

1 Collaboration between clinical and academic laboratories for sequencing SARS-CoV-2  
2 genomes

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4 Jeremy Wang<sup>1</sup>, Shawn E. Hawken<sup>2</sup>, Corbin D. Jones<sup>1</sup>, Robert S. Hagan<sup>3</sup>, Frederic Bushman<sup>4</sup>,  
5 John Everett<sup>4</sup>, Melissa B. Miller<sup>2\*</sup>, Kyle G. Rodino<sup>5\*</sup>

6  
7 <sup>1</sup>Department of Genetics, Center for Gastrointestinal Biology and Disease, University of North  
8 Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

9 <sup>2</sup>Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of North Carolina School of  
10 Medicine, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

11 <sup>3</sup>Division of Pulmonary Diseases and Critical Care Medicine, Department of Medicine, University  
12 of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

13 <sup>4</sup>Department of Microbiology, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania,  
14 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

15 <sup>5</sup>Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Perelman School of Medicine, University of  
16 Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

17

18 \*Corresponding authors

19 Melissa B. Miller

20 Campus Box 7525, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7525

21 Melissa.Miller@unchealth.unc.edu

22 Kyle G. Rodino

23 3400 Spruce St., Philadelphia, PA 19106

24 Kyle.Rodino@pennmedicine.upenn.edu

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26

27 **Abstract**

28 Genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 continues to provide valuable insight into the ever-  
29 changing variant makeup of the COVID-19 pandemic. More than three million SARS-COV-2  
30 genomes have been deposited in GISAID, but contributions from the United States, particularly  
31 through 2020, lagged behind the global effort. The primary goal of clinical microbiology  
32 laboratories is seldom rooted in epidemiologic or public health testing and many labs do not  
33 contain in-house sequencing technology. However, we recognized the need for clinical  
34 microbiologists to lend expertise, share specimen resources, and partner with academic  
35 laboratories and sequencing cores to assist in SARS-COV-2 epidemiologic sequencing efforts.  
36 Here we describe two clinical and academic laboratory collaborations for SARS-COV-2 genomic  
37 sequencing. We highlight roles of the clinical microbiologists and the academic labs, outline best  
38 practices, describe two divergent strategies in accomplishing a similar goal, and discuss the  
39 challenges with implementing and maintaining such programs.

40

41 **Introduction**

42 Beginning in the fall of 2020, SARS-CoV-2 lineages emerged globally showing evidence for  
43 greater transmissibility, disease severity and decreased treatment efficacy (1). Since then,  
44 SARS-COV-2 variants of concern (VOC) have swept the globe, displacing parent SARS-COV-2  
45 strains, and in the case of the Delta variant (B.1.617.2/AY.\*), risen to dominance in many  
46 countries. In the United States, Delta now accounts for >99% of all SARS-COV-2 (2). Increased  
47 positivity rates as a consequence of VOC transmission have led to public health interventions  
48 such as the reversal of masking guidelines and vaccine mandates (3). However, widespread  
49 transmission of SARS-COV-2 VOC has implications that extend beyond increased case-counts.  
50 For example, the efficacy of SARS-COV-2 monoclonal antibody treatment (mAb) and vaccines  
51 and the integrity of diagnostic tests are in jeopardy if regions of the genome encoding their  
52 targets are altered.

53 Variants emerge when viruses containing mutations that occur during normal RNA virus  
54 replication spread in a population (4). Mutations can occur in antigenic regions of the viral  
55 genome, such as in the SARS-COV-2 spike protein that mediates viral attachment to host cells.  
56 Spike protein is the primary target of neutralizing antibodies and vaccines. Thus, immunity after  
57 natural infection and vaccination, as well as the efficacy of mAb treatment, may be affected by  
58 mutations in the spike coding region (4-6). Already, variants have been recognized that  
59 demonstrate potential or observed resistance to mAb treatments including bamlanivimab,  
60 casirivimab, imdevimab and etesevimab. The FDA has revoked (bamlanivimab) or modified  
61 recommendations on their use with severe COVID-19 to include healthcare provider monitoring  
62 of data on currently circulating variants to guide treatment decisions (2, 7, 8). Similarly, SARS-  
63 COV-2 genomic data have already identified several variants with observed or potential reduced  
64 neutralization by post-vaccination sera. This has led to calls for development of vaccines  
65 targeting current variants and long-term strategies to deploy future vaccines to protect against  
66 variants that have not yet emerged (9).

67 Variant tracking is also required for monitoring of the efficacy of diagnostic and  
68 surveillance testing for SARS-COV-2. The FDA has warned that some SARS-COV-2 variants  
69 reduce efficacy of diagnostic SARS-COV-2 tests (10). Mutations that occur at genome target  
70 sites for SARS-COV-2 diagnostics can result in false negative results, imperiling patient care,  
71 case identification and public health tracking. If a variant has a mutation in a diagnostic target  
72 which renders the test ineffective or less sensitive, diagnostic laboratories may be blind to  
73 circulating strains, disrupting reporting of positive cases to public health authorities. Monitoring  
74 mutations that may impact commercial tests is crucial to maintaining accurate diagnostics in the  
75 setting of emerging variants (11). In addition, sequencing samples with negative results from  
76 patients with high clinical suspicion for COVID-19 may identify variants that would otherwise  
77 evade detection (12).

78 Strategies to track current circulation and emergence of variants require robust real-time  
79 genomic surveillance data. Use of such data requires the reporting of linked patient meta-data  
80 to state and national public health authorities. No standardized pipeline exists for genomic data  
81 generation, analysis and reporting at the state and federal level. Throughout the pandemic, the  
82 U.S. has lagged behind other countries in the proportion of cases sequenced (13). By early  
83 2021, the U.S. SARS-COV-2 genomes in online repositories represented less than 2% of all  
84 reported cases. There were vast regional differences in cases sequenced, in part because  
85 analysis took place in academic medical centers (14). Although the CDC implemented programs  
86 to enhance genomic surveillance, these programs only slightly increased the proportion of  
87 cases sequenced in the U.S. (National SARS-COV-2 Strain Surveillance, ~750 samples/week)  
88 or put the onus on commercial and local public health/hospital laboratories to perform  
89 sequencing and variant reporting (14-16).

90 The emergence of VOC has made it crucial to track emerging variants at local levels in  
91 order to facilitate real-time response to increased case-counts, monitor diagnostic tests, and  
92 inform SARS-COV-2 treatment decisions. Recently there has been a federal push to increase

93 sequencing capacity in the U.S. with the CDC initially investing \$200 million. The focus has  
94 been partnerships with commercial and academic laboratories and issuing guidance for  
95 standardizing reporting of SARS-COV-2 sequencing data to public health authorities (14, 17).  
96 Additionally, in April 2021 the Biden administration announced 1.7 billion dollars to support  
97 sequencing and bioinformatics infrastructure for monitoring SARS-COV-2 variants (18). This  
98 federal support for increasing sequencing capacity came with an initial disbursement of between  
99 1 and 17 million dollars to individual states to support these efforts (18). Although support  
100 through federal funding is an excellent first step towards improving genomic surveillance in the  
101 U.S., most public health laboratories have limited or no capacity for genome sequencing or  
102 analysis. Building a robust and responsive genomic surveillance system from the ground up is  
103 an expensive and time-consuming undertaking. The ever-changing SARS-COV-2 pandemic has  
104 shown that surveillance cannot wait. In the interim, local partnerships between clinical  
105 diagnostic laboratories and academic laboratories with NGS sequencing capacity and  
106 bioinformatics expertise are crucial to keep pace with the SARS-COV-2 pandemic.

107

### 108 ***The role of clinical microbiologists***

109 Few clinical microbiology laboratories have the in-house capability or capacity for high  
110 throughput SARS-COV-2 surveillance sequencing. Collaborating with academic laboratories or  
111 university core sequencing facilities with existing equipment and bioinformatics support is a  
112 substitute. Here, we highlight the roles of clinical microbiologists in such partnerships.

### 113 **Regulatory, Safety, and Quality**

114 Genomic sequencing occurs almost exclusively on residual SARS-COV-2 diagnostic  
115 specimens, making the clinical lab a key supporter of epidemiologic and public health initiatives.  
116 A clinical laboratory must abide by regulatory requirements when transferring residual clinical  
117 samples to non-CLIA academic laboratories, including maintaining a log of samples shared,  
118 specimen de-identification, and other data security measures as defined by the appropriate

119 Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval or exemption. When transferring samples to non-  
120 clinical labs, it is also important to address biosafety. Academic labs or sequencing cores may  
121 have a wide range of experience in handling infectious samples. The clinical microbiologist  
122 should offer guidance on appropriate sample handling, ensuring the necessary biosafety  
123 equipment (e.g. biosafety cabinet) is available and that sample inactivation occurs appropriately.  
124 Similarly, clinical microbiologists can offer advice on workflow and process control, gained  
125 through the rigors of testing in the CLIA compliant environment, which can benefit the  
126 consistency of results in the academic lab. A robust, repeatable process is needed to scale with  
127 demand and provide sustainability of SARS-COV-2 sequencing results. This is particularly  
128 important for workflow compatibility if long-term goals include moving the developed assay to  
129 the clinical laboratory.

### 130 **Identifying Samples of Significant Interest**

131 While the bulk of SARS-COV-2 sequencing is done in an unbiased fashion (i.e., randomly  
132 selecting samples to provide a snapshot of circulating variants), there are reasons to target  
133 specific samples. Examples include investigations into suspected outbreaks, severe cases in  
134 vaccinated individuals, or samples with abnormal test performance (e.g. unusual variance  
135 between cycle threshold values of multi-target assays). Notification of these events can come  
136 from a variety of sources, including infection preventionists, clinical services, public health  
137 agencies, or from within the clinical laboratory. All highlight avenues of communication that are  
138 frequently established with the clinical laboratory that may not be in place with the academic lab  
139 or sequencing core. Additionally, as such conversations may require review of prior test results,  
140 interpretation in the context of clinical history, or an assay quality assurance investigation  
141 including troubleshooting with commercial entities. The clinical microbiologist is best qualified to  
142 serve as the intermediary; fielding such requests, evaluating, and following up with results as  
143 appropriate.

### 144 **Reporting and Patient-level Information**

145 A challenge of non-clinical, epidemiologic sequencing of SARS-COV-2 is balancing the  
146 perceived clinical need (curiosity) for individualized result reporting while maintaining the  
147 appropriate level of patient anonymity across the spectrum of consumers. This dilemma was  
148 simplified with the release of CMS guidance on patient-level reporting of non-CLIA SARS-COV-  
149 2 sequencing results, only allowing for individual reporting to public health agencies and  
150 specifically prohibiting return of results to patients and providers (19). At both our institutions,  
151 samples are anonymized prior to transfer to our academic partners and de-identified meta-data  
152 are uploaded to the appropriate public databases (e.g. GISAID, NCBI) and in aggregate to our  
153 publically available SARS-COV-2 sequencing dashboards: UNC (<http://unc.cov2seq.org/>), Penn  
154 (<https://microb120.med.upenn.edu/data/SARS-CoV-2/>). Even for clinical colleagues and hospital  
155 administration, these aggregate data reports provide sufficient information to inform testing  
156 strategies or policies on transmission mitigation and educating staff and patients on the current  
157 pandemic makeup. We advocate for the clinical microbiologist to be active in these  
158 conversations and assist in translating these data for institutional colleagues and policy makers,  
159 as interpretation of genomic sequencing data may ultimately impact clinical laboratory  
160 operations. In cases where genomic data need to be reconnected to patient information for  
161 public health reporting, we have relied on the clinical microbiologist for this role. At both our  
162 institutions, the clinical microbiologist serves as the holder of the linkage file, maintaining  
163 separation of PHI from the academic lab, but allowing patient-level data to be linked for public  
164 health purposes, as approved by our respective IRBs. At the current time, a compelling use  
165 case for clinically reportable SARS-CoV-2 genomic data is absent. However, we advocate that  
166 clinical microbiologist remain engaged with these requests and continuously evaluate potential  
167 clinical needs. As experts in diagnostics, clinical microbiologists rationalize testing strategies  
168 and justify potential benefits or illustrate current shortcomings.

169

170 ***The role of academic labs or genomic cores***

171 The missions of clinical and academic cores are substantially different. Clinical sequencing is  
172 narrowly focused and tightly controlled in both assay and implementation. Academic cores, in  
173 contrast, are constantly adapting their approaches to the latest technologies and experimental  
174 ideas of the researchers they support. Thus academic and clinical laboratories are kept  
175 separate and distinct. The urgent challenge of SARS-COV-2 strain characterization, however,  
176 showed that the complementary strengths of academic sequencing facilities and clinical  
177 laboratories could be used to rapidly and effectively develop assays to fill public health needs.

178 Academic cores typically have the equipment, expertise, and staff to rapidly pivot to  
179 tackling a new assay and scale it quickly. Most of the equipment (i.e., robotics, sequencers, and  
180 other assays) in academic cores are general purpose. Robotics platforms, for instance, are  
181 routinely reprogrammed to accommodate new protocols. Academic centers also host a variety  
182 of sequencing platforms, which facilitates finding the right platform at the right scale for an  
183 assay. At UNC, for example, several different sequencers were investigated before it was  
184 determined that the Oxford Nanopore Technologies platform provided the best fit to the  
185 turnaround time (TAT), accuracy, and scale needed. Further, the availability of both MinION and  
186 the GridION platforms at the UNC academic core allowed the team to rapidly adjust the scale of  
187 the assays and provide consistently rapid TAT (Table 1). The Penn team found the widely used  
188 Illumina technology most convenient, primarily based on availability of equipment and familiarity  
189 with adapting the workflow for multiple applications.

190 Many large academic cores have staff scientists who routinely assess new and  
191 emerging technologies. This experience allows them to rapidly implement and assess recently  
192 published assays. For SARS-COV-2, the urgency of the need for effective sequencing solutions  
193 resulted in a bevy of preprints, new kits, and reported best approaches to sequencing and  
194 detecting viral strain variation. Investigators and the core staff were able to quickly and  
195 effectively work through these approaches to find those that met the needs of both the research  
196 and the clinical communities. As demand drove the need for increased sequencing capacity,

197 highly trained core staff could be redirected to support the SARS-COV-2 assay work without the  
198 need to recruit and hire new staff, which is limited in the clinical setting. Similarly, as demand  
199 waned, these staff could be refocused to other work without institutional loss of knowledge.

200 As with the wet-bench labs, academic cores typically have or work with a team of  
201 bioinformaticians to support processing and analysis of data. While the genome of SARS-COV-  
202 2 is small, and the data sets produced by sequencing were small compared to those generated  
203 for human and animal model studies, the downstream processing needed to be highly specific.  
204 The on-site staff again were able to redirect their efforts to investigating and supporting the best  
205 analysis approaches. Additionally, either local or cloud-based solutions are already available at  
206 academic cores. At both UNC and Penn, bioinformatics experts used existing infrastructure to  
207 support and scale SARS-CoV-2 bioinformatics without need to purchase additional hardware.

208

#### 209 ***Workflow Examples and Best Practices***

210 *The workflows presented are examples from the SARS-CoV-2 sequencing programs at UNC*  
211 *and Penn. Other methods could also meet the need and have been used at other institutions.*

#### 212 **Sequencing Platforms**

213 The dominant platforms for routine amplicon-based sequencing of SARS-COV-2 are Illumina  
214 and Oxford Nanopore Technologies' (ONT) instruments. Both have been adopted worldwide for  
215 surveillance sequencing of patient-derived samples. Several trade-offs exist between these  
216 technologies, the most salient being capital cost of the sequencer(s), throughput, cost per  
217 sample, and turnaround time (Table 1). We discuss these factors and common use cases  
218 below.

219 ONT sequencing platforms offer an alternative to traditional sequencing-by-synthesis  
220 with several advantages and disadvantages. Nanopore sequencing produces long reads (up to  
221 megabases) with a mean error rate around 5%. Unlike Illumina, these errors are dominated by  
222 short indels, most often occurring in homopolymer stretches. Nanopore sequencing produces

223 reads asynchronously and continuously, enabling real-time data acquisition. Sequence data are  
224 generated and can be analyzed immediately, and sequencing can be terminated as soon as  
225 enough data are generated. These features lead to a faster turnaround time than is possible  
226 with sequencing-by-synthesis platforms. In our hands at UNC, a single flow cell produces  
227 enough data for up to 96 samples in under 12 hours. The very low capital investment for the  
228 MinION sequencer (\$1,000) contributed to its rapid and broad adoption early in the pandemic to  
229 perform routine genomic surveillance near the point of collection. A single MinION/GridION flow  
230 cell is cost-effective for 12-96 samples at a time, further reducing the complexity and cost  
231 associated with sequencing surveillance in low and medium-throughput settings including  
232 academic medical centers. The MinION, as opposed to ONT's GridION and PromethION  
233 systems, must be attached to a sufficiently powerful computer to enable real-time basecalling  
234 and minimize turnaround time. A computer sufficient to perform real-time basecalling for a single  
235 MinION can be reasonable purchase or purpose-built for less than \$1,000 (20, 21).

236         The Illumina method is efficient for larger batches and is the approach favored at Penn.  
237 The cost of sequencing instruments is much higher than for the MinION, but the instruments  
238 allow sequencing of larger batches. Typically, ~96 specimens and controls are included in a  
239 batch and several batches combined for sequencing on a NextSeq instrument. Illumina has  
240 instruments that permit both smaller (MiSeq and MiniSeq) and larger (NovaSeq) batches. For  
241 use of instruments with larger capacity, upstream steps such as sample acquisition and  
242 processing often become limiting. Thus, filling up large batches can be slow and progress  
243 limiting, so that the mid-capacity NextSeq is a good fit.

#### 244 **Data Generation Pipeline**

245 Consistent processing and rigorous quality control are critical in both molecular biology  
246 protocols and computational analysis to produce reliable, unbiased data for clinical  
247 interpretation and local and global public health efforts. To this end, many efficient and  
248 reproducible protocols have been developed to sequence SARS-COV-2 genomes from clinical

249 samples. The most widely used non-commercial assay is that initially developed by the ARTIC  
250 network (22). The traditional ARTIC protocol applies the SARS-COV-2 genome in 98 partially  
251 overlapping segments in two non-overlapping primer pools.

252 At UNC, the resulting amplicons of ~400bp each can be sequenced on either Oxford  
253 Nanopore or Illumina platforms. In support of this method, a variety of laboratory protocols have  
254 been implemented for RNA extraction, reverse transcription, PCR, and library preparation to  
255 increase throughput, improve genome recovery, and reduce consumables costs and prep time.  
256 Our sequencing and analysis pipeline has evolved as technologies, best practices, and needs  
257 have changed. For routine surveillance of known positive samples (primarily nasal or  
258 nasopharyngeal swabs), we implemented variations of the ARTIC protocol depending on  
259 materials/reagent availability, viral titer, and batch size. For smaller batches (e.g.  $\leq 24$ ), we use  
260 one of a range of longer amplicon panels - derived from the full ARTIC set - depending on the  
261 sample titer. Longer amplicon tiles produce more even coverage and better avoid primer  
262 dropouts due to sequence divergence than do panels with more primers, but require  
263 significantly higher starting concentrations of viral RNA. In general, for Ct  $< 30$ , we use a subset  
264 of ARTIC primers targeting ~1.2Kbp amplicons (23). For Ct  $< 20-25$ , our experience is that  
265 amplicons of 3-5Kbp can be reliably amplified and further reduce coverage variation, but these  
266 are seldom practical for even moderate numbers of samples. For these longer amplicon  
267 libraries, we use a transposase-based barcoding kit for nanopore sequencing, further reducing  
268 the time-to-genome compared to ligation-based multiplexing. In particular, the hands-on time  
269 required for the "rapid" long-amplicon library prep is often almost half that of the full ligation prep  
270 required for standard ~400bp amplicons. For large batches (i.e., 25-96), or those with a mixture  
271 of low and high Ct (up to ~35), we default to the ARTIC V4 amplicon set followed by "native"  
272 ligation barcoding that allows for efficient batch processing and maximizes recovery of low-titer  
273 samples.

274 At Penn, the ARTIC V4 primers and POLAR protocol were used for all samples (24).  
275 Samples were analyzed if they achieved a cycle of threshold of <28 from various swab-based  
276 platforms and <20 from saliva-based testing on the Advanta™ Dx Assay (Fluidigm, San  
277 Francisco, CA) because these values correlated with acquiring adequate quality sequence and  
278 appropriate coverage.

### 279 **Minimum Quality**

280 Complete and accurate genomes are necessary for downstream analyses, including  
281 identification of mutations, lineage classification, and phylogenetic analysis. Accuracy is typically  
282 considered a function of the read depth at each locus, and completeness the proportion of the  
283 genome meeting this coverage threshold.

284 At UNC, 20x is a widely used coverage threshold that ensures high consensus  
285 accuracy, and was implemented in our pipeline (25). Downstream analyses vary somewhat in  
286 the proportion of the genome required to make accurate inference. For confident identification of  
287 Pango lineage (and WHO variant classification) – a primary endpoint for clinical and public  
288 health usage – this threshold is as low as 70% (30% missing sites/Ns), matching the default  
289 threshold for maximum ambiguous loci in the Pangolin lineage inference software. For many  
290 aggregate analyses, more conservative thresholds are often used, up to 99%. At UNC, we use  
291 a threshold of 7,000 missing sites (~25%) for taking a genome through downstream analysis  
292 and submission to public repositories. While clade/lineage assignments can be inaccurate for  
293 less complete genomes, Pangolin output and confidence values are carefully evaluated to  
294 exclude poorly supported or indeterminate lineage calls before reporting. These thresholds (20x  
295 over 75% of the genome) are typically achievable for samples with sufficient material (Ct <30).  
296 The typical throughput of a MinION/GridION flow cell, ~5Gbp for a 12-hour run, equates to an  
297 average depth of ~1,700x across 96 samples.

298           At Penn, genomes were accepted for further analysis if they achieved 95% coverage  
299           with at least 5 reads per base. Averages coverage was much higher, but quality control focused  
300           on the weakest part of the data for each genome.

### 301   **Informatics and analysis**

302           Consistent processing and rigorous quality control are equally important in data  
303           processing and bioinformatic analysis. Consistent and transparent processing is critical; data  
304           quality issues resulting from low-titer samples, processing variation, and contamination are not  
305           always avoidable. A full analytical pipeline typically consists of initial read processing and  
306           genome assembly followed by variant and phylogenetic inference and reporting/visualization.  
307           Initial data processing steps, including basecalling, demultiplexing, and trimming sequencing  
308           adapters, barcodes, and primers are generic read processing tasks that are commonly  
309           performed by academic sequencing cores. A representative and broadly applicable  
310           bioinformatic pipeline for sequence processing and assembly is the ARTIC network's nCoV  
311           bioinformatics SOP (26). The pipeline used at Penn is as previously described (27).

### 312   **Data Sharing**

313           To support local and global public health efforts, and in accordance with the World  
314           Health Organization's guidance sequences should be shared publicly by submission to  
315           appropriate public databases (typically, GISAID and chosen INSDC database such as NCBI's  
316           Genbank) with corresponding meta-data (28, 29). The public availability of SARS-COV-2  
317           genomic data in as near real-time as possible – in particular, forgoing an embargo before  
318           publication – continues to enable better identification and tracking of viral evolution and  
319           transmission patterns that inform public health decision-making.

320           To support surveillance at an academic health center, provide a resource depicting local  
321           SARS-COV-2 variant makeup, and inform local and state public health agencies, both  
322           institutions produce regular reports on aggregate trends, including mutation frequencies and  
323           lineages. These results are made publicly available through a web-based report and

324 visualization tool that additionally present aggregate lineage trends, tracking of mutations, and a  
325 phylogenetic tree to allow for more detailed assessment of up-to-date sequence data, for  
326 example to identify local clusters (Figure 1 A,B).

327

### 328 **Challenges**

329 While academic-clinical laboratory partnerships highlight the success that can be achieved  
330 through collaboration, there are a number of challenges. The overlap of clinical diagnostics,  
331 public health and research creates concerns related to safeguarding protected health  
332 information (PHI) and information technology security. When our institutions began these  
333 collaborations, no guidance existed regarding how or whether academic laboratories should  
334 report sequencing data, how it should be validated and how it should be submitted to public  
335 health authorities. However, both of our institutions committed to SARS-COV-2 sequencing  
336 based on our belief that is was the right thing to do for public health. Subsequently, CMS issued  
337 guidance confirming that non-CLIA certified laboratories are allowed to perform SARS-COV-2  
338 sequencing on identified patient samples as long as patient-level reports are not issued to  
339 patients or providers. However, CMS, CDC, and the Association of Public Health Laboratories  
340 confirmed that non-CLIA laboratories should report patient-level sequencing data to public  
341 health authorities (19, 29, 30). If a laboratory reports patient-level sequencing data for a  
342 person's diagnosis or treatment, then it must be done in a CLIA-certified laboratory using a CLIA  
343 validated test.

344 As mentioned above, the link between public health and research facilities can and  
345 should be the clinical laboratory. Clinical laboratories handle PHI and public health reporting on  
346 a routine basis. By using de-identified but linked identifiers on remnant patient samples, the risk  
347 of a confidentiality breach can be minimal when transferring specimens or data to research  
348 cores for sequencing or analysis. Secure networked shared drives can be used to transfer data  
349 back to the clinical laboratory so that variant sequence data can be linked back to the patient

350 and reported to public health authorities. Even though variant detection falls under the umbrella  
351 of public health, it is the opinion of these authors that Institutional Review Board approval or  
352 exemption be sought to document the safeguards being used and the personnel who have  
353 access to PHI.

354 In recent months, some state health departments have pushed to have variant data  
355 reported by Electronic Laboratory Reporting (ELR), similar to SARS-COV-2 diagnostic test  
356 results. While the data are likely more manageable on the public health side with ELR  
357 submission, there are significant concerns from the diagnostic/research perspective. To report  
358 through ELR, the variant data (whether just the lineage result or actual sequence data) must be  
359 entered into the Electronic Medical Record (EMR), such as EPIC. The result is then linked to a  
360 patient record. Even if the result does not cross the interface for providers to see, it is available  
361 in the Laboratory Information System (LIS; i.e., EPIC Beaker). When identifiable “research” data  
362 are reported in the LIS, the results are available to anyone with access to the LIS or LIS report  
363 building. This is potentially a violation of PHI protections. For large healthcare systems, there  
364 are hundreds to thousands of laboratory employees who would have access to this information,  
365 many of whom may not have the expertise to interpret data or have a consultant available to  
366 assist in interpretation. At both our institutions, hospitals throughout our health system submit  
367 samples for genomic surveillance. . We frequently receive calls from a laboratory or provider  
368 wanting to know a patient’s variant result (which we do not release). If the result is in the LIS for  
369 the purpose of ELR, it becomes a clinical test, even if there is not a specific medical intervention  
370 associated with the result. However, the majority of laboratories have not performed a CLIA  
371 validation for SARS-COV-2 sequencing and variant identification.

372 The conundrum of having patient-level sequencing data available for physicians is also  
373 complicated by the clinical meaning of the data. Clinical microbiology laboratories are not in the  
374 business of doing testing for testing sake. We are thoughtful about the tests we offer and the  
375 associated reporting so that the clinical interpretation is meaningful and results provide clinically

376 actionable data. To date, there is not an example of a SARS-COV-2 lineage that would alter  
377 patient care, so as of this writing, it is of no clinical value to report patient-level results. However,  
378 the possibility exists that eventually sequence data will provide insights into the activity of oral  
379 therapeutics or monoclonal antibody treatments as variants continue to emerge and more  
380 therapeutics are available. In the future, there may be scenarios in which it is clinically valuable  
381 to have lineage data, similar to when influenza A had both H3 (oseltamivir susceptible) and pre-  
382 2009 H1 (oseltamivir resistant) co-circulating. For this reason, the argument for the collaboration  
383 of clinical and research/core laboratories is strengthened. The sooner clinical laboratories are  
384 included in patient SARS-COV-2 sequencing efforts, the easier it will be to transition if/when the  
385 time comes for a clinical test for SARS-COV-2 variant reporting.

386           When thinking of a potential clinically reportable test, issues such as TAT and  
387 throughput will have to be considered. SARS-COV-2 sequencing is not a 1 hour test that can be  
388 used simultaneously to detect virus and report variant, which would be a clinically actionable  
389 timeframe, when/if indicated. Sequencing laboratories usually get results in 48-96h but the  
390 reality is that sequencing is done weekly to optimize workflow and costs. The longer the time to  
391 result the more limited the clinical utility of results. Nonetheless, sequencing efforts can help  
392 inform the development of more targeted diagnostic tests for variant detection, such as real-time  
393 PCR (12).

394           Additional challenges exist related to funding sequencing efforts. Although national  
395 programs like CDC SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing for Public Health Emergency Response,  
396 Epidemiology and Surveillance (SPHERES) and state-level funding are available, not every  
397 laboratory has access to these funds. Clinical laboratories, in particular, are held to a fiscal year  
398 budget for new testing initiatives. The budget is closely tied to reimbursement, for which there is  
399 currently none specific to SARS-COV-2 sequencing. Clinical budgets are already under  
400 pressure in the COVID-19 era, and it is difficult to obtain financial support for efforts that support  
401 public health and/or research efforts, but have no patient-level impact or associated billing and

402 reimbursement. Therefore, most clinical-academic SARS-COV-2 sequencing collaborations rely  
403 on funding outside of the health care system. Limited and uncertain funding impacts the number  
404 of specimens sequenced and the potential sustainability of these collaborations. However, our  
405 personal experiences highlight that internal funding can be secured when there is a shared  
406 need or common goal, particularly when filling the gap provides broadly beneficial information.  
407 Both sequencing programs were initially funded in a grassroots fashion, cobbling together  
408 multiple donations and contributions from a variety of departments, centers, and partners,  
409 including university offices with sources of philanthropic funding, that spanned the health  
410 systems and universities. Cumulatively, the contributions provided support and mid-range  
411 sustainability to our efforts, ultimately allowing the time and data needed to secure external  
412 support.

413 In addition to funding, limitations in other resources including personnel, reagents, and  
414 equipment can impact the volume of sequencing that can be performed. Labs with limited  
415 resources or an overwhelming number of samples may opt to sequence a fraction (e.g. 10%) or  
416 finite number of positive specimens per week. Others with fewer samples or increased capacity  
417 may be able to analyze a larger percentage of specimens. Restrictions in capacity will impact  
418 the accuracy in providing a snapshot of circulating variants or sensitivity in detecting an  
419 emerging variant. Modeling can be used to predict how changes in sampling or volume can  
420 impact the confidence in conclusions (31). It is the opinion of these authors that performing  
421 sequencing is the primary objective, with the ideal volume being secondary. Targets for  
422 sequencing capacity should be tailored to the specific institution and situation; maximizing value  
423 while sustainably managing resources.

424

#### 425 **Conclusions**

426 We highlight two examples of clinical-academic laboratory partnerships to increase SARS-COV-  
427 2 sequencing and variant monitoring. Our experiences serve as a model for such collaborations,

428 but more importantly show the power of using existing expertise from both clinical and academic  
429 laboratories to bolster public health reporting. Individually, each laboratory (clinical or academic)  
430 would not have been able to develop robust, sustainable programs as quickly as the  
431 partnerships. The success of this model was due to the willingness of both parties to provide  
432 critical guidance early during assay development, from the flexibility, capacity and expertise of  
433 the academic core, and from the diagnostic, PHI and public health reporting expertise of clinical  
434 microbiologists. As we look forward, we need to formalize the establishment of these  
435 partnerships to build upon existing public health infrastructure so that we can maintain a  
436 scalable surveillance program for emerging infectious diseases and be better prepared for the  
437 next pandemic.

438

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452

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558
- 559

	Illumina	Oxford Nanopore
Capital costs*	\$250,000 (NextSeq)	\$1,000 (MinION + computer)
Consumables cost per genome	\$43.98	\$19.60
RNA extraction materials cost per genome	\$11.04	\$3.39
Total cost per genome**	\$55.02	\$22.99
Turnaround time***	4 days	21 hrs
Optimum samples per sequencing run	>250	96

560


561 *Table 1. Platform comparison. Consumables costs assume optimal batch size is used for each*  
562 *platform and only reflect the experiences of our respective programs. Realized costs will be*  
563 *institution specific depending on equipment and reagents. \*Cost reflects equipment used.*

564 *Alternative platforms may be more comparable in price. \*\*Cost does not include labor.*

565 *\*\*\*Turnaround time includes RNA extraction through construction of the genome sequence and*  
566 *lineage/clade assignment. ONT turnaround time assumes sequencing is run with real-time*  
567 *basecalling.*

568

569 *Figure 1. (A) Trend of variants of interest/variants of concern (VOI/VOC) over time collected*  
570 *from UNC Medical Center as illustrated on the UNC surveillance sequencing dashboard*  
571 *(<http://unc.cov2seq.org>). (B) SARS-COV-2 lineage trends of time for samples collected from the*  
572 *University of Pennsylvania Health System and collaborators as illustrated on the Penn Medicine*  
573 *SARS-COV-2 surveillance sequencing dashboard*  
574 *(<https://microb120.med.upenn.edu/data/SARS-CoV-2/>).*  
575



Delaware Valley Baseline Surveillance

