THE REPRESENTATION AND OTHER IMAGININGS OF PACIFICATION:
FROM GOVERNMENT SPEECHES TO LIVED EXPERIENCES IN RIO DE JANEIRO'S FAVELAS

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INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Rio de Janeiro’s government launched a project to pacify favelas through the implementation of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs), establishing a continuous military presence in the lives of its residents. The project required not only physical occupation, but also a vast publicity campaign of daily commercials, videos of each pacification, and events held within favelas with top government officials in attendance. Through active constructive discourse, this propaganda developed a singular image of favelas and their residents: of a place and people that necessitated pacification.

However, the implementation of the project fell short of its publicized goals. The vastness of favelas—home to 1.5 million or about 24% of Rio de Janeiro’s population—problematizes pacification as a ready-made military project that is not tailored to each favela’s needs. While the UPPs claim within their logo that “the UPP came to stay!” people who live in favelas see pacification differently, using words like “spoiled” to describe its current state.

After the inaugural year of the UPPs, I was asked to write a fifteen-page research paper on something that I was passionate about. This was my sophomore year at Chapel Hill High School and the beginning to my interest in what would be several class assignments, an internship, a geography capstone paper, and now an honors thesis about the pacification of favelas in Rio de Janeiro. I have accompanied pacification since 2009 through Brazil’s vast changes such as the FIFA World Cup, Olympics, impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, and countless corruption scandals. Within the classroom setting, my focus on pacification was always limited to historical research and analyses that could be done using data accessible to me and within a semester’s time span. The development of this project into my thesis allowed me to expand to questions that could be answered by multiple sources of data.
In this thesis, I examine the current state of the military project and ask: How does the Brazilian government’s construction of pacification differ from the lived experiences of residents within pacified favelas? Further, how is the government representing pacification in a way that makes it palatable to international audiences, the pacifying police, and favela residents themselves? To answer these questions I will begin by situating pacification within the political geography literature on territory and power, and outlining how these are expressed in geographies of militarization and securitization. I then draw on the history of Rio de Janeiro in order to contextualize favelas and previous tactics of favela removal. Considering both the geographical concepts and history of pacification, I provide the reader with the tools to follow my discussion of twenty-five government speeches between 2008 and 2016, as well as five semi-structured interviews with six favela residents.
CHAPTER I: PACIFICATION’S GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

This chapter situates my research within geographical concepts of territorialization/boundaries, power and the construction of identity, militarization, and securitization. These concepts provide the framework for understanding the context of Rio de Janeiro as a place that becomes created through the assertion of state territory upon the favelas through a long history of policing and militarization.

**Territory, Place, and Space**

Pacification, and militarization more broadly, necessitate a territory in order to provide some concrete place to be pacified. The selection of this place involves an immense amount of power, as its imagining is “shot through with ideology” (Knott 2009, 156). Within the field of geography, space does not simply exist, it is constructed depending on whose lens you are experiencing it through and it is intertwined with political, cultural, and economic networks (Agnew 2011). Militarization occurs through a particular space, which continues the colonial process of defining territory as a part of “conceptualizing differences spatially and governing through them” (Bryan 2012, 220). For example, in her piece about immigration detention centers, Allison Mountz discusses how creating borders along differences reifies people into categories of citizens and non-citizens (Mountz et al. 2012). These categories are then attributed classifications as documented, undocumented, or the offensive yet commonly used terms, alien and non-alien. In a similar way, how space is defined in Rio de Janeiro has also been historically constituted through exclusionary processes and “justified in racial terms” (Bryan 2012, 216). The delineation of territory in Rio, more specifically what is considered a favela and what is not, defines where
pacification occurs; in other words, strong boundaries are imposed and policed “that both hold things in and, more importantly still, keep other things out” (Philo 2012, 5).

As described in following sections, favelas have continuously dealt with the question of territorial recognition (Perlman 1974, Perlman 2010). As favelas have experienced, territories are continually adapted to what is most beneficial for government systems (Bryan 2012; Agnew and Oslender 2010). What is at stake for the Brazilian government is not just the official demarcation of territory with titles naming favelas. Movements for spatial recognition of favelas have more at mind than the continuation of the colonial creation and importance of borders (Bryan 2012). Rather, the recognition of territory comes with a slew of government services in addition to the ownership of land and official boundaries defining communities. In relation to favelas, recognition means that governments begin to be accountable to these areas providing basic services including running water, electricity, and trash collection. For this reason, favelas are kept at a halfway point: close enough for an accessible labor force, yet far enough as to not be acknowledged and considered a responsibility.

Within international relations, territory has been defined as a portion of space that is bounded (Dell’Agnese 2013). However, what constitutes the space within this definition of territory is what Dell’Agnese attempts to answer with three possibilities: “physical space, geometrical space, and relational space” (2013, 119). The last possibility of space’s application, relational space, involves how space is produced in relation to changing connections beyond the physical location of cities. Looking at Rio de Janeiro as a global city, a term synonymous for relational space, encourages us to view the resulting government control of favelas, as a result of international attention being brought within its borders. Global cities are those that have become increasingly intertwined with global economic transactions while simultaneously experiencing a
sharp increase of inequality (Sassen 1991). These cities are also economic centers valued for their specialized services while distinctly undervaluing the other “economic activities and workers” deeming them “unnecessary or irrelevant to an advanced economy” (Sassen 1991, 82). In reality, these bodies are at the core to the success of the global city itself. Because global cities are based on the hierarchical organizations of localities, the image of a global oriented elite is only possible if this elitism is attainable by few (Sassen 1991).

The production of the global city can be explained through scales including government agendas or global systems. Even in the later, “changing connections beyond cities are inimically related to contestation and power relations within cities” (Dell’Agnese 2013, 120; Massey 1994). Despite the scale, defining a space involves power, as it brings to question what attributes we are assigning to that space (Asad 1993).

**Power**

Places are created through ideologies in an exercise of power (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a; Tyner and Inwood 2012; Asad 1993; and Knott 2009). Cynthia Cockburn classifies three types of power:

The power structures of economic class based on ownership of the means of production, the racializing power of ethno-nationalism expressed in community authorities and states, and the sex/gender hierarchy together shape human social structures, institutions and relational processes. Together they establish positions of relative power, thereby laying down the possibilities and probabilities for individuals and groups that variously inhabit them. (Cockburn 2010, 150-151).
In sum, Cockburn is speaking to the power of class, race, and gender in influencing the production of space along differences. An example of this spatial production (see Map 1 and Map 2), are cartographic displays of race and income in the 158 districts of Rio de Janeiro. Looking at race specifically, although people of color constitute nearly fifty percent of Rio’s population, there is a clear demarcation of a white city center and Black periphery. These maps are evidence of the race and class power structures involved in the creation of Rio. My research will not encompass a full literature review on class, racism, and gender and their spatial production but it is important to note the physical display of these powerful systems while they can remain “intractable” (Ford 2011, 223). “Intractable” does not mean that they do not have a historical basis and specific events codifying their actual existence, but rather, that no one claims to be classist, racist, and sexist, making it difficult to fight against systemic issues. As Tyner and Inwood state, “the individuals ‘responsible’ for the creation of such conditions are neither readily identifiable nor necessarily in the immediate vicinity” (2014, 781).

Rio de Janeiro’s government, operating within race, class, and gender systems, also executes power in demarcating which territories/favelas should be pacified and what is it about these places/people that necessitate such pacification. The drawing of territorial boundaries is always “an act in thought, conceptualizing ‘objects’ that should be kept apart, and one with material repercussions” (Philo 2012, 5). The immense power held at the government’s hands in demarcating boundaries shows the duality of agents in pacification. This duplicity is contested by political geographers; some geographers have asserted frameworks of militarization, while others have been calling for a shift towards theories related to securitization and thus recognition of multiple actors.
Militarization

Pacification in Rio’s favelas involves the rhetoric of peace, integration, and proximity in order for a deeply militaristic project to be perceived as an alternative form of community control and public security. Such a construction of a policing project has been subject to heavy criticism by geographers who study militarization and securitization within the overarching field of political geographies. Because of the intent deflection of ties with the military (i.e. the use of words that connote peace), pacification has avoided the geography scholar’s attention despite its clear connection to militarization of territory. This section will focus on the multiple definition of militarization within geography and then apply these meanings to the specific case of pacification in Rio’s favelas.

Military, militarism, and militarization, all deserve attention as their definitions alter the treatment of each of the terms’ objects. The evolution of these terms is seen within Rachel Woodward’s pieces, in 2005 and ten years later in 2014. In the former, Woodward defines ‘military geographies’ as “geographies both constituted and expressed by military activities and militarism” (Woodward 2005, 720). Here, “military” means the human, physical, and organizational aspects of military objectives including defense while “militarism” is the manipulation of everyday space and social relations by military objectives (Woodward 2005; Johnson 2004).

Unlike militarism, militarization does not have the experience of being a term studied, dissected, and debated over several decades. As such, its treatment was omitted in Woodward’s earlier piece (Woodward 2005) although it is a distinct concept within political geography. After nearly ten years of the evolvement of military geographies, Woodward works through these themes again in “Military Landscapes,” providing the following definition for militarization: “the social, cultural, economic and political processes by which military approaches to social problems and
issues gain both elite and popular acceptance” (Woodward 2014, 41). This definition is inspired by Lorraine Dowler’s work, whose definition is similar: a form of mobilization for conflict and expression of state sovereignty accomplished through private interactions that create an acceptance of militarization (Dowler 2012, 491).

Following a trend towards geographies of securitization, Woodward and Dowler stress societal “acceptance” and perpetuation as an inherent part of militarization (Woodward 2014; Dowler 2012). Looking specifically at favelas in Rio, it is difficult to understand the correspondence of these definitions of militarization with pacification—a clear enforcement of military strategies by a more powerful entity on a less advantaged subject. However, the stress on “acceptance” and perpetuation speaks to Tyner and Inwood’s point that violence doesn’t just exist, but comes into being (2014). Similar to violence, the reality of militarization is an assemblage of political practices; militarization does not come from a single source (Tyner and Inwood 2014). Therefore, violence, militarization, and pacification, cannot be made simple by stating that they are a choice made by the state. Rather, as Dowler states, it is a “process perpetuated and maintained by society more generally” (2012, 492).

Bernazzoli and Flint show that locality matters in the engagement of militarization, or the embedding of militarism in society (2009a). The study of militarization should be a comparative one between different locations with attention to the nature of the military presence and the characteristics of the civilian community (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a). How militarization occurs in Rio’s favelas is particular to its landscape, history, and political system. Militarization as a process and militarism as an ideology are used to reshape and reorient society using power through territory and space.
Securitization

This thesis is in conversation with political geography and specifically political geography of militarization because it acknowledges the power that the government has in curating the favela as a distinct place while giving its residents a particular characteristic. Pacification becomes imposed through government definitions leading to the production of a place sustained by 24/7 military surveillance working through power, territory, and place. However, it is often a discursive practice to paint pacification in terms of public security rather than militarism. Securitization is different from militarization, yet it is a critically complementary conceptualization of military occupation therefore it is important to discuss its relationship to pacification. Pacification must be viewed within the concepts of both militarization and securitization to have a complete view of its place within the former rather than the later.

There has been a call by geographers, including Loyd (2009) and Bernazzoli and Flint (2009b), to replace militarization with securitization. Securitization acknowledges multiple agents, including civil society itself, in the process of “organizing itself around the production of violence” (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b, 450). The study of militarization differs from that of securitization because it creates a binary between actor/subject, militarized/militarizing, state/society, etc. (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b). These binaries that militarization creates, has been deemed false and unavoidably messy because of the blur between militarized and non-militarized (Loyd 2009).

On the other hand, the word securitization puts the formal military between several different actors in the reproduction of violence, including society as a perpetuator of a military state. Stating problems in terms of security can legitimize state violence and allow state accountability to be diminished in a problematic way (Woodward 2015). Renaming ‘military’ as ‘security,’ as Woodward states, allows for “fear and threat” to be placed “beyond the visibility of
the military” (2015, 52). Therefore looking at pacification in terms of securitization rather than militarization would ignore the fact that this project is a *policing* project, directed by Rio’s government, enacting power and reconfiguring society. Because pacification is not a slow process, it cannot be “accepted” and reproduced by civil society as other militarization projects may (Dowler 2012; Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a). Pacification begins with a police raid conducted by BOPE, Rio’s highest ranking and most aggressive military police unit, and it ends with an implementation of a Pacifying Police Unit (UPP).

Geographies of security also frame security in terms of “we”; for example, “we” are in a state of insecurity and need security measures to ameliorate that threat. Using “we” creates claims of who is in and who is out of threats to security, or threatened by insecurity. Here, “we” is inclusive to few, and exclusive to those who are profiled as the very threats to security based on race, class, and geographical identities. Chris Philo adds to this point stating, “the practices installed by certain peoples in certain places when striving to enhance their own senses of security may end up exacerbating the insecurities felt by others in other places” (2012, 1). This imbalance is relevant to favelas in which the insecurities felt by people within the city center, including tourists, are resolved by increased policing of favelas, as the people living in them are deemed the root of the problem. The act of dissipating the imbalanced fear experienced by favela/non favela residents by creating a sense of national “we” attempts to frame personal insecurity experienced by a particular elite group into ‘big-S’ Security felt by a nation (Philo 2012, 2). The constructed rhetoric of pacification includes the use of “we” to share the responsibility of the project with those experiencing its effects. This point will be examined further when looking at government speeches and giving examples of the explicit use of this tactic.
In sum, securitization helps us focus on different kinds of violence enacted: violence that is produced by people at the top of a social class, violence that is accepted and reproduced by people of a lower economic class, and actors that don’t quite fit into either category (ex: NGOs). However, securitization also ignores other forms and outcomes of violence including instances in which the binary perspective of militarization is necessary: where there is one actor militarizing, and another being militarized. This choice between using militarization and securitization must be made on a location specific basis; “Geography must lie at the center of any discussion of violence” (Blomley 2003, 123; cited in Tyner and Inwood 2014, 771). For the remainder of this thesis, I will rely upon archival analysis and interviews to suggest that the pacification of Rio’s favelas necessitates the retention of militarization as a distinctive category because the impacts of state control are present, but not in the way that is described within geographies of securitization. But first, I provide a history of favelas, favela removal, and pacification.
CHAPTER II—RIO DE JANEIRO AND FAVELAS IN CONTEXT

History of Favelas

The history of favelas is one of spaces created out of functional necessity, paralleling the growth of Rio as a global city. The history begins with two coinciding events causing a mass rural to urban migration in Brazil: the abolition of slavery and the military coup that established the Republic of the United States of Brazil. In 1888, the Brazilian monarchy signed the Golden Law, making Brazil one of the last to abolish its 300-year long complicity in slavery after four million enslaved Africans, 40% of the ten million Africans who survived the Middle Passage, came to the country (Cottrol 2011). With the creation of the Brazilian Republic in 1889, the capital was determined as Rio de Janeiro—this was changed in 1960, when Brasilia became the official capital (Perlman 2010). Only one year earlier, in 1888, the abolition of slavery in Brazil caused a vast migration of plantation workers from inner cities to Rio de Janeiro. For this reason, many recently freed enslaved Africans settled in Rio aside from the soldiers who were promised land in the new capital.

The name “favela” comes from these very soldiers who were withdrawn from the Canudos war that took place in a community where a hearty plant, the favela bush, grew. After the 1889 Brazilian military-coup, Antonio Conselheiro, a preacher roamed the interior of Brazil and established a prosperous community run without money, alcohol, and with a promise of penance for past sins (Perlman 2010). In a country that was experiencing drought, the fertile and successful community made all nearby watchers jealous including farmers, the government, and the Catholic Church (Perlman 2010). The success of the Canudos community was met with violence in the fall of 1897 where federal troops killed approximately 15,000 residents, settling in the emerging capital of Rio de Janeiro on their return. Awaiting the land that was promised to them post war, these
soldiers settled in the hills of Rio de Janeiro besides recently freed enslaved Africans in what is today Morro da Providência. Morro da Providência was initially called Morro da favela after the resembling plant that grew in Canudos and was later found in Providência.

Favelas exist as physical places in conjunction with their imagined dimension or the “production of landscape, and the myriad cultural processes and politics” involved (Mitchell 2003). It is the interaction and co-constitution of the materiality and imagination of favelas that is important to note when describing their history and their symbology prompting their removal (Price 2004). Materially, favelas can be defined as creative adaptations of built environment stemming from an unmet need for housing (Williamson). In 1889 when Rio was designated the capital, one year after slavery was abolished, Rio saw a mass influx of people yet no plan to receive these new residents. This instance was when Rio’s paradoxical relationship with favelas began: Rio strives for development and growth requiring manual labor, while preserving a deep desire to hide the visible laborers.

While the development of Rio’s favelas cannot be traced to one common thread, many grew as a result of particular construction projects, urbanization, job cycles or the expansion of an area; Vila Autódromo evolved to meet housing needs among those constructing a new race track, while Favela do Metrô served workers building the metro station at Maracanã stadium (Ritter 2016). Similarly, Rio das Pedras grew in tandem with Barra da Tijuca in the 1970s and 1980s as the suburb’s demand for labor increased. The largest example of this growth is the first favelas which grew quite literally as the idea of the city was conceptualized. As stated, recently freed enslaved Africans along with previous soldiers settled in Rio in tenements, rooming houses, and shelters. The same people that wanted it removed, originally created the living scenario of Rio’s underclass residents: as a port city where during slavery, enslaved Africans would be directly left
to inhabit the region now known as Valongo. Valongo would go on to become the largest slave market in the world (CDURP).

Favelas became home to 24% of Rio de Janeiro residents not out of negligence, but out of extreme repression by Rio’s government. It was an act of meticulously removing and strategically ignoring issues that would cause the vertical growth of favela houses. Pereira Passos, Rio’s mayor between 1902 and 1906, is responsible for the initial envisioning of Rio as a “tropical Paris” (Perlman 2010, 26). This plan began with the removal of the residencies of Rio’s poor, and continued to include wide boulevards, and public squares (Ruchaud 2011). Just like in the Parisian reforms between 1853 and 1870, Passos tore the city apart for grand architecture, pavement, and the housing for Rio’s poor being pushed to the peripheries (Ruchaud 2011). During his term, Passos destroyed an untold number of favelas, 1,691 cortiços (tenements), and thousands of other buildings (Perlman 2010). Yet, he was unable to stop the existence of laborer’s residencies coupling the growth of the city. His term ended with 100 small buildings remaining on Morro da Providência, vulnerable to another government figure to enact their policy of favela containment/removal.

In 1933, the number of informal houses grew to about 1,500 in Morro da Providência (Perlman 2010). It was in the 1930s that favelas were first mentioned legally as “aberrations” and later, in 1937, the infamous Código de Obras or building codes were created to eliminate them (Código de Obras—RJ). These codes banned the building of new favelas, the expansion of existing ones, and the use of permanent materials in favela construction (Perlman 2010). Despite the Código de Obras, there continued to be a massive influx of people to the Brazilian capital spreading from the city center, to the South, and then West zones of Rio de Janeiro. Ten years later, an official Commission for the Eradication of Favelas was created to return favela residents to their states of
origin (Perlman 1976, 200). These explicit laws were never conceived because of the lack of concentrated power and resources given to Rio’s government.

The 1964 military coup marks a shift in favela eradication policies due to the inability for Rio de Janeiro to elect their own mayor. Notably, Rio de Janeiro policies were made on a national level which was now located in Brasilia after the shift in the capital’s location in 1960. Since their initiation, government policies towards favelas were to strictly eliminate them. Upon their expansive growth, which was considerably faster than the rest of the city, this stance changed to the containment of favelas. It also laid the foundation for the most recent attempts of Rio’s government to integrate favelas into the rest of the city through pacification (Perlman 2010). The next section will detail all of these histories of favela removal post 1964 military coup.

**History of Favela Removal**

Favelas are adaptations to economic circumstances of both the less wealthy favela residents and the extreme wealth just below the favela: Rio’s upper class. In their book, Maria Alves and Philip Evanson confirm, “there are sound economic reasons behind the continued growth of favelas” (2011). One of the largest is the aforementioned proximity to work. The consistencies of employment being in wealthy regions of Rio make favelas continue to grow vertically for residencies to remain close to work and therefore transportation to remain affordable. After the military coup of 1964, realizing that favela residents would continue to inhabit the city, Rio’s government began making plans for an aesthetically pleasing accommodation and containment of favelas rather than their removal.

In 1964, Brazil’s National Housing Bank was established to fund low-income housing using the FGTS—*Fundo de Garantía de Tempo do Servicio*—Brazil’s social security fund
Not only were the houses unaffordable, they also did not prioritize location and sustainability of the houses needed by most favela residents. CODESCO, created in 1968, contrasted Brazil’s National Housing Bank by aiming to improve three already established favela neighborhoods as a pilot project. Four key things led to the success of this project: it took place over a long period of time, it was inexpensive, all building materials were shared, and most importantly, all people whose homes had to be demolished for roads, services, and new public buildings were relocated in the same community. After the success and completion of the three projects in 1969, CODESCO did not further its projects and Rio’s government returned to the strategy of favela eradication.

Carrying an all too familiar tone, in 1968 Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Area Metropolitana do Grande Rio (CHISAM) was implemented and tasked to remove all persons living in the “slums” of Rio de Janeiro by 1976 (Perlman 1976). In CHISAM’s words: “The urban landscape, at present marred by conglomerations of sub-dwellings would be reclaimed by replacing the shacks with worthy housing, public works and parks” (Perlman 1976, 202). Funded again by Brazil’s National Housing bank, CHISAM was the military might to remove favelas while its counterpart, Companhia de Habitação Popular do Estado da Guanabara (COHAB-GB), resettled the favela residents in 40,277 housing units (Perlman 2010). The number of units built under COHAB-GB does not come close to the 100,000 dwellings CHISAM removed, and over 500,000 people were left without a home (Perlman 2010). In 1975, it officially closed and stopped systematic favela removal because as fast as favelas were removed, the causes of favela growth remained.

However, to this day, and especially in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, Rio’s government has continued forcibly evicting favelas. The most notable case of
contemporary favela removal was that of Vila Autódromo, a community of 800 families. Vila Autódromo gets its name from its initial residents moving to this region to build Rio’s racecar track, Autódromo International Nelson Piquet, in the upscale neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca (Hall 2012). Although Rio’s 2016 slogan remained “a new world,” residents of Vila Autódromo criticize that new world of Olympic Parks for not having room for the poor. When residents resisted eviction, police began using riot batons, rubber bullets, and percussion grenades (Watts 2015). Vila Autódromo also tells the story of fierce favela resistance to removals. The history of the Brazilian National Housing bank, CHISAM, and later pacification, are all paralleled with unified favela residents’ resistance. Although opposition became more difficult under the military dictatorship, favela residents persisted even when up to 80% of them living in the South zone knew that their favela was threatened with removal by the government (Perlman 2010).

**Favela Stigma**

*The view of the favelas as “a social problem” is produced and reproduced on a daily basis as those who live there are treated as a threat to the social system that created the favelas in the first place. (Perlman 2010, 148)*

In many ways, when speaking of favelas, the government’s struggle is not solely with the land. It is with the people, the citizens, who inhabit that space and what they represent. As the history of favelas has been coupled with the history of their removal, the depiction of favelas using solely negative terms has been successful narrative caught on by Rio’s elite, the media, and internationally. The word “favela” has been attributed countless negative definitions making it a demeaning term and causing its residents to be stigmatized by it. Favelas are consistently misrepresented in news outlets using derogatory substitutes that are not based in reality. Favelas
are not slums, shantytowns, squatter settlements, ghettos, lawless, irregular, and they are definitely not the dark side of Rio. Favelas can no longer be defined by their impermanence; today most residences are several stories high, made with brick and cement, and built to last (with pride) for several generations. Favelas today have become concrete housing developments that provide residents of favelas solutions to several economic constraints. For example, favelas are located in close proximity with the city in general but specifically jobs, schools, and free medical clinics. Favelas are no longer run-down and characterized by squalor; many public services such as running water, electricity, and garbage collection have reached most favelas, despite these services still necessitating improvement (Catalytic Communities 2014). Although favelas began as areas settled without government permission, all favelas are no longer illegal. In 1988, Brazil established a constitutional right to adverse possession after five years of land occupation—one of the strongest housing rights in the world (Catalytic Communities 2014). The stereotype of favelas as poor is also not entirely accurate: favela residents across Brazil generate R$38.6 billion per year in commercial activity and 65% of them are in the middle class (Catalytic Communities 2014).

Lastly, favelas cannot be described as an inherently separate world from the rest of Rio, as Perlman (1976) explains. Rather, favelas are tightly bound to the political, economic, social, and cultural, system of Rio de Janeiro. Perhaps favelas continue to be classified as at the margins of the city, necessitating integration, because the government does not was to confront how favelas are integrated and essential to the prosperity of few at the expense of many. Perlman contends that favelas are not marginal but “actively marginalized by the system and by public policy” (Perlman 1974, 4).

Despite the harmful perpetuation of false definitions of favelas, the problematic impact is on the creation of a type of person that resides in them: “perhaps the single persistent distinction
between favelas and the rest of the city is the deeply rooted stigma that adheres to them and to those who reside in them” (Perlman 2010, 30). Many of the stereotypes ascribed to favela residents are then used to justify their removal or repression. For example, favela residents can be deemed cancerous, parasitic, and sickly as they were in 1907 under Osvaldo Cruz the federal director of public health, or they can be characterized as drug traffickers as they were in 1980s (Perlman 2010). Favela residents can also be characterized as sensual, poor but happy, and passionate, as a form of a global marketing of the “marvelous city” as described in Erika Larkin’s book The Spectacular Favela (2015). In the chapter “Favela Inc.” Larkin describes the marketable global brand that the favela has become including even organized crime as “a source of fascination and fetish; a place where the allure of tropical Brazil merges with Rio’s illicit narco-glour” (2015, 81). Favela Inc. is defined by Larkin as the identities becoming commodified as a part of a larger consumer market (2015, 81). However, there is a discrepancy between who consumes, profits, and circulates this image, and who lives in the favela.

The perpetuated the cycle of engraining differences between those who do and do not live in favelas is also due to the lack of defined rights as citizens of Brazil. In many ways, justifying a lack of citizenship for some was easy for Rio’s elite: people who occupied land without government consent made their housing, and existence in that locale, illegal. However, by creating a different class of citizenship for people living in favelas, Brazil has legalized a type of citizenship that perpetuates and engrains inequality (Holston 2009, 7). Along with viewing the exclusionary citizenship in Brazil, James Holston (2009) also assesses the forms of citizenship created from unity within favelas. This sense of unity was created out of necessity; from their inception favelas were built, sustained, and improved, based on collective work. The word “mutirão” is a collective action planned by a community for a common goal. Often times to build a sewage system, renovate
a house, or to pick up trash in a community, favela residents will call on a mutirão. This theme of solidarity is repeated in protests in the United States, (“the people united will never be defeated!”) as we have learned that change does not occur through individualism. Yet, the positive aspects that are benefits of living in favelas are not publically marketed because unlike drug trafficking or Carnival, they are not sensationalized.

In sum, the description given to favela residents, positive or negative, are always used at the discretion of the government to either gain support for their removal, appear inclusive in international arenas, or to justify the policing activities within favelas such as pacification.

**Pacification**

*In 1969, the poor living in favelas feared that their homes and communities would be demolished. Today, they fear for their lives.* (Perlman 2010, 165)

The history of favelas, their removal, and the stigma that they and their residents hold, are parts in understanding the 2008 policing project that Rio envisioned: *pacificação*, or pacification. Favelas were seen as a problem and not a solution to inadequate housing by the government since their initiation. However, the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas became a formalized reintroduction of police units into the everyday lives of favela residents. Pacification called for the 24/7 presence of units within favelas, thus their fears were no longer eviction from their homes, but fear of losing their lives (Perlman 2010). In this section, I will outline the global history of pacification, pacification in Rio de Janeiro, and the aesthetics of pacification and security.
History of Pacification

Pacification can be approached from two key perspectives: the historical military strategy of pacification and the pacification theory analyzing the intentions and effects of this government tactic. The most prominent examples of the implementation of pacification are France’s pacification of Algeria from 1956 to 1958, and United States’ adoption of pacification against Vietnam in the 1960s. Pacification in both of these cases was established as a form of bringing peace and tranquility in a country. However both countries interpreted how to implement pacification, or when pacification was achieved, in the broadest sense (“1967 – Pacification”). In the case of Vietnam, the projected words of U.S. involvement was that the military was going to pacify the population by “changing the hearts and minds” of the people there (Jacobsen 2009). In the singular case of the Kien Hoa province, pacification had a death toll of 5,000 civilians killed by U.S. firepower. To the U.S., the 120,000 remaining people were said to be successfully pacified in Kien Ho, but to the Vietnamese 120,000 people were said to have survived pacification (Buckley 1972).

The Vietnamese pacification took shape nearly ten years after that of Algeria, one influencing the other. In fact, the United States was stepping into Vietnam after France’s presence in Algeria for nearly a century (Neocleous 2011). No occupation of a territory occurs without lessons to be learned; in the case of France, Lieutenant Colonel Lyautey published ‘Du role colonial de l’Arme’ in 1900 and later the book *Principes de Pacification* (Neocleous 2011; Lyautey 2010). France’s experience in occupying Indochina proved that for pacification to work there needed to be a clear command for how to accomplish it. One of the main lessons learned was that they would not be imposing pacification, but civilians would have to begin actively participating in pacification; not only being recipients of pacification but reproducing pacification.
itself (Galula 1963). It is in these cases of pacification that authors have theorized and come to a consensus that in the very least, “pacification is a euphemism for social control which has sinister connotations” (McMichael 2015).

Pacification has been heavily explored within academia especially involving its implications on security and capital (Rigakos 2016; Neocleous and Rigakos 2011; Saborio 2013; Francis 2010). Neocleous outlines the general concept of pacification as follows:

The thread, in other words, reminds us that pacification concerns the police power and its central role in the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2000; also Dubber, 2005), that the core logic of police power is peace and security, and that the war machine that is the state and capital is to be organized around this logic. It reminds us that the insecurity of bourgeois order must be permanently secured. (Neocleous 2011, 201)

There are many examples that can be given for this thread of events that are extremely familiar to citizens of the United States. For example, In the American South, lynchings were normalized as form of racial discrimination and oppression to maintain the familiar social order in the United States after the 13th amendment ended slavery. Together, the government and the media created a campaign filling newspapers of false accusations of Black men raping white women to encourage the political suppression of Black people (Tyson 2006). This fear wrongfully “justified” murder, and allowed laws to be created around racial segregation. Similarly, pacification emphasizes the necessity of security and peace in order to manipulate the social ordering of society with the portrayed exception of force. Using pacification in Rio as an example, I will later discuss the discourse that is embedded in Rio’s pacification project.

In Security/Capital: A General Theory of Pacification, George Rigakos expands the field of “police science” directly tying pacification with class wars of social ordering (2016, 2).
Specifically, pacification is an attempt to win compliance with the aim of fabricating a “capitalist order, from creating the conditions for accumulation to sustaining accompanying class, racial, gender, and other forms of domination” (McMichael 2015, 1262). This definition can be expanded to how social ordering, through pacification, becomes reproduced spatially in cities like Rio de Janeiro. George Lipsitz calls this the “white spatial imaginary” or the visualization of whiteness onto cities depending on systematic exclusion while idealizing “pure” homogenous spaces (2011, 25). A part of Rio’s spatial imaginary is its view as a global city and economic center valued for its specialized services. However, as previously mentioned, global cities are based on the hierarchical organization of localities (Sassen 1991, 82). The image of a global oriented elite or international culture produced is possible if this elitism is only attainable by some. All of the rules and the invisible norms created by the global city (fine dining, art galleries, yoga studios, etc.) are used to promote segregation while still making segregation itself “intractable” (Ford 223). In Rio, where there is a visible connection between race and residency as shown in Maps 1 and 2, not once is race mentioned in the discourse of pacification. This idea gives way to what Ford calls “racism without racists” and allows for segregation to be attributed to human nature (2011, 235). It takes out the agency that those in power, predominately white people, have in this mode of segregation and further police tactics.

The use of laws and programs such as pacification give a new palatable language to exclusion. Pacification relies on its image for continuation; despite the opposition and critique of its intentions after Algeria and Vietnam, it remains a contemporary military tactic in not only Rio but also in cities like Johannesburg, South Africa (McMichael 2015). The discourse of pacification begins with the connotations of peace, as Diana Francis’ states “peace is understood in terms of hegemonic stability, hierarchically managed, which in the first place meets the economic and
political interests of those who control it” (2010, 76). As McMichael’s does within the context of Johannesburg, I will attempt to apply the vast theories of pacification to the ongoing case of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.

Despite these historical cases in both Vietnam and Algeria, and their respective critiques, in 2008 Rio de Janeiro chose its latest sector of the military police to be called the Pacifying Police Units and began their planning their placement within favelas (UPPRJ). As the previous sections show, attempts to place the exterior police within favelas were not limited. The word “pacification” is even present within the history of Brazilian colonialism; in 1549, the Catholic Society of Jesus, under the order of Portuguese Kind João II, travelled to Brazil to pacify and subjugate the indigenous population. This included the use of “forced recruitment of indigenous labor and the instruction and conversion of native people in Jesuit-controlled Indian villages, called aldeias” (Alden 1996; The Jesuit Order in Colonial Brazil 2012). Aldeias aided the enslavement of indigenous people through a system of organized conversion (Alden 1996). The 2008 pacification project, detailed in the following section, was an extension of colonial-white-supremacist control of favelas.

**Pacification in Rio de Janeiro**

In early 2000s, the Grupo de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE) was created to serve as an unprecedented policing model in favelas. Envisioned by Luiz Eduardo Soares, the GPAE was an early attempt at integration of police force and the community in order to eliminate the top down feeling of police control (Ashcroft 2014). In its initial stages, the GPAE focused on three objectives: reduce access to guns; provide avenues for youth aside from engaging in crime; and to stop the violent practices of civil and military police (Riccio 2013). Although it had its successes
in two favelas, Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho, the social demands were not met due to GPAE’s institutional fragility. The top down approach of the GPAE would not be sustainable long term and the program ended in 2007 when Sérgio Cabral was elected as the Rio de Janeiro State Governor and, within the same party, Eduardo Paes became Rio’s mayor (Penglase 2014). Cabral appointed José Beltrame as the Secretary of Security who would envision and implement the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio’s favelas (Riccio 2013).

The political climate in Brazil influenced the failures of the GPAE and the future “successes” of the UPPs. Not only was there a shift in governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, but there was also a presidential election of a highly popular president amongst lower class Brazilians, Lula da Silva. Lula became president on January 2003 and is a founding member of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the Workers’ Party in Brazil. The PT is a close ally to the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) which both Cabral and Beltrame were a part of (La Botz 013). Because of the close connection between national and regional governments, a clear plan for intervention in favelas could be created (La Botz 2013).

On December 19, 2008, the first Pacifying Police Unit was installed in Santa Marta. Its initial goals were not to tackle drug trafficking, like many other government programs, but to regain control over favelas. The intervention is done by the BOPE, the Special Operations Battalion a section of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro. This step begins with military tanks and war-trained soldiers entering favelas and arresting people associated with drug trafficking. Their symbol largely depicts their method of operation, a skull with a dagger through it. Once the BOPE has entered a favela, they raise three flags, the Brazilian flag, Rio de Janeiro’s flag, and the UPP’s flag. This moment is intended to symbolize favelas once again becoming “integrated” into the nation, as if they were never a part of it (Penglase 2014, 12). Janice Perlman addresses this
false necessity of integration claiming that favelas were never marginal to the city but closely integrated to the creation and sustenance to the city in itself (1976). After the ceremony, BOPE remains there until the implementation of the UPPs, the police body that will patrol the area for a prolonged period. This patrol is a complete penetration of the state in a residential area made possible by 24/7 officers on foot to impose order.

When describing the UPP, it’s important to note that the policing project significantly changed since 2008; the changes will be spoken about more directly in the fourth chapter of this thesis under, “Analysis: two views of pacification.” The pacifying police were officers specifically trained for a community style policing who had no prior experience in the academy in order to break patterns of police corruption (Penglase 2014). These officers wore newly pressed light blue uniforms intended to bring peace, serenity, and trust into the communities. This is common, as Diana Francis suggests: “those engaged in pacification often wear peacebuilders’ clothes, covering themselves with the benign language of ‘humanitarian intervention’, [and] ‘peacekeepers’” (2010, 77). In all, pacification relies on three things: the creation of the favelas as a distinct place that necessitates government control, the idea that residents of favelas are passive objects and incapable of imaging (or implementing) a solution to the drug problem, and instilling fear of Rio’s growing security problem on its residents (Penglase 2014, 12).

The creation of the Pacifying Police Units in Rio was not only timely because of the national political agenda aligned between the Governor, Mayor, and President’s political coalition, but also because of the international attention Rio was generating. In 2007, Rio was economically sound with the discovered of the Tupi deep-sea oilfield in the state of Rio and it was experiencing a commodity boom allowed it to weather the 2008 global economic crisis. Rio was beginning to receive the image as a global city, becoming a part of the BRIC countries, meeting for the first
time in 2006, and winning the bid to host both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. However, at the time there was a “widespread perception of insecurity” that “had come to be seen not just as a public safety issue but also as a drain on the city’s economy, negatively impacting investment” (Penglase 2014, 11). The United Nations Council of Human Rights echoed this sentiment in 2008 where they criticized Brazil for its public security leading the national government to create the National Program for Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI). However, the 97 social programs that PRONASCI envisioned would only be implemented in Rio after José Beltrame, Rio’s Secretary of Security, established control of the favela territories (Alves and Evanson 2011).

Favelas were targeted as the problems of Rio de Janeiro’s insecurity, continuing Rio’s history with the criminalization of poverty, and the solution was increased policing of these “poor” areas. This is not to say that Rio did not have a drug problem or that favela residents did not want a solution to the presence of trafficking in their communities. However, as many protest against police brutality read, “The Rich Want Peace to Stay Rich. We Want Peace to Stay Alive” (Alves and Evanson 2011, 118).

Thus, in 2008 Santa Marta was the first of thirty-eight UPPs installed, the latest one being Vila Kennedy on May 23, 2014.

**Conclusion**

*The declaration that peace has to be brought inside the favelas ... was a communicative tactic used to legitimize the militarization of civilian territories.* (Saborio 2016, 132)

The previous chapter has introduced some of the geographical debates and approaches that the pacification of Rio’s favelas speaks to (geographies of militarization, securitization, and
power) while this chapter focused on understanding these frameworks within the historical context of Rio de Janeiro. In the following chapter, I will bring both the literature as well as Rio’s history in conversation with the government discourse of pacification. Specifically, I will analyze how the favela is constructed—through active constructive government discourse—as a space, an identity, and a site that necessitates pacification. My main goal being to compare pacification as portrayed by the government with the reality of pacification through lived experiences of favela residents.
CHAPTER III—METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The main question driving this thesis is: How does the Brazilian government’s presentation of pacification differ from the lived experiences of residents within pacified favelas? More specifically, I was interested in examining (1) the construction of pacification by the government and, (2) perspectives from within the favelas on the realities of pacification. To do this, I used archives of documents and speeches to analyze discourse used by Rio de Janeiro’s government surrounding pacification, and conducted semi-structured interviews with six favela residents to understand their lived experiences of pacification. In this chapter, I outline my methodology, data, and analysis.

Archival data

The first set of data consisted of an analysis of the construction of pacification by the government, which is facilitated by the enormous presence that Rio’s government has on social media and their upkeep of digital archives¹. This deliberate and conscious form of pacification’s representation within government speeches, coupled the physical presence of the pacifying police within favelas. Between 2008 and 2014, Sergio Cabral (Rio’s governor at the time), José Beltrame (Rio’s Secretary of Security at the time), and the former president, Dilma Rousseff, attended numerous events held within Rio’s favelas inaugurating public services and Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). These events were no small feat; there were gates filled with people waiting to hear the president, as well as about twenty of Rio de Janeiro’s top politicians present and simultaneously congratulated. The president herself attended all of the initiatives meanwhile commercials were

¹ See Table 1, a descriptive table of all digital archives used for analysis.
circulating Rio de Janeiro with advertisements coming directly from UPPs explaining their objectives. In addition, Sergio Cabral, José Beltrame, and all 38 UPPs have their individual YouTube channel consisting of a mix of videos representing every stage of pacification. Each UPP, and their respective police body, films the process of pacification, recording unedited, handheld selfie-videos of every stage. Further, Rio has a database of all government speeches and agendas called *Palácio do Planalto: Presidência da República* that was filtered for the following keywords: favela (and seven alternatives to “favela”), pacification, police, military, security, and integration.

Amongst hundreds of speeches, videos, and propaganda material, I analyze twenty-five that elaborate on how pacification occurs through deliberate and conscious discourse supplementing physical occupation. I chose to engage in this archival research for the reasons Jason Dittmer gives this method importance: “through the recognition and interaction of the various discourses in which we are embedded…meaning is created, power is conveyed, and the world is rendered recognizable” (2010, 275). Approaching these documents with an ontology of political geographies of militarization and securitization, all speeches were coded or categorized in order to help analysis. By coding, I took “text data or pictures gathered during data collection, segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and [labeled] those categories with a term” (Creswell 2009, 186). These terms led to twelve categories which helped me delve into the data and establish seven dominant themes used to sell pacification to the public. These included the construction of favelas as a place, construction of a favela resident, nationalism and the establishment of a collective “we,” branding of public security, branding of success, technology, and pacification as race-less.

This portion of my research uses strategies of studying up: studying the colonizers rather
than the colonized (Nader 1972; Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey 2012). Yet, limiting my research to studying the Brazilian government would lead to an incomplete perspective of pacification because of the naturally skewed source of my information: the archives. Archives, especially those taken directly from government sources, are “still the source of knowledge about the colonial past” (Arondekar 2005, 11). In addition, allowing archival research stand alone is dangerous it allows for a single narrative to emerge of a place and people “recuperated from the breach and shadow of the settler archive and colonial history” (Arondekar 2005, 18). Because of this, I have chosen a mixed methods approach within qualitative data: beginning with the construction of pacification by the government, which juxtaposes favela residents’ perspectives of pacification.

**Semi-structured interviews**

The second set of data consists of semi-structured interviews I conducted with residents of pacified favelas to supplement the archival research of the state’s construction of pacification. Having previously spent the summer in Rio doing journalistic reporting within favelas, I created a wide network of contacts allowing me to return to Rio in order to identify possible participants who would be willing to speak on the realities of pacification and the reactions to the government’s discourse on pacification. Over the course of two weeks, I conducted five interviews with six participants who live or previously lived in pacified favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Instead of signaling representative views, the purpose of this portion of my research is to understand how different experiences of favela residents might lead to alternative meanings attributed to pacification (Cloke, Cook, and Crag 2004). Thus, a limited number of interview subjects is valid in this qualitative research which is less interested in generalizations and instead looks at these ulterior representations. To accomplish this, I emphasize a diverse sample of participants to obtain a
variety of experiences with pacification in different favelas allowing me to extrapolate meaning from and give importance to the individual recounts of favela residents.

My participants were selected via the snowball sampling method, beginning with previous contacts and the already established precedence for entering these communities as a researcher. The interviews were set up prior to arriving in Rio due to the limited time and originally lofty goals. My initial goals for this part of my thesis looked vastly different from reality: I planned to conduct ten interviews and two focus groups. For several reasons, I found it difficult for to “come out” as a researcher within the favelas my contacts lived in which made me conduct fewer interviews than intended. Favela members have a historical memory of research being exploitive, with little in return for their stories being shared. In many ways, these criticisms are completely accurate, especially within the work I would ultimately do: I would leave the favela, return to UNC Chapel Hill, and write an honors thesis, while the lives of those who contributed to my thesis would remain unchanged. If time allowed it, I would have developed this thesis into a collaborative project not keeping the power and privilege of interpretation at my hands as someone who does not live in a favela and thus does not experience pacification intimately. However, sharing authority also means sharing control of the outcomes and while I attempt to let interviewee’s voices stand for themselves, I ultimately needed to formulate my thesis independently (Benson and Nagar 2006).

Thus, during the two weeks in Rio, I conducted five semi-structured interviews, all of which were recorded on a digital audio recorder and later transcribed for coding. The interviews were guided by the following questions:

*How long have you lived in your community?* *Were you living here when pacification began?* *What were your experiences with the Pacifying Police Units?* *What are your impressions of the project?* *How would you describe your use of and interactions with the police prior to your favela being pacified?* *How would you describe your use of and
interactions with the Pacifying Police Units? How present are police (of any sort) a part of your daily life? A part of my project consists of analyzing government’s discourse surrounding pacification; here is a clip of a speech that occurred in (date)—what are your impressions of this speech? How does (government figure) represent your community? Is this an accurate representation of your community members? How accurate of a description of pacification is it? After hearing this speech, and from your past experiences, how are members of your community usually portrayed by the government? What are the good or bad things that can be attributed to pacification? How are you and your community dealing with those benefits/problems?

The Participants

The five interviews included six participants from the following favelas: Rio das Pedras, Providência, São Carlos, Vidigal, and Rocinha, the largest favela in Brazil. By including interviews with favela residents, I am intentionally shifting the focus to the objects of pacification—favela residents. In national and international discourse, pacification usually expresses the government and police bodies’ opinions and it is essential for my research to break from this trend and include knowledge coming from within favelas instead of epistemology about favelas. In this same vain, it is important to give enough details of participants in order to humanize their experiences, while maintaining their anonymity through aliases and not specifying which favela they currently live in. The following paragraphs will detail the lives of Aline, Felipe, Bruna, Rosa, Danielle, and Priscila.

Aline, my first participant, is a young woman who works as one of the best manicurist within the favela she lives in. She is originally from Bahia along with her husband who moved to Rio de Janeiro three years ago for better employment. If you want to know anything about current events, politics, or neighborhood gossip, the salon is the place to go. Almost everyone circulates through the salon every day and entrusts Aline with updates about their lives and their feelings about the most up-to-date political scandal. After every shift, Aline watches the news giving
importance to staying informed in order to one-day participate in demonstrations if needed. If not a manicurist, Aline would make an excellent politician and community organizer.

Felipe and Bruna are a young couple who come from the Northeastern state of Ceará. Felipe grew up in Rio de Janeiro within two different favelas while Bruna only moved to Rio within the last five years. Because of their different experiences, I interviewed them separately. Felipe is a young entrepreneur who works in any job that involves meeting new people, taking every opportunity to inform them about the history of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Scared of the impact that the violence would have on their two sons, Felipe’s family moved to the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro when he was in his twenties. Now in his mid-thirties, Felipe has seen pacification in both of the favelas he grew up in while he lived there and during his visits. Bruna recently moved to Rio, quitting her job at the local radio station in her hometown near Fortaleza, Ceará to begin learning about wines and taking up a job as a sommelier at a wine shop at the mall. She is extremely professionally motivated; working twelve hour days while still managing to take English courses on the side. She lives in the same favela as Aline: a horizontally sprawling favela known for the vast amount of immigrants that make a home there from Northeastern Brazil.

Rosa has a different experience than my other participants in that she is a leader of a theatre non-profit in a compact, vertical favela. She has worked in several other favelas—some further from the city—but she speaks to her experiences where she has been for the last five years. Within this timeframe, she has seen the evolution of pacification: its strong beginnings to its eventual deterioration. Rosa is also used to giving interviews within her position at work, but it was the first time she spoke about pacification specifically.

Lastly, I interviewed Danielle and Priscila together in their home the day before I left Rio de Janeiro. Priscila moved to Rio at the age of thirteen (she’s now thirty-five) to work as a domestic
worker for a family that she is still with today. In 2008, Danielle came to Rio from Chile for Carnaval where she met Priscila. Nine months later, she returned, married Priscila, and lived with her in a favela. They both love to dance, enjoy the beach, and travel as much as their jobs allow. They experienced the police raids prior to pacification, during pacification itself, and in the attempts to pacify the favela that the majority of Priscila’s family currently live in. They are particularly attentive to issues surrounding racism, police brutality, and the comparison of Brazilian and Chilean politics.

Each of the interview participants offer a different context of pacification due to their history, gender, race, and other important intersectionalities. These descriptions also give a glimpse at where each participant came from, giving reason behind their stances within the quotations used in the last chapter on the analysis of pacification’s other imaginings.
CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS: TWO VIEWS OF PACIFICATION

THE REPRESENTATION OF PACIFICATION

Pacification is much more than BOPE’s initial entrance, the establishment of a police force, and the 24/7 presence of the Pacifying Police. Pacification includes the creation of a compelling discourse selling a military project, the establishment of a place/person/identity that necessitates pacification, and the technologies created to accomplish this promotion. This section explores how government discourse accomplishes these above tasks through seven primary themes.

Construction of Favelas and Favela Residents

The legitimization of pacification begins with creating a place and a people that necessitate pacification. The construction of favelas as a place is the creation of attributes assigned to favelas through government discourse, which in turn influences the policies or actions towards them. This section brings the literature review of “territory, place, and space” as well as that of “power” in conversation with the actual place making of favelas done by Rio’s government through government speeches. As previously mentioned, the creation of a place requires power, as its imagining is permeated with ideology (Knott 2009). Within Rio, the government has the power in place making and assigning attributes to locations is based on their biases and visions for the future of the city. Through excerpts from speeches and videos, I show the characteristics given to favelas and their residents that help justify and continue pacification’s agenda.

This section will reference three speeches that emphasize the visibility of favelas and the distinction made between them and the wealthy parts of Rio. These speeches include Dilma Rousseff’s 2013 speech in Rocinha, Rousseff in 2014 inaugurating the transcarioca, and the 2012 commercial published by the UPP RJ.
In 2013, a crowd of hundreds came to watch the former president, Dilma Rousseff inaugurate the PAC 2, the growth acceleration program that invested in infrastructure issues (Rousseff 2013). Within this speech, she distinguishes between the favela and its surrounding neighborhoods:

Investing in favelas in our Brazil was something, I would say, transformational. Transformational because not only does it improve the quality of life here, of the people that live in Rocinha, but it improves the quality of life of all the neighborhoods surrounding Rocinha. (Rousseff 2013)

In her speech, Rousseff outlines Rocinha as a particular place by differentiating its life as parasitic to surrounding neighborhoods, meanwhile making its improvement an investment, as it is beneficial to others. The demarcation of Rocinha occurs to both “hold things in and, more importantly still, keep other things out” (Philo 2012, 5). In her speech, and throughout the discourse on pacification, integrating favelas into the greater Rio is stressed, most frequently when thanking the military for their services integrating favelas (Rousseff 2011, 2013). However, Rio’s favelas have always been tightly bound to the political, economic, social, and cultural systems of Rio de Janeiro. After all, its residents largely created the physical structures of what the city is today (Perlman 1974). The government and police discourse surrounding pacification relies heavily on integrating favelas into Rio; however, it does not discuss its role in actively marginalizing those who live in favelas. As Janice Perlman contends, favelas are not marginal but “actively marginalized by the system and by public policy” (1974, 4).

This thirty minute-long speech is the most extensive and thorough in its discourse about pacification and favelas in general, coming at a time when Rio and the international community were concerned about the feasibility of the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics two years later.
What is important to note within this speech is that Rousseff was speaking directly to the people of Rocinha, something that as the head of the PT (the Workers Party, a political party in Brazil), she did often. Although pacification was a highly publicized tactic, its success depends on its credibility with the people that are being pacified.

The visibility of favelas is solidified in Rousseff’s speech in 2014 at the inauguration of the transcarioca (the BRT), the rapid bus transit opening just before the World Cup. Rousseff states, “It becomes visible when we ride the transcarioca that, without pacification of the various neighborhoods here in Rio, this fantastic construction that is the BRT, would not be possible” (Rousseff 2014a). This statement complicates the visibility of pacified favelas versus the visibility of favelas in general. Through its vagueness, the questions of “what is it about these “neighborhoods” that would not allow for a new transit system?” and “what is it about these now pacified “neighborhoods” that make them visible?” arise. Rousseff continues to talk about the importance of a bus line that is above ground and exposes people to Rio’s landscape versus a metro that hides all of the realities by going underground. She states, “For many years, this whole region wasn’t visible, now it will be visible and now it will also be transformed” (Rousseff 2014a). The history of favelas corroborate that they have always been present, visible, and at odds with the wealthy parts of Rio de Janeiro. Through constant plans for demolition and removal, favelas have only been “invisible” to those who benefited from their lack of recognition. Here, Rousseff demonstrates discourse’s power; deeming when a region is “visible” or “invisible” and depending on that classification, calling for action or in this case “transformation” (Rousseff 2014a).

In conjunction with the direct speeches given by government officials, are the publicity videos created by the Pacifying Police Units in Rio. This includes the 2012 official commercial playing on Brazil’s most popular channel, Globo, stating that “the result [of pacification] is visible,
it is visible” (Portal UPP RJ 2012). Later, Rio’s UPP headquarters allowed the news agency, Jornal do Dia, to accompany them through the training of new Pacifying Police officers in the favela Mangueira in which the UPP general stated, “The first thing that the police has to do in this area of this service is identify your territory” (Jornal do Dia 2012). In both of these videos, a place is created in which pacification occurs and creates a visible transformation of the favela. The later speech shows that pacifying police, as a part of their training, must define the area that necessitates pacification, or generally, what counts as a favela.

Asserting a place matters, not only for those creating the definition, but also for those who experience the effects of it. Because of this, the characteristics and demarcations of favelas also reach their residents who in turn become people and not just locations that require pacification. Looking at two videos produced by the UPP’s YouTube channel, Portal UPP RJ, the history of favelas and their residents is shown through the lens of the UPPs. Above all stereotypes perpetuated by the archives, the two themes that were predominant was that of favela residents being involved with drug trafficking and favela residents as incapable of imagining and implementing change within their communities.

The 2012 UPP commercial stated, “In 2008 the UPPs were born and the work to pacify these communities that for decades were dominated by criminals, began” (Portal UPP RJ 2012). The stereotype of favela residents as drug traffickers was born out of inadequate opportunities for employment within favelas coupled by an expansion of the Andean drug trade into Brazil in the early 1980s (Arias 2006). As the history favelas in Rio de Janeiro has continued to show, “the Brazilian state and powerful members of society have sought to exploit the labor of usually nonwhite poor people while, at the same time, devoting relatively few resources to their social well being or even, for that matter, their policing” (Arias, 2006, 20). However, trafficking has not
developed at the total absence of the government. In its early stages, politicians realized the control that new traffickers had as community leaders and began to work alongside them to obtain political support in exchange for monetary assistance with social projects in favelas (Arias 2006). In many ways, the police and state policy then sustain the existence of trafficking in Rio forming a relationship that is not “parallel” but instead one that helps maintain a trafficker’s power over favelas (Arias 2006). The language used to describe favela residents as drug dealers, has negative consequences mentioned by Teresa Caldeira (2000):

The fear and talk of crime not only produce certain types of interpretations and explanations (usually simplistic and stereotypical); they also organize the urban landscape and public space, shaping the scenario for social interactions, which acquire new meanings in a city becoming progressively walled. (Caldeira 2000, 19)

In the case of pacification, this means using a communicative tactic to “legitimize the militarization of civilian territories” and creating a place, the favela, where peace has to be brought into (Saborio 2013, 132).

The second predominant form of speaking of favela residents within the Pacifying Police’s discourse is as unable to carry out change in their communities. For example, in a video inaugurating the UPP in the favelas Manguinhos and Jacarezinho, the general coordinator for UPPs, Cel Paulo Henrique says, “When we begin an installation, the people have to see that this is a program improving their lives. And the police, takes the first step” (Portal UPP RJ 2013). The pacifying police, although claiming to improve the lives of favela residents, are prescribing a solution to a problem they have identified. This erases the very existence of favelas as being solutions to circumstances that were ascribed to them. Thus, favela residents are innovative by necessity. Including finding ways to fill the voids of the public services refused by the government.
Unlike what Paulo Henrique says, the “first step” may not be the police; rather it may be a discussion of what favela residents want and need. In Aranda-Comer and Gama’s article, “If The City Were Ours,” Rocinha residents discuss changes to public policy that directly affect them (2015). It is clear that not only do members of favelas have the ability to make decisions for themselves but they also crave that jurisdiction over their lives (Aranda-Comer and Gama 2015). This form of community control is a feasible alternative to Pacifying Police Units that already exists but receives little to no attention.

**Nationalism and the Collective “We”**

Through all government speeches, there is a presence of nationalism and an attempt at a collective ownership of pacification. Dilma Rousseff was the primary speaker, giving speeches within various favelas that were highly emotional, and occurred most often during an inauguration of new buildings and public housing within favelas. The following quotations are examples of the emotions and the nationalism conveyed:

“I know that the real Brazil, the real Brazil, my true Brazil, the Brazil that I owe my elections to lives here, are here, and this is the Brazil that allows for us to change.” (Rousseff 2013)

“We created, more and more, a process in which the people, the people of our country, the true Brazilian, the worker, the entrepreneur, the hairdresser, the owner of the shop, the factory worker, can all have a turn. Have a turn to be the object of concern of the federal government’s politics.” (Rousseff 2013)

The effective persuasiveness of Dilma Rousseff is clear after reading and coding almost all speeches that government figures have given within favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the last 8 years. Rousseff has an ability to make everyone listening truly feel that they are, as she says, an “object
of concern of the federal government’s politics.” Her convincing words are given credibility as they are usually at a timely event where a project is being revealed. For example, at the Minha Casa, Minha Vida, reveal Rousseff said,

We believed that people had the right to have their own house. What people? Not the rich who can pay for their own houses. The right to access this dream of having a decent house to live in could only be given to the most poor. So, what did the government do? …The federal government put their hands in their own pockets, in their own pockets, and created a public housing program called Minha Casa, Minha Vida.” (Rousseff 2014b).

Rousseff recounts the creation of public housing units as a direct relationship she has with the residents of a favela; reaching into her own “pocket” to provide a social project. This speech is a form of gratitude that she expresses to its residents for voting for her and it creates an image of the government working for projects that it wants with ease.

The nationalistic discourse along with the creation of the collective “we” encourages a sense of ownership over not only pacification, but also any interventions within favelas by the government. Within all of Rousseff’s speeches, she includes all Brazilian people as having one experience. In her speech to Manguinhos in 2014, she often uses this by saying, “What we are doing,” “our people deserve it,” and “we should be proud.” In her earlier speech in 2013, given in Rocinha, Rousseff attempts to instill in residents, ownership of plans for monetary investment into the community. With its slogan, “the development of Rocinha is yours too,” Rousseff creates a consensual relationship between the government’s actions and the favela residents (PalaciodoPlanalto). This form of consent has also been the goal of the Pacifying Police Units who state, “We need for people to understand our position there. That they respect all police when he points to a problem, or when he mediates a conflict. And we need them to participate in this
confrontation. It can’t just be police officers, we can’t work alone. This project is everyone’s” (Carvalho 2010). These examples show that through the inclusive discourse of pacification, the ownership of government projects can be dispersed to the objects of the project themselves using both nationalism and a sense of a collective “we.”

**Public Security**

Another form of selling pacification is branding it as a stride toward public security. Beginning with a publicized creation of fear of a particular type of people, favela residents, Rio justifies pacification by stating that it is necessary for the security of the city. This was not too far from what Loïc Wacquant describes during the 1980s campaign in the United States to criminalize and effectively discard or imprison “those segments of urban society deemed disreputable, derelict, and dangerous” (2001, 107). Here Wacquant speaks to the replacement of the ‘Black Codes’ of reconstruction or slavery itself with the carceral institution as a new tactic to constrict Black people (2001). In Brazil, the government’s discourse of favelas and their residents has crystalized a false reality of people who pose a risk to Rio as a whole. In the United States, authors including Khalil Muhammad, Antero Pietila and Ruth Gilmore, attempt to explain this myth and reconfigure what has for so long been a part of the white spatial imaginary.

Pacification sold as public security not only creates a society based on fear but it also gives a false sense of public input in the military project. In Rafael Dia’s interview for *Sur International Journal on Human Rights*, he expresses how the Pacifying Police Units are often times wrongfully regarded as a public policy (Saborio 2013). A “public policy” requires social participation in all stages of implementation (i.e. planning, performance and implementation), and the UPPs were not participatory in any of these processes. If there was some involvement of residents, perhaps they
would not have chosen an “overt and permanent presence of the armed police implies the militarization of everyday life in these communities” (Saborio 2013). Instead, coupled with pacification in Rio de Janeiro was the release of the Garantia da Lei da e da Ordem (Guarantee of law and order) which allowed the President to bear full power to employ the military forces until “the reestablishment of normalcy” in order to “preserve public order, [and] the integration of the population” in a community (Rousseff 2014c). In her speech during the reinstatement of this law she claimed, “this was the origin, the origin of all the transformation of Rio de Janeiro, the origin of all the transformation in the sector of our conception of public security” (2014c). These declarations of public security being brought to Rio, Saborio describes as a “communicative tactic used to legitimize the militarization of civilian territories” (Saborio 2013, 132).

Success

One of the expected tactics of shaping pacification within the Pacifying Police and government’s discourse is its portrayal as successful. Although every speech included some form of praise for the program, here I will point to a few examples that are representative of the type of language used. Rousseff uses this tactic throughout her speeches, especially in her initial remarks saluting fellow government officials. While saluting Sergio Cabral she states, “There is this good thing we feel in our soul when we are able to contribute to the improvement of the lives of these people, these fighters and workers in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro” (Rousseff 2013). Within this same speech, Rousseff voices the recurring theme of the Worker’s (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT): “I am certain that we got the politics right, why did we get the politics right? A country only wins when we have all the people win with it. Here, we created conditions for the people of this community to win with the country” (2013). Rousseff proves to be a persuasive and personable
public speaker and those listening to this speech within Rocinha, may reasonably feel a connection with the president who is introducing new public services to the favela. These inaugurations also are used as examples of the government’s tangible accomplishments. Using this in her favor in a later speech, Rousseff states, “One thing is putting something on paper, it is another very different thing to apply it, to know that it works” (2014c).

The portrayal of success is also essential for the Pacifying Police to believe in their own pacification efforts. Thus, there were numerous awards created and ceremonies held to commemorate officers. For example, in one of these ceremonies, recorded and published by the Rio de Janeiro Government’s YouTube channel, José Beltrame expresses why it’s important to congratulate the police involved with pacification because it “not only recognizes the activities of the police officers, but also other activities that the officers have done for the community. The people that have engaged in this process and also produced really positive results” (Governo RJ 2016). In the second portion of this chapter, I will compare the claimed successes of pacification with the realities of pacification experienced by favela residents.

**Technology**

In the previous sections, I highlight the communicative tactics used as technologies of pacification. However, within the discourse itself were mentions of the technologies and modern tactics of pacification and its physical occupation of favelas. Despite the brutality of pacification being omitted, the government and police forces all mentioned the ingenuity behind their efforts. For example, in a UPP commercial, the history of the implementation of pacification is told as follows:
It was time to establish public security policy with heavy investments in technology…and a new concept of combating criminality. The state government began doing what seemed impossible: win the war against trafficking and violence. (Portal UPP RJ 2012)

Nearly all of the themes touched on above are used within this narrative told by the UPPs including the construction of favelas and favela residents, branding pacification as public security, and publicizing the program’s “successes.” The technologies that the quotation refers to are never fully explained as the commercial continues to say, “With new equipment, vehicles, and modern technologies, the UPPs take care of people. The role of the police is to prioritize the preservation of life and liberties” (Portal UPP RJ 2012). Dilma Rousseff also refers to “technologies” when speaking about the World Cup stating, “we are leaving a legacy for our population, for our people, something fundamental which is putting technology at the service of public security” (Rousseff 2013). When Rousseff clarifies what technologies she is talking about, she points to “devices that ensure a very precise degree of oversight of events, which allows you to control violence in a region,” or as I interpreted it, the everyday surveillance of the lives of favela residents (Rousseff 2013). Interestingly, many favelas began installing their own cameras in public spaces during the World Cup and Olympics to monitor the actions of the pacifying police and tourists (Kuitert 2016). The conversation of technology is another prominent difference between the narrative told by the government and that of favela residents. These differences will later be discussed with the introduction of the interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro.

**Pacification as Race-less**

Pacification’s discourse tactfully includes and excludes topics that portray the government in a positive light. Amongst many examples, the government’s attempt to de-racialize pacification
is most prominent in the context of a military program that disproportionately affects Afro-Brazilian people. Given the historical relationship that favelas have with race, the absence of race becomes evident in pacifications discourse.

Despite Afro-Brazilians accounting for 50.7 percent of Brazil’s population, Black people were disproportionately disadvantaged (beginning with being forcibly enslaved) in Brazil creating a social hierarchy that is reflected spatially in its largest cities (Berenguer 2014). Despite these facts, Brazil has claimed itself as race-less with the proponent of this idea being Gilberto Freyre. In 1987, Gilberto Freyre, introduced the term “mixed race” explaining how Brazilians saw themselves as racially more complicated than Black, white or Hispanic (Rosas-Moreno and Straubhaar 2015). In his book, Casa Grande e Senzala, Freyre claims that Brazil was unlike any other society in that it was free of racism. Freyre also argued that Brazil had “a more benign system of slavery and as a result was ‘free of the racism that affected the rest of the world’” (Farfán-Santos 2011, Freyre 1956, xiii-xv). However, by enforcing that racial myth, we fail to enforce the few laws that can exist to counter racial discrimination (Rosas-Moreno and Straubhaar 2015). By its enforcement, we also continue to disregard the history of Afro-Brazilians and the systemic racism that Brazil perpetuates.

The “invisibility” of race is also maintained today within the discourse of favelas and pacification. Between all twenty-five speeches analyzed, race appears once at Rousseff’s inauguration of the BRT:

We are an afrodescendant, indigenous people, with all the white tradition as well, and with the combination of blacks, natives and whites gave birth to joyous people, happy people who produced the samba, gave birth to all our traditions and, above all, joy and generosity
and affection in the deal.² (Rousseff 2014a)

Despite mentioning race, Rousseff paints a similar picture to that of Freyre’s race-less or post-racial society. This points to the pluralism in race within Brazil but it is simultaneously from a privileged perspective of Rousseff, who does not consider that the “combination” of races was a product of slavery and often, the rape of women of color.

**PACIFICATION’S OTHER IMAGININGS**

In the previous section, I recounted one side of pacification: the tremendous effort on the government’s part in publicizing pacification while accompanying the physical insertion of the military within favelas. A part of pacification’s story is also the generated responses and concerns of favela residents regarding its implementation. This section will speak to how pacification goes beyond carefully constructed official discourse by generating conversation amongst residents of favelas. Speaking to residents of four different favelas in Rio de Janeiro, I listened to six people share their experiences with pacification. Often times the conversations responded directly to themes within the formulated government discourse of pacification. Other times, newly emerging themes were consistent in what people found important when talking about pacification. These themes included geographies of pacification, the lack of trust in the Brazilian government, the proximity to drug traffickers, and the change in the Pacifying Police Units since its 2008 initiation. Reorienting the conversation of pacification to favela residents allows for a comparison of the advertised versus the realities of pacification. Here, I am intentionally shifting the focus to the objects of pacification—favela residents. With this in mind, I try to have the voices of favela residents.

² Nós também, que somos um povo afrodescendente, indígena, e também com toda a tradição branca, a combinação de negros, índios e brancos deu origem a um povo alegre, feliz, produziu o samba, deu origem a todas as nossas tradições e, sobretudo, alegria e a generosidade e o carinho no trato.
residents to speak for themselves allowing knowledge to come from within favelas instead of analyzing epistemology about favelas.

Nearly all interviews touched on the themes that were consistent across the language used by the government and military: construction of favelas and favela residents, nationalism and the collective “we,” public security, success of pacification, and race. However, across all conversations, there was a more explicit direct response to the themes of public security, the success of pacification, and Mega-Events. To facilitate the explorations of these topics, I have broken each major theme into its individual section. To protect their identities, throughout this section I will be referencing all of the people I interviewed by an alias and will not be identifying the name of the favela they live in.

Success

Previously I spoke to one of the government and the police’s most widely used tactics of branding pacification: selling it as successful. In all twenty-five speeches, pacification is described as a victory in all settings including those directed to favelas in general, Rio de Janeiro, or the military program itself. In all interviews, the opposite was true: eight years after its initiation, all people interviewed unanimously agreed on the unsuccessful reality of pacification. Although in some cases, reflecting on its entirety, some people interviewed saw pacification as having two stages. The first stage involved many of the speeches I pulled from earlier including Rousseff in 2013 and again in 2014 that spoke to the strength of the Pacifying Police Units (Rousseff 2013, Rousseff 2014a). Filipe, one of my first interviewees and a resident of two favelas over the course of his life, stated that pacification “was presented as the salvation of Rio de Janeiro” and that in
order for people to buy pacification, “you have to sell it as a good thing, the best thing in the world.”

Rosa, another person interviewed, was a strong proponent of separating the initial pacification effort and the current reality. Rosa viewed the Pacifying Police Units as entering “serene, strong, and wanting to create a dialogue. And now, pacification is completely different. They are alert, tense, nervous, fearful.” All people interviewed agreed on this point, however Rosa went further to describe what I argue is a third phase of pacification: “The situation is, in popular terms, spoiled. It comes and presents itself as a solution, and it had a good opening, it was necessary, but today the image is already different. It is already descending” (Rosa). This descent is interesting because it justifies the many fears of what pacification looks like after the World Cup and Olympic games—a point that deserves its own section as all favela residents mentioned these Mega-Events. In these quotations, Felipe and Rosa both acknowledge the hope these residents gave pacification initially. In both of their interviews, they recognize the problem that drug trafficking posed favelas and saw that something needed to change. However, eight years after its initiation, it is difficult for interviewees to recall the positivity they originally felt.

Instead, pacification is viewed as an empty promise on social services and a temporary mask for national and international media. Aline, a Rio de Janeiro resident who stresses the importance of reading and listening to the news, reflects on pacification in the following way:

Now that it has been eight years, we can see that [the vision of pacification] is different from what happened in reality. It was a project that never came, a project where the only thing that happened was putting police in favelas, no social actions. (Aline).

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3 All quotations from interviews are translated by Juliana Ritter from Portuguese to English
For many people, pacification was advertised as having social projects even before the presence of police. The term “pacification” itself meant getting rid of the drug dealers but also recognizing favelas for the first time as places that were also under government responsibility for providing the most basic needs including electricity, a sewage system, and paved roads. Despite this, favela residents were never ones to wait for these services; their existence has always been based on finding alternative solutions to the lack of government attention. When asked if pacification brought additional services to favelas, Aline responded, “Regardless of pacification, when they want to amplify a social service in the favelas, they can.” When the government does enter favelas to build new buildings, pave roads, or launch a Pacifying Police Unit, it usually occurs at the very beginning, or entrance, of favelas. For example, Rosa said when they pacified the favela she works in, “they laid cement in a large portion of the roads at the beginning of the favela.” This largely contributes to the generalized view of pacification that my interview with Danielle and her partner Priscila presented: “For the whole media and everyone around the world, the favelas are pacified. Only people that go there will know the reality of what happens there.” Both Danielle and Priscila previously lived in a favela that was pacified and continue to have family in a favela that is currently being pacified.

Altering the entrances of favelas by adorning them with police and improved infrastructure creates this perception of the accomplishment of pacification, or the elimination of trafficking in Rio’s favelas. The perception created at the entrances of favelas could be what Rousseff references when she states, “It becomes visible when we ride the transcarioca that without pacification of the various neighborhoods here in Rio, this fantastic construction that is the BRT, would not be possible” (Rousseff 2014). The visibility of pacification’s success that Rousseff holds is countered by every person interviewed as merely a façade. For example, Rosa stated, “The traffickers
definitely left the area, but they didn’t leave the favela, they simply went to another place a little higher up,” and Aline said, “They continued selling drugs in the same way but not yelling on the streets. That’s the only thing that changed.” By creating this mask, the police are complicit in the continuation of drug trafficking. As Filipe says, “The police pretend that nothing is happening next to him, but for everyone else, that favela is pacified. It seems that the police are protecting the drug trafficking happening at the top.” Priscila and Danielle furthered Felipe’s sentiment saying, “The police are the same criminals as the drug traffickers.”

Public Security

In government speeches, pacification was treated as a matter of public security; stating its necessity as a matter of keeping the Rio de Janeiro safe. When public security was mentioned in interviews with favela residents, it was brought up as a need to be fulfilled after basic needs were met. Despite police funding being the last thing to be cut within the economic and political crisis, after months of schools being shut down and health clinics closing, the salaries of police began to be parceled (not received regularly). Police officers not being paid was seen by both Aline and Danielle as a contribution to what led to the current state of UPPs. Aline asked me to imagine, “our public security, having to receive their salary in parcels. This ends up taking away even someone’s desire to work.” Danielle also commented, “I keep watching the people that have guns placed in their hands while they haven’t received their salary in so long and there’s not money even for immunization and health care. You leave your people completely exposed.”

While sympathizing with what led to the current state of pacification and the situation that individual police officers are put in, this does not compensate for the brutality used towards favela residents in the name of public security. Police often, as Aline says, “Go to the streets to bring
people to justice,” rather than keeping people safe. In almost every favela, there has been a notable case of a disappearance or killing of an innocent person at the hands of the pacifying police. Speaking about these instances, Aline states, “[The police] think that to combat crime is to kill the drug dealers. To combat crime is to take this person out of circulation. It’s like saying, ‘let’s disappear with it. It’s bad; so kill it,’ because bad things need to be out of circulation.” When imitating how police speak about favelas, Aline notably uses the pronoun “it” to refer to favela residents, showing the dehumanization that occurs in the actions of the police.

**Mega-Events**

Along with race, the World Cup and the Olympics were infrequent in the government’s discourse of pacification. The opposite occurred when speaking to favela residents in which these events were mentioned in nearly every interview; pacification to them was completely integrated with the timing of these Mega-Events. The relationship between pacification and the Mega-Events was not just assumed but proven, Felipe speaks to this saying, “One of the rules that was created by the World Cup committee was that Rio de Janeiro had to show a step in solving the security issue. The project that seemed the most concrete in public security that presented itself was UPP.” Author, Jules Boycoff confirms this:

When Rio de Janeiro applied for the 2004 and 2012 Olympics, it lost out partly because of perceived shortfalls in providing security. With that in mind, when Lula [Brazil’s former president] went to Copenhagen in 2009 to pitch Rio’s Olympic bid, he was accompanied by Captain Pricilla Azevedo, a commander of the Pacification Police Units, a program designed to quell violence in favelas. (Boycoff 2016, 225)
This initial link between the two gave grounds for skepticism of pacification, having residents comment as Danielle did saying, “After the games, no one will care about pacification, no one will worry if everything is pacified” followed by Aline who said, “Everyone said that this wasn’t going to last until the World Cup. Like after the Brazil’s World Cup everything would go back to how it used to be.”

These three areas—success, public security, and Mega-Events—were not the only common topics in both government speeches and interviews with favela residents. For example, residents also critiqued the government’s use of nationalism to attract, “many young men who buy the idea of defending their country” (Danielle 2016). However, these three areas were the most direct reflections of earlier themes that became reinterpreted through the lens of those experiencing pacification. In the next section, I will focus on topics that residents repeatedly spoke about when talking about their experiences within pacification.

**Pacification’s Other Imaginings**

Pacification generated responses by favela residents that were not mentioned within the government and police discourses about the military project. Although a look at pacification in history and the presented speeches by government and police provide an insight on what takes place, the specific experiences of pacification generate topics of concern that were often times never mentioned through its advertised language. This section will treat pacifications other imaginings outside of the themes generated by government discourse, or the topics that are important to favela residents when talking about pacification. The four themes that I traced from all five interviews were the geographies of pacification, the lack of trust in the Brazilian
government, the proximity to drug traffickers, and the change in the Pacifying Police Units since its 2008 initiation.

**Geographies of Pacification**

Not all favelas are the same and not all parts of one favela are the same; these both are concepts well known to its residents, and one of the first differences between their experiences and what the government advertises. Favela residents understand that the pacification of each favela varies and that the “mask” created at the entrance (or bottom) of favelas is often different from the activities within it. In government speeches and within the propaganda created by the UPPs, there is no concept of molding pacification to the differences between favelas. Instead, the first pacification of Santa Marta, a favela of about 7,000 residents, was used as a model for the rest of favelas (Moore 2006). This included Rocinha, a favela of more than 200,000 residents and 21 favelas within it. Speaking about Santa Marta, Aline says, “[Santa Marta] is a model to be followed, but it was not what happened in the other favelas. So, it was a model to be followed but unfortunately in some places it did not happen.”

Danielle and Rosa discuss the differences of pacification in favelas that are closer to Zona Sul, the tourist and affluent area of Rio de Janeiro, and those that are further away. Rosa has worked with youth in both types of favelas and mentions even the differences between a horizontal favela and a vertical favela. The favelas that are closer to Zona Sul are those that, because of Rio’s landscape, are covering the mountainsides bordering the city center and the beach. Those further away are horizontally sprawling. Rosa speaks of her current place of work close to Zona Sul and says, “It is not a favela of the periphery where you’re closed off. It’s not a horizontal favela. It is vertical, so you have a horizon, a view. You’re in the postal card of the city.” Speaking to the same
favela that Rosa works in, Danielle states: “It all depends. In a favela like ____, pacification can even be a good thing because it’s a small amount of people. But in favelas like Maré it is completely superficial. The reality of pacification does not exist, and it will not exist if the government is the person that feeds the person selling the drugs.”

Favela residents are well acquainted with the differences between the bottom of entrances of favelas and their interiors or the top of favelas. Pacification uses the entrance of favelas to develop this “mask” of its successes:

It is a showcase, and I think our leaders will always view it in this lens because in Brazil it is always a mask. To put on a mask, and work for the appearance rather than the essence of what is really necessary. (Rosa 2016)

This showcase allows for the continuation of trafficking within favelas that are pacified. As Priscila says, “The only difference now is that at the entrance, there is a UPP; and one block away there’s someone selling drugs.” Several interviews also pointed to the differences between the way the Pacifying Police act on varying levels of the favela: “At the top of the favela, [the UPP] are apprehensive with what can happen.” Police have not only become apprehensive near the top of favelas, but many people interviewed found that over time all of them have become tense and nervous about their presence within favelas. I will focus on this shift in the final section on the changes within the UPPs over time.

Lack of Trust

Conversations around pacification in its current state are inextricable from sentiments of political distrust. The interviews were conducted when the depth of the scandal was being realized: Sergio Cabral, Rio’s governor and orchestrator of pacification, was imprisoned on corruption
charges from siphoning tens of millions of dollars from public construction projects (Sreeharsha 2016); Dilma Rousseff was impeached; and, Eduardo Cunha, the person who began Rousseff’s impeachment process, was arrested shortly after (Sreeharsha 2016). This immense corruption scandal in Brazil has left its residents without any trust in the government, viewing many of its actions, including pacification of favelas, as a fraud. The confusion felt by favela residents as portrayed by my interviews is summarized by Aline in the following way: “Unfortunately we stay on a seesaw the whole time. Waking up dizzy. Not knowing what to think.” Aline, as someone who follows the news daily, is able to recount exactly what is happening in Rio and in Brazil as a whole. For those who do not, it is extremely difficult to view the government with any legitimacy, it is easier to live their lives to the best of their ability and not rely on the government for changes. Aline shared a common experience that, “Like everything here in Brazil, it all starts out well, then it begins to turn into shit. So, we initially believed in [pacification], but we know that it would not last long.”

Speaking directly to the comparison of Brazil now and the military government between 1964 and 1985, Rosa says, “Look, we’ve had a declared dictatorship, and now we have a camouflaged dictatorship. We had a declared dictatorship and everything, but no dictator left his position as much of a billionaire as today’s leaders.” Making a joke, Felipe comments that all of the people in power now were trained in how to steal money while trying to overthrow the military dictatorship. Including Dilma Rousseff, who was arrested for robbing a bank in 1970, “she was not imprisoned innocently,” says Felipe.

The distrust felt for the government extends to the police as representatives and employees of the government. For example, Rosa states, “The police in reality, not all of them, but some are criminals in uniform that play a dual role that utilize the power they have.” She continues to say:
If I am being taken by a police officer there’s no way to intervene, [the police] has the power. He is in uniform; he is stamped by the system with approval. So today, I have more fear. Today, with pacification, I am more fearful. I do not know who is beneath that uniform.

In all of the interviews, favela residents said that they are more scared today than they were prior to pacification. Within the literature review of how power is exercised, I point to one of Cynthia Cockburn’s definitions of power: “The racializing power of ethno-nationalism expressed in community authorities and states” (2010, 150-151). The Pacifying Police, fit in as agents to exercise the type of power as Rosa puts it “stamped by the system with approval” to exercise the states agenda. Aline echoes the sentiment of distrust through a story about her friend that lives in a favela that has gone to war over pacification: “Unfortunately, here in Brazil, we not only have corrupt politicians…but there are many police that are more unlawful than the very drug traffickers.” In many cases, this heightened fear is because of the lack of proximity that residents have with the police. This proximity was especially detailed in Felipe’s interview, as someone who grew up as a young boy in a favela. Both the closeness with traffickers and Felipe’s interview will be the focus of the next section.

**Proximity**

One of the most interesting running conversations between the interviews was the proximity between residents of favelas and the drug traffickers within them. I want to make sure to refrain from generalizing this relationship to all favela residents; my discussion here is limited to the six participants I interviewed. I draw on one interview in particular, Felipe’s, who grew up within two favelas in Rio that were and are still (in a different capacity) run by drug trafficking
despite their pacification in 2010 and 2011. Within his, and others’, narratives, there is a sense of respect between drug traffickers, who are also favela residents, and the community (Monley 2014). Felipe’s interview depicts this relationship:

What I remember from the time that I was a kid and lived there, was the proximity of the drug traffickers with the people of the region, it was very close. If you needed a gas tank (for gas ovens), they would bring you one. On children’s day, they would give you gifts. So, they did all of this care, like Robin Hood, to rob from the rich and give to the poor…We admired the men that were there, they had the best clothes, the best shoes, guns, respect, and even gave back to their community.

This sense of mutual respect comes from an understanding of the struggles that people living in favelas. Felipe notes that, “[The traffickers] are the people from the favela. They grew up here, they saw everything, and they know everyone. Everyone knows each other. They are called the *crias* 4. They respect whoever lives there.” This respect is difficult to achieve through a project idealized by people who are distant because, “[The politicians] are not present there, no one lives there, no one knows what it is like” (Felipe).

Priscila, who lives in a different favela, talks about how respect is not shown in the actions of the Pacifying Police, “The residents fear the police because when there is gunfire, they go shooting in every directions, scratching the doors of people as if because it's a favela you can’t treat people like citizens.” In none of these cases are the interviewees condoning drug trafficking; rather they are comparing two forms of control over favelas and the people responsible for implementing that control. For example, Felipe feels that, “before you knew who was in control.

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4 People created there, or people that that place created
Today, you don’t know who has that control.” Because of the proximity of drug traffickers, the people I interviewed stated as Priscila did, “I prefer the traffickers than the police.”

**Change Within the UPPs**

In my interviews, I invited participants to reflect on the changes of pacification over the years. Despite many of the speeches and advertisements I analyzed from government sources coming out as late as 2016, there was no sense of change between pacification then, and now. Rosa, among others, tells a clear story of what she sees as two phases of pacification: “It began with news that police officers were being aggressive, disrespectful, and began to slack a little. Doing this in a hidden way, closer to the top of the favela, and maintaining that appearance at the bottom.” She continues saying, “Everything is a little fragile in the end, because the system repeats itself. The system is too strong.” The system that Rosa is referring to she later clarifies as the “white man’s system” or the system that has been in place since colonization of Brazil and later engrained with slavery where “Black people were taken with force, ripped away from their roots, their dignity, their land, and got [to Brazil] enslaved, and got here violated.” Rosa is referring to a system of oppression created by a series of acts, in this case colonialism and slavery, to establish and maintain dominance.

The intention of pacification was to break from the brutal confrontations of police and drug traffickers by forming an alternative police force, the UPPs (Beltrame 2011). Despite this being the intention, the actions of the police do not add up to their principles of “Police of Proximity” (UPP). One notable case of the realities of the pacifying police was Amarildo de Souza who was tortured to death by Rocinha’s UPP in 2013. This was one of the first instances where the military police’s actions and representations of favela residents (especially Black men) came into question.
In an interview of Rodrigo Mac Niven, the director of the film *O Estopim* about Amarildo, he explained the film saying, “The ‘figure’ of the trafficker somehow serves as a justification for taking someone from his house and into the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) headquarters, torturing him, killing him, hiding his body and lying about what happened” (2014). Yet, even after several protests and the imprisonment of ten officers, the government of Rio de Janeiro never admitted, nor apologized for the acts against Amarildo.

Priscila explains the juxtaposition of how pacification appears versus its reality: “They are putting a bunch of young people with guns to kill other young peoples with guns in their hands that have a different idea. Then later, you say it is to ‘save’ the favela, that you are going to pacify it because this place is in war and it’s not pacified. I don’t buy it.” Instead of “proximity” between police and residents, pacification created what several interviews called a visible tension present in pacified favelas. This tension is not only present within favela residents as mentioned in the previous sections, but also within the UPPs. This is because a pacifying police officer “is in a place where there is no protection for him, full of fear. He doesn’t want to be there” (Felipe).

In 1965, Frantz Fanon wrote about the tension felt by colonized bodies daily in his book, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Despite Fanon writing from Algerian examples, the frequency of interviews mentioning the tense feeling within favelas mirror his descriptions: “When the native is confronted with the colonial order of things, he finds he is in a state of permanent tension” (Fanon 1965, 52). When asked if you can physically see the differences today with the pacifying police, Rosa answered, “You can see the way they breathe, their eyes. They lost their serenity. There’s a tension…it seems like something can explode at any moment.” Here, Rosa is specifically talking about the Pacifying Police; however, favela residents who navigate their now pacified homes feel this tension comparable to Fanon’s description of how the “native” feels. When
referring to the favela she lived in before and after pacification, Danielle says, “Now, you are never calm, I feel tense, I don’t feel the same.” Felipe attributes this tension to fear felt by the police, drug traffickers, and residents stating, “The second a police decides to go around in an ally, and the trafficker decides to confront him, the police officer will shoot. So the fear is always present.” Rosa poses the question, “who loses?” answering it by saying, “More than the police, more than the factions, who loses, like always are the people there who are in large part, workers, children, students, good people.”

**Conclusion**

Interviews with residents of favelas that were pacified provided for an alternative perspective on themes exemplified by government speeches, including additional topics that were solely present in interviews. The six favela residents interviewed spoke to the lack of success of pacification, public security and mega events. They also spoke to topics that are particular to their experiences, or ignored by Rio’s government and their publicized versions of pacification. These included the geographies of pacification, their lack of trust in Rio’s government, the proximity of favela residents and trafficking, and the change within UPPs over the span of eight years. Rio’s government advertises pacification as a much needed (and successful) solution to the threat that favelas and the drug trafficking within them pose on the wider Rio. When speaking to favela this propaganda is sold using words that incorporate the listeners of the speeches in the decision to pacify favelas. The collective ownership of pacification is not successful amongst favela residents who view it as a violent attempt at showcasing the dominance and control over the entrances of favelas when in reality the same institutions of drug trafficking are in place now as they were before. As I discuss in the conclusion of this thesis, the government's attempt to paint pacification
as a kind of securitization that will support favelas and make them safe for its residents differs from the residents’ testimonies which suggest that the pacification had many characteristics that are normally associated with militarization, including police violence and less, rather than more, personal security.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored how the Brazilian government’s presentation of pacification differed from the lived experiences of residents of the so-called pacified favelas. Within Rio’s government, pacification is portrayed as the solution to Rio’s violence through the containment of favelas by the daily presence of the pacifying police. In contrast, the picture painted by favela residents suggests that pacification is an attempt to portray police presence in favelas to an outside audience at entrances of favelas while not considering the differing geographies within and between favelas. It is also a project that degraded over time, especially after the 2016 Olympics, and resorted to former styles of militarization including police raids. Drawing from both archival research on the state and semi-structured interviews with favela residents, in this conclusion I will briefly highlight why pacification in Rio should be thought of as militarization of urban landscape rather than securitization. I will also reflect on the significance for geographical theories of militarization as they relate to the spaces and territories of Rio.

Pacification is not unanimously accepted within favelas. Indeed, the assertions of the state and the views of favela residents suggest that pacification is not best described by securitization, but by militarization. Favela residents suggested a distinction between those conducting the pacification and those being pacified. The impact of the military’s continual presence within favelas is understood through the daily fear of its residents. However, this “tension” that interviewed participants described occurs differently than processes of securitization. Specifically, for favela residents, pacification has the characteristics of militarization as described in Chapter I, including the manipulation of everyday space by military objectives, the expression of state sovereignty, and the clear enforcement of military strategies by a powerful entity on an underprivileged subject. Felipe describes his experience with the police as a young kid as follows:
We lived on the side of the road going up the hill, so we would see the men going up. They (the police) would approach the favela and before getting there, we would run underneath the bed because there was going to be an exchange of bullets. They would go up with such a high velocity. Sometimes when they got to where our house was, they would start firing on the way to the favela itself.

Participants interviewed noted a clear agent of pacification who differs from the pacified, as it is also shown in Felipe’s account. Defenders of the original vision of pacification claim it to be within political geographies of securitization, with the UPPs attempting to integrate and sustain this type of security through favela residents. This view of violence being sustained by multiple actors has caused a recent shift within political geography towards the use of securitization instead of militarization (Loyd 2009; Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b). However, in reality, pacification encapsulates over eight years of constant military presence in favelas with resistance by favela residents. I found the imbalance of power amongst the actors of favela pacification a case necessitating the retention of militarization as a distinctive category within political geography.

This case is also significant because it points to a nuanced geographical lens of pacification. The residents of favelas understand the failures of pacification through the geographies of the favelas they live in: the higher or deeper they go within a favela, the more familiar their favelas become with the presence of the drug traffickers they are used to seeing. Where the government and pacifying police are ignorant to the actual physical favela, its residents know the façade of pacification at the entrances of the favelas. Rosa speaks to the “showcase” and “scenes” produced at the bottom of favelas saying, “Brazil is always putting on makeup and working for appearances instead of the essence, or what is really necessary.” The lack of attention to the bottom versus the top of favelas, suggests that pacification was never necessarily intended as an alleviation of crime.
and violence from these communities. Rather, while concerned with a display of increased security, this geographic ignorance suggests that the process of pacification was never intended to provide safety for all residents of Rio.

Interviews with favela residents also provide evidence of an important temporal shift in pacification since its initial phase. The first phase included the “serene, and strong” pacifying police that Rosa mentions, including the immense effort to publicize favela pacification across state and national governments. The second phase was the decline in the rapport of the UPPs; as Rosa says, “they became alert, tense, nervous, and fearful.” This research uncovered a third phase of pacification: the decline in UPP propaganda and presence within favelas more generally. As economic pressures increase, participants detailed a change within Rio, which finds itself resorting to old military raids of favelas, or even contemplating a new agenda of policing and forms of militarization. Comparing the views of Rio de Janeiro’s government and that of pacified favela residents helps us rethink pacification’s current standing. Up until August 2016, the extent of research about pacification was preoccupied with its sustainability past the World Cup and the Olympics. With those events behind, scholars can begin to explore this third phase of pacification, or what I have perceived as pacification’s decline.

As a necessary limited qualitative study, I used data that was available through digital archives and spent one week in Rio de Janeiro conducting interviews. As such, this is not a representative sample of the entire government media or the inhabitants of the favelas my participants live in. Part of this work is trying to identify what is meaningful about pacification within both the active constructive discourse of pacification and the experiences of people who have lived in pacified favelas. This research is ultimately a contribution to the understanding of
the process of pacification within political geography more generally, with limitations that include time and place constraints, and biases inherent in interpreting interviews and government speeches.

Future studies on pacification would benefit from conducting a robust analysis of favela perspectives with a focus on solutions already coming from within favelas. By highlighting community voices, research is able to counter the damaging stereotypes that reinforce prejudice against residents of favelas. Understanding the necessities of favela residents, which differs tremendously from place to place, can define future government projects, police interventions, or support for innovative solutions from within favelas.
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MAPS AND TABLES

Map 1: Percentage of People of Color in Rio de Janeiro’s Neighborhoods
Created by Juliana Ritter using data from IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia

Map 2: Salary Per Capita in Rio de Janeiro’s Neighborhoods
Created by Juliana Ritter using data from IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
Map 3: UPP location and Percentage of People of Color in Rio de Janeiro’s Neighborhoods
Created by Juliana Ritter using data from IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
Table 1: Descriptive table of government speeches and videos

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<td>President announces government investments for Rocinha and Jacarezinho</td>
<td>Speech in Rocinha</td>
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<td>Dilma Rousseff</td>
<td>1 June 2014a</td>
<td>President at the BRT/Transcarioca inauguration</td>
<td>Speech in RJ</td>
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<td>President at the inauguration of public housing units in favela, Manguinhos</td>
<td>Speech in Manguinhos</td>
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<td>President at the initiation of new Military General Officials</td>
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<td>Presidential interview including topics of favelas and pacification</td>
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<td><em>Garantia da Lei e da Ordem</em>: President has authority to call a state of emergency and to employ the military in these cases</td>
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