AFTERMATH OF WAR: CYPRIOT CHRISTIANS AND MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS, 1571-1625

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ABSTRACT

MATTHEW LUBIN: Aftermath of War. Cypriot Christians and Mediterranean Geopolitics, 1571-1625
(Under the direction of Professor Melissa M. Bullard)

In the period after the Cyprus War of 1570-71, during which the Ottomans invaded and conquered Venetian-ruled Cyprus, many Cypriots chose to leave the island. Most chose to go to Italy, a favored destination since at least 1400 for waves of Christian Greeks fleeing the Ottoman Turkish advance. Large numbers attended the Greek College in Rome, while a smaller but significant number went to the University of Padua. This Cypriot diaspora played a critical role in the formation of Christian Cypriot identity, one that was built on an increased knowledge of the Greek past and was supported by the increased interest shown by Western Europeans, especially scholars in Venice, Padua, and Rome, not only in the ancient Greeks, but also in the Greeks of their own time. Using documentary and archival material from many parts of the Mediterranean, I trace many of those in this Cypriot diaspora, paying particular attention to the writings of the educated classes, and engage in prosopographical analysis to identify where Cypriot migrants went after the war, and where the evidence suggests they felt most comfortable, and how we can interpret their diverse activities, viewed keeping constantly in mind the complexity of this period in Mediterranean geopolitics, when Ottoman-Christian warfare in the eastern Mediterranean theatre, having shifted from the sea to the land, that is, to the Balkans and Hungary, was no longer so pronounced in the vicinity of Cyprus. I argue that the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus was central to the formation of a distinct Greek Cypriot identity and the single most important event for Cypriot state formation, and also that Christian Cypriots after the war found themselves
in an unsettled state, with their loyalties and identities, both political and religious, tugged at in several directions. The Cypriots were pulled between several claimants. Their Byzantine heritage meant that they were part of a larger Greek Orthodox world. At the same time, from the Latin West, Catholic Savoy and Venice launched a polemical battle over who had the stronger claim to Cyprus, even at a time when neither could realistically reconquer the island; Catholic Spain and Tuscany, too, became involved in projects to recapture the island for what they called Christendom, even as the Muslim Ottomans tried to win Cypriot loyalty, and also to guarantee control of the island both by moving in thousands of Muslims, and, though the evidence is confusing, possibly Christians, from Anatolia as well, and by planting garrisons. I conclude that this period is of crucial importance for understanding developments on Cyprus much later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and also in understanding the polemics that continue even today, in discussions of the Cypriot past and the relevance of that past to contemporary claims and counter-claims.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments and Note on the Text....................................................... v

Preface............................................................................................................... vii

Introduction: Revisiting the Problem of Cypriot State Formation..................1

Chapter One: Latin-Orthodox Relations and Orthodox Identity
in the Aftermath of the Cyprus War............................................................. 40

Chapter Two: Spain, the Orthodox World, and Cyprus.......................... 115

Chapter Three: French and Savoyard Links to Cyprus, and their Role in
Cypriot Cultural Survival.............................................................................. 184

Chapter Four: Venice and the Cypriot Christians: Postwar Developments
in a Long Relationship................................................................................... 247

Chapter Five: Prospects for the Christian Population of Cyprus.................. 308

Conclusion..................................................................................................... 356

Appendices..................................................................................................... 370

Appendix 1: Latin Text of Selected Capites, or Chapters, of the
Agreement forming the Holy League, June 1571.................................... 370

Appendix 2: Transcription and Translation of the Sultanic Order of
February 15, 1570/9 Ramazan 977............................................................... 373

Appendix 3 – Transcription of the Sultanic Order of May 6, 1572
(23 Dhu al-Hicce, 979 Anno Hegirae) on the Just Treatment of the
Cypriots........................................................................................................ 375

Works Cited.................................................................................................... 378
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Note on the Text

I have adhered to the conventions of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* in transcribing Ottoman and Arabic, and I have followed their suggestion, if an English equivalent exists for a word, to use it. Not all Ottoman titles, however, are equally well known in English, so I make no claim to perfect consistency. Thus, I have used *pasha* and not *paşa*, but *beğlerbeğ* and not *beylerbey*. I take consolation in the thought that the Ottoman language in this period was no more standardized than were Italian, French, and English. Regarding geographical terms, these are for many people not neutral and agreed-upon, but fraught with political significance. Whether one uses Constantinople or Istanbul, Anatolia or Asia Minor can arouse unintended animosity. I have chosen to use *Constantinople* since the point of view of the dissertation is that of the Christian Cypriots in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and *Kostantiniye* was, after all, a term in widespread use at this time even among the Ottomans. All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
Preface

In the annals of all of its participants, the Cyrus War (1570-71) stood out for the length of its sieges, the heroism of its participants, and the close-fought nature of its two major campaigns, those of Nicosia and Famagusta. But many of the Greek-speaking Orthodox of the island identified the trials of this war with a previous disaster in their collective memory: the Fall of Constantinople. The Cyprus War was fought over an island, the third largest in the Mediterranean, at a time when the lands of that sea’s littoral, and the islands in that sea, were being contested by a new and powerful neighbor to the east, the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, descendants of a Turkic confederation in Central Asia, the Oğuz, had emerged from a principality in northwest Asia Minor to steadily conquer all of Anatolia, as well as parts of southeastern Europe. Over a century before, in May, 1453, they had extinguished the principal bastion of Greek rule in the former Byzantine empire, by conquering Constantinople, for a millennium one of the largest, richest, most powerful cities in Christendom. And once Constantinople was firmly in their hands, the Ottomans did not cease their military campaigns. They moved across the Mediterranean and southward, into North Africa (from the 1510s on), Syria and Egypt (1516-17), Rhodes (1522), Yemen (beginning in 1538) and Ethiopia (where the Ottoman province of Habes was established in 1554), as well as eastward against their Persian foes. Controlling the southern and eastern littorals of the Mediterranean, the Ottomans were in a strong position to wage a sea campaign against their Christian enemies, and by the time they decided to invade, Cyprus was surrounded on three sides by lands that were now firmly in Ottoman hands. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Venetians, rulers of Cyprus since 1489 – even though they at times had been allies of
the Ottomans against the Portuguese – had little reason to feel confident that their rule on Cyprus would last.

To many in the modern world Cyprus may appear to be a backwater. In pre-modern times Cyprus had been known mainly as a frequent site of earthquakes, plagues, and locust infestations, but this had not prevented the island from becoming, during the Middle Ages, an economic center in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus was strategically situated, forty miles from Anatolia, a hundred miles from the coast of Syria. The Cypriot port of Famagusta had flourished, especially around the year 1300, as a place where traders came from all over the Mediterranean to do business. The island also stood athwart the sea lanes, both those of Muslim pilgrims from Anatolia and travelling by ship for the first part of their journey, and those of Christian pilgrims from Europe making their way to and from the Holy Land. But after the Ottoman conquest, the shift of the main theatre of Ottoman-Christian warfare from the Mediterranean sea to the lands of southeastern Europe, and the lack of any Christian outposts around Cyprus, meant that the Ottomans began to treat Cyprus as a backwater, and to send their political and religious undesirables there.

So varied, so unusual, and for many at times so confusing, is the political history of Cyprus, that it deserves to be set out here, for the ease of readers, in stark chronological form. Since 58 B.C. Cyprus had formed part of the Roman Empire. In 649 A.D. it was invaded by Caliph al-Mu‘awiya, and a condominium that was agreed to with joint Arab and Byzantine rule lasted from 649 until 965. In that year the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus Phocas rid the island of its Arab co-rulers. In 1191, the would-be Byzantine usurper, Isaac Comnenus, assumed control. On his way to the Third Crusade,
Richard I of England invaded Cyprus and defeated Isaac. Richard then sold the island to
the Knights Hospitallers in 1191 but the latter, realizing they could neither control nor
administer the island, sold it back to Richard in 1192, and he then sold it to a member of
the French nobility of Poitou, Guy de Lusignan.

Now began the two periods of Western rule that immediately preceded the Cyprus
War and the Ottoman takeover of the island. The Lusignan successor to Guy, Amalric,
took the title of King in 1196. Members of the Lusignan family continued to rule over
what was considered their property, the island of Cyprus, until 1489. In that year, Venice
convinced the widow of the last Lusignan, herself a Venetian noblewoman, to transfer
Cyprus to Venice, and to abdicate. Venice then ruled the island from 1489 until 1571,
when the Ottomans defeated her, and the rest of the Holy League, and took Cyprus.
Ottoman rule continued on Cyprus from 1571 until 1878.

I have, in the following work, tried to deal with the varied aspects of the Cyprus
War, and with what I call the aftermath of that war, that is its consequences for those who
participated in it, but mainly, its consequences for the people living on Cyprus
themselves. Historians of Cyprus – those outside of Turkey – have generally shared a
consensus view that Cyprus had been largely isolated from the European mainstream for
much of its history before the Ottoman conquest, and even more so after its conquest by
the Ottomans. Indeed, it was believed by Western historians that the conquest of Cyprus
by the Ottomans in 1570-71 meant that Cyprus saw the Renaissance pass it largely by,
suffered a kind of Renaissance manquée, and a return to an even deeper isolation, at the
very time when, in any case, European energies were being turned away from the eastern
Mediterranean and toward the Atlantic, where new discoveries meant new riches for European powers.

In this dissertation I assemble the evidence to dismantle this picture of Cypriot isolation and to show how, even in what historiography paints as the darkest part of their history, the Greek Christians of Cyprus deliberately maintained links with their own past and successfully transmitted a coherent identity from generation to generation, with help from a large diaspora in Western Europe, mainly in Italy. I have tried to give the proper attention to many aspects of the Cyprus War and its aftermath. There is the geopolitical aspect, which includes the fascinating possibility that the successes, and new riches, at this very moment, of Spain in the New World was a distraction that prevented Spain from full-throttle engagement with, and commitment of sufficient forces to, the Holy League against the Ottoman invasion. And this may have contributed, inadvertently, to the Ottoman victory and consolidation of Ottoman power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Another geopolitical consequence of the war was the later attempts of Cypriot Greeks in exile to win Spanish backing for an attempt to retake Cyprus from the Ottomans.

There is the cultural aspect, that is the relations of the Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus, and those who left Cyprus to study and live outside, chiefly in Italy, with those they called the Latin Christians. This cultural aspect of the Cyprus War’s aftermath includes the new appreciation, in Western Europe, for Greek civilization and its products – literary, artistic, historical – not only from the time of classical Antiquity, but up to, and including, the early modern period.

There is the religious aspect, which includes the relations of Greeks and Latins (that is, Catholics) on Cyprus, and the ways that divisions based on theology were either
overcome, or overlooked, in the face of a threat from a shared infidel (i.e., non-Christian) threat. And the religious aspects of the Cyprus War included the reversion, as the Ottomans thought of it, of formerly Muslim territory to Muslim rule. The role of, and effect, of the imposition of the Holy Law of Islam, or shari’a, on Cyprus, and the imposition of the cizye, a tax on non-Muslims, and its role in affecting Greek Cypriots in their decisions to emigrate, and the contours of the modus vivendi, rather than that comforting but implausible convivencia that some suggest was established on Cyprus, between a largely Christian populace and their Muslim masters, is also discussed.

Finally, I have treated the historiographical problem. That is, Cyprus has been a subject dealt with mostly by Greek and, latterly, Turkish historians, and in both cases, a nationalist viewpoint has hindered attempts at objectivity. There have been remarkable exceptions, such as the English historian George Hill, but he was English, and he, and others like him, remain exceptions. It is only recently that many historians, including non-Greeks and non-Turks, have dealt with the subject of Cyprus, and with aspects of the Cyprus War, without the passion of parti pris and without viewing a war that took place four hundred years ago through the prism of another war, between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, that took place scarcely four decades ago. But because Cyprus remains a burning issue, as what had merely smoldered for centuries appeared to flame anew in 1974, with no firemen as yet having proved adequate to the task of extinguishing those flames, dispassion is the chiefllest of historical virtues in those who would treat of any subject having Cyprus at its center.
Introduction

The Place of the Cyprus War in the Formation of Greek Cypriot Identity

War has played a decisive role in the establishment of many early modern states and in generating national identities. ¹ Though many events have befallen Cyprus since the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1570-71, though our very language for thinking about countries and identity has changed, still that war looms large even today in the collective memories of Greeks, Turks, and Venetians alike. The interactions among those groups and their intersecting memories, together with those of other European players that contributed to the emergence of a Greek Cypriot sense of identity in the decades following the Cyprus War constitute the main subject of investigation in this study.

In order to begin to unravel the complex tangle of events and peoples, memories and beliefs in postwar Cyprus, let us start by recapping the major events of the war. On the eve of war Cyprus was a territory which since 1489 had been under Venetian rule, which lay at the intersection of Ottoman sea routes between Constantinople, grain-rich Egypt, breadbasket of the Empire, and Mecca, but the political status was complicated by the fact that from 1489 to 1570 the Venetians had also paid, first to the Egyptian Mamluk sultanate and, after the fall of the Mamluks, to their Ottoman successors, a tribute of eight thousand ducats annually in acknowledgment of those powers’ suzerainty over the island. In 1570, as they had been

¹ War’s importance in early modern state formation is explored, for example, by Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan. Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Machiavelli, who was preoccupied with newly-formed states, broke them down into categories based on the manner of their acquisition, and clearly regarded war as one of the most important ways in which states came into being and then maintained their existence. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter VII, “About New States Acquired with Other People’s Arms and by Good Luck,” trans. Robert M. Adams (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992): 18-24, and his Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
increasingly since the fourteenth century, the Ottomans were in an expansionist phase, having recently besieged the Knights of St. John on Malta – though vainly – in 1565, assumed control on Chios bloodlessly from Genoa in 1566, and sent an expedition to crush a rebellion in Yemen in 1568. Selim II, sultan since 1566, had vowed to erect a grand imperial mosque in Edirne, ancient Adrianople, a former seat of the Ottoman sultans, and to do so with money raised from a war against those he considered infidels. One particular episode of piracy, seems especially to have irritated the Ottomans and focused their attention on the island. In 1569 the Ottoman treasurer of Egypt was captured by pirates off of Cyprus, seemingly under the very noses of the Venetian authorities, who, if they were aware of the incident, did nothing to assist the Egyptian vessel when it was attacked. According to several Ottoman chroniclers the Venetians denied responsibility for this outrage, laying it instead at the feet of pirates from Messina and Malta.

In addition to ire over such piratical incidents, Selim II was thought (according to a widespread legend of indeterminate origin) to covet the wine of Cyprus, and to be of generally warlike temperament. As early as 1550, when Selim was still a young prince, Bernardo Navagero, Venetian ambassador and community head or bailò in Constantinople, had already warned Venice that Selim might eventually attack Cyprus. Upon attaining the throne in 1566, Selim made his desire to take Cyprus an open secret, and the Venetians accordingly fortified the island with the most advanced fortifications then employed, consisting of oblique-angled star-

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2 The German pilgrim Reinhold Lubenau, who travelled to Cyprus in 1588, recorded that the majestic Selimiye mosque in Edirne was paid for with the spoils of the Cyprus campaign. See Lubenau, Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau (Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1995), 1:119.


shaped bastions to deflect cannonades. They also increased their garrisons in Nicosia and
Famagusta. After the kidnapping of the Ottoman treasurer for Egypt in 1569 went unpunished,
an act Selim II saw as an especially egregious instance of Christian piracy, he obtained a
religious *responsum* issued by his sheikh-ül-Islam, Ebü’s-su’ud Efendi. Ebü’s-su’ud gave his
approval for an invasion of Cyprus, both to suppress the infidel pirates and to rectify what he
considered the criminal neglect of Muslim schools and mosques – *mudaris ü mesacid* – on the
island.\(^5\) These latter were likely remnants of the Byzantine-Arab condominium on the island in
the early Middle Ages, but possibly originated in small Muslim merchant communities from
Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia that had settled on Venetian-ruled Cyprus.\(^6\) Whatever the case,
preparations for the Ottoman invasion were on an enormous scale for the time. A massive fleet
was assembled in Istanbul and in Anatolian ports closer to Cyprus. Though the Ottoman
chroniclers do not record figures for the armies of this campaign, rumors ran that no less than
200,000 soldiers were dispatched to the island, an island the entire population of which was
probably less than 200,000 at this date.\(^7\) The bulk of the campaigning was directed against the
two largest cities, first the administrative capital, Nicosia, which capitulated in September, 1570,
and then Famagusta, with its newly strengthened fortifications and a reasonably large garrison,
one that was slightly increased, over the course of the war, by reinforcements from the sea. At
about this same time, a second, minor front opened up along the Venetian-Ottoman border in
Albania and Dalmatia. Famagusta held out hope of reinforcement from the sea, and continued to
resist until August of 1571 when it, too, finally capitulated under siege. In the rural hinterlands,

\(^{5}\) This phrase appears in the full text of Ebūsuud’s *fatwa*, Ottoman fetva, reproduced in *Tarih-i Peçuylu*, 486.

\(^{6}\) The Byzantine-Arab condominium on Cyprus had lasted from 648 to 965.

the Turkish army fought occasional skirmishes, and these more remote areas did not go through anything like the drama at Nicosia and Famagusta. The latter, when it fell, witnessed the execution of the Venetian commander Marcantonio Bragadin. Bragadin’s being flayed alive at the order of the Ottoman commander, Lala [“The Tutor”] Mustafa Pasha, became in Christendom the subject of an early Black Legend told to illustrate Turkish cruelty and perfidy.  

Bragadin’s death was the penultimate act in the drama of the Cyprus War. The last major development in this war, the Battle of Lepanto, was fought on October 7, 1571. By that date, Cyprus was already lost to Venice. The anticlimactic battle, fought off the coast of Central Greece by the fleet of the Holy League, some 240 ships strong, that had been formed by Venice, Spain, and the Papacy as well as other Catholic states, and an Ottoman fleet numbering about 300 vessels, resulted in a resounding Christian victory. The Battle of Lepanto became subject of another legend, that of the now-demonstrated ability of Christian forces to defeat the Ottomans in battle. At that time, however, in what many have taken to be a sign of encroaching feebleness in the Venetian state which was financially strained to the breaking point, Venice ignored the wishes of her allies, and signed a unilateral peace in Constantinople in March 1573. By this treaty, Venice agreed to yield Cyprus formally to the Ottomans, to pay the large sum of 300,000

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8 Niccolò Capponi, *Victory of the West* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 236. Capponi chooses the words “Ottoman – indeed Muslim – duplicity.” In the interests of recalling the language used in another age, it is worth remembering that the words used for the people referred to (with a considerable measure of sheer imagination and demonization) in this period and for centuries afterward in all European languages for these treacherous folk were Turk, Turc, Turck, and cognates. When Lazzaro Soranzo’s *L’Ottomano* (Ferrara: Vittorio Baldini, 1599) was published, the title referred to the Sultan himself, and the ruling dynasty of the Empire, the house of Osman.

9 Capponi, *Victory of the West*, 258-59, enumerates 213 Ottoman galleys and 33 galiots, smaller versions of the galley in the front squadrons, with more and smaller ships held in reserve. On the Christian side, he counts (at 261-262) 172 galleys in the advance squadrons, 30 more in the reserve, which also featured some 40 small brigantines and frigates. Since there were a variety of ship sizes on each side, it is not certain that the disparity in manpower available to each side was great.
ducats in war damages,\textsuperscript{10} and to return Dalmatia’s border to the \textit{status quo ante bellum}. Venice’s will to fight had likely been further weakened by her suspicions of Spain, her ally in the Holy League, Venetian commanders had quarrelled with the Spanish over many matters, including whether to concentrate on North Africa or on the Levant, where Venetian economic interests were stronger. There were other disagreements, too, over who should command each ally’s contingent in the fleet of the Holy League, the order of precedence among the commanders and their ships – crucial in a status-conscious age – and over the speed and timing of each campaign.

Whether accurately or not, in the popular view among Greek-speakers, Turkish-speakers, and Venetians alike, this war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire for control of Cyprus led directly, and more than any subsequent conflict, even the recent even if militarily small-scale Turkish invasion of 1974, to Cyprus taking on its present-day character, divided on ethnic, linguistic, and religious grounds. The animosity between Turkey and Greece, and Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot, and nationalist polemics in both countries, have led to very different – Greek and Turkish – historical accounts, two different narratives about the Cyprus War and its succeeding period, that cannot be reconciled with one another. When strong, even black-and-white claims emerge, skepticism seems called for. Throughout the dissertation I have referred where relevant to some of these historiographical themes that are unlikely to be familiar to a broad English-speaking audience. An extension of the Black Legend surrounding the \textit{Tourkokratia}, the period of Turkish rule, for example, has been the Renaissance \textit{manquée} argument put forth by such literary historians as Borje Knös, who has argued that the Turkish conquest strangled the intellectual influence of European Renaissance ideas in their infancy on

\textsuperscript{10} At a period when the average daily wage of a master builder in Venice, plying a highly skilled profession, was approximately 7.5 ducats. Joanne Ferraro, \textit{Marriage Wars in Late Renaissance Venice} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), xv.
Cyprus. Knös’ view developed further the earlier ideas of Konstantinos Sathas, Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Philippos Georgiou and Loizos Philippou that considered the period of Turkish rule to have been a disaster for the Greek-speaking peoples, one where they toiled in poverty and ignorance, with ample blame placed on the westerners who abandoned them to their fate. And these writers assigned blame aplenty to the “Turks” – in quotation marks, since the term served more as a catchall in these early years of professional historical study of Cyprus, than a carefully considered ethnic designator – who inflicted this misery upon them. These works took literary evidence seriously; this is one of their merits. A less kind reading of their use of Greek poems and historians from the early modern period, however, is that these historians were too uncritical in their use of their material, or identified too closely with the point of view of the authors of that material, whom they may have regarded as partaking of an essential Greek spirit, like themselves. This meant that, when Ottoman-language archival material became available even to Greeks in the 1950s, and when Greeks began to learn Turkish more often, and Turks Greek (though neither is yet common even today, and even at universities), very different source materials and points of view became apparent, and could be fit into these older narratives only with extreme difficulty. The culture shock for those raised on this older literature must have been considerable, as the practice of Ottoman history has come, understandably, to employ Ottoman-language sources more and more.


12 Relevant works include Konstantinos Sathas, Τουρκοκρατουμενη Ἑλλας (Athens: Koromelas, 1869), especially noting the constant contrast of slavery and liberation at at 1-3 and 644-5; Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Η ζωή της Εκκλησίας και του Ελληνικού Γένους εν τω Τουρκικω κρατει (Athens: Phoinikos, 1935), 37-40, on enslaved Christians; Loizos Philippou, Τα ελληνικα γραμματα εν Κυπρῳ κατα την περιοδον της Τουρκοκρατιας, 1571-1878 (Nicosia: Hypsilanti, 1930), 1-34, and Philippous Georgiou, Ειδήσεις ιστορικαι περι της εκκλησιας Κυπρου (Athens: Zavalle, 1975).
More recently, a large body of literature has emerged on the 1570-73 Cyprus War and its aftermath, which has presented Ottoman rule in a highly favorable light compared with the preceding Venetian period. In a curious reversal of older historiographical stocks-in-trade about what took place when the Ottomans conquered Christian areas in the eastern Mediterranean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, much of this literature has argued that it was the earlier Venetian government that caused misery on Cyprus. Neglect, sloth, corruption, excessive taxation and maladministration, as well as religious fanaticism, are thus linked, not with the Ottomans, as in earlier European history-writing, but with their Venetian predecessors on Cyprus – as well as with the Spanish, Venice’s allies in the Holy League who had sought to preserve Cyprus for Christendom. In the fourth chapter I present archival documents as evidence that supports the following: Venetian efforts at fortification, consistent Venetian concern for how the Greeks on Cyprus perceived them; finally, attention to education and to public works, and good treatment of many Cypriot Greeks who migrated to Venice in the wake of the Cyprus War. I argue from this evidence that the Venetian regime no more deserves this Black Legend than the Ottoman regime that succeeded it deserved to be tarred with its own version – and perhaps less.

The origins of Cypriot nationalism, have been the subject of much contradictory interpretation. I have tried to focus the debate using the language of the time, though language can at times mask underlying changes in social and political realities. I suggest that patriotic

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13 On the subject of the relief of the economic burdens of the Cypriot peasantry, a central figure has been Halil Inalcık, as in his “Ottoman Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest,” reprinted in Inalcık, The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Empire, and Society (Ashgate: Variorum, 1978), as well as Halil Inalcık, The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age (London: Prager, 1994 [1973]). This work, as well as Aikaterini Aristeidou’s edited collections of documents, Documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire de Chypre tirés des Archives de Venise, 4 Vols. (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1990-2003), and the section of Kostas Kyrris’ History of Cyprus (Nicosia: Nicocles Publishing, 1985) devoted to the period of Venetian rule, and Halil Fikret Alasya’s discussion of the Venetian period in his The Privileges granted to the Orthodox Archbishopric of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969), especially 6-12, present examples of the Black Legend of Venetian rule on Cyprus mentioned above. Benjamin Arbel of the University of Tel Aviv has analyzed this legend in “Entre mythe et histoire: la légende noire de la domination vénitienne à Chypre,” in Cyprus, the Franks and Venice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), XIV, 85-107.
sentiments – though this was not “nationalism” – are already discernible in Cypriot textual sources of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and that this feeling persisted into the Venetian period and beyond.\textsuperscript{14} That Cypriot national sentiments were inclusionary of all Christians, and not rigidly confessional in the sense of antagonistic towards those Christians who observed the European Latin rite is suggested by the diction of a major chronicle, that of the Cypriot Leontios Machairas. Machairas wrote in the middle of the fifteenth century, during the period of Latin rule. His \textit{Chronicle of the Sweet Land of Cyprus} referred to the Byzantine emperors in Constantinople by the prestigious title of \textit{βασιλεύς} (emperor), while calling the Lusignan kings in Nicosia by the lesser title \textit{ρήγας} (king). This, and similar turns of phrase in his chronicle, have sometimes been interpreted as indicating his “Greek nationalism.”\textsuperscript{15} But there are significant leaps of logic involved in going from an observation of Machairas’ respectful treatment of the Byzantine Emperor to the suggestion that he or other Greek-speakers on Cyprus were under the sway of the old grandiose ideas of a Byzantine \textit{oikoumene}, or that politically, before the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, they would, if pushed, have chosen Byzantine rule, as that of their fellow “Greeks,” over Latin rule.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Armenians, for example, made up a separate corps in the Lusignans’ army. But militating against any idea of strict segregation on Lusignan Cyprus, at least among the elite is the fact that the Lusignan rulers contracted marriage alliances with the kings of Cilician Armenia in the fourteenth century. The Armenians may have shared more culturally and found cultural assimilation easier, with the Latins of medieval Cyprus, than with the Greeks. That, at least, is what Gerard Dedeyan suggests in “The Armenians in Cyprus during and after the Ottoman Conquest,” Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas and Marina Elia, eds. \textit{The Minorities of Cyprus} (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), 53 and 65–67. Dedeyan also observes some related Latin-Armenian developments, such as that the last king of Christian Armenia, Leo V, ended his life in the monastery of the Celestines, in Paris. Greek-Armenian relations deserve their own analysis. The accounts of Dedeyan and others of Armenian relations with Christians on Lusignan and Venetian-ruled Cyprus are limited almost exclusively to relations between Armenians and Latins, not with the Orthodox.


\textsuperscript{16} For the Chronicle of Leontios Machairas, see the introduction and notes in the recent edition by Isabelle Cervellin-Chevalier, \textit{Une histoire du doux pays de Chypre: traduction du manuscrit de Venise} (Besançon: Praxandre, 2002), as well as \textit{Πρακτικα συμποσιου: Λεοντιος Μαχαιρας - Γεωργιος Βουστρονιος, δυο χρονικα της μεσαιωνικης Κυπρου}. 

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A different kind of evidence that historians of art have adduced has been that of dedicatory inscriptions in Cypriot churches. Andreas and Judith Stylianou have found that Cypriot church donors continued to mention the Byzantine emperors in their inscriptions (and to use the Byzantine chronological system) down to just a few years before the fall of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{17} This evidence, too, is hardly sufficient to demonstrate convincingly a Cypriot identification as Greeks, and proudly so, as opposed to such alternative possible identities as European Latins, Syrians, Muslims, or others. Rather, the weight of tradition which innumerable artistic vocabularies have exhibited, and the indifference of Latin authorities, may have led Greek-speakers to continue to dedicate churches in the same fashion that their forefathers had done when Cyprus had been either a Byzantine possession or held in condominium, a period that extended from the origins of the Byzantine empire to 1191.

I favor a position between the extremes of those who would idealize the pre-modern situation as one where, in the words of a prominent historian of the Balkans, “ethnicity did not matter,”\textsuperscript{18} and those who think Cyprus has possessed a clear and unambiguously Hellenic identity from antiquity to the present day. Some of those who study national, or even pan-Hellenic, sentiment among Greek Cypriots and the Greek diaspora more generally, in Venice, Crete and elsewhere write as though either “national” or “Hellenic” are uncomplicated concepts and terms that can be employed without further explanation for the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Such approaches are insufficiently nuanced. Sally McKee has suggested

\textsuperscript{17} Andreas and Judith Stylianou, “Donors and Dedicatory Inscriptions, Supplicants and Supplications in the Painted Churches of Cyprus,” \textit{Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft} 9 (1960), 97-128.

that Venice was obsessed with myths about the ethnic purity of its own settlers and accordingly policed the boundaries of ethnicity in Cyprus, Crete, and in the rest of its Stato da Mar.\(^\text{19}\) I suggest that perhaps as a result of Venetian discouragement of Greek separatist tendencies on Cyprus, the genesis of Greek national feeling (at least on Cyprus) – a feeling born of collective traditions and shared memories – arrived much later than has sometimes been allowed by some, such as Gilles Grivaud, who has written of a national awakening in the thirteenth century. Others will not admit the application of the term “nationalism” in any meaningful sense before the period of the American and of the French Revolutions, that is, the late eighteenth century.\(^\text{20}\) But rather than locate the stirrings of any nascent nationalism back in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries,\(^\text{21}\) I argue that two later events, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and then the loss of Cyprus to the Ottomans in 1570-71, did more than any other historical events to shape the Greek Cypriot consciousness, and its national self-awareness, as it exists today, at least until the French

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\(^{19}\) Sally McKee, *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). It appears that this “proto-nationalist” approach is more common among historians of literature than of political or economic matters; e.g. Borje Knös, *Histoire de la littérature néo-grecque* (Uppsala: Almqvist, 1962). Knös, together with many others, Greek and non-Greek, considers a number of medieval works in Greek including the *Achilleiad*, written to reflect national pride (“fierté nationale,”) and a “Greek reaction against Frankish rule” (“réaction grecque contre la domination franque,”) 137. Among the older literature, however, Konstantinos Sathas in *Τουρκοκρατουμενη Ελλας* [Greece under Turkish Rule] (Athens: K. Kamarinopoulou, 1962 [1877]), 1, devoted all of his attention to what appears to have been the original title of the book – what he called Απάτσια προς άπαξελήφωση των Έλληνων από της Τουρκικής δουλείας [Attempts at the Liberation of the Greeks from Turkish Slavery]. Studies of the language of nationality and ethnicity in fifteenth-century Cypriot writing (concentrating on the *Chronicle of the Sweet Land of Cyprus* by the chronicler Leontios Machairas, from the 1420s) include Michel Zink, “Groupes nationaux, sociaux et religieux en Chypre au XVIe siècle vues par Estienne de Lusignan,” *Πρακτικα του πρωτου διεθνους Κυπρολογικου Συνεδριου* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973) and Charis Demetriou, “Big Structures, Social Boundaries, and Identity in Cyprus, 1400-1700,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 51 (2008), 1477-1497.

\(^{20}\) These are the starting points, for example, for the recent study by Lloyd Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures and Identities since 1775* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

Revolution in 1789. No Rigas Velestinlis or Adamantios Koraes, to take two Greek advocates of the Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century, emerged on Cyprus in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, nor were there advocates of reduced privileges for the Ottoman ruling class, of course, in the later spirit of the French Revolution, but as we shall see, projects for the liberation of Cyprus from the Ottomans were ubiquitous, and embraced laymen and clergy alike. Such projects were at least “revolutionary” in the limited sense that they would have meant a tremendous shift away from Ottoman institutions and practices that were felt to be both new, and extremely alien.

I do not think, in other words, that Greek national feeling was a medieval phenomenon, but neither is it a concept that can be regarded as anachronistic if employed before the French Revolution or even the Greek war of independence in 1821. Rather, the 1570-71 war over Cyprus was a catalytic event in its formation. Since there was in the centuries before 1570 virtually no Muslim population on the island, save a few transient merchants and their slaves, to constitute a Turkish Cypriot identity, the war for Cyprus set the processes of ethnogenesis for both peoples, those we now call Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in motion. This process began based largely, I argue, on the pronounced religious distinctions that were maintained between the Cypriot Orthodox and their new Muslim rulers, so that a group of crypto-Christians known as Linovamvakoi emerged, practicing Christianity in secret, while benefitting from the social privileges of adherence to Islam. Yet many questions remain about the circumstances of the establishment of the new Ottoman regime. Did the change in ruler lighten the economic burden for Cypriot peasants, as has in recent decades become an accepted commonplace among

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22 And they have been often treated as such, as in Knös, Histoire de la littérature néo-grecque, 185.
some English-speaking historians and archaeologists of this period?\textsuperscript{23} Did it lighten the tax burden on the Cypriot church?\textsuperscript{24} The answers to these questions are by no means so clearly affirmative as some recent Turkish scholarship gives it to be understood.\textsuperscript{25} Did the change to an Ottoman regime nip in the bud on Cyprus the same kind of cultural flowering and Greek-Latin mutual influences that had been taking place at this very time in Venetian Crete, several hundred miles to the west of Cyprus? Did it put paid to nascent attempts on the part of some Venetians to learn, at more than a superficial level, about the Ottomans, their language and culture, as Francesca Lucchetta and others have suggested?\textsuperscript{26}

To be able to answer these questions, certain large groups of sources have been especially useful. The first group of sources is the correspondence undertaken by numerous Cypriots, and in some cases by Spanish officials writing on their behalf, with the Kings of Spain after 1571, in

\textsuperscript{23} As in Michael Given, “Agriculture, settlement and landscape in Ottoman Cyprus,” \textit{Levant} 32 (2000), 218: “The harsh Venetian taxes were reduced and rationalised…”

\textsuperscript{24} A lightening of the tax burden on the Orthodox Church would certainly run counter to some of the statements in such primary sources for early modern Cyprus, as the account of Kievan monk Basil Barsky, who made four trips to Cyprus in the 1720s and 1730s and reported considerable economic difficulties among monasteries: Basil Barsky, \textit{A Pilgrim’s Account of Cyprus: Bars’kyj’s Travels in Cyprus}, introd. and trans. Alexander D. Grishin (Altamont: Greece and Cyprus Research Center, 1996). Of the monastery of St. Mamas, in north central Cyprus near modern Morphou, Barsky reported that “At one time this monastery, during the rule of Christians, was rich and had numerous monks, but now it is poor and has few monks…the Turks impose heavy dues in envy of its fine architecture.” (Barsky, 20). Of monasteries in general, Barsky observed (Barsky, 28) that “…in the main [Greek] monasteries there could be as many as fifty or a hundred monks. Apart from these, there are many others which are deserted and in ruins because of the crippling taxes and intolerable persecution by the Turks.” When Barsky visited the monastery of Saint Paraskeve, near Kyrenia, (Barsky, 34) he made a point to note that “\textit{Unlike} other monasteries, this one does not face high taxes from the Turks, as it is a possession of Mount Sinai, and owns many fields for plowing and a considerable number of olive trees, and therefore has a sufficiency in bread, wine, and oil.” [italics mine]. While Barsky sometimes exaggerated the depredations of Turks, it would seem logical that the rumors and fears he reports are valuable evidence for how Cypriot Christians saw the regime at the time, as opposed to how we moderns might wish that, as rational actors, they had seen their circumstances.

\textsuperscript{25} At least for monasteries, the testimony of Barsky (above) on their crushing tax burden under the Turks should not be ignored, although some monasteries such as Kykkos were able to continue to thrive.

\textsuperscript{26} Francesca Lucchetta, of the University of Venice, has argued that the Venetian attempt to institutionalize and diffuse instruction in Turkish and the local mores of Turkey to provide for a permanent corps of dragomans—a corps known as the \textit{giovanoni di lingua}, literally the Youths of Language -- was set back by the Cyprus War. Lucchetta, “\textit{La Scuola dei ’Giovani di Lingua},’ Veneti nei secoli XVI e XVII,” \textit{Quaderni di Studi Arabi} 7 (1989), 23-4.
efforts to gain the ransoming of their families, pensions for themselves for faithful service, and concrete aid in planning campaigns to liberate the island from Muslim rule. These are letters advocating a certain course of action, and therefore are crammed with the honeyed words one might expect from those seeking favors. Yet, written over a period of many decades (Hassiotis’ two collections begin in 1578 and conclude in 1623-4) and concerning men of diverse class origins and many different walks of life, these letters constitute valuable evidence nonetheless and complement the material used by Ronald Jennings in his recent study of the Ottoman court records in Nicosia between 1571 and 1640.27 A third group of sources relevant to the fate of Christian Cypriots after 1571 is a series of letters emanating from the papal chancery, the thousand or so litterae hortatoriae preserved today in the Vatican Secret Archive, studied by W. H. Rudt de Collenberg for the period between 1571 and 1600.28 These letters were written by the popes on behalf of poor Christians who could not afford to ransom themselves. This group of sources are of limited worth for the history of Greek Orthodox from Cyprus since, though names are an unreliable guide to Greek or Latin identification, it appears that the great majority of the people whose cases attracted the attentions of successive popes were Latin Catholics.29 The letters nevertheless remind us of the number of Cypriot Christians of both Latin and Greek confessions enslaved and taken away by new Ottoman masters, above all to Constantinople, after the war. Some have suggested that there was considerable Orthodox sympathy for the Ottoman


28 Wipertus H. Rudt de Collenberg, Esclavage et rançons des chrétiens en Méditerranée (1570-1600) (Paris: Léopard d’Or, 1987). Concerning the dates of the extant letters, Collenberg points out that there is a complete lack of known letters from Though a few letters from later years may exist, which the present author plans to search for, it is only logical and natural that after 1600 there was a petering out of the number of Christians enslaved decades earlier during the Cyprus War whom the popes learned of for the first time and attempted to ransom.

29 See the chart of nearly 300 Cypriots captured during the Cyprus War provided in Collenberg, Esclavage, 100-161.
cause on Cyprus. If, as I think was the case, the Greek-Latin division among people on Cyprus was of comparatively little importance while the war was being fought, since conflict with the Turks tended to drive Christians to make common cause against the Ottoman invaders, then the violence, disruption and enslavement of thousands of Christians in the aftermath is likely to have contributed to the Greek Cypriots’ negative view of that war – even if they were impatient with their previous Venetian masters, and even if some large number of Orthodox were led by the fiscal exemptions and re-establishment of the Orthodox hierarchy offered by the new rulers, to favor the Ottoman cause, which themselves are doubtful propositions.30

**Greek Cypriot Identity and Elements of Cultural Change**

To what extent did the war in 1570-73 determine the subsequent direction of modern Cypriot society, and in particular the perceptions and collective memories of its Greek community, up to the present? In my attempt to answer this, I have sought to stress that the terminology used in the early Ottoman period for discussing society and community differed significantly from that used in the twenty-first century. To what extent did Greek Cypriot culture survive in Cyprus following the Ottoman conquest? To discuss such cultural survival among the Greek Cypriots is, perhaps inevitably, also to question what was considered culturally “authentic” in sixteenth-century Cyprus. And this is an enormous subject, for deciding who exercised cultural authority remains a contentious question. If we wished, for example, to characterize what was “Greek” about those I shall refer to as “Greek Cypriots,” it may be useful to single out the cultural persistence over time of traditions or practices X, Y and Z over time, but only once we have agreed that X, Y, and Z actually were distinctive features of that people’s

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culture, and not common to all, Greek and non-Greek, Cypriots. Positing such a cultural distinctiveness, however, seems quite faithful to the way sixteenth-century Cypriots thought about themselves: such writers as Solomon Rhodinos, likely author of the *Lament for Cyprus*, and his son Neophytos, author of a compilation of lives of famous Cypriots, *Concerning the heroes, generals, philosophers, holy men and other renowned men of Cyprus*, both used the words Κυπριοτής [Cypriot] and ζήνος Κυπριων [the people of the Cypriots] to refer to a culturally distinct people. The word clearly implied, at times, a Greek-speaker, or a Greek Orthodox adherent. As the student of medieval literature Michel Zink has put it, “in a revealing hesitation, whenever Etienne de Lusignan [who spent many years on Cyprus as a government functionary, and wrote two long works with historical elements about Cyprus, the *Chorograffia* (1573) and the *Description de toute l’isle de Cypre* (1580) – my note] speaks of Cypriots, he sometimes means “we, the Cypriots,” but much more often “the Greek Cypriots.”

Yet even the most fiercely anti-Latin Orthodox on both Lusignan and Venetian Cyprus did not articulate a Greek Cypriot identity in sharp religious relief, or counterbalance, to a Latin Other. The more recent Greek nationalist views that would claim that Orthodoxy and Hellenism are inextricably bound, furthermore, had no early modern echo on medieval Lusignan and subsequent Venetian Cyprus. In other words, although one can discern a distinct Orthodox theological and cultural identity on early modern Cyprus, it is not historically accurate to see this distinctiveness as wrought by religion alone. It was only after 1570, when the Ottoman conquest made Greek Orthodox on Cyprus more conscious of their status as non-Muslims, that some, both


on Cyprus and among those islanders who had gone abroad, began to construct a distinct Greek Cypriot identity, an identity that was linked to the Greek Orthodox Church.

I shall pay particular attention to the role of education in maintaining this identity, at a time when some groups conquered by the Ottomans, in Albania and Thrace for example, became thoroughly Islamized, and came to accept norms and ideals of high culture similar to those pursued in Constantinople. In modern studies of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot education, it is often taken for granted that education plays a basic role in the formation of communal identity, though, as one would expect, the understanding of what an “education” can or should be differs widely. The word “education” can apply to a wide variety of activities – from the broad soul-creation of Germanic Bildung to the narrow notion of education as basic training in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The significant role in transmitting Greek Cypriot traditions played by monastery schools in the early Ottoman period on Cyprus is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Theodore Papadopoullos, writing, within an Orthodox historiographical tradition, has argued that the Church was the single most important communal institution on Cyprus during the Middle Ages. In view of his argument, I have sought to establish what can be documented as to the divided political and religious loyalties that can be discerned in the Orthodox Greek-speaking population ruled by a Latin Catholic, and then a Muslim, regime. Comparison with other parts of the Venetian Stato da Mar, the conglomerate of merchant settlements and territories inherited from the Fourth Crusade that Venice possessed in the Eastern Mediterranean, can be instructive.

33 So closely did some Albanian Muslims come to identify with the Ottomans, for example, that near the end of empire, in 1899, Sami Frashëri, a Muslim writer, in trying to encourage his fellow Albanians to rely on none but themselves, nevertheless could write, “Albania is a part of European Turkey. Its existence today is linked to the survival of European Turkey...” http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts19_2/AH1899_1.html, consulted November 18, 2011.

For Venetian Crete, which together with Cyprus formed the other Venetian territory large and prestigious enough to enjoy the title Regno in diplomatic correspondence, Sally McKee and others have argued that there was frequent political and religious discontent from the moment the Venetians assumed control in 1211. There is epigraphic evidence in the form of church dedications from both Cyprus and Crete for an enduring awareness of, and loyalty to, Byzantium. As I have suggested, long after the Lusignan purchase of Cyprus from the Byzantine Empire, in 1192, and the Venetian conquest of Crete, in 1211, many Greek-speakers in those and other Latin-ruled areas retained attachment, if not outright political allegiance, to the Byzantine Emperors in Constantinople. Religious and cultural identities were fluid in the early modern Mediterranean, as recent research on the renegades (Europeans who had rinnegato or renounced their Christian faith in favor of Islam) of the Ottoman Empire, on Venetians in Constantinople, and on Venetian Crete has abundantly demonstrated. Inertia and tradition are not, in themselves, forces to be minimized or denied, since the Ottomans did not consistently try to Islamize the Ottoman Greeks, nor to compel them to speak Turkish.

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35 So much at least is implied in McKee, Uncommon Dominion, 160-61.


In my analysis I draw a distinction between those Greek Orthodox who remained on Cyprus, and those who went abroad. I argue that the Cypriot monasteries did play an important role in the preservation and transmission of knowledge, and of Greek Christian traditions which, partly in reaction to other traditions to which Cypriots were exposed, made them conscious of belonging to a distinct community, marked above all by the use of the Greek language. Many of these Greek monasteries employed copyists who continued to copy ancient, pagan Greek works as well as those that were produced in a Christian milieu. That there was a sense of precariousness to Greek monastic existence at this time can scarcely be doubted. The longstanding reputation of the monasteries of Mount Athos in mainland Greece – to which the Ottomans, after subjugating the area around Athos, briefly in 1387, then more permanently after 1430, accorded special protections – is that of serene outposts, where the transmission of knowledge continued despite the vicissitudes of the world outside. But things were less serene in the years just before the Cyprus War, when, in a famous episode of interference, apparently at the decision of Selim II’s sheikhülislam Ebu’s-Su’ud, who wished to bring Ottoman practice into greater conformity with the şeriye holy law, the Ottoman authorities confiscated the lands of the monasteries of from the monks – apparently all of them, though the monastery of Dionysiou is exceptional in maintaining documents bearing upon this episode – and sold them back at exorbitant rates, apparently to raise money for the Cyprus campaign. The confiscation was

38 On which, see Evgenia Kermeli, “The Confiscation and Repossession of Monastic Properties in Mount Athos and Patmos Monasteries, 1568-1570,” *Bulgarian Historical Review* 3-4 (2000) 39-53 and her dissertation, “The Confiscation of Monastic Properties by Selim II, 1568-1570,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1997, 5. Eugenia Kermeli mentions the strong economic position that privileges, renewed since Byzantine times, gave to Greek monasteries in the Balkans through the fifteenth century; these monasteries were some of the largest landholders in the region. With a handful of exceptions such as Kykkos, Cypriot Orthodox monasteries did not enjoy such a strong economic basis, either under the Latin regimes, or under the Ottoman. *Excerpta Cypria*, As I have mentioned, writing in the 1720s and 1730s, the Russian monk Basil Barsky noted numerous monasteries crushed by the weight of Ottoman taxation. The economic difficulties of the church were not restricted to monasteries. Reporting observations made some decades earlier, in 1683, the Dutch traveller Cornelius van Bruyn had noted that “Greek clerics are generally so poor that they have scarcely the wherewithal to live.” On Dionysiou,
described by the Orthodox abbot of the Monastery of St. Catherine on Mount Sinai, in Egypt, as applied empire-wide, though he may have exaggerated. Moreover, the Ottomans had already converted churches to mosques wherever they conquered in Christian lands, scratching out the eyes of saints and otherwise removing Christian imagery as they did so. Thus in the aftermath of the war it would not have been irrational for Cypriots to fear for the future of Christian books and manuscripts. I suggest that certain monasteries, such as Kykkos, played a role similar to that played by the monasteries of Mount Athos for the mainland of Greece. Though Kykkos flourished economically, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, this did not translate into a new favorable stance by its monks towards the Ottomans. The Kykkos example suggests the inadequacy of considering the view of *homo economicus* alone in interpreting Orthodox-Muslim relations on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest.

The organization of this dissertation is determined to a large extent by the geographic distribution of the source material. Venice was the recipient of a large influx of Cypriots, both during the Venetian period of rule over Cyprus, and after the Ottoman invasion. The copious printing activity in Greek in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries included a number of works written by and intended for Cypriots. I have chosen, therefore, to begin Chapter One with a consideration of how Venice came to rule Cyprus, and then of the role played by the Cypriot diaspora in Venice and other Venetian-ruled territories such as Crete in perpetuating a Greek Cypriot collective memory. If language was the main factor that led the Orthodox Cypriots to continue to regard themselves as Greek, it seems clear that Greek printing contributed in

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39 It is to the Ottoman period that is attributable the popular story of a Turk who tried to light a cigarette with one of the vigil lamps of the Kykkos monastery, and for his profane action was struck by gangrene.

important ways to the survival of a distinct Greek Cypriot consciousness, though the hand
-copying of manuscripts continued, some undertaken by Cypriot refugees such as Athanasios
Rhetor (1571-1663), who then returned to Cyprus to copy or collect manuscripts. As there were
no printing presses on Ottoman Cyprus, due to Islamic objections to movable type, the Greek
press abroad, especially in Venice, took on particular significance. Recognition of the
importance of the Greek-language press outside the Greek world in maintaining certain ideas
within that world, and in reminding Western Europeans of the situation of the Greeks under
Ottoman rule, in an age before newspapers, could lead us to question rosy pictures of the lives of
Ottoman Greeks, alleged to be contented and left largely alone by the Ottomans under their
millet system. That millet system has been reinterpreted by Benjamin Braude, however, as a
construct retrojected onto this early period of the history of the Ottoman Empire from the
nineteenth century, and one which does not accurately reflect the social realities of the time,
which are extremely difficult to get at given the inaccuracies and limitations in both the Ottoman
and even the most perceptive Western European sources. How best to understand the
predominant Ottoman ideas for dealing with non-Muslim minorities is still unsettled, and
perhaps deserves to be conducted not by positing a single “system” applicable everywhere, but
by studying how these minorities fared in particular geographic areas with their unique

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41 In saying so I am aware that the Greeks, like other non-Muslim minorities, were permitted by the Ottoman
authorities to set up a printing press, in their case in Constantinople, long before Muslims began printing in
Ottoman lands – the date was 1729. The Greek press in Constantinople began operating in 1627 through the effort
of a monk, Nikodemos Metaxas, slightly beyond the first half-century of Ottoman rule on Cyprus which is the
subject of this study. Little is recorded of its activities, though knowledge is increasing. See R. J. Roberts, “The

42 Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds.,
situations. On this subject, the detailed study of Professor Ronald Jennings (1941-1996) of the şeriye court records of Nicosia, for example, provides admirable focus on Cyprus alone. Jennings, both in his 1996 study of Christians and Muslims on early Ottoman Cyprus, and in a posthumous book published in 2009 concentrating on village life in the same period, has asked what the şeriye court records of Nicosia can tell us about the tenor of social relations in the first decades of Ottoman rule. While other scholars had studied court records in purely Muslim areas of the Ottoman Empire, Jennings was a pioneer in the study of court records for Cyprus, a mixed Christian-Muslim area. He reached a number of fascinating conclusions: that the Greek Orthodox, both laymen and clergy, routinely repaired to the Islamic courts, and that the condition of women on Cyprus likely improved after 1571, for example. But Jennings acknowledged that it is not clear whether Orthodox church courts persisted on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest, which would lessen the surprise that inheres in the discovery of large numbers of Orthodox taking cases to the şeriye courts. 43

Although Jennings did not explicitly situate his study in relation to the sweep of earlier Cypriot historiography, his evidence tends to clash with commonly accepted ideas about the nature of Ottoman rule on Cyprus: that it was so consistently oppressive that the enslaved Greek Christians could not trust its institutions, for example, or that the position of women was downgraded.44 Jennings also used the terms Christians and Muslims, rather than Ottomans and Greeks, which I interpret as an attempt to avoid anachronism. Little good has come out of moderns identifying with either a “Greek” or a “Turkish” side in the Cyprus War or indeed in

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43 Jennings has this to say on the subject of Orthodox church courts on Cyprus after 1571 (Christians and Muslims, 68): “Although the masses of the island’s Greek Orthodox Christians may have had the legal right to apply to their own clergy in certain internal matters of a communal nature involving fellow believers, no records of any such courts survive, and indeed few references even suggest their very existence.”

44 These appear to have been unauthenticated Black Legend ideas, based on assumptions, rather than evidence.
other conflicts in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean. Perhaps the concept of Hellenism has some validity in its application to early modern Cyprus, as some assure us it does, but this validity should be questioned and where necessary qualified. The differences between that era and our own cause the use of “Greek” and “Turk” to be best understood as contextual, rather than as the expression of some essential, let alone eternal, antagonism. Still, we must use some terms, and we can hardly ignore those terms which people at the time used when they wrote and thought.

An the application of the ethnonym “Greek” is not uncomplicated, but most educated Cypriots did consider themselves part of a wider Greek world. At least in the context of Venice, references in the archives of the Greek Fraternity in Venice show that by the late sixteenth century “Greeks” were divided into a number of specific patrides or communities, among which that of the Cypriots was one of the largest. The correspondence concerning Cyprus from the Spanish Habsburg archives at Simancas published by the historian Ioannes Hassiotis is additional compelling evidence for a Cypriot collective consciousness, and aids historians as well to better grasp how widespread, and deep, was the understanding at that time both among Christian Cypriots and among Western Europeans that “the Turks” posed a threat to the survival of Christianity on Cyprus. The ringing of churchbells was forbidden after 1570, for example, heavy taxes were imposed on a number of monasteries, the repair of Christian buildings was slow and permission often grudging; other limitations on Christians that observers found for the early Ottoman period will be discussed in the fifth chapter.

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45 *Hellenismos* is often, among Greek historians, used as shorthand for the body of Greeks, or “Greekdom” as one might say, while in Anglo-American historiography it more often means a set of cultural or intellectual values and practices associated with, but not ethnically bound to, the Greeks.

46 Chryssa Maltezou, “Cypriots in the City of Saint Mark after the Island’s Turkish Conquest (1571),” in Chryssa Maltezou, ed. Cyprus Jewel in the Crown of Venice (Nicosia: Leventis Foundation, 2003), 75.
Just as Pope Pius II had described the Turkish conquest of Constantinople in 1453 as the “second death of Homer, and of Plato,”\textsuperscript{47} so the rhetoric in much European writing after the loss of Cyprus suggested similarly, and inaccurately, that Christianity was doomed on the island.\textsuperscript{48}

But those exaggerated claims were at least rooted in the precedent of experience: the episodes of pillage, the deliberate defacement of churches throughout much of Anatolia and the Balkans that took place after the Ottomans swept in, and even the wholesale confiscation of churches and monasteries in the Balkans between 1566 and 1569. While the Ottoman reputation for being reluctant to forcibly convert non-Muslims is largely deserved, this did not mean that it never happened. The hundreds, possibly thousands, of Cypriots sold into slavery in Constantinople after the war offered human evidence of a wretched fate for many Christians, and though the well-informed economic historian can now dispassionately recognize that the Ottomans had no interest in depriving themselves of the revenues they raised through the cizye, an Ottoman head tax on non-Muslims, which is what would have happened had they converted all Christians to Islam, the perceptions of Cypriot Christians at the time were less sanguine, and were exacerbated, too, by a centuries-old demonology in popular myth and legend, about the dangers posed by the Saracen, the Hagarene, and the Turk.

\textsuperscript{47} Kenneth M. Setton, \textit{The Papacy and the Levant}, Vol. II (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978), 150: “What shall I say of the countless books, as yet unknown to the Latins, which were there [in Constantinople?] Alas, how many names of great men will now perish! Here is a second death for Homer and for Plato too.”

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid}. This was also implied by the fears Etienne de Lusignan, a Venetian subject with generations of family roots in Cyprus, expressed shortly after the Ottoman conquest that his family would be subject to the Janissary levy: “Doit-il abandonner ces pauvres âmes submergées en tant de labeurs, entre les mains des Turcs ennemis du nom Crestien, n’ayant personne qui leur donne secours?” [Must he abandon these poor souls, drowning beneath so many trials, having no one to give them aid?] Lusignan referred to his family, to be sure, but his words could just as well refer to the Cypriot Christians in general. Quoted in Kostas P. Kyrris, “The Role of Greeks in the Ottoman Administration of Cyprus,” Theodore Papadopoulos and Menelaos Christodoulos, eds. \textit{Πρακτικα του Διεθνους Κυπρολογικου Συναδειον} (Nicosia: Society for Cypriot Studies, 1973), 166.
Justifying the Use of the Term “Nationalism”

As suggested above, I argue that “national” feeling may be useful as a concept in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Cypriot context, even if the term “nation” meant something quite different from what is meant by that word today.49 A discussion, and analysis, of the beginning of Cypriot state formation necessarily implicates the question of the meaning and the timing of the emergence of nationalist sentiments and nationalist political and cultural programs.

Many historians remind us, rightfully, of the dangers of anachronism, and specifically of attributing an earlier origin to nationalist ideas and movements in distant parts of the world than the evidence warrants. Political groupings in the Mediterranean in the period under consideration were generally smaller, less systematically organized, and less subject to central government control – because of the much more limited means, and far slower pace, of transportation and communications – than today. For example, writing of the Safavid Empire in Persia, the powerful eastern neighbor of the Ottomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Michel Mazzaoui has strongly denied that nationalism can be usefully linked to the rise of the Safavid dynasty in Persia after 1500. His argument is based on the unsuitability he sees in using the very concept of nationalism for this period.50 I think this dismissal too much. Mazzaoui ignores the

49 A start through the vast literature on the subject of premodern Cypriot “nationality” is Gilles Grivaud, “Eveil de la nation chypriote (XIe-XVe siècles),” Sources Travaux Historiques 43-44 (1995), 105-116.

50 In “The Safavid Phenomenon,” an introductory essay to the collection Safavid Iran and her Neighbors (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2003), Michel Mazzaoui writes, “...several modern historians see in the rise of the Safavid state a manifestation of Persian national consciousness. This vaḥdat-e milli or nationalism did not exist in Iran or, for that matter, anywhere else in the world ca. A.D. 1500. The concept took shape in Europe after 1500, grew dramatically during the Age of Enlightenment, and ultimately matured toward the end of the eighteenth century with the French Revolution in 1789.” “The Safavid Phenomenon: an Introductory Essay,” in Michel Mazzaoui, ed. Safavid Iran and Her Neighbors (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2003), 1. Well before the eighteenth century, wars and battles played a significant role in collective consciousness, especially for southeastern Europe, including such struggles against the Ottomans as Kossovo in 1389 for the Serbs, and Mohacs in 1526, for the Hungarians. I would argue that the Cyprus War is such a conflict for the Greek Cypriots. The surviving sources and scholars’ conclusions that oral poetry has paid a crucial role in the self-understanding of South Slavic peoples may, however, drive these arguments, and that should be made clear. One key study in this
ample evidence that one can discern at least embryonic communal sentiment and a distinction between foreigners or outsiders in many places in the sixteenth century, including France, the Holy Roman Empire, and even Cyprus. There are respectable arguments that have been made for the emergence of national feelings in Europe long before the French Revolution, often linked with religion, as in France in the time of Joan of Arc, or in the German-speaking lands of the Holy Roman Empire of Luther’s day. In an older literature religion was recognized as linked to the growth of such national feeling.  

Although the French Revolution was many things, and among those things was its powerful contribution to a European “secularizing” process, it has also often been described, in general histories, as a crucial event in the rise of European nationalism. The French Revolution is not the sole instance or contributing factor to the growth of nationalism, however, and though that Revolution made manifest widespread dissatisfaction in France with the linking of French identity and a church (in this case the Catholic Church), and endeavored to erect a Cult of the Supreme Being in its place, not all movements of nationalist feeling, even post-1789, have been secular, as the scholar of nationalism Anthony D. Smith has recently reminded us. One may think, for example, of Poland and the intimate link between Polish nationalism and Polish Catholicism, or between Serbian nationalism and the Serbian

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51 Such as Heinrich von Treitschke, Luther und die deutsche Nation, in Historische-politische Aufsätze, IV (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1897), 377 ff.


Orthodox Church. In fact, there is reason to worry over the word “secular” as uncritically applied even to the French nationalism – paradoxically linked to French-generated “universal values” enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man – which the Revolution unleashed. Limiting themselves to the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, for example, some historians have discerned in the new Cult of the Supreme Being less a “secularization” than an emergence of a new, quasi-pagan religion. And in the Cypriot context, the Church of Cyprus furnished, I maintain, already in the sixteenth century one of the prime distinguishing institutions as well as theologies and traditions of popular religion that allowed for the formation of what we now call the Greek Cypriots, known in Turkish as the Rum, although this term is used for other groups of Greek-speakers as well.

Furthermore, in the last decade, such scholars as Anthony W. Marx and Anthony D. Smith have suggested that there have been many instances in emergent nations where religious discourse has played an important, and sometimes decisive, role in determining those considered by the majority to be full members of a given community. Smith gives the example of nineteenth-century Greece, where the Orthodox clergy played an important role in what they considered to be the liberation of Greece from the Turkish yoke, and where, to be fully Greek, in the eyes of some one had to be Greek Orthodox. In Cyprus, the archbishops of the Orthodox Church have for at least the last three centuries been referred to as Εθναρχοι, ethnarchs, a title that implies leadership of an entire people, and not merely ecclesiastical functions. In modern times,


the political leader and churchman Archbishop Makarios, who played such an important role in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, is one exemplar of the phenomenon. In Chapter Six, which concentrates on the sources that I interpret to reflect a Greek Cypriot point of view, I revisit the question of the title of ethnarch, and when it emerged on Cyprus.\(^{56}\)

**Cyprus and its Short-lived Renaissance, in Greek and Turkish Historiography**

There has long circulated – in Greece, the rest of the Balkans, and further north in eastern Europe, as well as in Russia – a set of arguments that maintain that Eastern Europe was shut out of the blessings of the Renaissance by the ravening Turk.\(^ {57}\) A number of historians and literary scholars have called into question whether this picture is not too simplistic, many of them, unsurprisingly, writing in Turkish.\(^ {58}\) For some of these regions, such as Thessaly, new Ottoman economic data has come to light, indicating a flourishing in the middle of the sixteenth century\(^ {59}\) - though it seems clear that the Greeks who in that period were subject to Ottoman rule would have judged things differently, and explained instances of that economic flourishing in Central

\(^{56}\) The degree of sympathy of the Archbishop of Cyprus with this revolutionary movement has been re-examined of late, and this seems to bear heavily on the question of whether Cypriots wanted to fully participate in the Greek revolutionary struggle.

\(^{57}\) The number of scholars who include themes concerning the stunting of Greek culture by the Turkish occupation in their work is large. For Greece and Cyprus, they include the Swedish literary scholar, Borje Knös: Knös, *Histoire de la littérature neo-grecque* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1962), 87 and 185; Loizos Philippou, scholar of literature and learning on Cyprus during the entire Turkish period from 1571 to 1878; Philippou, τα ελληνικα γράμματα εν Κυπρω κατα την περιοδον της Τουρκοκρατιας, 1571-1878 (Nicosia: Ch. Hypsilanti, 1930), 3-9, and Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, Archbishop of Athens from 1923 to 1938. See especially Papadopoulos, Ἡ εκκλησια Κύπρου επι τουρκοκρατιας (Athens: Phoinikos, 1929); and idem, η θεσις της εκκλησιας και του ελληνικου εθνους εν το τουρκικο κρατει (Athens: Phoinikos, 1935).


Greece and Thessaly as taking place not because, but in spite of, the often distant Ottoman administration. Furthermore, Ottoman financial documents are nearly always open to more than one interpretation, so that the newly-discovered data needs further study. And surely a balanced consideration of such a question will include a discussion of whether the transition to Ottoman rule has not been overly romanticized by the Turks themselves, who often regard the Turkish Republic as the primary successor state to the Ottoman Empire. Nor, I would suggest, is this simply a question of not indulging over-eager historians writing from an “Ottomanist” rather than an equally limited “Byzantinist” perspective, as one recent essay argues. Rather, there appears to be a conscious push from some quarters for a more positive re-evaluation of the Ottoman Empire, one that is closely connected with the pressure to offer a more positive re-evaluation of Ottoman Islam.

Although Turkish historians are far from uncritical in their analyses of the Ottoman Empire, there is nevertheless an apologetic spirit evident in some Turkish historical accounts of the conquest of Cyprus, and one consequence has been what I shall argue is an unduly critical view of the preceding Venetian regime. For instance, a frequent interpretation of Venetian rule

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61 This observation is also true of Greek and Greek-Cypriot writing on Cypriot history, where it manifests itself differently. Professors Benjamin Arbel of Tel Aviv and Gilles Grivaud of Rouen have stressed this “black legend” of Venetian rule in many of their writings; for example, see Benjamin Arbel, “Entre mythe et histoire: la légende noire de la domination vénitienne à Chypre,” Etudes Balkaniques: Cahiers Pierre Belon, 5 (1998); 83-107. Arbel points out that some myths are simply passed from one generation to the next unexamined, and have no documentary basis. It has been argued, for example, that the Cypriot population declined under Venetian rule due to drought, famine and locust plagues, and that this was in great measure the result of neglect – not so benign, at that – by a haughty and aloof Venetian government. Arbel has modified this picture, noting that, while wheat production did suffer towards the end of Venetian rule, nevertheless, the population on Cyprus increased from about 120,000 (an estimate from a letter written by the Venetian governors, in 1509) to 200,000 shortly before the Ottoman conquest (Arbel, “Cypriot Population under Venetian Rule,” 213, republished in Cyprus, the Franks and Venice (Ashgate: Variorum, 2000)). Even on this point, there is room for disagreement, as the testimony of Elias of Pesaro (1563) and Girolamo Diedo (1570) bears witness to considerable flourishing of crops on the island shortly before the Ottoman invasion. Yet another recent defense of Venice against the Black Legend concerns the report of ca.
of Cyprus by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot historians has been that it was largely, if not exclusively, a case of military rule over a remote – and to the Venetians by that time nearly irrelevant – colonial outpost. Halil Fikret Alasya, for example, who wrote his 1939 *History of Cyprus* from a Turkish Cypriot perspective, in his 1964 monograph * Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Kıbrıs Türk Eserleri* (History of Cyprus and Turkish monuments on Cyprus) wrote under the heading “Cyprus under Venetian Rule” (*Venedikliler Idaresinde Kıbrıs*) that the Venetians militarized the condition of the island.\(^{62}\) One can interpret the intention here as deliberately contrasting a militaristic Venetian regime with the more peaceful Lusignans who preceded them, and, more importantly, with the ostensibly more pacific and benevolent Ottomans who succeeded them. Several years later, in his contribution to a 1973 conference organized by Greek Cypriot historians on the Two Communities of Cyprus,\(^{63}\) *The Privileges Granted to the Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire*, Alasya wrote that “Venitian (sic) administration

\[^{62}\text{Halil Fikret Alasya, }	ext{Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Kıbrıs’ta Türk Eserleri. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1964, 9.}\]

\[^{63}\text{(The notion of the Two Communities —one which oversimplifies Cyprus’ historical demographic complexity by neglecting the many other small non-Greek and non-Turkish groups on the island, such as Maronite Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Jacobites, Nestorians and Copts – has been employed by many historians since at least the 1950s.) Writers on the Two Communities include Kostas P. Kyrris, “Symbiotic Elements in the History of the Two Communities of Cyprus,” Kypriakos Logos 8 (1976): 243-83, and C.F. Beckingham, “The Turks of Cyprus,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 87 (1957), 165-74.}\]
of Cyprus was *nothing but a military occupation*” (my emphasis).\(^{64}\) Such stark terms are overstated, when Venetian administrators’ own reports indicate their manifest interest for their subjects’ manner of worship, in the agriculture and viticulture of the island, in countering the plague (a primitive epidemiology) and many other subjects beyond the purely “military.”\(^{65}\) I shall seek to refute this and similar arguments in the fourth chapter, which concentrates on Venice in her relations with Cyprus. Halil Fikret Alasya’s description oversimplifies grossly, neglecting the considerable literary interplay, and influence of Venetian traditions on Cypriot historical writing, as well as on Cypriot poetry and music, which David Holton and others have recently brought to light, and which is noticeable in the Chronicles of Amadi\(^{66}\) and Strambaldi, and in that of Florio Bustron, but also the ample evidence for Venetian concern for the well-being of Cypriot subjects.\(^{67}\)

Similarly, in the 1971 collection of essays *Kıbrıs ve Türkler* (Cyprus and the Turks) by several Turkish and Turkish Cypriot historians, the *Venetokratia* – the period of Venetian rule on

\(^{64}\) H. Fikret Alasya, *The Privileges Granted to the Orthodox Archbishopric of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969), 5.

\(^{65}\) Examples of these reports are quoted in Chapter 2, below.


Cyprus – was generally presented in somber colors, dominated by famines, rebellions, incompetent administrators and short-sighted neglect – a mirror image of the way Greek and Western historiography has sometimes depicted Ottoman rule, or at least the first century of Ottoman rule, on Cyprus. A conclusion that İnalcık and others have drawn from this premise is that, once the Ottomans invaded, many Orthodox peasants sided with them, preferring “the turban to the cap,” in the words of the last Byzantine megadux, Lucas Notaras. But the historiographical bias against the Venetian period has run deeper still in some circles. In the matter of language, one would think that the terms “colonial” and “colony” can be neutral rather than pejorative, covering, as they do, an extremely wide array of political arrangements, places, and periods. Nor is it beyond dispute that Venetian-ruled Cyprus is best thought of as a “colony.” Yet sometimes this colonial status of Venetian Cyprus has been been assumed, and the utility of the term and the model also assumed, rather than defended or justified, as if it were beyond dispute. But Venice was a republic, its appeals to the ancient Roman imperial image even at the height of its prosperity half-hearted, and not backed up by imperial ventures remotely comparable to Rome’s, for Venice’s sixteenth-century Stato da Mar was organized in the form

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68 This conclusion, based on an examination of a large number of modern Turkish works dealing with the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus and with the early Ottoman regime there, helps to explain ill-informed generalizations such as that of Recep Dündar, who argues that the Venetians sought to force all residents of Venetian Cyprus to convert to Catholicism. He maintains this in the face of much contrary evidence: the continued existence under Venetian rule of many monasteries in the Greek rite on Cyprus, the many sources that show the impressive growth of a Greek community in Venice itself, and the construction of an Orthodox church for that community, and finally, the granting by both the Lusignan kings and later the Cypriot rectors – the leading Venetian magistrates of the island – of permission to the Orthodox to erect a parallel ecclesiastical hierarchy. Dündar, “Conquest of Cyprus,” in Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Öğüz, Osman Karatay, eds. The Turks, III (Ankara: New Turkey, 2002), 333.

69 A megadux was a high-ranking lieutenant to the Emperor. The memorable phrase was supposed to have been uttered shortly before the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, and has usually been Englished as “prefer the turban to the tiara.” implying a reference to the popes of Rome. But, as Kenneth Setton has pointed out, this is a translation of the Greek of the late Byzantine historian Ducas, whose words more accurately mean, “better the turban than the Latin cap,” referring to a hat worn by secular princes in the West; so that the sentiment as expressed by Ducas was not antipapal, despite a common interpretation of this utterance. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), III, 105.
not principally of territorial areas, but of merchant colonies presided over by officials known either as baili or consoli, with a few garrisons placed at strategic points in the Eastern Mediterranean. Crete and Cyprus were exceptions in which the Republic in theory owned all of the land, and they were utterly atypical. There were differences in the titles and roles of officials – Cyprus, which inherited many of its institutions from the Lusignan, was unusual under Venice in having a class which Etienne de Lusignan in 1580 called barons, baroni. Crete stood out for the degree to which Venetian government there constituted a miniature version of the Venetian government at home, with a duke of Crete serving, not unlike the Venetian doge, with his council – with the difference that his freedom of action was limited by orders from Venice. Then, too, there were differences in the linguistic and religious profiles of the territories under Venetian rule. On Cyprus Venice did not make a state-directed effort to implant Venetian families; a number arrived on their own, even before the Venetian assumption of control, attracted by the economic opportunities, notably in raising and exporting cotton, while some, such as Benedetto Soranzo, Latin archbishop of Cyprus in the 1480s, came to take up posts on Cyprus in the Latin hierarchy. While many historians take one feature of “colonialism” to be a deliberate mass transfer of people from a mother city or area to the colonized area, I think population estimates from the time, and more recent estimates, together with the impressions of travellers, make it unlikely that more than 1500 Venetian citizens lived on Cyprus at any point during the period of Venetian rule. The term “colonialism,” then, once employed neutrally in the lexicon of historians, has been endowed with new and not-always-helpful meanings. Furthermore, historians are not always consistent in their application of the term. If such criteria as the dispatch of religious missionaries, a deliberate change in governing ideology, changes to the physical landscape and laws of an area, and large-scale and state-guided population transfers to a
colonized area, are marks of the colonial experience, then Ottoman rule on Cyprus after 1571 offers an even more likely candidate for the “colonial” description than did its Venetian predecessor.

There is plenty of evidence for fluidity in identity, both on Venetian and on Ottoman Cyprus. Catholic bishops complained during both Lusignan and Venetian rule that families were mixed – there were occasional attempts to ban Greek-Latin intermarriage in the Venetian Stato da Mar – and some prominent families, such as the Podocataro and that of Etienne de Lusignan, included both Catholics and Orthodox. Nor does it seem, in an age when many Western Europeans could show themselves acutely concerned with religious confession, that confessional boundaries prevented unity among Christians on Cyprus during the Ottoman invasion and indeed there were repeated appeals to such Christian unity among the western powers who made up the Holy League in 1570 to fight the Ottomans and defend Cyprus, just as had taken place during the final siege of Byzantine Constantinople in 1453.

The last three decades have seen some influence on Cypriot historiography of broader trends in the writing of history, such as an increased interest in memory and in hybrid identities. Hence, the Maltese scholar Paul Sant Cassia’s Bodies of Evidence (2005) explores the topic of memory, in connection with the Greek Cypriot memorialization of the Turkish invasion of 1974, and of the several thousand Greeks who disappeared, presumably killed, in the aftermath of that invasion. However, the impact of memory studies on early modern Cypriot history, from either the Greek or the Turkish perspective, appears so far to have been slight. I attempt to weave the theme of collective memory, how it was produced and how it circulated among the Christian Cypriots after the Ottoman invasion throughout the dissertation. The Cypriots benefited, I argue, from the growing interest in Greek history – as opposed to Greek literature and philosophy –
among Western Europeans at this time. I recognize that a fascination with a given people, their language and history, need not translate into favorable views and actions towards them. Nascent Christian Hebraism in the cultural atmosphere around Martin Luther did not, for example, translate into favorable views of Jews in his mind. Still, I argue here, by highlighting some significant Cypriot figures who moved in the orbit of Rome (Chapter One), Spain (Chapter Two), France and Savoy (Chapter Three), Venice (Chapter Four) and in the Orthodox world (Chapter Five) that something like a cultural philhellenism had already began to sprout in the minds of Western Europeans in the sixteenth century. This feeling, one which went far beyond the enlightened scholar Martin Crusius of Tübingen, often called the “first philhellene,” was accelerated by the legends that surrounded the loss of Cyprus and the greatest Christian victory during the Cyprus War, the sea battle of Lepanto on October 7, 1571.

Perhaps as an outgrowth of earlier good will that had formed when the first Byzantines came to teach Greek in the Italian peninsula at the turn of the fifteenth century, as well as some relationships that were formed as a result of the Byzantine involvement in the major effort at Church union known as the Council of Ferrara-Florence, in 1439-46, correspondence grew up between a large number of Greek clergy in the Eastern Mediterranean and a preponderantly Italian clergy in the Western Mediterranean after the mid-fifteenth century. The fall of Byzantium appears to have drawn the two groups closer together in the face of the perception of a shared Turkish menace. There were cultural, as well as religious manifestations of this. The famous Venetian printer Aldus Manutius, devoted a great deal of his professional activity to the

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70 For Crusius’s efforts to bring Western Europeans into contact both with Greek culture and with real live Greeks, see Semne Karouzou, Μαρτινος Κρουσιος, Ὅ πρωτος φιλελλην [Martin Crusius, the first philhellene] (Athens: Ekdoseis Hesperos, 1973). For a Western European, Crusius had an unprecedented grasp of the continuities between ancient Greece and Byzantium, based on vast reading in both ancient and Byzantine Greek texts. See Klaus-Henning Suchland, Das Byzanzbild des Tübinger Philhellenen Martin Crusius (1526-1607) Ph.D. thesis, University of Würzburg, 2001.
printing of high-quality editions of Greek works.\textsuperscript{71} The Lutheran literary scholar and theologian Martin Crusius, who had many Greeks moving in his social orbit, wrote a massive work, the \textit{Turcograecia}\textsuperscript{72}, specifically to call the attention of his readers to the plight of Greeks living under the Ottomans. Both, in their own way, played a role in encouraging Westerners to appreciate Greek Christian contributions to Greek culture, rather than limiting their appreciation to the Greek works of classical, and pre-Christian, antiquity.

Hybrid identities have been another popular theme in Cypriot historiography, going back to the Latin rule of the island from 1191 to 1571, and even to the Byzantine and Arab regimes from the seventh century on. Building on the study of mutual relations of Greeks and Latins that is already a topic in such primary sources as the \textit{Alexiad} by the twelfth-century Byzantine princess Anna Comnena,\textsuperscript{73} such scholars as Chryssa Maltezou have pointed out how members of both groups formed stereotypes about each other that conditioned their relations.\textsuperscript{74} Miltiades

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{71} As suggested by the thought-provoking, if older, study of Ambroise Firmin-Didot, \textit{Alde Manuce et l’Hellenisme a Venise} (Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1966 [1875]). For Crusius, see the works cited above, n. 49.

\bibitem{72} Martin Crusius, \textit{Turcograecia} (Modena: Memor, 1972 [1584]), in his unpaginated Epistle Dedicatory, describes his intention to inform the reader about the Greeks of his own day: he mentions the help he received from Stephan Gerlach, in Constantinople attending upon the Holy Roman Emperor’s ambassador there, who wanted to inform Crusius “de hodiernis Grecis [emphasis mine], quae ipsorum religio esset, quae linguae scientia, & alia…” [concerning the Greeks of today, what their religion is, what their knowledge of language, and other matters…] Two pages later, also unnumbered, Crusius explains that the Greek empire can be propagated by those who keep its glories in their hearts, for to some — and it is clear from the context that Crusius refers above all to some of his fellow German Protestant scholars — the blessing of the study of Greek language and literature has been given as a gift by God, and “Optandum quidem esset, Grecum imperium adhuc stare et florere: nullos Turcas, ne in somnis quidem, nobis obversari.” [Choosing that this should be, the Greek Empire still stands and flourishes: no Turks, save in some dream, withstand us.]


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Efthimiou produced a study in 1987 of Greeks and Latins on thirteenth-century Cyprus, concluding that Cyprus saw the legal institutions of Crusaders reach a high state of development, but then lapse into a stagnation which Efthimiou calls *stasis*. The term *stasis* is redolent of infighting within ancient Greek *poleis* (city-states). Efthimiou notes of crusader legal institutions such as the *Assises de Jerusalem*, which the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem first established and used, and which Venetians continued to use, that their “subsequent history [on] Cyprus was one of gradual decay,” but he also argues that Cyprus, which participated in the wider medieval literary, musical, and courtly culture of Western Europe, and under its kings was one of several places that saw “the development, already in the thirteenth century, of nation states against the universal claims of the papacy, fueled in part by unbridgeable gaps between the Orthodox and Latin populations of the island.” 75

I have also tried to ascertain what the sources—from all corners of the Mediterranean—can tell us about the perceptions Christian Cypriots held both of the Venetians and of the Ottomans, the peoples who had fought over control of their island. Chryssa A. Maltezou of the University of Athens, as well as a number of others such as Miltiades Efthimiou, have written on the mutual perceptions of Greeks and Latins on medieval Cyprus. 76 My position concerning the period of Venetian rule (1489-1571) is that for the enormous majority of Greek-speaking Cypriots, the Greek-Latin distinction was of little relevance to their daily lives, but that a consciousness of a Byzantine past remained, in educated circles, as did a consciousness of a


76 Chryssa A. Maltezou, “Greeks and Latins,” cited above n. 43.
distinct history and set of cultural and intellectual traditions different from those of the Latin – largely Venetian – ruling class.

**Strength of Christian Identity**

The evidence suggests, then, that although the theological and social gaps between Catholics and Orthodox on Cyprus were wide throughout the Middle Ages, and remained so after the Ottoman conquest, the Cypriot Orthodox still identified more closely with their fellow-Christians, not only within the Ottoman Empire but even with non-Orthodox from Western Europe, than with their new Ottoman masters. The conquest of Cyprus did mean, however, that one of the leading medieval meeting grounds for Latin and Byzantine Orthodox cultures was brought within an altogether different cultural ambit. While the major Christian monuments on Cyprus in 1570 were the churches of Nicosia and Famagusta, built in styles imported from Western Europe, the new mosques, schools, aqueducts and soup-kitchen complexes known in Turkish as *imarets* that were built on Cyprus after 1571 were in styles that had been developed over centuries in what Hodgson has called the “Islamicate cultural area.”

I make an argument that, while it may seem obvious to some, nevertheless deserves to be made explicit: that there were fewer cultural opportunities for Cypriot Christians to engage in creative religious or artistic activity, if they stayed Christian, in the Ottoman Empire than in the Christian West.

A point I will examine at some length in Chapter Four on Venice concerns one such opportunity, that of receiving training at educational institutions on the Italian peninsula, both for children and for young men of university age. In education, the fine arts, music, and in literature,

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Ottoman and Greek Cypriot traditions drew their themes and inspiration to a great extent from religious traditions that used different vocabularies, and were inspired by different ethical models of behavior. A tradition had been established since the fourteenth century of Greeks leaving Greek lands to study at Western universities. The University of Padua, in particular, under Venetian control after 1405, received many students from Cyprus (as from Crete, and elsewhere in the Greek world) leading up to the Ottoman conquest. To graduate from Padua one had to swear an oath before the Catholic bishop, yet this did not deter a certain number of Orthodox Cypriots from studying there. As I shall show in Chapter Four, a healthy number of Greek Cypriots first studied at Padua and then took up posts there in the decades after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. Other figures who, though not Cypriot, took an interest in Cypriot affairs, such as the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Cretan-born Meletios Pigas, and the Patriarch of Constantinople Cyril Lucaris, have left writings whose contexts show the interest taken by Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists in the Orthodox world, an interest which seems to have increased after the Cyprus War. This play of Christian denominations for Orthodox loyalties, too, forms part of my story. I have attempted to detail the complicated, unique and significant development of a culture on Cyprus that was influenced, to a greater degree than has sometimes been realized, by religious and cultural developments elsewhere. Cyprus was an island, but it was an island that may be thought of as straddling a watery borderland that separated three distinct regions of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia. While it remained in Christian possession, it was a bastion in what was becoming after a century of Ottoman advance, a Muslim-dominated sea. Christians and Muslims of the region were by 1570 constantly in

78 Giuseppe Fabris, “Professori e scolari greci all’università di Padova,” Archivio Veneto 30 (1942), 121-165. The earliest example of a Cypriot studying in Padua Fabris mentions dates to 1353.
tension, and amidst all this thoughtful Cypriots, though on an island, could not and did not remain insular.
Chapter One: Latin-Orthodox Relations and Western Plays for Orthodox Loyalties in the Aftermath of the Cyprus War

The subject of the preservation of cultural identity among the Christian peoples conquered by the Ottomans has attracted its share of scholars. Several of them have probed the contemporary literature of, among others, the Serbians after the severe Serbian defeat at Kosovo Polje in 1389, and the Hungarians after their defeat at the disastrous battle of Mohacs, in 1526.  

In the case of the Greek Cypriots, their Orthodox faith did not prevent many of them from taking a deep interest in Western, especially Catholic Christendom, and from travelling to study and sometimes settle in the West, notably in Venice and Spain. Much biographical information about these Cypriots has been teased out from Western European sources, for, as Papadopoulos has noted, the “Ωθήνος Κύπρου” or “Lament of Cyprus” (ca. 1572,) is the “μοναδικὴ ἐλληνικὴ πηγὴ,” or sole source written in Greek, contemporary with the Cyprus War. It can yield insights into the mindset of Greek Cypriots at this time, but should not be made to bear the weight of large-scale

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79 For the Slavs, see Zdenko Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992), a study based on research in the State Papers in the archives of Dubrovnik, the former Ragusa, as well as in the archives of Venice, the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade, Simancas, and Naples. Also see Marko Jačov, who has published for the first time a substantial number of documents from the Vatican Secret Archives for the Crete War between Venice and the Ottomans of 1645 to 1669, a slightly later period: Jačov, I balcani tra impero ottomano e potenze europee (Cosenza: Periferia, 1997), as well as idem, L’Europa tra Conquiste Ottomane e Leghe Sante (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2001). See particularly chapter 6, containing the articles that bound successive Holy Leagues, and the article “Le Missioni Cattoliche nei Balcani durante la Guerra di Candia,” Testi e Studi, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana 352 (1992): 1-720 and 353 (1992): 1-786. I have been influenced by the importance which Jačov clearly assigns to Roman Catholic missionaries in supporting their coreligionists in the Balkans against Ottoman cultural and political pressures to ask whether a similar dynamic was at play even among the more theologically distant Greek Orthodox. We lack, however, contemporary accounts by Balkan writers about Catholic missionaries – who were mostly Franciscans from Italy and further west – which might provide insight into Balkan views of the intentions and activities of those missionaries. For the Hungarians, see Marianna D. Birnbaum, Humanists in a Shattered World: Croatian and Hungarian Latinity in the Sixteenth Century (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1985).

80 Theodore Papadopoulos, “Ο Ωθήνος τῆς Κύπρου” Κυπριαναί Σπουδαία Υλίνα (1980), 14: “Ο Ωθήνος εἶναι ἡ μοναδικὴ ἐλληνικὴ πηγὴ τῆς κατακτήσεως τῆς νήσου...” [The Lament is the sole Greek source for the Fall of the island...]
arguments. The *Lament for Cyprus* is written within a Christian providential framework. The Cypriots are being punished for their sins by the invasion, it is implied, and for their neglect of their devotions. People from all walks of life were led into slavery, which spared neither the aged nor clerics. The miserable Cypriots are struggling to survive, and the poet is thrown back upon repeated appeals to the Virgin Mary for succor.\(^81\) Judging from this poem, the preservation of a Christian Greek Cypriot identity was far from a foregone conclusion in 1571.\(^82\) The contribution -- partially inadvertent, but nonetheless significant -- made to this preservation by the See of Rome and the Catholic missionaries who dealt with Greek Orthodox, both on the Italian peninsula and in Cyprus itself, forms the subject of this, the first chapter. The fortunes of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus deserve a central place in any analysis of change in society in early Ottoman Cyprus because of the centrality of the institutions of religion in the lives of the Orthodox.

Cypriot refugees in Venice, on Crete and elsewhere in the Venetian empire, played a key role, through their writing and teaching, in forming and maintaining a Cypriot consciousness. One of the main cultural channels of communication these refugees maintained with the outside world was the religious connection with fellow Christians, both Eastern and Western. This chapter will first explore the changes in the Roman Church’s perception of the Greeks, as they gradually became able to analyze and observe those they regarded as schismatics, and to do so

\(^{81}\) Papadopoullos, “*Ο Θρήνος,*” 56, ll. 861-868, and 57, l. 887.

\(^{82}\) I am taking the Ottoman invasion as a starting-point, in part under the influence of Jan Glete, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2002), a study which takes for granted that war was a crucible that contributed in many cases (one might say “disproportionately” more than periods of peace) to state formation in early modern Europe. The specifically Orthodox component of that Greek Cypriot sense of cultural collectivity and identification with the interests of a larger Greek Orthodox world that makes up Cypriot nationalism fit well with the argument of Anthony W. Marx in *Faith and Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) that consciousness of religious difference contributed in many cases to the formation of early modern national identities, although one cannot speak of a Greek Cypriot “state” before independence from Britain in 1960.
with an appreciation that was separate from their theological disagreements. The interplay of Catholic and Orthodox in this period contributed to a heightened historical consciousness, among the Greek-speakers who lived on Cyprus, of their own Greekness, and of the elements – linguistic, cultural religious – that distinguished them from the new Ottoman rulers, other minorities on Cyprus, and other Greeks elsewhere. This was not the only factor allowing the Greek Cypriots to survive. Curiously, the very backwardness of Cyprus and its relative neglect by the Ottomans made a key contribution to the survival of the Greek Cypriots as a people.

Cyprus was most important to the Ottomans, it would seem, less for its intrinsic significance but, rather, as a place which they wished to keep out of Christian hands. How else to explain the scant mentions of Cyprus in that most comprehensive of travelogues, the Seyahatname of Evliya Çelebi, except that it was such a backwater in his eyes in the mid-seventeenth century that it did not merit a visit?83

Let us recall here that the Latin regimes on Cyprus between 1192 and 1571 had permitted a significant amount of cultural interaction between Latins and Greeks. Ecclesiastical differences did not always translate into social separation. Militiades Efthimiou has highlighted an alarming quotation from the Pope of Rome, Innocent III, shortly before the Fourth Crusade, to suggest the aggression of Westerners vis-à-vis Greeks: non-Latin Christians, wrote Innocent in 1199, were “worse than Saracens,” since they impeded Christian reconquest of the Holy Land.84 The overheated atmosphere in the papal circle shortly before the Fourth Crusade is relevant in interpreting such words. But the churchmen could fulminate as they wished, there was little they

83 There are a few passing references to Cyprus in his work, available in Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Zekeriya Kurşun, et al., eds. Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1996-2007). However, not only are these references brief, but the scholarly consensus is that Evliya never visited Cyprus.

could do to control Greek-Latin relations at a personal level. There was never a wide gulf between the two peoples and sets of traditions on Latin-ruled Cyprus, even if the Lusignan dynasty introduced and maintained court officers and ceremonial from the French tradition. 85 In the first half of the fourteenth century, George Lapithes or Lapithos, born into a Greek-speaking family, nevertheless became friend and advisor to King Hugh IV, and a scholar of Latin, as well as of Greek. 86 The anonymous poet or poets of the Greek Petrarchan love lyrics of the sixteenth century collected by Themis Siapkaras- Pitsillides, possessed a range of classical learning, on Roman as well as Greek subjects, and a mastery of poetic form, such as could have commanded the respect of Petrarch or Angelo Poliziano. 87

As in the Byzantine Empire, a fair amount of intermarriage took place, and was complained of by some Latin clergy. 88 Some social groups were ambiguous, neither fish nor fowl. For example, one of the most prominent groups that acted as intermediaries between the Latin and Greek communities – a group that existed on Crete and elsewhere among Venetian settlements in the Greek world – became known in documents from the thirteenth century as White Venetians, *veneti albi* in Latin. 89 These were generally Greek Orthodox who had managed to obtain Venetian citizenship through officeholding. Orthodox-Latin relations also had their

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85 On the Lusignan court officers, seneschal, constable marshal, chamberlain, and butler, see Peter W. Edbury, *Cyprus and the Crusades* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108 and 181, officers the use of which Edbury interprets (181) as part of “[t]he dynasty’s insistence on western as opposed to Byzantine court ceremonial.”


88 Hill, *History of Cyprus*, III, “The Two Churches,” 1099-1100. Hill attributes these to a relaxing of the Roman Church’s prohibitions against marriages between adherents of differing communions.

tensions in Venice, the colonial metropolis, herself. A significant struggle took place in the fifteenth century before Greek Orthodox worship was permitted in the city. By 1500, Venice possessed the largest Greek-speaking community in Western Europe, and their number, which grew considerably by 1570, included a large Cypriot contingent. Furthermore, the use of printing to inform Venetian Christians about the Eastern churches was already being explored by the *Tipografia Medicea Orientale*, in Rome, as well as in Venice, and other places with extensive printing activity in Western Europe.⁹⁰

**The Language of Cultural Survival**

The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus swept away the Latin church, as it swept away the island’s Latin rulers, and with them went the possibilities for fruitful Latin-Greek interaction that had been found on Cyprus for nearly four centuries.⁹¹ The production of certain works that would emerge in the next century from a combination of Greek and Latin literary traditions, for example, such as the *Erotokritos* written on Crete by Vintzentos Kornaros of circa 1642, could

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⁹⁰ The interests of successive sixteenth-century popes in publishing projects related to the Eastern churches are detailed in Robert Wilkinson, *Orientalism, Aramaic and Kabbalah in the Catholic Reformation* (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Wilkinson concentrates on the churches that employed Syriac and Aramaic as liturgical languages, but mentions the Greek Orthodox as well. The foundation of the Collegio Greco in 1577 and the many conversations with successive popes recorded by Cardinal Santoro offer further evidence of the interest of the Roman church in some form of relations with the Greeks, whether we call it reconciliation or merely some sort of détente. See also Alberto Tinto, “Per Una Storia della Tipografia Orientals a Roma nell’Ètà della Controriforma,” *Accademie e Biblioteche d’Italia* XLI (1973), 280-303, which mentions the importance to the projects of the Oriental printing press maintained in the house of the bishop of Novara, monsignor Cotta (292n.6:) “Nella nuova stampa che si fa in casa de Mons. Cotta, vescovo di Novara, saranno sei deputati dalla Sede Apostolica per stampare libri pertinenti alla Sacra Scrittura, et gli uffici di questi si venderanno al più offerente...” [In the new printing press being set up in the house of Monsignor Cotta, bishop of Novara, six men will be assigned by the Holy See to print books pertaining to Holy Scripture, and these offices will be sold to the highest bidder...]

⁹¹ The firman that swept away the Latin Church has not survived, to permit a close examination of its language, but it is mentioned by Archimandrite Kyprianos in his *History of the Island of Cyprus*, which, in reporting Ottoman government actions, is generally accurate. Crete, where many Cypriots repaired after the Ottoman conquest of their island, is possibly what Cyprus would have become in the absence of said invasion. See for examples of Latin-Greek cultural interplay the papers in David Holton, *Literature and Society on Renaissance Crete* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), particularly Arnold van Gemert, “Literary antecedents,” 49-78.
not have been plausibly produced on Ottoman Cyprus, because of the combination of the dismantling of Catholic society on Cyprus. It also would have been unable to reach as wide an audience as it did on Crete and in Venice, due to the the lack of a printing press on Cyprus. As I have mentioned, there were no printing presses introduced to Ottoman Cyprus, the first arriving in 1879.92

And with the conquest came other disruptions to the earlier patterns of life. A new officially sanctioned religion held sway on Cyprus. Catholic missionaries on Cyprus lamented both the forced and the voluntary semi-forced conversions to Islam, one complaining that converts then brought their families with them into sin and error.93 The conversion itself was a simple matter, consisting of no more than raising one finger and proclaiming the formula “There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet.” The aftermath was what caused those who remained Christians increasing difficulties, since the new converts were now subtracted from those paying taxes. Conversion to Islam meant an immediate change in social categories, from the tax-paying reaya94 (from an Arabic word meaning flock, the non-arms-bearing subjects of the Empire) to the Muslims who were not subject to the same. Not only did Christians, by converting, avoid the cizye tax, but converts were able to bring their families with them into the new faith. There were advantages in bringing their children along, furthermore, since the only schools the Ottomans built on the island were intended for the instruction of Muslim children.95


93 Zacharias Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδοτα γράφα εκ του αρχείου του Βατικανού, 1625-1667, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973), 42.

94 The term could refer to both Muslims and Christians. See Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. VIII, s.v. “Reaya.”

95 These included the primary schools, or sibyanlar, and secondary schools, or medreseler. Ahmet C. Gazoğlu, a historian and political radio broadcaster who labors to present the brightest possible face to Ottoman rule on Cyprus, could only adduce examples of Greek Christian education or Rum eğitimi from the eighteenth century on,
The curricula in those schools was not the same as that in the Christian schools then extant in some monasteries on Cyprus, but were based on two subjects: rapid instruction in Arabic, and then on the so-called Islamic sciences, including Koranic exegesis and mathematics.\footnote{Recently, for the first time, archival documents referring to specific texts used in the curriculum of medreses in Constantinople have come to light. Shahab Ahmed and Nenad Filipović, “The Sultan’s Syllabus: A Curriculum for the Ottoman Imperial Medreses Prescribed in a Ferman of Qanuni I Suleyman, Dated 973 (1565)” Studia Islamica 98/99 (2004), 183-218. The document is catalogued as E/2803/1 in the Topkapı Palace Archive. Perhaps the equivalent information will some day emerge for Cyprus.}

And thus some people on Cyprus, as one might expect under a new dispensation, adopted, after the Ottoman conquest, the faith of the conquerors. Even within families, some branches Islamized, some remained Christian.\footnote{Examples include the Paleologus family and the last female of the Cornaro Lusignan line, mistress of the fief of Potamia, as discussed in Kostas P. Kyrris, “L’importance sociale de la conversion à l’Islam (volontaire ou non) d’une section des classes dirigeantes de Chypre pendant les premiers siècles de l’occupation turque (1570-fin du XVIIe siècle),” in Actes de Premier Congres International des Études Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes (Sofia : Éditions de l’Académie Bulgare des Sciences, 1969), 437-462, at 437-9.} And, as we shall see, even among those who did not, there was ample internal squabbling within the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Thus, one should not assume that at any point under Venetian or Ottoman rule, complete accord prevailed within the Church of Cyprus. Even in the first century of the Church, long before the Schism, in the age of the Apostle Barnabas (1st century A.D.), the patron saint of Cyprus, Christians were already at theological loggerheads with each other. Major heresies (such as the Arian, the Donatist, and the Monophysite, to name only three of the more important) were widespread in the Greek East, as in the Latin West, try as some orthodox Byzantine emperors might to suppress

\textit{in Kibris‘ta Türkler, 1570-1878,} 285 ff. Mehmet Akif Erdoğru, in his brief recent consideration of the fortunes of the Orthodox, while analyzing many other sources of rural conflict such as the application of the Ottoman fief-system of timars to Cyprus, does not mention education at all. Erdoğru, “Notes on the Orthodox Community of Cyprus,” \textit{Tarih Incelemeleri Dergisi XX} (2005): 61-69. But that the sibyan - medrese system, infused as it was with Muslim theology, had little to offer students who intended to remain Christian, can scarcely be doubted.
them. In fact, one of the most devoted heresiologists, or cataloguers, and as it were, diagnosticians of heresy, Epiphanius of Salamis (310-403), was a metropolitan of Cyprus. Epiphanius was able to list dozens of Christian heresies, many obscure and forgotten today, some of which were found on early Christian Cyprus.

The seeds had long been sown for a diverse Christian religious landscape on late sixteenth-century Cyprus. Even after the Ottoman conquest, when many had fled the island and the Latin Church was briefly abolished – and even after it was again permitted by the treaty with the Ottomans the 1573, that Church would not be restored to anything like its presence under Venice – many Christian rites coexisted: Maronites (Catholics originally based on Mount Lebanon), Melkites, Armenians, Jacobites and Copts are all recorded on Cyprus in substantial numbers, alongside a long-established Jewish population. Nonetheless, scholars of medieval Cypriot history cannot avoid the major divide which George Hill referred to in the 1940s as the “Two Churches.” This was the division between the Orthodox, acknowledging the leadership of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, and the Latins, who looked to the popes of Rome.

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98 Notwithstanding the negative connotations that attach to the term heresy, I employ the term, instead of the more neutral “alternate beliefs” or “distinctive theologies,” to hew as closely as possible to the mindset of the early Christian controversialists themselves.

99 His Panarion is still famous today. This text is discussed, for example, in a notable recent study of Byzantine heresiology, Tia M. Kolbaba, Inventing Latin Heretics (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2008), 18-19.

100 This distinctively eastern title is assigned to a high clergyman ranked between bishops and patriarchs.

101 In 1596, for example, the Perugian professor of theology Girolamo Dandini, on his way to convene a Maronite synod at Qannubin in Lebanon, observed that there were, in Nicosia, numerous Maronites. Dandini, Missione apostolica al patriarca, e Maroniti del Monte Libano (Cesena: Neri, 1656): 3. An anonymous report by a Dominican missionary to the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith of 1625 mentions several hundred Jacobites and Copts – other Oriental Christian communities – as well as an unspecified number of Armenians and Maronites. Zacharias Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδοτα εγγραφα, 6. It is difficult to tell whether the Melkites, in English today also referred to as Greek Catholics, were recognized as a distinct sect by Catholics and Orthodox in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Some missionary lists written in Italian mention Greek Catholics – greci cattolici— as well as Greeks of the Greek rite, but it is possible that a distinct Melkite identity only emerged later.

102 George Hill, History of Cyprus, III, 1041-1104.
This division has acquired such historiographical weight, because political differences were deeply intertwined with theological ones, in the confrontation of Greeks and Latins, throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. But, in the face of the Ottoman advance, scholars have also recognized that the Catholic-Orthodox divide could be bridged, at least temporarily, as crises produced a sense of common purpose. This had taken place a few years before the invasion of Cyprus, when it became clear to the the ruling Catholic Genoese regime on the island of Chios, that the Ottomans had planned to annex the island, as they did in 1566 (the Genoese-descended Mahona government had, even before that, long been paying them a tribute.) The Genoese regime, at the time of the fall of Constantinople, tried to buttress the loyalty of the Orthodox by equalizing taxation upon all inhabitants, and eliminating a tax that had been levied upon the Orthodox alone.


104 The early twentieth century historian William Miller remarked, “if few Eastern politicians are religious men, nearly all churchmen are politicians,” *History of the Greek People*, London, Methuen, 1922, 25, quoted in Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 310. An important landmark in Latin-Greek relations was marked by the year 800; at that time, the Byzantine emperors, who saw Constantinople as the *caput mundi*, had not been happy when Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne as Emperor. They were no less upset by the apparent claim to equal prestige with themselves made by Otto I in 962, when Pope John XII crowned Otto at Aachen, and he took the title Holy Roman Emperor.

105 A largely Orthodox island near the Sea of Marmara, and Constantinople, which the Ottomans took over in 1566.

106 Ottoman orders pertaining to the treatment of Chios are reproduced in Philip Argenti, *Chius Vincta or, The Occupation of Chios by the Turks (1566) and their Administration of the Island (1566-1912)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941.

107 The Genoese also used Chios as a major slave-market for Orthodox Christians, however, as well as for Christians from the Caucasus (Georgians and Armenians). This was an area where the Genoese discriminated, and generally did not sell their fellow Latin Christians. See P.E. Russell, *Prince Henry “the Navigator:” a Life* [2nd edition] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), n. 13, p. 248.
The Evolution Since the Middle Ages of Catholic Approaches to the Orthodox

By the time the Ottomans set up a regime on Cyprus, the Catholic Church had been singled out by the Ottomans and treated with particular venom in a number of places they had conquered, including Rhodes, Chios, Naxos, and Cyprus itself, even as the Catholics would soon face difficulties at the site of Mount Zion controlled by Franciscans in Ottoman-ruled Jerusalem. The experience of having endured – or heard from their coreligionists about – an arbitrary and never entirely secure existence under the Ottomans in many places in Eastern Europe, gave the Catholics common ground with the Orthodox, and in the case of Cyprus, prepared Catholics intellectually to act as a support for the Greek Cypriots. The rapprochement of Catholics and Orthodox was made clear at the Union of Brest, a council convened in modern-day Belarus in 1596, after some Orthodox clergy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had come deeply to fear the incursions of Protestant ideas among their flocks, and sought to draw closer to the Latin church as a counterweight. In the meantime, in Italy, the Church of Rome was engaged in different efforts, especially in the south of the peninsula, where Greek-speaking Christians had been numerous since the age of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I (r. 527-565). Venetian society had been becoming more open to Greek Orthodox worship, at the same time that Venetian humanists were rediscovering ancient Greece, and also talking, on a more

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108 On Chios (Ottoman Sakız), after he conquered the island in 1566, the Ottoman commander, Piyale Paşa, ordered the Greek population to accept Orthodoxy, an indication that the formerly dominant Latin church was no longer welcome. We rely for our information on the Ottoman conquest in part on Ottoman documents, some reproduced in Philip Argenti, Chius Vincta, or, the Occupation of Chios by the Turks (1566) and some now available in 5. Numarali mühime defteri, ed. İsmet Binark (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994). For Mount Zion, Amnon Cohen, “The Expulsion of the Franciscans from Mount Zion,” *Turcica* 18 (1986), 147-57.

profound level than earlier, with the living (and often suffering) Greeks of their own day. In 1539
the first stone was laid for a church for the Greek community in Venice, St. George of the
Greeks, where the Greek rite (rito greco)\textsuperscript{110} was to be permitted.\textsuperscript{111} The Greek College of St.
Athanasius in Rome, which Gregory XIII (r. 1572-85), opened in 1577 to train Greek priests in
the Latin rite, offered another effort by the Latin church to extend a hand to the Greeks, by
training priests, most from Greek lands, to return with the pure doctrine in their hearts, so it was
hoped, to evangelize their schismatic brethren. One cardinal, Giulio Antonio Santoro (1532-
1602), was particularly important in its foundation. This reflected a more general interest on the
part of the popes and cardinals in the era of the Counter-Reformation in maintaining channels of
communication with the Eastern churches. Santoro’s other activities, for example, included his
examination of the Thirty-Two Articles promulgated by Ruthenian clergy desiring to make their
submission to Rome at the conference known as the Union of Brest, in 1593-96. This undoubted
openness on the part of the Holy See in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries does not mean
that all the old prejudices melted away. Santoro was more open to Greeks than were some of his
colleagues, such as Cardinal Antonio Cauco, whose work \textit{De Graecorum Recentiorum
Haeresibus} was later attacked by the ecumenically-minded Chiot theologian Leo Allatius (1599-

\textsuperscript{110} As it was almost always called in the Italian of the sixteenth century, rather than designated with the word
“Orthodox.”

\textsuperscript{111} The start of work on the Church, which was completed only in 1573, is mentioned in \textit{Archivio della scuola di S.
Nicolò e della chiesa di S. Giorgio dei Greci di Venezia, Mariegola 20}. This only followed after a long lobbying effort
on the part of the Greeks of Venice for a church of their own. The Venetian Council of Ten, a deliberative body that
made many of the most important decisions concerning matters pertaining to morals and the public welfare, as
well as to diplomatic and military affairs in the Republic, acceded to the wishes of Pope Clement VII, in his letter
preserved as \textit{Archivio Segreto Vaticano}, reproduced in Giorgio Fedalto, \textit{Ricerche sulla posizione giuridica ed
ecclesiastica dei greci a Venezia nei secoli XV e XVI} (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1967), 131, where Clement
allows the “Greci in civitate Venetiarum” [Greeks in the city of Venice] to build a church and to “missas et alia divina officia
more suo celebrare,” [to celebrate Masses and other divine offices according to their custom] with the proviso that
they should not “in opprobrium eorundem Latinorum exprimi facerent presumpserunt,” [that they should not
presume to make utterance of their own hatred for these same Latins].
1668) as extreme and ignorant.\footnote{112} At times the sixteenth-century papacy, wedded to precedent and tradition in its attitude towards schismatic Christians,\footnote{113} also renewed a medieval interest in bringing all users of the Greek rite over to the Latin rite.\footnote{114} Santoro’s notes on his conferences with Gregory XIII on how to handle the Greek Orthodox make clear, for example, that the church legislation of Innocent IV of 1254 on the Greeks of Cyprus was still considered relevant in the late sixteenth century.\footnote{115} All sorts of schemes for reintroducing the Truth to the Greeks had

\footnote{112} Antonio Cauco, \textit{De Graecorum Recentiorum Haeresibus ad Gregorium XIII Pontificem}, in \textit{Bessarione} 17 (1913), 369-75, a work from Vatican Library MS. \textit{Codex Barberinus Latinus} 1221. Cauco refers to Thomas Aquinas’ \textit{Contra Errores Graecorum} and lists thirty-one errors, some of them major grounds for disagreement between the Roman and Greek Churches since the Middle Ages, such as (373, heading IV) that a Purgatory exists for the defunct, (“\textit{n}egant defunctorum purgatorium…” 373) and (heading V) the primacy of the Supreme Pontiff of Rome (“\textit{n}egant Summi Pontificis romani primatum absolute…” and (374, article XV) that the Greeks deny marriage to be indissoluble, as the Roman Church does, and allow marriages to be dissolved on grounds of adultery (“\textit{M}atrimonii sacramentum tanquam vinculum indissolubile negant Graeci, et propterea asserunt romanam Ecclesiam errare, quia docuit, et docet propter adulterium alterius coniugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvī…”). As part of the intellectual context of this piece, it should be noted that Cauco had attended an early session of the Council of Trent, which systematized Catholic belief. Unlike the newly emergent Protestantism, though, Cauco and like-minded Catholics could not reasonably accuse the Greeks, who considered their practices to have been passed down from the earliest Church, of \textit{innovation} in their schism; rather, he instead stresses their \textit{stubbornness} and the \textit{longstanding} nature of their errors (as concerned the Greek custom of allowing a priest to say mass only once in a given church per day, for instance: “\textit{In parochialibus, et alis ipsorum Graecorum Ecclesiis ex antiquissimo et hactenus observato usu non nisi semel in die per unum sacerdotem celebri licet.” [In their parish churches, and other churches of the said Greeks, according to a most ancient and until now observed usage, it is permitted for one priest to celebrate, not more than once per day.]

\footnote{113} As Fr. Cyril Korolevsky pointed out in 1913, the so-called \textit{Bulla Cypria} promulgated by Innocent IV in 1254 was the main statement of the Church on relations with those they called Greeks for over three centuries, until the \textit{Super Aliquibus Ritibus Graecorum} of Clement VIII of 1595. See Cyril Korolevskii, “L’Istruzione di Clemente VIII ‘Super Aliquibus Ritibus Graecorum’ (1595) e le congregazioni per la riforma dei greci (1593)” \textit{Bessarione} 31 (1913): 344.

\footnote{114} Joseph Gill, however, has cautioned against imagining that the Latins invariably conceived of the Latin rite in rigid terms, as possessing only one possible form. Gill interpreted a letter of Urban V on the Greeks of Crete in 1368 as meaning that they would be allowed to practice a modified form of the Greek rite, thus accommodating, to some extent, their different liturgical tradition. Gill refers, in an ecumenical spirit, to “different rites (and obviously legitimate rites) with one faith,” calling to mind the tolerant Reformation-era inscription on the façade of the University of Rostock, \textit{doctrina multiplex sed veritas una}. See Joseph Gill, “Pope Urban V and the Greeks of Crete,” in \textit{Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204-1453)} (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), VIII, 465.

been considered in the Middle Ages, such as that conceived by the French lawyer Pierre Dubois to marry, through coercion if necessary, Greek girls to Latin boys.116 A similarly creative, if gently intolerant spirit seems to have revivified the efforts of the papacy in promoting Union, Latin unio – hence Uniate Christians is used for eastern Christians who accept communion with Rome – with the eastern churches in the decades before the creation of the famous Catholic missionary council the Sacra Congregatio Pro Propaganda Fide, in 1622. An important piece of legislation for insight into the papal thinking that led to this body’s creation was Clement VIII’s *Instructio per aliquibus ritibus graecorum* (1595),117 a famous text which makes no claim to innovation, but lays out systematically the same points of disagreement with the Greeks that had been widely perceived since at least the thirteenth century, and on some points, much longer.

The Orthodox Church never instituted a missionary program comparable to that of the Church of Rome. On the other hand, in 1587, Gabriel Seviros, an Orthodox cleric from Crete, was set up as head of the Orthodox community in Venice, with a title of Metropolitan of Philadelphia, a community in Ottoman Asia Minor, as well as Supreme Exarch of Lydia, a heavily Muslim part of Asia Minor. The conferral of such titles paralleled a long-established Western custom of episcopal titles held in absentia – though Catholic episcopal offices of this sort were often in partibus infidelium, in old Christian sees in North Africa and the crusader

[116] “Puellas vero que disponentur conjugandi cum illis qui non tenent articulos fidei nostre, prout eos tenet, docet et observat ecclesia romana.” [Let them indeed provide for the girls, who must be married with them, those of them who do not hold the articles of our faith, in order that the Roman Church may hold them, teach them, and observe them]. Pierre Dubois, *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, ed. Charles V. Langlois (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1891): 70-71. See the analysis of Michael R. Evans, “Marriage as a Means of Conversion in Pierre Dubois’ *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae,*” in Gyu da Armstrong and Ian N. Wood, eds., *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 195-202.

states and surrounding Muslim-dominated territories, such as the see of Damascus, for example. Though such titles were from one point of view quite empty of meaning, the appointment of Seviros is a striking sign of the vitality and confidence of the Greek community in Venice, and also the interest that the clergy based in the East continued to take in their fate. The Greek community, including many Cypriots, also set up what was called an Orthodox monastery in 1599 for Greek nobles. They seem genuinely to have enjoyed Venice, and Venice in turn to have been enriched by their presence. These cordial relations were a change from the earlier Middle Ages. Poor relations with those whom Latins often dubbed the Graeculi, the poor little Greeks, had been rather the rule than the exception for the western medieval church, punctuated by quarrels such as the mutual excommunication of Pope Leo IX and the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Kerularios, in 1054. The popes tended zealously to defend the prerogatives of their own Roman see, pointing to the Donation of Constantine as evidence in the High Middle Ages, and when this no longer carried weight as evidence, could still argue from the primacy of Peter among the apostles. The Orthodox responded by affirming the centrality of Constantinople, for a thousand years one of the largest and richest and most populous cities of


120 In recent years a few articles have appeared on the changes in the Catholic approach to Greek Orthodoxy after the Council of Trent. Not surprisingly, two of the most weighty were written soon after the Second Vatican Council of 1958-63. The dominant figure in these two accounts was Cardinal Giulio Antonio Santoro, a key figure in the Collegio Greco in Rome, which began training Greek clergy in 1577: on his life, see John Krajcar, Cardinal Santoro, 5-13, and Vittorio Peri, Chiesa Romana e Rito Greco: G. A. Santoro e la Congregazione dei Greci (1566-1596) (Brescia: Paideia, 1975), 105-120.
Christendom, and boasted not only of its title, the New Rome, *Nea Rome* in Greek, but of their own status as *Romaioi*, the heirs to the Roman Empire. They saw themselves as the beneficiaries of a *translatio imperii*, a transfer of power that had take place from Rome to Constantinople after the latter’s foundation in A.D. 330.\(^\text{121}\) The Orthodox patriarchs were proud and felt contempt for the upstart Latins – an attitude that was constant, whatever the Latin-Orthodox disagreements at a given moment. Against a background of theological warfare, the new Dominican and Franciscan orders of the thirteenth century tried to be conciliatory and often maintained cordial dealings with the Greek schismatics, beginning soon after their foundations, as orders, in the early thirteenth century. They even included some Greek-speakers among their ranks. There was a positive medieval heritage of Latin-Orthodox relations that could, and did, inform sixteenth and seventeenth-century efforts to bring Greeks and Latins closer together.

After the Ottomans began to move into Europe in the 1360s new common ground emerged between the Byzantines and Western Christians. Putting theological differences to one side, successive popes of Rome, as well as the ruler of Latin states such as Venice, Genoa, and Hungary, committed themselves to defending the tottering Byzantine Empire against the Ottoman advance.\(^\text{122}\) After the crusade of Varna in 1444, a disastrous defeat for the Christians trying to resist the Ottoman advance, the Council of Ferrara-Florence was the last opportunity a Byzantine emperor had, both to make his submission to Rome – the emperor in question, John VIII, attended the council and approved of the Union of Eastern and Western Churches – and to

\(^\text{121}\) See on the subject of the *translatio* Paul J. Alexander, “The Strength of Empire and Capital as seen through Byzantine Eyes,” *Speculum* 37 (1962), 339-57.

\(^\text{122}\) Having studied many of the humanist text warning against the Ottoman advance from these states, James Hankins has questioned whether we should neatly separate in our minds humanists – whom some would like to associate with a secular or worldly outlook – from Crusaders, or those who saw war against the Ottomans as an extension of the medieval Crusades. James Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 111-207.
elicit Western support again the Ottomans. It was during this visit that the Greek Unionist priest, Bessarion of Trebizond, bishop of Nicaea, while accompanying his emperor and passing through Venice, famously referred to that city as *quasi alterum Byzantium*, “like unto another Byzantium.”¹²³ The Council of Ferrara-Florence produced mixed results: as Syropoulos, one of the Greek clergy there recorded, he and most of his brother clergy rejected Unionism once they returned safely to Constantinople, but the emperor had partly succeeded in his diplomatic goal of gaining the Western aid he needed.

The final siege of Constantinople, in 1453, in which many thousands of Genoese, Venetians, and other Latins died fighting the Ottomans alongside the Greeks of the city, was a high point of collaboration among Christians of all creeds. Elegies for the Fall were written in the many languages of different Christian sects, ranging as far afield as Armenian – an interesting fact, in light of the alleged future collaboration of the Armenians with the Ottomans during their invasion of Cyprus – while in distant Scandinavia King Christian I denounced Mehmet II as the Beast of the Apocalypse.¹²⁴ At the time, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the future pope Pius II and planner of a crusade against the Turk, wrote that the Fall of Constantinople was a disaster, and the second death, both of Homer, and of Plato.¹²⁵ Piccolomini had earlier written that Constantinople remained the mother city, the seat of philosophy, and a place where every Latin Christian who dared to claim to be educated needed to study. This theme, too – the elision of the ancient Greeks with those of their own day – was another shift noticeable in the writings

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of several Western humanists, including Francesco Filelfo, and – for it was not a theme restricted to Italian humanists – Erasmus of Rotterdam too. It was common at this time in both East and West not clearly to distinguish ancient times from one’s own to the same extent as today. The Late Byzantine scholar Gemistus Plethon, for example, wrote to the emperor Manuel II (r. 1391-1425), “We over whom you rule and hold sway are Hellenes by race, as is demonstrated by our language and ancestral education. And for Hellenes there is no more proper and peculiar land to be found than the Peloponnese, together with the neighbouring part of Europe and the islands that lie near it.” One could argue that Plethon was a proto-nationalist, more interested in distinguishing his Christian flock from the Westerners by language and “race” than in stressing their continuities with Antiquity. But the lines along which he thinks are suggestive. Cypriots – such as the fifteenth-century chronicler of the history of the island, Leontios Machairas – writing at the same time as Plethon – were well aware of the historic ties of their island to Byzantium and the Greek East, and reflected on the “Greekness” of the island, even as they also showed affection for the ruling Frankish dynasty of Cyprus, the Lusignans. Machairas, writing of the Lusignan taking control of Cyprus, wrote in these terms: “I have up to now explained to you how the kingdom [of Cyprus] was taken from the Romaioi [the Byzantines] and given to the Latins, and how foreigners were made to come to oversee the country...may God be pleased that it be told to the world!”


There was an increasing willingness after the Council of Trent of 1545-63 of the learned Latin clergy, and I would argue in part stimulated by that Council, to separate, or perhaps better, *compartmentalize* their scholarship on Eastern Christian churches from their vocational duty to uphold the Roman rite. This compartmentalization allowed these Western churchmen, as well as Western laymen, to admire the Greeks of their own time in spite of, or separately from, their doctrinal differences. This was a new sort of philhellenism, one that could set religion partly aside and conceive of the Greek-Ottoman struggles largely in terms of competing political ideals. One side, the Greek, was conceived of as more free, and a common approach was to regard the modern struggle with the Turks as akin to, or analogous to, the ancient Greek struggle against the Persians. The Cypriots who fled west benefitted from this movement, particularly in Venice, where many members of the Gonemis, Kigalas, Sozomeno and other Cypriot Orthodox families settled. This new philhellenism was largely a phenomenon of the Catholic countries, although one must also recognize, and reckon with, the substantial exchange of

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rational and/or cultural continuity with his ancient Greek ancestors and of his national identity would probably not have occurred to a Cypriot of the Middle Ages,” is exaggerated.

128 A general council of the Roman Church convoked to counter the Lutheran Reformation and institute Church reforms.


130 Paolo Paruta’s funeral oration for those Venetians killed at Lepanto, late in the Cyprus War, specifically mentioned the Persian Wars fought by the Greeks as less heroic than the campaign fought by the Holy League, since he considered the Turks doughtier warriors than the Persians.

correspondence and ideas that took place between Constantinopolitan Orthodox churchmen and
the Lutheran theologians of the University of Tübingen in the late sixteenth century.132

Unlike in the early Middle Ages, when at certain times and places too keen an interest in
pagan learning could lead to suspicion of either heresy, or backsliding from Christianity, open
acknowledgment of and comfort with pagan influences on all areas of culture was widespread by
the middle of the fifteenth century. Pius II (r. 1458-64) was deeply interested in pagan Roman
poetry, while in Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici’s hired tutor and protected poet, Angelo
Poliziano, was penning Bacchic odes for the modern reader similar in prosodic form and content
to the Bacchic odes of classical antiquity. By the early sixteenth century the sculptor Benvenuto
Cellini told of a pagan-style magic ceremony held in the ruins of the Roman Coliseum; Cellini
has often been written of as a man whose activities display a remarkable mix of pagan and
Christian.133 Thus, even at the papal court, the heart of Western Christianity before the
Reformation, Renaissance culture permitted, indeed encouraged, the appreciation of pagan
literature within the limits imposed by the demands of Christianity. So it is not surprising to find
Cypriots under Latin Catholic rule and influence extolling the pagan past of Cyprus, especially

132 This is amply documented in the Turcograecia by one of those Tübingen theologians, Martin Crusius. Crusius,
Turcograecia, cited above n. 65, Chapters Seven and Eight, 409-514. One channel through which more Catholics
than Protestants were able to take an interest in and gain some personal experience of the Levant was through
pilgrimage, for Catholic pilgrims to the Holy Land greatly outnumbered Protestant, as pilgrimage was not high
among the priorities of the Reformers, although some Protestants, such as the German Leonhart Rauwolf, still
passed through Cyprus. This outnumbering meant that far more Catholics passed through Cyprus and had the
opportunity to observe its political circumstances, as did Girolamo Dandini, for example, who in 1596 in his
Missione apostolica wrote about his journey to the Holy Land, which he undertook by way of Cyprus. An example
of the sophisticated Catholic antiquarian scholarship on the Holy Land that emerged in this period, though not on
Cyprus, is the account by the Franciscan Fra Bernardino Amico, Trattato delle piante ed immagini de sacri edifi zi di
Terra Santa (Florence: Cecconcelli, 1620).

133 Benvenuto Cellini, La Vita (Milan: Istituto Editoriale, 1926), 139-42. The Russian writer Nikolai Berdyaev called
Cellini “a sixteenth century pagan: he commits the most dastardly crimes and sets his stamp upon the age in which
such crimes were common enough.” Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, Trans. Maria Nemcova Banerjee (New
the glories of its ten ancient Greek kingdoms – Kition, Idalion, Kourion, and so forth – celebrated by writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, including Leontios Makhairas, George Boustronios, Florio Bustron, and even by the Catholic priest Étienne de Lusignan.134

The rhetorical move that is perceptible after the Ottoman conquest was a departure from seeing Cyprus mainly as the outpost of Christendom _oltre mare_ – beyond the sea – that is, a stepping-stone to the Holy Land, towards an interest, prompted partly by the new enthusiasm for the Greek civilizations of classical antiquity, in the manners and morals of the Greeks then living on Cyprus, in an ethnological vein akin to that of the fashionable popularization of news about, and also speculation as to the Biblical or extra-Biblical origins of, the natives of the New World, that was current in Europe at about the same time.

Every aspect of the antiquities, geography, history, and legends of Cyprus was delved into, for one example, by Lusignan’s _Chorograffia_.135 In Cyprus and in the Latin West, also, travellers, among whom pilgrims to the Holy Land were especially numerous, took note of Cyprus, its flora and fauna, its population, its churches and monuments, and anecdotes told to these travelers by the locals.136 The travel accounts and correspondence about Cyprus in the early

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134 Reference is to the following: Leontios Makhairas, _Une histoire du doux pays de Chypre_, trans. Isabelle Cervellin-Chevalier (Besançon: Praxandre, 2002); George Boustronios, _The Chronicle of George Boustronios, 1456-1489_, trans. R.M. Dawkins (Victoria, Australia: Mebourne University Press, 1964); Florio Bustron, _Historia ovvero commentari di Cipra_ (Nicosia: Th. Papadopoullos, 1998), and Étienne de Lusignan, _Description de toute l’Isle de Cypre_ [Description of the Entire Isle of Cyprus] (Famagusta: Editions l’Oiseau, 1968 [1580]). Lusignan devotes Chapter 12 of his _Description de toute l’Isle de Cypre, et des roys, princes, et seigneurs, tant Payens que Chrestiens, qui ont commandé en icelle..._ and Chapter 13 to “the famous pagans of the island of Cyprus” (les Payens illustres de l’Isle de Cypre). To be sure, some Western writers on Cyprus, such as Girolamo Dandini, the professor of theology, emphasize that the apostle Barnabas then vigorously stamped out pagan worship on the island, which Lusignan also acknowledges in Chapter 13. But Lusignan’s interest in the Greek classical past is manifest.

135 Étienne de Lusignan, _Chorograffia_ (Nicosia: Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2004): 1-35 contains much pagan legendary material on Cyprus. To take one pagan figure upon whom Lusignan sheds light, _Chorograffia_ 8a; 17; 19a-21 is a unique source from the early modern period on what was known of the pagan god Kinyras/Kinara.

136 As related in an anonymous letter of 1609 to Philip III of Spain, Hassiotis, Ἰσπανικά ἔγγραφα, : “infinitos Christianos que habitan en aquella isla y están sujetos a los Turcos, de los quales reciben cada día infinitas vexaciones, molestias y tiranías,” [infinite Christians who live in that island and are subject to the Turks, from
Ottoman period are richer sources for the daily lives of the Orthodox inhabitants of the island than those of the Middle Ages. I suggest this reflects a shift in European interests about the Greeks, into a more rounded concern than the purely theological.137

Catholicism in the period after the Cyprus War saw the stirrings of missionary, or one can say evangelizing efforts, on a grander scale than at any time since the days of Franciscan missions to the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The Jesuit Order, founded in 1554, was prominent in these efforts, which eventually came to encompass all of the Greek lands, as well as Protestant parts of Europe, and even remote parts of Catholic Europe, where Christianization was deemed superficial even in the sixteenth century. But Cyprus was not an important focus of Catholic missionary activity. The Latin Church, which legally was only swept away for two years before Ottoman authorities began in 1573 to permit Catholics again to come to the island and to worship, still never recovered to anything like its prewar presence.

whom they receive every day infinite vexations, molestation and tyrannies] followed by a mention of the beginning of a levy of eldest sons on Cyprus in 1606 for the Janissary corps – apparently this was not undertaken directly after the Cyprus War. Especially interesting for those aware of later Christian missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire is a different passage, one of 1647, written by the missionary Giovanni Battista da Todi. He appears to connect the pressing need for aid and for more priests for the churches of Cypriot Maronites with the threat that if they do not receive them, many are likely to convert to Islam: “non volendo andar nissuno di detti sacerdoti, per non esservi le commodità necessarie, non vi essendo, per la gran povertà, né calice, né pianete, ma nella Pascha, per il gran forzo che li havemo fatto, fu necessario darli quelli che tenemo noi, ma né anco furono bastanti, non havendo noi altro che due calici...Iddio sà quanti n’havemo liberati, sì con li agiuti spirituali, come temporalì, che non si faccino Turchi, essendo tale la loro miseria, che commove a pietà ciascheduno che li vede...” [for none of the priests wish to go [to minister to the Maronite villages,] for there are not the necessary commodities. There are lacking, on account of the great poverty, chalices, and vestments, and during Easter, as part of the great effort we made towards them, it was necessary to give them ours, but these were not sufficient, for we had no more than two chalices...God knows how many we have freed, both with spiritual aids, and with temporal, so that they did not become Turks, so great being their misery, that it moves everyone who sees them to pity...]. Many missionaries thus came to perceive their activities as bulwarks against conversion to Islam.

137 In addition to Todi’s report cited above, the correspondence found in the Spanish Habsburg archives by Hasiotes concerning the revolts planned by Girolamo Combi and Pedro Aventaño also contains many descriptions of the sufferings of Cypriot Christians. Their fate is linked (e.g. in Hassiotis, Ispanika Engrapha, letter 57, 98-99) with that of the “popoli di Levante” – the peoples of the Levant.
But a large number of Cypriots graduated from the Greek College, as at least nominal Catholics, and a number of those graduates and other Cypriots, such as Leontios Eustratios and Athanasios Rhetor, went back to Cyprus to teach, preach, or both. The papacy’s influence on Cypriot church developments, then, from the 1570s on, once the island was under direct Ottoman rule and the Latin church had been abolished, was indirect, conducted through other Catholic states via Constantinople, and, after 1622, through the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, the Sacra Congregatio pro Propaganda Fide, which supervised Catholic missions both close to home (in southern Italian communities) and abroad. The popes’ most direct role in the lives of Cypriots, as the research of Wipertus Hugh Rudt de Collenberg has shown, was a determined effort to ransom as many Christians who had been kidnapped and sold into slavery – most in Constantinople – as possible. At least several hundred Cypriots were ransomed through papal efforts between 1571 and 1600. Many of these cases are also reported in the published correspondence of the papal nuncios to Venice in this period. On June 27, 1573, for example, the papal secretary of state Tolomeo Galli wrote to the newly-appointed nuncio, Giambattista Castagna, to say that “Over the last few days, it was ordered of monsignore di Nicastro by His Holiness that he should promise to aid Signore Pietro Muscorno, of Cyprus, in ransoming his

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138 I stress “direct” because, in Ottoman eyes, Cyprus had legally already been under Ottoman suzerainty since the Ottomans had conquered Mamluk Egypt in 1517, and inherited the tribute of 8000 ducats per year which the Venetians had formerly paid to the Mamluks, in exchange for their governance of Cyprus.

139 For the pre-history of the Sacra Congregatio, see Antonio Castellucci, “Il risveglio dell’attività missionaria e le prime origini della S.C. di Propaganda Fide,” Le Conferenze al Laterano, Pontificio Seminario Romano Maggiore (Rome: no publisher, 1923,) 117-254.

[relatives] who are slaves of the Turks, to pay therefore the sum of 200 scudi to those merchants who have taken charge of handling this ransom…”

The grounds for Western intervention to protect them had come, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to be phrased more in terms of universal rights and of the common language of resistance to Turkish cruelty than those of Christians fighting the Infidel. This was a shift from the Crusades of the High Middle Ages, when the reasons given for sending armies to the Middle East had been explicitly described as intervention to defend fellow-Christians. Religiously-based prejudice against the Orthodox endured. Even Cardinal Santoro, who had a reputation as a friend and protector of the Greeks, and who corresponded in friendly terms with the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, Meletios Pigas, could still sneer in print at a Greek Orthodox priest who had come to his attention, and the head of the Franciscan mission on Cyprus, Pietro Vespa, referred repeatedly over the 1620s and early 1630s to his disdain for the

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142 It is tempting to connect this move from Christian-specific language to the language of universal rights to resistance to tyranny to the influence of the monarchomach literature – political philosophy justifying the overthrow of tyrannical monarchs – produced in pro-Calvinist circles in France and the Netherlands beginning in the 1560s. Thus Sir Paul Rycaut, English consul in Smyrna, a major Ottoman emporium on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, in his Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, first published in 1679, argued that the Greek Christians labored under tyranny, but he did not attempt to portray that tyranny as specifically Islamic. The theme of Turkish tyranny and despotism would endure down to the end of the Ottoman Empire, and it freed critics of the Empire from having to single out Islam. See Lucette Valensi, Venise et la sublime porte: la naissance du despote (Paris: Hachette, 1987). Valensi specifically dates the shift to a new stress on Ottoman despotism in Venetian writings to the period after the Cyprus War.

143 Podskalsky has indicated through his research how he interprets the Orthodox as buffeted on the “battlefield of confessions,” as Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics fought among themselves and were, in addition, rivals jockeying for ways to win the loyalty of the Orthodox Christians. Gerhard Podskalsky, Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft, 1453-1821 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988). The monument of sixteenth-century European scholarship on the Orthodox living under Ottoman rule, for example, the Turcogræcia of Martin Crusius -- first published 1584 – he presents as the product of a Lutheran environment at the University of Tübingen which had as one of its goals an increased understanding of the Orthodox in order to bring about a rapprochement.
Greeks whose anti-Latin prejudice he saw as impeding his activity. Not everyone in the Roman church could forget the longstanding impatience and hostility towards what from their point of view was Greek schismatism, a view that had strongly marked the Latin Middle Ages. But these views were increasingly rendered irrelevant, as reason of state came to drive European Christian powers in their dealings with the Ottomans. Nor would one expect, with Protestant ideas and other heresies continuing to make inroads in Europe, and with the beginnings of a mass hysteria over witches and black magic, that what might seem “small” theological differences would be overlooked. More and more, the popes found themselves preoccupied with matters within Europe itself, and unable to devote much attention to matters without. Where the popes did play an important role in diplomacy involving Cyprus, somewhat later in the seventeenth century, was in a small matter: reconciling two Catholic states, Venice and Savoy, which continued to lay claim to the island long after the Cyprus War – Savoy based her claim on the fact of the marriage of Duke Amedeo VIII’s son, Louis, future Duke of Savoy, to Anne of Lusignan, Queen of Cyprus, in 1434. Successively, Urban VIII (r. 1623-44), Innocent X (r. 1644-55), and Alexander VII (r. 1655-67) all tried to heal the breach between Venice and Savoy, both of which laid claim to Cyprus according to the dynastic and hereditary principles that informed a rudimentary law of nations accepted at the time by states in Western Europe. Because of the lingering connection
in the minds of European elites of Cyprus with the glorious deeds of their ancestors during the Crusades, we can interpret this episode as a display of reactionary nostalgia, a gratuitous asserting of theoretical rights over an island that would never again actually pass under the control of either power involved. A more favorable way of regarding this disagreement can, however, be suggested. These popes may have seen themselves as fulfilling the traditional role of the pontifex (whose Latin name, after all, means builder of bridges) in reconciling Christian princes, at a time when the need for Christian unity was a particular preoccupation of theirs. That they failed to reconcile the parties, is less important than that they saw it as their duty to try.

I have suggested that consideration of Santoro’s life and work, including the evidence from Greek sources, suggests how Western clergy contributed to the survival of Orthodox traditions and consciousness in this period. In 1583, for example, we learn from the published letters of Meletios Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria, that Cardinal Santoro had sent him a well-crafted copy of the new Gregorian calendar, established by Pope Gregory XIII, for which

şeriye, the holy law of Islam, or the claims therein. Nor did anyone in Christian Europe make an attempt to reconcile the Islamic and the Roman law traditions of territorial law, the principles, in other words, that those on each side thought governed the question of who should legitimately rule a given territory. The closest the Venetians and Ottomans came to “reconciling” their views was when they established commissions appointed ad hoc to resolve territorial questions between Christian Venice and the Muslim Ottomans. Mahmut Şakiroğlu has referred to this process as it was conducted after the Cyprus War, in 1573, by Ferhad Pasha on the Ottoman side, and by Giacomo Soranzo on the Venetian, as a smr tespiti in Turkish, a fixing of boundaries: Şakiroğlu, “II. Selim’in Venedik Cumhuriyeti’ne Verdiği 1567 ve 1573 Tarihli Ahidnameler,” Erdem II (1986), 527-553. Still, the vast differences between the formal legal thinking about territorial claims, in the Christian West and in the Ottoman Empire remained and endured, long after the sixteenth century. Recognizing the incommensurability and incompatibility of Roman and of Islamic law as interpreted in our period, in turn, helps to explain the always anomalous and never fully resolved legal status of some Greek islands, such as the Cyclades. For more on this, see Benjamin J. Slot, Archipelagus turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonization latine et occupation ottoman c. 1500-1718 (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut, 1982). Another example of the unsettled legal position of a borderland was the trade emporium Ragusa (modern Dubrovnik), for which the study by N.H. Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship according to the firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), especially 29-45 and 60-71. As if to illustrate the tenuousness of the position of the Ragusans as “protected” subjects of the Ottoman Empire, Biegman quotes at 29 the popular verses, “Non siamo Christiani/non siamo Ebrei/ma poveri Ragusei.”
Meletios offered profuse thanks. But disseminating this calendar was, as is clear from both Pigas’ letters and from Santoro’s own notes on his audiences with successive popes, just one small facet of Santoro’s interest in the Greeks. Printing projects are mentioned over and over again in Santoro’s audience notes, and it seems clear that he took an interest in the projects for printing books in all of the Eastern liturgical languages taking place in the late sixteenth century in Rome, including Greek. On March 20, 1578, Santoro referred to a translation into Latin undertaken by Fabio Benvogliente of the account by Gennadios Scholarios, first Patriarch of Constantinople under Ottoman rule, of the Council of Florence on behalf of the union of the Greek and Latin Churches. The historian of the Greek rite in Italy, Pietro Pompilio Rodotà, describes Benvogliente as a Sienese paid by the Holy See just for such publication efforts. But though Rome was the heart of the Church, Cypriot Greeks themselves recognized in their writings that their fortunes were bound up with those of Venice. We can draw this conclusion from what is unfortunately, as mentioned previously, the only literary work of any length in Greek to come out of the period of the Ottoman conquest, the Lament of Cyprus or θρῆνος Κύπρου, which refers repeatedly to the Venetian defenders of the island during the Cyprus War in positive

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When Archimandrite Kyprianos published his famous *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus* in Venice in 1788, he still had a number of positive things to say about the period of Venetian rule, and left others to be understood from the somber colors in which he paints the transition to Ottoman rule. But I argue that it was not just their writings, but in their choosing to migrate to Venice and Padua that many Cypriots indicated how comfortable that part of Italy had become for Greek Orthodox by the late sixteenth century. Though the religious divide still existed, many possibilities also existed for amicable relations between members of the two communities.

**Influence of the Counter-Reformation on Relations with the Greek Orthodox**

There were parallels in Catholic circles between the debates on how to answer Protestantism, and how to act towards the Greek Orthodox. A number of people tried to figure out the best treatment to be given the Greeks, and among these a forceful presence, as mentioned, was Cardinal Giulio Antonio Santoro, who dominated the late sixteenth-century discussions at the papal curia on this question. Indeed, the results of his discussions with Pius V appear to have influenced much subsequent Latin missionary activity in Cyprus, and his views

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148 The *Lament* is available now in a French edition: *Le Thrène de la prise de l’infortunée île de Chypre* (Paris: Praxandre, 2000). The poet appeals to the Venetians, as well as the Virgin Mary, to save the island from the Turks.


150 François Rousseau has mentioned other cardinals whom Gregory XIII named to a commission in 1577 to develop evangelization projects for heretic and schismatic regions: cardinals Savelli, Antonio Carafa and Guglielmo Sirleto, as well as Gaspare Viviano, Latin bishop of Sitia in Crete. Rousseau, *L’idée missionnaire au seizième et dix-septième siècles: les doctrines, les méthodes, les conceptions d’organisation* (Paris: Edition Spes, 1930): 75. But none are as well-documented as Santoro, and even Rousseau conceded that regarding Catholic grand missionary projects generally (and not only to the Greeks) under Gregory XIII, Clement VIII and Paul V, Santoro was “l’âme de tous ces efforts,” [the soul of all of these efforts] (Op. cit., 79).
are worth considering at some length. Santoro, a native of Caserta in Campania, wrote an autobiography, not published until 1899, and we learn from this that his service as vicar general of Caserta and Naples (between 1560 and 1565) recommended him to Cardinal Alfonso Carafa, a native of Naples and nephew of Pope Paul IV (r. 1555-59). Having moved to Rome, with the title Cardinal Archbishop of Sanseverino, Santoro rose to prominence under Pius V (r. 1566-72). He wished to bring the Greek heretics back to doctrinal purity, that is to Catholicism, and to salvation. He influenced Pius’ successor Gregory XIII (r. 1572-85) to establish the Congregazione dei Greci in 1576. Though this body concerned itself largely with the geographically closer “threat” to Rome, in the Regno, that is, the kingdom of Naples, including Calabria and Sicily, home to many Greek and Albanian-speakers, it did not altogether neglect the old Greek lands east of the Adriatic. Santoro makes clear that in his own time, texts relating to the Greeks from the thirteenth century relating to the Greeks, such as the Bulla Cypria issued by Innocent IV in 1260, were still being appealed to and still carried authority when it came to dealing with the Greeks. To this extent, we can infer continuities with the Middle Ages in

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151 His notes from these audiences, filed in the Vatican archives under the rubric Udienze, have been studied by John Krajcar, Giulio Antonio Santoro and the Christian East and by Vittorio Peri, Chiesa Romana e rito greco: G. A. Santoro e la Congregazione dei Greci (1566-1596), Brescia, Paideia, 1975.


153 Six armadi (literally cabinets, chests of drawers) full of his notes on his personal interviews with Pius V and his two successors, Gregory XIII and Sixtus V have survived.

154 Not to be confused with the Kingdom of Cyprus, which the Venetians continued to call a Regno even after the abdication of the last queen, and which writers in Italian continued to call a Regno long after the Ottomans had conquered the island and divided it into “governorates.” Evangelia Skoufari has recently reminded us of this in her doctoral dissertation, “Il Regno della Repubblica: Continuità Istituzionali e Scambi Interculturali a Cipro 1473-1570,” University of Padua, 2008, http://paduaresearch.cab.unipd.it/288/1/E_Skoufari_tesi_dott_2008.pdf, accessed July 10-12, 2011. One example is a report by the missionary Giovanni Battista da Todi on the state of Cyprus in 1647: its title is Compendio della relazione del Regno di Cipro, mentioned in Zacharias Tsirpanlis, Ανεξάρτητα εγγράφα εκ του αρχείου Βατικανού, 1625-1667 [Unpublished Documents from the Vatican Archive, 1625-1667] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973), 115).
Catholic thinking about the Greeks. Though I have dwelt at some length upon Catholic views of the Greeks, it is clear that some Greeks, too, were interested in Catholic efforts such as the establishment of the Greek College, and did not always perceive them as a threat to true belief, but sometimes as an opportunity. One of the few references in Santoro’s published audiences with the popes to Cyprus, in 1579, mentions that “Concerning the notice sent to me by His Holiness for the Archpriest [i.e. Archbishop] of Famagusta, who would like to be a priest of the Greek College, I shall inform myself.”

Were the Western and the Cypriot Orthodox visions of the future of Cypriot Christendom compatible? And were the Orthodox of Cyprus pleased or threatened by Latin Catholics flocking again to their ports, especially Larnaca, as they began to already by the late 1570s? Here the sources are only somewhat helpful. Our major source for early Catholic missionary efforts in Cyprus has been published by Zacharias Tsirpanlis: correspondence, starting in 1625 and ending in 1667, between the Franciscan missionaries Pietro Vespa and Giovanni Battista da Todi, and their supervisors in Rome. A thorough survey of this correspondence brings out some complaints and suspicions on the part of the Greeks for the Latin Christians in their midst. Santoro, in his records, mentioned that the Bishop of Candia (in Crete) had never said Mass in Italy, presumably because he would not celebrate it in the Latin rite, for his father had threatened

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155 Krajcar, Cardinal Santoro, 30, quoting Armadio LII, vol. 17, f. 368: “Del memoriale mandatomi da Sua Santità per l’Arciprete di Famagosta, che vorrebbe essere prete del Collegio Greco, m’informarò.” If this refers to the Greek Archbishop of Cyprus, Timotheos, his taking the initiative, as a Greek prelate, to contact the Pope is quite extraordinary, and the document, among those on the early history of the Greek College, most important. If this refers instead to the Latin Archbishop of Famagusta (for this title continued to be used, even after the Ottoman conquest) then his request, as an absentee bishop almost certainly resident in Italy, would not have been unexpected.

to kill him if he saw him celebrate in the Latin rite. And there appear to have never been more than a dozen Catholic missionaries on Cyprus at any one time in this period. Given the relative paucity of evidence for Cyprus itself, it is possible that the situation of the better-documented Jesuit missions to the Aegean in this same era may provide insight into what took place with the Latin missions on Cyprus. An important paper by Kallistos Timothy Ware has suggested that the Jesuits, among the Greeks of the Aegean, were exceptionally flexible, gaining the trust of their flocks by their humility and lack of aggressiveness. Ware relates anecdotes that suggest that some Greek priests themselves came to trust these Latins wholly, in one case asking a member of the faithful on the Aegean island of Naxos to make her confession to a certain beloved Jesuit, rather than to himself: “‘Here is the confessor’ the Greek at once replied, pointing to the Jesuit, ‘here is the father, make your confession to him.’”

The Roles of Education and Evangelization

In the Middle Ages, as a solution to the problem of heresy, the Church in many cases prescribed what it considered education, from the Latin root *educere*, to lead along. As we shall see in Chapter 6, recent document finds make clear that the Ottoman sultans, too, were taking an interest by the mid-sixteenth century in education, specifically in the syllabus for the imperial

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157 *Op. cit.*, 123. The missionaries on Cyprus were exclusively Franciscan, interestingly, while in much of the Greek world, and elsewhere in the Levant, the Jesuits and Capuchins predominated.

158 Kallistos T. Ware, “Orthodox and Catholics in the Seventeenth Century: Schism or Intercommunion?” in Derek Baker, ed., *Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 267. This took place on Naxos, in 1627. In 1628, Ware points out (268), a former abbot from Mount Athos called on the officials of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome, and requested a priest to open a school on Athos for the monks. For mainland Greece and the Aegean, there are from the seventeenth century many such stories of warm Greek-Latin relations; Ware calls the Jesuit approach to the evangelization of the Orthodox in this area the “Trojan horse” approach, building up a core of Catholic believers within the Orthodox community so as eventually to gain leadership of that community from within.
medreses or schools which Süleyman the Magnificent founded in substantial numbers. But, to the extent that the Ottomans thought about the question, the Ottoman understanding of what it was to be educated did not approach that of the Franciscan missionaries on Cyprus, nor of the Orthodox church, which participated in a tradition of paidagoge, or the upbringing of children, that stretched back to such pagan authors as Plutarch (ca. 46-120 A.D.) and Libanius of Antioch (314-c. 393), to Christians such as Basil of Caesarea (329-379) and Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-after 394). The considerably greater numbers of Arabic manuscripts that remain in the large libraries of Istanbul serve as a reminder that knowledge of Arabic and of the ilmiye, the Islamic sciences, was an important component of Ottoman education, while the Greek language had been central to Cypriot education. The terminology used in the study of philosophy was different, and this was to be expected, for philosophy, as in the Christian lands, was an outgrowth of theology, and Ottoman Islam did not conceive of the soul, Heaven, Hell, and the paths for human salvation in the same terms as Christianity. In short, to the extent that grounding in proper faith and morals was the leading component of education as it was popularly understood, it is not surprising that Ottoman and Greek Cypriot conceptions of education should differ. Somewhat


160 Both the Moralia of Plutarch and many passages in his Parallel Lives, notably the Lycurgus, testify to his interest in the raising of children. Basil of Caesarea’s Oratio ad Adolescentes [Speech to Young Men] does the same.

161 For this reason, the evidence Ahmet Gazioğlu offers in Kibris’ta Türkler 1570-1878: 308 Yıllık Türk Döneminine yeni bir bakış, Nicosia: Kıbrıs Araştırma ve Yayın Merkezi, 1994, is not helpful for understanding how Greek Orthodox parents raised their children on post-conquest Cyprus. He provides documentation for the trusts set up to endow the schools opened for the Muslim population of Cyprus, from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, and copious as it is, his documentation does not explain how Ottoman (or Turkish, Türk, if we accept Gazioğlu’s word choice, though it seems anachronistic, for contemporary Ottoman government documents on the population transfers to Cyprus do not make reference to the Muslim population as ethnically Turkish) education actually contributed to the society of early Ottoman Cyprus, where a large majority was Christian. He does not specifically discuss the curriculum, nor how this curriculum might have engaged Christian students, or even if Christian students were encouraged or even permitted to attend.
more detail can be offered on the nature of Ottoman schooling. A heavy stress was laid, as in other parts of the Islamicate world, on orality, and especially on the memorization, and of the verses of the Koran. This was quite different from Christian education, which, while it generally involved a good deal of memorization as well, did not have any equivalent to the much-admired hafiz, the learned figure in Islamicate lands whose honorific means that he has memorized the entire Koran verbatim. And the scriptural languages that were learnt were themselves different, Greek and Arabic, with well-developed vocabularies that were closely bound up with Christianity and Islam, respectively. Religious differences, I maintain, produced an incompatibility between Ottoman and Greek plans and institutions for education of young Greek Cypriots after the conquest of Cyprus. Education was closely tied to religious instruction, and even in the Christian world education did not approach a secular model but was imbued with Christian teaching. We could ask if similar incompatibilities based, ultimately, on theological

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163 The importance of orality in Islamic culture in Western scholarship has been studied more in its role in court proceeding — perhaps because scholars have looked at orality in such a legal setting as a significant point of contrast, at least since the Middle Ages, with Western judicial practice, where written documents are often considered a *sine qua non*. See for examples the cases and analysis by Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). But government orders on Ottoman Cyprus have also been analyzed for what they teach us about orality. Albeit for a later period, the nineteenth century, Marc Aymes, “The Voice-over of Administration: Reading Ottoman Archives at the risk of Illiteracy,” in *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 6 (2007), http://www.ejts.org/document 1333.html, accessed October 23-25, 2011, accords orality a hugely important interpretative place in how we should read Cypriot archival sources of the Ottoman period. Aymes argues of early nineteenth-century government orders that “...this verbal orality is here [in an 1849 report by the Ottoman governor of Cyprus] endowed with mysterious powers of conciliation [įstımalet].” In considering the figure of the hafiz and the oral aspect of teaching more generally, one should keep in mind the implicit caution of Cornell Fleischer against assuming that earlier Islamic intellectual traditions persisted among the Ottomans. But the hafiz is attested to by many sources, and many noteworthy Ottomans were granted the sobriquet hafiz down to the end of the empire, including Hafiz Osman (1642-1690), a famous calligrapher. For traditions in Ottoman education, see Kenan Yakuboğlu, *Osmanlı medrese eğitimi ve felsefesi* (İstanbul: Gökkubbe, 2006). All of the studies I have indicated concentrate on the eighteenth century and later; for the sixteenth century, nonetheless, the court transactions cited by Ronald Jennings in *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus, 1571-1640* (New York: New York University Press, 1993) 17; 191-203, testify, through their frequent mention of witnesses, to the existence of a heavy oral component to legal transactions of all sorts on early Ottoman Cyprus.
disagreements, also divided Catholic missionaries on Cyprus and the Greeks living under
Ottoman rule. While recognizing that the Vatican documents by Santoro and others indicate
clearly how Catholics continued to view the Greeks as “schismatics” in the Venetian and early
Ottoman periods, we can also note that old theological and cultural differences between Greeks
and Latins seem to have become for some on both sides at least possible to ignore. The Cypriot
Neophytos Rhodinos (1579-1657), for example, never appears to have formally converted to
Catholicism, yet may reasonably be described as having served Catholic interests in aiding the
foundation of a Catholic mission at Himera (Cimarra) in northwest Greece.¹⁶⁴

On the Catholic side, the agenda appears to have been considerably influenced by the
Council of Trent, and its preoccupation with the seven sacraments.¹⁶⁵ As Meyendorff has
observed of the Orthodox conception of the sacraments, their precise number was not a matter of
pressing concern, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as it is not today, because the
dominant tendency in Orthodoxy was to attribute a sacramental character to all of life, in which
the sacraments administered by priests were only part of the individual communion with God.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Aristide Brunello, “Neofito Rodinó, missionario e scrittore ecclesiastico greco del secolo XVII⁴,” Bollettino della
apparently, Brunello describes him as having converted to Catholicism, probably while in Venice (“Neofito Rodinò,”
152; 164-66). As with many Greeks who travelled West at this time, a passive drift into the Roman faith may be
more accurate a description of their progress than a conscious conversion.

¹⁶⁵ The documents collected by Tsirpanlis on Catholic missions in Cyprus between 1625 and 1667, for example,
show the Catholic concern at Greek laxity in the liturgy. The theological issue blended quite easily into broader
cultural worries about barbarism overtaking civilization, and about the seeping of Islamic practice into Orthodox
Christianity. In the case of Albania and Bulgaria, in the early eighteenth century, the well-known Concilium
Albanum of 1703 warned Catholic missionary priests to point out to Christians the Muslim-inspired practices that
some were falling into: one was apparently that of observing Bayrams, or Turkish religious holidays [Eid ul-Adha
and Eid ul-Fitr in Arabic] and another was intermarrying with Muslims.

¹⁶⁶ John Meyendorff, “Byzantium as Center of Theological Thought in the Christian East,” in Rome, Constantinople,
Moscow (Brookline, MA: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996), 33-4. This difference in degree of emphasis on the
sacraments might explain the tenor of the letter by the missionary to Cyprus Fra Buonaventura di Lauro, written
from Nicosia on May 24, 1650, in which he takes complacent delight in reporting that the Orthodox archbishop of
Cyprus and bishop of Paphos, both hostile to the Catholics, still have increasingly permitted “that their subjects
should come to hear our sermons, Masses, and receive all the sacraments,” [hora più che mai, permettendo che li
But the Catholic missionary efforts among the Greeks did not, by and large, make themselves antipathetic by remaining inflexibly dogmatic on such matters.167

Most of Santoro’s circle never travelled to the Greek East. This is despite the fact that papal nuncios kept an eye on Venice, and thus they might have been expected to know something about Venice’s “Greek problem in the Stato da Mar.”168 By this time the Collegio Greco was instructing students in the modern via del Babuino.169 As he was president after 1599 of the *Congregatio super negotiis Sancta Fidei et Religionis Catholicae*, a group that preceded

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167 Ware, “Orthodox and Catholics,” 264-65.

168 John Krajcar, *Cardinal Giulio Antonio Santoro and the Christian East: Santoro’s Audiences and Consistorial Acts* (Rome: Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, 1966), 11: “...it never crossed [Santoro’s] mind how anomalous was the situation of the ecclesiastical organization in the Venetian possessions. There, Greek bishoprics and benefices were seized by Latin prelates or adventurers who remained often absentee prelates, while the Greek population remained without shepherds of their own rite.” Krajcar later concedes, however, about Santoro that “[h]is historical scholarship taught him a moderation which we see in his Response to the Questions of A. Lombardi, Archbishop of Messina. Many of the South Italian bishops condemned any ceremony and custom different from their own, but Santoro moderated their headlong zeal: ‘Ad eorum ritum pertinere videtur. [it seems to pertain to their rite]’” Of Cyprus, intriguingly, Krajcar notes at 12 that “[t]he plan of some adventurous zealots for the wholesale Latinization of Cyprus would not have met with his approval,” and cites *Archivio Vaticano, Nunziature di Venezia*, volume 5, folios 85, 87, and 92, from a letter dated February 15, 1569 from the Nuncio of Venice Facchinetti to the papal Secretary of State, pointing out that the bishop of Paphos had plans to “allargare il rito latino, et cattolico in Cipro...et sarebbe facile cosa, che andassero in processo di tempo tirando a se buona parte di quel popolo...” I concur with Krajcar’s interpretation of this document, and think that after 1571 such an approach clearly fell into disfavor among the Catholics, both on Cyprus, and in other Greek Orthodox lands.

169 The papal bull founding the school, *In Apostolicae Sedis Specula* (1576) by Gregory XIII, indicates that its role was to further the training of Greek-speaking Catholics so that they might evangelize Greek lands: *Bullarium Romanum*, IV, p. III, eds. Laerzio Cherubini and Angelo Maria Cherubini (Luxembourg: Chevalier, 1746), 328: “in quo pueri et adolescentes Graeci ex ipsa Graecia et aliis Provinciis et locis, ubi commemorantur, conquisiti alantur...instituantur.”[in which select Greek boys and youths from Greece herself and other provinces and places, where they are remembered, be chosen...[and] brought up]. The majority of youths appear to have been between twelve and fifteen when they began at the *Collegio Greco*, with some older students, as well. Latin was the principal language of instruction (Krajcar, *Cardinal Santoro*, 30).
the more famous *Sacra Congregatio pro Propaganda Fide*, he was well-placed to influence missions dispatched to the Greeks living on Cyprus. But that activity only took off after Santoro’s death, in 1624. To that activity, I now turn.

Documents in the Vatican Archive contribute to our picture of Catholic, or what the Greeks would have called Frankish, missionary activity on Cyprus. For the period now under discussion, the missionary activity was entirely in the hands of Franciscans, who had enjoyed a presence on Cyprus since the thirteenth century. The Greek scholar Zacharias Tsirpanlis began his compilation of missionary correspondence pertaining to Cyprus with those from 1625, and ended with those from 1667. These dates reflect important events. The first Franciscan missionaries to Cyprus arrived in 1625, and his *terminus ad quem* is less than a year after the death of a prominent missionary to Cyprus, Giovanni Battista da Todi, in July 1666, and the subsequent report of his death sent to Rome.

One of the most salient facts revealed by these documents is the small numbers of Catholic missionaries to Cyprus, for it appears that no more than eight, all Franciscans, were present on Cyprus at any time during this roughly half-century. We can also see that, from a Western standpoint, by 1625 any prospect of a Venetian expedition to reconquer Cyprus had faded, and by 1667, the fate of Crete, Venice’s other jewel in the Eastern Mediterranean, under attack by the Ottomans since 1644, was also sealed. Tsirpanlis’ introduction, in fact, is written

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170 The Jesuits went, by contrast, to many other Greek-speaking areas, as shown in Georg Hofmann, “Apostolato dei Gesuiti nell’Oriente Greco, 1583-1773,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 1 (1935), 139-163.

171 This is in contrast to the substantially greater number of Catholic laymen doing business on Cyprus, especially on Larnaca, which was the hub of European trade in early Ottoman Cyprus, and of which the English traveler Fynes Moryson recorded in 1596 the existence of a Catholic monastery: “we lodged in the village Larnica, within a monastery of European Friars.” (Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, 185). The likelihood is that this was the monastery [its name is unclear] which Father Francis of Spello is recorded as having bought in 1593. See Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 306.
with one eye constantly on Crete, which had been, after Cyprus, Venice’s next easternmost possession, and to which many Cypriots had fled, after the Ottoman conquest of their island.172

Several reports on the state of Christianity on Cyprus compiled by Tsirpanlis suggest that the missionaries were aware of different Christian rites coexisting on Cyprus, and regarded some as closer to their own Roman profession than others. In a Cypriot context, these reports single out the Maronites, an originally Lebanese group of Christians who acknowledged the authority of the Pope while retaining a Syriac rite different from the Roman, as especially favorable to the Church’s interests on Cyprus.173 A report from 1625 begins:

“First. On Cyprus, an island 700 miles around, there are about 15,000 Maronite Catholics, 30,000 Greeks and 12,000 Turks, and about 400 houses of Jacobites and Copts,174 reduced to the Catholic religion.”175

The author almost certainly exaggerates the number of Maronites on Cyprus, as had the

Maronite chronicler Stephen of Edhen, who had reported 18,000 Maronite men lost in the

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174 The Maronites, Jacobites and Copts are all eastern Christian sects that have existed since late antiquity. The Copts were found predominantly in Egypt, the Jacobites in Mesopotamia and Persia, and the Maronites in the area known as Mount Lebanon. Maronites seem to have first settled on Cyprus in three waves in the twelfth century: 1121, 1141, and 1153-54. See Alexis G. C. Savvides, “The Consolidation of Power in Cyprus on the Eve of the First Crusade and the First Decades of the Empire’s Relations with the Crusaders,” in Nicholas Coureas and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds. Cyprus and the Crusades (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 7. The stories that the Maronites tell of themselves generally attribute their origins to the hermit Marro of Cyrrus, who died in A.D. 433. For the Maronites, Paul Naaman, Théodoret de Cyr et le Monastère de Saint Maron : Les origines des Maronites. Essai d’histoire et de géographie (Jounieh : Universite de Saint-Esprit de Kaslik, 1971), is most helpful, and for the rivalries among these groups and others such as the Armenians, Melkites, and Greek Orthodox, John Joseph, Muslim-Christian Relations and Inter-Christian Rivalries in the Middle East (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1983).

175 Zacharias Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδοτα εγγραφα εκ των αρχεων του Βατικανου (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973,) 1. “Ridotti alla religione cattolica” is a curious phrase. The implication may be “returned or led back to the Catholic faith.”
defense of Famagusta. The census the archimandrite Kyprianos recorded when he reached the year 1571 did not break down the Christian population by numbers, though it singled out Maronites as a category. We do possess, however, an eyewitness account of the Maronites of Cyprus from 1596 by Dandini, who reported only nineteen Maronite villages on the entire island. Similarly, in 1686, the French consul at Larnaca, Balthasar Sauvan, reported “seven or eight” Maronite villages in the island. This makes it exceedingly unlikely that at the intermediate date, 1625, there were half as many Maronites as Orthodox, and more Maronites than Muslims (“Turks”) on the island. A figure of less than 10,000 is more likely. But the intriguing possibility also exists that those the documents refer to as Latin archbishops of Cyprus, post-conquest, may have been Maronite. This would suggest closer ties existed between the Syrian coast and the Catholics of Cyprus in the early Ottoman period of its history, as a handful of Cypriologists, but few non-specialists, have grasped.

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176 Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 381.

177 Dandini, Missione apostolica, translated in Excerpta Cypria, 181-4. There, as mentioned, Dandini reported only nineteen Maronite villages on Cyprus, and those in poor condition (Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 381). In 1629 the Catholic bishop of Paphos in the Catholic hierarchy that began to re-emerge on Cyprus after 1600, Pietro Vespa, reported a total of 1500 Maronites on Cyprus, a plausible figure (Tsirpanlis, Anekdotà Engraphà, 52). These reports, by men who had actually visited the island, are healthy correctives, both to the report quoted above from 1625, and to the fantastic account by the Maronite chronicler Stephen of Edhen.


179 This possibility was raised by George Hill, in History of Cyprus, Vol. IV, 307-8.

180 Jean Richard, a specialist on medieval Cyprus and crusader history, has called our attention to the considerable settlement of Syrians on Cyprus in the High Middle Ages: “Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIIle siècle,” Byzantinische Forschungen 7 (1979), 157-73. Marwan Nader has recently asserted that the Syrian Christians, who established prosperous and self-governing communities in Nicosia and Famagusta in the thirteenth century, benefitted from the exemption of non-Latin Christians from papal prohibitions against trade with Muslims: Marwan Nader, Burgesses and Burgess Law in the Latin Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus (1099-1325), (London: Ashgate, 2006). In the Maronite case, since their sect acknowledged papal primacy, the truth may have been more complicated.
The substantial presence of Oriental Christians belonging to rites other than Orthodox on early Ottoman Cyprus – a presence which as we have seen had a history stretching back to at least the twelfth century – can be interpreted in a number of ways. If the Armenians of Cyprus had indeed collaborated on a large scale with the Ottomans, one might have expected some instances of retaliation afterwards, which the sources do not disclose. Many non-Orthodox, non-Latin Christians were simple traders and craftsmen, and need not be interpreted in terms of a political role. Some, however, culturally and religiously, could have acted as middlemen between the Latin Christians who were coming back to Cyprus, and the Orthodox. If indeed the Latin archbishops were Maronite, this would be some evidence that life was at least bearable for many non-Orthodox, non-Latin Christians on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest – though flight was not always an option for peasants. But culturally, they stood out both from the Orthodox majority and from the Ottoman newcomers. Furthermore, since most Maronites spoke Arabic as their mother tongue, and very few Westerners knew any Arabic,\textsuperscript{181} it is likely that there were considerable cultural gaps between Western Christians and these Eastern-rite Catholics. Furthermore, although the Dutch traveler Cotovicus admired the labors of a small convent of Franciscans at Larnaka, when he passed through in 1599 on his way to the Holy Land, there is little evidence that they, or other Catholic missionaries, succeeded in attracting more than a tiny number of converts to communion with the Roman rite – the Maronites, who had accepted such communion long before, were the exception. The realization that both the Cypriot Orthodox and the wider Greek Orthodox world were not amenable to mass conversion to the Roman rite, and were undergoing real difficulties under Ottoman rule that threatened their continued existence as

\textsuperscript{181} The literature on European Arabic studies is more weighty for the Middle Ages than for the early modern period, but see Josée Balagna Coustou, \textit{L’Imprimerie en arabe en Occident: XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles} (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1984), and in Karl H. Dannenfeldt, “The Renaissance Humanists and the Knowledge of Arabic,” \textit{Studies in the Renaissance} 2 (1955), 96-117.
Christian communities, helped to soften and change the Catholic approach to them. But not only did missionaries change their approach to the Greeks to one based on a vocation of charity and maintaining a solidarity with fellow Christians in the light of a shared Ottoman, i.e. non-Christian, threat, but lay scholars in the West changed their approach to the Greek Orthodox as well.

More Western Europeans were coming to accord respect to the Greek Christian tradition, artistic, literary, and theological, which was increasingly studied in both Protestant and Catholic Europe in depth and as a “Byzantine” tradition that was understood to be a separate entity from ancient Greek societies. In the field of art, this shift in attention from a pure focus on ancient Greece to that of Christian Greece gained momentum in the sixteenth century, as the antiquarian writings of Belon, Gilles and other Francophone writers discussed in the third chapter will show, but interest in post-Roman Empire Greece remained circumscribed in its appeal. But in areas, such as Southern Italy, with large Greek-speaking populations, the locals had never forgot about Byzantium altogether in the Middle Ages. Already in the eleventh century, Abbot Desiderius of Monte Cassino had summoned Byzantine painters to decorate the rebuilt Benedictine abbey.

Monte Cassino, it should be noted, is in Latium, Lazio, far from Ravenna, Calabria and the other main centers of Byzantine cultural and political influence in the peninsula. The profound influence of Byzantine mosaic and fresco traditions, in iconography and technique, on artists of the Italian peninsula and especially in those gateway areas which had once been, for several

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182 As is well known, Cardinal Bessarion, a Catholic born in Trebizond who sought to bring about Latin-Greek union, justified his leaving a library of manuscripts to Venice because he said he recognized in Venice a scholarly atmosphere comparable with that of Constantinople: “quasi alterum Byzantium,” he called Venice. If Bessarion could appreciate Western Europe, a number of Westerners could also respect the Greeks of their day. Philip Melanchthon, Martin Crusius in his Turcograecia, and other Tübingen theologians were one group who did so; so, too, did Michel de Montaigne, the French jurist and essayist, who cites as an authority Laonikos Chalkokondylas’ late-Byzantine history in his famous essay “On Cannibals” dating to 1581. Montaigne, trans. M.A. Screech, The Complete Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1993), 228-41.
centuries, under Byzantine rule, have long been recognized. The exarchate of Ravenna, which when first formed in the sixth century, included all northeast Italy, but later was reduced to Venice and the wider Veneto, and Puglia, Calabria and Sicily in the south, all received repeated waves of Greek-speaking immigrants from antiquity through the early Middle Ages, including refugees from the Turkic advance in the East, and brought with them their artistic traditions and techniques.

What has been less recognized is that Greeks were also sometimes willing to make efforts to study Latin culture and learning. Maximos Margounios (1549-1602), for example, a Cretan and the learned metropolitan of Kythera, donated a collection of Latin books to Mount Athos upon his death. Far more people were involved with the Greek College in Rome after its foundation in 1576, and there, the predominant language of instruction was always Latin.\(^\text{183}\) Travellers, especially pilgrims, wrote a large number of descriptions of their pilgrimages, many of which took them through Cyprus.\(^\text{184}\) Some of the scholarly fervor with which the Orthodox were being “discovered” in Western Europe can be explained as the result of a determination to prevent the Islamization of these (in Western eyes) “schismatics,” just as some Latins had feared the Graecization of the Latins living in Orthodox areas. An anonymous letter of March 1625 warns the Holy Congregation in Rome that “[m]any Catholics [on Cyprus], because of not having anyone to administer the holy sacraments to them, have moved to the Greek rite; others,

\(^{183}\) Krajcar, Cardinal Santoro, 30 n. 48.

\(^{184}\) Three important collections of extracts from such writings, all translated into English, are C.D. Cobham, ed. and trans., Excerpta Cypria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908); Theophilus Mogabgab, Supplementa Excerpta Cypria (Nicosia: Pusey Press, 1941), and Gilles Grivaud, Excerpta Cypria Nova (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1990).
through ignorance, have become Turks, and if they had anyone to preach to them or to administer the holy sacraments, they would easily return to the catholic religion.”

Western missionaries had to be cautious, given an increasing anti-Christian trend noticeable in the late sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In 1566-69, as mentioned, Selim II had seized a number of Orthodox monasteries in Serbia and Greece, and sold their lands to line his own pockets. Upon the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571, Latin worship had been outlawed, and other disabilities imposed on Christians, which I detail in the fifth chapter. What evidence we have suggests they were forbidden from riding on horseback in Cypriot towns, as well, which conforms to the demands of the şeriye as to social and other disabilities imposed on non-Muslims in Muslim-ruled domains. In 1587, Murad III (r. 1574-95) seized the Church of the Pammakaristos, the principal church of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, and converted it into the mosque now known as the Fethiye Mosque – the Mosque of Conquest. Incidents from the Balkans, furthermore, such as the so-called Martydom of Scutari, during which over-aggressive Franciscans appear to have incurred the wrath of the Ottoman authorities – two of their number were impaled by the Ottomans in 1648 – must have served as a warning to Catholic missionaries about the dangers of their situation. The Latin Catholics must have realized that they would

185 “Molti de catholici per non havere chi li ministri li santi sacramenti, sono passati al rito greco, altri per ignoranza si sono fatti Turchi, e se havessero chi li predicasse o ministrasse li santi sacramenti, con facilità si ridurebbono alla religione catholica.” Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδοτα εγγραφα, 3.

186 See Aleksandr Fotic, “The Official Explanation for the Confiscation and Sale of Monasteries (Churches), and their Estates at the Time of Selim II,” Turcica 24 (1994), 33-54, where Fotic argues that “[a]fter two centuries, the Ottoman Empire strengthened so much in the Balkans that there was no more need for certain privileges to the encountered Christian communities,” as well as Paul Wittek and Paul Lemerle, “Recherches sur l’histoire et les status des monastères athonites sous la domination turque,” Archives de l’Histoire du Droit Oriental 3 (1947), 411-72.

187 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Missioni Francescane, Fascicolo 2, collates several different and anonymous accounts of this episode. The association of Christian missionaries with sedition is made, for example, on 2v: “essendosi irritati li Turchi contro li Cristiani, et in particolare contro li Religiosi per le continue guerre che ogni giorno più li augmentavano, mandaro quattro persone armate con’ altri à paleggiare à pigliar prigione li
accomplish nothing if their activities became widely identified with political subversion of the Ottoman state.

Though the Greek rite was viewed with contempt, it was nonetheless implicitly recognized, though rarely explicitly, by Catholics that the Greeks still enjoyed the *nomen Christianum* and therefore were much closer to them than the Muslim Turks could ever be. A letter of 1629 by Francesco Lucatello to his nephew, the missionary to Cyprus Pietro Vespa, suggests that moving from one religious community to another may have been common on early Ottoman Cyprus: “Two of my sons have begun to live in the Greek fashion, and the Greek Archbishop is my nephew; the other two live in the Latin manner and one has taken the daughter of the Pasha to be his wife, and a slave baptized her secretly.”

Language was an important indicator of identity. But learning another language was not necessarily to adopt a new identity, but simply to acquire prestige, the reflected glory of the culture with which that newly-learned language is linked. There is evidence that, on Cyprus, the learning of Italian (or rather, of the Venetian dialect of Italian) conferred prestige on the Cypriot Greeks who achieved it. In the report written in 1614 by Pietro Della Valle, a pilgrim to the Holy

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188 One could argue that this religious difference, more than any other factor, was in fact central to Western Europeans’ use and understanding of the terms *Greek* and *Turk* in their permutations. At least, one is hard-pressed to find any early modern source describing as a *Greek* someone who was not Christian, nor as a *Turk* someone who did not follow Islam. Hence, the phrase “turning Turk” to mean someone who betrays his faith, or his friends, and goes over to the side of an enemy, was widely used as an expression in early modern England, and *farsi turco* was used in the Italian peninsula. These verbal distinctions have a burgeoning literature devoted to them. See, for instance, in Daniel J. Vitkus, *Turning Turk: English Theater and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570-1630* (Houndmills, England and New York: Palgrave/St. Martin’s Press, 2003).

Land, he tells us that while in Limassol, he “found a certain schoolmaster Matthew, a Greek monk, who spoke Italian well, for he had been many years in Venice, and professed to have a knowledge of minerals, chemistry and the like.”\textsuperscript{190} The reference to the monk’s mineralogical knowledge seems intended to mark him as an educated man for the reader, and that he speaks Italian appears to further that implication.\textsuperscript{191}

Aside from missionaries, another group that contributed to the increased respect in which the Orthodox were held by Westerners, was what were called \textit{stradioti}. Both ethnically Greek and ethnically Albanian soldiers served as these \textit{stradioti}, a kind of light infantry, in the Venetian armed forces. There are numerous written testimonies to their bravery, particularly numerous around the time of each of the five Venetian-Ottoman wars fought between 1463 and 1669. Of one Albanian stradiot, Teodor Renessi, we have a document of 1536 noting that

Continuing in the accustomed munificence of our Signory [the Venetian government] in embracing with a grateful spirit the offspring of those who have not hesitated to expose and leave their lives for the benefit of our affairs, as did our faithful Teodoro Renessi, the son of the energetic knight Giorgio Renessi, our captain of stradioti, sent to Spalato, who died in the year gone by, fighting valiantly with the Turks who had come to despoil our city... to Geta Renessi, son of the said late Teodoro, be it conceded by the authority of this council the provision of five ducats, as the payment that was owed to his father, with which he can support himself and the sister left to him... \textsuperscript{192}


\textsuperscript{191} It is uncertain, however, whether he was educated in these subjects in Venice, or somewhere in the Greek-speaking world.

\textsuperscript{192} “Continuando nella solita benignità della Signoria nostra in abbrazzar con grato animo li posteri di quegli che non hanno dubitato per il beneficio delle cose nostre esponer et lasciar la vita sua, siccome ha fatto el fedelissimo nostro Teodoro Renessi figliuol del strenuo cavaliere Zorzi Renessi capo nostro di Stratioti deputato a Spalato, il qual l’anno preterito virilmente combattendo con Turchi venuti a depredar quel contado nostro fu morto...a Geta Renessi, figliol del ditto q. Theodor sia per autorità di questo consiglio concessa la provisione de ducati cinque per paga che have ail padre con la qual si possa sostentar lui con una sorella restatagli...” in Konstantinos Sathas, \textit{Documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire de la Grèce} (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1880-90), Vol. VII: 170. “Signoria” was a standard word in official Venetian documents to refer to the Republic itself, meaning literally the Lordship, but is generally rendered in English as the Signory or Signoria.
But to argue that some Venetians were increasingly able to perceive the value of the Orthodox subjects in their imperial system is not to deny that haughtiness towards the *Graeculi* continued in many quarters. Even Santoro himself could sneer at Greeks whose teaching he suspected of error. His contempt for a Cypriot churchman, Claudio Sozomeno, who did not embrace Latin doctrine, is discernible in his description of an audience with Pope Gregory XIII on February 7, 1583: “Of the Church of Pola, which His Holiness gives to Claudio Sozomeno of Nicosia in Cyprus, that I have let Cardinal San Sisto, himself a Greek, with a Greek mother and of the Greek rite, etc., know that it is not good to give churches to those people, because they do not succeed and they are not what is needed.” Some Cypriots clearly failed, in the demanding post-Tridentine atmosphere, to impress. Just before the quoted description, writing about another matter, Santoro had concluded, “[o]f the note of the father of the Greek boy from Cyprus, to place him in the [Greek] College, that it is not appropriate, since there are [already] so many Cypriots, who also cannot return [presumably, to Cyprus after completing their training]…” This note suggests, both that a great many Cypriots were attending the Greek College, and that unspecified factors – either the instability of Cyprus at this date (1588), or a perceived hostility of the Ottoman authorities there, or conceivably of the native Greek Cypriots, to Catholic missionaries – prevented Cypriot alumni of the Greek College from returning home.

Girolamo Dandini of Cesena, while travelling to Mount Lebanon for the papacy, also sneered at the ingratitude of the Greeks. Of the Orthodox on Crete, for example, he remarked:

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193 John Krajcar, *Cardinal Giulio Antonio Santoro*, quoting Archivio Vaticano, Armadio LII, vols. 17-22, f. 180, 61: “Della Chiesa di Pola che Sua Santità da a Claudio Sosomeno da Nicosia di Cipro, che ho avvertito il Signor Cardinale San Sisto, ch’egli è Greco, e di madre greca e del rito greco, etc. e che non è bene dare le chiese latine a costoro, perché non riescono e non sono a proposito.” And see ibid., 60, f. 180: “Del memorial del padre del putto greco da Cipro, per porlo nel Collegio, che non è espedito essendovi tanti Cipriotti, i quali poi manco vi ponno ritornare, etc…”

194 Lebanese Catholics who have since the Crusades of the twelfth century acknowledged (and still do) the primacy of the popes of Rome.
“I should have work to do to reckon up all the Impurities of the Prelates, Priests and other Ecclesiasticks of this nation; their Separation from the Latine Church, their Maledictions and Excommunications they fulminate upon the most sanctified Days against it, when we pray for their Welfare…”

But even Dandini, by clearly distinguishing between Greeks, Turks, and Maronites on grounds that go beyond those of language and religion alone (Dandini lays particular stress on distinctions of dress), shows an increased Western grasp of the complexity of the Cypriot religious landscape.

The Byzantine view of the Western church has been studied by Constantelos, Meyendorff, Alexander, and Kolbaba, among others. Alexander, in particular, adopts a conflictual model of Greek-Latin relations. But, in fact, those relations on Latin-ruled Cyprus (1191-1571) were often cordial. Although in many places in the Latin Orient the Greeks were

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195 Dandini, Trans. “T.C.,” *Voyage to Mount Libanus*, 13. Just before this, Dandini rails against the immodesty of Greek women on Crete. In his section on Cyprus, shortly thereafter, he mentions that the conquest of Cyprus by the Turks succeeded, and their conversion of the great churches of Nicosia to mosques took place, because “[s]ome years ago it was so, that God, by his Justice, was willing to punish the Sins and Schism of the Greeks in those places.” *Voyage to Mount Libanus*, 15.


197 For example, Paul J. Alexander, “The Donation of Constantine,” in Alexander, IV, 18-21, presented Greek-Latin relations in a model of conflict, based on the evidence of the hostility that the thirteenth-century Byzantine historian John Cinnamus expressed towards Western “usurpers of the imperial title,” such as Frederick Barbarossa. There were five principal points of theological disagreement between Greeks and Latins: the existence of Purgatory, the use of unleavened bread in the Host, the primacy of the Pope, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son or from the Father alone, and the marriage of priests, but, clearly, theology often shaded into politics, and vice versa, in both the eastern and the western Mediterranean in the thirteenth century.

198 Negative aspects of the relations between Greeks and Latins on Cyprus have been emphasized in some accounts, such as that by Miltiades Efthimiou, *Greeks and Latins on Thirteenth-Century Cyprus* (Brookline: Hellenic College, 1987). But many of those negative accounts of Greek-Latin relations on Cyprus have been influenced by the so-called Myth of Queen Alice, which Professor Chris Schabel of the University of Cyprus has effectively shown to be shot through with exaggeration in the influential account offered by the Archimandrite Kyprianos, father of
subservient, on Cyprus many Greek families, such as the Synglitico, did well for themselves under rule by the Latins. Many Greeks also got along with Latins, as is testified by the many references we have to intermarriage.\textsuperscript{199} One could argue that what \textit{convivencia} – to borrow a word much used, and abused, in reference to Islamic Spain – there was went on despite the wishes of the papacy. Church unity was an ideal that the medieval popes repeatedly reiterated, but it was clear after 1054 that Western arrogance could alienate many Greeks,\textsuperscript{200} so that this ideal of Christian unity would become even more remote a possibility if the Latins completely lost the loyalty of their Greek subjects by imposing too heavy a hand. Revolts by Greeks such as that of Sifi Vlastos on Crete in 1454-55 (that is, perhaps not coincidentally, shortly after the fall of Constantinople) took on a sectarian Orthodox coloring, as some Greek-speaking Cretans sought to overthrow their Latin masters.\textsuperscript{201} There are no signs on Cyprus of the recurring social and religious discontent that marked Cretan history under Venetian rule, however, and Cyprus was ruled by Venice for a far shorter time than Crete, eighty-two years against well over four hundred. The absence of recorded discontent on the part of native Greek Cypriots, for whom the Orthodox Church occupied a central place, leads one to the conclusion that for most Cypriots, Greek and Latin alike, such questions as the procession of the Holy Spirit and as to unleavened

\textsuperscript{199} George Hill, \textit{History of Cyprus}, IV, 1099-1100.

\textsuperscript{200} The Westerners, after all, considered the Greeks guilty of heresy on a number of theological points, and the feeling was returned.

\textsuperscript{201} Documentation on the Sifi Vlastos revolt, which strongly suggests that the conspiracy had a sectarian cast, pitting Orthodox against the Catholic-dominated government, and not just a revolt of locals against alien rulers, were published by the late Manoussos Manoussacas, \textit{The Conspiracy of Sifi Vlastos (1453-1454) and the New Conspiratorial Movement of 1460-1462} [in Greek] (Athens: Didaktorike, 1960).
bread in the Host did not come foremost in their relations in daily life. Yet Latin-Greek relations have been studied predominantly in relation to high culture – painting, music, and literature – as well as in theological terms – and even those Western sources of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries such as the *Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches* (1678) by Sir Paul Rycaut – English consul to the Ottoman trading emporium of Smyrna in western Asia Minor – do not mention what might simply have been regarded as cultural differences too mundane to mention. But dress, food and language were important areas where the Orthodox maintained traditions that rendered them distinguishable both from the Latins and from their new Ottoman overlords, and constantly conscious of that distinction.

Girolamo Dandini, in his *Missione apostolica* (written 1596, first published 1656), noted similar clothing worn by those he called Italians, and by the Greeks on Cyprus, yet he still was able to distinguish among Latins, Greeks, and Turks.\(^2\) I suggest that the actions both of Western Catholics, especially those of Larnaca, where they were most numerous, and of the Ottoman administration based in Nicosia, which taxed the Christian population of the island differently, and likely more heavily than it did the Muslims, helped to remind the Greek Cypriots that they were something different, proud participants in the Christian *oikumene*, and while obviously not fully sharing in Ottoman high culture, remained culturally closer to the Westerners. The very use of the term *Greci* by the Westerners must have contributed to this self-awareness as a distinct

\(^2\) Dandini observed, for example, that “[t]he Christians, whether Greeks or Franks, do not wear a Turbant, nor shave their heads, but they cut their hair genteelly as we do, and wear upon their heads a hat, or black Bonnet. They cloath themselves, nevertheless, according to the manner of the Levantines, with a Rest without a Collar, which reaches down to the Knees, with large Sleeves reaching to the Elbows. They gird themselves with a Linnen Cloth, or some other the like Girdle, which comes 3 or 4 turns about. Under this Vest they have another Garment over a first, reaching from their Necks down to their Legs; and above all, another Vest without a Girdle, and cut almost after the same Fashion as the first: they wear them ordinarily of a black, or violet colour, or else of some other colour which pleaseth them best.” That Dandini perceived this dress as distinctive to the Greek and ‘Frankish’ Christians is clear from the sentence which follows: “We will speak hereafter more particularly of the Habits of the Turks and Maronites, and of their Customs, but now it remains we should describe the nature of the Country.” (*Voyage to Mount Libanus*, 20).
people, as did, perhaps, the Italian term *Levantini* which Dandini used, and which appears to have originated around this time. There was also much physical evidence, that is, architectural remains of the Venetian and Lusignan periods, particularly churches, to remind the Greeks of a different, yet not unrecognizable Christian high culture. Given the temptations offered by Islamization, not just on Cyprus but in many Christian areas the Ottomans had conquered, such reminders may have contributed to the survival of a distinct Christian Cypriot culture.

**Further Evidence for Greek-Latin Dealings from Missionary Writings**

Recognizing that serious Latin-Greek divisions re-emerged after the Cyprus War, and that the Latin church barely clung to life on Cyprus, nevertheless some Orthodox churchmen on Cyprus kept in touch with the Catholic intellectual environment in Venice and stayed friendly with Catholic churchmen. The missions, together with the merchant communities of Larnaca, formed one of the main conduits through which Latin-Orthodox religious contacts continued on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest had swept away the Latin hierarchy. The early post-conquest activities of Capuchins and especially Franciscans on Cyprus were most often preoccupied with the physical trappings of religious worship: repairing and rebuilding churches and chapels, buying vestments, and supplying vessels for communion and baptism, as well as ministering to

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203 Archimandrite Kyprianos, from the *History of the Island of Cyprus*, first published 1788. Translation in Claude Delaval Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 353, reported that “Just then, that is shortly after the return of Mustafa [Lala Mustafa Pasha, Ottoman generalissimo on Cyprus, had returned to Constantinople shortly after the Ottoman disaster at Lepanto on October 7, 1571], certain Greeks of Ammochostos arrived at Constantinople as envoys to the Vazir Mehmed Pasha, [the Grand Vizier, or Prime Minister, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha], begging him to ratify the conditions made by the said Mustafa. He ratified them, allowing them to live as Greek Christians, on condition that no Christian of the Latin Church should be found among them: for to the Latins he would grant neither church nor house, and those who remained in Cyprus were obliged to frequent the Greek churches, and forbidden to hold property in the island.” The ban lasted less than twenty years, and possibly overturned by the treaty of 1573. In 1589 the Orthodox bought back the church of St. Lazarus in Larnaca from the Turks, and Catholics made an arrangement to be allowed to use a chapel in the north aisle twice a year, on the days of St. Lazarus and St. Mary Magdalene. Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 306.
their flocks, presumably working to reinforce a Christian faith that cannot have failed to waver in some instances in the wake of the apparent abandonment of Christianity as the governing, if we must use the term, ideology.\textsuperscript{204}

Missionary work in the late sixteenth century took its cue to a great extent from the Council of Trent, for the re-energizing of the Catholic Church that emerged from that council, under papal predominance, prompted a new sense of mission that expressed itself in such initiatives as the creation of the Jesuit order.\textsuperscript{205} There remained a significant pro-Latin sentiment among some segments of the Cypriot Orthodox populace in the decades following the 1570-73 war. The stories of travelers make it clear, for example, that knowledge of French or Italian continued to be seen as a desirable acquisition among a number of Cypriots long after the Ottoman conquest.\textsuperscript{206} I have already mentioned the Sieur de Villamont’s story, furthermore, that a Greek monk he encountered in 1590 expressed nostalgia for Lusignan times, and there seems to have been a widespread sentiment that Latin culture and learning were marks of social

\textsuperscript{204} Many of the previously unpublished letters in the archive of the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith founded in 1622, written by Franciscan missionaries on Cyprus for the years 1625-1667, and published by Zacharias Tsirpanlis, speak of these mundane aspects of church worship, and say nothing of how the Catholics planned to bring the Greeks back to the Roman fold.

\textsuperscript{205} There was again a focus on the idea that Christian truths applied equally to all men. The impact of the Council of Trent for the Cypriot Orthodox has been studied for the period before the Ottoman conquest by Konstantinos Etokos, "Η Εφαρμαγη των Αποφασεων της συνοδου του Τρεντο και η Ορθοδοξη Εκκλησια της Κυπρου," [The Application of the Decisions of the Council of Trent and the Orthodox Church of Cyprus], in Chryssa Maltezou, ed., Kypros-Benetia, 209-16, on the strength of sources Etokos does not trouble, however, to identify. The lack of footnotes severely hampers the contribution of Etokos. For the Council of Trent’s impact on relations between Latin Christians and the Eastern Churches more generally (and not Orthodox alone), Bernard Heyberger, Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient au temps de la réforme catholique: Syrie, Liban, Palestine, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1994).

distinction. It is striking that Archbishop Timotheos (r. 1572-87), the long-tenured first archbishop of the island to take office after the Ottoman conquest, was of Latin origin, a man who Hill says descended from the noble family of Acres. Of Latin background, too, was Neophytos, who was descended from the Orsini family of Rome (r. 1587-92), as well as Christodoulos (r. 1606 to 1640), and the most distinguished seventeenth-century Cypriot clergyman, the Archbishop Hilarion Kigala or Kigalas (r. 1674-78).\footnote{For Timotheos, Kyrris, “L’importance sociale,” 455, as well as Andreas Mitsides, “Ὁ πρωτος κατα την Τουρκοκρατία κανονικος αρχιεπισκοπος Κύπρου Τημοθεος ὁ Κικκώτης (1572-1587/8),” Ἑπετηρίδα Κεντρου Μελετων Ἱερας Μονῆς Κύκκου 1 (1986) 25-30. I suggest that Kigalas’ descent from the Genoese family of Cigala (given the huge Genoese presence on Cyprus before 1464) is a strong possibility.} These churchmen may have advanced far in part because of their perceived ties to Latin culture and the prestige it conferred.

This evidence for Orthodox-Latin mutual respect suggests Cyprus was not one of the areas of Latin Romania torn apart by sectarianism. There was no Latin-Orthodox residential segregation, of the sort later implied by the Ottoman command that infidels be forbidden from living in the citadel of Famagusta.\footnote{Mentioned in Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 24.} Aside from the execution of thirteen Orthodox monks from the monastery of Kantara in 1231, there was also little violence between Greeks and Latins, though the Latins held the sword of secular authority while the Greeks were far more numerous.\footnote{This episode has been recently re-examined by Christopher Schabel, in “Martyrs and Heretics, Intolerance of Intolerance: The Execution of Thirteen Monks in Cyprus in 1231,” in Christopher Schabel, Greeks, Latins and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010). The sources for this episode include the cartulary of Nicosia cathedral, and the acts of the Synod held in Nicosia in 1196, known as the Synodicon Nicosiense, which Schabel has published as The Synodicum Nicosiense and other documents of the Latin Church on Cyprus,1196-1373 (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2001), and the Martyrion Kyprion, published in Theodore Papadopoulos, “Martyrion Kyprion,” in Τομος αναμνεστικος ετι τη 50 επαρχια του περιοδιου Αποστολος Βαρναβας (1918-1968) (Nicosia: [no publisher], 1975), 308-37.} In many accounts of relations between the Latin and Orthodox churches on Cyprus,
the year 1260 is of great significance. In that year, the Lusignan administration did away with the Greek archbishopric altogether. Just as it helps to understand the anti-Latin venom expressed by the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, Germanos, when we recall that he was writing during the Latin domination of Constantinople (1204-61), so it is difficult not to interpret this abolition by the Lusignan kings as an action prompted by the overall parlous state of Latin-Greek relations after the Fourth Crusade. The archbishop of Cyprus at the time, also named Germanos, was allowed to retain his office, but it was understood that no one would replace him after his death. Archimandrite Kyprianos, the eighteenth-century Cypriot historian of Cyprus, and those who followed him, have stressed that when the Ottomans re instituted the archbishopric of Cyprus in 1571, they did so in the interests of realpolitik, seeing their action as a way to gain the favor of the Orthodox masses, and thereby to prevent any sentiment building for a return to Latin rule.

210 Militiades Efthimiou, Latins and Greeks on Thirteenth-Century Cyprus (Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic College Press, 1987)

211 Joseph Gill has translated this letter, in which Germanos admonishes the Greek faithful: “For let no one deceive even you, most holy brethren, into thinking that the heresy of the godless Latins is of small moment or that the subjects of their heresy are confined to one or two or three errors(…) The heresy of the Latins is almost the recapitulation of all the heresies that after the incarnate life on earth of Our Lord Jesus Christ have in the course of time been injected by the prince of evil into the holy and apostolic Church of God.” (“An Unpublished Letter of Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople,” in Joseph Gill, Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204-1453), (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), III, 138-149.


213 Medieval Greek akritic poetry such as Digenis Akrites is a genre that concerns frontier fighters against the Turks, but these have been recognized, for example, by Elizabeth Jeffreys in Digenis Akrites: the Grottaferrata and Escorial Versions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), as creations of a different ethical and moral universe. In their romantic frontier spirit, these poems are closer to the Chanson de Roland than to the crusade literature of, for example, Fulbert of Chartres. The spirit of the literature advocating Crusade is analyzed in Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Crusading as an Act of Love,” History 65 (1980), 177-92, as well as in his The Crusades: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) and in the introduction to Thomas F. Madden, The Crusades: the Essential Readings (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
In spite of such Ottoman efforts, even after the Ottoman conquest there persisted a certain amity between some learned Greeks and Latins. The Western Renaissance humanists linked the “greci” they corresponded with in Constantinople, many of whom had settled in Italy after 1453, with the ancient Greeks whose ideas so absorbed them. The scholarly interest in Greeks and Greek printing was often linked to theological speculation, and to a more general blossoming of interest in Oriental Christian churches. After 1500, plans for inviting members of Oriental churches to Rome and encouraging them to resist Islamization included projects undertaken by Popes Marcellus II and Gregory XIII for setting up presses in Oriental languages. The spreading of the Gospel was, it could be argued, the ultimate aim, but a corollary effect of such projects was that in Rome a larger number of people started studying foreign peoples, their histories, languages, and traditions. The translation projects undertaken by Spanish Jesuit missionaries to the Americas had parallels in the projects for the translation of the Gospel and liturgical texts into the languages of several Eastern churches such as the Ethiopic and Coptic.

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214 Some of the ethnic terminology used by current historians is dictated, of course, by that used in contemporary texts. I have found numerous references in Italian sources both of the sixteenth century and later to “greci cattolici,” and none at all to “greci turchi,” which suggests that the former two terms were not considered mutually exclusive, but that the latter were.

215 The Greek Orthodox are sometimes included when historians refer to the Oriental Christian Churches, and sometimes not. I do include them here.


217 Protestant projects for missionizing the Greek Orthodox have left almost no documentary record in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Rousseau, L’idée missionnaire aux XVI et XVII siècles (Paris : Soufflot, 1930), 17-41. There was a fair amount of correspondence between Lutheran theologians in Tübingen and Orthodox in Constantinople in the 1570s and 1580s, some of which was reproduced by Martin Crusius in his Turcograecia (1584), but the Lutherans were not moved to undertake personal missions to Greek lands. Still, the influence of Lutheran and Calvinist theological developments on the Greeks of Constantinople should not be minimized. Cyril Lucaris, Patriarch of Alexandria from 1601 to 1620, and Patriarch of Constantinople for six separate terms between 1612 and 1638, studied in Wittenberg and Geneva as a youth, and, not coincidentally, wrote a Confession of Faith that has been widely understood as Calvinist, which was mentioned in the Synod of
A certain urgency to these printing projects may have been added by the competition for Greek Orthodox hearts and minds from nascent Protestantism. Calvinism, as we shall see, won over no less a figure than the Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril Lucaris, in the early seventeenth century, and I have already mentioned the correspondence which Martin Crusius and other Lutheran theologians kept up with Orthodox churchmen from the 1570s on. Knowing, as they probably did, that such communication was taking place can only have spurred the Catholic clergy to redouble their efforts not to “lose” the Orthodox world, even as they were “losing” large parts of northern Europe to the reformed faith.

These projects were initiated mainly in two places. Some, such as the famous Complutensian Polyglot produced by Cardinal Ximenes in 1514, originated in Spain, and were led by Spaniards. Many others, especially under Popes Leo X (r. 1513-1521) and Clement VII (r. 1522-34), were undertaken in Rome itself. The establishment of presses capable of printing in languages used by the Eastern churches was not an end in itself, but is best viewed as a step taken in conjunction with efforts to increase knowledge of these churches among Western churchmen, and also to invite members of those churches to adopt the Roman rite.\textsuperscript{218} Since error could have, according to common belief, the gravest consequences for the immortal soul of the schismatic, there was obviously strong motivation for these efforts. The Ottomans impeded these Catholic overtures in many places in the Greek world, including Cyprus, where Latin worship

\textsuperscript{218} The adoption of the Roman rite was not crucial for all of the eastern Churches. The Maronites of Lebanon, often known as Eastern Rite Catholics (who had a substantial presence both in Venetian, and in Ottoman Cyprus) had been largely cut off from the Western church since the rise of Islam, and once the Crusades brought western representatives of the popes of Rome back into communication with the Maronites, efforts to lead them to acknowledge papal primacy were born. They were permitted to keep celebrating Mass in Syriac, and Gregory XIII founded a Maronite College in 1584. The Maronites then imported a printing press from Italy and began printing in Syriac at the Monastery of Saint Qozhaya in northern Lebanon, in 1610.
was forbidden during the first decades after the conquest. It makes sense now to examine why the Ottoman rulers treated the Latin Church so differently from the way they treated the Greek Orthodox Church on Cyprus.

The Greek Church and the West

As pointed out in the introduction, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot historical works have generally presented a negative view of the Venetian administration on Cyprus, and this has extended to Turkish views of the Latin Church on Cyprus. And also as previously noted, the modern Turkish historian Recep Dündar has stressed the coercive nature of the Latin Church on Venetian Cyprus, remarking that “[t]he inhabitants were forced into the Latin rite of Christianity. The rights of the Orthodox Christians were totally usurped as well, whereas the people who were living under Ottoman rule and belonged to religions and ethnicities different from each other were benefitting from all freedoms.” I have attempted to demonstrate that this is not accurate, and that, furthermore, to some extent the continued contacts of the Cypriot Orthodox with the West suggest their openness to the Latin Church.

Did the Greek hierarchy based in Constantinople hold out equal hope for, or even share the Latin interest in, church Union? Initiatives towards such union before the late Byzantine period had never been initiated by Greeks, rather than Latins. However, in the dying days of the

219 I am considering works from both before and after the end of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s, so that I use the more general term “Turkish.”


221 The commonly-understood meaning of Unionism, a term often applied to Greek-Latin relations in the Middle Ages, is that of a movement initiated by the Roman Church, encouraging unity with the Greek Orthodox church. The Uniate Catholics of Ukraine and elsewhere in eastern Europe, who threw their support behind papal authority at the Union of Brest in 1594, derive their name from this idea of union.
Byzantine Empire, political expedience appears to have driven a number of emperors, notably John VIII, to make overtures to the Latin West, offering to submit themselves to papal authority in exchange for help against the Turks. After the Ottoman-Christian warfare in the Mediterranean had subsided, however, and after the foundation of the Greek College of St. Athanasius in Rome in 1576, there were Greek-speakers who earnestly desired such a union. If we compare the intellectual approach taken towards the Greek Orthodox by the Catholic scholar and advocate of Catholic-Orthodox reconciliation Leo Allatius (1586-1669), in the mid-seventeenth century, in such works as his *De Ecclesiae Occidentalis atque Orientalis Perpetua Consensione Libri Tres* (first published 1648) with those of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth, as expressed in his *Contra Errores Graecorum* (1264),222 the difference in their views is striking. Aquinas is interested in the “normalization” of the theology of the Orthodox,223 its conformity to the Truth, and does not descend from the intellectual Empyrean long enough to interest himself in what there might be of value in Greek thought or tradition. By contrast, Allatius was an admirer of many Greek Orthodox theologians, without conceding that they differed in any essential way from their Latin opponents. Allatius, to be sure, was himself a Greek-speaker, born on Chios. But he was Western-trained, at the *Collegio Greco* in Rome, and reflected in his own being a more general opening of the minds of Westerners towards the Greeks at this time.224

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223 By normalization I mean that the primary concern of Aquinas was to bring Greek theology closer to doctrinal purity, purging it from *errores*, which one could most accurately translate here as *misunderstandings* or *inaccuracies*.

224 Allatius is mentioned in a major series of documents in the Archive of the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* in Rome, the *SOCG, Scritture originali riferite nelle congregazioni generali*, as having attended the Greek College in Rome, matriculating in 1600. See Zacharias Tsirpanlis, ed., *The Greek College in Rome and its alumni (1576-1700): A Study on the Cultural Policy of the Vatican* [in Greek] Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1980, 377-83. The date Allatius finished his studies is uncertain.
The view that the late medieval period in Latin Romania saw a gradual cultural opening between Greeks and Latins influenced George Hill, a dispassionate English numismatist and classicist, when he came to write the history of the relations of Greeks and Latins in Lusignan and Venetian Cyprus, in his *History of Cyprus* in the 1940s. For Hill, the Greek Cypriots were so far from being masters of their own destiny in this period that they seldom take center stage in his account. Without doing violence to his sources, Hill could hardly have avoided placing the Latin aristocracy at the center of his account of Cypriot history for the period 1191-1571. But with sixty years of further research and writing behind us since Hill, we can see far more evidence for Greek Cypriots being active in shaping the direction of their society, even after falling into the “slavery” which the rhetoric of history has identified with the Ottoman conquest.225

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225 I am referring to a rhetorical generalization that has used “slavery” in a broad non-technical sense that has gone far beyond reference only to the slavery into which many thousands of Cypriots were sold, mostly, in Constantinople. See, for instance, Loizos Philippou, in the introduction to his *Τα Ελληνικα γραμματα εν Κυπρω κατα τν περιοδον της Τουρκοκρατιας* (1571-1878), Greek literature on Cyprus during the period of Turkish rule, 1571-1878, is one of those who refers to this expanded and non-literal concept of “slavery,” vol. I, 3-9. The use of the language of slavery is everywhere in European scholarship on the Cypriot Tourkokratia. The Swedish literary scholar, Borje Knös, in his commonly-used 1962 history of modern Greek literature, dismissed the state of culture on Cyprus after the Turkish conquest: “Sans doute une poésie originale purement grecque aurait pu se develop en Chypre, si la conquête de l’île par les Turcs n’avait pas interrompu toute evolution intellectuelle et littéraire.” [No doubt a purely Greek original poetry could have developed on Cyprus, had the conquest of the island by the Turks not interrupted all intellectual and literary development]. Borje Knös, *Histoire de la littérature néo-grecque* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksells, 1962), 87. George Hill, in his history of Cyprus, with the first volume published in 1948 and the last in 1952, remarked that education on Cyprus fell into a parlous state in the century after 1570, which he said had left little trace in the historical record save for rebellions, locust plagues, and earthquakes. A desire to appease current Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sentiment may lie behind the mollification of such statements more recently, although even in 2005 Fani-Maria Tsigakou wrote that to the Western European Romantic imagination of the early nineteenth century, “The Greeks’ struggle against the Turks symbolized the conflict between civilization and barbarity, between the cross and the crescent, between freedom and oppression.” Fani-Maria Tsigakou, “Greece through the Eyes of Artist-Travelers,” in *From Byzantium to Modern Greece: Hellenic Art in Adversity, 1453-1830* (New York: Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, 2005), 109. Other references are to Ioannes Theocharides, *Καταλογος Οθωμανικων Εγγραφων της Κυπρου απο τα αρχεια της Εθνικης Βιβλιοθεκης της Σωφιας 1571-1878* [Catalog of Ottoman Documents of Cyprus from the Archives of the National Library of Sofia: 1571-1878 (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1984); Kostas P. Kyrris, “Armées Locales et Luttes de Libération en Chypre, 1570-1670,” *Actes du Deuxième Congrès International des études du sud-est européen* (Athens : 1972); Despina Vlassi, “Η Δορεα του Κυπριους Μεγαλάμπερος Μιχαελ Δημαρικου του Πετρου στην Ελληνικη Αδαφολτη Βενετιας (1608-1614)” [The Gifts of the Cypriot Merchant Michael Demarikos, son of Peter, to the
For example, I. P. Theocharides, Victor Roudometof and Michalis N. Michael have studied documents from the Ottoman period, preserved in the archives of the important monastery of Kykkos in the west of Cyprus, that show that Kykkos remained an important center of teaching, with its monks continuing to actively administer an economy in cotton and sugar. Kostas Kyrris has studied both Venetian and Ottoman histories for what they reveal about the Cypriot converts to Islam, who included in their number even members of the last Byzantine imperial dynasty, the Paleologi. Wipertus Hugh Rudt de Collenberg has made use of manuscripts in the Vatican Secret Archives, the Vatican Library and the family archive of the Roman noble family of Doria-Pamphili to piece together many connections between Pope Clement VIII and Cypriot noble families from the Venetian period. This work prompted Collenberg to speculate that the Western formation, and connections, of some of the Cypriot women who were Islamized after 1570 and resided in the Sultan’s palace as wives led them to try to soften the anti-Christian measures of their Muslim consorts. Despina Vlassi, Chryssa Maltezou and Angel Nicolaou-Konnari have unearthed in the archives of the Greek Fraternity of Venice material that shows that this organization grew impressively in membership and


influence over the sixteenth century. They limn a picture of a large community that looked after the welfare of the large Cypriot community (one of the largest Greek subgroups in Venice) and maintained links with the Christian community of Cyprus. In a period when no printing was taking place on Cyprus itself, the printing activities in Venice of Manoli Blessi and the brothers De Nores, Jason and James, among others, sustained Greek Cypriots in their hope that a recognizably Cypriot literature in their ancestral language would survive.\(^{229}\) As I have mentioned earlier, the popes, too, often showed interest in printing as a means to sustain the faith of Christians living in largely Muslim areas. A 1584 letter from Meletios Pigas, the chancellor of the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria in Egypt, conveys something of this interest, when in it Pigas thanks the Pope’s lieutenant, Cardinal Santoro, for sending religious books to the writer, who laments the lack of time, given the great burdens of his post, he has to read them.\(^{230}\)

The papacy’s interests in the Eastern Christians have sometimes been considered to constitute a unified tradition that extends from the Crusades to the last of the Holy Leagues in the seventeenth century.\(^{231}\) These interests included both an emphasis on teaching and on preaching,

\(^{229}\) The publications in Venice by Manoli Blessi are listed in Émile Legrand, *Bibliographie Hellénique, XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: A. Picard, 1894). A few decades later, Neophytos Rhodinos, the son of a man who may well have written the Lament of Cyprus, Solomon Rhodinos, published in Rome in 1659 a history of the great men of Cyprus: *Περι ἑρωών, στρατηγῶν, φιλόσοφων, ἀγίων καὶ ἀλλῶν ονομαστικῶν ἀνθρώπων... ἀπὸ το νησὶ της Κυπρου* [Concerning the heroes, generals, philosphe rs, and other names of men...from the island of Cyprus] (Rome: Mascardo, 1659).

\(^{230}\) Émile Legrand, ed. *Lettres de Méletius Pigas antérieures à sa promotion au Patriarcat*, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1903, letter 81, 107, Pigas to Santoro “Humanissimis literis tuis, illíme praesul, ingentes sedis huius frequentesque occupationes nos diutius tenuere obœratos quam vel humanitas ipsa tua postulabat...” [The tremendous and frequent labors of this see have often, most illustrious prelate, held us in debt to your most generous letters, as perhaps thine own generosity has been inferring...] One could interpret Pigas’ words as meant to suggest that Cardinal Santoro’s letters were among his relatively few channels for staying in touch with ecclesiastical affairs elsewhere. Those accustomed to conceive of Greek-Roman ecclesiastical relations as bitterly hostile in this period might note the laudatory language used later by Pigas of the Roman Church (108): “...et colimus ecclesiam romanam, etsi non ut ecclesiarum matrem, certe inter ecclesias principem...” [and we honor the Roman Church, even if not as the mother of Churches, certainly as the foremost among the churches...]

\(^{231}\) Tending in this direction is the paper by Hubert Jedin, “Papst Pius V und Die Kreuzzugsgedanke,” in Gino Benzioni, ed. *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metàdel ‘500 alla luce di Lepanto* (Florence : Leo S. Olschki, 1974), 193-
and also a diplomatic interest in cultivating alliances with the enemies of the most threatening infidel foes. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as in the Middle Ages, this was a task of the friars, Dominicans and Franciscans (which explains the many missions sent to the Orient made up of Franciscans and Dominicans, two orders deeply involved in preaching and teaching) but now with the new element of Jesuits, a teaching order founded in 1540. But, along with the spiritual interests of the Bishop of Rome, and the continuities that the Counter-Reformation papacy sought to stress with the ancient Christian church, there were in addition many worldly interests that occupied the papacy in the Levant.

Just War Doctrine in the West and its Development after the Rise of the Ottomans

The arguments, going back at least to Augustine, on behalf of the Just War theory, based on Christian doctrine, did much to inspire the popes of Rome to form coalitions of Christian states against the infidels, well past what we think of as the high point of crusading fervor. Serbian scholar Marko Jačov has analyzed the series of successive Christian holy leagues against the Turks, with the latest in his study being that formed at the time of the Cyprus War in the late sixteenth century, all of which leagues were abetted to a great degree, in both their formation and their maintenance, by successive popes.232 How violence could be reconciled with the Christian vocation was as nettlesome a matter to men of the sixteenth century as it had been to men of the eleventh.233 The Popes of the Renaissance were to varying degrees troubled by these

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213, as well as some of the studies by Norman Housley, such as The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: from Lyons to Alcazar (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).


233 Just as in the eleventh century the Church had attempted to limit knightly violence through the Peace of God (pax Dei) and the Truce of God (truga Dei), so in the sixteenth, innumerable laments over Christendom’s divisions crop up in writers from the historian Paolo Giovio to the humanist Erasmus, and were rhetorically de rigeur in the
contradictions. Those whom tradition associates most closely with a strong crusading fervor against the Turk sometimes justified their actions in writing. None was entirely un-selfconscious as, one could argue, few scholarly clerics could possibly be, for all were keenly aware of an earlier Christian tradition of writing on holy war. All over Christian Europe in Pius V’s day (r. 1567-72), in Protestant areas such as Denmark and northern Germany as well as Catholic areas, liturgies contained prayers against the Turks.234 Luther had made sure to include such imprecatory prayers in his own liturgical writings. 235 In his Commentaries, Pius II (r. 1458-64), whose papacy witnessed the consolidation of Mehmet II’s regime in Constantinople/Istanbul and his conquest of Bosnia, associated the Turks, as so many had before him, with the Biblical outcast peoples, Gog and Magog. 236

Pius V, a century later, stressed the urgency for Christian – that is, Catholic – princes to compose their differences, both to counter the Protestant threat and to fight the Turks. The Holy League against the Turks should be viewed not in isolation, but as part of a larger Catholic effort, of which his measures against Queen Elizabeth I and what he considered protestantizing tendencies in England, such as granting implicit permission to the Ridolfi Plot in 1571, and his bull Regnans in Excelsis excommunicating Elizabeth in 1572, constitute another part. It seems that, borrowing a page from Machiavelli, Pius V was willing, for the good of Catholicism as he saw it, even to contemplate assassination – for he supported the Ridolfi Plot, which aimed to kill

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234 See Janus Møller Jensen, Denmark and the Crusades (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 113-21, under “Crusade Liturgy.”


236 Peoples who, incidentally, were recognized in Islamic tradition under the names Juj and Majuj. Ibn Kathir refers to these figures, for example in his Al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah [the Beginning and the End] available in English as The Book of the End, trans. Faisal Shafiq (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2006), 152-159.
Elizabeth and place Mary, Queen of Scots on the throne of England. If the supreme head of the Roman Church was willing to resort to such measures against a queen of uncertain religious temperament, it is not surprising that even more violence was condoned when directed against the Turks, whose enmity to all Christians was more or less taken for granted in the sixteenth century. The papal curia did not itself write the many programs for war against the Turk sketched out by statesmen and tractarians all over Europe, but nor did it, consistently, oppose war or other uses of violence.  

On the contrary, in 1567, Pius V began to collect one-tenth of the revenues from convents all over Catholic Christendom, to contribute towards a crusade against the Turks, and made clear that his prayers were with those Christians who were fighting the Turks. Those who contributed could be confident that the money they gave to support a war effort meant that they were laying up treasure in Heaven. But the last days of the Cyprus War in 1573 showed that the papacy had lost much of its power to influence events by itself, without the support and agency of friendly Catholic governments. It was then that Pius V fulminated against what he

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237 In his study of the life and works of Pius V, Vita del Gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto, 190, (http://reader.digitalsammlungen.de/resolve/display/bsb10159919.html, consulted July 21, 22, 23, 2009) Girolamo Catena mentions that as the fleet of the Holy League was preparing to embark at Messina in Sicily, Pius V (who was present) exhorted Don John of Austria “Si che l’eshortava à pensar solo a combattere, che ’l provedergli da vivere tocherebbe a sè.” [He exhorted him to think only of fighting, (and) that he would provide for his survival.] The question of the papacy’s relation to violence is not a simple one. The treatment in James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969) is a helpful introduction.

238 Girolamo Catena, Vita del Gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto, mentions at 190 that Pius V “ordinò a D. Giovanni, ch’espurgasse tutto l’esercito... & riconciatisi con Dio per mezzo del sacramento della penitenza, & dell’Eucharistia pigliò ciascun l’indulgenza plenaria in forma di Giubileo, la qual dava Pio a tutti coloro, che andassero à quell’impresa per combattere.” [he ordered of Don John, that he should expurgate the entire army...and having reconciled themselves with God through the sacrament of penitence, and that of the Eucharist, each one took a plenary indulgence in the form of a Jubilee, which Pius gave to all those, who went to this enterprise to fight.] In the light of a Counter-Reformation intellectual atmosphere that tended to discourage indulgences, this measure from Pius V is striking. In 1567, all sale of indulgences for money had been strictly forbidden. But those freely bestowed were, it seems, another matter. Catena also notes that diceing was discouraged on board the Holy League fleet, and that Don John hanged two men for blasphemy.

called the betrayal by the Venetians of the Holy League, through their unilateral signing of a peace with the Turks.\textsuperscript{240}

It cannot reasonably be charged of the missionary orders on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest that they were the tools of a particular foreign power, unless one takes as a starting point that there is something irreducibly “foreign” about Catholicism on Cyprus. This alienness is indeed a theme of some Greek writing on the history of Cyprus, though in recent decades it is expressed with more subtlety than before. Kyrris hints at this continuing bias when he repeatedly characterizes those who made trouble for the Ottoman authorities in early Ottoman Cyprus as having links to the old Latin noble class. Archbishop Christodoulos (r. 1606-40), for example, is described as coming “from the same group of old noble families” as Parthenios, bishop of Kyrenia after 1605, a group which was “instrumental in repeated further such secret contacts [sic] with European states, and in organising anti-Turkish uprisings.” Later on, from 1669 to 1673/4, to describe the cruelties of the leading Christian official on the island, the Dragoman Markoulles, Kyrris says that “Markoulles and the Aghas imposed heavy tax-increases and with their assistants – chavushes [aides dispatched in all sorts of official capacities in the Ottoman Empire] and Greco-Latin adventurers – used cruel tax-collecting methods...”\textsuperscript{241}

Furthermore, it is not clear that Catholic missionaries were deemed to pose much of a threat to the loyalty of Cypriots in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. To be sure, the missionaries in other parts of the Ottoman Empire may have aided and abetted Christian

\textsuperscript{240} A description of his anger was provided by Tolomeo Galli, Cardinal of Como, papal secretary of state, to the papal nuncio in Madrid, dated April 7, 1573, which makes up Archivio Segreto Vaticano -- Nunziature Spagna [Vatican Secret Archive – Spanish Nunciatures] vol. 15, f. 227.

\textsuperscript{241} Kostas Kyrris, History of Cyprus, 268; 271.
rebellious sentiment.\textsuperscript{242} The reports sent back to the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide and related bodies in Rome of Catholic missionary activity in the Ottoman-dominated Balkans in the period after 1622 show that a small number of missionaries were martyred there. The causes were activities that the Ottoman authorities considered politically subversive or, on occasion, blasphemous. Certain of these martyrdoms, such as that of the Martyrs of Scutari in 1648, clearly made a deep impression on the missionary community, and their stories were told and retold.\textsuperscript{243} But these missionaries were small in number, and there is reason to consider the executions carried out by Ottoman authorities as disproportionate to any real threat. But the Ottoman authorities were not the only interested party in the complex religious picture in the Balkans. In light of Istvan Toth’s recent contention that Bosnian Franciscans made themselves so useful to Ottoman authorities, that they even supported the persecution of other Franciscans, including Hungarians and Italians, there may have been intra-Christian rivalries behind the scenes leading to Ottoman persecution of some Christian missionaries and not, or not to the same degree, others.\textsuperscript{244}

\textbf{The Role of the Latins in Revolts against the Ottoman Rule on on Cyprus}

One strand of Cypriot historiography appears to hold that the troubles on early Ottoman Cyprus were in part attributable both to people of Latin descent, and to outside Latin interlopers,

\textsuperscript{242} Georg Hofmann, “Apostolato dei Gesuiti nell’Oriente Greco,” \textit{Orientalia Christiana Periodica} I (1935), 144, denies that the Jesuit fathers working as missionaries in Euboea (Negroponte) were working with Venice when Venice briefly retook this Greek outpost in 1694; archival research may now be able to settle the question of their complicity, but it has not been settled yet.

\textsuperscript{243} I have found at least four different narrations of the story of the Martyrs of Scutari (who died in 1648) among the documents in \textit{Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Busta Missioni Francescane, fascicolo} 2, 1-14v.

their heads filled with crazed crusading visions, and distressingly disconnected from the realities of life on Cyprus. Men from Latin Catholic backgrounds were central, certainly, in a large number of those revolts, as the Spanish correspondence relative to Cyprus published by Ioannes Hassiotis makes clear.245 And the fact of the Latin Catholic descent of a number of the post-conquest Orthodox Archbishops of Cyprus – which I have previously noted – may indicate the continued prestige of Latin religious learning, if not of Latin religious doctrines.246 But on Cyprus, in the first century of Ottoman rule, there were quite enough revolts uniting Turks and Greeks in shared grievances over excessive taxation and other measures, to dispense with the need to attribute troubles to Latins.247 Chris Schabel has shown in detail how archimandrite Kyprianos, whose History of the Island of Cyprus was published in Venice in 1788, at a time when Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas circulated in Greece and Cyprus, manipulated his sources to cast Latin motives in a bad light. But the intellectual and political circumstances on the eve of the French Revolution were very different from what they had been in the 1570s, so it is desirable to pierce back beyond the filter of Kyprianos and other later historians, to try to rediscover a more accurate understanding of Greek Orthodox views of the Latins shortly after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus.

245 One of those who planned an uprising and actually carried it out was Pedro Aventaño, a Spaniard, who led a revolt in 1606, discussed in Hasiotes, Ισπανικα Εγγραφα, letters 54-6, pp. 92-98, of July-August 1613. A second was Geronimo/Girolamo Combi, who planned, it appears, with the support of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1613 to ally with the emir Fakhir-ed-Din of Saida, in Lebanon, who was leading an uprising against the Ottomans, and to retake, not Cyprus alone, but “il regno di Hierusalem e le fortezze maritime di Suria, le quali promise d(et)to emiri di far pervenire in mano di V(ostra) M(aes)tà.” (99) Ισπανικα Εγγραφα, letters no. 58, of December 30, 1613, 98-99.

246 As mentioned, Timotheos, Neophytos and Christodoulos, three of the first five post-conquest Archbishops of Cyprus, were likely of Latin descent. Meletios Pigas, the Patriarch of Alexandria who at times intervened in Cypriot ecclesiastical affairs, was born on Venetian Crete and studied in Venetian Padua. As suggested above, he displayed in his correspondence with Cardinal Santoro what appears to be unfeigned respect and affection for a number of Catholic clergy, including then-pope Gregory XIII.

The masses of Greek Orthodox on Cyprus in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since they were illiterate and almost never left the island, did not possess a clear and distinct impression of what was meant by “Western Christendom” as a whole. Greeks and Latins shared some sites on the island before 1571 to which they both accorded special reverence, such as the monastery of Agios Sozomenos and the Premonstratensian abbey of Bellapais. Both sites were hallowed in the wake of the Crusades. Agios Sozomenos (according to the fifteenth-century Orthodox chronicler Leontios Machairas) was founded after the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187, when 300 saints, scions of Crusader families fleeing Palestine, settled on Cyprus, while Bellapais was set up by the Premonstratensian Order in the wake of the Third Crusade. In the fourteenth century, the chronicler and diplomat Philippe de Mézières obtained papal consent to celebrate the Feast of the Presentation of the Virgin, which both Greeks and Latins had been celebrating on Lusignan Cyprus, where Mézières resided. The Orthodox must have observed some of the symbiosis between the Greek and Latin communities that existed on Cyprus, and perhaps even been aware that this symbiosis extended to other parts of the Greek Orthodox world, since there seems to have been substantial communication between Cyprus and Crete, for

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248 The Cypriot chronicles of Florio Bustron (1570), Etienne de Lusignan (1572) and Diomede Strambaldi (1546) all display considerable interest in the saint cults of the island and do not distinguish between sites venerated by Greeks and those venerated by Latins. For Agios Sozomenos, see Catherine Vanderheyde, “La Topographie Cultuelle Chrétienne de la Région de Potamia-Agios Sozomenos," Cahier du Centre d’Études Chypriotes 34, 2004, and for the shared veneration for Bellapais Monastery, A.H.S. Megaw, A Brief History and Description of Bellapais Abbey (Nicosia : Antiquities Department, 1964).


250 This story is told in the introduction to William E. Coleman, Philippe de Mézières’ Campaign for the Feast of Mary’s Presentation (Toronto: Toronto Medieval Texts, 1981).
example, where Latins and Greeks were in constant interaction, as well as between Cyprus and Syria, a land which had longstanding Latin and Greek Orthodox communities.\textsuperscript{251}

Despite significant cultural integration and lack of theological dogmatism outside limited circles, there remained hostility in some Greek Orthodox quarters towards Latins.\textsuperscript{252} The Orthodox and the Protestants of Northern Europe, in light of their common history of hostility towards claims of primacy by the Roman popes, could have found common ground in their mutual hatred of the popes. But anti-papalism was not the main thrust of Orthodox anti-Latin feeling in the late Byzantine period. More common appears to have been the views expressed by the princess Anna Comnena during the First Crusade. Her dislike of the Latins was based not on their allegiance to the popes of Rome, but on their perceived coarseness and barbarity. Anna disapproved of the sheer brutality of the crossbow, for example, which she associated with the Latins.\textsuperscript{253} She was also disgusted by the number of Latin priests who took up arms and shed blood, which she contrasted strongly with the practice of her own clergy:

“For the rules concerning priests are not the same among the Latins as they are with us; for we are given the command by the canonical laws and the teaching of the Gospel, ‘Touch not, taste not, handle not! For thou art consecrated.’ While the Latin barbarian will simultaneously handle divine things, and wear his shield on his left arm, and hold his spear in his right hand, and at one and the same time he communicates the body and

\textsuperscript{251} I am adopting the language of Kostas P. Kyrris, although not endorsing his specific conclusions, in his paper “Symbiotic Elements in the History of the two Communities of Cyprus,” Κυπριακός Λόγος 8 (1976), 243-282.

\textsuperscript{252} Giovanni Battista da Todi, a Franciscan missionary, reports in the 1640s that a number of Greeks harbor such a hatred for the Catholics that they threatened to kill others who showed pro-Catholic sympathies. Zacharias Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδοτα εγγραφα εκ των αρχεων του Βατικανου, 1625-1667 [Unpublished Manuscripts from the Vatican Archives] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973), letter no. 88, p. 103.

blood of God, and looks murderously and becomes ‘a man of blood,’ as it says in the psalm of David.”

We have next to no evidence for Orthodox anti-papalism from this period, despite the famous phrase from the fifteenth century which I have mentioned, attributed to the Byzantine chancellor Lukas Notaras, that he would prefer rule by the Sultan’s turban to that of what is generally translated as the papal tiara. It has rarely been understood, as was most usefully pointed out by Kenneth Setton, that the famous declaration is a mistranslation from the chronicler Doukas, who actually wrote “…than by a prince’s bonnet,” using a Greek word, καλυπτρα, which refers to a western ‘hat’ worn by secular men, and not specifically to the papal tiara. This recognition takes away the anti-papal sting and enlarges the class of those Westerners being spurned. Furthermore, this quotation was exceptional. Nothing like the savagery of early Lutheran anti-papalism emerged among the Orthodox. Nor have I found in the Franciscan missionary correspondence collected by Tsirpanlis any sense of a particular animus among the Orthodox against that order. Such historians of Latin-Greek theological conflicts as Joseph Gill, Donald M. Nicol and Tia M. Kolbaba have reminded us of the enormous volume of anti-Latin writings that were produced, beginning in the fourth century but provoked and exacerbated by such later

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254 Ibid., 256.

255 Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, Vol. II (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978), 105 n. 91. The Greek in the History of Dukas, chapter 37, reads “μεττυπτερον εστιν ειδεναι εν μεση τη πολει φακιολιον Βασιλεου Τουρκων η καλυπτραν Λατινικην.” [it is better to be in the midst of the City [Constantinople] wearing the kingly turban of the Turks than the princely hat of the Latin].

256 A report from the Latin bishop of Paphos, Pietro Vespa, in Tsirpanlis, Ανεκδότα εγγραφα, 37, suggests on the contrary that at that time, in 1629, the Greeks of his town were most reverent towards the pope. In this report, if the Catholics brought help to the Greeks (of an unspecified nature, but the anti-Turkish remarks earlier in the report suggest that this was help in expelling the Ottomans) they could expect as a quid pro quo a union of many Greeks in Paphos with the Roman Church. The Greeks of Paphos already, according to some of Vespa’s informants, “ricoscevano il Sommo Pontefice Romano per vero et antico capo,” [recognized the Supreme Roman Pontiff as their true and ancient head], and once they received aid, they would unite easily and quickly with the Latin Christians – “…quando li Greci habitanti in questa città havessero aiuto, con gran facilità et prestezza s’uniriano con Chrestiani Latini...”
episodes as the employment of the controversial *filioque* phrase\textsuperscript{257} by Germanic missionaries dispatched in the 860s by Nicholas I to Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{258}

Anticlericalism has by now been well studied for the medieval and early modern West, but less so (at least in English) in Byzantine history. Cypriot sources produced at the time of the Cyprus War, from histories to poetry, do not dwell on the failings of the clergy, Catholic or Orthodox. At a time when Christian unity was being stressed, this is unsurprising. And after the Cyprus War, though both Venetian and Cypriot sources made frequent reference to the displeasure of God as a reason for the fall of Cyprus to the Turks, they did not go so far as to say that the failings of the clergy, or of the pope, or of the Church, were responsible for the debacle. Giovanni Pietro Contarini, for example, a layman and not a priest, with no obvious reason to spare the clergy, concentrated on compiling and memorializing a solemn list of names and companies of the Venetian knights killed at Lepanto and at the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta, without placing blame for Christian losses. There was a stress on Christian unity between Orthodox and Catholic, and not on their differences. Similarly, the Cypriot, Manoli Blessi, an Orthodox who after the Cyprus War published, in Venice, Greek works on the fall of Cyprus, did not, in those works, attack the pope, either for having through his heresies contributed to the loss of Cyprus from Christendom or for having neglected the crisis that Cyprus had faced. Rather,

\textsuperscript{257} Latin for “and from the Son,” the *filioque* is the conclusion of a formula which appears in the Athanasian Creed and concerns the origin of the Holy Spirit, as follows: “qui ex Patre Filioque procedit. Qui cum Patre et Filio simul adoratur et conglorificatur.”

\textsuperscript{258} Tia M. Kolbaba, *The Invention of Latin Heretics* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 2008), 57-8. Kolbaba cites epistle 2 of Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople 858-67 and 877-86. Photios laments that less than two years after the conversion of the Bulgars, evil men from the west have introduced this Filioque addition, “the crown of all their evils, if there is such a thing...which has its impregnable strength from all the synodical and ecclesiastical decrees.”
Blessi evinced a desire for Christian unity and praised the valor of non-Greeks, the Albanian stradiotti, famous mercenaries, in their defense of the island.\textsuperscript{259}

**Papal Plans for Alliances with Foreign Princes. The Initiative Taken by Cypriots in Plans for their Homeland**

Though the language they used and the ideas they expressed were not those employed in present-day humanitarian interventions, as that in Kosovo in 1996-1999, successive popes in the wake of the Cyprus War worked for what may be described, using today’s lexicon, as a humanitarian relief effort for the Cypriot Orthodox, especially those who had been enslaved during the war. The popes were working on the understanding that the situation of their co-religionists under the new Ottoman regime was dire.\textsuperscript{260} They issued \textit{litterae hortatoriae}, literally “letters of exhortation,” begging their fellow Christians to help them in their efforts.\textsuperscript{261} The most concrete effort they undertook in this respect was the redemption of Cypriot captives who had been enslaved by the Turks, buying them back and settling them in Christian lands. In this effort, as in their earlier attempt to forge a Holy League, one should recognize that the popes were not always the initiators of these plans. Rather, Cypriots approached them and, at a time when many projects jostled for papal attention, reminded the popes of the plight of Cypriot Christendom. As


\textsuperscript{260} The most important book-length study is W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, \textit{Esclaves et Rançons des Chrétiens en Méditerranée, 1570-1600} (Paris : Léopard d’Or, 1987).

Hassiotis’ research suggested, and as Géraud Poumarède’s recent study of the Europe-wide struggle against the Turk in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reinforces, it was quite clear to the Christians living under Ottoman rule that the papacy was not nearly as useful an ally in their plans for insurrection as either Spain, a great power, whose government had acquired a reputation for distributing money to those who had been dispossessed by the Turks, or Savoy, which, though a small power, was ruled by a dynasty that claimed Cyprus by hereditary title from the House of Lusignan.

The question naturally arises as to why, when Venetian rule saw few episodes of organized discontent, so many rebellions were planned in the first place on Ottoman Cyprus. Religious animosity was one factor. One of the interesting features of the Ottoman Empire was the persistence of very substantial non-Muslim (both Christian and Jewish) populations under Ottoman rule. The ability to pass down distinct cultural traditions demonstrated by such large populations, and for such a long period, is evidence that the Ottoman regime was not universally or severely repressive in its dealings with non-Muslims. The framework the Ottoman regime employed for dealing with non-Muslims was that of the so-called Pact or Covenant of ‘Umar, an agreement said to have been made between Muslims and non-Muslims in the early days of Islam, one that was understood by the early modern Ottomans to date to the seventh century. At that

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262 On Cyprus-related documents in the Habsburg archives in Simancas outside Madrid, see the letters in I.K. Hassiotis, Ἰσπανικα Ἐγγραφα τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ἰστορίας (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000 [1973]) and a second collection, Πηγες τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ἱστορίας από τὸ Ἰσπανικὸ Ἀρχεῖο Σιμανκάς (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000).

263 A large number of the letters pertaining to Cyprus in the Spanish archives by Hassiotis are requests for pensions from Christians dispossessed or formerly enslaved by the Turks. See Hassiotis, Ἰσπανικα Ἐγγραφα, letters 1 (pp. 1-2, re: Paulo Petricio), 2 (pp. 2-3, re: Andrea Zacharia), 3 (pp. 3-4, re: Livio Podocátaro), 4 (pp. 4-5, re: Pedro Muscorno) and many others, as well as Πηγες τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ἱστορίας, letters 2 (pp. 42-3, re: Jorge de Pedro), 4 (pp. 53-4, re: Domenico Veneti and Angelo Roti), 8 (pp. 66-7, re: Jorge Cipriotto), 13 (pp. 78-9, re: Francisco Marcelo), 17 (pp. 89-91, re: Pedro Lusíñan), 24 (pp.110-11, re: Giulio Curzio) 38 (pp.163-4), 41 (pp. 179-80, re: Angelos Rodos), among many others.

264 Ibid.
time, the second Caliph following Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community or ‘umma, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, was thought to have reached agreement on the treatment of Christians under his rule with Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{265} Christians, as dhimmis, from ahl al-Dhimma, or people of the pact, were not to teach their children the Koran, were not to display their religion publicly or attempt to convert others to it, and were to maintain a style of dress and nomenclature that would clearly distinguish them from the Muslims. And there were other social and economic disabilities, chief of which was the required payment of a special tax levied on non-Muslims, the cizye, to support the Muslim ruler. The Western, that is Latin, Christians had their own intellectual frameworks for incorporating the Greeks, that is the Orthodox, into their worldviews, which differed from this dhimmi conception of tolerated non-Muslims, specifically Christians and Jews, both peoples of the book, ahl al-Kitāb, which the Ottomans held.\textsuperscript{266} While there were instances of both political and social subordination of Greeks to Latins in the Frankish Greece that arose after the Latin conquest of Constantinople and dismantling of most of the Byzantine Empire in 1204, the Latins, heavily outnumbered, did not insist that their fellow Christians refrain from expressing their beliefs, or that they dress as they themselves did. There were many more shared assumptions and understandings among different groups of Christians, than subsisted between the Greek Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, long rules by Latins, especially Venice and Genoa, in Greek Orthodox areas such as Chios and Cyprus, even after the Reformation began to gain traction in the 1520s, made the intellectual ground arable enough for the Western European religious divisions that with Martin Luther began to spill over into Eastern Europe and Orthodox areas.

\textsuperscript{265} The text of the Pact is translated in Alfred J. Andrea, The Medieval Record (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 87-98.
\textsuperscript{266} Dhimmi meant non-Muslim, or in practice, Christian or Jewish.
I argue that in this period Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics all tried to influence Orthodox hearts and minds. Their competition is embodied in the correspondence of learned Orthodox churchmen such as Meletios Pigas\(^{267}\) (Patriarch of Alexandria 1590-1601, then acting Ecumenical Patriarch) who, as previously noted, had a great influence on Orthodox church affairs from Cyprus to Moscow, and a man who corresponded with, among others, Cardinal Santoro, the Lutheran Martin Crusius, the Calvinist-influenced Cyril Lucaris, an eventual Patriarch of Constantinople, \(^{268}\) and the monk Leontios Eustratios\(^{269}\) (ca. 1560-1602). Eustratios himself also reflected the same wide-ranging set of teachers and influences, for he was born in Cyprus, later travelled to the University at Tübingen, where he learned about Lutheranism from Martin Kraus/Crusius, and at the same time maintained his ties with Catholic friends whom he had acquired during study as a young man at Venice. Eustratios, as the controversy that surrounded him when he returned to Cyprus to teach after the war would show, came down on the Latin side of teaching on the then-burning question of whether yeast should be used in communion wafers. We can see in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the influences on Orthodoxy of at least three separate and distinct intellectual traditions: the Catholic, the Calvinist, and the Lutheran. The many international contacts and extensive travels of so many learned Orthodox churchmen in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century,

\(^{267}\) Patriarch of Alexandria 1590-1601. In 1596, Pegas (or Pegas) sent Cyril Lucaris to Brest to oppose the push towards Union with the Roman Church. He did not enjoy much success.

\(^{268}\) Patriarch of Alexandria 1601-12, then of Constantinople for six separate terms between 1612 and 1638, Lucaris studied first in Catholic Padua, then later at Wittenberg and Geneva, where he absorbed Calvinist teachings. He travelled to Cyprus in 1605-1606, and in letters written on the island, he names as places visited the cities of Kyrenia, Nicosia and Famagusta. See Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, \textit{Πιναξ ομιλιων Κυριλλου Λουκαρεου} [Catalog of the Homilies of Cyril Lucaris] (Alexandria: Patriarchal Press, 1913), 11.

furthermore, meant that only by considering the native Cypriots (such as Kigalas, Neophytos Rhodinos, and Leontios Eustratios) along with, and not separate or isolated from, other Orthodox churchmen elsewhere, can we hope to gain an accurate view of their thinking. For Cyprus was part of a wider Orthodox world. The letters between Orthodox clergy on Cyprus and those elsewhere, like Meletios Pigas in Alexandria, suggests that the Cypriots were quite willing to ask for aid from any Westerners willing to give it. When they asked successive Spanish kings for aid against the Turks, there is no evidence that they were deliberately concealing hostility to Catholicism.  

**Conclusion: The Role of Western Christians in Cypriot Self-Awareness**

There is little doubt, as I hope was made clear at the outset of this chapter, that there was a great deal of interaction between the Western churches, both Catholic and Protestant, and a number of Orthodox churchmen on post-conquest Cyprus, just as there was between those Orthodox churchmen and other Orthodox all over the Greek oikumene. A more difficult question to answer is what factors determined whether Orthodox churchmen fell into the orbit of one particular way – Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinist – of thinking, and thus might have looked to the parts of Europe dominated by those respective confessions for aid and sustenance. A working hypothesis is that, because Cyprus was under Catholic Venetian rule, most of the Orthodox clergy from Cyprus in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who went west to work or study ended up in Catholic lands, and especially in Italy and Spain. Detailed prosopographical

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270 Ἡσιότης, Ἰςπανικά ἑγγράφα αν δΗγγες τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ἰστορίας, above n. 235.

271 This word meant “world” and referred to the universal community over which Byzantine emperors had often asserted their rule.
studies of the clergy of the post-conquest Church, including their backgrounds, who taught them and where they studied, remain to be done. But it is clear that the University of Padua – in a city under Venetian control – continued to give employment to educated Cypriots after the war, including Alexandros Syngliticos, and Giason and Giorgio Denores. Synglitico, who is recorded at the Greek College of Rome between 1600 and 1604, became Professor of Philosophy at Padua. Giason Denores became a theoretician of drama, learned in the rhetorical writings of Aristotle, and in 1577 earned for his fellow Cypriots the right, granted by the Venetian authorities, to settle in the town of Pola, in Istria (modern Croatia). Giorgio Denores wrote in the 1630s a major legal tract on the claims of states to be the legitimate rulers of Cyprus. Livio Podocataro, while he did not teach at Padua, when he died as Latin Archbishop of (Nicosia) Cyprus in 1555, left substantial scholarship money in his will (15,000 ducats) to pay for scholarships for a number of Cypriot students annually to study at that university. That such men aided in the formation of a modern Greek Cypriot identity and that a very substantial proportion of them were born in, raised in, or sought refuge in, Venice and Venetian territories in the early Ottoman period of Cypriot history, supports my basic contention that there were numerous connections between Cyprus and the West after the Ottoman conquest that were decisive in the persistence of a Greek Cypriot identity. Another Latin connection consists in the

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272 The study of individuals including their networks of contacts, relations, and influences.


fact that a number of the early Greek Orthodox Archbishops in post-conquest Cyprus were of Catholic origin, and it is clear that the main planners of revolts against the Ottomans were agents of Catholic states: Spain, Savoy, and Tuscany, while Venice made no concerted attempt to retake the island. Finally, it is evident that Venice served as a clearing-house of information for Orthodox from all over, that it played host after 1571 to a large Cypriot community, and that it constituted the main European center for the printing of books on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest of the island. After 1670, it became clear that Christian Europe would not effect a military reconquest of Cyprus, and efforts by Cypriots to interest them in such undertakings waned. But another sort of relationship and interest had been established. Greater numbers of Greeks were becoming aware of themselves as participants in a distinct culture, able, thanks especially to what could now be disseminated by the printing press, to regard their intellectual tradition as one unbroken since antiquity.

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277 Cypriot authors who published books in Venice between 1570 and 1700 included Manoli Blessi, Neophytos Rhodinos, Leontios Eustratios, Matthew Kigalas (father of the Archbishop of Cyprus Hilarion Kigalas, r. 1674-78, as well as the scholars Demetrios and Ioannes Kigalas) and Giason Denores. Giovanni Sozomeno and Alessandro Podocataro, also Cypriots, lived at Venice and wrote histories of the Cyprus War, although Sozomeno published his at Bologna and Podocataro’s account remained in manuscript until the nineteenth century. See Arbel, “Greek Magnates,” 336. Innumerable Greek liturgical books were also published.

278 There are a number of early modern manuscripts in the British Library, for example, BL MS. Add. 10016, containing poetry dating back to antiquity, followed by the contribution of the contemporary Archbishop of Cyprus, Hilarion Kigalas (r. 1674-8). Similarly, MS. Add. 10077 binds together Hilarion Kigalas’ Chronology of the Old and New Testaments with many other Greek tracts (ancient and more recent) on chronology and geography.
Chapter Two: Spain, the Orthodox World, and Cyprus

Though the Venetians could not hope to hold Cyprus against the Ottomans alone, and though, as I shall explain in Chapter Four, some of the correspondence of their governors on Cyprus indicate that the Venetians already were well-nigh reconciled to losing Cyprus in the 1560s, an alliance with Spain, which under Charles V (r. 1516-56) and Philip II (r. 1556-98) was by far the strongest European power, must nonetheless have appeared to offer at least a chance of victory. The Venetians had allied with the Spaniards in a Holy League in their previous war against the Turks, in 1537-40. While there were causes for suspicion on both sides, several factors tended to bind Venice and Spain together. In light of Venice’s defeat by the League of Cambrai, in which the pope and France had allied with Milan against Venice, early in the sixteenth century, and also of the geopolitical position of France, which obstructed Spain’s path to her Netherlands possessions, both powers saw France as a common enemy. And both Spain and Venice shared similar views of the Ottomans. At all levels of European society, – invariably using the term Turk or variants thereof, and not Ottoman save in reference to the Sultans and their families – Europeans branded the Turks as aggressive and barbarians, enemies of the nomen Christianum.279 Perhaps with these considerations in mind, Pope Pius V began to agitate even before the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus for the formation of a new Holy League to counter Turkish expansion. When the reports of an Ottoman fleet landing on Cyprus were confirmed, despite considerable tensions and suspicions within Catholic Europe, he succeeded in his aim as regarded Spain, though the Empire and France, both ruled by Catholics, nevertheless held aloof. The League’s “constitution” was first ratified in July 1570, and then renewed each year until

279 After the Cyprus War, in the 1580s, the Catholic League in France succeeded in drawing Spain into their intrigues, but this was Spain taking sides on behalf of a particular, ardently Catholic group in the kingdom, rather than a general “pro-French” policy.
1573, despite the current of Spanish – Venetian suspicions and lukewarm statements from other Catholic princes. Both naval and infantry contingents contributed by each League signatory were spelled out. Until the Venetians signed a separate peace with the Ottomans in March of 1573, the League succeeded in damaging Ottoman prestige, and Ottoman fleets, on a number of occasions, most spectacularly at Lepanto, on October 7, 1571, when some 200 Ottoman ships were sunk or captured.280

The Holy League – *Lega Santa* in Italian, *Sacrum Foedus* in Latin 281 – did not originate in a vacuum. The alliance was the latest incarnation of a long succession of Christian alliances directed against the Turks, in which the popes had played an important role, dating back to at least 1344, when Pope Urban V had organized a Genoese-Venetian fleet against the Turkish principalities of Menteşe and Aydn.282 It is reasonable to view the League as the continuation – despite a recent and vigorous denial of this idea – of that older tradition of Christian anti-Saracen alliances repeatedly in evidence during the Crusades.283 Although in those earlier leagues Spain

280 For this battle, see Niccolò Capponi, *Victory of the West* (New York: Da Capo, 2006), 253-286.

281 A widely-circulated pamphlet on the Holy League, written long after the Cyprus War by Uberto Foglietta, was entitled *De Sacro Foedere contra Selimum Imperatorem* (Genoa: Girolamo Bartoli, 1587).


283 The idea of continuity between medieval Crusades and later anti-Turkish Christian alliances has been disputed by Géraud Poumarède, in *Pour en finir avec la Croisade* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), 307-380, because he discerns significant changes from Crusader-era rhetoric in the language of anti-Turkish coalitions, that suggest a new goal, one different from that of the earlier Crusades, which were aimed at the liberation of Jerusalem and the Holy Land. Now the idealized goal, generally mentioned only by impractical churchmen but still important as an ideal, was to recapture Constantinople for Christendom. Comparison of the writings of the medieval crusading popes, such as Urban II and Innocent III, with those of sixteenth-century popes, however, appears, I argue, to undercut the stark contrasts that Poumarède attempts to present. Already during the medieval Crusades proper, motives were often mixed, and economic considerations were certainly not absent from the minds of those who were also desirous of reconquering Jerusalem and exacting retribution for the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre by the Caliph al-Hākim, and for the seizure of the Holy Land by Muslim Arabs from the
had never been the leading Christian power to take part, though individual Spanish knights had
joined the Christian forces, by the sixteenth century the popes were well aware that Charles V
and his son Philip II were then the Christian monarchs best able to advance anti-Turkish aims in
the Mediterranean, and they naturally sought to harness this worldly might to the advantage of
Christendom. Cyprus was widely seen as being vulnerable to Ottoman conquest. In 1365 King
Peter I had launched a naval expedition against the Mamluks and succeeded in burning
Alexandria, but the balance of power shifted, and in 1426 the Mamluks besieged and overran
Cyprus, and thereafter exacted tribute from the Lusignan monarchs, and after 1489, from Venice.
Pope Martin V expressed sorrow at this news at the time, and the papacy, in the person of Pius
V, appears to have been determined in 1571 not to allow the debacle a second time.

But, from the Spanish point of view, why join the Holy League at all? Cyprus lies at the
furthest end of the Mediterranean from Spain, and Spain’s intelligence was certainly reliable
enough to indicate the precariousness of any Christian outpost so close to Ottoman territories on
the north, east, and south. The answer does not differ materially from that for the other parties to
the League, principally Venice and the Papacy: a sense of solidarity with fellow Christians. Like
the Greeks from the other side of the Orthodox-Catholic divide, after 1453, the Spanish, too,
were coming to recognize the common ground with Orthodox Christians of both a shared

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Byzantines in the seventh century. Infighting among Christian powers, mercenary motives, and the resulting
cynicism were not unique to the Holy Leagues formed after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, though the greater
volume of documentation makes these arguably easier to discern in the later period than during the medieval
Crusades. Nor were the Turks thought of by Western Europeans very differently from the medieval “Saracens.”
Poumarède fails to prove his case that there is no coherent intellectual tradition linking medieval Crusades with
anti-Turkish Holy Leagues of the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries.

284 Hill, History of Cyprus, III, 476.

285 From that date, Cyprus had been in something like a vassal status to the Mamluks. Suzerainty and the claim to
exact this tribute were inherited in 1517 by the Ottomans when they took Cairo, and the Venetians who ruled
Cyprus by that date were quick to pay the tribute now to Constantinople.
Christianity, and a shared desire to resist the advance of Islam in eastern Europe. Similarly, this motive served as common ground between Western Europeans and Russia and Poland, as well, until at least the eighteenth century. The ruling classes in Spain were deeply troubled at the news of the Ottoman attack on Cyprus, an island bastion, under Venetian rule, of Latin Christendom in the East.\(^{286}\) As I have mentioned, Pope Pius V had promoted the Holy League, even before the Ottoman attack on Cyprus, as a counterweight to what was already understood to be the Ottoman willingness, under Suleyman the Magnificent and his son Selim II, to deploy its military might ever further afield. Not only Cyprus, but also Crete was understood to be in imminent danger. The military alliance did not take shape until June 1570, after the Ottoman attack on Cyprus had been launched. This was a time when the fate of the Venetian administrative capital Nicosia had already been sealed, but fighting on the island was still going on.

The League consisted of small as well as large powers in southern Europe.\(^{287}\) In addition to Spain, Venice, and the Papacy, much more modest contributions in ships, money and men were made by the Duchy of Savoy, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Knights of Malta.\(^{288}\)

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\(^{286}\) The fascination that medieval Cyprus held for scholars – particularly French – in the nineteenth century, including Emmanuel Rey, Louis de Mas Latrie, and Camille Enlart, was intimately linked to the chivalric character of its court. Furthermore, it is not surprising that these French historians appeared to regard Lusignan Cyprus as a part of French history, given that the Lusignan were a French family and, with the central importance of France to the Crusades well understood, the role played by Cyprus in a succession of Crusades, as well as in other campaigns against Muslims in the Levant, could be viewed as yet another contribution of the French.

\(^{287}\) The articles founding the League, versions of which exist in Latin, Italian and Spanish, have been reproduced in Marko Jačov, *Europa tra Conquiste Ottomane e Leghe Sante* (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2003), 198 ff. See Appendix.

\(^{288}\) During the famous siege of Malta in 1565, the successful relief of which Catholic Europe viewed as a miracle, the Moriscos had plotted with the Ottomans to seize the coast of Granada, in Spain, in part to prevent Christian relief from getting through to Malta. The story is told in Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux, *Dépeches de M. De Fourquevaux* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1896), Vol. 1, 7-9. The report exists in a letter of November 5, 1565, addressed to Charles IX of France. The Moriscos expected Ottoman help, in return, for a rebellion against Philip II of Spain. The account is related by Giacomo Bosio, the principal sixteenth-century historian of the Order of St. John, in *Dell’ Istoria della Sacra Religione et Ill. ma Militia di San Giovanni*, quoted in Thomas Heller and Stefan Herget, “The Morisco and Hispano-Arabic culture and Malta,” *Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos, Sección*
while other Catholic powers such as France and Ragusa maintained neutrality, in order not to upset their ententes with the Turks. The Spanish also insisted on provisions in the agreement of June 1571 founding the League (Articles I, and X to XII) that provided for the defense of its Christian outposts in North Africa.

Given Spain’s far greater interest in the Western than in the Eastern Mediterranean, the modern reader may appreciate my earlier question: why did she join a Holy League which was bound above all to attempt the defense of distant and tottering Cyprus? It is worth recalling that the relations of Spain, its constituent kingdoms, and individual Spaniards as merchants and mercenaries with the Eastern Mediterranean already had a long history by the sixteenth century. These involvements are equally worthy of consideration as factors prompting Spain’s participation in the Holy League, as the concern for the defense of the Catholic faith that the spirit of the Council of Trent encouraged. As is well known, there were extensive Venetian-Byzantine political and trade links in the Middle Ages, indeed Venice began the Middle Ages as a Byzantine vassal, part of the so-called Exarchate of Ravenna. But there were also links, though more intermittent, between the Spanish (or Iberians more generally) and the Byzantines. A great

Árabe-Islam 48 (1999), 114. Bosio notes (114), writing of events in 1565, “it had been verified, that the Moriscos of the Kingdom of Granada, having resolved to rise up, and rebel against the Faithful, and that to such an end, they had sent secretly to Selim, the Great Turk, asking, that he send his navy West, offering that with his strength and favor, to make him in a short time master of that kingdom, and the other provinces of Spain.” [...]era stato certificato, che i Moreschi del Regno di Granata, erano risoluti di sollevarsi, e di ribellarsi contra di fei; e che per tal effetto havevano mandato secretamente a chiedere aiuto a Selim, Gran-Turco; pregandolo, che mandar dovesse l’armata sua in Ponente; offerendosi co’l braccio, e co’l favor di quella, di farlo in breve Padrone di quel Regno, e d’altre Provincie della Spagna."

289 France had just renewed generous trade capitulations -- as they are traditionally known -- with Selim II in 1569; Ragusa, modern Dubrovnik, was surrounded on three sides by Ottoman territory and despite the Catholic character of its society the Ragusans could ill-afford to irritate the Sultans.

290 The text of these “Capites” or "Chapters" – as they are referred to in the Latin version preserved in at least thirteen copies in the Vatican – concerning the defense of North Africa can be found in Appendix I. See also Niccolò Capponi, Victory of the West (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006), 170.
many knights belonging to the chivalric orders which flourished in Latin-ruled Cyprus, the Templars and Hospitallers, who installed themselves in Cyprus after Richard I of England captured the island during the Third Crusade from 1187 to 1191, were of Spanish origin. One group of Iberian knights left a significant mark on late Byzantine society, less on Cyprus than on Constantinople: this was the so-called Great Company or Catalan Company of Knights, a mercenary company, one member of which, Ramon Muntaner (1265-1336?) has left a valuable Crónica of the Company’s activities. There were other kinds of links as well. Like other Latin Europeans, educated Spaniards acquired some knowledge of Greek literature. One might be a warrior, a knight, and also a cultivated man interested in the Greeks of classical antiquity. Juan Antonio de Heredia, for example, who was both a Hospitaller and, eventually, Master of the Knights of St. John on Rhodes, commissioned the first translation from ancient Greek of Plutarch’s Lives, and other Greek works, into a Western language, Aragonese, thereby spreading knowledge of these works in Latin Europe. Heredia was not exceptional. Those of an intellectual bent participated in the melding of chivalric traditions among medieval Greek and Latins taking place on Lusignan-ruled Cyprus, which in 1300 was one of the most artistically

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291 The physical evidence of these knights survives both on Cyprus and in the Levant: see David Nicolle, Crusader Castles in Cyprus, Greece, and the Aegean, 1191-1571 (Oxford and New York: Osprey, 2007).

292 The Crónica is the work of a knight who accompanied the Great Company to Constantinople in 1303 to serve the Emperor, Andronicus II Paleologus, in his campaign against the Bulgarians. See Ramon Muntaner, The Catalan Expedition to the East, trans. Robert Hughes, introduction by J. N. Hillgarth (Woodbridge: Tamesis and Barcelona: Barcino, 2006). In this account, Muntaner mentions that the Lord of Mallorca in his day, Jaime, had married Clarenza, the niece of the king of Cyprus, one of the many marriages the Cypriot royal family contracted with Western European royal households. This is a reminder that Cyprus in the Lusignan period was closely connected with Western Europe – more closely than in the Venetian period, and certainly more closely than after 1571.


294 On medieval Cyprus, under the influence of French and other Latin literary traditions, a literature in Greek flourished on the doings of knights and ladies that can reasonably be called “chivalric.” The chivalric spirit is evident in many places in the Chronicle of Makhairas. See also Themis Siapkaras-Pitsillides, Le pétrarquisme en
productive and richest areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. A great deal of the cultural cross-pollination in music, painting, and poetry that scholars have noted on Lusignan Cyprus among educated Greek and Latin residents started from shared interests in ancient and medieval Greek manuscripts, and the editing of, and commentaries on, those manuscripts, and both Greeks and westerners often shared an interest in the peculiarities of the Greek language. Curiously, one geographic area where one might have expected more of such shared scholarly activity, the viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily that Spain established after 1500, with their large Greek-speaking populations, did not produce much scholarly interest in Greek, though research on the subject is in its infancy. What most historians have so far dwelt upon has been the hotbed of plans for anti-Ottoman rebellion that these viceroyalties became by the late sixteenth century.

In addition to its military might on land and sea, one reason Spain remained, for the Greek Orthodox, worthy of their continued attention and the object of appeals, is that the Catholic Kings filled a symbolic role politically. This was perhaps especially so after the

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295 The interest that both Martin Crusius and his Greek interlocutors showed in the Greek language is discussed by Gerhard Pfeiffer, Studien zur Frühphase des europäischen Philhellenismus (Ph.D. thesis, Erlangen, 1968), 112-126. Even a casual glance at Crusius’ magnum opus, the Turcograecia (Modena: Memor, 1972 [1584]), which proclaims on its title page its aim to give an account of Greek life in all its aspects under Turkish rule, reveals the great extent to which, for Crusius, the Greek language and its literature were bound up with the identity of the Greek people. On the Greek-Latin cultural synthesis on Cyprus in the Middle Ages, see Jaroslav Folda, “Crusader Art in the Kingdom of Cyprus, 1275-1291. Reflections on the State of the Question,” in Nicholas Coureas and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds. Cyprus and the Crusades (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 209-37. A vast literature exists on Leontios Machairas (c. 1380-1432), a chronicler who wrote the Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus, and scholars have drawn attention to how the diction in the Recital indicates the sense of Cypriotness, not ethnically specific, that Machairas revealed. See Chares Demetriou, “Big Structures, Social Boundaries, and Identity in Cyprus, 1400-1700,” American Behavioral Scientist 51 (2008), 1477-97. For poetry, there is a famous study of a sixteenth-century manuscript of earlier Petrarchan sonnets in Greek, Siapkaras-Pitsillides, Le pétrarquisme en Chypre.

Ottoman conquest, once Venice had receded into the background of their consciousness. In the Cypriot imagination, the monarchs of Spain were akin to a medieval figure of hope and mystery, Prester John, an imagined Christian king of a powerful but fictional Christian kingdom. But they were in the West, on the Mediterranean, rather than located on the other side of the Islamic lands, in the distant East. 297 The Spanish kings served as the repositories of the hopes of many who longed for the protection of a powerful, if distant Christian prince to deliver them from the Ottoman yoke. Before 1453, they had been able to look to the Byzantine Emperors to perform this function, even though they were then under French – i.e. Latin Christian -- rule. One could argue that they also looked to their own Latin kings of Cyprus to fill a similar role, especially those who demonstrated both competence and a willingness to seek external Christian allies. One of these was King Peter I of Cyprus (r. 1358-69), who travelled to Western Europe in 1362 to organize a crusade to free the Holy Land, and later, as mentioned, in 1365, besieged Mamluk-ruled Alexandria. 298

With the benefit of hindsight, Spain thus appears to have been rather a symbol than a well-known quantity to the Greek-speaking Orthodox, albeit a symbol of significance because of what the Spanish king represented – that is, a powerful Christian state, with an empire and the riches of that empire behind it. And this heartened the Greeks and other Balkan peoples, although what the Spanish kings actually did for the Greeks and for the Greek Cypriots in particular was not impressive. Nonetheless, since the Greeks breathed a Mediterranean-wide

297 Prester John, the mythical ruler of a powerful Christian kingdom of uncertain location – sometimes imagined as located in India, and later placed in Abyssinia – offered solace to medieval and early modern Europeans who felt threatened by successive Muslim powers in the Near East, and that story held out, in the imaginations of many in Western Christendom, the hope that Prester John might ally himself with them to attack the Infidel from two sides. A classic account is Friedrich Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1879).

298 Norman Housley, “Cyprus and the Crusades, 1291-1571,” in Nicholas Coureas and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds., Cyprus and the Crusades (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 196.
atmosphere in which political symbols were important and monarchy widely respected, and considering that Spain was the object of interest not just for the Greeks, but for several other parties hoping to weaken the Ottomans, I have devoted this chapter to that kingdom’s role.

But in the period after 1492, I argue that the level of contacts between Greeks and Spaniards was much diminished from what it had been. There were two reasons for this. The most obvious one was that the discoveries by Columbus, and the subsequent explorations, and then the conquest of much of the New World, deflected Spanish attention from the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic, consumed Spanish energies, and even channelled the aggressive impulse that had been aroused by, and exploited during, the Reconquista that had ended with the fall of Granada in that same year, 1492. But there was a second reason unconnected to the discovery of the riches of Peru and Mexico. With the conquest of Granada, the last Muslim kingdom left in Spain, and the expulsion of the Jews, Spanish Christian society became more preoccupied than before with drawing boundaries of race and religion, worried as it was about “secret” Jews and “secret” Muslims – Marraños and Moriscos.299 After centuries of warfare to drive out Muslims, the Spanish were at the apogee of their self-consciousness about a specifically Spanish Christian culture. Worried about Jewish, Muslim, and, after 1517, Protestant threats to that culture, the Spanish were less sympathetic than were people in the Italian peninsula to contemporary Greeks, who were Orthodox and differed in language, dress, and theology from Spanish Christians. Yet this palpable want of sympathetic interest in Greeks who were their contemporaries could exist side-by-side with a continuing literary interest in Greeks of

299 I am following the arguments presented by Benzion Netanyahu in The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain (New York: Random House, 1995), such as at 272, where he repeats an argument found in his other works, that is, that discrimination among Christians on racial grounds was new in the middle of the fifteenth century, and “diametrically opposed to the traditional views and practices of the Church,” and intensified after 1492.
classical antiquity. The phenomenon of cultural philhellenism, including an interest in the contemporary plight of Greeks as well as in their classical ancestors, which one can discern in Venice, in Rome, and in the circle of Crusius at Tübingen, and slightly later (in the 1670s) in the writing of the Englishman Paul Rycaut, does not appear to have had a Spanish counterpart. In the wake of the German and English Reformations, such Spanish jurists as the Jesuit Francisco Suarez were far more concerned with defending the Papacy against Protestant claims, which made them less open to participation in the sort of sustained theological dialogue with the Orthodox that a number of Lutheran theologians, such as Martin Crusius and Stephan Gerlach, engaged in. Furthermore, the New World, to judge from the number of ponderous sixteenth and early seventeenth-century works on the Spanish possessions there, was a much more immediate object of interest – even of scholarly and artistic interest -- to Iberians than was the Orthodox world. Scholarly works published in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Spain on contemporary Greece, or the state of the Orthodox, are few. Orthodox Christianity was in

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301 For example, in Suarez’ 1613 work Defensio catholicae fidei contra anglicanae sectae errores. An important recent article on Lutheran-Orthodox relations is Matei Cazacu, “Le Patriarcat de Constantinopole dans la Vision de Stephan Gerlach (1573-1578),” Dossiers Byzantins 7 (2007), 369-386. Martin Crusius’ work Turcograecia (first published Basel, 1584) is a treasury of insights into the Lutheran-Orthodox relationship in the late sixteenth century. As for the relations between Spanish Catholics and Greek Orthodox, José M. Floristan Imizcoz, “Fraudes, Prejuicios e Incomprensiones en las relaciones Hispano-Griegas del Renacimiento,” Erytheia 18 (1997), 95-110. Even if – as it appears –people in early modern Europe did not draw the Catholic-Orthodox boundary consistently, many westerners still could regard Greek-speakers unjustly as heretics, even if many of those Greek-speakers were either indifferent to, or even well-disposed towards, the Latin church. The research of Imizcoz offers the example of Cardinal Granvelle, on of the principal agents, together with the Pope, in bringing about agreement between Spain, the Papacy and Venice to terms for a Holy League. In 1583-4, while president of the Council for Italian Affairs of Spain, Granvelle, though happy to entertain the Orthodox Greek humanist Manuel Glyzounios at the Escorial, refused to implement Glyzounios’ suggestion that a higher number of Orthodox priests be allowed to pass through southern, Spanish-ruled Italy (Imizcoz, op. cit., 97). And when the Moriscos began to be expelled from Spain in 1609, and the Spanish ambassador in Rome floated a proposal to replace them with resettled Greeks, the document Archivio General des Simancas -- Estado 1862 EF describes how the Spanish Council of State (Consejo de Estado) unanimously rejected this proposal in favor of resettling Bavarians, Lombards and Mallorcans, instead, good Catholics all, accompanying their rejection of the idea with anti-Hellenic expressions, such as that Greeks were not good farmers, and were a people in decline. Op. cit., 97-98.
many ways a more exotic animal to the Spanish Christian than was Islam.\textsuperscript{302} For, both before and even after the fall of Granada in 1492, there remained many thousands of Muslims and crypto-Muslims, in southern Iberia. Familiarity between Moriscos and so-called Old Christians, in this case, bred contempt and fear. Some of these Moriscos retained Muslim worship in secret, and even dared to communicate with the Ottoman sultans asking for liberation, and through the fear generated by such actions and through their cultural distinctiveness, brought upon themselves great suspicion from the Christian authorities.\textsuperscript{303} Why then, with domestic problems aplenty, and commitments in the New World and the Netherlands, did the Spanish monarchy join the Holy League?

Goals and Machinations of Pius V and Gregory XIII

\textsuperscript{302} Works dealing with aspects of the Orthodox-Catholic relationship include Demetrios J. Constantelos, \textit{Byzantine East and Latin West} (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), and Philip Sherrard, \textit{The Greek East and the Latin West: A Study in the Christian Tradition} (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), and the papers in Paschalis Kitromilides, \textit{An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe} (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007). There are few studies in languages other than Greek on Western perceptions of the Orthodox Church in the premodern period. One aspect of Orthodoxy that, to judge from the writings of western observers of Greeks, fascinated Western Europeans was the clerical dress, inherited in part from Byzantium, and it seems, at least in part, ultimately, from ancient Rome. See on this subject the study by Archimandrite Chrysostomos, \textit{Orthodox Liturgical Dress: An Historical Treatment} (Brookline, Mass. Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1981). As Chrysostomos notes, the Roman history by the Byzantine, Nicephorus Gregoras (generally printed in Europe in the sixteenth century with the title \textit{Romanae, hoc est Byzantinae, Historiae Libri XI}) contained pictures of the Byzantine emperors, and this history was often reprinted, with pictures, from 1562 on. Another popular sixteenth-century work that included pictures of distinctively Greek dress was Nicolas de Nicolay, \textit{Les navigations, pérégrinations et voyages, faites en Turquie}...(Antwerp: G. Silvius, 1576). To the extent that Western Europeans were inclined to see the Greek Orthodox as exotic and unusual, their different dress contributed to this perception. As Sally McKee has found, the wearing of beards was considered a distinctive feature of Greek, as opposed to Latin men on Venetian-ruled Cyprus for its entire existence, from 1211 to 1669. McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion}, 102, 126.

I have argued that both Pius V (r. 1566-72) and Gregory XIII (r. 1572-85) actively sought to revive some of the momentum towards union with Rome among the Orthodox that had been lost after the Council of Ferrara-Florence of 1438-46. And, in Philip II, successive popes knew that they enjoyed a powerful temporal ally as determined as they were to stamp out deviance from right Catholic teaching. Using as a springboard its viceroyalties in southern Italy, Spain in the late sixteenth century was deepening her involvement in the Balkans and western Greece, with a corresponding increase in the gathering of information and cultivation of spies in those areas. This history, and his reputation for Christian and, particularly, anti-Turkish zeal, help to explain why Philip II was willing to join the Holy League in the first place. For the League required a tremendous commitment of Spanish money, as Felipe Ruiz Martín has demonstrated, amounting to 7,141, 752 escudos for the years 1571-73, for their navies and armies combined. The researches of Preto, Tovar Llorente, Gil, Hassiotis, and Bartl have brought to light the names of several of the Greeks who worked for the Spanish administration, as well as some of the the many Spaniards who gave aid and comfort to Greek (as well as to other Balkan) insurrections against Ottoman rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.


306 Op. cit., 331. For comparison, a laborer’s daily wage around 1600 in Castile, the heartland of the kingdom of Spain, was 68 to 136 maravedís. See Akira Motomura, “The Best and Worst of Currencies: Seigniorage and Currency Policy in Spain, 1597-1650,” Journal of Economic History 54 (1994) 106. To convey an idea of the sums involved, at the exchange rate obtaining between 1566 and 160, which was 400 maravedís to the escudo, the Spanish disbursed an average of 25,575 daily laborers’ wages each day towards the Holy League’s war effort for the three years 1571 to 1573. Note too that the Spanish maintained a Mediterranean fleet on a war footing for two additional years – until 1575 – even after the Venetians made peace with the Ottomans in March 1573. See A.W. Lovett, “The Castilian Bankruptcy of 1575,” Historical Journal 23 (1980), 900.

As suggested earlier, the Spanish apparently felt the need to at least make a show of power in the Balkans from time to time, if for no other reason than to remind the Venetians that their hegemony there would not go unchallenged, even from their fellow Christians. But these demonstrations were sporadic.

It is difficult to overstate the role Pius V played in drawing Spain into the Holy League, which was aimed primarily, as I have noted, at the defense of Cyprus. The papacy, like Venice, had experienced up-and-down relations with both kings, Charles V and Philip II, of Spain. But Pius V, who seems to have planned an anti-Turkish crusade three years before the invasion of Cyprus, that is, when he first came to the papacy in 1567, kept up a friendly campaign of persuasion with Spain that gained traction in the summer of 1570, after the danger to Christian rule on Cyprus had become obvious. At that point, Spanish cardinals – there were many in Rome – acted as go-betweens in the negotiations over the terms of the League. At least two of them, Miguel Alejandrino and Francisco Pacheco de Toledo, kept Philip II informed about papal goals and papal efforts to bring about the Holy League.

The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Juan de Zuñiga, and the papal nuncio to Spain, Castagna, bishop of Rossano, worked out an agreement in the early summer of 1570 that was

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308 Impelled by an imminent war in Hungary that offered a chance for Christian princes to put aside their differences and unite against the Turk. See Niccolò Capponi, *Victory of the West* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006), 107.

309 Many of Alejandrino’s and Pacheco de Toledo’s letters from the years 1566-1572 are reproduced in Luciano Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede* (Madrid: Escuela Española en Roma, 1914): vol. I, 22, 29, 142, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221, 433 etc.
considered to draw fairly upon the resources of all participating parties. In the end, Spain agreed to contribute more ships and soldiers than any other power to the League. The arguments that Spain would prove her valor as the doughtiest champion of Christendom had proved compelling to King Philip II (r. 1556-98). Pius even suggested that the conquest of Cyprus could lead to the Christian conquest of Jerusalem soon after. But not everything went smoothly: while the League enjoyed some successes in the early stages of the war, particularly along the land front in Albania and Dalmatia, the naval operations of the League were marred by squabbles between the Venetian and Spanish contingents. The most striking evidence of the absence of real trust and confidence between the two allies was the signing by Venice, without having obtained the explicit consent of Spain, of a unilateral peace with the Turks in 1573, which aborted the planned campaign. Even after the huge expenditures of blood and treasure at Lepanto, Spain agreed to supply a larger number of soldiers (34,200) and galleys (130) for the intended campaign of 1573 -- than any other participant in the League. Given the distance between the easternmost outposts of Spain’s empire in 1570 and the Regnum Cyprium, and the apparent disinterest in the Greek Orthodox world, it is far from obvious today, even to those immersed in sixteenth-century political and diplomatic history, what interests lay in Cyprus for Spain that would outweigh the potential costs of conflict with the Ottomans over that island. But if we

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310 The “capitulaciones” of the Holy League – the terms spelling out the military contribution of Venice, Spain, and the Papacy, as well as the principal land and sea commanders – are printed in Luciano Serrano, La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570-1573); Ensayo historico a Base de Documentos Diplomaticos (Madrid: Impr. de archivos, 1918-19), 407-414.

311 Pius argued that “retenta Cypro, ad illas Terrae Sanctae ditiones recuperandas faciles patebunt aditus,” [with Cyprus having been held onto, easy approaches will lie open for those parts of the Holy Land that must be recovered] in Laderchi, Annales Ecclesiastici anno 1570, n. 90, cited in Hubert Jedin, “Pius V und die Kreuzzugsgedanke,” n. 19, in Gino Benzioni, ed. Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del Cinquecento alla luce di Lepanto (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1974), 201.

312 These figures in Serrano, La Liga, 408.
consider the fleeting nature of the Spanish conquest of Tunis which Don Juan of Austria, the senior Christian fleet admiral at Lepanto, carried out in 1572, only to see Tunis reconquered the very next year by the Ottomans,\textsuperscript{313} it appears evident that the religious impulses of Philip II sometimes outweighed his grasp of logistics or of economic consequences. Still, there is at least some evidence that over twenty years after Lepanto, some Venetian statesmen took seriously the possibility that Spain could conquer Scutari, along the Albanian coast, and hold it against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{314}

The Spanish kings, it should be noted, did not merely proclaim these religious intentions or ideals from their thrones. They showed themselves willing to risk their own lives and those of their immediate family. Charles V sailed with his fleet against Tunis in 1535, for example, and put himself at great personal risk.\textsuperscript{315} Philip II was desk-bound, yet was content that his half-brother, Don Juan of Austria, should command the fleet of the Holy League, and just as he had been present at the siege of Galera in 1570, capturing the main stronghold of the Morisco rebels, so at Lepanto, in 1571, Don Juan was in the thick of the fighting. The efforts to which the Spanish were willing to go to raise money for the effort testify to the success of papal efforts, but also to the depth of Philip II’s anti-Turkish fervor at a time when he was beset by other

\textsuperscript{313} And one could consider as well the disastrous results of the campaign against Algiers in 1541, the failure of the Spanish Armada in 1588, which had in part been intended to remove a heretic queen from the throne of England, and also the interminable drain on treasure and soldiers that resulted from the decades-long attempt to suppress the Dutch Revolt, between 1566 and 1609.

\textsuperscript{314} Vladimir Lamansky, \textit{Secrets d’État de Venise}, 495, citing Nicoló Donato, letter from the Archivio proprio Donà, the family archive of the Donà family, in Venice, MS. “Constantinopoli,” \textit{busto} 12, 447-450. In the fall of 1595 a large-scale Albanian uprising was very much in the air, as is evident from the correspondence reprinted in \textit{Ibid.}, 493-515.

\textsuperscript{315} Similarly, Don Sebastian of Portugal put himself in the thick of the fighting in Morocco at the so-called Battle of Three Kings, in 1578. He had hoped to fight the Moors in person. As is well known, Don Sebastian allied himself with a Muslim force under the former sultan of Morocco, Mulay Muhammad. Nonetheless, contemporary sources make clear that he saw this campaign as a sort of crusade. See J.M. de Queiroz Velloso, \textit{D. Sebastião, 1554-1578} (Lisbon: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, 1935). Also, Braudel, \textit{The Mediterranean}, vol. 2, 843.
problems, including both large expenditures and a political quagmire in the Netherlands, as he attempted to suppress a revolt.\textsuperscript{316}

**Uncertain Allies: Spain and Venice in the Holy League**

Another key aspect of Spain’s membership in the Holy League was the Monarchy’s relationship with Venice. Spain held the Duchy of Milan to the west of Venice, and viceroyalties in Naples and Sicily, to the south. She also enjoyed great influence with the Medici dukes of Tuscany, in west-central Italy. The Habsburg dynasty that ruled Spain was preoccupied with the glory of its own house, and allied with the powerful Habsburgs of the Holy Roman Empire, whose territories abutted those of Venice to the north. The Venetian archives, considered side-by-side with the evidence of contemporary histories, show conclusively that during the period of the Holy League and the decades following its collapse, Venetian statesmen were deeply suspicious of Spanish intentions, fearing that Spain aimed both at hegemony in Europe, including over Venice, and at using the Holy League for Spain’s own geopolitical purposes. And prominent among those purposes was the effort to strengthen their position in North Africa, an area remote from Venice’s interests.\textsuperscript{317} Some fears seem to have been vague and indistinct, the worries naturally felt by one power for another, distant, mighty, and less-than-familiar foreign power were hardly unknown or infrequent in the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{318} When, for example, the Spanish

\textsuperscript{316}The large loans that the Holy League commander had to raise in Sicily in 1572 from Genoese bankers to sustain the war effort, for example, suggest the perseverance of the Spanish commitment even after the loss of Cyprus: Felipe Ruiz Martín, “Las Finanzas de la Monarquía Hispanica y la Liga Santa,” in Gino Benzoni, ed. *Il Mediterraneo alla seconda metà del ’500 alla luce di Lepanto* (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1974), 361-63.

\textsuperscript{317}For example, the descriptions of Spanish-Venetian conferences in Luciano Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, 348. Document XX, pp. 192-3 circa. *Asim Estado* 918 f. 260. See also Niccolò Capponi, Chapter 6, “A League of Mistrust,” in *Victory of the West*, 153-78.

\textsuperscript{318}I can only agree with Hans-Joachim Kissling that the sheer volume of writings in German against “the Turk” in the sixteenth century warrants the special designation “Turkenfurcht,” *fear of the Turk*. See Hans-Joachim Kissling,
offered to detail 1,500 soldiers from Spain and 2,500 from Spanish Italy to the Venetian fleet, this was apparently intended primarily to bring the Venetian ship crews and soldier complements, at the time undermanned, up to full strength. But some Venetians interpreted this in less innocent a fashion, as an attempt to commandeer or at least to put pressure on the Venetian ships for Spain to divert their use to fighting in North Africa, far from the principal Venetian goal, which remained, unswervingly, the defense and retention of its rich colony, Cyprus.  

The Venetian ambassador in Madrid during the Cyprus War, Leonardo Donado or Donà, was aware that Philip II feared that France, a longstanding enemy of Spain, would take advantage of the commitment Spain had made to the Holy League to start a war along the border with Flanders, or even to invade Piedmont or Spain herself. As a result of such fears, Philip


Don Juan of Austria, commander of the Holy League, wrote from Messina to the Spanish ambassador to Rome, Juan de Zuñiga, in June 1572, that he had met with the Proveditore or commander of the Venetian fleet, so that Don Juan could offer another 4,5000 troops and the contingents from Malta, Savoy and Genoa as well, to the Venetian contingent of the League fleet (“Propuse a los dichos Marco Antonio y Proveedor que S.M. les ayudaria con quatro o cinco mill infantes italianos y les dexaria las galeras de la Religion de Sant Juan, las de Saboya y Genova.) From his description of their reaction, it appears the Venetians saw this offer as a sop to sweeten the bitter news that Don Juan planned for the League to turn its attention to North Africa rather than the Levant: “Oydas las exclamaciones del dicho provedor y que assi el como algunos sus ministros se han dexado intender, que no podia la liga permanecer sin romperse, faltandose a lo capitulado...Dixeles ...como tenia orden de S. M. de entratenerme en estos mares hasta ver en que paravan los franceses e yrne entretanto la buelta de Tunez y Bizerta por si por ally se podia hacer alguna cosa...” [I heard the exclamations of the said proveditore, and that both he and several of his ministers had allowed themselves to understand, that the League could not continue without being broken, if the agreement were to fail...I told them... how I held an order from His Majesty to stay in these waters until I see what the French are preparing, and to go meanwhile to return to Tunis and Bizerte to see if anything can be done there...” (Serrano, La Liga de Lepanto, Tomo I, 351, quoting ASim Estado 918, f. 332-333.) There follows a reference to the Reino de (blank) with the last word left out, likely a reference to Algiers. Algiers was coveted by both the Spanish and French Crowns at this time – Philip II’s father Charles V had sailed a fleet against the town in an unsuccessful attempt at a siege in 1541, and Charles IX of France coveted the portas for a guarantee of the security of southern France – and, in part to cleanse the Mediterranean of a nest of piracy, and the Spanish continued to fight the Ottomans for Tunis even after Lepanto. In short, Venetian suspicions that Spain in 1572 and 1573 wished to divert the Holy League’s activity from Cyprus were justified, and in late 1573 after Venice had dropped out of the League, as mentioned, Don Juan successfully led a storming and seizure of Tunis, which, however, the Ottomans retook the following year.
balked at again sending a fleet to the Levant in the summer of 1572 – at a time when a strong blow could have been struck against the Turks, still recovering from Lepanto.320 But he was ultimately persuaded, and Spain eventually supplied a large fleet in addition to smaller contingents from their allies Savoy and Tuscany. The campaign of 1572 was marked by the disgrace of two of the highest Venetian commanders. First came that of the Genoese, Gian Andrea Doria, then in Venetian employ, who left the League’s fleet rather than face the likelihood of dismissal, because he had been branded – unfairly – a coward for his actions at Lepanto.321 Then there was the demotion of the Venetian patrician admiral Sebastiano Venier, a future doge. Venier was forced to accept as a punishment a joint captain-general appointed with him, after he had executed, for brawling with and killing some Venetian crewmen, four of the Italian soldiers in Spanish pay, who had been moved onto Venetian galleys.322 Finally, the League lost one of its key supporters and motivators when on May 1, 1572, Pius V died.323 His successor Gregory XIII was not unsympathetic to the aims of the League, but lacked the energy of Pius V.

Perhaps the Venetian Republic could see no way to prevent the League from becoming embroiled in North African campaigns in which the Venetian Senate felt it had far less stake than it did along the Adriatic coast, and on Crete, and on Cyprus. Whatever the immediate spur, in

320 Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, Volume IV (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976-89), 1070-1073. Finally Philip and his representatives agreed that “che la guerra et imprese di quest’anno si faccino nelle parti di Levante” [that the war and enterprises of this year [the 1572 campaigning season] should be undertaken in the Levant regions], as opposed to North Africa or even Greece and Albania, where additional fighting with the Ottomans had taken place. This agreement was not a foregone conclusion, as Niccolò Capponi seems to think. (Victory of the West, 304)

321 Capponi, Victory of the West, 304-5.

322 Ibid., 244-45.

323 These events are nicely analyzed in ibid., 305-6.
March, 1573, Venice concluded a separate peace with the Ottomans, much to the fury of Pope Gregory XIII. The Spanish, by contrast, displayed considerable understanding for Venice’s move. Tensions between individual Venetian and Spanish commanders go far to explain why the Spanish and Venetians never quite trusted each other after 1573. But these tensions, and clashes, can best be understood as occurring against the backdrop of Venetian fear of Spanish encirclement, given Spain’s domination of Milan, Naples, and Sicily and the Spanish alliance with the Habsburgs of the Empire to the north of Venice.

**After the 1571 Conquest**

While few politically active Cypriots seem to have thought about Spain as a potential protector before the Ottoman conquest, they, like their fellow Greek-speakers elsewhere, began to appeal to Spain in significant numbers after that conquest was complete. Dozens of stories, the vast majority of them mentioning enslavement by the Turks, have survived in the Spanish archives, written by Cypriots to Spanish officials between 1571 and the 1630s. They call for one of two things, and sometimes both: (1) a financial stipend for the petitioner, who almost invariably describes himself as a loyal servant of the King – and (2) a post in Spanish service, in some cases accompanied by pleas for increased Spanish efforts to succor the Christians of Cyprus and/or overthrow Ottoman rule on the island. The writers range from two Orthodox Archbishops of Cyprus, Timotheos (r. 1572-87) and Christodoulos (r. 1606-40), to a trio of Greco-Latin nobles from famous families (Combi, De Nores, and Ballis), to men of humble station otherwise little known, such as Demetrios Zamberlanos. Non-Cypriots suggesting to the Spanish a liberation of the island included the Englishman, Anthony Sherley, better known for

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his and his brothers’ diplomatic dealings with Persia, and one “cavalier Pagliarino,” of whom little is known.325

It would be easy to dismiss these complaints and reconquest plans as attempts to extract money from a rich Monarchy. But I would suggest that there are too many of these appeals over too long a period (the century from 1571 to 1670), with too many different stories, and too many expressions of willingness to take great personal risk to plot for the overthrow of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, to dismiss all of them as either merely self-interest, or mere rhetoric. Such appeals, furthermore, were made not to the Kings of Spain alone, but to many different Latin princes, including the popes, the Grand Dukes of Tuscany, Duke Charles Gonzaga of Nevers, and successive Dukes of Savoy. On at least one occasion, the Cypriots even appealed to the head of the Latin church, Pope Paul V (r. 1605-1621). The very frequency of such pleas militates against their being dismissed as appeals to people whom the Orthodox secretly despised; the seeking by the Cypriots of aid from such a source is not explicable only as reflecting desperation.326 Some Cypriots genuinely welcomed Spaniards and other westerners as allies.327 Some Greek Orthodox may not have wanted to be ruled by the Latin cap, especially by the arch-Catholics of Spain – though at least some quite clearly offered the rulership of Cyprus to the Spanish king – but the

325 Hassiotis, Ισπανικα Εγγραφα, letter 14 (pp. 21-23) from Timotheos, letter 33 (pp. 55-56) from Christodoulos, letter 49 (pp. 81-82) from the Cypriot nobles; letters 68-69 (pp. 115-116) on Zamberlanos; letters 24-25 (pp. 39-43) from Sherley and the cavalier Pagliarino.


327 AGS –Estado 1434, nos. 47, 102, 117 etc. cited in Petros Stylianou, “The Evaluation of the Cyprus Revolution of 1606 from the Spanish Point of View,” Επετηρίς 1 (1979) 105 n. 21. These letters from the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, Juan Vives, on the failed Cypriot attempt to seize Famagusta in 1606, emphasize Vives’ impression that the Cypriots will willingly work alongside the Spanish for their freedom, and even be willing to accept Spanish rule on the island.
Orthodox could nonetheless welcome Spain’s military aid, and take advantage of the Monarchy’s vast resources. That was, in the circumstances, enough, and more than enough. For, in their eyes, the Ottomans were far worse, and the Ottomans were the immediate threat and concern.

It could be argued that, had the Christian powers wanted to mount a serious attempt at the reconquest of Cyprus, they could have succeeded if they had acted in the five or ten years immediately following the conquest, owing to the small number of Ottomans then on the island. But collaboration was unlikely between Venice and Spain in view of the lingering mistrust that followed the Cyprus War. One episode that produced bad blood between Venice and Spain, for instance, took place at Parga, in northwestern Greece, in the period following 1573. Pietro or Petros Lantzas, described in the sources as a Greek, who had served as the Venetian governor of Parga in 1573, was dismissed from office in 1574, and banished. The reason is not entirely clear, but an anonymous letter to the Venetian Provveditore (a sort of captain-general) of Zante and Cephalonia alleged that Lantzas was ostensibly buying munitions from the Spanish to allow the locals to defend themselves against the Turks, but in fact was selling these munitions to the Turks for his own profit. As a result, the letter goes on to ask for Lantzas to be assassinated for his “eagerness to cross the border and to commit the crime that he did.”

Elsewhere in Western

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330 “...ardir di rompere i confini e commetter le scellerità che ha fatto...” quoted in Lascaris, “Petros Lantzas,” 109. Lantzas later fled to Spanish Naples, and in 1606, we find him commanding Greek and Albanian troops bound to support an uprising against the Ottomans in Chimarra, in what is now Albania. See also Vladimir Lamansky, ed. Secrets d’État de Venise (St. Petersburg: Imperial Press, 1884), 461.
Greece and along the Albanian coast, wherever Spain and Venice contended for influence over local Christian populations, similar incidents were common among those eager to make quick money.\textsuperscript{331}

Thus, Venice and Spain had divergent interests before they formed the Holy League, and those interests did not suddenly converge after the formation of their alliance; geopolitical considerations may have rendered their rivalry and suspicion inevitable despite sharing a common enemy, the Ottoman Turks. Venice’s conflict with the Ottomans was above all in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean, while Spain contended with the Ottomans principally in the Western Mediterranean and the North African littoral. But independently of the policies of the Spanish central government, the Viceroyos of Naples and Sicily, who were closer than officials in Madrid to the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean, had the resources to fit out substantial privateering fleets. These fleets preyed extensively on Christian as well as Muslim shipping, and by doing so contributed to widening the fissures that had emerged between Spain and Venice during the Cyprus War. They approved of, and even encouraged, a large number of corsair raids of ships from Spanish Italy on Venetian merchant ships in the 1580s and 1590s, while, according to Alberto Tenenti, the historian of the role of piracy in the decline of Venice after 1580, Spain also supported raids on Venetian ships by Knights of Malta.\textsuperscript{332} The deepening


\textsuperscript{332} Alberto Tenenti, \textit{Piracy and the Decline of Venice} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 45, mentions four major Venetian ships captured in a flurry of Spanish piratical activity between 1585 and 1587. His chapter “Maltese, Florentines, and Spaniards,” 32-55 brings to light a total of twenty-two ships of Venice attacked and plundered by Spanish corsairs or "semi-official" pirates, as well as a number of other Venetian vessels captured by Maltese and Florentine corsairs. There were also some attacks, in turn, by Venetians on ships of other Christian nationalities. But in general, the Tenenti study is short on specific numbers, and does not answer the question of
distrust, and the turn of Spain’s main economic efforts ever more towards the Atlantic and away from the Mediterranean, were the result of a long-term divergence of interests between these two Christian powers, and they made it even less likely that Spain would aid Venice to recapture her former colony. These privateering raids were not officially approved, and sometimes ran counter to the will of the royal government in Spain, springing instead from the viceroys’ own initiative.

Furthermore, Spain was vastly more powerful in territory, wealth, and population than Venice, even taking into account all of the Venetian territories of the Stato da Mar. Perhaps Venice’s main importance to Spain, as Filippo de Vivo and others before him have suggested, was as a center for the gathering of information from the East. But, given that Spanish Milan was separated only by a border from Venice, and given, too, the perception that the Habsburgs to the north of Venice shared many interests with the Spanish, some apprehension of Spanish intentions on the part of Venice is understandable. This fear was always mixed with admiration for Spanish might and for the vast extent of her domains. Furthermore, successive Venetian ambassadors recognized that Spain could serve as a bulwark in Italy against French designs, something that Venice would no doubt regard – as would other Italian states – as desirable. Spain maintained garrisons of the Army of Flanders along the border with Italy, as Lorenzo Priuli, Venetian ambassador to the Spanish court, recognized in 1576, both as a ready

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333 Although there was a concerted attempt to gain Emperor Maximilian II’s adherence to the Holy League, his need to try to safeguard the Empire’s interests in northeastern Europe against Poland and in the northwest against Protestant separatism made him unable to contribute.

reserve to be able to quickly reinforce the Spanish troops trying further north to defeat the Dutch rebels, and so that she could, if necessary, immediately put an army into the field that would grant the capacity “with it to hold the French in check.”\cite{335}

I suggest that the hostility in the Venetian-Spanish relationship has sometimes been exaggerated, particularly in English-language historiography. William Bouwsma, for example, in his *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty* (1968), leaned heavily on a single quotation to show that the marquis of Bedmar, Spanish ambassador to Venice in the early seventeenth century, was convinced that Venice did everything she could to erode Spanish power. But Bedmar was not a representative figure. He was both paranoid, and the head of an embassy establishment in Venice well known to be swarming with Spanish spies.\cite{336}

The Venetian ambassadors to the Spanish court at Madrid, from the 1560s through the early 1600s, stressed, in the reports they submitted at the end of their appointments to the Venetian Senate, that the Spanish kings were constantly concerned with fortifying their territories in the Mediterranean against the Turks. The Spanish were understandably worried about the Ottoman advance, which had reached the western Mediterranean by the 1530s, just four decades after the conquest of Granada in 1492 had seemed to end the imminent Muslim

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threat to Iberia. The hundreds of thousands of Moriscos remaining in Spain, many continuing to use Arabic in private, despite such use having been officially forbidden, were widely thought to constitute an Ottoman “fifth column” in Christian Spain. From 1568 to 1570 the Moriscos had launched a costly revolt in Spain, often called the Revolt of the Alpujarras after a mountainous southeastern region where the rebels were concentrated, that brought this potential threat home. This initially successful uprising filled the Spanish with unease, and led them to scatter the Moriscos of Granada in the south through other regions, including Castile, which had had very few Moriscos, to dilute their numbers in any one area of Spain.

These geopolitical considerations meant that Spain, perhaps inevitably, would be more interested in using leagues with other Christian powers to fight the Ottomans in North Africa, rather than in the Levant. In their *relazioni*, those diplomatic summings-up of goings-on in the countries to which they had been posted that each composed and submitted as a duty before returning home, the Venetian ambassadors to Spain also pointed out the close connections (as they perceived the situation) that bound the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs in a commonality of interest. It is possible, even likely, that the Cypriots were aware that the parties to the League

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337 Leonardo Donato, *Relazione of 1573*, in Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato: vol. 6* (Florence: n.p., 1862), 404-407, which mentions many Spanish fears of outsiders, including that of the Moors. Donato describes how “Judaizers,” Huguenots and Moors could potentially ally with each other to threaten Christian Spain, and how, in the wake of the uprising of the Moriscos, they might all welcome “Mori e Turchi nella Spagna” [Moors and Turks into Spain].


340 In addition to their common interests in fighting the Ottomans, the Spanish Habsburgs also reached commercial agreements (as I shall discuss below) with major merchant families – the Fuggers and Welsers -- based in southern cities of the Holy Roman Empire, such as Augsburg and Nuremberg, to import a determined amount of grain from the Levant by way of Spain, thereby avoiding direct commercial relations with the Levant.
had these internal divisions. None of their many published appeals to Spain for aid after the Ottoman conquest mentioned the prospect of bringing Venice into their plans for the liberation of the island. And tellingly, the rival claims of Venice and the House of Savoy to Cyprus were understood sufficiently well by Cypriots in the first century of Ottoman rule, between 1571 and 1660, that they made no naive suggestions that the two powers might combine forces to reconquer Cyprus.³⁴¹

**Common Ground between the Scholars of Cyprus and of Spain**

The Greeks of Cyprus and elsewhere, it has long been understood, shared intellectual and philosophical interests with the Italians.³⁴² Even before 1453, Greek scholars had arrived in the Italian peninsula from Anatolia, seeking refuge from the Turkish advances, and they continued to do so after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Many of these refugees taught Greek in Italy – Marcus Musurus taught Erasmus in Padua³⁴³ – and many brought with them the manuscripts that helped Italians to re-discover Greek classical antiquity, in what historians of an earlier era referred to as the Revival of Learning. Some Cypriots after 1571, such as Alexandros Synglitico and John Sozomenos, librarians of the Library of St. Mark in Venice, continued to participate in

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³⁴¹ The conspiracy, for example, of Pedro de Aventaño, a native Cypriot who planned to seize Ottoman Famagusta in 1607, involved Spanish and Florentine, not Venetian, forces. See Alfonso Corral, *Unas Conspiraciones contra el Sultan Turc en tiempo de Felipe III* (Valladolid: Estudios de Historia Moderna, 1950), 404.

³⁴² Athanasius Rhetor (1571-1663), for example, shared with Pietro Pomponazzi and other Italian students of philosophy an interest in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and wrote a long tract on the subject: *Delitiae animae sive hortus ex iis quae lamblicho magno elaborata sunt consitus* (Paris: Buon, 1639).

a broader humanistic culture in Italy and – in the case of Athanasius Rhetor – in France. But Cypriots, after their conquest by the Ottomans, reached out to Spain not because of deep cultural links, but because Spain, on account of its wealth and military strength both by land and by sea, was being looked to above all for military aid.

In those days, the culture possessed by the learned, the intellectual questions that occupied the best minds, were informed by theology to a degree difficult to imagine today. Though I have suggested that the Renaissance permitted a greater detente in some areas between Latins and Greeks than during the Middle Ages, the Latin-Orthodox divide was still significant, in societies where religion played a much greater role than in much of the present-day West. Spain was such a society. Lacking either natural intellectual sympathy for the Orthodox church, especially in the quietist form that appears to have dominated theological developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, Spain was an unlikely destination for educated Cypriots to seek refuge, compared with the Italian cities Venice, Padua, and Rome. The differences between the intellectual traditions of Spanish Catholicism and those of the Greek Orthodox

344 Rhetor spent the period from 1620 to 1642, and again from 1653 until his death in 1663 in France. In the interim, while in Greek lands between 1642 and 1653, he collected Greek manuscripts germane to his research in Neoplatonic thought and desiderata of his patrons, Cardinal Mazarin and Chancellor Séguier of France. Many of these manuscripts are preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. See D.J. O’Meara, “The Philosophical Writings, Sources, and Thought of Athanasius Rhetor (ca. 1571-1663),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 121 (1977): 483-499.

345 Compared with Venice, and other Italian cities, Spain in the late sixteenth century had been little exposed to Greeks in the previous thousand years. There had been Spaniards in Byzantine service in the fourteenth century, and the Venetians had occasionally relied during their earlier wars with the Turks on Spanish aid (the chronicler Alonso de Santa Cruz, for example, recalls the aid provided by the so-called Gran Capitan, Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, during the Turkish siege of Modon, in 1501). Alonso de Santa Cruz, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1951), Vol. I, 213 ff. But as indicated above, medieval and early modern contacts between Greece and Iberia were rare and almost entirely the result of Iberians going to the eastern Mediterranean, with far fewer Greeks going West. The Greek community in Iberia, circa 1570, such as it was, was much smaller than that in Italy, at a time when the Orthodox had recently been allowed their own church in Venice. Such considerations suggest that Venice was not only a physically closer, but also a far more intellectually receptive destination for the Christians of Cyprus than was Spain.
world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were deep. As Kallistos Ware has argued, hesychasm, an important Orthodox theological tendency associated with Gregory Palamas, a fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian, included a stress on quietude and inner serenity, and hesychasm dominated Orthodox thought in this period, while Iberian Catholic religious thinking was militant and shot through with emotional tendencies.

Many of those Greeks who, both before and after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, fled the Turks, and found refuge in northern and central Italy, contributed to learned culture and to learned discussions on a number of philosophical and literary questions, so that, for example, two Cypriots became the librarians at the largest library in Venice, the Biblioteca Marciana, the core of which had been donated by another Greek, Cardinal Bessarion. By contrast, Greeks who migrated to southern Italy, under Spanish rule, have left an impression on history mainly for their efforts to organize insurrections to liberate their homeland, and far less of an impression for their contributions to scholarship in any field. Still, there were exceptions. Neophytos Rhodinos, after embracing Catholicism, studied philosophy, theology, and Greek letters at the University of

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346 Kallistos Ware, The Inner Unity of the Philokalia and its Influence in East and West (Athens: Alexander Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, 2004), http://www.scribd.com/doc/4517464/PHILOKALIA-and-Its-Influence-in-East-and-WestKALLISTOS-Bishop-of-Diokleia, consulted January 22 and 23, 2011. It is possible, though, to ascribe anachronistically a desire on the part of pre-modern Greek Orthodox to pursue a spiritual golden mean between Western Christianity and Islam. Ware himself exhibits this tendency, and there may be more stress in some quarters on irreducible Orthodox differences from Western Christianity now than there was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I argue that there were significant differences between Western and Orthodox Christians in this period, but not inevitable and “essential” ones.

347 See, for example, C.R. Boxer, The Church Militant and Iberian Expansion, 1440-1770 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), a book that is mainly concerned with the Portuguese empire, but provides insight into Spanish thought, as well.

Salamanca for six years (1610-1616). Julius Caesar Agiamavra or Santamaura, after graduating from the Greek College in Rome, studied the philosophy of Origen, corresponded with the scholar David Hoeschel or Hoeschelius, an Augsburg scholar of Greek poetry who also played host to the Cypriot scholar and theologian Leontios Eustratios Philoponos during his peregrinations. Agiamavra also spent two years, from 1612 to 1614, in Madrid, in arch-Catholic Spain.

Meanwhile – but this is a story for a later chapter -- those Greek Orthodox who remained under Ottoman rule seem to have drawn progressively inwards and away from interactions both with the other Orthodox churches (Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian) and with Western Europe, on an intellectual level, though they continued on a political level to appeal for outside aid to be given for the sorts of insurrections discussed here. There were certainly exceptions among the Orthodox to the theological drawing inwards, known as hesychasm, that I have discussed: judging at any rate by the way they lived their lives, retirement and passivity were not favored by the Cretans Meletios Pigas, Cyril Lucaris, Maximos Margounios, nor, among Cypriots, by Leontios Eustratios, Neophyto Rhodinos, and Athanasios Rhetor; in the seventeenth century, Leo Allatius of Chios was another famous counterexample. But it would be


351 As I.K. Hassiotis has noted, even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries national, ethnic, and even tribal consciousness, and divisions, existed within the Orthodox church: “From the “Refledging” to the “Illumination of the Nation”: Aspects of Political Ideology in the Greek Church under Ottoman Domination,” Balkan Studies 40 (1999) 41-55. The collection of Orthodox theology known as the Philokalia (first published Venice: Antonio Bortoli, 1782), with its concentration on the inner spiritual life, has often been interpreted as marking this turn, and although the works collected in the Philokalia date between the tenth and the seventeenth centuries, they appear to have been particularly popular among the Greeks under Ottoman rule. See G.E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, eds., The Philokalia (London: Faber and Faber, 1979).
imprudent to assess a general intellectual atmosphere from a few outstanding, and therefore unrepresentative, figures. I have briefly discussed the post-conquest Cypriot diaspora above, as well as in Chapter One. Men such as Ioannes Matthaios Bustron and his brother Georgios were not withdrawn, and were the exceptions to the theological/militant, or, as we might say, quietist/activist divide; that is, they were both men of action, and scholars too. They served Spain both as emissaries to, and spies living among, the Ottomans in the Balkans, and also wrote literary works that reflected a desire to locate a continuity in the Greek literary tradition, even in the absence of any remaining Orthodox state, and in the face of an uncertain future for a Greek learned culture in the very centers of Greek population: the Greek peninsula, Asia Minor, and the Aegean islands, as well as in such other areas of Greek settlement as Cyprus, Egypt and Syria.352

In the economic realm, neither Moorish nor Christian Spain’s trade with Byzantium during the Middle Ages had ever been significant.353 After 1400, while papal prohibitions on trading with the Muslim infidel had been gradually lifted,354 the Ottoman conquests of Greece and the Black Sea emporia of Caffa and Tana forestalled any impulse that may have existed for large-scale trade with the Ottoman Empire. Nor were the modern Greeks seen as culturally sympathetic, however much appreciation of the thought of their ancestors existed in learned

352 Apostolos Dascalakis, “Le rôle de la civilisation grecque dans les Balkans,” in Actes du Premier Congrès International des Études Balkaniques et Sud-est Européennes (Sofia: Académie Roumaine des Sciences, 1969), 105-109, stressing the roles both of Cyprus and of the Ionian Islands in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as producers of especially large numbers of learned men.


Thus Spain’s primary interest in the Greeks of the period after the Cyprus War was as an object of military support, Christians under newly-imposed Muslim rule who deserved relief from oppression. It is not surprising that Cypriot appeals to Spain for aid should have focused on their common ground with Spain: that of shared Christianity, and anti-Ottoman alarm.

Anti-Ottoman Revolts on Cyprus. The Place of Greeks within these Revolts. The continuing Influence of the Crusades. The Limits of Spanish Interests.

All levels of Spanish society, from the tiny élite of the literate at the top, to the illiterate masses, were in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries entertained by both histories and fictional versions of crusading. This pattern in cultural taste goes far to explain the success of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s *Don Quixote*, which parodies or inverts many of the traditional tropes of chivalric tales. The exploits of Roland, Charlemagne’s knight, were celebrated in Spanish versions such as the *Vida de San Gines*. The exploits of Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, known as El Cid, who -- despite likely having fought on behalf of Muslim rulers -- was transformed into the parfit Christian knight in epic poems such as the *Cantar de mio Cid*, remained for centuries the most popular character in Spanish chivalry, but there were many others. The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, Philip II’s father, who was also King Charles I

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355 There were some Spanish privateers operating in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. These are discussed by, among others, Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 47-55. However, the economic importance of their activities for Spain appears never to have been great, nor can we point to a single great coup they brought about, like the capture by Piet Hein and Dutch corsairs of a large proportion of the Spanish West Indies treasure fleet in 1628.


of Spain, had kept the Burgundian romance *Le Chevalier Délibéré*, by Olivier de la Marche, at his bedside.\(^{358}\) From this and other stories of chivalry, including the *Amadis de Gaula*, a work Cervantes mentions repeatedly as an influence on his hero in *Don Quixote*, Charles and the Spanish absorbed such stories of chivalry and knightly virtues. A number of popular chronicles, such as *Amadis de Grecia, Florisel de Niquea* (the tenth part of *Amadis de Gaula*), and *Lisuarte de Grecia*, deal explicitly with episodes of Byzantine chivalry, and discuss Constantinople and its knights in an unspecified, legendary past. These stories were avidly consumed, and often reprinted. But it is far from clear that such fashions in the history of literary taste translated into any special sympathy for, much less identification with, the living, breathing contemporary Greek Orthodox, those who might have been connected imaginatively to that Byzantine world of fabulous chivalry which so entertained the Spanish, and other Westerners. Such empathetic identification with those Greeks by the Latins did not occur in the Middle Ages, or later.

As mentioned, the correspondence sent by the Cypriots to Spain stresses instead the number of Christians pining for revolt against their Muslim overlords, appealing thereby to what they regarded as their principal common ground with the Spanish, that they were all Christians who shared a common fear of Ottoman, that is Muslim, conquest. It is to the reputation of Spaniards for military prowess that we must attribute the persistence of Christian Cypriots in appealing for deliverance to Spain for many decades after the Ottoman conquest. In consideration of the copious evidence of these appeals, which only peter out around 1670,\(^{359}\) I am led to disagree both with Kostas P. Kyrris, and with Vera Costantini. Both Kyrris and

\(^{358}\) The story is told by Guillaume Van Male, the Flemish scholar and courtier in attendance on Charles V, in his letters. These have been published as Guillaume Van Male, *Lettres de la vie intérieure de l'empereur Charles-Quint, écrites par Guillaume Van Male...*, ed. Baron de Reiffenberg (Brussels: Delevingne et Callewaert, 1843).

\(^{359}\) Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 59. Hassiotis only published appeals down to the 1620s; further documents dating to between the 1620s and the 1670s from Simancas have yet to be published.
Constantini have presented evidence that the numerous revolts on Cyprus were not religion-specific, but rather the product of a combining of forces of the have-nots, both Muslim and Christian, against grasping elites in the form of extortionate governors and tax collectors.\textsuperscript{360}

Kyrris concluded (461) that “Cette haine [hatred of both Greeks and Turks for Markoullis] montre le fond social des luttes relatées et l’absence de division religieuse absolue entre les deux communautés de l’île: les opprimés s’unirent contre l’oppresseur sans égard à leur religion, qui, d’autre part, ne caractérise aucun des protagonistes de cette histoire.” Presumably the “qui” refers to “religion,” and Kyrris means by his last sentence that none of the people involved in the revolt against Markoullis were known for piety or “religiosity.” They rely for evidence, for instance, on a 1578 Muslim-Christian revolt against the Ottoman authorities on Cyprus, which I shall discuss below. The correspondence of Christian Cypriots with Spain, however, that Hassiotis unearthed, is shot through with appeals based on shared Christianity. In one case, for example, there is reference to a particular relic, “la santa cabeza de San Phelipe Apóstol,” [the holy head of St. Philip, the Apostle] which the anonymous writer related that \textsuperscript{361} “the said Don Pedro keeps in his possession in a secure part of the said island, with many other treasures.” The head of St. Philip was to be treated, it seems, as a rallying-point for the imminent gathering of a Christian army.\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{360} Kyrris, “L’importance de la conversion,” 461, where Kyrris discusses the revolt in 1669 against the extortionate taxation of the tyrannical Markoullis, who was a dragoman – an interpreter – but also collected taxes, as most dragomans did on early Ottoman Cyprus. See also Vera Costantini, \textit{Il Sultano e l’Isola Contesa} (Turin: UTET, 2009), chapter 3, 76-77, and Hill, \textit{History of Cyprus}, IV, 38-39 on the joint Christian-Muslim revolt of 1578.

\textsuperscript{361} “...que el dicho Don Pedro tiene en su poder en parte segura de la dicha isla, con muchas otras riquezas.” Hassiotis, \textit{῾Ισπανικα Ἔγγραφα}, 63.

\textsuperscript{362} The appeal to saints and their relics for protection remained extremely common on Cyprus, as elsewhere in the Greek world. Just as on another occasion the head of St. Michael Synnada was to serve an apotropaic function by warding off locusts. See Hill, \textit{History of Cyprus}, IV, 67.
This is but one example of what we may regard as the Christian dimension to the revolts on Cyprus at the beginning of Ottoman rule. It was shared Christianity that was the principal glue binding Spaniards and Cypriots, so that the religious dimension of Cypriot discontent seems to be worthy of consideration here. It would be wrong to overlook that aspect by insisting that the new Muslim population at times must have shared with the Christians on Cyprus grievances about Ottoman misrule. That some grievances were shared is suggested by the record in an Ottoman chronicle from some decades later, in 1665. On that occasion, both Muslim and Christian inhabitants complained to the Ottoman central government of the extortionate practices of the governor of Cyprus, Ibrahim Pasha. And curiously, the small Armenian Christian population of Cyprus seems to have aided the Ottomans, both during the invasion of 1570-71, and during the repression of a rebellion in 1606. But the Muslim population was initially settled primarily in cities, while the bulk of Christians resided in the countryside and – down to the end of the seventeenth century – were even forbidden from inhabiting the important Cypriot town Famagusta, so that the Turks could keep it as a secure fortress. Muslims, furthermore, were exempt from the cizye [Arabic ‘jizyah’], a tax some version of which had existed since early Islamic times, and which was intended to be applied to adult non-Muslims – and whatever economic grievances they might have had were less acute than those of the Christians. But that did not mean they were perfectly content.

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364 Petros Stylianou, “The Evaluation of the Cyprus Revolution of 1606 from the Spanish Point of View,” which, however, adds little to Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 50 n. 1. One might speculate that the Armenians were jealous of the far more numerous Greek-speakers, or seen their interests as more closely aligned with the Ottoman regime than those of the Greeks. An important primary source is the seventeenth century chronicle by Krikor of Taranagh, but I do not read Armenian, and this work has not been translated into a language which I read.
Almost from the very beginning of Ottoman rule, it is quite clear, that some Muslim inhabitants on Cyprus were discontented. In 1578, for example, the Janissaries killed Arab Ahmet Pasha, the governor or beylerbey of Cyprus, apparently both because he was brutal and because they had not been paid. His replacement, Mehmet Ağa, was then also killed for having punished with death some of the Janissaries who had participated in the killing of his predecessor. It is likely that there were other cases of joint Muslim-Christian revolts, sometimes as a result of bribery of the Muslim garrisons. But, though some Ottomans in this period did go to Istanbul in person to report abuses by provincial governors, written details of Muslim grievances, the equivalents of the complaints Christians put in their letters to the Spanish kings and other Western princes, have yet to come to light. When we consider that a Muslim prince in Lebanon, Fakhr ad-Din, was willing in 1608 to form an alliance with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, a far more distant power than Cyprus, to buttress his autonomy against the central government in Constantinople, and consider, too, the generally tumultuous state of the Ottoman Empire’s heartlands in Anatolia at the turn of the seventeenth century, the notion of the Muslims of Cyprus finding Christian allies against the Ottoman central government is less absurd than it

365 The elite Ottoman foot soldiers recruited involuntarily from Christian families and raised as Muslims in Constantinople, about 4000 of whom had been settled on Cyprus by 1580.

366 This revolt is reported in Bağbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri 33, hüküm 442, 8 Zilkâde 985 (January 17, 1578), cited in Vera Costantini, Il Sultan, 218 n. 127. The English archival series State Papers—Foreign, for 22 June 1578, no. 32 and no. 95, supplied the remarkable detail that after killing Mehmet Ağa, the Turks invited the Christians into their garrison and hung out from the towers of this fortification the flags of the Christian princes, Spain, the Pope, and Venice, while informing the Venetian governor of Crete of their doings. This lends support to the idea that they were acting at the instigation of Venetian agents, as George Hill thought. Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 39.

367 The document series in the Ottoman archives which contains complaints about such abuses, the Şikayet Defterleri or Registers of Complaints, does not begin until the second half of the seventeenth century.
might first appear.\textsuperscript{368} This alliance did coalesce, but a landing force of some 2200 under the Marquis Del Monte, failed to take Famagusta, for the anticipated thousands of Greeks who were supposed to come to their aid did not materialize, and their scaling ladders were too short to allow the soldiers to ascend the walls and take the city.\textsuperscript{369}

Since every attempt of the Christian Cypriots to organize a revolt failed, we can perhaps understand the antipathy for Latin Catholics on the part of such figures in Orthodox historiography as the Archimandrite Kyprianos (1735-1803?), often called the Father of Cypriot History, whose \textit{Historia tes Nesou Kyprou} appeared in Venice in 1788. Schabel has identified some ways in which Kyprianos deliberately altered the material he found in his two principal sources, so as to cast the Latins in a more negative light than had his original material.\textsuperscript{370} Kyprianos, though he was aware that Latins such as the Duke of Savoy had planned campaigns for the reconquest of Cyprus, saw reason to doubt that those very Latins had much concern for the Cypriot people. And how far Spain was concerned with the welfare of the Orthodox of Cyprus, who were typically referred to in Spain as schismatics – \textit{scismaticos} in Castilian – or heretics, is a difficult question. As elsewhere in Western Europe, some Spaniards had been deeply affected by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 – though, as elsewhere, these deep feelings

\textsuperscript{368} On Fakhr ad-Din, see Paul Carali, \textit{Fakhr ad-Din II, principe del Libano e la corte di Toscana 1605-1635} (Rome: Reale Accademia d’Italia, 1936-38). Alliances of convenience dated back at least to the Muslim conquest of Syria in the 630s. At the battle of Yarmuk in 636, for example, Christian Arabs allied themselves with the Muslim commander Khalid bin al-Walid.

\textsuperscript{369} This last detail can be found in Capponi, \textit{Victory of the West}, who adds that the ships with the ladders had also been late to arrive, and also in Hill, \textit{History of Cyprus}, IV, 49.

\textsuperscript{370} Christopher Schabel, “The Myth of Queen Alice and the Subjugation of the Greek Church on Cyprus,” in Sabine Fourrier and Gilles Grivaud, eds., \textit{Identités croisées en un milieu méditerranéen: le cas de Chypre} (Rouen: Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2006), from 270-1.
did not translate into following through on their vows of reconquest. The spectacle of Constantinople, once the capital of the former Eastern Roman Empire, a bastion of Christianity in the East, the richest and most populous city in Christendom for centuries, now tottering and at last collapsing in such a chaotic and bloody fashion, moved many in Spain, as elsewhere in Western Europe, naturally to commiserate with men whom, doctrinally and culturally, they regarded as their fellow-Christians.

The Cyprus-related correspondence preserved in the Spanish archives suggests that, from the Orthodox point of view, overtures made to the Latin powers in the West had to be accompanied – with what degree of sincerity it is difficult to say – by a figurative genuflection before the Christian credentials of the Spanish kings, whose theology, ultimately, the Orthodox could not but disavow. Thus the Archbishop of Cyprus, Timotheos, writing to Philip II in 1587, to solicit his support for a Christian uprising on the island, began his letter with the following:

We dare as the devoted servant of your powerful and sacred Majesty, most religious and more high King of all the Spains and the Indies and of the other Kingdoms, we wish for Your Powerful and Sacred Majesty grace, and mercy, and peace, and blessing, and abundance, and many years and victory against your enemies…Your Majesty knows, very great King, how great and what is the misery and travail, which we suffer from the inhuman and impious Turks on this isle every day and hour and moment (and who could suffer such?) because

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371 Calixtus III Borgia, the pope who took office two years after the fall was a Spaniard with roots near Valencia, and he tried to organize a crusade under the Archbishop of Tarragona, Pietro Urrea, while Alfonso V of Aragon, the King of Naples from a dynasty with Spanish roots, vowed to raise an army to take back Constantinople. Charles Frazee, Catholics and Sultans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 11.

372 If one is moved to reduce Greek-Latin ecclesiastical conflict to questions of doctrine alone, the differences that stood out remained the same in 1570 as they had in 1054, when the mutual excommunication of pope and patriarch contributed to a split between the Latin West and Greek East. For how the parties attempted to resolve differences on two of these points, papal primacy and the Filioque controversy, see Joseph Gill, Church Union: Rome and Byzantium, 1204-1453, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 254-286.
sometimes from greed they boot us from our houses and sometimes, entering the houses, they engage in a thousand insults and knaverys there, seizing the women and girls; and that which most weighs on us is that by force, as highwaymen and tyrants, they take our sons, as though they were their own property; and the religious monasteries and holy churches of the Christians, they have violated and sold twice so far; they oppress the Christians through countless and cruel trials, as the accursed ones do not hesitate to think up nor to make and use blows and threats and torment to force them to renounce our holy faith. For all of these reasons, with a single voice and humility and tears, we beg your sacrosanct, clement and powerful Majesty by the heart of Jesus Christ, that he should powerfully extend His hand and succor us, to free us from the hands of these impious pagans...the Christians who are to be found on this island at present are sixty-five thousand men of an age to bear arms, who promise Your Majesty that at whatever hour and time by order of Your Majesty His fleet should arrive here, they will all struggle valiantly until they recover their liberty and will serve Your Majesty forever after, or all will die defending the faith of Christ our Lord...

So great was Spain’s power in the second half of the sixteenth century, particularly after France was weakened by the Wars of Religion, that Philip II was the recipient of many similar requests for aid. Such requests came, for example, from the Catholics of England and Ireland.

373 “Atreviendonos devoto siervo de V(uestra poderosa y sacra M) M(ajesty), muy religioso y muy alto Rey de todas las Españas y las Indias y de los demás Reynos, deseamos a V(uestra poderosa y sacra M) M(ajesty) la gracia y misericordia y paz y bendición y acrescentamiento y muchos años y victoria contra sus enemigos...sepa V(uestra) M(ajesty), muy gran Rey, quanto y qual sea la miseria y trabajo, que sufrimos destos inhumanos y impios Turchos en esta ysla cada día y hora y tiempo (y quién puede tal sufrir?), porque a vezes por avaricia nos quitan las haziendas y a vezes entran in las casas hazen mil insultos y bellaqueria en ellas, apoderándose de las mugeres y donzellas, y lo que más de todo nos pesa es que por fuerça, como salteadores y tyranos, nos toman los hijos, como si fueran bienes propios suyos; y los monasterios religiosos y las iglesias sanctas de los christianos las han violado y vendido hasta ay dos vezes; arrastran los christianos por infinitos y cruels tribunales, no dexando los malditos de dezir ani de fazer ni usar castigos y amenaças y tormentos para forçarlos a renegar la n(uestra) sancta fee. Por esto todos con una voz y con humildad y lágrimas suplicamos a V(uestra) sacrosancta clemente y poderosa M(ajesty), por las entrañas que de Jesu Christo, que poderosamente extienda Su mano y nos socorra, para librarnos de las manos destos impios paganos...Los christianos que en esta ysla se hallan al presente son sesenta y cinco mil hombres de edad para la armada, las cuales prometen a V(uestra) M(ajesty) que, cual hora y tiempo por mandado de V(uestra) M(ajesty) llegaren aqui Su armada, pleazarán valientemente todos hasta que a recuperen la libertad y sirvan a V(uestra) M(ajesty) siempre jamás, o todos mueran defendiendo la fee de Christo n(uestro Señor...” Archivio General de Simancas -- Estado 1342, p. 53, transcribed in Ioannes Hassiotis, ed. Ἰσπανικα Ἑγγραφα τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ἑστιαγς (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2003 [1972]), 22. I am inclined to think that the passage begins ‘devoto siervo,’ and not ‘de voto siervo’ as Hassiotis has transcribed.
Though Philip shared with his ancestors a zeal for the crusading aspect of the faith (so that, to give one example, an annual tax known as the *cruzada* was collected in his European realms, to sustain the struggle against the Infidel), he was tied down by the endless difficulties that resulted first from discontent, and then from open revolt, in the Netherlands, a possession of Spain which was separated from her by a strong and hostile France. 374 Neither he nor his successor Philip III could possibly have fulfilled all of the requests both for aid and for maintenance grants (akin to modern-day pensions) they received from Greeks, as well as from Albanians and other Christians of the East, and Spain never developed a consistent framework for judging the urgency and merits of particular cases.

In addition to rivalry with Venice, another reason for wonder at the large Spanish role in the Holy League is the low level of Spanish economic interest in the Levant in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The volume of Spanish trade was much less than that of Venice. 375 Spanish consuls did not establish merchant *fondaci/funduqs* throughout the Near East, as French,


375 Halil Inalcik, *Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Vol. 1, 357, notes that the Augsburg merchant Konrad Rott estimated Spain’s demand for spices in 1570 at 3000 quintals, or about 306,000 kilograms. But the Spanish obtained a large portion of this (as Konrad Rott’s interest in the question suggests) from Welser and Fugger merchants of Augsburg and Nuremberg, and not directly from trade in Ottoman ports. Philip II signed expensive contracts with these merchants in both 1586 and 1591, for the importing of a full 30,000 quintals of pepper, which were distributed from Lisbon (Portugal having fallen under Spanish control in 1580) to Amsterdam, Lübeck, and Hamburg. In general, far less attention has been paid in recent decades to Spain’s economic than to her cultural relations with the Ottomans and her perceptions of them, as revealed in art and literature. But on this subject it is somewhat misleading to disentangle entirely economic from spiritual matters. For example, the Spanish kings were confronted with the problem of how to act towards the Moriscos within their own domains, and enriching Ottoman Muslims abroad would not have seemed consistent with trying to convert or expel Muslims at home. One wonders if similar thinking may have also led them to avoid the Levant: Jews, who had been expelled from Spain and Portugal in 1492 and 1497 respectively, were extremely important middlemen in the Levantine trade of Ottoman-produced goods with Europe, and it would not have impressed anyone as consistent with her earlier zeal for the faith, had Spain shown herself eager to do business with, and thereby enrich, the very people Spain had expelled, by taking an active part in Levantine trade.
Venetian, and a little later, English and Dutch, consuls did. There was not even a Spanish ambassador in Constantinople until the late eighteenth century. Those Spanish subjects who did trade in the Levant were, virtually without exception, residents of Naples or Sicily, areas of Italy under the rule of Spanish viceroys. It seems possible that the truce signed by the Spanish and the Ottomans in 1580 was facilitated by the very lack of areas where their economic interests overlapped, that is, areas where they would naturally compete and collide.

Finally, Spain continued to respect Ottoman power, and this alone might have made a commitment to the defense of Venetian Cyprus unlikely. Cyprus, after all, was many hundreds of miles from the closest Spanish port, in Sicily, but just a few dozen miles from the Ottoman-controlled Anatolian coast, and about 120 miles from Ottoman Syria. Some indication of both the extent, and the limits, of Spanish knowledge about the Ottomans, and Spanish hostility towards them, is discernible in a letter written shortly before the Cyprus War by the Genoese diplomat and longtime servant of the Spanish crown, Adamo Centurione (1486–c.1568), who not only possessed some naval experience himself, but was also a close associate of Andrea Doria, the celebrated Genoese admiral who served Spain for decades. On January 20, 1565, Centurione wrote to Philip II, just as the Ottomans were known to be preparing a siege of Malta:

“The power of the Turk is so great, both as to the number of countries he possesses, and for the great obedience that he commands from his peoples, that it is with great comfort that he plans to gather a great fleet, such that he will always be able to send out so large a number of galleys, that, since Your Majesty cannot promise nor hope in the forces, nor the help of the Venetians, I should think that You must not think that You can bring together enough to stand against him, or if this should come to pass, that You should not judge it good counsel to expose Yourself to the fortune of battle with those of the Turk, on account of the many reasons which are against it, which, leaving aside posturing, your most prudent Majesty can well understand. And beyond the costs of the expense for the

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maintenance of the great number of galleys, which I suppose Your Majesty can meet, there are to consider the great difficulties which there will be to maintain them, as much for the necessary and normal supplies and provisions as for their continuous manufacture and masts and oars, and above all, of seasoned sailors, without which (one may say) the vessels remain useless...and experience teaches that more results and greater effects are gained with a small number of galleys than with a large navy, because it has been seen in the past that Prince d’Oria, with judgment and good government, rendered great service to the Emperor Charles’ Holy Glory. For example, the year ’32, when he took Patras and Coron, when 32 galleys which had been in Italy sufficed for the campaign, which was so useful to His Majesty and to the people of Germany, that it forced the Turk to remove himself from Vienna because of the noise it spread throughout Greece, and the next year, with the same number, with the help of ships which he took, it was enough to succor Coron, because he went ready and quickly, while should he have waited for the galleys alleged to be coming from Spain, he would no longer have been in time to deliver that succor, on account of the delay, and he would have been interrupted, which could have made it easier for the Turks to increase their forces, as they nevertheless did during the daytime. Nor should one be silent concerning the enterprise he carried out in the year ’37, when the Turk came to Valona and went above Corfu, when, again, while he could have gathered a great number of galleys together and other vessels, he resolved to want to go just with 28 galleys, well fitted out, to better execute that which the opportunity had presented him against the enemy...

Translation mine. Archivio General de Simancas, Estado 1394/188, transcribed in Rafael Vargas Hidalgo, Guerra y Diplomacia en el Mediterráneo: Correspondencia inédita de Felipe II con Andrea Doria y Juan Andrea Doria (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2002), 450:

La potenza del Turco è si grande, et per lo numero de paesi, che possiede, et per la molta obbedienza, che ha dalla popoli suoi, che è grandissima la commodità che tiene di adunar grossa armata, e tale che potrà sempre mandar fuori tanto numero grosso di galee, che la M.\(^{10}\) V. non potendosi prometter ne sperar nelle forze et aiuto de vinitiani, credèro, che non debba haver pensiero di poter porne insieme tante da poter stargli à fronte, ò che quando potesse pur essere non debba giudicare, che fosse buon consiglio esporsi alla fortuna della battaglia con quelle del Turco, per li molti rispetti, che vi sono all’ oppositio, che lasciandosi da parte le bravure, la M.\(^{10}\) V. prudentiss.\(^{a}\) può ben comprendere. Et oltre di non metter à conto la spesa per lo mantenimento del grosso numero di galee poi ch’io presuppongo che questa V. M.\(^{37}\) può farla si ha da considerare le grandi difficoltà che si havranno à mantenerle così per gli apparecchi et provisioni necessarie et ordinarie come per le continue fabriche di esse et di alberi et remi ma quello che più importa di marinari accomodati senza li quali i vaselli rimandono (si può dire) inutili...et la esperienza puo far’ conoscere che si fanno più espediti et maggiori effetti con manco numero di galee che con grossa armata perche s’è veduto per l’adietro che il Principe d’Oria col giudicio et buon governo ha fatto maggior servigio all’Imperator Carlo S.\(^{a}\) Glo. Come seguì l’anno del ’32. quando prese Patras e Corone [Koroni] che con .32. galee ch’erano in Italia bastò à far quella impresa che fù di tanto commodo et à S. M.\(^{10}\) et al publico dell’Alemagna che costrinse il Turco à levarsi da Viena per lo romore che pose nella Grecia et l’anno seguente col medesimo numero con l’aiuto delle navi che prese bastò à soccorrere Corone [Koroni] perche vi andò con prestezza et ispeditamente che se havesse dovuto aspettar le galee che doveano venir di Spagna non sarebbe stato piú à tempo à dar quel soccorso per la dilazione et vi si sarebbe interposta la quale havrevve data maggior commodità alli turchi di accrescere le forze loro come tuttavia alla giornata facevano. Ne si dee tacer anchora la impresa ch’egli fece l’anno del ’37. quando il Turco venne alla Velona et andò sopra Corfù ch’anchor ch’egli potesse adunar insieme
This report indicates that despite, or possibly, because of the fears the powerful Turks evoked, the idea of a new Holy League, comparable to that formed during the earlier Venetian-Ottoman war of 1537-40, was in the air. As a reflection of Centurione’s warnings about Ottoman might, while Portugal in the early sixteenth century had launched attacks against Ottoman-ruled Jiddah and remained a thorn in the Ottoman side through her possession of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Spain largely bypassed areas of Ottoman trading interest, such as the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and to a great extent the Indian Ocean. Instead the Spanish sailed around Africa and South America to the Spice Islands of modern-day Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Spain’s lack of intrepidity compared with Portugal may be related to the more complex organizational structure of the Spanish kingdoms, far larger and more geographically sprawling than Portugal. But what Spain lacked in stomach for competition either with the Ottomans, the Portuguese, or the Indian principalities in the Indian Ocean, she did not in North Africa. After 1492 the Reconquista impelled Spanish arms across the Mediterranean, where she acquired later in the 1490s Tlemcen, and took aim at Oran, Bougie, and Algiers.\textsuperscript{378} Denying some of the North African coastal strong points and ports to the Moors was Spain’s principal aim. In 1508, Pedro Navarro conquered Peñón de Velez, an islet off the Moroccan coast, principally to deny its use to pirates who had been ravaging the southern coast of Spain, for example. In North Africa, as in the American Southwest, the Spanish were concerned with the defense of their empire and took profound interest, extending up to the kings themselves, in acquiring and fortifying defensible

\textit{maggior numero di galee et altri vaselli si risolse voler andar solamente con ventiotto galee ben espedite per eseguir meglio quello che la occasione gli havesse presentato contra l’inimico...}

\textsuperscript{378} For which expansion, see Diego de Haëdo [but the actual author has now been shown to be Antonio de Sosa], \textit{Topografia e Historia General de Argel} (Madrid: Sociedad de bibliófilos españoles, 1927), 26. The island in the harbor of Algiers known as Peñón de Argel served as a key Spanish outpost from 1510 to 1529.
outposts. Spanish officials were kept well-informed of the corsairing activities of the Barbarossa brothers and of their turning over Algiers to the Ottomans in 1529, and the more general Ottoman advance across North Africa from Egypt in the 1520s and 1530s. Spain came to the defense of Malta in 1565, and for over two centuries was involved in a seesaw battle with the Ottomans over the major ports of the western North African coast. In the Mediterranean, then, Spain was more active and involved in anti-Ottoman maneuvers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries than in the Indian Ocean.

There are some exceptions to this general observation. Spain did seek a suitable site to fortify east of the Red Sea to protect spice ships coming from India. Portugal had earlier, in 1573, come to the aid of Bahrain against the Ottomans, during a campaign in which the Portuguese also destroyed several Ottoman vessels in Basra in southern Iraq. Spain then, through the Union of the Crowns in 1580, when Philip II took over the title King of Portugal with the extinction of the Portuguese monarchial house of Avis, “inherited” this outpost from Portugal, together with the rest of her colonial empire. But one can still consider Portuguese and Spanish activities as traders and conquerors as continuing to be conducted, to a noticeable degree, as separate pursuits even while the Spanish monarch was, from 1580 to 1640, titular king of Portugal. It would not be quite accurate, therefore, to characterize Hormuz, a tremendously lucrative port that generated some 250-300,000 Portuguese cruzados in customs revenue, as a “Spanish” emporium within the Ottoman sphere of interest.

**Anti-Ottoman Alliances: Spain, the Symbol of Hope by 1570**

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379 Mühimme Defterleri 22, #631, 317; #636, 320; #638, 322; MD 23 #426, 201. See Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 138.

380 Inalcık, Economic and Social History, 351.
As I.K. Hassiotis, Manoussos Manoussacas, and others have long recognized, by the late sixteenth century at least one common interest linked Catholics and Orthodox, namely that of defending against the Ottoman Turkish advance in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. A large number of what Nicolai Iorga called “adventurers” travelled in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to Western Europe from Christian lands under Ottoman rule to seek aid.\footnote{Nicolai Iorga, “Aventuriers orientaux en France au XVIe siècle,” Bulletin de la section historique de l’Académie Roumaine, 17 (1930), 1-22.}

What is striking among all the reasons these adventurers adduced to persuade Spain to aid them against the Ottomans – judging by the written records we possess – is the lack of appeals to economic interests. One might certainly have expected such appeals in the case of Cyprus. For most of its history, after all, that island had been an emporium for traders from all corners of the globe. The Arab geographer al-Muqaddasi had written in 985 that Cyprus “offers the Muslims many advantages in their trade thither.”\footnote{Excerpta Cypria, 5.}

Jean Richard has argued that in the thirteenth century, the Crusaders chose Cyprus as a base because its flourishing agriculture made feasible the provisioning of large numbers of armed men.\footnote{Jean Richard, “Une économie coloniale? Chypre et ses ressources agricoles au moyen-age,” Byzantinische Forschungen V (1977) : 348.} And in the sixteenth century, as Arbel has argued, while Cyprus was still under Venetian rule, the population increased, and Cyprus was able to export salt, cotton and other products to Venice thanks to the flourishing state of the development of its natural resources.\footnote{For the Venetian period, Jean Richard cites the French pilgrim Denys Poussot in 1532: Poussot observes that Cypriots worked to overcome the natural aridity of the soil by using waterwheels driven by donkeys or horses with their eyes covered to irrigate the cotton fields around Larnaca, in the southeast of the island. Richard, “Une Economie Coloniale,” 333-4. Benjamin Arbel has also sought to refute the entrenched negative perceptions among many historians of the economic picture in Venetian Cyprus. See “Entre mythe et histoire: la légende noire de la domination vénitienne à Chypre,” in Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 11th-16th Centuries (Ashgate: Variorum, 2000), IV, 83-107 at 92-94.} The Spanish had been impelled to explore and settle the
New World, once it had been discovered, not because of the potential to develop its agriculture, but because of its gold and silver. The Greeks of Cyprus, on the other hand, possessed no fabulous riches, ripe for the mining, and lived in a settled area that, furthermore, was already dominated by the powerful Ottoman Empire. It was as natural to appeal to shared religion, as it would have been implausible for them to hold out the prospect of mineral wealth or other riches before the Spanish as inducements to help them. It seems clear, too, that Spain would have learned, through her spies and agents in the Eastern Mediterranean, that the economy of Cyprus, while diverse, was not necessarily worth the cost of its defense in the 1560s, that is, in the period just before the war. The Venetian report by Bernardo Sagredo of 1585 indicates that in 1565, the Venetians were earning 940,000 Venetian ducats from the island. By way of comparison, we might note that Philip II’s annual revenues from Church benefices alone were calculated by a well-informed (anonymous) Spanish priest around that time at 1,970,000 ducats. Cyprus would have contributed little to Spain’s coffers to offset the expense of retaining the island against the determined Ottomans and her possession could well have earned Spain the enmity of Venice, unless she returned the island to Venetian possession. In any case, the Holy League was agreed to by Spain, not at the prompting of Cypriots themselves, and hardly at the instance of Venice, their ruling power, but mainly by Pope Pius V.

Other reasons besides the lack of proximity or of clear economic incentive told against Spain trying to take Cyprus for herself, either during the Cyprus War or after the Ottomans had successfully subdued resistance on the island. Spain was well-informed about the corsairs, both

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Christian and Muslim, especially the Knights of Malta, whose activity picked up in the waters around Cyprus after 1571, who made trade in those waters an even riskier proposition than it had been in the late Venetian period. And for several centuries, Cyprus had suffered from a deserved reputation as a land subject to frequent plagues of locusts, earthquakes, and droughts. When we add to these considerations the reflection that Spain possessed no earlier, and advanced no new legal claim to the island, the reasons for her refusal to try to seize Cyprus for herself seem compelling.

Without being prompted by clear economic motives, however, Spanish captains continued through the early seventeenth century to bring weapons and supplies to the Christian rebels, Albanian and Greek, in the Balkans, who took advantage of the confusion caused among their Ottoman masters by their loss at Lepanto. Why, when they were just as capable as the Venetians of being commercially savvy, would Spanish captains undertake such seemingly unrewarding work? The explanation lies in a Spanish diplomatic and military initiative (accompanied by more or less secret disbursal of funds to Greek captains considered reliable, and other agents) to block the advance of Islam, both in southeastern Europe and in North Africa, where the Spanish enjoyed little success. In several places, including Epirus, the Peloponnese, Ochrida, and northern Albania, Greeks, both adventurers inspired by chivalric ideals and mercenaries interested mainly in money, enrolled in the Spanish light cavalry, and rose in revolt against those Ottoman masters. Despite being suppressed in 1570-71, they continued


388 I.K. Hassiotis, “Spanish Policy Towards the Greek Insurrectionary Movements of the Seventeenth Century,” Actes du deuxième congrés international des études du sud-est européen, vol. 3, Athens: International Association of Southeast European Studies, 1972: 316. At 324, Hassiotis also notes on the basis of English and Spanish state papers that Anthony Sherley, an Englishman who in the late sixteenth century had travelled to Persia, had tried to fan the hostility of the Persians towards the Ottomans. Sherley, in 1607, was made commander of the Spanish
periodically in succeeding decades to revolt. They included Peter Menaghias and George Mizoteros, both of the Peloponnese, and Giovanni Varelis, a Corcyrean and a Knight of Malta. Such men did not, as a rule, go all the way to Spain to present their plans, but dealt with ambassadors or with the Vicerroys of Naples and Sicily and their agents. But it is clear that Philip II was aware of the Greek desire to cast off the Ottoman yoke, and approved of efforts to aid fellow Christians, overlooking the cloud of schism that hung over the Greek Orthodox in order to promote closer bonds between Christian and Christian because of the threat that he considered the Ottomans to present to all of Christendom.

These efforts were especially frequent under the Duke of Osuna, who, as Viceroy of Sicily from 1611 to 1616, and of Naples from 1616 to 1620, actively encouraged the Greeks in anti-Ottoman machinations. In the case of Mizoteros, while not everything in the diplomatic sources is clear, it seems that he offered his services as a mercenary both to the Spaniards and to

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390 For the activities of Menaghias, Mizoteros and Varelis, see Manoussacas, “Lepanto e i Greci,” 219-221.
the Venetians. Then there were the Melissenos brothers, one of whom fought in the navy of the Viceroy of Naples, while the others chose lives of scholarship. The activities of such Greeks seems to have been limited to corsair skirmishing, that is, to coordinated attacks by Christians on Muslim ships (as Muslims were at the same time engaged in similar attacks against Christian ships) rather than taking part in full-scale rebellions of Christians against Ottoman rule. It would not be until the eighteenth century, during the war of 1714-18, that a Christian power (Venice) succeeded in retaking part of Greece from the Ottomans, and that territory was then retaken by the Ottomans after only two decades, in 1739. In the Spanish correspondence with the Greek world that Hassiotis collected, there are a few reports that do mention the economic value of the island to Venice. One can read, for example, the description of the island sent in a letter to Madrid by the Cypriot Ioannes Agiamavra, who had fled to southern Italy after the Ottoman conquest. In June 1578, Agiamavra asserted, albeit without specifying the exact period of Venetian rule he is discussing, that “the kingdom of Cyprus was worth to the Signory of Venice, both from the income of salt-pans, and other incomes, one million Frankish ducats a year, and if I said more, it would not be in error.” This tallies well with Sagredo’s estimate of 940,000 ducats for 1565, but is a passing remark, only, not necessarily intended to whet Spanish appetite

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392 Hassiotis, Οι Μελισσουργοί, 56-58.

393 Known in Spanish documents as Juan de Santa Maura, he later became librarian at the Vatican. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Κυπριακή Λογοσύνη (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2002), 85.

394 “Il regno di Cipro valeva alla Signoria di Venetia, tanto dell’ intrata della salina, come di altre intrate, un milione di ducati l’anno franchi, et s’io dicesse più, non faria errore.” Hassiotis, Ἰσπανικά Έγγραφα, 8. As mentioned in Chapter One, the 1585 report by Bernardo Sagredo quoted by Halil Sahilioğlu estimated a total revenue for Cyprus under the Venetians for 1565 of 940,000 ducats.
for conquest. The idea that Spain might plant colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and begin seriously to develop her economic interests in the region in the way she was then attempting in her Spanish empire seems not to have occurred to the Greek adventurers who sought Spanish aid for their insurrections, nor did the Spanish government think along such lines. The Greeks wanted freedom from the Ottomans, but the long history of anti-Latin Christian sentiment that continues to be manifest in the Franciscan missionary reports of the seventeenth century makes clear that they would not have welcomed rule by ultra-Catholic Spain either, and were content to appeal to a shared Christianity, without drawing attention (and perhaps not wishing to draw attention) to the potential wealth that Cyprus could offer.

Spain, after all, was perceived to have wealth enough (despite government bankruptcies in 1557 and 1575, and another cyclically about every twenty years thereafter), and also had worries aplenty about defending the sources of that wealth, in the New World, from English, Dutch, and French interlopers, whether consisting of regular naval forces, or of privateers and pirates, as well as ensuring reliable labor at the rich silver mines of Potosí, in modern Bolivia. Mercantilism was the dominant model of political economy in Spain at this period, an economic theory according to which an influx of bullion, gold and silver, was an unmixed good, especially important for a kingdom wishing to be respected and also to provide the wherewithal to defend itself. Both of these indispensable attributes of a kingdom, as the Spanish saw things, that is the power derived from wealth, and concomitant respect, were obviously related.395

395 Questions of honor and prestige were tightly bound up with early modern economics, to an extent seldom appreciated today. See for instance the quotations in Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics 1 (1948) 1-29, and in reference to the economic calculations that accompanied marriage plans, Jutta Sperling, Convents and the Body Politic in Late Renaissance Venice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 21, where Sperling discusses the influence of the sociological study of Marcel Mauss’s early twentieth-century sociological study The Gift on her own thinking about Renaissance Venice.
A strong line of historiographical interpretation within the enormous literature on the “decline of Habsburg Spain” has since the nineteenth century held, furthermore, that sixteenth-century Spain, dominated by aristocratic mores that encouraged disdain for both manual labor and for commercial activity, was neither as culturally nor as intellectually receptive to capitalism as were England, the Netherlands, and Venice in the early modern period. The German economic historian Moritz Julius Bonn, was one of the first to argue this view, in his 1896 study of the role of the so-called Price Revolution in Spain’s decline.\footnote{Moritz Julius Bonn, Spaniens Niedergang während der Preisrevolution des 16. Jahrhunderts. Ein induktiver Versuch zur Geschichte der Quantitätstheorie. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1896, 48-57. Bonn implies that the low esteem in which Spanish hidalgos or noblemen held trade was owing to an association, dating back to the Middle Ages, of such activity with non-noble and even servile status.} Much more recently, in 1972, Ruth Pike argued that the nobility of Seville was indeed willing to participate in economic activity as merchants. But Pike argues that they were willing to do so reluctantly, without great enthusiasm, viewing such activity as a necessary stepping-stone to the acquisition of wealth which, in turn, would lead to the ultimate goal: the acquisition of further noble titles.\footnote{Ruth Pike, Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the Sixteenth Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), 99-100, where Pike also stresses the doctrine of limpieza de sangre [purity of blood, the racialist doctrine developed in Spain by those worried about the supposed menace of the “secret” Jews], and reminds us that Jewish origins were commonly associated in Spain with trading. For more on the Spanish aristocratic resistance to trade, see James Casey, Early Modern Spain: A Social History (New York: Routledge, 1999).}

But if the Spanish had no sustained economic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, still the Ottomans had no wish to alienate their Greek subjects by ruling with too heavy a hand in Greece. In this situation, in areas where neither the Spanish, nor the Ottomans, nor Venice were interested in direct rule, small non-state forms of political organization proliferated among some peoples, such as the Uskoks of Senj (or Segna), whose form of organization may be described as tribal. And other bands of irregular fighters and raiders, Greeks, Albanians, and “Dalmatians,”
came into being, their goal being to fight to reclaim autonomy from the Turks— and, for some, from Venice as well.\footnote{Catherine Wendy Bracewell, \textit{The Uskoks of Senj} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 86-87, quoting at 87 from \textit{Historijski Arhiv, Zadar} (Croatia), \textit{Fond Sime Ljubica}, 2/33: 282: “These [Venetian] subjects have been the cause of all the problems, because with their knowledge of the area and of navigation they guide the others in their piracy, and infest places where they would never have gone, had they not come from there themselves.” The toponym Dalmatia and its adjectival form “Dalmatian” refer respectively to the land, and then to inhabitants of what is now part of both modern-day Slovenia and Croatia on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and includes its hinterland, which was contested between Venice and the Ottomans.} The list of sixteenth-and early seventeenth century revolts against Ottoman rule in Albania, Dalmatia and the Greek lands is long. Such historians as Hassiotis, Tovar Llorente, Kyrris, and Papadopoulos have discussed many of them.\footnote{Especially important are the articles by Kostas Kyrris, “Armées Locales et Luttes de Libération en Chypre, “1570-1670,” \textit{Actes du IIe Congrès International des Études du Sud-Est Européen} (Athens: International Association of Southeast European Studies, 1981), 175-89.} Spain actively encouraged a number of these insurrections, and though results were never more than modest, Spain also acceded to the petitions of a number of rebels and would-be rebels, such as Petros Lantzas and Bishop Neophyros of Mani, as well as to petitions from other Christians formerly enslaved by the Ottomans who were now eager to enter Spanish service, asking for maintenance grants to support themselves, on the grounds that these petitioners had done their part to aid Christendom.\footnote{The numerous petitions for pensions or stipends addressed to Spanish officials collected by Hassiotis in \textit{‘Ισπανικά Ἐγγραφά τῆς Κυπριακῆς Ιστορίας}, as well as idem, \textit{Πηγές τῆς Κυπριακῆς ιστορίας απὸ το Ισπανικό αρχείο Simancas} [Sources of Cypriot History from the Spanish Archive of Simancas] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000), divide, in their majority, into two categories: those requested by escaped slaves from Ottoman lands, originally Christian, and those requesting aid in carrying out uprisings. Examples of the former are documents 33, i and ii, pp. 134-140, in \textit{Πηγές}, and of the latter, \textit{Ισπανικά Εγγραφά}, document 29, pp. 47-49.}

As I have mentioned, Spain had between 1492 and the late sixteenth century made a considerably greater investment in North Africa than in the eastern Mediterranean. In order to protect Spanish Italy and Iberia, Spain had undertaken the establishment of forts in critical places: Oran, Peñon de Velez, and Melilla were considered as integral to the defense of Spain as
fortified outposts on the northern coast of North Africa. These forts were manned partly by convicts, rarely had garrisons exceeding a few hundred, and because their situation was always precarious, surrounded as they were by potential enemies, both the military and financial risks Spain assumed in building them were considerable. Spain was also invested in the long-term attempt to redeem Christian captives in North Africa. Algiers alone likely held, at any given time during the last quarter of the sixteenth century, at least 25,000 Christian captives, and this number only increased in the seventeenth century.\footnote{Ellen G. Friedman, “Christian Captives at “Hard Labor” in Algiers, 16th-18th Centuries,” \textit{International Journal of African Historical Studies} 13 (1980), 616-632.} Not only were many of the enslaved Christians from Iberia – posterity remembers best a certain Miguel Saavedra y Cervantes, who spent five years enslaved in Algiers – but so were many, and perhaps most, of the friars of the Trinitarian and Mercedarian orders who collected funds to redeem these slaves from the so-called \textit{baños} or slave barracks of North Africa, and return them to life in Christendom.\footnote{An indispensable source for descriptions of these slave \textit{baños} is the \textit{Topografia de Argel}, once commonly thought to be by Diego de Haedo, but now quite convincingly identified as by the Portuguese, Dr. Antonio de Sosa. See \textit{Topografia de Argel} (Madrid: Ramona Velasco, 1927-29). In 1656, Felipe Palermo, a Spanish captive in Algiers, estimated that there were 35,000 Christian captives in the city: \textit{Archivo General Simancas, Seccion Cruzada, Legajo 286}, September 5, 1656, cited in Ellen G. Friedman, “Trinitarian Hospitals in Algiers: an Early Example of Health Care for Prisoners of War,” \textit{Catholic Historical Review} 66 (1980), 551.} Transporting the friars to North Africa, and bringing captives back safely, too, involved a massive effort led in part by the Church, in part by Spanish officials. Spain could not commit herself to the Netherlands, the Spanish Indies of the New World and the Pacific, and to outposts and redemption schemes in North Africa and, at the same time, give a great deal, much less her full attention, to the eastern Mediterranean. The latter ranked low on the list of Spanish priorities. In addition, given the icy state of Spanish-Venetian relations in the early seventeenth century, culminating in the uproar in Venice in 1618 over an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the Venetian government, a growing gulf between the two former allies (in the Holy League during
the Cyprus War) was to be expected. Though it is likely that this “conspiracy,” allegedly led by
the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis of Bedmar, had never really formed at all, this episode
contributed to the distrust between the two powers, and made it less likely that Spain would go
out of her way to help Venice recapture distant Cyprus.\textsuperscript{403}

These divisions among Catholic powers continued to be evident when, in the early
seventeenth century, custodianship of the Christian Holy Places in Ottoman-ruled Palestine
became the subject of heated debate. France assumed, together with Venice, an important place
in the discussion. Despite the longstanding interest of Armenian and other Eastern Christian
constituencies in maintaining a presence in the Holy Land and to have a say in the control of its
Holy Places, it was clear that Latin Catholic powers had become the dominant forces in the
ecclesiastical guardianship (shared with the Oriental churches) of the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and in certain other sites in the Holy Land. Louis XIII of France (r.
1610-43) was especially interested in this subject and in 1623 made it one of the central duties of
his newly-appointed consul in Jerusalem, Jean Lempereur.\textsuperscript{404} It was, however, equally clear that
Spain was not interested in taking a major role in this guardianship.\textsuperscript{405} She was overcommitted
elsewhere in Europe and, especially, involved with her colonial empire around the world, and
Spain’s rulers may have reasoned that ambitious popes were in any case already deeply engaged
in organizing Catholic efforts to maintain a presence in the Near East, including the Holy Land.

\textsuperscript{403} That Bedmar collected many spies around him is documented in the Spanish archives, e.g. \textit{ASim Estado,

\textsuperscript{404} Correspondence on this subject between Louis XIII and his ambassador to Constantinople is published in
Antoine Rabbath, \textit{Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire du Christianisme en Orient} (New York: AMS Press,

\textsuperscript{405} See the study by Michele Piccirillo, \textit{La Custodia di Terra Santa e l'Europa}. (Rome: Il Veltro, 1983), for historical
notes on relations between the major Catholic powers of early modern Europe and this area.
In spite of such neglect of the holiest sites of Christianity on the part of the Most Catholic Kings, as the Spanish rulers were known, the Cypriot Orthodox continued to look to distant Spain for potential aid, a testament to the powerful image Spain continued to project in this period. The Greek Orthodox would not forget the inferior position into which their people had been thrust in Constantinople after 1453 and then, after 1571, on Cyprus too, even as they observed how not only Ottoman but also Latin Christian commercial prosperity developed around them. And in the Orthodox areas of the Balkans, as Traian Stoianovich argued long ago in a famous article, many Orthodox merchants, Greek, Slav, Albanian and “other,” in this period did very well under Ottoman rule.⁴⁰⁶ On Cyprus, by contrast, as in many areas of Greece, most Orthodox languished in poverty. The tax burden was heavy, literacy was low, and those Cypriots who wanted to build lives as merchants appear sensibly to have chosen to migrate to Western Europe.⁴⁰⁷

The emphasis laid by defenders of the Ottoman regime on the new freedom enjoyed by the Cypriot Orthodox after 1571 should not obscure the evidence that all Christian Cypriots faced a difficult situation, and the pressure to put aside any anti-Latin views and unembarrassedly beg for Western help could be strong. As with the Roman Church, the Orthodox Church had a tradition of inculcating submission to the worldly powers that be, but the fall of Constantinople had made submission to rulers of an alien creed a discomfiting reality, and so obedience was not uniformly evident. Greek rebels, and even mere bandits, entered popular literature as heroes throughout the Greek world, the Robin Hoods of their time and place. Still, 


⁴⁰⁷ For example, the Michael Demarikos whose activities have been described by Despina Vlassi, “Η Δωρεά του Κυπριου Μεγαλεμπορα Μιχαηλ Δημαρικου του Πετρου στην Ελληνικη Αδελφωτητα Βενετιας (1608-1614),” in *Cipro-Venezia*, ed. Chryssa Maltezou (Venice: Greek Institute of Byzantine and Postbyzantine Studies, 2002), 217-237.
we lack evidence for a written tradition among the Greek Orthodox in this period advocating resistance to unlawful political authority, comparable to that of the Monarchomachs in France, political thinkers in this period (the late sixteenth century) who defended the principle that tyrannical monarchs could legitimately be resisted, and even deposed. Yet consideration of behavior, in addition to the written record, suggests that some ideas of resistance to authority were indeed present and even widespread.\footnote{Studies devoted to Greek political thought, independent, that is, of that limited category that is ecclesiastical politics, are virtually nonexistent for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, for the Orthodox, Rumanian-speaking principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, where many Greeks settled in the early modern period, there is Nicolae Iorga, \textit{Byzance après Byzance}, 84-91, and a study indebted to the approach of Iorga, Dumitru Nastase, \textit{L’héritage imperial byzantin dans l’art et l’histoire des pays roumains} (Milan: Fondation Dragan, 1976.)} So rebellious were the Greeks that the Western European powers could not possibly accommodate all their requests for aid in rising up. Over a decade after the fall of Famagusta, after the truce of 1580 – and on the verge of appointing a new, and, as it turned out, successful commander, the duke of Parma, for the military theater that most interested him, the Netherlands – Philip II showed in a letter that he simply did not want to be distracted by the affairs of the Greeks any longer. Responding to an appeal from the Greeks of Maina in 1582, he wrote,

To take on new enterprises, given that this one is at the point it is [the campaign to suppress the Dutch Revolt], and taking up so much business, your Holiness can now judge, if this is something that I can embark upon, unless everything needed were given to me, since one can turn with bravery but poorly in more than one direction at one time. Let this remain the answer to this proposal from the Greeks of the Morea, whom you said that His Holiness has begun to listen to...\footnote{Archivio General de Simancas, Estado, legajo 946, f. 229: “...Encargarme de empresas nuevas teniendo ésta en el punto en questà [las cosas de Flandes] y consumiendo tanta hazienda, juzgue agora su Sd. si es cosa que yo puedo hazerla si no fuera dándome todo lo necess para ellas, que a un tiempo mal se puede acudir gallardamente a más de una parte...Con esto queda respondida aquella propuesta de los Griegos de la Morea a que dezís que su Sd. comenzó a dar aydos...” Quoted in Antonio Tovar Llorente, “Una petición de socorro de los griegos de Maina a Felipe II en 1584-85,” \textit{Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia} 142 (1958), 363.}
Concerning Cyprus, a basic characteristic of the correspondence so far published of Christian Cypriots with the Spanish kings is that it appears to have been remarkably one-sided. While many Cypriots wrote to the kings, no responses of the Spanish kings, if they wrote any, have been found.\textsuperscript{410} However, it is possible that they did write some, but that they have not been preserved. They may have been destroyed, or the Spanish kings may have wished not to commit themselves in the delicate question of Cyprus, knowing as they did by the 1590s that Savoy and Venice had embarked on a propaganda war as to which of them had a stronger legal claim to the island. Why should Spain fight the Ottomans for territory that would then be claimed by others in the Latin West, and with, presumably, better title that Spain?

And the very fact that the Cypriots were reaching out to Spain, imploring its aid, despite the traditional Orthodox antipathy to Latin-rite worshippers, must have been taken to mean that for the Orthodox under Ottoman rule on Cyprus, conditions were grim. What else to make of a letter addressed to Philip III in 1609 by the Orthodox Bishop of Solea and Kyrenia addressing him as “Holy and Catholic King,” and begging him for succor from the Ottomans? This interpretation can apply likewise to another appeal from 1611 by the same Orthodox bishop, who could praise Philip III as \textit{ενδρέωμα τῆς ὑπερθέουσας πίστεως Χριστού}, “courageous one of the orthodox worship of Christ.”\textsuperscript{411} Here too, the response, if there was any, has not been found. Later, in 1613, the Cypriot Ioannes Agiamavra wrote to King Philip III,\textsuperscript{412} and mentioned another plot to take back Cyprus with the help of the Viceroy of Naples, the count of Benavente. After this, Agiamavra mentions earlier plans for a reconquest of Cyprus that he had discussed

\textsuperscript{410} As confirmed through correspondence with Prof. Ioannes K. Hassiotis of Thessaloniki, May 2011.

\textsuperscript{411} Ἐσπανικά Εγγράφα, 59.

\textsuperscript{412} Hassiotis, Πηγές τῆς Κυπριακῆς ιστορίας απὸ το Ισπανικό αρχείο Simancas, 153-4.
with Pope Paul V (r. 1605-21), and Cosimo, Duke of “Florenzia” [technically, by this date, Grand Duke of Tuscany].

According to this letter, Agiamavra, who had resided in Italy since the Ottoman conquest, was on the verge of being sent to Cyprus from Naples on a reconnaissances mission to discuss with Cypriot clergy the prospects for a successful rebellion, with the approval of Benavente, when “some men” came to the court of Naples bearing “false reports” [“falsas relaciones”], apparently with the purpose of discrediting Agiamavra by claiming that he had offered this same enterprise to the dukes of Florence and Savoy before coming to the viceroy of Naples – a charge Agiamavra firmly denied. What was at stake was not only his reputation but more concretely his own allowance, from the government of Naples, of “25 escudos per month which are owed to his wife, his mother and his aunt.”413 Again, this letter, which begs for money, like so many others from Cypriots in this period, seems to have gone unanswered, but that the King of Spain continued to be the object of such importuning shows how important Spain remained in the early seventeenth century in the plans of many Cypriots, as well as in the plans of other Greeks, for the liberation of their homeland.414

The inability of Spain to generate a military campaign for the reconquest of Cyprus after 1571 tends to confirm the venerable argument that both Charles V and Philip II, despite their energy and the vast resources at their command, were constrained by an excessive number of

413 *Ibid.*: “25 escudos al mes que se deben a su muger, su madre y su tía.”

414 Other Spanish involvement in the area included the seizure by a Neapolitan force of the fortress of Ağaliman in Anatolia, in 1613, and three years later the capture of an Egyptian convoy, as well as a series of raids against Ottoman shipping in the Aegean by the Neapolitan admiral Jacques Pierre, in 1617. B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus Turbatus* (Istanbul: Dutch Archaeological Institute, 1982), Vol. I, 118-9.
military commitments in too many different places, commitments that distracted them and rendered possible success in Cyprus far less certain than it might have been.

This relative inaction reflects as well the continued Spanish perception of, and worry over, an internal threat from the Moriscos, which I have previously noted was exacerbated by the revolt of 1568-71. The Moriscos were, as is well known, eventually expelled, in 1609-11, a measure that was denounced by some in Spain even at the time. But the Ottomans and their regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, were adept enough at manipulating Spanish fears both of an invasion from North Africa, and of the incessant corsair raids from Barbary, to render serious Spanish attempts to strike at the Ottomans further east in this period a risky and an unaffordable indulgence. Others, aside from Cypriots, were making appeals for Spanish aid. And among them were not only Christians, but at least one local North African leader opposed to Ottoman rule. It appears that during the major tribal rebellion against Ottoman authority in Tripolitania in 1588, its leader, Yahya ibn Yahya al-Suwaidi, hoped for Spanish aid. It is true that, as already noted, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf fell under Spanish control after 1580, and continued as an Iberian outpost until 1622, but Hormuz was not a conquest the Spanish had undertaken themselves. It was, rather, a territory that had been inherited from the Western power that had first seized it, Portugal. The appeals for action to Spain made after 1580 from Greeks both on and outside Cyprus went largely unanswered, with a few exceptions. One was the

415 Notably by Pedro de Valencia, who argued that the universal dignity of man militated against expulsion, and that the Moriscos should instead mingle with and intermarry with Old Christians. See Benjamin Ehlers, Between Christians and Moriscos: Juan de Ribera and Religious Reform in Valencia 1568-1614 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 126.

416 Archivio General de Simancas-Estado 1090, f. 124, Naples, September 18, 1589, cited in Hess, Forgotten Frontier, 238 n. 52.
Spanish sack of Neokastro in the Peloponnese in 1603. Further exceptions to the general Spanish uninvolvement were the acts between 1610 and 1620, previously mentioned, of a “maverick” viceroy of Naples and Sicily, the Duke of Osuna who, to offer one example, sent a combined Spanish-Maltese force that took Cos, near the Anatolian coast, in 1611. Osuna, it should be noted, undertook many of his raids on Ottoman lands not according to, but rather against, the wishes of Philip III. Such small uprisings and anti-Ottoman campaigns that were launched were generally undertaken – as previously noted – by the Knights of St. John, based on Malta, or directed by European princes other than the Spanish kings. The seizure of Chios in 1599 and the capture of the fortified Ottoman outpost of Prevesa in western Greece in 1605, for example, were financed, not by the mighty Philip III of Spain (r. 1598-1621), but by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand I de’ Medici, using soldiers from a chivalric order he had founded, the Knights of St. Stephen, and it was also Ferdinand whose forces were responsible for an attack on Famagusta on Cyprus itself, in 1607, led by his bastard son Don Cosimo.


A good summary of the Tuscan campaigns against the Ottomans in 1599-1607 is Hanlon, The Twilight, 39-40. See José M. Floristan Imizcoz, “Fraudes, Prejuicios,” 100. Also see Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 38 ff. I agree with the conclusion of I.K. Hassiotis in “Spanish Policy towards the Greek Insurrectionary Movements of the Early Seventeenth Century,” Actes du IIe Congrès International des études du sud-est européen, vol. 3 (Athens: 1972): 313-29, that the Spanish were not willing to undertake military commitments for Christians in the Levant after Lepanto. As was to be expected from a fervently religious state, there were exceptions. Certain Spanish counsellors in this period, such as the Duke of Maqueda, did support military action on behalf of the Greeks:
Habsburg Competition for Orthodox Loyalties

As I suggested in Chapter One, the rival branches of Western Christendom can be seen to have competed, after the Reformation, for the loyalties of the Orthodox. Both Spanish and Imperial Habsburgs had interests in Constantinople, but only the Holy Roman Emperors maintained ambassadors in that city, while Spain relied on spies and less formal means of staying informed.\textsuperscript{420} And though the Emperors remained Catholic throughout the religious wars in Europe, a succession of chaplains present at the imperial embassy in Constantinople were Protestant, since they ministered to an ambassador, David von Ungnad, who was himself a Lutheran. One of these chaplains, Stephan Gerlach, formed warm relations with the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias II (r. 1565-72). Through Gerlach, Jeremias began to correspond with a group of Lutheran theologians at the University of Tübingen, most importantly Martin Crusius, whose \textit{Turcograecia} is an invaluable source for the state of knowledge in German academic circles about Greek letters. The writings of Crusius can be considered a stage in the development of a historical understanding, in Europe, of a distinction between pagan and Christian Greek history. Gerlach himself maintained a diary which noted the details of several visits to the Patriarch and his ecclesiastical seat, the so-called Pammakaristos Church. Such a detailed description of the daily activities of the Patriarchal court – either by a Westerner or a

Greek – is unique for this period. All of these relations show how low-level cultural relations could push the Orthodox of Constantinople into Western doctrinal disputes and towards various camps, Protestant and Catholic, into which Western Europe was now sundered.

Thus, although neither the Catholic Habsburgs of the Holy Roman Empire, who were engaged with the Ottomans on land, nor their cousins the Spanish made any firm commitment to the reconquest of Cyprus between 1571 and 1670, they, and other Catholics, naturally would have preferred that the Greeks move into a Catholic cultural orbit rather than a Protestant one. So strong was their worry about were Protestant currents in Germany in the 1570s that even Philip’s cousin Maximilian II, the Holy Roman Emperor, was theologically suspect. It is an irony of history that, while the Spanish kings worked to buttress Catholicism against the inroads of the Reformation in Europe, the theological influences emanating from the Habsburg-ruled Empire, Catholic and with its rulers related to the Spanish kings, played a large role in undermining Catholic efforts to win Greek loyalties. By the early seventeenth century, Cyril Lucaris (who reigned for six separate “terms” between 1612 and 1638), the Orthodox Patriarch of

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421 Matei Cazacu, “Le Patriarcat de Constantinople Dans la Vision de Stephan Gerlach (1573-1578),” Dossiers Byzantins 7 (1996) 369-86. My contention that Lutherans, Catholics and Calvinists and, later, other Western denominations such as the Anglicans, competed for the loyalties of the Orthodox is similar to the conclusion of Gerhard Podskalsky in his chapter “Die Orthodoxie im Spannungsfeld der Konfessionen,” in Griechische Orthodoxie im Zeit der Türkenherrschaft 1453-1821 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 181-329. Numerous Greeks, such as the Cypriot missionary Neophyto Rhodinos and the would-be insurgent Dionysius of Larissa, at different points in their adult lives moved between divergent theological tendencies. It may be that the full breadth of this movement becomes clear only when one carries the story forward to the eighteenth century, as Podskalsky does, or even to 1788, when Archimandrite Kyprianos published his History of the Island of Cyprus. Still, many Cypriots whom most theologians would now consider Orthodox, and little-known to most Europeanist historians, took a strong interest in Western theology already in the century after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, such as Athanasius Rhetor (1571-1663), who studied in a Jesuit school in Constantinople under the auspices of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Timotheos II: see Podskalsky, op. cit., 191.

422 Maximilian II permitted his non-Catholic subjects to compose the Confession of Bohemia in 1576, an attempt at finding common theological ground with Catholics, and it has sometimes been alleged that he harbored Reformed ideas himself. Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 40.
Constantinople, was himself suspected, with justification, of Calvinist sympathies, and a detailed report by the Franciscan missionaries to Cyprus in 1661 singles out on a list of “Impediments to the holy faith and its needs” – *Impedimenti alla santa fede et bisogni* – the danger posed by “the heretic Calvinists and Lutherans, who are here, whom the simple folk do not distinguish.”

**Conclusion: The Spanish Kings Seen as Avatars of the Byzantine Emperors**

Trying to get at, or inside, Cypriot political thinking from this period in any detail remains a challenge. In the absence of systematic treatises, little choice exists but to tease out some sense of the political ideas that the Cypriots in the early Ottoman period inherited from the past by studying texts of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – and Cypriot texts from this period are rare. The Byzantine Empire centered on Constantinople until 1453 had, in the popular view, assigned a position of central significance to its emperors. The division of roles between the emperors and the Patriarchs of Constantinople was not altogether different from that between emperors and popes in the West but, as Gilbert Dagron has noted, the Byzantine emperors were far more entangled with the theology and deep religiosity of Byzantium than was the case with emperors and kings in Western Europe. In the West, the ruler’s role was often conceived of as that of the wielder of the sword of authority in this world, executing the justice of that above. But spiritual authority was claimed by the popes, and even temporal had not been uncontested; in addition, the Holy Roman Emperors never enjoyed the centralized authority in

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423 “*Li heretici Calvinisti et Luterani che vi sono che li semplici non distinguono.*” Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Ανεκδοτά Εγγραφά από Τούς Αρχιερείς του Βατικανού, 1625-1667* [Unpublished Documents from the Vatican Archive, 1625-1667] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973), 171.
their western realms that the Byzantine emperors did at the height of Byzantine prestige. The coronations of Byzantine emperors were, furthermore, replete with ritual that conveyed the central role of the Emperors in executing the will of God upon Earth. Not only did the Byzantine emperors exercise some sacerdotal functions, but they appointed bishops and metropolitans and also showed themselves both willing and able to remove them, too, all the way up the hierarchy to the Patriarchs themselves. Despite efforts by some to argue that we should dispense with the term Caesaropapism, no better descriptive term has emerged to describe this dual role of the Byzantine emperors.

After the Third Crusade of 1190-93 and the Fourth Crusade of 1203-4, increasing numbers of Greek-speaking Orthodox became used to being ruled by Latin rulers. That included the Greeks on Cyprus. Some of these Latin rulers proved to be capable, and succeeded over long periods in defending their subjects against both external threats and internal unrest. But until 1453, in some places, as on Crete, where Venice assumed control in 1211 and would govern until 1669, there is some evidence that the Greek-speaking masses continued to demonstrate loyalty to the Byzantine emperors. Dimitris Tsougarakis has recently described the dedications, from the 1260s to the 1340s, in medieval Cretan churches to the Byzantine emperors – from a period, that is, long after the establishment of a Venetian regime. On Cyprus, by contrast, it appears that from 1191 on there was no expression of loyalty to Byzantine emperors in church dedications. But there was not any such expression of loyalty to the Venetian regime, either, the

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425 *Idem*, “Ceremonial and memory,” and “Caesaropapism,” chaps. 3 and 9 in *Emperor and Priest*, 84-124 and 282-312. The Russian czars would also, in later centuries, be importuned as potential deliverers by the Greek-speakers, with the difference that the czars were aligned with Greek and not Latin theology.

visual symbols of which – such as stone lions clutching the pennant of St. Mark – remained confined to the Latin churches in the major towns.\textsuperscript{427}

The appeals of Cypriot Orthodox to the Spanish kings for support after the Ottoman conquest, then, were not being directed towards a Greek-speaking prince, for there was no powerful Greek prince to whom to make such an appeal, but, rather, towards a mighty prince on the edge of the Western Mediterranean who, though not Orthodox, was nonetheless a Christian. During the Middle Ages, Latins and Greeks had often fought as allies, either against the Saracens, or the Bulgarians – and had done so even during the confusing period when the Byzantine imperial house made attempts, between 1204 and 1261, to regain Constantinople from its Latin conquerors.\textsuperscript{428} Such an alliance was therefore quite consonant with medieval political precedents. But there was, on the other hand, the long history of Greek-Latin conflict in many places in the so-called Latin Orient. This conflict had been written of early on, already noted in chronicles of the twelfth century, such as that of the Byzantine princess Anna Comnena (1083-1153). She described the tensions in Constantinople when Western knights passed through her capital on their way to the First Crusade.\textsuperscript{429} As mentioned in Chapter One, the Latin-Greek

\textsuperscript{427} See Camille Enlart, \textit{Gothic Art in Renaissance Cyprus}, 70-71, where he discerns little Venetian symbolism or influence in Cypriot art outside the wooden furniture – pulps and wood-carvings – fashioned for churches. Also, Andreas and Judith Stylianou, “Donors and Dedicatory Inscriptions in Cyprus,” \textit{Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft} 9 (1960): 97-128, offer examples ranging from the Lusignan to the early Venetian period. Dedications on Latin-ruled Cyprus do not seem to have referred to the current rulers nor, even before 1453 – when such references would naturally cease – to the Byzantine emperors.

\textsuperscript{428} John Vatatzes, for example, Greek Emperor of Nicaea (r. 1222-1254), who coveted the Latin Empire of Constantinople, made an alliance with the German Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, a Latin, and married Frederick’s daughter. Vatatzes also negotiated with Pope Innocent IV, offering union with the Roman Church in exchange for the surrender of the Latin Empire to himself. George Ostrogorsky, \textit{History of the Byzantine State}, trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 441.

\textsuperscript{429} Anna Comnena, \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1969): 325, where she refers to her father, Alexius I, receiving the Latin army in his capital with infinite patience, “knowing of old the haughty temper of the Latins.”
tension was greatly exacerbated by the Latin conquest and sack of Constantinople in 1204. And
in the seventeenth century, as previously noted, the Catholic missionaries write occasionally of
the still-simmering hatred of the Greeks for Latins on Cyprus. In light of these considerations,
the temptation for the historian is to regard the numerous Cypriot appeals to Spain as the
attempts of men willing to do anything to save themselves, even ally with those whom
theologically they deeply despised as schismatics. I think this is an oversimplification.\textsuperscript{430}

In this chapter, I have examined how the Orthodox perceived Spain in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, as well as vice versa. I have argued that Spain’s real, as well as symbolic
significance to Orthodox both on Cyprus and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire was as the
mighty Christian sword that could free them from a sort of Babylonian Captivity.\textsuperscript{431} Unlike
Venice, Spain was not a land whose people had ever exhibited special understanding or
appreciation of Greek language or culture. And symbolic roles, in an age of slow
communication, were hugely important in determining how peoples perceived each other. Such
symbolic roles were also slow to be modified in the collective imagination. Thus I must agree
with José Floristan Imizcoz that after 1580 “[i]f up to then the Spanish monarchs did not show
themselves very favorable to intervening in the territories of old Byzantium, from then on they
would be even less so.”\textsuperscript{432} But we should nevertheless consider Spain as belonging to that line of

\textsuperscript{430} See above, 14.

\textsuperscript{431} Hence the title of Steven Runciman’s study of the Orthodox community in the late Byzantine and Ottoman

\textsuperscript{432} José M. Floristan Imizcoz, “Los Contactos,” II, 62: “\textit{Si hasta entonces los monarcas españoles no se habían
mostrado muy propicios a intervenir en los territorios de la antigua Bizancio, todavía lo serán menos a partir de
ahora.”
foreign powers that have had an effect on the destiny of Cypriots, and in the case of Spain, did so at a crucial point in the island’s history. Greek Cypriots began to realize that what tied them to the West was a shared Christianity. This aspect of their identity assumed a prominence it had not possessed before. It was during the Cyprus War, and in the decades immediately following, that the main modern ethnic-religious division on Cyprus, that between “Greek Cypriot” and “Turkish Cypriot,” began to take shape. The division has led, in a not-always-direct line, to conflict on the island in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish Cypriot communities between 1963 and 1969, and the army of the Republic of Turkey intervened and conquered the northern third of the island in 1974, and that army remains there still. This is a leap forward by many centuries from the period under consideration, but it implies a look back at that very period.

In the next chapter, I shall examine the significance of France and Savoy, and briefly, that of the Knights of Malta, other Catholic powers that could lay claim to defending Christians living under Ottoman rule in this period. And these were European powers, moreover, that were regarded with hope, for at least the first century of Ottoman rule, by the Cypriot Orthodox. But for the moment, in focussing on Spain, I have sought to show that for the Greek Cypriots between 1571 and 1660, as for other Orthodox under Ottoman rule, the military aspect of the relationship was exclusive, or nearly so. This was a difference from their links with Venice and France, where they encountered ideas and a religious and cultural environment that were congenial to their own. The status of Venice as a cultural cousin for the Orthodox had been recognized even before 1453 and the wave of Greek refugees that followed the Fall of

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433 The brothers Giovanni Maria (Juan Maria) and Giorgio (Jorge) Boustronios are among the few Cypriots who sought refuge in Spain – see Paschalis Kitromilides, *Kypriake Logiosyne, 1571-1878* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2006).
Constantinople. The Orthodox bishop Sylvester Syropoulos, who is one of our main sources for the events of the Council of Ferrara-Florence that attempted to reunify the Eastern and Western Churches between 1439 and 1446, could write of Venice in the 1440s that it was a wonder to behold, a paradise on earth.\[434\] I know of no similar description written by a Greek about Spain in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, and it is difficult to believe that the Greeks would not have found Spain backwards by comparison with Venice. The letters pertaining to Greek and specifically to Cypriot affairs in the Spanish archives at Simancas are, similarly, far more concerned with the military uprisings by Cypriots that Spain could support, and with examples of the arbitrariness and cruelty of Turkish government, than with “cultural” matters such as are discussed in the Franciscan missionary correspondence from Cyprus.

One more theme provides a way to connect the dots linking medieval and post-French Revolution European attitudes towards the Greeks. The word *philhellenism* is sometimes reduced to signify an aesthetic sympathy for Greeks of the present (that “present” depending on the period under discussion) that connects to, and would not exist without, a consciousness of the achievements of the Greeks of classical antiquity. Such philhellenism can, as with Lord Byron, lead to the embrace of a contemporaneous political cause and political action. In Byron’s celebrated case, this meant fighting for Greek independence once the revolution against Ottoman rule caught fire in 1821. But perhaps we could describe, as a different meaning of philhellenism, the desire of Spaniards, though fiercely Catholic, no longer merely to study the works of the ancient Greeks, but also, because of the Cyprus War and the Ottoman threat, to actively help the Greeks of their own day, heirs, as was increasingly recognized, of a Christian, albeit Greek-

speaking, imperial tradition. Spaniards and other Western Europeans were slowly coming to think that this tradition contained elements worthy of admiration. This required ignorance of, or studied indifference to, that part of Byzantine political and theological traditions that, undeniably, also contained a strong current of hostility to the papacy since at least the late seventh century.\textsuperscript{435} In part, both the Reformation and the Council of Trent stimulated an outward-looking Catholicism that was more conscious than before (particularly as printed books and news-sheets could spread more widely) of the international reputation of the Church, and of its would-be defenders. Philip II could not convincingly claim to be the Most Catholic King, in the tradition of his great-grandparents Ferdinand and Isabella, who had completed the \textit{Reconquista}, which put an end to a period when many Christians had lived in the Iberian peninsula under Arab or Berber rule, were he to have turned a blind eye to new reports of the oppression of Christians – of whatever sect – under Ottoman rule.

Given the love for classical Greek, and for that miscellaneous mix of literary, topographical, and onomastic lore that was a marked feature of classical scholarship throughout Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one may ask whether there was a substantial gulf between \textit{érudits} who studied such classical material on the one hand, and statesmen and soldiers of the type of Don Juan of Austria, or even of his half-brother Philip II, who did not possess deep learning, but were known for dealing swiftly and competently with military, political and economic affairs. Men such as the celebrated grammarian Antonio de Nebrija (who wrote the first grammar of a vulgar tongue in Europe), for example, who exhibited a deep appreciation for ancient Greek thought and literature, exerted no influence on the

formation of Spanish foreign policy. I have stressed this apparent lack of cultural sympathy as a way to set off by contrast Spain’s full commitment to the Holy League intended to liberate Cyprus, and her continuing interest in the Christian peoples. Recent historiography of the Cyprus conquest written from the Ottoman standpoint, which I have mentioned in the Introduction, has stressed the pan-Islamic character of concern among Muslims for the fate of Cyprus: the Moriscos of Spain had reason to take an interest in the war, for example, since in his correspondence with them the Ottoman sultan, Selim II, appeared to promise that after conquering Cyprus he would come to their rescue. There was also, in this same period, what might be called a pan-Christian viewpoint on this question, one which stands in danger of being forgotten. The Christian concern for Cyprus, on the part of Latins as well as the Orthodox, was felt, and demonstrated in different ways and degrees, all the way from one end of the Mediterranean to the other.

436 That this was at least a possibility is suggested by the debate held in Spain over what Christian morality demanded should be the proper treatment of the New World Indians, a debate into which Spanish Aristotelian scholars were drawn. For classical scholarship in Spain in this period, see the papers in José Maria Maestre, Joaquín Pascual Barea, and Luis Charlo Brea, eds., Humanismo y pervivencia del mundo clásico: homenaje al profesor Antonio Prieto, IV (Alcañiz: Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos, 2008).

Chapter Three: France, Savoy, and Cyprus

The Lusignan Dynasty: Origins of its Rule on Cyprus

To understand later French interest in Cyprus, it makes sense to remember the medieval French past of Cyprus. It was a comital house in Poitou, south-central France, that – having first emerged from obscurity in the tenth century – would supply the island’s most enduring French connection.\footnote{For the pre-Cypriot history of the Lusignan, see Chanoine Pascal, 
*Histoire de la Maison Royale de Lusignan* (Paris: Léon Vanier, 1896) : 1-11.} Prior to their gaining the Cypriot throne in 1192, the Lusignan counts had enjoyed a modest position among the French medieval houses, buttressed, however, by the crusading feats of arms of certain members of the family. In 1101 Count Hugues VI de Lusignan “le Diable,” (the Devil) also known as “le Brun,” (the Brown-haired), accompanied Duke William IX of Aquitaine on crusade and by so doing, added to the prestige of the family. The family’s fortunes, however, rose even more dramatically when a later capable paterfamilias, Guy de Lusignan (1129-94), accompanied Richard I of England on the Third Crusade (1187-93). It appears that Richard sold Cyprus to Guy of Lusignan in 1192 because he was the nearest available noble willing to pay the price, and not because of any particular fondness on Richard's part for Guy or his house, nor special gratitude for the service Guy had rendered to the English king. Richard had first tried to sell Cyprus to the Templars, but the fractious Greek “archons” or nobles of the island caused too much trouble, and they restored it to Richard when they found they were incapable of pacifying the island, and Guy de Lusignan was next to be given his chance to try by Richard. The transition to Lusignan rule on the island was far from smooth, as a
revolt broke out in 1191-92 among the Greeks. But the Lusignan dynasty managed to carve out for itself a kingdom that at times even flourished, and which maintained a steady flow of contacts with Western European Christendom. Some Lusignan legal institutions, such as the Cour des Bourgeois and the Cour du Raïs, proved so useful that they were retained by the Venetians after 1489.

The significance of Cyprus within the Mediterranean in the late medieval period was substantial, and included both economic and military-strategic components. As Peter Edbury has pointed out, Famagusta, Cyprus’ main port, on the eastern coast, was in 1300 one of the leading emporia in the Mediterranean, as judged by the volume of trade passing through its harbor. From the Third Crusade on, Cyprus became a bridgehead for subsequent Latin attempts to reconquer the Holy Land. During this period Cypriot literature flourished, as close contact between Greeks and their Latin overlords enabled cross-fertilization between French littérature chevaleresque and the Byzantine courtly literary traditions. Thus the Latins and Greeks coexisted on Cyprus, socially as well as through overlapping or shared literary interests, on terms that may have been more equal than elsewhere in the Latin Orient. Chris Schabel has reminded


440 Benjamin Arbel, “Urban Assemblies in Frankish and Venetian Cyprus,” in Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th-16th Centuries (Ashgate: Variorum, 2000), IV, 207.

441 Peter Edbury, “Famagusta in 1300,” in Nicholas Coureas and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds. Cyprus and the Crusades (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 337-53.


us that although the number of Greek bishoprics was reduced on Cyprus after 1260, they were not abolished altogether as they were in the Latin-ruled Peloponnese and on Crete. Instead, a parallel system of Latin and Greek clerical hierarchies grew up, a less extreme change than took place in Crete and the Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{444} The influence of French culture continued on Cyprus, as countless members of the upper Latin clergy were drawn from the French-speaking regions of Europe.\textsuperscript{445} Middle French remained an important language at the royal court of Cyprus, and is the language in which the thirteenth-century Ibelin court historian Philip of Novara composed his \textit{Gestes des Chiprois}.\textsuperscript{446}

In 1468, the so-called \textit{Livre des Remembrances de la Secrète du Royaume de Chypre} was published, a work that summarized the laws of the kingdom and recalled its crusader roots.\textsuperscript{447} The \textit{Secrète} supplies an example of those many laws and legal institutions of the Lusignan period that continued to be used in the Venetian period. This institution can perhaps be described as the \textit{royal fisc} for the Lusignan period, and \textit{state fisc} for the Venetian. Staffed at first by ten \textit{secrétains}, the \textit{Secrète} preserved records concerning the lands, revenues, and taxes on Cyprus. Through this and other institutions, the Venetians kept careful track of their subjects on the island – although some of the details of this process are not known, since the Ottomans


\textsuperscript{445} For examples, see Christopher Schabel, “The Latin Bishops of Cyprus, 1255-1313, with a note on Bishop Neophyto of Solea,” \textit{Epeterida} XXX (2004) 75-111.

\textsuperscript{446} The \textit{Gestes des Chiprois} has been published as Philippe de Novare, \textit{Mémoires 1218-43}, ed. Charles Kohler (Paris: Champion, 1970).

\textsuperscript{447} Jean Richard, \textit{Le Livre des Remembrances de la Secrète du Royaume de Chypre} (Nicosia: Centre des Recherches Scientifiques, 1983). The \textit{Secrète} was the royal treasury, taking its name from the Latin \textit{secretum}, something which is stored.
apparently destroyed Venetian records on the island during their invasion. But interestingly, an
early Ottoman register of taxation, the _defter-i mufassal_ or detailed survey of 1572, provides
indirect evidence for the Venetian administration’s interest in the financial details of the island,
particularly that of its agriculture, since it claims to report the taxation figures from the end of the
Venetian period for the major towns and villages of the island. In addition to institutions like
the _Secrète_ and the evidence it provides, the Venetians also employed the Lusignan-era legal
code or system, the _Assizes de Jerusalem_, a crusader-era law code, which the government of
Cyprus translated into Venetian in 1531. Laziness and inertia might have been one reason for
these continuities, but when we consider not only laws but noble titles left over from the
Lusignan/crusader past, it is difficult not to conclude that Venetians saw much to admire in the
Lusignan way of doing things. The depth of detail contained in Venetian sources on the wealth
and agriculture of the island makes clear the intimate and active interest the Venetians took in the
welfare of their subjects when they controlled Cyprus. But, as with all early modern
governments, their ability to supervise and improve agricultural techniques, or to be cognizant of
corruption, especially in remote areas, was slight. During the Lusignan regime on Cyprus the
French kings apparently never made serious attempts to remind the Lusignan on Cyprus of their
Poitevin background and ultimate allegiance to themselves, still less to enforce upon them any
claims on Cyprus as its feudal lord, unlike the interest the kings took at times in both England, in
independent principalities they would incorporate into France such as Brittany, and in southern

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448 Ronald Jennings provides tables showing the level of detail that must have existed in Venetian administrative
records in “The Population, Taxation, and Wealth in the Cities and Villages of Cyprus according to the Detailed
Population Survey (defter-i mufassal) of 1572,” _Journal of Turkish Studies_ 10 (1986), 175-89. A good deal of
documentation has also survived and is now preserved in the Venetian State Archives.
Italy. But Cyprus did play a more limited role in the plans of the French kings in the west. As many scholars have recognized, the French, together with other Westerners, continued to think of Cyprus as a potential staging ground for Crusades against the infidel. In the early 1360s, the French cleric Pierre Thomas, who gained the title Latin patriarch of Constantinople in 1364, became, together with the French chancellor of Cyprus, his friend, Philippe de Mezières, an advocate of a crusade that would use Cyprus as a jumping-off point for a campaign against the Mamluks of Egypt. He got his wish in 1365, when King Peter I did indeed use Cyprus as the staging-ground from whence he launched a naval expedition that was able to sack and burn Alexandria.

The recent popular history of the Lusignan regime on Cyprus by Felice Fileti expresses in modern terms a nostalgia for the Lusignan period, with its heaping of praise upon King Amalric (r. 1194-1205), King Peter I (r. 1358-68) (a “star of exceptional splendor,”) and King James II (r. 1458-73), whom Fileti describes as liberal with donations of money to his followers, a natural leader, and an excellent judge of men. Furthermore, compared with the Venetian period that

449 While, by contrast, dynastic claims were forming in the early fifteenth century in the duchy of Savoy. Elsewhere, considerable bloodshed followed other dynastic claims involving vassals of the King of France: John of Anjou began to press his claims to Naples, for example, in 1459, leading to war with Ferdinand I of Aragon.

450 A title to which the Latin church clung long after the reconquest of Constantinople by Greeks in 1261.


followed, in most early modern chronicles of Cyprus, and leaving aside the pagan past of ancient Cyprus, the Lusignan period also enjoyed the lion’s share of attention from chroniclers and chorographers, such as (unsurprisingly, given his descent from the former royal family of Cyprus) the writer Etienne de Lusignan, in his *Chorograffia* (1573) and *Description* (1580). In his accounts he dwells on this ancient past of Cyprus, through the Roman imperial history of the island, more than on the Venetian period. He devotes little attention to the Byzantine past of the island, nor its brief Arab past between 647 and 965.453

French involvement with Cyprus and the wider Levant, political, economic, and military, did not stop with the end of the French-speaking dynasty of Poitevin origin on Cyprus, but continued through the Venetian period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The French King Charles VIII, for example, who had invaded Italy in 1494-5, planned to use southern Italy as a staging ground for a campaign against Ottoman sultan Bayezid II. At that time, the King demanded that Pope Innocent VIII turn over Bayezid’s brother Cem Sultan, who had been handed over to the pope by the Knights of St. John based on Rhodes, who had in turn been paid by Sultan Bayzeid II to keep him as a permanent, albeit well-treated, prisoner.454 Charles planned to release him to lead a campaign to claim the Ottoman throne and – so Charles hoped – throw

453 More recent historical amnesia, if not more understandable, can at least plead – though not convincingly – the excuse of a longer passage of time since the period of Greek-speaking dominance, making that Greek past easier to overlook than the Venetian: in 1986 the Prime Minister of Turkey, Turgut Özal, claimed of Cyprus that “The island had never been Greek in its history. It belonged to the Venetians and then was taken over by the Ottomans,” as though there were no Cypriot past before the Venetians. *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1996), 7.

the Ottoman dominions into chaos.\textsuperscript{455} Cem enjoyed enough support in the Ottoman realms to pose a real threat to Bayezid’s throne.\textsuperscript{456}

During the reign of Francis I (r. 1515-47) the first warm French relations with the Ottoman Porte developed. In 1535, Francis I sent Jean de La Forêt to Constantinople to gain beneficial terms for French merchants trading in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{457} Among the terms of the agreement was something of non-commercial interest: protection for French pilgrims visiting the Holy Land. Although historians differ as to the precise date, it seems clear that during the sixteenth century, in an attempt to exploit France’s generally cordial relations with the Sublime Porte, the subjects of other Christian countries began to take advantage of the French treaty and to fly the French flag on their ships in Ottoman ports, or otherwise pose as French subjects, sometimes with the tacit aid and support of French ambassadors and consuls.

The unlikely alliance persisted in later decades. During the Cyprus War, the French king, Charles IX (r. 1560-74), maintained his alliance with the Ottomans, and did not join the Holy League to preserve Cyprus for Christendom. In reply to the papal envoys sent to try to convince her to join the League in 1570, Catherine de’Médicis explained that the French king’s position

\textsuperscript{455} Before coming into the custody of Innocent VIII, Cem had lived in France, in the custody of the Grand Master of the Knights Hospitallers, Pierre d’Aubusson, from 1482 to 1489, when he was turned over to Pope Innocent. While living in the Grand Master’s castle in France, Cem lived under the protection, first of Louis XI, then of his successor Charles VIII of France. See Nicolas Vatin, \textit{Sultan Djem: un prince ottoman dans l’Europe du XV\textsuperscript{e} siècle d’après deux sources contemporaines: Vakı'at-i Sultan Cem, Œuvres de Guillaume Caoursin} [Sultan Cem: an Ottoman Prince in the Europe of the Fifteenth Century, according to Two Contemporary Sources: \textit{Deeds of Sultan Cem, Works of Guillaume Caoursin}] (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1997).


\textsuperscript{457} This treaty is reproduced in Ignaz de Testa, \textit{Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères}, Volume I (Paris: Amyot, 1864), 16-21.
was different from that of other rulers, since he was being asked to break with an old friend, while they would only be continuing a war with an old enemy. But, like the Venetians, the French and their Francophone cousins to the southeast, the Dukes of Savoy, did not lose interest in the island after the Ottoman conquest removed Cyprus from Christian hands. I shall in what follows analyze how these Catholic powers, too weak to hope to reconquer Cyprus on their own, played a role in an emerging competition by Western Europeans for the loyalties of Cypriots, and of Greeks more generally. The French historian Géraud Poumarède has illuminated many aspects of what one could call the French imaginary concerning the menace of the “Turks,” but he draws a clear distinction between the crusading movements of the Middle Ages and the successive Holy Leagues against the Turks of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, claiming their impulses and governing ideas were different. I maintain, by contrast, that many actions and writings on the parts of Frenchmen, Savoyards, and the Knights of Malta (an overlapping category, since a very large number of Knights in this period were French in origin) testify to the continued hold of crusading ideas in this period and the continuity linking earlier and later struggles against the infidel. Some took service with the Knights of Malta, the Savoyard Order of Sts. Maurice and Lazarus, and other chivalric orders like the Tuscany-based Knights of St.

458 Other relevant Catholic powers are discussed in other chapters (Venice, the Papacy, Spain, the Knights of Malta, and the predominantly Catholic Uskoks of Senj).


460 Students of the period do not always initially realize that “infidel” and its cognates were quite as widespread among Western Christians writing and speaking about Muslims, as “kafir/kuffar,” “gebran” and other Arabic and Turkish words generally translated into English as “infidel” were widespread among Muslims around the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. An example is the book of ordinances for the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, a chivalric order created by the pious Catholic, Duke Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, in 1572, the year after Lepanto. I have examined the copy at Harvard, MS. Harvard Houghton Riant 105, which at fol. 57 verso has a chapter entitled “Obbligo de Cavalieri di trovarsi in Armate reali contro infedeli, et in difesa de’ stati del Gran Maestro,”[Obligation of the Knights to join princely fleets against the infidels, and in defense of the states of the Grand Master]. But the number of examples from these centuries is enormous, and as one might expect, the vernacular crusading epics of Renaissance poetry by Ludovico Ariosto, Matteo Boiardo and Torquato Tasso furnish many uses of infedeli and similar words and phrases.
Stephen; others became missionaries to the East. French Catholic clergy in this period some took service as Catholic provincials, as the term was, and were dispatched to Ottoman-ruled areas, with no particular proselytizing role that would make them missionaries in the most commonly accepted meaning of the word. Though it was Italians who dominated the first missionary efforts to Cyprus organized by the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, in Rome, there were many Frenchmen among the Jesuits and Capuchins who went elsewhere in the Greek world. A number of these Frenchmen, both lay and religious, composed scholarly works during their travels that brought to the attention of a wide readership more reliable and detailed information on the Greek Orthodox, both on Cyprus and elsewhere, than had previously been available.

**French Humanist interest in Cyprus**

The Franciscan André Thevet or de Thevet (1516-1590), for example, a polymath, who, under the patronage of John, Cardinal of Lorraine, travelled to the Eastern Mediterranean between 1549 and 1554, wrote a study of the islands of the Mediterranean, a *Grand Insulaire* (an *insulaire*, or as many of these works were composed in Italian, an *isolario*, was generally a work aiming for a description of important geographical, natural, and historical lore and information then available about certain islands, including the information known from classical authors – Pliny’s *Natural History* being a favored source) that included a visit to Cyprus.\(^{461}\) He also devoted a section to Cyprus in his *Cosmographie de Levant* (a *cosmography* generally included both historical and geographic elements in a description of a given place), first published in

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\(^{461}\) This work makes up the text in *Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris*, MSS. 15452 and 15453. It has been published as André Thevet, *Le Grand Insulaire et pilotage d'André Thevet*, (Paris: s.n., 1985 [1586]) in the series *Recueil de voyages et de documents pour servir à l'histoire de la géographie*, vol. 4, a work which I have been unable to view.
At the same time, in the sixteenth century a number of Greek Orthodox, including Cypriots, went west to France, though not in the numbers of those who migrated to Italian city-states. Some brought Greek manuscripts with them, uncertain of the safety of these manuscripts under Ottoman rule. Janus Lascaris (1445-1535) was perhaps the most famous example. Lascaris, born in Asia Minor, went into exile in Venice as a young man. There, Cardinal Bessarion acted as a mentor and sent him to be trained in Latin at the University of Padua. Later, he entered the employ of Lorenzo de’ Medici in Florence, and at Lorenzo’s behest twice went back to Greek lands and collected Greek manuscripts, the second time, in 1492, to Mount Athos, whence he returned to Florence with some 200 Greek manuscripts. A third phase of Lascaris’ adult life began after the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici in 1492, when Lascaris entered the service of the kings of France, whom he would serve as ambassador to Venice between 1503 and 1508. His pupil, Pierre Danès, would be appointed by Francis I the first Professor of Greek at the newly-founded Collège Royale in Paris, the future Collège de France. There blossomed not only a scholarly interest in ancient Greek philosophy, history, literature, and that catchall term “antiquities,” but also, slightly later than in the Italian scholarly world, an interest in the Greeks of the time, the post-Byzantine Greeks living under Ottoman rule. On the other hand, whether on account of the lack of geographic proximity or mere ignorance, scholars in the kingdom of France do not appear to have written about the Greek-speakers of southern Italy at this time. The particular drama of Christian life under Turkish “slavery” served their rhetorical and literary purposes better. While France did not have, in the sixteenth century, anything equivalent to the Venetian Greek colony, it did exhibit an undercurrent of pan-Christian sympathy for the Cypriots.


and for the Greeks more generally. This sympathy bore fruit in the contingents of noble French volunteers who would sign up to participate in efforts – quixotic as they now appear – to restore a Byzantine empire. This was the case in the early seventeenth century with Charles Gonzague, Duke of Nevers, who wanted to make himself emperor of a new Christian empire centered in Constantinople, and of the corsair captain Jacques Pierre, who, while Cardinal Richelieu was first minister of France, planned a joint Franco-Spanish campaign, one aim of which was to place an Austrian Habsburg on the restored Byzantine throne. Such nobles continued to rally to what they regarded as the Christian cause for the later Venetian war effort (1645-69) against the Turk over Crete.

For examples of the written works that demonstrated the increased French interest in the Greek Orthodox and in Cyprus in particular, we may consider a book that can be described as the Ottoman version of the “captive narratives” printed on French presses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about Whites and Indians in North America. Barthélemy Vimont wrote a hagiographical account of the life and captivity of Isaac Jogues, a Jesuit who had done missionary work among the Iroquois, in 1642-43; François-Joseph Le Mercier and Joseph-Antoine Poncet de la Rivière wrote an account of the latter’s captivity among the Indians in 1653. These accounts formed part of the voluminous Relations Jésuites that began in the early seventeenth

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century, and which were contributed to annually for well over a century, detailing events such as the Deerfield raid of 1704, and inspiring the purely fictional kidnapping episode late in the Abbé Prevost’s *Manon Lescaut*. A book that is an eastern Mediterranean equivalent of these narratives in its themes, especially that of Christian virtue triumphant, but concerns Cyprus, is entitled *La Gallerie des Femmes Fortes* (the Gallery of Strong Women) by Pierre Le Moyne.467 This story refers to the dauntless Cypriot maiden Arnalda or Maria Singlitiki, who, after being captured during the fall of Nicosia in August 1570, set fire to the Turkish fleet, killing some of her enemies, while she too died in the blaze. As I have suggested, this account follows in some of its didactic intent and exaltation of the Lucretia-like virtue of the heroine, the conventions of North American captivity narratives – only the geography has changed.468

French interest in Cyprus was especially intense in the nineteenth century, part of a more general interest among many French historians in the subject of the Crusades and the French role therein – an interest which led in the 1840s to the publication of the first volumes of the large collective work, the *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades*. French interests in such matters, which help to explain the studies of such scholars as Charles Diehl and Gustave Schlumberger, extended to the Byzantine Greeks and their heirs, and to France’s premodern involvement in the


468 Systematic comparison of the language used in the North American and in the Levantine context might reveal a good deal of the differences in cultural context. For our purposes, what matters is that this and similar episodes of Christians enslaved by Turks fed very naturally into currents of European thought in the early modern period that considered the Ottomans a slave society, and the Sultan the absolute ruler of his subjects, enjoying power over their persons and property so great as to justify calling them all his slaves. With hindsight, we can question whether these well-worn characterizations of an Oriental despotism and a slave society were justified. For example, there were members of the so-called *kul* class – a word often translated as “slave” – who rose to the most intimate friendship with the Sultan, as well as high positions within the Janissary corps and the palace. The burgeoning literature on these images of Ottoman society includes Lucette Valensi, *Venise et la sublime porte: la naissance du despote* (Paris: Hachette, 1987).
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, influenced by France’s enduring fascination with the Middle Ages, which had seen a flourishing of the Francophone peoples, the romantic and neo-medieval fashions that marked much of educated Western European society, and the continuing important role of the French embassy in Constantinople, which acted as an advocate and proctor for the Maronite, and to a limited extent as well for the Armenian Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire, French intervention in Syria upon the massacre of Christians in 1860, and eventually the League of Nations Mandate France held in Syria and Lebanon from 1920 to 1946, reflect the strong French component in the history of Latin involvement in the Levant.

In the early decades of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, Christian Cypriots continued to look to France nostalgically, for they now viewed the Lusignan period as a golden age of Cypriot history. The Seigneur de Villamont, a French noble who in 1590 stopped at Cyprus on his way to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, offers one telling example. He encountered a Greek monk outside a Lusignan-era cemetery who waxed nostalgic for those beaux jours when the Lusignan, i.e. French kings had held sway:

It was very hot, and a thirst oppressed us, so that our monk led us to the house of a Cypriot priest to drink water from his fountain. Seeing which, the Cypriot politely offered us wine, asking my guide if I was one of the Lutheran English lately arrived at the port. The monk told him that I was a Frenchman. Upon this the poor man embraced me for joy, saying in Italian much in praise of the French, and how since they had lost the kingdom of Cyprus, the Cypriots had never been well treated, and had lost their liberty.


471 “...nous endurames tres-grand soif, à raison du chaud qu’il faisoit, ce qui occasionna le religieux de nous mener en la maison d’un prestre de Chypre exprez pour boire de l’eau d’une fonteine qui y estoit. Ce que voyant le
Yet in this same period, through the Edict of Nantes in 1598, despite whatever rhetoric about a common Christendom its orators employed, the French kingdom, tied down by civil war between Catholics and Huguenots and by its rivalry with Philip II of Spain, and bound by a longstanding alliance to the Ottomans, found itself utterly unable to help the Christian populations under Ottoman rule. Cyprus was, for the French kingdom, a lost cause. The much smaller duchy of Savoy, next door, did not see matters in the same light. But the official “France,” that could send or withhold soldiers and ships, was embodied and directed by the Kings of France.

And this was a monarchy that jealously preserved and cultivated France’s friendship with the Ottomans. One justification for including France as part of this analysis of Christian Cypriot cultural survival is that much took place aside from this “official” alliance, so that while the official France did not join the Holy League, many Frenchmen did what they could to act as protectors of Christians in the Ottoman domains. Through informal cultural contacts, through service in the Knights of St. John, in the Jesuit and Capuchin orders, and through books and letters, favorite tools of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for keeping up with news and maintaining intellectual contact, many of the individual Frenchmen I have mentioned in this chapter played a role both in calling the attention of the educated classes in Europe to the plight of Christians under Turkish rule, and in promoting, in a cultural sense, self-consciousness of Greeks as a distinct people.

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*Chyprien nous offrit du vin tres-hõnestement, en demandant au Religieux mon guide si j’estois de ces Lutheriês Anglois, qui estoient nouvellement arrivez au port. Le Religieux lui répondit que non, & que j’estois François : a ces mots de ioye le pauvre homme me vint embrasser, disant en Italien plusieurs louanges à l'honneur des François, & comme depuis qu’ilz avaient perdu le royaume de Chypre ils n’avoient eu aucun bon traitement, & que les Chypriens perdirent toute leur liberté.* Les Voyages du S. de Villamont, divisez en trois livres (Arras : Baudouyn, 1605), 237.
Despite the end of Christian rule on Cyprus in 1571, France during and after that war had been only deepening her involvement in the Levant. Ever since Francis I (r. 1515-47), France was known, or rather was notorious, in Europe for her alliance with the Ottomans. This alliance, unusual for the sixteenth century in being constituted between a Muslim and Christian power, led to an Ottoman fleet, commanded by the corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa, conducting joint naval operations with the French (a phrase with an admittedly modern flavor) in 1538-39, and later in 1544-45, an Ottoman fleet even wintered at the southern French port of Toulon. The French Crown’s representatives signed a major trade agreement with the Ottomans in 1569, and others followed in 1581, 1597, and 1614.472 But one should not imagine this relationship as devoid of problems. On the contrary, the Franco-Ottoman alliance had often exhibited cracks. François I had sought in the Ottomans to gain an ally to the east of the Habsburgs, and also to stimulate France’s trade in the Levant, which was threatened after 1500 by the Portuguese spice route around the Cape of Good Hope. But, like their rivals the Spanish, the French could not resist entertaining plans for North African footholds. Successive French kings, especially Charles IX (r.1560-74), who reigned during the Cyprus War, entertained a project to seize Algiers, an Ottoman governorate or beylerbeğlik on the North African coast, from the Ottomans, with a view less towards limiting the Ottoman advance and more towards impeding Spanish expansion in that area, and to offer it, as a kingdom, to his brother the duke of Anjou. The French ambassador in Constantinople, M. de Noailles, in a letter of September 4-6, 1572, at a time when the fighting in the Cyprus War was largely over, wrote:

“Sire, given the length of time I have habitually needed to receive answers concerning

the arze [petition, request] which I had made to the Grand Seigneur, I went to see the Pasha on the 28th of the previous month, who told me that His Highness had seen them, and that he had from the beginning found him much disposed to gratify monseigneur your brother with the Kingdom of Algiers, but, having communicated this with the muftis and doctors of his empire as he is accustomed to in such cases, he had found that, given that their religion had long been planted and exercised in the mosques, and Turkish justice administered by their magistrates and officers, he could not any more remove it from his dominion than he could Constantinople, although he held to the latter more than the former city. And nonetheless, for the assurance of his good will, he promised from now on to leave to you all of the conquests that his navy may carry out, both in Italy and in Spain... 

Years later, in a remarkable anticipation of nineteenth-century European discussions about partitioning the Ottoman Empire, Henry IV (r. 1589-1610) wrote that “having convinced myself that the empire of that Seigneur will soon fall into confusion...in that case, it may be necessary that I should take advantage of the occasion, as others will.” Geopolitics pushed the French kings to look to their own advantages over those of “Christendom” in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. But, if we restrict ourselves to the sixteenth century, we must be careful not to overstate the willingness of the French kings to become politically engaged in the Levant. The scholarly activity of Frenchmen interested in the Levant did not necessarily lead to geopolitical machinations or to any dent in Realpolitik. The writings of Pierre Gilles on the Constantinople and its antiquities in his time (1554), for example, neglect the modern Ottoman in

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473 So it seems that Sultan was engaged in bargaining over the fruits of his conquests with the French King. De Testa, Recueils des traités ottomanes, Vol. I, 438-439: “Sire, voyant la longeur dont on usait à me répondre sur les arze que j’avais fait au grand-seigneur, je fus voir le pacha le XXVIII du mois passé, qui me dit que Sa Hautesse les avait vus, et qu’il l’avait du commencement trouvée bien disposée à gratifier monseigneur votre frère du royaume d’Alger, mais ayan communiqué de ce fait avec les muftys et docteurs de son empire, comme est accoutumée en semblables cas, il s’était trouvé qu’y ayant leur religion de longtemps été plantée et exercée dans les mosquées, et la justice turquesque administrée par ses magistrats et ses officiers, il ne le pouvait éclipser de sa domination non plus que Constantinople, toutefois qu’il lui gardait mieux que cela. – Et cependant, pour l’assurance de sa bonne volonté, il promettait dès à présent vous délasser toutes les conquêtes qui se pourront faire avec son armée de mer, tant en Espagne qu’en Italie...”

474 “[M]e persuadant que l’empire de ce seigneur tombera bientôt en confusion...auquel cas il sera peut-être nécessaire que j’embrasse l’occasion de m’en prévaloir comme feront les autres.” Quoted in B.J. Slot, Archipelagus Turbatus, Vol. I (Istanbul: Dutch Archaeological Institute, 1982): 117.
favor of the ancient Greek and Roman city, still to be seen as a lower layer of the urban palimpsest, which his ancient sources described.\textsuperscript{475} Gilles does not mention a policy against the Turks, he does not pepper his sober account with the occasional anti-Turkish tirade, unlike, for example, Riccoldo da Montecroce circa 1300, who cannot help but occasionally shower invective on the Saracens and Muhammad, even as he describes his sojourn in the Baghdad of his day.\textsuperscript{476}

Another important figure was Guillaume Postel (1510-81). His case is slightly different from that of Pierre Gilles. An exceptional person, who combined political projects with rigorous scholarship, Postel’s researches on Semitic languages appear to have been intimately tied to a concrete political aspiration, that is his desire to convert the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire to Christianity. But Postel enjoyed little success in promoting his program and, while respected as a scholar, had no discernible effect on the making of French policy.\textsuperscript{477}

In the mid-sixteenth century, France was intent on promoting its economic interests in the Levant. In 1569 she pushed for revised capitulations, and wrested generous terms from the Ottomans for her merchants, so that to endanger them by joining the Holy League the very next year must have seemed an unappetizing prospect. French trade was a small enough proportion of Ottoman international commerce that the Sultans and their representatives had little to lose by being generous, and they coveted some luxury goods that they could obtain from France, such as


\textsuperscript{476}For Riccoldo’s works, see Giuseppe Rizzardi, I Saraceni = Contra legem Sarracenorum (Florence: Nardini, 1992) and René Kappler, Pérégrination en Terre Sainte et au Proche Orient (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997).

\textsuperscript{477}Many aspects of Postel’s thought and writings about non-Christian peoples are illuminated in Marion Leathers Kuntz, Venice, Myth and Utopian Thought in the Sixteenth Century: Bodin, Postel, and the Virgin of Venice (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999), IX, 241-55, and XIV, 299-323 and 445-65.
clocks and other mechanical objects. This agreement imitated earlier Ottoman agreements with Venice, in that it allowed the head of one of the European communities in Ottoman-ruled lands to administer justice in disputes involving merchants of his nationality. The 1569 capitulation the Ottomans signed with the French also contained an important innovation. As the historian De Lamar Jensen points out, here, for the first time, the French were granted the right to demand pavillon for other nations, that is a right to exercise legal protection of the Christian subjects of other states and principalities. And French officials extended this protection quite often, as for example to Dutch ships, with their crews, and the traders and merchandise they carried; this useful provision was renewed in the capitulation of 1581. It is not hard to grasp the effect of such a provision on other Europeans who might now wish to take advantage of French protection, and as a result might wish to curry favor with, or at least to do nothing to antagonize, the French. This agreement with the Ottomans, then, not only helped French trade, but made France more powerful in other ways. And this provision on pavillon, coupled with the longstanding French links with the Eastern Christian communities, must have spurred France to try to assume the role of leader among Christian powers trading in the East. We see language in the orders sent to Ottoman commanders of the fleets sent to Cyprus in 1570 that exempts French merchant ships from the punitive measures taken against Venetian commercial vessels. And, in 1572, the Ottoman Porte supported the successful attempt of the future Henri III of France to assume the

478 Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks,” 461.

Polish throne. The Ottomans thought that he would be more favorable to their interests than the rival Habsburg candidates.

Christian Europe never allowed the French to forget that they were impeding a united Christian front in making their peace with the hated Ottoman foe. As evidence for the contradictory positions in which Francis I and his successors found themselves, at least on the plane of rhetoric, in 1532, at a time when Francis I had already shown himself interested in an anti-Habsburg alliance with the Ottomans, still he signed the Treaty of Calais with Henry VIII of England, and agreed to its terms “for the defense and conservation of our Christian religion and in order to resist the efforts and damnable enterprises of the Turk, the ancient common enemy and adversary of our faith.” Writers in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries continued to stress ideals of Christian unity in terms reminiscent of the Middle Ages and the Crusades, and were subject to the influence of Christian theology even if they asserted, as did Alberico Gentili, “let the theologians keep silence about a matter [the Turkish matter] which is outside of their province.” A common Christian identity was regarded by some as more important than the Latin-Orthodox divide, and the more fearsome the Turks appeared, the less that divide mattered. In 1570-71, as we have seen, the Venetian chroniclers of the Cyprus War

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480 Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 455.


483 Ibid., 29-30.
such as Paolo Paruta and Giovanni Pietro Contarini tended to stress the unity of the two communities in the face of the Muslim Turkish peril.\textsuperscript{484}

\textbf{Francophone Interest in the Greeks}

Many individual Frenchmen took an interest in the Greek world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an interest that was not only political and military but also cultural. Like the Venetians, these Catholic Frenchmen were no longer – if they had ever been – blinded by contempt for the \textit{Graeculi} – the “Greeklings” that some westerners had mocked, since the days of Plautus and Terence, as effeminate, stubborn, and money-grubbing. In the European rediscovery of antiquity, both Greeks and Romans received attention. But it is often forgotten, or overlooked, that there was also admiration for the achievement of a more recent past, that of the Byzantine Empire, remembered through its monuments, coins, and the stories that Greek-speakers now living under Latin or Ottoman rule told. While the term Byzantine Empire did not come into use until the nineteenth century, there was even in early modern Western Europe interest in this Eastern Empire with its Christian Greek population and its historical origins in, and connection with, the ancient Roman Empire and the first Christian Emperor, Constantine. Western interest in the ancient Greek and Byzantine past, furthermore, was one of the factors allowing, under French, that is Lusignan, rule, the formation of a distinct though nascent Greek

\textsuperscript{484} Paruta relates that shortly before the final siege of Nicosia the Latin archbishop of Paphos, Francesco Contarini, in the absence of the Archbishop of Nicosia Filippo Mocenigo, then in Venice, encouraged processions through the streets of the city in public prayer and prayers in homes and in churches, too, for deliverance from the enemy. Paolo Paruta, \textit{Della Historia Vinetiana, Parte Seconda} (Venice: Nicolini, 1605), 81-4. Contarini’s speech stressed the virtues of all the Christian defenders of Nicosia, against that Pharaoh that was Selim II, and suggested that against such a united front, it would become apparent that “\textit{vana \& debole [fu] la potenza de’ barbari}” (“Empty and weak [was] the power of the barbarians”). Paruta, \textit{Historia Vinetiana}, 83.
Cypriot identity, as reflected in the previously mentioned chronicles of Philippe de Mézières and Leontios Machairas, and the literary borrowings I have discussed of Byzantine themes in medieval Cypriot literature written in French and other Romance languages.

Coming to the sixteenth century, there are many accounts of travels and studies, some scholarly, on a number of regions of the Ottoman Empire written in French. Among these writers were the Seigneur d’Aramon⁴⁸⁵ (an ambassador and an observer of Ottoman society), Pierre Gilles, whose work on the antiquities of Constantinople, paying special attention to what remained of the buildings built by Emperor Justinian (r. 527-65), has already been discussed,⁴⁸⁶ Pierre Belon du Mans,⁴⁸⁷ that Jerusalem-bound pilgrim the Seigneur de Villamont,⁴⁸⁸ and Antoine Galland, who, after serving in the French Embassy in Constantinople, a post that allowed him to collect Oriental material – in a slightly later period – compiled and translated a version of the Thousand and One Nights.⁴⁸⁹ Thanks to these works, we are better able to flesh out the rather stark contrasts not only of ideas but of human types—the “scholar” in opposition to the unsophisticated and unbookish “crusader”— to which Géraud Poumarède seems attached.⁴⁹⁰

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⁴⁸⁵ A noble and an ambassador, whose travels are described in Jean Chesneau, Voyage d’Aramon (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887).


⁴⁸⁷ Often considered an early naturalist, Pierre Belon du Mans was the author of Voyage au Levant (Paris: Chandeigne, 2001) that included observations on what he found most interesting about the flora and fauna of Cyprus.

⁴⁸⁸ As in the passage I have already quoted from the travel account of the Sieur de Villamont (extracts in Claude Cobham, Excerpta Cypria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 171-8).

⁴⁸⁹ Galland was the author of many works, including the travel account Voyage à Constantinople (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002). He took up a diplomatic post at Constantinople in 1670, and from 1673 on travelled in Syria and the Levant, collecting Arabic manuscripts along the way, and eventually it was he who introduced the Thousand and One Nights to a broad Western audience.

⁴⁹⁰ Many similar figures from other parts of Europe could be adduced, but the importance of France was the role she took on after 1600 as the foremost protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, a role which was largely
Just as the French remembered the Lusignan with affection, so, too, did the Greek Cypriots. The anti-Latin propaganda which the “father of Cypriot history,” Archimandrite Kyprianos, indulged in writing much later, in the late eighteenth century, could not conceal the evidence of considerable nostalgia for the Lusignan period which a number of Greeks on Cyprus in the late sixteenth century clearly held.\textsuperscript{491}

Such positive memories likely influenced Louis de Mas Latrie in composing one of the best-known nineteenth-century histories of Cyprus, the \textit{Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le règne de la maison des princes de Lusignan}.\textsuperscript{492} Franco-Cypriot mutual attachment may have influenced the Rumanian historian Nicolai Iorga to write his \textit{France de Chypre} (1934), given that educated Rumanians looked to France in his day for education and culture. Scholarly interest in the French regime on Cyprus – perhaps owing to a more general association of France with the cultural efflorescence of the Middle Ages and with the spread of courtly culture to the Eastern Mediterranean – continues to be observable right down to the 1985 \textit{History of Cyprus} by the Cypriot Kostas Kyrris, which paints the Lusignan period in generally favorable colors, even bemoaning the transfer of the island to Venice.

\textbf{French Involvement with Ottoman Christians}

\textsuperscript{491}That Kyprianos despised the Latin Church and its works, to the point that he consciously modified his sources Lusignan and Loredano, has been recently pointed out by Dr. Christopher Schabel: “The Status of the Greek Clergy in Early Frankish Cyprus,” in \textit{“Sweet Land...”: Lectures on the History and Culture of Cyprus}, eds. Julian Chrysostomides and Charalambos Dendrinos (Nicosia: Porphyrogenitos, 2006), 165-171.

\textsuperscript{492}Louis de Mas Latrie, \textit{Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le règne de la maison des princes de Lusignan} (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1852-61.)
For the first half-century, or even first century, of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, French missionaries – mainly Jesuits and Capuchins – travelled to other areas of the Greek Orthodox world, but not Cyprus. Many Frenchmen, however, as members of the Knights of Malta, plied Cypriot waters as corsairs, attacking Ottoman and other Muslim shipping. The domestic situation in France is key to understanding that country’s involvement with the Greek Orthodox. France in the late sixteenth century was torn apart by bloody conflicts over religion, and the Catholic-Protestant divide persisted even after the Edict of Nantes in 1598 ended widespread violence. Suspicion and hostility remained strong in the early seventeenth century. These Wars of Religion limited French economic and diplomatic activity in the Levant, as several historians with wide, Braudel-like interests have maintained. Trouble at home limited the ability to project power abroad, political or economic. Ernest Charrière’s nineteenth-century compilation of French government correspondence relating to the Levant was supplemented, a century later, by Fernand Braudel’s section on sixteenth-century French involvements in the Levant in his massive work La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (1949/1966) and more recently still other studies about the relation of these internal wars of religion to France’s relations with the Turk, include works by De Lamar Jensen, Pascale Barthe, and Stéphane Yérasimos. For the Huguenot proportion of the population of France, a traditional estimate on the eve of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of August 24, 1572, is ten percent. There was a good deal of variation, however. In the southern town of Montpellier in the 1660s, for example, Huguenots constituted 30% of the population. See Philip Benedict, “Confessionalization in France?” in Raymond Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, eds., Society and Culture in the Huguenot World 1559-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 54.
had an international component, for there was, at different times, involvement from the Netherlands, Spain, and the princes of the Holy Roman Empire. These wars were so fierce, prolonged, and devastating to nearly every corner of the French kingdom that they rendered Charles IX (r. 1560–74) and his successors Henry III (r. 1574–89) and Henry IV (r. 1589–1610) less able to tend to French commercial interests abroad. But there is another side to French involvement with the Ottomans. For the Ottomans were themselves quite capable of initiating overtures, and they deliberately tried to influence the French to favor their interests. And France’s refusal to join Venice, Spain, and the Papacy in the Holy League to fight the Turk during the Cyprus War was a salient example of the success of those Ottoman attempts.

But the Christian Cypriots had their own contacts, especially religious, with Frenchmen and they, too, could attempt to influence the French. French Jesuits and Capuchins came to the Orthodox Aegean in the seventeenth century, though their presence is not recorded on Cyprus. In attempting to categorize Cypriot-French relations, however – and here I differ from Géraud Poumarède, who, however, focused on Franco-Levantine relations more broadly and did not devote much space to Cyprus – one cannot reduce the human types involved to Quixotic and unlearned “crusaders” on the one hand and dispassionate “scholars” on the other. James Hankins in 1995, in his article “Renaissance Crusaders,” pointed out how many people and works this dichotomy cannot fit in, in the Italian case, and his remarks can be transferred mutatis mutandis.

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496 Just as they tried to influence Calvinist princes, giving rise to the term of opprobrium ‘Calvino-Turcism,’ that appears in polemical literature of the later sixteenth century. Christian Cypriots, though they lacked both the might of the Ottomans, and the fear that might provoked – so useful to the Turks in their foreign dealings – nonetheless were not timid in attempting to influence the French and other powerful parties in Western Europe.
to the French case as well.\textsuperscript{497} There are too many counterexamples, and inconsistencies in thoughts expressed on the Turkish menace in learned writing, to permit the reliance on doubtful categories created by some scholars to distinguish medieval “crusaders,” from Renaissance “humanists.” The writings and activities of François de la Noue, a knight from Nantes, offer one such counterexample. Two salient characteristics of La Noue are that although he was a Huguenot, who had served in what some Protestants called the “Huguenot wars” after 1562, he was yet willing to work with Catholic kings: both with Charles IX, who entrusted him with the task of attempting to reconcile the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle with the rest of the kingdom in 1572-3, and later, with Henry III. La Noue in his \textit{Discours} was capable of considerable sophistication. He aimed at setting out in print the advantages of an exceedingly ambitious plan for an attack on Turkey that he thought could destroy Ottoman power within four years, and for aid in carrying this out, he, though a Protestant, unblushingly appealed to the most devoutly Catholic King of Spain, and not to the king of France.\textsuperscript{498} This reflects not only the prestige of Spanish power, then at its apogee, but also, perhaps, an understanding by this Huguenot that the most ferocious opponents of the Turk were likely to be the Spanish, both because of their millennial Catholicism, and because of the resources they were willing and able to muster for anti-Ottoman efforts.

Spain was thus not the only country with anti-Ottoman chivalric ideas circulating among its nobility, to the point where taking up the sword against the Moor or the Turk had become a common experience in early life for male members of the European nobility. During and after


\textsuperscript{498} Poumarède, 145.
the Cyprus War, there were contrasts between “official” French policy – such as the refusal of
Charles IX to countenance proposals by two successive papal nuncios for a French attack on
Greece – and the actions of individual Frenchmen. Though France was not a signatory to the
Holy League, a large number of Frenchmen belonged to the Order of St. John, more commonly
known as the Knights of Malta. It was in that role that they fought at Lepanto.\textsuperscript{499} Others
volunteered individually or raised small companies to participate in the defense of Cyprus.
Géraud Poumarède is categorical that Western Europeans in the sixteenth century rejected the
crusading heritage and came to think of the struggle against the Ottomans in altogether different
terms,\textsuperscript{500} more sophisticated in their grasp of geopolitics and in some cases different European
states, he suggests, deliberately played the Turks off against their own Christian geopolitical
rivals within Europe. But the evidence for a great intellectual shift in the way Christian-Muslim
conflict was perceived on the Christian side between the Middle Ages and 1600 is not
conclusive. The degree of change one discerns turns largely on the relative weight one assigns to
religious concerns as compared to other concerns (for example, economic self-interest) in having
determined early modern loyalties and courses of action around the Mediterranean.

**Athanasios Rhetor**

The multifarious scholarly activities of the Cypriot monk, Athanasios Rhetor (1571-
1663), bring together a number of the themes I have tried to highlight in the post-conquest
relation of Cypriots with France. After his parents were killed during the Ottoman invasion, he
and his brothers fled to Constantinople. There, a large Greek-speaking populace could succor

\textsuperscript{499} The Grand Master of the Order when in 1565, a few years before the invasion of Cyprus, Malta successfully
resisted an Ottoman siege was Jean Parisot de la Valette, from a noble family of Quercy in southwest France.

Rejet de l’Héritage de Croisades.”
them, while on Cyprus they could encounter the Ottomans only in the context of invasion, conquest, and the imposition of military rule. Athanasios was trained in Constantinople by Jesuits, who had had an establishment in that city under the patronage of the kings of France, since in 1583 King Henry III had given this project his blessing. Such a Catholic establishment in the very backyard of the Patriarchate of Constantinople cannot have pleased the more anti-Latin among the Greek Orthodox, who feared Latin inroads through conversion. Indeed, as a result of his Jesuit education, Athanasios Rhetor did adhere to Latin doctrines for the rest of his years.  

Rhetor then settled in Paris, possibly as early as 1615 and certainly by the 1620s. He was able to write there a number of philosophical tracts on the thought of Aristotle, Plato, and Iamblichus. In the context of our recurrent theme, the way that Cypriots thought of themselves, it is interesting that Rhetor calls himself on the title-page of his work on the immortality of the soul, *Aristoteles propriam de Animae immortalitate* (1641), “the Byzantine.”  

This could be simply a reference to his upbringing in Constantinople, but may also be a more subtle reference to the entire heritage of the Eastern Roman Empire. Between 1643 and 1653 Rhetor returned to the East, undertaking an expedition to gather Greek manuscripts, under the patronage of both the French first minister, Cardinal Mazarin, and Chancellor Pierre Séguiier, an avid collector of such material. Rhetor travelled to Mount Athos, Constantinople and Cyprus and brought back several hundred Greek manuscripts, written between late Antiquity and his own time. Some indication of the personal, character of Catholic-Orthodox relations in that period, and of how individual relations, when particularly good, could smooth over theological disagreements, feature in documents from high Orthodox clergy in the East, including the Patriarchs of Constantinople and

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502 The publication information for this work by Rhetor is given in O’Meara, 486.
Jerusalem, material which Manoussos Manoussacas published in 1940.503 These letters of recommendation, or presentation, for Athanasios Rhetor, which read something like the letters of accreditation that in this period accompanied European ambassadors to foreign courts, not only praise his Christian piety but grant to Rhetor – a Catholic – license to teach, to preach, and to celebrate religious services while travelling in the jurisdictions of these Orthodox prelates. This generosity led to a backlash: a letter dated December 3, 1651 relates that an enemy of Athanasios, one Panteleimon Ligarides, attempted to denounce him as a “Western-lover,” (δυτικόφρονα) and a “mere” monk – presumably, as opposed to an ordained member of the clergy – and to suggest that he should not be permitted to preach in the presence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Parthenios “the Younger.” But it appears that the pro-Rhetor party won. Ligarides was correct that Athanasios retained affection for France, to which he was shortly to return, but in their defense of Rhetor four Greek clergy testify later in the above-mentioned letter of December 1651 that they, the undersigned, refute these charges as lies, and instead insist that Athanasios had already spoken of holy matters in the presence of the previous Patriarch, Neophytos II.504 Rhetor reflects both in his own activity and in his links to powerful people among the French the kind of scholarly interests some Frenchmen took in Cyprus. But he also embodies a chapter in the history of taste, that is, the taste that had already existed and persisted in France after Lepanto for chivalric tales of previous Christian struggles with the Infidel, often romanticized, a fashion and passion that existed elsewhere in Europe too.

503 Manoussos Manoussacas, “Ανεκδότα Πατριαρχικά Εγγράφα περί Αθανασίου του Ρητορος,” [Unpublished Documents concerning Athanasios Rhetor] Επετηρις του Μεσαιωνικου Αρχειου II (1940), 143 and 149.

504 Op.cit, 149.
All this while, long after Athanasios Rhetor, and well beyond matters of manuscripts and classical learning, French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Levant persisted. In the nineteenth century, French historians of the Middle Ages, and of other periods, too, became deeply interested in the *Gesta Dei per Francos* tradition – the medieval notion, developed by Guibert of Nogent in his account of the First Crusade,\(^505\) that the will of God was being carried out by the Frankish people. Guibert of Nogent’s account assigned pride of place to the French in the crusading movement. In their interpretations, these nineteenth-century historians attempted to understand and present the goals and limitations of French involvement in the Levant from the time of the medieval Crusades to their own present. Exhibiting an abiding fascination with the Crusades, and with formerly Christian lands now firmly in Muslim hands, a succession of distinguished nineteenth and twentieth-century historians, including Ernest Charrière (1805-65), Jean Jurien de la Gravière (1812-92), Louis de Mas Latrie (1815-97), Philippe Tamizey de Larroque (1828-98), Paul Edouard Didier, Comte de Riant (1836-88) and Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940),\(^506\) brought great erudition to bear on their studies of the numerous French economic and cultural connections with Cyprus – an erudition infused, often, with a more general interest in the Levant. Such an interest is not surprising, when we recall that these historians were all educated and grew up in an environment of a French colonial expansion in North Africa, that is, lands which long ago had been Christian (the homeland of both Tertullian, and Augustine of Hippo) and which for more than a millennium had been held, and largely peopled by, Muslims. The


\(^{506}\) Iorga, a Rumanian, promoted an influential concept for looking at the post-1453 history of Greek-speakers: *Byzance après Byzance*, that is, the continued influence of Byzantine imperial ideology and sense of Greek superiority even after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Iorga argued that the Greeks of Cyprus, though they lacked a larger protecting power that could perfectly replace the Byzantine emperors, nevertheless embraced Venetian rule as a close, if “non-Greek,” surrogate: Nicolai Iorga, *France de Chypre* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966 [1931]).
nineteenth century was also a time of growing French economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt, that is, in lands close to Cyprus. Indeed, an appeal was addressed by members of the French nobility to Napoleon III (r. 1852-70) in 1869, interested in cornering the cotton farming industry on Cyprus, and asking the Emperor of the French to assume control of the island.

It is therefore tempting to read sixteenth and seventeenth century developments as the beginning of a long story. Returning to that earlier period, some Franciscan, Jesuit and Capuchin priests, who were forbidden from taking up arms, but whose theological ideas, and observations on the state of Christians under Ottoman rule may have driven them to an anti-Ottoman stance, managed to take, as the object of their studies, such uncontroversial things as the flora and fauna, as well as the antiquities of the areas of the Ottoman Empire where they acted as missionaries. But such studies gave them, at the same time, license or cover, to closely observe and record, larger political developments. They then reported on what they observed. In some cases, these men were paid by the French government: André Thevet, for example, who had the title Cosmographer Royal, was in the pay of the French court; in a later period, in the years straddling 1700, Joseph Pitton de Tournefort would be in French pay as well, when he made the travels recorded in his *Voyage du Levant* (1718). The line between missionaries, in particular, and spies was not always clear, and Pitton de Tournefort lamented the suspicions under which the Latin

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508 This was discovered in the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, and published in 1985, by the Greek history professor Andreas Tillyrides: “Un très important appel de la noblesse française de Chypre à l’Empereur Napoléon III,” in George Dragas, ed. *Aksum-Thyateira: A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodios of Thyateira and Great Britain*, ed.(London: Thyateira House, 1985), 405-407. How self-interested these efforts were, and how far they were mere covers for economic exploitation are subjects that would take us too far beyond the period under consideration.

missionaries fell in Armenia in his day: “The most flourishing missions will fall, in the end, if God does not change the hearts of the schismatics. These wretches [schismatic Armenian Christians]...involve the authorities of the State, and never leave off making representations to them about how dangerous it would be for the Latins to multiply among them...that one must regard them as so many spies...”

Similarly, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as Michael Greenhalgh has pointed out, the line dividing French soldier, scholar, and spy in these regions was not always clear. This charge about “missionary-spies,” also a staple of anti-Christian Turkish polemics for centuries, is not without some element of truth.

After the War

Scholars have found that, after 1500, the development by the Portuguese of a spice trade around Africa noticeably reduced the overland spice trade with the East conducted by the Venetians. And after the Cyprus War, the Venetians also scaled down, more generally, their Levantine commerce. But this did not make it inevitable that another European party would begin to supplant Venice in Ottoman counsels. Nonetheless, this is precisely what France did after the Cyprus War. Once the Wars of Religion in France ended in 1598, French captains put

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510 Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, *Voyage du Levant* (Lyon: Bruyset, 1777), 278: “Les Missions les plus fleurissantes tomberont à la fin si Dieu ne change le cœur des Schismatiques. Ces malheureux...interessent des puissances de l’Etat et ne cessent de leur représenter combien il seroit dangereux de souffrir que les Latins se multipliaient chez eux...qu’il faut les regarder comme autant d’espions, qui sous prétexte de religion viennent pour reconnaître les forces du pays.”

511 Michael Greenhalgh, “French Military Reconnaissance in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries as a Source for our Knowledge of Ancient Monuments,” *Journal of Military History* 66 (2002), 359-388, which however continues to divide “scholars” on the one hand from “military men” on the other.

512 I am referring to the suspicion aroused by Christian missionaries, first in the late Ottoman Empire, and later in the Turkish Republic. The enormous literature is perhaps best considered chronologically, since other circumstances have changed so much between the sixteenth century and today. For one example, the suspicion of Jesuits by the Grand Vizier Murat Pasha, in 1609, see Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans*, 81-3.
into Ottoman ports in Syria and Egypt with increasing frequency. De Lamar Jensen, a historian of French diplomacy, has argued that the large increase in the customs tax known as the dernier du port, imposed at Marseille between 1569 and 1573, was principally a result of the growth in the eastern spice trade, and the revenues raised by that tax went from 20,000 livres tournois in 1560 to 64,000 in 1571. In the early seventeenth century, the French representative in Constantinople, Savary de Brèves, remarked to Louis XIII that “[n]ow more than a thousand vessels from the coasts of Provence and Languedoc traffic in the Turkish empire, and not just for their own enrichment but also to the benefit of the regions of France that are helped by it.”

This was an era of nascent mercantilism, and taking a more centralized and government-directed approach to trade was reflected in the French push to make headway in the Levant trade, and in the founding of merchant associations known as compagnies, resembling English and Dutch joint-stock companies. There was also a religious side to France’s interest in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, some French-dominated missionary orders, such as the Capuchins and Jesuits, expanded into the Levant (Syria and Palestine) and Greece, as well as

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513 The expansion of French commerce in the Levant after 1600 is discussed in an older work, a doctoral thesis, never superseded, by Paul Masson: Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1896). The sources are numerous enough to allow one to speak of a dominance by the port of Marseille, from which more French ships left to trade in the Levant than from any other port.

514 Jensen, “The Ottoman Turks,” 464.

515 Quoted in Jensen, Ibid., 470.

516 There were also centrifugal forces straining against centralization in France. We should not imagine or suppose that a coherent “French” national interest is discernible in all the actions of French subjects in the Ottoman Empire in this period. Some indication of the strength of regional identities within France is revealed in the account by Girolamo Balbi of the Ottoman siege of Malta, in 1565, a few years before the conquest of Cyprus. Christians are described as belonging to Langues (literally, languages or tongues) in a reflection of the organization of the Knights of St. John, and Balbi included Langues of Provence and Auvergne (which were provinces already subject to the Kings of France at the time) as well as the Langue of “France.” Francesco Balbi, The Siege of Malta, 1565, Trans. H.A. Balbi (Copenhagen: O. L. Rostock, 1961), 10. Similarly, Antonio de Sosa, the probable author of the Topografía y historia general de Argel [Topography and general history of Algiers], referred to “Burgundians, French, Navarrese,” and not to Spaniards tout court but to “Aragonese, Catalans, Mallorcans.” (52).
into Persia. Perhaps influenced by how they perceived politics to work back in France, French religious tended to try to work their influence at what they considered the center of power, the Ottoman central government and the ministers to the Ottoman equivalent of a Privy Council known as the *Divan*. Their presence in the Ottoman provinces, particularly outside port towns like Izmir, was negligible, as was that of foreign Christians in general. The Ottomans themselves noticed the concerted diplomatic efforts by European ambassadors to win their favor towards the end of the sixteenth century: the historian Sadeddin Hoca, who was also tutor [*hoca*] to the future Sultan Mehmet III, received lavish gifts of money from the French, as well as from the Venetian and the English ambassadors.\(^{517}\) Sadeddin’s report reminds us that there was another suitor, too, as Leslie Peirce has put it, for the Ottoman hand: England. But England would not take nearly as active a role in the seventeenth century as would France in diplomatic activity ostensibly aimed at protecting Ottoman Christians, and so her activities are less relevant to the discussion here.

Later, from the eighteenth century on, in both the Ottoman Empire, and in Persia,\(^{518}\) France made conscious efforts to act as a protector of Christians in the East, including under its umbrella of concern not only Catholics, but Armenians, Greek Orthodox, and other non-Catholics as well, but the roots of this activity lay in the seventeenth century. Given that this activity has been widely acknowledged, and in the light of the earlier lack of French interest in Ottoman Christians, scholars have wondered about, and studied, the reasons for this new French interest. Here I follow the arguments of Charles Frazee, the historian of Catholics under Ottoman rule. Frazee has concluded that “[t]he reign of Louis XIII in France coincided with an


outpouring of Catholic zeal unknown in that nation since the thirteenth century,“519 and Frazee points to the large number of recruits to two missionary orders, the Jesuits and Capuchins, both active in the Ottoman Empire and even further east, in Persia and East Asia. He has also argued that France – and a French Catholic advocacy for Ottoman Christians – began to assert itself in the Ottoman counsels in Constantinople after 1608, when the Jesuits,520 in a five-man party led by François de Canillac, were vetted and approved to travel to Constantinople to serve as embassy chaplains at the French embassy.521 It was the ambition of Louis XIII (r. 1610-43) to live up to the sobriquet Most Christian King, and guard the Christian Holy Places under Ottoman rule, that drove French interest in eastern forms of Christianity. This self-appointed role irritated a good many Ottoman officials along the way but was for the French kings a matter of prestige, too important to ignore even at cost of endangering some of the goodwill between them and the Sublime Porte. From this point until at least the nineteenth century, with the Revolution as a free-thinking interlude, the French Embassy in Constantinople used its influence to protect and further what were considered the interests of the Christians under Ottoman sway.

Relations of the French with the Orthodox were, naturally, a two-way street. The French were not only observers, but were also observed. The peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean with whom they came into contact, including the Ottomans, verbally lumped the French in with other Western Europeans as ‘Latins’ or, especially among Muslims, ever since the Crusades, as Franks – frenkler in Turkish, al-afranj in Arabic. Indeed, among Muslim Arabs that word was applied to

519 Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 85.

520 A Catholic order created in the mid-sixteenth century taking, as one of its goals, the re-Catholicization of swathes of Europe that had been lost to one or another brand of Protestant Christianity, mainly Lutheranism and Calvinism.

521 Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 81.
all the peoples of Western Christendom. Nonetheless, in later times, the Lusignan dynasty that ruled Cyprus from 1192 to 1489 was remembered by the Orthodox clearly as a French dynasty, and the impact it had on Cyprus categorized as a French impact. Camille Enlart’s *Gothic Art in the Renaissance in Cyprus* is a prominent example.\textsuperscript{522} Enlart’s ethnic and national terminology is that of the late nineteenth century, and art historians today will question some of it, but his basic argument that the Gothic architecture of northern France and certain other regions left its imprint all over Lusignan Cyprus is still helpful, and his command of the details of medieval buildings both on Cyprus and in France undisputed.

During that historical phenomenon which is often described as the Expansion of Latin Europe, beginning around 1000, the crusading knights of the French-speaking lands often are accorded a prominent place by historians.\textsuperscript{523} In fact, since the early Middle Ages, Francia/France and French-influenced areas enjoyed a continuing stream of diplomatic and economic contacts with eastern Europe, the Byzantine Empire and the Levant. There were, to be sure, exploits associated with the Crusades, two of which, the Sixth of 1244 and the Seventh in 1270, were led by the same French king, Saint Louis (IX). Crusades were also ably chronicled in French by subjects of the French kings, including, most famously, Geoffroi Villehardouin (1150?-1213?) of Aube, in the case of the Fourth Crusade, and Jean de Joinville (1224-1317) of Champagne, in the


\textsuperscript{523} The French contribution to the Crusades has been less and less stressed as nationalism has fallen from favor as an organizing principle for historiography, but French-speaking people took a leading role in all but the Fifth Crusade, and in the case of the Fifth, the lack of French involvement may be attributed to their distraction by a rather different animal, the Albigensian crusade against the Cathars of southern France from approximately 1304-1316.
case of the Seventh. But there was far more to French involvement in the Levant, and certain aftereffects of the Crusades are not always given their due.

As an example of the length and depth of French contacts with Eastern Europe and the Levant beyond the Crusades, many Frenchmen were to be found both among the Latin clergy on Lusignan Cyprus, after 1192, and among the Latin hierarchies set up in formerly Byzantine lands after the Fourth Crusade in 1204. Many Franciscans and Dominicans, furthermore, almost as soon as those two orders came into existence in 1212 and 1217, respectively, set out from the French kingdom to administer the Holy Places, especially in Jerusalem, as well as to do missionary work among the “heathen” Saracens and Mongols of the Orient. The traditional solicitousness of the French government for the interests of the Armenians, one that has lasted to this day, can be traced back to the alliance of the Crusaders with the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia that came into existence circa 1078 around the Gulf of Alexandretta in southern Asia Minor and which remained a bulwark of the Christian presence in the East until 1375. In 1396 the French commander Jehan le Meingre, the Marshal Boucicaut, collaborated with King Sigismund of Hungary in a campaign against the Ottomans under Bayezid I, a campaign that terminated with the disastrous Christian loss at the Battle of Nicopolis, in modern Bulgaria. Boucicaut later sailed from Genoa in 1399 to help the Byzantine emperor Manuel II repel the

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525 An important recent collection of papers on the Latin Church in the East is Asterios Argyriou, Catherine Otten-Froux and Pierre Racine, eds. _L’Église dans le Monde Byzantin de la IVe Croisade (1204) à la Chute de Constantinople (1453)_ (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 2007).

526 Among the massive bibliography on Franciscans and Dominicans in the East, the following has stood out: Jean Richard, _La Papauté et les Missions d’Orient au Moyen Age (XIIe-XIVe siècles)_ 2nd Edition (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1998).
Ottomans from Constantinople itself. Although one common thread to French policy in Eastern Europe was a desire to defend Christendom against the Infidel, but there were almost always more than considerations of religion, and religious enmities, involved.

Meanwhile, through heavy French participation in the Templars (until the destruction of that order in the first decade of the fourteenth century), and in the Hospitallers, and in other, smaller chivalric orders founded in the wake of the Crusades, some of which had landholdings on Cyprus, a significant contingent of Frenchmen remained on Cyprus throughout the Middle Ages. Although initially they may have had thoughts of a crusade against the Infidel in their minds, they remained on Cyprus even after the Venetians assumed control of Cyprus from the Lusignan. Several different currents contributed to form the French impression of the Levant. By the time the Ottomans invaded Cyprus, a love of Greek antiquity could be found among the scholarly classes in France – and it is relevant that the Cypriots, before the Cyprus War, were always written of as Greeks in French works. Thus, for example, the fifteenth and sixteenth-century Cypriot chroniclers, Boustronios, Makhairas, Florio Bustron, the anonymous “Michele Amadi chronicler,” and Diomede Strambaldi normally referred to the Cypriots as Greeks. But love of the ancient Greeks on the part of many Frenchmen, as I have noted, need not have translated into any particular political persuasion or program in their day. There is a “before” and an “after” state that the present-day historian cannot ignore. In 1500 the French Crown was quite uninterested in the eastern Christians, but by 1700 France had assumed a position as the principal protector of the Christians of the Near East, and continued in this role during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries, until Russia and her Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society began

527 These events are described in more detail in Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 42.
to offer competition, in the case of the Orthodox. It took a leap of the imagination to combine this interest in the French crusading past (evident in the large number of mid-seventeenth-century French genealogical works preoccupied in with the families of Outremer, that is to say, with a connection to the medieval Crusades) and what were regarded as the demands of Christian piety, with the development of the idea of protecting Ottoman Christians – just as the French flag in the late sixteenth century had protected Venetian and Dutch merchants trading in Ottoman lands – taking an interest, however paternalistic it may appear to some, in their fate. Whether these Ottoman Christians welcomed the attention is another question entirely, and would take us far from our theme.

As already mentioned, the Latin chivalric orders, most importantly the Knights Hospitallers and the Templars, many of French origin, established houses on Cyprus soon after the Latin conquest in 1191. The Knights of St-John of Jerusalem, established first on Cyprus, then on Rhodes, and, after the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes in 1522, on Malta, were also largely French in both their leaders and in their rank-and-file. But French crusading influence on Cyprus did not stop with the chivalric orders. A striking example of the continued influence of crusading ideas and traditions on the development of the Kingdom of Cyprus was the adoption from the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem of the legal code commonly known as the *Livre de la Haute Cour*, one part of the code used to govern the Kingdom of Jerusalem up until its end in 1291. The *Livre* was the work of John of Ibelin, a member of a baronial family that played a key role in

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the early history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1369, the Livre was adopted by King Peter II of Lusignan as the principal law code of the kings of Cyprus, and it continued to be applied until the Ottoman conquest, even though the Haute Cour itself was abolished when Venice assumed power. In using the Livre, and in other respects, too, such as maintaining two principal peasant categories of francomati and paroikoi, the Venetian rulers on Cyprus after 1489 maintained continuity from the Lusignan monarchy that preceded them. In fact, Florio Bustron, a native Cypriot who worked for the Venetian administration, was commissioned in 1531 to translate the Assizes de la Haute Cour into Italian for use in Cypriot courts. The continued use of laws, offices, and “feudal” institutions inherited from the Crusader Kingdoms were not the only inheritances Venice fostered on Cyprus. The court of the Cypriot kings developed a passion for the same kind of tales of chivalry as were told, and retold, in the Crusader Kingdoms of the Holy Land. The Byzantine knights of these medieval European tales were largely creatures of fancy, figures that were Gallicized and modernized and made more familiar. In sketching the Lusignan image of those they thought of as Byzantines, and then, after 1453, as Greek Orthodox, the historian has to keep in mind how much of what they thought existed in the realm of their own imaginary.

However one interprets the actions taken by Greek Cypriots after the Ottoman conquest, therefore, I hope to have established that politically and culturally, Frenchmen played a key role in the earlier fortunes of Cyprus through the Venetian assumption of control, in 1489. That the historic connections of Cyprus to the French nobility were recognized in the sixteenth century is

530 An important study on the history of the Ibelin family, and on the political and social context of the Assizes, is Joshua Prawer, Crusader Institutions (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

suggested by some of the interests of the major writers on the island. The importance of the Francophone period in the sweep of Cypriot history was recognized by Étienne de Lusignan (1537-90) in his *Chorograffia*, published in Naples in 1573, two years after the Ottoman conquest. The *Chorograffia*, which Lusignan may have so named because of its interest in topographical detail, begins with a description of the ten ancient Cypriot kingdoms of Idalion, Kition, Paphos, Amathus, Salamis, Soloi, Tamassus, Ledrai, and Chytroi, and is crammed with references to the Greek heritage of the island. Lusignan attempts to connect Cyprus’ Hellenic past with its present for, rather than strictly a chronicle of events, the *Chorograffia* pays much attention to the static, scarcely changing elements of Cyprus, combining attention to topographical and to archaeological detail, to natural features and ancient monuments. The writer, Étienne de Lusignan, also known in his time as Estienne-de-Chypre, or Stephen of Cyprus (1537-90), later assembled a voluminous genealogical compendium, *Les Genealogies de Soixante et Sept Tres-Nobles et Tres-Illustres Maisons...yssues de Merouée*, a work which reveals his fascination with the old French nobility and, not surprisingly, with his own family’s former triumphs. In any discussion of French relations with Cyprus, Lusignan’s work must appear, for it was in part inspired by his blood connection with the former ruling house of the island.

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533 This fascination with the Cypriot nobility and their interconnections and marriages into other European noble families, both before and after the Ottoman conquest, has continued among French-speaking scholars, for it is very evident in the seventeenth-century work of Charles Du Fresne, sieur Du Cange (1610-88), *Les Familles d’outre-mer* (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1869), and more recently in the genealogical excursions of Wipertus Hugh Rudt de Collenberg (died 1994) such as his *Familles de l’Orient Latin, XIle-XIVe siècles* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983).
Educated Europeans did not need to read anti-Ottoman *libelli* to react with horror to the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. They had been watching, for centuries, as the Seljuk and then Ottoman Turks had relentlessly pushed forward in Anatolia, and when Constantinople fell, the reverberation in Europe was great. Works such as the *Chorograffia* more subtly tried to elicit that reaction, by stressing the high level of civilization attained by Christian Cyprus, and implicitly contrasting it with Turkish savagery. Polemical writing against the Turks there certainly was, but the long detailed accounts about, and on behalf of, Christians living under Ottoman rule would await the seventeenth century, with such works as the English diplomat and consul Sir Paul Rycaut’s *The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches* (1679). 534

But Rycaut was an Englishman. By contrast, in the century when successive dukes of Savoy planned for the conquest of the island, the only Savoyard “studies” were works such as the *Trattato* by Pietro Monod (1632) and the *Discorso* of Giorgio de Nores (1637). These were juridical tracts on the relative merits of competing dynastic claims to the island. Furthermore, real scholarly study of the antiquities of Cyprus proceeded even as ‘Frankish’ 535 (western European) powers turned more and more from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and as the Ottoman-Christian fight in Europe moved increasingly from the sea to dry land, rendering


535 The Greek Orthodox in the Eastern Mediterranean continued to call Western Europeans Franks, *frangoi*. Some suggest that they borrowed the term from the Muslims in the East who had called the Crusaders *al-afranj*, Franks, because so many of the Crusaders were Franks, and the term was applied indiscriminately to all Crusaders who came from the West. For the use of the word in the Latin West, David Jacoby favors the etymology *francus* = freeborn, that is, those who were not serfs, and this etymology is supported by the sixteenth-century Cypriot usage of *francomati*, a word employed to describe those who worked the land but were free of feudal burdens. See *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, eds. David Jacoby, Bernard Hamilton, and Benjamin Arbel (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 6: ‘*Latinus* was synonymous with *Francus*, a word that acquired both an ethnic and a social connotation, as it meant ‘westerner’ as well as ‘free.’ On the other hand, the Greeks and Slavs, who remained faithful to the Byzantine Church, were relegated to the status of *villani*...’
Cyprus far less strategically relevant to Western imperial powers than earlier. It was no longer geopolitical considerations, but something else, that best explains the continued interest shown, among Western Europeans, in Cyprus. The French kings and the Dukes of Savoy, in their dealings with Cypriots, often appealed to their fellow-feeling as Christians, and their awareness of a common battle, a shared fight, against Turkish oppression. Narrow “national” claims, phrased in terms of the interests of “France,” were barely discernible and far less important than dynastic, those limited to particular families and their personal estates and fiefdoms. These dynastic claims were those of specific nobles on the make, hence, for example, the desire of French princes to be crowned king of Algiers, and of the dukes of Savoy to be kings of Cyprus and Jerusalem.

Though preoccupied, like the Spanish, with more than their share of famines, plagues, and episodes of political unrest, even after the Edict of Nantes brought the Wars of Religion to a halt in 1598, the French continued to take an interest in Cyprus and the Levant. Not only was there a political push for more French involvement in the protection of Jerusalem, from kings Louis XIII and Louis XIV, but there was, at the popular level, a continuous production of material, both literary and political, about the Ottomans, known as Turcica. In this period the public displayed a hunger for tales of the marvelous. Accounts of travels among faraway peoples and reports on exotic flora and fauna proliferated. Tales of the Turks combined factual reports with fabulous tales, which were the product of vivid imaginations. Reports from India and China

536 Angelo Tamborra has discussed the move after 1573 and (especially) after 1580 of Ottoman-Christian conflict in Europe from the sea to the land in his article “Dopo Lepanto: Lo Spostamento della Lotta Antiturca sul Fronte Terrestre,” in Gino Benzoni, ed., Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del ’500 alla luce di Lepanto (Venice: Fondazione Cini, 1974), 379 ff.


538 As European literature on the Ottoman Empire of this period is often known.
showed the same mix of fact and fantasy. But there were several differences. The Ottoman domains were lands that once, as lands of the eastern Roman Empire, had been Christian, and not as exotic as India or China. In the French works on the Ottoman lands, emphasis was placed on opposition of Christian freedom and Ottoman slavery. In the annals of French *Turcica*, the most vivid expression of this contrast was Racine’s celebrated *Bajazet*, of 1672.

**The Savoyard Claim to Cyprus**

Like Burgund in the fifteenth century, and like Lorraine and Liège in the sixteenth, Savoy, a duchy which combined French-speaking lands to the southeast of the French kingdom with the Italian-speaking Piedmont, in the decades following the Cyprus war was one of the states that constituted a buffer between the Habsburg and Valois spheres of interest in Western Europe. Marriage with other noble and royal houses was, as always, a frequent means of adding to a principality’s prestige, land, and money. When the son of Duke Amadeus VIII (r. 1396-1440), the future Duke Louis (r. 1440-65) was to be married in 1434, his chosen bride was Anne of Lusignan, daughter of King James I of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia. His father Duke Amadeus thus established a Savoyard claim upon Cyprus, minting coins with the motto *Cypria Recepta* or “The Cypriot Girl Received, where “received” meant “accepted,” or “welcomed,” that is “welcomed” into the hands of the Dukes of Savoy.  

When, in the sixteenth century, the Habsburg-Valois rivalry came to dominate much of Western European politics, Savoy, whose Dukes were devout Catholics, while not attacking

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539 Coins bearing this legend are pictured in Mario Traina, “Le monete dei Savoia parte seconda : I Duchi,” *Speciale Cronaca Numismatica* 36 (2008), 44.
France or showing clear hostility, nevertheless remained steadfastly on Spain's side. In 1568, for example, when the *tercios*, the feared infantry regiments of Spain, wanted to cross Savoyard territory on their way north to suppress the Dutch Revolt, the Duke allowed it. Savoy remained a Spanish ally, offering unimpeded transit through its territory, along the so-called Spanish Road that took Spanish armies north to the Netherlands, for the next eighty years.\(^{540}\) The same Duke, Emmanuel Philibert (r. 1553-1580), also contributed a small contingent of galleys to the Holy League in 1570-71, influenced mainly by the desire to be seen as a reliable ally of Spain. At the same time as still-active knightly Orders such as those of Calatrava (founded in 1157 in Castile as an honor for those knights who garrisoned a castle by that name that they had recently re-conquered from the Muslims) continued in the late sixteenth century to exhibit the fervent Catholic spirit of the Spanish court, Duke Emmanuel Philibert signalled his own proud embrace of crusader traditions. He reconstituted the chivalric order of Saint Maurice which his ancestor Amadeus VIII had founded in the fifteenth century, joining it with that of Saint Lazarus, with himself as head of the order, in 1572.\(^{541}\) But his son Charles Emmanuel I (r. 1580-1630) showed that, together with an upbringing steeped in Catholic chivalric notions, he had also inherited a failure to grasp certain geopolitical realities.\(^{542}\) Charles Emmanuel undertook, for example, to lay

\(^{540}\) Savoy's importance to the Spanish is illustrated in Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Curiously, as Toby Osborne notes, a number of writers from the north of Italy such as the poet Alessandro Tassoni would praise the historical role of the dukes of Savoy in resisting Spanish tyranny. But this resistance came decades later, in the 1610s, when Savoy was willing to fight the Spanish juggernaut to assert its claims to the small marquisates of Montferrat and Saluzzo. Toby Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years’ War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20-21.

\(^{541}\) The founding ideals of the order can be seen in, or more exactly teased out from, the *Statuti della sacra religione de Santi Maurizio e Lazaro* [Statutes of the Holy Religious Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus] spelling out the duties and regulations of members of the order, and dating to 1572 or shortly thereafter. I have consulted Harvard Houghton, MS. Riant 124, ff. 1r-93v.

siege in 1602 to what he regarded as a nest of abominable heresy, Calvinist Geneva. In a famous attempt to scale the walls of the Swiss city, an attempt known as the *Escalade*, his men botched the operation and were forced to retreat. This failure was similar to the half-baked plots – characterized by a lack of serious planning – concocted by successive dukes of Savoy to retake the island, which continued from 1570 to 1670. The Dukes maintained representatives and even spies on Cyprus (such as Eugenio Pennacchi in the 1580s, and, from 1609 on, Giovanni Accidas) and repeatedly sounded out popular sentiment on Cyprus concerning Ottoman rule. They shared some of the information they gathered with the Spanish kings. Aware that a few decades earlier the Tuscan Medici dukes’ claim to a kingly title had aroused strenuous Spanish opposition, the Savoyard dukes sought to keep their Spanish friends close. They were, like the dukes of Tuscany before them, desperate for a kingly crown and the prestige it brought, as Robert Oresko has pointed out, and this crown would accompany the rulership of Cyprus.

But given the military incompetence of Charles Emmanuel, demonstrated at Geneva, and given, also, the pro-Spanish tendencies of the duchy, it is unsurprising that when Savoy broached the idea to France of reconquering Cyprus, the French kings rejected the idea of an alliance.

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545 Nevertheless, the Savoyards continued to defend their claims to the island on a Europe-wide stage of pamphlets and counter-pamphlets into the 1650s. For instance, the tract by the Cypriot Giorgio Denores, trans. Paschalis Kitromilides, *A Discourse on the Island of Cyprus and on the Reasons for the True Succession in that Kingdom* (Venice: Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini di Venezia, 2006), is an admirably detailed and fair-minded work dating to between 1635 and 1638, which constitutes both a tract on inheritance law and on the relative strengths of several hereditary claims to the island. Denores concludes that the Savoyard claim to Cyprus is not strong, and that if any Latin prince is likely to redeem Cyprus, it is Ferdinand de’ Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany. In line with the argument of this chapter, it is striking how the Cypriot writer accepts that Western ideas of hereditary dynasties can and should decide who rules Cyprus in the future. The Orthodox-Catholic split is virtually impossible to detect in Denores’ tract.
Geographic distance alone may have accounted for the far greater French interest in Algiers and the Western Mediterranean than in Cyprus. Though Savoy was only marginally closer to Cyprus than France, still during the next century she displayed a close and persistent interest in retaking Cyprus from the Ottomans. The more compact, more peaceful and unified duchy and its dukes were in a better position to indulge what some will consider outdated notions of medieval Crusade than was the sprawling, war-torn kingdom of France. But there was also at the court of Savoy a distinct Counter-Reformation Catholic fervor which, fueled by the dynastic ambition of the dukes, and the chivalric tradition that impelled Duke Charles Emmanuel to found the Order of Sts. Maurice and Lazarus, prompted their unrealistic coveting of Cyprus.

**Savoy, the Troublemaker**

The House of Savoy, which claimed Cyprus, basing its claim on the marriage of the son of Duke Amadeus VIII to Anne of Lusignan, daughter of the King of Cyprus, in 1434, nevertheless in 1570-71 only made a token contribution of four ships to the Holy League formed to defend that island for Christendom. But after the war, it was Savoy, more than the larger powers, that seemed most serious about reconquest. In 1918 the Italian historian Giovanni Sforza published several letters concerning the plans made by the Duke of Savoy, Emmanuel Philibert, beginning as early as 1583, to take back Cyprus. Later, Sir George Hill, the most widely-read historian of Cyprus in English in the first half of the twentieth century, called attention to the large number of plans which Emmanuel Philibert and his son Charles Emmanuel continued to make through the mid-seventeenth century.\(^{546}\) Even as late as 1684, that is a century later, Savoy

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was offering aid to the Cypriots. Given Savoy’s small size and limited navy, the latter a key element in any plan to retake Cyprus, it seems astonishing that these plans went as far as they did. Only with the help of allies could they hope to wrest Cyprus back from the Ottomans, and indeed Savoy, together with independent Cypriot corsairs, tried to enlist the Spanish behemoth in their cause.

Several factors, which one may interpret as more or less coincidental, contributed to Savoy’s interest in reclaiming Cyprus for Christendom. First, the Dukes of Savoy shared with other Western European principalities a general interest in adding to their accumulation of titles and honors. No opportunity for adding to wealth or territory, particularly acquired through inheritance, was passed up. All over Western Europe, not in the sixteenth century alone but perhaps in the period from 1400 to 1800, in a more accentuated form than before or since, noble, royal and imperial families were eager to buttress their legitimacy by staking, or reviving and pressing, claims to the lands accumulated by their ancestors, as the house of Anjou did, for example, with the Kingdom of Naples in the mid-fifteenth century. Striking evidence of the

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548 These maneuvers are detailed in Giovanni Sforza, “I negoziati di Carlo Emanuele I, duca di Savoia, per farsi re di Cipro,” Atti del Real Accademia delle scienze di Torino 53 (1918) 529-42.

549 Roberto Bizzocchi, “La culture généalogique dans l’Italie du seizième siècle,” Annales E.S.C. 46 (1991) 789-805. That nobles sometimes took very seriously such disputed claims to distinguished pedigree – not surprising, since these claims could have great legal significance – is suggested by the fact that Alfonso Ceccarelli of Umbria, a forger – discussed by Bizzocchi – who worked as a genealogist in Rome, was executed there for falsifying noble lineages, in 1583 (Ibid., 789). There was also a threat of death uttered by the Marquis of Massa, according to the historian Carlo Sigonio, against his fellow-chronicler Onofrio Panvinio merely on the grounds that Panvinio had made out the ancestry of his relation, Pope Innocent VIII, to be less high in status than was accurate. Op.cit., 794.
Savoyards’ disconnection from political realities, can be found in the legal language used in the tracts, in the 1620s and 1630s, by Savoyard pamphleteers, that advanced Savoy’s legal claims to Cyprus. The Jesuit priest Pietro Monod’s *Tratto sopra li titoli* (Turin, 1633) is a prominent example.\(^{550}\) His arguments for Savoyard possession of Cyprus are based purely on the genealogy of the House of Savoy and Roman-law concepts of property inheritance. No attention is paid to the means, practical or impractical, by which this remote island was to be wrested from the Ottomans. For such polemical pamphlets were meant to argue against, not only the Ottomans and their claims through warfare and previous Islamic possession alone, but also, and perhaps mainly, against the legal claims of Venice to Cyprus, and to show that the claims of Savoy were the strongest. The rival claims of Christian powers were really the crux of the dispute, for none of those involved in the debate would fail to assign a higher legal and moral right to a Christian power, in any contest with the Ottomans.\(^{551}\) Gasparo Giannotti’s *Parere sopra un ristretto delle rivoluzioni* (1634), and Giorgio Denores’ *Discorso sopra l’isola de Cipri* (1637),\(^{552}\) are two such works. Both examine dynastic claims to Cyprus, but while Giannotti concludes that Venice has superior title, for Denores it is Savoy that has the stronger claim. Both mention only briefly the *de facto* possession of Cyprus by the Ottomans.

The legal framework underlying the Savoyard claims to Cyprus suggest both how European political concepts had changed since the Middle Ages, and also how far they had still


\(^{551}\) Baumer, “England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom,” 29: “the Turk was still a different species in kind from the Christian powers...”

to go before anything like the universalistic ideas about the laws of war and peace among nations, or the even more recent solicitousness for the “inalienable rights” of individuals, would begin to be entertained. That would have to await such thinkers as Montesquieu and Kant, and such epoch-making summaries as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* of 1789. The tracts I have been referring to drew mainly on dynastic principles, and the Western European understanding of such principles was not perceived by their authors as being compatible with the Muslim view of things. Christians such as Giorgio Denores did not seriously consider arguments that the Turks might have a claim to be the legitimate rulers of Cyprus, relying on the same theory that the colonial powers did in maintaining their claims, based on conquest, to the New World. So profound is his dislike of the Turks that Denores uses “*Turchi*” virtually as a synonym for “tyrants.” And it is hardly surprising that none of the powers involved in this period in determining or claiming Cyprus’ sovereignty, whether Muslim or Christian, came close to invoking the language of universal, inalienable rights. Ebu’s-su’ud’s *fetva*, for example, instead refers to specifically Koranic precedents for breaking a truce with non-Muslims.

The Venetians, whatever the Ottoman reasoning, rushed to defend their island when the Ottoman threat became imminent. In the wake of the delivery of the ultimatum that the Ottoman representative, Kubad çavuş, delivered to Venice in March 1570, the weaknesses in the garrisons and fortifications of Cyprus that had occupied so much correspondence in the 1560s were now glossed over. The accounts by the Venetian historians Giovanni Pietro Contarini and

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553 e.g. Denores, *A Discourse*, 48, “essendo hoggi l’imperio di Costantinopoli oppresso dalla tirannide de’Turchi...” Denores then lists the potential parties (50) with historic claims to rule Cyprus. The Ottomans are not among them. The four he mentions are the Duke of Savoy, the descendants of Henry Lusignan, brother of King Janus of Cyprus (r. 1398-1432), and the Republics of Venice and Genoa.

554 Kubad had been delegated to convey the Sultan’s ultimatum over Cyprus to the Venetian Senate.
Bartolomeo Sereno of what was said in the Venetian Senate show that there were now stirring exhortations to the defense of the Republic, claims of willingness to sacrifice the Venetians who had been arrested in Constantinople for the greater good of the Republic, and expressions of concern for the defense of Christians’ commercial interests. The welfare of the people of Cyprus was not mentioned, unless one interprets the references to Christian welfare as an oblique way of referring to them and their “rights.” The same observation can be made of Giorgio Denores’ defense of Sayovard interests, the Discourse. This was an age when the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, enunciated at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, held sway, and so Savoyard claims to Cyprus were not phrased in terms of their ability to defend minority or religious rights – Christians being the majority on Cyprus, but a minority by this date within the Ottoman Empire. The ruler’s religion could determine the religion of the state he ruled, and, in effect, that of his people, and arguments in the abstract about defending “minorities” were not part of the prevailing ius gentium or law of peoples of the time, though ideas of aiding one’s fellow Christians were ubiquitous, as was the rhetorical contrast of the arbitrariness and cruelty of Turkish governance with orderly Christian rule. And such abstract arguments about “minority rights” are indeed absent from those pamphlets making the Savoyard case.

**European and Ottoman Concepts of Sovereignty**

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556 In this context the rhetoric of one contemporary Genoese legist, Uberto Foglietta (1518-1581), is apropos. Foglietta began his study of the Holy League that formed in 1570, *De Sacro Foedere* (Bologna: Bartoli, 1587), by introducing a possibly imagined private dialogue between Sultan Selim and Joseph Miques, known as Nasi, over the fate of Cyprus, in which the Sultan promised Nasi that he would rule Cyprus as King. Foglietta, *De Sacro Foedere*, 2: (“Tu vero Cypri rex, si votis Numina annuerint” – You indeed [will become] King of Cyprus, if the fates so ordain). Foglietta implicitly contrasts the arbitrariness and despotism of the Sultan, in a way common to sixteenth and seventeenth-century Western literature on the Ottomans, with the more mature deliberations of the representatives of the Christian powers.
Ottoman interpretations of Islamic law did not countenance true peace treaties with unbelievers, but temporary truces alone.\footnote{Cf. Majid Khadduri, \textit{The Law of War and Peace in Islam} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1955), 212-213 and 235.} Given the importance accorded the precedents set by the Prophet and the first four (the ‘Rightly-Guided’) caliphs who succeeded him, Ebü’s-su’ud’s reference in his \textit{fetva} to Mohammed’s Treaty of Hudaybiyya, an episode from approximately 628 A.D., when Mohammed’s forces made a truce with a group of Quraish tribesmen, was entirely conventional. Ebü’s-su’ud’s interpretation, that this episode meant that good Muslims might break a truce (\textit{hudna}) with infidels if that truce endangered Muslim interests, enjoyed wide currency among early modern Ottoman theologians,\footnote{Colin Imber, \textit{Ebu-Su’ud: the Islamic Legal Tradition} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 85.} the principle of \textit{pacta sunt servanda} – treaties must be observed – not being an historical universal.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 85.} French juridical writings had absorbed Roman law by the late sixteenth century, and it was above all the Dutchman Hugo de Groot or Grotius who, in his early seventeenth-century writings, supplemented Roman civil law with what was regarded as natural law, to adumbrate the maxim of \textit{pacta sunt servanda}. Among the active and numerous French jurists who were writing around the time of the Cyprus War no one appears to have taken up the question of how Islamic and Roman-law concepts of sovereignty could be reconciled.

Nor did anyone appear to attempt to reconcile the very different ideas of both rule, and sovereignty, held by rulers in Christian Europe and in the Ottoman Empire. Striking coins with one’s name and having the Friday prayer or \textit{hutbe} recited in one’s name were signs of Ottoman sovereignty – and in the case of the Ottomans, the ruler was to be obeyed unless it could be
shown that he was not a true Muslim.\footnote{Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005), s.v. “Khutbe,” and “Sikke,” and see Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty (London: Continuum, 2008), 70-71 and 209.} In European lands, and particularly in France, the Wars of Religion – that is, wars between Catholics and Huguenots, Protestants of Calvinist inspiration, raised different questions as to whether, and when, sovereign authority could be overturned or resisted. In European lands, furthermore, either Salic law, or a set of rules sometimes called semi-Salic, predominated, and the signs of being a sovereign included having a close blood relationship to the last ruler, whether son, brother, or nephew, or in the case of the extinction or expulsion of a dynasty, the nearest relation of the last ruling prince. As proof, written documents were routinely preserved and produced to jurists to establish such claims to rulership. The interests of such jurists as Nicolas Cujas, Theodore Beza, and François Hotman focused on such matters.\footnote{See Donald R. Kelley, Chapter IV, “The Historical School of Roman Law: Andrea Alciato and his Disciples Discover Legal History,” in Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 87-115.} And in Spain, after the discovery and then the conquest of the New World, the preoccupying legal questions, for Vitoria and Suarez, were the status of the conquered peoples, and the licitness, or lack thereof, of Spanish treatment of the indigenous peoples of the New World.

**French and Savoyard Interests and Alliances regarding Cyprus**

We have seen that by far the most plausible reason for France’s lack of interest in Cyprus was the debilitating, and thus constraining, effect wrought by the Wars of Religion, waged from 1562 to 1598, on France’s ability to handle its overseas involvements. Eventually, these religious wars concluded, once Henry of Navarre had accepted Roman Catholicism with the famously cynical remark that “Paris is worth a Mass,” (“Paris vaut une Messe”), and had promulgated the Edict of Nantes (1598), granting Protestants right of worship in certain French towns, and four
safe havens, including La Rochelle on the Bay of Biscay. France could and did re-enter the
Levant, but for the purposes of trade, and with no latter-day crusade in mind in that area (while
further west, the Algiers project was the product of dynastic ambition, but had nothing to do with
a crusade). As we have seen, earlier that century, beginning in 1536, the French king had made
a series of agreements, known as capitulations, or in Ottoman ahdnameler, with the Ottomans.
These granted the French increasingly favorable terms in trading with the Ottomans. This, and
perhaps also the Ottoman intellectual tendency to think of the frenkler or wretched infidels,
kuffar-i haksar, as an undifferentiated mass, unless there existed some strong reason to
distinguish among them, explains how by the end of the century, in 1598, in the same year as the
Edict of Nantes, King Henry IV (r. 1589-1610), having been petitioned by Dutch merchants, was
able to grant them the right to trade under the French flag in Ottoman ports. Shortly afterwards,
the volume of Dutch Levantine trade swelled to considerable dimensions. France was benefitting
economically and strengthening a nascent alliance with the Protestant Dutch by maintaining
unhostile if not truly friendly relations, for commercial purposes, with the Ottomans. Why would
she wish to endanger that, with the risky enterprise of an attempt to recover Cyprus in alliance
with either Venice or Savoy?

562 This process is traced in Mehmet Bulut, “The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration
between the Levant and the Atlantic in the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient 45 (2002), 201.

563 Braudel, Mediterranean, vol. II, 961, and see Mehmet Bulut, Ottoman-Dutch Economic Relations in the Early
Diplomatic Realignments

The French échelles, merchant ports of call in the Levant, continued to prosper after the conquest of Cyprus. 564 It would be inaccurate to consider Venice the sole rivals of the French. The English and the Dutch, too, were prominent rivals, with the English establishing a Levant Company by the 1580s. England began trading in Ottoman lands with the arrival of William Harborne as ambassador to Constantinople in 1583 and the agreement he signed there with the Sublime Porte, and the Dutch established their own capitulations in 1612. Silk was a crucial luxury trade item that European traded in extensively at Smyrna and at other Ottoman ports, and since Fernand Braudel argued that “every single letter from Venetian or Marseilles merchants from Aleppo, Tripoli, or Alexandretta, carries a reference to silk,” 565 the important place of silk in European-Ottoman trade has generally been recognized.

How did the Cyprus War change the trade picture? In the very short term, Venetian-Ottoman trade was cut off. The analyses by Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein, Brian Pullan, Halil Inalcı and others of the economic slowdowns caused by the Cyprus War have concentrated on the principal combatants, Venice and the Ottomans. Much attention has been

564 Paul Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français (Paris: Hachette, 1896)... ii and 522. Masson thought that the French were intent on using their privileged position in Ottoman eyes to gain an advantageous position compared with Venice, although he also sees the new French capitulation of 1597 as failing in one important aim: English and Venetian merchants were not required, as the merchants of every other European nation had been since the 1581 capitulations, to fly the French flag. Masson, op.cit., xiii-xix. In reaching this conclusion, Masson concentrated on the records of Marseilles, both because of the large volume of documents that have been preserved, and because of Marseilles’ status as a major port, and the the closest French port to Ottoman territories, from which innumerable ships left for the eastern Mediterranean. See, for more on the subject of early modern French commerce in the Levant, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, II (New York: Academic Press, 1974): 272, and Halil Inalcı, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Vol. 1, 194. As I have noted, Franco-Venetian rivalry extended to other arenas, such as the protectorship of the Christian Holy Places in and around Jerusalem.

given, for example, to the timber shortages endured by the Ottoman Navy when the 1570-73 war reduced the flow of timber from Venetian territories to Anatolia to nearly nothing.\textsuperscript{566} France, by contrast, as we have seen, was affected far more by the Wars of Religion, as they played out domestically, than by the Cyprus War. In 1604, once Henry IV was relatively secure on his throne, and six years after the Edict of Nantes had brought a modicum of peace to France, a new capitulation was signed with the Ottomans that reconfirmed some of the privileges of French merchants, forbidding the corsairs of North Africa from attacking French vessels (this proved, however, to be an unenforceable provision) and permitting French fishermen to fish in the area of Stora-Courcourci, a dependency of the Regency of Algiers. This treaty, or set of letters-patent, also included the general mandate, which its French compiler De Testa labelled as Article 27, that “given that the aforesaid emperor of France is among all of the Christian kings and princes the most noble and of the highest family, and the most perfect friend which our ancestors obtained among the kings and princes of the belief in Jesus...we wish and command that his ambassadors, who reside at our felicitous Porte, have precedence over the ambassador of Spain and those of other kings and princes.”\textsuperscript{567} France was also accorded, by the language of a later article in the same treaty, \textit{at least equal} privileges in the Ottoman Empire to those enjoyed by Venice. And in the long term, Ottoman exports of silk to France, and to the rest of Europe, greatly increased, as did French and other European exports of woollens to the Ottomans. In

\textsuperscript{566} Halil İnalcık, “Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents,” in his \textit{The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Society, and Economy} (London: Variorum, 1978), 189. For a more general timber shortage in the late sixteenth century for Venice and for other Mediterranean states, see Brian Pullan, \textit{Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries} (London: Methuen, 1968), 43.

\textsuperscript{567} I have consulted the French text in Ignaz de Testa, \textit{Recueil}, Vol. I, 147: “Et pour autant qu’icelui empereur de France est entre tous les rois et princes chrétiens le plus noble et de la plus haute famille, et le plus parfait ami que nos aïeux aient acquis entre lesdits rois et princes de la croyance de Jésus...nous voulons et commandons que ses ambassadeurs, qui résident à notre heureuse Porte, aient la préséance sur l’ambassadeur d’Espagne et sur ceux des autres rois et princes...” The precedence of diplomatic envoys was a major question of prestige for all of the European powers, and this was, therefore, a major concession the Ottomans made to the French.
general, the Cyprus War contributed to France’s stronger commercial position in the Levant, even as it accelerated Venice’s decline.\textsuperscript{568}

**Pilgrimage to the Holy Land and the French Protectorship of Christian Holy Places**

One final, and non-economic aspect of France’s postwar policy in the Levant can help to explain the special French relationship with Ottoman Christians that developed at this time and lasted until the end of the Empire. It was Henry IV’s successor, Louis XIII (r. 1610-43), who first promoted the idea of a French protectorship of the Holy Places in Christianity in and around Jerusalem, an aspect of the French agenda with the Ottomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that is sometimes overlooked in light of the economic ties between France and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{569} As the account by the Seigneur de Villamont (a Breton) of 1589 testifies, even after the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, pilgrims from the French-speaking lands, as from the rest of Europe, remained determined to reach the Holy Land. The highest Sunni authority among the Ottomans, Ebü’s-su’ud, held, as will be recalled, that the Christian piratical interference with Muslim pilgrims was one set of grounds for approving of breaking the treaty with Venice and invading Cyprus. The converse of Ebü’s-su’ud’s reasoning was now true. For, just as a Christian Cyprus had threatened the tranquillity of Muslim pilgrim ships bound for Mecca, now a Muslim-ruled Cyprus threatened Christian pilgrims bound for the Holy Land. Pierre Duparc, writing an introduction to the collection of instructions written for French ambassadors in Constantinople


\textsuperscript{569} Not mentioned in Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade*, for example, despite his Gallocentric selection of texts.
which was published in 1969,\footnote{Pierre Duparc, ed. \textit{Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et aux ministres de France...Vol. XXIX, Turquie} (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1969), 6.} a series which has been preserved since the mid-seventeenth century, remarked that this was the period in which French claims to a protectorship over the Holy Places began to drown out those of other Western European powers. And indeed, the correspondence collected by Father Antoine Rabbath between King Louis XIII (r. 1610-43) and M. De Césy, his ambassador in Constantinople, shows that this self-promotion was not easily accepted. The Venetians, in particular, objected strongly to the French opening a consulate in Jerusalem, and their fear of French power and of the Jesuit order, which formerly had been Spanish-dominated, but had become increasingly French in its character and its priorities, appears to have been at the root of these objections. This is suggested by King Louis’ letter of June 9, 1624:

“you should know that the ambassador of Venice came to see me, a few days ago, and tried to persuade me that the schismatic Christians who recognize the Patriarch of Jerusalem, even the religious who are at the Holy Places, wanted to withdraw from my protection and resort to theirs alone, since they were apprehensive that I would try to establish the Jesuits there...I replied on that subject that...I wished to innovate nothing to their prejudice...”\footnote{Antoine Rabbath, \textit{Documents Inédits pour servir à l'Histoire du Christianisme en Orient} (Paris: A. Picard et Fils, 1905), Vol.II, 334: “...vous aurez à savoir que l'ambassadeur de Venise me vint voir, il y a quelques jours, et me voulut persuader que les chrétiens schismatiques qui reconnaissent le Patriarche de Jérusalem, même les religieux qui sont aux Saints Lieux, voulaient se retirer de ma protection et recourir à la leur seule, par l'appréhension qu'ils avaient que j'eusse dessein d'y établir les Jésuites...je lui répliquais la-dessus que...je ne voulais rien innover à leur préjudice...”}

Louis XIII showed both flexibility and firmness in dealing with the Ottomans, the Venetians, and other Christian parties in 1624, and in so doing lay the groundwork for French prestige in the later Ottoman period.
Conclusion: French and Savoyard Philhellenism

Despite much polemical rhetoric about the need for a united Christian front after the Ottoman conquest in 1570-71, that front, in relation to Cyprus, was far from being achieved. Instead, French and Savoyard interest in post-Conquest Cyprus shows that the internal squabbles of Christian states, such as France with Spain and Savoy with Venice, greatly influenced European relations with the Levant. Despite these disagreements among states, one current that pulsed across boundaries in Western Europe was that of philhellenism, no longer a sympathy limited to the ancient Greeks, but now extended to their modern descendants.

On the Ottoman side, a lack of curiosity about Cyprus, to the extent that the available sources permit a conclusion, was more marked. In the Cihannûma (Reports of the World), a world chronicle of about 1640 written by Katip Çelebi, an Ottoman admiral and statesman, there is mention of Cyprus, but only in a few paragraphs.\(^{572}\) Cyprus was one of the areas of the Ottoman Empire – the Maghreb was the other – not visited by Evliya Çelebi, a well-travelled bureaucrat and the author of that most famous of Ottoman travel accounts, the Seyahatname (Book of Journeys), finished between 1661 and 1672. That Evliya neglected Cyprus, when it was much closer and easier to visit than even North Africa, suggests that it remained, for the Ottomans, a place of insignificance in his day.

Near Larnaca can be found a tomb known to Muslims as that of Umm Haram, who is sometimes described as the aunt of Muhammad. Nowadays this is sometimes described as the fourth holiest site in Islam, but its significance was not widely recognized in the seventeenth

century, when Evliya was attempting to relate the most interesting features of the Empire to his readers.\textsuperscript{573} Only later, at the end of the seventeenth century, was this tomb recognized by the Ottoman administration as that of one of the female followers of Muhammad, who travelled at a great age to Cyprus, accompanying in 680 the conquering army of the Caliph Mu'awiya. Only at that point did the Ottomans build over the tomb as a holy shrine or mausoleum, in Ottoman a \textit{türbe}.

Like the Ottomans, as I have shown at several points, the western powers took a religious interest in Cyprus. They were aware of St. Barnabas the Apostle, the bringer of the Gospel to Cyprus, and of the legends surrounding him, and they were aware of Cyprus’ history as a place of refuge for knights of the chivalric orders, fleeing the Holy Land after the fall of Acre in 1291.\textsuperscript{574} Despite the religious nimbus about the island, the fame of its saints and relics, and its positive Crusader associations, we have seen how the Savoyard dukes were deceiving themselves if they thought that faith alone would persuade Christian allies to lay aside other more immediate concerns to attempt the reconquest of an island which could boast frequent earthquakes, famines, malaria epidemics, and locust infestations among its attractions. By repeatedly proving the depth of their attachment to the title of King of Cyprus during the first century of Ottoman rule, the dukes of Savoy made a contribution to the survival of a Greek Cypriot identity by reminding the Orthodox Cypriots that at least one small polity in Western


\textsuperscript{574} Etienne de Lusignan, for instance, who describes himself as a member of the chivalric Order of St. Michael, describes in the \textit{Description de toute l’île de Cypre}, 25, how King Henry II founded Famagusta as a refuge for those fleeing the Seljuk Turks when they conquered Ptolemais (an ancient name for Acre), and how he tried to make his new city resemble Ptolemais/Acre as closely as possible.
Europe continued to take a direct and intimate interest in their fate – an interest shared, though perhaps to a lesser degree, by Venice and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. During a period when the dominant political ideas among the Greek Cypriots were hierarchical, and king or emperor-centered, some of those Orthodox appear to have looked to the Dukes of Savoy in the same spirit that they looked to the Kings of Spain, as the long-sought-for deliverers from that “deplorable condition of slavery” in which they perceived themselves to be sunk after the Ottoman conquest.575 French and Savoyard philhellenism, as elsewhere in Western Europe, as an intellectual movement no longer limited itself to an interest in the Greeks of classical antiquity, but had an immediate impact on attitudes, and in some cases, on state policy.

Since a large number of European sixteenth and seventeenth-century descriptions of Ottoman Cyprus and of the conditions of the Orthodox were written by ambassadors and consuls, it is worth remarking on these reports as sources. The function of both ambassadors and the consuls, who differed in their prestige but undertook similar tasks, was to act as protectors of particular European merchant communities – and sometimes more than one. So one Balthasar Sauvan, for example, was consul simultaneously of the English, French and Dutch communities in the 1680s. These consuls had as one of their duties to protest against what they perceived as unjust treatment perpetuated against the communities of their co-nationals and “remind” the Ottoman authorities of the terms of the capitulations their government had signed with the Ottomans.576 Especially disturbing were what the Western merchants regarded as unjust customs demands, or demands for bribes. It may be that this very function for the consuls meant that they were a self-selecting group who tended to push for narrow interests alone and to view the

575 The phrase is that of the Cypriot jurist Giorgio Denores, A Discourse, 101: “servitù deplorabile.”

576 A description of the role of the consul in the French case is to be found in the 1604 capitulations, Article 25, De Testa, 147.
Ottoman authorities in a mainly antagonistic light. But this is hard to prove. Some, such as the Englishman Paul Rycaut, consul at Smyrna on the Aegean coast of Anatolia in the 1660s, were able to obtain remarkably detailed information about what concerned them the most. In the case of Rycaut, what most concerned him was the state of the Greek and Armenian Churches under Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{577}

Some of the consular correspondence from the late seventeenth century (to go a bit beyond the period principally considered in this dissertation) shows the French as weighing considerations of more than purely commercial interest, for example in their attempts to balance the interests of one indigenous Christian community against another. The French, for example, protected the small Maronite community, one that acknowledged papal primacy, against the Greeks. The French consul in Larnaca in 1686, Balthasar Sauvan – who collected Greek manuscripts for the powerful finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert – displayed a keen awareness, shared by other Catholic Europeans, of the differences among Ottoman minorities in the Ottoman lands. He was careful to distinguish Uniate Catholics like the Maronites, with their acceptance of higher papal claims to authority, and the Greek Orthodox, who insisted on equality of dignity among the five patriarchs of Rome, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Sauvan wrote as follows:

\begin{quote}
\text.misc{\textquoteleft\textquoteright}There are six or seven villages of Maronite Christians who pay \textit{harac}\textsuperscript{578} to the Grand Signor [the Ottoman Sultan], and every year, a bishop comes from Mount Lebanon, by order of the Patriarch, to see if the churches are well served, and if the priests are carrying out their duty well. The said bishop has been under our protection ever since his arrival, the Holy Congregation for Propagating the Faith having done us the honor to write to us\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{577} Paul Rycaut, \textit{The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, anna Christi 1678} (London: John Starkey, 1679).

\textsuperscript{578} An Islamic household tax on non-Muslims, assessed by the Ottomans and by earlier Muslim dynasties, as well.
on the subject. My lords the Greeks do what they can to trouble them [the Maronites], but I have always supported them, and prevented them from being irritated by them [the Greeks].”

As I hope to have established, both domestic and external factors had contributed to a re-emergence of French engagement – or perhaps better to say, the engagement of many Frenchmen -- with the Levant after 1598. At home, France could deal with a Spain weakened as a result of overcommitments abroad and endemic financial problems, in some cases exacerbated rather than ameliorated by the flow of silver from the New World. And Spain was now a power turned more and more towards the Atlantic, while on the Continent of Europe French influence, and French aggression against the Spanish in the southern Netherlands, was on the rise, just about the time, around 1670, that Savoy was losing interest in Cyprus and the prospect of a Western reconquest was more or less abandoned.

Instead, French and Savoyard interest found concrete expression primarily in non-military endeavors: in the labors of French missionaries to set up schools in the Greek world, and in the efforts, above all by Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, to maintain regular correspondence with the Christians of Cyprus. Even research on the ancient Greek past undertaken by Frenchmen was often conducted as a way of illuminating the Greek character of

579 Rabbath, Documents, Vol. II, 98: “Il y a six ou sept villages de chrétiens Maronites qui paient karach au Grand Seigneur, et toutes les années, il vient un évêque du mont Liban, d’ordre du patriarche, pour voir si les églises sont bien desservies et si les prêtres font bien leur devoir. Le susdit évêque est sous notre protection lorsqu’il est arrivé, la S. Congrégation de Propaganda Fide nous faisant l’honneur de nous écrire sur ce sujet. Messieurs les Grecs font ce qu’ils peuvent pour les inquiéter; mais je les ai toujours soutenus, et j’ai empêché qu’ils ne soient par eux vexés.” This letter is classified as Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Français 7164, folio 447.

580 On several occasions, Dukes of Savoy sent money to support the Latin bishops of Cyprus with pensions, as expressions of the sympathetic interest they took in the island as its would-be Kings. This took place in 1662, 1664, 1678, and 1684. Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 308, citing Renato Magni, “Casa di Savoia e l’isola di Cipro: Appunti Storici,” Bollettino Consolare XV/2 (Rome: Bocca, 1879): 19. The documents showing these payments, which Magni says are in the Archivio di Stato in Turin, have not yet been published.
their own day, for early modern scholars tended to compress past and present, and to the extent that they discerned what nowadays would be called “national character,” saw it as changing little over time. George Hill in his early twentieth-century *History of Cyprus* notes that in Hill’s own time it was easy to spark the interest, and pride, of Cypriots by referring to the glories of ancient Greece. 581 Simply by taking an interest in what the Cypriot Orthodox would come to see as “their” past, I have argued, the French and other Westerners contributed, during Lusignan, and then Venetian, and then early Ottoman rule, to the formation of Greek Cypriot identity. 582 These westerners saw the ancient Greeks as closely linked to the Greek-speakers of the eastern Mediterranean in their own time, and in this shift, Frenchmen and Savoyards played a significant role. This new attention was important in the process by which the Cypriot Orthodox developed a “Greek Cypriot” identity. 583 Still, the Venetians were the Westerners who had engaged Greeks for the longest time through their expansion, after the year 1000, into the eastern Mediterranean, and it was the Venetians who had ruled Cyprus immediately before the Ottoman invasion. To their place in Cypriot history after 1571, therefore, I now turn.


Chapter Four

Venice and the Cypriot Christians in the Aftermath of the Defeat

Looked at without a knowledge of historical context, Venice’s decision to go to war over Cyprus appears strange, even inexplicable. The island’s crusading past provides such a context and can help to explain the ties of sentiment which linked Venice to Cyprus. Venice’s involvement with the Crusades did not begin with the Fourth, in 1203-4, but extended back to providing ships to help ferry knights in the First Crusade, in 1096-97.\textsuperscript{584} To understand both the later Venetian determination to fight for Cyprus and her lack of interest in recapturing the island once it had been lost, it is useful to recall both this Crusader past on the island, and also how Venice came to acquire Cyprus in the first place.

Ever since the eighth century, Venice had gradually expanded both on land and on sea. The doge Maurizio Galbaio (r. 764-787) had founded a bishopric on the eastern Rialtine island of Olivolo, in the Venetian lagoon to the east of the city. When the Franks failed to occupy Venice in an attack in 810 A.D., and the Venetians sacked a potential rival in Comacchio in 886,\textsuperscript{585} their expansion into the Adriatic began. At the beginning of the tenth century Doge Pietro Orseolo (r. 991-1009) annexed parts of Dalmatia, across the Adriatic, in what is now Slovenia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{586} Venice had been a vassal state of Byzantium, and remained so, in theory, until at least the year 1000. Venetian merchants flocked to Byzantine ports between 1000 and 1200, and the Byzantine emperors considered them important enough to Byzantium to grant them generous trade privileges. I have mentioned the chrysobull of 1082, and in this period the Latins, not

\textsuperscript{584}Marie Favreau-Lilie, \textit{Die Italiener im Heiligen Land} (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1989), 74-77.


Venetians alone but Pisans, Anconitans, Genoese, Amalfitans and Catalans, all settled in the Pera district of Constantinople, which became known as the principal Latin quarter. There were some tensions both among the Latins (Venetians slaughtered Genoese in Constantinople in 1171) and with the Byzantine populace, which, upon the entry into the city of Andronikos Komnenos in 1182, boiled over in a slaughter of Latins, not in Constantinople alone, but throughout the Byzantine empire; there were at least 50,000 Latins resident in the city, and thousands were killed, while an additional 4000, the Latin chronicler William of Tyre reported, were sold into slavery. But the Fourth Crusade of 1203-04, during which Venetians, together with other Franks, lay waste to the Byzantine capital Constantinople, provided good evidence of the reversal of positions of Venice and Byzantium. While Venice would not assume control of Cyprus until 1489, rule on the island from the Latin West began in 1191, after the Third Crusade. It was in that year that King Richard I of England took Cyprus from the Byzantine emperor Isaac Komnenos and later sold it to Guy de Lusignan. In the meantime, during those three centuries of Lusignan rule on Cyprus, the Venetian trading community in the Byzantine Empire greatly expanded. But that Venetian expansion became more concerned with territory than with maritime commerce alone after the Fourth Crusade of 1203-1204. In the aftermath of this campaign, Venice acquired substantial new territories in the Greek East. For it was then that the Venetian nobility and ruling councils acquired three-eighths of the Byzantine Empire through a

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treaty known as the *Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae*. Venice used these lands partly for economic exploitation, and partly for settlement. Some noble Venetian families – the Ghisi, Gozzadini, Stampalia, and Corner among them – set up autonomous dynasties on small Aegean islands that had been allocated to them, after the new Latin Empire was founded out of the confusion and tohu-bohu of the Fourth Crusade, and its resultant Sack of Constantinople. These included Tinos, Andros, Kythera, Naxos (conquered in a later expedition led by the Venetian patrician Marco Sanudo), and others. On these islands and on Crete, Cyprus, and mainland Greece, Latin elites came to dominate heavily Orthodox populations. In some places, such as the Morea, the name by which the southern part of mainland Greece was known, scholars following the English historian William Miller (1864-1930) have recognized that while these Latin administrations made efforts to control the Greek hierarchy and in some cases inconvenienced them, there was no sustained effort to convert the Greeks. Latin indifference to such conversion, in contrast to their enthusiasm for crusading in the Holy Land for so many centuries, is not surprising. The Muslims were preventing Christian pilgrims from visiting the Holy Land, while the Greeks were not, and the Greeks, furthermore, were fellow Christians. Evidence of their lack of interest in conversion can be found both in the *Chronicle of the Morea*, an anonymous historical text of the fourteenth century about the Latin-ruled Principality of Achaea, which sketches a society where in a complicated Latin-Greek patchwork religious conversion was not assigned a priority. What the Latins celebrated were great military exploits

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590 Text in Antonio Carile, “*Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae,*” *Studi Veneziani* VII (1965-66), 125-305.


and the chivalry of their commanders – not the subjugation of schismatic Christians. In this, they differed from the Ottomans. The “perfidious Greeks” were often attacked by Latin, that is Catholic, poets and chroniclers. But the sober administrators of Latin Romania did not needlessly oppress the Greeks, or subject them, in the Middle Ages, to legal and political disabilities – at least by comparison with what went on in other regions at the time. There were exceptions. Historians have unearthed episodes of spasmodic Latin fanaticism, such as the massacre at Kantara of thirteen monks in 1231. But such episodes were rare. With the coming of the Protestant Reformation, however, the mood in Latin Europe turned more firmly against all non-Catholics, and theological doctrines came to be defined both more narrowly and more strictly.

Some indication of a new climate can be garnered from the comparison of texts. Thomas Aquinas’ *Contra Errores Graecorum* (circa 1264) is a tract dedicated to the question of what constitutes theological truth, *veritas*, a word that Aquinas uses over and over.593 His book contains no expressions of contempt for “Greeks” on religious or racial grounds, though the title of his work has been translated to suggest otherwise. But also not to be found is any trace of interest in Greek “culture” or a specifically Greek Christian tradition that might have something of value to be transmitted to a wider Christian community. Several centuries later, in the Latin West, there were other, different expressions of dismay about the Orthodox, and hope for their conversion. The writings of and records about Cardinal Giulio Antonio Santoro, from the period after Lepanto, express his hope of spreading the true and wholesome Christianity in the Greek lands, and contain expressions of contempt for Greek ignorance. At the same time Antonio Cauco was commissioned by Gregory XIII to undertake research on the “errors of the Greeks,” and the resulting work, the *De Graecorum recentiorum haeresibus*, repeated many of the old

calumnies: the Greeks were perfidious, they were given to errors and heresies, and God has blinded their understanding.\textsuperscript{594} Also at this time, the Latin priests (and historians) Etienne de Lusignan and Antonio Maria Graziani, writing about Cyprus and Cypriots, expressed doubts about the loyalty of the Greek population to their Venetian (Latin) masters, and disdain for the Greeks, whom Graziani clearly associated, on Cyprus at least, with rude and savage barbarism.\textsuperscript{595} Yet many Venetians, like Frenchmen and Spaniards, were coming to entertain a more positive view of Greeks, and to show a greater ability than in earlier centuries to sympathize with their plight, particularly in the years after the Fall of Constantinople, when there was reason to fear for the very future of Greek learning and culture.

Thus, there was a long history of involvement with the Orthodox in the Eastern Mediterranean that the Venetian ruling class had absorbed and could draw upon as experience, when, in 1489, Venice came to rule such largely Greek Orthodox areas as Cyprus. The \textit{Stato da Mar}, that collection of fortresses, small merchant enclaves, and territorial slivers that Venice had acquired after 1204 in the Eastern Mediterranean, as it had come to exist by the time of the Cyprus War, had been shaped by a gradual shift in power relations during the later Middle Ages. The Greek-speaking world was politically and militarily weakening and the Latin-speaking Christian world expanding, and in this shift, the role of Venice was important. Venice had initially been subject to the exarchs or Byzantine viceroys of Ravenna, to the south, down the Adriatic coast. Having been for so long less powerful, a vassal to Byzantium, influenced

\textsuperscript{594} Cyril Korolevsky, “Per la storia delle recenti eresie dei greci,” \textit{Bessarione} XVII (1913), 369 and 373.

\textsuperscript{595} In Graziani’s \textit{Vita} of Jacobos Diassorinos, for instance, which explains the success of the rebel Diassorinos in adding to his influence in the countryside by dispensing fake medical cures, with the reflection that he succeeded “...ut sunt Graecorum ingenia maxime agrestium ad omnem superstitionem proclivia.” [as the spirits of the Greeks, and especially of the wild ones, are greatly given to all superstition.] Emile Legrand, ed. \textit{Deux vies de Jacques Basilicos} (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1889), 226.
Venice’s political thinking and began a tradition among Venice’s political classes of taking a commercial, as well as a cultural interest, a fascination that subject peoples have not uncommonly exhibited for their imperial masters, rather than a strictly political and military one, in Byzantium and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those commercial and cultural interests did not disappear after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, but continued until the fall of the Venetian Republic itself, in 1797. Some might argue that the attitudes even outlasted the end of Venice as an independent republic.

Though Venice had gained self-rule by the eighth century and *de facto* independence by about 1000, she later sent aid to the Byzantines against many foes. These included Bulgarians, and Turkish tribes pushing west into Asia Minor. And Venice also helped the Byzantines against Norman knights who were advancing in the late eleventh century under Robert Guiscard, the warrior who had taken Apulia from the Byzantines in the 1060s and 1070s, then sailed for Corfu, again defeated the Byzantines at Durazzo in 1081, and possibly would have seized the Byzantine throne, had he not been called back to Italy to help raise the siege laid against the pope by Emperor Henry IV. After the death of Guiscard and the First Crusade, the Venetians again gave Byzantium crucial aid against Guiscard’s son Bohemond of Taranto in 1107-1108, who launched more than one attack on Byzantine territory in Albania.\(^596\) In 1082, in gratitude for such aid, Alexius I (r. 1081-1118) granted the Venetians extensive trading privileges in Byzantium, and the doge of Venice granted to the monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore in that city possession of extensive lands in Constantinople.\(^597\) A famous Byzantine imperial order or *chrysobull* issued by Alexios I Komnenos in 1082 conceded to this community a significant degree of self-

\(^596\) D.M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, 64.

government, and in the twelfth century they expanded their commercial presence in Durazzo, Constantinople, and many other cities and towns of the Byzantine empire, especially, though not exclusively, ports. The shifting balance of power between Venice and Byzantium was discernible even in Venetian iconography. St. Theodore, a saint much admired by the Orthodox Byzantines, came to be replaced – as Edward Muir has noted – by St. Mark. Venice was deeply enmeshed in lands of Greek Orthodox tradition. And contrary to what is sometimes thought, the church of San Marco was not the sole example of Byzantine or Greek Orthodox influence in the city over the next centuries. The Church of Santa Trinità and that of St. Symeon on the Rialto also were said to hold relics of Byzantine saints, brought in the wake of the looting of 1204. The Monastery of San Giorgio Maggiore received the bodies of Sts. Lucia and Eutychios from Constantinople. While some may see this as merely the booty of war, these Byzantine artistic treasures turned out to have an influence on Venetian art and architecture.

And if Venice was influenced by Greek, or more accurately Byzantine art and architecture, Greeks also went to Venice to study and practice music, and brought with them Byzantine music and traditions. The Cypriot Hieronymos Tragoudistes, for example, moved to Venice and studied with Gioseffo Zarlino (1517-1590), an influential theoretician of music, and

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598 As David Jacoby points out, Venetians settled in and began commercial activity in many towns, large and small, all over the Byzantine Empire around this time. These included: Thessalonica, Smyrna, Prusa/Bursa, and Constantinople. The Venetians were clustered in coastal towns, where merchants from many parts of the world met to trade. David Jacoby has listed many of these towns in his article “Les Vénitiens naturalisés dans l’empire byzantin: un aspect de l’expansion de Venise en Romanie du XIIIe au milieu du XVe siècle,” Travaux et Mémoires VIII (1981): 207-35.


601 Ibid., 220.
wrote a tract, the Περὶ χρειας μοντεγις Γραικων χαρακτηρων, Concerning the Need for Greek Musical Symbols, in which he discussed Byzantine musical harmony and notation.  

Zarlino himself had earlier included in his Istitutioni harmoniche (1558) a discussion of Byzantine chant.

Given the longstanding attachment of Venice, like much of Catholic Europe, to an idealized and positive view of the Crusades, and also the anti-Ottoman feeling that was, if rarely shared by all, still seldom far from the surface and generally commanded majority assent in the debates of the Venetian Senate and Council of Ten, and one that had exploded already in three earlier Venetian-Ottoman wars (1463-79; 1499-1503; 1537-40), the willingness of Venice to expend so much in energy, in men and in money, in an unlikely attempt to preserve Cyprus from the Ottomans, becomes more comprehensible. There were also trade connections to Cyprus, which had begun in the twelfth century. As noted more than once, Cyprus was surrounded by Ottoman domains on all three sides of the nearest mainland, to the north, east and south. What is more, the next-closest Venetian territory was distant Crete, three hundred miles to the west. My principal goal is to show that Venice was not, pace some of the writings of Kostas Kyrris, Aikaterini Aristeidou, and Halil Fikret Alasya, among others, either incompetent or uncaring as the administrator for Cyprus before 1489.

After 1204, as mentioned, Venice acquired initially enormous territories in the eastern Mediterranean, including those at Modon and Zara (from 1204), Corfu (1206), Coron (1209),

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602 Bjarne Schartau, Hieronymos Tragodistes über das Erfordnis von Schriftzeichen für die Musik der Griechen (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1990), 34-90.

603 Ibid., 14.

Crete (from 1211), Navarino (1417), the Morea (the ancient Peloponnese), and Aegean islands including Naxos, Paros, Antiparos, and Sifnos. Venice also handed over several of these new possessions to members of some of its patrician families, as a way to cement their political loyalty. Corfu, for example, was sold to and divided among twelve such patrician families. As David Jacoby and others have noted, the Venetians did not impose a feudal regime on the territories they annexed, as some Frankish regimes did, since Venice itself was not organized along feudal lines.  

605 Greece and the Aegean were the scene of innumerable petty rivalries among the Latin successor states to the Latin Empire of Constantinople, formed after that empire was torn apart by centrifugal forces. Venice struggled with some of them, including Pisa, Amalfi, and Ancona, but most fiercely with Genoa, its hereditary rival, and with the Catalans out of Barcelona, for both influence and trade.

Cyprus can be considered along with the territorial acquisitions by Venice after 1204, yet a significant difference was that, when Venice assumed control in 1489, Cyprus, in Aspasia Papadaki’s words, “already had a long feudal tradition in her past,” 606 from the Frankish landholding system that the Lusignan had put into place. 607 The precise understanding of what feudalism involves is a vast subject. Some would leave the peasantry out altogether from the feudal system, which they prefer to conceive in terms of the duties of knights to their lords, while


607 However, the question of whether the term “feudalism” can usefully be applied to the case of Venetian Cyprus (which some scholars doubt) is complicated, and depends on how one defines feudalism, a subject on which I do not consider myself competent to pass judgment.
others would include the peasants under the broader rubric of “feudal society.” What we can say with ample evidence of Lusignan Cyprus is that the documents are clear that the chivalric orders and the major monasteries, both Greek and Latin, retained vast estates, worked by two main categories of peasant, the *francomati* who enjoyed some freedom of movement, and the *paroikoi*, who were unfree. Such a degree of unfreedom as marked the *paroikoi* was not to be found, by the fifteenth century, in the Veneto region where Venice was situated. In other respects, however, Lusignan Cyprus was not socially and culturally alien to Venice, especially not to the many Venetians who had a history of engaging in trade with Cyprus even while it was still in the hands of the Lusignan.

Such Venetian archival series as those of the *Collegio* (the name given to the group of twenty-six men, including the doge, who took the most important decisions on matters of life and death) and the *Senato – Stato da Mar*, have yielded more documents than those previously published by such scholars as Louis de Mas Latrie, Vladimir Lamansky, and George Hill. This trove of documents provides a view of Venetian government thinking about the island. The *Senato – Stato da Mar* series, devoted to territorial and commercial engagements in the eastern Mediterranean, reveal a flourishing agricultural economy on Cyprus, especially in cotton, but also including sugar, dates, and vineyards. And on this subject, the Cypriot agricultural economy, one Ottoman source stands out among documents found so far. In 1572, immediately after the

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conquest, the Ottoman authorities drew up a survey of the economic state of the island. This survey, known as a defter-i mufassal, sometimes translated as Detailed Register, was a type of document commonly drawn up whenever the Ottomans first conquered a new province. In the case of Cyprus, this source provides precious information on the agricultural wealth of the island in the late Venetian period.611 And Cyprus did produce much, and in abundance. Arbel has rightly called Cyprus Venice’s richest colony. Other records left by men who spent years on Cyprus, have also been preserved, and fill in some of the gaps left by the Ottoman destruction of the Cyprus chancery archives in both Nicosia and Famagusta. Florio Bustron, author of a history of Cyprus, also wrote, in 1554, an assessment of the island’s government and economy, the Ordine della Secreta di Cipro, which, Gilles Grivaud has argued, indicates substantial continuity in agrarian institutions between Lusignan and both the preceding Byzantine administration of Cyprus and the subsequent Venetian period.612 From other sources, furthermore, such as the future doge Leonardo Donà’s three manuscript relations written about Cyprus based on his travels to the island with his father in 1556-58, we learn how well informed a studious Venetian patrician could become, in this period, about the finances of one part of the Stato da Mar.613 Cyprus’ population grew under Venetian rule, agriculture – notably cotton – flourished. And, though Greek Orthodox worshippers did not have their archbishopric restored to them, at least

611 An important article on this source is Ronald Jennings, “The Population, Taxation, and Wealth in the Cities and Villages of Cyprus according to the Detailed Population Survey (defter-i mufassal) of 1572,” Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986), 175-89.


613 These reports constitute Museo Civico Correr, MSS. nos. 45, 46, and 215. Oral tradition on Cyprus records that Donà, in one of these manuscripts, among innumerable other detailed observations, offers the earliest reference of which I am aware in Italian to that most famous of Cypriot cheeses, halloumi, which he calls “calumi.” This cheese is also mentioned in Grivaud, “Ordine,” 58: “Li calumi di tutto Mazzo,” refers to revenues from halloumi cheese for the month of May.
they were allowed bishops, which was not the case on Venetian Crete at this time. One sign of their level of contentment is that not a single rebellion instigated by native Cypriots took place during the eighty-odd years of Venetian rule – a singular contrast to what followed under Ottoman rule.

On the diplomatic front, from the very beginning of Venetian rule, Venetian officials had walked a tightrope. Due to their presence under the Lusignan (I estimate that, at any given time in the fifteenth century, Venetians numbered at least in the hundreds on Cyprus) Venetians were familiar with the intricacies of Cyprus’ position, and little can have surprised them. And they were aware of the Muslim powers and rulers on the mainland, and some of the internecine rivalries too, which sometimes affected Venetian trade. In 1473, for example, King James II of Cyprus had refused access to Famagusta to a Venetian vessel charged with munitions. For these munitions were destined for the emir of Karaman, a rival and neighbor of the Mamluks, and James II feared that the Mamluk sultan would be irritated by his allowing the ship through.614 Cyprus, then, was implicated, nolens-volens, in mainland rivalries and conflicts. The Venetians had long known this.

The precarious situation of the island meant that Venice took seriously its need to fortify Cyprus. The fortifications of Nicosia and Famagusta were thoroughly rebuilt in the most advanced star-shaped and carefully-angled *trace italienne* style in the 1560s, with low, angled walls that permitted cannon to aim at besiegers up to the very base of the walls, with no blind spots. The Venetian archives contain a stream of correspondence on this very subject of

fortifications, especially in the series Archivio Proprio Contarini, which preserves the family archive of the prominent patrician Contarini family. The Venetians increased the size of their garrisons and kept a watchful eye on ships near the Cypriot coasts. And on Cyprus itself, Venice continued to apply a Crusader-era law code, the Assises de Jérusalem, a text translated into Italian in 1531. Venetian correspondence of the time reveals a grim determination to hold onto Cyprus, thought of by the Venetians as the last of the Crusader States.

In March of 1570, when an Ottoman representative, the envoy or çavuş Kubad, came to demand that Cyprus be handed over, technically Cyprus was already subject to Ottoman suzerainty, which was recognized in the form of an annual tribute, the equivalent of 8000 ducats annually, paid not in money, but in cotton at a subsidized price. This payment of tribute to outside rulers on the mainland had begun nearly 150 years before the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus. The Mamluks, who had invaded Cyprus in 1425, forced Lusignan kings to pay a tribute from then on. And, once Venice assumed formal control of Cyprus in 1489, the Mamluks began to exact this same tribute from Venice. And upon the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk-ruled Syria and Egypt in 1516-17, the Ottomans assumed the role formerly filled by the Mamluks. From then on, until the Cyprus War and direct Ottoman rule removed Venice from the scene, Venice no longer sent its tribute for Cyprus to Cairo, but instead to Constantinople.

I have sought to show that despite the subordinate position implied by this tribute, the documentary record of Venetian Cyprus gives the impression of a comfortable, cohesive society. As I have mentioned, no rebellion comprised of native Cypriots is documented between Venice assuming a protectorate over the island in 1473, and the fall of Famagusta in 1571 – unless one

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counts the Jacobos Diassorinos “revolt” of 1563, led by a Rhodian, which was nipped in the bud and in any case on a small scale. The Cypriot population was growing. Estimates, by the mapmaker Francesco Attar in 1533, by the Venetian envoy Bernardo Sagredo in 1562, and by others, suggest that the population increased from about 120,000 in 1500 to 180,000 in 1570. The economic benefits accruing from the possession of Cyprus, which, as Anthony Luttrell has noted, moved under Venetian rule from an Age of Sugar to a flourishing Age of Cotton, were certainly enough to make the retention of the island highly desirable. Certainly it was regarded as such by those who met in Venetian councils of state. The records of the Council of Ten disclose a number of instances from 1554 on (the earliest date for which dispatches from Nicosia, the administrative capital of Cyprus, have survived), when the Venetian governing officials on Cyprus wrote back to the government in Venice itself to protest the actions of Ottoman captains who forced their way onto Cypriot shores in order to reprovision their ships.\textsuperscript{617} Vera Costantini has found that during these same years, the sultan was insisting, as a matter of right, that Venetian authorities deliver to him falcons from Cyprus, a species for which the island was apparently renowned.\textsuperscript{618} But despite such bullying, and the apparent yielding to it at times, Venice assuredly had no intention of withdrawing from Cyprus without putting up resistance.

Even before the death of Suleyman the Magnificent and the ascension of his son, Selim II, in 1564, Leonardo Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Vienna, reported that Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II feared that a “vast Turkish fleet” would sail for Cyprus in the spring.\textsuperscript{619}

\textsuperscript{617} Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato-Secreta, Dispacci-Cipro, Busta 1, docs. 1-18.

\textsuperscript{618} Vera Costantini, “In Search of Lost Prosperity: Aspects and Phases of Cyprus’ Integration into the Ottoman Empire,” in Michalis N. Michael, Matthias Kappler and Efthihios Gavriel, eds. Ottoman Cyprus (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 50-51.

\textsuperscript{619} Quoted in Setton, Papacy and the Levant, IV, 931.
During his tenure as *bailò* from 1565 to 1567, Giacomo Soranzo reported (in January 1567) that the Grand Vizier, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, often warned him of Selim II’s irritation at what was happening on Cyprus. These warnings apparently did not spell out the reasons for Selim’s anger, but presumably Selim perceived the Venetian authorities to be providing aid and comfort to Christian pirates who attacked Ottoman shipping near the island. Warnings about Ottoman designs on Cyprus continued to flow from Soranzo’s successor as *bailò* in 1567, Marcantonio Barbaro.\(^\text{620}\)

Various motives – honor, the perceived need to keep Cyprus as a possible bridgehead for the reconquest of Constantinople,\(^\text{621}\) the desire to be taken seriously in European politics – all played their role in the Venetian decision to go to war in 1570.\(^\text{622}\) To some historians, mindful of

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\(^\text{620}\) The correspondence between Sigismondo Cavalli and Niccolò Barbaro has been studied in detail. But the correspondence of the two *bailì* who came between Cavalli and Barbaro – that is, Vettore Bragadin and Giacomo Soranzo – deserves similar study. Bragadin’s correspondence on Cyprus from this period makes up the contents of *Senato—Dispacci Costantinopoli* folio 4d (July 13, 1564-March 15, 1565) and folio 1 (March 12, 1565-August 17, 1566). Christiane Villain-Gandossi published extracts from letters, written in code, of Vettore Bragadin, the *bailò* who held office during Selim II’s accession, which however do not concern Cyprus, in 1978. See Christiane Villain-Gandossi, “Les dépêches chiffrées de Vettore Bragadin, baile de Constantinople (12 juillet 1564-15 juin 1566)” *Turcica* IX/X (1978) 52-106. Vilain-Gandossi suggests this shows how accomplished the Ottomans must have been as codebreakers, since they cracked Bragadin’s code almost immediately, in 1565.

\(^\text{621}\) For the period, after the Fourth Crusade, I suggest that Constantinople increasingly took the place of Jerusalem as the principal city that Christian would-be Crusaders dreamed of liberating.

\(^\text{622}\) Giovanni Pietro Contarini, for example, who lacked Paruta’s taste for speeches, reports without naming names that “the Senate, having first at length considered and deliberated that it must be better for the dignity and greatness of the Republic, to defend itself from the Turk in open war…when this herald [the Ottoman messenger Kubad] was introduced into the Senate, he was at once dismissed.” (Haveva prima maturamente considerato, et deliberato, che dovesse star meglio per la dignità, et grandezza della Republica, con manifesta guerra difendersi dal Turco…introdotto esso Chiaus nel Senato, fu di subito licenziato), *Historia della Guerra…*, 5. Paruta, by contrast, mentions a specific senator, whom he says it took upon himself to encourage the Venetians to resist the invasion: Paolo Tiepolo, a “Senator of mature prudence” (“Senatore di matura prudenza”) (124), argued that not resisting the Ottomans on Cyprus would only encourage them to advance further, for “from these miscreant barbarians, no oath is enough to be sure, as every day both the power and the ambition of the Ottoman Princes waxes.” (“da questi barbari infedeli niuna fede era bastante d’assicurarsi, crescendo ogni di più la Potenza, e l’ambizione de’ Prencipi Ottomani,” 124).
the old phrase “We are Venetians first, then Christians,” economic motives naturally suggest themselves as the most important motive for Venice’s desire to hold onto Cyprus. For once Cyprus had come under Venetian rule in 1489, it became apparent that the island now constituted the single richest part of the Venetian *Stato da Mar*, that miscellaneous collection of territories east of the Adriatic that included towns and lands in Dalmatia, Albania, Greece, and the Aegean. Greek Cypriots were not excluded from this prosperity, and the small Latin Catholic elite (perhaps numbering between 800 and 1000) did not exclude Greeks from office, nor from amassing fortunes. Florio Bustron, who, if he must be categorized, would be called a Greek Cypriot, belonged to a family that in certain respects reflected the island society of his time. Though their first language was Greek, the Bustron family included both Orthodox and Catholics members. Many of them, whether Latin or Greek, including Florio himself, obtained important positions in the Venetian administration. New knowledge of such families that has come to light in the Venetian archives, showing their importance within the Cypriot elite, has dealt a blow to the arguments of those who, such as Halil Fikret Alasya, contend that Venice was an incompetent or neglectful master, interested in Cyprus mainly for whatever revenues could be derived through taxes, and for its putative military value. In truth Cyprus, when Venice assumed control of the island in 1489, possessed little military value for its new ruler, and Alasya is

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623 *Siamo Veneziani, e poi cristiani.* The origins of this phrase are unclear, but is sometimes attributed to legists at the University of Padua. Padua only became Venetian in 1405, so that if this attribution is accurate, the phrase cannot be older than that date.

624 On Cyprus' prosperity see Benjamin Arbel, *Η Κύπρος υπο ενετικη κυριαρχια*, [Cyprus under Venetian Rule] Theodore Papadopoulos, ed., *Ιστορια της Κυπρου* [History of Cyprus], V, 455-536, and *idem*, “La légende noire de la domination vénitienne à Chypre,” *Cyprus, the Franks, and Venice* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2000), XIV.


looking at the question exclusively from the Ottoman point of view.\textsuperscript{627} The “strategic” value of Cyprus to Venice was then primarily economic, a fact which Alasya does not make clear. In extenuation, his study was primarily concerned with the Orthodox Church in the transition from Venetian to Ottoman rule, but casual remarks in introductions and conclusions are often revealing.

Indeed, both under the Lusignans, the French dynasty that ruled Cyprus from 1192 to 1489, and even more under the Venetian regime from 1489 to 1571, it was not only taxes accruing to the state that were important. Many fortunes, such as that of the nephew of the last queen of Cyprus, Marco Cornaro,\textsuperscript{628} were made on Cyprus. Cotton and sugar were both extensively cultivated, the salt pans were exploited, the vineyards thrived. The cheese of Crete and silks and gemstones of Syria and further East flowed into Cyprus in great quantities.\textsuperscript{629} While the island of Madeira off of Portugal surpassed Cyprus, by the 1490s, as a producer of sugar for European markets, the sugar plantations at Episcopi and at Kolossi continued to prosper.\textsuperscript{630} Venetian Cyprus was also an important producer of wine, and indeed a possibly apocryphal (but

\textsuperscript{627} Alasya, \textit{Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Kıbrıs’ta Türk Eserleri}, 38-40.

\textsuperscript{628} Jan Morris, \textit{The Venetian Empire} (New York and London: A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 94. The Corner family built a palace at Episkopi, of which a plan of 1551 survives, and on the surrounding estates cultivated sugar on a large scale. The Corners were a Venetian family that had owned land at Episkopi (Piscopia, to give the site its medieval name) since 1369-70. An Italian traveller of 1458 noted 400 workers on the sugar plantation, and this scale of production was confirmed by another traveler in 1494. See P. Brigitte-Porée, “Les moulin et fabriques à sucre de Palestine et de Chypre: histoire, géographie et technologie d’une production Croisée et Mediévale,” in Nicholas Coureas and Jonathan Riley-Smith, eds. \textit{Cyprus and the Crusades} (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 432.

\textsuperscript{629} Louis Bergasse notes that a significant portion of the wax and wool traded at Marseille in the mid-seventeenth century had come from Cyprus or Syria. Bergasse, \textit{Histoire du Commerce de Marseille}, Volume IV (Paris: Plon, 1954), 145-47.

amusing) story holds that the Ottoman Sultan Selim II, despite being Muslim, was so enamored of Cypriot wines, specifically those of Commandaria, that he was driven to order Cyprus’ conquest to ensure a steady supply. 631

For the Ottomans, however, Cyprus was undoubtedly most important for its military value. The Ottomans were of course aware of Cyprus’ key position as a large island athwart the sea lanes which went to and from the Ottoman-ruled regions of Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt. Anatolia was the Ottoman heartland, Syria produced textiles and metalwork, and Egypt was a breadbasket for the Empire. And the Ottomans also well understood that Cyprus lay across the sea routes taken by Muslim pilgrims on their way to Mecca, and the same routes that took Christian pilgrims to their Holy Land. They certainly appreciated the advantages to their empire’s naval power of the island’s possession, though they would prove, in my judgment, nowhere near as effective at stamping out piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean as they had hoped before the Cyprus War. 632

In exploring the processes through which the Greek Cypriots were both reminded of their cultural distinctiveness, and managed to preserve it through the first century of Ottoman rule, it is worth considering how the Greek Orthodox, over ninety percent of the population just

631 The story is mentioned by Uberto Foglieta, *De Sacro Foedere*, column 947. As Hill remarks, *History of Cyprus*, 880 n.1, “A reasonable discount should be allowed on Christian stories of the vices of the infidel.” Recep Dündar, “The Conquest of Cyprus,” in *The Turks*, Vol, III, 341 n. 8 repeats the legend that Selim promised the title prince, or possibly king, of Cyprus to the Portuguese-Venetian Jewish merchant Joseph Nasi at a drinking party. Nasi was also referred to as the last duke (in Turkish *duka*) of the Aegean Archipelago, from 1566 to 1579, after Selim II assumed control from the Venetian-descended Christian dynasts who had ruled the Archipelago since the Fourth Crusade.

632 A large number of documents from the series *Senato-Misti* of the Venetian State Archive for the period 1571-1625 contain references to the continuation of piracy, both Christian and Muslim, in the waters off of Cyprus. A major problem in Ottoman administration, I would argue, is that the leading Ottoman maritime official for Cyprus, the *Kapudan Paşa*, or Grand Admiral, had his and his staff’s attention stretched thin over a large number of places, including mainland Greece, the entire Aegean, Rhodes, and, after 1535, Algiers, whose economy, furthermore, was so driven by corsair activity that for any Ottoman official to attempt to stamp it out would have been unwise politically, and folly economically.
before the Ottoman invasion, had been organized, ecclesiastically and politically, before the Ottomans arrived, particularly in the last decades of Venetian rule. Venetian administrators had maintained in place many Lusignan-era institutions, and this conservatism extended to ecclesiastical arrangements. Unlike on Crete, with a similar overwhelming Orthodox majority, where Orthodox bishoprics were abolished with the Venetian assumption of control in 1211, on Cyprus the Greek bishops, six in number, were allowed to remain, though no archbishops were appointed after 1260. However, those bishops were paid one-tenth the salaries of their Latin counterparts (save in the case of the bishop of Famagusta, who received one-fifth). Nonetheless, despite such discrimination, with the exception of the uprising of Jacobos Diassorinos in 1563, for which we are heavily reliant on the account by Antonio Maria Graziani, and the religious character of which is debatable, the Venetian authorities on Cyprus avoided the severe religiously-inspired turmoil that had marked Crete in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In his History of Cyprus George Hill published a portion of the instructions provided for Venetian officials dispatched to Cyprus in 1489 and in 1538, which show, in their level of detail, great concern for the opportunities available to administrators for corruption, a concern that belies the picture sometimes presented of Venetian neglect and administrative incompetence.

On the economic plane, the posthumously-published work of Ronald Jennings on the Ottoman law-code for 1572, offers precious evidence for the state of agriculture and many related activities, such as bee-keeping and sugar and cotton production, in the late Venetian period. It shows that Cyprus was, economically, in a flourishing state on the eve of the conquest. Under


634 Ronald C. Jennings, Village Life in Cyprus, eds. Mehmet Akif Erdoğru and Ali Efdal Özkul (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009), 16-19, 93-99. Jennings also stresses the lack of monoculture, so that cotton-producing villages, according to
Venice, Cyprus’ trade with Syria and Egypt, continued; Orthodox clergy continued to travel among Egypt, Syria/Palestine, Anatolia and Cyprus. And Cypriot students, both Catholic and Orthodox, continued to travel to study at the University of Padua.635

The outbreak of the Cyprus War has been treated in the introduction. But other aspects require mention. Two significant long-term trends help to explain Sultan Selim II’s decision to bring matters to a military head in 1570. The first was the hard-edged brand of Islam that was ascendant at the Ottoman court in Constantinople after about 1550.636 The second was the steadily increasing Ottoman confidence in their naval capability. This was reflected in the Ottoman belief that they could rid the waters around Cyprus of pirates, both Muslim and Christian, (for those pirates did not always distinguish among their victims) far more effectively than could their Venetian vassals.637 The loss of Cyprus contributed to a third development, which was the supplanting of Venice by France in a position of privilege vis-à-vis the Ottomans. For France was both the Ottomans’ (comparatively) loyal political ally since the 1530s and was

the Ottoman detailed register or defter-i mufassal of 1572, also had a safe mix of other crops to stand them in good stead if the cotton crop failed (Ibid., 93-99, 103-106.)

635 The record-keeping for enrolled students attending this university at this time are somewhat haphazard, but some Cypriot students are discussed in Giuseppe Fabris, “Professori e scolari greci all’università di Padova,” Archivio veneto XXX (1942), 124-26 and 133-34. Fabris mentions, 125 n. 1, that between 1405 and 1450 twenty Cypriot students attended university instruction at Padua and links this increase to the Venetian assumption of control at Padua; for the period after 1489, Fabris points to four members of the Cypriot noble family of Podocataro – Lodovico, Livio, Prospero, and Ambrosio – two of whom (Lodovico and Livio) became Catholic bishops and two others a high administrator (Prospero), and a professor of civil law there (Ambrosio), both at the University of Padua.

636 This is reflected, for example, in the Ottoman sultans’ adoption of more grandiose, Persianate titles, such as sahib-kiran, ruler of the world. See Barbara Flemming, “Sahib-kiran und Mahdi: Türkische Endzeiterwartungen im ersten Jahrzehnt der Regierung Süleymans,” György Kara, ed. Between the Danube and the Caucasus (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1987), 43-62, an article which links the sultans’ new titles with the millenarian fervor that accompanied the approach of the Muslim anni Hegirae 1000 (A.D. 1591/2).

637 This motive for the Ottoman invasion is provided, both in Ottoman histories such as those of Selaniki (Tarihi Selanikî, 77) and Peçoulu (Tarihi Peçevi, 486) and in Venetian historical accounts of the war (Paruta, Historia, Seconda Parte, 14). The Italian of Paruta does not include pirateria, or corsari/corsali, but rather describes the deeds of pirates without using a special term to describe them.
given trading privileges as well. A persistent popular view of Cyprus is of a place that, from the
days of the Roman Empire until independence in 1960, was neglected, isolated, and buffeted by
the whims of foreign powers. This view can extend to the Cypriots themselves, seen as victims
of fate, seldom in charge of their own destinies. I argue that the large number of Cypriots who
went to Venice and made successful lives for themselves offer evidence, through their own lives
and activities, to the contrary. And that Venice was the place to which they most wanted to
emigrate, and where so many Cypriot Greeks did develop and thrive, both reflects and further
justifies the positive image that Venice had in the minds of many Cypriots, and of the chances
that Venice offered for Cypriots to flourish after the Cyprus War. Much can be made of this role
for Venice, but also too much, and it would distort the picture to neglect the role, for Cypriots,
played by networks of relations and intellectual interests formed not only with Venetians, but
with other Greeks. And those Greeks included Cretans, especially, as well as some Orthodox
clergy in Egypt and Syria.

Over the last decades historians have pieced together biographical information for
numerous Cypriots, mainly those of scholarly bent, who were born in Cyprus and after the
Ottoman conquest moved to Western Europe, chiefly Italy, and within Italy, chiefly Venice. The
works of these Cypriots, though published in Venice and in a few cases other Italian cities, can
reasonably be considered part of the history of Cypriot literature and learning after the Ottoman
conquest.\footnote{As with literature produced by other emigrations, who qualifies as a Cypriot writer, let alone a Cypriot Orthodox
writer, is not always clear. In some cases, when people moved away from Cyprus as small children, or were
second-generation immigrants to other places, or were heavily Latinized by study in the West, one can reasonably
ask what is “Cypriot” about those writers. In general, I have been latitudinarian, allowing those born in Cyprus, for
example, but also those born to Cypriots in Venice or elsewhere in Western Europe, for example, to figure in my
discussion of Cypriot literature. George and Giovanni Matteo Boustronios, for example, relatives of the fifteenth-
century Cypriot chronicler George Boustronios, were born in the 1580s in Venice and published work in Latin. I
think they are to be regarded for most purposes as Cypriots. The linguistic criterion – what language these writers
published most of their work in – is helpful, since writers who wanted to publish books in Greek – as opposed to

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Chryssa Maltezou, who in examining the records of the Greek Fraternity of Venice discovered that by the end of the sixteenth century Cypriots formed the largest single community or πατρις of any group of Greeks in Venice.\footnote{639}

References to Cypriot affairs in the writings of high Orthodox churchmen who took an interest in the Church of Cyprus, from Cyril Lucaris, Patriarch of Constantinople (and therefore highest cleric in dignity in the Orthodox church), to Meletios Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria, illustrate how the Greek Orthodox community outside Cyprus in this period did not forget about the island, and actively tried to take a hand in its ecclesiastical affairs.\footnote{640} Both Lucaris and Pigas remained under Ottoman rule and did not emigrate. Gabriel Severos or Seviros, by contrast, was tied to Venice, when in 1577, with the title Metropolitan of Philadelphia, he took up supervision

\footnotetext{639}{Chryssa Maltezou, “Cypriots in the City of St. Mark after the Island’s Turkish Conquest,” in \textit{Cyprus: Jewel in the Crown of Venice: an Exhibition organized by the Anastasios G. Leventis Foundation}, Nicosia: The Leventis Municipal Museum of Nicosia, 2003, 75-89.}

\footnotetext{640}{For example, six speeches Cyril Lucaris delivered when he visited Cyprus ca. 1606, reprinted in Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, \textit{Κυριλλου Λουκαρεως Πιναξ Ομιλιων και εκθεσις ορθοδοξου πιστεως}, [Index of Homilies and Account of Orthodox Worship], Alexandria, Patriarchal Press, 1913. I have not seen these sermons, preserved in the Patriarchal Library of Alexandria. For Pigas, many of his early letters were published by Émile Legrand in \textit{Lettres de Mélétius Pigas antérieures à sa promotion au Patriarcat}, Paris: 1903, and many as well in a series of articles by Methodios Fouya, Metropolitan of Axum, in the journal of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, \textit{Εκκλησιαστικός Φάρος} [Church Beacon], between 1970 and 1975. The correspondence of Pigas after he ascended to the Patriarchate has been published along national lines. That concerning Russia was published by I.I. Malysevskii, \textit{Alexandrskii Patriarkh Meletij Pigas i evo Ucastie v Delakh Russkoi Cerkvi}, [Patriarch Meletios Pigas of Alexandria and his Participation in the Affairs of the Russian Church] Kiev, Tipografia Kievopecherskoj Cerkvi, 1872, while those relevant to the Rumanian-speaking principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were published by the Rumanian historian Nicolai Iorga, \textit{Documenti greceşti privitoare la istoria Romanilor}, Bucharest: C. Sfetea, 1915-17, vol. XIV.}
of the large Orthodox flock there. Seviros actually had his seat transferred from Philadelphia – a city in Asia Minor, under Ottoman rule at the time (and now part of the Turkish Republic) – to the Church of St. George, the institutional heart of the Greek Orthodox community in Venice. In Venice, Seviros could enjoy a comfortable life. By contrast, in Ottoman Alexandria, as the correspondence of Meletios Pigas reveals, after the Cyprus War the Orthodox Church endured anti-Christian hatred from the Ottomans, for the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto kindled a vengeful spirit against all Christians.

Christian refugees from the Ottomans such as Seviros, and the Cypriots Pietro and Giovanni de Nores, often were, or became, more conscious of their Greek identity than did those who remained behind. The Greeks of the early modern period, bereft of a political capital since 1453, had of course been aware long before the fall of Constantinople that Byzantine power was on the wane. In some parts of the Venetian Stato da Mar, such as Crete, they expressed their nostalgia for Byzantine times by carving inscriptions to Byzantine emperors. On Cyprus, too, it seems clear from the Italian sources that many Greek-speakers – even if not articulately – nevertheless continued to feel kinship with a wider Greek-speaking world and to feel the

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641 D.G. Apostolopoulos, ed. Gabriel Seviro, arcivescovo di Filadelfia a Venezia, e la sua epoca (Venice: Greek Institute, 2004), 12.

642 Ibid.


645 Dimitris Tsougarakis, “La tradizione culturale bizantina,” 512. Tsougarakis mentions inscriptions put up in Cretan churches to successive late Byzantine emperors, down to and even past the fall of the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, in 1453, despite the island being under Venetian rule.
distinction between “native” and “foreign,” although such ideas would never become so xenophobic as to prevent some Cypriots from accepting titles and honors from the “foreign” Venetian government.

Venice’s possession of Cyprus, though it had been relatively brief, just over eighty years (1489-1570), remained in later years for the Venetian Republic a proud reminder of a high point in her history, that “imperial age” in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to which David Chambers has alluded. Moreover, one can recognize that the Venetians sensed that their rule on Cyprus was continuous with the French-descended Lusignan dynasty that preceded them: not only in their maintenance in writing of the name “Regno,” realm or kingdom, to refer to Cyprus, but also in the maintenance of many government offices, noble titles, legal codes, and social structures inherited from the Lusignan. The Venetian subject, the Cypriot Etienne de Lusignan, whose Chorographia I have earlier analyzed, recounted in his 1572 work in French, the Description de Toute l’Isle de Cypre, the genealogies of the Lusignan dynasty, which he clearly wanted his readers to remember. And in his panoramic view of Venetian rule, which included reference to the nobles of Cyprus, a term perhaps used to distinguish them from the patricians who ruled Venice, Lusignan noted that the Venetian rulers looked back on their Lusignan predecessors with admiration:

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646 In fact, the Cypriot poem the θρηνος Κυπρου or Lament for Cyprus refers at one point to the allied Christian forces being mowed down by the Turks as τοπικοι and ξενοι, or “locals” and “foreigners.” Papadopoulos, “θρηνος,” l. 271. The opponents of Venice, meanwhile, are almost invariably referred to as Τουρκοι.


“The Venetians...hold the nobles [the Greco-Latin elite of Cyprus] in great repute, whom the Senate calls confederates, and not subjects, because they had not taken the country by force, but through friendship...” 649

The implied contrast with the Turkish modus operandi is clear. Lusignan contrasts the amicable and peaceful way in which Venice had assumed control over Cyprus with the force exercised in the Ottoman invasion and the imposition of Ottoman rule.

Among the reasons to oppose the imposition of Ottoman rule on Cyprus was the fear induced by the spectacle of the steady Ottoman advance. The Muslim Turks seemed unstoppable, and they were perceived – with justification – as posing a menace to the wellbeing of Christians and Western Christendom.650 The ferocity of the Turks, and the desolation that was widely reported to follow in their train, made them, especially among those Christians who lived near Ottoman borderlands, an object of dread. Had the Venetians given up Cyprus without a fight, the shame attendant upon a concession of such magnitude to the infidels would have been gerat, and hard to expunge. Venice’s militant opposition to an Ottoman takeover of Cyprus, no matter the objective odds of success, was unsurprising. Conceptions of Christian honor at this time, which often did not distinguish between the honor of a state, and the individual honor of members of that state’s ruling class, demanded that the Venetians not give in, cravenly as it would have seemed, to an ultimatum from an infidel Sultan. Venice had to struggle to counter the perception among other Western European powers that it had for too long been yielding to Ottoman demands. When describing the decision taken in the Senate early in 1570 to fight for

649 Etienne de Lusignan [Stefano Lusignano], Description de toute l’île de Cypre (Famagusta: Editions l’Oiseau, 1968 [1580]), 213: “Les Venitiens...ayant les Nobles en grande reputation, lesquels le Senat appelloit confederez, et non subjectes: pource qu’ils n’avoient pas acquis le pais par force, mais par amitié...”

650 The perception was widespread that, as the bishop Alexius Celadonius put it in the early sixteenth century, “Neminem nisi Turcum imperare Turci hominibus patiuntur” – “The Turks suffer no one but a Turk to rule over mankind.” Hans-Joachim Kissling, “Türkenfurcht und Türkenhoffnung im 15/16. Jahrhundert,” Südost-Forschungen 23 (1964), 1.
Cyprus, rather than to hand it over peacefully to a more powerful enemy, the Venetian historian Paolo Paruta, from a well-established patrician family, emphasized the honor of the state, and the necessity of putting up resistance to the imposition of a slavish despotism. The transition to Ottoman rule, coming as it did in the wake of an ultimatum and invasion, was a severe blow to Venetian pride and honor, even aside from the Christian-Muslim divide which leant a particular ferocity to the fighting. Therefore, contrary to what some historians of Cyprus have asserted, I see no reason to think that the Venetians were unattached to Cyprus, or indifferent to its fate. So deep an impression did the war for Cyprus make on the minds of Venetian contemporaries that at least eleven Venetian histories written during the decade following the Ottoman conquest of the island were mainly or entirely devoted to the Cyprus War, to say nothing of countless others published elsewhere in Italy and throughout Western Europe.

Among the arguments that Paolo Paruta, *Historia Vinetiana, Libro Secondo* (Venice: Nicolini, 1605), 44-46 reports a Venetian Senator made during the debate in the Venetian Senate over how to respond to the delivery of an ultimatum by the Ottoman messenger Kubat çavuş, is the suggestion that a show of force and defiance of the Ottomans would attract other allies to the Venetian banner.

I have in mind Contarini’s *Historia delle Cose Successe…*, (Venice: Francesco Rampazetto, 1572) Paruta’s *Historia Vinetiana, Libro Secondo* (Venice: Nicolini, 1605), Sereno’s *Historia della Guerra di Nicosia*, Angelo Gatto’s *Narrazione del Terribile Assedio e della Resa di Famagosta* (Seeber, Florence 1895), Antonio Maria Graziani’s *De Bello Cyprio*, available as *De Bello Cyprio*, Greek translation by Charalampos Gaspares (Nicosia: Kento Meleton Hieras Mones Kykkou, 1997), Angelo Calepio’s accounts of the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta, which he apparently added to Stefano Lusignano’s *Chorograffia* in 1572, at the author’s request; Pietro Valderio, *La Guerra di Cipro* (Nicosia: Givauda and Nasa Patapiou, 1996); Nestore Martinengo, *L’assedio et presa di Famagosta dove s’intende minutissimamente tutte le scaramucce et batterie, mine et assalti dati a essa fortezza* (Verona: Dalle Donne, 1572); Fabiano Falchetti, *Relazione della presa di Nicosia* (Biblioteca Oliveriana di Pesaro, ms. 117), Giovanni Sozomeno, *Narratione della Guerra di Nicosia, fatta nel regno di Cipro dall’anno MDLXX* (Bologna: Bignami, 1571); Alessandro Podocataro, *Relazione di Alessandro Podocataro de’successi di Famagosta dell’anno 1571*, ed. Andrea Tessier (Venice: Gio. Cecchini, 1876). Hill also reports (History of Cyprus, III, 1288) a history by Fidele Fideli, listed by Pierre Daru in his *Histoire de la République de Venise* (Paris: Didot, 1853), which I have been unable to see. Guido Antonio Quarti in the 1930s judged, rightly I think, that popular songs can also grant us some insight into the Venetian view of the Cyprus War, and he collected those he could find in print in *La battaglia di Lepanto nei canti popolari dell’epoca* (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Avionavale, 1935), a book which, in fact, does not concern Lepanto alone. To these should be added numerous ephemera of a few pages each, such as those held in Harvard University’s Houghton Library MS. Ott 199.6, under the rubric “Pièces Italiennes sur les Turcs: Pièces en Prose, XVIe siècle.” Containing such titles as Paolo Paruta’s *Orazione Funebre del Mag. M. Paolo Paruta. In laude de’morti nella vittoriosa battaglia contra Turchi Seguita à Curzolari l’anno 1571. Alli 7. D’Ottobre. In Venetia, Appresso Bolognin Zaltiero, 1572 (no. 36), and *Lo numero e la quantità de la armata cioe de li homini darme de le galee & deli pedoni chi verranno in aiuto de la S. lega nova – an
We have seen that down to the Ottoman conquest, then, Cyprus, despite its problems, was a rich kingdom. But economic well-being was not everything. Arbel and others have concluded that, as elsewhere in the Stato da Mar, Cyprus was not a pure colonie d’exploitation – for that would imply a stark divide between the natives and the government. On Cyprus, some native Cypriots could and did take advantage of the prosperity. Evidence for this lies in the instructions written in 1538 for the Captain of Nicosia who was, with the Rector of Famagusta, one of the two leading officials on the island. These instructions show that, at least in the realm of official regulation, the leading officials of the Venetian regime were forbidden from engaging in trade. Other sumptuary clauses set limits to the magnificence the Captain was permitted to display, just as such laws were imposed in Venice itself to check displays of swank and arrogance on the part of the nobility itself. For example, when mourning dead relatives, he could do so for no more than eight days, nor could he wear a mantle, presumably implying wealth and power, during that mourning.

Also overshadowing economic calculations was the religious dimension. Cypriot history as then understood among Christian Europeans invested the island with considerable significance.

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653 The Venetians continued to refer to Cyprus as a Regno even after the last Queen had abdicated and, indeed, long after the Ottoman conquest.


656 Ibid., 864-74.
beyond calculations of gain or loss, of power or wealth, for interested parties. Throughout the sixteenth-century Mediterranean and beyond, what Andrew Hess has called the first world war raged after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. This war, provoked by the Ottomans advance in North Africa, was between the Ottomans and their proxies, on one side, and many Christian powers of Europe, above all the Spanish Habsburgs and their vassals, on the other. Many Christians invested Cyprus with a sacred significance, as mentioned, in light of its proximity to the Holy Land and as a land associated both with Barnabas the Apostle and with Saint Helena, mother of Constantine, and rediscoverer of the True Cross. As Christians who saw their Christian overlords replaced by Muslim masters, the prospects of the islanders of Cyprus were suddenly and profoundly changed, just as they were for members of other non-Muslim and non-Turkish polities, wherever they might be, that the Ottomans conquered. As I shall examine in the fifth chapter, the Ottomans remade rule in most areas they conquered, changing not only some of the laws, but perhaps most importantly, also the system of taxation. They imposed special taxes on non-Muslims and shifted the taxation of Orthodox monasteries from a system that taxed individual monks to one that taxed the collectivity of a bishopric or monastery. The Ottomans, like the Venetians, would not make extra work for themselves and were willing to leave in place many laws from previous regimes, but that did not mean they would keep all of them, and they certainly did not agree to leave the previous legal system in place unchanged, as one could be forgiven for thinking is implied in some recent accounts of the transition from


658 The latter shift was one often welcomed by the Orthodox monasteries. As Eugenia Kermeli remarks, this recognizing of a collectivity was awkward within the dominant Hanafi school of interpretation among the Ottomans. Of Selim II’s leading Islamic jurist, Ebu’s-Su’ud, Kermeli remarks, 45, that “Ebu’s-Su’ud comes as closely as possible to recognizing the monks as a collectivity, within the constraints of a legal tradition, which does not recognize corporations as legal entities.”
Venetian to Ottoman rule. To go from a society governed by Christian ideals to one where the
Ottoman interpretation (along Hanafi lines) of Islamic religious law or serîye shaped the laws
was not a minor change.

Cyprus’ position athwart the sea routes both to Jerusalem and to Mecca, and its
importance in medieval crusading history – it served as the base of operations for Louis IX of
France in the Sixth Crusade, and was a key base for the Hospitallers and Templars for a number
of crusading operations – made it a possession that was important to Venice’s self-
understanding. The island was, in the historian Paolo Paruta’s words, a “most important member
of their state.” The loss of Cyprus was an important blow to the ruling Venetian patriciate. And
it was also a blow to those who continued to see Venice’s future as oriented towards the sea and,
beeyond, to the Levant. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Venice’s
governing class retrenched, shifting Venetian investments from maritime trade to land, that is, to
estates in the Terraferma, extensive territories that Venice had assembled in northern Italy in the
decades following the annexation of Padua in 1405. Daniele Beltrami, an economic historian of
Venice, has suggested that “the decline of the Venetian market, the new direction taken by the
economies of Europe, and the vicissitudes of Venetian foreign policy are not enough to explain
why, from the second half of the sixteenth century to the fall of the Republic, the mainland
attracted to itself constantly increasing attention on the part of the government and ruling

\[659\] Veinstein and Arbel implicitly warn against such a drastic interpretation of two documents that together have
come to be known as the so-called law-code or Kanunname of Cyprus, written in 1572, that reveal a good deal
about what the Ottomans understood the Venetian regulations on taxation to be, whether they grasped them
accurately and in depth, or, as is more likely, not. See Gilles Veinstein and Benjamin Arbel, “La fiscalité vénéto-
chypriote au miroir de la legislation ottomane: le qanunname de 1572,” Turcica 18 (1986), 1-47.

\[660\] The Hanafi mezheb or school of Islamic jurisprudence predominated in the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire.

\[661\] “...membro importantissimo del loro stato,” Paolo Paruta, Della historia Vinetiana, Parte Seconda, nella quale in
libri tre si contiene la guerra fatta dalla lega de’ prencipi christiani (Venice: Domenico Nicolini, 1605), 8.
I maintain that the Cyprus War, while part of the “vicissitudes” Beltrami alludes to, nevertheless accelerated this shift. Venice declined, and Spain lost interest in the Ottoman Mediterranean in ways that were other than military, while the English and Dutch increased their volume of commerce in the Atlantic, part of a wider shift in European commercial interest from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.\(^{663}\)

Such determination certainly does not suggest Venice was uninterested in the fate of Cyprus. But attachment is one thing, competent government another. Some have suggested that during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent the Ottomans reached the natural geographic limits that would allow successful control over their empire. Is it possible that in 1489, by assuming the governance of Cyprus, the Venetians reached beyond the geographic limits of what they could feasibly control? While Venice was indeed in a weak position on Cyprus, an island so distant from the metropolis or other friendly territory, and faced with the powerful Ottomans, they governed Cyprus with as much attention, even vigilance, as their other Eastern outposts closer to home. As John Hale has noted, the Venetians had a few outposts, mainly on the coasts of their Stato da Mar, that they guarded carefully, while allowing the hinterlands to be ravaged: this was true of Dalmatia, Albania, and Greek outposts as well.\(^{664}\) By the 1560s, the tenor of aristocracy.”\(^{662}\)

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\(^{663}\) An introduction to the vast bibliography on this subject from an economic standpoint is Louis Baeck, The Mediterranean Tradition in Economic Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), which argues that the shift in interest from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic was accompanied by a change in business emphasis from communitarian ethics to rationalistic mercantilism. An argument that Lepanto led to a shift from sea to land-based warfare has been made by Angelo Tamborra, who argued that the Cyprus War began a transfer of major Ottoman-Western military confrontations from the sea to the lands of Eastern Europe: Angelo Tamborra, “Dopo Lepanto: lo spostamento della lotta antiturca sul fronte terrestre,” Gino Benzoni, ed., Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del ’500 alla luce di Lepanto (Florence: L.S. Olschki Editore, 1974): 371-91.

archival documents in the series Dispacci-Cipro and Senato – Materie Miste that touch on
Cypriot affairs is that of a quiet desperation permeating the Venetian regime on the island. The
island’s governors recognized, and regarded with deep foreboding, the ability of the Ottomans to
put sailors ashore at will (on an island for which Venice was paying tribute, presumably, to be
left alone). Frustration and fear did not, however, translate into passivity and hopelessness. In
the 1550s Venice retained the services of the able architects Michele Sanmicheli and his nephew
Giangirolamo to design fortifications for Famagusta. In 1558, Giangirolamo, together with
Ercole Martinengo and his brother-in-law Luigi Brugnoli built a new pentagonal bastion at the
north of the port, and a barrier facing the sea, connected with the principal Venetian fortress. The
Venetians made further tremendous efforts, beginning in 1562, to build up the fortifications of
Famagusta, building five further bastions, on the recommendation of Giulio Savorgnan, whom
the Republic had sent from Venice in that year specifically to inspect Famagusta’s
fortifications. It was the turn of Nicosia in 1567-1568, while the main fortified place on the
northern coast of Cyprus, Kyrenia, also went through a series of improvements. A more pressing
problem than sturdy and well-placed fortifications was that of manning garrisons for those
fortifications, for which Venetian manpower was lacking while, as Gianni Perbellini points out,
it appears that the Greeks were never fully trusted as garrison troops.

To the Ottomans, as orthodox Muslims, the world was divided between the dar al-Islam
and dar al-Harb, and it was the duty of good Muslims to work to constantly expand the former at

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665 I have examined documents #1-21, in the State Archive of Venice from the series Dispacci dei Rettori – Cipro,
Nicosia, in five filze, running from 1554 to 1566.

666 Giulio Savorgnan, “Lettera scritta da Famagusta al Serenissimo principe il segnor g.r. Hieronimo Priuli del 1562
adi 7 luglio,” in Libro primo dei discorsi del sig. Giulio Savorgnan,” BMC Ve MS. Cicogna 1669, cited in Gianni

the expense of the latter. The concept of the nation-state, nascent in late sixteenth-century Christian Europe, did not exist in Ottoman lands although those lands were divided, for administrative purposes, into sanjaks, beğlerbegliks, and kapudanliks. More salient marks of sovereignty for the Ottomans were that of the caliphate, a concept derived from the Arabic khalif or successor, in matters of both political and spiritual import, to Muhammad; that of the Friday sermon, or hutbe, which was recited in mosques in the name of the acknowledged ruler and often reminded listeners of that ruler; and that of sikke, or the minting of coins with the image of the ruler on them.\footnote{Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005), s.v. “Khalif,” “Khutba,” “Sikke.”} Because of the military might and prestige of the Turks, who since 1517 had also controlled the Muslim Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, the Ottoman sultans and writers at court in the mid-sixteenth century began to refer to the Ottoman rulers as caliphs, superseding the decrepit caliphate that had existed in Mamluk Cairo, one that in turn had succeeded the Baghdad caliphate that had been destroyed in the conquest of the city by Hulagu Khan in 1258.\footnote{On the new Ottoman use of caliph among the sultanic titles from the 1540s on, see Gábor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry,” in Daniel Goffman, ed., The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 97, and Colin Imber, “Suleyman as Caliph of the Muslims: Ebu’s-Su’ud’s Formulation of Ottoman Dynastic Ideology,” in GillesVeinstein, ed. Soliman le Magnifique et son temps (Paris: La documentation française, 1992), 179-84.} One might broadly characterize the Ottoman concept of sovereignty in this period as more concerned with \textit{de facto}, rather than \textit{de jure} circumstances.

This observation is supported by another key Ottoman document from the period just before the invasion of Cyprus that has survived, in slightly variant versions, granting insight into the Ottomans’ motivations for undertaking the conquest. This is the \textit{fetva} which Ebu’s-Su’ud Efendi, the \textit{şeyhülislam} or principal kadi of the entire empire, issued in 1570. The full text is
given by the historian Ibrahim Peçuylu. The document stresses three points: first, that Cyprus had been Muslim before, part of the dar al-Islam; second, that the Ottomans are receiving no aid from Venice in stamping out the piracy in the waters around the island; and third, that the Venetians on Cyprus are carrying out abominations such as turning the mosque of the Caliph ‘Umar, one of the four so-called Rashidun or rightly-guided caliphs who succeeded Muhammad in the leadership of the Muslim community, into a pig slaughterhouse.

One should not underestimate the cultural gap between Western Europe and the Ottomans in the legal understanding of the position of Cyprus, and European legists seem to have understood this dimly. They did not even begin to discuss, until the late seventeenth century, the possibility that Ottoman claims to territory in Europe might have some legitimacy. Perhaps, as Rifa‘at Abou-el-Haj has argued, it was when the Ottomans were no longer perceived as quite so looming a threat, after the Ottoman defeat at Vienna and the peace of Karlowitz in 1699, that jurists in the West could allow themselves to consider Ottoman legal claims. I suggest that both the Greek Cypriots and the Western Europeans of the period 1571-1650 appear to have had a more reasonable understanding of the impossibility of arriving at a permanent peace with the Ottomans, over Cyprus and other territories, than that provided by written evidence alone. They had had long experience with the Ottomans and other Muslim powers and, though they may not have known about the Hudaybiyya agreement as a controlling precedent for all subsequent

671 Ibid.
672 As Franklin L. Baumer argued with a stress on England, but bringing in evidence from other European realms, in “England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom,” cited above.
Muslim treaty-making with non-Muslims, they had their own experience of the Ottoman advance since the fourteenth century to show them that periods of peace were unlikely to last longer than ten years.674 One can draw a distinction between what Venetians and other Christian Europeans thought the Ottomans thought, and what the Ottomans actually thought. But some Venetians clearly thought the Turchi believed that the whole world must ultimately come to be dominated by Islam, and that any territory once held by Muslims must be made to revert to Islam.675

Venetian society in the metropolis appears to have united behind the war effort over Cyprus. We lack a day-to-day account from Venice for the Cyprus War, comparable to the uniquely rich source that is Marino Sanudo the Younger’s diary-chronicles, Diarii, for the second Venetian-Ottoman war of 1499-1503.676 But Paolo Paruta’s funeral oration in absentia of 1572 for the fallen at Lepanto refers to brave and unified Venetians before whom the two stark alternatives were always present: “always in front of them, but wearing different aspects, liberty, and slavery.”677 It is clear from the context that Paruta refers, not to Lepanto alone, but to the

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675 One Venetian bailò in Constantinople, Giacomo Soranzo, writing in 1567, referred in his report back to the Senate at the end of his term to the idea that “nor have they ever yet lost a foot of conquered land, and it also seems that on account of religion it is forbidden to them ever to restore a place where they have prayed, nor do I find any place that the Turks have lost but never recovered, save the island of Cefalonia, which, having been acquired by this Most Serene Republic [Venice] in the year 1500 through the valor of the general Pesaro and of Consalvo Ferrando, has remained in our power until today, a unique example in Ottoman history.” [nè mai alcuno finora ha perduto un palmo dell’acquistato, e par che anco per religion sia a loro proibito il restituire mai luogo dovo abbiano fatto una volta la orazione, né altro luogo io trovo, che li Turchi abbiano perso nè mai ricuperato salvo la Isola di Cefalonia, la quale acquistata da questa serenissma repubblica l’anno 1500 con il valore del general Pesaro e di Consalvo Ferrando, è restata in potere nostro fino oggidì; solo esempio nelle istorie Ottomani.] In Maria Pia Pedani, ed., Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, Vol. XIV, Costantinopoli – Relazioni Inedite (Padua: Aldo Ausilio, 1994), 374.


677 Paolo Paruta, Oratione funebre del Mag. M. Paolo Paruta in laude de’ morti nella Vittoriosa battaglia contra Turchi, Houghton MS. Ott 199.6, f. 10r: “Era loro sempre davanti, ma con diversa sembianza, la libertà, e la servitù...”
entire Cyprus War. Wild hopes of going on to conquer Constantinople circulated in Venice after that victory, though cooler heads prevailed. 678 Venice prosecuted the war in deadly earnest, but the Republic’s stern treatment of her captain general (effectively, her admiral) Girolamo Zane, who was dispatched from Venice with a fleet to Cyprus but got bogged down in Corfu when a typhoid epidemic struck, and was later recalled and put on trial for failing to maintain discipline and for doing too little, too late, can serve as a reminder. 679 There was little to celebrate militarily on Cyprus itself, save for a single exploit by the Venetian provveditore (a sort of district governor) for Crete, Marco Querini. When he learned that the Ottomans had left only a dozen galleys over the winter of 1570-71 to guard Famagusta, Querini dashed into Famagusta harbor, defeated a small fleet of eight Ottoman galleys that had pursued Querini and his fleet from Costanza, six miles to the north, and then was able to unload reinforcements of some 1319 men, as well as munitions and food, to the beleaguered Famagusta garrison. The Venetian victories took place, rather, in a frontier war in Albania and Dalmatia, where Ottomans had begun raiding already in 1568. 680 Albania and Dalmatia, poised between Venetian and Ottoman territories, became the “western theatre” of the Cyprus War.

With the Venetian defeat in the Cyprus War, some Greek families, who had joined the ruling élite on Cyprus, stood to lose much when the Ottomans swept away the Latin Catholic ruling class (some of whom quickly converted to Islam, and remained powerful in the new

678 Correspondence in Michel Lesure, Lépante, la crise de l’empire ottoman (Paris: Julliard, 1972), 150.

679 See Ugo Tucci, “Il processo di Girolamo Zane, mancato difensore di Cipro,” in Gino Benzoni, ed. Il Mediterraneo, 417-419, which stresses the lack of discipline; and Capponi, Victory of the West, 145-52, which stresses Zane’s misfortune in having the men of his fleet stricken with an epidemic while at Corfu.

order)\textsuperscript{681} and forcibly transported many thousands of Anatolian, mostly Muslim, families to the island.\textsuperscript{682} Some Greeks had left Cyprus before the war and gone to Crete or to Venice, with little confidence that Venice could protect them on Cyprus itself.\textsuperscript{683} They seem to have anticipated, as Halil Inalcik judged in 1974, that the war of 1570-73 would prove crucial in Venice’s decline, and that Christian reconquest of the island was unrealistic.\textsuperscript{684}

In Chapter Three, I elaborated arguments for concluding that, as the power of Venice waned after the Cyprus War, the French replaced Venice as the principal and most influential western power able to be heard in Ottoman councils, through a powerful ambassadorial establishment in Constantinople and an elaborate and well-organized network of consuls all over the Middle East.\textsuperscript{685} Venice possessed these, too, but increasingly found herself shut out from any


\textsuperscript{682}Benjamin Arbel, “Greek Magnates in Venetian Cyprus: the Case of the Synglitico Family,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49 (1995): 325-337. In a brief article on the economy of Cyprus in the Ottoman period (1571-1878), Euphrosyne Rizopoulou-Egoumenidou remarked that only two Greek Orthodox, the Dragoman Hadjigeorgakis Kornesios and one other, appeared to qualify as “rich” over the entire seventeenth century in Cyprus: “The Economy of Cyprus under Ottoman rule with special emphasis on the late 18th and early 19th Centuries,” in Vassos Karageorghis and Demetrios Michaelides, The Development of the Cypriot Economy: from the Prehistoric Period to the Present Day (Nicosia: Lithographica, 1996), 193-208. I say “mostly” Muslim because it has yet to be settled whether a substantial number were not also Christian. See Theodore Papadopoulos, “Προσφατοί εξισλαμισμοί αγροτικού πληθυσμού εν Κύπρω,” Κυπριακαι Σπουδαι 29 (1965), 32-36 which explores the question of what proportion of the settler population on Cyprus after 1572 was Christian, what Muslim.


substantial influence with the Ottoman government by deliberate French efforts. Venice’s importance in the formation of a Greek Cypriot identity lay elsewhere.

**Greek and Cypriot Migration to Venice: its Significance**

Venice’s role as a refuge and place of work for countless Greeks, from approximately 1400 on, was significant. And her pedagogic role, particularly through her university, the University of Padua, was prominent in educating and promoting a small but influential elite of Greek Cypriots, such as Neophytos Rhodinos, who would play a crucial role in maintaining Cypriot ties to a wider Greek world and a distinctive Greek literary and philosophical tradition. These Cypriots will be dealt with after a brief summary of how the Cyprus War ended from the Venetian standpoint and an overall assessment of the period of Venetian rule on the island.

After both Nicosia and Famagusta had fallen, where the overwhelming majority of Venetian garrison troops had been concentrated, the Venetians decided to abandon the Holy League, and made a unilateral peace with the Ottomans in March, 1573. This decision earned them scorn from both the Pope (now Gregory XIII, r. 1572-85) and the Spaniards. As Venetians must have soon realized, Cyprus was not just a small setback for the Venetians or a stepping-stone for the Ottomans, but an island of considerable significance, both sacred and secular. And there were those Venetians who took note of Cypriot regret for the Ottoman replacement of Venetian rule. The Venetian consul in Syria, for example, wrote with conviction

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687 A contemporary report by the Venetian ambassador to Rome, Paolo Tiepolo, described how, when Tiepolo conveyed the news of Venice’s separate peace with the Ottomans, Gregory XIII rose from his chair in a fury and ordered him out, while cursing the Venetians and threatening excommunications: “ *lascio considerare a V[ostra]. Serenità] quanto dispiacere et indignatione ne habbi preso...*” Given in Luciano Serrano, *Correspondencia* (1918-19), II (413-14.) This letter is series *Nunziature -- Espagna*, vol. 15, fol 227, dated April 7, 1573.
in 1596 that the Cypriots longed to return to the beneficent rule of Venice.\textsuperscript{688} Though after 1500 Spain and Portugal were able to find new outlets for trade in the New World and in the Indian Ocean, Venice did not display equal flexibility after the Cyprus War, and her Levantine trading outposts in Aleppo and Alexandria became more isolated from the metropolis. The impulse towards holy war that Venice had felt since the First Crusade, and passed down through generations at last was spent, and no new impulse towards either commercial or territorial expansion, such as marked the England of Frobisher and Ralegh and Calvert in this same period, emerged.\textsuperscript{689} But Venice became the center of less belligerent interactions of Catholic and

\textsuperscript{688} Unlike a number of sixteenth-century observers, including Bernardo Sagredo, no one among modern historians seems to have ventured to estimate in print the economic value of Cyprus to Venice. Clearly, to judge from his language, when Alessandro Malipiero, consul in Aleppo, reported to the Venetian Senate in 1596 that the income Cyprus furnished to the Ottomans was 50,000 zecchini – the major Venetian gold currency -- he considered this to a be a figure that was substantial less than in Venetian times: “Le entrate pubbliche di tutta l’isola che sono di appalti, di gabelle di carazi [the Arabic kharaj, Turkish haraç, a longstanding tax prescribed by Islam on non-Muslims], ed altre molte, e compreso anco quello viene cavato dai Sali, i quali sono molto mancati ed ogni anno ne patiscono mancamento: detratte le spese non ascendono a 50,000 zecchini. E questi non si riscuotono tutti, perché gli emiri non pagano nei tempi debiti quanto vanno debitori, ma sempre vanno portando il tempo innanzi da un anno all’altro, nè mai se ne vede il fine. Subito che i Turchi si furono impossessati dell’isola descrissero 42 mille carazari, nei quali non sono compresi, nè donne, nè putti minori di 14 anni; ma ora non sono ridotti a 30,000, essendone molti mancati, altri fuggiti ed assai fatti turchi per non pagar carazo...[the state incomes of the whole island, coming from state monopolies, from the levies of kharaj, and other mulcts, and including that which was gained from the salt pans, which are incurring losses and suffer losses each year: with expenditures subtracted, they [the incomes] do not reach 50,000 zecchini. And these are not collected entirely, because the emirs do not pay on time the debts which they owe, but constantly take their time, even from one year to the next, nor does one ever see the end of it. As soon as the Turks took possession of the island, they described 42,000 payers of kharaj, among whom are not included women, or children younger than 14. But now they have been reduced to 30,000, since many failed to pay, many fled, and many became Turks [i.e. professed Islam] in order not to pay the kharaj.] Guglielmo Berchet, ed. Relazioni dei Consoli Veneti nella Siria (Turin: Paravia, 1866): 99. Malipiero goes on to observe that “Ora che hanno patito e patiscono l’oppressione del crudele governo turchesco, conoscono o mostrano conoscere il temperato e benigno governo della Serenità Vostra, e si affliggono e piangono e fanno voti a Dio per ritornare sotto l’ombra di questa Serenissima Repubblica.” [Now that they [the Cypriots] have borne and continue to bear the oppression of the cruel Turkish government, they understand or appear to understand the moderate and benign governance of Your Serenity, and they beat themselves up, lament, and pray to God to return under the shade of this Most Serene Republic.] For more details on the Ottoman kharaj, see the Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, s.v. “kharadj,” http://www.brillonline.nl.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/subscriber/uid=3226/entry?entry=islam_COM-0496, accessed February 3, 2011.

\textsuperscript{689} On this point, I am aware of my going against a number of accounts of Venetians’ later perception of their own role in the Crusades, which imply –largely, it seems, on the strength of Venice’s reputation as a a republic of homines economici – that commerce was too important to the Venetians for them to take any meaningful part in
Orthodox: translation projects, shared interests in Greek history, and an influx of Greek painters who lent a Byzantine flavor to certain churches in Venice and the Veneto.⁶⁹⁰

Was Venetian Rule on Cyprus Oppressive?

While there were some respects in which the Orthodox Church was relegated to subordinate status on Cyprus, this was consonant with the prevalent understanding of relations of these quixotic endeavors. The predominant interpretation of the Venetian role in the First Crusade is that the commercially-minded republic had no time for Crusades. This is the view of Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice; it is in some places assumed, rather than explicitly stated, in the recent collection of art historical papers on Venice’s visual representations of the Fourth Crusade of 1204, commonly understood to be the earliest Venetian involvement in the Crusades. See Henry Maguire and Robert S. Nelson, eds. San Marco, Byzantium, and the Myths of Venice (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2010). This assumption is worth rethinking. The impression gained from reading a good many of the relevant histories from the sixteenth century is that not only the Fourth Crusade, but earlier ones as well—the struggles, in short, against the Saracen, and later the Turk—were celebrated at least retroactively by both the Venetian state and by a number of noble families au sein de la famille. In a persuasive interpretation, Thomas E. Dale, “Cultural Hybridity in Medieval Venice,” Op. cit., 161 points out that St. George, prominent as a symbol of Christian might during the Crusades, may have been included on the Porta Sant’Alipio of the Church of San Marco as a symbol of Venice’s crusading involvement. During the First Crusade, there is in any case only one contemporary source for Venice’s involvement: the Translatio sancti Nicolai, no chronicle, but rather an account of the transfer of the remains of the fourth-century saint, Nicholas of Myra, to Venice. This is available in English in J. McGinley and H. Musurillo, “Translatio Sancti Nicolai,” Bollettino di S. Nicola X (180) 3–17. I am taking into account Donald M. Nicol’s account of Venetian involvement in the First Crusade. Reluctant to endanger her trade relations with the Saracens, notably the Fatimids in Egypt, Venice held aloof from the conflict until reports of Pisan and Genoese involvement, and also of unexpected military success, began filtering back to Venice. At that point, as Steven Runciman has pointed out, Venice sent the largest fleet ever dispatched from Italy to the Levant, some 200 ships, once Doge Vitale Michiel had become, in Donald M. Nicol’s words, “fired with zeal for the crusade” (Byzantium and Venice, 71). Runciman, “L’intervento di Venezia dalla prima alla terza Crociata,” Venezia dalla Prima Crociata all’Conquista di Costantinopoli (Florence: Sansoni, 1965) 1–22. To argue that Venice, because she intervened very late and at a time when the military situation had shown itself unexpectedly favorable, was uninterested in the ideas behind the First Crusade, is not unlike dismissing the involvement of the United States in the First World War at a very late date as motivated exclusively by economic concerns. A concise synthesis of the sixteenth-century Venetian world-view that notes the aspect of pride in the struggle against the infidel, dating to a time when scholars seemed more comfortable with the occasional broad characterization of an entire society, is Pier Silverio Leicht, “Ideali di vita dei Veneziani nel Cinquecento,” Archivio Veneto XIV (1933) 217–31.

⁶⁹⁰ On these painters, see Maria Konstantinidou-Kitromilides, “Κύπριοι ζωγράφοι στη Βενετία στα τέλη του δεκατου εκτος αιώνα,” [Cypriot Painters at the end of the Sixteenth Century,] in Κύπρος – Βενετία: Κοινές Ιστορικές Στιγμές (Venice: Greek Institute of Byzantine Studies, 2002), 353-68.
religious beliefs and the state everywhere around the Mediterranean at the time.\textsuperscript{691} There were also a number of respects in which the Orthodox of Cyprus enjoyed chances for advancement. One of the most salient was the opportunity to go to be educated in Venice or Padua or, using Venice as a gateway, elsewhere in Western Europe, and to participate in a society and culture that had already absorbed Byzantine influences, and was from 1400 on progressively more open to the Greek Orthodox, and that many Greeks would agree with Cardinal Bessarion, was quasi alterum Byzantium – nearly another Byzantium.\textsuperscript{692} Through stages that have been ably traced in the documentary record by Giorgio Fedalto, Orthodox worship had been allowed more and more openly, until the Orthodox Church of San Giorgio dei Greci opened in 1539.\textsuperscript{693} That church and a related confraternity, the Greek Brotherhood, an older institution, founded in 1498, were the principal Greek Orthodox institutions in Venice at this time.

In recent decades, our understanding of the \textit{Bulla or Constitutio Cypria} of 1260 has been progressively refined. This ecclesiastical document, which one could call prescriptive legislation, crafted by the Latin archbishop of Nicosia Hugh of Fagiano and by Pope Alexander IV, had aimed to clarify the relations between Latins and Greeks on Cyprus. Though written in a spirit of “the reconciling of discords,” it placed the Greek Church in a subordinate position, and did away with the Greek archbishopric on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{694} This document decreed that the last Greek

\textsuperscript{691} The most detailed recent treatment of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus under Venetian rule is the last part of the chapter by Theodore Papadopoulos, “Η Εκκλησία Κυπρου κατα την περιοδο της Φραγκοκρατιας” in Theodore Papadopoulos, ed., \textit{Ιστορια της Κυπρου} IV (1), (Nicosia: Archbishop Makarios III Foundation Press, 1995), 643-65.


\textsuperscript{694} The full text is available in Nicholas Coureas and Christopher Schabel, \textit{The Cartulary of the Cathedral of Holy Wisdom} (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997), 194-205.
archbishop, Germanos, was allowed to retain his title and rank for his lifetime, but no new archbishop was to be elected after his death. One can regard this as the beginning of the Orthodox church’s subordination to the Latin Church on Cyprus. But not all subordinations are equally burdensome. And the large discrepancy in salaries between Latin and Greek bishops I have mentioned is one of the few concrete pieces of evidence of differential treatment. Considering the suspicion of non-Catholic heretics taking place in a number of places in Italy in the sixteenth century, even leading at times to those suspected being executed, and considering, too, the tension inherent in Venetian Cyprus as a result of its position as a society on what had become, thanks to Ottoman conquests, the fringes of Christendom, the burdens placed on the Orthodox were comparatively light. Things were arguably even better in the Venetian metropolis for Greek Orthodox in the sixteenth century, aside from their being a small minority in the maritime republic as opposed to the vast majority on Cyprus. During and after the Cyprus War, these immigrants continued to flock to Venice in large numbers.

While it is impossible to give an overview of all Cypriot immigrants to Venice, in what follows I give some prosopographical analysis to indicate the varied activities of this large Cypriot population. The networks of friendship and influence embraced Cretans as well as Cypriots, and I have reflected this in my discussion: it is not possible to understand the life of the Cypriot, Neophytos Rhodinos, in depth without reference to his dealings with the Cretan, Maximos Margounios, for example. In Venice and Padua, as nowhere else in Western Europe, Cypriots after 1571 found a home. In other chapters I have already mentioned a number of

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Cypriots active as writers, musicians, and scholars. Here I shall consider Cypriot figures with longstanding links to Venice and her university in Padua. These include Jason Denores, a writer on genres in literature and which were most effective, Germanos of Amathus, the Orthodox bishop and later a high prelate ministering to the Orthodox in southern Italy, Neophytos Rhodinos, a poet and missionary, a convert to Catholicism, who returned to the Greek East, and Giovanni Sozomeno and Giovanni Matteo Bustronios, librarians of St. Mark’s Library, the largest and most impressive in Venice. To round out the picture, I shall also discuss a Latin, born on Crete, an ally and friend of many Greeks, Bishop Alvise Lollino, eventually bishop of Belluno, in the Veneto region, and his circle of Greek-speakers, including Gabriel Seviros, the Metropolitan of Philadelphia; Meletios Pigas of Crete; Maximos Margounios of Cythera, and Daniel Phourlanos of Crete. Then I shall consider the scholarly activities of the Cypriot scholar of law Alessandro Synglitico; and I shall conclude with considerations on the lives of the Cypriots Theophanes Logaras, and Leontios Eustratios Philoponus. Many of these men knew each other, having studied together as youths at the University of Padua or having been introduced to each others by a few linchpin figures such as Lollino, which is one justification for considering the Cretan figures side-by-side with the Cypriot. The picture that emerges of the Cypriot community in the decades after the Cyprus War in Venice and Padua (and in Rome) is of a varied and vigorous cultural landscape, teeming with a great range of interests and activities. In the discussion of their lives and activities, the thesis is that in ways big and small, such men advanced a consciousness of a distinct Cypriot identity. Connections of study and of patronage and friendship they formed in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries with other Greek-speakers, in Venice and Padua as well as the Greek East, especially Crete, and in Venice, also contributed.
The Venice that Cypriot refugees flocked to after 1571 was abuzz with news concerning the complex geopolitics and religious upheavals of Europe at this time. It was not, by modern standards, a religiously tolerant society. The Cyprus War, because of the perception that Jews, such as the merchant prince, Joseph Nasi, stood to gain from the War, had fanned the flames of antisemitism. It had also exacerbated suspicions of all manner of Christian heresies too, Socinianism, Lutheranism, and even *maomettanismo*, as Islam is referred to in the records of the officials in charge of rooting out heresy, the *Tre Savi sopra l’eresia*. The voluminous research of Daniele Santarelli and Pier Cesare Ioly Zorattini has given us some indication of the variety of non-Catholic religious threats that the Venetian authorities prosecuted, and sought to stamp out, in Venice in this period.\(^{696}\) And if the Venetians could prove intolerant as they attempted to explain, and come to terms with, their loss, elsewhere in Europe Venice itself was blamed. The papacy was slow to forgive the insult to its honor stemming from what Gregory XIII considered the Venetian betrayal of the Christian cause, shown by her signing a separate peace with the Ottomans.\(^{697}\) But, whether one consider the Cyprus War important in the endlessly analyzed phenomenon of Venetian decline after 1500, the political and economic effects of the war were not as important for the long-term cultural history of Europe as developments in which Venice, and her university at Padua, in addition to Rome and a few other centers of learning such as Tübingen, the university of Martin Crusius, played a large role. This was a new appreciation for the Greeks of that time, and no longer just the Greeks of antiquity. Plato and (especially) Aristotle had been in the curriculum of higher education for many centuries, but they belonged to


\(^{697}\) Venice’s possible reasons for doing so are discussed above, page 130.
a remote and distant past. Now, in the late sixteenth century, other Greeks began to be known, and appreciated, such as the Cypriot philosopher Athanasios Rhetor, whose Platonic writings I have previously discussed. Their writings showed consciousness of continuities with Greek antiquity in a way that dovetailed nicely with the preoccupations of Western European humanism.\footnote{For examples in music, painting, and manuscript illumination, the papers in Lowell Lucas, ed., The Byzantine Legacy in Eastern Europe (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988) offer examples.}

Giason Denores was one refugee who took advantage of his environment and whose writing illustrates some themes that were widespread among educated Cypriots. Born in Nicosia circa 1510, he had studied at the University of Padua between about the years 1530 and 1535, where he met the literary figures Trifone Gabriele and Paolo Manuzio, the son of Aldus Manutius, both of whom he corresponded with for many years.\footnote{Nikolaos Panayiotakis, "Ιασων Δενορες, Κυπριος Θεωρητικος του Θεατρου, 1510-1590," in Theodore Papadopoulos et al., Πρακτικα του Δευτερου Διεθνους Κυπριολογικου Συνεδριου (Nicosia: Society of Cypriot Studies, 1986), 472.} He returned to Cyprus, then fled the Turks in 1570 and came to Venice.\footnote{Ibid., 475.} He learned from the Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle, the Poetics of Horace, and the De Oratore of Cicero, but also read the works of a modern interpreter of those works, Battista Guarini, a poet, playwright, and author of works on logic and on politics.\footnote{Ibid., 480-481.} In 1568, Denores published his criticism of the genres of tragicomedy and pastoral, many examples of which Guarini had produced. Later, indeed shortly before his death, in response to the Verrato, a tract by Guarini on rhetoric, Denores wrote the Apologia contra l’auttor del Verato (1590). Guarini continued to return to themes and ideas raised in their polemics even after Denores’ death in 1590. In the Apologia, Denores reveals an interest in his own noble origins, and brags of his family’s prosperity – perhaps accentuating the contrast.
between the ancient lineages of the East and those who were the relative parvenus of Venice, with its patriciate of relatively recent vintage? Denores managed to live a life of achievement and to write about what he wished; if his status as a critic is considered modest, he is still a good example of the opportunities Venice offered to Cypriots. Germanos, Bishop of Amathus, like Denores, had been on Cyprus when the Ottomans invaded, and after taking an active role in the defense of Famagusta in 1571, had been captured and imprisoned in Constantinople. He was freed and returned to Cyprus, where he was elected bishop of Amathus in 1572 at the time when the Orthodox church hierarchy was reestablishing itself on Cyprus. Germanos came to know Maximos Margounios, bishop of Kythera, a graduate of Padua of strong humanist interests, and through him Gabriel Severos, metropolitan of Philadelphia in Ottoman Asia Minor and pastor of the Orthodox community in Venice. Apparently, perhaps through the influence of these men, Germanos became suspicious enough of the Ottoman rulers of Cyprus that he fled to Venice in 1580; this shadowy episode has yet to be satisfactorily illuminated. Though Germanos was Orthodox, he soon found himself in Rome, where Cardinal Guglielmo Sirleto and, tellingly, the last Latin Archbishop of Cyprus, Filippo Mocenigo, both supported him financially. Germanos made enough of an impression on members of the Catholic hierarchy to be appointed by Pope Clement VIII as Prelatus Ordinans, the cleric responsible for ordaining all of the Greek

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702 Nikolaos Panayiotakis, Ιασων Δενορες, Κυπριος Θεωρητικος του Θεατρου Πρακτικα του Δυτερου Διεθνους Κυπριολογικου Συνεδριου (Nicosia: Society of Cypriot Studies, 1986), where Iason is quoted from the Apologia (Padua: Paolo Meietti, 1590), 469: “essendo in quel Regno quasi in ogni famiglia delle più nobili un sol feudo, nella sua n’erano sette.” [There are in that Realm for all of the noblest families one single feudo, but his had seven] See also 473-4. As Panayiotakis notes, 469, Etienne de Lusignan described the Denores family as of French origin, while the seventeenth-century polymath and genealogist Du Cange thought they were of English origin.

703 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Κυπριακη Λογισυνη, 1571-1878, 116.

704 Ibid.

705 It was the munificent Mocenigo, who in 1560 had established scholarships for Cypriot students to travel to the University of Padua and study.
Orthodox clergy, for all of Italy. In 1600 he became bishop of the Greek-rite Christians of Sicily, first Akragas and later Palermo, and eventually, in 1602, moved to Spain, where he was supported financially by King Philip III, returning to Sicily to die, in 1610. Bishop Germanos’ career suggests that Cypriot Orthodox clergy, if they displayed talent, could receive generous treatment in the Latin West.

Neophytos Rhodinos, born in Potamia in southern Cyprus in about 1576, offers yet another example of the sort of life of accomplishment that was possible for a Christian Cypriot who placed himself in the service of Western Europeans during the first half-century of Ottoman Cyprus. His love of Cyprus also manifested itself in that he eventually returned to the Cyprus where he had been born. It was not surprising that he would keep up his connection to the island, for Rhodinos’ father, Solomon, may have been the author of the famous Lament for Cyprus. The son moved to Venice in 1599 in the retinue of the Cretan Maximos Margounios, another figure of note, and apparently converted to Catholicism. In 1607, at the advanced age of 30, Rhodinos entered the Greek College in Rome, and he later studied at the University of Salamanca, famous for its Catholic philosophers, such as Vitoria and Suarez. In the 1620s, after the founding of the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, the principal Catholic missionary body, Rhodinos was able to take an active hand in the foundation of a Greek Catholic (greco-cattolico) mission to the province of Cimarra in what is now southern Albania. Rhodinos had thus benefitted from a western education, and while he had engaged in missionary activity for a church based in the West, his celebrated work, a biographical dictionary, the Περὶ ἠρων (1659), reflected his consciousness of continuity with the Cypriot past. This work constituted a

706 Kitromilides, Κυπριακή Λογισμονή, 116.

long appreciation in print of the great men of Cypriot history. Rhodinos returned to Cyprus and copied manuscripts in Kykkos Monastery, the most prominent on Cyprus, and died there in 1659, the year his Περὶ ἔρωων was published in Rome. One might say that his work in its assumptions anticipated Carlyle’s Great Man theory of history. Rhodinos’ life shows how freely a Cypriot-born Orthodox could make his own way in the West, particularly if he joined the clergy, even if he remained Orthodox in orientation.

Bishop Alvise Lollino (1552?-1623), though himself a Latin Catholic throughout his life, was a central and influential figure for Greek Orthodox of various backgrounds, a man who acted as a human conduit, introducing or linking one person to another (and very often those people were from the Greek-speaking lands), and also lending out books, and sharing his insights into them with his friends. He also carried on a voluminous correspondence with many of them. Lollino was born to Latin parents, but on Crete. Once his parents decided, in the wake of the Cyprus War, to leave Crete, for rumors were rampant in the Eastern Mediterranean that Crete was the next intended target for Ottoman fleets, he moved to the Veneto, to study at the University of Padua, probably enrolling in 1577, at the age of twenty. While at Padua his interests ran to philosophy, and through those philosophical studies he came to know Gabriel Severos, the future Orthodox metropolitan in charge of the faithful in Venice. Other fellow students included a fellow Cretan, Meletios Pigas, known as Emmanuel in those days, chancellor to the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, and later Patriarch in his own right of Alexandria, and

708 Neophyto Rhodinos, Περὶ ἔρωων, στρατηγῶν, ϕιλοσοϕῶν, αγίων καὶ ἄλλων ονομαστῶν... (Nicosia: Grapheion Kypriakes Historias, 2007).


710 Luigi Alpago-Novello, “La vita e le opere di Luigi Lollino, vescovo di Belluno,” Archivio Veneto 14 (1933), 18, referring to a poem of Lollino in which he says he went to the great cities of Romulus and of the Veneti after spending twice ten winters in Crete (Bis denas hiemes Cretae).
finally Patriarch of Constantinople. Lollino, and his classmates, had the opportunity to be taught by leading scholars of the day in a wide range of subjects. He studied with the Neo-Platonist philosopher Jacopo Zabarella, the legal scholar Giovanni Francesco Mussato, and the distinguished naturalist Melchior Wieland, known to Italian-speakers as Guillardino, prefect of the botanical garden at Padua, and the mathematician and designer of fortifications, Giuseppe Moleto. Though from Crete, Lollino exemplifies the hand that many Latins extended both to Orthodox Cretans and Orthodox Cypriots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

After graduating from Padua, Lollino continued to correspond with both Severos and Pigas, whom he never saw in person after 1575, but whom he sent works by Dionysius the Areopagite and by Eusebius, while Meletios was a monk on Crete. In this period Lollino also met Maximos Margounios, also born on Crete, but Orthodox, and they exchanged books. Margounios was another extremely active patron of Greeks, as well as a writer on ecclesiastical and literary matters. Lollino also met and exchanged books with the Cypriot Alessandro Synglitico, later a professor of canon law in Padua. The exchange of theological ideas and the social intercourse Lollino carried on with Greeks is difficult to imagine three centuries earlier, say at the time the Council of Lyons in 1274, the year of Aquinas’ death, where the vocabulary to facilitate such an exchange hardly existed, when the nascent University of Padua had provided a very different curriculum and learning environment, to use a present-day term, from that of the late sixteenth century. And three centuries before, far fewer Greeks were studying and living in Western Europe. But the Ottoman advance pushed waves of Greek-speakers westward. As a result of an influx of refugees from Byzantium beginning in the early fifteenth century, the Greek


712 In one case, recorded in a letter of May 24, 1591, Margounios wrote to a friend that Lollino had sent him a copy of the Latin work Contra Celsum, by Origen. In another, in 1602, we learn that Margounios had leant Lollino a copy of Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses. Canart, “Alvise Lollino,” 565.
language came to be taught more often and in more depth in the Italian peninsula, and what is more as a “living language,” among educated Italians and other Europeans by teachers of Greek such as Manuel Chrysoloras, Janus Lascaris, and Demetrios Chalcokondyles. Lollino could correspond on Homer and Hesiod with Gabriel Severos, and with Maximos Margounios, who among other projects edited an edition of the works of John Chrysostom, on exchanges of ancient manuscripts. Though we associate the migration of Greeks to the Italian peninsula after 1400 with the spread of Greek learning, evidence of a shared interest in Latin works among these Greeks in Italy, and even in Ottoman lands, also emerges from the documents. Maximos Margounios, who had been taught by the Catholic bishop of Sitia on Crete, Gaspare Viviani, but eventually became Orthodox bishop of Cythera, collected an extensive library of works in Latin, as Deno Geanakoplos discovered decades ago. Latin friends and patrons could be crucial in introducing these Greeks into learned circles; the Orthodox Archbishop Gabriel of Achrida, for example, in 1589 did the Cypriot Leontios Eustratios, a young man with an interest in and talent for theology, a great favor by writing him a letter of recommendation to the celebrated Martin Crusius, a Lutheran scholar and passionate philhellene, at Tübingen – though Eustratios did not prove grateful. Another Cypriot we have encountered, Neophytos Rhodinos, was also friendly

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714 This episode, the text of the letter of recommendation, and further documentation on Eustratios and his Cypriot and Cretan allies are in Otto Kresten, “Ein Empfehlungsschreiben des Erzbischofs Gabriel von Achrida für Leontios Eustratios Philoponos an Martin Crusius (Vind. Suppl. Gr. 142),” Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici 6-7 (1969-70), 93-125.
with and corresponded with Eustratios. He also benefitted from the patronage of the Cretan Maximos Margounios, who wrote another letter of recommendation to Crusius on his behalf.\footnote{Crusius himself recorded the arrival of Leontios: “On March 17 [1590] two Greeks came here: Leontinus Philoponus, a Hieromonk, and Ezekiel Xyriches, a priest.” “Mart. 17. Duo venêre Graeci huc: Leontinus Philoponus Hieromonachus, et Ezekiel Xyriches, Presbyter.” Kresten, 105.}

In an article on Lollino’s circle, the Frenchman Paul Canart noted that the Cretan, Daniel Fourlanos, though born to Greek-speaking parents, appears as an adult to have been more comfortable in Latin than in Greek. Gabriel of Achrida stressed Leontios Eustratios’ competence in Latin, too. Paul Canart has remarked of the Cretan Greeks, Margounios, Phourlanos and Pigas, that they demonstrate in their writings a “notable, indeed remarkable, mastery of the Latin language and culture.”\footnote{Op. cit., 556.} As they had studied with the scholars of the University of Padua, among whom Latin was the lingua franca, this observation does not surprise, but is worth repeating nevertheless. Maximos Margounios, for example, composed a commentary on the Latin work by St. Augustine on the Trinity.\footnote{Giorgio Fedalto, Massimo Margunio e il suo commento al “De Trinitate” di S. Agostino (1588) (Brescia: Paideia, 1968 [1967]).} Pigas wrote letters to Phourlanos in Latin, and Phourlanos wrote poetry in Latin, such as a 1572 dedicatory epistle to Margounios’ Latin translation of St. John of Damascus’ tract against the Manichaeans.\footnote{Canart, “Alvise Lollino,” 557.} Such anecdotal evidence as there is suggests that large numbers of those Greeks who received higher education in Italy, including Cypriots, had developed an interest in the Latin language and in Latin literature, and were coming to engage in depth with that literature for the first time since the fall of the Roman West. This evidence also lends weight to a proposition that historians have been arguing about for a long time now, that Cretans (Fourlanos, Meletios Pigas, Margounios, and Lollino were all
born on Crete) had a special connection to Latin culture, owing largely to the Venetian regime that had been installed on Crete longer than almost any other place in the Greek world, that is, since 1211. One can interpret their role from the Cypriot point of view as middlemen, who often introduced the Cypriots into Venetian and other European society.

The careers of two Cypriot librarians at the Library of San Marco illustrate another profession available to Cypriots who came to Venice. The two, Giovanni Sozomeno and Giovanni Matteo Bustronio, worked at the largest and most prestigious of Venetian libraries, and dealt with both Greek and Latin manuscripts. Sozomeno was helped, no doubt, by his introduction into the house of the patrician Morosini family in Venice, and Bustronio undoubtedly benefited, that is in integrating with the Catholics, from his education at the Greek college in Rome, and from his Catholic tendencies, which are suggested by his being named provost to the cathedral of Rimini in 1610. It would have been extraordinary had there not been at least gentle pressure in the air in this period in Venice for educated men to adopt Catholic beliefs. It was this very danger, after all, that made northern European Protestants of good family reluctant to send their sons to Padua and elsewhere in Italy in the seventeenth century. The adoption of Catholicism by Bustronio and some others among Cypriots who travelled west, such as Athanasios Rhetor and Neophytos Rhodinos is not sufficient evidence of a carefully reasoned theological shift on their part, but was more likely prompted by an understandable desire to “do as the Westerners do” while in Western Europe, that is, to fit in with those among whom they lived, and among whom they perhaps felt they would be living for a long time, given the Ottoman rule over their Orthodox homelands.

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It is possible to idealize and to exaggerate the closeness of the ties that existed among members of Lollino’s circle, especially across the Catholic-Orthodox divide. Not everyone in that circle had a brilliant career or an unruffled life. Gabriel Severos, for example, Lollino’s classmate, and a correspondent with both Meletios Pigas and with the later Patriarch of Constantinople Cyril Lucaris, was forced as Metropolitan of the Orthodox in Venice to spend time in prison in Venice in 1588 on charges of sedition against the Republic, and fomenting rebellion. But Severos was an exception. The circles of friendship and influence linking Cypriot and Cretan Greeks to one another and both to influential Venetians and their institutions, are impressive in their reach.\textsuperscript{720}

Furthermore, if we venture to compare Catholic-Orthodox with intra-Orthodox relations, those familiar with the ecclesiastical history of the Greek Orthodox Church in this period know that there was plenty of intra-Orthodox squabbling and fighting in Severos’ day. The charging of Severos with sedition, which was likely a product of such infighting, would not have shocked Orthodox clerical circles in the Ottoman Empire. In the period from 1571 to 1625, there were twenty-four changes of Ecumenical Patriarch, some through deposition, many through the violent conflicts of rival church camps or factions, and these were far from serene times within the upper reaches of the Orthodox Church hierarchy in Constantinople, and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. The tensions that persisted, as there had been in Byzantine times and as there have been since, between Greek and non-Greek Orthodox, gave the Western Christian denominations, including Calvinists, Lutherans and Catholics, and eventually Anglicans and

other Protestant denominations as well, an opening to try to draw the Orthodox closer into their respective orbits. These differing Western efforts engendered tensions within the community of Greeks themselves between the more Latinophile (favorable to Catholic doctrine and practice) clergy, described in contemporary Greek sources as Λατινοφρονες, or “Latin-minded,” and those, like Cyril Lucaris, who apparently favored Calvinist doctrines. While not all Greek Orthodox were interested in or aware of the doctrinal disagreements sweeping Europe, it appears to have been extremely common among Cypriots who travelled west to be pulled in one or the other (non-Orthodox) direction.

Suspicion of the Greek Orthodox, as of other religious minorities, could always be rekindled in Venice, as elsewhere in Italy, especially in time of war or the fear of war, but the Orthodox-Catholic divide hardly features as a theme in the correspondence of the Greek and Venetian clergymen who corresponded in this period about their shared interests. The letters of the abovementioned Meletios Pigas of Crete, Patriarch of Alexandria from 1590 to 1601, and locum tenens Patriarch of Constantinople from 1597 to 1598, exchanged with many Latin clergy in the West, are a good example of Orthodox-Catholic friendliness unimpeded by such suspicion. This Orthodox chancellor, and later patriarch, bound in theory to doctrines that could not be easily reconciled with those of Rome, nonetheless wrote with great affection and goodwill to Cardinal Santoro, whose aims as president of the Congregation for the Greeks in the wake of the Council of Trent ran quite against those of Pigas, and instead towards the gradual breaking down of Greek objections to Catholicism. But they found common ground, and corresponded about shared literary interests, and Pigas thanked Santoro for the gift of the new Gregorian calendar, adding, however, that he had already acquired it, perhaps as a way to suggest that he, Pigas, was

well up on developments. Pīgas himself wrote Latin as well as Greek verses. And, in a theological controversy over Leontios Eustratios in 1598, who had returned from Italy to Cyprus in the 1580s to teach, but who was regarded with suspicion by some Cypriot Orthodox for his Romanist sympathies, Pīgas sided with Eustratios. Furthermore, Pīgas corresponded as well with the Lutheran, Martin Crusius, author of the _Turcograecia_ and _Germanograecia_, and widely considered the first German philhellenist — though whether Crusius actually influenced him in a Lutheran direction is unclear.

Theophanes Logaras (? – 1581), a Cypriot who left the island at the time of the Turkish invasion, settled in Venice where, like the Cretan Maximos Margounios, he published liturgical books. Compared to Margounios, Logaras’ range of interests was narrower, and those Greek liturgical books, his _evangelia_, are the main works he left to the world. Still, he offers another example of a Cypriot ecclesiastic who was able to escape the dangers of the Ottoman invasion and find a home in Venice, one where he could pursue his religious interests in peace. Leontios Eustratios Philoponos (ca. 1560-ca. 1602), by contrast, appears to have engaged in a wider range of activities and written on a greater range of subjects. Eustratios left Cyprus as a result of the Turkish invasion, and was taken into the household of the Patriarch of Constantinople, where he was educated in Greek. He later made his way to Venice, and then is recorded as having taught Greek at Corfu, in 1587, and then visited Vienna where he made the acquaintance of the Dutch Hellenist, Hugo Blotius, the first man to be appointed Court Librarian of the Habsburg court library. Eustratios wrote a number of philosophical works, and eventually returned to Nicosia.

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722 Legrand, _Lettres de Mélétius Pīgas_, 132.

723 The controversy Eustratios provoked is discussed in Hill, _History of Cyprus_, IV, 326.

724 For biographical details, Paschalis M. Kitromilides, _Κυπριακή Λογιοσωστία_, 1571-1878 (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2006), 184-6. See also Otto Kresten, “Ein Empfehlungsschreiben des Erzbischofs Gabriel von Achrida für
where he founded a school. In 1592, Eustratios, who had travelled West to study at Venice and perhaps Padua as well, and who inclined to the Romanist interpretation of the use of unleavened bread in the Host, was involved in a theological dispute on this very subject, that may have influenced the choice of the next Archbishop of Cyprus, and in which Meletios Pigas, who by now was Patriarch of Alexandria, played the role of peacemaker. Eustratios won this dispute, Athanasios I, who favored Eustratios’ views on the Host, became Archbishop of Cyprus in 1592, and Eustratios eventually died as hegoumen, or abbot, of the monastery of St. John Bibi, in Nicosia.

Philosophy, philology, and the fine arts, all disciplines in which the Byzantines had excelled, have been dwelt upon in recent studies of the Byzantine cultural inheritance that was still potent after the fall of Constantinople. While we do not possess evidence of Christian

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726 Ibid.

727 For example, John J. Yiannias, ed., The Byzantine Tradition after the Fall of Constantinople (Charlottesville, VA and London: University Press of Virginia, 1991). The Romanian historian Nicolai Iorga developed the idea of Byzance après Byzance in his study by that name, and Iorga, who wrote in French, seems to have played an important role in diffusing the idea in Western scholarship: Byzance après Byzance (Paris: Balland, 1992 [1934]). Iorga was, however, far from the first to recognize continuities in the culture of the Greeks pre- and post-1453. In the realm of philosophy, Athanasios Rhetor (1571-1663), for one, a Cypriot who converted to Catholicism and travelled to France and many of whose works in manuscript I have examined in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, appears to have seen himself as participating in a tradition of Platonic thought reaching back from his own time to antiquity. Athanasios travelled to Constantinople, Cyprus and Mount Athos in the 1640s to collect Greek manuscripts, at the bidding of his French patrons, including Cardinal Mazarin and Chancellor Pierre Séguier, and wrote a number of Platonic works, such as that contained in Bibliothèque Nationale, Supplément grec MS. no. 1026, entitled “Syllogistic Proofs of the ideas, collected in the works from the mind of Iamblichus...” as well as works on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle, and works by Proclus. Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, in his article “Un témoignage tardif sur Jamblique et la tradition Platonicienne,” has argued that “le Rhéteur se réfère à Jamblique avec beaucoup de vénération....les références d’Athanase témoignent de la tradition tardive platonicienne grecque.” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 20 (1977), 2.
Cypriot painters or illuminators who migrated to the Ottoman heartlands and were able to continue their craft, in the 1580s one John the Cypriot is recorded in the archives of the Greek Fraternity of Venice as having painted the dome of the Church of St. George of the Greeks, the principal Orthodox-rite church in the city.\footnote{Konstantoudaki-Kitromilidou, “Κυπριοί ζωγράφοι,” 357.} While there were also a number of prominent Christian painters on seventeenth century Cyprus who worked under Ottoman rule, such as Leontios the Hieromonk,\footnote{The hieromonk was responsible for such icons as that of St. John the Theologian in the monastery of Panaghia Amirou, no. 56 in Sophocles Sophocleous, ed., Cyprus the Holy Island: Icons through the Centuries (Nicosia: Anastasios Leventis Foundation, 2000), 243.} he stayed on Cyprus and did not travel abroad. Luke the Cypriot, who gained the ecclesiastical post of Metropolitan of Hungaro-Wallachia, continued to worked as a manuscript illuminator in Moldavia, a principality which enjoyed autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and Philippos Kyprios, Philip the Cypriot, who became protonotary, a Chief Secretary to the Church of Constantinople, in the early seventeenth century, and wrote the *Chronicon Ecclesiae Graecae*, a history of the Orthodox Church, eventually published in Frankfurt and Leipzig in 1687.\footnote{Philip is mentioned in this role in a letter of 1633 quoted in Andreas Mitsides, “Ὁ πρωτός κατά την Τουρκοκρατία και οικιακός αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου Τιμόθεος ο Κυκκώτης (1572-1587/8),” Επετηρίδα κειμένων Μελετών Ισλαμικής Μονής Κύκκου, 1 (1990), 26. His work is Philippos Kyprios, *Chronicon Ecclesiae Graecae* (Leipzig and Frankfurt: J.C. Wohlfart, 1687).} In Philip’s case, he was a Church bureaucrat, and a lonely counterexample to the prevailing tendency of Cypriots not to do much culturally if they stayed in Ottoman lands. Not many such examples have come to light, although it would be desirable to know if many Cypriots went to Egypt after 1570, for example. There are few records of cultural activity undertaken by Cypriots who stayed under Ottoman rule approximating those of the men whose lives I have presented and the links between them, in brief prosopography, here. The final tally is undoubtedly to the credit of Christian Europe; only the amount of the imbalance between Christendom and the Ottoman lands is in doubt. Finally, to continue the comparison of the
contributions made by Cypriots who migrated to Venice and those who migrated to the Ottoman Empire, I am also taking note, as circumstantial evidence, of the gradual amelioration of the social and religious position of the Greek Orthodox population of Venice, in contrast to what happened to the position of the Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire. For the latter, in many places, found themselves, with the passage of time, not steadily better off but the reverse, enduring an ever more tenuous position.\textsuperscript{731}

Before the French Revolution, as historians are fond of reminding themselves and their readers, nationalism scarcely existed in the form recognizable today. While this is generally true, documentary sources for post-conquest Cyprus suggest that a form of communal identity marked the “greci” off from other Cypriots. It is tempting to conclude that both for Balkan Christians in Albania and Dalmatia, and in Greek-speaking lands after the Cyprus War, the increase in Catholic mission activities, Franciscan, Benedictine, Capuchin and Jesuit, served to “remind” the Orthodox of their distinct traditions. Whether or not there was a threat to those traditions posed by the missionaries, still their effect was to highlight for thoughtful Greeks the differences between them, the Catholics, other forms of Christianity, and their Muslim rulers.\textsuperscript{732} The mission undertaken, for example, by the Jesuit Girolamo Dandini in 1596 at the behest of Pope Clement VIII (r. 1592-1605) to Lebanon, to solidify relations with the Maronites, was predicated on a distinction between those Eastern Christians who acknowledged papal primacy, and those who

\textsuperscript{731} For example, a number of monasteries were seized just before the Cyprus War by the Ottoman authorities, and though they then allowed the monks to buy the properties back, the episode reminded the monks of their precarious situation and the arbitrariness of their rulers. See Aleksandr Fotić, “The Official Explanations for the Confiscation and Sale of Monasteries (Churches) and their Estates at the Time of Selim II,” \textit{Turcica} 26 (1994), 33-54, as well as Evgenia Kermeli, “The Confiscation and Repossession of Monastic Properties in Mount Athos and Patmos Monasteries, 1568-1570,” \textit{Bulgarian Historical Review} 28/3-4 (2000), 39-53.

\textsuperscript{732} This interpretation can be reconciled with Timothy Ware’s account of a “Trojan Horse” approach to proselytizing taken by the Jesuits in the Aegean. See Ware, “Orthodox and Catholics in the Seventeenth Century: Schism or Intercommunion?” in Derek Baker, ed. \textit{Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 264-5.
did not. 733 Furthermore, the Greeks who observed Lepanto had already started to arrive at something like an abstract concept of the “freedom of the Greeks” – though the phrase is usually used of the ancient Greeks residing under Persian suzerainty, in Asia Minor – and to write to Western princes brandishing this idea as an inspiration. 734 Albanians, some Dalmatians, and other Balkan Christian peoples were doing the same at this time in 1571-73, and Zdenko Zlatar and Ioannes Hassiotis have suggested through their work that “nationalism” is a reasonable term to describe such fellow-feeling, 735 forged in a long struggle for political liberation, which amounted to more than merely a shared Christianity. “Tribalism,” to take an alternative term, is hardly adequate to the case.

Furthermore, on Cyprus itself, the war had led to different reactions from different Christian groups. For reasons which are unclear, the Armenians of Cyprus appear in the majority to have collaborated with the Ottomans, and aided their invasion. 736 By contrast, it is safe to say

733 Dandini also implies some casual anti-Greek animus: of Nicosia, he writes, “it is now twenty-seven years since the Turks took the city from the Venetians; it was thus that God chose to punish the sins and schism of the Greeks of the island.” Quoted in C.D. Cobham, ed., Excerpta Cypria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 181.

734 As analyzed by Ioannes Hassiotis, Οι ελληνες στις παραμονες της ναυμαχιας της Ναυπακτου (1568-1571) [The Greeks on the Eve of the Battle of Lepanto] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1970), 227-31, a chapter in which Hassiotis refers to Don John of Austria’s relations with “Greek patriots” (Ελληνες Πατριωτες) at 227.


736 This is the conclusion of Kostas Kyrris, in “Armées Locales et Luttes de Libération en Chypre,” 176. In one of the most recent treatments of the Armenians of Cyprus from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, Gerard Dedeyan, “The Armenians in Cyprus during and after the Ottoman Conquest,” in Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas and Marina Elia, eds., The Minorities of Cyprus (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), 52-91, the author minimizes the importance of this episode and argues that these Armenians were probably forced Christian “volunteers,” similar in status to earlier groups of Christians like the Serbs at the battle of Ankara in 1402, who had been recruited in their homeland. Dedeyan argues that, even if intercommunal tensions, possibly exacerbated by efforts to Latinize the Armenians by the Venetian authorities, may explain a local hostility of Armenians towards the Latin rulers, nonetheless, the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus was recognized more generally by the Armenian community as a disaster for Christendom. A poem that tends to support Dedeyan’s argument in its literary tenor and tone is that by the Armenian priest Nikoghayos dating to 1570: Voghb arman Kiprosi i T’ourkats, a Lament for the Capture of Cyprus by the Turks.
that had the evidence been unequivocal in Venetian eyes that large numbers of Cypriot Orthodox had collaborated with the Ottomans, the vigilant Venetians would have at least rethought their paternalistic relations with the Orthodox in other places such as Crete, and exhibited greater suspicion. But aside from the reference I have mentioned in Graziani, there is little evidence for widespread suspicion of the Orthodox on the part of the Venetian authorities. There was rather a more diffuse mood of panic from the 1550s through the Cyprus War, in which conspiracy theories germinated and spread, including occasional suspicions, mostly unfounded, of Orthodox collaboration with the Ottomans. The need to be able to rely on the Orthodox populace in the event of an Ottoman invasion, an invasion that seemed plausible in 1573 on Crete, and that the Venetians regarded as a real threat until it finally materialized, in the War of Candia that was fought from 1645-69, was clear and pressing – but no greater accommodation of Orthodox practice appears to have taken place. Physical preparation, the significant building of fortresses – this, there certainly was. But no concomitant great change in the relations of the Latin and Orthodox communities took place, either socially, or institutionally. As a frontier society, Cyprus was throughout Venetian rule a militarized society, and to that extent the claim that Venice valued the island for her military role only contains a kernel of truth.

I have suggested that Venice, the metropolis, was an easier place to live and work for the Orthodox – that is, the literate, educated Orthodox engaged in cultural pursuits – in the period of Venetian rule on Cyprus than was Cyprus herself. There was, beginning in the fifteenth century, a shift among Venetians in Venice itself, from a benevolent paternalism towards the Greeks to something else, a less impliedly condescending attitude, a greater appreciation of these

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contemporary Greeks and their culture, now understood as including their artistic and literary traditions even of the early modern period. And this happened even as the Greeks continued to be thought of, in religious terms, as schismatics. This new attitude is reflected in the publication in Venice of Orthodox religious books in large numbers, and also of works on Greek history and compendiums of biographies of great men.\textsuperscript{738} I have already discussed some of the Cypriot men of letters who participated in Venetian life, including Leontios Eustratios, Giovanni and Giovanni Matteo Bustronio.\textsuperscript{739} To the extent that Venetians were at all familiar with Cyprus after 1571, it was through written scholarship, as well as the stories, the popular histories, that were told and retold orally and expressed in songs that have survived.\textsuperscript{740} As long as Venice ruled Cyprus and worried about the Ottoman threat, it had naturally been preoccupied with the problems of the island’s defense and fortification. But as I have sought to show, not all scholars in Italy, nor in Venice, were indifferent even at that time to Cyprus’ historical past and its place in the history of Christianity. Once Cyprus had been lost, and the Venetians had adjusted to that loss, and Venice had become the host to many Greek Cypriots of the intellectual class, not military handbooks, but pacific scholarship, became both the carrier and cultivator of the post-bellum Venetian interest in Cyprus. I have traced in the first chapter how this shift in the Venetian view of Cyprus came about, where the issue was framed principally in theological terms, as a development in the history of Latin-Orthodox relations. That Venice was a center of Greek studies is well-known, but I have tried to emphasize the flourishing activity of the many

\textsuperscript{738} These include \textit{Menologia}, or calendars of religious services, arranged by month, as well as the \textit{Concerning the Heroes...of Cyprus} by Neophytos Rhodinos.

\textsuperscript{739} The activities related to Greek publishing of Sozomeno and Boustronios are discussed in Marino Zorzi, “Cypriot Librarians in the Biblioteca Marciana,” in \textit{Cyprus Jewel in the Crown of Venice}, Nicosia: Leventis Foundation, 2003, 83-89.

\textsuperscript{740} Quarti, \textit{La battaglia di Lepanto nei canti popolari dell’epoca} (Milan: Istituto editoriale avionavale, 1935).
Cypriots who flocked to Venice after the Ottoman conquest, not only to Greek studies but other areas of cultural life. The Ottoman historical relationship with Cyprus had been quite different from that of Venice, situated as the island was within an Islamic story about expansion and the necessity for the recapture of territory once opened to Islam. But I wish not to give the evidence for the Greek Cypriot point of view, buffeted, as I have suggested these people were, by outside political winds largely beyond their control.

741 Recent papers have explored many aspects of Greek life in early modern Venice, including the foundation of the Flanginis College by the Corfiote merchant Thomas Flanginis (1578-1648). See Maria Francesca Tiepolo and Eurigio Tonetti, eds., I Greci di Venezia, atti del convegno internazionale (Venice: Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2002).
Chapter Five: Prospects for the Christian Population of Cyprus

“The mass of Christians, observing so great a tyranny of the Turks...”  

To conclude this analysis, the discussion will shift from the point of view of Venice to the Greek Cypriot perspective, sparse though the documentary evidence is that allow us into the Greek Cypriot frame of mind in the early modern period. An overview of changes to Cyprus after the war will be followed by an examination of the prospects of the Greek Christian population at this moment in its history. I proceed on the assumption that after 1570, as before, most of the population was apolitical, yet that there were those Cypriots who did take an interest in plans to restore Christian rule on Cyprus. By combining the evidence contained in texts with that of the contexts of their creation, one can tease out a sense of what future the Christian Greeks saw for themselves and their children. In concentrating on the Greek-speakers of Cyprus, I do not wish to downplay or minimize the presence of other Christian groups on the islands, such as the Arabic-speaking Maronites from Lebanon, Armenians, Copts, and Jacobites. But the total number of these groups combined was not more than 2% of the total population of Cyprus, so that their effect on the main object of study, the Greek Orthodox, was limited enough that they need not be dwelt upon at length. But their presence, what happened to them, and how they

742 "Βλεπόντας το πλήθος τῶν Χριστιανῶν εἰς τόσον τυρρανύδαν από τοίς Τούρκους." Thus opens a letter of 1609 from the Jeremias, Orthodox Bishop of Soloi and Kyrenia, and Leontios, the abbot of Kykkos to Philip III of Spain, asking once again for aid, dated February 5, 1609. Hassiotis, Ισπανικα Εγγραφα, 59.

743 An important reason is that, unlike on Crete in the seventeenth century, where efforts were made to preserve the Venetian archives, when the Venetians abandoned Cyprus they did not preserve the bulk of their administrative archives from Nicosia and Famagusta. As for the new Ottoman administration, Greek had long ceased to be a chancery language for the Ottoman Empire, and though some administrators undoubtedly made use of “native informants,” so far Greek Cypriot voices have been reached mainly through court records, a distinctive category of source that does not necessarily reflect other aspects of life. See above all Ronald C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640 (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
interacted with the new rulers, is not to be ignored, either. At certain times these groups – as well as the Catholics who most often fled, but if they did not, saw their positions and status, official and unofficial, downgraded with the Ottoman conquest – were treated similarly to the Greek Orthodox, at other times not. I have attempted to sketch such differences – and similarities – in treatment, where relevant, without attempting to deal with all of the smaller Christian groups on the island.  

Chronologically, I have justified a concentration on the founding period of Ottoman Cyprus, between 1571 and 1625, as the focus that is best suited to direct engagement with the mainstream preoccupations of Cypriot historiography since the inception of critical history-writing on Cyprus. Historians – both Greek and Turkish – have dwelt to a notable extent on the 1570-71 invasion and subsequent change in ruler as the period that is generally regraded as having shaped the course of subsequent Cypriot history. To understand some of the problems associated with the historiography of this period, and especially of the transition from Venetian to Ottoman, Christian to Muslim rule, direct comparison of what the sources from that period, especially archival, can tell us, must be made with what recent historians claim those sources can tell us. In the last few decades, scholars following in the wake of Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, and Benedict Anderson have pointed out that national identity is artificial and constructed, rather than organic and inevitable.  

Angel Nicolaou-Konnari, among others, has

744 The question of why the Armenians of Cyprus are recorded – and in a contemporary chronicle written by a Christian Armenian – as having aided the Ottomans during the invasion of 1570-71 has yet to be satisfactorily explained, and aside from a recent article I have referred to by Gerard Dedeyan that argues that the Armenians indeed resented the Greeks, but that this intra-Christian spat paled by comparison with their despair over the sorry state of Eastern Christendom and at the fall of Cyprus to a Muslim force. Gerard Dedeyan, “The Armenians of Cyprus during Ottoman Rule,” The Minorities of Cyprus. Andrekos Varnava, Marina Elia and Nicholas Coureas, eds. (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009), 52-91.

written about the varied ways in which the Greek word Κυπριος [Cypriot] could be applied.\textsuperscript{746} If, at one extreme, some historians would like to think that “Cypriot” was a term that could embrace a huge range of ethnic and religious groups, at another there are those who suggest the immutable connection of Cyprus with Greece and with a Hellenic identity. If we want to remain most faithful to the sources available to us from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, I suggest that a middle position must be taken, one that fully acknowledges the Byzantine influence upon Cyprus and the continued dominance of the Greek language there through the period of Lusignan and then Venetian rule, but which does not regard all changes in the population makeup of the island after 1571, and especially the Islamization and Turkification of part of the island’s population, as a turn for the worse.

Religious conversions took place on Cyprus out of Christianity to Islam, and carried with them weighty social consequences. From such testimonies as that of Etienne de Lusignan as recorded by Martin Crusius in his Annales Suevici (1596), based on eyewitness testimony from those of his relatives who remained on Cyprus after the conquest, it is clear, even if precise numbers are lacking, that Christian converts to Islam were numerous, far more numerous than one recent study which numbers the documentable converts to Islam at four for the first years after the Ottoman conquest, will allow.\textsuperscript{747} Nonetheless, well past the 1620s, which is where this dissertation concludes its study, the word Cypriot and its variants in European languages always referred to a Christian, While those who were Muslim on Cyprus are referred to as Turkish, and their alienness to the island and its indigenous culture is thereby underscored.


\textsuperscript{747} Mehmet Akif Erdoğru, “Notes on the Orthodox Community (Rum) in Ottoman Cyprus (1580-1640)” Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi XX (2005) 61-69.
The Validity of “Decline” for Cyprus

Throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, if a generalization be admissible, and up until Speros Vryonis of UCLA wrote a famous study, published in 1971, on the decline of what he called Hellenism in medieval Asia Minor, both academic historians working in the Greek lands, and the popular memory of Greeks everywhere generally held that the results of the fall of the Byzantine Empire to Turkic peoples was an unmitigated disaster. Vryonis did not depart radically from this view, though he also took pains to emphasize that residues of the language of the Byzantine Greeks, and of their culture, could be detected at every level of Ottoman society, a legacy which, since his pioneering work, has been studied much further. As I have noted earlier, the publishing and study of Ottoman registers has forced the conclusion that the economic position of the Greeks under Ottoman rule was far more favorable than previously thought. But these registers have been published only for certain areas, and what has so far come to light for Cyprus is extremely limited. Conclusions about the economic wellbeing of the Greeks can be securely established only for those areas, such as Thessaly and Central Greece, with significant documentation. There is also a more elementary problem. To avoid making the story of Ottoman rule in Greece one driven entirely by current agendas, we should make allowances for the different criteria used by Greeks in those times to assess the justice or injustice of rule. For example, the Turkenfürcht – fear of the Turks – was not a fear based on economic considerations alone, or even principally. These Greeks in the lands conquered by the Ottomans were overwhelmingly illiterate and innumerate, and had yet to develop sophisticated ideas of political economy, so their experience of Turkish rule was of

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748 Speros Vryonis Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
necessity one where not statistics, and not always even facts, but impressions, and primitive responses, counted for much. Their ideas about, and responses to, Turkish rule were shaped to a great extent by their own religious ideas. For a current historian to say that the Greeks were “objectively” incorrect about the competence of Ottoman rule might or might not be accurate, but imposes too high a standard on them, and wilfully ignores or at least does not sympathetically enter into, the mental and emotional world of those Greeks, in order to make out the prism through which they saw their Turkish masters, and then passed judgment.

The analysis in this chapter of the position of the Greeks under Ottoman rule on Cyprus is primarily meant to suggest that the cultural transmission of Greek tradition was a fragile process, by no means inevitable, as migration of young men off-island continued, suggesting both hard economic times, and unhappiness with the Ottoman dispensation. There was always room, from the earliest Ottoman times, for Christians to join the Ottoman ruling class, and if military glory and a share of booty was their goal, they might have contented themselves with that. In the period I am considering here, that is the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, economic success was also attainable for Christians as merchants. Indeed, a recent argument holds that Cyprus, when it went from the Venetian to the Ottoman period, saw what could be described as a purely state-run economy transformed into one where individual Greek merchants could do well for themselves. But for those with different goals, such as the defense

749 As Heath Lowry notes of the fourteenth century, “the impression one gets is that the early Ottoman state was one in which religious affiliation was clearly less important than the creation of a working infrastructure.” Lowry contrasts this with the hardening of boundaries after 1400 and especially after 1453. If personal advancement was all that mattered to a given Greek Christian, he could make a good life for himself, even in later periods of Ottoman history. One example from the late sixteenth century is Michael Cantacuzenos, a rich merchant nicknamed the Son of Satan, about whom see Andronikos Falangas, “Post-Byzantine Merchants of the Fifteenth-Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 33 (2007) 7-21.

750 Vera Costantini, “In Search of Lost Prosperity,” in Michalis N. Michael, Matthias Kappler, and Efthios Gavriel, eds. Ottoman Cyprus (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 49-62.
of the Orthodox Church, and the transmission of a specifically Greek Christian interpretation of the Cypriot past and aspirations for the future, the new Ottoman masters appeared to have nothing to say.
Prospects and Professions for the Orthodox after the Conquest

Both Muslims and Christians had a chance to work for, and to rise, in the new Ottoman Cypriot administration. The Ottomans kept on the former Venetian castellan of the fortress of Girne/Kyrenia, for example, as a reward for betraying the fortress to them during the Cyprus War.751 For thirty years after the conquest they kept on the Venetian Claudio Cecchini, prewar administrator of the salt-works of Salines.752 But the evidence suggests that the Ottomans continued to consider the Christian Cypriots their inferiors, and to think of themselves as outsiders to Cyprus. The letters by and about Cypriots collected by Hassiotis in the Spanish archives are full of references to Turkish high-handedness and arrogance towards Christians.753 Cyprus, in the minds of Ottoman officialdom, was lonely and backwards, a place that did not rank high among the provinces where ambitious Ottoman officials hoped to serve; perhaps this view became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and only the less ambitious were sent. Beyond its storied wine, the attractions were few. And so it is not unexpected to find in sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that, with no new attraction for Muslims having emerged except for the

751 Kostas Kyrris, “The Role of Greeks in the Ottoman Administration of Cyprus,” Πρακτικα του διεθνους κυπρολογικου συνεδριου (Nicosia: Society for Cypriot Studies, 1973), 158. Pirot [Pierrot?] Zamerta is the name Kyrris gives, citing an Ottoman army diary quoted in Neoclis G.Kyriazis, Κυπριακα Χρονικα 10 (1934), 164, while noting that there were other officers who colluded in the surrender of the Kyrenia garrison, as well.

752 Kyrris, “Role of the Greeks,” 156-57. He was succeeded by a Christian Englishman, Purvis. Kyrris’ interests run to class conflict. He argues that there was a conscious attempt by the Greek Cypriot nobility to keep down their former serfs, who were in danger of claiming liberty in the more chaotic atmosphere following the Cyprus War. He notes that, just as they did during the Mamluk invasion of Cyprus in 1425-26, the nobles “assumed crucial secretarial and administrative functions.” But though this may have assured economic solvency for themselves and their families, and even, as Kyrris argues, aided in maintaining the social hierarchy, this continuity was one involving only the political class. It tells us nothing about admission to Ottoman cultural life. I suggest that conversion to Islam was the only way to gain participation in that cultural life.

753 A term that still persists today, applied both to that group and to the tiny remnant of a Christian Greek-speaking minority that remains in Istanbul and Izmir. See Paraskevas Konortas, “From Ta’ife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community,” Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi, eds. Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 169-79.
shrine of Umm Haram as a place of pilgrimage, remarkably few Ottoman Muslim subjects of note claimed Cyprus as their home. Siyahi Dede in the seventeenth century was one of very few Muslim Cypriot poets to be prominent before the early nineteenth century, when Hasan Hilmi Efendi (1782-1847) made a name for himself. In the nineteenth century, two Cyprus-born Muslims became Grand Vizier (Ottoman sadr-i ‘azam,) known as Kibrıslı [the Cypriot] Mehmed Emin Pasha, Grand Vizier in 1854, 1859, and 1860-61, and Kibrıslı Kamil Mehmed Pasha, Grand Vizier from 1885-91, 1895, and 1908-9. This usage tells us nothing about earlier Ottoman usage of the term Kibrıslı, which I have not found used in any of the Ottoman chronicles from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This omission may suggest that the Ottomans took several generations to be considered “indigenous” to Cyprus or, alternatively, that it was only when a Turk from Cyprus became prominent enough to be noticed in Constantinople that reference would begin to be made to his geographic origins. A recently-published Ottoman register of Janissaries on Cyprus dating to between 1573 and 1577, published by Stephanos Papadopoulos and Theocharis Stavrides, indicating both the regiment and the “national” origin of each, suggests that the Janissaries themselves, or the officials noting down their details, retained memories of their roots, far from Cyprus, in distant Bulgaria. The Ottoman subjects who moved to the island may have been called “Türk” in the Turkish of the day, but that was a term that referred to members of tribes now generally called Turkmen, and should not be

754 Matthias Kappler, “Toward a Common Turkish and Greek Literary History in Ottoman Cyprus,” in Michalis Michael, Matthias Kappler and Eftihios Gavriel, eds., Ottoman Cyprus: A Collection of Studies on History and Culture (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2009), 293.

755 Theocharis Stavrides and Stephanos Papadopoulos, “Γενιτσαροι Βουλγαρικής Καταγωγής που Ῥητά Μετέχουσαν στην Κύπρο(τέλη 16ου αιώνας)” [Janissaries of Bulgarian Origin who lived on Cyprus (End 16th Century)]Δοδονη 17 (1988), 151-157. This article examines document in the National Library of Cyril and Methodius, Sofia, Bulgaria, Oriental series [Orientalski otdel], defter 5, a record of Janissaries on Cyprus who came from southeastern Bulgaria. This document raises many questions. Was it Ottoman administrative routine in the late sixteenth century to trace Janissaries originating from the same geographic area as a group, or is this defter unique?
translated as “Turkish.” A “Turkish Cypriot” community, as a label, is an anachronism if applied before the nineteenth century.

By contrast, that the Christian masses of Cyprus considered themselves “Greeks” was so clear that it is an unexamined assumption, a given, of European travellers and pilgrims passing through in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. In travel accounts just before the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus in 1570, European observers of the island referred to its inhabitants most often as Greeks. This usage was based on the historical circumstances of the island: although Cyprus had had a linguistically and culturally mixed population in Antiquity, and though there had been a small amount of Arab settlement on Cyprus during the so-called Byzantine-Arab condominium established in 688 by the Caliph Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705) and the Byzantine Emperor Justinian II (r. 685-695; 705-711), the great majority had been Greek-speaking since long before Christ. Therefore, Europeans typically referred to the natives of the island as Greci/Greco/Griechen, when distinguishing them from the Latin Catholic elite of the island. In view of some of the more aggressive political statements made during the conflict over Cyprus in the last decades, in an attempt to deny the Greek character of Cyprus, it is useful to remind the contemporary reader of these points.\(^\text{757}\)


\(^{757}\) A pamphlet published in 1955 by the Turkish Embassy in London, for example, argued that “Cyprus has never belonged to Greece. The Greek Government’s claim to title derived from historical relations based on the domination, which in itself was intermittently, of the Byzantine Empire on the island during the Middle Ages, could not be valid as present-day Greece is in no way the successor to Byzantium.” Such a statement arrogates, on no authority, to the anonymous author of the pamphlet the right to judge the extent of the historical relation between Greece and Byzantium. It also neglects even to consider the extent to which cultural ties matter and can exist independently of naked power relations (the “domination” referred to). The next paragraph, entitled “Population,” does acknowledge such ties, but only for those Cypriots who are of “indubitable Turkish origin and culture.” (Many of the Muslims on modern Cyprus are the result of the conversion of indigenous Christians on the island, and would hardly meet the requirement that they be of “indubitable Turkish origin.”) Even the great historian George Hill, *History of Cyprus*, IV, 488-9, remarks “That there was real racial affinity with the Hellenic stock there is nothing to prove; the anthropological evidence, so far as it goes, seems on the whole to
A reasonable interpretation of recent studies of ethnic terminology used by and about early modern Cypriots is this: Christians and Muslims on early Ottoman Cyprus, traded with each other, lived often side-by-side with each other, and relied on the same Islamic court system, nonetheless the depth of their attachment to Cyprus varied considerably. When we find a Cypriot music theorist we have previously encountered who had moved to Venice, Hieronymos Tragoudistes, proudly identifying himself as “a Greek Cypriot, and Romaic of race” and a manuscript illuminator who had gone as far from Cyprus as Wallachia (modern-day Romania) loyally calling himself Luke the Cypriot, these are expression of attachment to Cyprus that appear to come only from Greek Cypriots. The new Muslim settlers on Cyprus in our period and for generations afterward do not appear to have formed such an attachment. In Islam the attachment to the umma, or community of believers, and often to a particular city, were more common in this period, while the idea of the nation was really introduced only in the early twentieth century. Perhaps the circumstances in which many of these Muslim Ottoman subjects came to Cyprus, as religious/political exiles (theologically suspect Shiites, known as “red-heads” or kızılbaşlar after the turbans they wore) made the development of loyalty to Cyprus slow. The references to Cyprus in the Cihannüma by Katip Çelebi from approximately the 1630s and in the Seyahatname by Evliya Çelebi from the 1660s, do not discuss any prominent Ottomans from Cyprus, though Evliya liberally sprinkled his accounts with short

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biographical references to famous locals in the places he visited. The Ottomans were inveterate writers of biographies. No figure of even moderate fame escaped one of their voluminous biographical encyclopedias.\(^{761}\) The conclusion seems inescapable that Cyprus had produced no Muslim figure of note yet in the middle of the seventeenth century. The island languished in isolation down to the end of Ottoman rule.

Perhaps the cultural synthesis that had been to some extent possible between two Christian groups under Venetian rule simply could not have come about, in the period around 1600, between Christian Cypriots and the new Muslim settlers on Cyprus. A large proportion of these settlers were soldiers, some of them Janissaries and they were isolated because they segregated themselves in garrisons.\(^{762}\) It appears that we can charge the Ottomans with what some charge their predecessors, the Venetians, and with far more supporting evidence: that they treated Cyprus as a military outpost, and little more.

This criterion, that of the degree of segregation of the populations of the rulers (and those sharing their background) and of the ruled, offers one way to measure and to assess the ethnically and religiously variegated societies of the early modern Eastern Mediterranean. Those historians who have argued a cultural synthesis between Venetian and Greek Orthodox literary and artistic traditions in the late medieval and early modern periods, in short, the fruits of a real coexistence between them, rather than a strict division separating the Greek and Latin

\(^{761}\) The most famous example from modern times is Mehmet Sureyya’s (1845-1909) Sicill-i Osmani, a Who’s Who for the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire: Sureyya, Sicill-i Osmani : the Ottoman national biography (Westmead, England: Gregg International Publishers, 1971 [1890-93]).

\(^{762}\) Cengiz Orhonlu, “The Ottoman Turks settle in Cyprus, 1570-1580,” argues that a substantial majority of the Muslims on Cyprus for the first couple of generations after the Cyprus war lived in the garrisons of Paphos, Nicosia, Famagusta, Girne, and Limassol; in 1572, 3779, virtually all of the Muslims, were soldiers, and Pietro Gonemis, whom we have previously met as a fomenter of rebellion, as well as dragoman or interpreter to the governor of Cyprus, estimated in 1608 that some 8,000 Muslims on the island were men who served in the military. Hackett, Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 205.
communities, have done this, in most studies, using the example not of Cyprus, but of Crete. That focus on Crete and not on Cyprus makes sense. Crete had been a Venetian possession for far longer, since 1211, than Cyprus. Moreover, Crete was much closer to Venice, within three weeks by sea, and so that island acquired a larger Venetian settler class than Cyprus ever did. On Crete, such a mingling of influences could be found in everything from ecclesiastical architecture to poetry. But on Cyprus, too, a great deal of Latin and Greek cultural exchange, both under the Lusignans, and under Venice, took place.

Revolts as Evidence

George Hill and other scholars of the early to mid-twentieth century maintained that there were an extraordinary number of revolts during the first century of Ottoman rule on Cyprus. As the picture has come into better focus, through meticulous and detailed studies, the number of revolts that can be definitely established through documentary evidence has diminished. Much earlier scholarship on the subject of uprisings has been focused on other subjects, and that consideration, in addition to the belief that some earlier studies did not have available the evidence that more recent studies have relied upon, leads me to the provisional conclusion that

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763 Estimates differ but in 1550 there was a Latin ruling class of perhaps 1000 on Cyprus, while there were 4,000-5,000, exclusive of garrisons, on Crete. Neither of these numbers is large, but the larger numbers on Crete may account for a greater degree of Latin influence. On the other hand, David Holton, Professor of Greek at Cambridge, has noted that we possess more literary remains from Venetian-ruled Cyprus than we do from Crete in the same period; 1489 through 1570 was a fallow period for Cretan literature, and it was only after 1570 that Cretan literary activity generated the Erotopritos by Vinzenzos Kornaros, a Greek epic on Italian models, and other noted works of Cretan Renaissance literature. As I have suggested, this Renaissance began and ended later in the eastern Mediterranean than that in Italy. Holton, “A History of Neglect,” 90.


765 Literary aspects of this exchange have been studied by Annemarie Weyl Carr, “Art in the Court of the Lusignan Kings,” in Cyprus and the Crusades, ed. Jonathan Riley-Smith and Nicholas Coureas (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1995), 239-274.
only ten definite episodes of armed uprising between the years 1571 and 1650 can be established as likely. In compiling this list I have not distinguished between Christian and Muslim revolts.

These revolts, and credible plans for revolts, are as follows:

(1) In 1578-79 there was a revolt of Ottoman Janissaries, for centuries the feared shock troops of the Ottoman Empire.766

(2) Benjamin, the Archbishop of Cyprus, and Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, planned an uprising in 1600.767

(3) There was an eruption of political disorder near Paphos in 1605.768

(4) Petros Aventanos/Pedro Aventaño led an uprising in 1606. The motive for this uprising is given in letter 38 in Hassiotis, Ισπανικα εγγραφα (62) as the impending introduction of the culling of Christian boys for the Janissary corps known in Turkish as the devşirme.769 Numerous letters in this collection detail Aventaño’s activities.


769 Documentation: As Kyrris notes, Etienne de Lusignan had already reported in 1582 that the introduction of the devşirme to Cyprus was imminent. Kyrris, “Armées locales et luttes de libération en Chypre,” 178 n. 19. Contemporary mentions include letters numbered 29, 38, 50 and 51 in I.K. Hassiotis, 'Ισπανικα εγγραφα της Κυπριακης Ιστοριας (Iz'-Iz" Au.) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2003 [1972]), 47-49, 61-63, 82-84. These letters constitute Archivio General de Simancas – Estado 1105, no. 147; AGS – Estado 1105, no. 148; AGS – Estado 1949, no. 9, and AGS – Estado 1949, no. 117.
(5) Ferdinand I of Tuscany planned to seize Famagusta in 1607. He sought to enlarge his own power and burnish his Catholic credentials.\textsuperscript{770}

(6) Petros Aventanos planned a revolt a second time, in 1609. Aventanos was possibly a lover of fighting for its own sake, but probably also absorbed some of the anti-Turkish fervor that was common in Spanish society at the time. From letter 38 in Hassiotis, \textquote{῾Ισπανικα εγγραφα}, it is clear that Aventanos remained hopeful of a successful Christian rising on the island.\textsuperscript{771}

(7) In 1614 a revolt broke out in the area of Paphos/Baf. This was possibly covertly supported by Archbishop Christodoulos.\textsuperscript{772}

(8) A brief revolt was led by Victor Zempetos in 1617.\textsuperscript{773} Zempetos was in the employ of the Duke of Savoy. He also had contact with the Archbishop of Cyprus, Christodoulos, and with the bishop of Paphos about his plans. When his uprising began to stall, he fled the island.

(9) Massimiliano Tronchi, 1628. Tronchi had addressed a letter to the pope asking for the liberation of Cyprus as far back as 1607.\textsuperscript{774} He has been interpreted by Kyrris as a “patriot” who


\textsuperscript{771} Documentation: Mentioned in AGS – Estado 1105, no. 149, as well as Archivio Segreto Vaticano – Spagna, vol. 336, f. 142-143, dated June 19, 1610. There is a report in Italian on this uprising in Munich, Staatsarchiv, K. Schw. 490/32, which states that in the wake of this uprising all weapons were seized from the Christian population, even spades. Nicolai Iorga, “Un projet relatif à la conquête de Jerusalem, 1609,” Revue de l’Orient latin, II (1894), 188.

\textsuperscript{772} Documentation: Referred to in a document published by Jean Darrouzès, “Notes pour servir à l’histoire de Chypre,” IV, Κυπριακai Σπουδai 23 (1959) 32 n. 15.

\textsuperscript{773} Documentation: Mentioned by archbishop Christodoulos in letter to Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, 1617, quoted by Stephanos Papadopoulos, “Ἡ ἕξεχεσθαι τοῦ Βικτωρα Ζεμπετου,” Δοδονή III (1974,) 340. This letter was earlier published by Konstantinos Sathas in Τουρκοκρατουμένη Ἑλλάς, 189-90.

considered a rebellion his Christian duty.\textsuperscript{775} However, as I have previously discussed, the very meaning of “patriot” in 1628 on Cyprus is not clear since the identity of the island was contested, and some people with equal attachment to the island disagreed over what its future should be. These disagreements were not only between people in Western Europe, where Venetians and Savoyards fought a war of words over rival claims to Cyprus, but even among the Cypriots themselves, who disagreed over whether there should be an uprising against Ottoman rule, or accommodation of that rule.  

(10) Janissaries, 1648. An Italian-descended dragoman,\textsuperscript{776} Pietro Vallacci, was killed in this Janissary revolt, which explains its having been mentioned in Italian sources. There is a good possibility that other incidents of rebellion, unrecorded either because of the illiteracy of their participants, who consequently left no written record, or the small scale of the revolt that hardly attracted any notice, or their abortive ending, also took place on Cyprus in this first century of Ottoman rule.

We can also consider what the written works of Christian Cypriots can tell us about Cypriot views of their prospects. As mentioned, a classification of such works according to their geographic origin does not turn up any by, or about, Christian Cypriots who moved, after the Cyprus War, either to Constantinople or to other Ottoman lands. In the chapter on Venice I attempted to look at the Cypriot diaspora from the Venetian/Paduan standpoint. Here I will

\textsuperscript{775} Documentation: Tronchi’s correspondence has not come to light in its original Greek, but Giovanni Mariti published an Italian translation of some in his \textit{Viaggi per l’isola di Cipro e in Soria e Palestina} (Florence: Giglio, 1769-76.)

\textsuperscript{776} Taking his title from a word descended from the Arabic \textit{tarjama}, to translate, the dragoman was second in importance within the Ottoman administration only to the governor of Cyprus by the second quarter of the seventeenth century. Documentation of the rebellion Zacharias Tsirpanlis, \textit{Ἀνεκδοτα Ἐγγραφα ἐκ τῶν Λεχών τοῦ Βατικανοῦ} (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973), p. 125 doc. 78, date July 7, 1648.
briefly discuss the travel of Cypriot refugees to various destinations with a focus, instead, on their own perceptions and aspirations.

First, there is the island of Crete, which would remain under Venetian rule until the Ottomans conquered the island in 1669. I have already mentioned that scholars have discerned participation of Cretan literary figures in the wider Renaissance after about 1570. Maltezou, Holton, and others who have studied the Cretan Renaissance have not explicitly maintained that Cypriot refugees from the Cyprus War contributed significantly to the Cretan Renaissance, though in the totality of his work, Holton implies as much. Kostas Tsiknakes has found many names of Cypriot refugees who went to Crete, most but not all with “Italianate” as opposed to purely Greek names, in the archives of the Venetian Senate.

Secondly, there are other Orthodox lands. The historian of post-1453 Greek manuscript art, Gary Vikan, has shown how the illuminator Luke the Cypriot remained keenly conscious both of his Cypriot roots, and of a common Orthodox oikoumenē, even as he undertook diplomatic missions to Moldavia. Some Cypriots undoubtedly found their way to Russia, a polity that was the closest thing to an heir to the Byzantine mantle, that is an imperial defender of

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777 We should read his note that Crete itself produced no manuscripts securely dated to the period between 1503 and 1570 (Holton, “History of Neglect,” 90) – in the light of the evidence he adduces that there were, both before and after the Cyprus War, numerous cultural and literary connections between Cyprus and Crete (Holton, “Cyprus and the Cretan Renaissance,” Έπετηρις τοῦ Κύπρου Επιστημονικῆς Ερευνας XIX (1992) 515-30.) Holton, in a slightly mischievous tone, makes the point that more literary works were produced on Cyprus over these decades of Venetian rule than on Crete in the same period, despite the lion’s share of scholarly attention, at least in the English-speaking world, being fixed upon Crete.


Orthodoxy. But only further archival work will allow us to establish the names and activities of the most important among them.

Third, Venice. I have dealt in the fourth chapter with Cypriots in Venice and their intellectual activities. Venice and Padua offered Cypriots something unavailable in their homeland: the printing press. That technological advance allowed news to spread and historical, poetic, and hagiographical works by Cypriots in Venice, on Cypriot themes – such as those by Neophytos Rhodinos and Manoli Blessi – to circulate faster and among a wider audience than they could have in manuscript form. And the experience of being in Venice, and of coming into constant contact with non-Orthodox at the University of Padua, may well have enlivened and sharpened the minds of some Orthodox Cypriots. But at the same time, it is worth remembering that for those who felt strongly about those theological points dividing Greek from Latin there was also a problem. For in order to receive a degree from Padua, it was necessary to swear an oath of loyalty to the Catholic faith. Nonetheless, the Cypriots continued to arrive. Daniele Baglioni, Kitromilides, and others have uncovered several Cypriot prose authors active in Venice already long before the Cyprus War, in the fifteenth century, and then many more through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Legrand, and more recently Nicolaou-Konnari, Zorzi, Maltezou, Rudt de Collenberg and Holton have found that such scions of prominent Cypriot

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families as the brothers Pierre and Giorgio, and their cousin Jason de Nores (or Denores) forged distinguished scholarly careers in Venice after the Ottomans took control of Cyprus. Clearly there was much more to the Cypriot community in Venice than simply the desire to organize, from a safe haven abroad, a Christian reconquest of their homeland. And for some of these émigrés, a reconquest was never a major preoccupation, while for others its importance dwindled as it came to seem less and less realistic a goal. Clearly, too, it was possible for Christian Cypriots to be integrated relatively easily, at times almost seamlessly, into Venetian cultural life, as evidenced by the activity of the Cypriots put in charge of the Biblioteca Marciana during these years.

Fourth, other Western European lands. From Tübingen, where the Cypriots Stephanos Lascaris and Leontios Eustratios visited Martin Crusius, to Paris, where Athanasios Rhetor settled, to Madrid, where Ioannes Ayiamavras spent some years, Cypriots ended up in a variety of places outside Italy and Venetian territory. Depending upon what they sought in life, and what need patrons had for them, they might move many times over the course of their lives. The question naturally arises: was such upward mobility and integration into the Ottoman oikoumene even possible for Christian Cypriots, and if so, with similar or lesser ease? Kostas Kyrris and others have given us a number of names, of Christian Greeks, and even of a few Christian Venetians, who were active in the Ottoman Cypriot administration. But aside from government posts, did the official ideology of the new regime leave space for the cultural expression, or cultural activities, of the Christian Cypriots?

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Ottoman Restraints

Historians have long recognized that the Ottomans imposed significant new restrictions on the Christian Cypriots. In dealing with Christians, the Ottomans, Hanafi Muslims, relied on the precedent that was commonly invoked at this time, the “Covenant of ‘Umar.” That covenant, had been fashioned, Muslims believe, by the Caliph Umar I (r. 634-44), one of the four “Rightly-Guided” caliphs who succeeded Muhammad.\textsuperscript{783} He was supposed to have made an agreement with the Christians of Syria circa A.D. 637, a covenant that has been held to be a highly influential model for how Muslims should treat non-Muslims, one emulated by Muslim rulers in later Islamic Empires.\textsuperscript{784} The Christians (and Jews) would be allowed to continue their worship as long as they accepted certain social and financial disabilities. Most onerous of all, the non-Muslims had to pay a head-tax, in Arabic jizyah, in Turkish cizye. Some of the prohibitions enforced on Cyprus that reflect these general rules of Islam, derived from the Qu’ran and the Sunna or consensus of the faithful, as well as the covenant of ‘Umar, included:

(1) Restriction on building new churches and on the repairing the old ones, and a prohibition of the ringing of church bells\textsuperscript{785} – a considerable change from the earlier Lusignan

\textsuperscript{783} Or possibly (this is not certain, but is in many ways more likely) by Caliph ‘Umar II (r. 717-720), a century later.

\textsuperscript{784} A translation of one version of this covenant is available in Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield, eds., The Human Record, Seventh Edition (Boston: Wadsworth, 2009), 243.

\textsuperscript{785} Mentioned by, for example, Michael Given and Marios Hadjianastasis, “Landholding and Landscape in Ottoman Cyprus,” 58, and George Hill, History of Cyprus, III, 1027. The reason apparently given in 1570 was that the brass bells were needed for cannon, but such a reason was no consolation to the locals. The early Egyptologist Claude Sicard, writing in the eighteenth century, cast doubt upon the authenticity of the Pact of ‘Umar through the (inaccurate) argument that bells did not exist in Eastern Churches until the seventeenth century, so that the supposed limits placed by that Pact on bell-ringing would have been a suspect anachronism. There are reasons to doubt the authenticity of the Pact of ‘Umar, but better arguments than Sicard’s can be found in A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects: a Critical Study of the Covenant of ‘Umar (London: Frank Cass, 1970). Given and Hadjianastasis suggest, in any case, that Orthodox tradition locally on Cyprus favored the striking of a metal or wooden bar, the tsimandro, rather than bells, to get the attention of the faithful.
and Venetian regimes. The Christians cannot have enjoyed seeing the more extreme depredations against their churches, since they could not then repair them without Muslim permission. The Venetian history by Paolo Paruta recorded, for example, that the Ottoman military commander on Cyprus during the war, Lala Mustafa Pasha, had “entered the Episcopal Church of Saint Nicholas, caused the graves to be opened and the bones scattered.”

(2) The restriction – similar to that operative in feudal Japan – on non-Muslims’ riding of horses and mules, as they were supposed to be restricted to donkeys, and required to ride sidesaddle, was enforced. In Famagusta, through at least the 1640s, even European Christians (and not Ottoman dhimmi Christians alone) could not spend the night, nor ride into the town on horseback. Similarly, a famous note in the travel account by the Jesuit Girolamo Dandini, points out in 1596 that only Turks were allowed to enter Nicosia on horseback. Christians were forced to dismount at the gate, but could then remount and ride to their homes once inside. As with any socially exclusive prohibition, the question will arise of how the authorities determined in doubtful cases who was a “Turk,” but that this rule was dominant is significant. It appears that in Nicosia Christians could at least spend the night, while in Famagusta, by contrast, Christians could not spend the night at all.

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787 Ibid. The Russian monk Basil Barsky, who visited Cyprus in the 1720s and 1730s, says that this custom, or perhaps more accurately, rule, was still operative in his time. Personal communication from Dr. Michael Walsh, University of St. Andrews, November 2009.

788 It is unclear whether this was a difference in custom between Nicosia and Famagusta, or, perhaps, two slightly variant accounts of what was in fact the same rule in both towns.

789 See Michael Walsh, “Saint Peter and Paul Church,” n.1.
(3) The cizye, sometimes called harac in Ottoman sources, was also imposed. This was not so much a restriction or restraint as an extra fiscal burden upon non-Christians and a reminder of their subordinate status. Rather than being added to old exactions, the cizye replaced some of the old levies, and determining whether it was more burdensome than the taxes the Venetians imposed is one of the thornier questions in Cypriot history for this period. Disagreements on what levies the new Ottoman government did or did not reduce or abolish, such as the mété du sel, continue, and the decrease in revenues that the Ottomans took in compared with the Venetians, from 940,000 ducats in 1565 to 194,000 in 1585, may mean either a reduction in revenues, or a reduction in the wealth of the Cypriot peasantry to the point that the Ottomans could not squeeze any more out of them.  

(4) The persistence of Greek courts is still not clear. It is some sign of the gaps in our knowledge of the details of the functioning of the Church of Cyprus under the Ottomans that the huge question of whether Orthodox church courts persisted or not on Cyprus should remain unanswered. But Ronald Jennings’ data suggests that the Islamic şeriye courts were rather the rule than the exception for Orthodox Cypriots taking legal actions after 1571. The non-Muslims were left with no doubt whatsoever that a Muslim regime was now in power.


791 Jennings, Christians and Muslims, 163. Jennings’ taste for wild generalization is to be treated with caution. As is evident above, I cannot accept his assertion, loc.cit., that “absolutely no official regulations were made which restricted any...city quarters, for Muslims,” unless the preposition “for” here means that Muslims alone were without such restriction, or else, we are somehow to understand that the ban on Christians sleeping in Famagusta was “unofficial.”

In the correspondence between Cypriots and powerful people in the Latin West, there is more than a hint of the arbitrariness they perceived in Turkish rule, and the precariousness of their existence, with allusions to attempts on their lives and property. Independently of the moral rights or wrongs of such Turkish actions, and independently of whether attacks on Christians and seizures of their property were legally justified in Ottoman terms or not, dozens of letters attest to the poor communication between even the highest reaches of the Orthodox religious and social hierarchy, and Ottoman officialdom on the island. Especially in light of the appeals made to the King of Spain by successive Cypriot archbishops (quoted at length in the second chapter), it is difficult to accept that Orthodox archbishops were perceived by the Cypriot Orthodox to serve served in this period as mouthpieces for, or even representatives of, a putatively benevolent Ottoman government on the island. It would have been unsafe for them to disclose publicly their real opinions of their Muslim masters but those opinions, as we can gauge them from that correspondence with the West, were hardly approving or complacently accepting. They saw how their new masters behaved towards the Christians they ruled on Cyprus and lamented this, and regarded them as adversaries.

Regarding literary composition, I provisionally conclude by concurring with what Alexandre Popovic maintained in writing about the Balkan context, that no integration into Ottoman literary culture was possible for Christians.793 I would go further, and argue that no real integration into Ottoman “high culture” of any kind – calligraphy, music, poetry, architecture – was possible for the Christian Cypriots – if they remained Christian. Of course, if one converted, that was another thing. The most famous Ottoman architect, for example, Koca Mimar Sinan,

was a convert, the son of Christian Armenians from Kayseri province. When we bear in mind the importance of religion in determining cultural aspirations and ideals all around the Mediterranean in this period, this conclusion should not surprise. Some recent studies seem intended *a priori* to persuade the reader of the innocuous or actively benevolent nature of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, but do not really deal with this question, instead assuming the current national and sociological categories of *Türk* and *Rum*, of Turkish and Greek Cypriot, as givens, as though coercion had not played a significant part in the formation of the community now called Turkish Cypriot.\textsuperscript{794}

**Chaotic Times in the Greek Church**

The late sixteenth century and early seventeenth centuries were unsettled times in the Orthodox Church as a whole, and especially turbulent in the Cypriot Orthodox Church. In 1600, Archbishop Athanasios I was deposed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Christodoulos I, since Athanasios “dared illegal deeds, outside the holy laws.”\textsuperscript{795} The text of the letter proclaiming this deed is allusive and indirect, as most patriarchal pronouncements were at this period, but other sources show that the crimes of Athanasios amounted to a series of moderate to serious transgressions (but which collectively must have suggested a shocking avarice and lack of piety) which included: sanctioning fourth marriages for some of the faithful, destroying consecrated hosts, and trying to sell in their stead ones he had made; finally, dismantling the throne of

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\textsuperscript{795} Ioannes P. Theocharides, *Καταλόγος Οθωμανικών Εγγράφων της Κύπρου από τα αρχεία της εθνικής Βιβλιοθήκης της Σοφιάς* [Catalogue of Ottoman Manuscripts of Cyprus from the Archives of the National Library of Sofia] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1984,) 257, “...ἀτοπήματι καὶ κατετάλμησαν ἤγερα ἁζύμα καὶ παράσωμα καὶ τῶν Ἱερῶν Κανόνων ἐκτὸς...”
Germanos, Patriarch of Jerusalem, which had come into the possession of the Cyprus Archbishopric, in order to steal the martyr’s relic it contained. These crimes did not, in the judgment of a noted historian of Cyprus, George Hill, in themselves merit deposition, though they seem serious enough even today; perhaps Hill held the Cypriot clergy of this period to a low standard. Questions about the orthodoxy of high clergy were common in the Great Church (as the Greek church was sometimes called by its clerics, Μεγαλῆ Ἐκκλησία) at the turn of the seventeenth century and in the ensuing decades. Some years into the seventeenth century, for example, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was riven by conflicts between those who constituted a Calvinistically-inclined clergy, probably including the Patriarch himself, Cyril Lucaris (r. 1612-1638, intermittently), whose name has at times been attached to an anonymous Latin work known as Eastern Confession of the Christian Faith (published in Geneva, 1629) and those who resisted, as they saw it, the theological innovations of that clergy, or even, like Lucaris’ rival Cyril Kontaris, favored the Roman Catholic church. Calvinism would in practice have meant the abolition of bishops, and the acceptance of views on predestination, justification by faith, the reduction of seven to two sacraments, and the rejection of the infallibility of the Church which were decidely a change from the majority Orthodox tradition on these matters.

Cyprus was an island, but it was not isolated from these theological currents emanating from the West. To try and stem what were seen as Calvinistic influences, and generally to put the Cypriot church in order, in 1668, under the most accomplished archbishop of Cyprus of the seventeenth century, Hilarion Kigalas, Greek Orthodox bishops, both Cypriot and non-Cypriot, convoked a major synod in Nicosia. At that synod, the earlier unresolved tensions in the

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796 George Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 325.

Patriarchate that had come to the fore in previous synods of 1638, 1639, and 1641 (at Constantinople) and 1642 (Yassy) where the Confession had been denounced were again on display, as *Confession* again formed a principal object of discussion. As George Hill suggested, it also appears that some Franciscans – i.e. Catholics – sought to influence the final form of the Acts of the assembly in a doctrinally more Roman direction. On the subject of this influence, a suggestive quotation was supplied by John Hackett, an English historian of the Church of Cyprus at the turn of the twentieth century, who translated the *Decrees* of this Synod into English. Hackett quotes Philippos Georgiou, a late nineteenth-century Greek historian, pro-Orthodox in his writings, who suspected the intentions of the Catholics over two centuries earlier:

“Let it be permitted us to observe here that the compiler of these decrees appears to us to introduce surreptitiously in two places opinions of the Latin Church. First of all in the summary concerning the Immaculate Mysteries he says: “After the bread and wine are consecrated (by certain specified words prescribed by Christ)’. From what he says in the parenthesis it is evident he means the words of Christ, ‘Take, eat,’ etc. and that by virtue of these words, or in the saying of these words the consecration is effected, *viz.*, the bread and wine are transubstantiated, which is an erroneous opinion of the Latin Church. Secondly, in the summary concerning commemorations where he says that ‘good works, etc. are useful for repose and shortening of the postponement,’ he is evidently inclining to the doctrine of the Latin Purgatory. But we leave the authoritative decision regarding these points to the theologians. We only add that the compiler of these decrees possibly fell into these errors from being educated in the college at Rome.”

The Cypriot church was, then, buffeted by the same winds as the broader Orthodox community, at a time – the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries – when Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists from the West all sought to influence the thinking of their Greek brethren, particularly over the doctrine of Purgatory and the nature of the Mass, or as many Protestants referred to the celebration of Jesus’ self-sacrifice, the Lord’s Supper. These

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799 Hackett, *op. cit.*, 664.
conflicting currents were also evident in the life and works of Athanasios Rhetor (1571-1663). Rhetor was born in Koilan in south-central Cyprus, and his parents were killed in the Turkish invasion. He was raised partly at the Orthodox patriarchate of Constantinople, and partly at a newly-founded Jesuit college in that city. Rhetor has been discussed in an earlier chapter devoted to a different theme: the relations of France and Savoy with the Christian Cypriots. Rhetor travelled to France, but he kept abreast of Orthodox theological writing, for it was in France that he composed his Anti-Patellaros against a tract of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Athanasios Patellaros, who had written his own tract against the Roman Church.800 Rhetor’s motives were no doubt mixed, but it is noteworthy that he composed the tract while in France, and thus beyond the reach of the Patriarch, and where Rhetor had found both a home, and powerful Catholic protectors. This work was not directed against Patellaros alone, interestingly, but also against Tommaso Campanella’s 801 De sensu rerum et magia, a work on natural philosophy published nearly seventy years earlier.802 Rhetor’s writing and his ten-year journey in the 1630s to Cyprus, Crete, Constantinople, and the monasteries of Mount Athos, to collect manuscripts for French patrons, is another example, like Leontios Eustratios, of a Cypriot returning to his native land in an endeavor to help those who had remained behind, in Rhetor’s case to preserve manuscripts that his patrons feared might otherwise be lost, or destroyed by the Ottomans, not a far-fetched worry given the Ottoman destruction of the Venetian records on the island.803

800 Athanasios Rhetor, Antipatellarus (Paris: Jacquin, 1655).


802 It is interesting that Campanella, a Dominican, should have been born and formed his intellectual interests in Calabria, one of the most heavily Greek-speaking areas of Italy in his day. Could this be relevant to Rhetor’s interests in similar Platonic subjects, despite his reaching very different conclusions?

Against a bleak economic and cultural background, the monastery of Kykkos, in the west of Cyprus, known for a famous icon of the Virgin Mary, appears to have been exceptional, both as an outpost of Greek learning, and an economically flourishing place, on early Ottoman Cyprus. For two hundred years following the conquest, Christian Cypriots concentrated their charitable donations on supporting this monastery, and a series of abbots – igoumenoi – such as Nicephorus (recorded as abbot in 1640), made Kykkos a flourishing intellectual center. At some point during the Ottoman period, Kykkos owned property – parcels of land known as metochia – in Constantinople, Izmir, Bursa, and Antalya within Anatolia, as well as, elsewhere within the Ottoman Empire, Georgia, Beirut, Tripoli in Syria, Edirne, Serres, Kos, Filipoupoli and Peristasi, in addition to extensive lands on Cyprus itself, a list of real estate that suggests the astonishing prosperity of the monastery.

**Decline in Learning**

Popular culture may be resilient, and be able to withstand, or even gain from, the effects of syncretism and symbiosis. Even today, an influx of incomers makes itself felt more rapidly in popular song and styles, but is less easily accommodated, if at all, in what can be called high

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culture, culture in the strict and old-fashioned sense. In the area of more learned culture (as that was understood by the Orthodox community itself) the Orthodox Church on Cyprus entered upon a decline after the Ottoman conquest. We have for this the evidence of complaints about the ignorance of the clergy who headed the Cypriot church early in the Ottoman reign – most written by their fellow Orthodox clergymen. The first post-conquest archbishop, Timotheos, appears to have been an educated man.\textsuperscript{807} He had been a monk at Kykkos, and later Protosynkellos, a sort of councilor, as well as confessor to the Patriarch, of the Great Church in Constantinople, before ordaining two further bishops, those of Paphos and Soli, and taking up his duties as archbishop in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{808} He was chosen to be archbishop by a group consisting of Patriarch Jeremias II and the Orthodox patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria, when they convened at Constantinople in 1572. The Archimandrite Arsenios, a high official in the Constantinople Patriarchate, describes him favorably in a letter of October 24, 1633, in a passage recounting some of the early history of the Church of Cyprus under the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{809} The appeal of Timotheos for the liberation of Cyprus (1587) communicates little about his degree of literacy, since it has been preserved at Simancas only in a Spanish translation, and the Greek original is lost. But it does show that Timotheos was himself concerned about what he considered the barbarous conduct of the Ottomans, whom he describes as routinely looting and harassing the native Christians.\textsuperscript{810} Too many other letters from other Cypriots over many decades exist to give us cause to doubt Timotheos’ veracity, particularly given the risk of death he was undoubtedly

\textsuperscript{807} Mitsides, “Ὁ πρῶτος,” 26-28.

\textsuperscript{808} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{809} Text in Émile Legrand, Bibliographie Hellénique, XVIIe siècle, vol. III, 274.

\textsuperscript{810} Hill passes severe judgment upon the Greek of several later archbishops. Of Neophytos, for example, he writes, “the Archbishop’s letter was quite barbarous,” History of Cyprus, IV, 322. The above-mentioned letter of Timotheos to Philip II, in Spanish translation, can be found in Hassiotis, Ἱστορίαι ἔγγραφα, 21-3.
incurring in writing what the Ottoman authorities could have considered treasonous language to a Christian prince. In fact, Timotheos’ very attempt to enlist the aid of the Spanish king shows that, however dark the Black Legend that some in Europe were spreading about Spanish cruelty, the Archbishop preferred the King of Spain as an ally to the Ottoman sultan. Such efforts continued later: two more high-ranking Cypriot clerics, the bishop of Paphos and Archbishop Christodoulos (r. 1606-40) wrote to Philip III to ask for aid again in October 1609, and yet again in April 1611. This time, the result was the abortive revolt of Vittorio Zebedo, probably a Greek though just possibly a Spaniard, who planned to raise the Christian population of Nicosia against the Turks. But Zebedo revealed the planned invasion by a Savoyard army, and his effort failed.811

The cultural decline on Cyprus under the Ottomans, a theme raised in the introduction, is supported by the observations of students of Greek manuscript production and of Greek literature. While these scholars have taken note of substantial activity on Cyprus under Venetian rule, under the Ottomans the production of manuscripts noticeably tapered off. It was not just in the writing of belles-lettres, but also in the general level of culture of the clergy, that previous generations of historians have detected that decline. The historian George Hill was trained as a classicist in an age that was more unapologetically elitist than our own, one in which pronouncements on educational levels were self-assuredly offered. In his History of Cyprus, Hill quoted from the correspondence of archbishops Athanasios, Benjamin, and Christodoulos, who

811 For which see Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 54-5 and Michael Lascaris, "Πετρος Λανζας, διοικητης της Παργας (1573) και Οργανος των Ισπανων εν Επειρω (1596-1608)," [Petros Lantas, governor of Parga (1573) and spy for Spain in Epirus (1595-1608)] in Αφιερωμα εις την Επειρον εις μνημην Χριστου Σουλη, 1892-1951 (Athens: Typographia Myrtide, 1955), as well as Stephanos Papadopoulos, Η Κυπριακη Εξεγερση του Βικτορ Ζεμπετος [The Cypriot Enterprise of Victor Zempetos], Δοδονη III (1974), 342-3. Zempetos was charged in 1608 by the Duke of Savoy with stirring up the populace of Nicosia to cast off their Turkish masters. He apparently made his master’s intention of sending a fleet to Cyprus public knowledge at too early a stage, which produced a riot between Christians and Turks in Nicosia. The report about Zempeto’s travels in Italy to gain support for his cause appear in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziature di Spagna, vol. 335, f. 72r (Rome, November 16, 1607) and f. 97r-98r, (Rome, January 16, 1608).
together presided over the Church of Cyprus between 1592 and 1638, and concluded that all three wrote barbarous Greek, were not learned men, and were, in fact, barely literate. They exemplified, according to Hill, a new and less cultivated breed of high churchman on Cyprus. Interestingly, Christodoulos, like Timotheos, appears to have been of Latin descent, and Kyrris has suggested that the Latin-descended upper classes in some cases tried to perpetuate their high status by joining the Orthodox clergy after 1571, when the Latins, that is, the Venetians, no longer were in charge, while still others of that class embraced Islam.

Evidence for a decline of learning is slippery and subjective. But when Cypriots wanted to obtain an education, they chose, after 1571, in much greater numbers than before to leave the island and head toward Italy, above all to Venice, Padua, and Rome, as we have seen. This migration testifies to the loss of faith in the educational system, under the Ottomans, at home.

The College of St. Athanasios in Rome, founded in 1577, attracted many students from Cyprus. Despite that, after 1571, the ending of a robust scholarship system that had allowed promising Cypriot students to study at the University of Padua, the leading academic institution in Venetian territory, likely reduced the flow. In 1393, even before Venice had assumed control

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812 Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 324-333. I have relied for the regnal dates of archbishops on a list kindly supplied by Dr. Michalis N. Michael of the Department of Turkish Studies at the University of Cyprus, Nicosia.

813 Hill remarks of Christodoulos that “He is described by Cyril Lucaris [a learned Ecumenical Patriarch, who reigned for six separate intervals between 1606 and 1633] as ignorant, lacking all learning profane or religious, but otherwise a gentleman” (History of Cyprus, IV, 331). This criticism, including Lucaris’ word “ἀμαθή,” unlearned, was also noted by Stephanos Papadopoulos, “Ἡ Εξέγερση του Βικτωρο Ζεμπετου,” 341. Hill also noted of one of Christodoulos’ letters to the Duke of Savoy appealing for aid in a revolt against the Turk that it was a “shockingly illiterate production” (Op. cit., 54)


of Cyprus, Pietro Cafran had donated money to a trust for Cypriot students to be able to attend the University of Padua. The last Latin archbishop of Nicosia, Filippo Mocenigo, had funded still more scholarships in 1560, to pay for Cypriot students to attend this university, which was the jewel of higher education in the Venetian state. Giorgos Ploumides is vague as to whether Cypriots continued to study at Padua in early Ottoman times, and appears to have reached a negative conclusion, but I side with Giovanni Fabris and Apostolos Vacalopoulos in seeing the flow of students continue. My impression is that Padua, the singular importance of which I have highlighted, was an even more popular place of study for Cypriots after the conquest than was the Greek College in Rome. Several Cypriots took up academic positions there after 1571 and made names for themselves, including Giason Denores, a scholar who was awarded a chair in moral philosophy soon after 1577, and Alexandros Syngliticos, who is recorded as having been one of the syndics – not unlike trustees – of the University of Padua in 1591, and held chairs of both canon and civil law at that university in the early seventeenth century. Denores was part of an accomplished noble family, distantly related to Pope Clement VIII Aldobrandini (r. 1592-1605). I have already mentioned his contribution to Venetian life as a theorist of drama, criticizing the writings of Battista Guarini and what he took to be their theoretical underpinnings, and Denores also remembered his Cypriot roots: in 1578, addressing Doge Sebastiano Venier on behalf of the Cypriot refugees from the Ottoman invasion, Denores praised the patriotism of

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817 G. S. Ploumides, Οι Βενετοκρατουμένης Ελληνικεσ χωρες μεταξυ των δευτερου και τω τριτου Τουρκοβενετικου πολέμου (1503-1537) [The Greek Lands ruled by Venice between the second and third Venetian-Ottoman Wars, 1503-37] (Ioannina: Yearbook of the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Ioannina, 1974).

those noble Cypriots who had defended the liberty of the island.\textsuperscript{819} Another illustrious member of the same Cypriot family was Giorgio Denores, who in 1632 composed a tract on the rights and claims of sundry European dynasties on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{820} The long-lived Alexander Syngliticos, on the other hand, is documented as having headed the civic library of Padua in that same year, 1632.\textsuperscript{821} The education that our old acquaintance Athanasios Rhetor received after 1583 in Constantinople was provided not by an Ottoman-run school, but by Jesuits in a newly-founded mission school. And his exceptional circumstances – receiving a Christian education in Constantinople – do not refute the general conclusion that for most Cypriots, the sole realistic option, if they wanted to obtain an education at the hands of the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, was to convert to Islam, even as the Orthodox schools on Cyprus themselves were less capable than before of supplying a top-notch education. The number and quality of Christian schools in the Ottoman Empire ministering to Cypriot and other Orthodox was dwindling at this time.\textsuperscript{822} Even if one converted to Islam, the education offered at the \textit{madrasa} (in Ottoman, \textit{medrese}) differed significantly from that offered in Christian schools, revolving around the Arabic language, as a foundation for the so-called Islamic sciences, including Koranic reading and interpretation. The correspondence of Meletios Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria (in Egypt) from 1590 to 1601, a man who was influential throughout the Orthodox world – intervening in ecclesiastical affairs as far as the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, for example, and important in the erection of the

\textsuperscript{819} The text of Denores’ \textit{Oratione} is published in N.M. Panayiotakis, \textit{Ιάσων Δενόρες, Κύπριος Θεορητικός του Θεάτρου} [Jason Denores, a Cypriot theoretician of the theater] (Athens: s.n., 1985), 23-36.

\textsuperscript{820} Giorgio Denores, \textit{Discourse on the Island of Cyprus and on the Reasons for the true Succession in that Kingdom}, trans. and ed. Paschalis Kitromilides, Venice, Greek Institute, 2006, 1-122.

\textsuperscript{821} Documents reproduced in Giuseppe Fabris, “Professori e scolari greci all’ università di Padova,” \textit{Archivio Veneto} 30 (1942), 121-65.

\textsuperscript{822} Vacalopoulos, \textit{The Greek Nation, 1453-1669}, 101-102, 151-52, 154-55.
Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow\textsuperscript{823} – provides evidence that the Orthodox clergy in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine continued to follow matters on Cyprus. Pigas was appealed to by both sides in a theological controversy in 1592 that involved Leontios Eustratios;\textsuperscript{824} he was able to intervene with the Church authorities on Cyprus and in Constantinople to effect the deposition of Archbishop Athanasios in June, 1600.\textsuperscript{825} At about this same time, the Greek Patriarch of Antioch, Joakim, took advantage of the unsettled state of the Church of Cyprus to reassert old claims of the Patriarchate of Antioch, based on eighth-century proceedings of the Second Council of Nicea, a document of dubious authenticity, to supremacy over that church.\textsuperscript{826} As I have previously mentioned, furthermore, the Patriarch of Jerusalem was actively involved in planning the revolt that the Duke of Savoy and Archbishop of Cyprus discussed in that same, eventful year, 1600.\textsuperscript{827}

I have selected evidence above that stressed resistance and revolt among the motivations of the Orthodox clergy post-conquest. The more mundane desire for money was another

\textsuperscript{823} This is shown by his extensive correspondence with Orthodox clergy in those lands, in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, ed. Documenti privitoare la istoria Romanilor [Documents concerning Romanian history], vol. XIV (Bucharest: C. Göbl, 1887-1938). For the Moscow Patriarchate, see Charles Graves, “The Ecumenical Significance of the Role of Meletios Pigas in the Erection of the Moscow Patriarchate,” in Aksum-Thyateira: A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodios of Thyateira and Great Britain (London: Thyateira House, 1985), 409-421.

\textsuperscript{824} I have discussed Eustratios’ life in the fourth chapter, 40-41.

\textsuperscript{825} A letter from Patriarch of Constantinople Matthew II proclaims this deposition. This has been published in Kallinikos Delikanes, Ta en tois Kodixi, 546-550. The episode is discussed in Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 326-7.

\textsuperscript{826} Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 327; Hackett, Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 202. To try and ward off the ambitions of the Patriarch, the Cypriots wrote to Meletios Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria, and invoked his aid. This playing off of the Patriarch of Alexandria against that of Antioch is itself revealing. This letter is in the MS. of the Library of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, and is described in vol. 1, no. 624 of the catalogue of 1912 prepared by Athanasios Papadopoulos-Kerameus: Ιεροσολυμικη Βιβλιοθηκη, ετοι καταλογος των εν ταις Βιβλιοθηκαις του αγιοτατου αποστολικου τη και καθολικου ορθοδοξου πατριαρχικου θρονου των Ιεροσολυμων...(St. Petersburg: V. Kirspaoum, 1891-1915), 543.

\textsuperscript{827} A letter concerning the plans for rebellion in 1601 and the visit of the Duke of Savoy’s lieutenant Francesco Accidas to both Alexandria and Jerusalem is summarized – though regrettably not published in full – in Mas Latrie, “Histoire de Lusignan,” III, 574-76.
motivation, and sometimes shaded into outright avarice that inflicted at least equal misery upon the Cypriot Orthodox as the economic burdens of the new imposition of the cizye. We should not forget the view of the Venetian consul in Syria, Alessandro Malipiero, who observed of Cypriot political sentiment in 1596 that “Only the [Orthodox] bishops are happy with the Turkish regime, because they can collect freely from the Greeks, without any impediment, an imposition of so much per head, and because no obstacle is put in their way by Latin prelates.”

It has sometimes been repeated, as an unexamined idée reçue, that the Church of Cyprus jealously guarded its autocephaly after the re-establishment of the Archbishopric in 1571. But Joakim, Pigas, and other Patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria, took for granted their right to intervene in the affairs of the church of Cyprus; neither geography alone, nor a supposed “tradition of autocephaly” stopped them. In 1622, for example, controversy erupted over whether Ignatios II Atiyeh or Cyril IV Dabbas should be recognized as Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, and Cyril IV attempted to exile his rival to Cyprus. Runciman’s position, that the Church of Cyprus was, during the period of Venetian rule, under the tutelage of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and “after the Turkish conquest the Constantinopolitan influence remained paramount,” is therefore only part of the story. Other Patriarchs, those of Antioch and Alexandria, who were moreover geographically closer to Cyprus than to Constantinople, also continued to influence church developments on Cyprus, even as they themselves were visited by


829 E.g. by Halil Fikret Alasya, The Privileges Granted to the Orthodox Archbishopric of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969), 8.

representatives from the West with political and religious agendas of their own. And, throughout all this, the flow of Christian pilgrims from the West to Jerusalem and the Holy Places, which had survived the Reformation, also continued.\textsuperscript{831} At no stage did the new Ottoman regime result in some early modern equivalent of the Iron Curtain descending around the watery perimeter of Cyprus.

\textbf{Education on Ottoman Cyprus}

Among the promises made by the Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel I, in a pledge of 1601, (which pledge has survived) to the people of Cyprus, promises to be fulfilled should he gain control of Cyprus, was that of the establishment of a university to educate the “people and nobility” of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{832} This suggests that Cypriots felt a need for places to send their sons for schooling at that advanced level. It makes no sense, when describing the situation in late Venetian or early Ottoman Cyprus, to write or conceive of education as organized on a large scale. No such thing then existed. The Greeks continued to send their children to church and monastery schools – a Venetian regulation of 1521 had allowed the Greeks of Nicosia to appoint a teacher of grammar, to be chosen by the monasteries, and each Greek bishopric was to have a teacher of theology. At the same time, the new Ottoman schools known as \textit{sibyanlar}\textsuperscript{833} attracted

\textsuperscript{831} Steven Runciman, \textit{The Great Church in Captivity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 177.

\textsuperscript{832} Mas Latrie, \textit{Histoire de l’île}, III, 573: “pour l’éducation publique des nobles et du peuple.” Again we possess only a summary so far in print; I hope to track down and publish the originals of this, and a number of other documents in the Turin State Archives, in the future.

\textsuperscript{833} Primary schools, as distinct from the secondary schools, medreses, that were especially intended to train Islamic scholars. See the first chapter of Ilhan Başgöz and Harold E. Wilson, \textit{Educational Problems in Turkey 1920-1940} (Bloomington, IN: Uralic and Altaic Studies, no. 86, 1968). The eleven sibyans or \textit{sibyanlar} founded between 1570 and 1600 on Cyprus are listed in Ahmet Gazioglu, \textit{Kıbrıs’ta Türkler, 1570-1878: 308 yıllık Türk dönemine yeni bir bakış}, Nicosia: Cyrep, 1994, 265, and their foundations discussed on the basis of the archive series \textit{Vakfiye defterleri}, preserved in the Ethnographic Museum in Nicosia.
Muslim children. The percentage of families that could afford to give their children any schooling on Cyprus was small. And the choices on the island were limited, and stark. Two sets of schools, Christian and Muslim, based on two different and, some might argue, incompatible sets of ideals and principles, co-existed on Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest, with significant consequences for the future of Cyprus. While some Cypriot students continued, as they had before the Ottomans arrived, to attend universities on the Italian mainland, those Cypriot Orthodox families who did not wish, or could not afford, to, send their sons abroad could, for those children who remained on Cyprus itself, offer only limited educational prospects, and those who did not go abroad for study would find it difficult to remain abreast of cultural developments elsewhere in Christendom.834

What did the Cypriots make of their Muslim conquerors? One should not underestimate what Greek Cypriots understood of Islam even before the Ottoman conquest brought them into direct conquest with their Muslim conquerors. The Muslims had not merely been “on the borders” of the Orthodox world, but had had extensive communities inside the Byzantine Empire, just as substantial Christian communities continued to reside under the new Turkish principalities of Asia Minor that arose after the battle of Manzikert in 1071.835 At a time of particular strength in the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258), during the eleventh century, the caliph had even more or less compelled the Byzantine emperor to build a mosque in Constantinople for Muslim merchants, and another mosque operated there until 1188. All sorts of men, and news,
passed through the ports of Cyprus. Though illiterate, many Orthodox Cypriots would have heard of the conversion of churches to mosques and of the slaughter of their coreligionists, both at Constantinople in 1453 and elsewhere. The Venetian rulers had no reason to keep reports of Ottoman advances and depredations from their Cypriot subjects. Indeed, by spreading such reports the Venetian authorities might have hoped to cement Orthodox loyalty to themselves. The correspondence between the Greek Cypriots and that broader Greek-speaking world which was already under Ottoman rule long before 1570, meant that few aspects of the changes in the aftermath of the invasion, such as the imposition of special taxes on Christians, the conversion of churches into mosques, the forbidding of church bells, the newer taxation regime for Church properties, can have taken the Cypriots by surprise. One need not, therefore, conceive of the Greek Cypriots as naively blindsided by what Ottoman rule brought.

At many points the story of the Greek Cypriots is not unique, but rather shares features with those of many Christians caught in the steady Ottoman advance from the mid-fourteenth century on. It even bears comparison with that of Muslim minorities at a later period of Ottoman history, when those Muslims were left stranded in the backwash of a retreating empire and found themselves isolated as minorities in largely Christian areas; this description applies to Muslim Albanians, the Pomaks of Thrace, and the so-called Bosniacs (in Turkish, Boşnaklar) who dwelt both within and without the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottoman advance into the Levant and southeastern Europe was a destructive process but also, like many other exercises in empire-building, a creative process. I have sought to strike a balance between asserting the uniqueness of the Greek Cypriot situation, and in seeing their situation in terms that might apply to many minorities, of all kinds, in large and diverse empires. What I hope to have demonstrated, among other things – and this observation, and evidence to support it, seems to me new in the
literature – is that this period was characterized by a species of rivalry among Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists to win the loyalties of Greek Christians, on Cyprus and elsewhere. Rhetor, Rhodinos, and Eustratios were all Catholic sympathizers; the most distinguished Cypriot archbishop of the seventeenth century, Hilarion Kigalas may have been a Catholic sympathizer, and not only attended the Greek College in Rome, intended to instil Latin doctrine into Greeks from all over the Greek-rite communities, but also, in the words of Hackett, he was “employed by the Propaganda [Fide] on missionary work in the East.”

The records of the Synod of 1668 suggest that Calvinism was in the air in Cypriot Orthodox theological circles – Cyril Lucaris, later Patriarch of Constantinople and a Calvinist sympathizer, preached in Cyprus five times in 1605 and 1606. And as we have seen, Leontios Eustratios, as well as many other Greek-speakers from other lands, corresponded with, and travelled with to visit, the committed Lutheran Martin Crusius, in Tübingen.

**The Ethnarchy of the Archbishops**

Though correspondence and friendships formed outside “official” ecclesiastical channels are an important part of my story, the centrality of the archbishops in so many histories of early modern Cyprus virtually demands that we consider the roles these archbishops played in the everyday functioning of the Church. The position of the archbishops has often been regarded as central to the existence of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. For the structure of the Church was hierarchical and even, one might say, monarchical. The relationship of those on the top of that hierarchy to the Ottoman authorities changed during the centuries of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, and eventually gave rise to a concept which, because it implied both religious and political leadership, was significant: that of the ethnarchos, “ruler of the people,” applied to the

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archbishops of Cyprus as recently as the late twentieth century. It is reasonable to ask when the term “ethnarch” first came into widespread use, but also how the concept and role of the ethnarch evolved over time. The middle of the eighteenth century is a terminus ante quem for the use of the word, since the energetic archbishop Philotheos (r. 1734-59) was described as εθναρχος both in documents contemporary with his reign and then in the influential 1788 History of the Island of Cyprus by Archimandrite Kyprianos.  

But the Cypriot archbishops were not always bold defenders of the Christian Greeks, despite the heroic stories surrounding the “martyrdom” of the archbishop Kyprianos, sometimes remembered as a freedom fighter, later, during the Greek war for independence from the Turks, in 1821. The archbishop in question, Kyprianos, expressed sympathy for the organization called Philike Etairia, a group which could be described as having a relationship to the Greek independence movement analogous to that which the secret society of Carbonari had to the Risorgimento in Italy a few decades later. And Kyprianos was eventually hanged by the pasha of Cyprus, Küçük Mehmet, as a troublemaker.  

But his story, however vivid and heroic, should be recognized as irrelevant to our attempts to understand the history of the sixteenth century. If historians can agree that by 1821 it is reasonable to speak of national feeling and of an ethnarch, who was also head of the Church on Cyprus, our understanding of the situation centuries earlier can only be helped by steering around the anachronistic application of such a term, to a period centuries before. Not everyone has been vigilant about avoiding such anachronistic terms in describing that much-earlier Cyprus.

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837 Hill, History of Cyprus, IV, 344.

838 Michalis Michael and others have pointed out that Kyprianos also wanted to proceed with caution and was by no means convinced that joining the Greek independence movement was in the best interests of the Greek Cypriots. Michalis Michael, “History, Myth and Nationalism: The Retrospective Force of National Roles within a Myth- Constructed Past,” in Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, eds. John Duvall, Umut Ozkirimli and Niyazi Kızilyürek, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 149-59.
Molding Orthodox Opinion

In attempting to ascertain the popular Cypriot Orthodox view of events on Cyprus in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we should worry about the anachronistic application of an atemporal “colonial” model. Since Cypriots were so inured to rule by an outside power in their past, for example, even if we were to conceive of the Venetian regime as “colonial,” we should not on that account alone assume that it necessarily follows that “autonomy” or “independence” constituted Cypriots’ deepest political aspirations. Fortunately there is written evidence of what the Cypriots aspired to. We possess three early modern historical accounts of Cyprus that were written by native Cypriot Orthodox: the *Sweet Chronicle of the Land of Cyprus* by Leontios Makhairas (who lived from about 1400 to 1460), the *History of Cyprus*, by George Boustronios, covering the years between 1456 and 1489, and the *History of Cyprus* by Florio Bustron, published in 1570. All three men were functionaries of the Cypriot government under Venetian rule, and this fact has often been adduced to explain why the picture they present of the Venetian regime is overwhelmingly positive. Yet in the works of all three, we can discern shades of gray. For, after all, Boustronios depicts the abdication of the last Lusignan Queen, Caterina Cornaro, who subsequently boarded a Venetian ship and sailed off into exile in Venice, in such poignant terms as to elicit sympathy, seemingly, for her plight at the hands of the aggressively grasping Venetians. Furthermore, both he and Florio Bustron exalt the ancient past of Cyprus, and

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840 Boustronios, *Chronicle*, 59: “And on the fifteenth of February 1487 [actually 1489] the queen went from Lefkosia on her way to Famagusta to cross over the sea. She went on horseback and all the knights’ ladies and the
although this emphasis on the ancient glories of Cyprus was (and in some circles remained) a common early modern theme, there was an implicit disdain for the Venetian regime under which they currently lived. Nevertheless, when they refer to the Cypriot royal governments of the Lusignans, the tone of both histories is encomiastic. The three accounts are also noteworthy for the insular character of their chronicles. Foreign powers, such as the Mamluks of Egypt, figure in their accounts, but do so only in a few passing and minor, allusions, to their irruptions into Cypriot history. The Mamluks, important as they were in the Eastern Mediterranean, are mentioned only in regards to their invasions of Cyprus in 1271, and again in 1422-6.

**Post-Conquest Cypriot Literature**

The Cypriots produced only a few works in this period which, many centuries later, continue to draw comment. The Swedish scholar Börje Knös, in his major history of Neo-Greek literature, took note of three works – all poems – produced on Cyprus in the sixteenth century shortly before or shortly after the Ottoman invasion. All take as their subject the titanic struggle between Christianity and Islam in the mid-sixteenth-century Mediterranean. The three poems are the *Threnos Kyprou* or *Lament for Cyprus*, an anonymous account which many attribute to the Cypriot humanist Solomon Rhodinos; the *Siege of Malta*, an anonymous poem, referring to the ferocious Ottoman attempt to take Malta from the Knights of St. John in 1565, just five years before the conquest of Cyprus; and the *Capture of Cyprus*, another poem about the Ottoman conquest of that island, an anonymous work in 54 couplets, clearly incomplete as we have it.841 Knös describes this last poem as “political,” which, in the broad sense of that word, can hardly...
be denied. Common to all three works is their reflection of a learned environment. They contain reference to ancient works, use an ornamental style in conscious imitation of Homer, and cannot reasonably be called works of popular literature. All three appeal to God to deliver the Christians, and all three take as their two principal antagonistic groups the Χριστιανοί [Christians] and Τούρκοι [Turks].

The longest work, the so-called Lament for Cyprus, about 43 printed pages, can tell us something substantial about Cypriot perceptions of the conquest. This lament, if we can take literary evidence as a reliable indicator of more general attitudes, suggests that the reputation of the “Turks” – Τούρκοι – as marauding and impious, was already well-established on Cyprus in 1571-2, when the anonymous author likely wrote. The poet notes the Turks’ looting of monasteries, including Kykkos and Koutsouvendis, and details the rapine with what almost seems ghoulish relish. Of Turkish captive-taking after the fall of Nicosia in September, 1571, he writes:

Priests and holy men, old men, teachers,
They seized them all and made them slaves,
The bishops and all such saintly men,
All of the aged, the good people, and the scholars...

The repetitive nature of the poem is evident here, and there is a debt owed to earlier Greek laments such as those written after the fall of Constantinople, but however conventional, in that context, some of its themes of rapine and looting (and murder) may be, and however repetitive the language and themes used, the poem conveys the horror and incomprehension felt by

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842 Papadopoullos, Lament, 15-58.

843 Papadopoullos, Lament, 33, ll. 379-382, Παπάδες καὶ πνευματικοίς, γέροντες, ἀδασκάλους, ὅλους τοὺς τοὺς ἐβγάλλαν καὶ ἐκάμασιν τοὺς σκλάβους, τοὺς εἰσικόπους ὅλους τοὺς κείνους τοὺς ἁγιασμένους, τὰ γεροντάκια τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς γραμματισμένους...
Cypriots at the rapid fall of their island, a fall accompanied by tremendous bloodshed – probably 80,000 died in the fighting, the great majority Ottoman soldiers killed during the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta. And that was not the end of the devastation. Then in the next two years, Pietro Valderio, last Venetian mayor of Famagusta, recorded in his history more than 70,000 more deaths, those of Cypriots killed in an outbreak of plague introduced by a ship from Syria. 

Because earlier traditions of laments and dirges were widespread in the Hellenic world, these three poems cannot be described as original. Indeed, such scholars as Simon Menardos and Theodore Papadopoulos have considered them as the products of much older traditions. In an article in the journal Kypriakai Spoudai (Cypriot Affairs), published in 1980, and in his chapter on the literature of Frankish Cyprus contributed to the collective History of Cyprus of 1995, a work he edited, Papadopoulos argued that laments for the fall of Constantinople to Mehmet II and his army in 1453 greatly influenced the Lament for Cyprus. The moralistic tone of the poet, who upbraids his fellow-Christians as “pitiful” for not doing more to resist, is evident throughout. He also has positive things to say about the Venetians, whom he presents as fortifying the resolve of the Cypriots to resist. Finally, in lamenting the “charred” land of Cyprus once it has been conquered, the poet unsurprisingly refers to the “torture” it is under from

844 Setton, Papacy and the Levant, IV, 1043.

845 See, for example, Margaret Alexiou, The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition, 2nd edition revised by Dimitris Yatromanolakis and Panagiotis Roilos (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

846 Theodore H. Papadopoulos, “Ο Θρηνός της Κύπρου,” [The Lament of Cyprus] Kypriakai Spoudai 44 (1980) 15-58 and idem, Η γραμματολογία της Κύπρου κατά την περίοδο της Φραγκοκρατίας, Ιστορια της Κύπρου, V, 232-345; also see Margaret Alexiou and Dimitrios Yatromanolakis, eds., The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 90. Menardou (1871-1933), in a 1908 article, had already indicated that the Lament presented a number of manuscript problems, but the alternate readings are not numerous. Simon Menardou, “Περί τού ζηγών της Κύπρου,” Δελτιον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας Β (1910), 65-68.

847 “Ο Θρηνός,” l. 124: “but they are pitiful, all of the baptized.”
In the historical circumstances of the day there is little about the content or form of the Lament that is surprising, but its vivid details at least support the idea that the conquest was anything but a welcome change for native Cypriots at the time.

**Changes in the Built Environment**

Architecturally, too, the face of Cyprus changed under Ottoman rule. Descriptions of some forty Ottoman monuments built within the first thirty years of Ottoman rule can be found in Halil Fikret Alasya’s study of what he calls Turkish monuments and the Turkish presence on Cyprus. Some monuments, such as the Bayraktar Camii in Nicosia, were erected to commemorate the Ottomans fighting for the island, and in this case, the heroic planting of a flag, by a soldier in the Ottoman invading force, at a forward position. Later, in the eighteenth century, the Ottomans built a superstructure over the so-called Tomb of Umm Haram, called in Turkish a tüürbe, a word reserved for tombs of holy people, in the environs of Larnaca in southeastern Cyprus. This monument became so prominent, and began to attract so many Muslim pilgrims, that it is often referred to as the “fourth-holiest” site in Islam.

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848 On the Venetians, *Ibid.*, 51, l. 755: “Venice wrote to [the Christians] to stand up and protect [Cyprus], sends a fleet quickly, they are not embittered.” [’Η Βενετία τοὺς ἔγγραφεν νά στάσουν φροντίδαν, ἀπομένων πάμπαι γλένσα, μὴν εἶναι πειραμμένον.”] The implication in the next lines seems to be that all of Venice’s prior wars with the Turks still had not exhausted the Republic. On the tortured state of Cyprus due to the Turkish presence, 39. l. 500: “that which all the Turks hold [i.e., Cyprus] is tortured.” [”ὤποι τὴν ἔρχου τὰ τουρκικα πολλά βασανισμένην.”]

849 We do learn from its repeated use in this poem that by this date armada, cognate with Italian armata and Spanish armada, had entered Cypriot Greek as a word for fleet.


851 For a more mercenary explanation for this new attention to the tomb of Umm Haram after the conquest (after centuries of neglect by Muslims), suggesting that the Ottoman authorities were mainly interested in the money of pilgrims, see Gilles Veinstein, “Le rôle des tombes sacrées dans la conquête ottomane,” *Revue de l’histoire des religions* 222/4 (2005), 509-28.
Concerning Christian sites, the Ottomans did not, of course, act exactly the same way. Pope Gregory the Great is famous, among other things, for his insight that art inside churches could constitute the scriptures of the illiterate. After the Christian art inside churches was defaced and a number of the largest churches themselves turned into mosques, the local residents of Cyprus were certainly aware of change in the ruling ideas. This happened, for example, with the former Venetian cathedrals in Nicosia (Saint Sophia) and Famagusta (Saint Nicholas). The latter became Lala Mustafa Pasha mosque, while the former became the Selimiye mosque. A large number of other Ottoman mosques were built in both cities.

So much for the religious architecture of the island. There were also many non-religious buildings built by the new Ottoman rulers. As Michael Given has recently pointed out, however, the Ottoman is perhaps the least studied in Cypriot archaeology. As a result, to take only one example, one of the major questions that remains unresolved and that bears directly on judging the degree of change from the Venetian to the Ottoman regime, concerns aqueducts. It is still not clear whether the Ottoman aqueducts that recent writers such as Ahmet Gazioğlu and M. Akif Erdoğru have bragged of began to be constructed in the late sixteenth century, or at some later point, perhaps as late as Bekir Pasha’s acqueduct in Limassol dating to the 1740s.\textsuperscript{852} It is claimed that the Ottoman budget for 1571-2 published by Sahillioğlu provides categorical evidence that the Ottomans were already building a “rah-i âb,” as the document puts it, a “road for water,” to bring water to the walled city of Nicosia. The words actually used for the use of the sum concerned, 25,800 akçe, are \textit{Teslim} ...\textit{beray-i ihrâcât-i râh-i âb}, however, which meant “Payment for the expenses of the road of water.” This could very well signify repairs, and not

\textsuperscript{852} Ahmet Gazioğlu, \textit{Kibris’ta Türkler 1570-1878}, 218 ff.
new construction. In a period when the exchange rate was 60 akçe to the Venetian ducat, it seems unlikely that a new aqueduct could be built for the equivalent of 430 ducats.

If I am accurate and the râh-ı âb in question pre-dated Ottoman rule, or was some structure that should not be dignified with the name aqueduct, then the supposed benefit to the Cypriot population from the Ottoman building of aqueducts may have been limited to a later period of Ottoman rule, about 170 years after the conquest. 853 Neither Gazioğlu nor Erdoğan attempt to observe what Vera Costantini has suggestively called the distinction between state and society. 854 Cypriot citizens may have been compelled for their very survival to continue to maintain the aqueducts in working order. It is, then, not clear that the Christian masses, even if some of the money for these maintenance efforts came from the Ottoman state, interpreted Ottoman motives in a benevolent sense. Warding off revolt may have been a motivating factor behind the sums allocated in the government budget for aqueduct repairs that M. Akif Erdoğan has found in Ottoman government documents for Cyprus during the four decades following 1570 – these may well have been aqueducts built by Venice, and not the Ottomans. 855 Meanwhile, as the examples of the revolts I have mentioned earlier in this chapter show, politically active Christians continued to agitate for the restoration of Christian rule. Yet another aspect of the question of Ottoman public works is that of water wells, the digging of which was regarded by


854 Vera Costantini, “In Search of Lost Prosperity,” in Matthias Kappler and Michalis Michael, eds. Ottoman Cyprus (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 61.

the Ottomans as a traditional sign of munificence by generous Muslim benefactors.\(^{856}\) Since the digging of these water wells and the construction of fountains often accompanied the construction of mosques, for the faithful normally completed ritual ablutions with water before their canonical prayers five times a day, it is open to question how generous an act the local Christians could have considered their creation. Further study may straighten out the muddled history of the post-1571 Cypriot water supply, and perhaps establish who were the actors, Cypriot and Ottoman, public or private, who provided the initiative both to build those aqueducts and wells, and to maintain them.

**Fears of the Devşirme**

One could get the impression from much recent writing on the Ottoman Empire that it is a matter of record that the *devşirme*, an annual culling of Christian boys as recruits to the Janissary corps that the Ottomans carried out in heavily Christian areas of the empire, was never applied in Cyprus. The evidence for this is not conclusive. Kostas Kyrris, a scholar who developed an enviable command of the contemporary sources, forcefully argued that Janissaries were indeed supplied from Cyprus, claiming that on at least five occasions, in 1570, 1580, 1606, 1609, and 1611, and probably in other years, too, the *devşirme* did take place on Cyprus.\(^{857}\) In 1580, the fear that this levy was shortly to be introduced appears in Etienne de Lusignan’s *Description de toute l’Isle de Chypre*, in which reference is made to Etienne’s own sister Isabelle’s fears that her son would shortly be pressed into Ottoman service.\(^{858}\) There was, however, a shift underway among the Ottomans in the late sixteenth century, from recruiting

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\(^{856}\) Erdoğru, 230-231, uses the evidence of Islamic court records in Nicosia – in Turkish, *şeriye sicilleri* – to show that there were at least twenty wells in neighborhoods of Nicosia in the late sixteenth-early seventeenth centuries, but it is not clear when these were dug.

\(^{857}\) Kostas Kyrris, “L’importance sociale,” 255.

\(^{858}\) Etienne de Lusignan, *Description de toute l’île de Chypre* (Paris: Chaudière, 1580), f. 204v.
Janissaries exclusively from the Christian population to permitting men born Muslim (generally between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five) to join this favored corps. And it is possible that for some Kyrris has not proved his case conclusively, either because his documentation must be regarded as scanty, or because he confuses individual cases of Christian boys being taken for military service to the Sultan with that more systematic draft which alone should qualify as devşirme. It may be that Lusignan’s fears in 1580 were groundless, and in recognition of the shift away from levied Christians in the Janissary corps, and perhaps the Ottomans did not introduce the dreaded levy to Cyprus or did so only in a very limited way. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriots, with no guarantees at the time of the Ottoman conquest in 1570-71, must have feared the worst, and the question of whether Janissary recruitment, perhaps conducted as informal, unsystematic impressment, might sometimes have taken place on Cyprus is hardly settled.  

Conclusion

The Cyprus War (1570-73) has, with notable exceptions, in the main attracted two distinct kinds of historians: Greeks writing in Greek, and relying on Greek sources, and Turks, writing in Turkish, and relying on Ottoman sources. By and large, it is only in the last half-century that these two groups of historians have learned to take seriously, and to respect, the work produced, and to some degree the sources relied on, by the other group. Yet both groups of historians, and a growing number who are neither Greek nor Turkish, generally share the consensus view of historians who have specialized in the study of Cyprus, that the Cyprus War was not a minor matter, but significant in its geopolitical and cultural effects, both on the island and on the European mainland. To the Ottomans, Cyprus mattered greatly before the war as a nest of pirates and a rebuke to their sultan’s claims to be lord of the White and Black Seas. But after Cyprus came into their possession, the Christian threat in that area was drastically reduced, and they allowed the island to become a remote and sequestered outpost, a place of exile for Ottoman subjects deemed undesirable as political or religious dissidents.

Why this war mattered, and in what ways it mattered, and what it revealed, and what depth-charge effects it had on the subsequent history of Cyprus and of the Eastern Mediterranean, and above all on the Greek Orthodox of the island, have been the subjects of my research, building upon recent new source material, such as the Nicosia court records Ronald Jennings has called to the attention of the scholarly world. I have tried to treat, and explain, the geopolitics of the matter. I have examined the attitudes, motives, and behavior of the interested powers. Those powers include those who were full-fledged members of the Holy League –

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860 Ak Deniz, or White Sea, is the Turkish term for the Mediterranean.
Venice, the Papacy, and Spain—and other Catholic powers—France and Savoy—that either made the most minimal of military contributions (as mentioned, Savoy sent exactly four ships to the fleet at Lepanto) or deliberately stayed out of the Holy League, as France, with its longstanding Ottoman alliance, so calculatingly did. The battle of Lepanto, that famous, and famously misleading, victory, has entered the Western consciousness; the war of which it was only one battle, the Cyprus War, has not. Yet that victory at Lepanto, though within the context of a larger defeat, did show the Christians that the powerful Turk could indeed be defeated if enough military power, and skill, were deployed; the myth of the invincible Turk was shattered, and this would have consequences much later. Greeks, Albanians, and other Christian peoples subject to Ottoman rule got a taste of Spanish naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cyprus war, and of the possibilities and potential—never realized on Cyprus—for successful collaboration against the Ottomans, if Christians could put aside their differences.

In first dealing with the geopolitical context of that war, and its aftermath, I have tried to explain how, and why, certain European powers participated with different degrees of enthusiasm and attention, and to analyze the multifarious considerations and concerns behind their attitudes and behavior. It is not a simple story of Christians rallying round fellow Christians to oppose the “Turk,” but, as becomes evident if we continue to study the history of Cyprus in the decades after the war, a complex tale of the possible responses to Ottoman colonization and of choosing whether to remain or leave the island for amenable refuges in Western Europe, that demands elucidation. I have offered an interpretation of Spain’s reluctance to wholeheartedly pursue the war that brings to bear wider events, including Spain’s other commitments in Europe, especially in the Netherlands and Italy, its interest in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa, and, above all, its growing involvement in the New World. Venice had ruled for less than
a century before the outbreak of the Cyprus War, but the ruler prior to Venice was French-connected, the House of Lusignan, a family that received Cyprus as their property. The Lusignan were, like the Venetians, “Latins” (i.e., Catholic). The relations of ruling Latins and ruled Greeks on Cyprus, which is likely to have influenced Greek views of the succeeding, Ottoman, regime, inevitably requires discussion, then, not only of Venice, but of the Lusignan regime that preceded the Venetians on Cyprus, and lasted for three centuries. And before the Lusignan, Cyprus had been ruled by the Byzantines, and that period, too, had left its mark on the Greek Cypriot memory, its affections, its identifications and identity. The layers of different rulers, and their effects, this palimpsest of powers that ruled in succession, continued to have effects, not only on the Greeks of Cyprus, but on those countries – France, and Venice – that because of their periods of rule had developed historical links with Cyprus, links that did not disappear, but became different in kind, when their respective periods as rulers came to an end. Their consciousness of, and interest in, a Crusading heritage on Cyprus, I have suggested, helps to explain the century-long interest of the Dukes of Savoy in pressing their claim to the title “King of Cyprus,” and in aiding a revolt on the island that would restore Christian rule.

I have dealt with the many different aspects of this war in the context of a wider history, both geographically and chronologically, and have offered a coherent set of explanations, some of them new, for the behavior of different actors. The Savoyards were perhaps the principal standard-bearers for a romanticized view of the Crusades and of the Latin Christian inheritance therefrom, and staked a dynastic claim to Cyprus that they took seriously for more or less exactly one century after the Cyprus War. The French held aloof from the war, but it is clear that they at least weighed casting their lot in with the Holy League and that the Duke of Anjou seriously coveted Algiers, which he thought he could seize. After the war, the French tended to
replace Venice in Ottoman councils. The Spanish were hard-pressed to show as much interest in the Eastern as in the Western Mediterranean, and the suspicions and misunderstandings that took place during the Cyprus War between Spain and Venice may have rendered the swift attempt to recapture Cyprus for Christendom impossible. Those historians of Cyprus who are Hellenophone or Turcophone have tended not to pay much attention to this wider context.

In treating of what happened to the people whose land, Cyprus, was the subject of the war, I have entered the thicket where the thorny question of “identity” in its diverse guises, including “nationalism,” and, what is not the same, “heightened religious or ethnic self-consciousness,” continues to bristle. I would suggest that one of the lapses in the histories, even the recent histories, of the Cyprus War has been in how historians, mainly Greeks and Turks, have treated, tendentiously, what the change from Venetian to Ottoman rule meant for the inhabitants of Cyprus. While some Greek historians at times assume a pan-Hellenic sentiment among Greek-speaking Cypriots in this period, when instead they should seek to establish this on a secure textual footing, and have also at times assumed the economic catastrophe and political oppression that they should rather seek to document, some Turkish historians on the other hand, have too easily assumed that “Turkish” Cypriots came into being as soon as people whom they consider to have been, possibly not entirely accurately, “Muslim,” were moved from Asia Minor to Cyprus – a leap of logic that partakes of what the Ottomanist Colin Heywood has described as the still-hale blood-and-soil, Blut und Boden school of Ottoman history.861

I have made use of such testimonies left by Cypriot scholars and clerics of their understanding of the island’s past, both those who lived on the island, and the greater volume of

sources written by those educated Cypriots who left the island after the Ottoman conquest and who found, particularly in Venice, the former ruler of Cyprus, a haven. I hope to have shown that in that Venetian haven they discovered ways to conduct and even expand their cultural activities, as Greeks, and even, sometimes, as Greeks in the service of Latins and of the Catholic Church. I have considered how the Venetians came to change their view, and the very terms in which they thought, of the Cypriot Greeks, affected as they were by the presence of so many more in their midst, and by the need to transform their interest in the Greeks of Cyprus from the political and military, now that the island had been lost, to the cultural sphere. This reflects a wider tendency, all over Europe, for interest and sympathy given to the Greeks of pagan antiquity, to be extended to contemporaneous Greeks. This impulse became even stronger after Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in 1453, which together with the subsequent conquest of the Morea in 1456 and Trebizond in 1461 extinguished Greek rule over every part of what had once been the Byzantine Empire. And, in the decades and centuries that followed, the steady Ottoman advance led to the seizure of Greek–populated islands – including the largest and most important, Cyprus. The two phenomena – a heightened ethno-religious consciousness among Greek exiles, and an enlarged sympathy and interest for Greek achievements since classical antiquity, and for these Greeks fleeing the Ottomans, among their Western hosts -- could be observed not only in Venice, but elsewhere in Italy, and in France, the two places where Greeks tended to live when they left the lands newly-conquered by the Ottomans.

I have examined how the war affected the people of Cyprus themselves, that is, the Greeks who remained on the island under the new rulers. Any considered judgment of Ottoman rule must, I have argued, take into account, and make a balanced comparison with, the previous Venetian period, as for that matter with the subsequent British period which, however, is beyond
our scope here. How the inhabitants fared under both regimes should not be deemed settled by reference solely to the evidence found in one source, as for example, in those Ottoman budgetary accounts that have been so heavily relied on by recent, and especially Turkish, historians. Important, too, are the testimonies of the Greeks on Cyprus themselves, but these are rare, given the low level of literacy in the late sixteenth century; they are available in the form primarily of two or three epic poems, only one of substantial length, and then through the filter of Western missionary reports (the Franciscans who were on the island from 1625 on) and the accounts by the numerous Western travellers and pilgrims to Jerusalem and the Holy Land passing through Cyprus, under both the Venetians and the Ottomans.

I have in some cases made use of material previously uncovered but not exploited in the same way, and in other cases I have uncovered new material. This is particularly true in telling the tale of those Cypriots who, in fleeing Cyprus after the war for Venice, relied on memories of Venetian rule, and on stories of how Orthodox Greeks, in a steadily enlarging community, had fared in Latin (i.e., Catholic) Venice. Among those Greeks, the Cypriots proved to be the largest contingent. The audiences of Cardinal Santoro, for example, show that Cypriots were numerous at the Greek College in Rome, which was more akin to a seminary, preparing Greek-speaking Catholic clergy, primarily for work among Greek speakers in southern Italy, but also abroad. However, young Greek students who came from Ottoman lands to the Collegio had no assurance that they would be allowed by the Ottomans to return to the places from which they had come, and which were now under Ottoman rule. But in this period they formed, these Greeks in Europe, an “Overseas Union” with the Latin motto “Insignia inclitae nationis ultramarinae,”

Symbols of a Famous Nation Across the Sea. Their awareness of, and pride in, being Greek grew

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862 Vacalopoulos, The Greek Nation, 162.
in Venetian exile, and in the other places in Europe where, in far fewer numbers, they found themselves.

I hope to have shown how many Cypriots on Cyprus retained an interest, or developed a new interest, not only in Western Europe but more precisely, in Venice and her historic ties with their island, and sympathy for Cyprus’s own exiles in Venice. And I hope I have shown how, on the Venetian side, although the reconquest of Cyprus was never thought to be a serious possibility, many in the elite of the city continued to take an interest in the Greek Cypriots, or even an increased interest, now of a cultural kind, in the rest of the Greek people. Such Cypriots as Etienne de Lusignan and Neophytos Rhodinos used their time in the West to write about the traditions and antiquities of the Cypriots from the most ancient times, and they paid ample attention to the pagan as well as to the Christian past. I have compared their efforts to those of the Venetian chroniclers, those in the service of the state and those not, who in this same period, were delving into the antiquities of their own homeland. I have shown how Greek Cypriots in Venice and in European refuges other than Venice, influenced and were influenced by, the Latins they encountered. The Cypriot Athanasios Rhetor, for example, shared the interests of his French employers Séguier and Mazarin, in old Greek manuscripts, and I have argued that Rhetor saw himself as participating, in his own activity in France, in a tradition of Greek thought that could be traced in a continuous line back to classical antiquity.

I have sought to show the lack of utility, and even the futility, of debates on whether “nationalism” is a tenable concept to apply to Cypriots several centuries before 1789. The amount of current debate on this very question has not treated with the right kind of deference, the passions raised, the feelings felt, and there has been a palpable want of curiosity in attempting to truly understand the meaning of the lexicon employed, both by the medieval and
early modern chroniclers of the island, and of countless European travelers to Cyprus. For those chroniclers, and those travelers, offer written testimony that clearly suggests that a sort of communal feeling, revolving around the powerful Orthodox Church, its theology and its saints, and the Greek language that was that church’s medium and their link to a storied past, all served to mark and distinguish them, the Greek Orthodox of Cyprus, as a special people, and made them self-consciously aware of how distinct they were from both the Latins and other Christian (e.g. Maronite, Armenian) and non-Christian communities. But nationalism implies, to moderns, a desire for political autonomy or independence, and the Cypriot Greeks were in no sense self-governing either before or after the Ottoman invasion. Their common identity, therefore, became instead one of culture and of religious community, as well as language. This did not imply that the Greek Orthodox remained aloof from other communities; there was some social mixing with the minority communities under Venetian rule, as well as the ruling elite “minority,” and this would be observable under the Ottomans as well.

I have examined developments in the war’s aftermath, that is, during the half-century after the Cyprus War was lost and won, and the changes that took place on the island, to daily life as it was lived, as Ottoman rule replaced Venetian. Concerning the degree of change that occurred after the Ottoman conquest, I have sought to show what kind of Ottoman financial documentation for the early Ottoman period on Cyprus is known, and some of the difficulties in interpreting that material. My experience leads me to concur with the skeptical words of Apostolos Vacalopoulos about the limits of relying uncritically on government financial documents as a source: “The provisions of [Ottoman financial] codices constitute, of course, an official and reliable resource for the historian who, however, must deal with the necessarily uninformative style in which they are set forth. If he is to understand the real predicament of
peasants and serfs, if he is fully to comprehend the depth of economic hardship, he must go beyond those sources to the credible eyewitness accounts of travellers.” I have therefore sought to call the reader’s attention to those eyewitness accounts, and to reaffirm their validity as both a complement and a counterweight to the laconic Ottoman budgetary documents and government documents for the history of early Ottoman rule on Cyprus.

There is much to appreciate in the contributions of the recent Turkish historiography to the history of the transition from Venetian to Ottoman Cyprus. But we should keep in mind that budgetary and property title documents constitute only a very small part of the total holdings in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul and Ankara, and only a tiny proportion of those documents known to exist have yet begun to be deciphered, and at the moment constitute a paleographic labyrinth. The proper study of early Ottoman Cyprus is still, that is, in its infancy. If the effect of re-examinations of Ottoman Cyprus, such as the specialized studies of M. Akif Erdoğru, is to force patient re-examination of sources and a more careful use of language, history-writing can only benefit.

I have also discussed, and sought to illustrate, still other problems in the recent historiography of Cyprus. These include more than the fervor with which, in the past, though less so at present, Greek and Turkish historians appeared unapologetically to wield their histories like weapons in a conflict that was not extinguished, but given new life with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and occupation of that island’s north. I have tried to show the dangers of insufficient attention to words, that is, to show the need for linguistic vigilance when terms are transferred from one period to another, much earlier or much later, which in the end so often proves vexing. “Feudalism” and “colonialism” are two of the main tricky terms in the Cyprus

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context, given the cluster of political associations that historians and others surround these terms with. For example, the words “feudal” and “feudalism” have often been used to describe the situation on Cyprus, especially by Turkish historians who have used these terms to pejoratively describe the condition of Cypriots under Venetian rule, and to impliedly compare it unfavorably with the Ottoman rule, depicted as much more beneficent, that followed, without much examination of the terms or what is gained, or lost, in applying them. But was the condition of life for the peasants who tilled the soil, or herded animals, on Cyprus, under Venetian rule true “feudalism”? Were there knights who owed military service to lords? Is the term “feudalism” to be used so casually, to describe a local peasantry, conceivably downtrodden, without more? Such questions are not always asked, and the term “feudalism” has perhaps, as a result of overuse, been leached of some of its meaning.

For Cyprus, there were, as Papadaki and Grivaud have demonstrated, a number of ceremonies that took place under Venice calculated to remind the Latin elite of their superior position, and perhaps the Orthodox masses of their subordinate position. They describe the annual procession of knights through the streets of this as a mostra, or ceremonial demonstration, of the feudal cavalry on Crete and on Cyprus. Papadaki has also argued that some other ceremonies on Cyprus should be considered feudal and

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864 For the European Middle Ages, the pitfalls of the overuse of feudalism was famously analyzed by Elizabeth A.R. Brown, “The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” American Historical Review 79 (1974), 1063-1088.

865 The work of David Jacoby has been especially helpful in supplying context to the question of feudalism in Latin Greece and what criteria might define this word. Jacoby argues that, after 1204, when Latins moved in force into the Eastern Mediterranean, both the nature of their regimes at home in Western Europe, and of the earlier regimes in given areas, in tandem conditioned the social and economic conditions of Latin-ruled Greek lands. See Jacoby, “Social Evolution in Latin Greece,” in Norman P. Zacour and Harry W. Hazard, eds. History of the Crusades (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) Vol. 2, 175-221. In the case of Cyprus, the Venetians did not have a feudal system at home when they took control of Cyprus, but the Lusignan regime that they supplanted on Cyprus (1192-1489) can be so described.

were intended, among other things, to remind the Greek populace of their subordinate position to the Latins. But feudal-like ceremonies are not the same thing as feudalism.

I have also tried to be alert to the dangers of relying on a limited number of kinds of primary sources. While the study by Ronald Jennings has undoubtedly broken new ground, Jennings was building upon his own studies from the 1970s of şeriye court records in Anatolia. He also followed in the footsteps of other scholars such as Najwa al-Qattan, Dror Ze’evi, and Leslie Peirce, who have analyzed court records concerning other Ottoman towns such as Damascus, Jerusalem, and Antep/Aintab. Jennings’ study was his first to deal with a Christian-majority area, and should be supplemented with such sources as can supply a Christian point of view.

My research has suggested to me that there is much to be gleaned from works that have not been made much use of, and some that are still little known to English-language scholarship on this period: the works of Cypriot émigrés living in Italy post-1571. Paschalis Kitromilides, and before him others, such as Legrand and Philippou, have done the spadework of collecting the names of works and editions by Cypriot writers in Greek from the Ottoman period, but there has yet to be a narrative constructed around these writers that would replace what some dismiss as the sentimentally appealing story of a “proud people in exile,” looking at their oppressed countrymen with sadness and hope for the future, the story, that is, that some Greek-language

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historians have accepted when writing of the Greek diaspora in Europe after 1453. I have suggested that one framework within which to place the activities of Cypriot refugees, some of whom then brought ideas back from Western Europe to the Greek-speaking world, is that of a competition among Western Christian denominations, which would only accelerate during the seventeenth century, for the loyalties of the Greek Orthodox Cypriots, and of other Greeks, as well.

And there are other critiques, including those made by Turkish historians, in which it is claimed that a sinister Orientalism, or other intellectual relics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as uncritical Greek jingoism, are responsible for the misrepresentation of the history of the transition from Venetian to Ottoman rule. It has also been charged that too many epithets that do not explain but merely vilify, as the “lazy” and “treacherous” Turk or “fatalistic” and “arrogant” Islam, were commonly used in the past by Western, especially Greek, historians. How far these charges are true, and to whom they apply, and whether they still apply, are some of the questions I have examined. I have tried to hold these critiques accountable for their characterizations of earlier scholarship. Some of the charges leveled by Ottomanist historians – Machiel Kiel’s criticisms of unnamed propagators of a “barbarous Turk” stereotype come at once to mind⁸⁶⁹ – do not concern narratives of history at all, but social views, popular images, things in the atmosphere that are beyond the capacity of academic historians to control or constrain. Some writers and readers will feel a profound sense of investment in the texts of one “side” or another in the Cyprus War. Here, too, the historian cannot ultimately force his readers to avoid taking sides. But he can point out complications in the story, and even the awkwardness of assuming a continuity between the language of ethnic difference in those days and in our own,

the discontinuities in semantics that render at some level deeply unsettling the close identification by a modern student of history, in the writing of that history, with either “Greeks” or “Turks.” I have tried to suggest that one way of viewing the effect of the Cyprus War and its aftermath, one not limited by national categories, is to describe it as a Renaissance manquée. This is the argument that, had the Ottomans not invaded, had Venice and the Ottomans reached a peaceful accommodation, Cyprus might have taken part, culturally, in the amazing developments taking place first in Italy, and then further north in Europe, might have shared in the European macro-climate, and in the climactic developments that took place between about 1550 and 1650 in Europe: the printing press, and the greater spread of knowledge; new developments in astronomy and other sciences; the rise of a more philologically critical approach to ancient and to Scriptural texts; above all, the dazzling achievements in painting and in architecture that we associate with that inspiring word, now fallen somewhat into desuetude, the Renaissance. Given the intellectual environment in the Ottoman Empire after 1550, these developments could not have, and did not, come to pass on an Ottoman-ruled Cyprus. I suggest that there is utility in employing this kind of counterfactual, asking what would have happened if the Ottomans had not conquered Cyprus, in that this question can be extended – indeed has been, and by learned historians from North Africa, the Balkans, and elsewhere – to other areas of the Ottoman Empire. That religious zeal and religious hostility, geographic proximity, population pressure or any other forces somehow rendered the bloody Cyprus War, which left a swathe of devastation in its wake, “inevitable,” is a mesmerizing idea for some historical determinists. I hope my study, in seeking and weighing different sorts of evidence, and indicating that more than one interpretation of them are possible at many points – so that we should speak more of plausibilities rather than certainties – will have undermined this notion.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Latin Text of Selected *Capites*, or Chapters, of the Agreement forming the Holy League,
June 1571. Chapters concerning the Defense of North Africa.870

I. Et primo quod huiusmodi foedus quod ad eiusdem turcharum immanissimae gentis vires Deo Omnipotente adiutore destruendas praefati contrahentes inter eos initum esse voluerunt sit Perpetuum et non solum ad ipsorum contrahentium et eorum qui eidem conventioni ac foederi adherebunt Statuum Dominiorumque ab eadem turcharum gente defensionem sed etiam ad ipsius gentis ab omni terre marisque parte offensionem atque invasionem Algerio, Tuneto et Tripoli etiam comprehensio...

X. Item victualia quae quotidie consumuuntur si ea defuerint in aliquo loco aliquibus ex confoederatis possint capi ex locis et terris illorum apud quos fuerint honesto tamen precio et teneantur extractiones aperte ad beneficii expeditionis quatenus necessitas ipsorum locorum unde pro provisione suarum copiarum confoederati extrahere volent ferre poterit praesertim cum quilibet confoederatorum statim maiorem copiam quam potuerit victualium huiusmodi comparare debeat ne autem aliud quod vera necessitas ab eac obligatione excuset nulli concedi debeat extrahere ex illis locis in quibus eiusmodi necessitas praetatur aliquid victualium quantitatem nisi prius confoederatis ex eisdem locis provisum fuerit pro suarum copiarum maritimarum et terrestrium indigentiarum ita tamen ut Catholico Regi liberum sit ex Regnis Neapoli et Siciliae victualia Golettae, Melitae et suae classi prius providere. Quibus autem in locis pro exportatione certum aliquod vestigal pendi solitum est id ne preiudicium exportationis confoederatorum augeris possit.

XI. Item ut quotiescunque predictus Serenissimus Rex catholicus a Turcis et nominatim etiam ab Algerio, Tuneto et Tripoli eo videlicet tempore quo aliqua communis foederatorum expeditio non fiat invasus fuerit praefatus Illustissimus Dux Senatusque Venetus Maiestati Suae Catholicae quinquaginta triremes bene instructas atque armatas subsidio mittere debeant sicut

870 This document appears in Marko Jačov, *Europa tra Leghe Sante e Conquiste Ottomane* (Vatican Library: Vatican City, 2001), 166-176. The archival versions of this document include Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASVa) Armadio I-XVIII, n. 1706, f.1r-6r, n. 2629, f. 1r-6r; n. 2690, f 1r-6v; n. 2694, f 1r-9r; Miscellanea, Arm. II, vol. 88, f. 317r-322v; vol. 101, f. 99r-102v, 269r-275v; Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (BAV), Vat. Latinus 12201, f. 1r-15v; Vat. Latinus 12203, f. 147r-154v, 177r-183r; Vat. Latinus 12205, f. 215r-224r, 235r-243v. 370
Maiestas Catholica anno praeterito eidem Illustriissimo Duci Senatuique Veneto subsidio misit, quod idem praefatus Serenissimus Rex Catholicus pari casu facere debet quotiescumque ipsi Illustriissimi Veneti invasi fuerint...

XII. Praeterea si ita contigerit ut predictus Serenissimus Rex Catholicus Algerianam vel Tunetanam vel Tripolitanam expeditionem susceperit aliquo anno quo neque aliqua communis foederatorum expeditio suscepta sit neque Turcarum Classis talis exierit ut verissimile sit praedictam Venetorum Rempublicam sibi ab invasione Turcharum timere debere Serenissimo Regi Catholico quinquaginta triremes bene instructas atque armatas subsidio mittere debeant sicut Maiestas Sua Catholica anno praeterito eidem Illustrissimo Duci Senatuique Veneto auxilio misit et vicissim idem Serenissimus Rex Catholicus pari casu et conditionibus idem auxilium Reipublicae praestar e teneatur quandocunque Respublica aliquam expeditionem intra sinum Adriaticum ab Appollonia vulgo Vallona nuncupata Venetias usque suceperit primo tamen loco auxilium debet Regi deinde Reipublicae nisi si Rege non petente Respublica petierit quo casu sequenti loco auxilium Regi debeatur.

Translation [mine]:

I. And first, that the agreement of this kind, which the aforesaid, contracting among themselves, wanted to be begun, for destroying the strength of that same most tremendous race of the Turks (with God Almighty helping), should be perpetual, and not only for the defense of those agreeing, and of those who adhered to the same convention and agreement, their States and Dominions, from the race of the same Turks, but also for the attacking and invasion of that same people from every part of sea and land, with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli too included...

X. Also the food that is consumed daily, if they are lacking it in any place, some of the allies may seize them from the places and lands among whom they will have been, yet for an honest price, and let these commandeering be held openly, for the benefit of the expedition. However much the allies wish to extract from those places for the provisioning of their troops, they can carry, and especially, some of the allies immediately ought to buy a greater supply than they can carry of this kind of food. Lest anything but true necessity excuse them from this obligation, nothing ought to be allowed to be taken from those places in which a necessity of this kind is claimed, [not] any quantity of victuals, unless first the allies in those places there will have provided for the needs of their ships, on land and on the sea. Yet still, the Catholic King should be free to first provide the victuals from the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily for Goletta, Malta and for his fleet. In which places, moreover, a certain remainder is accustomed to be rendered for export, lest the damage to the exports of the treaty participants should be increased...

XI. Also, that whenever the aforesaid Most Serene Catholic King will have been attacked by the Turks, and specifically also from Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, in that time when some common
campaign of the treaty participants is not being waged, that the aforesaid Most Illustrious Doge and the Senate of Venice ought to send as aid for His Catholic Majesty fifty triremes, well equipped and armed, as thus His Catholic Majesty in the past year sent as aid to the same most Illustrious Doge and Senate of Venice, which the same aforesaid Most Serene Catholic King ought to do in a similar case, whenever the same most illustrious Venetians will have been attacked...

XII. Moreover, if thus it will have befallen, that the aforesaid Most Serene Catholic King should undertake an expedition against Algiers or Tunis or Tripoli, in any year when there should be no joint campaign of the treaty participants, and a fleet of Turks shall not have gone out (in which case it would be reasonable for the aforesaid Republic of Venice to fear an attack of the Turks against itself), they ought to send as aid to the aforesaid Most Serene Catholic King fifty triremes, well fitted-out and armed, just as the same Most Serene Catholic King, sent as aid last year to the aforesaid Most Illustrious Doge and Senate of Venice, and in turn the same Most Serene Catholic King in the same case and conditions is bound to lend the same help to the Republic of the Venetians, whenever the Republic should undertake any campaign between the Adriatic Gulf from Appollonia, Valona vulgariter nuncupata, up to Venice. Yet in the foremost priority help is owed to the King, then to the Republic, unless the Republic should ask without the King asking, in which case only in a secondary priority is aid owed to the King.
Appendix 2: Transcription and Translation of the sultanic order of February 15, 1570/9 Ramazan 977. Translation mine.


İç-İl beğine hüküm ki: Mektûb gönderup cezire-yi Kubrus ahvâl ve re’âyâni emniyet-i İslâmî istediklerin bildirmişsin dahi her ne deymiş ise ma’lûm oldu buyurdum ki vardukt a dâima mukayyed olup re’âyâ ve berâyâ tenbih idüp kemâmî mertebede istinalet viresin ki inşâât ta-âli cezire-yi mezbureniñ feth ü teshiri büyüküm başka bir fard-i hilâf şeri’ ve kanun zülm ve teâdî olunmayıp kadîmden yerli yerinde tasarruf ittükleri emlâk ve esbâblarına ve ahâ ve ‘ryâllarına kimsene dahil ve ta’âruz itmeyüp fârîq-ül bâl ve huzur hâlle kâr ve kesplerinde olalar bu emr-i şerifîñ sûretin halka a’lâm ve i’lân eylesin ki ol bâda su’zenleri def’ ola ve min ba’di kuffarîñ ahvâl ve atvarından ve fikr-ü fasdîlîrindan tamam sahîh haber olup a’lâmdan håli olmaya 9 Ramazân 977.

Translation: It is ordered of the governor of İç İl: A letter has been sent, and it seems that you state that the island of Cyprus’ affairs and that the peasantry wanted the security of Islam, also everything you said, once it was known, I have ordered that always the peasants and people should always be registered and advised that accommodation will be granted in the proper degree, let there be a great building-up of the aforesaid island, when the conquest and subjugation are favorable, let there be no one opposed to the holy and the civil laws, let there be no injustice and oppression, let those who have saved from old, in the local place, possessions, and their sources, and to anyone, let his families and relatives not be included, and let him be exempt, for a condition of peace of mind, in his deeds and in his earnings. Let a copy of this noble order be
signified and published to the people, that those hearing evil at my Porte should depart, and let precisely correct news come about some of the infidels’ circumstances and their attitudes, of their thoughts in gossip, in order for them not to be exhausted by their nobles. On the ninth of Ramadan, 977.
Appendix 3 – Transcription of the sultanic order of May 6, 1572 (23 Dhu al-Hicce, 979)

Anno Hegirae) on the Just Treatment of the Cypriots


Note: The transcription and translation are mine, and depart slightly from that of İnalcık in Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969), 7.

Qubrus ahâlisine ‘adalene muamele edilmesine dâir hüküm: Kubrus beğlerbegiysine ve kadısına ve defterdarına hüküm ki: Cezire-yi Kubrus, kuvvet-i kahire-yi husrevânım ile, feth olunmuş.

Memleket olup re’âyâsına dahi nev ama zaf tari olub Cezire-yi mezbure re’âyâsına zûlm ü teâdi olunmayıp âdâlet olunup. Eğer icra-yi şer-i şerif ve eğer tahsil amvâl beyt ül- mâlinda ve eğer sair tekâlif-i örfiyye ve âvâriz-i divânîyye himâyet ve styânet olunup tekvinât verilmekte memleket ve vilâyet eski hâlî üzere mâ’mur ve âbâdan olmak mühimmât’dan olmağın buyurdum ki: bu bâbda her biriñiz bâl-dhaat mukayyed olup tâife-yi re’âyâ ki vedâî’ halk berâyâdâr mühim al-makan himâyet ve styânet eleyüp kimseneye zûlm ü teâdi itîrâneyüp eğer icrâ-yi ahkâm şer-i şerîfde ve eğer miri hizmete ve eğer beyt ül-mâl cem’ ve tahsilinde tederrüc ve adâlet ile tutup reâyâya teferrika ve ihtilâl virür hususlardan ihtiyât eleyyesiz ki ayyâm-i hümâyun adâlet-i mukarrînamda her biri fârîq-ül-bâl ve huzur-i hâl ile kâr ve kesblerinde olmağla cezire-yi mezbure eski hâlî üzere mâ’mur ve âbâdan ola cezire-yi mezbure’nîn mâ’mur ve âbâdan re’âyâ ve berâyâsî âmin ve amân ve refâhiyet ve atinan üzere olmasi nihâyet amal bi-hüccet ma’ibimdir bu hususda gerek gibi her biriñiz mukeyyed olup her vechle şenlendirüp mâ’mur ve âbâdan olmasi bâbında mesa’î - i cemileñiz ve cevde getürüp bâb-i akhdâmda dakika-i kuvvet
eylemeyesiz şöyle ki re'âyâ zûlm ü teâdi olunup fevk ül-hadd tekâlîf eyledikleri olmağla mabeynlerine teferruk ve ihtilâl virildâğı istıha' oluna beyân olunan azeriñiz kabul olmak ihtilâle yokdur aña göre gaflet eylemeyesiz. Fi 23 Dhu‘l-hicce 979.

Translation:
To the people of Cyprus, an order concerning the just doing of business: it is ordered of the governor and the kadi and the treasurer of Cyprus: the island of Cyprus, through the overwhelming power of my sultanate, has, it seems, been conquered. It is one of my domains now, and for the peasantry also, but contention is taking place. For the aforementioned island, let the peasantry not be oppressed, and let justice reign, as long as the execution of the noble holy law, and the collection of possessions in the Treasury, and the other customary obligations and extraordinary taxes are defended and protected, and if the given creations, the realm and the province, are put in order and made flourishing according to the old situation. On account of the importance of this, I have ordered that: each of you makes agreements with the people, with the community of the peasantry and of the people, these compacts are made for the sake of the people. Protect and defend the important sites, and do not oppress or confiscate. If the execution of commands in the noble holy law and if the collection in the Treasury and in public service, and the customs in collecting are preserved with justice, then may you take precautions against pretexts for rebellion for the peasantry. In the auspicious days, in my seat and name of Justice, with every sort of joy, freedom from anxiety, and ease make the said island’s peasantry flourishing and prosperous, safe and spared, and having comfort, and not upon the point of being thrown down. Finally actions without proof are not acceptable, so, as is necessary on this subject, let each of you make agreements by every means, and make inhabited and prosperous and
flourishing. Bring the efforts of your kind action and generosity to the Gate of Felicity, let not a minute be lost, lest the peasantry rebel and dissent. The highest punishment has been proposed for those who scatter and disturb the peasantry. Let those who are nobles listen, for there is no possibility of accepting your excuses. In my opinion, you had best be wary. On Dhu’l-hijja 23, 979.
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