofit by revenue. Its director is a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. It is repeatedly ranked as America’s most trusted non-profit. TNC approaches conservation according to what Stephens and Ottoway (*Washington Post*, May 4, 2003) call “compatible development”—
combining the needs of business with the needs of environmentalism. Following this model, the world’s biggest polluters can work as partners with TNC either through their “corporate leadership circle” or by directly funding projects. TNC’s position is that corporations will either wreak havoc on the world themselves, or will find “sustainable” ways to expand by working with conservation organizations. In other words, “there is no alternative”—the Amazon needs increased production, and the Amazon needs conservation. The contradictory nature of expanded production and conservation are not the problem; the problem, for TNC and similar NGOs, is one of governance.

Justification for “governance” depends on the problem of Amazonian development being rendered a technocratic one of deforestation, rather than an ethico-political problem of competing visions for Amazonia. In TNC’s words:

> Amidst all the arguments over the Amazon there is one point of consensus: deforestation should be reduced. In theory, there are two ways that might happen. The first, given that most deforestation in the Amazon is illegal, is that Brazilian authorities enforce laws against deforestation. But the Amazon is very large, the presence of the authorities is patchy and enforcement in the absence of other measures is unlikely ever to be a success: both sticks and carrots are necessary. The second way to reduce deforestation is to work directly with those responsible and change their behavior. For this, the people to reach are not the traditional partners of environmental organizations in the Amazon, like indigenous people, rubber-tappers or subsistence farmers, who clear relatively little forest. The key people to reach are the big deforesters: ranchers and commercial farmers. Very soon biofuel producers will be joining the party, as Brazil reinforces its position as the world’s leading producer of sugar-cane ethanol. So the expansion of commercial agriculture into the Amazon… is driven by very powerful market demands that will not disappear anytime soon…The Amazon cannot be insulated from the outside world.

In one paragraph, TNC has 1) rendered expansion of Amazonian soy inevitable; 2) made all competing arguments about Amazonia superfluous, reducing them to a

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technical issue of deforestation; 3) argued that a failure of government means that the only effective regulation comes from the stick (forced compliance that the government cannot do on its own) and the carrot (market-incentives); 4) justified an alliance with big business; and 5) made smallholders irrelevant to the situation.

In enacting the Soy Moratorium, TNC and Cargill joined several other NGOs (WWF and IPAM), Aboive (Brazilian Association of Industrial Vegetable Oils), ANEC (National Association of Cereal Exporters), and the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union (STTR), whose presence as local people legitimized the process as “participatory.” The Moratorium is a voluntary agreement between buyers, growers, and “civil society” beginning in June 2006 then extended for three years, which put a moratorium on purchasing soy grown on land deforested to grow soy. Its founding document (2006) focuses on “governance”—creating the “soy working group” to help the government “implement legislation and existing laws.” Like Responsible Soy—the Cargill/TNC agreement for soy produced in the greater Santarém area—the moratorium is premised upon the idea that deforestation is the problem, and that governance is the solution.

“The Carrot” in Theory

Licensing seeks to internalize potential externalities, thereby minimizing the exploitation (in this case, of the environment) that capitalist competition tends to create in its “race to the bottom.” This involves setting standards, in this case of production, and monitoring the meeting of those standards, or verification (Guthman 2007). Buyers agree not to purchase soy that was grown on land deforested beyond the size of the legally required reserve (in the Amazon this was 80% of a property and has, through negotiations
over Ecological Economic Zoning been reduced to 50%) in order to produce that soy. A third party (TNC/Soy Working Group) verifies whether or not producers have met these requirements, thereby authorizing the buyer to purchase the product. The agreement is voluntary in that it is not enforceable by law. In the case of Cargill and Santarém’s soy growers, the agreement could also be construed as coercive in that there is only one other regional buyer of soybeans, Avis Pará, who purchases approximately 10% of regionally produced beans. After Greenpeace’s campaign, banks stopped giving farmers loans without collateral. Because 67% of land in the state of Pará is not titled, most farmers there cannot put up their land as collateral (Oliveira 2009). Cargill, then, becomes the only entity capable of extending the credit that is necessary for industrial production. To access this credit, farmers are forced to participate in the program. In other words, the carrot is also the stick.

Voluntary agreements must be based on demonstrating the difference between non-licensed and licensed commodities. There is no other quality, such as taste or appearance, which would suggest that soy produced under the moratorium program is better, which would make it possible to differentiate that soy from other soy, or which could prove that it was produced on land not recently deforested. Verification by a trusted source is key to making believable claims. NGOs, then, become indispensible in the governing relation—they are able to transfer consumer confidence in them to the producer who works in partnership with them. Given that Amazonian produced soy has no exchange value on the international market (e.g. cannot be sold) without this certification, these programs function as the gateway to the access and distribution of

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value.

“The Carrot” in Practice

The Soy Moratorium’s founding document stipulates 1) that farmers must not deforest any new land for soy planting after 2007; 2) that farmers comply with the forest code; 3) that they reforest areas over the legal maximum for deforestation; 3) that farmers legally hold title to their land within two years of entering the program; 4) that within two years the soy working group develop a verification mechanism; and 5) that purchasing companies sign the National Pact to eradicate slavery. Farmers out of compliance with the above cannot sell their soy. Until 2009, no system was developed that could monitor deforestation of less than 100 hectares. Given that most farms in the Santarém area are between 200 and 1500 hectares in size, it is likely that such a large grain of analysis would fail to detect deforestation on soy farms. In September 2009, TNC’s Responsible Soy program director said they had developed a system to monitor deforestation on a farm-by-farm basis, but only for highlands outside of Santarém (the area in the Responsible Soy Program), not the entire area covered by the moratorium. He stressed in his interview that there was no other entity that had TNC’s technological sophistication—no one else was monitoring any soy production at this grain of analysis, as the moratorium implied.

TNC’s terms of agreement with Cargill change yearly and the terms of the contract are not made public, which raises the question—what are they licensing? According to TNC interviews, the 2009 agreement stipulated that farmers must have entered into the process to get an environmental license, submitting an application to register for the rural registry. This requirement is met by submitting paperwork; farmers
do not have to receive a response from the state environmental secretary (SEMA).
Waiting for SEMA to respond is illogical, according to TNC, because it is not TNC’s, nor
the farmers’ fault, that SEMA does not have the capacity to respond (or the political
will). In other words, contrary to claims elsewhere, TNC is not concerned with the
effectiveness of governmental process, only that farmers comply with its own rules.
Further, when TNC finds a farmer violating the forest code, they report them to Cargill,
not to the government. So it appears that they are not actually advocating for their stated
mission to aid enforcement of laws, but for compliance with the terms of the agreement
with Cargill.

Farmers in the Responsible Soy program must have farms located in areas of
“consolidation” or “expansion” within the ZEE (which means areas not explicitly
designated as protected areas). This means that while farmers in the program cannot
infiltrate indigenous or traditional territory (protected areas), there are no repercussions
for incursions on Agrarian Reform settlements or other areas where migrant farmers
(non- ethnically/culturally protected people yet those primarily displaced by soy) live.45
The struggle for/over land tenure is at the heart of Amazonian land conflict. TNC’s
research on land tenure and soy, which they have not released publically, concluded that
a large percentage of their farmers did not have tenure (Barreto 2009). When their
negotiations for that tenure for soy farmers with INCRA failed, they removed the land
tenure requirement from the program.

Internal government documents revealed that Cargill and TNC representatives
met with officials from INCRA, IBAMA, and the Ministerio Publico (Cohenca, 2007).

45There have been numerous requests for recognition of indigenous, traditional and Quilombola
territories within areas designated for “expansion” or “consolidation” in ZEE. Taking the ZEE as
the starting point for requirements for soy farmers effectively ignores these claims.
Arguing that soy would be an economic boon to the region, they asked these agencies to regularize the property rights of the soy farmers, reduce all of their existing fines to 10% of their economic value, accept data provided by TNC as “official” data (such as geographic data), and expedite authorizations for deforestation. They also proposed that the legal reserve, which at the time was 80% of a given piece of property that must be kept deforested, be allowed to be re-located off of the property (and inside already existing reserve areas)—which would theoretically allow soy farmers to be in compliance with the Soy Moratorium/Responsible Soy while deforesting up to 100% of their property. These terms raise doubts as to whether the purpose of governance is to better implement existing laws or to change them.

**The Effects of Soy Governance**

*Environmental Effects*

Whether the moratorium has been effective in stopping soy-related deforestation remains questionable. TNC and Greenpeace concede that a monitoring system capable of tracking deforestation on the smaller size farms more common in the Amazon has not existed until this past year. Further, the number of farms found deforesting in order to grow soy in the Amazon biome actually increased between 2006 and 2008 (Greenpeace 2008). Researchers produce different and contradictory data on soy-related deforestation rates (Cohenca 2005; Coelho 2009; Weinhold, Killick, and Reis 2010). Most arguments for effectiveness of the moratorium rely on conclusions that are based on correlations rather than evidence-based causation, and NGOs’ propaganda misrepresents existing data. For example, Greenpeace’s website states, “thanks to the Soy Moratorium, soy is no longer the chief driver of Amazon deforestation.” During the primary period of soy
expansion into the Amazon (2001-2008), 80% of deforestation of the Amazon happened in Brazil and 70% of that has been cattle-related and only 10% soy-related—in other words, soy was never the chief driver of Amazonian deforestation. There is no data indicating that the Soy Moratorium has impacted soy expansion or deforestation. To the contrary, most evidenced-based arguments for the slowing of soy expansion point to falling/stagnating prices on the global market (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006; Malhi et al. 2008). In July of 2010, even Greenpeace, the moratorium’s biggest supporter, admitted that the results of the moratorium were inconclusive. The apparent the success of both the Soy Moratorium and the Responsible Soy program are based on rhetorical expertise rather than evidence-based scientific research.

Figure 10: Soy fields in Belterra, Pará
Social effects

When Lira Maia brought MatoGrosso’s farmers maps of potential soy areas near Santarém, he neglected to inform them that they were not maps of an empty landscape. Much of the land was utilized by smallholder farmers—primarily peasant farmers who had migrated to the region to escape cycles of drought and extreme inequality in northeastern Brazil. Known as colonos, these subsistence farmers have generally settled in the uplands along Amazonian highways and roads. Government programs and propaganda regarding free land and work in extractive industries attracted hundreds of thousands of poor and landless workers to the Amazon beginning in the late 1960s. Government withdrawal from the region in the 80s left them, in their words, feeling “abandoned,” their communities “forgotten,” and the people “stuck.” Even now, most remain in small rural settlements, farming on individual plots, cynical about repeated government promises for roads, credit, and energy that after forty years have still not arrived.

These are the communities that have been most directly impacted by the arrival of soy into the region. In some cases, the conflict generated with colono communities by the arrival of soy farmers has manifested according to what we might think of as the traditional forms of latifundia—peasant conflict, where soy farmers have forced people off of their land, burned their houses, created false titles and expropriated families living on land, or simply started farming on land that belonged to a given community as represented in the Greenpeace documentary, “Eating up the Amazon,” and reported in some interviews. More commonly, however, displacement and disruption of rural communities happens along the lines of what we might call a “rural gentrification,”
where what are largely medium-sized farmers (200-1000 hectares), buy land cheaply from poor farmers with little capital in order to establish larger soy farms. Unlike typical Amazonian *latifundia* or ranchers, these farmers are not absentee owners. Rather, according to the several farmers that I interviewed as well as the head of the Sirsan, the agribusiness union in Santarém, they tend to be farmers who worked in middle management on the mega-farms of MatoGrosso, who acquired capital and moved to the Amazon, where farming had lower start-up costs, with dreams of establishing a successful farming project and a bucolic, rural life. Their success is dependent upon displacement of the existing communities, because the land for one soy farm usually comprises what had previously been the land of many families, and dependent upon commodification of the land, because it is needed as collateral for loans. It was also dependent upon their participation in TNC’s program, because without TNC’s stamp of approval, Cargill would not purchase their soy.

Since the end of the 1990s, soy farmers moving into the region have offered large payments for land, especially for land with documents. As some smallholders began to sell, incentives for others to sell increased because the social networks in which they lived were broken, schools were closed, and pesticide on neighboring soy fields drove pests into their fields. It is estimated that twenty-six communities disappeared in the highlands proximate to Santarém between 1998 and 2007 (Projeto Saude & Alegria 2008).

The transformation of the landscape along the highways leaving Santarém from a landscape of family farms to one of monoculture soy was striking, and there was much discussion over the effect of soy on surrounding communities but little actual information
regarding what happened to families and communities displaced through this process of land sales. In order to better understand the effects of the territorialization of soy agriculture, I conducted meetings in three communities where we mapped out the families who had left, where they had gone, and if possible, what their sale prices had been. I also tracked down several of these families and interviewed them regarding their land sales and their lives after they left their communities.

My empirical research in six of these communities demonstrated that people who moved out of these communities tended to move short distances (2-50 kilometers) and closer to urban or transportation infrastructure. Land sale prices varied widely from less than $100 reais (approximately US$35 at the time) per hectare to upwards of $2000 reais (US$850), largely depending on the time of sale (earlier sales yielded lower prices) and the security of property rights (titled land demands higher prices than other forms of possession). Families interviewed who sold land universally purchased smaller lots than those they had previously inhabited, and usually significantly smaller (e.g. sold 60 hectares and purchased one hectare, or sold 40 hectares and purchased an urban or peri-urban lot measuring 30 x 40 meters were the norm). When purchasing new land, they paid between five and ten times as much per hectare for land that always had less secure property rights. In summary, smallholders generally sold titled land or land with some type of legal possession and in its place purchased a much smaller and more expensive plot of land with no legal property rights. In all cases, the only document that people received for new land was a purchase receipt from the seller. People’s youngest children tended to move with them, while older children often went to the city (Santarém) or dispersed to other rural areas. Family income upon moving to urban areas always
included at least one form of government subsidy, usually either social security 
(aponentadoria) or the family assistance program (bolsafamilia). Those who moved to 
other rural areas continued to plant manioc (the region’s staple crop), while those who 
moved to urban/peri-urban areas no longer engaged in subsistence agriculture beyond 
small home gardens.

In communities where most people had left, remaining residents lamented the 
deterioration of infrastructure, the destruction of their communities, and the loss of their families, many of which were split up in the process of land selling. They also reported extreme reduction in their ability to grow, which they blamed on soy farmers’ application of pesticides, and said that now they were forced to purchase food that they had formerly grown. “Life” in the remaining community, interviewees said repeatedly, “is difficult, but wasn’t always this way.” Those who remained had generally never received offers to sell.

Many development practitioners in Amazonia, including Responsible Soy’s program director, argue that subsistence agriculture is “unproductive,” that it threatens Amazonian conservation, and that it would be better replaced by the more “productive” (in terms of surplus) agro-industry.46 The underlying assumption is that non-agricultural life is more desirable, that surplus production (i.e. profit) is better and/or more secure than subsistence, and that urban employment even exists, which in Santarém is not the case. Migration for waged employment and/or for access to better land is not uncommon in these communities. What is uncommon is the disappearance of the communities that have consistently formed a rural safety net when food prices increase, or when other

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46The 2008 World Bank Report, which also suggests that smallholders unable to compete in higher value production exit agriculture, demonstrates that this is a dominant strain in development thinking. It is also highly disputed. See the Journal of Peasant Studies 36(3) Forum on the Report, and specifically Li (2009) in that issue.
types of employment become scarce. Interview data revealed that relocation and return migration is common among these communities. If there is no place to return to, the cycle of rural life and its safety net is disrupted.

Consequently, the region’s food sovereignty is at risk as soy farms replace subsistence farms. Like other neo-extractive industries, soy production is for export. Displaced local production must be replaced by importing food from other parts of Brazil. Imported goods to Santarém are expensive for the same reason that soy shipping is expensive—they must be shipped from afar via river or plane. Displacement also drives up the price for locally produced food. For example, in Santarém, in 2009, a combination of increased government subsidies for daily living of smallholders, low market prices for the labor intensive farinha (a manioc product), extreme weather conditions (very dry summer, very wet winter), and growing urban demand meant that farinha prices doubled in Santarém. Rural families who had not planted farinha in previous years re-planted intensively again following the rise in prices. For those who no longer have land, this is no longer an option. The threat to food sovereignty is especially severe because there is no consistent form of alternative income for displaced farmers; purchasing food when prices rise is challenging.

**Political effects**

The conjunctural changes of the past ten years, marked by the incursion of agribusiness into the region and its alliance with organizations that were previously viewed as sympathetic to smallholders, means that lines of antagonism are blurred. Rather than the historical conflict between smallholders and latifundia that often erupted in confrontational violence and the forced relocation of smallholders, soy farmers usually
purchase land from smallholders. Smallholder reception of soy farmers range from quite receptive (“it was by the grace of God that the soy farmers appeared and bought our land”) to resigned (“if I had the money to stay, I would not have sold, but I did not have the conditions to refuse the offer, so now we are here [in their new, smaller plot].”) And most soy farmers were on reasonably good terms with the people they displaced.\(^{47}\) When larger, longer-term effects of displacement became apparent, those still eligible turn to the rural workers’ union; the union points to “Cargill” as their adversary. A transnational adversary is less immediate and more difficult to effectively organize against through existing resistance strategies.

In response, union leaders built their own international alliances, stating, “How can we fight against Cargill? We have no resources. We do not have access to the national and international media. Greenpeace and The Health and Happiness Project (PSA, a regional NGO) are important partners because it is only with them that we have the resources to fight against Cargill.” The union participated in a PSA/Greenpeace “participatory mapping” project to record the effects of soy in Belterra. The Greenpeace release of this map, both in Santarem and at the World Social Forum in Belém in 2009, was hailed by the union, NGOs and the representatives of the indigenous, traditional, and quilombola communities present at these events as the key tool to battling Cargill, soy farmers and Agribusiness in the Amazon.

One and a half years later, the only official use of this map was by Cargill, who incorporated the map into its environmental impact assessment to demonstrate that they had evaluated the negative social impacts of soy, and to argue that port construction’s

\(^{47}\) One farmer, for example, built a water tower near the highway to encourage people to sell him their land and re-locate near the highway, which they did. He and Belterra’s mayor (who has greatly facilitated the expansion of soy farming) threw a party to Christen the new “community.”
positive impacts outweighed the negative in terms of job creation and regional economic
growth. The map, then, was instrumental for governance in multiple ways. It functioned
as a tool for Greenpeace to “empower” local actors, offering them resources (financial
and technical) with which some thought would make their claims legible to government
and media in order to rally political support against Cargill, drawing their energy away
from other avenues of resistance. It also provided Greenpeace with the legitimacy that it
needed to carry out its anti-soy campaign and to ultimately negotiate the Soy Moratorium
(on their behalf), which incorporated none of the social concerns of local actors, and
instead, as previously discussed, focused strictly on deforestation. Finally, it was a tool
for Cargill to argue that it had considered social issues, in order to have its Environmental
Impact Assessment, and therefore its port, approved.

Legitimacy of the Soy Moratorium hinged on the inclusion of “local” actors.
Initially, the Santarem Rural Workers’ Union and the Amazon Defense Front participated
in the negotiations; however, FDA withdrew when “they laughed at our proposal for ‘soy
zero’” (no Amazonian soy production). Other moratorium signatories included NGOs
that work on regional social/environmental issues but have no constituency in the
Santarem area (ISA). The CPT, the Landless Workers’ Movement or MST, Via
Campesina, and FASE (a national social justice NGO) all opted out of the moratorium
stating in a letter that it would “only serve to legalize soy in the region.” The Union and
Greenpeace argued in internal emails that although the moratorium is not ideal,
negotiation is the only option for stopping transnational corporations from destroying the
Amazon. As demonstrated in the introduction, more unified resistance was divided as
some opted to “participate.”
Soy and the near disappearance of the soy controversy from the media and from everyday discussion in the city, indicates that governance neutralized this controversy. More importantly, it points to the changing terms of the territorial and environmental politics in Amazonia.

**CONCLUSION**

In summary, the growing pace of neo-extractive development deemed necessary to sustain Brazil’s expanding economy is in part constituted by contemporary conservation initiatives that redeploy neo-extractive expansion as environmentally progressive. This “greening” of neo-extractivism itself, I have demonstrated here, turns on explicitly environmental and implicitly social claims. Tying neo-extractivism to issues of poverty and environment makes it indispensible to maintain those things, which are represented apolitically as the “public good.” The failure of the state is blamed for negative development impacts and as such, the optimal method of dealing with these impacts is presented as non-state, voluntary, public-private agreements. In such arrangements, various groups may come to the table, but only a few of them can set the agenda, leaving local actors with the choices to “opt in or out.” This assumes that a difference in form will necessarily address a difference in power relationships, an assumption that we will see repeated in the approach to territorial ordering that will be explored in the next chapter. Assuming that the needs of all parties can necessarily be addressed through participation neglects the reality that different actors’ needs and desires are based in their different material existences, and that these material existences are the products of the very disparate relations of force. Thus, attending to the “public good” through public participation in the form of multi-stakeholder agreements and
participatory forums is not a simple privatization of state process; rather it is a re-working of public processes to make them productive for accumulation. This productivity of the public is one of the key strategies and effects of governance (Harney 2008).

The development apparatus has historically functioned as a mechanism of control, setting the terms of development debates (Escobar 1995); however, the mechanisms for doing so have substantively shifted under neoliberalism and continue today as part of the neo-extractive project in ways that are perhaps less apparent—focused on participation and empowerment of local actors—but which, I have argued here, nonetheless fail to substantively intervene in the given relations of force. The disruption to social relations, displacement of communities, and the confusion of the political lines of antagonism discussed above are evidence of this failure.

The arrival of soy into the Amazon has re-worked Amazonian territory in myriad ways that we have only begun to explore in this chapter. The next chapter will explore the more explicitly territorial partitioning of landscapes, communities, and resources through land use policy enacted to address the wide-ranging effects of agribusiness expansion. This chapter has sought to explain some of the mechanisms that in the most immediate sense make the geographic advance of soy, along with its proximate effects, possible. This chapter also shows how these programs have co-emerged with and strengthen the new political networks across NGO, state, movement organizations, and corporations that are central to the re-working of conservation and development in Amazonia.
Chapter Three. Territories of Extractivism, Technologies of Ordering

INTRODUCTION. AMAZONIA: THE FUTURE ARRIVES AGAIN

“Brazilians feel [pride] over the opening of the nation’s new frontier, constituted by the gigantic work of conquering and colonizing the largest empty space on the globe.”

Jornal do Brasil 1968

“The forest is our great laboratory, the place where we must create policies and institutions that will have relevance in the rest of the country. Amazonia is the way forward (vanguarda) not backward (retaguarda)”

Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 2008

Territorializing Development 1964-Present

Military Government

In 1970, with the slogan “integrate to avoid losing it [to foreign governments]” (“integrar para não entregar) the Medici military government officially initiated its project to colonize the nation’s own hinterlands, the Amazon, under the Plano de Integração Nacional (National Integration Plan, PIN). By presidential Decree (1.106, July 16, 1970), PIN would address both the geopolitical concern to “occupy” the region and induce rapid economic growth by creating “integration corridors” to link up the “growth poles” established under the military government’s first development plan, Operação Amazônia’s (Operation Amazonia). That is, they planned to build 15,000 km

48 Cited in Bunker (1985, 107)
of roads across the region, the main arteries of which would be the Transamazon (BR 230) crossing the region east-west, and the Santarém-Cuiabá highway (BR-163), crossing the region north-south. Medici’s government nationalized 100 km on either side of these and other regional “highways,” (2.2 million square kilometers of largely unpaved roads) to serve as the future home sites, or so it was planned, for the half a million landless people from the northeast and south that they planned to resettle as “colonists.” Like the development plans for the Belém-Brasilia highway built seven years prior, PIN expanded the agricultural frontier – through agribusiness and small farming expansion – into the region filling the “empty space” of the northern region (Brasil 1970, 89).50

49 Operation Amazonia focused on providing investment incentives for agribusiness, ranching, logging, and mineral extraction in 15 specific areas called growth poles.

50 The “empty space” crossed by the PIN roads affected 96 tribes, more than half of the tribes in the Amazon and further expansion under subsequent programs such as Polonoroeste and Calha Norte increased this number to 75%. After the Trans-Amazon was built, the Parakanã Indians lost 45% of their population in one year, the Yanomami by 25% and the list goes on and on.
The Poloamazonia program that followed PIN (under Ernesto Geisel, Medici’s successor), shifted the focus from small-scale agriculture to incentivizing investment in agribusiness, ranching, mineral extraction and hydro-electric dams (Fearnsdie 1986; Schmink and Wood 1992). The massive migration of rural poor and capitalized developers stimulated by PIN and the national and international multi-lateral (the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank) and private investment of POLOAMAZONIA and other programs effectively established a new, dominant territorial organization through roads and extractive exploration (Carlos Walter Porto-
Almost thirty years later in 1998, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched his multi-year investment plan called *Avança Brasil* (Forward Brazil) promising, in language that harkened back to the military projects of the 60s and 70s, to create a “new economic and social geography” for the country by investing hundreds of millions of dollars into a nationwide infrastructure network for the development of extractive resources (Cardoso 1998). This plan marked a significant shift in national development policy to re-focus on resource production and infrastructure development as a primary part of its economic growth strategy, a strategy that had been abandoned in Amazônia during the economic crisis and democratic transition of the 1980s.

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52 Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration reoriented the focus and structure of national development projects by restructuring the country’s multi-year investment plans. Based on research conducted under the first plan (*Brasil em Ação* or Brazil on the Move 1996-99), the second plan *Avança Brasil* (or Forward Brazil) proposed a new ‘economic and social geography’ for the country, reorienting development – planning, financing and structures of accountability – around five different development axes (strikingly reminiscent of the military dictatorship’s ‘development corridors’) as opposed to the traditional municipal-state-national nested structure, or around eco-regions planning that was key for conservation (Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestao 1999; Fearnside 2002).
The project itself divided Brazil into “development axes” (reminiscent of PINs development corridors) with 338 projects planned, including the paving of 7500 km of highways through the Amazon that were built but never paved under the PIN project (See Figures 11 and 12). The proposed budget was 317 billion reais (then approximately 300 billion USD) for investment in extractive and infrastructure development, half of which would come from federal government funding (primarily through the national bank, BNDS) and half of which (and this was the departure from the military model) would come through private, largely international, investment through a series of public-private...
partnerships. For the Amazon, this meant US $43 billion dollars worth of development investment, with US $20 billion going directly into infrastructure (road and dam) construction, providing paved access to and through the core region of Amazonia along the Madeira and Tapajós Rivers with the explicit goal of encouraging the agro-industrial production of soybeans, corn and other crops in several regional development centers (Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 2010). As discussed in the previous chapter, outcry by the pro-environment policy block generated controversy and halted some of Forward Brazil’s key projects, most famously, as discussed in the previous chapter the paving of the BR-163.

While the BR-163 controversy temporarily (for approximately 10 years) postponed plans to move forward on road paving, it did not represent an impasse of two fundamentally opposed positions (pro-environment and pro-development), as many argue (Zhouri 2010). Rather, it marked a shift in the approach to governing and developing the Amazon that would provide an explicit articulation of the two positions. They have consistently operated side-by-side but often in conflicting ways and each dominated policy making at different times (Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Lemos and Roberts 2008). This articulation was possible, I will argue in this chapter and further in Chapter four because they share a logic, based in political economy and oriented around the inter-related ideas of property rights and efficient production that allows for their articulation within the larger state territorialization project, discussed below.

Accelerated Growth

The Lula and Dilma administrations’ Accelerated Growth Programs (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC) both included many of Avança Brasil’s most
controversial Amazonian programs (Belo Monte Dam, BR-163 highway, Madeira River dams), would add others (for example, dams on the Tapajós). They would substantially and progressively increase the PAC budgets. Funding for PACs came from several different sources. They would be funded in a small part by direct federal government investment, and then in approximately equal amounts through investments by national corporations (e.g. Petrobras) and private, largely multi-national corporations. Private investment was/is incentivized through tax breaks and interest rate subsidies by the federal government for loans provided through BNDS. BNDS vastly increased its funding for coordination and investment in infrastructure under the PAC program in Lula’s second term (Oliva and Zendron 2010: 76). In fact, funding from the BNDS for these projects was so substantial – BNDS directs over 95% of its lending to Brazilian development projects and the bank itself lent more money than the World Bank and Interamerican bank combined in 2009-2010 – that a blogger at the national weekly Veja called “Bolsa BNDS,” a riff on “Bolsa Familia,” the federal program that gives a monthly stipend to low income families (Zibechi in Hardt and Reyes 2012; Hochstetler and Montero 2012). Linking income generated from this “new extractivism” to social programs would rhetorically place the mission of poverty alleviation at the center of the developmentalist project.53

The previous chapter made the argument that in order for this development to be possible, it also had to be “greened” and explained that one of the primary methods for doing that is voluntary, market-based incentives. This chapter will explore the more expansive, region-wide, and explicitly territorial strategy to making this development

53 See for example, the statements of Lula’s minister quoted in the Preface or Dilma’s PAC contra miséria (Folha de São Paulo, January 1 2011)
both possible and “sustainable.” To green the PAC programs on a region-wide scale, the Lula administrations introduced the *Plano Amazonia Sustentável* (Program for a Sustainable Amazon, PAS) in 2007, which proposed to integrate conservation with Lula’s anti-poverty mission and to develop Amazonia’s extractive resources and associated infrastructure (MMA 2011). This program articulates the pro-environment and pro-development policy positions by “solving” what both sides took as the central challenge to regional governance – the land tenure issue (*questão fundiaria*). This issue would be solved through the “Ordering of Territory” (*Ordenação de Territorio* in the 1988 constitution, and *Ordenamento Territorial* in national policy) a project that marked a return, by the State, after over a decade, to an explicit territorial strategy for re-establishing and “securing particular social relations and relations of production” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006). In Amazônia, one of the primary strategies for “securing relations” was a land-use zoning model called Ecological Economic Zoning and the subsequent assignment of property rights.

All of the plans discussed above, from the PIN projects of the 1960s and 1970s to *Avança Brasil* in 1998, to Lula’s PAC programs and the *Plano Amazonia Sustentável* that would make them possible are premised on an evolutionary development imaginary that seeks to transform Amazonia from a place that is “atrasado” (backwards) and nationally irrelevant to one that is Brazil’s (economic) “future” by re-territorializing the region to facilitate natural resource exploitation. Of course, a vast political and conceptual terrain has been traversed since 1964 that make the strategies to reach this “future” today, under the neo-developmental state, substantively different from the military dictatorship’s
The crisis of the developmentalism and of state in the 1980s was also a crisis of territory for the Brazilian state. In Amazonia, the organized resistance movements encountered in the supposed “land without men” successfully challenged the state’s (and capital’s) coercive function and demanded and claimed new political and territorial spaces. These struggles forced the recognition, at minimum, that Amazonia was a territory marked by “multiplicity” (in the words of the document) of social and spatial logics, a multiplicity that according to the state’s own planning documents, was based in and productive of “a vision of economy, society, and territory” that “fragmented” the state (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 35).

Thus, unlike the dictatorships’ authoritarian programs that not only overlooked, but were designed to disrupt and incorporate existing forms of life in the region, today development planning must contend with the demands of these movements. The PAC/PAS, recognize and incorporate these territorialities, placing – rhetorically, if not

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54 “Developmentalism” in Brazil more generally developmentalism is generally understood be what is also called the ISI (import substitution) period that began prior to the military dictatorship under Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo (1937-1945). This developmentalism and was defined by policy a particular set of policy instruments, agencies, and parastatal institutions geared toward promoting exports and attracting foreign direct investment. The early developmentalist state focused primarily on industrial sectors in the south (Sikkink 1991). With a few exceptions, it was not really until the Kubitschek administration (1956-60) began construction of the Belém-Brasilia Highway, the 1966 creation of the Superintendency for the Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) was established and began funding ranches and then, most significantly, the military government’s National Integration Plans I and II that opened roads and promoted colonization that developmentalism began to take shape in Amazonia and thus developmentalism in Amazônia has a slightly different time scale than other parts of Brazil.

55 Specifically rubber tappers, indigenous people, quilombolas, ribeirinhos, other traditional people, and rural workers all claimed territorial and citizenship rights. The 1988 constitution recognized the rights to indigenous territory and to Quilombo lands, reaffirmed the need for the “social function of property” and usucapião, both of which would become key for land access for rural workers, and through the 1990s new forms of property rights in the form of the Agroextractive Settlement (Projeto Agroextrativista PAE) and the Extractive Reserve were created as a form of usufruct rights for traditional people. These forms proliferated throughout the Amazon. Today in the Legal Amazon there are approximately 400 demarcated indigenous territories and 26 Resexes.
practically – the needs of the poor, of social movements, and “cultural and biological diversity” at their center. If the shift over forty years, from colonization to governance meant a shift from the violent imposition of territorial order to an ordering that seeks to recognize, account for, and create space for variation and difference among the many different “Amazônias” that refused the colonization model, the continuity among these plans is that the central question remains one of implementing (and drawing this difference into) a particular kind of order, one that begins with the question of “legibility.”

**Legibility**

In his now classic work *Seeing Like a State*, James Scott (1998) establishes legibility as a central problem of statecraft. His argument has been taken as a point of departure for innumerable works that have taken up, critiqued, and revised his question of why state projects to impose order consistently fail. Critics argue that either Scott’s “state” either no longer exists (Ferguson 2005), or that it never did (Agrawal 2005; Li 2005; Li 2007; Vanderveest and Peluso 1995; Corson 2011). The former position argues that Scott’s authoritarian, socialist, and developmentalist states are a thing of the past and further, that arguments about the legibility-making function cannot be easily translated to global capital as Scott suggests (Ferguson 2005). The latter position argues that states are not coherent, autonomous, bounded “up there” realms of power that expand outward and downward to colonize people and places outside of it. Rather, following the Foucauldian (2008) concept of governmentality, these authors argue that the mechanism of state power is no longer coercive, that state “schemes” (namely development) work on and through practices and desires, and that such work happens through a range of governing
parties, institutions, individuals, some of which are quite distant from the bureaucratic institutions normally associated with the state (Agrawal 2005; Li 2005; Li 2007; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Corson 2011). This critical line of thinking in development studies takes as its starting point the premise that Scott asks the wrong question. The question should not be, as Tania Li (2005) puts it, “why have these schemes failed?” but rather “what do they do?”

This critique has resulted in a proliferation of studies that have described the messy, contradictory, conjunctural effects of development schemes implemented by an equally messy, contradictory, conjunctural state-ngo-civil society apparatus. The basic argument of much of this work, broadly, is that these schemes may tend to reproduce relations of inequality, close off certain possibilities for action, but also that they create openings through which different actors may act to empower themselves and thus, every particular situation must be studied in its specific contextuality.

I would argue that this literature sheds important light on the complex, specific workings of power and has been foundational for nuancing and expanding notions of “the state.” I would also argue, however, that although much of the work in this vein of critical ethnography is often meant to do be a politically aimed critique, it runs the risk of being politically ambivalent. As Li herself tells us, this detailed description is the same work done by the World Bank (Li 2005). The logical conclusion of this work, which has effectively, and importantly demonstrated that, for example, state-civil society relationships are porous and complex and are not pre-determined (for an excellent example, see Borras 2001), should not be, that there is no particular logic to the state, that the complexity of relations of force is infinite, and that there are not contradictory
positions and goals. Rather, the logical conclusion should be that social situations exceed the dominant logic, containing multiple logics. The analytic question is thus not how to simply describe the endless complexity of positions, but how to understand (and undo) the dominant logic and the power relations contained therein for any given situation.

Following from this premise, in the remainder of this chapter, I would like to resurrect Scott, drawing on another argument from that same book - that state projects of legibility are like maps, in that they implement a project of order that produces an effect. If, following Scott’s critics, that the state is not an “up there” *a priori* territorial entity that implements order onto docile subjects, but following Scott, that these projects of legibility are productive, I argue that the state (among other things) is (re)produced through these ordering projects, and thus these ordering projects are key sites for exploring the logics and functions of the contemporary Brazilian state. State territorialization, (and any territorialization for that matter, see Porto Gonçalves 2007 and Chapter Four) in other words, is productive and reproductive. It is a state and subject making practice (Foucault 2008; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). This chapter seeks to describe and theorize the state strategies articulated and produced through territorialization tactics.

To do this, I examine the specific process of “state territorialization”- the series of programs, laws and policies broadly grouped under the term *Ordenamento Territorial* – associated with the paving of the BR-163. I argue that the contemporary complex landscape of laws, policies, and programs implemented by an equally complex array of state, non-governmental, and economic actors that governs the region embodies a territorial ordering strategy based on recognizing, incorporating, and disciplining social,
ecological, and territorial difference. This does not, I argue, change the fundamental fact that the re-territorialization serves as the basis for regional development functions in the interest of the state and market even though it very carefully incorporates certain aspects, strategies, practices and actors of Amazonia’s already existing socio-ecological territorialities into the given order-of-things. In other words, this territorialization remains a strategy for “above” although it is enacted, at least in part, from “below.”

To make this argument I will first briefly review the history of the “land question” in Amazônia in order to develop a working definition of the concept of Ordenamento Territorial, which today is the central mechanism for “state territorialization” (as discussed in the preface) in the region. Then I will turn to the specific example of the series of laws, policies, and programs that comprise Ordenamento Territorial in Western Pará – inspired by the proposed paving of the BR-163 to explore the broad transformations in territorial management. I will argue that some of the most significant effects of this ordering for the existing regional residents are the tendency to legalize formerly illegal practices (grilagem, logging) and to de-link property rights from territorial control. In the final section, I use the cases of Renascer and Gleba Nova Olinda to demonstrate how these processes of state territorialization function on a localized level.

THE LAND PROBLEM, THE LAND SOLUTION

The Land/Agrarian Issue (A Questão Fundiaria)

Amazonian geographers (Becker 1997; Porto Gonçalves 2001; Santos 2006) have located the primary territorial contradiction in the Amazon between what is best characterized broadly, as a territoriality of “below” and “above.” The territories and
territorialities of “below” are defined by their pluralism. They tend to be highly differentiated, self-organizing, social and political groups that are oriented around what we (outsiders) understand as the region’s ecology, namely, its rivers and forests. Today we call these people indigenous, traditional, rubber-tappers, babaçu-breakers, ribeirinhos, quilombolos, peasants, and caboclos (although these categories are neither mutually exclusive, fixed, uncorrupted, nor uncontested). Amazonia, then, is a place where different societies co-exist, “geo-graphing” (Porto Gonçalves 2003) their own territories in the process of making and remaking social relationships, thereby articulating multiple territorial logics.

Following these authors, and the documents of the Brazilian Ministry of National Integration (2006), the territory and territoriality of “above” tends to be techno-industrial, statist, and more recently, scientific and environmentalist, organized around axis of resource extraction, development, and conservation and geared toward “constructing and consolidating the nation-state” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 13), albeit today a reconstituted one. Historically, this territory has taken on multiple physical forms - from early networks of telegraph lines to contemporary river-road transport and infrastructure networks that link regional agro-industrial and extractive landscapes to global markets, to new forest districts and carbon sinks. The primary contradiction at the heart of most political struggle in the region, then, at multiple historical moments, has been that the territorial transformation implemented from above, either to protect natural resources or exploit natural capital, tends to disrupt, incorporate, and reorganize – or re-territorialize – the terrain of self-organization.

In academic and policy circles, this contradiction has resulted in what is called the
Questão Fundiaria, or the “land issue” or “the agrarian issue” – the problem of unequal land distribution and security of property rights – a central political question across Brazil. In Amazonia, “land conflict,” is commonly at the center of most social, environmental and political issues – from questions of migration, subsistence, conservation, development, government and international programs, and struggles for emancipation (social movements do not refer to the “questão fundiaria,” but rather, the “the struggle for land” (Ianni 1978; Foweraker 1981; Fernandes 1999; de Medeiros 2003; Wolford 2004; de Paula 2004; Wolford 2010, or more recently, "the struggle for territory," see Chapter Four). In state and policy discourses on the “land issue” the lack of land tenure is presumed to be the cause of: land conflict and violence (between 1988 and 2009 1,545 militants in land struggles have been murdered, with half of these deaths occurring in the Amazon region); deforestation, especially as posse or use is demonstrated through landscape transformation (e.g. the labor theory of property), which in the forest, tends to mean deforesting; and the primary barrier to economic growth, because if land cannot be commodified through the creation of private property, it cannot be used as credit for purchasing agricultural inputs, serve as a form of accumulation through improvement and sale, receive rights for legal resource extraction etc.

The roots of the contemporary iteration of the Questão Fundiaria on a national level are generally traced to the 1850 land law, which recognized the direito de posse (right of possession), or, the right to land if it was put to productive use, thereby consecrating in law the Lockean labor theory of property (Wolford 2007). Since then, 56

56 Prior to that, on April 22nd 1500, the Portuguese crown took control of what is now “Brazil.” In 1522, control of the crown’s lands passed to the General Governors and soon after that to the local powers. With the advent of the Brazilian Empire in 1822, the State began to identify, sell and legitimize (through “regularization,” a type of agrarian reform and to identify other publicly held lands. A resolution passed on
constitutional amendments, laws, and court decisions have created ambiguity regarding those rights, despite the fact that the 1964 land statute (no. 45004, 1964), the “usucapion” law (Law 6969, 1981), and the 1988 constitution re-affirmed that posse was a valid way to access property rights and that private holdings must fulfill a social function (Stedile and Fernandes 1999; Wendy Wolford 2010), a legal fact that has been basis of social movement demands for agrarian reform nationwide.

In Amazonia, the contemporary “land” or “agrarian” issue is understood to have its roots specifically in the policies of the military dictatorship described at the beginning of this chapter (Loureiro and Pinto 2005; Costa 2005; Becker 2005). The dictatorship introduced regimes of private property and the generalized commodification of land and resources on a region-wide level. During that time grilagem became standard, and accepted practice (Loureiro 2005). To deal with the land tenure question, rather than expropriating and redistributing land to treat the inequality of land distribution, government policies have tended toward coloniztion and “regularization” (assigning rights to utilized land that lacks formal documentation), largely because much of the land in Amazonia is Terra Devoluta or undesignated government land, which is often “occupied” and used, although without formal property rights. Today 50% of the land in Amazonia and 67% of the land in the state of Pará is Terra Devoluta, and much of that land is subject to multiple, competing claims.57

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57 These lands have their origins in the Portuguese Concessão de Sesmarais, issued by the Portuguese crown in 1530, which gave the crown’s land to the State on the condition such land be used productively. It was meant to be a juridical system that would secure colonization. With the 1850 Lei de Terras, Terra
Ordenamento Territorial: *Territorial Ordering as the solution*

At a municipal meeting to discuss the new Provisional Measure MP 458 (now law *Terra Legal*), called by social movements the “MP of Grilagem” (along with an earlier MP 422 which had a similar function), which promised to legalize 300,000 land titles for *terra devoluta* held by *posseiros* (like homesteaders) for land held informally in units of up to 1500 hectares, the then-superintendent of INCRA opened the meeting by informing the crowd – “[t]he state of Pará is the Amazonian state with the history of the most programs for Territorial ordering (*ordenamento territorial*) and yet it is the state with the least order (*orden*).” During and since the military government – when land commodification and therefore land titling became necessary and land conflict became extreme – a complex series of mechanisms to create order have been established, and have largely failed to reach their goal. This is especially true in the state of Pará, the Amazonian state with the most “land conflict” (See, for example, Comissão Pastoral da Terra 2007).

Historically, much of the large landholding in Pará were granted as long term concessions (*aforamentos*) for harvesting wild extractive resources such as rubber. Some large landholders still make their claims through these usufruct grants. Smallholders, on the other hand, did not have legal claims on land until they began to become more necessary, largely during the dictatorship, with incentivized development in the region.

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*Devoluta* was defined essentially as unused land (not serving the public use, meaning any municipal, provincial, or national use, not held under sesmarais, not held under posse etc., whether titled or not), which was therefore returned (devolved) to the State. The 1891 constitution upheld the possession of such land by the state. The 1934 Constitution passed this land to the states. The 1946 Constitution gave some of them back to the Union (those “indispensable to the defense of frontiers, military fortifications or constructions, and railways” (article 34, II), and a 1969 amendment included in this list the terra devoluta necessary for “national development” (article 4, I). Finally, the 1988 Constitution named *Terra Devoluta* of the Union all *Terra Devoluta* that is “indispensable for frontier defense, military fortification and construction, federal communication networks, and environmental preservation, defined in law.” (article 20,II).
At that time, the mechanisms for legal land distribution included *licitações*, which were occasional sales of government land to large, private owners, or the sale of small plots of land called *lotes* or lots to the *colonos* (smallholder “colonists”) in government-sponsored settlement areas. During the initial colonization programs (1960s-70s) these were 100 hectare lots and later (1980s) they were 50 hectares. In practice, the possibilities for accessing land through these means were nearly non-existent. The more common practice by both large and small landowners has been occupying land and later petitioning the government to “regularize” or legalize it (which also happens quite rarely).

The vast majority of large landholdings, and therefore most land in Pará are held by *grileiros* using forged deeds (usually in combination with bribery, threats and violence) (Asselin 1982; Fearnside 2001a). This land could be acquired through a variety of mechanisms: “invading” or simply taking land, forcing others to sign over their rights to *posse*, expanding boundaries of existing claims (onto other claimed land), et cetera. The most common way to make a claim is to create a false title. Originally, this was accomplished by placing a forged title in a box with crickets (*grilos*) to make it look old; today, the more common method is called *larangas*, literally oranges, where people claim land using other peoples’ names, or false names as a proxy in order to claim land above the legal limit, in agrarian reform settlements, etc. As a result much of the land in Pará is held by “ghosts” (*fantasmos*), fake names that serve as a proxy for the actual landholder.

The system for titling land through legitimate mechanisms has historically been exceedingly complex, involving tracing land records back historically in different *cartorios* and usually inhibited by competing land claims.

The struggles over land and territory brought on by the incursion of development
into the region resulted in multiple new forms of land rights, and in Amazonia, rubber tappers, indigenous people, quilombolas, ribeirinhos, other traditional people, and rural workers all mobilized for territorial and citizenship rights through the 1980s and 1990s. The 1988 constitution recognized the rights to indigenous territory and to Quilombola lands, reaffirmed the need for the “social function of property” and usucapião – both of which would become key for land access for rural workers – and through the 1990s new forms of property rights in the form of the Agroextractive Settlement and the Extractive Reserve were created as a form of usufruct rights for traditional people. These forms proliferated throughout the Amazon. While many areas were created, many more areas remain contested, especially within the state of Pará.

To provide a better understanding for how rare any form of title actually is, during my fieldwork, I asked nearly everyone that I interviewed or had extended informal conversations with during my fieldwork about their legal claim to their land. Among those people who lived in an area with some form of collective title or usufruct rights, I asked about their title situation prior to the collective rights. Of the hundreds of people that I spoke with in three different sites across the region, the only people that I encountered with title were soy farmers, who largely bought any titled land they encountered near Santarém. Many people had certificates of posse (possession) issued by Incra in prior decades. Others had some sort of certification from the rural workers’ union, many of who have helped people to stake out the boundaries of their land in order to qualify them for government financing programs for micro-enterprise such as FNO or PRONAF. Some had papers issued from Incra recognizing them as part of a settlement (although they actually were not part of a settlement). And others had receipts of “compra
e venda,” essentially a sales receipt written by the land’s previous owner, a paper which is nearly meaningless unless the sale is registered in a cartório (which it almost never was).

Figure 13: Example of a receipt of purchase. The most common land document for land I encountered.

The complex and conflicted nature of territory and territories in Western Pará, marked by not only an opaque and confused constellation of land tenure, but also the multiple and competing designs on the region, posed significant challenges to the new developmentalist/extractivist program because clear land title is the basis for rights to extractive resources (either because it provides ownership over those resource, or the entry point into the legal system of accessing use rights). This precipitated a refocusing on state-led territorializing strategies that will be discussed below, beginning with the Plan for the Sustainable Amazon. The concept of Ordenamento Territorial, literally Territorial Ordering and more specifically “the [territorial] organization of a group of
elements according to a given relation of order” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 16), was resurrected from the 1988 constitution and turned into a national policy “the National Policy on Territorial Ordering” in 2003, with implementation beginning several years later (around 2006). This marked a “[state] preoccupation with the re-taking of territory” through “a logic of ordering [that] aims to reinstate the role of the state in new places,” specifically in these places that express a different logic of ordering (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 17). This re-ordering was an effort, which the National Policy on Territorial Ordering policy papers indicate the state planners realized would be enacted not through force, or even necessarily by direct state-driven mechanisms, but rather through the production of “governmentality” (Ministério da Integração Nacional 2006, 16). The DNOT policy papers begin with a summary of the concept of governmentality as the rationality rule within the contemporary state and then outline how this must be implemented through territorial planning, as “the product and producer of new [social] configurations” (14).

Beyond the particular definitions laid out in the national policy documents, the term Ordenamento Territorial (hereafter OT) has been widely used to refer to anything from the generalized concept of regional planning (Santos and Becker 2006), to particular territorial policies such as zoning or regularization of property rights, (see for example, Unger 2008). I use the term more specifically to refer to what I call a technology of ordering generally directed toward incorporating multiple, and often contradictory, territorialities into a particular mode, or logic, of social/spatial organization.58 That is, OT is an assemblage of forces (repressive, economic, administrative), techniques (scientific,

58 I explicitly use the word “generally” to leave open the possibility that such a technology can be, and is, engaged strategically by actors to create a different form of ordering, as will be discussed in the final section of this paper.
calculative, legal) and devices (property titles, development credits, conservation payments) integrated to regulate territorial relationships. OT is not simply an idealized concept imposed by “the state” onto space, but also a technology employed by a range of actors including, in Western Pará, state, federal and local government organizations, private actors, NGOs, and historically grassroots actors, to create a particular determination of space that makes certain things possible, such as the commodification of resources, particular understandings of citizenship, and sustainable development.⁵⁹

Practically, contemporary OT brings together old techniques of ordering, such as road building and property rights, with newer ones, such as GIS, ecological science, multicultural recognition, and participation, to address the challenges posed by multiple territorialities to past state territorialization projects.

**ORDENAMENTO TERRITORIAL IN CONTEMPORARY AMAZONIA**

Despite the creation of the Sustainable Amazon Plan, which is more of a political statement and set of policy guidelines for a sustainable development policy in the Amazon than actual policy, there is no a single, coherent approach to managing Amazonian territorial development and land rights. The public policy realm is historically contradictory, providing incentives for speculation, deforestation, and extractivism through road-building, incentives, tax breaks, credit subsidies, et cetera, on

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⁵⁹ Specifically, in Western Pará, government actors include the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio), the Ministry of the Environment, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), the State Environmental Secretary (SEMA), the Institute for Forest Development of Pará (IDEFLOR), and the Land Institute of Pará (ITERPA). Examples of private actors include Vale do Rio Doce and Cargill. The primary NGOs involved are Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Institute for Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM) and the Health and Happiness Project (PSA). Grassroots actors include the Rural Workers’ Union (STR).
the one hand and on the other hand creating protected areas, inserting environmental protections into development mandates and more (Simmons 2002; Fearnside 2009)  

The details of the assemblage of laws, policies, programs, and everyday practices associated with territorial governance in western Pará cannot be fully explored in a single paper, or even a single dissertation. Given, however, that it is precisely their intersection that constitutes and expresses key components, practices, and logic of state territorialization, it would also be inadequate to try to theorize these territorial practices “of above” by only examining any single policy law, or case. Therefore, in this section, I provide an overview for how discourses and practices of state territorialization processes (re)produce a given order in Western Pará, by briefly reviewing the key policies and programs themselves – their actual content (e.g. the laws), the philosophies behind them, and the logistics of and struggles over their implementation. I focus my analysis on the emergence and function of the key policy that attempts to set the parameters for organizing the entire region – Ecological Economic Zoning (ZEE). I first provide an overview of the context in which these policies emerged. This is followed by a brief  

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60 There has not been a single agency responsible for Amazonian development policy since the Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM), which primarily was responsible for developing ranching through incentives from its creation in 1966 until 1991 (when it underwent profound policy redirection; it was officially disbanded in 2002 because of a corruption scandal) (Bunker 1985). Beginning in the 1980s, multilateral development banks (World Bank and Interamerican Development Bank) began to play a major role in funding Amazonian development projects. The funding structure for current development projects has been discussed above and different projects are handled by different ministries (of mining, of planning, agriculture, etc.) Incra (within the Ministry of Agrarian Development, MDA) and in Pará, the state land agency (ITERPA) have for decades been responsible for implementing land tenure policies, through the regularization (either through individual title or through Agrarian Reform) of land claims (e.g. by posseiros or grileiros). The federal government agency IBAMA was responsible for most enforcement of environmental policy (and thus for land use in conservation areas) until 2007, when its responsibilities were shifted to primarily enforcement on federal lands. At that time, both enforcement and permitting for extractive industry on State held lands were devolved to the notoriously industry friendly state environmental secretaries (In Pará, this is SEMA, formerly SECTAM), and management of federal protected areas was shifted to the newly created (and largely PPG7 funded, at the time) Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio). FUNAI, since 1967 has been responsible for demarcating, and protecting indigenous lands.
summary, elaborated in **Box 1**, of the key policies passed in the last few years that work within and through the ZEE to organize the region, as well as the major critiques and conflicts that they generated, in order to demonstrate their contested nature. This section lays the basis for the final section on Traditional Territories, which provides an overview of the policy issues that in part constitute each of the two struggles encountered in Chapter One. These two sections together are meant to provide a sense for how this array of policies and practices intersect to territorialize the state, to familiarize the reader with some the details of the struggles, and elucidate how state territorialization has shifted under neo-extractivism.

**The Sustainable Amazon Plan**

In his first term, to the delight of the environmental community, Lula appointed former Rubber Tapper leader and governor of the western Amazonian state of Acre, Marina Silva, as his environmental minister. Her appointment, although at odds with the interests of some of Lula’s other cabinet positions (such as the agricultural ministry, the mining ministry, and other development-focused cabinets), symbolized a commitment to sustainability. Marina Silva’s appointment generated significant enthusiasm among the mainstream environmental community and among Amazonian social movements, although during her time as minister, her relationship to movements would become quite strained. Even more mainstream organizations such as Greenpeace critiqued her for being too conciliatory toward development.61 Developing a sustainable development plan for

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61 At the National Symposium for Agrarian Geography at UFPA in Belém in November 2011, Rubber Tapper Leader Osmarino Amâncio called Marina Silva and the National Rubber Tappers’ Council the “biggest traitors” of the movement. These breaks among the left under progressive government will be addressed further in the next chapter.
the BR-163 (discussed in Box One) was the key action project to be conducted under the broader “Sustainable Amazon Plan” developed initially by Silva within the Ministry of the Environment and meant to be one of the key elements in her stated project to strengthen the environmental agency (PAS 2006). As Lula’s first term progressed, however, commodity prices rose and the developmentalist emphasis emerged, tensions between Silva and the administration became more severe. After a series of disagreements including over the BR-163 plan and culminating with the appointment of Mangabeira Unger to head up the Sustainable Amazon Plan instead of her, Silva resigned in 2008, and she would later became the Green Party presidential candidate.

In 2007, when Lula began his second term, he created a new Ministry of “strategic affairs,” and appointed renowned, progressive Harvard Law Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger as minister. Unger was a strategic choice, as he lent both progressive political and scientific legitimacy to the developmentalist project (de Castro 2011). Shortly following his appointment, the administration shifted the Sustainable Amazon Plan to the new ministry. Setting a new territorial agenda for the Amazon region would prove to be Unger’s most significant legacy. Unger's position was immediately clear. In an interview regarding the Sustainable Amazon Plan in Maranhão, he said, “the Amazon is Brazil’s future, not simply a collection of trees” (Invest NE, May 22, 2008). In another interview in that same month, he told the Estado de São Paulo (June 15, 2008) “Amazonia is our great frontier, not only geographically, but in our imaginary.” He added that Amazonian inhabitants “lack a project” but whose destiny is “divine, not to be children trapped in a green paradise” (the latter quote in de Castro 2008), effectively re-

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62 Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.socioambiental.org/nsa/direto/direto_html?codigo=2008-06-27-103435. For all of the many years of writing against this imaginary (See, for example, Slater 2002; Stepan
invoking the colonial imaginary not only of Amazonia as “the future” but of Amazonian people as helpless, trapped, needy people, abandoned by the government and the world, who ek out a marginal existence – have no “projects” of their own, and are in need of being saved by development. This ministry, and particularly the Sustainable Amazon Plan is dedicated to solving these problems by articulating green governance, infrastructure, mineral, agro-industrial, and timber development, and the administration’s anti-poverty program (Ministerio de Assuntos Estratégicos 2008, see also the SAE website, http://www.sae.gov.br/site/?page_id=11517).

Ecological-Economic Zoning

In another 2008 interview, Unger explained the philosophy behind the Plan, based in a particular instrument of Ordenamento Territorial called Ecological Economic Zoning:

…the point of departure for this project (the Plan for a Sustainable Amazon) begins with Ecological Economic Zoning of the Amazon, the basis for a solution to land issues, that allows for the defining of distinct economic strategies for different parts of the region…we need projects for deforested Amazonia, green Amazonia and we still have the problem of the complex industrial urban areas. My work is to combine all of these elements….it is a project of ecological economic zoning that makes possible the formulation of distinct economic strategies for different parts of Amazonia….Ecological Economic Zoning does not represent a cartographic exercise. It means the spatial translation of economic thinking.

This spatial translation of economic logic in the Sustainable Amazon Plan is the most current iteration of “geo-coding” Amazonia (Pickles 2004), whose particular form –

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2001), it remains quite pervasive. For another recent example, see the Al-Jazeera series by Gabriel Elizondo.
the Ecological-Economic Zoning originated in the 1980s. The World Bank first proposed Ecological Economic Zoning (Zoneamento Ecológico-Económico, ZEE) in the late 1980s as an instrument to “plan rational territorial occupation for “sustainable use of natural resources…reconciling these polarized positions [developmentalism and environmentalism]” (Becker and Egler 1993, 4). The ZEE contains what Henri Acelrad (2008) calls a “double temporality” in that it seeks to both assess the given “truth” of a given area (e.g. assess the given state of things), and then to prescribe its future (e.g. make improvements). Conceptually, zoning is based in a classical ecosystemic model that assumes all aspects of nature (human included) in a given area can be held in balance (Acselrad 2000), supposing that incorporating different processes into one, territorial logic can facilitate efficient, sustainable, environmentally sensitive growth. That is, across a given area, the needs of different interested groups are addressed by re-ordering the state into discreet areas to meet their various needs and demands. In this case, those needs and demands are framed as either conservation or development (despite the fact that this is a contested framing as will be discussed below), mapping particular economic practices (such as industrial farming, logging, slash and burn agriculture, or extractivism) to pre-defined groups within their newly assigned territorial polygons.

To produce this ordered territorial whole out of fragmented, overlapping, and contradictory territories and territorialities (“multiplicities” in the language of the Planning Ministry, 2006), the ZEE renders elements in a given landscape equivalent and interchangeable so that their boundaries can be negotiated. Practically, that means turning land (namely terra devoluta) into property so that it can be exchanged in a process mediated by the state. It creates particular categories based in economic practices
(sometimes linked to ethnic identities) by which different actors can formally enter into relationships with that property, rendering them “stakeholders” whose interests can be negotiated.

The ZEE proposal assumes that previous failures of state planning were technical failures that can be resolved by refining those techniques. Methodologically, the ZEE is premised on incorporating all aspects of the region into a single system of (empirical scientific) knowledge. This is achieved by first fragmenting a given area into knowable parts through a combination of scientific investigation and technological innovation. These parts do not necessarily have any relation to the existing forms of socio-territorial organization, but rather, are organized according to the categories of contemporary science. In other words biological, social, geologic etc. processes can all be studied separately, and with increasing precision through methodological innovation within the given fields of study.

The first ZEEs were literally created “from above” using aerial photos and newly available radar-based mapping capabilities along with available socio-economic and ecological data to zone a given region into areas for “appropriate” forms of restricted use (Ab’Saber 1989; Nitsch 1996). Problems with their implementation led to a new methodology based in “ground truthing” this information. This meant a whole new generation of trained and funded scientists (biologists, geologists, ecologists, agronomists, anthropologists, foresters etc. – experts created largely through PPG7 funding to research NGOs and government positions) could extend the new research technologies into all facets of territory, accessing aspects of life, nature, and community

63 The ZEE was a national project and implemented throughout Brazil with priority given to Amazonia (See Brazil 1990).
previously outside of the domain of state knowledge. New geographic information
systems, scholars argued, created the conditions of possibility for the integration of
different knowledges (i.e. quantitative, qualitative, community based, etc.) (Becker and
Egger 1993; Mello 2005) into a better prescriptive ordering model. This new technology
allowed for the application these methodologies, and their truth regimes over large areas,
thereby extending and solidifying authority, and incorporating nature/life/community into
the space of sustainable development.

The options then, for people who operate within a different system of knowledge
(e.g. the other Amazonias or other territorialities), at best, are either to participate or not
in the incorporation of their own beliefs, practices, etc. into the research of the ZEE and
to cast themselves within the available categories of the state.64 To not participate is to be
evaluated and incorporated without providing input into that process. Such participation,
has been critiqued for leading to unjust and illegitimate excercises of power and being
easily coupled with a top-down development model (Cooke and Kothari 2001).

“Cooptation” it is argued, manifests in these situations through a misaplication these, a
misapplication of the processes of participation. In fact one of the major controversies
around the creation of the ZEE for the BR 163 was the lack of even marginal attempts to
inform, let alone include “grassroots actors” in what is meant to be a “participatory

64 This is not only done in the ZEE, but broadly through “identity-based” land rights. For example,
indigenous people, identified as indigenous through research by FUNAI (the Indian Agency), can have
usufruct rights to “indigenous land” (Terra Indigena). Once the state recognizes indigenous land as
covering a particular area, there are 90 days in which anyone else with claims to that land can contest it,
and then the boundaries of that land are negotiated in the courts. Another category “traditional people” also
may access land rights to a particular area through either agrarian reform (Agro-extractive settlements) or
as a unit of conservation (Resex). These people are recognized as “traditional” by exhibiting certain
cultural practices that are broadly linked to sustainable resource use. In other words, to access land rights,
people must cast themselves as traditional, indigenous, etc. according to the norms laid out by the state
rules. They must be researched by a team of experts to determine their eligibility according to these
definitions.
practice.”

While individualized corrupt practices, intentional omissions, etc. within the process state territorialization (or any state projects for that matter) can (and should) be understood as intentional destruction and/or incorporation of movement demands, the more significant and complex phenomenon at work here is what Marcelo da Souza (de Souza 2006) calls “structural cooptation,” or the way that the influence that the state operates (in this case, the mechanisms for ordering territory), force an “adjustment” of the social movements dynamics and agenda to that of the state, (which the federal OT documents themselves essentially lay out as a governing strategy).

For example, the state structures for land rights for indigenous or traditional people were created in response to demands by those movements, the rubber tappers, discussed in the previous chapter, being a case in point. As conceived by Chico Mendes, the extractive reserve both acknowledged and supported the co-existence and co-constitution of people and nature – something not done previously in units of conservation – and reworked the relationship between society and the state in that the reserve territory remained state property, but was managed, autonomously, by the people. In 2001 with the creation of the National System of Units of Conservation (SNUC), however, the power to design reserve management plans was quickly taken out of the hands of the people and placed in the purview of technicians that worked at ICMBio (the Chico Mendes Institute, the government institution who manages conservation areas and whose establishment was financed by the PPG7), or outsourced to NGOs, an action that movement militant and intellectual Osmarino Amâncio (at Belem conference 2011) and geographer Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves (2009) both call “the second assassination of
Chico Mendes” because it corrupted the concept that he had struggled for. Thus, traditional movements struggle for land has since largely been framed as a struggle for the Extractive Reserve, the struggle for space and territory on the terms of the state. This corruptive effect does not obviate the possibilities for politics, as will be explored in the following chapters, but, I would argue, is one of the central organizing principles of *Ordenamento Territorial*. Thus the ZEE is not simply a map representing an area. As a prescribed future, it actively produces a particular territory and as the “spatial translation of an economic logic” this is the territory of neo-developmentalist.

**ZEE for Western Pará**

The Ecological Economic Zoning Plan for the BR-163, later re-named the ZEE of western Pará (State laws 6.745/05 and 7.243/09), elaborated in only two years (a similar initiative in Acre took 11), in the words of Daniel Cohenca, former director of IBAMA Santarém, “fell as if it were a rock on the heads of socio-environmental movements who were unaware this mechanism was being developed.” The ZEE divides western Pará into two broad areas (with many subdivisions): land for conservation (which varies from preservation to sustainable use) and land for development (areas of consolidation and expansion of extractive industry). While most environmental NGOs officially signed on to the measure by 2008, critics took issue with three primary components of the policy: 1) the reduction in the size of the ‘legal reserve’ (e.g. the amount of land on a given property in the Amazon Biome that, according to the Forest Code at the time must be kept as standing forest, which was 80%), 2) the designation of most areas outside of

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65 State Decree 1.026/2008 created the ZEE Supervisory Committee, comprised of 38 representatives from municipal, state, and local governments, ‘social movements,’ represented by representatives of the rural workers’ unions, as well as environmental NGOs (CI, TNC, and WWF), and several research institutions, also including environmental NGOs.
existing reserves as spaces for the “expansion” and “consolidation” of extractive industries, and 3) the ambiguous, and broad, nature of the “sustainable use” zoning characterization.

**Figure 14: Ecological Economic Zoning Plan for Western Pará**

The controversy over the reduction in the size of the legal reserve was particularly contentious given that the ZEE was created while industrial soy production was rapidly
expanding in the region, displacing smallholder agriculture in the highlands near Santarém (Fearnside 2007b; Steward 2007). Critics argued that reducing the reserve facilitated soy expansion, illegal logging and land theft, because it would legally open more land to industrial soy production, “as opposed to [protecting] the regions’ traditional and peasant populations with historically sustainable livelihood strategies” (Cohenca 2009). During the negotiations, internal government documents indicated that Cargill and TNC were lobbying federal agencies INCRA, IBAMA and the then State environmental secretariat SECTAM to reduce soy producers’ deforestation fines to 10% of their value and to regularize all of soy farmers’ lands and to allow them to re-locate their legal reserves off of their properties and inside of existing Conservation Units. Their petition (which was not granted by these agencies) combined with the fact that the ZEE coordinator at the federal agricultural agency EMBRAPA had published highly contested research suggesting that soy production had no impact on forest cover (Venturieri et al. 2007), raised further doubts among critics about the ZEE’s capacity or intentions to address the needs of traditional, peasant and indigenous communities, or forests, given that soy expansion was happening within their territories.

Next, the ZEE zoned almost all areas outside of already existing conservation units as areas for “expansion” or “consolidation” of extractive industries, reducing the possibilities for new territories to be recognized for indigenous or traditional people. In other words, areas for expansion and consolidation of development are prioritized as areas for establishing private property rights. Because western Pará is a relatively new horizon of extractive expansion, many communities only recently began pursuing such

66 Especially given that then - director of IBAMA, Daniel Cohenca, had published a remote sensing analysis (2005) of soy expansion that had also come to the opposite conclusion.
rights in order to protect their ways of life and their resulting territories. There are many potential collective land claims within these areas of expansion and consolidation whose territorial claims would be put at risk by the ZEE designation, because other claims on their territory were likely to be legalized prior to theirs (CPT 2010).

Finally, areas designated for “sustainable use,” which as per the zoning guidelines meant areas where use should be geared toward activity that benefits local populations and should not encourage intensive resource explanation, were being opened to extraction, yet still considered in compliance with the ZEE. This was generally achieved by creating new forms, largely on state lands, of landholdings such as “state forests,” which would function as lands held by the state that loggers or others could apply to log or farm through “management plans.” Thus the “prioritized” use could easily be subverted.

**Territorial Programs and Policies**

The ZEE sets parameters for what types of activities are or are not permissible in a given area. The actual legal designation of property rights and management of productive activities happens through a variety of laws and policies that include older forms of accessing land rights – such as land sales, posseiros petitioning INCRA for property rights, groups of subsistence farmers petitioning Incra for an agrarian reform settlement (usually with help from the rural workers’ unions), ICMBio for Extractive Reserves, or indigenous people petitioning FUNAI for indigenous territory – along with newer programs to access private property rights such as Legal Land or NGO-facilitated programs such as some of the practices within the “Green Municipalities” program, or temporary land rights for logging access. Along with land rights, there are new
instruments, through which either land-holders or other parties can access resources, including through logging “management plans,” mineral rights, payment for environmental services, et cetera. There are also new institutions, such as the Brazilian Forest Service, and institutional arrangements, such as IBAMA’s more limited focus on enforcement with permitting and management now in the hands of state environmental secretaries or IDEFLOR, and ICMBio respectively. The third key element in the territorial ordering of Western Pará State is the discursive or rhetorical “greening” function served by programs and policies such as “ecological” zoning, the “sustainable” BR-163, and the creation of Conservation Areas. While these programs function to dispel controversy, their actual implementation is much more complex and is often partial, contested, and the effects ambiguous, or damaging to regional inhabitants, who themselves tend to appear in these policy debates only to the extent that they voice opinions in “participatory” forums, and/or as “environmental” actors. Other authors have also noted this “gulf between plans and practice” (Fearnside 2009). The examples of Gleba Nova Olinda and Rensacer will be used below to demonstrate this complexity.

Box One, below details the major policies, laws, and programs enacted that constitute territorial re-ordering (within the bounds of ecological-economic zoning) in Western Pará in the last several years on the state and regional level. I will highlight a couple of they key policies in order to help the reader make sense of the list and to draw a few conclusions regarding regional trends.\(^{67}\) First, in 2003, in response to rising

\(^{67}\) It is important to note that if this chapter were addressing the most significant policies on a region-wide basis in this, neo-extractivist moment, the most significant policies would have to include the construction of hydro-electricity and the new payment for environmental services programs such as PROAMBIENTE, Bolsa Verde, and Bolsa Floresta, which are now starting to proliferate in Western Pará as well. There is also legislation pending, Law project 1.610, opened by the Dilma administration, which would open
deforestation rates, IBAMA stopped issuing logging permits for areas without land title. That means that over 53% of the Amazon and 67% of the state of Pará, which is *Terra Devoluta* could not be legally logged. Given that most of the remaining land is either already logged or in conservation areas, this new policy essentially closed the major avenues to logging legally and resulted in a major push by the industry for both land rights and for creating mechanisms for legalizing logging. This resulted in the 2006 Public Forest Management Law (and a parallel state law in Pará). This law opened federal lands to logging via bid by private companies. Territorially, this resulted in a territorial expansion of logging (both legally and illegally; Chapter Five will provide a better understanding for how this functions) as well as a series of “mosaic” proposals for protecting lands, where an area is created that is protected as a state or federal forest, but is open to extraction, as we will see in both cases described below.

Next, Mangabeira Unger’s legacy to the Amazon was ultimately neither the Sustainable Amazon Plan itself, nor the re-invigoration of the concept of Ecological Economic Zoning. Rather, Unger was responsible for passing into law the program called “Legal Land,” which proposed to legalize 300,000 private property titles for areas up to 1,500 hundred hectares in unassigned public land. Proponents of the law, including Unger, INCRA broadly and Santarém superintendent Luciano Brunet specifically, as well as José Benatti, president of ITERPA who also write the state version of the law, argued that the law was meant to protect smallholder land rights. Legal Land would legalize large pieces of property at fees well below market value, would forgive previous logging indigenous lands to mining, which would have significant effects in Pará where indigenous lands hold rich mineral reserves (*Valor Economico*, April 9, 2012).
on the properties, and would allow for the larger parcels to be sold within four years and the smaller parcels within ten. It was incredibly divisive and all major social movements, several prominent ecologists as well as “big conservation” mobilized against it, arguing that it would legalize grilagem and increase land clearing (Fearnside 2009; Oliveira 2009). Movements also argued that it would work against those seeking collective land rights in that private holdings would be legalized much more quickly, and prior to collective claims, thereby invalidating future collective claims. Within INCRA, 50% of the staff in Amazonia were re-directed from their Agrarian Reform work to carry Terra Legal after the law was passed. In its first year, the law was mired in legal challenges, suffered a series of major technical difficulties. Brito and Barreto (2011) estimated that in the first year of the program, 63% of land petitions made were for 76 hectares or less, but that these petitions comprised only 16% of the total area petitioned for regularization. 39% of the total area registered went to only 8% of the petitions for properties. The program, however, is moving forward.

Finally, the BR-163 Sustainable Development Plan, one of Marina Silva’s key projects, was coordinated by prominent regional NGO IPAM (also the leader in the calls for “governance” in the Science debates). IPAM articulated fourteen government ministries and 32 NGOs to create a ‘governance’ structure – government through partnership with local actors - capable of supporting sustainable development and geared toward favoring Agroforestry over land-grabbing and soy, ranching, logging expansion to create a “corridor of sustainable development” around the BR-163 (Alencar et al 2005; IPAM 2005). A key element of the plan was to develop participation along the communities that would be most affected by the paving in the southern part of Pará. To
do this, IPAM developed the ‘Forum of BR-163 Social Movements,’ comprised of other NGOs (Fundação Viver, Produzir e Proteger, FVPP and the Instituto Socio-ambiental, ISA) as well as representatives from the state federation of rural workers’ unions (FETAGRI), closely tied to the workers’ party government, and some residents from communities along the road. They held a series of meetings in cities and towns, primarily in the BR-163’s southern reaches, to discuss planning associated with road paving. The plan itself, elaborated through a series of closed meetings and discussed in public workshops was largely disagreed on by the people from the communities and towns along the road who did not share IPAM’s vision for what constituted that sustainability. In fact, most ‘grassroots’ actors sought road paving as quickly as possible and many were seeking rights to log on their lands, diverging from the NGOs’ visions of sustainability. The tensions among residents and between residents and the coordinating NGOs, expressed in interviews and visible in meetings, did not enter into the more public representations of the plan as a united front of pro-environment social movements. The NGOs involved and the government generated a lot of press around the plan and the planning process, which appeared as a solution to the problem of governance. The plan itself shelved by the federal government; the BR-163 paving moves forward with no particular plan for sustainability in place.
western Pará).

**Agrarian Reform on the BR-163.** In 2005-2006, the recently established Incra Santarém created 97 agrarian reform settlements to regularize land rights for smallholders along the BR-163, located almost exclusively in areas of primary forest (2.2 million hectares) and granted to 33,600 families (meeting a dual goal of achieving Agrarian Reform for the Lula administration and opening up land for the logging industry). It was later revealed that most recipients of land rights were “ghosts,” names used by the logging sector to open the land to timber extraction. In 2009, in one of series of scandals for INCRA Santarém (others include Faroeste, see Chapter Two) the Ministério Publico brought an action against INCRA. The settlements were ultimately voided.

**Public Forest Management Law.** This 2006 federal law (11.284) created by the Environmental Ministry under Marina Silva created “public forests,” a new territorial designation that could be given to any forests on federal land (including in reserve areas), which would open them up to logging, or “forest management,” by companies through bidding. These forests would be managed by the new Brazilian Forest service (Ideflor), also created with this law. This led to the creation of new kinds of land designations for areas that were formerly terra devoluta as part of an effort to control logging there, with the problem remaining that many of these were contested. With this restructuring in 2006. Forestry management on privately held land was transferred from IBAMA (the federal agency) to the state-level environmental agencies (SEMA in Pará). In Pará many forestry projects previously denied by IBAMA because of the lack of valid land documents were subsequently approved by SEMA.

**BR-163 Forest District.** This district, created in February of 2006, many argue in response to outcry over the murder of Sister Dorothy Stang by loggers in 2005, placed 19 million hectares of land into a mosaic of national parks, extractive reserves, Areas of Environmental Protection, and National Forests (Servico Florestal Brasileiro 2010). They superimposed many areas on existing communities and contested territories, and many logging areas, with little possibility for enforcement, generating mobilizations against this model by actors on all sides of the debate. The results of the district are rather ambiguous as some argue that it inhibited deforestation (Banerjee et al. 2009) and others that it opened new land to logging by creating public forests.

**Terra Legal or Legal Land.** The law “Legal Land” began as MP 458, a highly controversial provisional measure, known as the “MP for grilagem” and passed into law 11.952 by the national congress, that would regularize 67 million hectares of undesignated government land (terra devoluta) as private property in plots up to 1500 hectares. The first areas to be regularized by Legal Land are along the southern portion of the BR-163. The first to be legalized by the state version of the same program are in Gleba Nova Olinda II.

**State Policy on Territorial Ordering, Pará state.** In 2007, following a similar move by the federal government, which re-established its National Policy for Territorial Ordering in 2006, in 2007, after the new Workers’ Party Governor, Ana Julia Carepa appointed professor José Benatti as president of the state land agency ITERPA, the agency developed its own new policy for Territorial Ordering and Land Regularization that followed the national program in focusing on facilitating the articulation of development, anti-poverty, and environmental protection. Benetti also wrote a state version of Legal Land, passed in 2009, whose priority area for implementation was the Glebas.

**The Participatory Development Plan for the BR-163.** Regional NGO IPAM coordinated a group of 14 government ministries and several NGOs to create a regional ‘governance’ structure (Alencar et al. 2005). Through their ‘Forum of BR-163 Social Movements, comprising other NGOs (FVPP and ISA), union representatives (FETAGRI), and some area residents, they held a series of meetings along the road and elaborated and discussed the plan. People from the communities along the road largely disagreed on the plan and specifically on the notions of ‘sustainability’ in the plan (Campbell 2009). The plan itself was ultimately shelved and the BR-163 paving moves forward.

**Green Municipalities.** The challenges to implementation of Terra Legal have led to the expansion of the Green Municipalities program, which essentially devolves responsibility for land regularization to one of the two most powerful regional NGOs (TNC or Imazon), who have both dedicated the past several years to developing sophisticated databases of land tenure across the region (Imazon in eastern Pará and TNC in western Pará).
The combination of the above policies, as well as the new approaches to “greening” extractive industry embodied in programs like “sustainable soy” to be addressed in the following chapter, made it clear as the first decade of the 21st century progressed, that the proliferation of protected areas that had marked the Amazonian policy period since the early 1990s (under PPG7) had shifted. As the president of Pará’s land agency José Benatti put it in an interview (September 2009), “[c]reating protected areas was a strategy appropriate in the 1990s. Today there is a different logic.” This logic is based in techniques and programs that explicitly bring land and resources into markets, he explained, in order to strengthen both conservation and production.

This shift in logic, can be delineated in the actions of regional political actors. By 2009, the fact that the federal government had not created a Conservation Unit in over a year (ISA 2009), that Márcio Meira (the head of FUNAI under Lula) had gone so far as to say that demands for indigenous territory had become “excessive” and there needed to be a “limit” to their creation (Viveiros de Castro 2006, 148), that a 2006 federal law shifted the responsibility for granting logging management plans from the chronically under-resourced but (generally) trusted IBAMA to the notoriously corrupt and industry friendly (especially in Pará) state environmental agencies (article 83, Federal Law 11.284, March 2, 2006), and that environmentalist politician Marina Silva had resigned from her position, all indicated cracks in the hegemony of the pro-environment policy program. This was not a simple re-centering of developmentalism - environmentalism debate, but rather a re-articulation of these positions into the “green development”

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68 Lemos and Roberts (2009) call the “donor-led socio-environmental policy period,” when hundreds of millions of dollars in international conservation money flooded the region through the PPG-7 and re-worked Amazonian policy and civil society relationships.
paradigm (what the Amazonian social movements call “green capitalism” as opposed to “brown capitalism), currently central to facilitating extractive development in the Amazon (Baletti 2012).

This expansion of markets is not only about privatizing land, but, we see in the policies above, also about separating land tenure from resource rights. That is, there is an increasing disjuncture between land rights in property and what happens on the land itself that we see in many examples discussed here including the following: logging is now possible in “public forests” that are often technically protected areas; areas designated for “sustainable use,” which should protect traditional people, are open to loggers; Agrarian Reform clients can and are often under pressure to grant access to their land to loggers and miners (Jurutí Velha and ALCOA being a case in point); there is a current proposal in congress to open indigenous land to mining; and the ZEE’s closes off certain areas in order to open others to extraction. As a result, we see an expansion of areas that have some form of protection and a growth in extraction.

In summary, the order that the state is seeking, through the policies of Ordenamanto Territorial to “create” and “expand into new spaces” is one that brings land and resources into markets by establishing multiple forms of land rights. The regional property regime mixes private property, state-held property, indigenous and traditional areas, and agrarian reform, but many of these forms of land rights that formerly took land and resources out of the market can now be opened, in part, to extraction. As we will see in the following examples, another significant effect of this planning is to limit the actual territories of traditional and indigenous people. In this way, their demands are technically met (e.g. they get land rights), but not on their terms. It is
proving an effective strategy in one sense, because over the past few years, deforestation rates on a region-wide scale are dropping, but the continuing conflicts over regional development indicates that while the implementation of "governance" may have created the conditions for particular kinds of conservation and development, it had done little to solve the problems of “the land issue” or, what will be articulated in Chapter Four as “territorial struggle.”

**TRADITIONAL TERRITORIES**

In this final section of this chapter, I turn briefly to one particular moment in the two struggles introduced in Chapter One – the assignment of land rights in order to demonstrate how OT impacts, and incorporates, other territorialities.

*Gleba Nova Olinda*

Gleba Nova Olinda is a 182 thousand hectare area – all of which is designated in the Ecological Economic Zoning plan for the consolidation of extractive industry. In other words, the ZEE prioritizes the area for mining, logging, and agro-industry. It is home to eleven traditional and three indigenous communities who had been petitioning for land rights since the 1980s (the history of this struggle will be recounted in more detail in Chapter Four). In the late 1990s/early 2000s when Cargill opened its port in Santarém and soy farmers began moving into the region, a consortium of 50 loggers and soy businesses called COOEPAs entered the Gleba and began to acquire land through illegal and legal channels, to obtain management plans, and to log on the land that the people living there considered to be their own.
COOEPÁ obtained land in the Gleba through four different methods. For the first method, grilagem, they purchased fraudulent titles from a corrupt employee at ITERPA (the state land office) in the municipality of Jurutí. After the purchase, ITERPA employees made field visits to verify the land and legitimize the fraud (2500 hectares). They occupied land in the Gleba and cleared some area for pasture (a common practice for creating legitimacy for a land claim), hired gunmen to protect their claims, and posted signs with their protocol numbers on them. Ibama discovered this grilagem in 2003, when they conducted an enforcement operation in response to a complaint by communities of Gleba Nova Olinda denouncing illegal logging. Ibama also found that a separate company, Rondon Belém Madiera, has established over 100km of illegal roads, logged illegally, and committed other environmental crimes. They levied a fine of 136,000 reais and confiscated trucks, chainsaws, and other equipment. (O Liberal, December 15, 2003). This had no significant impact, according to residents, on logging practices.

69 I assembled this information on COOEPÁ’s land rights and management plans from a number of different sources including the following: life history interviews in the communities of Novo Lugar and Cashoeira do Maró, Gleba Nova Olinda December 2009 and February 2010; various documents on the history of the land conflict in Gleba Nova Olinda that were held by the CPT and the legal representation for the movement, Terra de direitos, newspaper articles, two audiences that I attended at the Ministério Publico, and an examination of most of the actual management plans in Gleba Nova Olinda. I examined these plans on behalf of MDVCA as their selected outside observer as part of an effort to determine their legality or illegality, their actual geographic locations, and their relationship to land grants made by state agencies (the plans were provided to me by IBAMA for a limited time in December 2009) and how they related to the land rights being proposed to the movement by state agencies. The plans were provided to me by IBAMA in December of 2009. It was never entirely clear how these loggers had gotten some of these permits. Some management plans were issued in the permuta areas, but others were clearly illegal (in that they were in clear violation of existing laws), but had been approved by the former environmental secretary SECTAM and so, in another sense, were legal. One logger interviewed (and the only logger willing to grant an interview) explained that when then-candidate for governor Ana Julia Carepa (PT) was running for office, her staff took several regional loggers, including the interviewee, over Gleba Nova Olinda via helicopter, indicating the management plans would be easily forthcoming in exchange for campaign support. The logger interviewed declined the offer, but suggested that those who had accepted, received management plan authorization. I could not verify this beyond his interview, however, Ana Julia, like all Pará politicians, does have strong ties to the logging industry (See, for example, http://www.mst.org.br/node/5082; http://veja.abril.com.br/010306/p_038.html on Ana Julia’s ties to logging, Accessed July 1, 2012)
Their second method for obtaining land in GNO was through a sort of land swap called *permuta*. When the federal government created a Kayapó indigenous territory in the São Felix de Xingu in 1990, they expropriated land from several absentee landholders who had originally purchased the land in order to log it. (Decreto n°98.865 de 23 de janeiro de 1990 e da Portaria da FUNAI n°220 de 13 de março de 1990). In compensation for their loss, in 2006, the Pará state government assigned those landowners 25 lots in Gleba Nova Olinda called *permutas*, which were explicitly designated for logging, although they could not be clearcut, they had to be selectively logged.70 (Decreto Estadual n°2.472, September 29, 2006, published in DOEPAnº30.777, October 2, 2006). These *permutas* were located on land that Gleba Nova Olinda’s indigenous people consider to be their own and inside of the community of São Luiz. The *permuta* holders formed their own association within COOEPA called ASPIT (the Association of Proprietors of the Trairão project).

The third strategy for accessing land in Gleba Nova Olinda (and in the neighboring Glebas of Gleba Nova Olinda II and III) was through a state granted form of temporary land rights for logging ADIPs (Authorization for the Detention of Private Property). ADIPs functioned as a sort of temporary land rights that were granted in areas with high potential for profitable logging to get around the existing Brazilian law that

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70 Clear cutting is the type of logging associated with deforestation. Over the past two decades and increasingly today, as concerns for deforestation have significantly increased, logging is done through a process called “selective logging,” where loggers create a “sustainable management plan” and selectively cut and then transport to a mill for processing only the trees that they will actually sell. This is a more labor intensive and expensive logging because creating the plan requires a detailed forest survey submitted to the state that designates which trees will be logged and extraction is more complicated. It is also a much more difficult type of logging to track with remote sensing (or at all) because it thins forests rather than clearing them. By 2005 in the state of Pará, selective logging had either matched our outpaced deforestation in terms of the amount of trees logged and is deemed to have severe, and understudied ecological impact (Asner et al. 2005). As we see in these examples, its impacts on local communities are also severe as the logging damages local ecosystems, removes the wood that communities use, re-works their territory with infrastructure, circumscribes the communities, and generates conflict.
stipulated that logging could only happen in areas where people had private property rights. In three glebas that are adjacent to each other, there were a total of 8 ADIPs granted, with four of these grants within areas claimed by indigenous people in Gleba Nova Olinda.

Finally, through common practices of petty bribery, loggers worked with some of the inhabitants of Gleba Nova Olinda – in some cases entire communities, such as Fé em Deus – and in other cases individuals, incentivizing (through bribery) and facilitating (flying them to Belém, ferrying them between Santarém and their communities via speedboat) their petitions for private property rights. Private property rights would serve the loggers in three ways. The people could sell the loggers their land, allow them to take out management plans on them, and it would limit the amount of land given to inhabitants (private lots are much smaller than collective ones), thereby opening the rest of the Gleba either for sale or to be a “public forest.”

In 2007, in another enforcement operation, IBAMA found that some of these loggers Alfredo Sippert, Rosenil Vaz de Souza and Rondobel Industria e Comércio de Madeira Ltda, were in violation of several environmental laws. Upon being discovered, the loggers submitted to IBAMA permits for sustainable management plans in the Gleba that they had been granted by the State Environmental Secretary. Area residents argued that the loggers logged extensively outside of their allotted areas and had illegal loading docks and roads and, more significantly, should never have been granted the management plans in the first place, ethically, but also legally – within 10km of a conservation area (the RESEX Tapajós-Arapuins due east) logging is illegal. Further, much of the logging

71 The Public Forestry Law passed in 2006, a coup for the logging industry, began to allow logging on publically held land, but was still not applicable to terra devoluta, so was of no use in the Glebas, hence the ADIPs
was in areas claimed by indigenous people.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, while the logging itself was in violation of several laws, it was legal, because it was being done under a state-granted permit. IBAMA requested that the permits be cancelled, initiating a legal battle that would ensue for the next several years over the cancellation of these plans resulting in the standoff on the beach at São Pedro.

\textbf{Figure 15}: Sign encountered during mapping indicating the area claimed by a logger with his ITERPA license number.

In an effort to mediate the tensions growing among Gleba Nova Olinda’s communities (explored more fully in Chapter Four), all of the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda held a series of meetings in order to negotiate a land tenure arrangement that would divide the Gleba into private property (for extractive development), traditional

\textsuperscript{72} Resolução CONAMA nº 013, de 06/12/1990
land, and indigenous land – a model very much in line with the territorial compromise model laid out in the ZEE.

Figure 16: Proposal for Gleba Nova Olinda land distribution. Indigenous land is in yellow, traditional land in pink, private property in red, and conservation area in green.

Implementation of this agreement, however, dragged on for several years. FUNAI, the federal agency that governs recognizes indigenous land dragged their feet on the process of recognition despite numerous pleas by the indigenous residents, threats and fines by the Ministério Público and pressure from the National Rapporteur for Human Rights in Land, Territory and Food. The state forestry agency IDEFLOR, visited the traditional and indigenous communities to engage them in a participatory mapping project to develop logging management plans on their future territories (given that new laws opened even traditional lands to managed logging in reserve areas). In June 2009 the traditional territories were created in law, they were reduced to 1/5\textsuperscript{th} of their agreed upon size. In an interview with the president of ITERPA, when asked why these lands were
reduced, he said “IDEFLOR mapped their use areas, those are the areas that they use. Saying that your grandfather once hunted somewhere is not grounds for getting land rights. Everyone cannot be Latifundia.” When we mapped the extents of the staked out logging management plans in the Gleba, our mapping demonstrated that the new, reduced boundaries also directly matched the boundaries of the loggers’ area. In other words, the boundaries of the traditional lands were reduced to leave the management plans intact.

In summary, in Gleba Nova Olinda, we saw the legalization of not only unethical, but illegal activity through the creation of temporary and permanent land rights and management plans. We also witnessed the reduction of traditional and indigenous territories to meet the needs of extractive industry, and a practice, also common in the region, of what the ministerio publico called intentional foot dragging to allow time for resource extraction before creating a protected area. Whereas in previous moments, loggers were granted impunity, in this situation they are being granted something that is much more difficult to struggle against – legality. It is much easier to galvanize support for a movement against illegal logging, than legal (and even certified, some of these companies have certification agreements with Imazon) logging, despite the fact that this logging is being legalized on already claimed land, results in the minimization of the territorial extent of traditional and indigenous land, and has generated intercommunity conflict.

**Renascer**

The territorialization of the philosophy of governance, based in the idea that the territorial interests of all actors are not contradictory, but negotiable was most emblematically expressed by the worker’s party governor of the state of Pará, Ana Julia
Carepa, when she met with president Lula during a much reported plane ride from Brasilia to Sao Paulo in late 2008 to discuss the legalization of the Renascer extractive reserve. It was necessary, she argued, to find “the best design possible” to respect “the rights of the communities who live there and of the producers, ranchers and loggers who have been in that area for decades” (IDEFLOR 2008).

What is today the Renascer (Rebirth) Extractive Reserve, located in the Prainha municipality, was originally slated for inclusion in the Verde Para Sempre (Forever Green) Extractive Reserve, located directly to the East of Renaser in the Porto de Moz municipality and legally created in 2003. The entire area proposed for the Renascer Extractive Reserve was designated for “Sustainable Use” in the ZEE for Western Pará. This designation is reserved for areas that would explicitly “prioritize” the needs and livelihood practices of traditional people. Renascer was recognized in multiple studies as a key area for biodiversity and cultural conservation. It is also rich in hardwoods and located in a prime area for logging (an industry that arrived only 10 years prior and whose arrival was the impetus for regional people’s struggle for territorial rights), ranching, and it would later be revealed, is rich in yet-undeveloped bauxite deposits under initial exploration by interested mining corporations.

The Prainha and Porto de Moz mayors (both PSDB along with then-governor Jatene), were both the municipalities’ largest landholders, and loggers and ranchers themselves), a common situation in Pará, and had, working jointly with the logging industry, successfully lobbied against the inclusion of Renascer in the Verde Para Sempre Reserve to the east. Immediately following Verde Para Sempre’s creation, then Pará state

73 It is a key site, for example, for Brazil nut trees, angelim-vermelho, muracatia, maçaranduba, mogno, cedro, maparajuba, acai, and buriti. Fishes include pirarucu, tambaqui, and surubim. There are 43 species of mammals.
Governor Simão Jatene (PSDB) opened the 400,000 hectare area of the future Renascer to loggers by declaring the entire area a “state forest” (FLOTA) through a gubernatorial decree. Loggers immediately began to obtain environmental licenses for management and logging authorizations AUTTEF (Authorization for Timber Exploitation). In other words, the area was named a protected area (in accordance with the ZEE) so that it could be open to exploitation.

Logging in the Renascer area was not necessarily contingent upon having a legal claim and permit. Much of the logging was flagrantly illegal. In the introduction, recall that Manoel do Pão, logger and advisor to the mayor, indicated that he – whom many considered to be on the side of justice – logged illegally in the Renascer area. He did this through another common practice, which was to purchase land with title (although usually without trees), and obtain a permit for a sustainable management plan on that land. Loggers then remove timber from forested areas, in this case the Renascer area, using that permit. When the wood illegally removed from an area arrived at customs, it would be carrying a legal permit, thus “laundering” illegally extracted timber. The third mechanism through which loggers wood illegally was through document falsification. In July 2012, when the logging that we had detected in our mapping – the largest apprehension of illegal logging in Brazilian history ($16 million reais worth of wood) – was finally formally prosecuted, the head of the Jauru logging corporation, Adriano Dandolini, was accused of forging 1,189 documents.74

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74 See the Ministério Público’s denouncement at: http://www.gvces.com.br/index.php?p=noticias/view&id=242583 Accessed July 1, 2012. Perhaps not as relevant to this chapter per se, but rather to the overall argument regarding the links between progressive government, anti-poverty, extractions and political strategy, the Ministério Público Federal also entered into a judicial action in 2010 to stop ICMBio from contributing the $16 million reais to the Ministry of Social Development and anti-hunger (MDS) in an elections year (implying that it was an attempt to buy
The communities in conflict with loggers were advised by the IBAMA and the Rural Workers’ Union that their only option to protect their territories against loggers who were now, in part, operating legally was to struggle for another extractive reserve. Several communities re-organized themselves into the movement for Renascer (this struggle was contested within the reserve itself; all communities/people in the communities were not in agreement). The struggle for Renascer, continued for several years and was extremely contested, as will be detailed in Chapter Five. It generated bitter, at times violent, conflict in the region between people “for” and “against” the reserve, which broke down largely along the lines of those aligned with the logging and cattle industry and those engaged more exclusively in traditional living practices, and even generated a split in the movement itself between the Rural Workers’ Union and the reserve movement, which will also be discussed in the next Chapter.

Following closed door negotiations between the rural workers’ union, the WWF, and federal and state government officials, on “World Environment Day” the fifth of June 2009, Renascer Extractive Reserve was created by presidential decree with an area of 211,634 hectares, approximately one half of the size (414.274) petitioned for by the communities involved, recommended by the research report by IBAMA and discussed in the Public Audience in the Reserve in December 2007. An area owned by local ranchers, the floodplain, almost all of the primary forest, the sources for the reserve’s three rivers, and most decisively, a later interview with ICMBio coordinator Fabiano votes) and moved for the money to be returned to the communities of Renascer. At the time of this writing, the communities are still in conflict with ICMBio over this.

75 IBAMA. 2006. Estudo Socioeconomico da area proposta para criação da Reserva Extrativista Renascer, Prainha/PA. A study conducted by a UFPA professor “Raimundinha” the wife of Airton Faleiro, state deputy (PT), former president of FETAGRI, and coordinator of the movement for the survival of the Transamazônia and the Xingu region.
Costa (interview September 2009) would indicate, the Bauxite deposits, would be excluded from the reserve in “the best design possible.” The area excluded from the reserve is again slated to become a “state forest,” which would be open to mining and timber extraction.

Figure 17: Map of RESEX Renascer. The Resex Verde Para Sempre is to the east marked with hatching. Renascer is in green and the yellow outline indicated the proposed reserve area that was eliminated in the final creation of Renascer.

The process of creating protected areas has another significant impact for communities – the intensification of extraction. It is quite common that, because it takes
time for government agencies to set up mechanisms for enforcement, resource exploitation spikes when conservation areas are created in law, so that industry can extract as much as possible prior to being removed from the area. In the case of Renascer, because their area was cut so significantly, this meant that loggers infiltrated community common lands.

The reduction in the size of the reserve came to reserve residents as a shock. Those people who had been unwilling to negotiate on the size of the reserve – which, they argued compromised their very identity as “traditional” people, were not invited to participate in the negotiations. In other words, stakeholders were only those who would negotiate on the state’s terms. Thus, at the end of over a decade of struggle, the people of Renascer found that their broader community was deeply divided. They had achieved territorial recognition, but found that it was insufficient to their own reproduction with much of their land nearly all of the primary forest placed outside of the reserve. There was also concern that the Resex would create restrictions on their livelihood practices that would likely be incongruent with their actual means of subsistence (because their management plan would be drafted by ICMBio and there were already disagreements with ICMBio regarding what was permitted and not permitted within the reserve boundaries).

CONCLUSION

The overall argument of this chapter was that an examination of the evolution of state-led or state inspired development projects indicates that state approaches to governing and development have shifted from maintaining/producing order through force to doing so through the fragmentation and incorporation of existing other
logics/subjects/territorialities. This demonstrates that while the mechanisms have certainly changed, the ordering function (producing/reproducing relations of force) has not. State territorialization is the process of producing that order. Specifically in this situation, the way to do that is to turn nature into resources, land into property, and resistant subjects into stakeholders all integrated into a single, holistic model of territory that assigns each of these elements their proper place, which people are increasingly dissatisfied with.
Part Two. Territories of Resistance

The first half of this dissertation recounted the historical, social processes that precipitated and made visible a sort of territorial crisis – a moment when the tenuous nature of the link between territory and state became apparent in the wake of the dictatorship and developmentalist period and the emergence of new territorial actors in Amazonia in the 1980s. It unpacked the contemporary hegemonic processes re-territorializing the region, based largely in what we might call a geopolitics of sustainable development and resource control, which set the conditions for the intensification of extractive industry in the region ongoing today.

In this final section of the dissertation, I return to the two struggles introduced in Chapter One to examine the “new territorialities” geared toward emancipation emerging and/or present in the face of this re-territorialization (Porto Gonçalves 2006). In Chapter Four, through a detailed examination of the genealogy of the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture and the Arapiuns River, I examine the emergence of territorial subject(s) and within that, the concept of territory itself. As part of the larger argument of this dissertation to re-think “territory” as separate from the nation-state, this section is based in the premise that innovation in strategies of struggle has meant the re-invention or creation of new concepts. The de-linking by social movements of the concept of territory from the nation-state serves two functions. It reveals the instability/destabilizes the naturalized link between state and territory, and it offers up the concepts that make these
practices of struggle intelligible, articulating an approach to politics that is historically and epistemologically adequate to the current moment.

This exploration of innovation in strategies of struggle is not meant to over-emphasize their “success.” One of the arguments of this dissertation is that Brazil’s economic growth, the corresponding anti-poverty payments to low or no-income people (including, significantly, the payments for environmental services that are not explored in this dissertation but have begun to be dispersed in these areas studies over the past several months), and the presence of many social movement actors into institutional politics, presents a significant challenge to previous social movement strategies. Rather, my intention is precisely to map out the shifting terrain of politics, and to try to better understand what movements are articulating as political strategy adequate to the current moment.

In this vein, Chapter Five examines more closely the processes that come after the moment of attaining land rights in the case of Renascer, where the Resex inhabitants achieved a degree of territorial control, but not what they had been struggling for. It explores how, when a minimum amount of stability is achieved, new political possibilities for self-determination become actualized. This happens, however, alongside and within political practices aimed at re-establishing the given order. While this chapter does not examine the concept of territory as explicitly as Chapter Four, its premise is that the possibilities for the self-determination at stake in the project to establish Resex governance rest in a material and territorial capacity to reproduce and protect their ways of life.
Through both of these chapters we will see the development of a conception of territory that, as I will elaborate further in Chapter Four, is based simultaneously (and inextricably) in the spatialized social practices that constitute a particular, collective way of life and the struggle for the defense of that way of life. Given that the questions engaged here are explicitly political, and in response to – and building on – a substantial, recent literature that focuses on the cultural and environmental practices of traditional people rather than on political subject formation (see for example the recent edited volumes by Nugent and Harris 2004; Adams et al. 2009), my analysis focuses less on an ethnographic description of daily practices and more explicitly on developing a practical comprehension of struggle.
Chapter 4. From Land to Territory: the Movement for the Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River

INTRODUCTION

Almost immediately following the taking of the timber barges on the Arapiuns River, described in the introduction, officials from several state agencies rushed upriver to where the barges were being held to try to mitigate the situation. The state environmental agency representative offered to take the wood elsewhere to determine its legality. The wood, however, was the movement’s bargaining chip; they did not even consider that proposal. The state forestry agency offered to pass demands regarding indigenous territory on to the federal government. Indigenous issues, the agency explained, were outside of their jurisdiction. The aldeia (indigenous community) leaders could not count the number of times they had heard that before; the federal government was well aware of their demands. They declined the offer. The Civil Police threatened to arrest the demonstrators, although they had no arrest warrant. The protesters sent the police back to Santarém empty-handed.

Realizing that they were settling in for the long haul, the protesters assembled on the beach to discuss organization and strategy. First they dealt with logistics, setting up commissions for cooking, cleaning, camp infrastructure, resource assessment and procurement, and entertainment/consciousness-building – establishing the material means for the encampment’s existence. Then, they moved on to questions of leadership, establishing a twelve-person commission, with rotating membership, to represent the
movement. This group, it was decided, would always consist of both men and women and of both indigenous people and “extractivists.” Next, they articulated their objectives/demands, and outlined a strategy for moving forward. As discussed in the introduction, the movement’s early demands were quite specific – determination of the detained wood’s legality, expansion of the Agro-extractive Agrarian Reform settlements’ (PAEx’s) boundaries (which, as discussed in Chapter Three, had been reduced to one-fifth of their agreed upon size), and demarcation of the Borari indigenous land in Gleba Nova Olinda. Finally, they selected a name for themselves. The Movement in Defense of Gleba Nova Olinda was the obvious choice, but it was not the name they chose. It was true that the demands themselves aimed at “defending” rights to land and resources in Gleba Nova Olinda. However, the desires and goals of the movement, it was argued, exceeded the immediate implications of these demands. In fact, the majority of the people protesting on the beach did not even live in Gleba Nova Olinda. They lived in the RESEX Tapajós-Arapins and the PAEex Lago Grande. Why then, were so many communities from across these different areas, who already had collective property rights, who had basically “succeeded” in their “struggle for land” gathered on the beach, in a standoff with both loggers and the state, to make demands about land rights in a place that they did not even live?

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76 This was the designation that they began using for non-indigenous people from the extractive reserve (extractive reserves are dedicated to subsistence extractivism, as opposed to industrial extractivism). They ultimately deemed the word unsatisfactory because, as one indigenous leader pointed out, “We are all extractivists.”

77 Gleba is the word used to describe a large area of government-held, undesignated land (e.g. no property rights or use rights are assigned in this area).

78 Naming movements the “movement in defense of [name issue here]” is common in Amazonia, perhaps a legacy of the environmental movement and the fact that the wave of region-wide movements in the 70s and 80s were largely defensive (defending land and resources from exploitation by developers).
For years, and intensely in the previous several months, the people and communities of the Arapiuns, Aruã, and Maró Rivers witnessed logging barges headed downriver to Santarém from Gleba Nova Olinda daily. To them, the extraction of millions of dollars worth of timber represented the first step in their ultimate dispossession and displacement. The effects of activities in Gleba Nova Olinda could not be restricted to that area. As one interviewee explained, the only thing that differentiated the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda from the rest of the people of the Arapiuns were the “boundaries created by the state.” These boundaries, she explained, did not represent difference among them as people. They all “plant farinha, hunt, and fish” and had family networks that extended across the entire region. Many of them, she explained, were “one movement, we have struggled together, against the loggers, for the Resex...for our rights...Without Gleba Nova Olinda, there is no Arapiuns. These rivers, this territory they are our life, our culture, all of ours.” These were the initial moments of the formation of the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture of the Arapiuns River, a movement not for land, but, in their words, for territory.

In this chapter I demonstrate and theorize this shift, by movements in the Lower Amazon (Baixo Amazonas) over the course of two decades from a “Struggle for Land” to one for territory. I argue that this move from the pursuit of land and property to a struggle for life, culture and territory is not a simple “re-framing” (Benford and Snow 2000) of ongoing struggle. Rather this substantive and strategic shift expresses deeper political changes in the capacity of these movements to confront, and intervene in the given order of domination. Embedded in this shift is a move away from the political supremacy of the concepts of “peasant” and “rural worker” introduced by political parties and the syndical
movement in rural Amazonia (and Brazil) (Castro 2006; Almeida 2011), and toward new subject categories that split these previous categories and re-organized them according to self-determined collective, ethnic, and ecological (e.g. relations to nature/natural resources) elements.

At the foundation of this shift, I will argue, is a move away from economically based claims about production. The framing of the struggle for land within the labor theory of property (land to the tiller) ultimately trapped the claims that Amazonian movements were making within an economic argument that was inadequate to their actual struggle, and could even be used against it. The claim for territory, in response, is less a claim of economic productivity – although economic production may be one component of it – and more a claim about the production of a collective subject and a
particular way of life. This claim expresses a conception of territory that understands particular territories and subjects as a co-produced and thus inextricable and that understands territorialization as a practice of resistance forged through a combination of everyday practices and struggle through which these subjects are formed (Porto Gonçalves 2001; Porto Gonçalves 2009; Fernandes 2005; de Almeida 2006; Reyes and Kaufman 2011; Zibechi 2008). I will more explicitly theorize this conception of territory by charting the emergence of new collective political subjects (e.g. movements) and their corresponding, specific processes of territorialization and territories - what geographer Bernardo Mançano Fernandes (2005) calls socio-territorial movements – in multiple iterations, in the Araipins region.

To make this argument, I begin with an overview of what we might call the sociological characteristics of life in the lower Amazon, which lays the foundation for the analysis that follows of how a rather objective category (agricultura familiar) was invested with meaning and linked to particular notions of both struggle (for land) and political change. In other words, I explore theoretically and historically how practices-in-common were used to generate a broad political category (peasant, and then rural worker). I address the limitations of these broad categories of analysis through a closer

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79 It is important to note here that I am not suggesting that the struggle for land is not a struggle for a particular way of life, or, for that matter, for territory, as I would argue that it most certainly is (and in fact, this analysis draws heavily on other analyses of the Landless Workers’ Movement as a movement for much more than simply “land” (Wolford 2004b; Wolford 2004a; Wolford 2005; Wolford 2004c), and that argue that the MST is a socio-territorial movement (Fernandes 2005). Rather, many of these broad categories were externally introduced to Amazonian people and although they are meant to be categories of resistance, they have some of the same destructive effects of erasing difference as other colonizing practices. The strategic innovation in explicitly territorial claims that express diverse forms of collective life are a re-claiming of this difference.

80 This is a conception explained quite clearly in the above quote from a protester, whose self description of the movement was people who “hunt fish and plant farinha” and who have “struggled together.”
examination of territorial struggles in Gleba Nova Olinda, demonstrating that common livelihood practices do not map on to political categories. Rather, following EP Thompson (1978) and others, these are forged through struggle. I examine the co-constitution of political subjects and land claims in Gleba Nova Olinda through the struggle for the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, the “Resurgent” Indigenous movement, and finally the movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River (MDVCA). I pay special attention to the way that the concept of territory as articulated by the indigenous movement informs MDVCA’s formation, especially in its capacity to join different forms of collective subjects into a common struggle.

TRADITIONAL POPULATIONS

Across Amazonia (and Brazil, but here we are particularly concerned with Amazonia), innumerable variants of collective groups of people who subsist largely through agriculture and/or a combination of agriculture and subsistence extractivism are agglomerated in the literature under the terms “smallholder” agriculture in English and agricultura familiar (family agriculture) in Portuguese. A more specific description of the actual production processes in different places and communities can vary substantially, as people adapt to the complex, delicate and infinitely variable regional micro-ecosystems that form the basic unit of cultural and economic life. Such differences mean that there

81 The complexity and variation among these different types of practices should not be underemphasized, from the western Amazon where rubber tappers base their subsistence in rubber, to Gleba Nova Olinda which is a combination of hunting and fishing to the varzea communities closer to Santarem who fish, to the crab collectors on the coast, to the babacu-breakers of Maranhão, these differences are increasingly claimed and celebrated. This variation can also be found within the lifetime of a single person. Many interviewees worked as wage laborers in mining or ranching, in avamiento situations tapping rubber or harvesting malva, lived in different places, even within a single year of their life. See Porto Gonçalves (2001) on the variety of “traditional” people that inhabit Amazonia (whose names include but are not limited to ribeirinho (river-dweller), caboclo (can mean anything from person to mestizo, to hillbilly).
is a vast heterogeneity of daily practices, forms of organization, and spatial practices (WinklerPrins 2001; Raffles 2002; Nugent, Harris, et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2009). What these “peasants,” “people of the forest,” or “traditional populations” hold in common, generally speaking, are practices and systems that are small-scale and geared toward subsistence and thus oriented around a logic of self-reproduction rather than that of accumulation. In this section, I briefly provide an overview of these collective livelihood practices in Gleba Nova Olinda, in order to familiarize the reader with an understanding of what are considered to be some of the key elements of collective livelihood practices there. Then I explore the way that this rather objective understanding of these practices has been used to construct the political categories of peasant and rural worker and some of the tensions that emerge in that process. This will lay the basis for a broader argument that both daily collective practices and the processes of struggle constitute the territories at stake here. I place this argument in contrast to a literature, a conservation and development practice, and former projects of movement building that define these subject categories largely through the former (e.g. practices of everyday life). Because scholars have documented these practices, this chapter pays less detailed attention to an ethnographic representation of daily life and focuses more on describing and analyzing struggle as a constituent practice of territory.

quilombo (remnant afro-Brazilian escaped slave communities), indigena, seringueiro (rubber tapper), extrativista (extractivist), pescadores (fishermen), or the more generic traditional.

82 All of these terms are used to reference these groups and will be addressed in more detail below, but briefly, the designation “people of the forest” was proposed by the many different social movements (indigenous, rubber tappers, ribeirinhos etc.) as a project of building a common struggle for identity-based rights in the 1980s. “Traditional” is a legal designation.
Traditional populations of the Arapiuns

While the communities of Gleba Nova Olinda have different particular histories, most of the current communities were established between fifteen and fifty years ago. They trace their ancestry to communities that have lived in the broader region for generations, in small hamlets or communities that were loosely organized around dispersed extended family units, a dispersal that was largely the effect of the post-Cabanagem (uprising of 1835-40 discussed in the introduction) regional repression and the subsequent re-structuring of relations of domination through the aviamento system. These processes nearly completely destroyed familial and affinitive relations and consequently the ethnic and social fabric that had so deeply challenged the structures of domination. People and families re-located in small groups from the river margins to the more remote terra firme (uplands). Beginning with the rubber industry in the late 1800s and continuing during the mid-late 20th century with the production of juta and malva, people began moving back to the rivers, or more commonly, maintaining an area within the forest centers and along the rivers edge. Communities remained small and relatively mobile, moving when resources became scarce or to escape conflict.

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83 Or always, the collective memory encountered in interviews goes back at least to Cabanagem, the uprising of 1835-40 discussed in introduction. For a more detailed analysis of the specific regional history of the lower Arapiuns see (Bolaños 2008; Vaz 1996; Vaz 2004; Vaz 2008).

84 Aviamento is a mercantile system based on personal debt relations established region-wide during the rubber boom that significantly re-worked labor and social relations across the region entrenching clientalist relationships that persist today. For discussions of aviamento see Weinstein 1983; Da Cunha and de Camargo Monfrê 1967; Wagley 1988; Hecht and Cockburn 2011).

85 In an 1850 visit to the region, British naturalist Henry Bates noted that the Borari people, then living in Alter do Chão (an entirely different location closer to Santarém than their Borari descendents of Gleba Nova Olinda) that almost no one escaped the massacre and there were almost no middle aged males left among the Borari. (Bates 1876 quoted in Ioris 2011, 226).
Today, the people and families living in Gleba Nova Olinda’s three indigenous and eleven traditional communities variously engage some combination of productive practices generally understood to comprise traditional production systems, including subsistence agriculture (slash and burn/shifting cultivation) and extractive activities such as fishing, hunting, collecting, and non-timber forest product extraction.\textsuperscript{86} Agricultural labor is oriented around the production of manioc as a staple crop. Manioc is inedible in its raw form, but used to produce – through an extremely labor intensive process – a course flour called farinha, or a derivative called tapioca, eaten with every meal and supplemented by some combination household level animal husbandry (cattle, pig, or chicken and duck production), fishing and hunting.

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\textsuperscript{86} The indigenous communities, Novo Lugar, Cachoeira do Marô and São José III, are located proximate to one another on the Marô River. The traditional communities are Prainha, Fé em Deus, Repartimiento, Viste Alegre and Mariazinha on the Marô and São Francisco do Aruã, São Luis do Aruã, Novo Paraíso, São Parentes, São Raimundo, and Sempre Serve on the Aruã. The Gleba is estimated to contain a total of 309 families and 1,304 people (Iterpa 2007). The size of communities varies between approximately 10 and approximately 50 families. The difference between indigenous and traditional communities is complex and as I will argue below it is a political question, rather than a sociological one. While the specific livelihood practices may vary by community and even by family, they are do not specifically vary by these identity categories (indigenous/traditional) and this section is broadly describing life across the Gleba.)
Figure 18: Back from hunting

Figure 19: Home life
Figure 20: Making an oar

Figure 21: Slaughtering a cow for upcoming assembly
Subsistence practices vary seasonally because life is oriented around the rivers, whose levels vary drastically from the rainy season (*inverno*) to the dry season (*verão*), affecting the availability of fish, fruits, and crops. Planting of manioc and other staple crops in the small fields called *roças* is generally done close to the villages and up to a few hours walk into the forest. Living areas are determined and organized according to communal forms (either family or community level) of territorial appropriation and each family’s *roça*, as well as the location of their house is designated through decisions made in community meetings called assemblies. This is the case whether one’s house is in the village or in the forest (“the centro” or center); some families do not live within the village sites although they are considered part of the community. People also collect “wild” food from the forest, including, but not limited to, myriad fruits, *castanha-do-
Pará (the Brazil nut), and palm fruits such as açai and bacaba, they build their homes and boats with wood taken from the forest, and they make their roofs from palm (palha). 87

Labor (planting, home-building, community projects) is generally done by family members, through reciprocity, communal practices (especially to meet the reproductive needs of the communities, such as maintenance of community structures, event planning, etc.), and in some cases, people are paid for day labor (in 2010 the paid labor rate was at a rate of 15 reais per day, approximately $7 USD at the time). 88 Basic commodities (rice, sugar, coffee, cooking oil, and cachaça, the regional alcoholic drink of choice) are increasingly purchased, either on monthly trips to the city or from local mercadinhos.

87 This is a housing construction model, which is one of the first things to change once people receive land rights and become eligible for government housing credits. That is, they receive funding, sometimes as grants but primarily loans for up to $18,000 reais, to build a home, which is built by a company contracted by INCRA and in a style designed by INCRA. During my time in the field, the former superintendent of Incra Santarém was also the head of the house construction corporation.

88 Based on a household level survey of four houses in two communities (Novo Lugar and Prainha), I drafted a list of plants cultivated and collected. In a community meeting in Novo Lugar with several households, we reviewed the lists and added items they believed were missing. We found that in their roças and home gardens, all families plant manioca and some combination of macaxeira, milho, arroz, batata, cana-de-açúcar, carão, feijão, and the fruits abacaxi and melancia. Fruit trees in home gardens or exploited in the forest usually include some combination of cajá, mamão, cupuçu, laranja, banana, muruçu, goiaba, taperibá, manga, abacate, acerola, manga, jambu, graviola, cajá, limau, maracujá, ata, and pupunha. Other commonly extracted forest foods include bacaba and açai, castanha do Pará, uxi, tucumã, miriri, burutí, and inga. People also commonly extract wood for houses or canoe construction, primarily itaúba or guaruva or oiti. Other forest products commonly extracted include cipós and barks along with oils such as andiroba and copaíba, and other medicinal herbs, and fibers such as curua (for making string) and palha (for house roofs), as well as latex. Commonly hunted animals are small veado, cutia, tatá, paca, and occasionally macaco and jabuti, along with a variety of wild birds, such as jaca-açu and galega. People also raise galinha and pato along with the occasional boi. There are seemingly innumerable types of fish and fishing methods vary from underwater diving with handmade spears, to net fishing. Some examples of fish in include traíra, jatuarana, and apurá. These lists are compiled from interviews with families, home garden and roça visits, group discussions and questions asked while walking in the forest. They are not necessarily exhaustive, but meant to give a general idea of the diversity of cultivated and extracted products. While people sometimes sell surpluses (especially of castanha do Pará and some of the barks and cipós) to middle men or at the mercadão 2000 (the largest outdoor market at the port) in Santarém, sale, trade, or sharing of food and medicinal products is common within communities. People tend to purchase coffee, pasta, rice, sugar, crackers, and bread on trips to Santarém. Sale of fish or hunted meat outside of the community is extremely rare. The staple food is manioca, which is processed through a labor-intensive process into a flour called farinha and into a tapioca flour used for cakes and beiju.
usually consisting of a stack of items for sale in someone’s living room. Alcohol is sold only in the towns that have a logging presence and its sale (although not its consumption) is explicitly banned in the indigenous communities.

Beyond agriculture and extractivism, livelihood strategies take on myriad forms, and inhabitation in one’s community, especially among younger people, can be dynamic. Many of the youngest generation of adults migrate to Santarém, or often to Manaus, for several years or permanently. Manaus is located three days upriver by boat from Santarém and is a free trade zone that offers the possibility of economic success. Aside from the proposal by outsiders to begin soy plantations there, Gleba Nova Olinda has no major cash crop, although historically the people there, like most people across the region, worked in rubber production, and at different times collected other non-timber forest products (drogas de sertão) for sale to local middle men or in Santarém through the aviamento system. Today people may sell surpluses, artisanal goods, or local commodities (boats, oars etc.) in the villages or occasionally in Santarém. They may operate small stores out of their homes, or move to the city for periods of time for employment. At times they may work on boats, or work for loggers or other extractive industries. Some families receive government subsidies in the form of bolsa família (the family grant program) or aposentadoria (similar to social security). Many extended families have houses or family in Santarém and it is common for children to spend several years studying in the city because there are no schools in the communities past the elementary level.

Nearly five hundred years of evangelism by the Catholic Church means that most families are Catholic. Yet because visits by priests are only occasional, masses are
organized and conducted by catechist teams within the communities. In recent years evangelical churches such as the Seventh Day Adventists and the Assembly of God, have made inroads into some of the communities. The evangelical churches prohibit dancing, soccer playing, and saint-day festivals, some of the most important regional communal practices, giving rise to inter-community conflict. Evangelicalism has not been permitted in the indigenous communities.

What is more difficult to communicate through this rather objective description is that beyond simply a strategy of subsistence, the roça and its product farinha, embody a consistency of practice across the various Amazônias that do not mark simply a method of cultivation or simply a strategy of subsistence. Rather they define a collective way of living (Almeida 2006; Almeida 2011). The roça signals, in the mundane sense, the choice of agricultural land and areas of extractivism. More importantly, the roça marks a particular relations between time and space, a process of territorialization that articulates and organizes the social practices and institutions – the agricultural calendar, religious festivals, soccer tournaments – standing as a central reference that sediments inter and intra-familial and community relations of reciprocity that are ultimately both productive of and necessary for the demand for and defense of territory, as we shall see below.

The Traditional Peasant/Caboclo as an object of study

As discussed above, scholars designate the many different Amazonian peoples and communities who engage in these combined practices of agricultura familiar and extractivism by multiple names that fall under the broad category of the “traditional peasantry” (camponês) (a word seldom utilized among the Arapiuns people themselves), which has an ethnic correlate of caboclo. That is, they are understood to be mixed-race,
non-Indian peasants, who, in the popular imagination, are descended from of northeastern
migrants to the region and detribalized indigenous people (Galvão 1955; Wagley 1988;
1997; Nugent 1993; C. Adams et al. 2009; D. M. Lima 2009). The word caboclo itself
carries myriad racialized stigma. At best, the term caboclo is a gross oversimplification
of a complex regional, racial, and ethnic history, as is the term “peasant,” which itself
does a lot of the work of erasing these complex ethnic identities. In this section, I
examine the emergence of the Amazonian traditional peasantry as an academic and
political object of study, its continued importance to contemporary analyses of struggle. It
is these limitations – namely its tendency toward economism – that, I will later argue,
territorial struggle works toward overcoming.

Initial theorizations of the Amazonian peasant emerged at a historical moment
where on the one hand, the worldwide rural uprisings associated with decolonization
were generating a re-invigoration of political and academic fascination with rural people
as political actors. On the other hand, and in response, this moment was marked by the

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89 The “traditional” peasantry is differentiated from the “neocamponeses” who are the more recent migrants
from the south and northeast (discussed in Chapter 2), landless peasants themselves. See Nugent (1996) on
the variety of both names and practices of the “neocamponeses,” e.g. people who have migrated to the
region in the past four decades often referred to as colonos (colonists), nordestinos (people from the
northeast), sulistas (people from the south), squatters (posseiros), along with the other group of more
capitalized migrants, which include garimpeiros (gold miners), fazendeiros (ranchers), sojeiros (soy
farmers), grileiros (land speculators), gauchos (generally wealthier and white people from the south), and
of course, pistoleiros (hired gunmen).

90 Racist stereotypes range from caboclos as lazy, as a category of non-being – they are not Indians, nor
white, nor Afro-descendents – to romanticization as the simple, uneducated, forest-dwellers, a stereotype
that continues to this day. For example, see recent Al Jazeera news report on Amazonian life for a perfect
example of this http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/06/201262310194990483.html [accessed
July 1, 2012]. Although the actual racial history of the Amazon is infinitely more complex and at a
minimum the “caboclo” is a descendent of indigenous populations, escaped slave populations, Portuguese
colonizers, later migrants etc. For a more substantive discussion of race, ethnicity, and “caboclo” see
Nugent (1997) and Harris (1998).
development of an international regime of counter-insurgency, largely enacted through both repression (in Latin America by the military dictatorships) and new development strategies (such as Basic Needs development), all oriented toward addressing the new figure of the “peasant.” Academic and political analyses tended to naturalize the “peasant,” as the rural political, economic, and social subject – a category that stood in for and masked other forms of difference (ethnic and racial) (Harris 1998; Viveiros de Castro 2006).

Amazonian political economy re-focused on the Agrarian Question and broadly proposed two different analyses of the Amazonian peasantry. “Classical frontier theorists” (Cleary 1993) such as Otávio Velho (1976, 1981) and Joe Foweraker (1981), writing at a time when industrial capitalist transformation of the region appeared inevitable, theorized the “peasant” as the key actor in the transition to capitalism. In other words, the peasant was the subject who evolved from subsistence farmer to petty commodity producer to waged laborer.

Other scholars, broadly inspired by peasant uprisings in the northeast (Ianni 1978; Martins 1981; Leroy 1991), cast Amazonians as peasants in an explicit effort to foreground their potential as revolutionary political subjects. This argument relied on a certain “peasant essentialism” (Bernstein and Byres 2001) that links particular livelihood-based and cultural practices (subsistence farming, egalitarianism) to a definition of peasants as unique political subjects that constitute a class (that is, different from either the proletariat or the latifundia). This amounted to the reading of a political category onto

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91 Not to mention the fact that Mao and events in China forced a re-thinking of the peasantry as protagonists of revolutionary political change. That is, it forced a rethinking of peasants beyond the classical political economic analyses that sought to understand their place in transitions to capitalism, socialism, or liberal democracy (Marx 1976; Lenin and Fineberg 1943; Kautsky 1988; Luxemburg 1951).
what is essentially a sociological one, and consequently in a rather instrumentalist
analysis (albeit one that we may have sympathies with) of peasant as political actor, (not
to mention an ultimately politically ambivalent one as it is this same essential peasant
who can be the agent of capitalist transformation, as in the above scenario).

This argument regarding the peasant is based on an analogy of the laboring
subjects’ (peasants) relation to their instruments of production (land). José da Souza
Martins (1991), solidified this conception of peasant as laborer in his seminal work on the
distinction between “terra de trabalho,” that is, land as an instrument of labor meant to
provide familial subsistence, and “terra de negócio” or land of business, privately held
land meant to provide profit, usually through speculation, rent, and the generation of
surplus value. These categories of land use were then introduced to identify the primary
contradiction (between use-value and exchange-value) within agriculture as a system. In
other words, they were understood to set the conditions of possibility for class struggle in
the countryside.

This conception of rural contradictions would become key to the construction of
the “struggle for land” in second half of the 20th century in Brazil, which broadly coun-
poses subsistence and industrial agriculture as the material expression of this
contradiction and Agrarian Reform (through expropriation and redistribution) as its
potential resolution. While this analysis is useful for helping us to understand that one of
the - if not the - primary contradictions in the contemporary Amazon is between the
organizing logics of surplus-oriented and social reproduction-oriented relationships to
land, the empirical categories (peasant and latifundia) and demands (land reform based in
the labor theory of value) that were developed politically from this analysis ultimately,
did not/do not map on to the material reality of Amazonia, and are thus inadequate to represent the extent of the contradictions present there. This limitation, I will argue, is linked to the fact that these categories work within the logic of political economy (e.g. the logic of the dominant order), a logic that I argue contemporary struggles for territory attempt to disrupt.

Subsequent treatments of Amazonian peasants within academic and policy analyses would broadly continue to engage with one of these two frames - peasants as either agents or inhibitors to the capitalist transition of the amazon. By the 1990s and 2000s social and natural science research, conducted in the wake of the clear environmental destruction wrought by modernization programs, was almost universally informed by a strong ecological discourse and a preoccupation with the “environment.”

Questions of capitalist transition versus liberation were recast as questions of environmental destruction versus conservation. In consequence, the question became whether Amazonian “peasantries” were the potential destroyers or saviors of the “lungs of the earth.” That is not to say that there was not more nuanced research, such as that done in Political Ecology, which more critically explored the political possibilities of

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92 The exception to this would be the more recent anthropological literature (and especially work within and inspired by a conversation between Mark Harris and Steven Nugent. See for example, Harris 1998; Harris 2000; Nugent 1997; Nugent, Harris, et al 2004), which has attempted to respond to what they argue is a certain economic reductionism in Amazonian peasant studies by rescuing the “Amazonian peasantries” and the caboclo (with an emphasis on their plurality) as a cultural category. The anthropological response to the multiple “peasant essentialisms” and to political economic analyses of the peasantry more broadly, was to argue, not incorrectly, that is both modernization itself, and theories of frontier change, and environmental stewardship had erred in their failure to recognize (and thus to overcome and understand, respectively) the nuances of what was not a “peasantry,” but rather highly differentiated “peasantries,” (Cleary 1999). For Amazonian Peasant Studies, then, the mandate was/is to describe, analyze and create concepts, and add ethnographic nuance, that capture the diversity of livelihood practices. Thus, recent anthropological approaches have focused on providing the historical and ethnographic detail that can help to understand the emergence of the traditional peasantries. This work has made significant contributions to historicizing and nuancing the category of peasant/caboclo, but ultimately and perhaps paradoxically also theorizes Amazonian peasantries as simply outcomes of an economic process (e.g. merchant capitalism in the form of the rubber industry).
peasants-as-agents (Schmink and Wood 1992; Hecht and Cockburn 2011 are some excellent examples of such work), and cultural ecology, which explored how they could be environmental stewards, largely through consciousness and institution building with expert help ((Furtado 1988; Moran 1993; Brondizio et al. 1994; McGrath et al. 1999; Lima et al. 2000). Much of this research also has an economist bent, seeking to measure and increase the economic viability of traditional production systems, marked by the proliferation throughout the 1990s and 2000s of participatory development projects across traditional, rural Amazonia. This research was in a large part inspired by environmentalists’ interest in incorporating local populations into conservation frameworks, which contributed to valorizing the productive and biological diversity of “traditional peasancies” and served as a key strategic argument and an important factor in some of their key victories in the Amazonian struggle for land.

This mobilization, from below, by people that identified themselves not as peasants per se, but as, *ribeirinhos, quilombolas, babaçu* breakers, indigenous people, extractivists, and people of the forest, to name a few, established subject categories that rejected analyses of them as naturalized biological actors and assumed positions as collective, political subjects constituted through processes of territorialization. In the next section, I turn to the history of the struggle for Gleba Nova Olinda to argue that the move away from the concepts of “peasant” and “land” help us to understand how particular constructions of struggle could be and have been interpolated into the reproduction of the status quo, and what sorts of strategic and conceptual shifts move toward breaking with it.
Territorial struggle in Gleba Nova Olinda, and the Tapajós region more broadly is marked by what I argue are four distinct moments – the expansion of the logging frontier and the establishment of the Rural Workers’ Union; the struggle for the Resex and “traditional” identity; the resurgent indigenous movement and the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River. In this section, I recount this history, focusing on the co-constituent processes of subjects and territory through an analysis of the way that conceptions of and arguments for and about territory emerge with traditional land claims and how through the indigenous movement and MDVCA they shift, responding to the given situation.

The Expansion of the Logging Frontier

The arrival, in the 1960s and 70s, of tens of thousands of landless peasants into the Amazon, new government incentives for developers, nationalization of land along transportation corridors and elsewhere (70% of all land in Pará), and the establishment of federal (INCRA) and state (ITERPA) land agencies, were all instrumental in the push for land regularization in the Tapajós-Arapiuns region beginning in the 1980s. The most immediate reason that “smallholders” began to demarcate the boundaries of their land

93 The history recounted in this section draws primarily on interviews, and countless informal conversations and observed meetings, as well as participation in and witnessing of most of the events associated with the formation of MDVCA, all implemented between January 2009 and October 2010. Historical facts were also cross-checked where possible with a few key sources – there is limited written documentation on this region - including Leroy 1991, an unpublished report by Raphael Frederico Acuoli Moreira da Silva (2010) the anthropologist for the Federal Ministério Público in Gleba Nova Olinda, and Vaz (2004). These are cited in the text where they provided information not provided in primary data.

94 To clarify something that might be a point of confusion for the reader, the “resurgent” indigenous movement that will be discussed below is a movement of several thousand people in this region who, at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s began to reclaim their indigenous identity. They share a history and livelihood practice with other communities across the region and so prior to that time, self-identified as rural workers, traditional people, and other forms of self-identification that will be discussed here.
and to pursue property rights, however, was as a strategy of defense against the incursion of the logging industry.

In 1974, Poloamazonia’s Amazon Development Plan II (Plano de Desenvolvimento da Amazonia II, PDAMII) specifically designated the Tapajós River basin as a “growth pole” for the timber industry, and in the 1980s the federal government began to subsidize extraction of “madeira pesada” (hard wood, also “madeira de lei”) more commonly located inland in the terra firme, to meet growing demand in international markets (Browder 1987). Taking advantage of the subsidies, and of Incra’s willingness to assign them land rights for legal logging, timber companies Amazonex Exportadora Ltda. and Santa Isabel Agroflorestal Ltda began logging in the terra firme of what is today the Tapajós-Arapuins Resex.

Because this land was already inhabited by thousands of people in nearly 100 communities, the companies engaged in forms of negotiation and manipulation, still common today within the logging industry, in order to access land (Leroy 1991). That is, alongside spreading misinformation, surreptitious land occupation, and small bribes, they entered into a series of agreements with several communities, granting the companies access to land in the terra firme (remaining 13.4 km from river margins, Ioris 2011) in exchange for land rights for the existing communities along the rivers, for work in logging companies, for small cash payments and other amenities.96

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95 The area had been first opened to logging by an FAO program in the 1950s. Earlier timber exploration for the less valuable “madeira leves” (light wood) occurred primarily along the river banks.

96 This meant assigning land rights to small farmers so that loggers could attain rights to the remaining land. INCRA and the logging companies worked together to demarcate small farmers land in an extremely circumscribed way. While communities lived along the river for access to water and fish, most of their most important living spaces are deep in the forest, what they usually call the centro (center), areas that were not titled to them, but to the logger.
“Community” both in name, and in organizational structure, was heavily influenced by the work of the Catholic Church’s radical liberation theologists, who were, regionally and nationally, key organizers in the anti-authoritarian struggle against the military dictatorship, specifically in the struggle to stop expulsion of rural people from their lands and to demand land reform. Beginning in the late 1960s, the progressive Church sectors (and importantly the Pastoral Land Commission or CPT, still a key mediator organization for these movements today) began organizing rural people across the country into Ecclesiastical Base Communities (CEBs) (Azevedo 2004; Houtzager 2001). In the Tapajós-Arapiuns-Maró this community organization coincided with the geographical re-location/establishment of many regional community bases from the terra firme to the river margins. The word “community” itself became a very particular referent to a common identity with embedded notions of common rights to land and resources (Lima 1999).97

By the early 1990s the logging companies were disregarding their agreements not to log on community-held land. The communities living along the Tapájos and Arapiuns Rivers found their territories increasingly circumscribed to “their house, their yard, and one or two hectares of useless land” (Leroy, 116). Articulated through the newly established Rural Workers’ Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais, STR), they began to mobilize against loggers and INCRA engaging tactics that would become common practices – making demands through demonstrations at government agencies and demarcating their territorial boundaries with picos or lines cut through the forest.

97 Other words used to reference communities but that are more descriptive and less political include povoados (town), localidade (locality).
Seu Raimundo of *Gleba Nova Olinda* explained:

…. In that time was when the union first said that we should begin to demarcate our communities, and they asked us where our community [Novo Lugar] ended and Cachoeira [neighboring community] began, but we did not have a boundary like that and so we met – the two communities met – and decided that it should be at the Arraia [igarapé] that went to Cachimbo they made a division [a pico] at and they said that they were going to demarcate all of this and that it would be our land, on this side of the *pico* would be ours and that they would help us to negotiate with INCRA to get title, collective title…

The simple act of cutting *picos* to defend land against appropriation also marked a conceptual shift from conceiving their territory as consisting of abundant land, as an area without fixed borders or frontiers, as containing multiple, potentially overlapping collective areas, and as something that could shift from one place to another, to defining it as a fixed, exclusive area. This counter-strategy of land demarcation did not, however, indicate a mere acceptance of the loggers’ terms or territorial framework. Rather, it explicitly sought to avoid commodification of land and to maintain many of their existing territorial practices (e.g. collective use areas, shifting cultivation and home sites, etc.) within a more fixed, defined area through collective titling.

*The Rural Workers’ Union*

Through this struggle, the Rural Workers Unions became a key mediator for the rural regional communities and the communities became a key site for the unions. Originally, Rural Workers’ Unions were founded as para-statal institutions, part of the corporatist, officially sanctioned labor bureaucracy under the military dictatorship. The STR Santarém, in particular, was originally formed in 1972 by local oligarchs linked to CONTAG (the national agricultural worker federation and later the central organization...
in the syndical movement), who used clientalistic social welfare program as incentive to attract all local “rural workers” – be they, in the Amazon the traditional or neo-
*campones* - to join (the union today continues to be the purveyor of social benefits including retirement etc.).

The progressive elements of the Catholic Church, community, and those involved in the early formation of the Workers’ Party, however, recognized the unions as viable institutional bases from which to organize with rural people. As a result, early struggles within the rural union apparatuses aimed to transform the unions into representative, worker-controlled (rather than state or elite-controlled) organizations. The dramatic and historic struggle liberate the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union from clientalist control was largely considered one of the most successful of these struggles for the (then) “new unionism” in the countryside (Leroy 1991 provides an excellent and detailed account of these events. (Houtzager 2001; See also Schwartzman et al. 2010).

In the interest of building a movement adequate to face the existing threat of the expansion of extractive industries and the corresponding land takeovers by southern developers, ranchers, and national and international corporations, practices-in-common (*agricultura familiar*) became an intentional, strategic, objective category around which to construct a political category, the “rural workers,” as a class (at times synonymous with, at times replacing “campones”). Nationwide, “rural worker” became a political category that broadly included all rural poor (and thus, by this logic, oppressed) people and placed them in contradistinction to the wealthy landowners (*latifundio*), commercial investors, and the military government (Leroy 1991; Petit 1996; Houtzager 2001). The

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98 In Amazonia, the Rural Workers’ Unions were deeply involved in party and electoral politics and key to establishing the Workers Party (PT) in the region (Petit 1996).
CEBs became key sites, throughout the democratic transition and afterward, where the church, working largely through the CPT, and the progressive factions of the Rural Workers’ Unions focused their efforts to unite the peasant populations under the banner of “rural worker” in a “struggle for land” (and thus for the building of the Workers’ Party [Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT] in the north). As one former union and party organizer put it, rural communities were key sites for organizing, “because our work was based in the philosophy that to organize the people we had to be inside him, live with him, feel what he feels…we would defend the idea that no one teaches nobody else (ninguém conscientiza ninguém), people build their own consciousness participating in the process of building a new society.”

Because much of the land tenure conflict in Amazônia was different than the large landholder/landless peasant conflict so common in Brazil, the Rural Workers’ Unions in the North (the “north” of Brazil is the Amazon) had to develop different demands and strategies. Rather than seeking an Agrarian Reform based in the expropriation and redistribution of large landholdings, the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union, and the rural workers unions in Amazonia more generally, focused on organizing against displacement and for secure access to land (e.g. a struggle for land regularization) through the establishment of property rights – either individual or collective for people that already held land in order to avoid or stop expropriation. Through its work accompanying and facilitating regional peoples’ struggles for land, the union was thus established as a key ally, key strategy, and in fact a key identity – sindicalista. As one interviewee who had
fought for land rights in what is now the Tapajós-Arapuins through the union during the tumultuous 1980s and 1990s explained, “from that time on, we were all sindicalistas.”

Across the Amazon, the Rural Workers’ Union was quickly standardized as a form of rural political organization (even Chico Mendes was a union leader). The struggle for land regularization popularized by the unions in the 1970s, 80s and into the 1990s adapted the broader struggle for land to a particularly Amazonian context and in many cases was very successful at attaining land rights, as well as instrumental in mediating government services, and the extension of credit to rural workers (FNO and later PRONAF). Their legal argument for land regularization remained based in the Land Statute of 1964, itself, based in the labor theory of value/property, or “land to the tiller.”

This organizing enacted a sort of homogenization of different existing forms of organization across very different types of rural peoples (Leroy 1991; de Paula and da Silva 2008). This homogenization would give rise to new tensions.

**Becoming Environmental Subjects**

“There is no Defense of the Forest without the People of the Forest” – Chico Mendes

We were surprised at this time with the arrival of new people there [in their villages]. Anthropologist, biologists, geologists, any kind of “ologist” you can think of started arriving calling us “ecologists” and “environmentalists.” They came and said, “Here are the greatest ecologists in the world” and I asked Chico, what is this thing, ecology? And so we asked them to explain. They explained that there is a polar ice cap, I don’t know where, and it was dissolving and the ocean was going to rise 8-9 meters. And we said, but we live far from the ocean, so what does that matter to us? And they said that there is a layer around the earth called the ozone layer. It is like a curtain, like what we use to keep out mosquitos when we sleep in our hammocks, and this curtain of ozone was breaking and if the rays of the sun hit people’s skin, mostly white people, it would cause cancer. And we said, but we aren’t white and we don’t work in the sun. And so they gave us

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99 The definitive book on the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union, *Uma Chama na Amazonia* by Pierre Leroy has a chapter title that is a very similar quote “o sindicato é nós,” or “the union is us,” meant to capture the argument and sentiment of the time that the union quite literally embodied the people.
another explanation. They said that the forest was important and that they did not want to take our land (colocações) – that is, they didn’t want to at that time – and they wanted to keep the forest standing, and they wanted to assist us with education and health, and so we said, ok, that’s good, let’s have a partnership and so we made one, a partnership of a struggle that was very historic.

--Osmarino Amâncio

In the late 1980s taking advantage of attention from international environmentalists the rubber tappers in the western Amazonian state of Acre, famously recast a struggle for land organized as part of the rural labor movement, into one for conservation (which, they argued, would be achieved by granting territorial rights to forest peoples). On a national and international level, they forged an uneasy but strategic alliance with the international environmental community, who could bring international pressure to bear on the Brazilian government in favor of their struggle (Allegretti 1990; Almeida 2002). Externally, they were celebrated as “environmentalists,” internally they developed what they called an “ecosocialism,” that is, “joining the struggle against devastation [of the forest] with a struggle against exploitation and capitalism” (Porto Gonçalves 2010; Amâncio, 2011).

The rubber tappers formed their own representative organization (the National Rubber Tappers’ Council, CNS) and proposed a new form of conservation unit, the Extractive Reserve. As conceived by the rubber tappers, this conservation unit challenged assumptions regarding the separation between people and nature, by arguing (and demonstrating) that nature would only be “conserved” by protecting the existing practices of people whose lives were deeply intertwined with and, in fact, inextricable from it. Logistically, the reserve model would create usufruct rights to families’ houses and collection areas and hold the larger forest area in common. It also innovated the
relationship between society and the state in that formal property ownership would stay with the federal government, but autonomous governance of their territory would stay with the people. In practice, the PAEex (Agro-extractive settlement project, which were established first) and ultimately (and shortly after Chico Mendes’ death) the Extractive reserve (Reserva Extractivista, RESEX) was established a legal category through dialogue between social science researchers, social mediator organizations (union, CPT), and social movement leaders, many of whom were part of the leadership of political parties of the left, namely the workers’ party (Hecht and Cockburn 2011; Porto Gonçalves 2001; Esterci 2002; Hochstetler and Keck 2007).

At this time “traditional populations” (populações tradiciones) became an object of policy as a result of the various struggles of the “people of the forest” across Amazonia and nationally, especially the indigenous and quilombola struggles for full recognition. Legal recognition of these different peoples carried with it different, specific forms of land rights that were based in their different modalities of holding land and using resources. In 1992, the federal government created an agency specifically to deal with traditional people’s issues, the National Center for the Sustainable Development of Traditional People (Centro Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sustentado das Populações Tradicionais, CNPT) (Portaria 22 de 10 Feb 1992), launched as a centerpiece of the Rio Earth Summit, institutionalizing the link between environmentalists and local people.

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100 Struggles by indigenous people, quilombolas, rubber tappers, babaçu breakers and a long list of others resulted in recognition for many of these different groups in the Constitution of 1988. For a much more substantive review of this political and legal history and its contemporary implications see, for example, Almeida 2006; French 2003; French 2009; Almeida 2011, among others.

101 CNPT was a predecessor of the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation, which today governs traditional territory and was created and initially funded under PPG7.
The subsequent proliferation of what Chico Mendes called “agrarian reform for rubber tappers” and what other authors have called the “other agrarian reform” (Little 2002), or “Amazonian Agrarian Reform” (Esterci and Schweickardt 2010), meant that the granting of collective land rights to “traditional” people who would protect the environment would become a key part of the dominant ordering logic of the region. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, over 40 federal extractive reserves encompassing millions of hectares of land were established in the Legal Amazon.\textsuperscript{102}

The people of the Arapiuns region also engaged in traditional livelihood strategies and, in 1996, the Rural Workers’ Union, Grupo em Defesa da Amazona,\textsuperscript{103} the National Rubber Tappers’ Council and others supported the people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns region in re-articulating their struggle for land rights as “traditional populations” and petitioning the government for an extractive reserve. Just over one year later (an extremely short turn-around time) the federal government signed the Tapajós-Arapiuns Resex into law with an area of over 647 thousand hectares, home to over 20,000 people in 67 communities. The reserve area explicitly \textit{excluded} the Pará State-held area west of the Maró River, Gleba Nova Olinda and its 14 communities, who had formed part of the struggle since its initiation, who were linked, via community (e.g. several communities were literally cut down the middle by the reserve boundary), affinity, and kinship to the people of the area that was now the Resex and thus subject to different protections, rights, rights,

\textsuperscript{102} For a list of extractive reserves, their sizes and dates of creation, see http://uc.socioambiental.org/uso-sustentável/reserva-extrativista. The rate of Extractive Reserves created has slowed since approximately 2006.

\textsuperscript{103} GDA (Group in Defense of the Amazon) is a Santarém NGO founded in the late 1970s by several Franciscan Friars, along with some regional inhabitants some of whom would become key in the Indigenous movement.
and rules of governance. With the creation of the RESEX, the logging companies operating in the area almost immediately found their “sustainable management plans” cancelled and their activities monitored. To get around this problem, they simply crossed the Maró River into Gleba Nova Olinda.

**Traditional Territories**

With the emergence of mobilizations for “traditionally occupied land” (*terras tradicionalmente ocupadas*), we began to see – in movements’ discourse, scholarly analyses, and in the actual content of the claims made - new elements, such as ethnicity, ecology, and collective practices, as opposed to strictly productive claims, as the basis for what are explicitly territorial claims (made by explicitly territorial subjects). Specifically, on the Arapiuns, the initial mobilization through the union and in defense of community lands had strengthened organization within and across communities, resulted in an articulation of community territories and tactics for their defense, and forged political subjects strongly associated with the unions.104 The re-articulation of the movement in the mobilization for the Resex as one of traditional people both reimagined and specified territorial rights in a way that more explicitly mapped onto their own particular ways of inhabiting and producing territory. That is, rather than mobilizing together against loggers and for their own individual land rights based in claims to areas that they use (e.g. home sites and *roças*), they created a form of collective rights, governed by an assembly

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104 For example, Teresinha from the community of São Pedro explained, “We were here, struggling against the loggers, who were taking our land, and the struggle was very difficult (*pesado*) and we though that it was only us….and then we went to the union and we met people from the Tapajós and they were struggling with the same loggers, the same people, Amazonex, and we were not alone, no, we were stronger together.”
of its residents, and organized generally according to their relationships with one another and with nature.

Becoming traditional (to appropriate a trope from Jan French’s 2009 book on identity and land claims in the Brazilian northeast), meant rejecting the racist, prevailing narrative of regional people that cast them as atomized, invisible, disappearing “caboclos,” a subject category that, again following French (2009), carries no legal rights of any kind and, for that matter, no territorial imaginary. It meant affirming and valorizing existing collective practices – community and intercommunity organization, livelihood practices, etc. – especially those relating to the use of natural resources, and re-classifying them as environmental. Further, in the process of the struggle for that territory, (e.g. territorialization) the collective, territorial subject itself – its spaces, its networks – is strengthened and transformed. Claiming the Resex meant establishing new collective practices by organizing first into a movement for the Resex (a process itself fraught with conflict and negotiation) and then into Resex-wide assembly to govern the area, specifying and formalizing territorial organization (family areas, community common lands, Resex common lands, reserve areas). Through this process of mobilizing to make this claim, the traditional people of the Tapajós-Arapuins (or at least those of them who lived within the boundaries of the reserve) articulated themselves as collective and territorial subjects, strongly associated with the Resex territory and with a broader movement of traditional, extractivist people.

These territorializing processes simultaneously posit a different conception of territory (from that of the state). Territories produced through these struggles, are not simply something determined and assigned arbitrarily from above (e.g. a subdivision of
state territory) – or at least, they are not that way as proposed by the movements. This is explicitly different from an agrarian reform that would have selected, subdivided, and delegated particular areas for them. Their existing forms of territorial organization were incompatible with such a model. The claim to the Resex – an expansive area that is much greater than simply home sites, farming areas, and community areas – and the claim to traditional territories more generally, posits territory as an expression of a specific, collective life (e.g. it is not the area necessary to produce farina, but to reproduce the society) and a claim made to protect this collective life in the face of conflict with loggers. Expressed in the demand for the Resex is the argument that overlapping territories (of loggers and traditional people) were destroying the traditional communities and thus what is at stake in this struggle for territory is not only a piece of land, but the very existence of a collective subject. Within the project to, we might say, deterritorialize the state-sanctioned territories of, in this case, logging, lies the potential for territorial struggle to disrupt, challenge, and intervene in the territoriality of the given order, the territoriality of “above.”

Such potential, especially as brought into a legal framework, is not without risks and drawbacks. Casting themselves as environmental subjects, gave traditional people a greater claim to legal and popular legitimacy, but also limited their abilities to determine the content of their territories. The process of linking collective claims to some relationship to conservation or sustainability also has, to a greater or lesser effect depending on the situation, the effect of ensnaring these people within the limitations of these the subject categories. For legal recognition to be implemented, subject categories

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105 This is not to say that Agrarian Reform through re-distribution is not potentially territorial. The MST and the work of Bernardo Maçano Fernandes have demonstrated that it most certainly can be. Rather, I would say that it is strategically, rather than inherently territorial.
are defined and given parameters, the locations and forms of territories specified, and their “management” institutionalized. As juridical mechanisms for this have been developed over the past two decades, in addition to legally linking a definition of certain types of traditional people to sustainability, these mechanisms have put the ultimate responsibility for recognizing traditional, and even self-determined indigenous people into the hands of government-employed social scientists. The National System of Units of Conservation SNUC established in 2001 transformed governance of extractive reserves into a technocratic exercise, moving it from the Resex associations comprised of inhabitants, into the hands of government technocrats who make and implement Resex rules with the “participation” of the people. Barretto (2004) and Ioris (2011), argue that this post-SNUC RESEX form is not a right to territory at all, rather it “allows” people to stay on their lands – a privilege reviewed and renewed every 20 years – that is contingent on people’s ability to be seen as “authentic” and “sustainable.” Subject to external evaluations to determine their suitability to such categories, the traditional people of the RESEXs are left in a relation of dependence and unequal power that neutralizes any of their territorial demands and subjects them to the rules (established with minimal “participation” in the management plan). Finally, and perhaps most important for the case of Gleba Nova Olinda, is that those “left out” of the Resex are excluded from rights, from land security, and ultimately, from being part of the territorial collective subject that was constituted during their struggle as an effect of reserve

106 Porto Gonçalves describes the National System of Units of Conservation, the law that accomplished the forms and institutionalization of such management, as the “second assassination of Chico Mendes” because it gave government technocrats and NGOs management control of the Resexs. Under SNUC, the reserves are governed by a council that composed of the reserve association (e.g. the people of the reserve), NGOs, and ICMBio, with a federal manager ultimately having the final say over reserve decisions. Further, the management plan, essentially the reserves master plan is a technical document, based in scientific research and a perception of sustainability that comes from the state and from ecological science. Reserve residents participate in making a “utilization plan,” one component of the management plan.
construction, which only recognizes those who live within a certain boundary as legitimate traditional people. Seu Genio explained, “When we found out that we had been left out [of the Resex] we couldn’t believe it, we thought, after all that, Damn! and now what? We are forgotten, ignored, we struggled together, and now here we are, on the outside, not only of the Resex, of the movement.”

**The Struggle for Gleba Nova Olinda**

In 1998, at the same time that the Tapajós-Arapuãns Resex was being created, the new national development plan “Forward Brazil” was re-igniting dreams of modernization and wealth through extractive resource development across the country. New developers, with capital for investment in soy agriculture and timber extraction (which, like ranching and logging, often work in tandem), traveled the BR-163 to Santarém and began to establish themselves through the region taking, buying, and claiming land.

This time, when the timber companies moved into *Gleba Nova Olinda*, they did not first negotiate with regional inhabitants. Signs and wooden stakes with painted tops laid out in lines through the forest started appearing, marking out their claims. The signs had names and permit numbers on them. They were posted along newly cut roads. Although the communities of *Gleba Nova Olinda* had not staked out all of their own forest claims with *picos*, this was not unclaimed land. Much the forest was crossed by a series of unmarked collective territories. Possession of familial plots both within and outside of the community boundaries (the *centros*) were, marked, if at all, by the end of a row of crops or the overgrowth of a field used previously and then left fallow. More distant forests used by multiple communities contained overlapping claims. This overlap
was not always without conflict, but there was a structure for their mediation in community assemblies. These conflicts never neared the degree of intensity that would be generated by the arrival of extractive industry.

By now familiar with the process of making claims on the state, Gleba Nova Olinda’s residents filed a denunciation with the Ministério Publico and IBAMA. In 2003 Ibama conducted an enforcement operation, where they encountered COOEPA, the consortium of 50 logging and soy businesses from the southern states of Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Mato Grosso called COOEPA had established itself in Gleba Nova Olinda and that was discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. As discussed, COOEPA, along with several other logging companies had taken over significant portions of land in the Gleba through both legal and illegal methods, had staked out management plans, and were logging, primarily selective logging, across indigenous and traditional territories

Exclusion from the Tapajós-Arapíuns Resex had dealt a significant blow to the movement for collective rights in Gleba Nova Olinda. The practices-in-common around which the syndicalistas constructed the notion of a shared identity were proving insufficient to hold together a political struggle, and previous strategies were doing little to build a movement or to intervene in exploitation. At a loss for what to do, and with increasing pressure from loggers, relations between and within communities began to fracture. “After we were left out of the Resex the union came and helped us demarcate our communities again, to cut picos around the communities. The first time, we went

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107 SEMA, notorious for its loyalties to the logging industry as well as for its corruption, began handing out management plans to those who paid the standard bribe. As one logger interviewed put it “you don’t get a permit for less than $10 reais per hectare. It is simple you don’t pay, you don’t work” (management plans in GNO tend to be tens or hundreds of thousands of hectares).
with everyone but *Fe em Deus* (one community), but already on the second trip, Aruã didn’t come, so we lost already them [to the loggers].”

COOEP A and the other logging operations had made the usual promises - occasional work, gas-powered motors for energy, and financial support for future development projects (such as dams to generate energy, etc.). In exchange, they wanted forest access, road construction permission and space inside of communities to build loading docks to transfer timber from trucks to barges. They also proposed that the communities divide their land into individual lots, get property rights to them and sell them to the cooperative. Attaining private property rights to individual lots would also “liberate” the Gleba’s remaining land (e.g. the common lands) for purchase by the Cooperative from the state. Some families and some entire communities (Fé em Deus, Aruã, some people from Vista Alegre, some in Prainha, for example) accepted the payments, and began to pursue private property rights, even flying to Belém (paid for by the logging companies) to make the case for private property to ITERPA.108 Tensions ran high and at times became violent between communities and even between families (pro and anti-logging). Anti-logging community leaders have been kidnapped and beaten, homes set on fire with families sleeping inside, and tense armed standoffs between loggers and communities demarcating their lands deep in the forest.

“You start offering money and people lose their heads,” Seu Francisco, and older resident and former president of *Novo Lugar* in Gleba Nova Olinda. They forget their

108 This strategy was quite effective. When I interviewed Jose Benatti, then president of ITERPA, he referred to this meeting several times in order to argue that many communities of *Gleba Nova Olinda* wanted property rights.
friends, their own mother for an electric motor. They think, if Prainha has an electric motor, why shouldn’t we, it is only fair. They think that is justice. Imagine that.”

“Eu sou indígena. Nos somos indígenas.” (I am indigenous. We are indigenous)

As the Resex was established, people immediately began to reckon with the fact that its territory was not the same as theirs, or in other words, did not map on to their own territoriality, (not the least of which was because it excluded those living in Gleba Nova Olinda). Simultaneously, there was increased tension and conflict with loggers, the arrival of soy interests, and the breakdown of inter-group alliances that accompanies attacks on their social structure through industry bribes, separation of the movement by partial recognition (e.g. demobilization through the establishment of the Resex). In this context, several hundred communities and several thousand people across the region began a movement to affirm their indigenous heritage and cultivate their indigenous identities, eviscerated during a long and violent history of colonization and development in the region. Territorialization is a key constituent process (Oliveira et al. 1998; Oliveira 1998), and as a result, we see some shifts in the conceptualization of territory.

The 2nd cacique (like “chief”) of the Novo Lugar aldeia in Gleba Nova Olinda and part of the Borarí ethnic group tells the story birth of the movement, a story that I heard repeated in several interviews:

Pajé (medicine man) Laurelino, he always said, “I am indigenous and I am not ashamed of this.” He identified himself [as indigenous] “I am indigenous, here my people are indigenous. We are Mundurucu.”109 And that was the time, that Pajé Laurenino, he died, you know, he died to

109 Other ethnic groups that would form part of the indigenous movement are Arapium, Tapajó, Jaraki, Munduruku, Arara-Vermelha, Apiaka, Tapuia, Tupinambá, Borari, Maitapú, Cara Preta, and Camaruara (See Bolano 2011). The approximate number of indigenous people in the region is estimated at approximately 5000 people.
resurrect [ressurgir] many people, with his death. What it means for us is that he isn’t dead because it was only with coming together at his death that many people started to identify themselves as indigenous. And at that time Florencio\textsuperscript{110} was already saying “in the Constitution there are rights for indigenous people” and so, we decided to study. We began to have encounters (encontros), seminars, and we organized a group, the Indigenous Consciousness Group (CGI), and we worked with the consciousness of the people, and would go to communities and ask people if they were indigenous…Some people said, ‘I am not, but my grandmother says that she is an Indian’, or other times, ‘I am an Indian, but I don’t identify as one because I am discriminated against, very discriminated against.’ And there were also some people that said no, I am not indigenous… And then more and more people said, said “yes, I am indigenous. We are indigenous, and we are not ashamed of this” At and so, shoot, that was how the movement began, and we founded CITA (the indigenous council of the Tapajós-Arapiuns), and today there it is, we have 10 years of this struggle, and [more] really because before CITA, there was CGI...

Here we see the articulation of indigeneity as an intentional, collective project to (re)produce new subjects capable of struggling. It is an affirmative project that rejects former structures that inhibited its potential (“I am discriminated against” to “we are not ashamed of this”) and creates new organizational forms to work throughout the movement creating consistency.

Most interviewees trace the precise moment of the birth of the movement to a meeting, in 1998 (shortly after the Resex was created), in the aldeia of Taquara, on the right margin of the Tapajós River where multiple aldeias composed a letter for FUNAI asserting their indigenous identity.\textsuperscript{111} That meeting, was followed by a series of

\textsuperscript{110} Florencio Vaz is a Franciscan priest from one of the indigenous communities on the Tapajós who was instrumental in movement formation, a founder of CGI and would go on to write a doctoral dissertation on the indigenous people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns.

\textsuperscript{111} Aldeia is the Portuguese word used to identify and indigenous settlement and is the name that the people of the Tapajós-Arapiuns region use to designated indigenous villages as one of they key ways that they mark their difference from non-indigenous communities. In 2001 and 2003 (the team dispatched to Gleba Nova Olinda was in 2003), FUNAI sent research teams to initiate the identification procedures to
meetings, workshops, conversations and assemblies across the region, with encontros happening every two years. The regional indigenous movement grew quickly and gained political force. They created their own representative organization called the Indigenous Council for the Tapajós-Arapiuns (Conselho Indigena do Tapajós-Arapiuns) (which, according to interviews was the start of now on-going tensions with the Rural Workers’ Union), that represents 38 communities across the region, and whose designated leadership (a council of 6 people whose coordinator position rotate between aldeias from the Tapajós and Arapiuns/Maró and now includes new communities from the Terra Firme near Santarém), is accountable to a generally assembly, held yearly. Through CITA, the various indigenous groups organized their campaigns for recognition and for demarcation of their indigenous territories.

This particular form of indigenous mobilization – the revitalization of indigenous identity among people and in places where it has been obliterated – is variously referred to in the anthropological literature as ethnogênesis (Hill 1996; Oliveira 1998; Bartolomé 2006), ethnic revival, ethnic resurgence (Ramos 2003), or ethnic emergence (Viveiros de Castro 2006) and among the indigenous people themselves as “resistance ethnicity” or “resistant Indians” (the re-claiming of the word “indio” as a source of pride as opposed to a racist term figures centrally within indigenous discourse). In the lower Amazon region, the Cabanagem uprising in 1835-1840 that was ultimately crushed by the national army determine their territories and in 2004 they announced that the lands would be included for demarcation in a project for indigenous land demarcation in the Amazon called the Projecto de Protecção às Populações e Terras Indígenas na Amazônia Legal. In 2006, CITA was informed that demarcation of the regional indigenous territories had been cancelled (they alleged that there were inconsistencies in CITA’s listing of regional indigenous groups and further field investigation would be needed. 11 years later, only one of the indigenous territories have been demarcated (Bragança).
was followed by an even more destructive period if indigenous dispersal – indigenous people were chased from their lands, forced into work camps, “assimilated” and eventually subject to a new system of domination in the aviamento labor system, leaving “a trail of mutilated identities across the Amazon” (Ramos 2003, 416), especially in Pará, where most of the fighting, and the autonomous government, had occurred. Given that the Cabanagem was the biggest, bloodiest, and most successful rebellion in Brazilian history, its near-complete absence from the national historical narrative is evidence of the complete annihilation of its protagonists.¹¹² The indigenous movement of the Tapajós-Arapiuns explicitly links itself to Cabanagem, not necessarily through bloodlines, but as inheritors of that spirit of resistance. On the beach at São Pedro, people were constantly informing visitors and new arrivals that the rebellion was the “largest [in the region] since Cabanagem.”

While the wide range of debates surrounding indigenous and ethnic recognition in Brazil are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I’d like to draw attention to what I think are the key elements of the Borarí’s claims for thinking about effective strategies of resistance today and to what lays the groundwork for the emergence of the Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River. First, while claims of indigeneity may always have some link to a pre-colombian past (Viveiros de Castro 2006), the claims of the resurgent indigenous movements, and the Tapajós-Arapiuns movement in particular, is not exactly autochtonous. Rather, these claims are actually based on the notion of a break with the past – violent repression caused the cultural suppression and territorial dispersion of indigenous communities. Thus, unlike many other indigenous

¹¹² If it were popularly recognized as a historical moment, there would be a question of righting historical wrongs on the table – its invisibility makes the issue of these people also invisible.
people, they cannot base their claims on a linear relationship to a past tradition – they do not “still” speak a language or “still” practice shamanistic rituals – or continuous occupation of a particular space – they do not “still” inhabit their historical territory, or even the same particular land as they did, in this case, 60 years ago. Rather, they are constantly and consciously redefining the definition and understanding of an “authentic” indigenous identity as one that is actively forged in the present, or more profoundly, challenging the very notion of authenticity.\footnote{Even the Maró’s indigenous people mark a difference between themselves and some of the “indios puros” (pure Indians) who live upstream. They would never, however, consider themselves to be less indigenous than the “indios puros;” their indigenous identity simply has a different genealogy.}

While claims to land may be the “literal landmark” (Ramos 2003) of indigenous identity and an assumed correlate, it is not simply a desire for land rights that forms the basis for indigenous claims. In fact, in the Tapajós – Arapiuns region, the vast majority of these indigenous communities \textit{already} had land rights in the form of the RESEX, or, on the left margin of the Tapajós, in the FLONA, but primary demand of the movement was for territory. Territory, for the indigenous resistance movement, then, is not simply land (See also French 2009); it is the material expression of the social relations forged in the process of the struggle for self-determination. Especially because there is not some pre-given cultural referent for resurgent indigenous claims, territorialization, or the process of taking hold of that territory is \textit{the primary constituent process of subject formation.} This process of territorialization, has two components. On the one hand, collective memory, spaces of resistance, and socio-cultural practices – from learning indigenous language, arts, and ritual, to the community practices of assembly, religious festivals, and soccer, to subsistence farming, hunting and fishing, and medicinal practices – are spatial practices (Lefebvre 1991), cultivated in common. And on the other hand, it is through the struggle
for territory – that is where there is a shared point of antagonism and a process of struggle around it - that relationships within and across communities (e.g. the collective) are built and strengthened, that the collective, territorial subject emerges. In Gleba Nova Olinda, the decisions to make this claim were not uncontroversial within the indigenous communities (because of normative racialized pre-conceptions about what it means to be indigenous, fears of having to “return” to some form of idealized past way of living, because some communities and families were working with loggers etc.). Through long conversations and debates as well as through the processes of (re)constructing their indigenous practices together on their lands, and also in opposition to the process of territorial takeover by developers, that the Borarí communities constituted themselves as a collective subject of resistance.114

In other words, a territory, following Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, is both a “convention” and a “confrontation.” It is a convention in that it is space created through the everyday practices of collective subjects who, producing and inscribing it with their particular social relations, themselves produced in that process of “geographing”.115 It is

114 A key factor, for example was in the literal demarcation of their territory. As a counter-offensive against the increasing claims to land by COOEPa and their supporters in other communities within Gleba Nova Olinda, the three indigenous communities there mobilized a large group of people to do an auto-demarcation of their lands. This process involved discussions amongst the communities regarding the space that they needed for their own reproduction (including future reproduction and the mobile livelihood strategies that they engage in), and, it is important to note, that this was not meant as a definitive boundary, but an assessment of the extent of their territory at that moment, subject, according to interviewees, to continual negotiation and reflection amongst the communities. During this demarcation, they encountered a pico that had been opened by COOEPa, as part of a management plan that was approved by SECTAM in 2007 that passed through the center of their communities. This demarcation also initiated a conflict with the community of Fé em Deus, affiliated with the loggers, who was also laying claim to an area called Beiju-Açu, the former site of the community now known as Novo Lugar.

115 Vivieros de Castro (2006) argues that indigenous territoriality is necessarily collective. “There is not an indigenous community because there is a collective of indigenous individuals, there are indigenous individuals because there is an indigenous community.”
a “confrontation” in the sense that in inscribing space with the order of these particular, collective social relations, it threatens other (dominant) order that is, in this case, dependent on limiting the spatial extent of their claims, and commodifying their resources (be it for conservation or development).

That is not to say that multiple territorialities (or, following Haesbaert 2004 multi-territoriality) cannot and do not exist within the same space, or even, following Reyes and Kaufman (2011), within the same subject. In fact, it is precisely the existence of such multi-territoriality that makes the resurgent indigenous movement so important for understanding what type of resistance strategies are adequate to the given moment where there are no pure spaces external to relations of capital and state. That is, resurgent indigenism does the work of (re)creating political subjects, from people whose histories are infinitely complex, who have deployed multiple identities, shifting political and economic allegiances and engage in an immense variety of livelihood practices (not only their “traditional” practices, but also negotiating with loggers, waged labor, strategically commodifying their own externally valorized cultural processes). That is, they are not remnants of pre-capitalism, not necessarily ideal environmental subjects, nor mere victims of repression and development (although their existing practices may contain elements of some of these, and a geographical and social condition of marginality may have been key to their ongoing cultivation). To be, or rather, to become (de Castro) indigenous is not a question of re-locating a pre-existing subjective category of difference, rather it is a dynamic process of differentiation. As such, indigeneity in this case is not a simple question of culture, it is a question of politics – of differentiating the collective from a given identity in order to create the conditions for self-determination.
This is an approach to subject-making, is central to MDVCA’s strategy to challenge the
given order-of-things.

The Movement in Defense of Life and Culture on the Arapiuns River (Movimento em
Defesa da Vida e Cultura do Rio Arapiuns MDVCA)
The power of the territorial identity categories and ordering of the state is
expressed in myriad ways, not the least of which is in academic representations. In the
few published papers on the movements for regional land rights and the indigenous
Olinda barely makes an appearance. In fact, it does not even appear on their maps of
indigenous communities in the region. It is remarkable, then, or perhaps logical, that the
struggle for the Gleba would be the struggle that would galvanize the entire region.

In the decade of indigenous struggle, the state created an agrarian reform
settlement for traditional people (Paex Lago Grande, created in 2005), contiguous to
Gleba Nova Olinda but again excluding it. Logging rates rose despite IBAMA’s 2003
enforcement operation. Gleba Nova Olinda’s the three contiguous *aldeais*, Novo Lugar,
Cachoera do Maró, and São José III, decided that rather than wait for FUNAI’s
recognition, they would demarcate their own territory and began a process of auto-
demarcation that led to a stand-off in the forest with loggers and subsequently intensified
threats of violence. Ultimately, several of the indigenous leaders were put into the federal
government’s protection program and were guarded by police agents whenever they
traveled to Santarém.

The indigenous movement generated tensions between indigenous and non-
indigenous people. These tensions have a basis in the history of racism against
indigenous people, deeply internalized even among regional peoples, and exacerbated by
a concerted media campaign against the “false Indians.” This campaign, propagated for years within local and state media outlets, went national during the MDVCA encampment, with articles challenging the Borari indigeneity appearing in local and state-level media outlets, and even in the national weekly magazine *Veja* (January 5, 2010). A secondary, but key point of conflict was that both indigenous and traditional people feared that the others’ territorial claims would threaten their own because they inhabited a shared territory. Although they negotiated this conflict through a series of meetings in the Resex Tapajós-Arapians in the early 2000s, tensions and concerns remained (as indicated by a number of interviews). The re-subjectification that came with making particular land claims in terms legible to the state had ultimately generated conflict that weakened a movement that had previously acted together.

116 The “authenticity” of clearly autochthonous indigenous groups like the Yanomami or the Kayapó might be clear to a larger public, but all sorts of accusations of “non-indian-ness” are hurled at the indigenous groups that do not hold the stereotypical markers of indigeneity—language, dress (or as the press likes to claim, no dress. Pure Indians have been portrayed in Santarém’s media as those who like to run naked through the forest). People associated with the loggers and soy farmers in Gleba Nova Olinda have sought to discredit the claims of the Borari people, kidnapped and beaten their spokespeople, homes set on fire with families sleeping inside, generally terrorized their communities and there have been tense armed standoffs between loggers and a group of Borari demarcating their territory. Other challenges to their identity have come from a ‘researcher’ (with no degree or research employment) named Inácio Régis who works for right wing federal deputy Joaquim Lira Maia (DEM) and wrote a piece challenging the ‘DNA’ of Dadá, the second cacique of one of the Gleba Olinda Communities. Not only is his story completely fabricated, based on all of the interviews that I and other anthropologists have done, but ‘DNA’ is not a legal basis for determining ethnic identity. As part of an effort to discredit the MDVCA, the national weekly magazine *Veja* also challenged the ‘indigenousness’ of the Borari people in an article (Coutinho 2009) alleging anthropologists were facilitating the takeover of Brazilian territory by Quilombola and indigenous people. Other challenges in local media have been based on Régis’ claim or have come from the Rondonbel loggers. Such allegations, and tradition of anti-indigenous racism that they draw on and cultivate are not without effects for the movement. As a consequence of that article, one Borari leader named in the *Veja* article was assaulted and badly beaten in Santarém. This media also exacerbates existing tensions among indigenous and traditional Arapiuns residents that I witnessed and discussed with people in interviews. "Currents of anti-indigenous sentiment is related in part to the earlier destruction of indigenous culture, exacerbated by unequal distribution of government resources among these communities (indigenous people receive more government benefits). The tension is also a function of the regional struggle for land rights within the categories given by the state, as some twenty indigenous communities seeking demarcation as indigenous are located within the Tapajós-Arapians and approximately eight such then in the PAEX Lago Grande, and many people are concerned that recognition of indigenous territory threatens the future security of their own land claims."
Gleba Nova Olinda is on state, not federal, land (although indigenous demarcation remains under the purview of the federal government) and the election in 2006 of a Workers’ Party governor, along with the appointment of José Benatt, a law professor and IPAM (regional NGO) researcher who has written extensively on the traditional peoples’ territorial rights, to be president of the state land agency Iterpa, and a shift in the FUNAI leadership in 2007,117 re-invigorated hope for negotiations in the Gleba on the part of movements. Conflict attracts NGO attention as well and a participatory mapping project initiated through a partnership between the STTR and a Santarém based NGO called the Health and Happiness Project (Projeto Saude & Alegria) created maps utilized as part of a series of negotiations among all of the regional communities and aldeias, including those in conflict, facilitated by the Rural Workers’ Union and the CPT, with all of the relevant government agencies participating (The Ministerio Publico, ITERPA, INCRA, IBAMA and SECTAM) for the “ordenamento” of Gleba Nova Olinda. They reached an agreement (discussed in Chapter Three) that divided the Gleba into traditional lands (PAExs) private property, Indigenous Territory, and an unspecified conservation area.

Despite this agreement, and despite a second research trip by FUNAI to begin the demarcation process of the Borarí territory in 2006, by 2009, none of the areas had been created legally. Even an aggressive campaign by the Santarém Ministerio Publico to force FUNAI move on the promised demarcation, including the publication of a letter accusing FUNAI of intentional foot-dragging, the demarcation was not published. During

117 Márcio Mera replaced Mércio Gomes. In publication in the Estadão in January of 2006, Gomes had suggested that the Federal Supreme Tribunal needed to define a “limit” for the increasingly “excessive” demands for more indigenous territories (Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 2006). This generated outrage among indigenous movements, but was also very much in line with the turn taken toward limiting and incorporating the territorial claims of social movements discussed in the previous chapter.
this same time, recall from Chapter Three, Gleba Nova Olinda was designated in the state Ecological Economic Zoning plan as an area for the expansion of extractive industry. In what appeared to be part of an effort to realize this, in 2009, Pará state passed its own state version of the Legal Land law and slated Gleba Nova Olinda and its contiguous Glebas (names here and perhaps map) to be the first areas regularized. Also in 2009, the traditional lands were finally legalized at 1/5 of the agreed upon size and the rate of timber leaving the Gleba, by all reports, escalated rather than diminished.

A second participatory mapping project 2008, again implemented through a partnership between PSA and the STTR and IDEFLOR with SEMA and ITERPA and funded (180,000 reais approximately $90k) by the Ford Foundation was meant to help communities develop management plans for harvesting timber and other “artisanal”, productive, sustainable projects under the new public forest concession law (the law that, among other things, opens protected areas to logging). Other than a report that mapped and inventoried the productive activities of the Gleba’s inhabitants, there was no outcome to this project. When I interviewed Benatti, the head of Pará’s land agency regarding the severe reduction in size to the traditional settlements, he used the maps created by IDEFLOR in this project to argue that the communities only “used” the land on the river margins, and thus any type of larger claim was simply their desire to be “latifundio.”

Thus, an indefinite postponement of indigenous recognition, tensions among indigenous and traditional people, violent threats and attacks on indigenous leaders, the continued exclusion of Gleba Nova Olinda from collective rights, the Gleba’s legal

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118 In the latter part of the 2000s, the STTR began to get significant funding from international NGOs and funders including Greenpeace and Ford and facilitate “development” projects. PSA has slowly and steadily been making inroads into the Arapiuns and the Gleba Nova Olinda by bringing funding for small projects, including participatory mapping, video project, internet projects, all which become property of PSA.
designation as an area of expansion for extractive industry, and the reduction of traditional land rights there as part of a move to make this possible, was the context in which communities of the entire region – not only from Gleba Olinda and not only Indigenous or traditional – mobilized to block the river and seize the barges of timber, and demand control over Gleba Nova Olinda in October of 2009. I have already summarized their MDVCA’s demands (regarding territorial control – land rights, ending extractivism, etc.), organization (both the pre-existing organization necessary and the new intensity of organization within the encampment itself), and tactics (demonstration, consciousness building, sequestering and burning wood, creating their own data and narrative through mapping, filing complaints through the ministerio public, and negotiating with government agencies, seeking support from communities and NGOs) and so I will not recount them again here. Rather, in this final section, I outline how MDVCA draws on key elements from prior struggles to innovate their strategies of resistance.

**FROM LAND TO TERRITORY**

The history of regional struggle has made MDVCA aware of the limitations of any form of government-granted land rights, including indigenous lands (*terra indigena*). Although indigenous lands carry more autonomy than an extractive reserve, in Brazil, indigenous land rights mean possession and usufruct rights to federal land, rather than full territorial control. On the one hand, MDVCA demands land rights – demarcation of specific indigenous and traditional land. On the other hand, they challenge state definitions of those territories in two substantive ways. First, they reject the category of “use” as a legitimate way to demarcate their land. MDVCA considers its territory to be
all of that land, not only where they farm, but that has symbolic relevance to them, that they may need in the future as they grow and move their communities (thus maintaining and re-invigorating a notion of territory that is not fixed), and that must be protected in order for them to continue to thrive – what we might call in scientific terms, an ecosystem. As such, and following from this, Gleba Nova Olinda is the territory that supports the life and culture of people whose day-to-day existence happens quite far from that geographical location and thus MDVCA is a movement comprised of people from across the Arapiuns. So it is not only that the Borari claim a larger space than a peasant who is claiming land for production might claim (although it is also that), but that MDVCA as constituted by people from the entire Arapiuns region, claims all of Gleba Nova Olinda as its territory.

This claim to territory stands in contrast to from decades of previous struggles that were framed as a struggle for land and the pursuit of property (even collective property). The idea of the right to land for those who work it, which has been so central to the struggle for land in much of Brazil (Wolford 2004c; Mançano Fernandes 2005), in the Amazon, where livelihood strategies are often only partially agricultural, this idea of land to the tiller has been used against movements to limit their land claims (e.g. recognizing only their fields as part of their settlement), as we saw in the arguments made by Benatti, head of Iterpa. In response, the demand for territory is a demand for control over an expanse of land that extends well beyond any particular area that is being used for economic reproduction (farming, hunting etc). It can thus be read as an argument against the idea of economic production as the defining factor in the struggle for ecological and social justice. Instead MDVCA is explicitly making a demand for the
reproduction of a way of life. That is, to the preservation of social and natural relationships that are inscribed in space. By proposing an alternative framework that values territory beyond its productive capacity, these movements reject these categories of political economy.

It would be incorrect to say the desire or demand for a particular way of life is not present in the struggle for land, because the rich history of this struggle is also certainly about the struggle for a particular way of life. Rather, I would argue that the demand for particular ways of life is not as clearly enunciated in the broadly constructed struggle for land (for those who work it) as it is in the multitude of different specific types of territorial claims that have emerged in Amazonia (qulombolas, babcu breakers, rubber tappers etc.).

When I say that MDVCA rejects the categories of political economy, or their place in the given order, it is not to say that they remain external, or unrelated to these categories (e.g. is simply non-state). In bringing together indigenous and traditional people to make a claim to an entire territory – that of the Arapiuns River Basin – on the one hand, they refuse the categories of state recognition (indigenous, traditional etc., and people being identified with the particular conservation area or agrarian reform settlement in which they live) that we see implemented through state ordering and that, as discussed above, had re-subjectifying effects that were at times divisive. At the same time that they unite indigenous and non-indigenous people into a movement to defend and celebrate life. However, they also simultaneously deploy these same categories in order to gain certain minimum control over a given area or moment (e.g. they are still trying to achieve traditional collective land rights, indigenous territory).
Not only do they use the categories of the state in order to re-position their own practices of territorialization, but they also utilize the more traditional forms of ritualized protest in order to enact new forms of protest. For example, in turning the union’s symbolic action into an act of concrete oppositionality, MDVCA used resources from Rural Workers’ Union and NGOs to initiate mobilizations that were only ever allowed to happen because they were pre-coded as symbolic, as not truly adversarial, and as existing within the field of State Politics to make demands that did not fit within the given order-of-things. Thus, they work against the state logic without regarding it as wholly exterior to the domain of their politics. According to MDVCA spokespeople, working through state, the market, and the ambiguous world of NGOs - which one participant explained to me are ‘tools’ that the movement utilizes, even while recognizing that they may have contradictory goals - can be a necessary maneuver in an overall struggle that exceeds them.

The new lines of antagonism became visible quite quickly. Within a few days of the barge capture, the Rural Workers’ Union officially withdrew its support from the mobilization. Although some individuals within the union continued to visit the encampment, the sindicato, in a letter, indicated that it had too much to lose (financially – their building, funding from government agencies, etc.) by supporting any sort of illegal action. After the burning of the barges Greenpeace publically condemned the movement (link to greenpeace article here). This mode of direct protest, perceived as illegal and violent, was thus rejected by the groups who today stand-in in the region for “resistance” as being too openly oppositional.
CONCLUSION

Thus the political subjects, “born in fire” with the MDVCA were not (only) resistant, but embodies a propositional concept of territory that is collective and that transcends a particular, productive relationship to land and a resistant strategy that engages and exceeds contemporary forms and relations of politics. These claims are for self-determined control over territory and resources strikes at the heart of the contemporary neo-extractive project. The conditions of possibility for the growth and stabilization of Brazil’s economy has been the re-centering of extractive development. In the struggle for control over these resources, then, the contemporary form the state is precisely what is at stake, which is why this, and other similar struggles across Latin America are precisely at the heart of the question of politics today.
Chapter Five: Toward the Worker State? or Working for the State? Reflections on the Rural Workers’ Union and the National Rubber Tappers’ Council in the Renascer Extractive Reserve

INTRODUCTION. LOCATING THE TENSIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY STATE

Under the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) government, social movement/leftist party leaders have entered the state in astounding numbers (an estimated 21,000 cargos de confiança or appointed positions under the Lula administration, multiple governorships, and countless mayors, city council people, state representatives etc.) and scholars and activists have debated whether this amounts to the inhabitation of the state by the party, or vice versa (see for example, Guimarães 2004; Singer 2005; Singer 2010a; Betto 2006; Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; De Oliveira 2007; Ricci 2010a; French and Fortes 2012). Explicit resistance to particular state projects in the lower Amazon have created new tensions in relationships among affected communities, social mediator groups historically aligned with social movements and with the workers’ party, and the state. These tensions are further exacerbated by the fact that individual people find themselves simultaneously inhabiting several of these positions. The argument of this chapter is that a closer examination of these relationships can help us not simply to determine whether movements have been co-opted by the state or vice versa, but to delineate the relations, and breaks, among movement, civil society, and state, at a moment when these very categories themselves have become uncertain.
In what follows here, I first situate the struggle over the creation of Renascer within the national and regional development context. The second half of the chapter is a detailed analysis of the evolving differences, which saw their most dramatic expression in a dispute over the meaning and form of democratic governance for Resex Renascer, between the Prainha Rural Workers’ Union (STR), the National Rubber Tappers’ Council (CNS) and the Movement in Defense of Renascer (MDR). I delineate how the STR and CNS tend to perform the work of the state, (albeit a re-constituted one). That is, they function as the state both institutionally, in that members of STR leadership simultaneously hold municipal and state offices, and effectively, in that they are deeply invested in maintaining the given order, namely hierarchical relations of control. I highlight, in contrast, the nascent impulses of MDR to break with institutional politics-as-usual and how those impulses are acted on by these organizations to fold them back into the dominant political logic.

THE CASE OF RENASCER

The Renascer Extractive Reserve is located in the eastern part of Western Pará in the center of an area that spans hundreds of miles between the Xingu River and the BR-163, contains some of Pará’s last large stocks of commercially high-value timber and which, in the 1990s, was relatively untouched by industrial extractive industry. The large supply of high value timber in this area, along with the rapid growth of both the ranching and soy sectors nationally and specifically in the BR-163 region near the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s increased pressure on this area by logging, which generally moves ahead
of these industries (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006). As a result of this development expansion, Greenpeace (2003) estimated that by 1999 approximately 90 logging companies (funneling their timber into four larger companies Curuatinga, Rancho da Cabocla, Madesa, Eidai and DLH Nordisk) operated in the territory claimed by hundreds of traditional communities on the border of the municipalities of Porto de Moz and Prainha (the eastern portion of Western Para). As in Gleba Nova Olinda, individual loggers and logging corporations accessed land and forests primarily through land theft (grilagem), through the state land agency (ITERPA) who granted either permanent or temporary land rights (ADIPs) and the state environmental agency (SECTAM later SEMA) who granted temporary logging rights (AUTEFs), and operated with the near complete lack of monitoring on the federal level, other than on the occasional case-by-case basis.

Gerson Campos and Gandor Hage (both PSDB, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, a center-right party that has been the primary opposition to the PT) the then-mayors of the two municipalities, both the largest or near-largest landowners in their respective municipalities and firmly ensconced themselves in the business of logging, ranching, and the grilagem, fiercely defended the industry and sanctioned the ongoing violence against those who opposed it, setting the conditions for its continued

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119 As land must be cleared for cattle or soy farming, they cycle of deforestation usually works with loggers clearing an area and then these other industries expanding into it. Selective logging, discussed in Chapter Four is also increasingly common in this region.

120 These were the same mechanisms described in Chapter Three. The ADIP was the Authorization for the Detantion of Public Property and the AUTEF was the Authorization for Forest exploitation. In this area a substantial number of requests for logging concessions had been denied by IBAMA because their documents were questionable. After the Public Forests Concession Law was passed in 2006, SECTAM authorized most of these previously denied petitions, which, as described in Chapter Three, also opens the area to logging well beyond the management plans themselves.
The Mayor of Porto de Moz himself was not only one of the municipalities largest landowners, but he also controlled one of the major logging companies in the area, was part owner of the sawmill Exportadora Cariny, his brothers owned one of the three largest logging companies (Indústria Madeireira mature Ltda (Maturu), were also the municipalities largest cattle ranchers, and had been accused in the Brazilian National Report to the UN high Commissioner on Human Rights of multiple counts of land invasion and violence (for a more detailed account of the near countless crimes of Grupo Campos, see Greenpeace’s 2003 report “State of Conflict). The Hage family operated a political machine that had controlled the government of the municipality of Prainha for over forty years and although they lost the mayoral seat in 2008, hold strong clientalist networks throughout the municipality through their control of the timber and ranching sectors. Greenpeace (2003) also reported that the then-president of the Pará land agency ITERPA, Ronaldo Brata, also aggressively supported the logging industry, warning the governor in a letter against creating a protected area in the region as it would “be a serious impediment to the economic development of the region” (Greenpeace 2003, 32).

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121 The Mayor of Porto de Moz himself was not only one of the municipalities largest landowners, but he also controlled one of the major logging companies in the area, was part owner of the sawmill Exportadora Cariny, his brothers owned one of the three largest logging companies (Indústria Madeireira mature Ltda (Maturu), were also the municipalities largest cattle ranchers, and had been accused in the Brazilian National Report to the UN high Commissioner on Human Rights of multiple counts of land invasion and violence (for a more detailed account of the near countless crimes of Grupo Campos, see Greenpeace’s 2003 report “State of Conflict).
Life in Renascer is oriented around its three rivers – the Uruará, the Tamuataí, and the Guajará – all Amazon tributaries. Its 14 communities contain anywhere from approximately 25 – 150 households each. The numbers are a bit elusive because many people of the reserve move back and forth between the *varzea* or floodplain (outside of the reserve) and the *terra firme* or uplands (inside of the reserve) with the seasonal flooding. Cattle is moved to the *varzea* when the water is low for feeding, and then back to higher ground during the rainy season. Residents also practice shifting cultivation and rely on a combination of fishing, working in their *roças*, forest extraction, and increasingly on cattle and buffalo production along with some commercial crop production (primarily watermelons). *Roças* are also located both close to the villages and further away. As in Gleba Nova Olinda the clearing of new land by any family or individual must be approved in community assemblies. The list of fruits and vegetables cultivated and animals hunted overlaps significantly with that of Gleba Nova Olinda but also varies, especially because these communities are situated closer to the Amazon and tend to be oriented more around consumption of river animals (such as turtles, alligators, and *capivara*) and fishing, including some small-scale commercial fishing, and the consumptive and commercial production of *piracú* (a *farinha* made from manioc and dried fish).

There is no road to Renascer; it must be accessed by boat – an easy task in the rainy season, but in the dry season most of the reserve is only accessible via canoe or *rabeta* (canoe with outboard motor). There are two families on the Tamuataí that run a passenger boat, each of which go to and from Prainha once a week for 10 *reais* (approximately 5USD one-way). In the summer (dry season), people wishing to travel to the city must travel several hours by *rabeta* to the mouth of the Tamuataí at the Uruará River, where commercial boats go from Prainha to Santa Maria pass multiple times per week.

Some of the villages have a small dried goods store, but outside products are generally purchased in the nearby city of Prainha and brought back via boat. Most families send their children to the city for secondary education, because it does not exist in the communities. Although there are evangelical churches in the city of Prainha and nearby Santa Maria, all of the communities of Renascer remain Catholic.

While most regional colonial histories reference settlements along the Tapajós River to the west and the Xingu River to the east, the historical occupation of the three rivers of Renascer is not well documented. Among interviewees I did not encounter a historical memory that went back more than two generations – a truncated historical memory that may be due in part to the repression that followed the *Cabanagem* and in part to the fluidity of regional territorial occupation until the latter part of the 20th century. Although many interviewees reported that their families have lived on these rivers for as long as they have known, they explicitly do not identify as indigenous, and they differentiate themselves from indigenous people through stories of conflicts that happened with "*indios*" over territory on the Tamuataí in the 1950s and 60s.

Those people (the majority) whose families had migrated into the region largely came during one of two migration waves. The first migrants came from the nearby Xingú region and the neighboring municipality of Almerim in the early 20th century, and the second wave came from further away, from Breves (Ilha do Marajó) near Belém in the 1950s. People came looking for land, for *drogas de sertão* and many came in response to solicitations for work on the plantation farms being established in the region at that time for the production of jute and malva. Seu José explains the story of his family’s migration:

My father was from Breves and my mom she was from another village (*povoado*) called Afuí, and me, well I came from Breves too, but I was very young because life there, life there was only suffering, and so we moved every few years….We left there because Tavico Miranda came to find many people to come and live here to work in Jute with him. We came here in '53.
to the Amazonas....we stayed in Vira Sebo [a community outside of the Resex in the varzea] and we worked there in jute, for two years...and we worked for the Alvarengas, we went to work with him and I passed my youth there, working with him, and he treated me well, and I had a lot of responsibility.

Or, as another resident, Edinildo put it, “everyone worked in jute production at that time, it was like the garimpo” (referencing the gold-mining that brought thousands to Pará in the 1980s). As Pedro explains above, many families came to work in relations of clientalism with the Alvarenga family. Although jute production dissipated in the 1960s, the Alvarenga family, along with the Hage family, continue to hold most economic and political power in the municipality and remain in clientalist relationships with regional residents.

These migrants also brought with them some subsistence or small-scale artisanal commercial practices, namely timber extraction for boat production or for local commerce (timber extraction was a major industry in Breves since the 17th century, Torres 2007). Until the 1950s, most communities or settlements (sort of a pre-cursor to communities – a group of people living together) remained fisherpeople in the varzea. Many people moved to the uplands of what is today Resex Renascer and established the present community sites after a significant flood in 1952 destroyed homes and crops and impelled many families to relocate to higher ground (IBAMA 2006).

According to interviews, people lived largely in dispersed settlements until approximately the early 1970s when they began to form “communities.” That is, they established collective village sites, began to build houses near each other, establish schools, churches, common land management systems, and develop the community as a political and social entity. This was linked to the regional transformations happening within the Catholic Church in the Amazon. Marked by two regional bishops meetings in 1972 and 1974, in Santarém and Manaus respectively, the formation of pastoral agents and ecclesiastical base communities was prioritized as part of the church’s re-organization and politicization (Arenz 2001, quoted in Fannelli 2008). This was also the time when the Rural Workers’ Union was in formation and both of these organizations established strong bases in these communities, an influence that continues to this day, as will become apparent in the discussion of the struggle over Renascer, discussed below.

The Rural Workers’ Union worked alongside the Catholic Church in a project of political consciousness building. As part of its regional project to strengthen the position of the peasant, the Union introduced both the project of acquiring land rights and of accessing rural credit into these communities. Many regional inhabitants reported that the state land agency ITERPA had visited the area sometime in the 1970s, although I did not encounter anyone who had a document for their land. Most people did seem to know the exact size of their individual plots of land, which surprised me, because it is usually a type of knowledge developed in order to make a land claim. The Union president informed me that the union and the state worked together to help the communities stake out their land claims and to take out loans through the federal agricultural development loan fund (FNO program) in order to purchase cattle. In other words, cattle were introduced to the communities through state-led programs for rural development. Today, ironically, their cattle ownership is the primary point of conflict with the government, as ICMBio asserts that it is the livelihood practice that threatens their status as “traditional and conservationists.”

Since then, and primarily over the past ten years, many people have also taken out other loans under the family agricultural development fund (PRONAF) program, primarily to start sustainable production “projects.” The most common projects were for acai and lime production. I did not meet a single family who had invested in a successful project that was not for cattle. The acai did not grow, and the limes grew abundantly, but there was no market for them. As a result, these families, who have no income, currently
Despite the strong coalition of people in power supporting logging expansion, there was also significant regional opposition. More than two decades of organizing for land rights by local rural workers’ unions (STRs) in the lower Amazon, along with the region-wide struggles of traditional people such as the Rubber Tappers, and the institutionalization of new forms of conservation areas (SNUC 2000), had formalized organizational and legislative networks for traditional, indigenous and peasant peoples to protect their lands (if not the political will, see below). Communities and militants embroiled in conflict with loggers accessed these networks, seeking land rights as a way to stop logger incursions onto their territory. The Rural Workers Unions of Porto de Moz and Prainha, along with support from the National Rubber Tappers’ Council and international environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and WWF successfully petitioned INCRA, IBAMA and SECTAM to create the Verde Para Sempre Extractive Reserve in 2004, Brazil’s largest Conservation Unit.

Verde Para Sempre’s boundaries were cut along the boundary between federal and state lands, which were also municipal lines, effectively excluding the state-held land in Prainha from the reserve. Governor Simão Jatene (PSDB) opened the excluded 400,000 hectares to loggers by naming the entire area a “state forest” (FLOTA), as discussed in Chapter Three. Several communities working with STR Prainha petitioned for a second reserve, Renascer, and in their words, their struggle was “reborn.” The loggers excluded from Verde Para Sempre, however, had moved west to the Uruará River and set up shop in the town of Santa Maria (which grew rapidly with the establishment of saw mills) and within the proposed reserve area. As is common practice for loggers to access land held by marginalized rural communities, loggers provide jobs,
and they provide local communities with amenities that the municipalities cannot, such as
direct payment for land access, building schools, health clinics, and energy, often through
deals negotiated by local politicians, generating loyalty for their (both loggers and
politicians) position.

The links between loggers and politicians is not limited to the political right or the
old clientalist networks. An advisor to the social movement sympathetic mayor informed
the encampment at Renascer that the mayor accepted 200,000 reais from loggers for his
campaign. When the movement confronted the mayor about this bribe when he visited
the encampment, he responded that “Now is not the time to discuss this.” He also later
negotiated with loggers to allow them to stay in the Reserve for three months and finish
their work in exchange for a health clinic and a school (authorization that he did not have
the authority to give on federal land). At the state level, the exchange of management
plans for campaign financing in Pará is notorious, and the PT’s Ana Julia Carepa’s
gubernatorial campaign was implicated in a scandal called “Safra Legal” where PT
officials were found to be facilitating management plans in exchange for campaign
funding. Ana Jula’s ex-husband, Marcílio Monteiro, was appointed by her to be head of
IBAMA while this was ongoing.122

The conflict over Resex Renascers’s creation was not simply a struggle between
traditional people and loggers/ranchers. Nearly all families living within the proposed
reserve area meet the legal definition of “traditional” people (MMA 2006), however, they

122 The story of Safra Legal is too complex to do justice to here. For more on this scandal, see a series of
articles at http://candidoneto.blogspot.com/2009/02/e-saga-continua.html. See also the series of stories in
the national weekly magazine Veja, March 1, 2006 and June 3, 2005, the Folha de São Paulo February 26,
2006 and, most importantly, the full report from CPI, Inquiry by the parliamentary Commission on
Biopiracy.
did not all want a Resex. The Resex movement polarized existing tensions within and beyond the proposed reserve area between, on the one hand, families and communities “in favor” who believed that the Resex model could serve as a tool to stabilize their territorial control in the face of the incursion of loggers and ranchers onto their lands, and those “against” who viewed the reserve as an instrument that would destroy their livelihood practices, either because those practices were logging, ranching, or payment from loggers, or because they believed the reserve would limit their ability to hunt, fish, raise cattle etc. and subject them to the rule of government environmentalists (a fear cultivated by the Hage family political machine through the spreading of gossip and also through Junior Hage’s weekly radio show, Junior Hage on the move [Junior Hage em Ação]). This latter concern was not unjustified, as the reserve would limit the amount of cattle permitted in the area, which would (and will) have serious repercussions for many people in the reserve (on both sides “contra” and “a favor”). This led to bitter conflicts between and within communities between those who began to call themselves “extractivists” and those who called themselves “not extractivists” invoking external categories from a broader debate that framed regional conflict as one between “environment” and “development.”

Even those “in favor” of the reserve became progressively convinced that neither the state, nor the union who “increasingly kept both feet in the judiciary and policy realm” (Interview RS March 2009) would intervene quickly enough to protect their resources. From 2004 to 2007 communities organized a series of defense actions that were intense and at times violent (forced logger eviction, river and road blockages, and

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123 This claim to be “extractivist” was itself extremely complicated because it created some confusion in the actual goals.
barges of wood set aflame), organizing themselves into the *Conselho Popular da Região do Guarape* (without the participation of the STR). These tactics bore fruit. In 2006’s Operation *Renascer*, Ibama expelled all loggers from the area and a federal judge issued an injunction against the existence of a “state forest.” Within one year, the logging companies had changed names and returned.

In addition to the new movement leadership in the *conselho popular*, the mobilization for *Resex Renascer* differed from that of *Verde Para Sempre* in that it occurred within a new political context. Between 2002 and 2008, the Workers’ Party gained control of the presidency (Lula), the governorship (Ana Jula Carepa), and the municipality (mayor Sergio Pingarilho PMDB and vice-mayor Adamor Malcher PT won on a compromise ticket), and three different leaders from the Prainha STR/PT served multiple times as city council people. Also, Greenpeace’s high profile “State of Conflict” report (2003) as well as a series of letters to the federal government signed by several prominent international environmental NGOs meant that national and international eyes were on the future of *Renascer*. This attention was due less to the plight of local people (although that plight did figure largely in that discourse) and more to issues of the shifting politics of conservation. It was increasingly clear that the proliferation of protected areas that had marked the Amazonian policy period since the late 1990s had shifted.\(^\text{124}\) That the federal government had not created a Conservation Unit in over a year (ISA 2009), that Márcio Meira (the head of FUNAI under Lula) had gone so far as to say that demands for indigenous territory had become “excessive” and there needed to

\(^{124}\) Lemos and Roberts (2009) call this the “donor-led socio-environmental policy period,” when hundreds of millions of dollars in international conservation money flooded the region through the PPG-7 and re-worked Amazonian policy and civil society relationships.
be a “limit” to their creation (Viveiros de Castro 2009, 148), that a 2006 federal law shifted the responsibility for granting logging management plans from the chronically under-resourced but (generally) trusted IBAMA to the notoriously corrupt and industry friendly (especially in Pará) state environmental agencies,\footnote{Such management plans immediately proliferated.} and that environmentalist politician Marina Silva had resigned from her position, all indicated cracks in the hegemony of the pro-environment policy program. This was not a simple re-centering of the developmentalism - environmentalism debate, but rather a re-articulation of these positions into the “green development” paradigm (what the Amazonian social movements call “green capitalism” as opposed to “brown capitalism), currently central to facilitating extractive development in the Amazon (Baletti 2012).

This articulation was territorialized in the state’s approach to the region’s “\textit{questão fundiaria}” whose premise is (contrary to the arguments made by the movements) that the territorial interests of all actors are not contradictory, but negotiable. Ana Julia Carepa, the PT governor known for her links to loggers\footnote{See \url{http://www.mst.org.br/node/5082}; \url{http://veja.abril.com.br/010306/p_038.html}}, met with president Lula during a much reported plane ride from Brasilia to Sao Paulo in late 2008 to discuss the situation in \textit{Renascer}. It was necessary, she argued, to find “the best design possible” to respect “the rights of the communities who live there and of the producers, ranchers and loggers who have been in that area for decades.”\footnote{See \url{http://www.ideflor.pa.gov.br/?q=node/140}}

On June 5 2009, the \textit{Resex Renascer} was created with an area of 211, 634 hectares, approximately one half of the size (414.274) petitioned for by the communities.
involved, recommended by the research report by IBAMA and discussed in the Public Audience December 2007. The floodplain, almost all of the primary forest, the sources for the reserve’s three rivers, and most decisively, a later interview with ICMBio coordinator Fabiano Costa (interview September 2009) would indicate, the Bauxite deposits, would be excluded in “the best design possible.” People interviewed living within Renascer were at a loss. Speculation and rumor quickly spread, some of which placed the blame on Ana Julia, because “Lula would not have done this if he had known.” Others within the union blamed Professor Raimundinha’s (the principal investigator on the federal study for the reserve), links to the state (she is married to state deputy Airton Faleiro, PT). Many also suspected that the union had negotiated away half of the reserve in order to claim the creation of the reserve as a political victory.

Tension among movement leadership and union had been evolving for several years and the union and the conselho popular increasingly operated in separate realms in their reserve advocacy. The latter and their allies increasingly acted on their own behalf, mobilizing within the reserve, meeting with government officials in Santarém, and consulting with the Pastoral Land Commission. The first meeting that I attended in 2009 with both groups present erupted in a conflict over the over the fact that Delfem, secretary of the STR, refused to step down from his position despite the fact that he had been elected to city council. The conflict expressed a larger tension over the fact that Badé’s Ferreira’s family (Delfem’s father, several times president and ex-city council member) controlled rural political representation. His daughter-in-law (Delfem’s wife)

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128 IBAMA. 2006. Estudo Socioeconomico da area proposta para criação da Reserva Extrativista Renascer, Prainha/PA. A study conducted by a UFPA professor “Raimundinha” the wife of Airton Faleiro, state deputy (PT), former president of FETAGRI, and coordinator of the movement for the survival of the Transamazon and the Xingu region.
was union secretary, his son Valdílène was treasurer, and his other son Vadíson Ferreira was president of the Colônia de Pescadores.\footnote{This conflict was an expression of ongoing tensions regarding union practices more broadly that would become more apparent in future months. Practices that included the holding of exclusive meetings – the \textit{sindicato} would frequently call those that they considered to be leaders to meet privately in Prainha, rather than holding open meetings in the communities, the lack of transparency in use of and access to funding (using motorboats to travel around whereas everyone else used regular and very slow boats, frequent trips for “leaders” e.g. Badé’s family to Brasília and Belém – decisions made at the level of the union leadership and not among reserve members) among other things. Immediately following the creation of the reserve, Badé, who held no official position in the union or the municipality, solicited 10,000 reais from the city in order to visit all of the communities of the Resex. This was understood by the participants in the \textit{conselho popular} to be his campaign to be president of the Resex. They were outraged and began a campaign to say that the president of the Resex must be from the Resex.} One month prior to the establishment of the reserve, Delfem, Bade, Cley (the other PT city council person) and Vadíson had flown to Brasilia and Belém for closed-door meetings with representatives from WWF, the Ministry of the Environment, the Casa Civil and others, raising suspicions regarding their role in the negotiations.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the rural workers unions began as a para-statal institution, part of the corporatist, official sanctioned labor bureaucracy under the military dictatorship. Church, community, and party leaders, however, recognized them as viable institutional bases from which to organize, and developed a political program based around economic grievances particular to “rural workers” as a class and opposition to the military dictatorship (Houtzager 2001). Efforts to democratize the institutions and break them of their elite ties and clientalist structures focused on removing leadership engaged in those practices, (and were largely successful, most famously in the case of Santarém. See Leroy 1991), but largely embraced the union structure. This process culminated with rural unions in Pará allying nationally with CUT (Unified Workers’ Central, the national trade union movement), and later with FETAGRI (the state level
association of unions), and became a key site for the cultivation of the Workers’ Party in the rural north (Leroy 1991; Petit 1996).

Any discontinuity between the union and community practices seems to have been largely obscured under the military dictatorship and during the democratic transition/neoliberal period when the primary regional antagonism remained between the world views and practices of rural people and developers in the dominant sector (largely associated with right wing politics.) The union became the location for economic support for rural people, facilitating access to land rights/agrarian reform, FNOs, Pronafes and other benefits. Not only in Prainha, but across the state, STR leaders from the rural workers union would go on to win mayoral, federal congressional elections, seats in state legislatures and city councils as well as a host of appointments to state and federal government positions. These achievements created ongoing tensions about whose interests these leaders were protecting (Schwartzman et al. 2010). The contradiction that the union holds is that it simultaneously represents the grievances of a rural population dominated by authoritarian and later development interests, and is an expression of a particular conception of power, leadership and political relationships “of favors” that have produced the given order of domination.

Following the legalization of Resex Renascer, the rate of timber being felled and leaving the reserve skyrocketed.¹³⁰ Petitions for enforcement fell on deaf ears, the mayor and city council encouraged (and negotiated) compromise with the loggers, and ICMBio claimed a lack of resources to enforce. Residents of Santa Maria and the reserve set up an

¹³⁰ There is always a lag-time between the creation of a Conservation Unit and ICMBio’s capacity to demarcate and monitor the area. Thus loggers increase their activities in an attempt to extract the maximum possible profits before the area becomes inaccessible.
encampment at the entrance to the reserve blocking the river to logging traffic for 45 days (again, without the *sindicato*). On January 14th, six barges left the sawmill inside of the reserve headed for the Amazon. When the barges approached the encampment they opened fire. Two people were shot and the rest escaped into the forest. With promises from the government to act on the situation, the assembly decided to disband the encampment but created a committee of 13 people from their group, charged with organizing workshops and meetings on the reserve’s three rivers of the reserve to organize the Reserve-wide “mother association” as a system of “self-determined, democratic governance” They were called the Movement in Defense of *Renascer* (MDR).

**“THE GREATEST LAW IS AN ORGANIZED COMMUNITY”**: MAKING GUATAMURU

MDR called for a meeting in Prainha, where all partners and advisors (MDR, the union, the vice-prefeito, the PT city council members, the CPT, the Fisherpeople’s Association, and the Amazon Defense Front (FDA), met to plan the process for the creation of the *Associação Mãe*. They would visit communities on each river (Guajará, Tamuataí, and Uruará) to discuss the best models for reserve governance, create the necessary infrastructure, and select delegates for a reserve-level Assembly to formalize the Association. Ultimately, the meetings were facilitated only by MDR, the CPT, and FDA.

100 anti-reserve residents interrupted the first meeting on the Uruará River. Silently, they entered the *barracão* as a group and declared, “We are not extractivists. We
don’t want this reserve.” The tension was palpable. Judith, a CPT coordinator, diffused the situation. “What is your favorite thing to eat?” she asked the man who had spoken for the group. Caught off-guard, he responded “Jabuti” (a local turtle). “Do you buy it at the supermarket? Or hunt it on the riverbank?” Everyone laughed. “Hunt” he responded. “That is extractivism” A long and difficult conversation ensued regarding the concept of extractivism (a remnant practice of poor people, or a legitimate future), a reserve (destructive or productive for residents), management (could it be internally generated or would it be imposed from above), and democracy (rule by majority or participation).

The question of the reserve had put those “in favor” of its establishment in an awkward and at times confusing position of defending, and struggling for, something that they did not actually believe was going to solve their problems, but that they saw as a necessary, intermediary step. This intermediary step, however, polarized reserve communities, precisely because it mandated a subjective identification that was not necessarily consistent with the lived experiences and desires of people whose livelihood strategies were extremely complex and often a mix of “market-oriented” and “traditional” practices. Nonetheless, they saw reserve creation as a necessary step, a tactic, to regaining control over self-definition (not to mention to sorting through the complexities and impacts of these mixed economic strategies). In order to reach their goal of self-definition it was necessary to establish control over their own reserve governance.

The MDR went on to explain, the distinction that we might make between tactics and strategies, is the difference between tools and goals.

A reserve is not a solution for anybody. It is a tool, an instrument that we can use in our favor. An instrument that we can use to protect our land, our territory so that we can reach our goals, our dreams for our families for the future. So the reserve is our tool, but it is also, now, our
problem…Chico Mendes (ICMBio) will want to direct (dirigir) with their rules, their laws, but that is not what we want. Before our biggest enemy was the loggers. Now, our biggest enemy is Chico Mendes. We need to organize ourselves to create the reserve that we want.

Another resident added, “The greatest law is an organized community.”

After several hours of tense conversation, rooted in years of conflict, the “against” communities left promising to look through the materials that MDR would send on to them, and to consider participation in the formation of the Associação Mãe. It would be a misrepresentation to describe the interaction as “successful,” but it was clear that there had been a relational shift, and the intense feelings of antagonism, to a certain extent, mitigated. This was confirmed by the fact that the same situation repeated itself the following day at the second Uruará meeting, and many “against” participants from the first day returned.

A few weeks later, the organizers traveled to the Guajará, the part of the reserve that is the least accessible to Prainha, Santa Maria. As an effect of geography, the communities there had had less involvement both in conflicts and in the creation of the reserve. These communities bordered Verde Para Sempre so they had some idea of how reserves worked (or “didn’t work” as they frequently joked). Concerned that their remote location, political inexperience, and cash poverty (resulting in a lack of funding for travel) would result in their marginalization from the reserve governance process, a proposal emerged in the workshops. Rather than having a single president of the Mother Association, who would be certain to come from the Tamuataí, the most organized part of the reserve with the most formalized relationships to the union and the prefeitura, each
The preparatory meeting for the communities of the third river, the Tamuataí, took place in the community of Espírito Santo on the eve of the General Assembly. Assembled in the community barracão (large, open-sided, roofed structure in community center used for meetings) one of the organizers stood and spoke. Their comments are worth quoting at length:

This process that we have been completing over the last month of going from community to community to discuss the governance of the Resex is to ensure that ALL people of the Resex participate in the creation of the association of the Resex, because who will create the Resex is the people of the Resex. As we have said before, a Resex, it is not a solution for anybody’s problems. It is a tool that we can use, but it is the people that live here who need to create it…and how do we create this? Do we leave it for leaders? No leader is more important than the people that live here. Leaders are important workers, they are articulators to help the process, but they are not more important than the rest of the people, they simply have a different role. They are very important for facilitating the process and we need leaders, but leaders are not more important…without people, leaders don’t have value…Also all people are of equal importance, whether they are for or against the Resex. We can’t take people out of the process because we don’t agree with them and we can’t ignore them…We need to learn how to communicate, negotiate and understand each other’s point of views…The assembly that will happen tomorrow will bring together the people and discussions that have happened in all of the Resex...the assembly that will happen tomorrow, the assembly is only a result, tomorrow will not be anything new, tomorrow is the result of the meetings and discussions that have happened in each community. They already happened. They have happened since the decision that was made there in Prainha [to organize] the process for creating the Associação Mae. Does anyone disagree with this? And they have happened over 10 years of struggle for this Resex…
At that moment, a motorboat arrived carrying Badé, Gatão (National Rubber Tappers’ Council), city councilman Delfem, and the presidents of the Prainha Rural Workers’ Union and the Colonia de Pescadores (The Fisherperson’s Colony, a sort of union for fisherpeople). They entered the ongoing meeting and MDR invited them to introduce themselves and say a few words. It is worth quoting Badé at length:

…I just want to say one more thing, we intend to sit down with all of the leaders of all of the communities tonight, if you could plan a time, and we could have a debate, you know, because our responsibility every day, is to improve each leader, especially now that we have our dream of creating a Resex, which you know was not easy, this dream. This dream cost much struggle, much struggle, so much that we have the sadness that 50% of our area was cut...we have to have a lot of care in how we are going to guarantee the future of our families, and this is the responsibility of each of our leaders. Because, it is like this…each community has its leaders. Its leadership is a command, and every community waits for this commander and this commander has to have, in fact and by right, the responsibility to represent without looking to A or B because it is only with this kind of representation that we can guarantee, in the future, all that we have always wanted … We had the opportunity to elect Lula, the commander of the nation and today Lula is not a reference for Brazil, he is a reference worldwide, and we need to see this with clearly and carefully. And so these policies of the government, in the moment that we embrace them, we don’t have to say anymore that we lost 50% of what we have and that we can’t arrive at the conclusion of our project. All of this [the arrival at the conclusion of our project] will depend on the discussion among our leaders. How are we going to hunt, how are we going to follow our dreams?..and so today what we [the Prainha Rural Workers’ Union and CNS people with him] want, and this isn’t my demand, but the demand of all of the leaders of the municipality of Prainha, we want to decide on a time to talk with the leadership. We need to discuss these things among the leaders before we hand it over to the masses, because it is like this, the masses wait for the leaders, society waits for the leaders, because the leaders have a more ample vision, they have a vision that looks outward to see and discuss problems and so we want to have a meeting with all of the leaders tonight so that we can decide what we want from this project, where do we want to go with this project…
They then left the meeting to go relax in their hammocks for the rest of the morning.

The differences and contrast in the two positions almost needs no exposition. They appear to almost directly contradict one another. They are not, however, simple inversions of a shared logic – say, one that celebrates leaders versus one that celebrates the base, or in Badé’s words, “the masses.” In MDR’s statements, they recognize the value of and the need for leadership within communities (and by extension within movement), but argue that this leadership is one role among many and necessarily embedded within a larger group and vision. Thus, rather than seeking to place individuals in a position of power, they indicate that their leaders function as a tactic to generalize or amplify the claims of the group.

Given these statements we can conclude that for them, that a leadership integrated into the base both expresses and facilitates the community’s desires, project, etc. but cannot exist separately from it, neither thought nor action occurs in only one or the other position. Secondly, we see decision-making defined explicitly as an organized process, a form of decision-making that excludes the possibility for individualized, decision-making that would tend to concentrate decision-making in the hands of whoever may be present in a given moment (generally leaders). That is, we see the organizational impossibility of oligarchical and personalist political action typical of regional institutional politics. Finally, we see an inclusiveness, a respect for and acknowledgement of different positions and the need to engage them. In other words, in the argument for recognition, understanding and negotiation, we can read an argument for co-existence, rather than unification of multiple positions.
In the second discourse there is a valorization of leadership, not only above other participants, but also to their exclusion. In the world of “leaders” and the “masses” the “masses” have no capacity to think, but must be, in Badé’s words, “commanded.” This “command – obey” logic is one of the guiding rationalities at the heart of the contemporary state (Foucault 2008; Foucault 2009) and the modern project of sovereignty (Reyes and Kaufman 2011). It should perhaps not be surprising then that it forms the basis here for assumptions about who commands and who obeys within the union structure (On this question see French 2006). This is especially true given that the unions began as a para-statal institution, and that the Rural Workers’ Unions in rural Pará have been so deeply connected to the formation of the Workers’ Party, which itself was a (successful) struggle to take state power. In this discourse, without a capacity to think, “the masses” not only lack the ability to make their own decisions (and must be led), but they cannot even participate in mainstream conceptions of citizenship – which minimally assumes a modern, rational, actor capable of engaging in market, or market-like, transactions. The more organic forms of organization that emerge from daily life cannot fit within the bureaucratic structure reproduced in state-centric organizations, such as the union. The apparent effect of this structure, and this theory of power is that the other issues raised in the first discourse – the embedded, organizational forms of decision-making and the respect for and acknowledgement of difference - become irrelevant conversations within the command-obey relation. Thus, the reconciling of these positions would not involve simple reforms, but fundamental changes in outlook.
The Union/CNS contingent rejoined the meeting that afternoon. The CPT coordinator asked to facilitate the meeting began by introducing the proposal, formulated on the Guajará, that the Mother Association have three coordinators and three vice coordinators as opposed to a single president/vice president. Badé quickly made the argument that three coordinators was legally, juridically impossible. The CPT coordinator disagreed. Badé insisted. “I am talking about the question of legality.” Four lawyers present all confirmed that the association, legally, could be constructed however the people cared to construct it – with one leader or with four. Badé continued to say that it was illegal, that it was impossible and if it was, in fact legal, as they asserted, “What part of the federal constitution says this?” The lawyers affirmed that it was legal, that the legality had nothing to do with the federal constitution. “So what part of the civil code then, there has to be one.” Despite the testimonies and explanations of the four lawyers present as to the legality of the proposition, Badé continued to insist that it was not. This accusation of illegality, coming from his respected position as a leader, raised doubts among those present.

When the question of legality was put to rest, Gatão intervened,

“They have to be certain about what they want, if it is president or coordinator. Have you decided? I can’t tell you what to do...what I can tell you is that culturally traditional people have the custom of a president, there is no custom of coordinator, I don’t have a custom of coordinator. I am part of an organization, for many years, as you know the CNS, that has a president, it is obvious like our companheiro said (gesturing to Badé), our way of living is with a president. Maybe somewhere there are some community associations that have coordinators, but the grand majority [of associations] have presidents. You can’t say that one of these is more democratic [the CPT coordinator had explained this as the Guajará’s motivation], that is not true, what is democratic you can only tell in actions. You can have a coordinating group that is totally authoritarian, it isn’t the word coordination that makes a community democratic, it is the practice of democracy…you have to vote. I can only offer you council, I
can’t induce you to do anything. It is you who decide. I can’t show up and
tell you, no, a coordinator is better, because it is your decision. I can tell
you that this is not the custom of traditional people. But I cannot decide
for you because I am here to advise, not to induce.”

After several hours of debate, the people of the Tamuataí decided to ally
themselves with the union position, deciding that at the next day’s general assembly, they
would charge their delegates to vote for a president. They also devised two other
proposals – that the Tamuataí should have two extra people on the Mother Association
because they had been more engaged with the Resex struggle, and that the Tamuataí
should have a right to hold a majority majority of the positions on Mother Association.
Both of these proposals, suggested by Badé and the Union leaders proposed to
institutionalize Union control over within the _Associação Mãe_ by guaranteeing that the
communities that the union controlled would themselves control the association. This
proposal would replicate, in a way, the situation that existed within the representative
organizations of the Rural Workers’ Union and the Fisherperson’s Colony, where Badé’s
family controls the leadership within them and therefore controls the organization.

The regional history of struggle of marginalized people in the Amazon, in which
not only the rural workers’ union and the CNS, but these particular people, Badé and
Gatão, were protagonists means that both they and their institutions carry a tremendous
amount of legitimacy within the communities present and engaged in this debate over
how to construct their future. Invoking their particular realms of expertise and experience
(law and tradition) functioned to destabilize the nascent, and precarious, expressions of
dissent or difference and, in this case and at least on the Tamuataí, reassert and re-
produce their own form of politics.
That evening, more people began to arrive from the other rivers and we watched politics happen in the plaza. Small groups gathered and discussed and debated and made deals. Badé, Gatão and the other elected officials from the Rural Workers’ Union and the City Council people met with the leaders at the house of one of the community members (who was, incidentally, also in MDR). The rest of the members of MDR retired to a boat to plan the assembly. The community quieted down for an unsettled sleep.

On the morning of the 7th, people arrived from the more distant communities, including, to everyone’s surprise, the communities that were “against” the reserve, along with the acting mayor (vice-mayor Ademor) and Padre Jorge (the regional Priest and an ally of the Resex struggle and the Union). The assembly began with a brief mass followed by an introduction. The people from the communities on the Uruará that were against the reserve requested space to speak and read a letter:

We the residents of communities of São Raimundo, Terra Preta, and Cipriano along with some residents of Mato Grosso we would like to communicate that we do not accept the invitation to participate in the formation of the Associação Mae, and we do not accept the formation of the reserve because we are not accustomed to working with extractivism and we do not want to survive from that.

They submitted their letter, wished everyone a good day, and left. This was not, as it might appear, a rejection of the process of the formation of the Mother Association, but an acknowledgement of it. These families had traveled 6 hours by boat, and would travel six hours back, not to disrupt or destabilize the formation of the association, but to acknowledge it, to acknowledge the other communities’ right to self-organize, and to opt out of the process. To opt out is itself a form of participation that simply ignoring the process would not have been. This was further evidence of the shift in relations among reserve residents.
The Tamuataí’s proposal to have two additional people sit on the association, and to control the direction of the association was put to the delegates and was immediately thrown out by the communities from the other rivers. MDR put forward its proposal to have a three-person coordinating committee, rather than a president, at the head of the Resex Association. Rather than challenging the proposal, as expected, a resident from the Espírito Santo community on the Tamuataí challenged the legitimacy of the voting process itself. This process – whereby only delegates from the communities to the Mother Association were voting, rather than everyone present in the assembly, had been decided in the series of community planning meetings. This model of delegate-only voting had been selected because it would have been logistically (and financially) challenging to hold an actual RESEX-wide assembly with all RESEX residents present. Thus, an assembly-wide vote would favor the community where the meeting was held, because their residents would not have to bear the time and financial expense of travel to the meeting. Because the meeting was held in Espírito Santo on the Tamuataí, it would have favored them. This challenge to the process threatened to destabilize the entire assembly process, which MDR had worked for months to establish, and members of MDR confessed that they felt that, “all of our work was being undone.”

This proposal gave rise to hours of debate. City councilperson Delfim (son of Badé) proposed that the general assembly (e.g. everyone present) should vote on whether or not the delegates should be the only ones to vote on the issues at hand. During the debate that ensued, most of the people who stood up to speak were associated with the Union, giving the impression that if Delfim’s proposal were put to the assembly, they would vote against the delegate’s position as representatives. Finally, after several hours
of debate, the exasperated members of MDR decided that they would give in to Delfim’s proposal and the entire assembly would vote on the legitimacy of the delegates. They called a vote. All of those in favor of leaving the power to decide in the hands of the delegates raised their hands. 313 votes. All of those opposed, 3. The acting mayor, city councilman Delfen, Gatão from CNS, the president of the Rural Workers’ Union, the president of the municipal level PT, Father Jorge, and ex-city councilperson and former president of the Union Badé all got to their feet and stormed out in anger, got in their speedboat, and sped off.

Figure 23: Assembly on the Tamuatai voting in favor of delegates

The following week, the Rural Workers’ Union wrote a letter to the CPT national office, accusing the CPT of manipulating the people of the Resex and the process of
creating the Mother Association. The letter was signed by the two PT City Council people, the vice-mayor, Padre Jorge and the “social movements of the region,” a signifier that they were claiming for themselves. They indicated that they intended to legally challenge the association that was created, and to re-initiate the process of creating an association, but this time without the CPT or MDR (who were reserve residents). The association created that day, dubbed Guatamuru in honor of the three rivers, has been legally formalized and to date, no legal challenge has been brought.

CONCLUSION

“No, our biggest traitors have not been the environmentalists. We knew they were never us. No, our biggest traitors have been the Union of Rural Workers and the National Rubber Tappers Council”
– Osmarino Amâncio, Belém 2011

Much as been said to both celebrate and oppose the rise of progressive government in Brazil. Is it a break with the past, or “a change so that everything stays the same?” In Brazil, and particularly in the Amazon, this question has been complex, because state intervention has created some stability (e.g. bringing the ‘rule of law’ to places where the governing presence was largely absent or corrupt) and created openings for progressive, redistributive economic policies. The contradictions of the post-neoliberal moment, however, have been particularly apparent in the intensification of neo-extractivism, which placed the Brazilian government in tension, if not in direct conflict, with environmental concerns, but more significantly, with the primarily traditional and indigenous people and communities whose territories house these
resources. These conflicts demonstrate the impossibility of a simple separation of the economic and social policy.

This chapter, then, has tried to explore the new tensions and contradictions of this moment, by examining the shifting dynamics around the location where movements, civil society, and the progressive state intersect: the rural workers union in Pará. In the early years of their formation, the union and their leaders, embodied the rejection of a system of domination, confronting, in the Amazon, an oligarchy who had trapped them in a system of dependence, and nationally a repressive and exclusionary regime. The alliance between rural, marginalized communities, these representative organizations and the national project of the workers’ party was easier or logical, under military, and then, neoliberal rule. The movement of the PT into spaces of institutional government gives rise to new tensions and contradictions that this chapter has tried to explore in one particular case, but, as tensions between the Santarém Rural Workers’ Union and MDVCA discussed in Chapter Four, and the quote from Osmarino Amâncio above speaking from his experiences in Acre indicate, are consistent with other cases across the region.

These tensions and contradictions allow us to identify a series of breaks, or splits. On the one hand, there is a split in the workers’ party itself, as politicians that support a developmentalist program ally themselves with the industries that oppose the interests of their base. The rural workers’ union maintains a key role here, because its historical position alongside and within movements means that its presence within communities is deeply rooted, as is its support, thus making it a key site for holding together these ostensibly opposing interests, itself falling into neither one camp or the other, even as its
individual members may enter and leave institutionalized political positions. This leads to a second split – in the movement itself – here expressed by the increasing tension between MDR and the STR. As we saw, this split is not simply about a political stance – either for or against conservation or development – but, a more substantive one regarding the very question of the nature of politics itself. In other words, in this new political moment movements and the states and their relationships to one another have changed, giving rise to new conflicts that we must endeavor to understand.
Chapter Six. Conclusion. Rethinking Amazonian Studies

The Green Development Paradigm has become Hegemonic.

The paving of the BR-163 and the arrival of soy in the Amazon Biome was arguably the first major “environmentalist” controversy – or at least the first to receive national and international attention – of the period that I have called, in this dissertation, “neo-extractivist.” Since then and equally through other controversial development initiatives, such as changes to the Forest Code and the construction of the Belo Monte Dam, we have seen the production of a familiar narrative that poses environmentalism and developmentalism as two ends of the spectrum in the field of debate over the future of Amazônia. While this debate has gone through multiple iterations, its parameters – since the late 1970s when this polarization first emerged – remain strikingly unchanged.

As discussed in the introduction, over the past decade under progressive government, Brazil has seen its first period of sustained economic growth since the “Brazilian Miracle” (1968-72). Rather than replicating that era’s project of modernization through violent colonization, today’s growth is happening amidst, and even driving, historic records of poverty reduction and is implemented by a Workers’ Party government with equally historic records of popular support and a new position of leadership in regional and global politics. Thus, today’s package of economic growth and poverty reduction take a kinder and gentler form. This new model is marked, in
Amazonia, by a neoliberal politics of limited social inclusion, achieved both through granting land rights to formerly marginal socio-ecological actors and a move toward industry “greening” that has re-territorialized the region, as outlined in Chapter Three. This new platform is supported by a civil society apparatus produced through networks that move from green corporate initiatives through the World Bank, the Brazilian National Development Bank, and foundations like Ford and Moore, to “big conservation,” and disperse through a broad complex of local civil society organizations, an example of which was discussed in Chapter Two in the Sustainable Soy initiative. The coupling of representative organizations of the left in “partnerships” with the International Finance Corporation, Vale, Cargill and others, mediated by organizations such as the Nature Conservancy, has gone a long way toward positing green development as the only alternative.

**The Study of Environmental Politics in Amazonia has Reduced Politics to Policy.**

International outcry over ecological devastation brought on by modernization gave the entire world a stake in Amazonian politics and effectively transformed Amazonian political conflict into “Environmental Politics.” The initiatives described in this dissertation taken to respond to and mitigate the destructive effects of development for the region – the consolidation of federal agencies and ministries, the creation of international and national environmental management supervisory apparatuses (PPG7, Sustainable Amazon Plan), and the dramatic increase in the number of NGOs through the course of the 1990s – and “re-work” Amazonian civil society into a more conciliatory
and participatory apparatus, centered on a program of sustainable development. As discussed in Chapter Three, this new, sustainable development paradigm was premised on the production of “the environment” as an object of research, and technical and scientific knowledge as the form of knowledge necessary to understand and therefore manage it. This, in turn, brought forth a new type of knowledge producer – the professional social and natural scientist, largely employed in one of the many new regional research organizations that have since become world leaders in the production of Amazonian data and analysis. These shifts amounted to a re-mapping of the Amazonian situation as a symptom of management failure whose ‘solution’ could be achieved by re-organizing the region to allow for “the rational use of natural resources.”

This re-mapping was premised on the radical separation of “the environment” from the political conditions of its production. Environmental problems could be delinked from their foundation in inequality and exploitation and re-deployed as technical problems of poor (e.g. “not rational”) management. Such issues could be resolved, then, by introducing rationality, either through the state, state-like structures of governance, or the market. It was precisely this radical separation of nature and politics that would allow organizations like the Nature Conservancy to say, as quoted in Chapter Two, that they are concerned with “deforestation” and not with politics, as if one might exist separately from the other.

The final conceptual move within this re-mapping of the Amazonian situation was a renewed concern with “local people.” The importance of local people to conservation was raised by scholars deeply committed to those people’s struggles and was enacted by

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131 On the “rational use of natural resources, see, for example, WWF’s website http://www.wwf.org.br/natureza_brasileira/reducao_de_impactos2/amazonia/amazonia_acoes/uso_sustentavel/
them as a move against former, more clearly colonialist, conservation models that excluded “local knowledges” (e.g. the fortress conservation model). The new, people-focused conservation assessed local people’s practices and conferred rights on them according to their potential as “community-based” resource managers - some of the contradictions of which were explored in Chapter Five, where local people are not always necessarily conservationists, or in Chapter Four, where the environmentalism of movements and managers is not the same.

Following from this, social movements were and are assessed according to their potential to contribute to environmental protection – by their capacity to move, from “chaos to conservation” (Schwartzman et al. 2010), from uncivil to civil. More radical, insurrectional or oppositional forms of resistance in this literature are treated as a primitive formation in a trajectory toward “participation” in full environmental citizenship (which in the current contexts means joining in round table agreements with Agro-industry and public audiences, NGO participatory mapping with NGOs and government agents, etc.). Direct oppositionality or a struggle for something beyond what is currently permitted within the bounds of the law is portrayed as “ideological” (For an emblematic example of this see Scholz 2005), and marginalized rural people without an explicitly environmentalist agenda lack access to political space.

Thus, over the past three decades, and even more so today in this moment of global environmental crisis, the Amazon is deeply politicized, but that politicization lies within an extremely narrow conception of what constitutes “the political.” Much like the neoliberal agenda as a whole, the field of politics in the Amazon has been reduced to issues of governance, sustainability, institutional politics, participation, citizenship and
public policy (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2011). It is not that one or the other of these is or is not political, but that the dominant outlook, be it political or intellectual, strictly circumscribes what is or is not acceptable, recognizable political behavior. This reductive treatment of politics is not simply an oversight in pursuit of a research agenda more concerned with environmental issues. Rather it is deeply invested in a liberal conception of the political that locates the site of politics only within the structures of the state or para-state institutions such as NGOs. It is a philosophy of politics that understands power as held by and emanating from the rulers and exercised on the ruled. In consequence, this approach understands social movements only in terms of their effectiveness in articulating with and/or influencing those who are already “hold” power. In taking the existing structures of power as given, this approach fails to recognize the basis of this structure within the production of massive, unequal and hierarchically organized exclusion, while it is exactly this foundation that many social movements challenge. Thus there is a vast and variegated field of politics rendered illegible within this paradigm.

**Politics in Amazonia must be re-thought.**

This is not to say that environmental research and in fact technical or positivist research does not have important applications, because I would argue that environmental problems are real and that this type knowledge is important to understanding them. However, when this framework is substituted for an analysis of politics, it has the effect of neutralizing the possibilities opened up by those engaging in political action – that is, engaging in action that challenges the very foundations of the given relations of power. That is also not to say that there have not been advances or changes in structures of governance that have been responsive to movement demands. This dissertation has tried
to argue that these paradigms, of participation, of inclusion, of multiculturalism, of progressive government, been the result of struggle, but that within the parameters of the new situation, there are, once again, significant contradictions and limitations.

If as scholars we reduce the new social realities being constructed to the existing frames of analysis, we risk limiting these actions to the same paradigms that colonized and oppressed their protagonists in the first place. This takes us back, to the proposition by Raquel Gutierrez cited in the introduction, to create a practical comprehension of events. This means being able to encounter the new strategies and knowledges enunciated in these moments of resistance and provide concepts for reflecting on their meanings and potentials. This is imperative, lest we risk reducing these actors to “backwards,” “needy,” and “uncivilized,” a status to which they have consistently been reduced to since colonization, thereby becoming unintentionally complicit in the ongoing re-production of the colonial project. From this position, on the simplest and most fundamental level this means changing our research questions. The question should not be whether movements achieve conservation or chaos, but rather, (following da Paula) how do Amazonians think emancipation from and within Amazonia?

One preliminary answer to this question that I have sketched out in this dissertation is that through a territorial strategy movements are seeking to break with both the oppressive forms of domination associated with the expansion of industrial extractivism and with the more “participatory” and ambiguous forms of politics associated with governance under “progressive” government. Some might read this strategy as completely within state logic. Territory is a legal category for land that people may access through processes of state recognition and it is true that through this legal
category, movements continue to struggle for state-based territorial rights, claiming areas that are fixed, bounded, calculable, and measurable. On the other hand, this category emerged in response to – and as an attempt to incorporate – the territorial strategies enacted by Amazonian movements in the 1980s and 90s, as addressed in Chapter Four, and the movements discussed here have argued that this form of recognition by the state has ultimately proven insufficient to re-produce their ways of living and themselves as collective subjects. Thus although they continue to engage state-based territorial struggle as a tactic, this tactic forms part of a larger strategy, as articulated in Chapters Four and Five respectively, for the reproduction of “life and culture” and for “the creation of the Resex by the people of the Resex.” In other words they are explicitly struggles for a collective political subject, and thus for a territoriality that is organized around the social relations of that subject rather than according to the static, measured, and regulated spaces allotted by the state. Whether this nascent strategic shift succeeds or fails or what success or failure might even mean is will only become apparent with more time. The lesson that we can take from them, however, is that in a moment of confusion, ambiguity and seeming “impasse” it is both possible and necessary (and also extremely difficult) to develop an ethic of resistance that is not premised on pre-existing radical exteriority to the state, but rather on the production of that exteriority, by using the elements of the given situation in order to create the conditions of possibility for transcending it.
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