Relearning Ujamaa: Education in Tanzania from 1954 to 2002

Alexander Peeples
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Introduction

The late 1950s and early 1960s served as a catalytic moment in modern African history. For the first time since colonialization, African nations were nominally sovereign, and postcolonial governments began a wave of development projects and state expansion. In the years since that initial wave of independence, historians have critiqued many of the most ambitious projects of early African independence as unresponsive to the needs of local populations. In most instances these histories serve as honest appraisals of complicated policy failures and the normatively damaging effects of state violence. However, simply identifying when states or international actors used coercive power or active neglect to subjugate communal knowledge or desires is not enough to understand the potential of African states. For a more robust historical analysis, it is also necessary to understand contexts in which the work of the state intersected at least somewhat positively with the interests of both a general populace and particularly marginalized subgroups. My intention is to tell one history of a complicated but constructive state action by examining the case of education in post-colonial Tanzanian through the end of the 20th century. Education stands out as both a forgotten component of discourse around Tanzanian politics and as a generative location in understanding the relationship between state development and human rights.

The value of interrogating Tanzania stems both from its distinctive postcolonial politics, including the state’s particular investment in education, and understanding that politics beings with a having a basic timeline of the Tanzanian state. During the colonial period, Tanzania was originally overseen by Germany and transferred to Britain after World War I. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led Tanzania to independence in 1961 under the socialist vision of Julius Nyerere. In the late 60s and early 70s, the nation’s leaders accelerated Ujamaa,
Nyerere’s particular collectivist vision of uniquely African socialism, but a severe economic collapses tempered their most far-reaching ambitions. By the late 1980s, the state abandoned most of its most ambitious socialist goals as it disinvested from social goods under the terms of a structural adjustment program. When Tanzania eventually stabilized in the 90s, a new generation of political leaders mothballed the original socialist goals of early independence in favor of further political and economic liberalization, which has continued into the present.

This political context has been extensively explored in evolving waves of scholarly interest. In Tanzania’s first decade, there was an excitement among many Western radical scholars about the potential of the Tanzanian state’s commitment to egalitarian growth, and a few even went to Tanzania to teach at the University of Dar es Salaam. Many of these academics viewed Nyerere as a visionary political leader with a unique interest in serving as an intellectual and global public thinker.¹ The larger development community, including scholars, international government bureaucrats, and professionals in the field, shared some of the optimism this generated, though with a greater amount of doubt about the feasibility of Tanzania’s goals. After the political acceleration of the 70s, economic collapses of the 80s, and eventual pivot of the 90s, the consensus around Tanzania’s past socialist state politics is muddled. Traditional development economists have criticized their enormous state expenditures, political theorists have pointed out the socialist state’s coercive use of power against its constituent populace, and historians have pointed out the exclusion of various communities from Tanzania’s created identities.² Susan Gieger, for example, has complicated the masculine narrative of the independence process, while

² James C. Scott, Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, Yale University Press, 1998
even more recently Emily Callaci has interrogated how urban populations inhabited space within Tanzania’s explicitly rural-oriented politics.³

This wide interest in reinterpreting Tanzanian politics and policies is valuable but, in a particular way, it has occasionally suffered from a myopic lens of analysis. Ujamaa was used to describe the general ideology of Nyerere’s and TANU’s African socialism, but it is also often a more specific shorthand for the villagization projects that Nyerere advocated for as part of collectivizing the state, Ujamaa Vijijini. This project began initially as voluntary resettlement but movement into the new village structures created by the state was eventually encouraged with force before failing completely.⁴ Because of the structural importance of villagization to Ujamaa, the failures and contradictions of attempts at population resettlement into village units has been mapped onto the entirety of Tanzania’s state socialism. This slippage between Ujamaa as a larger ideological project and Ujamaa as a program villagization reveals some valuable truths about the Tanzanian state, but also obscures other sources of TANU’s appeal. This includes advancements in expanding health care, maintaining internal peace, and rapidly expanding education. Reframing the history of Tanzania through the lens of education cannot fully represent the relationship of the Tanzanian state with the populace or the contributions of the Tanzanian context to global debates about development or rights. It can, however, demonstrate a more productive version of modernist state projects as well as illuminate the germane tensions between frameworks of rights and development.

⁴ Scott, 224.
During the same time span that villagization struggled to gain traction among the general populace and eventually metastasized into forced resettlement, education flourished in Tanzania, despite a tepid colonial antecedent. Under German colonialism there were some educational opportunities, but all of them were meant to teach needed vocational skills to the indigenous collaborators. Though this training was lauded for effectively preparing local peoples for economies of extraction, no great attention was given to including precolonial methods of learning or creating opportunities for learning outside of skills like German tax collection. When the British took over, they considered Tanzania something of a backwater and initially paid little attention to creating schools or literacy programs.

British and German missionaries created a handful of mission schools that provided slightly more expansive educational opportunities, but they were woefully under-resourced to provide schooling for any significant portion of the indigenous population. Missionary reformers also created secondary schools and job opportunities for a small number of educated Tanzanians as teachers, but even those attempts were limited and unstable. Starting in the 1940’s with the return of soldiers from World War II, Tanzanians began to push for a more robust education system through letters to colonial governors, repeated petitions to the British state, and verbal discontent. Eventually, the British government tried to fulfill some of these demands by planning to build new schools and creating a more diverse curriculum, but local colonial administrators thwarted most of these efforts, likely out of concern about ceding authority to

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possible African replacements. Tanzanians would have to build the education system they demanded themselves.

After independence, schooling was integrated and widely expanded under the new state, and unlike with resettlement, available sources suggest that education projects enjoyed significant popularity among most Tanzanians. Many of the gains extended across lines of gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. Even after the end of villagization, the impact of economic recession on education and the revamping of education in the 90’s mapped the continuing legacies of Ujamaa in ways villagization no longer could. Further, while education was not as physically linked to the execution of Ujamaa as resettlement, it was always a central part of Nyerere’s and TANU’s political philosophy. Nyerere was deeply engaged in reforming and expanding education in Tanzania, and he understood universal public education as a foundational part of ensuring prosperity and egalitarianism in Tanzania. This importance stemmed both from the economic value of teaching workforce skills and the greater autonomy enabled by literacy and structured critical thinking. Doing so required substantially restructuring the colonial system, and significant buy in from even the poorest peasant communities. In education, many of the groups that had been relegated to the subaltern, like young women or poor and unskilled laborers, found common ground with the state in creating new pathways to greater agency. This occasionally involved ignoring the state’s intentions in providing educational opportunities.

Beyond allowing for a better understanding of Tanzania’s socialist project as it was negotiated between the state and population, historicizing postcolonial Tanzanian education also suggests the kind of insights that engaging with alternative projects of problematic African states

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might produce. Understanding Tanzania’s commitment to education as sincere and significant, if strategically deployed, includes accepting the sincerity of the dual justification of education expenditures as both protecting a universal right and enabling greater economic development. The friction Tanzania experienced between the two frameworks is instructive in understanding how validating a good as an immutable right is at odds with simultaneously understanding it as a conditional investment in financial growth on a global scale. If a social service, like education, is a good then it cannot be subject to the same cycle of volatility in commitment that conditional investments are. In the crucible of poverty and anti-colonial politics, the Tanzanian government created an education system in the 60s that threaded the narrow limits of development while maintaining a commitment to egalitarianism that was radically expanded into the late 70s. That the system buckled under structural adjustment programs in the 80s and was eventually restructured as primarily a tool of development in the 90s reflects more than Tanzania’s internal politics. It suggests that, despite its global prevalence, the discourse of rights remains secondary to the hegemonic and coercive power of development-oriented ideologies. Even state projects responsive to the desires and rights of its populace are at risk of being consumed by the corrupting influences of international financial coercion and a global tendency towards authoritarian state rule.
Chapter 1

Independence Thinkers: Building Education 1954 to 1967

Since its inception as an independent nation, Tanzania - or Tanganyika - has had leaders interested in the place of education in a democratic nation.\(^\text{10}\) After assuming control of their own education system, Tanzanian people capitalized on the existing language of global rights and education emerged as a primary concern of post-independence political discourse. Tanzanian thinkers generatively added to that discourse, espousing a vision of education that accounted for the way in which economic instability changes the capacity of states to provide education without reducing the necessity of educational opportunities. This early Tanzanian context also serves a reminder of the ways in which national education systems served as locations of transnational influence in which local interests interacted with international intrigue and politics. Tanzania does not represent a utopic education system for poor nations or a monolithic resonance across the global south, but it does serve as an effective reminder that the ideals of post-independence African states were not entirely a failed dream.

Tanzania’s particular understanding of post-independence education is also helpful in understanding the possible limits of using both rights and development discourses simultaneously and interchangeably and the limits of a supposedly benevolent international network of development agencies and NGOs. Gaining these insights starts with understanding the education system of an independent Tanzania. From the start of independence through the early 1970s, Tanzania prioritized education among its political commitments and the education

\(^{10}\) Tanganyika, in this case and on later reference, refers to what is now the mainland of Tanzania. The island territory of Zanzibar was separately governed at the time, and continues to operate under a separate education policy.
system rapidly expanded both in length of coursework and number of students while breaking down preexisting racial barriers. Tanzanian leaders justified these efforts both on the basis of economic development and human rights, a mix that would have later consequences. In the process, they generated an important case study in human rights, poverty reduction, development, and state cohesion.11 Understanding the lessons of the modern Tanzanian education system starts with an afternoon in the capital city of Dar es Salaam in the summer of 1954.

The Beginning of Tanzania

That afternoon, July 7th 1954 at 4:30pm to be precise, 16 men, representatives of various branch offices and their general organization president Julius Nyerere, sat down for the beginning of a national meeting of the Tanganyikan African Association.12 It would later come to be known as the first conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union.13 After an opening prayer, the men discussed the rather banal matter of a telegram that had been sent by a regional office without the national association’s consent. This dialogue lasted until the meeting adjourned for the day at 2 am.14 The next day, starting at 9 am, the group began work in earnest. After voting to record minutes and recognize the registration of all branches present, the organization began to reshape entire its function.15

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13 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library. Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954,
14 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 2.
15 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 3.
They started by renaming the Tanganyikan African Association the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU).\(^{16}\) This shift served as a statement of purpose for what the organization would become. In the past it had served as a glorified social club mostly composed of bureaucrats with a muted political impact. Even at its most radical it only obliquely suggested that Africans in the Tanganyikan Trusteeship might have other authority structures outside the chief system supported by the British Empire. In its new iteration, younger more radical voices gained greater sway and organizers began to create a more economically diverse base of supporters.\(^{17}\) This new entity, TANU, would be a fully-fledged political body, intended to represent the interests of the people of Tanganyika.

Next, the newly formed TANU collectively agreed to push forward the fight to make the Legislative Council of Tanganyika, the primary legislative body of the territory, an elected body rather than one appointed by the Governor and to make Kiswahili the second language of the Legislative Council.\(^{18}\) They then engaged in a debate about what the make-up of the Legislative Council would ideally be. The agreed upon proposal was one in which the three races of Tanzania (White, Asian, and African) would each be represented by nine legislative council members. The primary point of conflict during that discussion was that many on the council felt that in the future Africans should have a larger portion of the Legislative Council membership given that they were both the majority in Tanganyika and the original inhabitants.\(^{19}\) It was at this point, having only established that their organization should be renamed and support a democratic multi-racial Tanganyika that the group turned to the issue of education.

\(^{16}\) Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 3
\(^{18}\) Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 4.
\(^{19}\) Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 4.
That education took precedence just after democracy at the very first conference of TANU should serve to highlight just how important an issue it was to leading Tanganyikan political leaders, especially Julius Nyerere, a former teacher who would use the honorific for teachers, Mwalimu, until he died.\textsuperscript{20} Education was undeniably a primary policy concern of Tanganyikan leaders when they were aspiring democrats. Many saw it as embedded in the process of greater African autonomy, the most important priority, and believed it took precedence over economic growth and development.\textsuperscript{21} Education would continue to be a core value and policy focus when Tanganyikan organizers turned toward calling for independence and when they eventually took over the government themselves. During that July 8\textsuperscript{th} meeting many of hopes and goals that Tanganyikans, and later Tanzanians, had for their country found their first expression. The committee first agreed that education should be both universal and compulsory because at the time the majority of African children were not formally schooled.\textsuperscript{22}

Achieving universal and compulsory education would go on to be the central struggle of Tanganyikan education policy. Aside from that priority, the group also discussed the need to extend the length of primary school, improve the quality of middle school, and to provide more trade school options for those interested in them. As with the legislature, it was determined that Kiswahili should be prioritized in primary schools. The national organization appointed a sub-committee of four led by TANU President Julius Nyerere to go around the country collecting donations for education that could not be spent anywhere else.\textsuperscript{23} This mandate reflected the popularity of education among the diverse range of a Asian, African and White Tanganyikan

\textsuperscript{21} John Iliffe, 574, 1979, \textit{A Modern History of Tanganyika}, New York, Cambridge University Press.
\textsuperscript{22} Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 5
\textsuperscript{23} Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 5.
communities TANU was hoping to consolidate popularity in. From the very beginning of an independent Tanganyikan political conscious, Tanganyikans prioritize education both ideologically and practically, an education in which “all the people should equally share.”

Early Steps towards Independence

While all of the proposals discussed at the time of the first conference would eventually become law in some form, these seeds of education policy would take years to sprout as Tanganyikans organized and prepared for independence. This was a burdensome process, but one that they were able to navigate with greater ease than many of their neighbors. Only about a year after the creation of TANU, Nyerere was the first African to present to the Tanganyika Trustee Council, an institution headquartered in New York and created in 1923 under a UN mandate after the British took possession of German colonial holdings. Speaking on behalf of “his people’s hopes and fears”, Nyerere discussed a wide range of topics. In a sense, this early meeting was a dress rehearsal for the full complexity of later independence negotiations. Despite the wide range of concerns impeding that eventual goal, the one topic both Nyerere and the Trusteeship Council kept coming back to was education.

This interest started with questions about a rhetorical flourish. Throughout his career, Nyerere would often say that the three enemies of Tanzania that must be fought with development were ignorance, disease, and poverty -- a line that is still used in Tanzanian political parlance. At this early meeting, he had only developed the phrase to include ignorance and poverty, but one of the committee members, Mr. Jaipal of India, took note of Nyerere’s

26 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 27
repeated uses of the nomenclature nonetheless. When questioned by Jaipal about what he saw as the solution to ignorance, Nyerere responded that because there was a “great demand for education in the country,” among both boys and girls, but not enough resources to fulfill the demand, he saw the immediate solution as more “school education.”

In a dual argument that he would repeat in different iterations for the rest of his career, he further argued that education would both help Tanganyika escape a subsistence level life style and would help Tanganyikans become better more fulfilled people, as it had him. These educated workers would then feed into the collaborative markets of African co-ops that Nyerere would come to use as the foundation of his economic Ujama philosophy. Here again, as Nyerere sought to position Tanganyika as a more independent nation he imagined education as both an end unto itself and the engine that would drive economic success.

This self-reliant model was necessary partially because of the nation’s poverty but also because, as Nyerere would point out to the committee, TANU had no way of becoming a governing party at the time given existing laws against political organizing. Perhaps the most telling part of the entire presentation was not one directly about education. After affirming TANU’s belief in the non-racial education to the Syrian committee member, Nyerere was asked about Tanganyika’s need to develop to capital by an American, Mr. Sears. Juilius Nyerere, a man who would later come to be known as the father of African Socialism, did not immediately launch into a discussion of wealth and economics or even of agricultural development. Instead he

agreed that the economic problems could be particularly vexing because of the need for technical knowledge to solve them. He located the answer to these problems in learning new technologies, and he compared the difficulty economic problems to the relative ease of political ones. In politics what was needed was “merely to sit down and think out the problems.”31 Given an easy opportunity to lay the foundation for his, later infamous, villagization schemes or theories of economic socialism, Nyerere prioritized education as both a right and salvation from economic woes. As he understood it, education was key to ideological questions, and it was even more important for technical ones. This suggests the depth and danger of early prioritizations of education as a focal point of independence. Education as a right would also be expected to create economic development through centralized state action.

The Beginning of Tanzanian Education

This initial meeting became the foundation for a transition to self-governance that was eased along by the specter of the more violent independence fight in neighboring Kenya, the unique trusteeship status of Tanganyika that provided a forum both for TANU’s representatives and sympathetic UN officials, and Nyerere’s own personal charisma.32 While still not independent, Tanganyika held elections for the first time in 1958, and TANU claimed a majority of seats in the legislative council.33 By the end of 1958, the first year of TANU legislative majority, the legislature formed a committee to review the existing education system, and to make recommendations for integrating the four racially separate education systems” within

31 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 76.
existing financial provisions, African, European, Indian, and the miniscule other non-native system.\textsuperscript{34} After working for a year and receiving memoranda from organizations including a range of parent associations and the national teachers union, the Committee on the Integration of Education published its report in October of 1959.\textsuperscript{35}

The report outlined both the stark inequality that defined colonial education systems and provided a set of recommendations. It started with a brief accounting for the state of education prior to any change.\textsuperscript{36} While almost any non-African with an interest in primary education was able to find a spot, only 44\% of eligible African Tanganyikans could even enter primary school. This was only exacerbated in higher levels of education and by the end of middle school the African population enrolled in the grade level population dwindled from 110,330 students in the first year of primary school all the way down to 7,503 student, 6.8\% of the already small number of enrolled primary students.\textsuperscript{37} Non-African students also received their school funding from a special account rather than the general allocation process that African schools were beholden to which meant that their funding level was both higher and more stable. To change this the committee proposed 26 recommendations which sought to address inequalities with minimally radical change.\textsuperscript{38}

Mostly comprised of technical details about examination regulations or funding mechanism, these 26 proposals largely amounted to merging the various Tanganyikan systems, erasing their racial distinctions, and standardizing instruction and funding. A few proposals of note outside of the more technical notations included a recommendation that Swahili-language primary schools not pay tuition from which two members dissented, the only dissentions in the report. There was also a recommendation that further planning of the new system be done regionally, a proposal that governments help fund those privately created schools that fit the new standards, and a possible timeline under which the suggestions would be implemented the first day of 1962.39 These proposals helped establish that any new education system would have to take seriously the concerns of African Tanganyikans, that, though controversial, Swahili would be the prioritized language, and that the input of the general populace would have great importance, both through the localized governing bodies and the ability to create new schools when needed.

Much of this promise soon came to partial fruition with the passage of corresponding legislation. Though Tanzania was still not independent in 1959 when the report was published, TANU has again been elected with a majority in the legislative council and in 1960 Julius Nyerere was elected Chief Minister.40 Under Nyerere’s guidance, an education ordinance was passed on October 30th of 1961 that followed the recommendations of the committee with a few added provision.41 The new law made clear that students could not be discriminated against for

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41 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Tanganyika National Assembly, October 30th 1961 An Ordinance to make provision for a Single System of Education in the Territory, Tanganyika Gazette, Dar es Salaam
their race or religion. This was meant to both undermine racialized class hierarchies, and to prevent the marginalization of Christian and Muslim minorities in largely religious homogenous regions of the country. It also gave the Minister of Education the authority, though not the responsibility, to make primary education compulsory. Compulsory education might seem like a coercive measure, but it was conceptualized as an emancipatory provision for students whose parents might seek to prevent them from going to school and was ultimately not enacted under this initial ordinance. Finally, it also created a registry of schools to which school owners could apply in order to recognized and possibly funded by the government, without which an institution was not allowed to call itself a school. This last reform would be the mechanism through which churches, municipalities, or civic organizations could create their own new schools. Schools were rarely unable to be listed, and the government funding mechanism allowed communities to create schools that could then be funded and eventually expanded by the government.

The ordinance’s reforms were the first tangible realization of TANU’s idea that Tanganyika’s education system should serve as both an economic tool and an intrinsic good for all citizens without discrimination. Less than two months later, after years of slow political escalation, Tanganyika gained full independence on December 9th, 1961. The Education Ordinance of 1961 did not take effect until January 1st 1962, and was passed by a legislative body and leader chosen by the people of Tanganyika. In this sense, it was both the first education

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42 Tanganyika National Assembly, October 30th 1961 An Ordinance to make provision for a Single System of Education in the Territory, Tanganyika Gazette, Dar es Salaam
45 Tanganyika National Assembly, October 30th 1961 An Ordinance to make provision for a Single System of Education in the Territory, Tanganyika Gazette, Dar es Salaam
law of independence, and a reminder that education could be a building block for a new
Tanganyika, intended for all regardless of race or creed. As Oscar Kambona noted in his first
parliamentary speech one year earlier Tangayika was a “far reaching experiment to show the
world the races can live in harmony.” 46 This description of Tanzania as a model for the world
carried particular weight because Kambona was one of the most important Tanganyikan
politicians and at the time served as Minister of Education. Before independence, Kambona had
been one of the leading figures in organizing support for TANU, and he most prominently served
later as Foreign Minister, at various points surpassed only by Nyerere in power and popularity. 47
In that first speech to the assembly, Kambona also made sure to note that almost every member
of the legislative body had brought up education in their speeches. As he further pointed out, this
first generation of Tanzanian leaders was disproportionately comprised of teachers. 48 As a group,
hey not only had benefited from education, but had actively participated in its provision.

Even aside from the demographic background of Tanganyikan leaders, these reforms at
the beginning of independence defined the structural function of schooling for years. The
commitment to removing race from education was the core of an effort by Tanganyikan leaders
to frame the newly formed nation as an egalitarian community where race, ethnicity, and religion
were not divisive issues. This narrative certainly fit the needs of an aspirational one party
government, but it also spoke to a utopian vision of harmony. 49 In some sense the scale of

46 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Hansard 18 October 1960. Tanganyika National Assembly, Session 1
49 It is important to note here that what constituted a one-party system in Tanganyika, and later Tanzania, would change. Originally this designation was just a representation of the lack of competitive opponents to the popular TANU, though opponents like the Tanganyikan African National Congress did exist. Later the one party system would be formalized, and it would only be possible to vote for TANU candidate. However, even in this context individuals still voted in competitive elections for local representatives from a slate of TANU representatives.
change was underrepresented by the committees report because it took for granted some of the grassroots change, local organizing, and legislative modification that TANU had been doing to shift the issue. However, these reforms were not especially radical, and came far from satisfying the desires of the party, people, and parliament. Tanganyika was a particularly poor African nation with significant dearth of even enough educated professionals to fill schools as teachers. Education was beginning to be talked about in universal terms as a right, but the dream of universal and compulsory education was a distant aspiration. In order to begin to bridge the gap between their aspirations and reality Tanganyikans would have to rely on external aid and the advice that came with it.

**Foreign Aid and Abet**

As an exiting colonial power, the British had plenty of advice and some aid to give, but Tanzania’s condemnation of British involvement in Rhodesia in 1965 caused a steep reduction in their unilateral aid. That same year, West German aid was complicated by Tanzania’s insistence on close relationship with East German. In the absence of ample aid from colonial powers, Tanzania’s path to external development aid ran through diversified unilateral relationships and the growing multilateral international development community. No singular example or road map existed for negotiating this reality. The Marshall Plan, an American-led project to rebuild Western Europe in the wake of World War II, acted as the first project of modern international development, but newly independent African states of the 1960s, like Tanganyika, were the first staging ground for creating a codified global process of

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Both international educational governmental bodies, like UNESCO, and international financial institutions, like the IMF, had been created in the 1940s, but only after the wave of African independence would their functions being to resemble that of their modern iterations. Similarly, during the 1960s civic societies and progressive social circles in Europe and the U.S. were just beginning to expand a now well-established global network of development NGOs. Most development NGOs saw their function as providing a boost of aid through short term projects that would allow poor countries to overcome deficits in capital, technology and knowledge. The implicit value structure of this mission and its possible long term consequences had yet to be robustly interrogated.

While nominally these organizations, institutions, and the network of nations that ran them were primarily invested in Tanganyika’s wellbeing and future prosperity, fissures quickly became clear between the future that Tanganyikans perceived as best for their country and what the international community thought was most prudent. Some of the earliest signs of this can be seen in the 1962 UNESCO Educational Planning Missions report on Tanganyika published in January of 1963. As the report was being written, Tanganyika was wrapping up its first year of both independence and its newly reformed education system. The report members documented this and congratulated Tanganyika on prioritizing a singular development goal rather than a range of programs when the 1961-1964 development plan for Tanganyika posited that the single greatest need for the “country’s development” was the “considerable expansion of secondary

54 Alan Fowler, "NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation?." Third world quarterly 21, no. 4 (2000): 637-654.
However, in their recommendation the UNESCO board members also made clear that they saw education not as a fundamental human right but as a complicated economic calculation, reflecting the trickle-down model implicit in early aid. They explicitly prefaced their list of primary recommendations with a statement that they worked under the “economic premise” that education would be a tool of “developing and administering the country” and thus all other uses, such as advancing “culture,” should be ignored. They also made clear that their vision included a distinctly un-egalitarian system of education, uninterested in the values described by TANU leaders since the creation of TANU. Charging fees for school was “to be encouraged,” ensuring that the poorest Tanganyikans would be unable to access this new learning. Part time schooling that enabled children from working families to still attend school was “highly undesirable” and would not be “tolerable” in the future. Perhaps most egregiously, it was explicitly stated that “emphasis should be placed on boy’s education.” This argument was justified on the perceived higher economic value boys generated from the cost of their education. In contrast to the discourse of Africa’s pre-modernity, often reinforced by bodies like UNESCO, Tanganyika was

more committed to the education of women than the international agencies and development charities “guiding” them. More broadly, though, this language of education as primarily an economic tool would later begin to infect the discourse of Tangayikan politics.

Despite the contradictions of such necessary associations, Tanganyika’s relationship with external donors was generally not confrontational and the education system maintained a general stasis during early independence. For the most part, during the early independence period of the early to mid-60s Tanganyika continued to simply find its footing as new nation. The 1964-1967 Development Plan was much the same as the first, lauding the expansion of secondary education and relying on the generosity of external donors.63 The nation tried to broadly follow a middle path in the Cold War where TANU endorsed a gentle vision of socialism utilizing communal “self-help” as a primary political and development ideology.64 Over those early years Zanzibar joined Tanganyika as semi-autonomous region, with a separate education system, creating Tanzania. Despite a few instances of political intrigue, rioting, and a brief retreat of Nyerere from the government, Tanzania remained relatively stable. However, few structural or systematic changes were made to overhaul the preexisting political and economic reality. TANU still had yet to accomplish, or even truly set many of the goals it had set for itself, and the path forward seemed somewhat murky under an ideologically mixed socialism. That moderation with the release of an TANU policy document, “The Arusha Declaration,” in 1967 as well as series of companion documents written by Nyerere himself, most notably the widely read “Socialism for Rural Development” and “Education for Self Reliance.”

65 TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance,[Dar es Salaam]: [Publicity Section, TANU], 1967
Tanzania Starts a Radical Shift

The Arusha Declaration was short, but it provided the missing ideological mandate for TANU as a governing party of Tanzania and included a more fleshed realization of education as both a right and an economic tool. On a structural level, it codified the formal creation of a one party political system, the nationalization of the economy, primary economic reliance on agriculture, cultural separation from Europe, and a continued investment on every level in Tanzanian and African identities.\textsuperscript{66} It also crucially expressed a commitment to a national framework of human rights, to include the international norms expressed in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and emphasized the importance of education.\textsuperscript{67} “Socialism and Rural Development” followed in 1968 and it outlined Nyerere’s understanding of African socialism as the utilization of indigenous African knowledge to embrace egalitarian social structures and avoid capitalist impulses. As Nyerere conceptualized it, this process would likely require a systemized embrace of structured villages theoretically based on family networks, the roots of the villagization process.\textsuperscript{68} However, despite its importance, “Socialism and Rural Development” was actually predated by the 1967 release of “Education for Self-Reliance.” In “Education for Self-Reliance,” Nyerere expanded on the idea of education as a human right by arguing that in fulfilling its obligation, Tanzanian public education needed to be egalitarian,

\textsuperscript{66} TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, [Dar es Salaam]: [Publicity Section, TANU], 1967
\textsuperscript{67} TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, [Dar es Salaam]: [Publicity Section, TANU], 1967


represent the educational needs dictated by the Tanzanian economic context, foster critical thinking, and impart the particular nature of Tanzanian society.⁶⁹

These concepts were a rebuke of the existing reality of education and assumed the right to education broadly. The idea that everyone should have equal access to education might seem simple, but it was a clear break from Tanzania’s educational past where the British used education as a tool to create a limited number of bureaucratic elite in “service of the colonial state.”⁷⁰ This principle was also an expansion of the Arusha Document’s claim “that all human beings are equal” through education.⁷¹ Just as egalitarianism in education was the companion to complete human equality, a right to pragmatic education was a fulfillment of the socialist right to labor and the “just return” of that labor.⁷² Nyerere believed that agriculture was the only economic option for Tanzanians, so preparing them for agriculture was a fair fulfillment of the promise of labor rewarded with fair compensation.⁷³ The responsibility of the state to use education in fostering critical thinking among its populace and not producing “robots” served to help ensure that every individual’s right to “take an equal part in government” was fulfilled on an intellectual level so that TANU and the Tanzanian could operate optimally.⁷⁴ Finally, the utilization of pre-existing knowledge from elders and the spread of government mandated socialist ideology fulfilled a right of Tanzanians to be educated in a distinctively Tanzanian, distinctly African way, which partially based on what Nyerere saw as the pre-colonial African

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⁷¹ TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, [Dar es Salaam]: [Publicity Section, TANU], 1967
⁷² TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, [Dar es Salaam]: [Publicity Section, TANU], 1967
pedagogy of education.\textsuperscript{75} Nyerere intended for education to serve the pragmatic needs of the Tanzanian people, and imagined a system of education that could accomplish that goal without compromising the state’s philosophical mandate to validate human rights, individual dignity, and African precolonial heritage.

\textbf{Early Cracks in the Right to Education}

Despite these sincere and progressive commitments, the limits of this understanding of education as a human right uniquely enabled by TANU should be easily apparent. Tanzanians’ individual ability to be educated outside of European standards might at first be liberating, but even the language of rights insured that the state had the sole authority to create a “Tanzanian” method of instruction. Tanzania as a cohesive identity was just recently constructed by state forces. The centralized Tanzanian identity was meant to hide ethnic difference at the same time that it capitalized on precolonial heritage that predated the concept of Tanzania. The notion of including a precolonial African pedagogy seems laudable, but even as an ideal it involved flattening a diversity of varied African identities and traditions.\textsuperscript{76} This slippage can be symbolized by the use of Swahili as the language of instruction.

Swahili was not the colonial language of English and it represented a break from a previous form of oppression. However, it was also not a language widely spoken at home by most individuals in Tanzania, rather it was a regional lingua franca.\textsuperscript{77} It was an African language, but it was not an indigenous or culturally specific language like Chaga, Datooga, or Bemba. It was a different kind of externally enforced standard, but it was still an enforced standard.

\textsuperscript{75} Nyerere, Julius K, "Education for self-reliance," \textit{The Ecumenical Review} 19, no. 4 (1967): 382-403
Controlling what constituted an African tradition with ahistorical state projects was a later flaw of Tanzania’s Ujamaa Vilijini, and this tendency is not completely absent from education reforms. Education served other state purposes as well. Empirical data from the era suggests education was successful as a political tool. Students of government controlled schools were more than 20% less likely to have complaints about the state than similar students who attended private schools. The nature of state education naturally involves some form of internal propagandizing, and Tanzania was no exception.

Cracks are also evident in the other expansions in the right to education made by Nyerere. There was a point past which the state did not want individuals to question the accepted socialist ideology, which makes it difficult to take completely seriously Nyerere’s claim that he wanted to grow questioning minds. A mind bounded by a strict ideological limit and centrally motivated to continually labor sounds quite familiar to the “robot” mentality Nyerere decried. This distaste for active dissent was not limited to a rebuke of groups considered regressive or opposed to wealth redistribution. It also included attempts by the state to mute radical student groups at the University of Dar es Salaam and the removal of the politically heterodox South African journalist Frene Ginwalla from her position as managing editor of the Tanzania Standard. The choice to justify the right to education as a tool to fulfill a right to labor and just compensation for that labor was similarly concerning because it was rooted in an assumption that the needs for labor were simply what the government planned for. If the party and government’s economists and bureaucrats misinterpreted the economic possibilities of the state, like underestimating the

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possibility of industrial growth, the nation’s right to fair labor and fair compensation would be abridged and the right to education would be rendered moot. Education became conditional on central planning. Finally, even Nyerere conceded that the fundamental egalitarianism of Tanzanian education was imperfect. “Only a few” Tanzanians would have the opportunity to attend secondary school under the existing economic circumstance and even fewer would be able to attend a university.  

The Codification of Tanzania’s New Approach to Education

Despite these limitations, “Education for Self-Reliance” was an ambitious project and soon became the basis for the next Tanzanian education law, the Education Act of 1969 which effectively made established party doctrine codified state regulations. The majority of the text of the Education Act of 1969 was concerned with creating legally enforceable definitions for categories like school and committee, but the Act’s most important impacts included resetting the baseline for Tanzanian education law, functionally nationalizing education, and re-structuring the process of governing education in Tanzania. The process of formally resetting Tanzanian education policy started with repealing the Education Ordinance in order to further excise vestigial colonial practices and to avoid contradictory definitions or guidance. The process of nationalization was perceived as an extension of this reset and was primarily comprised of the state taking over the operation of formally private mission schools. The takeover was implemented as an extension of the act’s stronger non-discriminatory admissions policy for schools and sought to address the marginalization of Muslim students who were excluded in

82 United Republic of Tanzania, Education Act of 1969, December 1969
predominantly Christian areas without other educational opportunities. This prompted some
discontent among Tanzanian priests and pastors, but secular education continued to be
supplemented by religious groups and NGOS.84

The act’s bureaucratic reorganization of the education system involved mandatory
teacher certification, the establishment of Local Education Committees and the consolidation of
the education system into the hands of the Minister of Education.85 The Assembly’s
establishment of Local Education Committees was meant to create regionally accountable
government body that drew from existing community leaders, and the consolidation of control
under the Minister of Education was meant to clarify and reinforce a clear chain of state
authority for education. Mandatory teacher certification was a secondary change intended to
allow greater government oversight of teacher credentials. Across the board these reforms
removed the remaining presence of colonial methods served as an attempt to make good on a real
right to education, and ensured that the state had tighter control over every aspect of education in
Tanzania. Viewed collectively, these reforms mirrored the contradictions between expanded state
power and individual rights seen in Nyerere’s personal writings. In effect, the act was meant to
begin making Nyerere’s theoretical writings codified policy.

**Education as Women’s Work**

The 1969 Education Act also included, as the prominent Tanzanian politician and head
of the TANU women’s organization Bibi Titi Mohammed was proud to note of the 1961

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84 William Anangisye and Augustino Mligo, "The contribution of religious institutions to the development of secular

85 United Republic of Tanzania, Education Act of 1969, December 1969
Education Ordinance, no separation between the education of girls and boys.\textsuperscript{86} As Titi Mohammed drew attention to, making no gendered distinction in Tanzanian education was a continuing rebuttal to both domestic norms and international methodologies which saw boys as more valuable than girls. Despite being only semi-literate herself, Titi Mohammed was one of many Tanzanian women who saw gender neutral education policies like the Education Act of 1969 as part of ensuring that women were a part of Tanzania’s imagined egalitarian future.\textsuperscript{87} Titi Mohammed had only a few years of any kind of formal schooling as a child both because of her gender and Islamic faith, but took advantage of basic literacy instruction as adult, a trend that was not uncommon among her demographic peers.\textsuperscript{88} The existing historiography suggests that, starting in the lead-up to independence and continuing into the era of independence, many working class women saw attaining education, for themselves and for their daughters, as a fulfillment of a trend towards greater autonomy.\textsuperscript{89} This new space for was fostered both by societal shifts, like the monetization of bride wealth, and personal ones, the death or divorce of a first husband.\textsuperscript{90}

This broad base of support for girl’s education was amplified by women in power.\textsuperscript{91} Bibi Titi Mohammed was the first woman to join TANU and, because of her success organizing

\textsuperscript{86} East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Hansard, Tanganyika National Assembly Education, Second Readings, 12 December 1619
\textsuperscript{87} Susan Geiger, “Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania and the Needs of the Rural Poor.” \textit{African Studies Review} 25, no. 2-3 (1982): 45-65
\textsuperscript{88} Susan Geiger, “Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania and the Needs of the Rural Poor.” \textit{African Studies Review} 25, no. 2-3 (1982): 45-65
\textsuperscript{90} John Iliffe, 531, 1979, \textit{A Modern History of Tanganyika}, New York, Cambridge University Press.
\textsuperscript{91} While most of this paper is structured chronologically, this section appears near the end of the first chapter not because women did not actively shape education before 1969 but because the role of women during the 1950s and 1960s has only partially been integrated into the larger historiography of Tanzanian independence. Susan Geiger’s work in this area is foundational as a source of both information and theory. Her life histories of
communities like beer brewers and dance club members, was one of the two or three most important political figures at the turn of Tanganyikan independence along with Kambona and Nyerere, but she not the only prominent women to hold political power and advocate for girl’s education. Unlike Titi Mohammed and her peers, Lucy Lameck came from a moderately well off Christian farming family and directly benefited from educational opportunities early on in life starting with a Catholic mission school. Her early involvement with TANU organizing resulted in her being sponsored to study briefly at Oxford just before independence. At independence, she was part of the first group of elected members of parliament and became the first woman in Tanzania to hold a ministerial post as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives and Community Development.

In that position, Lameck was part of overseeing and directing the majority of Tanzania’s adult education programs throughout the 1960s. One such program was an extended literacy campaign in the Singida region which counted 25,898 members of which 16,162 were women. In a follow up that Lameck would have likely reviewed, a Community Development Officer, Miss M.R. Jellicoe, described the possibility of expanding the program to more rural and decentralized Turu communities given the interest of the local women and potential UNESCO assistance. This liminal space between the Tanzanian state and international aid was another

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Tanzanian women are the main source of information available on prominent women, particularly working class organizer like Titi Mohammed, and it is her interpretation of these women as neither fitting into the discourse of the general populace or language of “great men” like Nyerere that prompted me to use this divergent structure.

95 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, M.R. Jellicoe, Occasional Papers on Community Development, 1962, East African Literature Bureau
96 M.R. Jellicoe, Occasional Papers on Community Development, 1962, East African Literature Bureau
important space where powerful women worked on spreading education. Lady Marion Chesham, an American born widow of a British expatriate farmer in Tanzania, was one such woman and was actively involved in Tanzanian politics throughout early independence, serving as a member of parliament and a close friend of Julius Nyerere’s.\(^97\) Perhaps most importantly though, she set up, and briefly ran, the Community Development Trust Fund under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s office. The CDFT was a program that funneled assistance from external NGO’s into development projects in rural Tanzania, including significant investment into schools and adult literacy, and many development NGOs, like Oxfam, saw it as their primary planning partner in launching new projects.\(^98\) During Lady Chesham’s tenure, the CDFT often encouraged projects targeted at eliminating burdens on women based on the idea women would be the driving force behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and opportunity. This gendered approach to development was well ahead of its time, and when Lady Chesham stepped down it was continued by the Tanzanian woman who replaced her, Martha Bulengo.\(^99\)

Unfortunately, even this active leadership and groundswell of popular support from women did not always directly translate to complete equity in education for boys and girls in Tanzania. As Tanzanian scholar Marjorie Mbilinyi documented in 1969, the ratio of girls enrolled in primary school to boys enrolled was approximately 1 to 1.598.\(^100\) In rural communities the ratio was even more lopsided at 1 to 1.77, though it dropped down to 1 to 1.22 in urban areas. At the time, Mbilinyi conducted a study of the cause of this discrepancy between

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policy and practice which focused on interviewing fathers of school age girls enrolled in primary education and parents of girls who were not enrolled. She concluded that girls’ comparative under-enrollment was primarily linked to families’ reliance on school girls’ domestic work and the expectation that girls would get married in place of holding jobs.\textsuperscript{101} This patriarchal tendency to undervalue the formal learning and knowledge of women extended to the treatment of women field officers, agricultural assistants, and school teachers. In one such instance, the male principal of a farming school in Ukiriguru, one of four Ministry of Agricultural Training Institutes, noted to a World Bank researcher that men were often dismissive toward female field workers the school trained despite the fact women did more farm work than men in most households.\textsuperscript{102}

Such indignities and condescension’s were experienced by even the most powerful women. Less than three months after lauding the 1969 Education Act, Bibi Titi Mohammed was detained by the government for her connection to a possible coup attempt by Oscar Kambona. She was quickly convicted, and, despite a presidential pardon in 1972, never regained any of her former political or personal clout.\textsuperscript{103} Lucy Lameck avoided such intrigue, but despite a career of public service that did not end until 1992 with her death, she was never chosen for a higher position than Deputy Minister. Even the elderly Lady Chesham became a political liability before her death in 1973. Other party and government officials resented her close relationship with Julius Nyerere and repeatedly critiqued Nyerere for listening to the opinions and advice of a white woman.\textsuperscript{104} Post-independence education structures greatly reduced gendered disparities in

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education and explicitly validated the equal claim of girls to the right to education. However, even radical pronouncements like the Arusha Declaration’s statement that “Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania” or Nyerere’s comment that women were the mother of the nation framed women within traditional gender norms. To reap the benefits of education women not only had to grapple with the expanding power of the state, but the continuing presence of patriarchal cultural norms.

**Conclusion**

From the early independence movement through 1969, education played a key role in popularizing Tanganyikan claims to independence and was a central concern of both the Tanzanian leadership and general populace. At the outset of self-governance, TANU and the Tanganyikan state proactively committed to education as a right for all citizens, and eliminated the legal frameworks of discrimination based on racial, religious, and gender difference that had defined the sparse colonial systems. The resulting process of actually building the system of education that these legal changes mandated helped model the diversified range of development aid that Tanzania would come to rely on while also demonstrating the limitations caused by international agencies’ short time lines and primary interest in quantitative economic outcomes.

Domestically, the first decade of independent rule was marked by a tentative socialist politics that had yet to be fully developed, but the political pamphlets written by Julius Nyerere provided some insight into the later egalitarian possibilities of Ujamaa as a political philosophy while also portending its tendencies towards coercive standardization. Education was as central to this increasingly radical project of African socialism as it had been to the independence movement,

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and by 1969, Tanzania’s legal system quickly began to reflect TANU’s reinforced commitment to education as an uninfraingeable right and as the expanding engine of long term state-led development. Women were instrumental to Tanzania’s state prioritization of education, and the number and percentage of girls and women enrolled in primary education and adult education increased significantly. However, this expansion of education was not enough to close the education gap between girls and boys, let alone the larger power inequalities between men and women. These initial successes and limitations of Tanzanian education foreshadowed the even larger accomplishments and missteps on the horizon as Nyrere led Tanzania into the 1970’s.
Chapter 2

Common Knowledge: Teaching African Socialism 1969 to 1985

The 1970s and early 80s serve as an inflection point in the history of Tanzanian education. Serving as both the halcyon days of expansion and the harbinger of downturn and austerity, this era is critical to understanding both the amazing successes of Tanzanian education and the contradictions that made it possible. By integrating human rights with appeals to economic development, Tanzania was able to channel local will while creating external political interest in education. There were limited alternatives, but the state’s proactive commitments were still noteworthy given the significant limitations Tanzania faced. Legal structures were less important in changing policy during this time period than they had been before. This partially reflected the fact that the foundation for the nation’s education system had already been set but was also a result of the more direct assimilation of TANU/CCM party politics into the functions of the Tanzanian state. With the escalation of socialism in 1969, the Tanzanian government became a vehicle for the ambitious possibilities, and catastrophic failures, of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. The period running from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s was as an era of enormous educational success for the Tanzanian state, both in accessibility and quality, which can also retrospectively be recognized as the beginning of a precipitous decline in the importance and provision of education in Tanzania. That decline was ironically caused, in part, by the same development oriented mindset that enabled the earlier successes, and exacerbated by other state commitments.
What Was Ujamaa

The successes of the 1970s were not catalyzed by a spontaneous explosion of interest in education, though interest did rapidly expand. Through 1985, Tanzanian leaders, particularly Nyerere, understood Tanzania’s commitment to education as extending from the ideological frameworks described in “Ujamaa,” the Arusha Declaration, and Education for Self-Reliance, and TANU’s decision to double down on education expenditures stemmed from the party’s broader interest in bringing the goals of those texts to fruition. Unfortunately this connection complicates the clarity of interpreting the successes of education because. Both Ujamaa and the Arusha Declaration are better known as early blueprints, along with other documents like Socialism for Rural Development, for Ujamaa Vilijini, the harmful resettlement project that has come to define both the modern historiography of the Tanzanian state and Ujamaa as a political philosophy. Because of the historical and ideological importance of villagization, understanding any project undertaken by TANU or the Tanzanian state in the 1970’s includes reckoning with the ongoing failure of resettlement programs. This is particularly true because the spread of schools and adult learning programs in Tanzania were directly connected to the development funds Tanzania used to build the new Ujamaa villages.

As mentioned in the introduction, the larger political project of Ujamaa was not just the collectivization of individuals into reconstituted village structures. It was a comprehensive politics of localized socialism developed primarily by Julius Nyerere as the party ideology of TANU. Influenced greatly by an early exposure to both Marx and egalitarian theology, Nyerere wanted Tanzania to follow socialist doctrine, but thought that most existing socialist models
could only function in European contexts. In Nyerere’s mind, this necessitated the creation of an African socialism that could account for the kinship networks and communal economies of precolonial and colonial African. The result was Ujamaa, a Swahili word that roughly translates as familyhood. According to Nyerere, under Ujamaa the state would combine the technical knowledge of modernity with precolonial communal economies. In the process, existing hierarchies of family and community would become extensions of the egalitarian socialist state and the economic development of the state would remain founded in agricultural production.

The primary impediments to this program were the aforementioned enemies of Tanzania: ignorance, disease, and poverty, and it was in relation to these enemies that Nyerere measured education. As discussed in the first chapter, Nyerere saw education as both normatively valuable and as necessary to spread new technical knowledge which would in turn make Ujamaa economically feasible. For Nyerere ignorance was an amorphous notion, generally referring to an uncritical lack of knowledge, and only a rigorous national education system that created self-reflective and literate citizens could eradicate it. Education was also one of many tools, like new practices in agriculture and fairer distribution of wealth, needed to combat disease and national poverty. For Nyerere, villagization was a necessary part of structuring land in a way that was both socialist and accessible to state control, but education more directly addressed the issues of greatest concern under Ujamaa. However, the international aid community was enthralled with the development-oriented mandate of villagization, and Ujamaa’s political

complexity enabled a wide range of donors, which will be explored later. When party leaders began to actually force the resettlement of Tanzanian farmers and peasants into planned villages in 1973 they did so, in part, because of overwhelming international support, not in spite of international condemnation.\footnote{James C Scott,, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.}

In order to more deeply understand the failure of resettlement, it is useful to build from James C. Scott’s interrogation of the process of villagization in the sixth chapter of his book \textit{Seeing Like a State}. Scott’s particular criticisms are valuable both because they cut to the most damning assumption of Ujamaa and because his work is perhaps the most widely cited discussion of villagization.\footnote{James C Scott,, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.} This is true to the point that his analysis has come to define Tanzania for many scholars. Scott’s narrative history of Tanzanian coercive resettlement starts with Nyerere’s decision in 1973 to make consolidated villagization mandatory. Resettlement had previously been voluntary since 1967.\footnote{James C Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.} Nyerere asked that this mandate be enacted through village meetings and persuasion, but local official were still held accountable to ensuring resettlement actually occurred, so many interpreted this persuasive mandate loosely.

As Scott recounts, this resulted in government coercion on the local level that extended burning down houses and making famine aid conditional on moving to government villages. When news of this violent coercion eventually reached Nyerere he emphatically restated that resettlement should be facilitated by dialogue, but he doubted the breadth of the problem and took no steps to make resettlement voluntary again before planned villagization was abandoned.

\footnotesize{111 James C Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.  
113 James C Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.}
in 1976. When Tanzanian farmers did eventually move to government villages they often found them poorly laid out and inattentive to the needs of actual residents. In some regions, village planners paid little consideration to water sources or soil fertility, and in most instances of resettlement, indigenous agricultural knowledge was completely ignored. Because of this ignorance of local agricultural specificities, government policies created an aesthetics of agricultural development that was incongruous with the destructive reality. As Scott points, the ecological failure of villagization directly mirrored earlier agricultural failures by British colonialists. He further argues that Nyerere and other leading Tanzanian were ultimately passive ideological actors, entranced by the high modernism of the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development.

Scott’s description of planned villages under Ujamaa provides useful insights into the authoritarian tendencies of TANU leaders, but it also occasionally fails to capture the generative potential of Ujamaa by ignoring Tanzania’s political specificity. Two particularly valuable insights Sweet’s narrative tangentially provides, are that schools were often built in planned villages to encourage peasant movement and that these schools utilized democratic student governance systems, a program many Tanzanians lauded. Taken together these aspects of resettlement are a reminder that the Tanzanian state’s interest in expanded and innovative education opportunities was shared by the peasant population, but also complicates any attempt to disentangle the gains of education from the high modernist failures of resettlement. More

broadly, Sweet’s connection of the authoritarian coercion of resettlement to the state’s damaging reliance on development narratives from external aid benefactors demonstrates the erosive power of development discourse on rights in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{118}

Given the primacy of his writing, Scott’s sporadic lapses of political specificity and historical rigor also provide valuable insight into the limitations of judging Ujamaa solely by the failures of resettlement. Scott repeatedly equates Stalin and the Ethiopian Dergue with Tanzania under Ujamaa, while only passingly noting that the Tanzania state did not embrace the actively fatal coercion of either regime.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, he briefly acknowledges that even during Ujamaa Nyerere and TANU remained popular among Tanzanian peasants, before declaring that this was also based in the distaste for colonial agricultural policies.\textsuperscript{120} Read together, these two attempts to minimize Tanzania’s difference effectively close off the academic space to read Ujamaa as a project negotiated within the limited space of poverty Cold War binaries. It also obfuscates any other desires of Tanzanian peasants outside opposition to resettlement despite citing Göran Hydén, whose work interrogates one aspect of that exact subject.\textsuperscript{121} This erasure of varied agency extends to actors within the state. In one instance, Scott argues that Nyerere’s preference for authoritarianism over organic peasant communities of was demonstrated by the closure of Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). This ignores that Nyerere referred to the leader of Ruvuma as the only true socialist and only conceded shutting down the project to keep party

\textsuperscript{118} James C Scott. \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.

\textsuperscript{119} James C Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.

\textsuperscript{120} James C Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}. Yale University Press, 1998.

\textsuperscript{121} Hydén, Göran. \textit{Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry}. Univ of California Press, 1980.
loyalty in check. Understanding the overlapping interest of the Tanzanian state and populace in education is best facilitated by interpreting TANU’s interest in the provision of social services, like schooling, as at least partially sincere, and the dominance of Scott’s narrative of Tanzanian leaders as exclusively high modernist caricatures unnecessarily precludes that analysis.

Rejecting the limited agency that Scott ascribes to Tanzanians does not mean discarding his critique of resettlement as part of Ujamaa. Even among more sympathetic audiences, the dominant scholarly interpretation of resettlement has been as a “noble social experiment” that turned into a “miserable failure.” It undeniably true that rural Tanzanian populace did not embrace initial voluntary relocations, and eventually nearly 6 million people were coercively relocated in some capacity. However, as Bonny Ibhawoh and J. I. Dibua have argued, Ujamaa is better understand as a discourse than as a set of policies. While some specific collectivist policies failed, much of the larger language of Ujamaa as shared socialist uplift remained popular. Education embodied Ujamaa’s popular socialist narrative that every citizen deserved a certain standard of life, to include literacy and useable skills for labor. In the Tanzanian case, unlike the Ethiopian Dergue, socialism actually provided an effective social good demanded by the populace. Reviewing policies and proclamations of the 1970s, like the Musoma Declaration, begins illuminate the way in which the government saw education as essential to the official form of socialist and the extent to which education projects were embraced by Tanzanian peasants in ways other contemporary reforms were not.

A New Kind of Education Policy

Outside of the shared discourse of Ujamaa, one way in which Tanzania education and villagization were linked was that both not explicitly guided by legislative acts. In both cases most important changes came from informal and formal policy around funding or external negotiation. Laws mostly served to affirm policies that were already occurring under ministerial departments and through party organs. At the implementation of the Arusha Declaration, TANU divided the entire country into units of 10 family cells, and the party perceived this structure of governance as filling in the state’s responsibility for state accountability. In 1973 TANU combined with the Zanzibari independence party to be renamed CCM. No document better represents the opaqueness of Tanzanian education policy formation during this new CCM Ujamaa period than the Musoma Resolution. Agreed upon in 1973, the Musoma Resolution was a TANU, which was renamed CCM party decision to radically move up the deadline for universal and compulsory primary education from the end of the 80s or beginning of the 90s to 1979, just 6 years later. It also required all university students in Tanzania to serve two year of public service.

That declaration prompted some of the most rapid expansion of education in Tanzania, and the public service requirement was controversial among college students. Aside from the Arusha Declaration, and Education for Self-Reliance, few document from the Ujamaa era are more referenced or discussed by scholars interested in Tanzanian education than the Musoma Resolution. However, it was not a law so it did not appear in the National Gazette and it was

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128 This is particularly true in literature analyzing Tanzanian education as part of development policy.
not widely discussed by name in contemporary newspapers.\textsuperscript{129} While the Arusha Declaration, and to a lesser extent “Education for Self-Reliance”, are common knowledge among Tanzanians, the Musoma Declaration is not only rarely discussed, it is basically unheard of.\textsuperscript{130} This might partially be attributed to the fact that it is almost impossible to find. Most of the academics discussing it cite secondary material, and essentially no copy is available outside of the National Archives.\textsuperscript{131} It is even frequently mistakenly referred to as having been drafted or voted on in 1974. The centralized logic of state control did not prevent Tanzania from remaining committed to education, but it did undermine transparency already eroded by the shrinking voice of political voices that were not Nyerere.

\textbf{New Leadership and the Increasingly Rapid Expansion of Education}

Tanzanian leadership was not limited to Nyerere in the 1970s, but it is true that many of the other leading figures of early independence fell out from prominence. Oscar Kambona and Bibi Titi Mohammed were political outcasts, Lady Chesham died, and even Lucy Lameck lost her seat in 1970 and did not regain it until 1975. As a result, a new generation of leaders began to appear that did not have popularity or external constituencies separate from their position within the state. As a result there were fewer prominent political voices outside education, and this trend extended to education. While Oscar Kambona was technically the first Minister of Education during 1961, Solomon Eliufoo took over the position in 1962. Eliufoo was originally chosen for

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\textsuperscript{130} This can documented by the secondary school curriculums available from HakiElimu and the experience of talking to a variety of residents. This lack of knowledge extends to even those officials currently tasked with crafting education policy.
\textsuperscript{131} I talked to multiple experts who said they had no idea where to find a copy and that they themselves simply relied on citing other secondary sources. I was not able to enter the national archives or the CCM party archives, but none of the other archives I visited had a copy or any other documentation of the events around the resolution. To my knowledge there might not be any accessible public copy anywhere.
\end{footnotesize}
the cabinet because he was perceived as one the most popular moderate Tanganyikan leaders, and prior to joining the government he had served as education secretary of the Lutheran Church.\textsuperscript{132} Eliufoo served as Minister of Education for most of the 1960’s, and he defined the role more than any other following Education Minister.\textsuperscript{133} He was both popular and effective and his name became a mainstay in East African newspaper headlines documenting his strong tack with teachers unions, his travel to newly built schools, and the exponential increase in Tanzania’s education enrollment.\textsuperscript{134} However, at the turn of the decade Eliufoo suffered a stroke and stepped down as Minister of Education to be replaced by C.J. Mgonja.\textsuperscript{135}

C.J. Mgonja would be a less vital part of Tanzania’s education history, but he took over the Ministry at an inflection point of scale. Education was still be a priority in Tanzania, but the days of steady incremental growth through a modified version of the colonial model were now gone. In its place, TANU planned to spend the next decade expanding a radical vision of education as a truly universal right and as an economic building block of African socialism. In fact, Mgonja’s first major speech was an introduction of the second five year development plan for education. Eliufoo had led through first five year cycle starting in 1964, but this second iteration was more than a bureaucratic report, it was a blueprint for the future. Even the more moderate Eliufoo, who had led the Ministry of Education while the report was being written, hoped that it would solidify education as “a cementing matrix of \textit{Ujamaa} and progress.”\textsuperscript{136} 

\textsuperscript{134} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Tanganyika Standard and Tanzania Standard archive 1961-1968.
\textsuperscript{135} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.
Mgonja’s word, the 60s had been spent creating most of the basic foundational infrastructure needed to create and run a multiracial national education system, but the 70s would be spent transforming Tanzania’s “entire educational system into a powerful instrument of socialist development.”\footnote{Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.} The old report had been called “A Plan for Consolidation” while the second was named “A Plan for Revolutionary Change.”\footnote{Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.} Mgonja was a somewhat important member of parliament, but this shift in discourse obviously owed much to Nyerere. Mgonja admitted as much saying that the policies contained in the plan were meant to create the ideal Tanzanian education system as it had “been explained to us by the Father of our Nation.”\footnote{Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.} Even when espousing the value of education in a Tanzanian socialist state where supposedly anyone’s voice could be heard, it was important to make sure that President Nyerere’s voice was heard the loudest.

The actual proposals of the document were no less revolutionary than the rhetorical flourishes in Mgonja’s speech announcing it like: “Education for All is a basic socialist principle, and no expense should be spared to bring it about in increasing measure.”\footnote{Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.} Insuring that the country was on track to achieve Universal Primary Education was named as the plan’s first priority, despite that it could more than double the government’s education budge. However the development plan for education was not limited to primary school enrollment. The complete list of 19 core objectives were a wide range of ambitious projects. For example, the plan outlined a road to doubling the number of teachers receiving certification each year to 2,850, but it also included a mandate to create Faculties of Medicine and Engineering at the University of Dar es
Salaam.\textsuperscript{141} The basic resources required for primary education were created, but this did not take away from Nyerere’s belief that the university needed to be expanded to address the “particular and urgent problems” of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{142} Similarly, primary schools would become “people’s schools” that reflected the daily life of villages through newly rewritten syllabi, and simultaneously adult literacy classes would also be expanded due to “popular demand.”\textsuperscript{143}

Every aspect of education was slated for growth and expansion in the report and education itself would be asked to do more. On one hand subjects which “play[ed] a part in development” would be given preference and a second technical college would be set up in Tanzania to encourage skilled laborers, but on the other hand national culture was to be fostered by the creation of museums and adult lessons were to include political and social education.\textsuperscript{144} This surprising utilization of culture in the face of economic had two roots, outside of the direct connection to Ujamaa. Literacy is an iterative process, and policy makers hoped that cultural materials would keep Tanzanians engaged with reading. This aim would be reinforced in 1972 with the launch of program to create regional libraries.\textsuperscript{145} The other value of spreading cultural goods stemmed was, as Laura Fair has theorized about drive-in theatres in Dar es Salaam during the same period, the validation socialism’s ability to provide an enjoyable life.\textsuperscript{146} Though not explicitly stated in this document, the implication of the report was that education was the answer to any social or economic ills that might face Tanzania, and the government intended to

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\textsuperscript{141} Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.
\textsuperscript{142} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Julius Nyerere, “The University’s Role in the Development of the New Countries”, March 1970
\textsuperscript{143} Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.
\textsuperscript{144} Outline of the Second Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.
\textsuperscript{145} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Simon Malya, “Creating Literacy Surroundings in Tanzania”, 1978, Kenyan Literature Bueareu
\end{footnotesize}
treat education appropriately as a cure all. All that this commitment to education as a right and as an economic duty would cost was hundreds of millions of shillings the government didn’t have and the voluntary commitment of the Tanzanian people to building much of the actual physical groundwork. Unlike the case of villagization, Tanzanian citizens bought in. It was also here, at the point of funding and individual construction programs, that external actors would get further involved in Tanzania’s newly “decolonized” education system.\footnote{Outline of the Scond Five Year Development Plan for the Department of Education, 1970, Tanzania Press.}

**International Plaudits and Dollars**

Despite some skepticism about the feasibility of Tanzania’s goals, aid organizations latched on to Tanzania as an exemplary nation. This embrace was the result of a wide range of influences, but it started from the very top. While Nyerere was solidifying deific status in his own country, he also parlayed his charisma and intelligence into a sterling international reputation. When American newspapers, particularly African-American newspapers, discussed Tanzania they invariably mentioned Nyerere, an embodiment of black excellence and the capacity of black people for self-rule.\footnote{ABOUT NYERERE. 1966. *Afro-American* (1893-1988), Jan 22, 1966. (accessed December 11, 2017).} The American President Jimmy Carter called him “the man who has the best insight into African problems of anyone I’ve ever met.”\footnote{Jimmy Carter: “Visit of President Nyerere of Tanzania Remarks to Reporters Following the President’s Departure,” August 5, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.} When international aid reports summarized the governance structure of Tanzania a laudatory sentence or two was always saved for Nyerere who was as “masterful an author as he [was] a political theoretician.”\footnote{Lewis, L.J, Coppen, Helen, Loveridge, A.J., Pratt, Simon, Tretiakov, I.P., Wal, W. van der, Cameron, John; Mhaiki, I.J, 31 Jan. 1963, Report of UNESCO educational planning mission for Tanganyika - (mission).} Nyerere used this popularity in particular as part of Tanzania’s participation in the Non-Aligned movement, which he saw as an opportunity for postcolonial autonomy.
Tanzania did not commit to the Soviet bloc or the United States, and the state shared this non-affiliation as part of a broader coalition of non-aligned states, many of whom shared a similar development and nationalist oriented socialist politics.\textsuperscript{151}

Because of this lack of clear political affiliation, Tanzania had much greater autonomy in accepting aid from a wide range of actors than many other poor nations who were reliant on a single set of factional allies. In contrast, the Tanzanian state could feasibly accept Peace Corp volunteers, draw on Cuban expertise, partner with China on agricultural funding, and continue to receive money from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{152} This resulted in a wide range of external aid partners, all of which were financially critical given the both Tanzania’s poverty and the ambitiousness of the State’s projects. As mentioned above, Tanzania was one of the earliest and closest partners of emerging development NGO’s like Oxfam. This close partnership with NGOs extended to the, often underestimated, development resources of religious aid organizations.

Nyerere was a devout Catholic, and many progressive Christian leaders saw the Arusha Declaration as the almost divine forefront of a new kind of Christian Socialism.\textsuperscript{153} By 1980, Catholic Relief Services alone was operating 33 ongoing projects directly connected to Ujamaa.\textsuperscript{154} Among Islamic leaders and aid networks, the Aga Khan led a stream of aid towards building new schools.\textsuperscript{155} Perhaps most impressive of these multilateral relationships, it was Tanzania’s approach to agricultural education that convinced the religiously World Bank to

\textsuperscript{152} East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, Non-Alignment in the 1970s, Julius K. Nyerere, April 13-17th 1970
\textsuperscript{153} East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, The Arusha Declaration and Christian Socialism, Tanzania Publishing House, 1969
\textsuperscript{154} East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, Evaluation: Self-Reliance Projects in Schools and Villages, Catholic Relief Services Tanzania Project, 1980
\textsuperscript{155} East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, His Highness the Aga Khan, Education for Development, East Africa Institute, November 16, 1966.
begin funding education projects in the late 60’s, and it was also Tanzania’s expansion of those projects under Ujamaa that convinced the World Bank to expand their funding policies to include assistance with training. On a less groundbreaking scale, Tanzania was also able to draw on America’s USAID resources throughout Ujamaa despite Nyerere’s repeated critiques of American policy.

In spite of Tanzania’s increasingly socialist politics speaking the language of development opened up significant investment from even conservative aid agencies. For nations more sympathetic to socialism, especially wealthy Nordic Countries, Tanzania’s development project was even more appealing. Through 1979 Tanzania received 15.9% of Norway’s total development aid and was Norway’s most significant aid partnership. Sweden’s development agency, SIDA, was similarly generous, and through 1990 Tanzania received 15.3% of all Swedish aid. SIDA was particularly important to Tanzania because Sweden actively sought to avoid neocolonial power structures early on in its aid dispersal and was also especially invested in a tradition of supporting egalitarian projects targeted at the rural poor. When Tanzanian development coordinators were given a comparatively high amount of autonomy in deciding where Swedish aid went, they directed vast majority funding to education. At one point this aid was as much as a third of Tanzania’s total education budget. Further to the political left, China

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was a particularly close ideological ally of Tanzania’s, and provided almost entirely unconditional aid to the state broadly in the form of grants and loans. The Soviet Union’s development programs were less transparent so it is difficult to interpret the scope of their giving, but it is clear that Tanzania received development assistance from the Soviet bloc.

This unique depth and range in development aid partners provides several insights into the operation of Tanzanian education. By side stepping much of the most explicit political segregation of the Cold War, Tanzania was able to harness resources that far outstripped its reputation as one of the 25 poorest and least developed countries in the world. Without a clear linkage of education to development, there is little chance Tanzania would have had access to even a fraction of those resources. Certainly, Tanzanian state’s programmatic commitment to education for all was a bold and drastic goal, and the perceived apolitical appeal of agricultural development and education was central to achieving it. Education could be palatable as a step towards developing capitalist production for the United States, a fulfillment of peasant empowerment for the Soviets, and as a model for technical literacy training for World Bank bureaucrats.

On the flip side, this wide range of actors all invested in Ujamaa with very different goals and only moderate long term commitments. The pull of international money weakened the reliance of the Tanzanian state on its populace for support, and required repeatedly negotiating the issue of nonnegotiable rights. This imbalanced power dynamic incentivized development workers to develop the kind of schooling and classes that international agencies thought would

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be most useful, rather than what local Tanzanians were most interested in. As Marjorie Mbilinyi noted with concern in 1976, the international aid community conceptualized poor countries as deserving lesser degrees of education. Tanzania’s reliance on development aid to grow education also meant that new projects had to be constantly launched, regardless of public interest. Donors had little to no interest in continuing programs in regions that already had adult literacy classes, technical colleges, or teacher training programs. The infrastructure maintenance was assumed to be taken over by the Tanzanian government leaving education development projects dangerously hollow in the long term.

Despite this top down aid strategy and the coercive bent of centralized government planning, by all accounts Tanzania’s commitment to education remained popular domestically. In fact this popularity was part of what motivated such substantive international investment in Tanzania. In explaining how “seriously” Tanzanians took education, one UNESCO worker described how even her cab driver knew the academic function of each building on University of Dar es Salaam’s campus and how education was treated by almost everyone she met as a form of “moral and material improvement.” Similarly, after returning to the U.S. one Peace Corp volunteer remarked how his Tanzanian students had been as “bright and hardworking” in their pursuit of education as any children he had met. These account are duplicated by the description of many other aid workers, and it was part of source of Tanzania’s perception as a unique space for education-oriented development. This broad support was convenient for Tanzanian government officials because broad popularity was also the party line of CCM. For

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the party, education proved the validity of a socialist system in which the needs and desires of the general population were reflected through the organ of the party and the legislature.167

Local Voices and Written Words

The importance of popular support for education started with the legal framework for creating schools. The easy process of incorporation of formerly private schools into the public system meant that many schools sprung up after local communities built them with the intention of having the government takeover operation.168 Even further, to some extent the bottom-up mindset had to be true for the entire system to function. Self-help programs, where local people contributed the labor for building a school or road, were financially necessary to make most construction possible, even for externally funded projects.169 A similar logic governed adult education learning. Adult Education programs provided instruction for literacy, numeracy, and a wide range of specialized skills. They were part of a massive project that the government Community Development bureau spent hundreds of thousands of shillings and sparked some of the greatest external aid. However, the program still usually relied on the, often voluntary, work of students from local schools who taught many of the classes.170 In this sense, the massive scale of education programs, absent the sort of coercion seen in forced land reform, should serve as a degree of proof that education mattered to the general populace as much as it mattered to the party and government.171 The Tanzania Standard could proudly run headlines like “Moshi

Student Start Literacy Classes for over 2,000” or “New Schools Built in Iringa with Self Help” daily because the population mobilized around a national vision that centered education as an engine of change and a platform for enabling dignity.172

The speeches of political officials and the taxi cab conversations of aid workers weren’t the only manifestation that the exponential growth in education Tanzania experiences was in part a project of the people. When asked, participants in expanding education programs were laudatory in their description of the comprehensive education scheme. Perhaps the most telling version of this is the interviews that were done with participants in Adult Education programs for projects like Yusuf O. Kassam’s book examining the qualitative impact of Tanzania’s education and literacy programs, “Illiterate No More: The Voice of New Literates from Tanzania.”173 It would make sense that adults whose education, or lack thereof, predated an independent Tanzania would express the most resistance to these new expensive high modernist education projects having lived their lives up to that point without the frills of formal education. However, this was not the case at all. In fact, not only did adult literacy campaign participants express a thriving interest in Tanzanian education, their justifications for it were very much in line with those of the government.

Like the Tanzanian government, the participants in adult literacy programs, Kassam estimated roughly 5.2 million individuals between 1972 and 1975, understood the expansion of education as both a way to improve their economic outcomes and to give themselves a greater sense of dignity and self-worth.174 Rather than fall back on economic justification, if anything

many of these individuals prioritized the enrichment of education and the way in which it provided them a conduit to greater understanding of their word more than the Tanzanian government or by an even greater margin external aid agencies. Yusufu Selemani was one such an individual, a coffee factory worker who had lived 43 kilometers from the nearest school as a child. Literacy did little to change his formal responsibilities or job prospects, outside of allowing him to sort labeled products by himself. What it did do was allow him to write letters to his wife, sign his own name, and help his children with their schoolwork. For him education used to only exist “somewhere faraway”, but literacy programs brought it to his home allowing him to, in his words, “feel liberated.”

From a similar background as Yusufu, Rukia Okashi was a peasant farmer who had slightly more practical inclination of wanting to read her own will in first participating in the literacy classes. However, over time she was able to read to her grandchildren, and reflect on the very nature of education, a good she used to believe only belonged “to a certain class of people”, changed for her. She came to expect these programs not just for herself, but everyone she knew. Such endorsements were often supplemented by songs or notes that the literacy class participants where now able to write down for the first time. This tendency was pervasive enough that students could contribute stories or poems to publications like *Hapa Leo: the Student Journal of The Institute of Adult Education in Mwanza*. Less about literacy itself than an expression of adult learners new found skills, the journal includes stories about everything from

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175 Kassam, Yusuf O. *Illiterate no more: the voices of new literates from Tanzania*. Tanzania Publishing House, 1979
178 East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, *Hapa Leo: the Student Journal of the Institute of Adult Education in Mwanza*.
falling in love to a beloved flute. These stories were often quite touching, and they were a tangible expression of the non-economic value of education.  

Programmatic success was not limited to adult education or qualitative metrics. The initial quantitative outcomes of both the tertiary and vocational expansions of Ujamaa were similarly impressive. Despite the new requirement from the Musoma Resolution that all college students first spend two years doing service for the nation, the high demand for higher education prompted the creation of new universities beyond the University of Dar es Salaam and new colleges at UDS. Many students were eager for the advanced educational prospects of tertiary instruction. This broad support for educational programs extended beyond the comparative elite at tertiary institutions to vocational programs as well. These were programs intended to teach workers new skills or practices. When surveyed, 95% of students who had attended vocational or trade schools reported being satisfied at their current job with 97% reporting believing they would not have received their positions without the technical training they received from the government. 85% of supervisors similarly agreed that vocational schools were training effective and skilled workers. Education was serving to both broaden Tanzanians perspectives and give them more diversified skills and opportunities for employment.

The Hazy Outline of Success

The wide range of education projects in Tanzania under Ujamaa speak to the diversity of meanings that effective instruction can have, especially when the purpose of that instruction is differently interpreted by a diverse range of populations and actors. However, the most basic

179 Hapa Leo: the Student Journal of the Institute of Adult Education in Mwanza.
180 East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Julius Nyerere, A Time of Struggle, 1980
181 East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Ministry of Labor Study of Vocational Learning.
182 East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Ministry of Labor Study of Vocational Learning.
goals of the state in education fundamentally came down to increasing primary school enrollment and literacy. These basic requirements, receiving formal instruction and learning how to read, also animated most demands from the Tanzanian public for education. Given the complication of disentangling other metrics like employment from unrelated external influences, it makes sense to primarily judge the quantitative success of Ujamaa education programs by the change in adult literacy and primary school enrollment. On face this should be easy given appropriate research. Regrettably, the standardized online databases managed by international institutions like UNESCO and the World Bank have little consistent information for either statistic before 1990, and even projects reports for individual literacy programs have almost no comparative data. The Ministry of Education sporadically published a report of basic facts about Tanzanian, and that publication includes an assertion that 79% of adults were literate by 1976 with 4,914,634 adult learners and 3,518,183 primary school students enrolled in classes.\textsuperscript{183} However, as Joel Samoff has discussed, the precision of those numbers obscures a significant margin of error. Samoff participated in the collection of education data during Ujamaa and documented the miscounts, best guesses, and gaps in knowledge that resulted in some schools being counted as half the actual size they were.\textsuperscript{184} Calculations of education as a percentage of state revenue were even more inaccurate, with a margin of error of 20%.\textsuperscript{185}

Despite this imprecision, it is not impossible to get a broad picture of quantitative change over time by using both Samoff’s adjusted figures and the rates provided by other sources. In other literature, Samoff has estimated that between 1971 and 1981 school enrollment rose by

\textsuperscript{183} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, \textit{Basic Facts about Education in Tanzania}, Tanzanian Ministry of Education, 1984


nearly 630% to roughly 3,600,000, and the percentage of students who were girls rose from 35% to 48%. Similarly his data states between 1971 and 1981 the number of adult learners rose from about 190,000 to 5,180,000. Other data from a comparative analysis of Tanzania and China estimates that percentage of Tanzanians over the age of 10 who were literate rose from roughly 29% at independence to a peak of 90% in the mid-1980s, and that primary school enrollment peaked in the early 1980s between 96%. For all these numbers there were more conservative and more aggressive projections, but the general trends, and scale of those trends, remains the same. Tanzania’s mass literacy project were wildly successful, and the resulting rates of literacy, gender equity, and school participation were a significant outlier among African state. Despite the failures of villagization, Tanzanian education development was a global model. The nation’s adult education programs even won the world’s only award for literacy programs, the Nadezhda K. Krupskaya literacy prize, from UNESCO in 1973. The corrosive effects of foreign aid and programs of state intimidation notwithstanding, Tanzania’s education efforts succeeded wildly by even the most unforgiving standards.

**Financial Crash**

Unfortunately, these outcomes were not spontaneously generated, and required constant expenditure far above Tanzania’s own resources. As the very first UNESCO report on Tanzania’s education system had foreshadowed, by 1979 an amount roughly equivalent to

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Tanzania’s entire tax revenue was being spent on education.\textsuperscript{190} This budget squeeze was aggressively exacerbated by a 1978 war with Idid Amin and Uganda, which cost the state roughly $67 million, and severe droughts which were exacerbated by the existing instability in Tanzania’s agricultural system caused by villagization.\textsuperscript{191} The financial pinch lead Nyerere to address the parliament rather somberly in a 1980 address titled “A Time of Struggle.”\textsuperscript{192} In it Nyerere acknowledged that Tanzania was facing a financial crunch, but he called on the legislature to consider the moment an opportunity. He also rebuked the international doublet that Tanzania was forced into in which both the USSR and the US saw any action by the Tanzanian state in its own development interest in terms “of their own hostility.”\textsuperscript{193} Reinforcing his reputation for pragmatic idealism, he acknowledged the weight of the country’s poverty, but urged collective strength and unity.

Unfortunately, unity was not enough to overcome the simultaneous global oil crisis, and African commodity crisis, that further plummeted Tanzania’s already weakened purchasing power and increased the larger economic malaise.\textsuperscript{194} Originally, Nyerere had planned to step down in 1980, but he promised party leaders that he would stay on through the economic downturn. Two years later, addressing the CCM party Nyerere acknowledged the escalation of the problem but nonetheless assured those in attendance that Tanzania would avoid the sovereignty crushing effects of structural adjustment.\textsuperscript{195} Unfortunately, the economic stagnation

\textsuperscript{190} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Julius Nyerere, A Time of Struggle, 1980.
\textsuperscript{191} Alex B. Atuhaire, “Uganda: Country Pays Tanzania Shs120 Billion Amin War Debt”, All African, April 11, 2007
\textsuperscript{193} East Africana Collection, University of Dar Es Salaam Archives, Julius Nyerere, A Time of Struggle, 1980.
became a continual crisis, and in 1985 Nyerere stepped down without not completely exiting the power structure of the part. His decision not to run for president signaled the end of a Tanzanian state with the political power to commit to education in spite of financial contradictions.

**Nyerere’s Legacy of Education**

Upon reaching this inglorious, though end of his political career, Nyerere was less ambitious in his description of the scope of Tanzania’s right to education, but he remained largely committed to the basic principles he had always articulated. In a *Harvard Educational Review* article published as he stepped down as president, he restated his belief in the importance of educational egalitarianism stating “education is the right of all citizens and not something which should only be provided for a plutocratic elite or as a form of charity for the poor.”\(^{196}\) In the piece, Nyerere continues to make reference to the value to a practical education noting that Tanzania was continuing to invest in “technical education” despite an instructor shortage.\(^{197}\) He also widely discussed the importance of the economy in determining a countries educational outputs. More a defense than an apologia, the article served in some places as an explanation for the ways in which Tanzania’s education program struggled.

Mostly though, Nyerere felt the need to defend himself, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, to the world. He retrospectively summarized the foundation of his approach somewhat charitably as:

“first, that every human being is fundamentally of equal worth and has equal rights; second, that the individual becomes meaningful to him or herself and to others only as a member of society; and third, that basic literacy and numeracy liberate the human personality, and are thus valuable

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in their own right quite apart from the contribution that literacy and numeracy make to the nation's economy and to the individual's economic situation.”198

He further lauded the complete revision of school syllabi to order to reflect the party doctrine of “Education for Self-Reliance” and create a Tanzanian identity with a specific “social, political, and economic character.”199 Nyerere even referenced the critical thinking engendered by this education describing Tanzanians as an “aware people” continuing to ignore the implicit contradiction in a nation guided by critical thought and completely united behind a singular ideology.200 In light of the available evidence, Nyerere’s cumulative legacy includes the radical reimagining of both the limits and possibilities of the human right to education. It is telling that the policy of independence and Ujamaa that Nyerere sought to highlight as he left office was universal education. However, the poignancy of the Harvard Education Review article also lays in the fact that as Julius Nyerere was writing it Tanzania was moving further and further away from the policies.

Conclusion

Nyerere’s decision to step down from the presidency did little to staunch the rising tide of economic downturn and resulting deconstruction of public goods. Within two years Tanzania signed a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF that reinforced the changes it had already been forced to make. As Tanzania’s budget crumbled donors pulled out of funding new programs. No money had been committed for upkeep of the education system under most of these aid relationships so the crisis in education was even worse. Schools had to be shuttered, the crisis in teacher pay deepened, and, even by the conservative measurements of the World Bank,

literacy rates and school enrollment precipitously dropped.\textsuperscript{201} As the international community condemned the failures of Tanzania to act responsibly a new future for the Tanzanian education system began to be developed. Unlike the early independence education systems these externally imposed reforms would challenge the very ideological grounding of education as a right and would posit economic austerity as the only acceptable parameter for the education system.

Internationally, the failure of Tanzania education projects, and the Tanzanian Government broadly, to maintain sustainability was ascribed to the irresponsible spending habits of the Tanzanian legislature. Left un-critiqued, were the funding structures of aid organizations, the political pressures exacted on accepting certain kinds of assistance, the failure of the global security community to prevent the funding atrocities of Idi Amin and the international systems of economic inequality that had been partially propagated during colonialism and continuously attacked by the Tanzanian government and people. The failures of Tanzania’s development partners were particularly egregious. The early 1980’s marked a rapid shift to explicitly market oriented neoliberalism in the international aid community.\textsuperscript{202} As a result, organizations like the World Bank and USAID ended up actively critiquing Tanzania for failed villagization schemes which they had been directly involved in planning, and USAID even withheld all aid from Tanzania from 1982 to 1986.\textsuperscript{203}

This betrayal would end up providing ammunition for many of Tanzania’s external conservative critics, who were already beginning to frame the project of Ujamaa as just a violent

\textsuperscript{202} Alan Fowler, "NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation?." Third world quarterly 21, no. 4 (2000): 637-654.
\textsuperscript{203} USAID.gov, Tanzania: History, 2018
program of resettlement. This captures part of Tanzanian state behavior, but it also erases the historical complexity of Ujamaa. During the 1970s, the state’s commitment to extended development projects was more successful at bringing in funding for projects supported by the populace than all other available alternatives. Led by a popular president, the government was able to continue to achieve unprecedented educational successes in literacy, school enrollment, and gender equity that directly responded to concerns that Tanzanian peasants had raised since the 1940s. The state’s growing disregard for individual autonomy betrayed CCM’s commitment to human rights, but this disregard was not the reason that Tanzania was forced to agree to structural adjustment. Tanzania’s next education system would come not only complicate the relationship of Tanzania with high modernism and narratives of rights, but would also come to illuminate the impossible balance that TANU/CCM’s earlier successes had been based on. Perhaps most dangerously the simplistic narrative of state irresponsibility would come to define both the local and international conscious.
Chapter 3


When Julius Nyerere stepped down as President of Tanzania in 1985 after leading the country since independence, his influence did not suddenly dissipate. He was Chairman of the ruling party for 5 more years until he voluntarily stepped down in 1990, and his mythos remain central to Tanzanian politics. However, the end of his presidency did in some ways mark the end of a specific kind of national dream. Since the 1950s, Nyerere had led the chorus of Tanzanian voices demanding more for the nation from the international community. It was also his vision that guided the state’s radical determination after the Arusha Declaration. He had been part of securing a free and unified Tanzania, and it was his writing that formed the backbone of the Tanzanian government’s promise to provide a just and prosperous state for its people.

In spite of this, Nyerere’s presidential retirement was obviously far from triumphant. Endogenously, the rapid expansion of government power since 1967 had engendered widespread corruption among public officials. Parastatal industries struggled with extreme inefficiency and the villagization projects of Ujama failed to deliver on its promise of economic prosperity even after requiring forced migration and mandatory communal labor. Internationally Tanzania had only come more fully under the yolk of global finance during the financial hardship of recent years but did not receive the same level of compensation for this sacrifice of sovereignty as it had before. The TANU/CCM promise of an autonomous, prosperous, and socialist Tanzania was ebbing as its most powerful proponent stepped down.

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From Nyerere’s retirement through the new millennium, liberalizing reforms continued the treatment of education as a location of development policy, but failed to capitalize on the earlier successes that stemmed from affirmatively providing education as a right.

**The Beginning of Tanzania After Ujamaa**

In some ways, the era of Tanzanian politics after Ujamaa only symbolically started with the end of Mwalimu Nyerere’s term. Despite his deep opposition to structural adjustment and the IMF’s financial coercion, six years of protracted negotiations with the IMF had convinced Nyerere to begin the process of slowly devaluing the Tanzanian shilling and allowing the expansion of private businesses.205 Nevertheless, the transition of presidential power still rapidly accelerated the process of disinvestment from the socialist state. This was particularly true because Julius Nyerere’s immediate successor as president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was most notable for his aggressively hands off approach to governance.206 His accommodating attitude, and general disinterest in ideology, starkly contrasted with Nyerere’s obstinacy, and he seems to have had few personal objections to economic neoliberalism. These differences, coupled with the increasingly dire financial position of the government, greatly facilitated Tanzania’s acceptance of the IMF’s proposed structural adjustment program in 1986. As originally written, the agreement required the Tanzanian government to devalue the shilling by 53%, deregulate and privatize industry, and reduce government expenditures.207 During the following nine years

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Mwinyi enacted these policies while encouraging a general culture of permissiveness that facilitated free trade but also encourage growing corruption.\textsuperscript{208}

This impacts of this new neoliberal reality were particularly pronounced in the case of education. During the severe economic downturn the Tanzanian education system began to fail as both an end unto itself and as tool of economic stimulation. Foreign aid fell by 40\% between 1981 and 1985 alone, and a corresponding drop in education expenditure left the promise of education as a universal right unfulfilled.\textsuperscript{209} Poor workforce prospects left many of those who did receive an education without a way to support themselves, throwing the value of education as even a tool of development into doubt. Under Mwinyi, this disinvestment developed into a spiraling feedback loop. Educational outcomes grew worse and worse as external funders withdrew because they were concerned about diminishing educational outcomes like falling secondary school enrollment and low quality teachers.\textsuperscript{210} The lauded literacy programs, innovative schools, and broad national interest in education that partially defined Tanzania under Ujamaa were subtly ignored and eventually forgotten by foreign actors. Under the new discourse of neoliberal development, Tanzania could barely be considered a modern nation hamstrung as it had been by the toxic ideology of Ujamaa which was comprised of the worst features of “East and West.”\textsuperscript{211} In the eyes of the IMF, the future of Tanzanian education needed to primarily focus on mitigating expenses rather than building on the successes of the past.

The implicit directive to abandon the ideal of universal education litters external governmental reports about Tanzania from the era, couched in bureaucratic language. One 1990

\textsuperscript{210} Galabawa, C. J, 1990,” Implementing Educational Policies in Tanzania”, World Bank Discussion Papers, 86,
World Bank report summarized this view obliquely by stating that Tanzania’s “quantitative policy objectives are incompatible with efficiency ones.”\textsuperscript{212} “Quantitative policy objectives” in this context were all numerical indicators of success used in the past, like literacy rates and gross student enrollment. In contrast, the efficiency goal was maximizing the financial return on investments in education. Efficiency was the paramount aim of structural adjustment so the implied solution to this conflict was abandoning most quantitative goals. Rephrased, the report argued that in order to make education’s return on investment higher the Tanzanian government needed to move past attempting to provide education for everyone.

The logic implicit in this kind of argument not only suggested that education as a right and tool of development were incompatible, but that, given the choice between the two, education should only be used in so far as it served economic development. In the same vein, a World Bank paper from 1996 celebrated the rise of the mean level of education in Tanzania. The fact that this increase came from increased secondary and tertiary education enrollment by wealthy Tanzanians, which hid falling enrollment fell among poor peasants, was treated as a secondary to the economic boons of mean education levels.\textsuperscript{213} Extrapolated, this language suggests universal programs in poor countries should not be not a moral imperative but a convenience purchased by wealth. The gradual expansion of education at slow, economy boosting, intervals in market-oriented states Kenya was presumed to be the preferable model.

Viewed in direct comparison though, the education outcomes of Kenya and every other explicitly capitalist African state failed to match that of Tanzania under Ujamaa.  

Sadly, this comparative success in providing education had little meaning for an indebted nation in the late 1980s and 1990s. The rapid decline and fall of the USSR and capitulation of communist China to a quasi-capitalist economy left Tanzania without the ideological counterweights and diverse aid options that enabled its past politically heterodox success. Even Sweden, Tanzania’s closest development partner in providing primary adult literacy classes and universal education with, embraced the neoliberal trend in development, and made SIDA’s resources conditional on compliance with Bretton Wood norms. Any attempt by Mwinyi’s government to avoid austerity, even for education, was met with coercive aid freezes on all fronts. For Tanzanian state officials it became clearer and clearer that the global development aid was now both essentially unipolar and defined by liberalism. CCM’s past political balancing act was no longer possible. Political discourse in Tanzania was not completely stripped of its socialist roots, but the rhetoric markets, capital, and property rights began to gain greater purchase in comparison to the existing language of collective uplift. The external pressure of structural adjustment and shifting domestic political dynamics made internal liberalization almost inevitable. From 1985 through 1995, the Tanzanian state held its first multi-Party elections, privatized state-held companies and rolled back almost all the remaining post-Arusha Declaration projects of the past decades.

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education in Tanzania was deprioritized and reimagined primarily as an economic investment rather than a state-supported human right.

**Local Liberalisms**

The discourse of responsibility that both catalyzed this shift away from Tanzania’s socialist universalism and prompted an emergence of market conscious initiatives started as an external pressure, but it connected to internal discontent in Tanzanian politics. In some cases this included a legitimate accounting of the policy failures. Under the harsh light of international scrutiny, the Tanzanian government was forced to admit that Ujamaa villagization and the consolidation of industry under the state had been at most “moderately successful”, and in many cases deeply catastrophic.218 Moreover, government leaders acknowledged many programs had been executed with highly variable levels of long term planning and a severe dearth of necessary technical knowledge.219 As with many modernist development programs, the state had erroneously assumed that large economic projects would eventually pay for themselves. At the time this self-assurance was only exacerbated by Ujamaa’s framing as a return to African tradition. Criticism was easily silenced for being insufficiently cognizant of Tanzania’s historical context or inadequately founded connected to Ujamaa.220 Before structural adjustment, supporting even the state’s most misguided programs, like forced resettlement, had become functionally necessary for proving that one was both sufficiently socialist and sufficiently African. This dogmatic tendency of the state was increasingly inescapable until economic

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collapse destroyed the illusion that Tanzania development was inevitable. In one sense, liberal reforms created an opening to disentangle the growth of education from villagization.

However, this increased space for dissent was not framed within any viable alternative political system that could provide the social services Tanzanians cared about. In fact, the structural adjustment program mandated that Tanzania shrink education expenses as part of reducing government spending in order to prompt economic growth and stability. That mandate made it clear that international aid agencies continued to understand education as tool of economic development and not as an unconditional right or even as a transactional social good. Absent international investment, the Tanzania state lacked the money necessary to grow, or even sustain, an education system that was created with the expectation of extensive external funding. Worse, without the guiding principle of Ujamaa, the government had no ideological reason to aggressively fund education if it was not directly generating economic growth, a fact the state seems to have recognized. Even as gross government spending significantly shrank under austerity education declined as a portion of the reduced government expenditure. Over the course of just 3 years starting in 1986 education dipped by around a third from 9% of total government capital expense to 6% and from 16% of recurrent expense to 12%.

This decline in revenue contributed to poorly instructed teachers, overcrowded schools, and the general deterioration of Tanzanian education. At the same time that government expenditures fell the Ministry of Education utilized cost-cutting measures that infringed on the

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223 These numbers are imprecise, but they represent the general trend of state disinvestment.

reality of education as a right. This included instituting school fees for all levels of education and requiring that students purchase their own textbooks which made it more difficult for poorer students to attend school. As a result, primary education enrollment dropped by approximately 67%. Similar fees were levied at the level of adult education, and the national literacy rate fell to roughly 60%. The government’s cost cutting measures also included further shifting the burden on school construction to local governments and communities and deepening development techniques of having students perform profitable labor, like growing food for sale at an agriculture focused secondary school.

The perception of education as fundamentally an economic value proposition had been part of the development framework of most external aid and development agencies since 1961 in Tanzania, but the state’s embrace of that position during austerity represented a rejection of the one social obligation that the state respected during even the most coercive periods of Ujamaa. During Ujmaa, lived policy reality was much more important than codified law, which was often functionally meaningless, and this remained true through the 1990s. It did not matter that parliament amended the constitution in 1988 to more fully incorporate a codified right to education, including language that not only gave individuals the right to education but mandated that the government fulfill that right. Financial reforms made education less accessible for most Tanzanian families, constitutional right or not. Ironically, cost saving measures still failed to meaningfully change the Ministry of Education’s financial situation. Fees were inconsistently taken up and students that did remain in school often simply failed to purchase textbooks. Local

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communities were also already carrying almost all of the burden of school construction, and self-reliance schemes at technical secondary institutions were only able to cover around 3% of the schools’ overall budget.\textsuperscript{229} Writ large, the Tanzanian state began to sell out education but failed to even turn a meaningful profit.

The international aid community did no better than the Ministry at imagining a satisfactory education system that would not cost money, though not for a lack of trying. Some agencies and analysts argued for an increase in focused technical education which seemed to completely overlook that Tanzania both already had a robust number of schools for technical education and that those already existing schools struggled to match students with jobs in the industries for which they were nominally trained.\textsuperscript{230} Others more blatantly revealed their lack of concern about education for Tanzanians by suggesting the nation scale back the entire education system and refocus efforts on simply providing basic agricultural instruction. One pervasive argument put forward by an analyst from the World Bank suggested that perhaps the problem was that the government was spending too much on secondary education relative to primary education, which was more efficient since it taught laborers the bare necessities.

This ignored two important realities in Tanzania. The first was that Tanzania had built an education with a similar premise; primary education was meant as the universal and terminal education standard while secondary options existed for a small few given limited resources. The second is that when the government failed to fill an educational niche the private market filled it poorly. In 1986 only 0.1% primary school students went to private schools. Up to 53% of secondary school students attended private schools, which were both more expensive and often

of a worse quality, either in Tanzania or elsewhere in East Africa, but this was only done by those who were not accepted into the public system.\textsuperscript{231} Ceding more grounds to these private institutions could have only served to undermine Tanzania’s commitment to egalitarianism while failing to improve the state of education.

\textbf{A Return to Form 1}

Post-Ujamaa economic torpor was not permanent, and eventually Tanzania began to reemerge with a stabilized economy rising from the country with the second lowest GNP to the 18\textsuperscript{th} lowest.\textsuperscript{232} As it did so, the government continued to reimagine its core civic functions throughout the mid-1990s. By about 1990 education began to slightly rebound, and by 1992 key figures like schoolgirl enrollment and graduation rate were marginally better than they had been during the middle of the crisis in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{233} The resulting stability of schooling, compared to storms of the economic collapse, and its particular social and political importance in Tanzania made formal education a clear target for liberalization advocates. New reform efforts reached crescendo with the creation and implementation of the 1995 Education and Training Policy which made gestures to Tanzania’s past successes but laid out a new ideological structures for understanding education in the future. Its bent was most efficiently summarized by President Mkapa when he tried to justify sharing the financial burden of education between citizens and the state during an interview that occurred just after he won Tanzania’s first multi-party presidential election. For the post-Nyerere era, Mkapa, the first Tanzanian president never to serve as a teacher, argued education was “a fundamental right but it is not so veryvery

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{231} United Republic of Tanzania, 1989, “Education in Tanzania Sector Review,” UNESCO Educational Financing Division.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{233} Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995, “Education and Training Policy”
This likely sounded eerily familiar to many Tanzanian’s who were already familiar with human rights that were not so very very fundamental.

Up until 1995, Tanzanian government had not officially changed education law in any meaningful way since the late 70’s at the onset of the economic collapse, so in a practical sense a revaluation of training and policy was arguably overdue. Read optimistically, many of the goals and changes outlined in the document were in line with the historical precedents set by the early independent Tanzanian and Tanganyikan governments. The introductory language of the text invoked the need to promote both “access and equity” as part of making education a basic right of all citizens, and this was mirrored throughout the text. Similarly altruistic goals like engendering a love of Tanzanian culture in its people, valuing human rights, and allowing for the proliferation of human dignity fill out much of the document’s 104 pages. Broadly, larger ideological aims that proliferated under the Arusha Declaration and Education for Self-Reliance were also mentioned and appraised positively. In this sense there was no significant rhetorical shift against the educational successes of Tanzania. Instead the Education and Training document was cast as a necessary update to enduring Tanzanian ideals.

This framing was also not entirely old rhetoric. As a holistic overview of Tanzania’s education system the Education and Training Policy document effectively touched on a variety of issues that needed to be addressed and also appropriately noted many of the existing non-formalized mechanisms of training and education that existed for children, though it offered no suggestions for integrating them. Training and Education Policy document also suggested supplementing existing policies, like girls’ boarding, with new reforms like de-gendering school

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234 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Mkapa, Benjamin W., 1995, “Building a Vision”
material and hiring more women as teachers.\textsuperscript{237} It similarly addressed the need to promote and provide for education among underserved communities like remote pastoralists, the physically disabled, and orphans. This would require culturally specific instruction and in some cases specialized facilities.\textsuperscript{238} These new reforms also facilitated the incorporation of new global education movements into the Tanzanian main stream. These international trends included screening for gifted and talented children, the implementation of food and wellness programs for students, and even the re-launch of trade schools.\textsuperscript{239} Unfortunately, very few of these valid concerns were intended to become public projects. The training document saw private schools as the key solution to gendered education inequities and programs for pastoralists and physically disabled people would have to wait until they were implemented by NGOs.\textsuperscript{240} Even gifted and talented screening and reimagined trade schools were symptomatic of larger structural changes inherited from the international zeitgeist through liberalization.\textsuperscript{241}

While many of the goals and new focus areas of the Training and Education Policy directive were laudable, its central function was to reimagine education as a decentralized and privatized industry rather than the locus of transformative state social projects. Next to goals about access were mandates to imagine “education as an area of investment” and encourage private institutions to take on much of the work of education. Similarly, the documented “rationalize” universities to encourage the educations of “technologists”, and to broadly encourage the “liberalization of the provision of education.”\textsuperscript{242} This language of prioritizing

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{237} Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995, “Education and Training Policy”
\bibitem{238} Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995, “Education and Training Policy”
\bibitem{239} Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995, “Education and Training Policy”
\bibitem{242} Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Culture, 1995, “Education and Training Policy”
\end{thebibliography}
“rational” technologists mirrored global efforts to make universities financially profitable spaces instead of mixed-method locations of learning. While it did not include an explicit rebuke of early independence or Ujamaa education policies, the implicit argument made throughout the training and policy document was that the world of the 90s so completely precluded the state spending of the past that a new mind set should be expected. The proliferation of private schools should be encouraged, not prohibited, because they had the potential to alleviate some of the government’s costs. School fees should be reinstated because students understood that they needed to contribute financially to their education. NGOs should be considered long term caretakers of education rather than short term supplements in order to further remove responsibility from the national government’s hands. The devolution of education responsibilities to local governments that began during the crisis should not only be codified but also expanded. In short, the government needed to support education, but it should treat as an economic investment rather than a right or fundamental responsibility of the state. It was this mindset more than any other change that was most successfully encouraged by the passage of the training document.

While there was significant external pressure to further privatize education these reforms were generated and implemented by Tanzanian officials primarily from the ruling CCM party, which still has yet to lose a presidential election. The state’s reluctance to explicitly criticize policies of the past while effectively reversing their ideological roots likely stems from the


continuity of rule by CCM, which nominally retained its status as the party of the left. The leading opposition parties CHADEMA, literally referred to in English as The Liberal Party, and the United Democratic Party ran even further to the right on education, though they had little to say about it. The only recommendation for education suggested in a joint policy paper endorsed by both parties and published in 1996 by the Free Market Development Society was that it be “improved”, with no mechanism for improvement suggested.\textsuperscript{248} The justification given for improvement was that it would better enable “responsible citizens” to act as individuals in economic and intellectual free markets.\textsuperscript{249} Even the nation’s first multi-party elections were largely a referendum on the effectiveness of members of parliament individual clientalism, and Tanzanians were left without the opportunity to vote against liberalization in the education sector.

\textbf{Voices of Dissent}

This shift in the ideology of education did not occur without dissent. As far back as the 60s student radicals had charged aspects of Ujamaa era programs as being too dependent on Western liberal models of development in Cheche, a student-run Marxist journal.\textsuperscript{250} This fits into a larger history of leftist scholars, journalists, and politicians critiquing the Tanzanian state.\textsuperscript{251} More direct critiques of the liberalization of education began in the late 80s as government officials first began to discuss a post-crisis system that continued some of the reforms of austerity.\textsuperscript{252} One early and powerful critique came from a conference of representatives of the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{252} Mblinyi
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staffs of all of the tertiary institutions in Tanzania in April of 1990. This convention was meant as an official response of all of Tanzania’s academic staff organizations to a perceived increase in government authoritarianism under the economic crisis, but it had a separate value as a conceptualization of education Tanzania that was not predicated on the erosion of communitarian values or the reduction of state accountability and responsibility.

The document that emerged from that conference, “The Dar es Salaam Declaration on Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility of Academics”, was meant to reinforce what the assembled academic staff saw as the appropriate foundation upon which education should be built in contrast to the government’s failures. Because education was underfunded and overextended, the authors worried it was at risk of becoming “the preserve of the wealth and influential.” Education they argued should be a universal and equitable right that cultivated critical thought, a knowledge of the environment, and commitment to emancipation in every individual. This was not simply a hypothetical moral obligation of the state. The declaration argued that the state had an obligation to constitutionally mandate that a certain minimum portion of the government’s resources to all education, not just universities, while implementing affirmative policies that addressed historical inequalities. This was complimented by the responsibility of academic staff and institutions to work to solve “contemporary problems” and address historical injustices. While much of the rest of the deceleration’s language around freedom of speech and the rights of individuals to be democratically represented was coopted
into the discourse of new liberal parties, the expression of education as a fundamental right was largely ignored on all sides. To little surprise, no provision creating a mandatory constitutional minimum for education funds was passed.

The system created by state preference for the vision of Training and Education Policy document over the “The Dar es Salaam Declaration on Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility of Academics” did not completely destroy Tanzania’s education system. It did, however, undermine the most historically continuous social obligation paid from the Tanzanian government to its people and create a structure far more likely to treat education as a market or good than a right. Decentralization and cost sharing where pitched as methods for creating community and individual buy in on education, but they were more honestly intended as an offshoring of financial liability for an expensive social program. Similarly the language of rights proliferated throughout the 1990s, but no additional protections were actually created to reinforce the system of responsibility the government ignored throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{257} Electoral politics offered no alternative because no party advocated for the social promises of the past, not even the party that made the original promises. There was little money to be made from socialist-style public education, and in liberalized Tanzania partisan politics were also a marketplace.\textsuperscript{258} Tanzania Education grew as Tanzania continued its economic rebound throughout the late nineties and into the early aughts, but it was built on a shaky foundation of a cobbled together coalition of NGOs, public funding, international aid, and private schools that replicated the least sustainable aspects of the Ujamaa era programs that crumbled under financial pressure.

The late 90s saw no other significant structural changes to education outside of edits to the Training and Education Policy document and laws passed to further legislate the policies of the document. The most significant shift was a cultural one as the government grew more comfortable articulating education as an industry without any uncomfortable asides about its simultaneous importance as a right. The markers of this shift could soon be seen everywhere. When President Mkapa delivered a speech to the students and professors of the University of Dar es Salaam in 1999 he noted that his three priorities as president has been “the economy, the economy the economy!”

259 He further argued that the only solution to a lack of funding in education was a better economy. When he discussed education as a social service in his address at the CCM party meetings in 2002 his only note on the issue was that it was important for Tanzanians to realize education was an economic investment.

260 This comment can be interpreted quite literally, as the state-sponsored investment guide for 2002 listed education as an industry for investment. After assuring investors that total foreign ownership of education institutions in Tanzania was both was both “allowed and well accepted,” the investment guide suggested profitable areas for privatization or private investment including new for-profit schools, hectares of land earmarked for development by private dollars on the University of Dar es Salaams campus, and recreational businesses.

261 The guide wrapped up by advertising the dwindling governmental budget for investment and the “conducive political environment” for investing in education.

262 This language of government decline was also used by the

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259 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Mkapa, Benjamin, “Speech Delivered By the President of the United Republic of Tanzania”, Delivered to the University Community at the University of Dar es Salaam Nkrumah Hall, February 1999

260 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Speech Given by the Chairman of CCM his Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa at the 6th Ordinary CCM Congress rwanda


government when they justified a lack of data on children’s rights to the convention on the rights of the child as caused by the decentralization of Tanzania’s child policy. This suggests that while there was not an outright failure caused by liberalization, there was a loosening of accountability that circumvents the ability to identify failure.

Conclusion

In January of 2002 Tanzania implemented its next big education plan, the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP).263 It was the first step in a government strategy to revitalize Tanzania’s education system and bring back the primary school enrollment and literacy rate successes of the 1970s. It launched with a wide range of development partners and significant public support.264 It was considered important enough that it has since been erroneously described as an amendment to the Education Act. With Nyerere passing away in 1999 it also represented the nation’s first completely post-Nyerere large education initiative. However, it did not substantially rewrite the educational strategies established in 1995 or rebuke the shift towards asset based evaluation of education. PEDP is largely based on a shaky foundation of private industry and the same development agencies that funded much of the first wave of education expansion in Tanzania. The primary ambition of PEDP was actually only to remove the school fees created during structural adjustment. It also does not even universally accomplish that.265 It remains to be seen how the liberalized education sector will handle an economic crisis on the scale of the 1980s. However, what is clear is that the Tanzanian

commitment to education has been eroded by the rising tide of the market economy washing away a promise of literacy and schooling that starts at least in the 1950s.
Conclusion

Despite Tanzania’s early tradition of expanding education as a universal right, contemporary Tanzanian policy makers are not particularly different from other African bureaucrats in their approach to education. Some of the earliest achievements of independence, such as racially integrated education or choosing not to distinguish between a right to education for men and right to education for women, have since become norms expected in all countries. Other successes, such as the extensive network of adult education classes, largely faded stop with the end of radical Ujamaa. Education is less of a civic institution than a series of World Bank metrics used to demonstrate development, and the broader spectrum of civic space has started to shrink as well. In one sense this eventual acceptance of development norms is a reminder that the ultimate sovereignty of African countries often does not lie in the hands of state governments. An opaque global structure of political hegemony and financial capital ultimately dictates the acceptable limits of political expression in Africa. On a more clearly defined scale, the history of Tanzanian education demonstrates both how education can be undermined by the prioritization of liberal development and the way in which focusing on education provides can provide an alternative understanding of state capacity.

Despite the deconstruction of successful Ujamaa era policies, it would be alarmist to describe Tanzania’s education system as completely failing in the contemporary moment. In late 2015, the Tanzanian government expanded the 2002 partial eradication of primary school fees to secondary schools, and these legal expansions of education opportunities have been accompanied by improved metrics. Since the new millennium, primary school enrollment metrics have reached as high as 98%, matching and perhaps surpassing those of the 1970s. Literacy rates are also roughly comparable, if still lower, to those under Ujamaa, with the percentage of individuals
over the age of 15 able to read hovering in the high-70s.\textsuperscript{266} Education remains a priority for many law makers, and around 22\% of Tanzania’s 2016-2017 budget went to funding education, though expenditure statistics are still fairly inaccurate.\textsuperscript{267} In a quantitative sense, the loftiest goals of education might not have been met, but by most metrics education is not performing significantly worse than it was under Education for Self-Reliance. However, the underlying fragility of contemporary education begins to come into focus when considering these change in the statistics over the last decade or so. Since 2006 secondary school enrollment rates have not risen above 40\%, literacy rates have stagnated, and primary school enrollment rates have actually slowly but steadily declined.\textsuperscript{268} Put simply, even after almost thirty years of relative economic health and stability, neoliberal education reforms have yet to completely equal the education metrics of Ujamaa or match their upward trend.

Development analysts and politicians have blamed this torpor on a variety of issues including the dearth of secondary schools in growing rural communities, remaining school costs like books and uniforms, and even the eradication of fees, which has only exacerbated the chronic underfunding of individual schools.\textsuperscript{269} All of these problems are at least partially rooted in Tanzania’s poverty, but most of them have existed in some form since the creation of a national education system. The inability of the state to utilize the successful solutions of the past stems from a larger lack of interest on the part of the national government in affirmatively advancing education as a universal right. Celebrating the current stability would overlook that little to nothing has been done to protect public education from the possibility of future economic

\textsuperscript{266} UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “United Republic of Tanzania: Education and Literacy”, 2018
\textsuperscript{267} Elin Martínez, “‘I Had a Dream to Finish School’: Barriers to Secondary Education in Tanzania,” Human Rights Watch, 2017
\textsuperscript{268} UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “United Republic of Tanzania: Education and Literacy”, 2018
\textsuperscript{269} Elin Martínez, “‘I Had a Dream to Finish School’: Barriers to Secondary Education in Tanzania,” Human Rights Watch, 2017.
downturn, or the increasing disinvestment of the government from the Tanzanian people. In education, this disinvestment has included both economic withdrawal, like failing to build schools in growing rural areas, and civic withdrawal, like President Magafuli’s recent decision to reverse existing policy norms and expel any school girls who become pregnant before graduating.\(^{270}\) Unfortunately, such disinvestment is not limited to education, and almost any aspect of the Tanzanian public sphere is now open for privatization and profit. Increasingly, individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments in Tanzania’s history.\(^{271}\)

The long-established support for education in Tanzania suggest that there should floor to state withdrawal, but conceptualized solely as an economic good for economic development, education is more vulnerable than ever if it fails to provide adequate returns on investment. Outside the state, even the most democratic organizations are at constant risk of cooption. HakiElimu is one such institution, the leading Tanzanian education nonprofit, and its reports and analysis is actively sought out by members of parliament. Prominent intellectuals like Issa Shivji and Marjorie Mbilinyi have distributed papers through their publishing arm and they have a well-established reputation of trying to amplify both the needs of Tanzania collectively and the needs of individual marginal populations\(^{272}\). However, as the space for criticism grows smaller in Tanzania, the private sector offers no protection. Even as the most powerful advocates of a right

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\(^{270}\) John Aglionby, "Tanzania’s Enemies of the State: Pregnant Young Women," Financial Times, October 11, 2017


to education in Tanzania, HakiElimu is increasingly at risk of either eventual government retribution or the creep of self-censorship. Further many of the organization’s boldest leaders are part of the shrinking segment of the population old enough to understand personally the evolution of Tanzania’s education system. Smaller, younger NGOs are only more vulnerable to state coercion or cooption by moneyed interests. The expanding number of small private schools and for profit ventures are necessarily uninterested in visions of education that preclude profit. In all of the areas that the government has withdrawn from education, it has been replaced by actors unable to consistently recreate the obligations and accountability of the state over the long run.

The fragility of education is not limited to Tanzania, though its particular transition from its former politics is among the most disheartening. Financial disinvestment, privatization, and a withdrawal of state accountability is undermining the stability of education systems across the globe. Tanzania lags far behind the prodigious financial expansion of the American school voucher movement where public funds pay for largely unregulated private schools, or even the internalized privatization of some Kenyan universities where smaller class sizes are available for a much higher price, essentially creating private universities within public ones.273 Globally, as scholars like Patricia Burch have argued, the transition from validating education as civic necessity to a source economic development ending in understanding education as a marketplace good has only accelerated.274 Historicizing the successes of the Tanzanian education system not only highlights how rights can be subsumed by development, but also how alternative interpretations of education and development might be possible.

Using the education system of Tanzania as a window into global histories of development or even as an alternative touchpoint to villagization for discussing Ujamaa does not necessitate ignoring more critical aspects of the existing historiography. Reading histories of African state projects generously does not mean reading them naively because the benefit of this kind of historical interrogation is not dependent on state purity. To the contrary, interrogating modernist projects of development that counterintuitively represented bottom-up interests is necessary in attempting to escape the most authoritarian tendencies of state power without accepting state neglect as the only alternative. Viewed this way, understanding the successes of education is not a rebuke of existing scholarship like James Scott’s analysis of the coercive misdeeds during Ujamaa villagization.\footnote{James C. Scott, \textit{Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed}, Yale University Press, 1998} Instead it advances that scholarship, by supplementing existing knowledge about why Tanzanians supported aspects of the Ujamaa state even as they resisted resettlement schemes. Hopefully this expansion not only demonstrates that education was treated as a fundamental right by the Tanzanian government but also helps map alternatives to the failing contemporary approach to education.

This historicized approach towards Tanzania’s education system is not just necessary as correction to scholarly discourses. As Marie-Aude Fouéré, has demonstrated, the discourse of Ujamaa has reemerged in Tanzania as kind of political aesthetics of morality. Rather than serving as an inspiration to adventurous politics of egalitarianism however, or even as a warning about the dangers of development ideologies and modernist hubris, Ujamaa has been utilized, as a deflection of criticism of the state and depoliticized model of goodness.\footnote{Marie-Aude Fouéré. "Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa, and political morality in contemporary Tanzania." \textit{African Studies Review} 57, no. 1 (2014): 1-24.} As is the case with
many issues tangentially connected to Tanzanian education, Marjorie Mblinyi has already modeled a more productive version of this complexity in her contribution to a recent collection on Nyerere’s legacy. As she points out, it is absolutely vital to highlight the explicitly people centered leadership and liberation that occurred under Ujamaa to combat an increasing disregard for the public will. Since before independence, before Tanzanian even existed as a political unit, Tanzanians have been demanding that the state provide literacy and formal schooling. The most ambitious and successful program that the independent Tanzania has implemented since then have all been stemmed from filling that demand and providing all Tanzanians education. In the process, the state both capitalized on and was corrupted by development and aid, but remained committed to the enrichment of the Tanzania. Reinvigorating this political project has not been more necessary since the early days of independence. After all, it was not so long ago that even the coercive Tanzanian state recognized education as very very fundamental.

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