ΚΑΙ ΟΝΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΑΡ: DREAMING IN THE ANCIENT NOVEL

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ABSTRACT

DAVID P. C. CARLISLE: Καὶ Ὄναρ καὶ Ὕπαρ: Dreaming in the Ancient Novel
(Under the direction of Werner Riess)

This dissertation is a study of dreaming as a narrative device in the eight canonical ancient novels: Chariton's *Callirhoe*, Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, Petronius' *Satyrica*, Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, and the anonymous *Historia Apollonii*. It argues that the recurrent motif of dreaming in these works is best understood as a central element in a religious structure which is characteristic of the ancient novels, and concludes that religious ideas are an important part of these novels: not as part of their "message," but as a pattern of cultural expectations upon which they draw to achieve an emotional effect upon the reader.

The first two chapters look at the way dreams operate purely within the narrative universe of the novels themselves. In the first chapter, evidence is presented to support the claim that dreams in the ancient novels are for the most part assumed to be divine in origin. The second chapter investigates the *reasons* these dreams are sent, and concludes that while they may have various roles, or even no role at all, in shaping the novels' plots, the one constant is that they are sent for their beneficial *emotional* effect on the dreamer or protagonist.

The third and fourth chapters ask how these functions of dreams within the novels can be connected to the role of the novels in the real world. The third chapter argues that

the dreams have a *metalingual* function in relation to the novels themselves: they *essentialize* the novels by providing insight into their basic structures of meaning in simplified and thus more easily comprehensible form. The emotional effect and connection with the divine provided to the protagonists through their dreams is thereby offered to the reader through the novels. The fourth chapter examines these related functions of religious meaning and emotional effect, and shows how they fit into and offer evidence for the socio-historical context of the novels. It concludes with a brief examination of the dreams in each of the novels taken individually.

PARENTIBUS OPTIMIS

…at hoc nunc laus illis debetur et a me gratia maior.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of dreaming in the "canonical" ancient novels.[1] There are about sixty dreams and twenty passages about dreaming distributed very unevenly among these eight works, with at least one dream in each: numbers which alone justify a closer inspection of the theme. In my treatment of the topic, two ideas in particular come across with some strength, which put my argument at odds in one way or another with previous scholarship that has touched on the subject. The first is that dreaming is treated as a *religious* phenomenon in these works; the second is that dreaming can be shown to be the equivalent, in certain ways, of narrative fiction. The combination of these produces a conclusion which will, I fear, be unsavory to a good many literary critics of the ancient novels, and discomfiting to a number of historical critics, though it addresses a topic which is ready to be addressed: the ancient novels were, in some sense at least, religious works. How exactly this fact is to be interpreted, and why it should no longer be avoided

[1] The "canonical" novels are, in approximate chronological order, Petronius' *Satyrica*, Chariton's *Callirhoe*, Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca*, Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, Heliodorus' *Ethiopica*, and the anonymous *Story of Apollonius, King of Tyre*. The limitation of my field of inquiry to these works is not intended to suggest that these should always be set apart from other evidence for the ancient novel, nor even that these are the only representatives of a genre which we might call the ancient novel. Rather, two criteria were of particular importance in my decision: 1) Because my arguments will be based, in part, on the role of dreams in the larger structure of the novels' plots, I could only use those works from which enough has survived to allow us a fair picture of the whole; hence, I have included the fragmentary *Satyrica* and the possibly epitomized *Ephesiaca* and *Story of Apollonius*, but not the fragments or testimonia from other novels. These are treated briefly in Appendix B. 2) Because one of my central goals is to elucidate the role of religion in those novels with a fairly stereotyped plot, which included definite and repeated references to divine management, I have relegated the "fringe" novels, which do not, by and large, share plot features so much as stylistic and formal features, to the same appendix. This is not to say that these works may not be generatively related to "canonical" novels, simply that my object of inquiry was, in part, a stereotyped conception of the religious significance of the tale being told which was absent from these works.

but taken up with relish by scholars of the ancient novels will, I hope, become clear in the pages that follow.

Before turning to an outline of the arguments I will put forward, it will be useful to clarify here exactly what I mean by the terms "religion" and "religious," which appear frequently in the pages that follow, and are of crucial importance to my central theses. Of course, the definition of these terms is a complex issue, and one to which much scholarship has been devoted. For simplicity's sake, and because the idea I want to highlight in the novels by employing these terms is relatively straightforward, I adopt here only a very basic definition. I take "religion" in the ancient world as the collective of beliefs and practices by which humans relate themselves to the superhuman forces in control of their world, forces which are *definitively external* to humans and are conceived of as "gods." These beliefs and, more tangibly, practices will have a very real effect on cultural expectations, and will thus be reflected both in the way ancient authors describe certain objects, realities, events, or actions, and in the way ancient readers would have understood and responded to those descriptions. I thus use the term "religious" to mark any description of an object, reality, event, or action in the ancient novels which makes reference, whether directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, to the interactions between these objective external entities, called (for convenience) "gods" or "the divine," and humans and human experience.

My study is divided into two major parts. The first, divided into two chapters, looks at the role dreams play only *within* the fictional universes constructed by the novelists. Treating, that is, the world constructed by each novel as a separate entity in

itself, I elucidate the rules governing the deployment of dreams.[2] I begin with the observation that dreams are treated, both within the novels and outside of them, as communications. In its simplest form, this observation is a tautology, since the very act of interpretation imposes on phenomena the cognitive framework of communication: to treat something as meaningful is to treat it as a "message"; even scientists, though they may not realize it because they have suppressed the idea of any agency behind such a communication, treat the objects of their study in these terms. What can DNA *tell us* about human biology? Though agency has been displaced to the object of study itself (the DNA makes its own meaning) or to some vague impersonal force to which attention is never directly turned (Nature, e.g., or Evolution), the organizing principle of *communication-interpretation*, of sending and receiving a message, remains. Even clinical studies of dreaming thus treat dreams as communications of sorts, though the agency is now the subject's unconscious, or neural network, or the like. Unless dreams are left unexamined, that is, they must always be treated as communications.

On a more complex level, however, the claim that dreams are treated as communications suggests that a fruitful approach to understanding their function may be the application of a functionalist theoretical model of communication to them. In chapters one and two, I apply Jakobson's model of communication, which is the most complex and thus comprehensive model to date that I am aware of, to the dreams as they are depicted within the fictional worlds of the novels. In the first chapter, I focus specifically on the issue of what Jakobson would call the *addresser* of the dreams: who in the fictional universe of each novel is responsible for creating the dreams described? Two possibilities

[2] See N. J. Lowe (2000) for an exciting and challenging way of modeling such worlds, and understanding their applicability to our own experiential reality.

exist here: that it is the dreamer himself or herself, or that it is some other character. Our modern cultural assumptions lead us naturally to the former possibility: ever since the rise of psychoanalysis, we read dreams as the product of the dreamer's mind, usually of that part of the mind which operates without the conscious awareness of the individual (the subconscious). Although it was phrased in different terms, this interpretation was not unknown when the novels were written; indeed, there may even have been a fraction of the ancient population who, like most of us, took it for granted that *every dream* could be so interpreted.[3] The latter possibility, which must in our culture be very explicitly presented for us to adopt it (and even then, depending on our religious beliefs or degree of superstition, we may be straining our ability to enter the fictional universe of the narrative) was, however, much more prevalent in the ancient world; as such, the *external* addresser was generally taken to be a divinity.[4] This, at any rate, is by far the most prevalent communicative source for dreams *in the fictional universe of the novels*, as I will show in the first chapter.

This is a direct contradiction of one of the more common interpretive positions taken by modern critics who have discussed the dreams in the novels, namely that they function, at least in part, as reflections of the dreamer's psychological state. This is clearly an imposition of our own culture's interpretive *communis opinio* on these works; at times it is quite unabashed. Bowersock, for example, through a sophisticated but misleading argument, comes to the conclusion that the ancient novelists illustrate their

[3] Much valuable work has been done in general on ancient theories of dreaming; see in particular Miller (1994) for dreaming in the Imperial period and later; Näf (2004) for a "history of ideas" treatment of dreams; Lieshout (1980) for a general treatment and Holowchak (2002) for a treatment of the "scientific" theories developed in antiquity; Lewis (1996) is an interesting sourcebook with material not generally encountered in some other studies.

[4] See Lane Fox (1987), 150: "…only the Aristotelians wrote sceptically about the very existence of any 'divine' dreams at all."

culture's interest in dreams "principally as reflections of the fears or desires of the dreamer," then goes on to assert that "these texts illustrate the same kinds of dreams as interested Freud."[5] Schmeling, treating the first dream in the novel of Xenophon of Ephesus, argues that "Habrocomes' menacing nightmare can be explained as the workings of his subconsciousness [*sic*] on the predictions of the oracle."[6] MacAlister, while allowing the dreams prophetic power, adds the modern view to this: "…the contents of the novels' dreams –the anxieties and preoccupations they reflect and the events to which they refer—suggest that the sought-after understanding relates to the sphere of the self."[7] Sandy, remarking on the misinterpretation of a dream in Heliodorus, remarks that it "…serves only to confirm the infatuation that Thyamis has already felt and to precipitate a course of action that he seemed, in consequence of his infatuation, destined to take in any case."[8]

This is all quite convincing to a modern reader who is comfortable with a narrator psychologizing fictional characters and who, indeed, *expects* far more of this than the ancient novelists seem inclined to provide. The only problem is that it lacks strong textual support. The dreams in the ancient novels are only rarely treated as psychological in origin. Sandy's argument interprets a dream which the author explicitly marks as θεῖον, "god-sent," in which the goddess Isis herself is the star; when the dreamer realizes his mistake in interpretation, he reproaches the *goddess* for her trickery. MacAlister's assertion comes as an extrapolation of what Achilles Tatius (and Heliodorus) meant to

[5] Bowersock (1994), 93.

[6] Schmeling (1980), 34.

[7] MacAlister (1996), 42.

[8] Sandy (1982), 46.

say when they stated that, in effect, "The gods give us foreknowledge of the future to prepare us psychologically for what will happen." How is knowledge of the future necessary for psychological preparation, if what it reveals is something with which we are already preoccupied, or over which we are already anxious? Schmeling's psychological interpretation, finally, is a response to a dream by which a character, perfectly at ease beforehand, is deeply terrified, because he interprets it as a prophecy; the omniscient narrator then says, in effect, *he was right*.

In all of these cases the psychological interpretation is an imposition of our own understanding of causality, in relation to dreams and their origin and "meaning," upon the events in the novels. This may well be a useful interpretive technique when dealing with historical texts. But the novels are *fictional*, and as such, they take place in a fictional universe. N. J. Lowe offers a powerful metaphor for understanding such imaginary worlds: they are like *games*, life-like in certain respects, but with their own rules and boundaries.[9] To comprehend a particular set of moves in such a game, we must know the rules, which may or may not be "realistic" in any meaningful sense. We may, therefore, believe that dreams are always psychological in origin, but that may not be one of the rules of the narrative universe of the novels, and if it is not, such an interpretation will be counterproductive to an understanding of the text. Bowersock presents the clearest example of this: to support his assertion that the dreams in the novels are mainly either reflections of the dreamer's psychological state or ways of motivating the plot, he presents a "selection" of the dreams in the various Greek novels. This selection is, of course, carefully constructed to exclude many dreams that serve no purpose but the prophetic; while he acknowledges that there are such dreams, he claims that they are

[9] See Lowe (2000), 31 ff.

rare.[10] Yet the utter failure of such an importation of external rules into the fictional universe to explain the workings of that universe is apparent both from the narrowness of his interpretation of those dreams he does treat, and from his exclusion of many dreams that would refute such a rule. Two examples of this will suffice.

At the start of book five of Chariton's *Callirhoe*, the heroine Callirhoe has a dream, in which she sees herself back in her hometown, on the day of her wedding. A modern reader will likely interpret this as a wish fulfillment dream which makes use of a happy memory to create an image of something Callirhoe is preoccupied with, and deeply desires (reunion with Chaereas). Such a reader would thus follow Bowersock in interpreting this dream as a reflection of Callirhoe's psychological state: "This is obviously another reflection of her love for Chaereas and her desire to be united with him."[11] Such an interpretation, however, is an importation of our own rules about dreams and their significance. The interpretation presented in the text is, instead, that the dream is prophetic: Callirhoe's maid, Plangon, says that the dream predicts a reunion with Chaereas and a happy ending; by the end of the novel, moreover, we know that she was right. More importantly, the effect of the dream on Callirhoe is to change her mood completely: while she went to sleep in despair, after the dream, she is joyful, *as if she knew what was going to happen* (*Call.* 5.5). This, then, at least suggests that dreams do more than reflect the psychological state of the dreamer: Callirhoe, at this point, believes that Chaereas is dead, and is filled with despair over the upcoming trial; how, then, if the dream simply reflected her state of mind, could it possibly *alter* that state? Yet this is what we will see time after time with the dreams in the novels: that they visit someone

[10] Bowersock (1994), 93.

[11] *Ibid.*, 88.

who has a certain outlook on his or her life, and that this outlook changes completely after the dream has departed.

Bowersock does allow that dreams may be presented as divinely sent, but argues that in such cases the dreams are almost always "admonitory," that is, that they motivate the characters' actions.[12] It is true that there are many such dreams in the ancient novels, but there are also many that are not (and are not psychological, either). Moreover, the observation that many dreams function in this way ignores the question of *why* they are included. The commonsense reasoning might be that these sorts of dreams show up in fiction in order to motivate the progression of the narrative, to explain, that is, characters' actions. Such, at least, is implicit in Bowersock's analysis of another dream in *Callirhoe*, in which the bandit Theron decides to wait a day before killing the heroine, whom he subsequently (and finally) manages to sell: "This [dream] he believes to be an admonition to wait for at least a day. So he does wait for a day, and the story is able to continue in its meandering way without the sacrifice of the heroine at an early stage."[13] The implication is that these sorts of dreams (unlike those that are wrongly analyzed as psychological) need no explanation: they are there to allow the author to manipulate the actions of his characters as he sees fit.

This idea, again, does not fit the text. Other scholars have pointed out that the *divine* motivation in the novels can almost always be replaced with simple human causes.[14] If this is the case, the dreams which motivate characters' action cannot have been included for that purpose alone. Rather, their inclusion in the novel must serve some

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[12] Bowersock (1994), 89: "The only dreams that are not of this [psychological] form are admonitions, in which the dreamer infers what he should do on the basis of what he has seen in a dream."

[13] Bowersock (1994), 87.

[14] On Chariton, see Reardon (2003), 335; on Heliodorus, see e.g. Sandy (1982), 54.

other function: the point is not that someone did something (because a dream told them to), but rather that *it was because of a dream* that they did such and such (which they could easily have done anyways). In the case of Theron, closer examination reveals that the entire episode which leads to the dream is extraneous to the plot, and that the dream is unnecessary to resolve the episode: in other words, that the whole reason to include the episode is to show a problem being solved by a dream. What, then, does this reveal about the rules of this fictional universe? Certainly not that it is "just like the real world."

In the second chapter, I take up this second question. After showing in the first chapter that the narrative rule about the origin of dreams is that the gods usually send them, I examine in the second chapter the *function* of these dreams: to what purpose(s), within the fictional universe of the novels, are the dreams sent? Jakobson's theory is, once again, useful here, since it allows us to isolate the various elements of a communicative act and to determine, by first examining which elements of the act are emphasized, what the *function* of the act is. The conclusion I reach is that the dreams are sent for two main purposes: to establish or maintain a communicative link between the addresser and the addressee (the *phatic* function), and to have an effect on the addressee (the *conative* function, which may result in an action, but may also stop at the emotional). Given the divine source of these dreams, they thus become a profoundly *religious* phenomenon, establishing contact with the divine and thereby changing the emotional state and sometimes behavior of the dreamer or other fictional character. This places the dream as it functions in the fictional world of the novels at the center of a heated debate in ancient novel scholarship on the question of religion.

Froma Zeitlin, in her chapter on "Religion" in the *Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel*, declares of the religion question that "Of all the unsolved (or

rather, insoluble) problems facing a study of ancient prose fiction, this is the issue that is perhaps both the most tantalising and the most vexed. It is the alpha and omega of the novel…"[15] To understand why this question remains elusive, we must briefly review the history of the subject. Scholarship on the ancient novel focused in its earliest stages on the question of origins; discussion of Erwin Rohde's seminal though often misguided treatment, which set the parameters of the discourse for many years, is practically formulaic in introductions to the ancient novel, and I will not repeat their generalizations here. Suffice it to say that, after his work, the question of origins became the central topic for nearly a century, such that even scholars who strongly disagreed with Rohde focused their own theories on explaining the source from which this curious growth of literary history had sprung. The main competing theory, first developed by Karl Kerényi and later championed and made more dogmatic by Reinhold Merkelbach, sees the novels as derivatives from oriental cults to which the Greek world was first exposed by the conquests of Alexander.[16] In this theory, then, emphasis is placed most strongly on the religious element in the novels, while Rohde and his followers downplayed religion in favor of more literary influences.

Simon Swain has very nicely outlined the way in which these two major strands in scholarship continue to influence modern explorations of the novel, despite conscious rejection of their more dogmatic points.[17] So, for example, Perry and more recently Reardon are heirs to the literary approach taken by Rohde, while Bowersock comes much closer to Kerényi. In essence, then, while the diachronic examinations implied in

[15] Zeitlin (2008), 93.

[16] For a more recent example of this approach, applied specifically to Apuleius, see Münstermann (1995).

[17] Swain (1999), 15.

questions of origin have now been largely made subordinate to synchronic questions of the relation of the novels to their cultural milieux, the division between the social explanation and the literary one remains.[18] It is in this context that we can understand scholarship on the problem of religion.

Zeitlin has pointed to two "poles" of opinion on the role of religion in the ancient novels, between which all treatments of the topic may be placed: at one end, scholars may be inclined to interpret the religious framework of the novels as mere narrative coloring, the proverbial window trimmings or "mental furniture"; at the other end, there are scholars who, in the tradition of Kerényi, see religion as the point of the novels, to which all other things are subordinated.[19] The latter group is, of course, best represented by Merkelbach, and we can thus see that this division is a reflection of the same scholarly divide over the question of origins which once dominated the field. Religion, then, as a worthy topic of examination in studying the novels, has become a casualty of the debate over origins, since the first champions of a religious reading made such a reading central to their explanation of the origins of the novels. In recent years, as scholars have distanced themselves from this debate, and as Merkelbach's theories have been more or less rejected, the question of the religious pattern of the novels has been cast away along with the question of origins, and has thus been determined to be "insoluble" (see the quote from Zeitlin above). More importantly, it has led those scholars who focus on the literary qualities of the novel, and who are thus, as Swain observes, to some degree the

[18] The origin question has thus fallen out of fashion, though it is still occasionally explored, most recently and notably by Anderson (2007); in general, the two main branches of scholarship are now concerned with the novels as sources for social history (e.g. Bowersock, Swain, or Bowie, etc.) or with their literary complexity (e.g. Bartsch, Winkler, Reardon, Morgan), though most scholars address both questions to some degree, and some are quite successful at synthesizing them (e.g. Morales).

[19] Zeitlin (2008), 94.

heirs of Rohde, to dismiss the role of religion in the novels as immaterial, mere convention by which the more important, structural goal of the narrative is achieved. A good example of this interpretive move is the conclusion of Winkler on the question of Heliodorus' blatantly aretalogical ending[20]: "It is not that Heliodorus is any kind of believer but merely that he must employ beliefs to illustrate the comedy of composing a romance. There has to be some Noble Message or other at the end, any one will do."[21]

This sort of argument conflates two separate issues: first, the role of religion in the imaginary world of the novels; second, the relationship between that role and religion in the world of the author and reader. It is precisely this conflation which leads to the problems we find in the previous treatments of dreams and dreaming. Historical scholars like Bowersock, for whom the novels reflect the society which created them, want to see in the dreams and other religious phenomena in the novel some kind of hard evidence for cultural practices and beliefs. At the same time, literary scholars like Winkler who focus on the artistry of the novelists, and examine the way in which their narratives are put together, may lose sight of the fact that the building blocks of these narratives are materials found in daily life.[22] Winkler may be right that Heliodorus is not "a believer," and that he manipulates the cognitive categories of religion for his own narrative purposes, to put a good story together. That, however, is beside the point. The reality is that many of Heliodorus' readers undoubtedly were, and continue to be, "believers," in a religious meaning lying behind the events in life, even if they do not recognize Helios as

[20] See Merkelbach (1994) on the tenth book as aretalogy (290); compare Beck (2003), who argues that Heliodorus, along with Longus and Apuleius, is one of only three novelists who *definitely* use religion for more than coloratura (140).

[21] Winkler (1999), 349.

[22] Cf. Assmann (1980).

the god responsible for this meaning. For such readers, the constant reference to divine control over human life, and in particular divine benevolence, is not an empty shell, a placeholder for narrative control, but is a rich and emotionally compelling component of the narrative. To argue that any *specific* religious meaning is automatically to be derived from the work is very difficult, but to argue that it has no religious meaning whatsoever is to be blind to what lies in plain view.

This skirting of the issue of religion is endemic to literary scholars who turn their attention to the ancient novels. Bartsch is a particularly good example of this: her chapter on dreams in the ancient novels is a fine work of narratological criticism, but its constant emphasis on the hermeneutic games played using these dreams as foils ignores the substance of the foil itself, and in particular the religious significance of the dreams within the fictional universe being narrated.[23] MacAlister's attempt, finally, to bridge this gap and to combine the literary criticism of Bartsch with the sociological approach of an historian, is strained in both regards: too much of our own conception of the *real* meaning of dreaming is imported into the historical critique, while not enough stock is taken of the very real *religious* significance of dreams for the dreamers in her treatment of the dream's deployment as a narrative device.[24] The result is a fragmented account, in which dreams are both solutions to and ways of prolonging uncertainty, both reflect anxieties and put anxieties to rest, etc. This problem stems, I believe, from a confusion of the two narrative levels: the imaginary world of the novel (and the rules which govern the dreams as communicative acts there), and the real world in which the novel exists as a text, where

[23] Bartsch (1989), chapter 3.

[24] MacAlister (1996), e.g.: "…the novel's dreams for the most part represented a non-human means of understanding…" (101). As we shall see, "non-human" is a way of avoiding the issue of religion, while a "means of understanding" is often the last thing dreams are.

the dreams are parts embedded in the larger communicative act of the novel itself. This is a problem which I try to solve in this study, by finding a means of bridging this gap and connecting the rules of the fictional universe to the reality of the author and reader playing the game of the novel. I thus end my second chapter by pointing out that, while we have proven that dreaming plays a religious role *within* the novel, this does not confirm any religious interpretation of the novels themselves. Instead, we must turn to an analysis of the novels as literary creations, *keeping in mind*, as Winkler and Bartsch have not, the religious implications of these dreams for the characters of the novels.

In the third chapter, I address the question of the role of these dreams in the novels when the latter are themselves viewed as acts of communication between an author and his reader(s). Looked at in this way, the dreams appear to be *metalingual* in relation to the rest of the novels; that is, they provide some information to the reader about the operation of the novel's code. They achieve this effect, however, by *representing* some part of the novels themselves in microcosm, through the demonstrable similarity between dreaming and fiction. Adopting Lowe's terminology, the dreams are thus able to represent to the dreamer (and, through him or her, the reader) a miniature of, or fragment of, the novel's *achronic model* (Lowe 2000; 27). They are thus *essentializations* (borrowing a term from States) of the novel plot. Since the function of dreams within the fictional universe is to affect the emotional state of the dreamer through contact with the divine, and since they perform a *metalingual* function within the novel itself by *modelling* the novel itself, they suggest that the novels, too, perform a conative function (emotionally) and are phatic, putting the reader in touch with the divine, who is at one level equivalent to the author.

The dreams' narrative function, while not in itself automatically religious, thus depends upon the religiosity of their role within the fictional universe: those who read the function of dreaming as "foreshadowing" are, at times, correct, in as much as the dreams often achieve their effect by revealing something to the dreamer of which he or she is unaware but will soon learn.[25] But the fact that this is revealed in dreams (and sometimes oracles), rather than in some other form, i.e. that it is foreknowledge shared by *the divine*, means that the *fact of its being shared* is, in itself, a message of divine benevolence, and is thus *religiously significant* for the reader as well as the dreamer. I end the chapter by examining the specific outline that is chosen by many of these dreams as the model *par excellence* for the novels as a whole: marriage. Understood in a metaphorically expanded sense, I argue, marriage is an ideal representation of the primary emotional and religious structure embodied in the novels themselves.

In the fourth and final chapter, I turn to these twin notions of religion and emotion, connected to the phatic and conative functions of the novels as exemplified in the dreams they contain, and ask how we are to understand their role in constructing the author-reader relationship. Brief mention is made in this chapter of some of the more important positions taken by modern scholarship on the historical significance of the ancient novels, but my final verdict is that the best way of understanding these works is by attempting to understand the emotional effect they can have on, and could have had on, their *individual* readers. This emotional effect is, I argue, the product of a structure of divine control and intervention which the novels present as one of their governing narrative rules, and which allows the generalization of their optimistic patterns to a life

[25] Bartsch (1989), e.g., argues that this is the primary role of the dream in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus (and that the narrative game of our failed attempts to guess the events thus depicted is the point of these dreams for the author-reader relationship).

believed to be under the watchful eye of the divine. This interpretation has the advantage of explaining the function of one of the characteristics of the genre, which other critics have been forced to dismiss or ignore: the novels' pattern of divine control and intervention.

Indeed, divine intervention on this level seems perhaps one of the *most important* parts of the novel formula: even the author of the *Historia Apollonii*, despite his brevity and singular lack of supernatural apparatus, cannot bring himself to close the novel and have his characters end happily without *one* divine intervention bringing it about (see the following chapter). One literary predecessor, furthermore, to which the novel is sometimes said to have closest ties (e.g. Holzberg 1995; 8-9) is New Comedy, about which Reardon says: "…New Comedy is for all the world like a tamer predecessor of romance—minus the travel, violence, and divine intervention" (1991; 50). Yet travel is not a necessary component of the novels, unless we are to exclude Longus from their number; violence, furthermore, is not by any means absent from New Comedy.[26] This leaves only divine intervention, which may be read into many events in the novels, but for which the chief evidence is provided by dreams; in this chapter I thus argue that the source and effect of the dreams is vital to understanding their narrative function. Finally, I conclude with a preliminary sketch of the emotional outline of the novels as presented in their dreams, understanding that this will not by any means elucidate the full meaning of the novels, explain their origins, account for their social role, or anything of the sort; it is, instead, simply meant as an illustration of how the dreams in the novels can encode each novel's central anxiety and its conquest, and how this essential core of the novels might be reflected in the emotional response of the readers.

[26] See Riess (forthcoming).

Ultimately, then, my approach differs from previous treatments of dreaming in the novels in the following essential ways: 1) I argue that the *psychological* dream is a rarity in the ancient novels, and that dreams instead are almost always divine in origin; 2) I distinguish the function of dreams in the fictional universe from their function in the real universe to which the former is an approximation at best; 3) I argue, nonetheless, that the function of dreams in the "real world" relationship between author and reader is closely linked to the *religiosity* of their role in the fictional universe, and thus that they impart to the novels a *religious* significance that is not simply a conventional cipher for authorial control; 4) I argue, finally, that that religious significance, like the significance of dreaming and storytelling in general, is best understood in terms of its *emotional effect*. I turn now, by way of concluding this introduction, to an application of these ideas, not yet proven but, I hope, sufficiently introduced, to one of the more complex and poorly understood dreams in the ancient novels, from which I have taken the titles for two of the following chapters.

In the third book of *Leucippe and Clitophon*, the heroine is captured by a band of brigands, and is brutally murdered before our eyes (which look through the eyes of the narrator Clitophon); her insides are pulled out and eaten in a cannibalistic scene which is a favorite topic of discussion among critics. A few chapters later, Clitophon watches while his beloved is miraculously restored to life; he rejoices abundantly, and cries out "either that [vision of your death] or this is a dream." He soon decides, having recovered the object of his love and desire, to consummate his passion, and tries to make love to her: she, however, demurs; when he asks why she refuses him, she replies that it would not be right:

> "ἡ γάρ μοι θεὸς Ἄρτεμις ἐπιστᾶσα πρῴην κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ὅτε ἔκλαιον μέλλουσα σφαγήσεσθαι, 'Μὴ νῦν,' ἔφη, 'κλαῖε· οὐ γὰρ τεθνήξῃ· βοηθὸς γὰρ ἐγώ σοι παρέσομαι. μενεῖς δὲ παρθένος, ἔστ' ἄν σε νυμφοστολήσω· ἄξεται δέ σε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἢ Κλειτοφῶν.' ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀναβολὴν ἠχθόμην, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίσιν ἡδόμην."
>
> "For the goddess Artemis stood over me in my sleep the day before yesterday, when I was crying because I was about to be slaughtered, and said 'Don't cry, now: for you will not die, for I will be beside you as a helper. And you will remain a virgin, until I give you away as a bride; and no one will lead you away in marriage besides Clitophon.' And I was upset at the delay, but was pleased at the hope for the future" (*L&C* 4.1).

The most observed fact about this dream is that it is responsible for changing Leucippe's former willingness to have sex with Clitophon before marriage into a deeply rooted commitment to chastity.[27] Bartsch, following this interpretation, cannot apply her theory about dreams as interpretive puzzles to this, and she is forced to make it a foil for the dream of Clitophon which follows it.[28] MacAlister is forced to relegate it to a footnote, because it neither serves "as an accompanying, non-human means of apparently clarifying uncertainty and understanding chance events," nor does it serve "itself…as the intrusive chance."[29]

And, although there could scarcely be a dream more explicitly marked as a religious communication, Bowersock insists on interpreting it as purely psychological in origin ("The dream reflects the dangers and anxieties of Leucippe," 1994, 88), thereby revealing the degree to which he is willing to impose a modern conception of dreaming on ancient exempla, simply because there is a precedent in ancient thought for the idea of a psychological dream. This is not to say that there is nothing psychological about a

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[27] See e.g. Durham (1938), 9; Reardon (1999b), 251; Chew (2000), 63; Heiserman (1977), 124.

[28] Bartsch (1989), 89-91.

[29] MacAlister (1996), 34; there is nothing "chance" about any of the dream's references; furthermore, Leucippe possesses "uncertainty" about her chastity neither before nor after the dream; her certainty simply changes directions.

phenomenon which is described in religious terms. A psychological explanation of religious experience is always a possibility. What I am arguing, however, is that the idea that such a dream *originates* in the dreamer's psyche, and in her psyche alone, is one which ignores the conception of dreaming prevalent in the novels, and thus fails to read the novels on their own terms. Whether he reads this dream as purely a product of Leucippe's psyche, or as something sent to her from an objective external power in control of both her life and, possibly, our own, makes a great deal of difference in how the reader is affected by the novel, and thus in how *we* evaluate the work both as historians and as critics.

Treating the dream purely in terms of its content and effect on the dreamer, and importing as little as possible of our own modern preconceptions about dreaming into the rules of the fictional universe of this novel, we see that the command to Leucippe to remain chaste is only a small part of the dream, and is, in fact, not even a command *per se*, but a prophecy: "you *will* remain a virgin."[30] The dream, in fact, may be divided precisely into two parts, the second connected to the first with the weak particle δὲ, which adds a long-term projection (of the basic outline of the novel) to a short-term prediction. All of the foreknowledge in the dream, however, is subordinated to one end, with which the goddess begins: "*do not cry*," she says, and then lists the reasons why. And Leucippe's response makes it clear that the purpose of this dream is, first and foremost, emotional: "I was upset…" she says, "but pleased…" The dream, then, within this narrative universe, is not *primarily* psychologically expressive: its function, whatever it may be for the reader, is, for the dreamer, to provide insight into the overall shape of her

[30] While it is true that the second person future indicative may be used as a command (the so-called Jussive Future—see Smyth 1984, section 1917), the proximity of this to two other second person future indicatives that are clearly *not* jussive, as well as its combination with a temporal clause containing the *first* person future, suggest a straightforward prophetic reading.

life, insight whose main purpose is to alter her emotional state. Secondarily, however, since the *source* of this insight is a divinity, the mere fact of the dream serves to establish the presence of, and contact with, the divine force guiding events and taking care of the protagonists: it is thus a *religious* dream with powerful emotional consequences.

On the level of reader and author, the dream thus functions to tell us something about the way the world of the novel works, namely that it is directed by divine forces, who have the protagonists' best interests at heart, and who shape the narrative into an optimistic form of hardship overcome: Artemis promises Leucippe a happy end, and outlines the rest of the novel for her and for us. At the same time, Leucippe's response to the dream suggests the propriety of a similar response from us to the final *achronic* model of the novel itself (the picture we get of the story as a single unified whole once we have put all of the pieces dropped during the narrative progression into place).[31] Yet this achronic model, because it is pointed to by the dreams as something created by the divine (though that is, of course, also a mask for the author), is made a model, not only of this particular plot, but of the way the gods might work in general; if we believe in divine providence, the promise given to Leucippe by her dream is given to us by the novel itself. Thus while a literary approach which illustrates how many of the dreams in various or individual novels are put to service in the manipulation of the narrative line is useful in understanding how this part of the narrative, like every other part, is pressed into service in the construction of a story, it misses what is unique about dreaming and other religious phenomena, and what can be said of *every* religious dream, not just those that are made to do double duty as interpretive puzzles. Though we may not immediately know what the significance of a dream is, and though we may even misinterpret it at first, we will

[31] Lowe (2000), 27.

eventually reach a point in the narrative where it becomes apparent that the dream, which is assumed to be a divine communication, referred to some reality which, though hidden from the dreamer, was nonetheless true. At that moment, it also becomes apparent that this revelation was directed to the (emotional) benefit of the protagonist, and to establish the presence of the divine. The dreams in the novels, in other words, though they may play a complex role in the patterning of the narrative flow, in the *achronic* picture which emerges from that flow link the optimistic pattern of the protagonists' adventures to a divine shaper. They thus create an emotional effect on the dreamer and possibly, by extension, the reader. This effect, finally, has a religious conception of the world as its source. The novels, then, are not religious tracts: they do not aim to convert or proselytize. They are not stories about the gods, but about human life, and in particular the role love plays in it. At the same time, however, what they say about love and human life is that they are patterned by a divine providence into a form which, if we can only catch a glimpse of it through the haze of spatial and temporal flux, will appear, though terrifying in parts, ultimately delightful.[32]

[32] Cf. Zeitlin (2008, 99-100): "What matters most finally is not the presence of such [religious] elements in romance texts. As Jack Winkler notes, 'every narrative from Homer to Nonnos refers at some point to the rites, language, and beliefs of ancient religions. The point of…analysis is to assess the interaction of religious information and fictional imagination,' as, in this instance, how that interaction serves the purposes of the genre's erotic themes."

CHAPTER ONE: "THE DIVINE WILL WHISPER AT NIGHT…"

In these first two chapters, we will examine the role dreams play within the novels themselves; the next two chapters will then be devoted to connecting this role to the novels *qua* literature. Another way of putting this is to say that these chapters will ask what the dreams *mean* to the characters of the novels; the final chapters will then ask what they mean to the author and his readers (including ourselves). Implicit in this question is the idea that dreams have a "meaning" that can be determined, and this is, of course, a problem. We can avoid this problem, however, by taking the functionalist approach suggested by the first phrasing of the question, what *role* do the dreams play, in other words, what is their function? To determine this, we must pay attention to two things in particular, corresponding to the two (not always completely insulated) textual levels below the author, i.e. narrator/narratee and actor.[33] The first is the way the dreams are described: in some cases, for example, words like "god-sent" are used, which make explicit assumptions about the nature and role of dreams. The second is the way the characters react to or speak about their dreams, as well as the circumstances relating to them: in other words, the way dreams are viewed on the level of actor. Some dreams, for example, have explicitly described emotional impact on the dreamer; others motivate specific actions; many are subjected to interpretation or analysis. Taking a functionalist approach, then, we will ask what these statements or events indicate about the *role*

[33] For the narratological distinctions, see de Jong et al. (2004), especially 1-10.

dreams are seen to play in human events within the fictional world of the novels: what is their function?

As we will see, the vast majority of the dreams in the novels are treated by the narrator and/or characters as *divine communications*.[34] If we maintain the functionalist approach, this demands a correspondingly functionalist analysis of communication, and the best model for that can be found in the work of the linguist Roman Jakobson, who formulated a broadly applicable and immensely useful description of communication from a *means-ends* (i.e. functionalist) perspective.[35] In this model, communication necessarily entails six "inalienable" elements: addresser, contact, code, context, message, and addressee. Treating this dissertation as a communication, I, the author would then be the addresser; you, the readers, would be my addressee(s). The contact would be the whole system enabling our communication, and would include the digital mechanisms allowing me to send this to you; once printed, it would include the paper, ink, and binding on which the words are printed. The code would be not just the entire system of English, but also any particular jargon specific to our field, and any linguistic or otherwise semiotic conventions which allow my communication with you (the rule, e.g., that says that any piece of text which is indented 5 points from both sides and single spaced is a quote from some other source, of four lines or more). The context is the (at least partially) shared world we inhabit, and the objects and ideas in it to which I refer: the ancient novel, e.g., is part of the shared context, as are the Romans and Greeks.

[34] Cf. Anderson (2001), 151; Lane Fox (1987), 164; MacMullen (1981), 60-61. It is interesting that historians of religion take it virtually for granted that divine dreams are to be taken at face value, while literary critics of the novels often insist on shifting the focus from the signified (the gods speaking to the characters) to the process of signification; but see Reardon (1991), 164.

[35] See Jakobson (1990) for this model (69-79); it is particularly useful for our purposes not only in its functionalist perspective, but also for the broad range of phenomena it covers, which includes non-linguistic phenomena, and for its emphasis on the importance of certain elements normally left out of simpler models, e.g. contact and code.

Finally, the message is the actual substance of my communication, the thing said (this parenthetical statement, for example, is part of the message).

Jakobson further defines six primary *functions* of language, one or more of which is at work in any communication. Analyzing communication as a means to an end, that is, he groups the "ends" into six categories, each corresponding to one of the six elements, towards which the act of communication must be "set" to perform this function. That part which is set towards the addresser is *emotive*, that is, its function is self-expression on the part of the addresser; interjections are words especially suited to this function. Any part set towards the addressee is *conative*, i.e. functions to motivate some response in the addressee; the imperative mood of the verb is specially developed for the conative function. Elements set towards the contact are *phatic*, i.e. function to establish or maintain the channel of communication between addresser and addressee; greetings or formulaic openings are a good example. An utterance which is set towards the context is *referential*, i.e. serves to share information about the reality which the addresser/addressee inhabit (this, it should be noted, is what is most often meant when we refer to "communication"). When reference is made to the code, we may say that an utterance is *metalingual*, that is, that it functions to explain some element of the code. Finally, if an utterance is directed towards the message (note that this not the *meaning*, i.e., the reality referred to: that is part of the *context*, and communications set towards it are *referential*) it performs a *poetic* function. The following table should aid in the clarification of these functions.

Function	*emotive*	*conative*	*phatic*	*referential*	*metalingual*	*poetic*
Concern	addresser	addressee	contact	context	code	message
Example	Oh God!	Bless you!	Our Father…	In the beginning…	This we pray…	The Lord is my shepherd…

If the dreams in the novels are treated as acts of communication, it then becomes necessary to locate these six elements and to determine which of them is the predominant object of the communication; it will then be clear what the *function* of the dreams is. As we will see, the addressee is generally the dreamer (that is intuitively obvious); the context is assumed to be the waking world of the dreamer, although the distinction of the *present* reality from the *past* and *future* is crucial here: to which does the dream refer? The contact is, of course, the nighttime visions of a sleeping mind. The code is sometimes linguistic, sometimes imagistic, but notoriously difficult to decipher. The message is thus either a spoken utterance (which is sometimes in meter) or a visual representation, or a combination of both.

I have left the addresser for last, because this is a point of difficulty. Often the addresser is not mentioned; since, however, the narrator and characters treat dreams (usually) as communications, the question then becomes: what is their source? This is certainly essential to understanding their function, since any communication is a collaborative act between addresser and addressee: without an addresser, there is no reason to assume that a dream has any meaning. Implicit in the assumption that his or her dreams are meaningful communications, then, is the character's attribution of those dreams to some source. When the source is unnamed, it must be understood, and it is here that cultural assumptions take over. A modern reader, if confronted with a character who

ponders the "meaning" of a dream, is likely to assume that the origin of that dream is the subconscious self, the sleeping mind, or the like, i.e. physical or psychological processes. That, however, is an interpretation based entirely on our own cultural assumptions about dreams. When one of the ancient novelists is not explicit about the source of a dream, however, we must interpret this on the basis of his cultural assumptions, and not our own. This assumption, as it turns out, is that dreams are divine in origin. Furthermore, by contrast with the traditional (e.g. epic) distinction between lying dreams and true dreams (even though god-sent),[36] the dreams in the novels are assumed to be, in some sense, truthful (though this is a distinction that properly belongs to the *referential* role of communication, which is, as we will see, secondary to the *conative* function in dreams). We may begin, then, with this point: the cultural assumption which seems at work in the Greek novels is that dreams are divine in origin, that they are truthful messages (i.e., communicative acts) sent by the gods. Having established this we may then proceed to address their function in the world of the novels by analysis of the way the narrator and characters discuss and react to them.

Achilles Tatius offers the most explicit theoretical treatment of the phenomenon of dreaming to be found in the novels themselves. In a passage to which we shall often return (one which already occurs in the first paragraph of his narrative proper), his narrator Clitophon remarks:

> φιλεῖ δὲ τὸ δαιμόνιον πολλάκις ἀνθρώποις τὸ μέλλον νύκτωρ λαλεῖν, οὐχ ἵνα φυλάξωνται μὴ παθεῖν (οὐ γὰρ εἱμαρμένης δύνανται κρατεῖν), ἀλλ' ἵνα κουφότερον πάσχοντες φέρωσι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ἀθρόον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον ἐκπλήσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἄφνω προσπεσὸν καὶ κατεβάπτισε, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ παθεῖν προσδοκώμενον προκατηνάλωσε κατὰ μικρὸν μελετώμενον τοῦ πάθους τὴν ἀκμήν.

[36] See, e.g., *Odyssey* 19.535-569, or *Iliad* 2.1-83.

> "Often the celestial powers delight to whisper to us at night about what the future holds—not that we may contrive a defense to forestall it (for no one can rise above fate) but that we may bear it more lightly when it comes. The swift descent of unforeseen events, coming on us all at once and suddenly, startles the soul and overwhelms it; but when the disaster is expected, that very anticipation, by small increments of concern, dulls the sharp edge of suffering" (*L&C* 1.3).

To take this as the intended explanation for every dream in the novel, let alone all eight canonical novels, would be disingenuous, and probably wrong. It is likely, nonetheless, that, if we assume a desire on Achilles Tatius' part to present his characters as (relatively) ordinary, it represents an opinion about dreams that is much closer to that held by at least some of his readers than any ideas about dreaming with which we, in our post-Freudian "scientific" age, may approach the text.[37]

Two elements strike me as especially noteworthy. The first is Clitophon's assumption that dreams, or at any rate many of them (note the adverb πολλάκις) have divine origins. The second is that their divine authors—the phrase "τὸ δαιμόνιον" is as unspecified as the Greek allows without losing the sense of "divinity"—send them for the dreamers' signal benefit (in this particular conception, to ease their suffering); that their focus is, in other words, on the addressee, and that they are thus *conative* in function. Implicit in this is a third point, which is that dreams, when thus understood, establish contact with a benevolent divine force in charge of events, and thus serve a secondary, *phatic* function. These two elements seem to me vitally important to our interpretation of the many dreams in the ancient novel. Is the reader expected to assume a divine origin for every dream? If not, which dreams are excluded, and how could an ancient reader tell? And, in cases where a divine source is assumed for a dream, is it then to be read as a

[37] Bartsch (1989) points out a very close parallel between this passage and Heliodorus 2.24, which is not discussing dreams specifically, however, but prophetic knowledge in general (83).

benevolent communication from the gods, sent to assist the dreamer in some way? To address these questions, we must turn to the novels themselves, and ferret out clues to help us determine first to what degree a divine origin is to be assumed for the dreams we encounter there, and second, what role the divinity is thus playing in the hero/heroine's life, and therefore in the plot of the novel.

The Divine Origin of Dreams: Chariton's *Callirhoe*[38]

The strongest argument for reading the dreams in Chariton as divine in origin is not a dream itself, but the reaction of a character to good news. Dionysius, after losing his first wife, has fallen in love with Callirhoe; she, however, has not yet yielded to his marriage request, and he has sunk into a deep depression. He has resolved to commit suicide by starvation, and is in the process of drafting his will when the maidservant Plangon interrupts him with the news that Callirhoe has agreed to marry him. He faints, and the household mourns him as dead for a short time, but on his revival he exclaims: "τίς με δαιμόνων…ἀπατᾷ βουλόμενος ἀναστρέψαι τῆς προκειμένης ὁδοῦ; ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ταῦτα ἤκουσα; θέλει μοι Καλλιρόη γαμηθῆναι, ἡ μὴ θέλουσα μηδὲ ὀφθῆναι;" "'What spirit is deceiving me and trying to turn me back from the path that lies before me? Was I waking or dreaming when I heard those words? Is Callirhoe willing to marry me? Callirhoe, who is unwilling even to show herself?'" (*Call.* 3.1). Here, then, we can observe three simultaneous facts, each of which much be addressed separately: 1) Dionysius, upon hearing something unexpected and incredible, is uncertain whether he is dreaming or awake. Thus the interpretive mode for something "too good to be true," i.e., something that fulfills our deepest wishes, is a "dream" or "dream come true." 2) Working on the

[38] For the single-name title and its implications, see Reardon (2003), 317.

assumption that this impossibly good news is, in fact, a dream, Dionysius assumes that some god (spirit or *daimon*) is responsible for the dream. That there is nothing inherently religious about what would be little more than a simple wish-fulfillment dream is plain; that Dionysius nonetheless attributes the dream to some spirit is thus striking. 3) Working on the assumption that some god has created this dream/illusion, Dionysius then assumes said god is acting out of compassion, from a *wish* (βουλόμενος) to turn him from his proposed suicide. The dream is assumed, that is, to perform a *conative* function rather than a referential one.

The third observation will be discussed further when we consider the *role* dreams take in the novels; here we should observe that Dionysius, like Clitophon, assumes that his dreams originate in some divine source, even though there is nothing explicitly religious about the dream, and, in fact, he has no guess as to the god responsible. This assumption that dreams are divine communications, no matter their content, could explain what to a modern reader may seem an unusually curt dream description. In the middle of the first book, the pirate Theron, having kidnapped Callirhoe and attempted unsuccessfully to sell her, resolves to kill her the next day and to make his escape. But that night he has a dream: κοιμηθεὶς δὲ ἐνύπνιον εἶδε κεκλεισμένας τὰς θύρας. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτῷ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην ἐπισχεῖν. "Falling asleep, he saw in a dream the doors closed. And so he decided to hold off for the next day" (*Call.* 1.12). Theron, not a particularly god-fearing man, has a dream described no further than "closed doors," and this alone is enough for him to wait a day before taking his planned course of action. This may strike a modern reader as highly improbable, but the nonchalant manner in which the narrator introduces the dream signals a different expectation: that his narratee will have

no difficulty accepting that even a low-life like Theron has religious scruples about his dreams, even those that are not in any way religious in content.

Of course, some dreams *are* explicitly religious, and these are not treated in any strikingly different way from the others in the novel. One example is a dream of Aphrodite Callirhoe has, in response to which she decides to pray again at her shrine, where she first meets Dionysius (*Call.* 2.3). Another example, which confirms the way in which the characters in this novel assume that dreams are divinely sent, is the dream invented by the Persian King in Book Six as a way of stalling his judgment of Chaereas and Dionysius' case, to avoid sending Callirhoe away from his court:

> βασιλεὺς δὲ καλέσας τὸν εὐνοῦχον Ἀρταξάτην, ὃς ἦν <παρ'> αὐτῷ μέγιστος, "ὄναρ μοι" φησὶν "ἐπιστάντες βασίλειοι θεοὶ θυσίας ἀπαιτοῦσι καὶ δεῖ με πρῶτον ἐκτελέσαι τὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας. παράγγειλον οὖν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν ἱερομηνίαν ἑορτάζειν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀφειμένην δικῶν τε καὶ πραγμάτων."
>
> "But the King called the eunuch Artaxates, who was his right hand man, and said 'the royal gods appeared to me in a dream and demanded a sacrifice, and I am bound first and foremost to fulfill the requirements of piety. And so proclaim that all of Asia is to celebrate a holy month of thirty days, and is to hold off from court cases and business transactions" (*Call.* 6.2).

The reaction to this fictive dream is telling: it is not questioned by any of the king's subjects, who duly celebrate the prescribed festival; later, when Egypt revolts, the dream is reinterpreted to have foretold this (*Call.* 6.8).[39] Chariton singles out three people, however, who were distressed by this turn of events: Callirhoe, Dionysius, and Chaereas.

[39] In a sense, it may indeed have done so; Alvares (2002) views the war as a summing up of the king's failings as a ruler resulting from his improper behavior in matters of love (he is thus made a negative example for readers); one example of these failings is the way he "…undercuts Persian religion by feigning a dream…" (112). In an earlier article (Alvares 2000), he argues that the reference here to "storytellers" as the equivalent of prophets and dream interpreters is a reference to the stereotyped self-serving use of religion in Persia (384); we will argue, however, in the third chapter that there is a close affinity between stories and dreams; such a pairing is thus quite natural for other reasons as well (see also Alvares 1997, 621; Alvares 2001-2, 125; Luginbill 2000, 7-8).

Callirhoe simply curses the festival; Dionysius, however, seems to suspect that something is wrong: he points out the incongruity of the gods demanding a sacrifice when the king sacrifices to them every day. What is important to note is that he leaps from that observation to the assumption that the king is being dishonest: "νῦν βασιλεὺς καὶ ὀνείρατα βλέπει, καὶ ἀπαιτοῦσιν αὐτὸν θυσίας <θεοὶ> οἷς καθημέραν θύει. ὦ τῆς ἀναισχυντίας· παρέλκει τις τὴν κρίσιν, ἔνδον ἔχων ἀλλοτρίαν γυναῖκα, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι λέγει δικαστής." "And now the King is seeing dreams, and the gods to whom he sacrifices every day are demanding sacrifices from him. Oh, the shamelessness! For someone to drag out the trial, when he has another man's wife in his house, and such a man to call himself a judge!" (*Call.* 6.2). Dionysius calls the king shameless, because he assumes the dreams to be a contrivance to "drag out" (παρέλκει) the trial. How does he arrive at this conclusion from the observation that the gods are unlikely to request a sacrifice they are already bound to get? There is another possibility, we would assume: that the King's dream is not really sent by the gods. But this doesn't seem to enter into consideration for Dionysius: his assumptions about dreams thus allow him to impute fiction to the Persian king, but not to the gods who must have sent the dreams.

Chaereas, by contrast, doesn't question the king's motives for an instant, nor does he question the dream itself, and this is equally telling: the possibility that the king's dream is deceptive, or is not really a divine communication, does not enter his thoughts; he instead concludes that the gods must have it in for him, since they now send this request to the king, and he resolves to commit suicide. When his friend Polycharmus stops him, Chaereas lets out a bitter lament against him, since he has so often prevented Chaereas' suicide, in spite of his persecution by the divine forces. He concludes this speech by exclaiming "καὶ ὄναρ καὶ ὕπαρ οἱ θεοί με μισοῦσι" (*Call.* 6.2). Not only, then,

is Chaereas willing to accept without question that the "dream" was sent by the gods, but he considers this to be proof that the gods intend to make him suffer. This certainty that the gods are against him, based on the evidence of a dream, and the suicide attempt it provokes, emphasize his faith in the fact that these dreams have a divine origin, and combined with Dionysius' reaction it is safe to say here that Chariton's characters do not for a moment hesitate to assume that their dreams, as well as the dreams of others, have a divine origin, to the point that the contents of another person's dream are taken by the hero of the novel as evidence of divine will just as compelling as reality itself.

Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca*

In the novel by Xenophon of Ephesus, the heroine Anthia has a similar reaction to her only dream in the novel, in which she seems to be jilted by her husband Habrocomes for another woman:

> Ἐδόκει μὲν αὐτὴν εἶναι μετὰ Ἁβροκόμου, καλὴν οὖσαν μετ' ἐκείνου καλοῦ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον εἶναι τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτοῖς χρόνον· φανῆναι δέ τινα ἄλλην γυναῖκα καλὴν καὶ ἀφέλκειν αὐτῆς τὸν Ἁβροκόμην· καὶ τέλος ἀναβοῶντος καὶ καλοῦντος ὀνομαστὶ ἐξαναστῆναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι τὸ ὄναρ.
>
> "It seemed to her that she was with Habrocomes, and she was beautiful, and he handsome, and that it was the time when they were first in love; but then another beautiful woman appeared and dragged Habrocomes away from her; and finally, when he cried out and called her by name, she rose up and the dream ended" (*Eph.* 5.8).

The interpretation of this particular dream is difficult. If it is meant literally, it is a lying dream, but I am inclined to believe that it is meant to reassure Anthia through reference to her waking reality, and thus that she misinterprets it.[40] This will be discussed later,

[40] For this position, see Plastira-Valkanou (2001), whose emphasis, however, is on the correspondence to Artemidoran dream interpretation, for which see MacAlister (1996), 38-39 and *passim*; she is directly challenged, however, by Giangrande (2002); see also Liatsi (2004) for dreams in the *Ephesiaca*, which has,

however, when we take up the question of the function dreams perform; for the purposes of the present discussion, Anthia's reaction is more interesting than the dream itself. We are told that she sought to end her life (though, for whatever reason, she was unsuccessful), because "she believed the vision to be true": ἀληθῆ τὰ ὀφθέντα ἐνόμιζεν.

We might at first guess that this means she has confused dream with reality, but the speech that follows makes it quite plain that she is aware that this is a dream, and requires interpretation: "σοὶ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλη που δέδοκται καλή· ταῦτα γάρ μοι σημαίνει τὰ ὀνείρατα," she exclaims, "perhaps some other woman seems beautiful to you: for that is what my dreams signify." The fact that she is willing, for as long as she is uncertain as to Habrocomes' fate, to go on living in the hope that they will be reunited, yet immediately seeks to kill herself *because of a dream*, indicates how much faith she places in dreams. If it were possible for a character in the world of this novel to interpret her dreams as empty figments of the imagination, it would seem bizarre that she is willing to cling to every last thread of hope, yet seeks death as soon as a disturbing dream appears.[41] For the novel to make any sense, we must then be expected to accept that a dream can bring certain truth, and must then blame Anthia's error (for Habrocomes loves no other woman) on her interpretation, and not on the dream itself.

Thus, although the gods are not explicitly mentioned as the origin of the dream, we may take it from Anthia's faith in the dream's veracity that she, at any rate, believes it

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strangely enough, inspired a fair amount of scholarship on its dreams, perhaps because there are few enough of them to be easily manageable.

[41] MacAlister (1996) draws strong sociological connections between dreaming and suicide as "reponses to uncertainty," which both fill the ancient novels, and argues from this for the "age of anxiety" model of second sophistic society which has now been largely discredited (see esp. chapter 4 below).

to be prophetic, which may suggest a god-sent dream.[42] The second dream in the novel is not narrated in such a way as to indicate any more clearly any assumption of divine origin, although the change in Habrocomes' mood after he wakes up is suggestive. Slightly more explicit, however, is the first dream in the novel, which marks the beginning of the couple's (mis)adventures:

> …ἀρχὴ τῶν μεμαντευμένων. Τῷ δὲ Ἀβροκόμῃ ἐφίσταται γυνὴ ὀφθῆναι φοβερά, τὸ μέγεθος ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον, ἐσθῆτα ἔχουσα φοινικῆν· ἐπιστᾶσα δὲ τὴν ναῦν ἐδόκει καίειν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀπόλλυσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ μετὰ τῆς Ἀνθίας διανήχεσθαι. Ταῦτα ὡς εὐθὺς εἶδεν ἐταράχθη καὶ προσεδόκα τι δεινὸν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνείρατος· καὶ τὸ δεινὸν ἐγένετο.
>
> "...the things that had been prophesied began. Habrocomes dreamt of a woman frightening in appearance, larger than a human, and wearing scarlet clothing; she stood over him and seemed to set the ship on fire, and everyone else [seemed] to perish, but he [seemed] to swim away with Anthia. And as soon as he dreamt these things, he was distressed, and expected something terrible from the dream; and the terrible thing took place" (*Eph.* 1.12).

Two things are especially revealing in the narration of this dream. The first is the phrase which immediately precedes it, "ἀρχὴ τῶν μεμαντευμένων." The μεμαντευμένα referred to here are the events predicted in a Delphic oracle reported earlier, which is responsible both for the couple's marriage and for their current travels. The dream signals the start of this prophecy, and is thus a parallel phenomenon to the oracle itself. Just as an oracle is a divine message offering insight into a problem, so must this dream be.

This is confirmed by the second element of note, the authorial assertion which concludes the dream, so abrupt and laconic as to be easily missed. "καὶ τὸ δεινὸν ἐγένετο," remarks the narrator, intruding his own omniscient voice into the description of

[42] I take this as proof of my contradiction of Bowersock's (1994) argument regarding this dream that we are to read it as merely a reflection of Anthia's anxiety (88); if so, it is presumably an anxiety she has while awake; why, then, does its appearance in her dreams provoke such a drastic change in waking behavior?

Habrocomes' reaction to the dream.[43] The statement is not strange for its awareness of what lies ahead in the narrative (an omniscient narrator, after all, has the ability to reveal as much as he wishes of the future events). It is, rather, in the casual assertion that the awful event Habrocomes expected from his dream was what actually happened. Underlying an assertion like this is the very notion of dreams held by his character Anthia, and examined above: that they can predict the future or otherwise reveal the unknown, a power which resides with the gods. Implicit in Habrocomes' interpretation, then, is the notion that this dream is a communicative act, in which some god addresses a message to the dreamer; this message is *referential* with respect to the dreamer's future, just as Anthia's is with respect to an *unknown present*, both of which are parts of the shared context which are opaque to mortals. The contact is, of course, a vision while unconscious. Though the *code* may not be clear, and the interpretation may thus be faulty (as in Anthia's dream), the main point to make is that the addresser is assumed to be someone with knowledge of the future, which at least suggests it may be a divinity.[44] For the narrator to approve this interpretation by saying, in effect, "Habrocomes decoded it correctly," is tantamount to the authorization of these assumptions about dreams; the suggestion is thus possible here as well that dreams originate with the gods, though it is decidedly on weaker footing than in some of the other novels.

[43] Cf. Schmeling (1980), 90.

[44] There was a great deal of debate in the ancient world about how it was that come dreams could be (or could seem to be) prophetic; various non-religious explanations were offered, by Aristotle, e.g., but the explanation that prophetic dreams come from the gods, who have knowledge of the future, would likely have seemed quite natural to an ancient reader, and may indeed have been the first assumption. See Holowchak (2002) for a survey of the "scientific" positions; see also above, Introduction, note 3.

Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*

Unfortunately, given the first-person narrative form of Achilles Tatius' novel, there are no passages quite so revelatory, since the entirety of the narrative proper is told through the eyes of the character Clitophon, and thus falls short (except on occasion) of omniscience.[45] Clitophon's own view of dreams has already served to introduce this line of inquiry, but there remain a number of passages elsewhere in the novel that support the notion that dreams have a divine origin. Most obviously, a number of dreams are explicitly religious; that is, in them the gods themselves appear and speak directly to the dreamer (*L&C* 4.1, 7.12).[46] The reaction to these dreams is in every case as though the message had been delivered by a waking epiphany. Leucippe, as was discussed in the introduction, refuses to allow Clitophon to take her virginity early on in the novel, despite her willingness to rendezvous with him earlier, because she has been instructed by a dream:

> "ἡ γάρ μοι θεὸς Ἄρτεμις ἐπιστᾶσα πρῴην κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ὅτε ἔκλαιον μέλλουσα σφαγήσεσθαι, 'Μὴ νῦν,' ἔφη, 'κλαῖε· οὐ γὰρ τεθνήξῃ· βοηθὸς γὰρ ἐγώ σοι παρέσομαι. μενεῖς δὲ παρθένος, ἔστ' ἄν σε νυμφοστολήσω· ἄξεται δέ σε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἢ Κλειτοφῶν.' ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀναβολὴν ἠχθόμην, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίσιν ἡδόμην."
>
> "For the goddess Artemis stood over me in my sleep the day before yesterday, when I was crying because I was about to be slaughtered, and said 'Don't cry, now: for you will not die, for I will be beside you as a helper. And you will remain a virgin, until I give you away as a bride; and no one will lead you away in marriage besides Clitophon.' And I was upset at the delay, but was pleased at the hope for the future" (*L&C* 4.1).

Leucippe here obeys the dream as though the goddess had spoken to her in person, and does not question its authority, though she is frustrated at the prospect of putting off her

[45] See Reardon's (1999b) excellent treatment of the effect of the "ego-narrative" on Achilles' novel.

[46] *pace* Bowersock (1994), 88.

union with Clitophon.[47] The possibility that the dream is deceptive, or a vain figment of the imagination, is not even considered.[48]

Clitophon is prompted by Leucippe's confession to recall a dream of his own, which is also explicitly religious.[49] Because of their two dreams, he leaves off any attempts to ravish her, thus revealing the same assumption on his part about the nature of these dreams: despite his desire, he does not for an instant consider the possibility that the dreams might come from some source with less authority than the gods who appear in them. The result is the preservation of Leucippe's virginity, which is crucial to her redemption at the conclusion of the novel.[50] Another crucial element in the conclusion of the novel is the presence of Leucippe's father in Ephesus at the moment of crisis. This is partly determined by a dream he has, which is the last in the novel and is also explicitly religious: ἦν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τῷ Σωστράτῳ νύκτωρ ἡ θεὸς ἐπιστᾶσα· τὸ δὲ ὄναρ ἐσήμαινε τὴν θυγατέρα εὑρήσειν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ τἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱόν. "And the goddess (Artemis) had also appeared to Sostratos in private by night; and the dream indicated to him that he would find his daughter and the son of his brother in Ephesus" (*L&C* 7.12). Sostratos, then, takes this dream to be a direct communication from Artemis, a personal parallel to the epiphany described just before. And that this is a natural assumption, one which

[47] Reardon (1999b) interprets this dream as a device by which Achilles Tatius, having flirted with the violation of the novel conventions, is able to get his work "back on track" (251). Be that as it may, it does not detract from the earnestness with which these dreams are presented: there is no Eumolpus here to remind us of the Epicurean interpretation of dreams.

[48] Chew (2000) does see in these dreams a "unique" instance of the imposition of chastity from an outside force, by comparison with the other novels (63); this, she argues, is part of Achilles Tatius' "parody" of the generic conventions by violating the expectation that the hero and heroine are inherently chaste (on parody, see also Durham, 1938). The source of the dreams, however, and their authority is undeniable; we will discuss further below how much more they do than simply impose chastity on the *Liebespaar*.

[49] Bowersock (1994) equates this dream with the dream of Theron, because both use "closed doors" to represent frustrated plans (89); this completely elides, however, the complexity of the dream, its religious significance, and its revelation for Clitophon of the plot structure of his adventures (see chapter 3).

[50] Cf. Durham (1938), 9: "This dream proved the salvation of Leucippe in a different way at the end."

anyone would make, is revealed by the exchange that takes place when Sostratos mistakenly believes Leucippe to be dead. He cries out against Artemis, and exclaims "Ἐπὶ τούτῳ με, δέσποινα, ἤγαγες ἐνταῦθα; τοιαῦτά σου τῶν ἐνυπνίων τὰ μαντεύματα; κἀγὼ μὲν ἐπίστευόν σου τοῖς ὀνείροις καὶ εὑρήσειν παρὰ σοὶ προσεδόκων τὴν θυγατέρα." "Is this what you led me here for, mistress? Is this the sort of prophecy you make in dreams? And I trusted in your dreams, and expected I would, according to your word, find my daughter" (*L&C* 7.14). The dream in which Artemis appeared is described as "hers"; when the outcome it predicted is not fulfilled, Artemis herself (not the dream) is to blame. That this conflation between goddess and dream-goddess is not unusual is confirmed by the phrasing of the reassurance offered Sostratos by Cleinias: Θάρρει, πάτερ, ἡ Ἄρτεμις οὐ ψεύδεται "Have courage, father, Artemis does not lie…" (*L&C* 7.14). Not "Artemis' dreams" or "your dreams," but simply "Artemis."

Of course, the mere fact that any explicitly religious dream is automatically assumed to be god-sent does not automatically imply that *dreams in general* are thus understood; to confirm this hypothesis, we must turn elsewhere in the novel. It might be argued that the parallel between Hippias' recurrent dream of a failed marriage and the explicitly god-sent bird-sign, received when he ignores the dream's warning and tries to hasten the wedding, argues for a religious interpretation of that dream as well (*L&C* 2.11).[51] But one passage, in particular, supports the idea that the normal assumption when confronted with a dream is that it is a message from some divinity. In the middle of their adventures, Leucippe is taken deathly ill, and after ten days with no improvement, in her fevered sleep she cries out a name: "Διὰ σὲ μαίνομαι, Γοργία!" "Because of you am I mad, Gorgias!" (*L&C* 4.15). Clitophon and Menelaos search for the man thus named, and

[51] Cf. Bartsch (1989) for the implicit connection between the dream and the sign that follows (87).

meet with Chaereas, who tells them Gorgias is dead. Clitophon is distraught, though he still does not know who Gorgias was, so he asks: "Τίνα ταύτην ἀπώλειαν, καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Γοργίας; δαίμων γάρ μοί τις αὐτὸν ἐμήνυσε νύκτωρ· σὺ δὲ διηγητὴς γενοῦ τῶν θείων μηνυμάτων." "How did he perish, and who is Gorgias? For some spirit revealed him to me at night; you, then, explain this divine revelation!" (*L&C* 4.15). Thus, although Clitophon has earlier wondered whether Leucippe is insane in dreams as well as waking life (ἄρα κἂν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους σωφρονεῖς, ἢ μαίνεταί σου καὶ τὰ ὀνείρατα; *L&C* 4.10), he does not hesitate to attribute a chance bit of her dream he has overheard to a divine source: it is some divinity (δαίμων…τις), not Leucippe, who has given him the name Gorgias, and he calls this revelation god-sent (θείων), the sort of thing that requires an interpreter (διηγητὴς). This assumption of a divine inspiration for the dream is later confirmed when Clitophon tells Leucippe to prophesy again in her sleep (μάντευσαί τι καὶ νῦν καθεύδουσα), says that her earlier oracular utterance proved true (κατεμαντεύσω δικαίως), and finally that her dreams show sense (τὰ δὲ ἐνύπνιά σου σωφρονεῖ *L&C* 4.17): although he recognizes that they are dreams, he considers them oracular and thus divinely inspired.

Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* and Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*

The same word indicating a divine origin (θεῖον) is used by the narrator to describe the first dream in the *Aethiopica*, and this raises an important question: is the word used to distinguish dreams of divine origin from those that are not, or is it either pleonastic or descriptive of a different quality (containing an actual divinity, as this first dream does, e.g.). The use of the word confirms that Heliodorus considers this dream, at any rate, to have a divine source, but we must turn elsewhere to determine whether the

same holds true for the other dreams in the novel. The *Aethiopica* is, in fact, the only Greek ideal novel to include a passage offering any theory of dreams that does not interpret them as having a divine origin. In the ninth book, when Hydaspes first sees Charikleia, he reports a dream from the previous night in which she appeared. His followers then respond with a psychological interpretation of dreaming: Τῶν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰπόντων ὡς φαντασία τις εἴη ψυχῆς τὰ μέλλοντα πολλάκις <εἰς> εἴδωλα προτυπουμένης, ἐν παρέργῳ τότε τὸ ὀφθὲν ποιησάμενος, "Those who followed him around said that it was some apparition of the soul, which often represents the future in images, so he then put the vision in the back of his mind…" (*Aeth.* 9.25). It is clear, however, that Hydaspes does not accept this theory; later when he meets Theagenes, he asks how their theory accounts for him. In the band which Charikleia will use to identify herself, we are told, in fact, that Charikleia's conception was a result of Hydaspes obeying a dream command (*Aeth.* 4.8).[52] If he believed dreams were empty reflections of the future, he would scarcely have listened to his dream. To a reader, in any case, who knows that Charikleia really *is* Hydaspes' daughter, the courtiers' explanation falls flat. We know that Hydaspes' dream is literally true, and thus that it is an oracle, not a mere psychological figment; we therefore know that *within* the novel, it probably has a divine origin.[53]

A more definite indication of the source of dreams in the novel can be found in the pair of dreams in book eight. There Charikleia is miraculously saved from a fire by a

[52] Cf. Anderson (1997) in reference to this dream and focalizing through the royal couple: "…divine commands must not be disobeyed" (312). This dream will be discussed further below, especially as an important clue to the function of dreams in the author-reader relationship (see the start of chapter 3); see also Sandy (1982b), 50.

[53] In a sense, this is an example of the same sort of interpretive dilemma which Winkler (1999) singles out as a particularly important narrative technique of Heliodorus (314-329; though he focuses on those that are voiced by the narrator himself rather than his characters); it is interesting to note that here, at least, the audience is certain which of the two explanations is correct (in a sort of dramatic irony).

gemstone, which causes her to recall a vision in which their dead guardian Calasiris told her that "Pantarbe" (the name of the gemstone) would protect her. She voices some uncertainty as to the exact status of this apparition: οἷον γάρ μοι νῦν ὄναρ εἴτε καὶ ὕπαρ ἦν ἐνθύμιον γέγονεν (*Aeth.* 8.11). Her immediate reaction on recalling this dream/vision is to invoke the gods: Ἱλήκοιτε, θεοί, she exclaims; "Gods, be merciful!" This is precisely the exclamation Hydaspes will use in the next book, when he recognizes her from his dream (*Aeth.* 9.25), and we thus already have some sense there that a similarly coincidental event has occurred. What is surprising here is that it seems to matter very little to Charikleia whether her vision was dream or reality. We must be very clear about this: if "reality," it would be a "real" (i.e. waking) apparition of Calasiris, who is dead, and who would thus be appearing in spirit form, as a δαίμων. But Charikleia doesn't bother asking whether her vision was a dream or not: first she calls it a dream (ὄναρ), then says that *either* she fell asleep without knowing it (εἴτε καταδαρθεῖν λαθούσῃ) or that he appeared to her "manifestly" (ἐναργῶς), i.e., in waking reality. This suggests that it makes little difference: either way, the vision was a message from the gods.

This is confirmed when Theagenes tells his dream, which he has been reminded of by Charikleia's narration. Calasiris has appeared to him, too, and he, tellingly, avoids the terms for "dreams" altogether: he refers to the vision as an "oracle" (χρησμὸς), perhaps because of its metrical verbal content, and says that "either Calasiris or a god appearing as Calasiris" (εἴτε Καλάσιρις…εἴτε θεὸς εἰς Καλάσιριν φαινόμενος) seemed to speak to him. We cannot, in fact, be certain that this vision was a dream, which in itself indicates how little difference this distinction is meant to make. But Theagenes' choice of wording suggests that it is, in fact, a dream: λέγειν ἐδόκει, he says; "he seemed to say." This use of the verb δοκέω is a normal way to narrate a dream, and if used to describe

actual events would be rather odd. Yet it matters little to Theagenes, either way; he treats the "oracle" as though it were from the Pythia herself.[54] This imputation of a divine origin for dreams is, finally, confirmed by Charikleia, who responds to Theagenes' pessimistic interpretation of his dream with a more hopeful interpretation of her own. That interpretation may seem impossible in their current straits, she remarks, "…θεοῖς δὲ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ μελήσει τοῖς καὶ τὰ μαντεύματα φήνασιν"; "…but for the gods these things are possible, and will be taken care of by them, since they showed us the prophecies." Here it is not a dream, nor Calasiris, nor an image of Calasiris, but the gods themselves who are responsible for the visions; to them, Charikleia attributes the vision and her rescue: "…βουλήματι τῷ ἐκείνων τετέλεσται…" "…it has been accomplished by their will…" and later "ἢ κἀμὲ τυχὸν συμβουλήσει θεῶν περιέσωσε." "And this, as it happens, saved me, by the goodwill of the gods." Finally, as if to drive the point home, after Theagenes has voiced his doubt that another such miracle, another "pantarbe" will save them, she replies: "παντάρβην ἑτέραν ἔχομεν τὰ μεμαντευμένα καὶ θεοῖς ἐπανέχοντες σῳζοίμεθά τε ἂν ἥδιον καί, εἰ δέοι, πάσχοιμεν ὁσιώτερον." "We have as a second pantarbe the prophecies, and let us trust in the gods and be saved more sweetly and, if we must, suffer more purely" (*Aeth.* 8.12). For Charikleia, Theagenes' dream does not merely predict salvation: it is as good as the salvation itself. We could scarcely ask for a more clear indication of the assumption that dreams are divine in origin and are as good as oracles or divine epiphanies while awake.

[54] Winkler (1999) has, for good reason, ignored instances like this (Calasiris had earlier shown similar hesitation as to whether a dream of his was not, in fact, a vision) in his treatment of the "amphibolies," that is, double interpretations, that "…Heliodorus has scattered through the *Aithiopika*" (314). This example contradicts his assertion that these amphibolies are meant to suggest that there may be an alternate explanation for events which does not require divine providence: here, divine providence must be at work whether the event is a dream or a vision. Cf. also Dowden (1996), who rightly ciriticizes the assertion that the second possibility of two is automatically the more remote (276-7).

The majority of the dreams in Heliodorus feature one or more of the gods in person. Given that a dream of the departed Calasiris is taken as a divine message, we would scarcely expect these explicitly religious dreams to be treated any differently, and they are not. We can go even farther than this, however, and say that there is even a passage in this novel that suggests that *all* dreams originate with the gods: Calasiris, to whom belongs the wisest and most authoritative role in the novel[55] (with the possible exception of the gymnosophists, who appear at the very end, but say nothing about dreams), mentions dreams and oracles in the same breath, as though they were one and the same (*Aeth.* 2.36); more significantly than this, however, his prayer to the gods when going to bed is for a night of good dreams (εὐόνειρόν…τὴν νύκτα), and to see his loved ones in his dreams (φανῆναι αὐτῷ τοὺς φιλτάτους κατὰ γοῦν τὸν ὕπνον, *Aeth.* 3.5).[56] We must infer from this that Calasiris, a man of great religious knowledge, considers dreams, even those containing mere mortals, to be controlled by the gods.

Longus presents the most straightforward picture of all. In his novel, which has the highest concentration of dreams, nearly every dream is explicitly religious, that is, contains a god who explicitly or implicitly communicates with the dreamer.[57] The only exceptions are: a number of daydreams, which are a different class, are described in a different way, and will be treated in the third chapter; a reference to the erotic dreams of Daphnis and Chloe as their love grows (which may still be interpreted as religious, since

[55] See, for example, Dowden (1996) for a defense of Calasiris' wisdom (283-284); Sandy (1982) presents the more nuanced view that Calasiris is *both* a wise man and a trickster (e.g. 154: "Calasiris is a complex character and cannot be labeled fraud or holy man. He is both.").

[56] Alvares (2002) considers Dionysius' dream of his departed wife (see the next chapter) to belong to this type, and refers to an interesting passage in Euripides (114); Leonas' interpretation of that dream is thus implicitly taken to be misleading.

[57] Though Morgan (2004) exaggerates slightly in asserting that there are *no* allegorical dreams in the novel: Megacles dream (see below), at any rate, is allegorical; and even the first dream might be said to be "enigmatic" from the dreamers' perspective, in as much as they have no idea who the god in the dream is.

this is a novel explicitly about the power of the god Eros[58]), and a final recurring dream in which Megacles, Chloe's biological father, sees "that a sheep will make me a father" (με πατέρα ποιήσει ποίμνιον, *D&C* 4.35). Yet even this dream, whatever form it takes (it is not described), is interpreted by Megacles as something sent by the gods, albeit as a joke. He is quite explicit: "the gods send me dreams at night," οἱ θεοὶ…νύκτωρ ὀνείρους μοι ἐπιπέμπουσι. Thus, although the dream seems so ridiculous that it can only be a joke (we, of course, know that it is quite serious), it is nonetheless interpreted as something sent by the gods; there is no question of *vana figmenta somniorum*.

Petronius' *Satyrica*

In the comic-realistic Latin novels, by contrast, this notion of dreams as empty illusions seems almost a trope.[59] The fragmentary nature of Petronius' *Satyrica* makes it particularly difficult to assert that any particular assumptions about dreams hold true for that novel. What is particularly interesting, however, is that while none of the Greek idealistic novels even mentions any of the various non-religious view of dreams held in the ancient world (that dreams were the remnants of the day, e.g.), this view is mentioned no less than twice in the small fraction of Petronius' novel that remains to us.[60] The first instance is at 104.3, when both Lichas and Tryphaena have been told in dreams of the stowaways onboard their ship; Eumolpus, fearing they will be discovered, argues that dreams are not to be given any weight: "Hinc scies," inquit Eumolpus, "Epicurum hominem esse divinum, qui eiusmodi ludibria facetissima ratione condemnat." "From

[58] See Hunter (1983), 31; see also further discussion in the following chapters.

[59] For the comic/ideal distinction, see e.g. Perry (1967), vii and *passim*.

[60] For the various views on dreaming in our period, see Miller (1994); for various philosophical positions, see Holowchak (2002).

this," said Eumolpus, "you may know that Epicurus is a divine man, because by reason he rejects absurd jokes of that sort." Here it is the philosopher Epicurus, in his act of rejecting the possibility of meaningful dreams, who has divine knowledge;[61] the dreams themselves are called *ludibria*, "jokes," and are thus treated as meaningless noise.[62]

This attitude towards dreams is not limited to Eumolpus; Ascyltos, referring to Agamemnon's speech and poem on education at the start of the excerpts we possess, and explaining that he left in the middle of the lecture because he was hungry, asks: "An videlicet audirem sententias, id est vitrea fracta et somniorum interpretamenta?" "Or would you have me listen to his ideas, that is, broken glass and interpretations of dreams?" (*Sat.* 10.1). Here, to express his scorn for Agamemnon's views, Ascyltos refers to them as worthless trash;[63] so much is clear from the phrase "broken glass,"[64] but the addition of "dream interpretations" shows just how low an opinion he has of the notion that dreams can provide meaningful insight. And again, near the very end of our extant excerpts, after Circe has vanished from the impotent Encolpius' bedside, he compares the experience to frustrating dreams: Nocte soporifera veluti cum somnia ludunt | errantes oculos…mox ubi fugerunt elusam gaudia mentem | veraque forma redit, animus quod perdidit optat | atque in praeterita se totus imagine versat. "Just as when, during sleepy nights, dreams mock our wandering eyes…soon, when the joys have fled the mind they mocked, and the true form returns, the soul yearns for what it has lost, and turns itself

[61] Cf. Courtney (2001), 161.

[62] See Kragelund (1989) for a treatment of these passages and the "Epicureanism" they exhibit; see also note 172 below.

[63] See Bowersock (1994), 82.

[64] See Zeitlin (1999) for a deeper interpretation of the phrase (40-41); I would add to her identification of this as a powerful metaphor for the failure of rhetoric that dream interpretation (the second item in the list), too, is presented in this novel as a symbol of the failure of the intellectual in this period to make real sense of the world. See the following chapters.

completely to the shadow of the past" (*Sat.* 128.6). The use of the verb *ludo*, repeated in its emphatic form *eludo*, describing the mind as the victim of a joke or game at its expense, and dwelling on the way the person so mocked prefers the dream to reality, and loses himself completely in something unreal, all drive home a very different image of dreaming from that encountered in the Greek novels: dreams are cruel jokes, unreal and empty. Although we cannot be certain where in the novel it belongs,[65] the fact that this sentiment is echoed again in one of the few fragments of Petronius we have left underscores how common the idea is to this novel (*Frag.* 43).[66]

Yet there are those in the novel who think of dreams differently. The three dreams that are actually described in our fragments are *all* interpreted by their dreamers (none of whom are central characters to the novel, however, as far as we can tell) as god-sent messages, just as in the Greek novels.[67] This idea of dreaming is thus not absent from the comico-realist novels, but is simply one of several views on dreams voiced, rather than the nearly unequivocal orthodoxy. The strongest statement of it to be found in Petronius is offered by Lichas, who is without question a serious man, one who would be much more at home in a Greek novel, here caught up in a world of jokers.[68] When Tryphaena

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[65] See, however, Courtney (2001), 160 for an argument that it stood immediately after Eumolpus' protestations.

[66] See, however, Musurillo (1958) for the interesting idea that this poem may be read on a second level, which suggests not that dreams are empty fictions, but that life itself is dreamlike. Certainly, by some readings, *Encolpius the character's* life is dreamlike; see Beck (1999), 71: "…the earlier Encolpius…himself dreamt up and experienced the fantasies…" Beck sees a contrast between the experiencing Encolpius, who is lost in a fantasy world which he expresses through his poetic or literary reactions to events, and the narrating Encolpius, who points this up; notably, at least two of the expressions of an Epicurean view of dreams are made in these flights of poetic fancy, which would suggest that the *illusion* is not the dreams themselves, but the idea that they are unreal or meaningless, and pleasant.

[67] The relation of Petronius to the Greek novelists is a complex issue; one critic, at least, sees the *Satyrica* as a parodic critique of a perceived debasement of classical models by the Greek novelists; see Conte (1996), 149-150; for the most recent position, see Bowie (2008), 37.

[68] As can be seen, for example, from his reaction to the tale of the Widow of Ephesus (113): while everyone else laughs or is perhaps slightly embarassed by the bawdy tale, Lichas is outraged at the perversion of

argues for mercy towards the prisoners Encolpius and Giton, he responds by invoking divine retribution as his cause: "Deos immortales rerum humanarum agere curam, puto, intellexisti, o Tryphaena. Nam imprudentes noxios in nostrum induxere navigium, et quid fecissent, admonuerunt pari somniorum consensu. Ita vide ut possit illis ignosci, quos ad poenam ipse deus deduxit." "You understand, I think, that the immortal gods take an interest in human affairs, Tryphaena. For they led the evildoers onto our ship unawares, and disclosed what they had done by the equal agreement of dreams. So see, how is it possible to pardon those whom God himself has led to punishment?" (*Sat.* 106.3). For Lichas, the dreams are as good as a divine mandate, and one and the same with the serendipity of finding his wrongdoers in his power.[69] There is no question, for him, that the hand of (a) god is at work *both* in his good fortune *and* in the dreams that tell him of it. In this respect, then, he resembles one of the heroes we have already encountered in the Greek novels.

Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* and the Anonymous *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*

Apuleius' novel is also marked by a diversity of attitudes towards dreams. At the very outset, in the programmatic tale of Aristomenes,[70] the narrator of the story invokes the "medical" view of dreams: "Non" inquam "immerito medici fidi cibo et crapula distentos saeua et grauia somniare autumant; mihi denique, quod poculis uesperi minus temperaui, nox acerba diras et truces imagines optulit, ut adhuc me credam cruore

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morals which it exhibits; it is interesting, given this oddity of Lichas, that, as Courtney (2001) notes, Lichas is the only fatality in the extant novel (174).

[69] Kragelund (1989, 443 and *passim*) argues that this viewpoint is parodied. Here it is relevant only that a number of conflicting interpretations are offered, and that one closely resembles the approach taken almost universally in the Greek novels.

[70] See Tatum (1999), 162-168; see also Schlam (1992), 32-33.

humano aspersum atque impiatum." "It is not," I said, "without reason that the trusty doctors affirm that those who are glutted with food and boozing have wild and difficult dreams; a bitter night, at any rate, because I was less than temperate in my drinking last night, brought me savage and frightening visions, so that even now I think I am sprinkled and soiled with human gore" (*Met.* 1.18). Thus from the start of this novel, we have to consider the possibility that dreams are not divine messages at all, but the mere side-effects of debauchery. When it turns out that Aristomenes' vision was real, and that the dream Socrates offers in response to it was truthful, we may question the validity of this perspective, but the very uncertainty itself marks a difference from the Greek novel.

Another perspective on dreaming is offered by the old woman who narrates the tale of Cupid and Psyche. Charite, after being taken prisoner by the same robbers as Lucius, has a terrible dream which seems to predict her betrothed's death, and she immediately seeks a way of ending her life, which is now deprived of meaning.[71] In this reaction, she behaves very much as the heroine of a Greek novel would (we think, for example, of Callirhoe or Anthia). But the old woman watching over her tries to comfort her, explaining that not all dreams are so straightforward in their interpretation:

> 'Bono animo esto, mi erilis, nec uanis somniorum figmentis terreare. Nam praeter quod diurnae quietis imagines falsae perhibentur, tunc etiam nocturnae uisiones contrarios euentus nonnumquam pronuntiant. Denique flere et uapulare et nonnumquam iugulari lucrosum prosperumque prouentum nuntiant, contra ridere et mellitis dulciolis uentrem saginare uel in uoluptatem ueneriam conuenire tristitiae animi, languori corporis damnisque ceteris uexatum iri praedicabunt.'[72]

[71] This dream appears to be an Apuleian addition to the Greek model (if the argument is followed), which is *not* a novel, according to the traditional core grouping, and notably has not a single dream (see appendix B); see Perry (1930), 203.

[72] I here adopt Beroaldo's emendation of the text; see Helm (2001), 96.

> "Be of good cheer, my mistress, and do not be frightened by the empty fictions of dreams. For besides the fact that the images of daytime rest are held to be false, then even nighttime apparitions often predict opposite outcomes. Thus weeping and being beaten and sometimes having one's throat slit announce a wealthy and comfortable future, while laughing and stuffing one's belly with honeyed sweetmeats or coming together in lustful pleasure will foretell that one is to be harrowed by sorrow of spirit and weakness of body and every other curse" (*Met.* 4.27).

Of course, the old woman's dream theory rings hollow; we have already seen one person who dreamt of having his throat cut, at the very moment he was having his throat cut. Charite's husband will, in fact, be slain (though we do not know that yet). The mention of the commonly held theory that daytime dreams are considered false is, moreover, irrelevant.[73] Yet both of these "truths" (that daytime dreaming is false, and that even nighttime dreams often predict their opposites) are invoked by the old woman as justification (as is made clear by the connective "nam") for her characterization of dream images as *vana figmenta*, empty fictions.

To these two theories of dream origins explicitly voiced in the *Metamorphoses*, we must add at least a third, which seems essentially the same as that encountered in the Greek novels: that dreams originate with the gods, are sent by them as messages. As in Petronius, that interpretation is represented; the difference is that here it is the protagonist himself who expresses it. In the eleventh book, Lucius is changed back to a man, converts to the Isiac religion, and becomes a priest of Isis and Osiris all because he is instructed to do so in his dreams. Part of the shock of the eleventh book, in fact, results from this: that throughout the first ten books, not only does Lucius not have a single dream, but the several dreams that occur, to minor characters, are interpreted, if they are discussed at all, as *vana figmenta*. Their outcomes, as well as the reactions of a few decidedly more

[73] See Hijmans et al. (1977), 205.

Greek-novel-like characters[74] suggest otherwise, of course, but it is not until the eleventh book that the divine origin of dreams is even suggested, let alone explicitly depicted. And then book eleven begins with the goddess Isis appearing, shockingly, benevolently and so reassuringly, to two men at once, telling them their part in the future she has planned.

The eleventh book is without question what makes the *Metamorphoses* a religious work, whether we read it as a religious satire or a religious drama.[75] Yet the religious element in that book is injected through the repeated dreams of Isis, and thus by the repeated reference to the idea, absent except in subtle hints from the rest of the work, that dreams originate with the gods, and offer in sleep messages of their benevolence in waking reality. The two are thus conflated, the dream, where the gods speak to us, and the waking reality, where they watch over us, though we cannot know it except through our dreams. This is expressed perfectly in the prayer of Lucius to Isis, shocking only because it takes for granted a divine providence witnessed in dreams but always present, which is nonetheless absent from the first ten books, as though they belonged to a different world: "nec dies nec quies ulla ac ne momentum quidem tenue tuis transcurrit beneficiis otiosum…" "Neither any day nor any rest, not even the slightest moment passes by free of your blessings…" (*Met.* 11.25).[76] In Book 11, dreams come from the

[74] Charite, for example, or the baker's daughter.

[75] For drama, see e.g. Shumate (1996); for satire, see Harrison (2000), 226-259; Harrison 2000-2001 argues for the connection with Aelius Aristides, whose type of "religious autobiography" he believes Apuleius to be parodying; see also Harrison (2003), 514-515; Schlam (1992) has, I think, put forward the most convincing argument (that the polarity has been made too much of; 17, e.g. and *passim*) without recourse to the sort of convoluted post-modern criticism seen in Winkler.

[76] Another interesting instance in support of this is the fact that the famous identification of Lucius as a *Madauran* (something which even he does not know about himself) occurs in a dream; see my article (Carlisle 2008); cf. Smith (1972), 532: "Osiris has the special prerogative of divinity: his prophecy is likely to see further than his human listeners can comprehend, and may have a secret meaning unknown to anyone in the story"; cf. Smith (2008), who compares this with the "we-passages" in *Acts* as well as various other ancient sources; see also, however, Robertson (1910) for a possible emendation that removes this mystifying description of Lucius; van der Paardt (1981) provides the best treatment of the various

gods (more specifically, from Isis), though if such an idea is present in the first ten books, it is only in the subtle hints found in the way a few people seem to treat dreams as though they were no different from reality, and the way they seem to turn out right.[77]

In the last of the Latin novels, we have a far simpler case. There is only one dream in the *Historia Apollonius Regis Tyri*: it is, it seems, an explicitly religious dream, in which an "angel" instructs Apollonius to proceed to Ephesus rather than Tarsus, and to make sacrifice to Diana there, and to relate all his misfortunes.[78] The idea that this dream might be something other than a message from the gods no more crosses a reader's mind than it does Apollonius' or his daughter and son-in-law's, who all tell him to follow the dream's command (*HART* 48). Thus we may infer, as far as is possible, that the dreams in the *HART* are meant to be read as divine messages. But it is a point barely worth making here, since this, the one and only dream in the novel, seems a straightforward and almost formulaic example of the sort of dreams we have been examining elsewhere. The simplicity with which it is narrated, without excessive show or explanation, and the matter-of-fact way Apollonius' discovery of his presumed dead wife as a result of the dream is told, may easily lead us to miss the oddity of it. Yet on closer examination of the places and events involved, we come to a realization: this dream is completely unnecessary. Consider first that Ephesus lies directly on a route between Mytilene, where Apollonius has just discovered his daughter, and Tarsus, where he is heading for vengeance. He only ended up in Mytilene, in the first place, because of a storm which

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arguments for and against this passage, and also suggests that the appearance of the identification in a *religious message* may have special significance (105), or that the identification may in fact fit with the novel's theme of *metamorphosis* (106).

[77] Carlisle (2008), 233.

[78] The angelic appearance of the messenger is likely a result of the Christianization of the text; see Kortekaas (2004) for the fascinating problems surrounding the history of this novel; see page 3 for Diana as the source of the happy ending.

caught him on his way from Tarsus to Tyre (which is quite a storm, to send a ship from that route all the way to Mytilene). Thus, whereas his discovery of his daughter was highly improbable, yet was explained away with a simple storm, Apollonius must be *sent* to Ephesus, which is a major port town on his route, to the temple (where he would likely have gone anyway), and told to recite his entire story (when his name would, presumably, be enough), through a *dream*, though a storm is good enough for every other improbable coincidence in the novel. We are therefore confronted with a new question, one which brings us back to the second element in Clitophon's dream theory, and which must now be addressed: if the dreams are, by and large, messages from the gods, we must then ask *why the gods send these dreams*.

Recognizing that the dreams in the novels are generally presented as divine messages necessarily places them under the rubric of the "religious" (see the introduction for my definition of the term), and thus brings up the contentious question of the religious element in the novels. This will be treated later, especially in the final chapter. For now, suffice it to say that the events in the novels are presented as religiously significant by their narrators; whether we are to read this seriously, ironically, satirically, or in some other fashion is not a question about the world of the novels themselves, but of the author and reader. Thus, for the present purposes it is enough to say that the dreams in the novels function within the novels as part of the divine machinery that gives the events narrated their religious significance. Having accepted that the assumption made explicit throughout the novels, and only challenged in the Latin novels, is that dreams are a communicative act, whose author ("addresser," in Jakobson's terms) is a divinity, we can then turn to the dreams with our second, more important question: what is the *function* of the dreams in the world of the novels?

CHAPTER TWO: "TAKE HEART AND BE GLAD"

Let us turn once more to Clitophon's theory of dreams. The second element in this theory, namely that dreams are sent as psychological preparation for the dreamer, provides an explanation for *why* the gods bother to send dreams: an explanation, that is, of their *function*.[79] Yet a close examination of this reveals that, although the dreams refer to the future in their message, he is far more interested in their effect on the dreamer than the information which they communicate. The *referential* function of the dreams is thus mentioned only in passing: τὸ μέλλον, "the future," is the only part of this theory that alludes to the context referred to in dreams; this is the means by which the dreams achieve their ends, but their real function is focused on how the dreamer is affected by them. This is emphasized by his repeated reference to suffering, its prevention, its acceptance, its effect on the soul if sudden and the process of dulling its sharp edge by gradual acclimation, which is the specific role he singles out for dreams. In short, by this

[79] MacAlister (1996, 42) says of this and the similar passage in Heliodorus (see note 37 above): "These passages suggest that the dream in the novel should be viewed in terms of its meaning as a tool for understanding the arbitrary nature of fate…the sought-after understanding relates to the sphere of the self. Although the dream does not grant a person the power to control or combat what is to come, it might—ideally—provide a means of resolving personal uncertainties." This is an extremely forced interpretation: Clitophon's theory does not suggest that the dream functions to allow *understanding* of any sort, nor to resolve *uncertainty*, but to *prepare* the individual for something of which he or she would otherwise be unaware and thus shocked by. For Bartsch's (1989, 83) interpretation, which also ignores the theology of the passage and focuses instead on the "red herring" she claims that it represents, see note 111. Cox Miller (1994, 11) also reads this as a defense of dream divination as a means to "self-understanding," though her position is considerably more nuanced, and in general recognizes that Clitophon is here telling us that dreams tell us about the future so that when it arrives we will not be so shocked by it; her leap from that to "self-understanding" results from an understandable though anachronistic urge to rescue this kind of thought from the attack of modern "rationalism"; unfortunately, reading what Clitophon here says about dreams as a defense of the dream as a means to "self-understanding" depends on ignoring the *source* of the dream, which is here as elsewhere in the novels taken to be *the divine*: thus it is not a means to self-understanding, but to religious understanding.

theory dreams have primarily a *conative* function, i.e., are directed primarily towards affecting the dreamer, particularly by changing his or her psychological state.

Does this theory stand up? We have already seen that, in the world of the Greek novels, dreams are generally interpreted as "god-sent," and Clitophon thus seems absolutely correct (though the Latin novels are a bit more complicated). Yet a moment's reflection reveals that this second part of his theory is far too specific. Many dreams, as we shall see, are *motivational*, which implies that they are sent because the dreamer *can* do something about the future. And other dreams which seem purely predictive may result in an action that protects the dreamer from the outcome foreseen: so, for example, some chapters later in Achilles Tatius, Leucippe's mother seems to forestall her defloration by rushing into her room after a dream that predicted that very occurrence (*L&C* 2.23).[80] More immediately, Clitophon's father (and others in other novels) reveals his belief that misfortunes shown in dreams *can* be averted, when he hurries the wedding because of his dreams (though he fails, of course, so Clitophon is right in this instance that attempts to avert the future are vain; *L&C* 2.11). These few examples alone demonstrate that there is more to the dreams in these novels than Clitophon would have us believe, even though they are, by and large, sent by the gods. What, then, is the reason they are sent? What various roles do the dreams play in the ancient novels, and is there any common thread, some particular recurrent function each performs, that ties the various instances together? And if so, are the dreams all *conative* in function, or are there some that play other roles?

[80] Though the matter is decidedly less simple; see the discussion below (page 76).

Chariton's *Callirhoe*

We can begin with what is likely the earliest of the extant novels.[81] *Callirhoe* is particularly useful not only in its (likely) chronological primacy, but also in the way it provides, as we will see, an example of each type of dream to be found in the novels.[82] There are seven dreams, one fictional dream, one hallucination, and four references to dreaming. No two dreams are exactly alike in their function, although there are several similarities.

The first dream, then, occurs in the first book, at the first moment when Callirhoe's life is truly endangered; this is Theron's dream described above.[83] We are probably meant to assume that the "closed doors" are the metaphorical doors through which Theron would have left; their being closed thus indicates that he cannot leave yet. The referential function, however, is noticeably unimportant to the narrator, as he gives no indication as to the dream's meaning.[84] Nor, indeed, does he bother much describing the dream, dedicating a mere two words to his extremely laconic phrasing, but focuses

[81] See Bowie (1999, 46); but O'Sullivan (1995) argues for placing Xenophon first (145-70), as does Konstan (1994b), 49.

[82] Auger (1983) claims that the use of dreams in Chariton is unique; this, as we shall see, is not the case though there are certainly different proportions of different uses of dreams from novel to novel.

[83] See page 29.

[84] MacAlister (1996) develops an elaborate explanation whereby this dream in fact reflects Theron's eventual demise (39-41), but it is scarcely necessary here, and extremely strained (it is based on accepting that Chariton here referred to a well known dream symbol on the basis of its appearance in the significantly later and hardly authoritative author Artemidorus, then upon a revised interpretation that takes this dream as an allusion to the fact that Theron left the doors of Callirhoe's tomb open). She then later suggests that Theron's dream may actually have been "a revelation of aspects of his self" (42). This is patently an injection into the text of our own cultural preoccupation with dreams as a source of self-knowledge, which does apply in the case of the ancient novels.

instead on the effect it has on the dreamer, and, through the eventual outcome it has, the effect on Callirhoe.[85]

Two effects are achieved, then, by this dream, and we may thus divide its function into two parts; both, however, belong to the *conative* category of communicative function. The first, more immediate, effect is to forestall Theron's decision to kill Callirhoe and to run away. The second effect is an emotional one: Theron is thrown into a state of *aporia* by the dream, and it is in this condition that Leonas finds him: …οἷα δὲ ἀλύων ἐπί τινος ἐργαστηρίου καθῆστο, ταραχώδης παντάπασι τὴν ψυχήν. "…wandering aimlessly, he sat down at some workshop, completely disturbed in mind." Theron is troubled in his ψυχή because of the dream; the same dream which he seems to have known how to interpret. Or did he? The important point here is that intepretation of the dream, i.e. the determination of its *context*, is utterly immaterial to the narrator: what is of paramount importance is its effect on the dreamer, which is both psychological (Theron is troubled) and practical (Theron doesn't kill Callirhoe). In practice, we can separate these two results out, but of course they are intertwined: Theron decides to wait a day not because of any particular significance he attaches to the dream (that we are told of), but because it has disturbed him. We can, then, if we treat some unnamed god as the source of this dream, draw the following conclusions about its function: the god used the dream as the means of achieving some particular communicative ends, which have, at a minimum, a psychological component with practical results.

[85] Reardon (2003) argues that exploration of the emotional effect of the various episodes is, in fact, Chariton's characteristic narrative technique: "The principal feature of *Callirhoe*'s structure is the way in which…Chaereas [*sic*; sc. Chariton?] plays the events in his story against the emotion they generate" (333-334). Be that as it may, as we will see in the following discussion, the application of this technique to *dreams* is not merely a literary structural device, nor is it limited to Chariton's novel.

Dionysius also has a dream not long after this; in this dream, he sees his recently deceased wife as though she were really with him:

> ἰδὼν δὲ τὸν Λεωνᾶν ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὸν "μίαν ταύτην ἐγὼ νύκτα μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τῆς ἀθλίας ἡδέως κεκοίμημαι· καὶ γὰρ εἶδον αὐτὴν <ὄναρ> ἐναργῶς μείζονά τε καὶ κρείττονα γεγενημένην, καὶ ὡς ὕπαρ μοι συνῆν. ἔδοξα δὲ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ἡμέραν τῶν γάμων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χωρίων μου τῶν παραθαλαττίων αὐτὴν νυμφαγωγεῖν, σοῦ μοι τὸν ὑμέναιον ᾄδοντος.
>
> "And seeing Leonas, he said to him "this is the first night since the death of my poor wife that I have slept sweetly; for I saw her [in a dream] vividly, become taller and more beautiful, she was with me as if in reality. And I thought it was the first day of our marriage, and that I was leading her as my bride away from my country estate by the sea, and you were singing the wedding hymn for me" (*Call.* 2.1).

This dream has at least two roles, the first given by Dionysius, the second by Leonas. Dionysius emphasizes the dream as a sweet illusion, a lie which brought him happiness for the first time since his wife's death. This explains the emphasis he places on how *real* the dream seemed (ἐναργῶς, then later ὡς ὕπαρ μοι συνῆν), and on how dreaming this dream made him sleep "sweetly" (ἡδέως). For him, it is enough that the gods have allowed him this mercy of being with his beloved wife again;[86] Leonas, however, tells him the dream is even better than that: it is a true prophecy. "εὐτυχὴς εἶ," he says, "δέσποτα, καὶ ὄναρ καὶ ὕπαρ. μέλλεις ἀκούειν ταῦτα, ἃ τεθέασαι." "You are a lucky man, master, both asleep and awake. You are about to hear those things which you have seen." The idea that dreams depict good fortunes in times of trouble, already invoked by Leonas when he hears Theron's story, is again brought up here. His choice of wording, however, is vital: he says that Dionysius is lucky "both dreaming and awake," as qualification of

[86] Alvares' (2002) use of this dream is interesting; he believes Dionysius' proper role as widower is to be satisfied with this fleeting pleasure, and thus that his replacement of his previous wife with Callirhoe, and the eventual failure of that relationship, is an object lesson to the reader about the proper role of a husband at this particular stage (114). My objections to this interpretation are that it takes little account of the *source* of the dream, and that it is *Leonas* who interprets it as a reference to Callirhoe. It does not, however, really contradict the argument here made.

his good fortune. The importance of this lies in the failure to dismiss the "lie" of the dream as meaningless: the consolatory function of the dream, that is, is not dismissed, but simply extended from the dream to Dionysius' waking life.

For Leonas, then, the function of the dream is still consolation, still reassurance in Dionysius' time of trouble. A simple question highlights the importance of this insight: if Dionysius is about to meet, fall in love with, and marry Callirhoe, and if she is to replace his old wife in his heart (as Leonas' interpretation suggests), why should the gods bother telling Dionysius this in a dream? His actions are not changed by the dream, the outcome of events is not changed, so the only purpose this dream could have is to *reassure* Dionysius, in his time of trouble, that better times are ahead. That the consolatory dream, then, also refers to some real happiness in the future does not change its function: it is still sent to reassure Dionysius that the gods can see his future, and have seen to it that he will be happy again. This dream, then, forms a striking contrast to the dream of Theron. First, it has no effect whatsoever on the course of events, but is sent purely for the psychological relief it brings to the suffering protagonist. Secondly, its psychological effect is not negative, but positive: it raises up a downcast mind, while Theron's dream casts doubt in his resolute mind. Both dreams, however, work to the benefit of sympathetic characters.

The third dream (*Call.* 2.3) in the novel is barely described, although it is explicitly interpreted as a message from the goddess Aphrodite (she herself appears to Callirhoe in a dream, which is all we are told of this dream, and we must thus assume it is all that is important). The context of the communication, as well as the message, is not mentioned, so we may again assume that this dream is not referential but conative. Indeed, Callirhoe acts in response to it, by visiting Aphrodite's shrine and praying. This

suggests, though it does not confirm, a secondary function which dreams may perform: they may also, besides their conative function, be concerned with the *phatic* function: the role, that is, of establishing or maintaining the contact between addresser and addressee. This is equivalent to a teacher in class who tells her student "come see me in my office." The primary function is conative, but we may also argue that the goal of the action directed by the communication is further communication. Dionysius' first meeting with Callirhoe is a direct result of this dream, and we may then wonder if there is not some deeper significance here, especially as Dionysius at first mistakes Callirhoe for the goddess. Is the engineering of their meeting in that particular spot important to Aphrodite? Is there some sense in which bringing Callirhoe to her temple just as Dionysius is about to appear there is another way for Aphrodite to communicate with Dionysius, to manifest herself (in human form) to him? Is there, then, some sense in which his initial reaction to Callirhoe's manifestation is correct?[87] There is no way to be certain that this is what is happening here, but it does suggest that a secondary role, of maintaining human connection with the divine, is at work in this dream.

We are, in any case, in a position now to posit a theory for the function of dreams in this novel, borrowing somewhat from Clitophon's theory of dreaming as well; we may then test and refine that theory on the remaining dreams, and then determine to what extent it is applicable to the other novels as well. Dreams, it seems, are divine communications which perform a primarily *conative*, and secondarily *phatic* function. The conative function may aim at some action (psychologically motivated or otherwise) which benefits the protagonists or other sympathetic characters, but it may also be purely

[87] Compare the argument of Alvares (1997) that Callirhoe is elsewhere, in effect, a manifestation of Aphrodite (617-18); this was put more emphatically by Edwards (1994), 703 and *passim*.

psychological. When psychological, it may either reassure or warn (this latter function is inferred from Clitophon's theory of dreams), and is thus *emotionally* conative. In the former case, it is sent to someone enduring a hardship, to console them by offering a picture of a better, happier time. This may be represented by an image of their happier past, but in such cases reference to a correspondingly happy future is not precluded. In the latter case, the image is a warning about some hardship they will have to endure, and is meant to prepare them psychologically by allowing them to grow used to the idea. The unifying idea, in all these cases, however, is that the gods send a message for the benefit of a sympathetic character (almost always the dreamer, as it turns out).

This theory fits all but two of the remaining examples in Chariton quite well. Callirhoe has a bizarre dream in which Chaereas entrusts their unborn child to her. This dream performs the conative function of reassuring Callirhoe that she may marry Dionysius for the sake of her child; it also, by changing her psychological state, saves the child and possibly Callirhoe herself from death (*Call.* 2.9). Callirhoe's description of her previous life as a "dream" (*Call.* 2.5; to be discussed at greater length in the next chapter) corresponds to the role of the dream in times of hardship of representing a happier time. When Dionysius questions whether the news that Callirhoe will marry him is a dream (see above; *Call.* 3.1), and guesses that a god is trying to "deceive" him to prevent him from committing suicide, he confirms that dreams are to be interpreted as communications from the gods, and that they perform both a *conative* function, which can be both psychological (consoling him when he despairs of marrying Callirhoe) and practical (preventing his suicide), but is in any case directed to the benefit of the dreamer. His implication that the *message* of a dream may be a fiction, i.e., may not truthfully correspond to the *context* of the communication (its referential function, that is, is

ineffectual), does not interfere with the interpretation of dreams in terms of their *conative* function.

Callirhoe's dream of Chaereas in chains (*Call.* 3.7) is sent to warn her, and thus prepare her psychologically for a hardship that lies ahead;[88] the fact that this dream occurs at a time when she is relatively happy again confirms the hypothesis that reassuring dreams are sent in times of suffering, warning dreams in times of happiness.[89] Its psychological effect is, of course, taken a little too far by her, because she misinterprets the dream to mean that Chaereas is dead. That very misinterpretation, however, is indirectly responsible for Chaereas' salvation, since the satrap Mithridates only recognizes Chaereas and Callirhoe's name because he has fallen in love with her at Chaereas' mock funeral. Dionysius' vision during his faint (*Call.* 3.9), too, if we are to interpret it as a dream, has a similar effect; it prepares him for the reality of Chaereas stealing Callirhoe from him.

Callirhoe's dream of rescuing Chaereas from the attack on his ship (*Call.* 4.1) serves a consolatory function, as indicated by its form and context; she falls asleep while lamenting for Chaereas, and then has a dream, in which she saves him.[90] It is because of

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[88] She will, quite literally, see Chaereas in restraints and unable to reunite with her.

[89] I take this (the fact that she seems largely to have forgotten Chaereas until this dream) as well as the exact correspondence between this dream and Chaereas' experience (of which she has no knowledge) as two counts against Bowersock's (1994) claim that this dream is merely a psychological reflection of her love (88).

[90] Auger (1983), argues that this dream belongs to Artemidorus' category of the *theorematic* dream (42); although the dream is certainly prophetic, it cannot be theorematic, for the simple reason that it does nto come literally true, but is fulfilled in an indirect way; Auger's insistance on Chariton's use of dreams as different from the other novelists (43) is problematic; Chariton uses the same technique of misinterpretation (e.g. for Callirhoe's preceding dream of Chaereas) as the other novelists, though only once; and, of course, they contain a large number of theorematic dreams (with the exception of Xenophon of Ephesus) as well as allegorical dreams, just as Chariton does. In general, the application of Artemidorus' classificatory system is prblematic, because the correspondences are rarely exact, and thus there is no reason to suspect that the same system of dream interpretation was meant to be read into the texts of the novels, especially given the multitude of alternate or opposing views on dreams (see introduction).

her, of course, that Chaereas is freed from slavery, and in that sense her dream is truly prophetic; the only purpose it seems to serve, however, is to comfort her in her hardship by offering a happy ending to the story she believes to have ended with Chaereas' death. We are not told her reaction, but when Dionysius suggests she erect a tomb for Chaereas, she inexplicably feels better; we may perhaps view this as the residue of her consolatory dream.

When she is about to go to the Persian king's court for the judgement between Mithridates and Dionysius, Callirhoe dreams of her old life in Syracuse (*Call.* 5.5). Plangon's interpretation of this dream, namely that it predicts Callirhoe's happy ending and is thus a reassuring dream, corresponds with our theory in all respects. We may then view this dream as an analogue of Dionysius' dream of his dead wife: both are divine messages consoling the dreamers in a time of great difficulty by presenting them with images of a happier time from their past; those images, however, are interpreted (correctly, as it turns out) by their slaves as reassurance not only by allowing them to escape into the past, but also by foretelling a correspondingly happy future.[91] Finally, even the lie concocted by the Persian king to forestall his judgment (*Call.* 6.2), if a real dream, would fit our theory: it is essentially conative in function, as it is commands the king to decree a festival month, and also nicely displays the secondary phatic function, by allowing a continued contact between the king and the gods. It fails our theory, however, in that it is not directed to the benefit of a sympathetic character, but instead to the benefit of the king (who is a villain, more or less); this we may attribute to the fact that it is a lie.

[91] This explicit interpretation offered by Plangon contradicts Bowersock's (1994) claim that we are to read this dream as a psychological reflection (88).

The two dreams which do not seem to fit are the daydream of Leonas (*Call.* 1.12) and the king's dreams of Callirhoe (*Call.* 6.7). The first of these is problematic because we are told so little about it; Leonas' passing reference does not tell us what the substance of his daydream was, merely that the tale Theron is expounding corresponds to it. It is true that this "dream" works to the benefit of Callirhoe, because it leads Leonas to purchase her from Theron, and so to move her out of danger into the protection of Dionysius. The problem, however, is that it is likely that this is a waking fiction, actively composed by the dreamer himself.[92] If that is the case, how far are we to press the assumption that all dreams come from the gods? Surely, in this case, Leonas will have understood that he himself is the author of his own "daydream." Yet it seems to make little difference to him, because when Theron presents him with "the very thing he was dreaming of" in reality (ἃ γὰρ ὠνειροπόλουν ὕπαρ μοι δεικνύεις), he jumps to the conclusion that "some god sent me you as a benefactor" (θεός μοί τις…εὐεργέτην σε κατέπεμψεν, *Call.* 1.12). That the gods are the author, if not of the daydream, of its fulfillment at least, is obvious to Leonas. The dream itself, whatever Leonas may think of it, takes second place to this event, which itself functions as a communication of divine favor: note the positive emotional charge of "benefactor," and the deep irony this causes for us, who know that Theron is hardly anyone's "benefactor."

The second of the problematic dreams is difficult because it does not work to the benefit of the protagonists, but rather prevents Callirhoe and Chaereas' reunion. Indeed, had it not been for the war, this dream would likely have led to Callirhoe being made one of the king's concubines. Furthermore, the dream seems to have no conative effect except

[92] MacAlister (1996) interprets this as an actual dream (39); Leonas, however, here uses the verb ὀνειροπολέω, which is never used elsewhere in the ancient novels to refer to an actual dream, but always refers to daydreams; the imperfect tense also suggests that Theron interrupted Leonas in the middle of his "dreaming," which would not make sense unless this were a daydream.

to strengthen an emotion the king is already feeling (lust for Callirhoe). There is no phatic function, nor (of course) metalingual, nor emotive (if it is a message from the gods, since they don't even appear in the dream), nor referential (it does not tell the king anything he doesn't already know), nor poetic (the message is hardly even described: simply "Callirhoe"). Is it then safe to assume that this dream is not meant as a communication, at least not from the gods? If we are to read it as a communication, then, the only function it could conceivably perform is the emotive function, which would make the addresser not a god, but the King himself. This, then, is a very rare instance of a non-religious dream, which is described merely to emphasize how much the King is in love with Callirhoe.[93] The very fact that it is the only psychological dream in the entire novel demonstrates how unusual this type is: it is the exception that proves the rule that dreams generally come from the gods.[94]

A slight modification of our theory to allow for these two exceptions provides a surprisingly effective explanation, not only for the dreams in this novel, but for the dreams in the Greek ideal novels in general, as well as the *HART*; this explanation allows us to see what is unique to each author, and to highlight the differences and similarities between the Greek novels and the two so-called "realistic" Latin novels. This theory is as follows: dreams are presented as communications from the gods which serve a primarily *conative* function, secondarily a *phatic* one. In non-Jakobsonian terms, this means that they aim primarily at effecting a change in the dreamer, either in emotional state or behavior or both. This change, as we have seen, is always directed to the benefit of the protagonist or another sympathetic character. When the dream appears to the protagonists

[93] Cf. Auger (1983) who argues that this helps to characterize the king (41).

[94] Cf. MacAlister (1996), 71-73.

themselves, it acts either as reassurance, which aims at changing the emotional state from a negative one to a positive (or less negative) one, or as a warning, which aims at changing the emotional state from a positive to a negative one (in preparation, lest the sudden change overwhelm the dreamer).[95] This mere fact of benevolence towards the protagonists from the gods indicates the nature of the secondary, phatic function: the dreams also serve to make the dreamer aware of the presence of the gods, to establish contact between the dreamer and a divine force that is surprisingly interested in the welfare of the protagonists. Two exceptions to these generalizations must be made, for dreams that are actively composed by the dreamer (i.e., "daydreams") and for dreams that merely reflect the waking state of mind and thus are, if anything, psychological *emotive* communications.

Can we, returning to Jakobson's terms, generalize at all about the *code*, *message* and *context* of the dreams? As far as the code is concerned, there seems to be surprisingly little interest in explaining it: it may be imaginal (Dionysius' and Callirhoe's dreams of their past lives, e.g.) and/or symbolic (Theron's dream of a closed door, e.g.); it may also include a linguistic component (Chaereas' statement that he entrusts their child to Callirhoe). The narrator is far more interested, at least in Chariton, in presenting the

[95] This second part of the theory, that "bad" dreams are sent for the sake of psychological preparation, is based largely on Clitophon's theory; there is less textual support for this (what support there is will be adduced below, page 70 and notes 113, 127, 145, and 151). This requires some explanation. One of the problems we face in analyzing dreams in the novels in general is that when they are eventually fulfilled, the narrator and characters say nothing; in cases where the event predicted by the dream is not entirely clear or even intentionally ambiguous, this can even lead to the situation in which we do not know what the dream referred to (e.g. Panthia's dream in *Leucippe and Clitophon*; see below). This supports the idea that the immediate emotional change is the purpose of these dreams, and in the case of reassuring dreams, this is not a problem. In the case of dreams that are supposed to lead to longer-term psychological preparation, however, the textual support for this function thus becomes scarce, and we are left with very little beyond theorization to go on. This does not concern me overly in presenting this analysis, however: the "bad" dreams are far more scarce than the "good," and thus it would even be possible to leave them out altogether, with some detriment to the comprehensiveness of the analysis, but no real detriment to its overarching claim.

effect of the dream, which is how we can generalize and say that the dreams are primarily conative. The message of the dreams is also relatively little explored; the most vividly described dreams are those of Callirhoe and Dionysius, and in both cases the message takes the form of a narrative description of their wedding day. The context to which this points may then be either a happier past (the literal reference) or a happier future (the metaphorical reference). Callirhoe's first dream of Chaereas, similarly, presents as message an event which is temporally and spatially separate from her present frame of experience; the context to which this refers is a future hardship which she will have to endure. We may generalize, then, by observing that the dream achieves its conative function by reference to a reality not (yet) present to the dreamer, and of which the dreamer thus has no way of being aware, but which nonetheless, if realized, has the power of reassuring, warning, or modifying behavior.

We may generalize further, however, and say that the central component to all of these functions is *emotion*. In the final chapter of this study, we will examine emotion to clarify the effect of the novels, and in particular their religious framework, on the reader; at that point, we will introduce some of the positions of Martha Nussbaum on the philosophy and psychology of emotion to help clarify our approach. At the moment, however, one particular aspect of her approach will be very helpful for illuminating the function of dreams within the world of the novels. She argues persuasively for a eudaimonistic definition of emotion as an evaluative judgement about an object's relation to the subject's own flourishing.[96] Emotion, that is, is the recognition that an object more or less outside of our control has a specific and influential relationship to our own goals and projects. As the characters in the novels pass through their fictional universe, they are

[96] Nussbaum (2001), 19.

subjected to various vicissitudes, which produce emotions:[97] most especially, they are constantly subjected to fear and grief. The former is the apprehension that something may be a threat to our flourishing; the latter, that something which was important to our flourishing has been lost. In simple terms, the protagonists are afraid that bad things may happen to them and/or their beloved, and are sad at having lost their former happy state of integration and harmony in their society. Both of these emotions are the product of evaluative judgments about their goals' standing in the world.

A judgment, however, as Nussbaum tells us (following the Stoics), is an assent to an appearance.[98] "First, it occurs to me or strikes me that such and such is the case…I can accept or embrace the way things look…I can repudiate the appearance as not being the way things are…Or I can let the appearance hang there without committing myself." For the protagonists to feel emotions in their narrative worlds, that is, they must assent to some appearance which is relevant to their own flourishing. In the case of contentment, which we find at the beginning of the novels (and occasionally for a brief stretch in the middle of them) before anything to speak of has happened, as well as at the end (when nothing else *can* happen) the protagonist has assented to the appearance that nothing threatens his or her flourishing. In the middle of the novels, on the other hand, the protagonist is often seized with despair, fear, anxiety or the like: these are thus the result of assenting to the appearance that his flourishing is at risk, or that he has lost something central to that flourishing. The dreams in the novels are thus sent by the gods to present *an alternate appearance to which the protagonist may assent*, thereby bringing about a change in emotional state. In the midst of contentment, a dream brings an appearance of

[97] Cf. Oatley (2002), 39-40.

[98] Nussbaum (2001), 37-8.

great danger, and the dreamer, assenting to that appearance and experiencing fear and anxiety, is psychologically prepared for a real danger ahead. In the midst of grief, despair, fear, or anxiety, a dream brings an appearance that all is well, and a dreamer may assent to that and alter his or her emotional state. Even dreams like that of Theron, which are taken as commands of some sort, nonetheless exhibit this essential core: that they present some *appearance* (closed doors, e.g.) in accordance with which, should the dreamer assent to it, his behavior will change (he will not immediately carry out his plan, for example). This is, then, fundamentally a change in judgment (because it is an assent to a new appearance), judgment which, furthermore, relates to the dreamer's projects or goals (towards which all of his actions will be directed), and is thus a change in emotional state, which happens sometimes to be accompanied by a particular action; it is the emotional alteration, nonetheless, which is at the core.

Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca*

Turning now to the other novels, we can observe the ways in which the basic pattern is varied and further refine our generalizations. In Xenophon of Ephesus, there are only three dreams. The first, Habrocomes' dream before his ship is attacked, bears some resemblance to the dream in Achilles Tatius (discussed below) which Clitophon introduces with the dream theory discussed above. What is worth noting at this point is that the dream, which corresponds to the oracle given earlier in the book (as discussed above), does not provide any new information to Habrocomes. He already knows, from the oracle, that he and Anthia face great hardships ahead; that he has no awareness that the dream is more specifically predictive (i.e., that they really will face the destruction of their ship) is indicated by the vagueness of his interpretation: "προσεδόκα τι δεινὸν," "he

expected something terrible" (*Eph.* 1.12).[99] Furthermore, this awareness that something terrible will happen is scarcely of any practical use to him: only a few moments later (though it is delayed momentarily for the reader by a flashback in the narrative), the pirates attack his ship. Why, then, do the gods send this dream?[100] Two points are worth observing. The first is that the narrator is interested more in the emotional effect on Habrocomes: he describes the reaction by coordinating, rather than subordinating the two salient points, that Habrocomes was disturbed and that he interpreted the dream vaguely as a prediction of some great evil. The second point is that in focusing on the δεινὸν which is predicted by the dream, he ignores its ending: he and Anthia swim to safety. This, of course, does not really happen, and so we can assume that this second element is a condensation of the end of the oracle, predicting more generally a happy end to their tale, and which Habrocomes ignores as he focuses on the negative element.

The element of psychological preparation is suggested by the reaction of the various people on board the ship when the pirates attack: …κἀνταῦθα οἱ μὲν ἐρρίπτουν ἑαυτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκπλήξεως εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἀπώλλυντο, οἱ δὲ ἀμύνεσθαι θέλοντες ἀπεσφάζοντο. Ὁ δὲ Ἀβροκόμης καὶ ἡ Ἀνθία προστρέχουσι τῷ Κορύμβῳ τῷ πειρατῇ… "…whereupon some cast themselves into the sea out of terror and perished, others, trying to defend themselves, were butchered. But Habrocomes and Anthia ran up to the pirate Corymbus…" (*Eph.* 1.13). Only Habrocomes and Anthia escape because only they are

[99] It is this lack of specificity in the oracle *and* Habrocomes' interpretation of his dream, by contrast with the relative accuracy of the dream and Habrocomes' seeming lack of concern for the significance of the oracle up to this point, that leads me to reject he possibility of interpreting this (in an obviously anachronistic fashion) as "the workings of [Habrocomes'] subconsciousness [*sic*] on the predictions of the oracle" (Schmeling, 1980; 34).

[100] Kytzler's (2003) suggestion that it is merely "to heighten tension" (356) is either an observation about its effect on the reader (this is how I interpret it), which thus ignores its meaning in Habrocomes' world, or an implication that the gods in this novel have some interest in tormenting Habrocomes, which I do not accept; why would they "heighten tension" only a moment before the event which they predict takes place in reality?

self-possessed enough to supplicate the pirate captain; those who try to defend themselves die, and even more tellingly, some die simply because they throw themselves overboard out of terror. The word used here for "terror" is ἔκπληξις, the noun form of the verb ἐκπλήττω, which is used by Clitophon in his dream theory to describe what happens to the mind of a person who is not psychologically prepared for a disaster by a dream.

The dream, then, functions to warn Habrocomes only moments before disaster strikes, indicating that the psychological preparation is the point; further, it serves to reassure him (though he misses this reference), even in the midst of disaster, that he and Anthia will pull through. The dream could thus be seen, at a stretch, to fit with our theory of dreams, except that here two different conative functions are combined: the warning function, which prepares the dreamer psychologically for a disaster, and the reassuring function, which indicates in the midst of disaster that happier times exist outside the present moment. It is possible, however, that the separation of the two is never complete. We have pointed out the secondary *phatic* function which some dreams seem to have. Clitophon's dream theory, in fact, in some sense implies this: he is so certain that, when warning comes of future hardships, it is the gods' doing, and that it is done for the dreamer's benefit, to preserve his soul from too powerful a shock. Implicit in this is the sense that there are benevolent divine forces looking out for the dreamer's welfare; this is connected to the phatic function of the dream, which establishes contact with the divinity, and makes the dreamer aware of that benevolent presence. The very fact of the dream is, then, an implicit reassurance that the gods are looking out for the dreamer, even if its content is purely negative; that divine providence ("looking-out-for") is, in some sense, itself a reassurance that "everything will be all right," even in the midst of a warning about something bad that is about to happen. The phatic function of the dream thus

connects the several aspects of its conative function: it is because the dreams are thought to come from the gods, because the very fact of them establishes contact with the higher powers, that dreams, both warning and reassuring, are given so much weight and are even, at times, acted on. Thus Habrocomes' failure to recognize the reassurance implicit in this dream in no way negates its power: it may well be that preparing him for the disaster necessitates a failure to understand that that very preparation is undertaken to ensure his survival, though this is clear to us. The function of this dream is, at any rate, extremely complex and mysterious.

The second dream in the *Ephesiaca* (2.8) follows this same pattern; it is an imaginal representation of the "happy ending" which will take place, after much wandering and suffering, and the conative function of the dream is stressed by the fact that it is not decoded, explained, or otherwise tied to any external reference.[101] Instead, we are simply told that Habrocomes felt a little better when he woke up, emphasizing the emotional effect as the crucial reason for the dream.[102] Far more problematic, however, is the final dream in the novel, which appears to Anthia (*Eph.* 5.8). As noted above, this dream is difficult to interpret. Its reference is not clear, but once again what is emphasized by the narrator is not the fulfillment of the dream, or its interpretation, but Anthia's reaction to it: she is so distraught she attempts suicide, because she thinks the dream was true. Two possibilities exist for making sense of this, since Anthia is clearly wrong in her interpretation (the dream is not true in the sense she means, because Habrocomes never has, and will never, join with another woman). Either the dream means something else, and she has missed the point, or it is a lying dream, and thus either

[101] Though it is possible to guess at; see note 427 below.

[102] Cf. MacAlister (1996), 39.

not godsent, or the only dream in the entire corpus of novels which is sent by the gods with the intention to deceive. If the latter, that is, a lying dream, we must decide between these two possibilities: it is a deceptive dream, and her suffering is its aim, or it is not a godsent dream, but belongs instead to the category we outlined in the treatment of Chariton of psychological dreams: i.e., dreams which merely reflect or reinforce the dreamer's own emotional state.[103] Of these two choices, the most probable is the latter, since a deceptive dream sent to the protagonist by a malicious spirit would not only be inconsistent with the world of the novels in general, but also with the overwhelming sense of divine benevolence indicated by every other religious experience Anthia has.[104]

Of course, the possibility also exists that this dream has been misunderstood, and that it thus fits with the theory of divine dreams posited thus far, and was sent to reassure her or warn her. One possible interpretation that allows for this is that the point of the dream, which she misses, is that even though Habrocomes has been separated from her by a "woman" (Fortune, perhaps? Or is it a real reflection of what happened with Manto?), he nonetheless remains faithful to her, crying out and calling to her even as he is dragged away. In any case, it is impossible to determine what, precisely, this dream means; what is important is that it could fit the theory posited so far, but that if it does not fit, it must not only be incoherent with that theory, but also with the novel in which it appears and with the genre in general.

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[103] This is how Kytzler (2003, 356) interprets it, but I have my doubts. Anthia is already upset, and that is clear from many other events in the novel. Moreover, it seems that when a novelist wants to illustrate the psychological state of a person, the standard technique is a soliloquy, not a dream. Dreaming seems, for the most part, reserved for divine communication.

[104] Consistency is not really a strong point with Xenophon; he is generally regarded as the worst of the novelists, not least for his choppy narrative: Anderson (1993), e.g., calls it "…a melodramatic mishmash lacking judgment in almost every respect" (170).

Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*

Achilles Tatius' novel contains eight dreams and six references to dreaming. The first dream is the one introduced by his dream theory:

> ὄναρ ἐδόκουν συμφῦναι τῇ παρθένῳ τὰ κάτω μέρη μέχρις ὀμφαλοῦ, δύο δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ ἄνω σώματα. ἐφίσταται δή μοι γυνὴ φοβερὰ καὶ μεγάλη, τὸ πρόσωπον ἀγρία· ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν αἵματι, βλοσυραὶ παρειαί, ὄφεις αἱ κόμαι. ἅρπην ἐκράτει τῇ δεξιᾷ, δᾷδα τῇ λαιᾷ. ἐπιπεσοῦσα οὖν μοι θυμῷ καὶ ἀνατείνασα τὴν ἅρπην καταφέρει τῆς ἰξύος, ἔνθα τῶν δύο σωμάτων ἦσαν αἱ συμβολαί, καὶ ἀποκόπτει μου τὴν παρθένον.
>
> "I seemed in a dream to grow together with the maiden at the bottom, up to the belly button, but from thence the top parts were two bodies. And then a frightening and huge woman, with frightening looks, stood over us; her eyes were bloodshot, her cheeks rough, and her hair made of snakes. She wielded a sickle in her right hand, a torch in her left. And so, falling upon me wildly and stretching out the sickle, she drew it down from the groin, where the two bodies were joined, and cut the girl away from me" (*L&C* 1.3).

This dream has been subjected to at least three interpretations. The first is that it foretells Clitophon's separation from Calligone, his betrothed, and that certainly seems to make sense given its immediate context.[105] The second is that it foreshadows the scene in which Leucippe's mother bursts into her room and interrupts her tryst with Clitophon.[106] That, too, seems to fit; the torch, in particular, and the dishevelled hair (which could look like snakes), could make Panthia look like a fury.[107] A third interpretation has been

[105] See Bartsch (1989), 85; Cueva's (2004) reading ignores this possibility, however, and claims that the dream obviously refers to sex (70).

[106] See Bartsch (1989), for whom this revision of interpretation is a general pattern that characterizes not only Achilles Tatius' (and Heliodorus') treatment of dreams, but their narrative technique in general, especially in their use of any number of descriptions (ecphraseis) that require interpretation (87). See my Introduction for a more general treatment of her work and my differences from it; see also MacAlister (1996), who restates the double interpretation in terms of the Artemidoran allegorical/theorematic distinction (78), though this is problematic: even she must admit that the dream cannot be *completely* theorematic, and the fact that its fulfillment is so long delayed negates Artemidorus' claims about these dreams, at any rate; see my Introduction for the main treatment of MacAlister as well.

[107] See Whitmarsh and Morales (2001), 147.

offered, that this dream is programmatic for the entire theme of the book: it is, in effect, a dream about the physical separation of soulmates which is given in Plato's *Symposion* as one of the explanations of Love's power; the theme of the novel is, as the preface indicates, about Love's power; Clitophon and Leucippe's story may be read as that of two halves of the same original soul who have found each other.[108]

What is important to point out here is that none of these interpretations is explicitly marked as the correct one. We are given no indication as to what, exactly, the outcome to which this dream referred was. This has been interpreted as part of the hermeneutic game played by second sophistic novelists, and which will be exploited even further by Heliodorus.[109] I would like to suggest, however, that a second possibility exists: this dream is not explained, because it does not matter what its outcome is. When Panthia's invasion of her daughter's chamber reminds us of this dream, this is only one of the possible explanations, and it does not *correct* the previous one, so much as add another point on which the dream was correct.[110] What is important, instead, is that this dream appears to Clitophon at a time of general contentment and prepares him for hardships which lie ahead.[111] Are we to privilege the second explanation over the first,

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[108] See Whitmarsh and Morales (2001), xxi; also Morales (2008), 52-53."

[109] See Bartsch (1989), 83 and *passim*; see also Morgan (2003), 444.

[110] Thus Bartsch's (1989) claim that "…their [Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius' readers'] efforts are subject to criteria on adequacy…because the true solutions are eventually made apparent…" (175) is questionable: the authors never tell readers in any explicit fashion what the true solution to those (realtively few) dreams whose solution is not immediately apparent is; instead, there are verbal echoes and the like which *suggest* a second interpretation, but not usually anything definite.

[111] In this sense, Clitophon's dream theory, which is the closest we have to an authorial statement about how dreams are to be interpreted in his novel, is far from a "red herring," (Bartsch 1989), 83 and in fact provides the most comprehensive explanation for this dream of all; Bartsch's error is in assuming that a dream which does not reveal the literal "truth" cannot have the palliative effect which Clitophon gives it, but of course mental dread about being cut off from someone we love does not demand a precise knowledge of how and when this will take place to have the intended psychologically preparatory effect.

with no indication by the narrator that we should do so, when the basic core of the dream ("you will be violently separated from the one you love by a cruel goddess (Tyche?)") might be said to be an accurate description of *every* major trauma in the novel?[112] Indeed, the point which Clitophon seems to want to make, since he never tells us what the dream refers to, has less to do with the meaning of the dream, and much more to do with its source and effect: the gods prepared him for a great difficulty.[113]

This same explanation, extended by the theoretical implications drawn from Chariton to cover "good" dreams and dreams of intervention as well, will fit every dream or reference to dreaming in the novel. Clitophon, after he has fallen in love with Leucippe, says that he ate his dinner without awareness of what he was doing, "as if in a dream" (τί μὲν οὖν ἔφαγον, μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἔγωγε οὐκ ᾔδειν· ἐῴκειν γὰρ τοῖς ἐν ὀνείροις ἐσθίουσιν, *L&C* 1.5). This is a reference to the level of awareness one experiences in dream, in which the details can often be fuzzy; it is consistent with a focus on the conative function of dreams, i.e., on the importance of their *effect* on the dreamer rather than the details of their content (or message).[114] When Clitophon reports that all of his dreams were of Leucippe (πάντα γὰρ ἦν μοι Λευκίππη τὰ ἐνύπνια, *L&C*, 1.6), the statement can be classified with the King's dreams of Callirhoe as one of those rare instances of *emotive* psychological dreams.[115] When Clitophon's father, Hippias, receives

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[112] Cf. Hägg (1983), 49: "Perhaps this symbolizes, in a general way, the novel's separation-motif…The terrfying woman of the dream was Tyche, Fortune," cited in MacAlister (1996), 204 note 22.

[113] Which weakens Whitmarsh's (2003) position that Clitophon is oblivious to the promise of a happy end (197). If Clitophon's dream *does* refer to the moment when Panthia bursts into Leucippe's room, we may perhaps recognize the effect of the psychological preparation in Clitophon's unusual sharpness of wit in reaction: he manages to sneak out before she can identify him.

[114] Morales (2004) suggests that the simile here means Clitophon was like someone *seen* in a dream, rather than experiencing a dream (223); this does not make sense to me: why should he look dreamlike?

dreams predicting the failure of the marriage he has arranged between Clitophon and his sister Calligone (*L&C* 2.11), he misconstrues these as actionable pieces of information; they are, of course, warnings to prepare him for an inevitable hardship ahead (the happy union he is hoping for for his son is not to be), as the bird omen that spoils his sacrifice makes clear. Coming as soon as it does after Clitophon's explanation of the source and function of dreams, of course, this is hardly surprising.

Twelve chapters later, we have the much discussed dream of Panthia (*L&C* 2.23); two interpretations are possible here. The first is that this is a manipulative dream to a minor (possibly even antagonistic) character, designed to work to the benefit of the protagonists, not the dreamer. If this is the case, it is equivalent to Theron's dream in Chariton, and, though still conative in function, is sent by the gods to effect physical intervention, to save the life of the heroine (the virginity test at the end of the novel will kill any girl who fails it).[116] The other possible interpretation that has been suggested is that this dream foreshadows the very real (seeming) mutilation of Leucippe that will occur in the next book.[117] If it is the case that this dream refers to that event, it would function within the narrative of the novel (since foreshadowing is a technique concerned with the experience of the *reader*, not the protagonist) in the same way as the previous

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[115] See MacAlister (1996), 71-73, though her claim that Artemidorus' verbal distinction between *enypnia* and *oneiroi* applies here is problematic: the very next dream is also described using that word, and it is clearly not meant to be read as purely psychological; see Bowersock (1994) for a refutation of the applicability of this terminology to Achilles Tatius' novel (93).

[116] See note 50 in the previous chapter; see also Lalanne (2006), 268.

[117] Bartsch (1989), who again interprets the second possibility as a correction of the first, but it is never explicitly marked as such (87-88); see also MacAlister (1996), who claims that the different interpretations are based on a misinterpretation of a theorematic dream for an allegorical dream (76-77), though the imprecise correspondence between the dream and the second fulfillment (as well as the delay in time) disqualify it in my mind may disqualify it from the category of the theorematic; in any case, the problems highlight my main point which is that the interpretation of this dream is never explicit; see also Chew (2000), 65.

two "bad" dreams, which is to say, as a psychological preparation for some inevitable event.[118] Whether this is indeed meant to be the case, we can never be certain, because there is no explicit link drawn between Leucippe's mock sacrifice and the dream. I am inclined, however, to be skeptical, for the simple reason that Panthia, who has the dream, is not present to witness the mutilation of her daughter. We would then have to believe that Clitophon was able to infer enough of her dream (ignoring as an obvious lapse in the first-person narrative stance the fact that he is describing another person's dream in vivid detail)[119] to be forewarned that he would witness the mutilation and death of Leucippe.[120] Otherwise, what is the purpose, within this narrative, of the gods sending this dream to Panthia and not Clitophon himself? In any case, both interpretations would be consistent with the theory propounded thus far, and as with Clitophon's first dream, the narrator does not seem quite as interested in the interpretation of the dream as he is in its *effect*.

After Clitophon witnesses Leucippe's death, and she is then miraculously restored, he exclaims that "either that [her death] or this has to be a dream" (ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἐνύπνια, *L&C* 3.18). What he is alluding to here is the radical disjunction between the two "realities" he is experiencing, a disjunction which, he surmises, can only be explained if one of the two is a dream. This illustrates the means by which the dream achieves its function of reassurance or warning, as discussed above: its *message* is often the depiction of a reality that is radically different from the one experienced by the

[118] Bowersock's (1994) claim that the dream is not really predictive, but simply reflects Panthia's fears and anxieties (88), is unproductive. Why would Achilles Tatius include it? Why narrate it so vividly? Why not simply have the mother burst into the room for some other reason?

[119] See Reardon (1999b), 248.

[120] Morales (2004) accepts Bartsch's interpretation of revised meaning; she explains the dream and the link it establishes between these episodes as the important effect (169); that, however, is a role for the dream in the author-reader communication, making the dream and essentializing representation of a central theme in the novel, and thus metalingual; see the following chapter for a discussion.

dreamer at the moment. Through this message it is able to front the conative function of reassurance (if the waking reality is negative and the dream reality positive) or warning (if the waking reality is positive and the dream reality is negative). It is interesting to note here that Clitophon is not certain which reality is dream and which is "real," though he seems to lean towards the happy reunion as the actual reality because of Leucippe's kiss. That can hardly reassure him completely, however, because, as we recall, his psychological dream in book 1 also involved kissing Leucippe; in that instance he chided his slave for waking him, and preferred dream to reality. What this emphasizes, then, is that he does not really care which is dream and which is reality, so long as he gets to kiss Leucippe: once again, the *effect* is more of a concern than the ontological or phenomenological "reality" of the dream/not dream.

The pair of dreams which follows is a classic example of the overtly religious dreams, which are, in effect, oracular in nature. Both dreams illustrate well the three conative functions discussed so far, as well as the phatic function. The first is Leucippe's dream (given above), which has four results: 1) it informs her that she will not die (οὐ…τεθνήξῃ), but will be married to Clitophon (οὐδεὶς ἢ Κλειτοφῶν); 2) it ensures that she will preserve her virginity (μενεῖς δὲ παρθένος);[121] 3) it warns her that she will not be united with Clitophon until later (ἔστ' ἄν σε νυμφοστολήσω); 4) it quite emphatically establishes contact between her and her protective goddess Artemis (βοηθὸς…ἐγώ σοι παρέσομαι).[122] Item three alone is slightly subtextual, but the fact that this is well

[121] For a "parodic" reading of this function, see note 48 above; see also Reardon (1999b), 251; he does not believe the novel is parodic *per se* (258), but that it does experiment with, and "grimace at," the generic conventions, sees this as the point at which the generic love plot gets back on track; such a reading, however, though it may be in part accurate, ignores the other aspects of this dream (μενεῖς δὲ παρθένος is, after all, only a fraction of the overall message).

understood as part of the message is clear both from her reaction (ἠχθόμην) and Clitophon's (ἀναλογιζόμενος δὲ τὸν τῆς Λευκίππης ὄνειρον οὐ μετρίως ἐταραττόμην).[123] This dream, then, fits all three conative functions, as well as the phatic: it reassures Leucippe ("Μὴ νῦν… κλαῖε," says the goddess, and she takes it to heart: "ἡδόμην," she says), it warns her of difficulties ahead (hence the other element in her reaction: ἠχθόμην),[124] it intervenes to protect her ("Ἀλλ' οὐ θέμις," she protests when Clitophon tries to make love to her), and it informs her of a divine presence and protection in her life.

Following this, Clitophon remembers a similar dream, which appeared to him the same night:

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[122] Bartsch (1989) also focuses on this dream as a necessary device to change Leucippe's sexual behavior without changing her character, and on its function to "foreshadow" the ending (91); cf. Heiserman (1977), 124; yet no author seems willing to explain why a novelist would wish to foreshadow the ending of a work that followed narrative conventions, and thus would be expected to end this way in any case. Finally, her focus on the dream as a way for Achilles Tatius to validate the assumption that dreams come true (by predicting a rescue which we are now in a position to verify) ignores the goddess' promise of patronage, which is a profoundly meaningful religious statement, and amounts to much more than "you will not be killed."

[123] Bartsch (1989) interprets Clitophon's dream as a prediction of his sexual encounter with Melite (92); Morales (2004) follows this interpretation (221-222). This is largely based upon the repeated reference to Aphrodite in the Melite storyline: that, however, simply reflects the fact that the substance of Clitophon's interaction with Melite centers around sex, while his interaction with Leucippe, from this point forward, does not. There are several reasons, moreover, why Clitophon's dream cannot refer to this encounter: 1) The dream tells him that he will become a *priest* of Aphrodite, thus indicating a lasting state; his encounter with Melite is brief and final. 2) The idea of entering Aphrodite's temple *cannot* refer simply to sex: we know from the previous book that Clitophon has had sex, with women; the only thing he has never done is have sex with a woman with whom he is in love (he has only ever been in love with Leucippe); he is not, however, in love with Melite, and thus sex with her cannot be the initiation into Aphrodite's mysteries that is here referred to (since sex with Melite is no different from sex with the courtesans with whom he has some experience). 3) Instead, the idea of entering Aphrodite's temple must refer, as the *full* context of the dream makes plain, to something which he is now trying to do, but is forbidden from doing, and which he will at some later date be able to do on a regular and permanent basis, and that, of course, can only refer to his attempt to have sex with Leucippe. Thus Clitophon's disturbance here cannot refer to some guess that he would have sex with someone other than Leucippe (since he has already done that, and it disturbed him not at all); nor does it even seem to have anything to do with *his* dream, but with hers, specifically; it is not unreasonable, then, to assume that we are meant to understand here that Clitophon is disturbed by Leucippe's dream for the same reason she is: because it means he will have to wait some time before making love to her; see, however, Winkler (1989) who suggests that Clitophon misinterprets this as a dream about Leucippe's death (222, note 53).

[124] Cf. Morales (2004), 206.

> ἐδόκουν γὰρ τῇ παρελθούσῃ νυκτὶ ναὸν Ἀφροδίτης ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἄγαλμα ἔνδον εἶναι τῆς θεοῦ· ὡς δὲ πλησίον ἐγενόμην προσευξόμενος, κλεισθῆναι τὰς θύρας. ἀθυμοῦντι δέ μοι γυναῖκα ἐκφανῆναι κατὰ τὸ ἄγαλμα τὴν μορφὴν ἔχουσαν, καί, "Νῦν," εἶπεν, "οὐκ ἔξεστί σοι παρελθεῖν εἴσω τοῦ νεώ· ἢν δὲ ὀλίγον ἀναμείνῃς χρόνον, οὐκ ἀνοίξω σοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱερέα σε ποιήσω τῆς θεοῦ.
>
> "The previous night I seemed to see the temple of Aphrodite and the statue of the god was inside; but when I got closer to pray to her, the doors shut. And then a woman appeared to me, as I was disheartened, like the statue in form, and she said: 'it is not for you to enter into the temple now: but if you hold up for a short while, I will not only open the door to you, but will make you a priest of the goddess'" (*L&C* 4.1).

Clitophon's dream is equally multifunctional. It warns him of a difficult time ahead (κλεισθῆναι τὰς θύρας, to which his reaction is to become ἀθυμοῦντι; the goddess also tells him he will have to wait a little while, which is a bit of an understatement); it reassures him that all will be well in the end (ἀνοίξω σοι); it intervenes to protect one of the protagonists ("οὐκ ἔξεστί σοι παρελθεῖν," says the goddess, which results in his restraint with Leucippe: οὐκέτι ἐπεχείρουν βιάζεσθαι), and, finally, establishes a special connection with a divine presence (ἱερέα σε ποιήσω τῆς θεοῦ).

The various passages surrounding Leucippe's mania from a love-potion overdose present several interpretive difficulties for the function of dreams in this novel (see the discussion above). The passages are singularly unhelpful with the question of the function of dreams in the novels. The focus here seems to be on the relationship between dreams and the waking world: on the referential function, that is, of their communication. The point seems to be that even someone who is insane in waking life can still have sane dreams: in her sleep, Leucippe not only knows that she is mad, but why, which is more than anyone else in her circle knows. What the function of these dreams might be, then, beyond making this point (which is a function that will be further discussed in the next chapters), is not clear. Leucippe seems distraught in her outburst against Gorgias, and that

would argue perhaps for a preparatory dream, or perhaps a dream of intervention, although it is hard to see how this dream helps save Leucippe when the minor character Chaereas is on his way to help her anyways. It does seem to have a phatic function, since Clitophon immediately interprets it as a message from some divinity, and later asks for another such communication. The main point, however, is that there is very little we can say about this dream itself, as all we know about it is that it caused Leucippe to cry out as she did; as for the references to the dream by Clitophon, these seem mainly to emphasize the power of the dream to present a more accurate perspective on the truth than waking consciousness, which, if anything, argues in favor of the theory propounded so far.

Melite's passing reference to her fantasy of living happily ever after with Clitophon (*L&C* 5.26) is clearly one of the exceptional cases which we have classified as "daydreams"—this is indicated by the use of the verb ὠνειροπόλουν. As such, it is a human creation (because it is actively created by a waking mind) which is called a "dream" because it imitates the dream's ability to present an alternative reality to the dreamer, one which is happier and more meaningful than present circumstances because it supplies a narrative closure which revises the achronic model of one's life: in other words, it presents an alternate appearance (by the addition of fantastic details) to which the daydreamer can, at least for the duration of his or her daydream, assent. But the main purposes of these passages within the novels is to lend psychological color (they reveal the aspirations of the characters); they are not real dreams. It is true that they have a deeper meaning on the level of the author-reader, but that will be discussed in a later chapter.

The next reference to dreaming is similarly oriented towards this ability of dreams to present an alternate reality (which, if the dreamer is currently suffering, is inevitably a

happier reality); Clitophon, having rediscovered Leucippe, is told shortly afterwards that she is dead. He cries out that all he got to do was see her, and he didn't even get enough of that. "ἀληθής μοι γέγονεν ὀνείρων ἡδονή," he cries; "my pleasure was that of dreams." Shortly before he has blamed this newest *Scheintod* on the gods: "Τίς με δαίμων ἐξηπάτησεν ὀλίγῃ χαρᾷ," he asks; "what god has deceived me with this brief joy?" This passage reminds us immediately of the point in Chariton when Dionysius, unable to believe the news that Callirhoe will marry him, thinks that some god must be deceiving him (see above). These two passages share the same motivation, the one difference being that Dionysius' only evidence for believing the ὀλίγη χαρά to be a deceit was his previous conception of Callirhoe's resoluteness not to remarry. Here, Clitophon has the slightly better reason in that someone has told him Leucippe is dead (though this is not the first time someone has been wrong about that). Both reactions reinforce the function dreams perform in the novels of providing consolation from the gods in times of trouble by presenting images (and promises) of happier times; that they then interpret those images as lies need not shake the theory put forward because 1) these are not really dreams, but are said to be *like* dreams, and 2) even if they were dreams, both Dionysius and Clitophon would be wrong about their truthfulness: they both turn out to be true.

Finally, we have the dream of Sostratos, discussed above. What is vitally important in understanding the function of that dream is to point out that it is utterly unnecessary, in terms of its referential function, and even in terms of its conative role in motivating Sostratos to travel to Ephesus: he is already on his way to Ephesus to lead a delegation in thanksgiving prompted by a public epiphany of Artemis when he receives

the dream.[125] What role can it possibly play then, except to comfort Sostratos, who is presumably heartbroken over the loss of his daughter? It assures him that he will recover her in Ephesus, and that surely lifts his spirits (the goddess revealed this to him as soon as he was free from the responsibilities of war, the war which caused him to send Leucippe away in the first place; as soon, that is, as he could conceivably have been reunited with his daughter). This is made quite plain in the profound disappointment he feels when he fears that the dream was deceptive: he rebukes the goddess, and cries out; "a fine gift, this" he says (*L&C* 7.14). When the dream seems to have been a lie, the rug is pulled out from under him, and this proves negatively the profound positive emotional impact the dream must have had when he thought it true; this is reaffirmed when Cleinias assures him that he should "take heart" (Θάρρει), because "Artemis does not lie" (ἡ Ἄρτεμις οὐ ψεύδεται): in other words, he should restore the dream to its real meaning and function, which is to reassure him; this is, after all, why Artemis sent it.

Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*

Longus, of all the novelists, uses dreams to greatest effect; he structures his very narrative around a series of dreams,[126] most of which are described at greater length than in any of the other novels; at least two occur in each book.[127] The first such dream, which is really two dreams since it appears to both Dryas and Lamon, is described as follows:

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[125] Bowersock (1994) takes this dream as the cause of Sostratos' trip to Ephesus (90), but that is not supported in the Greek; in fact, it seems more likely that Sostratos was already appointed to lead the delegation when he had this dream, though that removes the convenient explanation of "plot motivation" which would make this dream unproblematic even for a modern reader.

[126] Morgan (2004) touches briefly on the structural symmetry of Longus' use of dreams (155).

[127] None of the dreams in Longus, notably, are "nightmares," which illustrates both how infrequent and non-essential this type is to the Greek ideal novel's use of religious patterning through dreams. Cf. note 95 above.

> Τὰς Νύμφας ἐδόκουν ἐκείνας, τὰς ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ πηγή, ἐν ᾧ τὸ παιδίον εὗρεν ὁ Δρύας, τὸν Δάφνιν καὶ τὴν Χλόην παραδιδόναι παιδίῳ μάλα σοβαρῷ καὶ καλῷ, πτερὰ ἐκ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντι, βέλη σμικρὰ ἅμα τοξαρίῳ φέροντι· τὸ δὲ ἐφαψάμενον ἀμφοτέρων ἑνὶ βέλει κελεῦσαι λοιπὸν ποιμαίνειν τὸν μὲν τὸ αἰπόλιον, τὴν δὲ τὸ ποίμνιον.
>
> "It seemed to them that those nymphs, the ones in the cave, where the spring ran and where Dryas found his child, handed Daphnis and Chloe over to a handsome and haughty boy, who had wings growing out of his shoulders, and carried little arrows and a tiny bow; and he touched them both with a single arrow, and ordered them in future to keep flocks, him as a goatherd, and her as a shepherdess" (*D&C* 1.7).

This dream is explicitly conative, as indicated by the verb of commanding (κελεῦσαι). The remainder of the dream's message, in the Jakobsonian sense, i.e., the symbolism of the nymphs entrusting Daphnis and Chloe to Eros, and of his touching them with a single arrow, is lost on the dreamers, however, because as we are later told, they do not even know who the winged boy is! The emphasis, then, within the novel is once again on the *effect of the dream on the dreamers*, i.e. the conative function. The very beginning point of this story is thus effected by a conative dream; that is the dream's function, on the level of the narrative: to send Daphnis and Chloe into the fields to meet each other and fall in love. A second conative function can be seen in Dryas and Lamon's reaction to this command which they nonetheless obey: ἤχθοντο, we are told; "they were troubled," which is precisely the emotional reaction of Leucippe to the first half (the "warning" half) of her similarly overarching dream; the dream thus provides emotional preparation for the (temporary) disappointment of Dryas and Lamon's high hopes for their foster children.

This dream, however, also performs a phatic function; indeed, in Longus more than any other author the phatic function of dreams is made quite explicit. So, having been contacted by the gods, Dryas and Lamon respond to their dream not only with obedience, despite their reservations, but also (and first) with a sacrifice to Eros, even

though they do not know who he is (*D&C* 1.8). The next pair of dreams (*D&C* 2.10) we can pass over with little comment; they belong to the category of psychological dreams with a primarily emotive function discussed above as an exception to the more common function of dreams; in this role, they mainly emphasize the degree to which Daphnis and Chloe have fallen in love.[128] The next dream is a different story: it is the one of the longest dreams in the novels, and is quite a masterpiece, well worth examining closely:

> Καὶ αὐτῷ αἱ τρεῖς ἐφίστανται Νύμφαι, μεγάλαι γυναῖκες καὶ καλαί, ἡμίγυμνοι καὶ ἀνυπόδετοι, τὰς κόμας λελυμέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασιν ὅμοιαι. Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐῴκεσαν ἐλεοῦσαι τὸν Δάφνιν· ἔπειτα ἡ πρεσβυτάτη λέγει ἐπιρρωννύουσα. "Μηδὲν ἡμᾶς μέμφου, Δάφνι· Χλόης γὰρ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σοὶ μέλει. Ἡμεῖς τοι καὶ παιδίον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἠλεήσαμεν καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄντρῳ κειμένην [αὐτὴν] ἀνεθρέψαμεν. Ἐκείνῃ <καὶ> πεδίοις κοινὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τοῖς προβατίοις τοῦ Δρύαντος. Καὶ νῦν δὲ ἡμῖν πεφρόντισται τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην, ὡς μήτε εἰς τὴν Μήθυμναν κομισθεῖσα δουλεύοι μήτε μέρος γένοιτο λείας πολεμικῆς. Καὶ τὸν
> Πᾶνα ἐκεῖνον τὸν ὑπὸ τῇ πίτυϊ ἱδρυμένον ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐδέποτε οὐδὲ ἄνθεσιν ἐτιμήσατε, τούτου ἐδεήθημεν ἐπίκουρον γενέσθαι Χλόης· συνήθης γὰρ στρατοπέδοις μᾶλλον ἡμῶν καὶ πολλοὺς ἤδη πολέμους ἐπολέμησε τὴν ἀγροικίαν καταλιπών· καὶ ἄπεισι τοῖς Μηθυμναίοις οὐκ ἀγαθὸς πολέμιος. Κάμνε δὲ μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἀναστὰς ὄφθητι Λάμωνι καὶ Μυρτάλῃ, οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ κεῖνται χαμαί, νομίζοντες καὶ σὲ μέρος γεγονέναι τῆς ἁρπαγῆς· Χλόη γάρ σοι τῆς ἐπιούσης ἀφίξεται μετὰ τῶν αἰγῶν, μετὰ τῶν προβάτων, καὶ νεμήσετε κοινῇ καὶ συρίσετε κοινῇ· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μελήσει περὶ ὑμῶν Ἔρωτι."
>
> "And the three Nymphs appeared to him, tall and beautiful women, half-naked and barefoot, loose-haired and looking like their statues. And first they seemed to be pitying Daphnis; then the eldest encouraged him, and said: 'Don't blame us, Dapnhis; for we care more about Chloe than you. We took pity on her even when she was a child, and we nurtured here as she lay in this very cave. She has nothing in common with the fields and sheep of Dryas. Now, too, we have taken care of her situation, so that she will neither be carried off to Methymna and become a slave, nor become part of the spoils of war. We have begged that Pan over there, the one seated under the pine, whom you yourselves have never honored, even with flowers, to be Chloe's defender; for he is more used to military camps than we, and he has already fought many wars, leaving the country behind; and he won't be a good enemy for the Methymneans, when he attacks. So don't weary yourself, but get up and be seen by Lamon and

[128] Cf. Morgan (2004), 185.

> Myrtale, who themselves also lie on the ground, thinking that you too have become part of the plunder; for Chloe will come to you tomorrow, with the goats, with the sheep, and you will graze together and pipe together; everything else about you will be Eros' concern'" (*D&C* 2.23)

This dream essentially consists of seven parts, 1-2 being a description of the dream vision itself, and 3-7 a transcription of its linguistic component: 1) a description of the physical appearance of the Nymphs; 2) a description of their attitude and purpose in addressing Daphnis; 3) an assurance that they do, in fact, take care of Chloe; 4) a description of how, on this occasion too, they will take care of her, 5) an exhortation to Daphnis to reassure his own foster parents about his safety, 6) a reiteration, in more certain terms, that all will be restored to the way it was before, 7) a reassurance that the more general trouble Daphnis and Chloe are experiencing, at the hands of Eros, is up to that god.[129]

Part 1 is phatic in function; this is indicated by the resemblance between the dream Nymphs and their statues, before which Daphnis has just prayed, as often before. It is concerned with the *contact* between divine and human, formerly in the form of an icon, now in the form of a dream. Part 2 indicates the motivation behind the dream (the Nymphs *pity* Daphnis) and their goal in sending it (they seek to *encourage* him). Part 3 begins with the phatic ("Μηδὲν ἡμᾶς μέμφου," a response to Daphnis' previous statement in their dialogue, so to speak, and a direction to engage in contact with them in a particular way), then moves to the conative, which continues to operate through part 4, and is summed up at the beginning of part 5 by the exhortation "Κάμνε δὲ μηδέν," don't wear yourself out (i.e. emotionally). Embedded in part 4, which, like part 3, is primarily concerned with reassuring Daphnis that Chloe is being looked after, and he needn't trouble himself, is another secondarily *phatic* element: the rebuke implied by the relative

[129] cf. MacQueen (1990), 54.

clause "ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐδέποτε οὐδὲ ἄνθεσιν ἐτιμήσατε" is designed to shame Daphnis into honoring Pan, which is primarily conative but, like Callirhoe's dream of Aphrodite, directs an action which serves to establish contact with a god. Part 5 is also conative, in a different sense: it is aimed at motivating Daphnis to return home; the purpose of his return, however, is to reassure his foster parents, and this is thus an extension, through Daphnis as divine agent, of the *reassurance* which is the dream's primary purpose. This is emphasized by the return of this theme in part 6, which states with powerful emotional impact, though simply, that all will be as it was. This is achieved, just as in many of the reassuring dreams we have seen elsewhere, by the description of some of the activities of their previous life, before disaster struck; here, however, the *futurity* of the reference is made explicit.

Finally, almost as an afterthought, the Nymphs add reassurance not only that the current crisis is being looked after, but also that a god is looking out for their love affair. We thus see three of the four functions discussed so far, interwoven in a complex and lengthy dream of great power and emotion: the phatic function, and the conative functions of reassurance and motivation. This is reflected perfectly in Daphnis' reactions to this dream: he 1) is reassured (though still upset, of course, at Chloe's absence); 2) prays to the goddesses and to Pan and promises sacrifice; 3) returns to his foster parents and reassures them. The phatic function and the positive emotional effect is further emphasized by the fact that he prays again to the goddesses, and asks both for another dream and for the day to come quickly; he is so profoundly comforted by the dream, that is, that another dream, further contact with the Nymphs, is nearly as good as the arrival of the day which will return Chloe to him.

The next dream is the apparition of Pan to the captain of Chloe's captors, Bryaxis; he and his men are greatly troubled by a series of strange occurences, in the midst of which the captain suddenly falls asleep, though it is midday (we are told this is "not without divine prompting"; *D&C* 2.26), and dreams:

> αὐτὸς ὁ Πὰν ὤφθη τοιάδε λέγων· "Ὦ πάντων ἀνοσιώτατοι καὶ ἀσεβέστατοι, τί ταῦτα μαινομέναις φρεσὶν ἐτολμήσατε; Πολέμου μὲν τὴν ἀγροικίαν ἐνεπλήσατε τὴν ἐμοὶ φίλην, ἀγέλας δὲ βοῶν καὶ αἰγῶν καὶ ποιμνίων ἀπηλάσατε τὰς ἐμοὶ μελομένας· ἀπεσπάσατε δὲ βωμῶν παρθένον, ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει· καὶ οὔτε τὰς Νύμφας ᾐδέσθητε βλεπούσας οὔτε τὸν Πᾶνα ἐμέ. Οὔτ' οὖν Μήθυμναν ὄψεσθε μετὰ τοιούτων λαφύρων πλέοντες, οὔτε τήνδε φεύξεσθε τὴν σύριγγα τὴν ὑμᾶς ταράττουσαν· ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς βορὰν ἰχθύων θήσω καταδύσας, εἰ μὴ τὴν ταχίστην καὶ Χλόην ταῖς Νύμφαις ἀποδώσεις καὶ τὰς ἀγέλας Χλόης καὶ τὰς αἶγας καὶ τὰ πρόβατα. Ἀνάστα δὴ καὶ ἐκβίβαζε τὴν κόρην μεθ' ὧν εἶπον. Ἡγήσομαι δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ σοὶ τοῦ πλοῦ κἀκείνῃ τῆς ὁδοῦ."
>
> "Pan himself appeared saying the following: 'O most unholy and irreverent men of all, how do you dare these things with your crazed thoughts? You have filled the countryside I love with war, and you have driven off the herds of cows, and of goats, and of sheep which are my charge; you've torn away from the altars a maiden, from whom Love wants to make a story; and you have shown no shame before the Nymphs as they watched you, nor before me, Pan. So you will not see Methymna if you sail with these spoils, nor will you escape this pipe which disturbs you: instead I will send you, drowned, as food for the fishes, unless you give back Chloe and the herds, both sheep and goats, to the Nymphs forthwith. Stand up, then, and put the girl ashore, with the animals I mentioned. And I myself will lead you at sea, and her on land" (*D&C* 2.27).

The first portion of this dream is unlike anything seen so far. Its function seems to be mainly *emotive*, piling censure upon censure, negative adjective upon negative adjective. We may say, then, that this dream functions partly to express the divine displeasure directed towards Bryaxis. That displeasure is, however, scarcely new information to the captain: he and his men have already surmised that Pan is responsible for the disturbances of their ship (Συνετὰ μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ἦν τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἐκ Πανὸς ἦν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ ἀκούσματα μηνίοντός τι τοῖς ναύταις; *D&C* 2.26). Thus this first

portion of the dream is redundant; it simply emphasizes what is already well known. What is not known, however, is how Pan is to be appeased, and that is what this dream serves to reveal to Bryaxis; the emotive function of the dream is thus subordinate to the dream's primary function of *getting Bryaxis to release Chloe and her flocks*, which is, once again, conative. We may even consider this emotive function part of the greater goal of motivation, of rescuing Chloe, since the point of all of the portents is to strike terror into the hearts of the Methymneans, to convince them to do whatever Pan asks. In this sense, then, the dream is parallel to Theron's much more laconic dream in Chariton, which ultimately serves the same purpose: the rescue of the heroine from peril.

Lycaenion convinces Daphnis to sleep with her by lying, claiming that she has had a dream in which the Nymphs told her about his and Chloe's plight, and told her to instruct him in the proper way of making love (*D&C* 3.17).[130] Daphnis trusts her completely, and does not suspect anything, precisely because her dream corresponds in every particular to the role played by dreams in his world. If it were a real dream, it would have been a divine message, *conative* in function, though with much referential material (because the Nymphs explain Daphnis and Chloe's situation). It would have aimed towards the benefit of the protagonists by motivating the action of a minor character. All of this corresponds to the way other dreams function; it is scarcely surprising, then, that Daphnis is duped. What is surprising, even ironic, is that despite the fact that it was a lie, this dream really did benefit the protagonists, as it provides Daphnis with the information he needs for their wedding night (it also benefits the dreamer, by

[130] Cf. MacQueen (1990), 73.

allowing her to satisfy her desire, though that is of secondary importance).[131] It might as well have been real, then.

Another threat to Daphnis and Chloe's happy union comes in the form of rich suitors for Chloe; Daphnis is distraught, and prays for another dream from the Nymphs, which promptly appears:

> Αἱ δὲ αὐτῷ καθεύδοντι νύκτωρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐφίσταντται σχήμασιν, ἐν οἷς καὶ πρότερον· ἔλεγε δὲ ἡ πρεσβυτάτη πάλιν· "γάμου μὲν μέλει τῆς Χλόης ἄλλῳ θεῷ, δῶρα δέ σοι δώσομεν ἡμεῖς, ἃ θέλξει Δρύαντα. Ἡ ναῦς ἡ τῶν Μηθυμναίων νεανίσκων, ἧς τὴν λύγον αἱ σαί ποτε αἶγες κατέφαγον, ἡμέρᾳ μὲν ἐκείνῃ μακρὰν τῆς γῆς ὑπηνέχθη πνεύματι· νυκτὸς δέ, πελαγίου ταράξαντος ἀνέμου τὴν θάλασσαν, εἰς τὴν γῆν εἰς τὰς τῆς ἄκρας πέτρας ἐξεβράσθη. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν διεφθάρη καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐναὐτῇ· βαλάντιον δὲ τρισχιλίων δραχμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ κύματος ἀπεπτύσθη καὶ κεῖται φυκίοις κεκαλυμμένον πλησίον δελφῖνος νεκροῦ, δι᾽ ὃν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ προσῆλθεν ὁδοιπόρος, τὸ δυσῶδες τῆς σηπεδόνος παρατρέχων. Ἀλλὰ σὺ πρόσελθε καὶ προσελθὼν ἀνελοῦ καὶ ἀνελόμενος δός. Ἱκανόν σοι νῦν δόξαι μὴ πένητι, χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ἔσῃ καὶ πλούσιος."
>
> "And they appeared to him as he slept at night in the same form in which they had appeared before; and again the eldest spoke: "Another god is in charge of Chloe's marriage, but we ourselves will give you a gift, which will charm Dryas. The ship of the Methymnean youths, which your goats once ate the willow from, was blown far from the land that day; but that night, when the ocean wind stirred up the sea, it was cast to land on the rocks of the shore. So the boat itself and much of what was in it was destroyed; but a little bag containing three thousand drachmas was spit out from the waves, and lies covered over with seaweed near the dead body of a dolphin, which is why no passerby has come upon it, because they avoid the foul smell of the decay. But you go there, and having gone take it up, and having taken it up, give it. It is enough for now that you not seem poor; later on, you will even be rich" (*D&C* 3.27).

Once again, the first elements are phatic, emphasizing that these are the same goddesses who appeared to Daphnis before, and that this is thus part of an ongoing contact. The second element is a reassurance, echoing the end of Daphnis' last dream, that another god is in charge of their love affair. The third provides a long description of the location of a

[131] See Chalk (1960), 44; though I disagree with his emphasis on mystery cults here.

lost treasure, as well as the circumstances of its losing: all of this is directed towards allowing Daphnis to "charm" Dryas. They end, then, with further reassurance: soon, he will be rich. The function of this dream is thus conative (as the series of imperatives near the end emphasizes), both practically and emotionally, and phatic. It is also the most referential dream we have seen so far, which is one of two things which marks it out. This might be explained, however, by the second unusual fact about it: it is the only dream, not only in *Daphnis and Chloe*, but in the entire corpus of Greek novels, which comes because it is solicited. In all other cases, that is, the gods see fit to intervene themselves, and there is thus some crucial change that must be effected, even if only emotional. In this case alone, however, a solicited dream is deemed worthy of description; it contains less urgency, then, and is more concerned with giving information. It remains, however, primarily conative in its function; this is indicated by the distraught state in which Daphnis solicits it, contrasted with his happiness after receiving it; and of course by his action in obedience to the commands it contains.[132]

Two references to daydreams follow (*D&C* 3.32 and 4.27), both of which are described with the verb ὠνειροπόλει, as we would expect. Both refer to Daphnis' high birth, the first a speculation by Dryas that Daphnis may be a foundling from a wealthy family, the second a jealous exclamation by Chloe that Daphnis must be "dreaming" of rich marriages. Both clearly refer to the active creation of alternate realities in the mind, and thus belong to the excepted category discussed above. Like all the "dreams" in that category, of course, they too resemble the actual dreams in the novel in their form, since the message of actual dreams also takes the form of the presentation of some reality outside the dreamer's waking experience. Passing over these daydreams, then, we come

[132] For an alternative interpretation, see MacQueen (1990), 76.

to the last two dreams in the novel, both of which are concerned with the question of Chloe's true parentage. The first occurs when a final obstacle stands in the way of Daphnis and Chloe's union: she does not know who her real parents are. Dionysophanes (Daphnis' biological father) is wondering how they are to find the answer to this enigma, when he falls asleep:

> Ὄναρ δὲ Διονυσοφάνει μετὰ φροντίδα πολλὴν εἰς βαθὺν ὕπνον κατενεχθέντι τοιόνδε γίνεται. Ἐδόκει τὰς Νύμφας δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἔρωτος ἤδη ποτε αὐτοῖς κατανεῦσαι τὸν γάμον τὸν δὲ ἐκλύσαντα τὸ τοξάριον καὶ ἀποθέμενον τὴν φαρέτραν κελεῦσαι τῷ Διονυσοφάνει πάντας τοὺς ἀρίστους Μιτυληναίων θέμενον συμπότας, ἡνίκα ἂν τὸν ὕστατον πλήσῃ κρατῆρα, τότε δεικνύειν ἑκάστῳ τὰ γνωρίσματα, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ᾄδειν τὸν ὑμέναιον.
>
> "But the following dream happened to Dionysophanes, who fell into a deep sleep after much thought. It seemed that the Nymphs were begging Love to consent to the marriage at last, and that he loosened his little bow and put away his quiver, and ordered Dionysophanes to invite all the aristocrats of Mytilene to a drinking party, and when he had filled the last mixing bowl, to show the tokens to each one, and then to sing the wedding song" (*D&C* 4.34).

This dream performs conative functions of both reassurance (the compression of time that allows the "wedding song" to follow immediately upon the passing around of the tokens hides the fact that this is, in fact, an assurance that Chloe's father will be found, and she will be able to marry Daphnis) and motivation, which is the main function of the dream (Dionysophanes is not really a major character, so it would be surprising if too much trouble were taken to reassure him). Chloe's father, Megacles, reconizes the tokens, then tells how he left them with his daughter and has since come to regret the action, and is "made fun of" by a recurrent dream that a ewe makes him into a father (*D&C* 4.35). This recurrent dream is misinterpreted by Megacles, who lacks the frame of reference

necessary (i.e. he shares too little *context* with the *addresser*) to understand it.[133] He believes it performs a purely emotive function, expressing the amusement and scorn of the gods (who are, perhaps, offended by his exposure of the child). This, however, shows that he misunderstands the role of dreams in his world, the world of the novel, because this dream, like every other one, is *conative*: its effect is the recognition and acceptance of Chloe as Megacles' daughter (one may argue that it also fronts the *context* rather highly, and thus performs a referential function, providing information: Chloe=Megacles' daughter). Ultimately, however, the point of this information is not the information itself, but the final removal of obstruction to Daphnis and Chloe's union, which provides the happy conclusion to the story.

Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*

Heliodorus, the latest and most complex of the Greek novelists, also exhibits the most complex use of dreams in his narrative.[134] The very first dream shows how complicated the phenomenon will be in the world of the *Aethiopica*: it is subjected to two interpretations, both of them wrong, though both of them nonetheless end up benefitting the protagonists (and destroying an antagonist).[135] The dream appears to Thyamis, the bandit chieftain who has captured the hero and heroine by the banks of the Nile in the first scene:

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[133] MacAlister (1996) claims that this is an example of a theorematic dream interpreted as an allegorical dream (75); but the idea of "a sheep making Megacles a father" could hardly be theorematic in any case; this is simply a matter of Megacles failing to understand the allegory.

[134] Latest: see Bowie (1999); most complex, see Fusillo (2003), 285.

[135] See Morgan (2003) on how this episode emphasizes the process of interpretation; this, however, is a function that concerns the *reader*, not the characters (445). Note, however, his argument (1994a) that this emphasis on the difficulty of interpretation aims at realism (109), and is thus not an end in itself (which is what readings like Bartsch's (1989) and Winkler's (1999) suggest).

> Κατὰ τὴν Μέμφιν μὲν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τῆς Ἴσιδος ἐπερχόμενος λαμπαδίῳ πυρὶ τὸν ὅλον ἐδόκει καταλάμπεσθαι· πεπλῆσθαι δὲ βωμοὺς μὲν καὶ ἐσχάρας ζῴων παντοίων αἵματι διαβρόχους, προπύλαια δὲ καὶ περιδρόμους ἀνθρώπων, κρότου καὶ θορύβου συμμιγοῦς πάντα πληρούντων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐντὸς ἥκειν τῶν ἀνακτόρων, τὴν θεὸν ὑπαντῶσαν ἐγχειρίζειν τε τὴν Χαρίκλειαν καὶ λέγειν "ὦ Θύαμι, τήνδε σοι τὴν παρθένον ἐγὼ παραδίδωμι, σὺ δὲ ἔχων οὐχ ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄδικος ἔσῃ καὶ φονεύσεις τὴν ξένην· ἡ δὲ οὐ φονευθήσεται."
>
> "In Memphis, his own city, he arrived at the temple of Isis, and the whole thing seemed to burn with torchlight; the altars and hearths had been soaked with the blood of all sorts of animals, and the entryways and aisles were packed with people filling it all with babbling and shouting. And then, when he arrived inside the shrine itself, the goddess met him, and handed him Charikleia and said 'O Thyamis, I entrust this maiden to you, but you having her will not have her, but you will be unjust and will slay the foreign woman: but she will not be slain" (*Aeth.* 1.18).

Thyamis, because of this dream, decides that Charikleia will be his bride, and that this is ordained by the gods; we are, furthermore, told quite emphatically (it is repeated) that this interpretation was the result of Thyamis' *desires* (πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν, 1.18; and αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐξηγουμένης, 1.19).[136] This implies that Thyamis misinterprets the dream as one of reassurance (since it corresponds to his own wishes) and motivation (both conative), as well as divine approval (emotive).[137] Because of this misinterpretation, when his camp is attacked, he has Knemon hide Charikleia in a cave, where she will be safe. This is vitally important, as we realize when the battle has ended, and the island where Charikleia was hidden has been burned in a great conflagration: the fire is so bad that Theagenes is convinced Charikleia could not have survived. When

[136] See Winkler (1999) for a treatment of this dream as an example to the reader of "inadequate exegesis," making Thyamis an example of how *not* to read (310-12); see also Bartsch's (1989) response, however (99).

[137] Sandy (1982b) argues that this dream "…serves only to confirm the infatuation that Thyamis has already felt and to precipitate a course of action that he seemed, in consequence of his infatuation, destined to take in any case" (46). Such an argument misses the point: if Thyamis' action would have made perfect sense without the dream, *why include it*? Rather, the dream here has a vital purpose, and emotional one, which is entirely independent from Thyamis' misinterpretation and subsequent action (it is not, after all, a command, but a prophecy, and we know that the dreamer's actions cannot change the outcome of those).

Knemon tells him otherwise, he is certain it is a lie: "πρὸς ἄφρονας ταῦτα καὶ παῖδας, ὦ Κνήμων," he exclaims; "[Tell that] to fools and children, Knemon!" (*Aeth.* 2.2). Charikleia has thus been saved by Thyamis' misinterpretation of his dream, as Leucippe was by her mother's.

Thyamis misinterprets his dream a second time, however, focusing this time on the words "ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄδικος ἔσῃ καὶ φονεύσεις τὴν ξένην." Now, that is, he interprets the dream as a deceptive dream, which is to say, the expression of a malevolent deity aiming to harm him by psychological disappointment.[138] This is demonstrated by his reaction when the second interpretation comes to him, which reminds us of Sostratos' reaction when he thinks Leucippe is dead: Καὶ πολλὰ τὴν θεὸν ὡς δολερὰν ὀνειδίσας…"he attacked the goddess for trickster a great deal…" (*Aeth.* 1.30). Because of this misinterpretation Thyamis murders a woman whom he believes to be Charikleia; in fact, it is Knemon's wrongdoer, Thisbe; we may see in this some element of divine retribution on behalf of one of the (lesser) heroes of the novel.[139] This is, at any rate, how Knemon interprets her death. Despite reading a letter in which she professes her love for him, he declares that he is glad she is dead, then adds: "Οὕτως ἄρα τιμωρὸς Ἐρινὺς γῆν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐλαύνουσά σε οὐ πρότερον ἔστησε τὴν ἔνδικον μάστιγα πρὶν καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ με τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἠδικημένον θεατὴν ἐπιστῆσαι τῆς κατὰ σοῦ ποινῆς." "In this manner the avenging Fury hounded you over the entire land, as it seems, and did not rest the goad of justice until she had set me, the one wronged, who happened also to be in Egypt, as the audience for her punishment against you" (*Aeth.* 2.11). Thyamis, however,

[138] Cf. Morgan's (1989a) observation about the implicit theology of this sort of misinterpretation of dreams: (303).

[139] Dowden (1996) argues for this, and indeed, that there are likely many places in the novel where we are expected to see the divine at work even before another character has the same reaction.

believes that he has really killed Charikleia, and because of this he is understandably upset; the fact that the dream tells him he will not kill Charikleia, if properly interpreted, would provide relief.

Thyamis' dream is thus sent for at least four reasons, all of them conative:[140] 1) to protect Charikleia by temporarily entrusting her to him (this is suggested by the verb παραδίδωμι, combined with the statement that "ἔχων οὐχ ἕξεις"; he is thus a guardian, without being a husband); 2) to wreak vengeance on the villainess Thisbe, who is slain by Thyamis because of a misunderstanding of the dream (which misunderstanding, as it turns out, is the very thing that brings about the end predicted by the dream); 3) as a warning dream, to prepare Thyamis for the hardship of losing Charikleia; 4) as a reassuring dream, to tell Thyamis that Charikleia has not really been slain.[141] Not all of these functions can be performed at once, obviously, but it is important to note that the "correct" interpretation of the dream is never explicitly marked; when the dream turns out to have provided accurate information, it may bring satisfaction or pleasure to the reader, but within the novel itself, it has no effect whatsoever: it is not even mentioned in passing.[142] Not only, then, is the principal function of the dream in the world of the novel conative, to motivate action or change the dreamer's feelings, but that very function is by no means entirely dependent on the "correct" interpretation of the dream's *meaning*, i.e. on the correct operation of its *referential* function.

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[140] MacAlister (1996) argues that there is a third interpretation, made clear in book eight: the goddess entrusts Chariclea to Thyamis after Calasiris' death, since he inherits all of his father's duties (including the care of his wards; 80-81). This interpretation is no more marked as correct than the others, and, like Chariclea's dream which seems to be about Calasiris' death, does not seem primarily concerned with telling the future so much as having a particular emotional effect on its recipient (and thus bringing about the various results here considered). Nonetheless, even if it is an acceptable interpretation, it does not conflict what is here being argued about dreams.

[141] Cf. Morgan (2003), 448.

[142] See note 117 above.

Charikleia's celebrated dream of the savage assailant has attracted much attention in scholarship.[143] She has just fallen asleep in the cave where she was hidden, along with Theagenes and Knemon, when she has a frightening dream: τῇ Χαρικλείᾳ τῇδε ξυγκείμενον ὄναρ ἐφοίτησεν· ἀνὴρ τὴν κόμην αὐχμηρὸς καὶ τὸ βλέμμα ὑποκαθήμενος καὶ τὴν χεῖρα ἔναιμος ἐμβαλὼν τὸ ξίφος τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῇ τὸν δεξιὸν ἐξῄρητο. "A dream of the following form visited Charikleia: a man with matted hair and the look of a highwayman, brandished a sword in his bloody hand and cut out her right eye" (*Aeth.* 2.16). The more common approach to this dream is, as with Panthia's dream in *Leucippe and Clitophon*, to argue for a specific interpretation for the dream, and then to explain how the dream builds suspense until it is solved. The most convincing of these solutions is probably that Knemon's interpretation is correct, and that the dream foreshadows the death of Calasiris in book 7.[144] If this is correct, the dream could function within the novel as a warning, designed to prepare Charikleia psychologically for this eventuality. There is no explicit indication that this is the dream's role; and all we can say is that there is, in that case, nothing about this dream that contradicts the role suggested so far for dreams in the novels.[145]

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[143] See the following note.

[144] See Winkler (1999), 307-310; Bartsch (1989), 100; Bowersock (1994), 91-92; MacAlister (1996) points out that Knemon's interpretation fits what we find in Artemidorus, for what it is worth (37-38).

[145] It is rather odd that, when Calasiris does die, the misfortune is described from Charicleia and Theagenes' perspective as "contrary to expectation" (παρ' ἐλπίδα—7.12); this suggests that the psychological preparation the dream provided was insufficient; furthermore, we are told that it is partly because they are distracted by this that they follow Cybele to Arsace's house, which leads to their penultimate round of suffering. The implication is thus that, had the dream had its intended effect, they could have been spared the entire apisode with Arsace—but then perhaps they would not have made their way to Ethiopia. These insurmountable complexities are characteristic of Heliodorus' plot, and it is partly because of their inscrutability that I have focused, in this discussion, on the more immediate and significantly more tangible effect of the dream moments after it has occurred.

There is, however, another aspect to this dream that has been paid less attention. The debate which follows the dream has rightly been examined as an example of the hermeneutic process at work.[146] It also offers, however, a demonstration of the function of dreams in this novel. The first interpretation Charikleia suggests is that the dream predicts the death (or at least the loss) of Theagenes; she would rather, she says, the dream were real (i.e. literal). Knemon then offers a second explanation: that the dream foreshadows her father's death, and she says that this, though still bad news, is better than losing Theagenes. Three possibilities are thus considered for the relationship between the lost eye in the dream and her waking reality: 1) Theagenes will die; 2) she will lose her eye; 3) she will lose her father; these are ranked in the degree of "disaster" they represent to Charikleia. She assumes that (2) represents (1), and wishes that it instead represented (2). Then Knemon suggests that it actually represents (3); she prays that it may be so. Now, if some god appeared to Charikleia and simply said "you will lose your father," she would doubtless be greatly upset. By suggesting two worse fates, however, including what is for Charikleia the worst fate possible, the dream is able to get her so used to the idea that her father will die that she actually (indirectly) prays for it (as an alternative to the worse fates). The dream and the process of its interpretation thus depict, not only the hermeneutic process, but the very way that "bad" dreams can serve to get the dreamer to come to terms with some inevitable disaster.

At 2.20, Knemon has nightmares of being chased as he is running away from Thermouthis, and prays not to fall asleep again; these dreams can be relegated to the category of psychologically emotive dreams discussed above, since they merely intensify the emotions Knemon is already feeling. At 2.36, Calasiris remarks in reference to the

[146] See Winkler (1999), 307.

oracle which reveals the plot of the novel that the "interpretation of dreams and oracles depends for the most part on their outcome" (χρησμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ὄνειροι τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς τέλεσι κρίνονται). This is an explicit denial of the practicability of the *referential* function of dreams, which suggests, of course, that if dreams are understood to be the communications of some divinity, their purpose cannot depend on the correct interpretation of their "meaning"; this is a point we have already made.[147] If we assume that the gods are not simply expressing themselves, or creating dreams for dreams' sake, and point out that very few dreams contain metalingual references, we are left with the same conclusion to which we have arrived by other means: dreams must perform conative and phatic functions, primarily. This is indicated again by Calasiris, when he prays for a night of good dreams, in which he will see his loved ones (*Aeth.* 3.5). He is thus not interested in learning anything, or knowing the pleasure or displeasure of the gods, but merely in the emotional satisfaction of seeing what he wants to see. The fact that these dreams will be in response to the contact he establishes through prayer also highlights the phatic role of dreams; but these two, the emotional effect and the establishment of contact with the divine, are all that seem to matter in his request for good dreams.

Calasiris decribes two of his dreams in his story to Knemon, the first of which (*Aeth.* 3.11) is an explicit command,[148] and thus quite obviously conative, though the questioning and resolution concerning whether this was a dream or a real vision indicates

[147] Bowersock's (1994) invocation of this passage to support his argument is backwards (91): if dreams cannot be interpreted until they have come true, their value as commands or reflections of anxieties is non-existent! Calasiris here refers, of course, to prophetic dreams, but these are precisely the sort Bowersock would have us believe are very rare in the novels.

[148] See Bartsch (1989), 101.

a phatic function as well.[149] The second of his own dreams he narrates is the bizarre apparition of Odysseus (*Aeth.* 5.22). This dream runs the gamut of functions, beginning with the emotive (Odysseus expresses his wrath), then the phatic (since Calasiris asks the fisherman to sacrifice on his behalf to appease the divinity, and Penelope sends "greetings" to Charikleia), the metalingual (a reference to the *Odyssey*), the referential (Calasiris' adventures will be like Odysseus' own), and ending most importantly with the conative: the dream is a warning for Calasiris, but also a message of reassurance to Charikleia.[150] Here, again, however, it is the conative function that is stressed, since the only significant outcome of the dream is that Charikleia is given more reason to be hopeful, and Calasiris is forewarned that the road ahead will be rocky.[151]

Three dreams of other characters are also narrated by Calasiris as he recounts his story. The first appears to Charikles, and depicts his daughter being carried off to

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[149] On the sophistry of Calasiris' digression on Homer, and the absurdity of his claim that he has proven that this was a waking epiphany and not a dream, see Sandy (1982), 143 and *passim*.

[150] Bartsch (1989), admits that this dream does not fit the pattern she highlights in other examples of misinterpretation followed by a correction; she does not see any contradiction in that for her theory however, but explains that some dreams simply motivate the action, including this one (101): this is wrong. The only action taken by a character as a result of this dream is the sacrifice to Odysseus, and that is a narrative dead-end (it isn't even described); Calasiris' decision to leave immediately is *not* a result of this dream, but of an emergency that occurred earlier; his claim to be worried about departing too late is clearly a lie he tells Theagenes to explain his distress on waking. Furthermore, there is a very definite Odyssean echo shortly hereafter (the recognition scene after Calasiris disguises himself as a beggar—see Sandy (1982b), 86); thus this dream would perhaps support Bartsch more general argument better than she realizes (it calls for interpretation, seems to point to the storm, but in fact points to Calasiris in disguise); I hold, nonetheless, that this dream, like those she discusses earlier, has a number of possible interpretations, and that the fact that none of these are explicitly marked as correct indicates that the dreams function instead as links between the narrative pattern as it unfolds, and the religious framework which we are to understand underlies it.

[151] Sandy (1982b) fails to see how this dream and the religious significance it injects can be anything more than "window dressing" simply, because no significant action results from it (48); this is a very limited scope for the possible functions a dream can have in the world of the novel. If we accept that this dream is an example of psychological preparation, it is interesting to note that when Calasiris' ship is attacked (5.24; presumably part of the disasters of which he was forewarned), he alone has the self-possession to plan a means of avoiding destruction, while Theagenes wants to defend the ship and Charikleia wants to commit joint suicide (cf. the attack of the pirates in the *Ephesiaca* and the reactions of the crew members *not* prepared by a dream; page 70 above); neither of them has had a dream, of course. This may also be explained at least in part by the fact that Calasiris is already aware that they are being pursued, or simply by his exceptionally great confidence in general, but there may also be something more to it.

Ethiopia by a god-sent bird (*Aeth.* 3.18; 4.14). This dream is clearly a warning to Charikles that he will lose his "daughter," and although he misinterprets it to mean that he will lose her to *death*, he understands it well enough for it to play its conative role of preparing him for disaster.[152] Calasiris, however, presents an altogether unconvincing interpretation in which it is a dream of reassurance, which tells Charikles that he will get his deepest wish and see his daughter married. This is a lie, but both interpretations are, noticeably, mere variations of the normal role for dreams we have come to expect. This is emphasized more dramatically still by the dream of Hydaspes, narrated on Charikleia's story-band, which relates the circumstances of her birth and exile. We are told simply that the love-making by which Charikleia was conceived was "commanded by a dream." We are told nothing about the form of the dream, i.e. the message, the code, or the context: simply that its function was conative, and aimed at motivating the action which would create the situation from which the entire tale of the novel derives.[153] The only important points about this dream, then, are that it resulted in Charikleia's conception, and that it was a message from the gods.

The latter point is, of course, not explicit in the narrative found on Persinna's band; it is, however, clear from Calasiris' reaction to that narrative when he finishes reading the band: "Ταῦτα, ὦ Κνήμων, ὡς ἀνέγνων, ἐγνώριζον μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν οἰκονομίαν ἐθαύμαζον," "As I read these things, Knemon, I recognized and wondered at the management of the gods…" (*Aeth.* 4.9). This "οἰκονομία" is at least partly indicated by the fact of Hydaspes' dream, and this illustrates the connection argued for above between the mere fact of a dream, in the world of the novel where dreams generally come

[152] Cf. Lalanne (2006), 106.

[153] Cf. Morgan (2003), 448.

from the gods, and the phatic function of the dream, i.e. its role in establishing the presence of and contact with the divine.[154] This function is apparent also in the last dream of another character narrated by Calasiris. As he is wondering how to escape with Theagenes and Charikleia, he is asked to a feast in celebration of the victory of a Tyrian merchant at the Pythian games. As it turns out, this victory was the result of a dream, in which Heracles informed the young man that he would win; he convinced his fellow merchants to change their course to Delphi, and the dream came true (*Aeth.* 4.16).[155] The celebration is in thanksgiving to the god for the victory, but also in preparation for departure. Calasiris is thus provided with the perfect means of escape, and we see that the dream, which to the Tyrians was directed to their benefit in a manner rather uncharacteristic of the world of the ancient novel (though it is still conative), was in fact also designed to allow the heroine of this novel to escape Delphi and the impending marriage which will destroy her happy union with the hero and her recovery of her true identity at the end.[156] All this is made clear in the way he introduces the episode: "Ἀλλ' ἦν ἄρα καὶ νοῦ παντὸς ὀξύτερον τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοῖς κατὰ βούλησιν αὐτῷ δρωμένοις

[154] See, however, Anderson (1997), who argues that this dream is also included by Persinna as an excuse for her presumably abnormal midday sexual activity, which is a violation of *sophrosyne*, the subject of Anderson's article (317-18). He sees the emphasis on Hydaspes' oath as particularly revelatory here; this may, indeed, be a subtext (though I have my doubts…there is surprisingly little to suggest it, and the oath of Hydaspes may just be a way of assuring us that he really did have a dream, though we receive the news second hand); nevertheless, Calasiris' reaction to the band makes it plain that the overwhelmingly more important "point" of this part of the narrative is the involvement of the gods, a point which Anderson also cedes.

[155] Winkler (1999) cites this as the prime example of the way Heliodorus is fond of including insignificant details which later turn out to have been quite meaningful, especially conversations (295). Yet there are two reasons why this case does not fit: 1) the paragraph immediately preceding this episode introduces it by saying quite explicitly that it will be an example of divine serendipity; we are thus alerted (through a passage nearly as long as the tale itself) that this will be a *very* significant chance conversation; 2) Calasiris' observation that 'God is very sharp-witted' is thus an observation made by way of *introducing* the event, and may be understood to refer just as much (if not more) to the fact that the Tyrians were brought to Delphi *by a dream* as to the fact that Calasiris just happened to stumble upon their celebrations.

[156] See Sandy (1982b), 53.

ἐπίκουρον γίνεται καὶ ἄκλητον εὐμενείᾳ πολλάκις φθάνον τὴν αἴτησιν…" "But, as ever, the divine is sharper than any human intelligence, and it becomes a helper to those acting according to its will, and uncalled often anticipates the request in its goodwill…" (*Aeth.* 4.16).[157]

After the death of Calasiris, Arsake manages to capture Theagenes and Charikleia, and to subject them to many difficulties. Part of her maid's attempt to get her hands on them involves a lie that she wishes to placate the gods because of an alarming dream; this belongs, of course, in the same category as the Persian king's lie in Chariton, and Lycaenion's tall tale in *Daphnis and Chloe*. The fact that it is a lie, and that it does not work, places it in a different category from most of the other dreams in the novels, although if it were a real dream, it would seem to function mainly in an emotive, secondarily a phatic role (similar to the first part of Calasiris' dream of Odysseus). Much more important than this, however, is the pair of dreams that appear to Theagenes and Charikleia in the next book. Charikleia has just been miraculously saved when she was sentenced to be burned at the stake; somehow the flames simply could not harm her. Given the countless far less miraculous events that are attributed to divine guidance of events in this novel, Theagenes' attribution of this miracle to the gods (ὁ μὲν Θεαγένης εἰς θεῶν εὐμένειαν τὸ αἴτιον ἀνέφερε, *Aeth.* 8.10) seems quite natural.[158]

Charikleia, however, objects:

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[157] This passage is also an excellent example of what several scholars have seen as a major role of Calasiris, who models for us the act of looking for providential meaning hidden in seemingly random events; see e.g. Sandy (1982), 167 and *passim*; Winkler (1999), 329; see also my treatment of Heliodorus in the final chapter.

[158] See especially Dowden's (1996) treatment of this passage (277); he points to this rightly as a key witness to the idea that Heliodorus' novel is at least in part "about" the workings of the divine; see my treatment in the following chapters.

> "Τὸ μὲν γὰρ καινουργὸν" ἔφη "τῆς σωτηρίας δαιμονίᾳ τινὶ καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ τὸ δὲ ἐν τοσούτοις ἐξετάζεσθαι δυστυχήμασιν ἀδιαστάτως καὶ κολάσεσιν αἰκίζεσθαι ποικίλως τε καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντως θεηλατουμένων εἶναι καὶ δυσμενείας κρείττονος πειρωμένων, πλὴν εἰ μὴ θαυματοποιΐα τίς ἐστι δαίμονος εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα μὲν βάλλοντος ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων διασῴζοντος."
>
> "For the novelty," she said, "of my salvation resembles something spiritual, some divine intervention, but our being unceasingly tested by such great misfortunes and tormented variously and excessively by punishments looks more like the fate of those who are persecuted by the gods, and who suffer from the malevolence of some higher power, unless it is one way of working miracles for the god to cast us into the depths, only to rescue us from our helplessness."

Charikleia, considering the dire straits in which she and Theagenes continue to find themselves, cannot convince herself that any part of their adventures could be evidence of divine goodwill. She has lost contact with the divine; she no longer feels the gods' presence in the midst of her suffering. She continues this line despite Theagenes' protest, until she quite suddenly remembers her dream of Calasiris (*Aeth.* 8.11; see above): "Τὸ δὲ ὄναρ ἔπος ἦν εἰς μέτρον ἡρμοσμένον, ἔλεγε δὲ τὸ ἔπος ὁ θειότατος Καλάσιρις, εἴτε καταδαρθεῖν λαθούσῃ φανείς, εἴτε καὶ ἐναργῶς ὀφθείς· εἶχε δέ, οἶμαι, ὧδέ πως· 'παντάρβην φορέουσα πυρὸς μὴ τάρβει ἐρωήν, | ῥηίδι' ὡς μοίραις χἄ τ' ἀδόκητα πέλει.'" "The dream was fit into a phrase of verse, and the most divine Calasiris spoke the phrase, whether he appeared to me after I had fallen asleep without knowing it, or else I really saw him; it went, I think, something like this: 'wearing pantarbe, fear not the rush of the fire, | even what seems impossible is easy for the fates.'" Upon remembering this dream, she exclaims "Ἱλήκοιτε, θεοί." The function of this dream is thus quite emphatically *not* referential: Charikleia does not even remember it until she has been saved by the *pantarbe* quite by accident. Its function is, rather, phatic: it reestablishes the presence of, and her

trust in, a divine providence that is guiding their fates.[159] This is apparent both from her outburst "gods have mercy!" which is itself a phatic utterance, directed at establishing the proper attitude towards the gods, and from the profound change in her attitude towards the miracle which has just saved her life: "ἡ γοῦν εἰς ἐμὲ πρόρρησις ἤδη, ὡς οἶσθα, βουλήματι τῷ ἐκείνων τετέλεσται καὶ ζῶ σοι τὸ παρὸν ἡ παντοίως ἀπελπισθεῖσα…" "The prediction, at least, concerning me has already, as you know, been fulfilled in accordance with their will, and I live still, though before I was completely without hope…" The referent of ἐκείνων is the gods themselves; Charikleia is now completely certain both a) that the gods are responsible for her rescue, and b) that they are benevolent, not malevolent. This is all the more striking because, logically, her realization that the *pantarbe* is the reason for her rescue should make her more willing, rather than less, to attribute the miracle to some other cause (dumb luck, for example). Yet the very fact that the miracle was predicted by a dream is, for her, enough to change her attitude towards the gods completely. Indeed, that seems the only reason for *her* dream.[160]

It is precisely this new confidence in divine providence that allows her to see the true meaning of Theagenes' dream, which he reports to her immediately after she tells her own: "…πεφοίτηκε καὶ λέγειν ἐδόκει τοιάδε· 'Αἰθιόπων εἰς γαῖαν ἀφίξεαι ἄμμιγα κούρῃ | δεσμῶν Ἀρσακέων αὔριον ἐκπροφυγών.'" "…[Calasiris] came to me and seemed to say the following: 'you will come to the land of the Aethiopians with a maiden | escaping tomorrow from the bonds of Arsake.'" This dream is subjected to two

[159] Cf. Bartsch (1989), 105; though my argument is that *Chariclea herself* is helped by the preceding dream in seeing the divine hand at work in these events; how this affects the readers is a topic for the next chapter.

[160] Though Bartsch (1989) argues that the dream serves to validate the idea that Theagenes' dream is also literal (105); this, however, is a mixture of its function *within* the novel, which is to re-establish Chariclea's faith in the divine, and *outside the novel*, which is to suggest to a reader that this faith, and the inferences drawn from it, are not misplaced; this latter function will be examined in the following chapters in more detail.

interpretations; both of them give the dream a conative function, but while the first (Theagenes') is negative, and he thus assumes the dream to be a warning about a greater disaster still to come (his death), Charikleia, because her own dream and subsequent rescue have inspired a confidence in the providence of the gods, offers another, more literal interpretation, which turns out to be the correct one. Theagenes, then, begins: "Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅποι τείνει τὸ χρήσιμον ἔχω συμβάλλειν γῆν μὲν γὰρ Αἰθιόπων τὴν τῶν καταχθονίων ἔοικε λέγειν ἄμμιγα δὲ κούρῃ τῇ Περσεφόνῃ με συνέσεσθαι καὶ λύσιν δεσμῶν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν." "I can construe the oracle as far as it concerns me, for by "the land of the Aethiopians," it likely speaks of the realm of the underworld, and says that I will be "with the maiden" Persephone, and by a loosing of bonds, it speaks of a passage thither from the body."

Charikleia, however, not only responds with a more positive interpretation, but also offers a logical explanation for why Theagenes puts this gloomy interpretation on the dream: "Ὦ γλυκύτατε" ἔφη "Θεάγενες, ἡ συνήθειά σε τῶν δυστυχημάτων πάντα πρὸς τὸ φαυλότατον νοεῖν τε καὶ εἰκάζειν παρεσκεύασε, φιλεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ συμπίπτοντα τρέπειν τὴν γνώμην." "O sweetest Theagenes," she said, "your familiarity with hardship has prepared you to consider and construe everything for the worst, for men love to twist their opinions to meet their circumstances." In this response, Charikleia has provided a convincing argument for why a dream that foreshadows a positive outcome might be misinterpreted, by one who is suffering, to predict the opposite. When Theagenes insists on maintaining a pessimistic attitude, and cannot see how they will escape their present hardships, Charikleia tells him simply to trust in the gods, introducing this instruction with a word of encouragement: "Θάρσει," "take heart," she says; this is precisely the injunction used by Cleinias, when Sostratos believes his dream

foretold Leucippe's death rather than recovery; it is the same word used by Plangon when she reassures Callirhoe that her dream will come true; it sums up in one simple command the role these dreams play. They offer encouragement, reassurance, and consolation to the dreamer in times of difficulty, though he or she may not take them this way if misled by a misinterpretation forced by the hardship suffered at the moment.[161] This dream, then, performs the conative function of reassurance, which we have encountered so often before in the other novels; taken together with Charikleia's dream, it performs the phatic function of reestablishing the presence of a benevolent divine force directing Theagenes and Charikleia's lives. This is illustrated nicely by the speech with which Charikleia continues, which concludes this episode (the dreams are never mentioned again): "…παντάρβην ἑτέραν ἔχομεν τὰ μεμαντευμένα καὶ θεοῖς ἐπανέχοντες σῳζοίμεθά τε ἂν ἥδιον καί, εἰ δέοι, πάσχοιμεν ὁσιώτερον." "'…we have the prophecy as a second pantarbe, and if we should trust in the gods, we would be saved more sweetly and, if we must, suffer more piously'" (*Aeth.* 8.12). We can scarcely imagine a more profound change in Charikleia's attitude to her misfortunes and the gods' hand in them; nor could there be a more clear demonstration of the role of dreams in establishing the presence of divine providence and the reassurance of those who suffer that all will be well.

The last two dreams in the novel both center around the parentage of Charikleia: first Hydaspes (*Aeth.* 9.25) and then Persinna (*Aeth.* 10.3) have dreams about becoming parents to a daughter instantaneously; when Hydaspes sees Charikleia for the first time,

[161] There is a complicated problem here, in the possibility of misinterpretation, which is to some degree outside the subject of my inquiry. Morgan (1989a) points out, however, that the possibility that Theagenes' interpretation is correct, i.e. the doubt which is raised in the readers' minds by the voicing of this misinterpretation, and the implicit theology of this doubt (and other signs like it) is part of what keeps the reader on the edge of his or her seat until the end of the novel. This is a different question from the topic addressed here, however, which is the function of the dream *in the life of the dreamer*; here, the end result of this dream is that Charikleia and (in as far as he follows her lead) Theagenes are reassured at a moment of despair; the dream is thus *emotionally conative* in function. The next two chapters will address the question of the effect of these dreams *on the reader*.

he immediately recognizes her as the girl from his dream, though he does not understand the reason for the correspondance; both parents misinterpret their dreams, which makes them similar to Megacles' dream at the end of Longus' novel (there, too, the conclusion of the novel hinges upon the recognition of a lost child).[162] The function of these dreams is not clear, though a few clues suggest that they are 1) phatic, in that they establish the hand of god in the recognition scenes;[163] 2) conative, aimed at convincing the parents that Charikleia really is their daughter;[164] 3) dreams of reassurance, in that they provide assurance to both parents that they will regain their daughter, by the gods' will. Evidence of the first two can be found, for example, in Hydaspes' speech at 10.8: "…ἐμὴν μὲν εἶναί σε θυγατέρα τά τε γνωρίσματα ἐμήνυσε καὶ ὁ σοφὸς Σισιμίθρης ἐμαρτύρησε καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν εὐμενὲς πρὸ πάντων ἀνέδειξεν…" "The recognition tokens profess, and the sage Sisimithres bears witness, and the goodwill of the gods above all indicates, that you are my daughter." The dreams thus form an integral part in the attribution of the miracles of the final book, all of which are taken as evidence of the hand of god, to divine providence.[165] The third function is suggested, for example, by Hydaspes' words as he addresses Charikleia a few chapters earlier: "Σὺ δὲ ὦ θύγατερ (πρῶτα γάρ σε καὶ ὕστατα τὸ <u>ποθητὸν</u> ὄνομα τοῦτο προσφθέγγομαι)…" "And you, daughter (for the first time and

[162] And, just as with Megacles' dream, MacAlister (1996) applies the theorematic/allegorical distinction to explain the misinterpretation (81-82). This is hardly important, however, even if one believes that an image of giving birth to a daughter who grows immediately into a marriageable woman could ever be theorematic (since it could never literally happen); the important point is that the gods are informing the Aethiopian monarchs about the event that is about to occur, and are thus, in a sense, taking credit for it, which makes its end result and the emotional effect this achieves the gods' doing, and not mere chance.

[163] Cf. Bartsch (1989): "…many dreams [in Heliodorus], whether obvious or obscure, point at the progress of the plan of a divine will…" (107).

[164] Cf. Bartsch (1989): "…the dreams may be said to function in the text as indirect movers causing the parents' eventual acceptance of Chariclea's proofs of her birth…" (106).

[165] Cf. Merkelbach (1994), 290.

the last I address you by this longed for name)…" (*Aeth.* 10.16). This suggests that Hydaspes has long lamented the loss of his child, and the dream informing her of his return may thus be read also as an act of compassion, which reassured him that he would soon see his daughter, though fully grown. It is impossible, however, to know what the purpose of these dreams is for certain, and we may simply conclude that, if nothing else, they serve to prove to the king and queen that the miraculous recovery of their daughter is, to use Longus' terms, "not without divine prompting."[166]

The hypothesis, then, that dreams in the ideal novels function primarily *conatively*, and secondarily *phatically*, <u>within</u> the novels themselves, can be confirmed for each of the canonical five. There are, naturally, exceptions to this generalization, and further refinement is necessary to describe the range of conative functions: though in every case, if a dream actually occurs (and isn't a lie), those dreams that are conative work to the benefit of the protagonist. The dreams thus contribute to the depiction of a world in which the hero and heroine are guided through many misfortunes and brought to a happy end by divine providence.[167] If this theory seems a bit one-sided, it is: we have only to reflect on how few of the dreams work to the protagonists' disadvantage, how few express divine wrath, and more importantly, how few are treated as insignificant fantasies (to name just a few of the alternative possibilities), to see that the dreams in the ideal novels are decidedly univocal, pointing the vast majority of the time to a *benevolent* divine force guiding the events. The univocality of this is highlighted very effectively by

[166] In fact, this is Gill's (1989) translation of what, as Morgan (2004) points out (193), is a Homeric phrase.

[167] Bartsch (1989) recognizes this pattern at work in Heliodorus (where it is most obvious), yet denies its presence in the other novelists (or at any rate Achilles Tatius), which it should now be clear is a debatable conclusion; moreover, she places the emphasis on the *author* as analogous to the divine will directing the novel (a legitimate analogy—see my next chapter), and is thus able to circumvent the questions of religious significance for the novels which are my main focus in this study.

a comparison to the two Latin "realist" novels, which are decidedly different in their approach to dreaming.

The Latin Novels

We may pass over the one dream in the *HART*, which is a straightforward enough example of a conative dream aimed at effecting the protagonists' happiness, in the style of the Greek novels, and thus adds nothing to the discussion at this point.[168] The first mention of dreaming in the extant fragments of Petronius is the passage cited earlier, describing the *sententiae* of a rhetorician as "broken glass and the interpretation of dreams" (*Sat.* 10).[169] This already indicates a break with the Greek novels, because it presents the opinion that dream interpretations are worthless, and places that opinion in the mouth of one of the central characters. No person who thinks dreams are messages from the gods could possibly consider their interpretation fruitless. It is possible that Ascyltos refers here to dream interpreters, who would have been like today's palmists: hoaxers who played on superstitious beliefs to make money.[170] The scorn would then be directed not towards the idea of prophetic dreams, but the sorts of people who made a living off such interpretations. Skepticism about the value of dreams, however, is scarcely limited to this passage. We examined the passages presenting the Epicurean view of dreams earlier, and the expression of doubt that the gods are responsible for

[168] The theory that this novel is an epitome may explain the dearth of dreams (though I have avoided such special pleading in the construction of my argument), especially if Kortekaas (2004) is correct that the Christian "epitomator" removed evidence of pagan cults except in cases where it was necessary to motivate the action (53).

[169] See footnotes 63 and 64 above on this phrase.

[170] See Bowersock's (1994) excellent demotion of the value of Artemidorus for an understanding of ancient cognitive categories, with which I agree completely, though I strongly disagree with the conclusions he draws from this for reading the dreams in the ancient novels: "Artemidorus's position is that of a professional dream interpreter, a kind of superior fortune teller…" (93).

sending dreams already marks a difference from the Greek novels. Besides these passages, there are only two references made to dreaming; one is a reference to nightmares of being hunted as an explanation of how terrified Encolpius feels when he hears Lichas' voice (*Sat.* 100.5). If this fits the theory of dreaming formulated above in any way, it is in reference to the exceptional psychologically emotive dreams which simply reinforce what the dreamer feels while awake (of which there are only four in the entire corpus of Greek novels). The other occurs in an aphorism spoken by Trimalchio, to explain his wife's "uncivilized" behavior: "Sed hic qui in pergula natus est aedes non somniatur" "But he who was born in a hut does not dream of a palace" (*Sat.* 74.14). The sense of this is not entirely certain, but it is clear that it refers to the type of dreaming which has been separated out above as a separate category, referred to as "daydreaming."[171]

All of the passages that *talk about* dreaming in Petronius, with the exception of Lichas' passing reference (discussed above) thus focus either on the types of dreaming which in the Greek novels are the exceptions that prove the rule (that dreams are messages from the gods), or else present explicitly naturalistic, rather than religious, explanations for dreams. The three dreams which do occur, as mentioned earlier, contradict these theories, and suggest that dreams really do communicate truths from the gods.[172] These dreams are, like those in the Greek novels, conative, aiming at motivating

[171] See Smith (1975), 204.

[172] Kragelund (1989), as noted above (note 62), considers these passages parodic, and thus believes that these dreams do not contradict the expressions of Epicureanism in any way (444 and *passim*). In the case of Quartilla's dream, he may be right, though there is nothing that suggests to me with any certainty that the dream is not meant to be taken seriously; in the case of Lichas and Tryphaena's dream, however, I have to disagree. It may be true that these are "wish-fulfillment" dreams, but the specificity of them ("you will find Encolpius and Giton *on the ship*"), combined with the unlikely coincidence of the protagonists ending up on that very ship, suggests far more strongly that the dreams are to be taken seriously than the simple wording. Wish fulfillment, that is, does not explain why they should have these very particular dreams

the action of the dreamer. Quartilla's dream (*Sat.* 17.7), because it is solicited, is closest in function to Daphnis' hidden treasure dream, and thus has a strong referential function as well (it tells her where to find Encolpius).[173] Lichas and Tryphaena's dreams (*Sat.* 104.1-2) also might seem at least partially referential, but their subsequent interpretation by Lichas shows that they aimed not simply at providing information, but also at motivating the punishment of Encolpius and Giton. And it is here that they exhibit the strongest difference from the Greek novels; whereas every god-sent dream in the latter is directed towards the benefit of the protagonists, in Petronius it is precisely the opposite: all three real dreams aim at the persecution of the protagonist. The closest the Greek novels come to this function is probably the dream of Thyamis, if we can imagine how it might have been seen from Thisbe's perspective.[174]

This, in fact, is precisely what we would expect from Petronius, given what has often been said of the *Satyrica* in relation to the Greek novels: that it is a parodic inversion of their conventions.[175] A kind of corroboration for what has been argued for the dreams in the Greek novels is thus provided by the *Satyrica*; at the same time, the inverted mirror provided by the Greek novels can help us to an understanding of the role of dreaming in this odd work, an understanding which might otherwise be significantly

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(they would not be so motivated by them if they had been a regular occurrence) at the very moment when they just happen to be true. Put another way: the famous "buried treasure" example of a wish fulfillment dream ceases to be easily explained away by this fact if, on waking, we dig in the spot told to us by our dream and find actual treasure there. Cf. Panayotakis (1994): "Petronius, the alleged Epicurean, treats it in a non-Epicurean way, since what the dream conveys is not at all 'nonsense' {*ludibrium* (104.3)}, but an actual fact which will be revealed in the end" (614); also Courtney (2001), 160-1.

[173] Unless, of course, Courtney (2001) is correct that this dream is a fabrication (66); in that case, he has correctly pointed out that the closest parallels in the Greek novels are Lycaenion's "dream" in Longus and Arsace's "dream" in Heliodorus.

[174] For Knemon's story as a sort of mirror to which the main narrative of the *Aithiopika* is held (and thus for Thisbe as a sort of anti-hero), see Morgan (1999), esp. 281.

[175] See e.g. Courtney (2001), who identifies the position as originating with Heinze (24); also Conte (1996), 169 for a more nuanced expression of the position.

more difficult, given the fragmentary nature of the novel. Petronius' narrator presents a world in which the central characters try to explain dreams away, to suggest that they have no real meaning, to provide a "scientific" explanation that removes their power. Yet the dreams that actually do occur suggest the opposite: that the gods *do* communicate through dreams, and that dreams are meaningful, much to the detriment of the protagonists.[176] The fundamental difference between this and the Greek novels might be explained by the fact that the gods in Petronius are, as far as they are mentioned at all, presented as forces *opposed* to the protagonist.[177] Dreams as divine messages thus become, not communications of hope, of happiness and better times, but of doom, punishment, and torment.[178] No wonder, then, that the characters in this world try to explain them all away as *vana figmenta*: the alternative is far more discomfiting.[179]

This same role for dreaming appears again in the first ten books of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, which contain four dreams and four references to dreaming. The first of these references is part of the programmatic tale of Aristomenes, and is Aristomenes' attempt to explain away his nightmare-like experience of the previous night as precisely that: a nightmare (*Met.* 1.18). He explains away, that is, something that is too bizarre or

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[176] If Musurillo's (1958) reading is right, even the Epicurean protest against the significance of dreams may be undercut by a subtle suggestion that it is, rather, life itself which is meaningless, and that dreams merely copy this.

[177] Though some readers argue that this, too, is a figment of the naïve narrator's imagination; see, e.g., Conte (1996), 95; 100.

[178] Cf. Zeitlin (1999): "Typically, unpredictable and unpleasant accidents occur which further emphasize the chaotic and even malevolent aspect of reality" (23). To this I would add simply that the dreams in this novel indicate that some of these events are not exactly unpredictable: other characters, at any rate, who might be inclined to *add* to the malevolence directed towards the protagonist, are given prophetic dreams, though not such as allow them to predict their own misfortune (see below on Lichas' death, page 229).

[179] This, indeed, seems to be the narrative mode in Petronius: he depicts a hero who doesn't understand what goes on around him, who tries to explain it all away with literary fantasies: see Beck (1999); Conte (1996), 26; Courtney (2001), 50. What I would like to stress, however, is that the Epicurean interpretation of dreams is emphatically *part of this illusory response by the characters*, rather than the reality presented by the narrator.

troublesome as a *dream*, and attempts to escape into rationalism.[180] When his "dream" turns out to have been real, he never recovers, but lives the rest of his life in fear.[181] The second reference to dreaming occurs just after Lucius witnesses the transformation of Pamphile into an owl; this vision is so incredible that he rubs his eyes and wonders whether he is dreaming (*Met.* 3.22). Like Aristomenes, then, Lucius focuses on the separation between dreaming and reality, the disjunction (in a communicative model) between the signifier and the signified, the message and the context. In this sense, his statement is similar to Callirhoe's in Chariton, when she compares her previous life with a dream: there the point was that the disjunction between her present waking reality and her past seems so great that she cannot think of them as the same reality. Here, Lucius reacts to a vision which is so disjunctive with his waking reality that he assumes it must be a dream. Both miss the fundamental point, however, which recurs in both novels: because dreams are messages of divine authority, their messages, however strange by comparison to waking reality, are nonetheless "true" in that there is a real correspondence between the message and the context (waking reality). Even if Lucius' vision is a dream, that is, it is nonetheless significant, though not "real."

The desire to explain away bizarre or terrifying dreams or events as *vana figmenta* is also shown in the third reference to dreaming in the first ten books, the old woman's dream theory discussed above. It too focuses on the disjunction between the message and the context, and argues that dreams don't always mean what they say. Here we see some allowance being made for the possibility that dreams are god-sent, and that their messages are significant, but her argument is that the interpretation may not always be

[180] Cf. Shumate (1996), 64; Carlisle (2008), 219; for an interesting discussion of the use of the "medical"theory of dreaming here, see Panayotakis (1997).

[181] See Tatum (1979) for the effect on Lucius (36).

literal. This is the same reflex as that shown by Aristomenes and Lucius, and it is equally misguided. An interesting contrast is shown when we consider how the novel might have been changed had the old woman presented, instead of this dream theory, the theory of Clitophon.[182] Would Charite have grown used to the idea that Tlepolemus would precede her in death? Would she still have committed suicide, or would she simply have avenged herself on Thrasyllus, and lived on? The entire mood of the novel would have been drastically changed. Of course, if Charite were the heroine of a Greek novel, Tlepolemus would not die: the tale would end with their marriage, and the implication would be that they lived happily ever after. Instead we are told later of Tlepolemus' death, of Charite's second dream, her revenge and finally her suicide. So another interesting contrast appears if we imagine the radically different novel Helidorus would have written had he made Charikleia's dream in the cave turn out to predict exactly what she thought it did: the violent death of Theagenes. Such a novel would greatly resemble the tragic tale of Charite and Tlepolemus.

The two groups of novels, we see, are completely distinct, and this has in no small part to do with their conception of the divine role in human affairs. That role is, in turn, revealed in the dreams that appear, so that even the nightmares in the Greek novels are signs of divine benevolence: they prepare the protagonists for the hardships ahead, and allow them to make it through to the happy ending. It is scarcely surprising, however, that the dream theories in the Latin novels are so different: they try to explain dreams away, to rationalize them, to suggest that the nightmares signify good fortune. The truth, as it appears in the world of the Latin novels, is far worse: that dreams are real, or that they are

[182] The parallels between the end of Charite's story and Adrastus/Atys in Herodotus have been observed by a number of scholars (see, e.g., Repath 2000, 628 and the note on that page for earlier examples); in that story, too, the tragedy only takes place because a dream is misinterpreted or ignored; how, we should wonder, might these stories have turned out had the dreams been treated differently?

truthful messages from the gods;[183] messages that reveal cruel, spiteful divinities who seek the destruction of the protagonists, or tell of horrors that are not to be endured, but will bring death and destruction.[184] A brief review of the four dreams in the first ten books of the *Metamorphoses* and their outcomes reveals how true this is: 1) Socrates dreams that he has had his heart cut out. The next day, as he bends over a river to drink, the sponge which was used to replace his heart the night before drops out, and he falls down dead (*Met.* 1.18-19). 2) Charite dreams that she has been carried off by robbers, and that they kill Tlepolemus. Some months later, after they are happily married and all seems well, Tlepolemus is cruelly and foully slain (*Met.* 4.27; 8.5). 3) Charite dreams that the man who is courting her is actually Tlepolemus' murderer; she seduces him, stabs out his eyes, and commits suicide (*Met.* 8.8-14). 4) The daughter of a local baker who is, for all she knows, alive and well in the next village, has a dream in which her father appears to her, hanging from a noose, and tells her that her stepmother has slain him by witchcraft by sending the ghost of a murdered man after him. She travels to her father's village, and finds him dead, discovered in his room with the door locked, hanging from a noose (*Met.* 9.29-31). Dreams 1, 2 and 4, by contrast with the dreams in the Greek novels, have no significant conative function; they are, rather, primarily referential, and serve to reveal the cruel reality hiding behind the illusion of normal waking life.[185] Dream 3, the only conative dream in the first ten books of this novel, motivates Charite not towards a happy ending, but towards the mutilation of her enemy

[183] On Charite's dream, see Graverini (2003), 211.

[184] Cf. Tatum (1999), 176.

[185] Note, however, that there is always the possibility for the reader, like the characters in the novel, to dismiss these dreams as unreliable sources; a good example of this is found in Dowden's reaction to the dream of the Baker's daughter (1982), 431; see also Hijmans et al. (1995), 266.

and the destruction of her self.[186] It is surely because of this function of dreams, which contrasts so sharply with their role in the Greek novels, that when Charite chooses to blind Thrasyllus rather than kill him outright, she is not troubled by the fact that he will still dream. In explanation of this punishment, Charite makes the fourth and final reference to the phenomenon of dreaming in these ten books: "Quiesce securus, beate somniare...uiuo tibi morientur oculi nec quicquam uidebis nisi dormiens…incertum simulacrum errabis inter Orcum et solem…" "Rest free from care, dream happily…your eyes will die while you live, and you will not see anything unless you sleep…you will wander as an empty shadow between Orcus and the sun…" (*Met.* 8.12) She is relegating him to this nightmare world, and the only thing he will see will be dreams, yet this is a punishment worse than death, where one does not dream.

In Book Eleven, all of that changes. The dreams that appear there are too many to examine in full; none of them, however, are nightmares. The very first dream is Lucius' vision of Isis (*Met.* 11.5-6), which runs the gamut of communicative functions.[187] It begins with a long ecphrastic description of the goddess' appearance, which is presented so beautifully, and yet so completely irrelevant to the final result of the dream, that it is clearly *poetic* (in the sense used by Jakobson): it fronts the message itself, in this case an

[186] Cf. Frangoulidis (1999a), 606.

[187] Harrison (2000) does not interpret this as a dream (239); while it is at first unclear whether Lucius is awake, however, the narration immediately following (…*somno protinus absolutus*…) makes it clear that Lucius was asleep when he saw Isis (a point further suggested by her statement at 11.6 that she is simultaneously appearing to and instructing her priest "*per quietem*"). I wonder, given the argument pu forward here, to what degree this divergent reading has influenced Harrison's willingness to assert that the text points without doubt to a parodic interpretation? Indeed, his assertion that the parodic element first creeps in when Lucius meets Isis' "personnel" (240), arguing this from the clash between these all too human characters and Lucius' vision, is weakened if the two encounters are explicitly made to take place on separate planes of experience.

imaginal one.[188] The goddess then begins to speak, and her speech is at first *phatic*: "En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus…" "Lo, I am here, moved, Lucius, by your prayers…" She then turns to a lengthy description of herself, which is both *emotive* (because she focuses on herself) and *referential* (because it tells Lucius who she is). She continues, then, by returning to her original theme ("adsum"), and then indicates that her dream has a doubly *conative* function of reassurance ("Mitte iam fletus et lamentationes, depelle maerorem…") and command ("ergo igitur imperiis istis meis animum intende sollicitum.").The only function, indeed, which is absent is the metalingual. What are we to make of all of this? Which function is most important? What role does this dream play most especially?

The answer can be found in Lucius' reaction. He rises immediately *pauore et gaudio*, wonders at so clear a divine presence (*miratus deae potentis tam claram praesentiam*) and then remains intent on fulfilling the goddess' commands (*magnisque imperiis eius intentus*; 1.7): he thus focuses on her *reassurance*, her *presence* and her *orders*; these are the *conative* (both psychological and practical) and *phatic* functions of the dream. This dream, then, is surprisingly like something out of a Greek novel, though it is decidedly more overblown; its function is nonetheless the same. The remainder of the dreams in the final book emphasize these three roles; they command him and lead him deeper and deeper into initiation; they reassure him when he has doubts, and in many cases simply establish a link with the goddess (his dream of Candidus, e.g.). The final dream, which occurs in the last chapter of the book, is a perfect example of this:

> Deus deum magnorum potior et maiorum summus et summorum maximus et maximorum regnator Osiris non in alienam quampiam personam reformatus, sed coram suo illo uenerando me dignatus adfamine per

[188] See Tatum (1979) for a discussion of the artistry of this episode (154-159).

> quietem recipere uisus est: quae nunc, incunctanter gloriosa in foro redderem patrocinia nec extimescerem maleuolorum disseminationes, quas studiorum meorum laboriosa doctrina ibidem sustinebat. Ac ne sacris suis gregi cetero permixtus deseruirem, in collegium me pastoforum suorum, immo inter ipsos decurionum quinquennales adlegit.
>
> "The god more powerful than the great gods, and highest of the greater, and greatest of the highest, and ruler of the greatest Osiris, not changed into some other form, but deigning to address me openly in his own form, appeared to me in a dream: he told me to continue unhesitatingly my famous advocacy in the courts, which I now practiced, and not to fear the slanders of ill-wishers, which the serious pursuit of my studies was enduring there. And lest I should serve his mysteries mixed up with the rest of the flock, he inducted me into the college of his *pastophori*, or rather into the quinquennial board of directors itself" (*Met.* 11.30).

This dream serves to establish a special contact with Osiris himself (both through his appearance in his own person, rather then some other form, and in his election of Lucius to a position in his priesthood), but also to direct his actions (he is told to continue practicing law) and to reassure him (he is told not to fear the slanders directed against him).

This book, then, illustrates well the difference between the world of the Greek novels and that of the Latin; it is, in effect, an overblown version of a Greek novel ending, tacked onto a Latin novel.[189] The disjunction is so pronounced that it has created interpretive problems that are still being debated.[190] Whatever position we take on those depends on how willing we are to gloss over this disparity, or how efficient a solution we can find to explain it;[191] it depends, in other words, on how we are able to connect the function of dreams within the world of the novel to the function of the novel in the world

[189] Cf. Schlam (1992), 25; Reardon (1991), 44.

[190] Recently, see Harrison (2000), 226-259 for an argument that this ending is meant completely in jest; see Shumate (1996) for a "serious" interpretation which skirts Winkler's famous objections (Winkler 1985, e.g. 131-132) to any serious reading by focusing only on the narrative of the "actor"; see her (1999) acknowledgement, however, that both interpretations can coexist (123).

[191] See Winkler (1985), 208.

of the author-reader relationship. How we describe that relationship will to some degree depend, then, on our explanation of the following: the use of dreams in the Greek novels as messages of reassurance, warning or motivation which establish the presence of a divine force directing the protagonists to a happy end;[192] the use of dreams in the Latin novels as messages of punishment, doom, or death, which suggest the presence of a divinity hostile to the protagonists or of a reality much crueler than waking illusions, try as one might to explain them away as empty and meaningless; and, finally, the strange stitching together of both these functions in the synthesis of the *Metamorphoses*.[193]

Conclusion

Having established the functions of the various dreams within the novels, we can now turn to addressing this question of their interpretation from a reader-author perspective. Before we do so, however, one question which remains should be briefly discussed. This turns upon the question of religion in the ancient novels. In brief, if we recast the conclusions reached above in non-Jakobsonian terms, we can say that within the world of the Greek novels, the two, concurrent and essential functions of most of the dreams are: 1) to make known, even experienced, the presence of a divine power benevolent to the protagonists, taking a hand in the course of events, and 2) to lessen the suffering of the protagonists, whether by taking an active hand in preventing it, by putting it in a larger perspective by communicating this presence and the happy end to which it is directing the the temporary hardships, or by preparing them to endure an oncoming

[192] *pace* Billault (2003), 129.

[193] See Heller (1983) for an interesting assessment of this contrast: he argues that it is part of Apuleius' Platonic *dualism*, and that the eleventh book thus represents an escape from the worldly plane represented by the previous ten books.

difficulty, that they might endure until the happy end that lies ahead. The Latin novels, excepting the eleventh book of Isis, essentially reverse this role.

All of this might seem like a roundabout way of saying about the dreams in the novels something that has been said many times before about the novels in their entirety: that they are religious works. We thus come to an issue that has been skirted so far; to explain the role of the dreams in the novels as we have above is to say, in effect, that they are used to give *religious meaning* to the adventures of the protagonists. This leads naturally to the question of the religiosity of the novels. We should observe, however, that in as far as the majority of the dreams in the novels have been shown to have a *religious* function, to give, that is, a religious meaning to the adventures of the protagonists, that function has been proven a) only for the dreams themselves, and b) only *within* the novels. This requires clarification: what has been examined so far is the role dreams play in the plots of their novels, their function, that is, in the world and lives of the characters. To connect this to the function of the novels themselves, in the lives of reader and author, and especially in the process of communication between them, will be the task of the following chapters, and must be done with great care. We cannot simply assume that, because some part of a novel imparts a religious significance within the world of the novel itself, that the novel automatically takes on a religious significance for its readers, or proves religious intent on the part of the author (though it may be the case). That much is clear, for example, from the diverse interpretations that have been offered for the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius. Furthermore, we are not yet at a point in the argument where we can even assert that the events narrated in the novels in their entirety have a religious significance for the protagonists. That this is the case can be asserted on more explicit textual evidence than the dreams we are examining: Habrocomes and

Anthia, for example, leave a copy of their story in a temple; we are told in Longus that the entire narrative is an exegesis of a religious icon; so, too, is Achilles Tatius' narrative, though not an exegesis per se, nonetheless a response to the first narrator's meditation on the divine power of Eros. These are but a few examples; in short, there are many explicit textual statements to the effect that the adventures described in the novels are taken by their protagonists, or narrators, to have a religious significance. To connect this to the significance of the novels for their authors and readers, however, requires us to step out of the fictional universe and its rules, and ask how this relates to the "real" historical world of authors, readers, and texts. It is to this task that we now turn.

CHAPTER THREE: "A DREAM AND A STORY"

The Metalingual Function of Dreaming

At the start of book 11 of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, Lucius has a dream of Isis in answer to a prayer for salvation. It is fair to say that this dream changes not only Lucius' life, but the novel and its interpretation as well. Yet few scholars have remarked on what is most striking about this passage (for our purposes): Lucius' salvation and conversion to the cult of Isis is brought about through a dream. Here, if anywhere, then, we will find the motif of dreaming in full realization of its narrative potential, and thus an examination of this passage is a good starting point for an analysis of the role dreaming plays in the complex communicative acts which the novels encode. As was observed in the previous chapter, this dream acts *within* the narrative in all six of Jakobson's communicative functions, yet remains primarily focused on the conative, and secondarily on the phatic. We may guess, then, that within the communicative act of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, this dream will again fulfill all six functions, but that we may nevertheless isolate one or two which are especially important.

The first function we notice is *emotive*, that is, an expression of the narrator's thought or emotion. This is indicated by the strongly evaluative initial reference to the vision's appearance (*mirandam speciem*, 11.3), and the anxiety the narrator expresses about his ability to describe the vision adequately (*si…tribuerit facultatem paupertas oris humani…*). What follows is a glorious description of the dream, scarcely paralleled elsewhere in the novel; we may be certain that this is at least in part *poetic*: that is, great

care has been taken in the construction of the message itself, and many elements in the passage are included to that end. It is also clear, however, that this passage is quite emotionally charged for the narrator, who expresses an awe that cannot be parodic; here, at any rate, scholars who argue for a "serious" interpretation of the novel have found powerful ammunition. [194] We have, then, the poetic and emotive functions quite admirably represented, and closely linked to these is a *conative* role, in as much as the reader is clearly meant to be deeply affected; again, if a serious interpretation is implied by this passage, those who argue for a proselytizing (and thus conative) function for the novel as a whole could hardly find a passage more likely to turn a reader towards investigation of and possibly initiation into the goddess' cult. The referential function of the communication is also present in this description, which could present a quite impressive picture of a cult statue of Isis to anyone unfortunate enough never to have seen one. Isis herself follows this with some information of her own, which is referential in function both within the world of the novel, and in the world of the reader, if we are willing to assume that the syncretistic idea of the goddess is really in earnest (i.e. that we are really being *informed* that the Pessinuntine Mother of the Phrygians, the Cecropian Minerva of the Athenians, and the Isis of the Egyptians are all one and the same goddess). A willingness to read such an idea as authorized in the world of the reader as well as that of the novel implies the operation of a fifth function, the *phatic* one: if the syncretism of all of these deities is taken to be truthful, it must be so on the authority of whatever agent of communication exists in our own reality, and that, of course, is the author.

[194] See, e.g., Griffiths (1975).

If dreams, that is, are messages from the gods, they must be authoritative; yet who is this authority, from our own perspective, in our own world, who manipulates the text, who tells Lucius what has happened and will happen to him, and has the authority to make it so? It is none other than the creator of his world, the author of the text.[195] This much was clear to Frye, who in his treatment of the structure of "romance" (his preferred term for the genre of the ancient novels) asserts that "There is often a god behind the action of a romance…A god of this type is clearly a projection of the author himself, and as such he is placed outside the action. He becomes an alienation figure in Brecht's sense of the term, reminding us that the show is only a show after all."[196] It seems clear to me, however, that the alienation of the divine communication is significantly less than if the author himself stepped in and told us "Lucius' experience was really all about his progression towards salvation by Isis"; the point of using a dream, in fact, seems to be partly that it allows the author to address us directly without breaking our projection into the world of the novel: to address us, that is, *as Luciuses rather than as readers*. Thus the "alienation figure" is *less* alienating when appearing in dreams; just as the dream performs a phatic role in the world of the novel by putting the dreamer in communication with an external authority (a divinity), the same function is performed in the world of the reader by putting him or her in contact with the authority behind the novel, i.e. the author himself, while at the same time allowing the projection into the text to continue uninterrupted. Any dream which "comes true" (as nearly all dreams in the novels do) must implicitly perform this function, since it establishes direct contact between the reader and the authority in charge (and aware) of how things will turn out: in life (and

[195] Cf. Morgan (2003): "The entire divine plan which supports the plot is, in one sense, a cypher for the author's own control of a properly formed story" (445).

[196] Frye (1976), 107.

thus the simulated life of the novels) this is "the divine"; in an artistic creation, this is the artist.[197]

This brings us to the final and, seemingly, most important function of this dream; this, the *metalingual*, is the function which the dream is most emphatically performing when it ends, i.e. at the most emphatic point in its narration. If we accept that the dream is necessarily phatic if it puts the reader in contact with the authority who directs the text, but whose presence is not always felt, we must then conclude that the references made in the dream to the direction of the text are metalingual, in as much as they are a part of the code that is designed to illuminate the code itself. Thus, when Apuleius, in the guise of Isis, informs his readers, in the guise of narratees of Lucius' dream, that Lucius will be saved *through Isis' intervention*, and further, that the words which the priest of Isis will speak at the crucial moment of Lucius' transformation (simultaneously his second and third *metamorphosis*) express knowledge he has gained through a similar dream of Isis, he is essentially telling us something, not about the world of the novel, but about the novel itself: what we are about to read and how we are to interpret it. The end of the dream thus takes the form of a prophecy, but a prophecy with a (necessarily) interpretive framework included, a sort of "key" to the code. It is a summary of the novel, with a teleological and theological bent; the speech of the priest at Lucius' transformation is the

[197] Cf. Bartsch (1989), 163-164; also Lowe (2001), 58; it is important to stress, however, that the significance of this equivalence between author and divinity does not allow the substitution of the former for the latter: for as long as we project ourselves into the text to any degree, the author is always, at some level a god. To ignore this and to assume, once we have peeped behind his mask, that Apollo is not really meant as Apollo, but is simply a cipher for the author, and therefore that the novels had no serious religious import for anyone, is to negate the possibility of ever writing anything meaningful about religion. Such an interpretive move, pushed to its extreme, would tell us, for example, that Christians worship not God but four gods: Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. I do not here claim, of course, that Apuleius' work is the equivalent of a Christian gospel in any sense, but simply make the point that a text will always be mediated through its author, so that leaping from the fact that the "god" in control of a narrative is the author to the conclusion that the point of including gods in a narrative is to "illustrate the comedy of composing a romance" (Winkler 1999; 349) or the like negates the possibility of *ever* writing a religious narrative.

most famous instance, perhaps, of this sort of metalinguality, but it, too, we must remember, is a summary originally provided by a dream.[198]

We have said in the previous chapter that the primary function of this dream in the world of the novel was emotionally conative, and that its secondary function was phatic. Here again, then, we see the phatic role at work, but the primary role of the dream in the world of the reader is *metalingual*: to tell us something about the code itself which might not otherwise be clear. Can we put these together and arrive at an initial, hypothetical, but comprehensive description of the role of dreaming in the ancient novels, which may then be tested against other dreams in the works? It seems possible, though we must of course admit that any such picture will at this point be quite theoretical. In brief, then, we may say that dreams in the novels are points of contact between dreamer and divine in parallel to reader and author, by which the dreamer is led to change his or her emotional state or behavior in such a way as benefits the protagonist; at the same time, the reader is told something about the way the novel is to be read. If we postulate a strong link between these two (reader and protagonist),[199] we can, finally, connect both levels of operation: what the dream tells the reader about the code is that it is to be read under the light of divine providence, i.e. that the events of the novel are, in effect, a revelation of the hand of the divine in human affairs. The dreams, as we shall see in the next section, are *essentializations* of the novels or of parts of the novels themselves, i.e., miniature versions of events encountered by the protagonists which are stripped of all their extraneous elements and thereby focused upon in their relation to the overarching optimistic pattern of the novel (that is, the lives of the protagonists) as a whole. If we are

[198] See Apuleius, *Met.* 11.6.

[199] See, e.g., Oatley (2002), 40.

able to sympathize with the protagonists and to see a connection between their lives and ours, between the rules governing their universe and those governing ours, our own reactions to the novels may reflect the reactions of the protagonists/dreamers to the dreams. That reaction can be described as follows. First, there is the realization that an alternative perspective to experiential reality exists, which together with experiential reality forms a grander scheme in which we face great hardships and difficulties yet overcome them all. Second, there is the awareness that this pattern is authorized by a power with greater insight than the individual. Third, there is the reordering of one's emotions in accordance with this alternative reality. The same realizations and assent to an alternate reality, moreover, *may be experienced* by readers in reaction to the novels because of the role of the dreams in revealing the achronic model of the novel and at the same time modelling the emotional reaction of someone who finds in it a model for his or her own life. In short, the dreams in their *metalingual* function provide an interpretive schema for the novels themselves; the reactions to the dreams model potential reactions to the novel that may be felt by readers whenever they extend the pattern of the novels, pointed to by the dreams and operative in the protagonists' lives, to their own reality. We are given a blueprint for the final interpretation of the novel together with its potential effect, indicating that the novels themselves are at least partly conative in function.

This is quite a bit of significance to give to the dreams in the novels, however prevalent they may be, and it thus requires thorough support from other passages and further scholarship. In particular, we must ask to what degree these various functions and hierarchies of functions are absent in other dreams in the novels. It seems especially significant that this is the longest and most complex dream in any ancient novel, and that it occurs in a novel which is not exactly the best representative of the genre, and in a

situation which is without parallel elsewhere. To what degree, then, is the role of this dream unique, and what measure of it carries over into other dreams? The objections that this is the most complex dream in any novel, and that it occurs at a pivotal point in the narrative, and is thus uniquely able to have so complex a role, may be answered by finding the simplest, most peripheral dream in any novel, and determining what it shares of this dream's role. A good candidate for this seems to be the dream of Hydaspes in book 4 of Heliodorus. It is described in four words (ὄναρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο κελεύειν), in a chain of transmission as complex as any in the novel (Hydaspes told Persinna, who wrote it on a band passed on to Charikleia, read by Calasiris, who now tells Knemon about it), and occurred many years before any event with which the novel is centrally concerned. It thus makes sense to read it as a sort of "zero-grade" dream, one, that is, which is minimally laden by other functions, but should express the role of the dream at its simplest and most basic.

We find, first of all, that the poetic function is entirely absent from this dream: it is expressed as curtly and unimaginatively as possible, with no regard for the message itself. Furthermore, its only referential value is to things existing solely in the world of the novel: we are never told the source of the dream, or its content, only its interpretation by and effect on the dreamer (and that only minimally), who is, of course, a fictional character. It thus has no referential function in the world of the reader, since the only thing to which it refers is a part of the communicative act itself (the novel). It has no emotive role, beyond that which is played by every part of a literary creation. Any conative role it plays for the reader, similarly, can only result indirectly from its function within the larger scheme of the novel itself. We are left, then, with a metalingual function, and the phatic function which this implies. This dream is, in effect, a statement

about the code of the novel. It is a key which suggests a particular interpretation of the events of the novel: they are all, it suggests, to be read as the result of some divine guiding hand.[200] This, in turn, suggests a secondary, phatic role for the dream, since it alone puts us in touch with the authority directing the novel, just as it puts Hydaspes (and, indirectly, everyone who reads or is told about the band) in touch with the authority directing the events in his world. To prove this, we need simply imagine a copy of Heliodorus which somehow contained a lacuna in place of those four words (and the participle which introduces them). Nothing would seem to change in the events of the novel, and yet everything would in our interpretation of them. The basic outline of the story would be the same, from Charikleia's conception to her marriage. Nothing of artistic value or expressive value would be taken away. We would know no more nor any less about the world in which we live. One could even argue that enough other signs are in place in the remainder of the novel that it would have more or less the same effect on us. This alone would be missing: we would not know that everything the novel contains should be read as having begun when a king believed *a god was directing him* to father a child.[201] The only difference this makes, then, is in the way we decode the events of the *Aethiopika*: in our interpretation, that is, of the entire novel.[202]

Consider, for clarification, the reaction of Calasiris to reading the band of Persinna, discussed in the first chapter. He is gripped by a complex series of emotions,

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[200] Cf. Winkler (1999), who nonetheless misses this (as well as Calasiris' reaction to it) as positive proof that Heliodorus wants us to see the divine at work in the events of his story (312); see also Sandy (1982b), 50.

[201] Even if Anderson is correct (see above, note 154) that this dream has a secondary function of apologizing for Persinna's sexuality; that would simply reveal more about the character of Persinna, who is a relatively minor and completely fictional character, and would thus function mainly *within* the narrative.

[202] Cf. Bowie (1999): "The impression that the couple is in the hands of a divinity… is a mixed literary blessing" (55).

which turn upon the contemplation of the vicissitudes to which human beings are subject. Yet all of this is initiated because, as he tells us, he "recognized and marveled at the management of the gods" (ἐγνώριζον μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν οἰκονομίαν ἐθαύμαζον).[203] There is, to be sure, much in Charikleia's story of the improbable, one might even say the miraculous. Yet the only thing in Persinna's band which one could say easily justifies a *religious* interpretation is the dream of Hydaspes. Among the various events of the novel which elicit this reaction from Calasiris, then, pride of place must go to these four simple words, without which a religious interpretation would, of course, still be possible, but it would be on much weaker footing.[204] At the very start of Charikleia's life, then, which in all its twists and turns provides the plot of the novel, we have a dream ordering a king to lie with his wife, and the moment of the princess' conception, which might otherwise have been a simple and random chance, is *divine will*.

This idea must be in the front of our minds when we come to the close of the novel and read what Merkelbach has quite fairly called "a long, elaborate aretalogy about the miraculous workings of the sun god,"[205] in which the bad is transformed into the good, horror into celebration, weeping into laughter, grief into joy, etc. (10.38). Somehow the populace of Meroe understands it all, and their emotional state is deeply affected: perhaps, Heliodorus pretends to speculate, because the same divine impetus that had "staged all of these things" (ἐσκηνογράφησεν) brought them to an understanding of the truth. In a profoundly metalingual moment, then, Heliodorus reveals how we are to

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[203] See note 157 above.

[204] See note 200 above on Winkler (1999), who, notably, insists that the "religious" ending of the novel is "mere convention" (349); had he paid more attention to the significance of this dream, he may perhaps have been less convinced.

[205] Merkelbach (1994), 290.

think of the events of the novel: they are all part of a great theatrical production, for which the divine powers are the directors; our reaction to and appreciation of the novel, then, must be on par with these ignorant Meroites, who are brought to an understanding of events by the same authority who has depicted the events of the novel for our benefit. Within the world of the novel, of course, that must be some divine power, since only a divine power can direct human lives and foresee the future. In the world of the reader, that authority is the author himself, who is the real stage manager for the drama as we read it.[206] Yet the identity between the two is permeable: we are meant to wonder at the miraculous events of Charikleia's life just as the Meroites do; the authority of the author and the authority of the divine are one and the same, and both tell us that the world of suffering and torment which Theagenes and Charikleia have undergone is over; it has been replaced with a joyful celebration of life and all that is good in it, which is the end to which the gods may direct all people such as Theagenes and Charikleia.[207]

My point is that the dream of Hydaspes is a piece in the interpretive puzzle of Charikleia's life, and that while the metalingual statements of the tenth book are far more explicit in their reflection on the significance of that life as depicted in the novel, without this dream there is something crucially absent from our interpretive framework; we do not, that is, have a complete notion of the code with which the novel speaks. Charikleia has been brought from Ethiopia because of her white skin, which is an accident of the circumstances of her birth: very well. She is descended from the gods and heroes of old,

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[206] Cf. Bartsch (1989): "…Helidorus has designed his work in such a way that an analogy is clearly manifest between author and divine *choregos*; the god's relation to the novel's characters is that of the author-playwright to us…" (141).

[207] Cf. Fusillo (1999): "The meta-literary impact of this passage makes it a true poetic declaration…it may give us an idea of the significance of the entire Greek novel and help formulate a conclusion of its development…This final passage of Heliodorus thus highlights the fact that the poetics of the novel are anti-tragic and consolatory. All dissonances are resolved harmoniously in the triumph of eros" (82).

in particular Andromeda, whose likeness she shares through a sort of double determination, both because of genetic descent and because of a sort of sympathetic magic at the moment of her conception. She meets Theagenes, and Calasiris, by chance it seems, yet there are oracles surrounding their presence in Delphi, and the whole affair reeks of divine intervention. They are saved from a great many hardships, and eventually make their way to Charikleia's homeland, quite by chance, where they are transformed from sacrificial victims to high priests. All of this is quite scientific (for its time), but improbable enough that a miraculous explanation may be a little more acceptable. Yet how does it all begin? What makes this girl's life any different from the ordinary princess' (if such a person exists), beyond a series of rather improbable accidents? Four words: she was conceived because Hydaspes was *commanded by a dream* to lie with his wife. And now the code is complete: from beginning to end, the life of Charikleia has been managed by divine providence.

In Longus, the clearest indication of a metalingual function for the dreams lies in the dream of Bryaxis. We will discuss this further below, but for the moment, we may simply observe that the revelation to Bryaxis that "Eros wants to make a story out of [Chloe]" can have no significance to the dreamer.[208] nor is it ever communicated in any form to anyone else but the *reader*; it is, furthermore, completely irrelevant to the events that follow, except that it, like every other dream in the novel, indicates that the structure of the novel follows a *divine plan*, and one which, furthermore, the divinity wants to create as a clue to his manner of operation. This is information for the reader, and it is information not about *what happened*, but about *why*, in other words, how the events described in the novel are to be *decoded*, how their significance is to be determined. In

[208] Cf. Morgan (2004), 193.

Achilles Tatius, this function is apparent in the otherwise completely useless dream in which Leucippe reveals the name of her poisoner; in Xenophon of Ephesus, in the redundancy of Habrocomes' first dream, which tells him nothing he did not already know from the oracle, or in the absolute pointlessness of Anthia's dream, which leads her to attempted suicide, about which we never hear another word: the point of the dream is thus nothing to do with what actually happens in the novel, but instead to explain how we are to understand those happenings. In Chariton the same can be said of Theron's first dream, in combination with the entire scene which introduces it, or Callirhoe's dream of Aphrodite, which, like the only dream in *HART*, are completely extraneous as a motivation in a novel in which motivation is rarely even explained; instead, it must tell us not *why* Callirhoe went to Aphrodite's temple, but what it means that she did. Finally, in Petronius, the utter lack of necessity of having Encolpius and Giton, stowaways on a ship and thus effectively captives, revealed to Lichas and Tryphaena because of two *dreams*, indicates that the inclusion of that episode must have some significance for the reader trying to interpret the accident of their presence on board the very ship of their enemies, and thus functions, for the reader, as a *metalingual* part of the whole.

There are, of course, other metalingual and phatic passages in the novels, in which the author contacts the readers directly and tells them something about the system of the novel and the effect it is to have. I am not arguing that we can learn all there is to know about the novels or their meaning from the dreams, simply that the primary reason the dreams are included is for their metalingual function, which implies a secondary phatic function. More specifically, they function to reveal the condensed, received, and interpreted form (the achronic model) of the novel itself, and thus simultaneously provide a schematic for the plot and a model for its reception in the form of the dreamer or

protagonist (into whose position the reader projects himself). In order to express this idea another way, we may set up a proportion: if the novels purport to be a representation of real life, the representation is the encoding of someone's perspective. The narrator depicts reality as experienced by the protagonists, from the perspective of someone who knows more than they, in particular how their stories intertwine and how they will end. In reality, the author creates the story, and is thus in control of these details to which the narrator is privy. Since the story itself is set in "reality," however, the narrator and author must have some existence in the world of the novel as well. The are both divine entities, one in control of events, the other with an acute awareness of how events will turn out; they may be one and the same, in which case they are gods who both direct and foresee the future. The dreams in the novels are thus communications between the narrator (on behalf of the author) and his characters. The content of these revelations is some perspective on the events of the novel, from the authoritative position of the divine/narrator/author. Where is the reader in all of this? He is, of course, the audience of the author/narrator, which is to say, of the *god* of the novel. This puts him, in the case of any protagonist's dream, doubly in the position of the protagonist. He both projects himself into this position and, from *outside* this projection, receives the novel just as the protagonist receives the dream. The content of the dream is thus a reflection on the world around him as seen from a divine perspective, in as much as he is able to assume the role of the protagonist, and a reflection from the narrator or author's perspective on the status of the novel (in as much as he remains a reader). This yields the proportion:

NARRATOR : NOVEL : READER :: GOD : REAL WORLD : PROTAGONIST/ READER

Thus, on the first level, the dream is a revelation from a god to the protagonist of the divine perspective on the world in which he or she lives; on the second level, it is a

revelation by the author to the reader of the authorial/narratorial perspective on the novel which he or she is reading. Just as these dreams provide a different way of extracting meaning from the events of the real world for the protagonist (e.g.: "your present suffering is but a point on the journey towards happiness" or "your present contentment is in fact the quiet before a storm of woe" or "you must become a shepherd that you may learn what love is, though your parents believe you are nobly born"), they provide a way of extracting meaning (i.e. a modification or clarification of the code) from the events of the novel for the reader, and are thus metalingual in function in the communicative act of the novel itself. Because they do this by representation rather than discussion (i.e. they "show" how the novel is to be interpreted, rather than "tell"), however, they also suggest that the function of the *novel itself* (rather than the dream as a part of the novel) is emotionally *conative*, just as the dream is to the protagonist.[209] How is this possible? Since the act of reading is simultaneously one of decoding and of experiencing, the reader is at once both decoder (to whom the *metalingual* dream is addressed) and sympathetic reader (to whom the novel as *emotionally conative narrative* is addressed): the reader, that is, as the one responsible for enabling the text, is responsible for the intuitive leap from "real" world to narrative world, and must jump between the triple position of reader (who exists in the world of the author), sympathetic reader (who exists in the world of the narrator) and protagonist (who exists in the world of the novel, and with whom the reader may wholly identify). In the first position, the reader is told something about the operation of the novel, the code which he or she is to use in enacting its content; in the second and third, this content, including the dreams themselves, affects

[209] Cf. Fusillo (1999--see note 207 above).

him or her just as they do the characters in the novels, which is to say emotionally:[210] since all three positions are taken by the same person (the reader), we cannot separate them, and we may thus conclude that at the same moment that the dreams assist the reader in decoding the novel, the overall function of the novel, once decoded, is precisely that of the dreams, which are metalingual references to the overall pattern of the novels themselves from the authorial/narratorial perspective, for the protagonists.

With the idea that the dreams in the novels serve a *metalingual* function within the communication between author and reader established, we must now clarify how, precisely, the dreams tell a reader about the code of the novels: how do their revelations relate to the overall shape and content of the novels? When we further establish, in the next section, that they point to an interpretive pattern which *essentializes* the events of the novels, we must then ask what this interpretive pattern is. Finally, given that the function of the novels is revealed by the metalingual example of dreaming to be *emotionally conative*, and that this effect is achieved by an appeal to religious authority simultaneously with authorial knowledge, and by the allusion to these authorities as the source of the interpretive pattern thereby revealed, how are we to understand the exact nature and source of their emotional effect, and where this fits into their place in social history? It is to these questions, in order, that we must now turn.

Dreams as "Essentializations"

We can begin with a passage taken from Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, which, we should remember, is the oldest of the extant novels.[211] Callirhoe, the proud daughter of

[210] Cf. Reardon (1991), 100.

the foremost citizen in Syracuse, after being buried alive, abducted from her own tomb by pirates, and sold as a slave in a city a thousand miles from her beloved husband and the only home she has ever known, is asked by her new master who she is and where she comes from. When she refuses to tell him, giving only her name, he presses her, and she responds: "δέομαί σου…ὦ δέσποτα, συγχώρησόν μοι τὴν ἐμαυτῆς τύχην σιωπᾶν. ὄνειρος ἦν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μῦθος, εἰμὶ δὲ νῦν ὃ γέγονα, δούλη καὶ ξένη" "I beg you, master, allow me to keep silence about my fate. The past was a dream and a fairytale, and I am now what I have become, a slave and a foreigner" (*Call.* 2.5). Callirhoe thus draws a connection quite explicitly between the two phenomena of *dream* and *fictional narrative*, as well as between these and an earlier portion of the novel. This is a valuable clue for us as we evaluate the role of dreaming in relation to the rest of the narrative, and it suggests that the relationship between the two is quite close.[212] In what sense, then, is a dream equivalent to a narrative fiction, and how might the former help us understand the latter?

"Dreaming and art-making…appear to share a 'technique' of purification of waking experience. They are essentializing processes, as aestheticians say."[213] Bert States thus summarizes the similarity between the dream and the artistic creation in the third of his books on the link between dream and narrative. By this model, a dream is, in effect, the same process we used in daily life to construct narratives, running under the different

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[211] For the chronology, see e.g. Bowie (1999, 48); Konstan (1994b) and O'Sullivan (1995) prefer to place Xenophon earliest, however.

[212] Cf. Kathryn Morgan's (2003) challenging, though not directly relevant conclusions about Plato, e.g.: "I shall…suggest that dreaming be seen as an analogue for the experience of fiction" (102); and see Reardon (1991) for a connection between Plato's writing of "fiction," compared here by Morgan to dreaming, and the novels' own fictional nature (66).

[213] States (1997), 6.

conditions, such as sensory deprivation, that exist during sleep.[214] What is particularly noteworthy is that such an operation is always a process of selection, choosing the most salient ideas and connections between ideas and putting them together in a narrative structure: it is, in other words, always an *interpretive* process. In his previous book, States had argued that this interpretive process takes place on several levels of human thought, each exhibiting a higher order of "formal organization," as seen in the following diagram, to be read from left to right:[215]

life experience (desire)→dream→day dream→fiction and art

As we experience life, we organize our experiences into a narrative structure, yet much or even most of the structure remains outside our control. Each level to the right represents a higher order of structural imposition, and thus a higher level of abstraction from 'reality,' and a greater degree of schematization and authorial control.[216]

This same hierarchy can be extended to these same processes as they are embedded in a fictional narrative, with one corrective: we have already seen that the chief difference between the dreams as they are conceived by the novelists and our modern conception of dreaming lies in the *authorship* of dreams. In States' hierarchy, "life experience" is the only process with any degree of external control (since certain events undeniably take place in our daily lives without our control, even if we do have some

[214] See also Burkert (1996), 25-26; his contribution to understanding the connection between dreaming and fiction will be explored in the next chapter, as it is especially helpful in understanding the *religious* function of both.

[215] States (1993), 108.

[216] It is interesting to note, in explaining this, that Michel Jouvet (1999) has found the most consistent predictor of the amount of dreaming an animal engages in to be not the size or complexity of its brain, but rather the relative "security" of its environment (56). We might then suppose that each of these orders of schematization requires a higher level of safety, beginning with the simple protection necessary to allow rest and sleep, then the lack of focused concern which always prefaces daydreams, and finally the *leisure* from work and similar interruptions traditionally and logically associated with the creation of art. We will return to Jouvet's hypotheses in the conclusion of this work.

leeway in our interpretation of them); the seeming lack of control in dreams is a result of their management by a mental process of which we are unaware. This may be true, and it may have been just as true for the ancient dreamer, but it will not be true for the fictional ancient dreamer, since he or she will be manufactured in accordance with the author's ideas about dreaming, and one of those ideas demonstrated in the first chapter of this study is that the author of dreams is more or less the same as the author of "life experience," i.e., is some divinity. Bearing this in mind, we may construct a complex version of States' hierarchy, equating the "fiction and art" level to the "life experience" level of the fictional character:

<u>life experience (desire)</u>→<u>dream</u>→day dream→fiction and art/[<u>life experience</u>→<u>fictional dream</u>→fictional daydream→embedded fiction or art]

I have underlined those portions of the hierarchy that are, in the world view exhibited in the novels, under external control, in each case by an author(ity). It is evident from this that the value for us, as readers, of the embedded dreams should be (in as far as the authors remain true to this model of dreaming) that they offer insight into the "meaning" of the novels from the "authorial" perspective, just as dreams (theoretically) offer insight into the "meaning" of our lives from the "authorial" perspective of the divine forces in control of those lives.

We should note here that this insight does not have to be complete; essentializing is not the same as summarizing. It is, rather, the process by which certain elements in a hopelessly complex object are brought into a relation that renders that object comprehensible and thus meaningful, whether that object is the temporal flux of life experience, the simulation of this flux by narrative in its temporal (not achronic) form, or an everyday part of our experiential universe. States' example is a foot, sketched by

Michelangelo or simply observed in the course of daily life: the sketch is more real, more meaningful, because it has been stripped of all that is not relevant to the foot as an object of contemplation and understanding.[217] The narratives we construct out of daily life are thus essentializations, not because they summarize our entire lives, but because they strip away all irrelevant events, however relevant they may be to a different narrative, and focus only on those elements which, when brought into relation with each other, build the core of our narrative: together, these constitute the achronic model, however temporally we may transmit them to a listener. Our dreams, States tells us, are like this, essentializations of daily life; not summaries, not the end all and be all of our existence here, simply processes selecting elements from a hopelessly complex jumble and bringing them into meaningful relation to each other. I am here arguing that this truth about dreams has been captured by the novelists; since the "daily life," however, of a novel protagonist is, for us, the complex narrative of the novel itself; an essentialization of that is an essentialization of the novel for us, and thus a revelation, from some perspective limited to the expediency of the plot, of the achronic model of the novel itself.

Borrowing States' artistically anatomical analogy, we may say that the novel is in some ways like a painting of the human body. We may traverse each line, moving from head to toe, thus experiencing the painting temporally. Adopting an achronic perspective, however, we may observe how the whole, or any of its parts, is composed. Now *if* we can imagine that the body is not a work of art, but a living, breathing person, and that (adopting the mindset of someone with cultural expectations constructed by religion) this person is the creation, not of an artist, but of a god, we have managed to enact the

[217] States (1997), 6.

painting, to project ourselves into it much as we project ourselves into the novels. Imagine, then, that we can watch as the painted person is shown a depiction, a painting within the painting, perhaps of a foot, perhaps of an arm, perhaps of his or her entire body from one angle. Finally, imagine that this depiction is handed to the painted person by the very same divine forces that created the person in the first place. Such an image would stand in relation to our aesthetic experience of the original painting much as the dreams in the novels stand in relation to our experience as readers. This is an extremely complex analogy, and for good reason: the dreams in the novels are extremely complex in their metalingual role. What the analogy is intended to illustrate, however, is that by "essentialization" I do not mean anything like summary (though it may include summaries), but rather a depiction of reality which presents together in a meaningful way aspects of that reality which are not seen together in a temporally or spatially complicated experience of that same reality.

A perfect example of this is Lucius' dream of Isis at the start of book 11 of the *Metamorphoses*, which we discussed above as an example of how the dream's function in relation to the novel as a whole was *metalingual* with reference to the novel as a communicative act. John J. Winkler has quite correctly pointed out that the interpretive problems that plague Apuleian scholarship center around the interpretation of book 11 in relation to the previous books, quite simply because this final book is "an interpretation of Books 1-10."[218] In a short article I wrote a few years ago, I demonstrated that the problems scholars have with this interpretation stem from revelations in the eleventh book that derive their authority from *dreams*, especially the first dream of Isis.[219] In fact,

[218] Winkler (1985), 9.

the entire *interpretive* framework applied in these chapters is a sort of expansion of the idea of this first dream: that everything Lucius has done so far can be teleologically explained as leading him to his Isiac salvation and happiness.[220] The problem with this is that it never seems completely integrated with the first ten books,[221] so that it is only if we are willing to accept the authority of Isis as interpreter that we will find the final book completely convincing; we may convince ourselves of her authority by finding elements in the previous ten books that point to her presence, however hidden from the first reader, yet it will always require a "leap of faith" to believe that she is not simply a dream, and thus that her interpretation of the novel is not simply a fantasy.[222] I would thus reverse Winkler's observation, and argue that the first ten books are a waking experience, for which book eleven is the dreaming coda:[223] the expanded dream that finally appears to Lucius and reveals what the religious interpretation (i.e. the divine understanding) of his trials and tribulations in fact is.

For our present purposes, the most notable thing about this dream is that it *is*, in fact, an essentialization; in this case, it reduces the events of Books 1-10 to their salient features and organizes these into a teleologically simplified structure. Furthermore, it is

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[219] Carlisle (2008), 215-16 and passim; Winkler's own locus for the problem is the speech of Mithras at 11.15, but both Lucius and his audience are at that point aware that Mithras is simply repeating what he has been told in a dream, which took place at the same moment as Lucius' first dream of Isis (see *Met.* 11.6: *Nam hoc eodem momento quo tibi venio, simul et ibi praesens, quae sunt sequentia sacerdoti meo per quietem facienda praecipio.*

[220] Cf. Tatum (1979), 82.

[221] Comparisons with modern novels have been made; my favorite is Norwood's (1956) adaptation of Rose's: "Imagine the climax of *The Pilgrim's Progress* tacked on to the end of *Tom Jones* and try to justify the result!" (4).

[222] My own suggestion, made in the article cited above (note 219), is that these earlier dreams are themselves the one really convincing piece of evidence I can find that leads us ever so subtly towards the "serious" conclusion.

[223] See Winkler (1985), 9.

an essentialization from an *authorial* perspective, and it is precisely the disjunction between this authorial perspective and that exhibited in Books 1-10 themselves (e.g., in the famous aside to the *lector scrupulosus* at 9.30) which has caused such consternation among critics.[224] Indeed, the duplicity detectable in the final book is not Lucius', but the *author's*, in as much as he has seemed to have a different perspective when wearing the mask of author in the first ten books and when wearing the mask of *Isis* in the dreams in the final book. Whatever we may say about Lucius, he is honest, because he tells us nothing that he has not been told by Isis. Our discomfort with the seeming contradictions between Isis' perspective and that of the author of books 1-10 is in fact an indication of our expectation that these two should be identical, and that is an expectation that is borne out in the Greek novels.

Another way of understanding this idea of "essentialization" can be found by fitting the metalingual use of dreams, paying attention in particular to the means by which they achieve their emotional effect, into the model of narrative outlined by Lowe in his examination of the Classical Plot.[225] There are, he suggests, two models of any tale which we process simultaneously when we encounter a narrative. The first, which he relates to the level of "story" (although his preferred term is narrative), is a temporal flux which unfolds as we read; we think of ourselves as being 'in the middle of' this.[226] The second, however, is the level of *fabula* (which he calls "story"): "…we are simultaneously building up a mental model of the story *as a whole*. And unlike the first model, this image of the story is *timeless*: it includes everything that 'has happened' and

[224] Winkler (*ibid.*) surveys five possible interpretive positions, each of which must import or extract some "master text" to resolve this disjunction (6-7).

[225] Lowe (2000).

[226] *Ibid.*, 23.

a good deal that 'is going to happen'." This is a powerful model for the reading process, and we can immediately see where dreaming fits in: the dreams in the novels are revelations to the dreamers, and through them the readers, of the *timeless* model of the "story" in the midst of their experience of the "narrative." Now, the "story" as such is that picture of the narrative which will only become completely clear at the end (Lowe speaks of a shift from a blurred image to a focused one). If the story *as a whole* is to have any significance, whether religious, emotional, or ludic, it must ultimately derive from *this* image. The meaning, that is, which we derive from the *temporal* model is imperfect, and is limited by space and time, by our present circumstances within the narrative; it becomes complete only when it has been fitted into this timeless "jigsaw puzzle." Furthermore, Lowe argues that the *tension* between these two models is the source of the affective power of plot.[227]

An essentialization, then, is some image or segment of the narrative flux which points to a greater portion of the "story" (sometimes the story in its entirety) than it occupies on its own. Such a narrative event is an extremely powerful means of manipulating the tension Lowe highlights, and dreaming is a particularly potent example of this. The dreams in the novels have the ability, like fiction itself, to present to the dreamer a narrative image that, though not "real," is nonetheless capable of revealing more of the structure of the *story* of which our lives are the *narrative* than experiential reality (bounded as it is by the spatial and temporal restrictions of "narrative") ever can. Put another way, a dream or a story can tell us more about the "story of our lives" than simply living them can, because they present the *holographic* picture which we will only obtain through experiential reality *in retrospect*. In this way, dreams (and stories) really

[227] *Ibid.*, 24.

can "tell the future." Within the novels, however, their purpose is emotional: by presenting "the whole picture" (or at least more of it) of the dreamer's story in place of the limited picture provided by the narrative flow of experiential reality, they provide an alternative appearance for the dreamer's life; assenting to that appearance (accepting that the dream is "true") is tantamount to changing one's outlook on life, and the dreams are thus able to effect an emotional change (which may be accompanied by a change in action). Yet this is precisely the relationship the *novels* have to our own lives: they present a *holographic* picture of life (and are thus, if accurate, more meaningful than our own sense data, which are, like the narrative level of the novel, temporally and spatially bounded), which, if we assent to it, has the power to change our thinking about the world around us. Why, however, should we ever assent to this appearance (beyond the duration of our projection into the fictional universe of the text)? Simply put, because the story model of the novel derives from the story model of the dreams, which in turn derives from divine providence; if we believe in divine providence in our own reality, we may assent to the appearance presented by the novels as the way things are, not only in the novel world, but in our own world as well. But that is an idea to which we will have to return in the next chapter.

We may turn now to an examination of the manner in which the dreams in the novels perform this "essentializing" function. In Chariton's novel, Dionysius' first dream (2.1) as well as his "fantasy" that Callirhoe is being snatched from him (3.9), and Callirhoe's third, fourth and fifth dreams (3.7, 4.1, and 5.5) all repeat or predict some particularly important event in the novel in a simplified narrative form.[228] If we turn to

[228] Cf. Auger (1983), who charts the use of dreams in a sort of backwards reflection of key moments in the novel's plot, from the point of Callirhoe's *Scheintod* to her reunion with Chaereas and the end of the novel;

the last of these, we can establish more clearly the relationship between the novel as object and the experience of dreaming. The night before Dionysius and Chaereas are to face trial in the court of the Persian king, Callirhoe has a dream. In it, she dreams that she is a maiden in Syracuse once more, and then that it is her wedding night, and she is about to embrace Chaereas; then she wakes up. To put it another way, Callirhoe has a dream in which she is back inside the existence which she has described a few books earlier as "a dream and a fairytale." When Callirhoe tells this dream to her maid Plangon, she interprets it to be a prediction of the future: just as it happened in the dream, so will it happen in reality ("ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄναρ ἔδοξας, οὕτως καὶ ὕπαρ"). So she tells Callirhoe that she should take heart and rejoice: "θάρρει, δέσποινα, καὶ χαῖρε." And Callirhoe, for her part, does just that: ἡ δὲ αὐτομάτως ψυχὴν εἶχεν ἱλαράν, ὥσπερ προμαντευομένη τὰ μέλλοντα, "And she began on her own to rejoice in her spirit, as if she foresaw what was to be." We have already observed that the remarkable fact about this dream, within the world of the novel, is its *emotional effect*, which stems from the alternate reality it presents to someone who is suffering, and that this image derives its power from its authority as a communication from the divine: it is, in other words, phatic and (emotionally) conative. What could not be observed before, because it depended on adopting a perspective *outside* the text, was that this dream is, in effect, a summary of the novel itself: its *message*, in other words, is a brief statement of the most salient points in the narrative.[229]

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see also Zeitlin (2003), 73, 82, and *passim* for a treatment of how dreams fit into the pattern of "optical events" in the novel.

[229] Cf. Auger (1983): "Le début et la fin du récit se condensent dans cette vision de songe, qui fait ainsi voir la circularité de la narration" (50).

The emotional effect of this dream depends upon three concomitant facts: 1) the substance of the dream is Callirhoe's past, which was very real at the time, and during which she was happy; 2) the dream comes to her at the very nadir of her misfortune, at a time when all seems quite bleak; this is obvious from her lament which precedes her dream; 3) the representation of her past, at this time and in the narrative mode of *dream*, is interpreted as a prediction of a return to her former happy state. We have here, then, a beginning, a middle, and an end: the beginning, which is the *message* of the dream, is Callirhoe's first marriage; the middle, which is both implied by the end of the dream and made real by Callirhoe's state upon waking, is the *separation* which is, in effect, the substance of the story, "what happens," and without which we would not have a story at all; the end, which is the *meaning* of the dream, in which Callirhoe will return to her husband and her home, and everything will be as it was before, or better. This dream thus points to what Frye has outlined as the basic structure of "romance": a *descent* from a happy state of "identity" to an unhappy state of "alienation," followed by a return to "identity."[230] It is, in effect, a communication from the gods (who are, presumably, in charge of both "planes") to a protagonist on the "demonic plane" of reality and which refers to the "idyllic plane." It reminds this protagonist of her former existence on that idyllic plane, and in so doing also promises a return to that world.[231]

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[230] See Frye (1976), 54; MacAlister (1996) is particularly concerned with the idea of "identity" as the central concerns of the novels (e.g. 32); she conflates, however, the more general meaning of "identity" as it is used by Frye ("Identity means a good many things…") with the more limited idea of *self-identity*, which leads her to force dreaming to conform to her model as "…a tool for understanding..." in which "…the sought-after understanding relates to the sphere of the self" (42). This, in turn, leads her to argue that the dreams were part of the means by which "…the novel constantly communicated the contemporary social question *Who am I?*" (112). As neat as this formula is, we have only to hold it against the light of the various dreams discussed here to see that "who am I?" might as well be the last question on the protagonists' minds when they experience their dreams.

[231] This descent-ascent formula is universal to the ancient novels, and indeed to everything which Frye would recognize as "romance" (a great many works). The final book of the *Metamorphoses* is a perfect

This basic structure, then, is what we discussed in the previous chapter as the revelation of some alternate perspective on reality to the dreamer; something which is at once "unreal" in the sense of being outside the dreamer's experiential reality, but which nonetheless provides a pattern into which that experiential reality may be fitted, and thereby changes the dreamer's attitude towards the events in his or her life. The dreams thus point, not to any particular piece of information, but to the various parts of the novel which are known to the god/author in charge of its structure, but are either unknown or forgotten by the dreamer, without which some other, known part of the novel may not be fully understood. At the same time, they put the dreamer and readers in touch with the divine authority as the source of this structure. The metalingual function of the dreams is thus performed by 1) pointing to the essential structure at the heart of the novels, and thereby *essentializing* the events that take place in them; 2) indicating that the source of this structure is a *divine authority*; 3) modeling the emotional effect that the realization of this structure and its source in one's own life has on the characters of the novels and, by extension, its readers. So within the world of the novels, as we saw in the previous two chapters, the four causes of the dreams are 1) a divine origin (the efficient cause); 2) the presentation of some reality not available to the dreamers, but without which the pattern of the events in their lives cannot be understood (the material cause); 3) the presentation of this during a "fictional" experience, i.e. in a form that is "unreal" (the formal cause); 4) taken together with the "reality" to which it is opposed, the pattern this creates results in a

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example of this (this will be discussed further below); Heller (1983), however, has interpreted that work specifically as representing a Platonic dualist division of the cosmos in its division between the idyllic and demonic planes. It may of course be the case that the form of romance appealed to the Platonist Apuleius for precisely this reason, but if that is the case, the simple structural problems here suggested still stand: why is there no reassuring dream earlier in the novel? Where is Isis before Book 11? We may accept that the first ten books represent a demonic or tawdry world for the contrast it creates with the final book, but why is this world so completely isolated from the divine that even the intermediaries of the gods, the *daimones* seem malevolent until the very end? Platonic dualism will not explain the problem away.

reordering of the emotional state, and thereby (sometimes) the actions, of the dreamer (the final cause). Within the author/reader communication, however, the dream is *metalingual* in function (the final cause), is composed of cross-references to other points in the novel (the material cause), puts the reader in touch with the author, who is the source of the dream (the efficient cause), without breaking his or her projection into the text, which it manages to do by taking the form of a fiction-within-a-fiction, thereby allowing the reader to contact an entity who is not really a part of the fictional world of the novel (the creator of that world) without leaving the world of the text. Since the final cause, however, is to perform a *metalingual* function, and since this is achieved in this particular case without interrupting the fictional world of the novel (i.e., because the alienation figure of the divinity/author is cleverly masked in a *dream*), the reader is simultaneously put in the position of the dreamer, and what is true of the *dreams within the novels* becomes true of the *novels within the reader's world*.

If we turn to the other novels, we can observe this metalingual essentialization at work, and provide further support to this theory. In Xenophon of Ephesus, all three of the dreams combine disparate episodes of the action of the novel and present them to the dreamers in symbolic form: Habrocomes' fallen status during his search for Anthia, similarly fallen, is represented in the simple form of a horse chasing another horse, only to become human when they are united (2.8);[232] Anthia, near the end of the novel, dreams what is in effect the plot of the novel since their separation, in a very simplified form, and misinterprets the dream (not knowing that, like Callirhoe's similar dream, it foreshadows her return to the happy state which has been interrupted) because she does not recognize

[232] Cf. Schmeling (1980), 47; I disagree, however, with his assertion that this is an explicitly sexual metaphor.

the happy ending it implies (5.8). Tyche wreaking havoc on them is represented, near the beginning, by an icon of the goddess herself, actually attacking their ship (1.12); this is very similar to the dream with which Clitophon begins his narrative, and is thus one of the few examples of a "bad dream." The ending of the dream, however, as well as our conclusions drawn from the very fact of this dream if we follow Clitophon's dream theory, suggests the happy ending which is temporally separate from this disaster, but which when brought into relation to it changes its significance completely.

In each of the examples, then, the dream presents, once again, a tripartite structure of beginning, middle, and end: 1) the beginning, in which the dreamer is happy (relative to his future state); 2) the middle, which is the disaster that will occur and its various repercussions; 3) the future which the gods wish to ensure the dreamer reaches, i.e., the eventual escape from the negative effects of the disaster which they are warning of. We have said that divine benevolence is implicit in the very fact that the gods are sending these dreams; so, too, is the "happy ending" which is a natural conclusion from that divine benevolence, and thus "bad dreams," as they appear in the Greek novels, are also summaries of Frye's basic descent/ascent plot structure. To put it another way, it operates very much like the generic expectations we have for a romance: the initial relationship between the love interests is fraught with tension for us, because we know that something is going to happen to shatter their happiness; at the same time, we know that everything will work out in the end.[233] Once the happiness has been shattered, we no longer look

[233] Schmeling (1980) sees these revelations of the ending as a flaw in Xenophon's technique: "…a little like telling the punch line of a joke before the joke" (90). He argues further that this interferes with our ability to sympathize fully with the protagonists. Yet we are without question able to sympathize fully with the protagonists of stories to which we already know the ending, more or less (thanks to generic convention); these conventions, moreover, seem to play an important role in ensuring our feeling of "safety" while exploring our anxieties, which is largely the point of reading fiction (see Oatley 2002, 63; see also the discussion in the following chapter). It is to this function that I connect this seemingly odd "spoiling" of the

forward to it with dread, but now look forward to the reconciliation of the lovers with a great deal of optimism, because we know it is inevitable. Without these generic expectations, of course, our experience of the genre would be quite different: the events might be shocking and then unimpressive, rather than sad and then joyous.

In Achilles Tatius, besides the "bad dream" already discussed, the most obvious examples are the twin dreams of Leucippe and Clitophon (4.1), which reveal the essential religious pattern of the novel's plot to the two protagonists.[234] In addition, however, we can see the same element of essentialization in the first dream of Clitophon (1.3—separation from the beloved, which is the basic idea behind this particular novel, and has even been read as the central idea of all of the novels, though in fact neither Heliodorus nor Longus exhibits a particular adherence to this pattern), and in the dream of Panthia (2.23—combining what is about to happen to Leucippe with what will eventually happen at the close of the novel: indeed, the defloration of Leucippe, had it happened at this point, would have made the rest of the novel moot; it is the prediction of this "resolution" and its subsequent suspension until the very end which form the basic tension of the novel plot).[235]

Nor are Longus and Heliodorus any different. In Longus we have perhaps the most striking examples of the essentializing form: every dream, even if it aims at some other ostensible goal in the furthering of the plot, manages to put its instructions into the

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plot, which is not limited to this oracle or this author, but occurs quite frequently in the novelists, and usually through dreams.

[234] This is another way of seeing what Reardon (1999b) remarks about regarding this dream (that it gets the novel back into a generic plot), one which includes the other details of the dream besides the command to remain chaste: it is at this point that the author, *qua* goddess, reveals to his characters (and readers) that they are in a Greek "romance," and thus that the basic plot outline will be like that of other such works (251).

[235] See Morales (2004) on thwarted desire (the theme of this dream) as an *essential* motif in this novel (123-126).

context of the plot as a tale of love, only consummated in the final words of the novel. Thus even Bryaxis' dream, for which the only parallel in any other novel is Theron's dream in *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, and to which the main point logically should be simply to tell the Methymneans to release Chloe and her flocks, not only goes into detail about the gravity of Bryaxis' action in interrupting the progression of the love between Daphnis and Chloe which provides the main "action" of the work, but even reveals that the reason Chloe is being rescued is that "Eros wants to make a story out of her" (2.27).[236]

The implication of this for the reader is significant: the author has put on the mask of Pan, and told Bryaxis while we watch that the story we are reading is being engineered by Eros, that everything that is happening is for the sake of the erotic plot which ties the work together, and will end with the consummation of Daphnis and Chloe's love in the final words of the novel.[237] Pan has revealed to Bryaxis something about the novel which cannot have the slightest relevance for him, since all he need know is that the god wishes him to put the girl ashore; its relevance is, rather, for the readers of the novel and for the characters with whom it is centrally concerned. With respect to them, it is an *essentialization* of their experiences, boiling them down to the simple truth of their relevance from the divine perspective: as a representative example of the universal pattern of love.[238] That is the *point* of the novel, and it has nothing to do with war between Methymna and Mytilene, so Chloe must be released; this is, in other words, an interpretation of the novel. This pattern is repeated in other dreams; when the Nymphs appear to Daphnis to tell him where he can find a dowry, they mention at the end, quite

[236] Cf. MacQueen (1990), 86-87.

[237] Cf. Cueva (2004), 94.

[238] Cf. Morgan (1994b), 74.

unnecessarily (since it is a fact that has already been drilled into our heads and Daphnis' on several prior occasions) that Eros is taking care of the rest of Daphnis' concerns: in short, that the *telos* of the novel, the consummation of Daphnis' and Chloe's love, is under divine management.[239]

Divine management seems to be the point also to Heliodorus' novel,[240] whose final book is, in the words of Reinhold Merklebach, "a long, elaborate aretalogy about the miraculous workings of the sun god."[241] We are reminded here a little of Apuleius' novel, which Roger Beck has paired with Longus and Heliodorus as the third novel with a clear religious framework.[242] Certainly it is that, and as in Apuleius, the main source of information the characters have for understanding the divine role in their lives seems to be the numerous dreams.[243] Thus the religious interpretation given the events of the novel

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[239] For this management of events by Eros as the point of the story, see Reardon (1994): "These elements…contribute, and are meant to contribute, to an impression that the story is impregnated with a theology, an 'erotic theology' in the sense of a theology of Eros-Dionysus. It is Eros who makes shepherds of Daphnis and Chloe, who reunites them, who authorizes their marriage. Whether in his own person or through Pan and the Nymphs, Eros watches over everything they do, and sometimes he actually guides them. Eros sets in motion and controls the progress of Daphnis and Chloe as he sets in motion and controls the natural world that they are part of. It is initiation into his mysteries that we are concerned with, even if this is a metaphor" (139); see also Hunter (1983), 31.

[240] Cf. Sandy (1982b), 52; 54.

[241] Merklebach (1994), 290; see also Dowden (1996), who defends a "religious" (though he prefers "philosophical") reading of this novel; but see Morgan (1989a): "I do not see this…as a religious 'message' to the novel…" (319); Bowie (1999): "…we are not entitled to assume that this [religious intensity] was the writer's chief concern" (55). My own sense is that it is not the "chief concern" so much as the chief means of achieving the emotional effect which *was* the chief concern.

[242] Beck (2003), 140.

[243] Simply in terms of numbers, there is one oracle that is largely irrelevant (2.26) and one oracle which is analyzed repeatedly, and which requires a dream to interpret fully (2.35, 3.11 and passim); there is one dream-like vision which Calasiris insists was a real epiphany, though his reasoning for this assertion is rather ridiculous, and the veracity of it is mediated by the fact that he, a secondary narrator, is telling the tale to secondary narratee (it is not, that is, the primary narrator who makes this assertion, nor is it directed at the primary narratee/reader; 3.12). The source of Calasiris' knowledge that he was to witness his own sons' potentially mortal battle is not explicitly given, but we may assume it was an oracle or something similar (2.24). There is an instance of necromancy (6.14). Two more dreams are accompanied with some doubt as to whether they were not, in fact, "real" (8.11); finally, the gymnosophists in the tenth book seem to have some special knowledge of the divine which allows them to intuit divine intent. Taken together,

in book ten is an extension, for the most part, of an interpretive scheme that is given to the characters in their dreams, among a few other sources. Besides this more general relation between dreaming and interpretive summary, however, there are a number of actual dreams in the novel that are precisely that: interpretive summaries. Calasiris' "vision" (3.11),[244] Charikles' dream (3.18; 4.14), and Theagenes and Charikleia's dreams in book eight (8.11), for example, are all variations on the plot summary outlined in the oracle given, unasked, at Delphi (2.35) which, nonetheless, is opaque in meaning without the more explicit message given in these dreams.[245] Perhaps most interesting, however, is Calasiris' dream of Odysseus (5.22), which might seems extraneous to a reader inattentive to the *interpretive* role of dreaming in relation to the novel as text: Odysseus appears to Calasiris and informs him that he will suffer hardships like his own, but that Penelope has deep respect for Charikleia, for her adherence to a model of chastity very like Penelope's own. This dream presents Calasiris, and by extension the reader, with an interpretive model for understanding the experiences of Calasiris and Charikleia (they are like those of Odysseus and Penelope, respectively).[246] The poor fit between model and data only emphasizes how much must be lost in this sort of schematization and summary: Calasiris is more like Charikleia's father than her husband, and she travels with both him and her "husband," rather than waiting for them at home. Yet the suggestion that this is

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these various sources represent at most eight instances of religious knowledge through other channels than dreaming; by contrast, there are at least seven dreams that are clearly religious; if we include the three dubious epiphanies mentioned above, there are ten dreams to only five alternative sources of information.

[244] For the quotation marks, see Sandy (1982, 143 and *passim*) whose argument suggests that Calasiris' digression is mere sophistry and is neither a valid reading of Homer, nor substantiation for his claim.

[245] Cf. Morgan (1994): "The obscure oracle is in fact a predictive armature around which the whole future course of the plot is built" (108).

[246] See note 150 above; thanks to James Rives for pointing out that this parallel too suggests divine oversight in their lives, since Odysseus and his family were also cared for by a goddess (Athena).

an appropriate model for interpreting the novel reveals the salient points of the narrative, from the authorial (and thus divine) perspective: Calasiris will suffer many hardships, Charikleia will remain chaste until she is united with the "right" person.[247]

In the *HART*, the one dream is not a summary, but an explicit command, and it is thus in a similar vein to, for example, Hydaspes' dream which led to the conception of Charikleia. It is important to emphasize, however, that this dream is nonetheless a quite deliberate communication *to the reader* of a point important for the interpretation of the novel: namely, that it is the *gods* who are directing Apollonius towards a happy ending of reunion with his whole family and repossession of his power and property.[248] This becomes apparent as soon as we realize that there is nothing in the least bit *necessary* about the dream in explaining the actions which lead Apollonius to reunion with his wife.[249] Thus, since the dream has no role in explaining the events to a reader, it must have some role in explaining their meaning, and in this role its function is obvious: it indicates that Apollonius' happy ending is no mere matter of chance, but something seen to by the gods. It reveals to us, retrospectively, that we are to understand his narrow escapes, and the many twists and turns that have ensured his arrival at this point, as the result of divine providence.

In Petronius, we face a very different situation. All three of the actual dreams in the remaining fragments of his novel present a nearly identical pattern: an antagonist is given information in a dream which leads to the apprehension and punishment of

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[247] See earlier…where these same points were made, but from the perspective of their *purpose* for the characters.

[248] See e.g. Kortekaas' (2004) summary of the plot: "…after many vicissitudes, the whole family, thanks to the help of the goddess Diana, is happily reunited" (3).

[249] See above, page 52.

Encolpius and his companions. In contrast with the very "real" results of these dreams, there is a repeated denial on the part of various protagonists of the power of dreams to reveal anything "real." All of this was outlined in the first two chapters; here we should observe that these dreams, though not plot summaries, nonetheless function to communicate to the reader a number of very important points for his interpretation of the novel: first, that the protagonists' seeming optimistic attitude contrasts with the harsh reality revealed in the dreams of others; second, that the gods are against them. The interpretive model they provide is thus one of human folly (perhaps even intentional naïvete) in the face of divine hostility, as opposed to the model of divine benevolence helping the protagonists through grave difficulties to a happy end which we find in the Greek novels.[250] The former model is quite clear in Apuleius' novel up until the eleventh book, and it is the contrast between the hostile gods of those books and the benevolent god of the final book that has led to such conflict around the interpretation of this novel in particular. So, for example, Charite's dreams reveal a divine power that is not offering her solace, but allowing her rather to glimpse death before it arrives; most notably of all, the very first pair of dreams in that novel shows a "reality" to Socrates and Aristomenes that lies hidden behind their optimistic outlook on life, and which, once understood by Aristomenes, leaves him unable to lead his life without overwhelming fear and depression.

Thus the dreams in the novels, though not perfect summaries, are nonetheless capable of *essentializing* the events of the novel in as much as they tell us something that is capable of coloring our interpretation of them, indeed, of allowing us to fit them into a

[250] The folly may reflect the parodic presentation of the protagonists' attempts to assimilate their tawdry lives to sublime literary models; see Conte (1996), 149-150.

larger, more schematic understanding of life in general. The same can be said for the majority of the dreams in the Greek novels, even those that do not summarize by any stretch of the imagination. Examples of this in Chariton are Callirhoe's dream of Aphrodite (2.3) and her first dream of her husband (2.9). We know very little of the content of the former, simply that she saw Aphrodite and so decided to pray to her; because of this, she runs into Dionysius at the shrine, and he mistakes her at first for the goddess herself. The latter is, of course, responsible for Callirhoe's decision to marry Dionysius, since it is Chaereas' "vote" in this dream that provides the deciding factor in her debate whether to abort her child and (perhaps) kill herself or to keep the child and marry Dionysius for its sake. The dream of Aphrodite seems utterly unnecessary: there is no reason why Callirhoe should not return to the shrine to pray again, and thus an explanation of her motivation is extraneous unless it serves to indicate that the goddess is managing even the minor detail of the location of Dionysius and Callirhoe's first meeting.[251] And the second, as well, simply gives divine voice to an idea that Callirhoe could easily have arrived at on her own: that it is more important to save Chaereas' child than to remain faithful to him. By casting the reason for these two decisions in a dream, however, Chariton reveals to his readers that these choices are part of an *essential* framework of religious presence in human interactions. Without summarizing, then, they nonetheless point to an important scheme operative in the novel, and thus aid in our understanding of the complex events unfolding before us.

Finally, Theron's dream at the beginning of *Chaereas and Callirhoe* provides a perfect example of the essentializing role of dreams. It is scarcely narrated at all; we

[251] For an interesting argument on Aphrodite as managing goddess and the symbolism of this for a citizen of Aphrodisias, see Edwards (1994).

remarked earlier that this makes it clear that the point of the dream *within the novel* is its conative function.[252] What is the function of it for a reader? A few moments' reflection reveals that the point just before the dream is the greatest danger Callirhoe is ever in: she is, it seems, about to be drowned. At that very moment, a divine power intervenes and keeps Theron from acting on his plan for a day, during which Callirhoe safely changes hands and is under the protection of Dionysius' household virtually until she is reunited with Chaereas. Yet this divine intervention is scarcely necessary, but for the fact that Chariton has contrived to have Theron have a difficult time selling Callirhoe at first, and then miraculously sell her the day after resolving to give up. Nor was it necessary even then, since it would be simple enough for Theron to decide to change his mind in the morning, with or without a dream. The whole situation seems to have been contrived, then, not simply to create suspense or make the reader afraid for Callirhoe, but rather to make the point that Callirhoe *will not die* because the gods are on her side. Chariton, under the guise of the gods, is essentially saying to Callirhoe (in the words of Artemis to Leucippe): "do not cry, you will not die, for I will be your protector." Except, of course, that Callirhoe, as far as we know, never hears a word about this dream: instead, it is clearly meant for the audience of the novel, for the Callirhoe that each of us becomes in reading her story sympathetically.

All of the dreams in Xenophon of Ephesus are, as we have seen, summarizing; in Achilles Tatius as well, with the rather inscrutable exception of Leucippe's dream of her poisoner, all of the dreams serve to reveal the basic optimistic structure of the novel as a whole to each of the characters whom it might concern. Longus fits even more

[252] Perry (1930), in his left-handed encomium of Chariton, though he spends a great deal of time discussing the adventures and characterization of Theron, skips over this dream as though there were a lacuna in his text (121), which indicates both how brief it really is and how different our own reading of such events is from an ancient's (for whom, I suspect, the dream would have been the crux of the passage).

completely: even the fictive dream of Lycaenion, were it real, would reveal to Daphnis, and thereby to readers, the divinely managed structure of the novel as a whole (i.e., Eros, in collaboration with the Nymphs, initiating Daphnis and Chloe into the mysteries of love, though stopping them short of intercourse until their wedding, which will also be managed by the gods, and will occur concomitantly with the discovery of their place in elite society).[253] In Heliodorus, finally, we have already discussed how even the simplest dream (Hydaspes decidedly *non*-summarizing dream commanding the conception of Charikleia) is nonetheless metalingual, and we can here observe that this metalingual function is achieved by pointing to the structure of divine management which underlies the entire narrative. Charikleia's bad dream in the cave, too, though scarcely a summary, nonetheless operates much as do the bad dreams in Achilles Tatius and Xenophon of Ephesus. The remainder of the dreams (with the exception, as in Longus and Achilles Tatius, of the extremely rare psychological dream) all summarize the novel plot in terms relevant to the emotional state of the dreamer before all has been revealed, and thereby show the divine hand in managing the optimistic structure of difficulty overcome which is not yet apparent (but will be) to the dreamer. This is nicely illustrated even in the seemingly pointless dreams (they are misinterpreted, have no effect whatsoever on the outcome of events, and, but for the theory here offered, would seem to be completely extraneous) of Hydaspes and Persinna, foretelling the return of their daughter (9.25, 10.3).

Finally, we can observe that the comments on dreams, as well as the fictive dreams and the "daydreams," also point to this metalingual, essentializing function for

[253] See Chalk (1960): "That marriage was an initiation and initiations were marriages was a familiar example of the kind of allegory dear to the ancients; and our initiation is fulfilled at last by the marriage of the initiates, which completes the revelation of Lykainion-as Longos shows by recalling her name in the closing words of the work (iv 40)" (44).

dreaming in the reader-author communicative act. We have already pointed this out in the case of the fictive dream of Lycaenion in Longus. In Chariton, the interpretation, in particular, of the King's fictive dream points, as we have seen, to the idea that the gods are in control of the dreams and the events in the novel; for a reader, it also indicates that the dreams in the novel, even those of antagonists like Theron or the King, may fairly be taken as expressions of the basic *religious structure* into which the characters' adventures may be fitted: so Chaereas, believing that the dream is real, interprets his adventures as if he were an *Encolpius*, hated by the gods "καὶ ὄναρ καὶ ὕπαρ," the very phrase used by Leonas to describe the good fortune which Dionysius' *summarizing dream* foretold (6.2; 2.1). Arsake's fictive dream, finally, would also be convincing even if it were real; she is, undoubtedly, the sort of anti-hero represented sympathetically by Petronius in the character of Encolpius, and a dream expressing the anger of the gods could very neatly point to the divine perspective on her "plot," in particular to the sticky end to which she will come. This would make her a character very similar to Thisbe, who has interfered in the happiness of a sympathetic character, and whose demise is thus orchestrated, at the same time as the safety of Charikleia, in Thyamis' dream. All of this points the reader to the basic pattern of the novel, in which the "good guys" end happily, the "bad" unhappily, all because the gods are in control.

One of the recurrent hints at a parallel between dreams and fiction is the use of the verb ὀνειροπολέω to describe the active creation of fantasies by characters in the novels; this occurs in Chariton as well as in several other authors. In Chariton, when Theron runs into Leonas and tells him about Callirhoe, whom, he suggests, Leonas could buy for his master. Leonas then responds: "θεός μοί τις" εἶπεν "εὐεργέτην σε κατέπεμψεν· ἃ γὰρ ὠνειροπόλουν ὕπαρ μοι δεικνύεις." "Some god," he said, "sent you to me as a

benefactor: for the very things I was dreaming of, you show me in reality." Leonas, as we know, will soon echo this very sentiment to Dionysius, when he tells him that he is "lucky, both awake and dreaming," because of what he, Leonas, is about to tell him. Here, however, it is not the dream that is god-sent, but the reality which corresponds to it; Theron, Leonas says, must be sent by some god. There are two ideas in this reaction which support the analysis of dreams in the novels here proposed. First is the nature of the "daydream," which is a phenomenon halfway (as we have seen) between dreaming and fiction, with characteristics of both. It is fictional, "unreal," yet is the creation of a human author rather than a god, and takes place while awake rather than asleep. What marks it as particularly "dreamlike" is its projection into the future, and its creation, in that hypothetical future, of a "happy ending," a resolution, that is, of current difficulties. The second point to make is that Leonas, on discovering that his "dream" is *coming true*, assumes that the gods are responsible for this: he thus simultaneously admits that the dream was his own creation, and recognizes that, in his world, the fulfillment of just such a fictional structure is evidence of a divinely governed pattern at work: that happy endings, in other words, are *dreams* when they have not yet occurred, but are divinely orchestrated when they do. Given that *actual dreams* are also taken to be divinely orchestrated, this reference points very strongly to the idea that a dream is a summary of the structure of events guided by the divine, and that such a structure, when revealed in a dream, is therefore both evidence of the divine and an interpretation, from this divine perspective, of the real events of the novel.

This verb is used in Achilles Tatius by the "widow" Melite to describe, in retrospect, the folly of her wishes for a happy life with Clitophon: οὐκέτι δέομαι πολλῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ γάμου μακροῦ, ὃν ἡ δυστυχὴς ὠνειροπόλουν ἐπὶ σοί. "I no longer ask for

what I once dreamed of: many days and a long marriage to you." Melite, like Callirhoe describing her past, contrasts her unhappy reality (she describes herself as δυστυχὴς) with the fantasy she created of a happy life with Clitophon. That life is summarized in a few words: many days and a long marriage. Is this not, though, precisely the "happy ending" which characterizes the Greek novels? She creates a fantasy of a long marriage to the one she is love with, and thus fictionalizes her own life as a Greek novel; this process of creating an idealized love story is called "dreaming," though here, again, the agent/author of the dream is the dreamer, and is thus human, so this dream has as much in common with fiction as it does with a dream. And Melite contrasts this fictional fantasy with her own reality, in which she is misfortunate. As she is a minor character, and thus not one on whom a reader projects himself or herself particularly extensively, this failure of her "dream" to "come true" does not communicate a bleak message for our own lives; it does, however, emphasize the parallel between fictional creations like the one we are reading and the dreams and fantasies of the characters contained in them, and thereby suggests that the one, when god/author-sent, may summarize the other from the divine/authorial perspective.

Longus also uses this verb, twice in fact, to describe fantasies created by the "dreamer," which have an interesting relationship to the novel itself. The later instance occurs after Daphnis has been recognized as the son of Dionysophanes, and is caught up in all of the hubbub surrounding this discovery; Chloe feels abandoned, and laments her fate: "Ἐξελάθετό μου Δάφνις. Ὀνειροπολεῖ γάμους πλουσίους." "Daphnis has forgotten me. He is dreaming of rich marriages." Chloe feels as though she has been left behind by Daphnis as he enters his happy ending, which has come a bit sooner than her own; he has, that is, left her reality and become a part of a separate story. She is convinced, then, that

his *dreams* are no longer about her, that the fulfillment he seeks is no longer union with her. In this anxiety, she reveals the nature of their relationship, which up to this point has *dreamed* of a consummation of their love; this can be seen from the dreams which, we are told, visit them at night, in which they go further together in their lovemaking than they dare while awake. Thus the happy end of their dreams, which has yet to become real, is the consummation of their love. Now, however, Chloe is afraid that Daphnis no longer shares this dream; her anxiety is that, now that he is rich, his happy end must be a *rich* marriage, not a marriage to her; in fact, as the previous paragraph about Daphnis makes clear, he is still in love with her, and still harbors his dream of marrying her. The fantasies actively created by the characters are thus parallel both to the plot of the story, since they aim at the very end which will become the conclusion to the novel, and to the dreams which work again and again in this novel to bring them together. A link is thereby made between human-made fictions of happy endings and god-sent dreams of happy ends.

Longus has already used the verb earlier, however, shortly after Daphnis has convinced Dryas to betroth Chloe to him; Dryas then proposes this to Lamon, but Lamon is hesitant, and tells Dryas that he should be aware that "you are eager for a son-in-law who is better than us" (σπεύδεις περὶ μειράκιον κρεῖττον ἡμῶν). Dryas is perplexed by this, and goes away wondering what it could mean:

> Ὁ δὲ Δρύας οὐ παρέργως ἀκούσας τὸν ὕστερον λόγον τοῦ Λάμωνος ἐφρόντιζε βαδίζων καθ' αὑτὸν ὅστις ὁ Δάφνις. "Ἐτράφη μὲν ὑπὸ αἰγὸς ὡς κηδομένων θεῶν· ἔστι δὲ καλὸς καὶ οὐδὲν ἐοικὼς σιμῷ γέροντι καὶ μαδώσῃ γυναικί· εὐπόρησε δὲ καὶ τρισχιλίων, ὅσον οὐδὲ ἀχράδων εἰκὸς ἔχειν αἰπόλον. Ἆρα καὶ τοῦτον ἐξέθηκέ τις ὡς Χλόην· Ἆρα καὶ τοῦτον εὗρε Λάμων ὡς ἐκείνην ἐγώ; Ἆρα καὶ γνωρίσματα ὅμοια παρέκειτο τοῖς εὑρεθεῖσιν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; Ἐὰν ταῦτα οὕτως, ὦ δέσποτα Πὰν καὶ Νύμφαι φίλαι, τάχα οὗτος τοὺς ἰδίους εὑρὼν εὑρήσει τι καὶ τῶν Χλόης ἀπορρήτων." Τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐφρόντιζε καὶ ὠνειροπόλει μέχρι τῆς ἅλω…

> "Dryas had not heard this last word of Lamon idly, and he thought to himself as walked along about who Daphnis might be: 'He was nursed by a goat as if the gods took care of him; he is handsome and in no way resembles the snub-nosed old man and the bald woman; he could even afford three-thousand drachmas, as many as a goatherd wouldn't be likely to have, even of wild pears. So was he exposed, like Chloe? Did Lamon find him, too, as I found her? Were tokens of recognition laid beside him, like those I found? And if these things are so, master Pan and dear Nymphs, perhaps this fellow will discover something also about Chloe's secrets when he learns about his own.' He thought and dreamed such things to himself all the way back to the threshing floor…"

When Dryas begins this meditation, the narrator calls it simply "thinking," ἐφρόντιζε, and that is what he does at first: he goes over everything he knows about Daphnis. At some point, however, he begins to speculate, and then moves from speculation to pure fictional invention: he imagines, following the purely speculative hypothesis that Daphnis was found with tokens like those found beside Chloe, that Daphnis, when he solves the mystery of his own birth, may find out something about Chloe's too. From the present circumstances, he constructs a fanciful happy ending, and so it is not surprising that our narrator adds a verb at the conclusion of this meditation: ἐφρόντιζε καὶ ὠνειροπόλει, "he thought and he *dreamed*." The active construction of a fantasy based in reality, a fantasy which concludes happily, is described as *dreaming*, and the parallel between dreaming and the creation of fiction is thus reinforced. There is more to it than that, however; Dryas invokes the deities who have been responsible for every dream in this novel, and the creation of his happy ending bears striking resemblance to the ending eventually brought about by an instruction given Dionysophanes in one of those dreams. Finally, we should note that the meditation, in its entirety is, in effect, a summary of the novel, which begins, like the plot of the novel, with Daphnis' exposure, and ends, as the novel very nearly does, with the discovery of Chloe's identity. Thus, the

daydream of Dryas forms a link between the novel itself and the dreams which fill it; both have the same purpose, the communication of divine meaning and mystery to the mind of the dreamer or reader. Like the fictive dream of Lycaenion, then, even this "daydream" plays the role of pointing to the optimistic structure into which the novel may be reduced, and revealing to the reader that it is directed by the gods, and thus that the dreams in this novel have the same function in Dryas' world (revealing a pattern which is operative in human life because of divine management, and into which experiential reality may be "essentialized") as the novels have in the reader's.

Finally, a number of the statements about dreaming in the novels support this theory. We have already discussed Callirhoe's alignment of dreaming and fiction; in the same novel, we also have Dionysius' assumption that the news Callirhoe will marry him is a dream. We saw in the previous section how this points to the idea that the gods are the source for all dreams; here we may add that it communicates to the reader the idea that "happy ends" are the material from which dreams are made, and that the appearance of such a pattern is thus evidence, whether in dream or in reality, of some god at work. We have seen that when Leonas has such an experience, knowing the "dream" to have been his own creation, his assumption is the *reality* is divinely orchestrated; Dionysius here, knowing that the "dream" is decidedly *not* his creation, but unable to believe that it is "real," attributes it, because of this optimistic pattern, to the gods. Thus the reader infers not only that the source of dreams is divine, but also that dreamlike structures, whether real or in actual dreams, reveal the management of the divine, and are thus, if real, to be read as evidence for a divine source for the pattern of life, but if in dreams, are to be read as the divinely created pattern to which life will, at their will, conform. When the novel eventually follows this pattern, the reader has thus been told, via the dreams

which predicted it, that the novel is evidence of divine management, and may even be led to believe that the same pattern governs his or her life if the implicit theology of the novels is accepted: this is a metalingual esentialization of the novel and extension of its essence from its imaginary world to the world of the reader.[254]

This same alignment of "happy ends" with god-sent dreams or god-sent realities as parallels to fictional narrative is clear also in Clitophon's reaction to the miraculous recovery of Leucippe from her first *Scheintod*, as well as his speculations about the source of her "madness" dream, and in his reaction to the news that she is dead in book 7 of Achilles Tatius' novel (*L&C* 3.18; 4.17; 7.5). It is clear also in Calasiris' prayer to see his loved ones (*Aeth.* 3.5), in Trimalchio's reference to daydreaming (*Sat.* 74.14), and most especially in the old woman's decision, in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, to wipe clear the effects of Charite's bad dream with the idealizing, *Greek-novel-like* story of Cupid and Psyche (*Met.* 4.27).[255] In each of these cases one or more of the following suggestions are made: 1) dreams and stories are both recognizable from the teleological structure to which they point; 2) the gods are the source of that structure in the case of dreams and reality; 3) the reality depicted by the structure may be more accurate than waking experience; 4) waking experience is eventually seen to conform to that structure; 5) when waking experience conforms to that structure, the gods are responsible; 6) the emotional reaction to the idea that such a structure may be applicable to our lives is the

[254] Another parallel, not a statement on dreaming *per se*, may be found in Daphnis and Chloe's reaction to the story of Eros narrated by Philetas in Longus' novel: they treat it as a *mythos* rather than a *logos*. Why? Because it contains a divine *epiphany*, which in their world is a characteristic of dreams, not waking reality (Bryaxis, for example, has to fall asleep to meet Pan in person). It too, then, like a dream is essentializing, and offers a religious framework for understanding the events of the novel; the other *mythoi* in the novel are, as well, essentializations of the plot; cf. Philippides (1980-1981): "The same development can be detected in the progression of the *aitia*, which thus parallel the plot" (199).

[255] Cf. Winkler (1985): "…the old woman presents a fairy tale that inverts the young woman's account of herself" (5); see also Schlam (1992), 98.

point of revealing it in the "unreal," i.e. fictional, modes of dream, daydream, or story. By reinforcing these ideas, the various passages in the novels on dreams, in addition to the dreams themselves, both *essentialize* the novel by pointing to its essential structure, and suggest a way of interpreting that structure; taken together, their function is thus *metalingual*, highlighting the narrative pattern of the novels and extending it as a divinely orchestrated possibility for the lives of the readers. *If a reader believes in these same gods*, or more weakly if he or she believes in divine providence in general, the emotional effect on the protagonists of the dreams may blend into the emotional effect of the novels on the readers.

There is another way of looking at this relationship between dream and novel, which will lead us to our next topic. We can, as above, begin with the novels, treat them as prior, and work inwards to the dreams to determine the role of dreaming within their structure; or we can begin with the dreams, treat them as prior, and move out from them to the novels: first we have the dreams, then the novels. This may seem nonsensical at first: the novels are not *dreams*, they simply include a lot of dreams.[256] But an author may refer to a summary of his plot, or point out an important idea and reveal it to his characters and readers, in one of two ways: he may create the novel first, and then act as critic of his own work, and boil down his ideas into a few basic plot developments and really key concepts, to make it clear exactly what he was aiming at with the work. Or, alternately, he may begin with a basic plot outline, and a few really key ideas about its significance in relation to more general patterns in human life, then expand these ideas, only revealing them in their essential form, in the guise of a god, at those moments when

[256] Lev Kenaan (2004), however, wants to argue something very much like: that Apuleius' novel (and perhaps the other novels—she says that the article is part of a larger work that extends her conclusions to the novels in general) derives its "textuality" from *dreams*. This, of course, as a theory of the origins of the novels, lies outside our area of inquiry.

the disasters of the plot, the gloominess of the misfortunes he is relating (or, in the case of the Latin novelists, the naivete and boundless optimism of the heroes) look like they may overwhelm his characters and readers alike. We can, in other words, take the idea of "essentialization" both ways: it can boil down a complex picture to a key idea or two, but it could also be the key idea or two that lies behind the complexity, that existed before the work of elaboration was undertaken. An artist may stand in front of his painting and point out for us the outlines he thinks particular revelatory, but he must also begin with those outlines, at least in mind if not on paper, before he begins to fill in color and detail.

From this perspective, we may find States' observation about the relationship between dreams and the "two adjacent kinds of narrative" particularly useful: "that of life itself, from which the dream borrows both its content and its contingent plot structure, and that of fictions, which are in a manner of speaking waking dreams designed for other people." The dreams in the novels, as we have seen, "essentialize" human waking experience from the perspective of both the gods in the novels and their authors (who are really one and the same). Thanks, however, to the identity between "life experience" as the novels are perceived by the protagonists (and by us as far as we are able to become protagonists) and "fiction" (and thus an even more organized essentializing structure), as the novels are perceived by readers, the novels themselves, in as much as they are "dreams designed for other people," contain the very dreams upon which they have imposed further structural organization. We may thus say, with the understanding that it is meant only in the complex form exposed by this discussion, that the dreams in the novels give direct clues to a kind of *deep structure* (to borrow a useful term from linguistics) which underlies the much more elaborate mimetic surface structure of the novels. In short, if the novels are dreams designed (i.e. refined and expanded) for other

people, and if the dreams in the novels themselves point to those original dreams, before they were (re-)designed, or after they have been deconstructed, then we may use them to investigate the logically subsequent questions: dreams designed for other people *out of what*, *by whom*, and most especially *to what end*?

We thus return to the points left in the second chapter with a framework for the interpretation of dreams from the frame of reference of the author-reader relationship: we argued there that *within* the novel, the dreams are divine communications with a primarily conative and secondarily phatic function; that they achieve this function by revealing to the protagonist (or reader) an alternate perspective on reality which is drastically different from their ideas about their current, experiential reality, and which thus offers reassurance in times of trouble, warning in times of comfort, but which in every case points to a benevolent divinity directing matters to a happy end (though this is more complicated in the Latin novels). From the reader's perspective, then, these dreams are communications from the author to his characters, and to the readers in their projection into the novels, of the *overall* pattern of the novel, which is essentially that outlined by Frye; this pattern is, however, tied by the dreams explicitly to the idea of religious authority as its source and emotional effect as its result. To say, then, that religion is the *point* of the novels is misguided: like the dreams they contain, their point is their (emotionally) conative effect; this will be explored in the next chapter. It would also, however, be a mistake to assume that the religious machinery in the novels is "mere convention"[257]: a universal pattern is a universal pattern in any case, but it makes a great deal of difference whether we ignore it as part of the generic form we are reading and

[257] See Winkler (1999): "It is mere convention, theatrical convention, that the 'higher' perspective is privileged and seems to prevail in the end" (454).

thus not worthy of conscious notice, or as explicit evidence of some benevolent designer of men's fates. In the first case, we have absolutely no reason to believe that a similar pattern may be operative in our own particular situation, whatever it may be; in the second, we have every reason in the world to believe it could, as long as we are more or less in agreement with the implicit theology upon which it depends. Thus the secondary phatic function of dream and novel, as well as the specific details of the authority it puts protagonists (and readers) in contact with, is also crucial to understanding these works, and this will be examined in the final chapter.

Marriage and Other Happy Endings

We will end this chapter by saying a bit more about this universal and essential pattern to which the dreams in the novels point as the core of the novels themselves. Out of approximately[258] forty dreams in the Greek novels, 25 are directly or indirectly concerned with the marriage of the protagonists. Judith Perkins has pointed to marriage as a central concern of the Greek novels, and has argued, moreover, that marriage serves as a symbol for social order: "The ideal romance, with its narrative focus on the couple, can be read as having a similar subtext—a celebration of the social order as epitomized by the central couple's union preserved through every circumstance."[259] She thus revises Konstan's argument that civic identity was in this period redirected into personal attachment: "In the transnational culture of the Roman empire, social identity began to be

[258] The number is approximate because some dreams may or may not be dreams; others are recurring or appear to more than one person.

[259] Perkins (1995), 48-9; compare Egger (1994), whose primary concern is, however, not with the socio-political significance of the marriage theme, but the implications of the depiction of marriage for women and a putative female readership: "…marriage is the social backbone of the romances and the focus of the love plots" (260).

perceived or imagined through the language of personal attachment and marriage. The romance used the trope of marriage to talk about social identity and social structures."[260] She argues that the Greek novels were not so much about love as social order: "Romance celebrated not so much the achievement of personal attachments as the bonds of social relations. One mark of the romance's idealizing nature was its fiction that these coincided."[261] We may observe, however, that this fiction of coincidence is not present in the entirety of the novels, but only in their endings.[262] What Perkins sees as straightforward "testing"[263] of an already extant social relationship, is in fact precisely this: the conflict between personal attachment and the bonds of social relations.[264] The drama, that is, of the novel is not that of a static relationship subjected to trial by fate, but of a sudden personal attachment wreaking havoc on social bonds until those who possess it are, as Perkins notes, "reintegrated into their society."[265] Thus marriage is the solution, precipitating or signaling the "ascent" to the "idyllic plane" (to use Frye's terms discussed above), to the problem which caused the "descent" to the "demonic plane," the

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[260] *Ibid.*, 66.

[261] *Ibid.*, 71.

[262] Cf. Morales (2008): "…it is only by reading teleologically—stressing the ending and downplaying the journey towards it—that we can read the novels simply as celebrating marriage" (41). Such a teleological reading is precisely what the dreams point to; it is the interplay, however, between this teleological vision (which we can equate with Lowe's *achronic model*) possessed by the author/gods and revealed through the dream the dreams they send, and the temporal vision of the narrative as a progression, produced by limited perspective on events, that accounts for their curious functions in the novels.

[263] Perkins (1995), e.g. 46.

[264] Cf. Morales (2008): "Much of the pleasure in the narrative comes from the *tension* between the destructive, willful, eros, and the cohesive, social bonds of marriage" (43).

[265] Perkins (1995), 26.

"alienation" of the protagonists: the conflict between a newly formed personal erotic attachment and the demands, expectations, loyalties etc. of society.[266]

To be fair to Perkins and her treatment of the subject of marriage in the novels, besides there being much to recommend her perspective, she also hints at the possibility of different approaches. Her notion that the central theme of marriage is the missing link between the seemingly private nature of the romance form and the quite convincing modern position that these novels must have been part of the way in which the elites "created and projected a sense of their society and their position in it"[267] is quite useful and will be returned to later. Moreover, she also suggests that the narrative shapes may be less static than some of her other statements would lead us to believe, when she summarizes Achilles Tatius' novel as "describing the metamorphosis of anti-social desire into a union underwritten by divine and paternal approval."[268] More useful still, however, is her use of Frye as well as her intriguing observation that the novel plot is structurally similar to an initiation rite, and her suggestion that the romance plot may thus be read "on one level" as "a story of initiation, a story of the individual's initiation into the social order epitomized in marriage."[269] The idea that the ancient novels bear a resemblance to initiation rites is, of course, by no means new,[270] but the (re-)placement of marriage at the

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[266] Cf. Egger (1994): "Matrimony is not only the sentimental focus and locus of sexuality for the central couples, but also the core of their moral integrity and identity. Emotionally, it stands for safety, belonging, homecoming…"(262).

[267] Perkins (1995), 42.

[268] *Ibid.*, 65; Chew (2000), however, reads the contrast between the protagonists' lack of interest in chastity and their eventual (imperfect) conversion to this ideal as *parodic*. I am inclined to side with Perkins, as well as with Reardon (1999; 258) and to say that the novel stretches the limits of the genre, and has comic moments, but is not completely parodic, and that the conversion, albeit through an outside force, to a more idealized pattern of sexual behavior is genuine, and is only postponed for greater effect. See page 254 below.

[269] *Ibid.*, 64.

center of this idea, as well as the simultaneous identification of the plot structure with Frye's descent/ascent approach and the overall purpose of the narrative with the idea of the affirmation of elite social structures, make this a valuable synthesis of theoretical positions.

Marriage, then, may be identified more generally with both the symbolic structure of initiation and with the social function of the creation and affirmation of social order and identity.[271] We will return to these ideas in the next chapter when we reconsider religion and emotion as the source and function of both dreams and novels. For the moment, however, it is important to stress that "marriage" is simply an efficient expression of and symbol for a more complex cluster of ideas, including sexuality and its social control, individual identity in relation to social hierarchy, the resolution of conflict between social and personal attachment, and (according to the most general interpretation offered by Frye), the triumph of life over death. This may be seen, for example, in the recitation at Athenian weddings of the phrase "I have banished evil and found good," which would likely be what any of the protagonists of the ancient novels would say if asked to summarize his or her experience in as brief a sentence as possible.[272] In its most essential form, then, marriage is the escape from the potentially negative power of the world, as exemplified in the ambiguity of *eros*, into the safety of society, through the integration and control of an originally biological force (sexuality) into a social framework.

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[270] It goes back, in various iterations, to the start of the 20th century; most recent is the interesting treatment by Lalanne (2006).

[271] With reference to Chariton's novel, see Edwards (1994); this argument is bit more difficult, however, when it is extended to other novels, which have a different divinity or group of divinities in charge, but nonetheless concern themselves with love, marriage, etc.; is the "love story" form simply particularly well suited to an elite in Aphrodisias (in which case, how do we account for its attraction to the other novelists?), or is it simply a coincidence that a form, which was found attractive for other reasons, coincided so nicely with the divinity who happened to be the patroness of Aphrodisias?

[272] Zaidman and Pantel (1992), 69.

In Chariton, both Dionysius first dream and Callirhoe's last are nothing more than the representation of their wedding days. Both are interpreted by a servant, and both are taken to represent a happy ending to their (current) grief. As essentializations of the novel, we could scarcely ask for better clues to its meaning: the core of the novel is an escape from sorrow and hardship through marriage. Yet that sorrow and hardship is only present in the first place because of a broken marriage: in Callirhoe's case because of her *Scheintod* in Syracuse, in Dionysius' because of the very real death of his first wife. The marital state is thus presented as a symbol of happiness, what Frye has called "identity," i.e. the state before anything happens in a romance plot, and after things have stopped happening.[273] Other dreams in the novel hold out the same promise, and point to the same basic structure behind the novel.[274] So, for example, Theron's dream in the first book, as we have seen, intervenes just as Theron is planning to kill Callirhoe; although the gods have allowed Callirhoe to be abducted and thus allow her "alienation," they will not allow it to be made permanent through death; that way is closed, as the shut doors tell us. When Dionysius is told that Callirhoe will marry him, he reveals a suspicion that some god has contrived this news as a dream to prevent his death, and the idea of marriage as an escape from death is thus reaffirmed. Callirhoe dreams that she rescues Chaereas from the pirates who attacked his ship, and so, indeed, she does, since Chaereas is only rescued from death at the last moment *because he is married to Callirhoe*.

In Xenophon of Ephesus, the very first dream is presented as a development of the oracle which sets the novel plot in motion. This oracle, however, though it predicts

[273] Frye (1976), 54.

[274] See also Alvares' treatment of the theme of love and marriage in this novel (2002); in particular, he suggests that the novel as a whole may function as a kind of education for the reader and (several characters in the novel) about the proper behavior of a husband at various stages in the progression of conjugal love.

doom and gloom, ends with the reintegration of Anthia and Habrocomes into their society. And this, as was argued in the previous chapter, seems to be what is meant by their escape by swimming from the burning ship in Habrocomes' dream. In his second dream, he is only transformed back into a man when he is reunited with the mare he is pursuing; there cannot be a better symbol for the idea of alienation ended by the reunion of the spouses, of identity lost and regained only when "marriage" is regained. Anthia, finally, has a dream *about her wedding night*, and when another woman drags Habrocomes off, thus interrupting the wedding, she resolves to kill herself. Yet this dream is, in effect, a reiteration of everything that has happened so far: Anthia and Habrocomes have had their marriage interrupted by another woman (*Tyche*, if Habrocomes' dream may be trusted, or Manto). When Anthia believes that this is truly the case, she resolves to commit suicide: once again we see that marriage and death are, in effect, complementary alternatives for the conclusion of the novel; one makes alienation permanent, the other ends it. This alienation, however, here as in Chariton's novel, is the result of *eros*, since the entire plot is precipitated by Anthia and Habrocomes falling in love. The oracle with which the novel begins thus provides in summary the same authoritative interpretive framework which is elaborated and offered piecemeal in the three dreams in the novels: Anthia and Habrocomes, *because they have fallen in love*, will suffer a great deal, but will eventually regain their identity and happiness, when they are reintegrated into society.[275]

[275] Cf. Schmeling (1980): "The real value of the response of the oracle, I believe, is to provide the reader with an outline of the plot of the story. The response provides an acceptable road map which Xenophon carefully follows" (27); see also 34; 47; 89.

In Achilles Tatius the story is the same: Clitophon's initial dream can be read differently at different points in the narrative,[276] yet the basic pattern is the same in each case: because of his attachment to a woman (achieved by Eros, who is the subject of the story, as the prologue makes clear), he will suffer great violence when she is separated from him. Eros is both the cause of the alienation, since he has become attached to a private person and thus someone beyond his and society's control, and the root of its solution, since his reunion with Leucippe brings about happiness every time it occurs; though it only truly brings identity when it has been accepted by society; that is the end of the story, and it is marriage as an alternative to death (which Leucippe would have had to suffer had she allowed him to make love to her without social sanction). Perkins has argued quite persuasively also that the dream of Panthia points to the same framework: "Her dream permitted Pantheia to rescue her daughter from a social death that her words show she considered worse than a physical one."[277] Thus we have here also the potential of Eros to cause death and destruction, a potential which can only be controlled through society as it is manifested in the "solution" of marriage. This is made quite clear also in the dream Leucippe narrates after her first reunion with Clitophon, which is here worth examining once again for what it reveals about the prominence of marriage. Artemis, we will recall, has appeared to Leucippe as she weeps for her own immanent death and said to her: "Do not be afraid, for you will not die; for I will be your protector and helper, and you will remain a virgin until I myself give you away in marriage, and no one will marry you except Clitophon." The goddess reveals in this brief passage the plot of the novel: Leucippe, who is in danger of dying because of her love for Clitophon, will not die, but

[276] See e.g. Bartsch (1989), 87; cf. MacAlister (1996), who makes this a distinction between allegorical and theorematic interpretations (77-78).

[277] Perkins (1995), 65.

will be allowed to consummate that love, but only by waiting until religiously/socially sanctioned union, i.e. marriage, which is thus here opposed to death, and the death-dealing potential of erotic love and sexuality.[278]

In Longus' novel the opposition between nature and society is far more explicit. The very first dream reveals that, *for the sake of their love*, Daphnis and Chloe must be sent into the countryside, and thus removed from society. Just as in the other novels, they face dangers in this extrasocial environment into which Eros casts them, but Longus' interest is on the process of falling in love more than on the problems love might cause and how they are eventually integrated into society, and thus the extrasocial world, though at times dangerous, is more generally idyllic. When dangers do erupt, however, the fears they evoke are once again quelled by dreams that point to marriage as the solution: when Chloe is kidnapped, Pan reveals that it is because of Eros' plans for her that he is intervening; when other suitors come for Chloe, the Nymphs reveal the location of a hidden treasure to Daphnis so that his love for Chloe may progress towards marriage; even the lie Lycaenion tells Daphnis to get him to have sex with her claims that she was instructed to seduce him in a dream so that he could make love to Chloe, but the violence of defloration as she describes it is precisely the thing that makes certain that they do not consummate their love until they are married (why Daphnis should be afraid to hurt her before they are married, but not after, is never explained).[279] Finally, it is only when Eros

[278] Chew (2000) claims that this imposition of the social demand from an outside force is evidence of parody (thus developing the location of "parody" largely in the sexual mores of the characters, suggested earlier in Durham 1938), and is in sharp contrast to the other novels (63); I remain skeptical on this point. The plots of the other novels differ significantly enough as to make it rather pointless to observe that there is no parallel for this. Only in Heliodorus' novel are there places where the comparison may be apt, and that work is peculiarly obsessed with chastity, even beyond the norms of the day (as is evident from the Meroites' surprise when Theagenes passes the gridiron test). In Chariton and Xenophon's novels, the couple are married in short order; in Longus, Daphnis and Chloe are only chaste because they do not know how to have sex (and then because Longus is afraid of hurting Chloe).

consents to their marriage and instructs Dionysophanes in the means of finding Chloe's father that their marriage can take place; the implication that Eros, as interested as he is in bringing these two lovers together, will only be satisfied with an ending in which his power is legitimately accepted into society, may seem strange, but points to the ambiguity of the emotion and the way the playing out of this ambiguity gives these novels their form: Eros may cause problems when it forces lovers to abandon society, but through marriage they may be brought back into society.[280] This in turn, as we have seen, is a prototypical representation of the problem of natural forces that may bring death and destruction, but when integrated into the social order through a ritual (in this case an initiatory one, since the natural force in question is an internal change in the individual members of society who fall in love), may be controlled and thus made part of our identity.

In Heliodorus the association of marriage with identity is made explicit through the representation of identity as "lineage" and Charikleia's insistence that she cannot make love to Theagenes until she regains her true parentage. The opposition between death and marriage is elaborately depicted in Charikles' dream about his foster daughter, in which she is abducted by an eagle and carried to a land populated by people with black faces. Charikles quite convincingly interprets this dream as foreshadowing Charikleia's death, and he thus laments for her while she is yet living; Calasiris responds by interpreting the dream as a promise of marriage, and this cheers Charikles up. In reality, of course, the dream represents neither death nor marriage per se, but the very plot of the novel, in which, because of her love for Theagenes, Charikleia will elope, abandoning her

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[279] See note 253 above.

[280] See Chalk (1960): "…[in] book iv…Town and Country are equally recommended and reconciled in a rite satisfactory to the claims of both nature and human society, the rite of marriage" (50).

society and thus exposing herself to many dangers; she will, however, eventually make her way to her true homeland, where she will achieve her true identity and simultaneously be married to her true love. The basic plot is thus, once again, similar to an initiation, in which the lovers must be removed from society, to return to a true identity, and to the assimilation of their love into society.[281] Erotic love is thus the cause of the plot and of the dream, in more than one sense of the word: it is *because of* the arrival of their sexuality and its expression in their love for each other that the lovers must be separated from society, and thus must face many dangers and hardships, but it is also *for the sake of* their love that they endure it all, and are at the end married and made happy. Love, then, brings them into conflict with society and causes their separation from it, the alienation or descent of the novel, but is also at the root not only of their return to society, but of their newfound identity as its representatives, as priests of the civic cult.

Other dreams in the novel reaffirm this. Calasiris' dream of Odysseus points to the *Odyssey* as a model for the plot of the *Aithiopika*, and that is, of course, a novel that is centrally concerned with the reclamation of marriage and identity as equivalent to the re-entering of society after many hardships suffered because of alienation from it.[282] Theagenes' dream in the cells of the villainess Arsake is in effect a restatement of the oracle, which Calasiris' first dream affirms and which points to the same ending as Charikles' dream of the eagle-abduction. Hydaspes' dream, finally, is a reminder that this

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[281] Cf. Morgan (1989a): "…the work ends with marriage, an affirmation of its profoundest social and sexual values. The marriage about to be enacted when the text closes is the end to which all the experiences of hero and heroine have been directed, and which alone can make their experience bearable and senseful. It is a sacramental ending to a novel which has elevated love to the status of sacrament. The last sentence of narrative coincides with the attainment of the novel's truest value: the consummation, under the auspices of marriage, of true love" (320).

[282] For the *Odyssey* as a model for the novels in general, see Morgan (2008), 220; see also Sandy (1982b), who draws up a number of similarities between the *Odyssey* and the *Aethiopica* specifically.

network of love and its social acceptance through marriage answer to a higher authority still, in the form of the divine forces guiding these events; it is they who decide when to make a marriage fruitful, and it is they who are able to engineer this complex plot for the sake of the polysemic ending, in which an end is brought to human sacrifice (a symbol of the necessity of human death), Eros is controlled and given social expression through marriage, the elite couple regain their identity in society, and become a model for social and religious order. To say, as Winkler does, that it matters little what the "Noble Message" at the end is so long as there is one does not follow from his proof that the theology involved is relatively flexible, and that no particular religious beliefs are being seriously recommended: the "Noble Message" is marriage and all that it represents; to say that the theology involved is unimportant, is as correct as saying in our modern world that it does not matter what religious authority pronounces two people husband and wife, so long as it is a marriage at the end.[283] It does make a great difference, however, whether that representative of social order sanctions the union or not: if not, the couple is left in the demonic plane of social alienation. Marriage, then, is here, as in the other Greek novels, a symbol for the control of nature through society, a mark of the triumph of life over death, a resolution of the conflict between individual and social attachments, and an expression of elite identity within the social order. It is this central idea to which most of the dreams in the Greek novels point as an essentialization of their plots, and it will thus be the emotions connected with this idea which the novels, like the dreams, explore,

[283] Winkler (1999): "It is mere convention, theatrical convention, that the 'higher' perspective is privileged and seems to prevail in the end. It is not that Heliodoros is any kind of believer but merely that he must employ beliefs to illustrate the comedy of composing a romance. There has to be some Noble Message or other at the end, any one will do" (349); Dowden (1996), however, challenges this sort of perspective quite persuasively. Winkler's argument, for all of its subtlety and cleverness, does not convince me: one has to ignore the many dreams, oracles, and signs in the novel, and the fact that they are attributed to a divine source, or else be the sort of religious skeptic that may be common enough today but was significantly rarer, I think, in the ancient world, to be convinced that all of Heliodorus' allusions to a religious order are simply the icing on a particularly splendid postmodern hermeneutic cake.

express, and create; it will, finally, be the religious ideology (such as initiation) surrounding marriage which they invoke as their source of authorization.

In Apuleius, by contrast, there are only four dreams that are even remotely related to marriage; we can learn as much about the role of marriage in the dreams of the Greek novels by this counterexample (and that offered by Petronius) as we can from the examples explored above.[284] Of the four dreams which take place before Lucius' conversion, only one is directly concerned with marriage: Charite's first dream, which is essentially a reiteration of the misfortune she has just suffered with the added detail that her husband is slain.[285] This is a direct contravention of the pattern of the Greek novel, where a character may interpret his or her dream to foreshadow death (though in fact it almost never does), but death itself never appears in a single dream.[286] Thus while we have what in other respects is a fairly straightforward example of the interrupted marriage theme, which we see also in Chariton or especially in Anthia's dream in Xenophon of Ephesus, for example, and while Charite's reaction is similar to Anthia's (both look for some way of committing suicide), Charite's dream, through this addition, alters the generic convention completely. When the old woman comforts her by telling her a story, we see once again the parallel between dreaming and storytelling: the emotional damage that can be done with a dream can be undone with a story.[287] That story, however, is only

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[284] Unless we follow Schlam (1992) and read Lucius' initiation in book 11 as "a kind of marriage" (21).

[285] See Papaioannou (1998) for a treatment of the marriage theme in Charite's story, especially this dream, and the tale of Cupid and Psyche; cf. Winkler (1985), who compares the alternate ending provided for Charite's life by the dream to the alternate ending for the novel provided by book 11: the crucial question is then "Is it real?" (52); this is precisely the question which we must ask of any new appearance of the world in relation to our flourishing, and thus *answering* this question—assenting to the appearance, or denying it—is equivalent to making an evaluative judgment, and thus to altering our emotional state: this is precisely the function of fiction (see the discussion above, pp. 68-69).

[286] Cf. Tatum (1979), 72.

undertaken after the old woman attempts to reassure Charite by telling her that dreams do not always come literally true. We observed in the previous chapter that this is an idea that is almost never mentioned in the Greek novels, and it seems equally out of place here, in a very Greek-novel-like plot of a young girl separated from her lover by pirates.[288] Its inapplicability is highlighted both immediately by the fact that the old woman has to resort to distraction rather than reassurance, and later on, when Charite's dream turns out to be, in a sense, true: Tlepolemus does die, and Charite eventually commits suicide because of it. This dream, then, is a perversion of the common marriage-themed dream of the Greek novel: where those dreams come to the dreamer in the midst of hardship and promise the triumph of life over death through marriage, even represent that marriage, this dream comes to a dreamer in the midst of hardship and promises an even worse hardship, the triumph of death over life: the end it represents is not the happy end of marriage, but the death of the bridegroom, and thus the termination, rather than the continuation, of life.[289]

The other three actual dreams in these first ten books are equally perversions of the idea of triumph over death and the integration of the individual in society which marriage and related dreams in the Greek novels represent.[290] Socrates' dream in book

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[287] Cf. Papaioannou (1998), 314, 318 and *passim*.

[288] The tale of Cupid and Psyche also greatly resembles a Greek novel, though it, unlike Charite's story, has a happy ending as well; see Mason (1999), 231.

[289] See Lateiner (2000) for an analysis of this theme of the broken or failed marriage; the vast number of marriage-themed stories, and their contribution to the cynical view of the world in the first ten books suggest that it is an equally important theme for Apuleius, though it is used differently; most intriguing of all is his suggestion that Lucius' Isis initiation can even be read as a marriage, of sorts; see note 284 above.

[290] Cf. Lateiner (2003), who argues that this is the way Apuleius characterizes marriage, which is, in fact, one of his central themes (especially in the embedded tales): "Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* elsewhere consistently figures marriage negatively—as a trap, a deceit, a source of misery" (235).

one is of his own death at the hands of a woman who calls herself his "wife," though his real wife has been abandoned because of her; Socrates has left society behind and entered the demonic plane where he is kept captive by this woman; he does not escape, however, but is slain by her in the deep of night, though he is allowed to think for a short time that it was only a nightmare. The dream of the baker's daughter (we never learn her name) as well as Charite's second dream are both similarly gloomy: in the latter, Charite's husband appears to her and reveals that the man who is now trying to seduce her murdered him; in the former, the baker appears to his daughter and reveals that his own wife has killed him through witchcraft by sending the ghost of a murdered man after him. Both dreams, then, talk about death rather than marriage, but a death which is brought upon its victim because of the failure of marriage conventions:[291] Charite's husband is slain for much the same reason that Callirhoe is (temporarily) slain, but he never returns and Charite really does commit suicide; the baker is slain because his wife violated the bonds of marriage (and thus of society) by committing adultery, and so he threw her out, and then refused to take her back.[292] All of these dreams, then, depict the dark side of which the dreams in the Greek novels are the light side; the failure of marriage, in other words, its inability to provide happiness, is precisely the antithesis to the idealized, structured world towards which the Greek novels progress, and is used to create the sense of collapsed order, of a

[291] Another way of looking at it, equally gloomy in my opinion, is suggested by Frangoulidis (1999a): that the death of Charite *is* a kind of re-marriage to the already dead Tlepolemus (602; 606), and thus that the marriage did not so much fail as continue even beyond the grave.

[292] It is interesting to note here that Bechtle (1995) has argued that the first ending of the baker's story (when he throws his wife out) is a kind of temporary return of the social order to the novel, and that the baker's speech shares certain features with the revelation (which occurs in a *dream*, we should note) of Isis (112). This would make the baker's story, like Charite's (which also has a false "happy" ending), temporarily a manifestation of a more "optimistic" pattern, and the role of dreaming in these first ten books is thus again emphasized, by the baker's daughters dream, as that of pulling back the curtain and revealing the ugly truth behind this optimistic, idealizing vision with clear parallels to the Greek novels.

world "unglued," which Shumate has shown to be the essence of Lucius' "crisis" leading to his "conversion."[293]

There is another idea, however, which is central to these dreams and which is particularly important for the dreams in this novel: the contrast between ignorance and knowledge, particularly as it pertains to death.[294] What is striking about each of these dreams is that it allows the dreamer access to information which would otherwise be, in some way, impossible to obtain. This is made especially apparent in the last example, when the baker's daughter learns about the manner of her father's death through a dream. This dream is, in fact, the answer to the skepticism voiced by the narrator on behalf of the *lector scrupulosus*, who might question how Lucius came by all the details of this man's death. Thus the central concern of these dreams seems to be not how a person is to be married, and thus to conquer death, but rather how they are to die (or already have died).[295] Ignorance of this detail of life is, of course, what keeps us hopeful, but also what fills us with dread, and so this is an alternative way of conquering fear: not by promising, as Artemis does to Leucippe, "you will not die," but simply by saying *this is how you will die*, or this is how so-and-so died.

This idea of ignorance and knowledge about death becomes even more important when we consider that it is the central idea of the mystery cult of Isis, and that it is thus the "solution" to the problem which the novel confronts, just as marriage is the solution to the problem played out in the Greek novels. Lucius' problem, his fatal flaw, is his

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[293] Shumate (1996), 44.

[294] Cf. Heller (1983) on the goal of both Isiac religion and Platonism, which he identifies with each other, being *knowledge of the supreme divine* (283 and *passim*).

[295] Though marriage and death are often compared; see, e.g., Papaioannou (1998): "…Apuleius suggests that marriage and death are complementary aspects of a single experience, namely the transition to the unknown" (318); cf. note 284 above.

curiositas: his desire to know things that cannot (or should not) be known.[296] It is this which precipitates his descent, just as it is *eros* in the Greek novels which precipitates the descent of the *Liebespaar*. It is also a problem which causes conflict between the individual and the social order, and here, too, the resolution lies in the integration of the problem into a socially sanctioned religious ritual: in this case, however, that ritual is the initiation into a mystery cult, one which explains the mysteries of life and death and thus offers *information* in the same way that marriage offers *sexual union* as its telos. Thus where the Greek novels can be essentialized through *marriage* and related structures, this novel is essentialized through *revelation of mysteries* and similar structures; because its dreams, then, are structurally revelations of how a person dies, they will stand in a rather perverted relationship to the dreams of the Greek novels and their concern with marriage, since death is a failure of "marriage" in as much as the latter stands for the triumph of life over death.

The dreams in Petronius, as I have said, though scarce, reveal if anything a preoccupation with the structure of *retribution*: all three of them are revelations to *antagonists* of the location of the protagonist and his friends, allowing them to be punished; in one case this is taken quite explicitly as an indication of divine wrath. Their form is thus still an essentialization, in as far as we can tell from our limited knowledge of the novel in its entirety: they present the idea of the protagonists running from an angered divinity who nonetheless catches him from time to time.[297] It seems,

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[296] On *curiositas* as a central theme, and the way this fits into Apuleius' Platonism, see DeFilippo (1999); see also Schlam (1992), 48.

[297] Regardless of whether that scheme is another illusion of the naïve protagonist rather than an assertion of the wiser narrator (Beck 1999, 65), though Lichas' dream would suggest that it is not, and even if this scheme gives no real order to a novel whose point is to be random and chaotic (Zeitlin 1999, 25), the fact

furthermore, that the divinity so angered is the god Priapus, who represents the domestication of sexuality; the novel is thus a twist on the central conflict of the Greek novels, that of erotic attachment with social obligation.[298] In the *Satyrica*, however, we have instead the conflict between uncontrollable sexuality (rather than erotic attachment to a specific object) and social constraints: thus the descent seems to have been caused by an insult to the god Priapus, some sort of sexual violation; we may assume that the ascent, if it occurs at all, will be the solution of this problem, the appeasement in some manner of the insulted social mores. In any case, the central idea emphasized by the dreams is related to marriage, but only in as much as Encolpius' sexual violation contravened the rules of marriage: his exile from society, to the demonic plane is thus essentialized in dreams which point to a protagonist who flees unsuccessfully from divine wrath.[299]

The one dream in the *HART*, finally, points rather banally to the same central idea that we see in the Greek novels: that the gods are in charge, that they are directing everything to an end point, and that that end point is the reunion of the hero with his wife *and family*, and thus the integration of their love into a social framework. One crucial difference between this novel and the Greek examples lies in the curious addition of the

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remains that it is the closest thing we have to an overarching narrative pattern, and thus that these dreams essentialize the basic motivation of the novel at least as well as anything else could.

[298] For the possibility that this Priapic anger is meant to be read as a figment of Encolpius' imagination, see Conte (1996), 95; 100; see also, however, Courtney (2001) for a balanced examination and defense of Priapic wrath as a continuous theme (55). For the relation of Petronius to the Greek novels, see note 175 above.

[299] Whether or not we read that wrath seriously or choose, like Kragelund (1989), to follow the sophistic dismissals of the validity of dreams rather than outcome of the dreams themselves as our interpretive framework, and thus read the novel as a *parody* of stories of divine wrath like the *Odyssey*.

father-daughter relationship as a social bond of great importance.[300] Apollonius' descent is caused, not by any fault of his own, but by the failure of another man to allow Apollonius to replace him in his daughter's affections.[301] Apollonius is later allowed to marry another man's daughter, and there is a temporary ascent: what Antiochus did wrong, driving Apollonius into the demonic plane, Archistrates puts right, bringing him back into the idyllic plane *up until the moment that he has a daughter of his own*, at which point he is once again in danger because of the possibility that she will replace his wife; it is only when he has refused to take her virginity (even though he does not know she is his daughter) that she is restored to him, and it is only when he, too, has allowed her to marry another man that he is reunited with his wife. Thus the solution to the problem of the emergent sexuality of *daughters* and the danger this poses to the stability of the family and thus of society is the correct social behavior towards women in both roles: the recognition of daughters as daughters, and of wives as wives, and the refusal to confuse the two categories, despite emotional (though not erotic) attachment to both.[302]

We can see, then, that while the most prevalent structure in the dreams in the ancient novels is that of *marriage*, and thus that the ideas represented by, related to, and involved in marriage will be central to the novel (since the dreams in the novels are essentializations of the complex plots of the novels themselves), there are significant variations from novel to novel, as well as dreams that are concerned either with other ideas altogether, or with ideas that are relevant only to some *aspect* of marriage. More

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[300] See Konstan (1994), e.g. 178-179: "The narrative may be seen as exploring the right relations between father and daughter and husband wife…"

[301] See Schmeling (1999), 149; see page 142 for a summary of other recurrent themes in this novel.

[302] See Konstan (1994): "The emotion that is valorized in the novel as the basis for all relationships within the family is a general affection on the model of that which is supposed to exist naturally between father and daughter" (180).

generally, however, we can say that marriage is simply a particularly apt representation of the structure that lies at the heart of every ancient novel, and that is pointed to in every dream; the basic structure, that is, described by Frye of polarization of the world into a high plane, associated with "identity," and a low plane, associated with "alienation," and the progression through that plane from high to low and back again. In the Greek novels the precipitating event that exiles the protagonists from society into the lower plane is their falling in love, which brings with it a realignment of priorities in one's attachments, and thus the potential (played out dramatically in the middle part of the novels) for the rejection of and rejection from society.[303] The return to society is thus achieved only when this personal attachment can be integrated fully into the social order through marriage and its acceptance by the entire social group, as well as the acceptance of its demands by the lovers (the main events in Chariton's novel, for example, are brought to pass because Callirhoe's former suitors fail to accept the marriage, and because Chaereas fails to observe proper behavior towards his wife). In the Latin novels, by contrast, the precipitating event is a contravention of a social norm because of improper desire (incestuous desire in the *HART*, morbid intellectual desire in Apuleius, and unbridled sexual desire in Petronius); the return to the higher plane is thus achieved by the control of this desire by channeling it in a socially accepted direction. In these novels, then, marriage, while still an effective representation of the structure of desire integrated into society, will not be as central an image because the type of desire concerned is not straightforward (socially acceptable though potentially dangerous) heterosexual erotic attachment.

[303] Cf. Zaidman and Pantel (1992): "…an excess of sexual passion was thought to threaten the stability and decorum of marriage from within, so Aphrodite had to be handled with care" (71).

In each case, however, the dreams point to the divine (and thus religious, hence socially sanctioned) perspective on the social problems thus explored and their solutions. The problem in the Greek novels is not so much one of the desire dealt with being socially unacceptable as its *potential* to betray society. The descent thus depicts the possibilities, the "what ifs" of *eros*: thus when the protagonists first fall in love, before their hardships begin, or at a moment of reunion and thus temporary escape from their hardships, they may have warning dreams which prepare them for these "what ifs," the potential disasters inherent in erotic attachment; the implication is still, however, that if these potential problems can be endured, as they are when played out in the narrative, the end result will be a socially acceptable union, represented by the image of marriage.[304] Once these potentialities are being played out, however, the dreams represent the goal itself, the ideal of the socially sanctioned union towards which all of this is directed, and which is a sign of the integration of the individual's goals into society and the triumph of life over death.[305] This points us back in the direction of the conclusions reached in the first two chapters, namely that the dreams operate within the novels as divine messages sent for emotional effect. We are now in a position to re-evaluate this from the perspective of the world outside the novel, since we can now see what the relationship between the dream and the novel as a whole is, as well as the relationship of both to our own world: the dreams essentialize the novels containing them, and thus represent or point to structures that are of central importance for the novels; one of the most important

[304] Cf. States (1988): "Thus in our dreams, as in our fictions, we find ourselves, as hero-creator, coaxed to the verge of possibility: imagination demands nothing less than our own head on the block, our own body (or the body of a loved one) in the path of the monster, the bullet, and the spear" (70); see also Swain (1999, 25-26: see note 348 below).

[305] Cf. Swain (1996): "But from the Stoicizing ethics of our period there emerges a new premiss to the discussion, that marriage is a duty to the city and that a wise man will make it an essential part of his life" (120).

of these is the marriage structure, but this is, in turn, a specific representative, particularly well suited to the novels' main focus, of the more general pattern of individual in conflict with society, played out in narrative form as a removal of that individual from society followed by his or her reintegration into it through a process of mediation. What, then, is the role of emotion as the final cause tied to these formal and material causes for the dreams and the novels containing them, and what, finally, are we to make of the location of the efficient cause for these phenomena in the realm of the divine? We turn now to emotion and religion as interrelated processes in the creation and reception of fiction.

CHAPTER FOUR: "DO NOT WEEP, FOR YOU SHALL NOT DIE; FOR I MYSELF WILL BE YOUR HELPER."

Religion, Emotion, and Society

In chapter two, we examined the role of dreams within the world of the novels, and found that the majority of dreams had a primarily *conative* and secondarily *phatic* function and that, furthermore, the former function was primarily *emotional* in its effect on the addressee which was its goal. In the last chapter, we developed a framework for understanding these dreams in their relation to the novels as communications between authors and readers: dreams *essentialize* the novels by pointing to a structure of sense which lies at their core; this structure is basically that described by Frye in his treatment of "romance," and is thus a pattern which the novels demonstrably exhibit with or without the dreams they contain. In this final chapter, we will re-examine the two functions discussed in the second chapter from the perspective of the author and reader, and ask *why* the authors have pointed to this essential structure in a number of dreams, thus explicitly tying the structure to a divine origin and demonstrating its deep emotional effect. As we will see, by including the dreams and thus making this pattern not the result of random chance, but explicitly the product of *divine management* (and thus implicitly authorial design—this is the effect of the *phatic* function on the reader), they extend the emotional effect of this revelation from protagonist to reader, as he or she recognizes the

divinely orchestrated pattern behind the adventures of the characters.[306] We can thus postulate that the inclusion of these dreams in the ancient novels serves to extend the applicability of the events to the reader's own life by making the optimistic pattern into which it fits not a matter of chance but something which anyone who believes in divine providence might expect for his or her own life. This, in turn, amplifies the emotional effect of the novel by suggesting that the events being narrated are the sorts of things that happen generally, with the gods in control, rather than just this once.

Northrop Frye, in discussing the deepest level, or "night world" of the "demonic plane" in which he locates the middle part of the romance structure, says this: "Much of what goes on in the night world of romance is cruelty and horror, yet what is essential is not cruelty as such, but the presence of some kind of ritual."[307] Earlier in the same study, he argues that "ritual" is in fact what romance is all about: following Aristotle's argument about the difference between poetry and history, he says that "There are other types of action which are symbolic and representative of human life in a more universal perspective…For these actions the best term is ritual." The point of such acts is "social cohesion," and they always exhibit the same mixture of dream world and waking world that, he argues, is seen in "romance as a whole." In essence, then, the "…narrative of fiction, more especially of romance, is essentially a verbal imitation of ritual or symbolic

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[306] Thus I will partly agree with Merkelbach (1994) in his more recent and much tamer argument about the religious implications of the genre: the novels *are* aretalogies in the sense that they are presented as evidence for the working of the divine in human life; this is the primary result of the dreams, in their metalingual capacity, and it extends the significance of these works from mere storytelling to storytelling with a message for the reader; I do not, however, think that that message is any clearer than something like "good things will happen for you, too, since the gods are in control, so do not be anxious"; furthermore, I do not think that this religious expansion of the narratives' significance can be traced to a still more religious origin. The reading of the "religious" element of the novels which comes closest to my own is thus Beck (2003), e.g. 138-139: "Can one view the novels as in some sense aretalogies writ large…? Certainly, the novels are replete with episodes which are the stuff of aretalogies…"

[307] Frye (1976), 113.

human action."[308] Thus the narrative pattern to which the dreams in the novels point, and which is the essential structure of the novels themselves, is the verbal expression of a ritual, which, in turn, may be charged with religious significance, although in Frye's mind rituals are created in that stage of society before the "religious," as such, has been separated out from other symbolic acts.

This connection between narrative and ritual runs deep, and has been explored by a great many scholars. For our purposes, we may recall first of all what Judith Perkins, in some measure following Frye, says in relation to marriage as the core event of the Greek novels; namely, that they could be read on one level as "initiations," a term which also refers to a particular ritual pattern.[309] Frye, as well, mentions marriage as an example of ritual, but also singles it out as a "symbol" of the return to the idyllic world;[310] marriage is thus at once an example of the sort of thing which the novels, as wholes, verbally imitate (rituals), and a symbol for the end point or goal of these phenomena (this should scarcely surprise us, given what was said in the previous chapter about marriage). More intriguing still is the contribution of Oatley, who has developed, following the same Aristotelian distinction which led Frye to his distinction between universal (ritual) and particular (practical) patterns of action, a theory of fictional narrative which places emphasis on the *emotional effect as the purpose of fiction*. "Emotion is to fiction as truth is to science,"[311] he asserts. In developing his theory, he adopts a definition of narrative which he borrows from Bruner, summarizing it as "that mode of thinking in which

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[308] *Ibid.*, 55.

[309] See above, page 175.

[310] *Ibid.*, 54

[311] Oatley (2002), 39; cf. Fusillo's (1999) argument that the ancient Greek novels center on emotional conflict.

human agents with goals conceive plans that meet vicissitudes"; he then extends this to describe specifically *fictional* narrative by pointing out the Aristotelian distinction mentioned above, and the fact that these vicissitudes elicit an emotional response: "Fictional narrative is that mode of thought about what is possible for human beings in which protagonists, on meeting vicissitudes, experience emotions."[312] We will return later to his ideas about emotion, but for the moment it is worth noting that he points to the *social* purpose of these narratives, as well as their close relation to rituals: "Fiction in the form of myths and cultural themes contributes to the forming of societies and individuals' identities within them…" and later "…certain rituals, as well as certain kinds of drama and other fictional forms, achieve their principal therapeutic value for emotions that have been too overwhelming for people to assimilate in ordinary life."[313]

One of the most important voices on this subject, however, is that of Walter Burkert, who argues that the control of *anxiety* is central to ritual and narrative alike: "I propose the existence of biological patterns of actions, reactions, and feelings activated and elaborated through ritual practice and verbalized teachings, with anxiety playing a foremost role."[314] This echoes his discussion in an earlier treatment of the subject:

> Religious ritual, by producing anxiety, manages to control it. It is just the stereotypy of the sequence which guarantees that the action will not end up in hopelessness, but reach the prescribed end, and thus presents a model of how to overcome…and as anxiety tends to draw a group together, group solidarity is all the more established by the experience and performance of anxiety overcome.[315]

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[312] Oatley (1999b), 103.

[313] *Ibid.*, 110.

[314] Burkert (1996), 177.

[315] Burkert (1979), 51.

This dual role, of emotional dissipation and the formation of social bonds, is precisely the purpose of narrative as well, which, by Burkert's theory, rises from the same essential human motivation:

> This [telling a story for entertainment] is practicing—out of gear, as it were—basic action programs, which are at the same time sequences of psychic experience, and thus discharging depression and anxiety, to translate what Aristotle said about tragedy into more modern terms. Certain experiences, attitudes, and expectations are performed, processed, and socialized by telling stories; they do not contain much of a 'message,' much information value; rather they tend to reestablish and to confirm pre-existing patterns.[316]

Thus the core structure of the novel, which Frye has referred to as "ritual," and which the dreams in the novels reveal to the characters and readers of the novels, has itself a dual function: the formation of social bonds and the creation of emotions in the individual; these two are, moreover, closely related.

This much touches on the emotionally *conative* function we have highlighted for dreams and novels, as extensions of dreams, but what of the phatic function? These patterns, that is, of anxiety overcome and solidarity created, which we will examine in greater detail when we discuss emotion, would be present in the novels *with or without the dreams*. What the dreams add is not the structures themselves, but metalingual reference to them, which both demonstrates their effect and *explicitly links them to the idea of divine control*. Where, then, does the idea of divinity fit into Burkert's analysis? What, that is, is the point of making *god* the source of the pattern? Appeal to a higher

[316] *Ibid.*, 26. To this we can compare both Oatley (1999b), 101; and States (1993, 129-130): "…dreams (especially) imitate not only the content of experience but the forms of action that flourish in waking life as a consequence of inevitable behavioral patterns…If we attach dream narrative to scripts—that is, to stereotyped patterns of behavior in the waking world, as opposed to some mysterious creative ability—it seems to be that we have explained how dreams are able to get from point A to point B and beyond…"; Burkert as well sees dreaming as a parallel to these phenomena of ritual and narrative.

authority, according to Burkert, is the ultimate technique of reducing seemingly unmanageable complexity to a structure of sense:

> …dependence is a form of "making sense." It is a truism that we are unavoidably dependent on a variety of circumstances both known and unknown…Religion makes all of this secondary by turning the attention structure toward one basic authority, thereby achieving a most effective "reduction of complexity" and creating a sense out of chaos.[317]

Thus by making the optimistic pattern of anxiety overcome which the novels follow a *divine plan*, and thence dependent on divine authority, the dreams in the novels create a certain sense out of what might otherwise seem rather chaotic. Burkert has tied the origin of religion to the advent of language, and thus the ability to posit the existence of realities outside the here and the now.[318] He also discusses the sorts of ideas generally dealt with in narrative: "What we learn in tales is knowledge of a different kind: that a certain person has done this or that, and this is what came of it. Although it is difficult to explain how such personal knowledge can be generalized, it can still be said that tales are understandable…"[319] In our case, however, it is not difficult to explain this: the personal knowledge of Chaereas and Callirhoe, Daphnis and Chloe, and the like can be generalized *precisely because of this radical reduction of complexity*, because they have been explicitly tied, through dreams, to a pattern that is taken to be exemplary of the working of the divine in human life. The tales told thus cease to be isolated incidents and become clues to a divine, which is to say universal and eternal, plan.

This, at any rate, seems to be what Longus has in mind for his novel. In what has been recognized by many as a clear Thucydidean allusion, he asserts that his work will be

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[317] Burkert (1996), 84.

[318] *Ibid.*, 25.

[319] *Ibid.*, 56.

a κτῆμα δὲ τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, "a delightful possession for all mankind."[320] What is not generally remarked upon, however, is that he here alludes to Thucydides at his most unhistorical (by the Aristotelian definition), Thucydides at one of the rare moments when he argues that his work will be of use for its relation to generalities, which are the subject of poetry.[321] Furthermore, the author here makes a definite break with the historical tradition by suggesting that the use of his work will be in its *emotional effect*: it is to be "τερπνὸν."[322] Finally, however, he understands this emotional effect to be linked to the *generality* of the story ("no one has ever escaped nor will escape Love"); this, in turn, is linked to the idea of Love as a *divine force*, a universal power, whose operation this tale will help us understand.[323] This is driven home by the repeated reference to Eros' role in the story, which we are made aware of *only in the dreams*, with the story of Philetas the one exception. It is made even more explicit by the metalingual reference in Bryaxis' dream (discussed above),[324] in which Pan tells the dreamer, and thus indirectly the reader, that Chloe is being saved because Eros wants to make a story out of her. The god, in other words, will not allow the optimistic pattern to which the dream points to be disrupted by Bryaxis, because he wants Chloe's narrative as a representative example, a clue to the way he works. Thus by tying her story explicitly to a pattern of divine management of human affairs, the dream indicates that this novel is to be read, not as

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[320] See e.g. Hunter (1983), 48-52; Cueva (2004), 55-61.

[321] Cf. Morgan (2004), 17.

[322] See Morgan (1994b), 74.

[323] For a similar argument about Longus, see Chalk (1960), esp. 33; I disagree, however, with his emphasis on the *Orphic* religion, and on the aspects of the novel that parallel *mysteries*, e.g. his argument for a "vegetation god" at the heart of the novel; his claim that Longus is the only novelist with an explicit religious motivation for the action of the novel (34) is, as should be clear from this study, incorrect.

[324] p. 134.

something that happened once upon a time, but as the sort of thing that happens when Love guides human interaction.[325]

This contrast between the metalingual moment in the preface, when Longus tells us explicitly what the purpose of his novel is, and the metalingual use of dreaming, in which we are addressed directly by the divine forces responsible for this pattern, can be observed also in the other novels. Chariton tells us explicitly at the start of his eighth book that he anticipates that we will find that book "the most pleasant," because it "cleanses away" all of the bad things from the previous book and replaces them with "proper loves and lawful marriages" (8.1).[326] He thus reveals to his readers what had earlier been made known to Callirhoe in her dream (5.5): namely that the pattern of the novel is one of happy marriage interrupted by all sorts of bad things, only for marriage to return triumphant at the end, *cleaning away* all of the negatives about which we had anxiety.[327] Through this good-bad-good structure, the purpose of his novel, which is

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[325] Even Reardon (1994), who wants to read the novel as something far from serious, admits (grudgingly, it seems) that this is in earnest: "Is Longus serious? Yes; after his fashion. One is tempted to call the work a fairy story written by Nabokov…It would tell us what Love is; that is serious enough. Only, the manner is not" (146); Morgan (1994b) has come to a remarkably similar conclusion to my own about Longus by a very different route; his full summation is worth repeating here: "This seems to be what Longus is saying…To understand our experience and ourselves fully, we must become aware of the forces which shape our lives. But to do this necessarily involves interpretative processes of selection, generalization, simplification, organization, categorization, all distortions of the myriad diversity of daily existence. It means imposing structure on life, turning it into narrative; experience understood, in short, becomes fiction. Fiction in its turn is the vehicle of truth, about ourselves and about the world. Through fiction we can pool our experiences and learn imaginatively what we cannot or choose not to learn experientially" (76).

[326] Auger (1983) interprets this as a naïve perspective on narrative (51-52), which misses the idea driven home by the audience's reaction to Chaereas' story at the end of the novel that the *unhappy* events in a narrative are just as desirable. Yet it is also true that *without* the happy end, the narrative would have a very different emotional effect, and thus the narrative structure *as a whole* is here being invoked *pars pro toto* through the ending which consummates its meaning.

[327] I disagree with Conte (1996), who argues that this expresses a naïve belief (or willful ignorance) that the readers are just as interested in the bad parts as the good: the good end could not be very interesting, even according to Chariton's description, without these preceding tribulations; it is *because* the final book sweeps all of that away, in other words, that it is the most pleasurable, yet few would deny, I think, that the climactic point of this story, the pinnacle of our emotional response, is the happy ending, and that is all Chariton claims.

explicitly marked as *emotional* (the last book is the "sweetest," i.e. most pleasing) is achieved; only in Callirhoe's dream, however, is evidence for its *religious origin* provided directly, rather than on the basis of authorial interruption and interpretation, to the reader. The novel is thus an expansion of the dream; its ending is a "dream come true," and the effect of this is the creation of pleasure to replace the negative emotions which are provoked by anxiety over the dangers of the world, to which love may lead, as exhibited in the adventures of Chaereas and Callirhoe. All of this, however, is given universal significance by the suggestion, made through the dreams, that it is standard operating procedure for the divine powers in control of our lives.[328]

In Xenophon of Ephesus, our narrator tells us that on Anthia and Habrocomes' return to Rhodes, the Rhodians cheer and praise Isis for bringing them back in safety; we are also told that the hero and heroine experience a series of emotions: happiness, sorrow, fear, memory of the past and anxiety for the future. They, too, then thank Isis for their restoration; it is in this emotional state of joy at the happy ending, which the author tells us continued for the rest of their lives, that they offer a record of all their adventures as a votive to the goddess. We are thus informed, just as we are more directly in the protagonists' dreams, that the goddess is responsible for this pattern of happy ending wiping away all bad emotions, including anxiety, fear, and negative memories, and that this emotional effect is the point (since it is the conclusion) of the novel; finally, the reaction of the crowd, and the inscription of the events of the novel in the temple as a thank-offering and thus, presumably, as a record for the general populace of the way the goddess works, all point to the divine origin of the pattern as a way of extending its

[328] Cf. Reardon (1999b): "Life can bring isolation and grief; but if Fortune is kind, they can be overcome; let us, for our comfort, suppose that Fortune is kind. This is the salient thing, it is what Chariton has to say" (188).

importance to others besides Anthia and Habrocomes. In Achilles Tatius, the entire narrative proper is introduced, as in Longus, as a story about how Eros operates in human affairs, and it is thus made parallel to an image of the god leading Europa and Zeus across the sea (which is thus, likewise, an iconic representation of the sort of thing that happens when the gods take a hand in the management of human affairs). Clitophon, in fact, warns the first narrator that his story resembles "myths," suggesting thereby that it is similar to a narrative fiction: "τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε," he says (1.2). Yet this very fact, he implies, suggests its validity as an indication of the power of Eros over human affairs. Thus the resemblance between his adventures and "stories," and, we may assume, *dreams*, is taken as evidence of its relevance for others as a clue to the working of universal forces in human life; the only real evidence he has for attributing his adventures to the gods, however, is to be found in the dreams the novel contains. This metalingual reference to the *significance* of the message, which functions to clarify the code, is thus supported by the dreams in the novel, and their structural and originative correspondence to the storylike pattern the novel itself follows.

In Heliodorus, as we have already seen, the multiple metalingual passages in the final book which point to the divine management responsible for the unfolding of events, and thus for the core structure of the novel and its conative effect on those who witness it, have the dreams in the preceding books as their main source. The emotional effect of the story on the Meroites, in particular, which is implicitly the effect of the novel on its readers, is achieved only through the action of the god (similar to a dream revelation) to make the pattern of the protagonists' adventures known to them, *and their recognition of the gods as the source of that pattern*. The Meroites are thus able to partake, through this miraculous instillation of understanding, to the same sort of metalingual information and

its emotional effect which the dreams provide the protagonists and, indirectly, the readers of the novel. In the *HART*, Apollonius is led by a dream to describe his adventures in the temple of Artemis, and it is because of this that he is reunited with his wife; it is also because of this dream, however, that he attributes the overarching pattern of his story to the intervention of the goddess, and recites it in her temple just as Anthia and Habrocomes recite theirs, as evidence of her operation in his life; when the tale gets out, complete with the final reunion of Apollonius and his wife, there is great rejoicing among the populace. Why? We must assume it is because they recognize in this happy ending brought about by the goddess her interest in human affairs, and thus the possibility of happy endings and the dissipation of all of their anxieties as well. In Apuleius, the reaction to the old woman's tale of Cupid and Psyche, and even more importantly the reason she gives for telling it to Charite in the first place (to reassure her in her moment of difficulty), support this interpretation of the purpose of storytelling; that purpose, however, is explicitly given to a story that greatly resembles the Greek novels.[329] Furthermore, Lucius' prayer to Isis is one of the great metalingual references in the novel, and it suggests that the great joy which his happy ending has brought him is entirely the result of Isis' intervention in his life; he further suggests that this is her manner of operation, and that she thus acts in such a way in others' lives as well: implicit in this is the idea that Lucius' story, as evidence of a universal pattern of Isis' control of human life, is cause for joy for everyone else.[330] At this moment, then, he presumably makes good on his promise from the prologue, *lector intende: laetaberis*. Only in Petronius are we lacking in this sort of retrospective or prospective summary of the general

[329] See Bowie (2008), 36.

[330] Cf. Schlam (1992), 22; 123.

significance, emotional effect, and divine origin of the overall pattern of the novel, a summary which is supported in the novel itself by the dreams it contains. This is hardly surprising, however, given that we lack both the beginning and end of this novel.

The explicit attribution of the novels' events to divine control, which is made in large part by the dreams they contain, and which is the source of the contention over the "religious level" of the ancient novels, may thus be understood *functionally* as the means by which the narrative patterns which they follow, and to which the dreams in their essentializing form may point, are *generalized*. The phatic function which we have traced for the dreams within the novels, when combined with the metalingual function they play as part of the novels as communications between reader and author, becomes the means by which the particulars of the characters and their adventures are put in contact with, i.e. assimilated to, the universals governing all human interaction with the world, which are here represented by the notion of the divine. This "purification" of the narrative pattern of the novels, this assimilation of the particular to the universal[331] (and thus, if boiled down through the most radical means to arrive at a reduction of complexity, divinely determined), has itself two functions, as we have observed: the first is the elicitation of emotion, which is the response to fiction and thus to the exploration of general patterns in human life. Burkert has located this function most especially in the creation and dissipation of anxiety, which is the means by which it is controlled: "the performance of

[331] Compare States (1993), following Foulkes: "…one of the purposes of dreaming may be to interconnect particularized and generalized knowledge…" (111); and later, with reference to storytelling and dreaming as ways of remembering: "If something is to be remembered at all, it must be remembered not as what happened but as what has happened again in a different way and will surely happen again in the future in still another way" (119): if a story is to be told, in other words, and is to have any usefulness for its recipient, it must be not for the *particular* information it imparts, but for its *generalized* significance.

ritual grows out of anxiety and is designed to control it."[332] This creation and control of personal emotion through the manipulation of particulars into generalized patterns, however, has in the case of public narratives like published or otherwise propagated fiction, and ritual, the secondary function of creating and solidifying group identity, and it is this function which we shall examine here first.

One of the two main functions Burkert finds for religion, besides the individually emotionally therapeutic and/or preparatory, is the social;[333] both States and Oatley have also pointed to the socializing function of dreams, rituals, and verbal narratives.[334] This socialization is fundamentally *conservative*, in as much as it serves not to change the social order, but to reinforce the status quo.[335] This brings us once again to the argument put forward by Judith Perkins, who sees in the novels, and especially in their marriage-centered optimistic structure as well as their use of religion, an embodiment of "the quintessential elite myth—that things were the way they were meant to be."[336] In her treatment, Perkins follows the relatively recent trend in scholarship which sees the Greek novels as "products of the ebullience of the urban elite of the Greek East…[through which] the elite in the early Roman period created and projected a sense of their society

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[332] Burkert (1996), 36.

[333] Cf. MacMullen (1981), 57; Anderson (2001), 159-160.

[334] States (1993), 123 and *passim*; Oatley (1999b), 110.

[335] Burkert (1979), 26; see above: "[myths] tend to reestablish and to confirm pre-existing patterns." We may add to this also the argument of Barthes (1972), who says that mythology (which is a significantly broader term for him than for most classicists, and includes such things as professional wrestling and Basque architecture) serves to make the existing order seem natural (143); Frye (1976), on the other hand, finds that romance (which Barthes would surely consider a form of mythology) is not generally conservative, but may be kidnapped and make to reinforce the status quo (57; 165): surely if the romance form was ever appropriated by the elite to buttress their position it was in these Greek novels, composed by and for the elite (see the following discussion).

[336] Perkins (1995), 52.

and their position in it."[337] This is the position developed in the last decade or two by scholars like Bowie[338] and Swain;[339] it contrasts sharply with the older position which "sees it reflecting the new isolation and quest for individual identity of the inhabitants of the Greek East whose traditional civic identity had been eroded beneath Roman hegemony."[340] As Perkins argues, "This latter reading has cogency only if the centrality of marriage in the genre is ignored." I would add that it has cogency as well only if the role of dreaming (which points to the centrality of marriage) in the novels is not considered.

The position Perkins here argues against was first fully developed by Perry in the 1967 publication of his Sather Lectures, as a reaction against the *Quellenforschung* which had dominated the field. His main contention was that the novels are, fundamentally, each the creations of individual minds, and thus should be studied as *inventions* rather than the product of literary evolution.[341] To combat this preoccupation with the literary precursors which had "generated" the novels, he pointed out that literary creations have no generative power of their own, but rather that we can only understand the process of their production if we understand the social conditions peculiar to the age in which their authors devised them.[342] It is, then, for the purpose of demonstrating just such an alternative approach to studying the creation of the novel that he devises this picture of a society at loose ends, in which "Faced with the immensity of things and his own

[337] *Ibid.*, 42.

[338] See, e.g. Bowie (2003) on readership.

[339] See especially the magnificent work *Hellenism and Empire* (Swain 1996), especially 101-131.

[340] Perkins (1995), 46; for an argument for this "escapist" reading, see Holzberg (2003), 21 n.24.

[341] Perry (1967), 12.

[342] *Ibid.*, 25.

helplessness before them, the spirit of Hellenistic man became passive in a way that it had never been before, and he regarded himself instinctively as the plaything of Fortune."[343] Yet this attitude of helplessness before the immensity of things is precisely the feeling which Burkert has described as the driving force behind religion, the reason for the need to create "structures of sense"; helplessness and passivity before it are, furthermore, inseparable components of emotion, as we shall see; any literary work which aimed at creating emotion would necessarily depict passivity, or at least helplessness, in the face of the vicissitudes of life.

There is thus nothing particularly unique about the outlook Perry describes; it is characteristic of all societies at all times (as is suggested by his own association of it with "romance," which, according to Frye, is ever present though not always fashionable),[344] and we must look elsewhere to explain the rise of the ancient novel. In particular, the optimistic structure pointed to in the dreams, which is both explicitly religious and socially charged (since the "ascent" pointed to is, in general, an integration of the individual into elite society) is fundamentally conservative in a way that an expression of a disgruntled, overwhelmed, or otherwise negative outlook on the world could not be. A more recent proponent of Perry, B. P. Reardon, has made this problem of conservatism clear inadvertently, through his well considered though incomplete comparison of Perry's model to the structural analysis of Frye as well as to the mystery cult theories of Kerényi

[343] *Ibid.*, 48.

[344] Frye (1976), 3-31.

and Merkelbach.[345] This comparison is summed up in a table, which I reproduce here in its entirety:[346]

	Setting	*Initial Condition*	*Activity*	*Experience*	*Final Condition*
Frye	dream world	alienation	quest	circumstance brings descent and ascent	identity
Perry/ Reardon	big world	isolation	travel	adventure brings trials, love sustains	salvation
Kerényi/ Merkelbach	life	?vulnerability	search	evil forces brings death, resuscitation	eternal life

As we can see, the problem is that Reardon has elided, in his desire to align these admittedly similar patterns, the differences in the *initial condition* of the protagonists. Reardon/Perry's "big world" *is* parallel to the night world (though not necessarily the world of dreams as such) in Frye's scheme. Frye is quite clear, however, that this is *not* the initial condition of the protagonist: it is the *middle*, rather, of the narrative, and it is preceded by a beginning and a descent. This world is, moreover, explicitly *not equivalent* with reality, any more than is the idyllic plane from which the protagonist has descended and to which he or she will return. Both are mixtures of illusion and reality, and are polar divisions of the (in reality) otherwise mixed phenomena designated as what we do want and what we don't want.[347]

This omission is quite revelatory, and it allows us to put our finger on what, precisely, is wrong with Perry's model: if the demonic plane into which the protagonist descends in the novels is to be identified with the social reality of the Hellenistic world in

[345] Reardon (1991), chapter 7 ("The Pattern of Romance").

[346] *Ibid.*, 174.

[347] Frye (1976), 53-54.

the face of his eroding confidence and identity, and the happy ending of the novels is thus an escape into a utopian realm, *why do the protagonists begin in the utopia*? The "big world" of the Perry/Reardon scheme, in other words, is not meant to reflect the way the world looked to the authors of the novels, but rather *anxieties about the way the world might be*. As such, it no more reflects the way "Hellenistic man" felt the world to be than our modern horror films reflect the way we believe society truly is. It *cannot* be taken as an historically accurate snapshot of contemporary perceptions. If it were, the conclusion to the tales would be inherently subversive, because it would, in effect, argue against the status quo, argue that "the way things are" was unsatisfactory. All of that might be possible if the novels *began* in this nightmare world, but they do not: the protagonists are quite happy before their adventures, and quite happy after; the overall structure thus reinforces the status quo: even if the worst happens (and the worst thing imaginable to the novelists seems pretty feeble if we keep the comparison to modern horror films in mind), you will survive, the gods will look after you, everything will be alright. The middle part of the novels express a certain anxiety, it is true, but it is not the anxiety of someone who is lost in a confusing world and longs for meaning. It is, rather, the anxiety felt by someone who has everything and is worried about losing what he or she has. I think we could scarcely find a time or place in which that anxiety is not widely felt, and so it is absolutely unnecessary, as well as a *non sequitur*, to postulate an author who feels awash in a sea of troubles to explain the genre or its appeal.[348]

In fact, we might even argue that the pettiness of the concerns expressed in the novels (the consequences of falling in love!) gives greater evidence of a world of security

[348] See Swain (1999): "The confidence of the Greek world in the period of [the novels'] production did not preclude personal anxieties (which there is not need to psychopathologize)…The stories of the novels are the imaginary necessary reverse side of society's success, a harmless way of asking 'what if?' But they are not a sign of introspection or collapse, as the happy endings make plain" (25-26).

and general optimism than of its opposite. One of the notable features of the ancient novels by contrast with historiography or epic (the two prominent genres of equal scale) is the relative absence of military action: Chariton, it is true, has a few books of warfare, and Heliodorus does as well, but it is ancillary to the focus on the individual and his or her concerns. One possible explanation for this may be that offered by schemes like Perry's: that the period which gave rise to the novel saw a turning away from the social as a way to construct identity, and a focus on the individual in search of personal meaning.

A far more likely explanation, however, seems to me to be that the novels were, by and large, conceived in a time of relative peace in the Greek world, when the *pax Romana* had made the necessity of military participation for the elite Greek male moot (hence the oldest and the newest novels, standing at either end of this period of peace and prosperity, are most interested in, though still not particularly concerned with, war);[349] such a state of affairs would scarcely lead to a sense of confusion and hopelessness as a newfound feeling of security and leisure; anxiety, which is an omnipresent human emotion, would then be directed not to Iliadic problems of war and the conflict of states, so much as to "private" concerns, like love and marriage. Yet these concerns are, for the elites, emphatically not "private," as is made clear by the role of the public in so many of the resolutions offered to the problems they give rise to.[350] Perkins has pointed to this lack of necessity for military service as the source of the new marriage-centered script of

[349] See Bowie (2008), 21.

[350] See Perkins (1995), who follows Hägg in pointing out the prominence of a "commenting public" in these novels (50); this contradicts Perry's (1967) assertion that "Neither [Homeric hero nor Hellenistic hero] is attended by a chorus or anything resembling it in significance" (59). Alvares' (1997) argument that Chariton rewrote history in such a way as to present Aphrodite and Eros *as political forces*, the marriage of the *Liebespaar* as a matter of *political* concern, etc. also supports this.

male identity, borrowed, she argues, from the already existing script for the female citizen.[351]

This is, in effect, a reversal of Perry's essential argument by recasting it in a positive light: rather than saying that lack of a role for the Greek male in the new Rome-centered world left him unsure of his place in it, and caused him to search for a new source of identity, which was found in marriage, Perkins says that the lack of a need for military service left the male at a loss for ways to express his "adherence to the social," and so chastity and marriage, previously part of the woman's way of expressing this, were adopted by men as well. The key difference lies in the interpretation of the social order to which the characters in the Greek novels end up embracing: is it, in fact, a sham substitute for a lost political reality, or is it simply that same reality now unconcerned by matters of war and statecraft?

For our purposes, however, the important idea to stress is that the anxiety expressed through the night world, i.e. the reality encountered in the middle portion of the novels, cannot be equated with contemporary perceptions of the world; in fact, the very tameness of these anxieties suggests, if anything, the world of someone with significantly less to worry about than had been the case in, for example, the time of Homer or that of Herodotus. This is the greatest problem with Perry's scheme, and it is in response to this that the approach taken by more recent scholarship on the novel was developed.[352]

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[351] Perkins (1995), 67.

[352] Swain (1996), e.g.: "No one today should hold that this picture [of an Age of Anxiety] is true" (106), and "It is naturally possible to find signs of discontent in the closely rule-bound society the Greek elite constructed for itself in the second sophistic period…But overall we must recognize a profound satisfaction with being Greek and living and continuing to live in the traditional Greek city" (109).

There are, however, at least three great virtues to Perry's approach, especially when supplemented with the more accurate picture of the historical period developed more recently. The first is that it draws attention away from the largely unanswerable questions of literary predecessors, and puts it more squarely on the more manageable questions of *Zeitgeist*; the more recent approach, however much it may disagree with Perry's understanding of the world of the authors of the novels, likely has the trend in scholarship developed by him to thank for its own existence.[353] The second is that, when read it in contrast with the more recent approach, it shows how crucial the largely unanswerable question of authorship and audience is to any conclusive analysis of the genre. And the third, a virtue which is still unfortunately somewhat absent from much of the work in the more recent approach, is his emphasis on the *individual*, both author and reader, who must find something profoundly meaningful in the works for them to have been composed and to be read and copied over the years.[354]

This last point will be discussed very soon, when we turn from religion to the related question of emotion. The second of these, however, must be mentioned briefly because it points back to the problem Perry himself sought to avoid, that of origins. Perry's position was based, to some extent, on an understanding of the authors and readers of the novels as representatives of what he called "Everyman," that is, a sort of bourgeoisie of the Hellenistic world.[355] The more recent development in scholarship, on the other hand, is founded in large part upon the idea that the authors and readers of the

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[353] See Swain (1999) for Perry's place in the history of scholarship (24).

[354] Perry (1967), e.g.: "We must study the creator of romance; first the spiritual impulse that moved him to write, and after that the way in which he worked and the literary concepts and precedents that guided or conditioned his procedure" (43).

[355] *Ibid.*, 174.

novels were primarily *elites*, though other groups may have taken an interest.[356] This conflict is a useful reminder that there is nothing specifically "elite" about the "form romance": as Frye points out, it is found from the lowliest sorts of narrative all the way up to the highest, though it remains in every case essentially optimistic, like the religious rituals with which it shares both form and origin.[357] It may, however, become fashionable among the literary for a time, or may even be appropriated, because of its conservatism and optimism, by those with an interest in maintaining the status quo, for this purpose.[358] Yet it remains a universal form, always available even when it is not in fashion.

Thus we need not posit any specifically literary predecessor for the genre to explain its "invention," nor need we assume that this "invention" was anything of the sort: the *form* of the romance would have been there, ready to be used, in folktale if not in literary writing. This brings us, then, closest to Graham Anderson's position on the question of origins: it is quite possible that many or all of the novels were expansions and adaptations of tales their authors heard or read in more humble form; what we must then account for is not *where the novel came from*, but why these sorts of stories became appealing to a literary mind at this point, and why they appealed well enough to his (or her) audience to allow the continued use and survival of the genre.[359]

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[356] Swain (1996): "There is no good reason to question the current realization that the readership of the novels was to be found primarily among the establishment class…" (104); see also Hägg (2004), 109-140 for a discussion.

[357] Frye (1976), 23 and 55.

[358] *Ibid.*, 165.

[359] Anderson (1984) made the case that the novels were rhetorical expansions of and developments of tales already in circulation, a position very close to that of Lavagnini (see Swain 1999, 21 for a discussion of this); he further argued that these tales were originally myths from the non-Greek cultures of the Hellenistic period; this account of origins has been refined and more subtly restated in his most recent book (Anderson 2007); see also his critique of the division between "sophisticated" and "popular" narrative (Anderson 2003); he has published more generally, too, on the subject of a "folklore" stratum of narrative in the ancient world: see Anderson (2000) and Anderson (2006).

To answer this with reference to the *group* to which they appealed is largely impossible: the form of romance appeals to some people of every class and profession. The papyrological finds, once construed as evidence of popularity and a lower class readership,[360] are now understood to be evidence, though not particularly strong evidence, that the genre was not particularly popular, and that its readership was in all likelihood the same as for any other literary creation, which is to say, elite.[361] Perry's scheme is based on a flawed vision of the social situation of the elites, some of whom were demonstrably interested in the novels, and among whose ranks the authors likely found their place.[362] Swain, focusing on his convincing argument for an elite readership, argues for the primary importance of examining "…the cultural expectations which, once interiorized, determine why texts are pleasurable,"[363] thereby identifying the entertainment (emotional) value of the text as primarily linked to the *social* ethos of its audience. Swain has argued this case well, and we must remain aware, in our analysis of the emotional impact of the texts and their religious elements, of the *social* component of that effect, particularly among the upper classes: there is no doubt that religion was a powerful tool for the self-presentation of the elite, and thus that *religious texts* would have performed, at least in part, such a function.[364]

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[360] See, e.g., Perry (1930), 96 (esp. n. 5); 133.

[361] For the most definitive recent analysis, see Stephens and Winkler (1995); see also Stephens (1994), e.g. 414: "The conclusion seems to me inescapable that the novels were not popular with the denizens of Graeco-Roman Egypt—Christian or otherwise."

[362] See Whitmarsh (2008), 72, for a summary of the current *communis opinio*.

[363] Swain (1996), 79.

[364] MacMullen (1981) discusses an anecdote that is illuminating here: "[quoting Plutarch] '…on an occasion affording a graceful, noble pretext, through honor to god that draws everyone to piety; for in *hoi polloi* at the same time a strong belief in, and conviction about, how grand the divinity is, and how august, is engendered when they see those whom they honor and consider great, themselves so liberally and

Yet we cannot dismiss entirely the notion that "Everyman" also found the novels meaningful, and thus while the argument about elite identity is powerful, it is not complete: we must turn, instead, to the individual who is moved by these works and finds them valuable, whatever his station in life, and account for how the dreams, by pointing to structures of sense by which the novels may be understood, and explicitly tying those structures to a divine origin, thus making the pattern of the novel universally applicable and not a mere random occurrence, help to create a fictional world that is profoundly meaningful for a number of authors and many readers. We thus return to the question of emotion, since the appeal of the novels' themes both for the authors who decided to take the trouble to write them and to the audiences who guaranteed their survival, depends on their successful creation of emotional effect: that, we have seen, is the final cause of fiction in general, and more especially of the ancient novel.

Burkert has identified this emotional effect with the specific emotion of *anxiety* as its predominant component.[365] The effect of the tale or ritual is to create anxiety and then to dissipate it through the conclusion of the structure; anxiety is thus *controlled*. This has both a social and an individual effect: on the social level, it serves to create and reinforce solidarity among the members of the group experiencing the narrative pattern, through the shared anxiety towards a communal threat and the shared participation in its solution. Oatley, we may recall, in his analysis of the emotional effect of fiction, also emphasizes the social result of this emotional effect. We may easily identify this effect with the social function of the novels just discussed: the novel, if understood as a part of the elite's expression and affirmation of group identity, served to reinforce the bonds among its

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zealously competing in regard to the divine.' Which by no means convicts Plutarch of hypocrisy. He had his faith and believed in its truth; *hoi polloi* had theirs, and he believed in its usefulness" (57-58).

[365] See above, p. 196; see also Reardon (1991), 57.

members through the sharing of a common anxiety and common solution (represented by the *marriage*, which is the reassertion of social control over private concerns).[366] The use of religion, finally, to universalize this optimistic structure of "anxiety overcome" fits perfectly: since the world depicted in the novels is *historical* for its authors and readers, the only real connection between it and their own lives and civic identity is the commonality of their Greek heritage.[367] This is precisely what the religious structures stressed: if Artemis, Aphrodite, Eros, and Pan are responsible for these patterns of anxiety overcome, they will produce similar patterns in our own lives, however much the variables of the world may have changed.

What are we to make, however, of the individual emotional effect of the novels? This, too, is important, and as we have very little hard evidence for the specific details of the groups who are responsible for creating or who found pleasure in reading the ancient novels, this alternative question becomes even more pressing a concern.[368] Burkert is relatively vague about the exact operation of the narrative on an individual level: "Fiction, dreaming, and the workings of the imagination evidently have some function for

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[366] Our position again aligns itself with Perkins (1995), whose interdisciplinary approach to the subject is one of the more useful studies for understanding religion (and marriage) in the ancient novel; she shows, in particularly, that there is a strong argument to be made for the importance of religion in these texts when understood *politically*; good treatments of this as it touches specifically on Chariton's novel may be found in Edwards (1994) and the several articles by Jean Alvares. This, however, is outside the scope of this dissertation; it will be discussed in a more general work in progress on religion in the ancient novels.

[367] Cf. Swain (1996): "…the past setting of the ancient Greek novel appealed to the Greek elite because of the role of the past in their ideology of power" (112-113); Swain emphasizes the activation of this ideology through family ties, but it is also patently present in the religious structures of the ancient world and their cultural representation in literature; see Lane Fox (1987), 163; cf. also Anderson (2001, 145-146) for an example of a religious festival playing a similar role. If the novel (e.g. the *Ephesiaca*) were originally performed, could some such 'pageant' have provided the 'venue'?

[368] See Bowie (1994), e.g. 435: "…what might count as evidence for either the intended or the actual readership of any one novel is exiguous…" He goes on to refute many of the arguments that have been made about readership, including: 1) that the novels were written for an uneducated audience, a female audience, or some other exception to the mainstream literary audience comprised of elite males; 2) read by such an audience; 3) condemned, or at least ignored by the guardians of letters in the ancient world.

the individual, preparing or rehearsing human activities or helping with solving problems while avoiding direct confrontations."[369] When discussing the role of anxiety in his earlier work, he argues that narrative "presents a model of how to overcome,"[370] and we may project this forward or keep it in the present to understand what he means by "rehearsing" and "problem-solving." What is the individual nature of this anxiety which narrative, by this theory, allows us to overcome? What sorts of "problems" do we solve, what do we "rehearse"? Since anxiety is first and foremost *an emotion*, these problems and rehearsals are thus emotional, and an answer to these questions depends on the nature of emotion.

Martha Nussbaum has recently argued persuasively for a definition of the emotions as eudaimonistic judgments: "Emotions…involve judgments about important things, judgments in which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control."[371] Later in the same work, she argues that narrative art has an important role in allowing us to understand and add to our emotional judgments about the world: "The understanding of any single emotion is incomplete unless its narrative history is grasped and studied for the light it sheds on the present response…Narrative artworks do not simply represent that [emotional] history, they enter into it."[372] Oatley has argued that the events in fiction are related to the audience's (or reader's) emotional

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[369] Burkert (1996), 25.

[370] See above, p. 196.

[371] Nussbaum (2001), 19.

[372] *Ibid.*, 236.

history in at least three ways: through 1) sympathy, 2) identification, and 3) memories.[373] All of these, however, should be understood as the processes by which the emotions of the fictional characters are made part of the audience's own emotional history; the basic form of emotion is the reaction of a character whose plans have met with vicissitudes.[374] Fiction, recast in Nussbaum's Stoic terms, is thus essentially the form in which we are given enough information about the experience of another person to understand the objects of his or her eudaimonistic judgments, and the vicissitudes with which those objects met; we can thus recreate their experience in emotional terms for ourselves (i.e., "simulate it"), and make it part of our own emotional history, without the risk of loss inherent in *real* participation in such experiences.

Nussbaum has developed Oatley's tripartite division of emotional response into a system of her own: a reader may experience "1) Emotions toward characters… 2) Emotions toward the 'implied author'…3) Emotions toward one's own possibilities."[375] For each of these levels, the matter is further complicated by the various levels of specificity at which any one response may operate: she points to at least two types of emotions for each of the first two categories based on differences of generality: (1) may be further divided into a) "identification" or b) reaction; (2) into a) empathy and b) sympathy or criticism. So, for example, in the case of the famous shower scene in Alfred Hitchcock's *Psycho*, Nussbaum argues that a viewer experiences: 1) fear for Janet Leigh; 2) fear for women (at various levels of specificity) who are always vulnerable to rape and assault; 3) fear for herself (if she is a woman) or for the important women in his life (if he

[373] Oatley (1994), 61.

[374] Oatley (2002), 40.

[375] Nussbaum (2001), 242.

is a man); 4) sympathy for Leigh and rage at her stalker; 5) sympathy for women and rage at their attackers; 6) by contrast, aggression towards Leigh; 7) exhilaration and delight at learning about ourselves.[376] The core of Nussbaum's argument, however, is that the emotions we experience in this context are very real, and are connected to two principal facts about the unfolding of fictional narrative: first, that it concerns itself with "possibilities," i.e. the way the world works and thus, in a sense, what could (conceivably) happen, or may already have happened, to us and those around us; second, that the emotions connected with these possibilities can be explored more freely in the fictional context precisely because their objects are not "real," but are simply placeholders for "possibilities." Thus the fictional nature of fiction is more an aid than a hindrance to its production of *real* emotions.

This allows us to understand what Burkert has said about "anxiety" on a deeper level. We may define anxiety as, in essence, a negative (and, as Burkert points out, potentially destructive[377]) feeling aroused by uncertainty with regard to the future. Put in eudaimonistic terms, it is the judgment that there is a general possibility that the objects to which we attach importance for our own flourishing may not turn out as we need them to. It is thus the most basic *negative* emotion felt upon the recognition of our *neediness* and our lack of *control* over objects important to our needs which Nussbaum locates at the root of every emotion.[378] This is, therefore, based upon our own experience as well as the experiences of others *which have been narrated to us*, from which we are able to

[376] *Ibid.*, 246-7.

[377] Burkert (1979), 51; cf. Burkert (1996), 32.

[378] It is for this reason that she identifies anxiety as one of the first emotions felt in the developmental stage of infancy; Nussbaum (2001), 190.

project what Burkert calls the "truism that we are unavoidably dependent"[379] (i.e. "needy") in combination with the parallel "truism" that our needs (or desires) are not always met. The only way to overcome this anxiety, then, is to try to understand how one's projects meet with vicissitudes, and how those vicissitudes may be overcome. It is surely at least partly for this reason that we are so endlessly fascinated by stories, which allow us to experience the very things our anxieties are about, or if not the very things, then things that may be metaphorically connected to our own anxieties; we travel into the heart of our own anxieties and either escape them by "waking up" from the story, play, or dream; or follow them to a happy end when the vicissitudes are overcome and the projects and goals meet with a happy end. This is the "problem solving" and "rehearsal" of which Burkert speaks, which fiction grants us: the ability to solve the problem of our neediness, the trauma of the countless times our needs have not been met, or our goals have been squashed, which we overcome by seeing how it might still turn out well in the end, or how we are lucky to have escaped with our lives; the rehearsal for the possibilities that lie ahead, for which we have anxiety that might be dissipated if we can only consider every bad scenario, as others have experienced them, and see how they ended happily after all, or if not, where they went wrong that we might avoid the same pitfalls.

What is the role of the appeal to religious authority in this private emotional experience? We have noted already that one of the primary roles of "the gods" in narrative and ritual, according to Burkert, is as a means by which a "reduction of complexity" may be achieved; that is, the unpredictable nature of the future, the seeming randomness it implies, and our own dependence on its outcome, are all made, by an appeal to "one basic" divine authority, secondary to a straightforward dependence on the

[379] See above, p. 198.

divine. This, then, is also a way of dealing with the recognition of neediness and the anxiety it entails: if we make everything dependent on a god, then one way of achieving a reasonable security that we will get what we want, the way, in other words, of overcoming anxiety, is to do our best to get this god on our good side. Another way, however, is to convince ourselves that this god already has our best interests at heart. Thus telling stories of vicissitudes overcome may be extremely reassuring, very anxiety-dispelling, if they spell out the details of how, exactly, this was achieved: we will thereby end with the feeling that we know how we might confront the same problem, should we come upon it. This is the purpose, for example, of reading history for the statesman. Another formula, however, is the one which presents an anxiety-evoking set of circumstances overcome (the more anxiety-evoking the better), through no particular action of the protagonist: indeed, the more passive the protagonist the better. If that is all there is to the story, it is only briefly anxiety-dispelling, only for the duration of our projection into the narrative world it creates, because the whole thing will look like a freak occurrence, and we can hardly hope for the same for our own (potential) difficulties. But *if the pattern is attributed to a benevolent deity*, it becomes the most reassuring formula possible, because it suggests that the worst sorts of difficulties may be overcome, indeed *will* be overcome if/because the gods are on our side; the pattern is thus made universally applicable, in addition to whatever particular anxieties it may deal with on a more specific level.[380] In other words, such a narrative, like the tale of Cupid and Psyche, or the dreams which visit the dreamers so often, presents an optimistic pattern to us as an *appearance to which we can assent*, and indeed likely *will* assent *if we have*

[380] Cf. Holzberg (1995), 54.

some belief in divine providence.[381] This is an appearance not of the way Leucippe's or Clitophon's life was, but of the way human life, *our* life, *is*.

We thus see that the religious framework pointed to especially in the dreams in the Greek novels is neither "the point" of the works (the point being something more along the lines of dispelling anxiety, generally, rather than getting readers to sign up for initiation), nor an element that can be easily dismissed as narrative convention.[382] Instead, it is vitally important to the particular way the novels achieve the emotional effect which is their final cause, both for its society affirming, group identity building value, and for the personal meaning it brings to the life of the individual reader.[383] The role of dreaming in constructing this framework is, in turn, crucial: it establishes the narrative pattern of anxiety overcome, and attributes this pattern quite concretely to a benevolent divine force in control of human life. This discussion has been quite general, however, and we have so far passed over the particular details of the "anxiety" which is explored and put to rest in the various novels. We will end this chapter with a novel by novel consideration of the most salient points unique to each novel; first, however, we must return briefly to the specific identification, unique to the *Greek* novels, between "anxiety overcome" or "alienation replaced with identity" and the idea of marriage. What anxiety, specifically, is being explored, and is it possible to fit this into Burkert's more central argument about the intersection between biology and religion?

Perkins, as was noted, has identified the idea of marriage and chastity as an expression of "adherence to the social" with a specifically female program of social

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[381] See the discussion in the previous chapter, pp. 168-169.

[382] See note 283 above.

[383] Cf. Reardon (1991), 75, 79 and *passim*, for the importance of countering negative emotions as the object of the novels; he misses, however, the religious basis and significance of this process.

orientation.[384] She has also noted, however, that the form of the Greek novel imitates "initiation."[385] We may note that this corresponds quite well with what Frye has said about the genre, that is, what he describes as a "ritual" cycle of descent followed by ascent, especially when described as identity-alienation-identity, looks very much like the crisis-separation-reintegration pattern of "rites of passages."[386] The "crisis" would thus be the arrival of sexual maturity, the separation would be the concomitant break with one's past identity in the group (as a child), and the reintegration would take the form, in this case, of marriage. Thus the structure of the Greek novel looks a great deal like what Burkert has identified as "the maiden's tragedy," the pattern of events which marks the transition of a young woman from childhood to adulthood.[387] This matches what Perkins has said about this as a (to some degree) uniquely feminine pattern; it may also account for the baffling return of scholar after scholar to the idea that *women* are in some way uniquely implicated in the genre, whether in its creation, its intended audience, or its appeal and survival.[388] This gives us, then, further support for Anderson's idea that the genre sprang from folktale roots: the "maiden's tragedy," as a narrative form concerned with the social development of half the population, is particularly widespread, and would

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[384] See above, p. 211.

[385] See above, p. 175.

[386] See Lalanne (2006) for an extensive treatment of the novels as "rites of passage"; her comparison of the phenomena is convincing, though any argument for derivation falls prey to the same difficulties and uncertainties as all such works (e.g. Merkelbach (1962), Anderson (1984)).

[387] See Burkert (1996), 77-78.

[388] For a summary of its proponents and a critique of this idea, see Egger (1999), esp. 108-112; but see also Johne (2003) for a more positive evaluation of the various notions.

likely have had countless variants in the pool of narrative tradition from which the novelists may have drawn.[389]

Yet the relevance for us is not the possibility of the genre's origin in a particularly prevalent form of folktale preoccupied with the concerns of adolescent women, but the appropriation of the form for the expression of the civic identity of both men and women, and more importantly, the *widening* of the genre's relevance, through the dreams attributing its pattern to divine providence, to any and all who may have found reassurance for their anxieties in the optimistic message it proclaimed. This may account for the fact that Apuleius' novel, despite being composed in a different language, on a different subject, without marriage as its (explicit) central theme, without Greek elite identity brought to the fore, is nonetheless recognized by readers to bear some essential resemblance to the Greek novels which goes deeper than the mere fact of its being fictional and in prose. And it may, further, help to explain the resemblance between the form of Greek prose fiction and Christian literature which soon arose in its wake;[390] whether such literature imitated the novels or simply found a strikingly similar mode of expression, the point is that the formula followed by the novels for controlled anxiety turned out to be equally well suited to the writings of the new religion, which argued, among other things, that one should cast off all worries about the future ("consider the lilies"), i.e. all *anxiety*, and put one's trust in a benevolent divine power who would see to the happy end to which all men were entitled.[391] The Greek novel, too, risen perhaps from

[389] See Anderson (2007) for the most recent and subtle version of his theory.

[390] Cf. Reardon (1991), 166; Perkins (1995), 203 and *passim*.

[391] Cf. Smith (2008) for interesting parallels in the use of dreams to authorize a structure of belief; Alexander (2005), following the "narrative convention" explanation the religious structures in the novels

folktales developed to socialize adolescent girls through the crises of menarche, marriage, defloration and pregnancy, appropriated by the *pepaideumenoi* for the fiercely conservative and optimistic expression of their Greek elite identity, yet filled with dreams which put all their readers in contact with a benevolent deity who promised that come what may, he (or she) would see him or her through, seems to have struck upon a form of lasting religious and emotional power, despite the countless attempts over the years to dismiss it as frivolous or lowbrow.[392] Frye, pointing to the ritualized form of the genre, to its power to create a meaningful world for the reader out of the chaotic mixture of forces in life, and most especially to its preoccupation with *mankind's* place in the cosmic order, coined the alliteratively apt description "secular scripture."[393] As we turn, by way of conclusion, to an examination of the salient religious and emotional points singled out by the dreams in each novel and a discussion of their relevance for the effect of each novel on its readers, we may ask what should by now seem to be a fair question: how secular, truly, was this scripture?

Petronius

The *Satyrica* presents the most difficulties for understanding the role of dreams in the novels. It differs from the other canonical novels more than any of them differ from each other; its fragmentary state makes it even more difficult to analyze structurally than the complete novels; and the relative lack of actual dreams by comparison with the other novels (with the exception of the *HART*) makes the picture decidedly hazy. There are,

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(to which I hope I have here presented a serious challenge), finds that the religiosity of Christian narrative's predecessors is fake (156 and *passim*); I strongly disagree.

[392] See Part IV, "Reception," in Whitmarsh (2008).

[393] Frye (1976); the phrase is explained on page 60.

nonetheless, important points to be made about the role of dreaming in the author-reader relationship. To begin with, despite there being only three dreams (or two, if Quartilla's is fictional[394]), one of these is the only actual confirmation the reader has, in the extant fragments, of the religious interpretation given the novel, as a whole, by Encolpius:[395] that he is persecuted by the god Priapus for some offense, and will only escape this persecution and return to society when he has expiated his sin.[396] This, in fact, is the religious core both of the novel itself, and of the dream which appears to Lichas: it signals to a reader, and to Encolpius, that the pattern into which his adventures may be fitted is one of divine retribution. We may further add to these two facts, which may be gleaned from the repeated learned protestations that dreams are empty fictions and from Encolpius' reaction to the voice of Lichas crying out in his sleep, regarding the emotional response to this pattern which the characters exhibit and which is thus extended (though in a less straightforward manner than in the Greek novels) to the reader. The first is *denial*, and the second is fear and *aporia*.

In the previous chapter, we saw how the insistence by the central characters of the novels that dreams are meaningless, and in particular that it is human reason, typified by the wit of Epicurus, which is *divine* is a pedantic attempt to cast a screen in front of what is really happening.[397] More striking still, however, is Encolpius' reaction to the voice of

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[394] See Courtney (2001), 50.

[395] The dream of Lichas; see Courtney (2001), 154.

[396] *pace* Conte (1996), 95; 100; and Beck (1999), who suggests that the pattern of divine retribution may be in Encolpius' head (65); if so, why would the sardonic narrator present Lichas' dream so unquestioningly? See Courtney (2001), 155 for a defense of the Priapic interpretation.

[397] Even if we, like Kragelund (1989), believe that Eumolpus is ultimately correct, we cannot deny that the more religious interpretation *seems* at this point to have won out: "…while events seemingly prove Eumolpus wrong he is of course perfectly right…." (443); see also Panayotakis (1994), 614; Courtney (2001), 160-161.

Lichas, crying out because of the one dream which reveals a real religious framework (and the voice of Tryphaena, crying out because of a dream that ties this to an epic model): he is thrown into a state of terror and helplessness, just as if in a dream about being chased. This is likely an indirect reference to the epic simile found in Vergil, who is imitating Homer, to heighten the emotional experience of Turnus, fleeing from Aeneas (or, in Homer, Hector fleeing from Achilles). Thus, when confronted with the reality of divine retribution to which Lichas' dream points, no longer able to deny its validity if real, he treats it as a "nightmare come true," and uses his erudition to exaggerate its significance. This corresponds precisely with what Edward Courtney has said about Encolpius: "What he does with his education is to use it as a substitute for realistic efforts to cope with problems and a medium for interpreting and heightening his emotional reactions to events that overwhelm him."[398] Herein are the two reactions to the pattern revealed through dreams: denial of their value through pedantic philosophizing (a practice in which his friends Ascyltos and Eumolpus take part)—"…a substitute for realistic efforts to cope with problems…"—and *aporia* and fear interpreted and heightened through indirect reference to an epic simile—"…a medium for interpreting and heightening his emotional reactions to events that overwhelm him."[399]

What does all of this imply for the effect on the reader? The *Satyrica* is here greatly complicated by the fact that its narrator and protagonist is not a hero, but a sort of antihero.[400] The reader is thus in the tricky position of identifying with Encolpius and

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[398] Courtney (2001), 50.

[399] Cf. Zeitlin (1999) on the significance of "broken glass" for the failure of rhetoric (the basis of education in this period—40-41); on the contrast between Encolpius unrealistic reactions to events and the reality of those events, see Beck (1999); see also notes 64 and 179 above.

[400] See, e.g., Zeitlin (1999), 33; Courtney (2001), 153.

being called upon to revile him at one and the same time. Thus a reader feels sympathy towards Encolpius as he faces the trials and tribulations of his world, which are real possibilities, or exaggerations of real possibilities, in the reader's world, and about which the reader may feel no small measure of anxiety; he or she is, at the same time, drawn further into the fold of "normal society," the group from which Encolpius has deviated, by the identification of his adventures as the result of that deviation, and thus some feeling of confidence that a similar fate is not in store for those who conform to the expectations of that society. When Lichas has his nightmare, then, and interprets it quite unsurprisingly as a mandate to mete out divine retribution to Encolpius, we are presented with conflicting emotions: on the one hand, there is the fear of divine wrath and its consequences as real possibilities, and the uncertainty about what we can do to avoid them;[401] on the other hand, this is counterbalanced by an awareness that Encolpius has erred, that he has done something to warrant these consequences; these are both results of the religious pattern pointed to by Lichas' dream, and which is the overall pattern governing the novel itself.

The interpretive scheme pointed to thus simultaneously elicits our anxiety, by reminding us of the possibilities if "the gods are angry at you," which is simply a generalizing way (making use of the drastic reduction of complexity which results from an appeal to the divine) of saying that things "go bad," and assuages that anxiety by suggesting a causality behind Encolpius' suffering: he is facing this terror because he strayed, and we, who belong to Lichas' group, are safe. The strengthening of social bonds as well as the individual emotional effect are both clear here, and the appeal to a religious

[401] Unless, of course, like Kragelund (1989) we read Eumolpus' protestations, uttered admittedly to protect Encolpius and Giton, as more sensible than Lichas' interpretation of the dreams, in which case we presumably are Epicureans and have no reason to fear the gods. Not all readers would, I believe, fall into this category, however. Cf. Panayotakis (1994, 614—see note 397 above).

meaning thus fits the model outlined above quite well. This pattern, however, is undermined, in a manner quite characteristic of Petronius and scarcely to be found in the other novels, when Lichas' body washes ashore after a shipwreck, and is discovered by Encolpius (115). As usual, his reaction is hyperbolic,[402] yet he manages to drive home the point we must carry away for our discussion of the dreams in the novel: though the optimistic religious framework seemed very real a few chapters before, and it seemed perfectly sensible that Encolpius faced terrors because of his sins from which we are exempt because of our propriety, here lies Lichas, food for the fish, and Encolpius is alive to mourn him.[403] Musing on the randomness with which death takes us all, he cries *…illum diis vota reddentem penatium suorum ruina sepelit*: "…that man, his falling house destroys as he gives his vows to the gods" (115.16). In the very act of prayer, the gods abandon us and we are destroyed: where now is the religious framework which seemed so certain from Lichas' dream? And, indeed, when Encolpius reaches the end of his adventures and is saved (as he likely was)[404] with nothing more to worry him, we are left, not with the certainty that our worst fears will be overcome by the help of gods (as we are at the end of the Greek novels), but that our worst fears *are the gods*, who are real enough, are always ready to punish a fault, yet scarcely eager to rescue an innocent. And thus, while we take pleasure in the "ascent" which ends every romance structure, we cannot help feeling some concern at this perversion: in the end, it was the *antihero*, the sort of character (like Thisbe) who is supposed to come to a sticky end, who made it

[402] See Conte (1996), 62 on its banality.

[403] Cf. Slater (1990), 74, 236, and *passim*; Conte (1996), 169.

[404] See Schmeling (2003), 461; such reconstructions are admittedly speculative, but there is nothing in the text to suggest anything other than a happy end, and the generic conventions exhibited in every extant novel support this.

through, and the sort of people who, in the generic model promised by the dreams in this ancient novel and every other as the religious scheme into which life, imitating art, must fit, should have survived to live happily ever after, instead now live no longer.[405]

Apuleius

"Nec dies nec quies ulla ac ne momentum quidem tenue tuis transcurrit beneficiis otiosum, quin mari terraque protegas homines…" "Neither day nor any sleep, not even a brief moment passes by empty of your blessings, but you protect mankind on sea and land…" (*Met.* 11.25). So says Lucius, after he has been initiated into the mystery cult of Isis. The strangeness of this statement now, after books 1-10, cannot be lost on any reader. Where was Isis when Tlepolemus was brutally slain? Or Socrates? Or when Thelyphron lost his nose to the witches? Or when the Baker's wife had a witch send the spirit of a murdered man after her estranged husband to kill him? Or, perhaps most powerfully, when Charite's happy ending turned out to be, not marriage, but *death*?[406] Lucius, that is, takes the pattern of his own adventures, the long series of dangers, suffering, trials and tribulations from which he escaped unscathed, as evidence not only that the goddess Isis saved him from every danger, but also that this is a general pattern of divine intervention in human life: that she protects everyone just as she protected him. This conclusion is based, not only on the final outcome of his adventures itself, but also and more emphatically on his *dreams.* We have here, then, the essence of the use of dreaming in the novels: Lucius' dreams suggest an optimistic pattern into which his

[405] Cf. Zeitlin (1999), contrasting the ordered structure of "romance" with the "picaresque" (the genre into which she places the *Satyrica*): "The picaresque, by contrast, never really resolves the chaotic appearance of the world…The picaresque plot asserts that experience is ultimately devoid of order and intelligibility" (20).

[406] Or perhaps marriage *only through* death; cf. Frangoulidis (1999a).

adventures may be fitted, suggest that a divinity is the source of that pattern, and therefore that the pattern is operative in the lives of others (including, implicitly, the readers). This is nowhere more evident than in the declaration of Mithras, who remarks on the insignificance of the torments to which Lucius was subjected when compared to the supreme power of the goddess who brought him to his happy end (11.15). Winkler has, as we mentioned earlier, pointed to this speech as the root of every interpretive difficulty surrounding the novel; what is vitally important for our study, however, is the fact that Mithras' source for all of this information is his dream, which runs parallel to Lucius' first dream of the novel, the dream which not only reassured him by allusion to this romance structure into which his life was fitted, but was directly responsible for his arriving safe from his adventures at the "happy end" or "ascent" which characterizes the structure.[407]

We would expect the emotional effect of the dreams in the final book, then, to be that outlined in the discussion above: namely that a reader, who is caught up in the adventures of Lucius, whose vulnerability and human (or rather asinine) weakness and neediness leads him through negative possibility after negative possibility, will recognize those same possibilities (or at any rate less overblown versions of them) as relevant to his or her own life. He or she will then, when Lucius is finally rescued by the goddess, see this pattern of divine salvation from even our worst nightmares as something universally applicable, because of the presence of divine providence, and will thus feel great joy and reassurance, as his or her anxiety is dissipated. This reaction will be, in large part, because of the dreams which reveal this pattern, this religious framework by which his life may be interpreted, to Lucius. And, indeed, this is the reaction of some readers, who

[407] Winkler (1985), 6.

see in the ending of the novel a very real, emotionally moving conversion, one which, in Chariton's terms, clears away all of the bad things from the previous chapters, and replaces them with *lawful knowledge* and *proper behavior*.[408] Such a reading will, furthermore, draw the reader closer to his or her socio-religious group, *whether Isiac or not*, provided that a belief in divine providence of some sort is part of the *ethos* of that group. Yet there is another group for whom the emotional reaction is quite different, for whom this final book, the dreams it contains and the religious structure they point to, seem a macabre joke, a last thumb on the nose from an author who has already turned many conventional notions on their heads.[409] How are we to account for this reaction, given what has been argued above about the emotional effect of the dreams in the novels, without allowing serious damage to the theory here proposed?[410]

The answer lies in Apuleius' use of dreaming in the first 10 books. As we have observed, the dreams here are far more like those in Petronius, in that they point to a religious framework in which the gods are not *benevolent* towards the sympathetic characters, but hostile. There is, however, a crucial difference in Apuleius: none of the

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[408] Griffiths (1975), e.g.; Tatum (1979); Gollnick (1999); cf. Heller (1983), who argues that this reflects a Platonist dualism between the corrupt mutable world, knowledge about which will only lead to grief, and the supreme divine world, the reality of the One, knowledge of which is a proper object to seek.

[409] The best recent example of this is Harrison (2000): "This [satiric reading] gives the novel as a whole a clear unity: the tone throughout remains fundamentally amusing and entertaining." But compare Tatum (1999), who questions the limitation of our response even to the tales of the first ten books to amusement or entertainment: "If we can perceive nothing more than *iucunditas, festivitas,* or a *lepida fabula* in this story, then we have grasped nothing more than Lucius himself" (167).

[410] Lateiner's (2000) argument that the theme of marriage is central in the novel (which reminds us of the Greek novels), and that Lucius' conversion is a kind of marriage which is touted as superior to all the failed marriages of the previous books, hints at another solution, namely that what is expressed is not the integration of the social with the personal, but the transcendence of the (failed) social model by a more private model for granting "meaning" to human life and emotion: "He tells us stories of marital collapse in order to save us from our natural impulses and societal pressures (cf. Tatum 1969: 493). They are thus 'predictive,' the wisdom of hindsight purchased from those stories. His "No Sex" priesthood enables Lucius' spiritual progress and union with the divine (Isiac or the Platonic *unio mystica* of the Symposium)" (329).

characters (with the possible exception of Socrates) who are involved in these nightmares are presented as in any way *deserving* of their horrible fates. Thus Charite's dream is not like Lichas': only if Lichas had, rather than dreaming that Encolpius was on board, instead dreamt that he would soon die (which he eventually does) would the dreams be parallel. Thus while Petronius undermines the comfort we may take in the knowledge that Encolpius deserves his fate by killing Lichas, who is, as far as we know, undeserving of this, Apuleius *never extends this comfort*. Until the eleventh book, at the same time that he drives home the point that knowledge gained through dreams is, despite the denial of various characters, accurate, and thus that the emotional reaction to them he presents is appropriate, he also suggests that the divine perspective shared through these dreams is one in which the gods *do not* watch out for humans. Instead, they simply inform the dreamers that, from their divine perspective, human life is (in the words of Hobbes) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.[411] The emotional reaction to these dreams, then, rather than reassurance, is instead the emptiness we feel on recognizing that the very real possibilities which the characters encounter, and which are thus expressions of our own anxieties, will not be overcome by divine intervention, but are nonetheless universal patterns: we may all, one day, be subjected to a similar fate.

Whereas the Greek novels repeatedly point, then, through the dreams they contain, to the pattern of "anxiety overcome," so that when, in the end, we reach a "happily ever after" the relief and rejoicing expressed is extended to our own lives as a

[411] This is the human world in general, by Heller's (1983) interpretation (see note 231 above); see also Tatum (1999): "The grim picture of life without Isis in book 11 is not contradicted here. By including even his light-hearted thieves in the 'Isiac' scheme of things, Apuleius has left no episode and no set of characters untouched by his pessimistic and consistent view of life: most men, if left to themselves, are not likely to make things come out right" (176); Shumate (1996) argues that this pessimistic or confusing depiction of reality represents Lucius' cognitive state following a "collapse of familiar cognitive constructs" (14-15); she points in particular to a blurring of dreaming and waking states as a symptom of this (64-65; 170).

valid possibility because of the divine management at the root of this pattern, the *Metamorphoses* points instead to a pattern of "anxiety come true," so that when we reach the final book and the dreams and reality there both reveal a pattern of "anxiety overcome," we have arrived at a paradox. The ability to accept the revelation of the final book thus depends on some dismissal, whether conscious or not, of the pattern exhibited in these earlier dreams. An argument that dreams do not matter will not do, for anyone who takes the eleventh book seriously must, in order to accept Lucius' account, believe that the pattern pointed to in dreams of Isis *do* matter. Yet any reader who would dismiss the eleventh book as a pack of lies, or as a naïve expression of a misplaced faith, must believe that the dreams of Isis do not matter, and that contravenes the evidence of the first ten books. The only way out of this quandary is to find, whether consciously or not, a reason for dismissing one or the other interpretive scheme, and this is the crux of the interpretive problem which Winkler has outlined so well: a reader is forced to choose between two interpretive patterns, because Apuleius has stitched two sorts of novels together; the choice cannot be made without criteria which the readers themselves import.[412] Of central importance in the making of this choice, however, is the emotional effect of the religious structures of interpretation pointed to by the dreams in each part of the novel. If a reader is able to assimilate the particulars of his or her own life to the pattern pointed to by the dreams and the reality of the final book, the emotional effect will be quite powerful, and this final pattern will be accepted;[413] if, however, the pattern seems too farfetched, too artificial, by comparison with his or her own experience, the emotional effect will be rather one of emptiness, similar to the reaction to the dreams in

[412] See Winkler (1985), e.g. 208.

[413] In Winkler's (*ibid.*, 124) terms, it is thus only the *dreams* of the novel that can provide the "ground to stand on" to make Lucius' "leap of faith" with him, and that is unstable ground indeed.

the earlier books. These dreams, unlike the earlier ones, will seem to be *vana figmenta*, and it will seem that a veil of illusion has been drawn over Lucius' eyes at the very moment that he regained his human status, having seen enough of what life was really like from the unique perspective of an ass.

The *HART*

As has been remarked upon numerous times, there is only one dream in the *Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri*. What is, then, most remarkable about this novel in terms of the religious and emotional scheme outlined here is that the religious framework to which the dream quite emphatically points is entirely absent from the rest of the novel. The mere fact of the dream, however, is enough to convince Apollonius that it was Diana who was protecting him all along. This is very crudely managed, then, by the author, yet the simplicity of the single dream and its immediate transformation of this story into a religious paradigm is quite powerful, in a primitive sort of way. The manner in which the shift of focus to the religious occurs suddenly and near the end bears some basic resemblance to the *Metamorphoses*, though it is significantly less complex and controversial, largely because there was no *pessimistic* religious structure in the previous books to undermine this change. One possible explanation of its simplicity is the theory that this novel is an epitome; I am inclined, however, to avoid such special pleading.[414] Instead, if we accept the novel on its own terms, the observation made by Schmeling,[415] that a recurrent motif in the novel is that of *summary*, becomes particularly relevant here.

[414] See, for example, Kortekaas (2004): "Our final conclusion is obvious: the *HA* is available to us only in the form of an epitome, which affect the whole story. All motivation is lacking. Pagan cultic elements have become merely links that help the story onward" (46).

[415] Schmeling (2003), 549-550.

Each summary presents a different perspective on the events, yet the summary which is prompted by Apollonius' dream, in which he attributes everything good to the goddess Diana, and which leads to his happy reunion with his wife, is the last summary of all, and thus must carry special weight: it is the final word on the significance of Apollonius' adventures.

The events of the novel, therefore, are quite frequently essentialized, by different characters, from different perspectives, and with different emotional effect. Yet the final such essentialization is the only one which includes the vital piece of the interpretive code, the part which allows the novel to achieve its true significance and emotional effect for readers: namely, that a goddess has been in charge of bringing Apollonius through all of his trials to a happy end, and thus, that a pattern generally like this may be operative in their own lives. What, however, is the more specific pattern which Apollonius' life follows? What, that is, is the crisis which precipitates his descent, or the event or action which leads to his ascent, in which the goddess Diana explicitly takes a hand? The novel is structured around the problem of father-daughter love.[416] The crisis is thus, here as in the Greek novels, the arrival of sexual maturity or sexual attractiveness; this crisis brings with it a great deal of anxiety, many "what ifs"; in the *HART* the focus is on the alteration of the father-daughter relationship.[417] Thus the first "descent" in the novel is the direct result of a father who misbehaves in this crisis, and takes his daughter to bed. This pair is not of much concern in the novel, and the more or less vanish once Apollonius leaves them. The real point is that the sexual maturity of the girl brings with it much potential to disrupt the social order, and this potential is played out in the

[416] Much of what appears in this brief treatment is based upon the excellent analyses of Konstan (1994) and Schmeling (2003).

[417] See Schmeling (1999), 149.

adventures of Apollonius. His first "ascent" from the night world is brought about by Archistrates, a king who behaves properly when his daughter reaches sexual maturity: he marries her to the man of her choice, who happens to be Apollonius, thus providing the marriage and end of the first stage of Apollonius' adventures which, in a Greek novel, would bring the conclusion of the narrative.

Since this novel is concerned with the problems caused by *daughter-father* love and its conflict with the erotic, however, Apollonius' adventures are not over: at the very moment that his *daughter* is born, he is cast once again into the night world through the *Scheintod* of his wife. He will not see her again until the end of the novel, which now focuses on the daughter she has brought into his life. Again, since the crisis in father-daughter love is not reached until the daughter becomes sexually mature, Apollonius conveniently disappears for the second half of the narrative, while Tarsia grows up in the care of his friends, and the narrative now focuses on the crisis of sexuality from her perspective. When she becomes sexually attractive, a crisis once again intervenes: her foster-mother is envious, for the sake of her daughters, of Tarsia's beauty (desirability), and thus causes her to undergo a *Scheintod* as well. Apollonius, on learning of her "death," is sunk into deep despair; it is only when Tarsia has appeared to him as a prostitute, he has resisted her charms, and the potential for father-daughter violence has been dissipated through the relatively harmless nosebleed he causes her (which substitutes for the bleeding which resulted from Antiochus raping his (virgin) daughter, the act of father-daughter violence which precipitated the narrative), and married her off to another man, that the crisis has been solved, and he may return to the idyllic plane.

His full return, however, cannot be achieved alone: at the crucial moment, as he is sailing home with his daughter and new son-in-law, his dream tells him to act in a way

which will reunite him with his wife. The very means by which he is recognized is, as we have seen, the tale he tells, which is the final essentialization of the novel itself. Thus, while the novel is by and large preoccupied with the problems of father-daughter relations and their solution, this dream is its one concession to the interests of those who have no specific interest in such issues. Any father with an unmarried daughter who read or heard the novel would likely have felt a special power in the narrative spell, and have found the message that the difficulties brought by the sexual maturation of his daughter could be overcome particularly meaningful. Any reader or listener, too, who is able to project himself into the position of the fathers or daughters in the work would have been able to empathize, and to find some relevance in that empathy. By including this dream, however, the author suggests that, if all else fails, this tale may be understood as further evidence that the gods are on our side, and that they protect those who do right, however much they may suffer because of the problems inherent in human life or caused by wicked people.

Chariton

The juxtaposition of Callirhoe's final dream, in book five of Chariton's novel, with the situation in which she finds herself on waking is, in my opinion, one of the most powerful passages in the novel, though it not usually treated as such. There are, it is true, several more books in which Chaereas and Callirhoe are subjected to various hardships, not least the Persian king's lust for Callirhoe and its consequences. And the courtroom scene which follows not long afterwards is without doubt one of the most dramatic moments. Yet there is something deeply moving in the dream of Callirhoe which must not be overlooked. The moment immediately preceding her dream is, in a sense, the nadir

of her "descent": she has now been brought as far from her home and all that is familiar to her as possible; she is still under the impression that Chaereas is dead, and now faces the possibility that she will no longer have Dionysius' love to protect her. She realizes all of this, and laments quite bitterly, then finally falls asleep. Her subsequent dream is quite simple, and today we would likely find nothing remarkable in such an event: a mere memory of a past life she once had, in which she was truly happy. The contrast at once highlights the severity of her current unhappiness; yet, when she awakes, Plangon interprets the dream as a prediction that she will be happy again, and that is enough to bring her great joy: it is as if the joy she felt in the dream has been carried into her waking life because the reality to which it points is taken as more than a mere fiction.

For a reader, this is a culmination of the pattern suggested by the other dreams in the novel. When Theron's dream prevents Callirhoe's death, much of the anxiety which his decision to kill her stirred up, whether for Callirhoe herself, for our own loved ones, or for ourselves, is quieted, and we get our first inkling that some divine force is watching over the heroine. As the narrative progresses, a real pattern emerges: Dionysius is consoled through the mercy of the gods, and promised a happier future; Callirhoe and her unborn child are both rescued by a dream; Callirhoe is shown to Dionysius in the best possible light because a dream led her to Aphrodite's temple at just the right moment; her new presumably somewhat happy life with Dionysius is interrupted when she is warned of the hardships Chaereas faces and the trouble ahead; her misinterpretation of the first of these dreams is indirectly responsible for Chaereas' escape from crucifixion at the last moment; the second brings consolation by telling her of this rescue; Dionysius' dream during his faint warns him of his future separation from Callirhoe at Chaereas' hands. Then comes this dream of her previous life, and the reader whose anxiety for Callirhoe

has been brought to the furthest point possible receives the last reassurance that all will turn out alright before it actually does. Thus, by the end of the novel, looking back on Callirhoe's adventures, it becomes quite clear to us that the whole time she was subjected to various trials and hardships because of her love for Chaereas, the gods were looking out for her, making certain that she reached the end of it all in safety and lived happily ever after.

The specific anxieties provoked, and the particular ways in which they are overcome, are thus generalized by this dream to suggest that they apply, not only in the case of Callirhoe, but more generally in a world ruled by benevolent divinities with human interests at heart.[418] This much explains the emotional appeal of the novel to a general audience, however erudite or proletariat, however elite or common.[419] Yet the specifics of the anxiety should point, as well, to concerns that had some prevalence for the author and his intended (or actual) audience. What are these specifics? In the case of Theron's dream, the anxiety that has been aroused by Chariton immediately prior is the possibility of Callirhoe's death. On a general level, then, this may stand for the death of anyone dear to us, including ourselves; more specifically, however, it represents the life-threatening potential, for a young woman, of love and all that it entails (we here

[418] The specific divinity chosen, as well as the socio-political implications of this choice for a citizen of Aphrodisias are explored in Edwards (1994); cf. Zeitlin (2008), 101; Connors (2008), 167. I am here concerned more with the private emotional appeal of the novel, and thus with individual instances of readership. It is surely probable, if not certain, that some of the readers of the novels were elite Aphrodisians or elite members of other cities (including Rome) with which Aphrodisias had political dealings; Edwards' argument that the novel would have had special significance for them is quite convincing, and may even partly explain the motivation for composing such a work (though I am certain that other, more personal, motivations must have been involved as well). Yet what of the many other readers who found some relevance in the novel without any personal connection with Aphrodisias? Surely the complete absence of any reference to Aphrodisias, beyond the author's self introduction, suggests that they, too, should be considered in any attempt to understand the novel.

[419] Reardon (1989) emphasizes the emotional effect of the events described as the point towards which Chariton directs much of his narrative (20).

remember that Chaereas and Callirhoe, *before* marrying but after falling in love, nearly died simply from the emotion; this was the first crisis averted). Being captured by pirates robbing your tomb after you have been left for dead, then nearly being drowned at sea by them, is hardly typical, it is true, of your average love affair. Yet this crisis is a highly stylized and very unlikely problem which is nonetheless basically an answer to the worrying question *what can happen to people because of love*. Love is disruptive, even destructive, and has led many people far from any support networks designed to keep them alive and safe, like the society into which they have previously been integrated.[420]

Leonas' daydream is also a reaction to anxiety: specifically, his anxiety over the possibilities now that his master is a widower. It is thus addressed once again to the possibilities that our loved ones may die, but this time it is seen from a different emotional perspective: the grief that is then felt by those who are left behind. Dionysius' first dream is not as much a response to anxiety as it is to this grief. Yet the forward looking interpretation given it by Leonas makes its relevance clear: it is meant, not to comfort someone who is grieving by allowing him to be with his departed loved one again (though it has that effect), but instead to reassure him by suggesting that all is not lost, but that he will get another loved one who is even better. The absurdity of this idea highlights the idealistic perspective that is adopted here: no one who is so deeply in love with his wife as Dionysius seems to be would actually accept the idea that anyone else could substitute for her, or that simply because the substitute was even prettier than his first wife, that he would be even happier with her. Thus, whereas the *possibility* of death is evoked in the events preceding Theron's dream to heighten anxiety, death when it has

[420] Heiserman (1977) observes that the curious description of Callirhoe in Aphrodite's temple as like Artemis with a child, which Chariton explicitly marks as a kind of paradox, could be symbolic of precisely this kind of conflict between the social and the private, the chaste and the sexual, and so on (94).

actually occurred is trivialized: it holds no sting for the bereaved, because even so grave a loss is soon made better, and the earlier state even improved upon by the intervention of the gods. The novel is not concerned with evoking death as a way of exploring grief, but rather as a way of heightening anxiety: even the slightest change in fortune might lead to suicide, if not to actual danger from anyone else. This makes the effect of the final structure, when all anxiety is miraculously washed away, that much more powerful.

We may pass over the next two dream passages, which both serve mainly to point to the divine as the force in charge of both dreams and the events unfolding in waking reality. Callirhoe's dream, in which Chaereas tells her that he entrusts their child to her, also occurs at a moment of heightened anxiety for the reader: Callirhoe, it seems, has been put in an impossible position, having to choose between fidelity and maternal care (or perhaps fidelity and life). This is, again, an unlikely scenario, yet it is still precipitated by the love Callirhoe has for Chaereas (it is this which stands in the way of her marriage to Dionysius, which is undoubtedly the better solution all around but for this obstacle), and is thus another exploration of the problematic nature of this emotion. In this case, her love stands in the way of her performance of her socially scripted role, as an elite woman (and thus a producer of the next generation of elite citizens); that social status is here an issue can be seen from her insistence that refusing to marry Dionysius yet keeping the child is not an option, since he would then be born into slavery (and she would be shirking her duty just as certainly as if she aborted the child and/or killed herself). The dream which comes resolves this conflict in precisely the same way as the ending of the novel resolves the anxiety surrounding the inherent danger of love as a disruptive force, and in precisely the same way as the dream of Callirhoe in book five: by pointing to marriage to an elite Greek male as the solution; Callirhoe is thus to subordinate the

private aspect of her love to the civic duty it entails, which is represented by marriage and childbirth; only Chaereas, however, can transform this prioritization of the civic over the personal into a *resolution* by suggesting that it is what *he* wants, and thus that her private love for Chaereas will not be violated, but on the contrary, will be fulfilled by her performance of the civic duty which is expected as a result of that love.[421] This can be seen from the oddity of having a living person appear to Callirhoe, and the reference to an Homeric passage in which (as is more common) a *dead* person appears to Achilles and instructs him to give up his private emotion and perform the act that is expected of him as his civic *duty* to his beloved.[422] Thus, for a reader, at the same moment that this dream points to a more general scheme of divine intervention to resolve human problems, and thus brings relief of anxieties, it also affirms the idea that love will only work if it is subordinated to the demands of the social group, and thereby suggests that the various problems and anxieties being explored are only real dangers if the social model represented by marriage is disrupted.

Callirhoe's next two dreams are both concerned with the fate of Chaereas during her relative security as Dionysius' new wife. The first tells her of Chaereas' bondage, and she interprets this as a symbol of his death; her only consolation, for the moment, is the idea that the dream may have been deceptive. We, however, know at this point what the gods here also know, and reveal to Callirhoe (indeed, we have been told it in the previous sentence): that Chaereas has been captured, and sold into slavery. On one level, then, this dream serves to tie the separate narratives of Chaereas and Callirhoe together; at another, it serves to arouse in Callirhoe the same anxiety over the dangerous possibilities, the most

[421] See Perkins (1995), 70.

[422] See Auger (1983), who interprets this Homeric echo as an indication of the use of dreams to create an impression of the beyond (*d'au-delà*) (47-8).

extreme of which being death (to which for an elite, as her interpretation implies, slavery is a close second), inherent in her and Chaereas' mutual attachment. It also serves, however, after some time to motivate the action which eventually saves Chaereas from slavery and death (the former having made him quickly vulnerable to the latter), and is thus once again an example for the reader of the gods intervening to impose a structure on human events, made dangerous by love, which resolves these dangers and our anxieties about them. Callirhoe's next dream, in fact, may be directed almost entirely to this end. In the previous chapters, it was argued that this dream must, within the text, have been included for its emotional effect on Callirhoe, of which her relief after conducting Chaereas' funeral was a delayed manifestation. Here, we may simply say that for a reader, who is given no interpretive clue as to the meaning of the dream, the most immediate effect is that he waits to see (having just witnessed a dream which depicted the truth quite literally) whether this dream, too, is accurate: will Callirhoe save Chaereas? It thus serves to heighten suspense, which goes hand in hand with anxiety and hope (may even be said to be a mixture of the two): on the one hand, there is the anxiety over Chaereas' vulnerability, as a slave, to death or torment as a result of his love for Callirhoe; on the other hand, there is the hope, instilled by this dream, that she will save him. This suspense reaches its climax when Chaereas is about to be nailed to a cross, but is then (nearly miraculously) saved by, as it turns out, his friend's mention of the name "Callirhoe." The reader is thus alerted, this final time before Callirhoe's dream with which we began this analysis, to the pattern of divine benevolence, revealed through the dreams and serving to protect the two lovers as they cycle through all of the possibilities about which the disruptive potential of love causes anxiety.

Xenophon of Ephesus

In Xenophon's novel, the dangers inherent in love are cast rather clumsily in quite explicit terms of Habrocomes' hubris against Eros and that gods subsequent revenge. The basic conflict between love and society (which, in the case of Habrocomes, is represented by the deep admiration which everyone has for him wherever he goes, and the enormous ego he develops as a result) is thus first introduced by the ominous notion that a god is seeking revenge, but the emplotted ramifications of this are spelled out more explicitly in the oracle, solicited relatively early in the first book, which says, in a nutshell, that Anthia and Habrocomes' problem is also the solution (i.e., they are in love), that their problem is worse than it seems, because they will have to suffer terrible things and travel far, but they will be saved by a goddess and have a happy ending (1.6). The optimistic "romance" structure which must be alluded to and hinted at in other novels is, then, introduced in this novel very early, in an oracle, and is thus tied quite explicitly to a religious source.[423] What, then, is the purpose of the dreams? Why is this oracle not enough to achieve the purpose required of the religious element in the novel? In short, because while this oracle outlines the structure of the narrative as a whole and attributes it to a divine source, the emotional effect of the structure is minimal. At most, it is a mixture of confusion and anxiety: confusion at the obscurity of the oracle's meaning, general objectless anxiety at the *bad*, whatever that may be, that it clearly predicts.

Habrocomes' first dream prepares him for the full significance of the disaster about to occur by making him experience it, in stylized form, just before it takes place. The emotional effect of this is, by comparison with the oracle, profound, as we have

[423] Schmeling (1980) finds this to be a flaw in Xenophon's narrative technique, that he does not build up suspense: "…the subtle force of foreshadowing is consequently here lost" (27); see note 233 above for my response to this kind of argument.

seen.[424] Thus at the same moment that the dream creates emotional readiness in Habrocomes, it preemptively stirs up in readers the fear which came in murmurs with the oracle, but now strikes us quite powerfully, as we experience the terror of the dream scene.[425] Because it is a description of a nightmare, too, it taps more generally into our memories of our own similar dreams, and we are thus able to feel the terror, perhaps not exactly as Habrocomes did, but in our own quite visceral way. In this sense it operates a bit like the dream simile at the end of the *Aeneid*, or in book 22 of the *Iliad* to which, as we have seen, Encolpius alludes in his terror, also aboard a ship which has met with (in his eyes) disaster, in the *Satyrica*. Yet this dream, unlike the chasing dreams alluded to there, ends with escape: this is a hint for a reader as for Habrocomes at the optimistic structure already revealed in the oracle, operative in the Greek novels, and thus softens the anxiety and terror: here, as in Chariton, the interest seems not so much in exploring death and destruction as such, as, that is, very real possibilities in human life, but instead in evoking their existence and power over us only to show that the protagonists, despite this disaster, will remain unharmed. Habrocomes and Anthia swim away; Callirhoe sets Chaereas free. We are thus, even as we are encouraged to sink ourselves into the terror of the nightmare world, reminded that the point to all of these disasters is not that they are real, that they are possible, or that they are frightening, but that, in the end and with the help of the gods, they will be overcome.[426]

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[424] See Schmeling (1980), 90.

[425] In this sense, Kytzler's (2003) observation that the dream serves as a "means of heightening the tension" (355) is correct, though simplistic.

[426] Schmeling (1980) once again sees this as a flaw in Xenophon's technique (see his comment on the oracular response above): "…[Xenophon] arouses the emotion of fear but allays it with a happy resolution before that emotion can be fully exploited" (90).

This is clear as well in Habrocomes' second dream; there, however, Habrocomes is already, in the midst of his waking reality, sunk deep into the nightmare world of which his earlier dream was a warning. He is in prison, like Chaereas in slavery, and has been separated from his beloved. It is not surprising, then, that this dream does not focus on the terrors ahead, but instead on the theme of escape: it shows his father setting him free, his wandering in search of Anthia, and his transformation back into himself (i.e. an elite Greek male rather than a "beast of burden," i.e. a slave).[427] The emotional effect of this dream is a slight lightening of his mood, and this is thus a reiteration, at a particularly gloomy point in the narrative, of the emotional effect of the "swimming away" ending of the previous dream. In readers, as well, it serves to reinforce this tiny but nonetheless present glimmer of hope and reassurance in the midst of terror and grief, a glimmer which makes this an exploration, again, not of the dangers of the world, not of death or slavery or captivity, but of the possibility of rising above these things, however horrible: of regaining one's standing and happiness in the world. It, too, is thus an effective reminder not to allow this gloomy nightmare world to become the subject of the novel, but to make it the background, necessary for contrast, against which the novel's message of hope and security is displayed. An analogy, perhaps a bit overblown but useful for thinking about the effect of this dream on a less jaded audience than is constituted by modern readers, can again be drawn to a horror film. Given the *religious* power of the dreams as presented in these novels, it is perhaps not exaggerating too greatly to make the following comparison. If we were watching a horror film, and reached the scene in which the hero/heroine is locked in a closet/room by the villain, who is about to subject him/her

[427] That we need not "interpret" the dream to understand its function is largely my point here; nonetheless, I do not agree with Schmeling (1980) that the appearance of Habrocomes' father need foreshadow his death (47); indeed, "father" here could simply substitute for the (prospective) father-in-law which Manto's father (who really does set Habrocomes free) was; cf. Heiserman (1977), 49.

to some horrific torture (or perhaps already has), and suddenly said hero heroine has a vision in which an angel appears and reassures him/her that everything will be alright in the end, the effect would be similar to this dream.[428]

This is not to say that the ancient novel/horror film comparison is ideal, simply that there is some similarity between the two genres, in that both explore our anxieties about death, isolation from society, torment, etc. Not all horror films share the optimistic pattern of the ancient novels: there are usually significantly more deaths of sympathetic characters, including at times the protagonist, and the overall structure is thus more often tragic. If we can imagine a horror film, however, in which the protagonists, after being subjected to various terrors and torments, escape safe and sound, the scene described above, in which a divinely sent message promises this escape, would be equivalent to the second dream of Habrocomes. When we turn to Anthia's dream, however, the matter becomes a bit more problematic. An argument has been made earlier that this dream is meant to be read much as Callirhoe's final dream in Chariton's novel, and that Anthia's reaction is a result of her *misinterpretation* of it; that, however, cannot be proven for certain. Whatever the case, it is certain that a reader will know 1) that Anthia's interpretation leads her to a false conclusion; 2) that her interpretation, like Habrocomes' reaction to his first dream, ignores a critical part of the dream (the fact that Habrocomes is dragged off *unwilling*); 3) from the oracle, which provides a sustaining hope for a happy ending throughout the novel, as discussed above, that the dream *cannot* accurately predict a bad ending. Anthia's reaction to this dream seems, in fact, rather odd, and her failure to follow through with her resolution to commit suicide is left unexplained.

[428] Anderson (1989) compares the novel to another film genre, the western (126); if we adopt this model, we can still get a sense for the oddity of this scene: it is as if at the very moment that the hero has been brutalized and jailed by the local sheriff, an angel appears to him and tell him that he will be set free and will be reunited with his true love…

Something seems to be missing here, and the theory that this novel, as we have it, is in fact an epitome of an original, twice as long, is tempting as an explanation for this seeming lacuna.[429] If we avoid such special pleading, however, the readers' greater awareness of the facts to which this dream points, outlined above, must lead to a divergence of emotional reaction from Anthia. Instead, we may propose, a reader will be led to the deepest level of sympathy for Anthia and all of her sufferings by this dream and her resulting desire to commit suicide; there will be anxiety over the possibility of her death, fear and pity for the lovers, and by extension those dear to us, but just as with the earlier dreams, which signaled the desire to explore pain, suffering, and death as a *backdrop* for happiness rather than an endpoint, our background awareness that this dream has been misinterpreted allows us to see Anthia's misery as the darkness before a glorious dawn. I will reiterate, then, that the dreams, pointing as they do to this optimistic structure, are a bit like the generic conventions of romantic films in our culture: we feel deep sorrow and pity for the hero and heroine when they enter the "break-up" period of the film, but this is still tempered by our knowledge that everything will work out in the end.[430]

[429] See Schmeling (1980), 76-77; also O'Sullivan (1995), 10-11 for the theory, as well as 99-144 for his argument against it. His more general thesis (that the *Ephesiaca* is an oral composition, from which the later novels are derived) I find unconvincing. See also Hägg's (2004) discussion of the epitome theory (159-198).

[430] See Goldhill (2008), 187 and *passim* for the role of generic expectations in shaping our emotional response to the novels.

Achilles Tatius

Achilles Tatius' novel is by far the most histrionic of the Greek novels; in this sense it is closer still to a horror film than Xenophon's novel.[431] This, I believe, is one of the reasons why many scholars see it as a comic piece: the dramatic elements are so stylized as to be patently *melodramatic*. There is, nonetheless, a close link between horror and humor, in as much as both explore the *monstrous*, the extremities of human imagination.[432] Achilles Tatius thus pushes the envelope in his exploration of the *possible* dangers inherent in love; the horrific nature of Clitophon's first dream, which foreshadows a later scene, points from the very beginning to this technique.[433] Whereas Habrocomes' first dream, to which we have compared Clitophon's, instilled *terror* (an extreme expression of fear) with the image of the frightening woman setting his ship on fire, Clitophon's instills *horror* (terror mixed with disgust) by depicting the mutilation of the androgyne of which he is a part. This is repeated in Panthia's equally horrific (and quite similar) dream; Hippias' dream, though not particularly terrifying, is nonetheless ominous, and together these nightmares set up a network of religious signification that is quite frightening. More significant still is the fact that, in comparison with other dreams we have seen in earlier novels, *none of these dreams hint at a happy ending*. For the moment, the only positive signs we have are Clitophon's love (reinforced by the psychological dream mentioned earlier; that Clitophon prefers this to waking reality is also a rather ominous reflection on that reality) and the theory he proposes at the very

[431] Cf. Reardon (1999b): "…these episodes demonstrate that there was undoubtedly a taste for fiction as sensational in its methods as any modern ghost or science fiction story" (247).

[432] See Carroll (2003), 90.

[433] Heiserman (1977) compares it to Habrocomes' first dream, and finds it comical in contrast with the serious presentation of that dream (121).

beginning, which, as we have seen, assimilates even nightmares to a pattern of religious optimism.

The ambiguity of Clitophon's introduction to his story, which could just as easily point to a tragic end, makes this seem as if it is all leading to a gloomy finish, and this is only reinforced by the tragic tale of Cleinias and Charikles. When Leucippe is brutally murdered, we reach the depths of the nightmare world: the horrific dreams have come true, and this novel seems to be a genuine (albeit rather melodramatic) tragedy. When she turns out to be safe and sound, however, and rises out of her coffin, it becomes apparent that the entirety of the previous narrative was one extended *set-up* for this dramatic moment. It is only then, immediately after Leucippe's "resurrection" that the *Liebespaar* recall their twin dreams, which function like the oracle at the start of the *Ephesiaca*, and reveal to us that we are reading an *optimistic* novel, with a happy end, and that we are thus in the middle of an optimistic structure controlled by a divine benevolence. Some scholars have pointed to this moment as the point at which the novel gets "back on track" with the generic conventions.[434] I would argue, however, that the bending of these generic conventions in the previous books was not purely comic in effect: instead, it leads us to believe that we are reading a tragedy, it heightens the anxiety we feel to a greater level than was possible in any of the previous novels, because there is no firm hint at the *optimism* of the novel's structure until *after* Leucippe's apparent death; after, that is, our despair, fear, pity, horror, etc. have been raised to the highest point humanly possible.[435]

Achilles Tatius' pushing of the envelope is thus more than a simple experimentation with, or part-parody, of the genre: it is an attempt to achieve something

[434] See footnote 121 above.

[435] Which is at least part of the reason for using a first-person narrative; see Reardon (1999b), 253.

aimed at also by the other novels to a degree not possible with them. It is not a violation of the conventions so much as a hybridization of them:[436] the similarities between this novel and the *Latin* novels have been remarked upon often. Indeed, the first third of *Leucippe and Clitophon* reads, in terms of the dream structure, somewhat more like parts of the *Satyrica* than *Callirhoe*: the dreams nearly all seem to point to a *pessimistic* religious force, and the only contradictions of this are in Clitophon's Stoic *sophistry* (to which we can compare, e.g., Eumolpus' Epicurean sophistry in the *Satyrica*) and his attempted escape into one of the few markedly "empty" dreams in the Greek novels.[437] This first portion is thus also similar to the first ten books of the *Metamorphoses*, with their violent, stabbing, murderous dreams and the protestations of various characters through philosophizing that the implications of these dreams are, in fact, positive or meaningless. In this sense, Leucippe's resurrection and the dreams that (temporally) precede it but come after in the narrative are similar to Lucius' rescue by Isis and the twin dreams to Lucius and Mithras which precede it and restructure the narrative to fit an *optimistic* pattern. It seems, then, that Achilles Tatius has borrowed some of the conventions of the Latin novels to construct this first part of his narrative.

Yet the novel is, undeniably, in the same category as the other Greek novels. The optimistic structure is revealed late, but not in the final book; there are decidedly comic elements, but they do not overwhelm the general seriousness of the overall narrative.[438] What we may say is that Achilles Tatius seems to have borrowed, or perhaps simply to

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[436] *pace* Chew (2000), Durham (1938), etc.; cf. Reardon (1999b): "…a parody would be concerned exclusively with making fun of its genre, whereas Achilles does have a story to tell of the conventional kind, and carries it through to its end conscientiously. That story is a version of the familiar pattern, not a sustained send-up of it; it is written for its value as a story, not for its value as a parody" (258).

[437] Cf. Courtney (2001), 50.

[438] Winkler (1989) argues, alternately, that we should not really expect a resolution of the conflicting tones of this novel (173).

have hit upon, some of the same techniques used in the Latin novels to portray a frightening world, and to have used these techniques to prolong our anxiety without hinting at any relief for as long as possible. Once he has recast his structure as an optimistic one, however, and brought the novel back in line with the conventions of the genre, his task is accomplished: very few dreams of any real significance (besides reaffirming that a divine, benevolent power is still in charge) follow these twin dreams. It is, continuing the comparison to the Latin novels, as if Apuleius had introduced Isis in the middle of book 4: the result is drastically different, and because the Greek novel-like structure, which is only present in Apuleius in the final book and in the tale of Cupid and Psyche, here makes up the majority of the narrative, the overall effect is still that of the other Greek novels. The first three books, then, are like the start of Chariton up to the dream of Theron, drawn out much longer (three books rather than a half a book) to heighten the anxiety-creating effect, and perhaps influenced by the decidedly more gloomy world of the Latin novels in their presentation, but ultimately only a temporary suspension of the optimistic pattern employed by the genre.

Longus

Longus' novel, by contrast with Achilles Tatius, is the least melodramatic, and spends the least of its time exploring the terrors and horrors of the other world into which the emotion of love may cast us. Instead, it focuses on the process of falling in love. This is an important component of the other Greek novels, but it is usually treated relatively briefly. In Achilles Tatius, it occupies parts of the first and second books; in Xenophon of Ephesus, it occupies the first half of the first book; in Chariton, it occupies only the first chapter of the first book (although it is repeated, without Callirhoe's participation, with

the characters Dionysius and the Persian king); in Heliodorus, to be discussed at the end of this chapter, it is described by Calasiris in parts of the third and fourth books. In *Daphnis and Chloe*, however, this is the main narrative line: as if the traditional novel form had been turned inside out, or, rather, as if the novelist had selected one particularly interesting detail in the conventional plot and zoomed in on it, leaving the other elements to fade somewhat into the background. This leads to a narrative in which, by contrast with the other novels, the external dangers which the lovers face are not potential *consequences* of their love, but rather *obstacles to* it. It is for this reason that the dangers are not encountered by two lovers as a consequence of their alienation and isolation from society resulting from their love, but instead impingements of society into that alienation and isolation, which is necessary for their love to form.[439]

Yet the optimistic structure remains in place, and is pointed to by these dreams even more emphatically than in the other novels. Indeed, Dryas and Lamon's initial dream is responsible for, and a summary of, the basic movement of the plot (such as it is). Since falling in love is the focus, the marriage which caps the novel, and is a symbol of the lovers' reintegration into elite society, is nearly an afterthought, something already implicit in the fact that they have fallen in love; yet it, too, must be achieved by a dream, which negates Chloe's isolation from elite society and allows her to achieve the "happy end" towards which the novel points. On the level of the emotional reaction of the readers, then, this novel also, in general terms, expresses and arouses an optimistic outlook on life, according to which all obstacles may be overcome, and problems end

[439] Cf. Heiserman (1977), who suggests that Longus' use of Pastoral presents its ideals as at war with society (168-9); but see also Morgan (2004), who problematizes this easy opposition (16).

happily with the help of the gods.[440] The difference lies in the more specific anxiety which is overcome: it is not fear of the disruption of society which love can cause, but fear of the disruption of love which society can cause. In more general terms, it is anxiety potential abrogation of personal desires, motivations, attachments, etc. by the civic. This makes it by far the most personal, individualistic of the novels, which, though it still promises a happy end in which conflicts are resolved, the resolution is not a compromise of the personal for the sake of the civic, but of the civic for the sake of the personal. This is why there is emphasis, even at the end of the novel, on the fact that Daphnis and Chloe never become fully comfortable with their new-found elite roles, but remain on some level simple pastoralists.

We may examine the role of the dreams in exploring this specific emotional structure further. At the very beginning, after Daphnis and Chloe have been found and raised by Dryas and Lamon, we are told that Eros wishes them to be sent into the fields, because they are destined for each other. Even here, then, there is some dissent on the part of the society's demands, because Dryas and Lamon, though simple shepherds, are nonetheless proponents of the social order and believe that it is beneath the youths to perform such menial tasks. This conflict between Love and social hierarchy is not violent, but it is pointed and sends an immediate signal to the reader, who responds with some measure of apprehension, in sympathy with the foster fathers, in proportion to his or her own allegiance to this social hierarchy. Our recognition of the winged boy, however, signals to us that this is the expected conflict between love and society, and thus that we may expect it all to turn out well in the end (the idea of a god hostile to the

[440] For a defense of the more generalizing reading in opposition to the "mystery" interpretation of the divine framework (which has been perhaps most successful with this novel), see Hunter (1983), 37.

protagonists is never even mentioned in this novel). Our apprehension is thus only mild, and leads us to hope for the eventual integration of the *Liebespaar* into the society from which they are now exiled.[441] In the meantime, we are able to enjoy the description of their growing love, which is emphasized in the next book by the description of their psychological dreams. The next divine dream comes after Chloe has been kidnapped by Bryaxis and his men, and Daphnis is reassured by the Nymphs that all is being taken care of. This event is an intrusion of the civic (represented by war) into the cocoon of isolation into which the lovers have been sent, and is thus a reversal of the sort of conflict we see in the other novels: their (as earlier in Longus) the hostile forces are "Others," barbarians, robbers, ghoulish women, or the like.[442] Here, it is a group of fellow Greeks, *fellow Lesbians*, even, from a rival city-state. The isolation which is *interrupted*, rather than prolonged by these men, is thus not a negative force, but a positive one, which is necessary for the development of a private attachment. Our fear for Chloe is just as real as it is for Callirhoe when she is kidnapped, but the force which we fear in this case, the cause of trouble is society itself. The dream thus promises, not a return to society, but a return to the private world which Daphnis and Chloe inhabited before, that their private emotion may grow further (until, we presume, it is strong enough to be integrated into society through marriage: this is where the general pattern of the Greek novel remains in effect).

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[441] Cf. Effe (1999) on bucolic, which is the genre with which, by my analysis, Longus has chosen to represent the personal in contrast with the civic (or urban): "This allows the following hypothesis about the actual function of the bucolic in Longus. It obviously does not serve to establish an alternative to given reality, but rather offers a temporary, pleasurable evasion from a world of living whose values and standards as such are never seriously questioned" (208).

[442] Cf. Perkins (1995), 61.

This also explains the significance for the reader of Daphnis' evaluation of his dream and the consolation it provided as of equal desirability with his previous life with Chloe (see above).[443] In a sense, Daphnis' life, in isolation from the reality of society and its demands is a dream existence, like Clitophon's reality at dinner after he has fallen in love with Leucippe. Thus, in this novel, the "descent" is still into a dreamlike world, but it is not a nightmare world, except when society impinges upon it.[444] In fact, this is the one novel in which the *isolation* period of the "maiden's tragedy" scheme which it follows is a *positive* time, an idyllic plane of existence. Bryaxis' dream, by contrast, is the only nightmarish dream in the novel, and it is not sent in the beginning, as a warning to the protagonist as many of the nightmares in the other novels are, but in the middle, as a command to an antagonist who has interrupted the idyllic plane prematurely. Our reaction to Bryaxis' dream is one of fear, of course (since an angry god is always frightening), but also, in as much as we sympathize with the protagonists, is one of reassurance, that in the conflict between society and self, society will not win, thanks to the benevolence of the gods: instead, a compromise, a peace agreement will be reached, like the agreement the Methymneans soon draw up with the Mytileneans. This focus on society as a threat to the self, rather than the other way around, also explains the gods who appear in this novel. There are no major civic cult gods, but instead, local, rural divinities (with the exception of Eros, who is, still a famously rebellious and anti-social divinity, and who does not usually receive civic cult recognition). It is these gods who are

[443] See the discussion in chapter 2 (pp. 88-89) above.

[444] Cf. Saïd's (1999) argument about Longus' different treatment of the town/country opposition: "Longus' originality is not that he substitutes the countryman's point of view, but on the contrary that he highlights at times the distortions caused by this purely urban perspective and that he introduces a critical distance which is not found elsewhere" (107).

benevolent, who protect their favorites from the overpowering force of the civic, and ensure a resolution of the conflicting loyalties.

Daphnis' next dream of the Nymphs also serves to bring about such a resolution, and promises a more complete resolution as the happy end of the novel: his private attachment to Chloe is again threatened by society, in the form of wealthy suitors who come bearing gifts to her foster father.[445] This threat is soon resolved, however, when he is told where to find a purse of gold, lost by the very Methymneans who kidnapped Daphnis and who caused the "war" in which Chloe was taken captive; the purse thus represents a minor triumph of the private over the social. Our emotional reaction is, again, first anxiety over the interruption of social forces upon a private attachment, and then reassurance that the social cannot triumph over the private, both because Daphnis is miraculously granted the means to compete with other representatives of the social expectations placed upon Chloe (that she marry), and because a more complete resolution will be reached later; this entire optimistic structure is, of course, extended into a more general pattern by the suggestion that it is effected by benevolent deities.

Finally, the dreams of Dionysophanes and Megacles are both resolutions of a problem caused by the conflict between love and social obligation: in the case of Dionysophanes, the love of Daphnis and Chloe is blocked by the social expectation that Daphnis, as an elite Greek male, will marry an elite Greek woman (which Chloe, at this point, does not appear to be). The gods intervene and bring a solution, showing Daphnis' father how he can find a place for Chloe in elite society by discovering her parents. In the case of Megacles dream, the problem is grief at a lost child who was exposed because

[445] Cf. Chalk (1960): "The public ritual of marriage is something separate from the story of personal love: it calls for a separate season and Book to itself (iv)" (42).

Megacles was loathe to bring up an elite citizen (his daughter; the fact that he comes from a noble family is represented by his performance of liturgies) in poverty; this, however, is a poverty that is exacerbated by his spending every penny he has on meeting *social* obligations. Thus the conflict here is again between love (father-daughter love) and social obligation; it is, again, resolved by the gods, who bring Chloe back to him at the moment when his social obligations no longer conflict with, but instead demand, his playing the role of father. This dream, then, which is sent as reassurance that this conflict will be resolved, yet is misinterpreted by him as mockery, is meant as a message to the reader that this resolution is divinely orchestrated. Yet it cannot reassure us regarding Chloe herself, for at this point we already know that she and Daphnis will have their love successfully integrated into society, but instead is meant as a reassurance to us about our own lives, that the same resolution of conflict between social and personal roles can and will be resolved with the help of the divine.

Heliodorus

The last author to be considered is also the most complicated; there are elements in Heliodorus of all of the preceding novels, and yet there is an earnestness and grandeur to his narrative that surpasses all of his predecessors. Heliodorus, in fact, gives us an idea of what the Greek novel might have become had it not, for whatever reason, died out. Longus' theme of the abandoned daughter, sent away by her parents for the sake of social convenience finds its way into the narrative, and is highlighted at the end of the novel by two dreams that are the equivalent of Megacles' strange visions. The macabre and gloomy notes of Achilles Tatius also find their expression, in particular in Charikleia's famous cave dream which, like the bandit slicing Leucippe open which Panthia

witnesses, doesn't end in such a way as to point to an optimistic structure, and requires sophisticated interpretation to have the requisite positive effect. Here too there is an oracle revealing the essential plot structure,[446] but made more explicit by a dream, as in Xenophon, though Heliodorus manages, by beginning his narrative *in medias res*, to save this spoiler until nearly halfway through the narrative. Finally, as in Chariton, there is also a period of captivity by a powerful and haughty Persian, who lusts after one member of the *Liebespaar* (in this case the young man, who is in this novel a decidedly more passive hero than Chaereas), which begins when the woman Arsake *pretends to have had a dream demanding sacrifice*. Heliodorus, however, depicts the divine framework governing his novel even more seriously than his predecessors, by the unique trope of having his characters questions whether their more powerful dreams were even dreams at all, or were instead *actual visions of the gods*.[447] The effect of this hesitation on the part of his characters is to suggest, without insisting, that the gods are even closer, even more intimately involved, in the management of human affairs than had ever been the case in earlier novels. By reporting his characters voicing doubt on the matter, however, Heliodorus is able to deflect skepticism from his own narrative to the judgment of the characters: anyone who does not believe that the gods actually appear to humans while awake can simply assume that these were dreams.[448] By this technique, then, Heliodorus is able to assert as strongly as possible, without alienating skeptics, that the pattern of his novel is evidence for the operation of the divine in human life, rather than chance

[446] Cf. Morgan (1994a), 108.

[447] For the sophistry of the evidence used to support this claim in the case of Calasiris' first dream, see Sandy (1982), 143 and *passim*; this could be mere characterization of Calasiris, but it could also be included to make the "out" offered the skeptical reader more obvious, thus ensuring the acceptability of the "dream" alternative.

[448] Cf. my argument about the "protective" function of the dreams in Apuleius (Carlisle 2008, 231).

occurrence. The emotional effect of the "anxiety overcome" is thus more powerful, and the "aretalogy" of the final book does not grate on the reader, as it might have had anything so devout been placed at the end of *Callirhoe*, for example.

Calasiris has more dreams (or were they visions?) than any other character in the novel. This helps to represent him as a holy man, one with whom the gods can freely communicate, but it also allows the author to present the dreams being interpreted by the most reliable voice possible.[449] It is his son Thyamis, however, who has the first dream; we have explored the significance of that dream in some depth; here, it is sufficient to say that, when Charikleia is the central concern of this dream, and is first saved by it, and then has a false death because of it (Heliodorus thus puts the powerful *Scheintod* motif, with the divine author of the dream explicitly the source of her narrow escape, and thus of the first optimistic pattern), a reader is alerted to the fact that she is being protected by the gods, and to the optimistic pattern of the novel. The emotional effect of this is largely what we have seen in the previous novels, and need not be reiterated here. In the case of Charikleia's dream in the cave, our own emotional reaction moves in lock step with hers: first, we are terrified for her safety (and by extension the safety of our loved ones, especially the young women), then for Theagenes; when the suggestion is made that dream refers to her father, we are relieved, not because the death of a father is a good thing, but because it is decidedly less terrifying than the death of a lover (because it is something we have already grown at least slightly accustomed to, as a possibility in the future). We, in fact, may even feel the relief more than she, because we have no idea, at this point, who Charikleia's father is, and thus have no particular attachment to him.

[449] Cf. Näf (2004), who argues very briefly that dream interpretation in these novels is a method of characterization (*Charakterisieren*—109); Auger (1983), 45 and *passim*, makes a similar argument about Chariton's use of dreams.

After Knemon's psychological dream, Calasiris' comment on the interpretation of dreams (which suggests to us that their main use is as retrospective proof to dreamers of the divine hand in an event; this becomes particularly important when we get to Charikleia and Theagenes' double dreams in the early part of book 8) and Calasiris' prayer for a night of good dreams, which has little direct emotional effect on the reader (though it does signal both that the gods are in control of dreams and how deeply attached Calasiris is to his loved ones), we have the series of dreams surrounding the revelation of Charikleia's true identity, Calasiris' mission to return her, with Theagenes, to her parents, and her elopement from her foster father. These dreams are rather unusual in that they have a large *referential* component for the reader: in these chapters, that is, and largely through the dreams, the reader learns everything of importance to allow him to understand how the narrative ended up where the novel began. The main emotional effect of this, besides the same pattern of reassurance of anxiety which we have seen in other cases, is one of *awe*: as the reader learns more and more about how all of this came to pass, and how it was subtly orchestrated by the gods, as Calasiris remarks, the effect is that of recognizing a subtle order to what seemed mysterious and chaotic, of coming to understand the previous incomprehensible. This results in a kind of wonderment at the *artistry* of events, which is on one level the artistry of our author Heliodorus, but which we also, through the analogic extension of the novel world into our own, interpret as wonderment at the subtlety of the divine (thus, once again, tracking with a character's reactions to the dreams and the pattern they reveal, in this case the reaction of our narrator Calasiris).

This awe at mysteries and serendipitous occurrences which turn out to have been divinely planned is a unique aspect of the implied author's conception of his world, and

our emotional empathy for it.[450] It is this concern, in fact, with riddles and their solutions, with understanding the meaning behind seeming chaos, which characterizes Heliodorus' special brand of the generic conventions of the Greek novel.[451] This makes it especially religious in Burkert's sense, because these impulses are characteristic of religion (though also of *narrative* and *dreams*).[452] We can see this in the odd riddling structure of the novel; in the complex chain of narratives,[453] each revealing more and raising more questions, and in particular in the fact that Charikleia and Theagenes elope and enter the nightmare world, in part because their love conflicts with the social order (Charikles wants Charkleia to marry someone else), but also in part because of Charikleia's need to solve the mystery of her birth, to return to her homeland, and to find her true identity. This accounts as well for the unique shape of the travel in this novel: whereas every other novel ends where it begins (more or less), this one begins in Egypt, travels back by flashback to Delphi, and then ends in Aethiopia. The quest of this novel is not a search for a solution to the conflict of love and society, self and collective, but instead the search for the society with which that love does not conflict, where the self and collective are in

[450] See Nussbaum (2001), 241.

[451] Morgan (1994a), 100; cf. Morgan (2003): "The fondness for aporetic situations demanding interpretation can also be read as an approximation to reality, where sense-making is partial, provisional and retrospective" (445).

[452] Burkert (1996), 84; States (1988, 57): "In making my analogy between art and dreaming, then, I am thinking of art not as the familiar instrument of our pleasures an instruction, but as a process by which the brain determines what goes with what in human experience. In art, as in dreams, we process the patterns and qualities of life…"; Winkler (1999) emphasizes training in and exploration of *hermeneia* as the point of this novel (350: "…the *Aithiopika* is an act of pure play, yet a play which rehearses the vital processes by which we must live in reality—interpretation, reading, and making a provisional sense of things."), and thus argues that the *religious* element in the novel is not meant seriously; this indicates too narrow an understanding, I think of religion, which is, by Burkert's argument, *precisely the codification of that sort of play*; thus to argue that this *hermeneia* is the point of the novel, and that the religious framework is merely a way of codifying this, is to miss the point that religion (when mean seriously) is *always* a way of codifying this process, and that the difference in the other novels is simply that they do not focus much attention on this underlying purpose, but instead on its religious expression; see also Morgan (1994a): "…I would prefer to see the enigmatic mode of the *Aithiopika* as an attempt to move fiction closer to life" (109).

[453] See Fusillo (2003, 285).

harmony. This is apparent in the nature of Charikleia and Theagenes' "marriage": they are, as they see it, already married, yet Charikleia refuses to consummate this marriage until she has found her true parents. The emotional significance of this pattern is, on a general level, still one of hope and reassurance that the gods operate in such a way as to solve our problems and to ensure that our suffering is not the end point of our story, but an obstacle and backdrop to the happiness which they ensure. On the individual level, however, this pattern is curiously *not only* concerned with the dangers, or disruptive potential, of love or private attachment; in addition, it is concerned with anxiety over the *meaning* of seemingly random and perplexing events, like Charikleia's birth, Thisbe's death, etc.[454]

The last dreams we will discuss, which provide perfect support for this argument, are the pair of dreams of Theagenes and Charikleia; enough has already been said about the dreams of Hydaspes and Persinna.[455] These dreams take place as Theagenes and

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[454] For the search for the meaning of the seemingly meaningless as a central theme and narrative technique in the novel, see Winkler (1999): "The deepest anxiety which informs this novel is the fear of *misinterpretation*" (312); Sandy (1982): "…Heliodorus…by formulating the principle at an early stage in the narrative (3.12-13) conditions the reader to anticipate that even the most apparently insignificant events have a significance that is part of some still unclear transcending goal" (167); Dowden (1996), 271.

[455] Morgan's (1989a) article provides an excellent examination of these dreams, the other dreams in the novel, and the oracle; he focuses on the ambiguity of their interpretation, and concludes that a large part of their function is to create suspense in the reader. There are two problems, however, with making this effect (which is undeniable) primary: 1) if Morgan is right (300), generic expectations will already have told the reader that everything would work out in the end. Why, then, are *reassuring* dreams necessary? Surely a terrifying dream, one which seemed to predict death but turned out to predict marriage, would be better able to create suspense? In other words, once Theagenes has misinterpreted his dream as a prophecy of death, why have Charikleia correct him immediately? And what about Charikleia's dream, juxtaposed with Theagenes', which is clearly a literal prophecy, since it has already come true? Why, indeed, are there any dreams or oracles at all, since the very fact of hero and heroine in danger, despite our generic expectations that everything will work out, would create at least as much suspense as the dream-filled version? The only thing the dreams add which cannot be achieved in any other way is the association, though it may only occur with certainty at the very end of the novel, of the optimistic pattern characteristic of the novels with a divine benevolence guiding events; this is a function which Morgan recognizes (319) but makes secondary to the pleasures of suspense. 2) Some readers do not consider the ending to be particularly suspenseful; indeed, if anything the *overall* effect of the dreams seems to be to add to our certainty that everything will work out; cf. Bowie (1999): "When together they face death in Meroe we have little doubt that they will

Charikleia are captives of the evil woman Arsake, who plots to have Charikleia burned at the stake in order to remove her as a rival for Theagenes' love. These dangers are quite clearly representative of the potential harm love (in this case we would label it lust, but it is Eros in either case to a Greek) can do if it conflicts with the social code: Arsake is the perfect example of someone driven to act appallingly because of her uncontrolled passion; she is a "monster" in the sense described by Noël Carroll, and is thus the antagonist in what is virtually a horror story.[456] When she tries to burn Charikleia, however, the flames quite miraculously have no effect on her. Up to this point, our anxiety over the *Liebespaar* and the potential dangers of love which their adventures depict has reached an all-time high: even when Thisbe was slain in the cave in book 2 and we were led to believe it was Charikleia, our attachment to her was nowhere near as great, and thus our anxiety for her sake was not as intense. When Charikleia is saved from the flames, then, our anxiety is somewhat quelled, but the inexplicable nature of the event makes it very difficult to extrapolate that the lovers are out of danger. We will only be able to overcome our anxiety for Charikleia and Theagenes and all that they represent if we understand *why* they were saved. This is thus a case of the particular mark Heliodorus leaves on the optimistic structure characteristic of the Greek novels: he leaves some suspense as the *meaning* of the "salvation," so that we are not able to interpret them emotionally until we have made sense out of something obscure or riddling. This can be seen in Charikleia's reaction: she is distraught, rather than pleased, by the miracle, and is uncertain what to make of it. When Theagenes suggests that it may have been divine intervention (a thought which has certainly crossed readers' minds as well), Charikleia

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escape, and are best advised to admire Heliodorus' dramatic rendering of the occasion instead of nurturing pity or fear" (55).

[456] Carroll (2003), 91-92.

dismisses this idea, because she cannot make sense of the event, in combination with her current circumstances, in terms of a framework of religious benevolence: the only way, she suggests, that this could be the gods at work is if they like to dash us to the ground so that they can save us. Upon remembering her dream, however, and hearing Theagenes' all of that changes, as does our own emotional reaction to this episode. It is suddenly clear to her, not only *why* she was saved from the flames (which had nothing directly to do with divine intervention: she apparently would have been wearing the *pantarbe* stone in any case), but that the gods are at work in her experiences, and that they are steering things to a happy end. Thus the religious framework is quite explicitly shown to be 1) something which is only visible through divine revelation, such as takes place in *dreams*; 2) something which brings about a profound emotional change, altering the way one sees one's present reality in relation to future prospects (these first two are common also to the other novels); 3) something which depends upon understanding the meaning behind a seemingly random event, and thus which is only visible when chaos has been ordered into a sensible structure.

Our own emotional reactions track along with Charikleia's; we are first mystified as to the cause of her rescue (though we may suspect the hand of some god). Upon hearing the twin dreams, we understand why things happened as they did, and this brings some sense of satisfaction at knowledge gained, suspense put to rest; at the same time, however, the source of this understanding, not in any reason but instead in divine revelation, suggests that the gods were responsible for this event; the reassurance which Theagenes' dream adds to this by pointing to a happy end for the novel, brings a combination of awe and hope, awe at the power and cleverness of the gods (i.e. the author) to put events together in this way, and hope that they will continue, and will also

put things together as they promised in the future, and that Theagenes and Charikleia will reach their happy ending. Furthermore, by the extension of this into our own world which results from the realization that this is all managed by the gods, who are the same gods controlling our lives, we, too, are given some measure of hope, our own anxieties are overcome, and we are (uniquely to Heliodorus) left with the impression that we have *understood* something otherwise baffling, all through the help of the gods.[457] This final pair of dreams, then, is a perfect illustration of how anxiety (in this case Charikleia's and Theagenes') may be overcome by the realization that some event which ended well but which seemed a random occurrence may, when its structure of cause and effect, its narrative pattern, is revealed by the gods in a dream, be taken not only as evidence that those gods were responsible for bringing this happy end to pass (even if it had a straightforward earthly cause as well; a sort of double determination is at work here), but that they can and likely will do the same in the future, and thus that no matter how bleak things may look, no matter how anxious we are about the dangers in the world outside our experience, all will turn out in the end. And that, after all, is what we have argued is the general function of dreaming in the Greek novels.

[457] Cf. Dowden (1996): "Part of the reader's task…is to observe the workings of the divine in the novel, even when the characters fail to notice and the narrator does not overtly prompt us. In this way the reader is drawn by the act of interpretation into the providential world of the plot…"(271).

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have argued that the various dreams and passages about dreams in the ancient novels present us with a useful pattern for understanding these rather obscure works and their place in the societie(s) in which they were created. First, the dreams are, by and large presented as irruptions into the narrative sequence by a divinity, and function as messages whose main focus is on the emotional state of the dreamer, which is altered by this intervention of the divine and the alternate (and more authoritative) perspective it offers on reality. Second, the narrative illusion containing emotional truth, of which the dreams consist, can be analogically connected to the narrative illusion with emotional truth which we encounter in fiction, and by this analogy, we can extrapolate the potential of an emotional effect for the novels which would run parallel to the emotional effect of the dreams they contain. This effect is produced not only by the optimistic structure which the dreams essentialize or highlight, and which guides each novel as a whole (with significant variations from novel to novel), but also and more importantly, by the attribution of this structure in both cases to a divine source: by, that is, its explicitly religious interpretation. The conclusion that may be reached is that the novels, while aimed primarily at emotional effect (which may be understood on a number of levels, both social and individual, and subjected to further functional analysis), make use of religious structures to achieve this effect.[458]

[458] Cf. Heiserman (1977), 48.

The popular novelist, atheist-turned-Christian-apologist, and literary critic C. S. Lewis presents a case in his *An Experiment in Criticism* for an assumption about the object of criticism which echoes what has become one of the more productive positions available in modern theory: that literary works are to be judged by their readers' responses.[459] Thus, he argues, in order to evaluate specific books, we must determine the sort of reading they enable: "…we should end by defining good literature as that which permits good reading; and bad, as that which does the same for bad reading."[460] He admits that such a formulation is too neat; the important thread for us, however, as Classicists who are thereby as much or even more historians than critics in the strictest sense, is not thereby discredited: that the best assessment of a literary work is that which explains the sort of reading it enables. As historians, then, our own goal is to use such explanations not as evidence for evaluative judgments of the quality of the works in question (for our task is not to judge the past, but to make it comprehensible to the present), but rather as evidence for understanding the place of these works in their world: how they were informed by their context, and how they may inform us about it. In short, our goal must be first of all to determine what sort of reading the novels enable, then what the fact of the participation in that particular sort of reading by (some of) the ancients can tell us about the world in which they lived.

I have proposed, then, that the sort of reading enabled by the novels is one in which our anxieties about the world in which we live, anxieties which are not a product of an age, but of human life and society itself, and particularly those which spring up around the emotion of love and its profoundly disruptive potential, are exaggerated to

[459] See Tompkins (1980), 201-232 for a brief history of this position.

[460] Lewis (1961), 104.

increasing degrees, only to be quelled by an appeal to the existence of a benevolent, divine force at work in the world. Such a reading does not aim to "solve" the problems surrounding the ancient novels. To my mind, their origin has been plausibly explained in a number of conflicting ways, and without further evidence it will be impossible to choose one explanation with certainty. The causal connection between the society in which the novels were produced and the peculiar attributes of the novels themselves also seems to me adequately explained, once we have allowed for at least some possibility that there *is no* strong causal connection,[461] by scholars like Swain (1996) and Perkins (1995), who argue that the novels are simply one of the many ways the Greek elite expressed their cultural identity and superiority. What I find valuable, for the historian *and* literary critic, in the sort of reading I have proposed is that it allows us to explain the function of religion in the novels in terms of their specific goals as literary, that is, artistic (not scientific or theological) creations. Furthermore, by treating the *emotions* which are the goal of fiction functionally (following Oatley and Nussbaum), we are able to analyze the use of religious structures in the novels functionally as well, and suggest a use for the novels as historical sources: not for the history of religious *practice*, nor of religious *thought* in the theological or philosophical sense, but of religious experience in a form more commonplace and less ecstatic or transcendent than that of the prophet or initiate (though there is some of that to be found in one of the novels, the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius). The novels, in my reading, illustrate the experience of living in a world which was understood, and more importantly coped with, in ways which at times relied on the

[461] The novels were hardly the most popular works in their day, though they seem to have gained some degree of circulation; see Stephens and Winkler (1995), 10-11; for all the intrigue in speculating about the connection between the novels seemingly sudden rise and various generalizations about the society in which it occurred, there is scant evidence to suggest anything other than the birth of a genre from some combination of earlier forms and literary invention, as much an historical accident as a marker of anything uniquely prevalent in contemporary taste.

simple belief in divine providence and the emotional comfort which it undeniably can provide.

This reading, in other words, places *all* of the novels squarely in the body of evidence for understanding religion in the ancient world, while at the same time emphasizing that their value is for an understanding of the psychological (and thus neither the practical nor the philosophical) side of religion. The theology of Xenophon of Ephesus, for example, is not subtle, nor consistent. Nor are the religious practices he describes presented in any particularly revelatory detail. Most importantly, it is very difficult to know what, in any of the novelists, reflects real practice and thought, and what is merely invented to serve the expediencies of the plot. What we can say, with certainty, is that the primary goal of the ancient novels was emotional effect, and that at the heart of this emotional effect is an appeal to religious meaning, made most frequently across the genre through dreams as revelations of the divine attitude towards human life. Such a rhetorical device would fall flat, indeed, would fail utterly, if the optimistic structure it presented did not correspond with the cultural expectations of some, at least, of its readers. And it could scarcely do that unless the religious patterns of which it made frequent use were not a part of the normative discourse of the culture in which it is used. Indeed, I will conclude by saying (adopting now the stance of a literary critic) that however much we may discover about the literary quality of the various novels, or about their clever narratological patterning or pre-postmodern deconstructive tendencies, we will never be able to appreciate them as literary artifacts any more than we do as historical sources, until we are honest about the nature of their emotional resonance and the cultural discourse upon which it depends, which is in reality quite alien from the standard academic perspective of our modern secular society.

"It is not that Heliodorus is any kind of believer, but merely that he must employ beliefs to illustrate the comedy of composing a romance," asserts Winkler.[462] It may well be that the religious pattern upon which Heliodorus builds his narrative resonates with *Winkler* because he is able to allegorize it as the pattern of artistic creation by identification of god with author. That, however, is more an indication of Winkler's beliefs than of Heliodorus'. My point is not that this sort of reading is invalid: the pattern of anxiety overcome is universally appealing precisely because it is universally open to this kind of substitution. If we can substitute the Sun God for Apollo, why not substitute Heliodorus the narratological genius for both? The reader then, like Winkler, will stand in awe of the *Aethiopica* as evidence not for the cleverness and beneficence of the gods, but for the cleverness and beneficence of the author (since giving us an entertaining tale is the act of a truly providential author).

But the problem with treating this sort of structure-redeemed-by-substitution as the *point of the original structure*, of claiming, in other words, that a religious pattern is meaningful because it stands for something else, something untrammeled by an embarrassing ancient unsecularism, is that it fails to account for the presence of the original structure. As Burkert says, "…to understand a true metaphor one must know the primary meaning, else one does not get the point of the secondary application…";[463] just so, to understand the meaning of Winkler's substitution of Heliodorus for the Divine, we must first understand the notion of the Divine and the significance of its deployment in this novel. That we must substitute some other subject for the Divine (the Author) in order for Heliodorus's novel to have emotional significance for us indicates, then, not a

[462] Winkler (1999), 349.

[463] Burkert (1979), 28.

failure of the surface level of the novel to hold any meaning for a reader, but our own failure as readers (albeit through no fault of our own) to align ourselves with the religious worldview upon which that surface level depends. It is possible, of course, that no reader has ever been capable of that; it is also possible that Heliodorus always meant his novel to be read allegorically.

My argument here is simply that it is also possible, indeed likely, that a great many of Helidorus' readers, including perhaps Heliodorus himself, may have found that surface level quite emotionally appealing on its own, and may not have felt the necessity of any substitution. Furthermore, if we accept this possibility as just as solid a basis for argument as much of our data for understanding the ancient world, it has something to tell us about religion in the ancient world, and in particular about its emotional function in an everyday, theologically simplistic and non-cultic but nonetheless psychologically powerful narrative of anxiety overcome, whether deployed as an affirmation of elite solidarity or simply as a way for an individual to cope with the strain of daily life and the dangers of love.

APPENDIX A—PASSAGES ON DREAMS

The following is a list of the various passages on dreaming found in the ancient novels; it is organized by language, with Greek first, then by novel, in approximate chronological order.

I. The Greek Novels

Chariton

C1) κοιμηθεὶς δὲ ἐνύπνιον εἶδε κεκλεισμένας τὰς θύρας. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτῷ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην ἐπισχεῖν. οἷα δὲ ἀλύων ἐπί τινος ἐργαστηρίου καθῆστο, ταραχώδης παντάπασι τὴν ψυχήν.

"Falling asleep, he [Theron] saw in a dream the doors closed. And so he decided to hold off for the next day. And wandering aimlessly, he sat down at some workshop, completely disturbed in mind" (*Call.* 1.12).

C2) τούτων ὁ Λεωνᾶς ἤκουσεν ἀσμένως καὶ "θεός μοί τις" εἶπεν "εὐεργέτην σε κατέπεμψεν· ἃ γὰρ ὠνειροπόλουν ὕπαρ μοι δεικνύεις· ἐλθὲ τοίνυν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ φίλος ἤδη γενοῦ καὶ ξένος· τὴν δὲ περὶ τῆς γυναικὸς αἵρεσιν ἡ ὄψις κρινεῖ, πότερον δεσποτικόν ἐστι τὸ κτῆμα ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς."

"Leonas heard these things with joy, and said 'Some god has sent you to me as a benefactor; for the very things I was dreaming of, you show me in reality; come, then, to my house, and be my friend and guest right away; her appearance will decide the question concerning the woman, whether she is a possession fit for my master or for people like us.'" (*Call.* 1.12).

C3) ἰδὼν δὲ τὸν Λεωνᾶν ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὸν "μίαν ταύτην ἐγὼ νύκτα μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τῆς ἀθλίας ἡδέως κεκοίμημαι· καὶ γὰρ εἶδον αὐτὴν <ὄναρ> ἐναργῶς μείζονά τε καὶ κρείττονα γεγενημένην, καὶ ὡς ὕπαρ μοι συνῆν. ἔδοξα δὲ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ἡμέραν τῶν γάμων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χωρίων μου τῶν παραθαλαττίων αὐτὴν νυμφαγωγεῖν, σοῦ μοι τὸν ὑμέναιον ᾄδοντος. ἔτι δὲ αὐτοῦ διηγουμένου, Λεωνᾶς ἀνεβόησεν "εὐτυχὴς εἶ, δέσποτα, καὶ ὄναρ καὶ ὕπαρ. μέλλεις ἀκούειν ταῦτα, ἃ τεθέασαι."

"And seeing Leonas, he said to him 'this is the first night since the death of my poor wife that I have slept sweetly; for I saw her [in a dream] vividly, become taller and more beautiful, she was with me as if in reality. And I thought it was the first day of our marriage, and that I was leading her as my bride away from my country estate by the sea, and you were singing the wedding hymn for me.' And

as he was still reporting this, Leonas cried out 'You are a lucky man, master, both asleep and awake. You are about to hear those things which you have seen.'" (*Call.* 2.1).

C4) …ἡ δὲ Καλλιρόη τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκείνης θεασαμένη τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἠβουλήθη καὶ πάλιν αὐτὴν προσκυνῆσαι· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑστῶσα ηὔχετο, Διονύσιος δὲ ἀποπηδήσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν νεών.

"…but Callirhoe, because she had seen Aphrodite in a vision that night, wanted to worship her yet again; and she stood there and prayed, but Dionysius dismounted from his horse and entered the temple first" (*Call.* 2.3).

C5) "Καλλιρόη" φησίν (ἤρεσε Διονυσίῳ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα), τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐσιώπα. πυνθανομένου δὲ λιπαρῶς "δέομαί σου" φησίν, "ὦ δέσποτα, συγχώρησόν μοι τὴν ἐμαυτῆς τύχην σιωπᾶν. ὄνειρος ἦν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μῦθος, εἰμὶ δὲ νῦν ὃ γέγονα, δούλη καὶ ξένη."

"'Callirhoe,' she said (even her named pleased Dionysius), but was silent about the rest. When Dionysius persisted in questioning her, she said 'I beg you, master, allow me to be silent about my fate. What happened before was a dream and a fairytale, and I am now what I have become, a slave and a foreigner.'" (*Call.* 2.5).

C6) ταῦτα λογιζομένῃ δι' ὅλης νυκτὸς ὕπνος ἐπῆλθε πρὸς ὀλίγον. ἐπέστη δὲ [αὐτῇ] εἰκὼν Χαιρέου, [ὁμοία]

πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' ἐϊκυῖα,
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἵματα <ἕστο>.

<παρ>εστὼς δὲ "παρατίθεμαί σοι" φησίν, "ὦ γύναι, τὸν υἱόν." ἔτι δὲ βουλομένου λέγειν ἀνέθορεν ἡ Καλλιρόη, θέλουσα αὐτῷ περιπλακῆναι. σύμβουλον οὖν τὸν ἄνδρα νομίσασα θρέψαι τὸ παιδίον ἔκρινε.

"While she thought these matters over all night long, sleep came to her for a little while. And an image of Chaereas stood over her, [like]

'similar to him in every respect, both in height and in fair eyes
and in voice, and wearing just such clothes about his skin.'

And standing there he said 'I entrust to you, wife, our son.' And though he wished to say more, Callirhoe leapt up, since she wanted to embrace him. So, reckoning her husband was advising it, she decided to raise the child" (*Call.* 2.9).

C7) ὀψὲ δὲ καὶ μόλις ἐκεῖνος ἀνανήψας ἀσθενεῖ φωνῇ "τίς με δαιμόνων" φησὶν "ἀπατᾷ βουλόμενος ἀναστρέψαι τῆς προκειμένης ὁδοῦ; ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ταῦτα ἤκουσα; θέλει μοι Καλλιρόη γαμηθῆναι, ἡ μὴ θέλουσα μηδὲ ὀφθῆναι;"

"Finally, and with some difficulty, he revived and said with a weak voice: 'Which of the gods is deceiving me, wishing to turn me back from the road ahead? Did I hear these things in reality or in a dream? Does Callirhoe wish to marry me, she who does not even wish to be seen?'" (*Call.* 3.1).

C8) Καλλιρόῃ δὲ ὄναρ ἐπέστη Χαιρέας δεδεμένος καὶ θέλων αὐτῇ προσελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δυνάμενος· ἀνεκώκυσε δὲ μέγα καὶ διωλύγιον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις "Χαιρέα, δεῦρο." τότε πρῶτον Διονύσιος ἤκουσεν ὄνομα Χαιρέου καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς συνταραχθείσης ἐπύθετο "τίς, ὃν ἐκάλεις;" προύδωκε δὲ αὐτὴν τὰ δάκρυα καὶ τὴν λύπην οὐκ ἠδυνήθη κατασχεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔδωκε παρρησίαν τῷ πάθει. "δυστυχὴς" φησὶν "ἄνθρωπος, ἐμὸς ἀνὴρ ἐκ παρθενίας, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις εὐτυχής· εἶδον γὰρ αὐτὸν δεδεμένον. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ἄθλιε, τέθνηκας ζητῶν ἐμὲ (δηλοῖ γὰρ θάνατόν σου τὰ δεσμά), ἐγὼ δὲ ζῶ καὶ τρυφῶ, κατάκειμαι δὲ ἐπὶ χρυσηλάτου κλίνης μετὰ ἀνδρὸς ἑτέρου. πλὴν οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν ἀφίξομαι πρὸς σέ. εἰ καὶ ζῶντες ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἀπηλαύσαμεν, ἀποθανόντες ἀλλήλους ἕξομεν."

"Chaereas stood over Callirhoe in a dream, bound and wishing to approach her, but unable; and she called out loud shrill in her sleep "Chaereas, come here!" Then for the first time Dionysius heard Chaereas' name and asked his distraught wife 'Who is it that you called to?' Her tears betrayed her, and she was not able to check her grief, but gave free rein to her sorrow. 'A luckless man,' she said, 'my first husband, not even lucky in dreams: for I saw him bound. But you, misfortunate man, have died searching for me (for your chains signify death), though I myself live and in luxury, lying on a bed made of gold with another man. Not long from now I will come to you. Even if living we did not enjoy each other, we will have each other in death.'" (*Call.* 3.7).

C9) ἐξέθανεν ὁ Διονύσιος ἀκούσας καὶ νὺξ αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατεχύθη· φαντασίαν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ὡς ἐφεστηκότος αὐτῷ Χαιρέου καὶ Καλλιρόην ἀποσπῶντος.

"When he heard this Dionysius fainted and night covered over his eyes: for he got an vision of Chaereas standing over him and tearing Callirhoe away" (*Call.* 3.9).

C10) …μικρὸν δὲ καταδαρθοῦσα ὄναρ ἑώρα λῃστήριον βαρβάρων πῦρ ἐπιφέροντας, ἐμπιμπραμένην δὲ τριήρη, Χαιρέᾳ δὲ βοηθοῦσαν αὑτήν.

"…but when she slept for a little while she saw, in a dream, a robber band of barbarians, and they were bringing fire, and the ship was set on fire, but she herself helped Chaereas" (*Call.* 4.1).

C11) …νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπελθούσης ὄναρ ἔβλεπεν αὑτὴν ἐν Συρακούσαις παρθένον εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τέμενος εἰσιοῦσαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπανιοῦσαν, ὁρῶσαν Χαιρέαν καὶ τὴν τῶν γάμων ἡμέραν, ἐστεφανωμένην τὴν πόλιν ὅλην καὶ προπεμπομένην αὑτὴν ὑπὸ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ νυμφίου. μέλλουσα δὲ καταφιλεῖν Χαιρέαν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἀνέθορε καὶ καλέσασα Πλαγγόνα (Διονύσιος γὰρ ἔφθη προεξαναστάς, ἵνα μελετήσῃ τὴν δίκην) τὸ ὄναρ διηγεῖτο. καὶ ἡ Πλαγγὼν

ἀπεκρίνατο "θάρρει, δέσποινα, καὶ χαῖρε· καλὸν ἐνύπνιον εἶδες· πάσης ἀπολυθήσῃ φροντίδος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄναρ ἔδοξας, οὕτως καὶ ὕπαρ. ἄπιθι εἰς τὸ βασιλέως δικαστήριον ὡς ἱερὸν Ἀφροδίτης, ἀναμνήσθητι σαυτῆς, ἀναλάμβανε τὸ κάλλος τὸ νυμφικόν." [καὶ] ταῦτα ἅμα λέγουσα ἐνέδυε καὶ ἐκόσμει τὴν Καλλιρόην, ἡ δὲ αὐτομάτως ψυχὴν εἶχεν ἱλαράν, ὥσπερ προμαντευομένη τὰ μέλλοντα.

"…but when night came, she saw, in a dream, herself in Syracuse, still maiden, going into the shrine of Aphrodite, then returning, and seeing Chaereas; and she saw their wedding day, and the whole city garlanded and herself being escorted by her father and mother to the bridegroom's house. As she was about to embrace Chaereas, she leapt up from her sleep and called Plangon (for Dionysius had already gotten up, so that he could practise for the trial), and told her the dream. And Plangon responded 'Take heart, mistress, and rejoice: you saw a good dream; you will be set free from all care; for just as you imagined in your dream, so will it be in reality. Go off to the courtroom of the king as though to a temple of Aphrodite, remember who you are, and take up the beauty of your maidenhood.' As she said this she dressed and adorned Callirhoe, who had a joyful spirit of her own accord, as if she divined in advance what was to take place" (*Call.* 5.5).

C12) βασιλεὺς δὲ καλέσας τὸν εὐνοῦχον Ἀρταξάτην, ὃς ἦν <παρ'> αὐτῷ μέγιστος, "ὄναρ μοι" φησὶν "ἐπιστάντες βασίλειοι θεοὶ θυσίας ἀπαιτοῦσι καὶ δεῖ με πρῶτον ἐκτελέσαι τὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας. παράγγειλον οὖν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν ἱερομηνίαν ἑορτάζειν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀφειμένην δικῶν τε καὶ πραγμάτων."

"But the King called the eunuch Artaxates, who was his right hand man, and said 'the royal gods appeared to me in a dream and demanded a sacrifice, and I am bound first and foremost to fulfill the requirements of piety. And so proclaim that all of Asia is to celebrate a holy month of thirty days, and is to hold off from court cases and business transactions" (*Call.* 6.2)

C13) διαγρυπνήσας δὲ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος καὶ τοσοῦτον καταδαρθὼν ὅσον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις Καλλιρόην ἰδεῖν…

"He lay awake the greater part of the night, and as long as he slept, he saw Callirhoe even in his dreams…" (*Call.* 6.7).

Xenophon of Ephesus

X1) …ἀρχὴ τῶν μεμαντευμένων. Τῷ δὲ Ἀβροκόμῃ ἐφίσταται γυνὴ ὀφθῆναι φοβερά, τὸ μέγεθος ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον, ἐσθῆτα ἔχουσα φοινικῆν· ἐπιστᾶσα δὲ τὴν ναῦν ἐδόκει καίειν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀπόλλυσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ μετὰ τῆς Ἀνθίας διανήχεσθαι. Ταῦτα ὡς εὐθὺς εἶδεν ἐταράχθη καὶ προσεδόκα τι δεινὸν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνείρατος· καὶ τὸ δεινὸν ἐγένετο.

"...the things that had been prophesied began. Habrocomes dreamt of a woman frightening in appearance, larger than a human, and wearing scarlet clothing; she

stood over him and seemed to set the ship on fire, and everyone else [seemed] to perish, but he [seemed] to swim away with Anthia. And as soon as he dreamt these things, he was distressed, and expected something terrible from the dream; and the terrible thing took place" (*Eph.* 1.12).

X2) Ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτὸν ὕπνος καταλαμβάνει, καὶ αὐτῷ ὄναρ ἐφίσταται. Ἔδοξεν ἰδεῖν αὐτοῦ τὸν πατέρα Λυκομήδη ἐν ἐσθῆτι μελαίνῃ πλανώμενον κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ἐπιστάντα δὲ τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ λῦσαί τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀφιέναι ἐκ τοῦ οἰκήματος· αὐτὸν δὲ ἵππον γενόμενον ἐπὶ πολλὴν φέρεσθαι γῆν διώκοντα ἵππον ἄλλην θήλειαν, καὶ τέλος εὑρεῖν τὴν ἵππον καὶ ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι. Ταῦτα ὡς ἔδοξεν ἰδεῖν, ἀνέθορέ τε καὶ μικρὰ εὔελπις ἦν.

"As he said these things sleep overtook him, and a dream stood over him. He thought he saw his father Lycomedes in black clothes wandering over all the land and see, and then standing before the prison, he freed him and sent him out of his cell; but he, transformed into a horse, journeyed over much land chasing another horse, a female, and finally found the mare and became a man. After he imagined these things, he leapt up and was somewhat hopeful" (*Eph.* 2.9)

X3) …τῇ δὲ Ἀνθίᾳ ὄναρ ἐπέστη ἐν Τάραντι κοιμωμένῃ. Ἐδόκει μὲν αὐτὴν εἶναι μετὰ Ἀβροκόμου, καλὴν οὖσαν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου καλοῦ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον εἶναι τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτοῖς χρόνον· φανῆναι δέ τινα ἄλλην γυναῖκα καλὴν καὶ ἀφέλκειν αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀβροκόμην· καὶ τέλος ἀναβοῶντος καὶ καλοῦντος ὀνομαστὶ ἐξαναστῆναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι τὸ ὄναρ. Ταῦτα ὡς ἔδοξεν ἰδεῖν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἀνέθορέ τε καὶ ἀνεθρήνησε καὶ ἀληθῆ τὰ ὀφθέντα ἐνόμιζεν «οἴμοι τῶν κακῶν» λέγουσα, «ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ πόνους ὑπομένω πάντας καὶ ποικίλων πειρῶμαι δυστυχὴς συμφορῶν καὶ τέχνας σωφροσύνης ὑπὲρ γυναῖκας εὑρίσκω Ἀβροκόμῃ· σοὶ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλη που δέδοκται καλή· ταῦτα γάρ μοι σημαίνει τὰ ὀνείρατα..

"…but a dream stood over Anthia as she slept in Tarentum. It seemed to her that she was with Habrocomes, and she was beautiful, and he handsome, and that it was the time when they were first in love; but then another beautiful woman appeared and dragged Habrocomes away from her; and finally, when he cried out and called her by name, she rose up and the dream ended. And once she seemed to see these things, she jumped up and lamented and believe the dream was true, saying 'Alas! I undergo every sort of hardship and endure various misfortunes, wretch that I am, and find methods of chastity beyond a woman's means, for Habrocomes: but to you, perhaps, some other woman has appeared beautiful: for this is what my dream tells me…'" (*Eph.* 5.8).

Longus

L1) …καὶ ὁ Δρύας καὶ ὁ Λάμων ἐπὶ μιᾶς νυκτὸς ὁρῶσιν ὄναρ τοιόνδε τι. Τὰς Νύμφας ἐδόκουν ἐκείνας, τὰς ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ πηγή, ἐν ᾧ τὸ παιδίον εὗρεν ὁ Δρύας, τὸν Δάφνιν καὶ τὴν Χλόην παραδιδόναι παιδίῳ μάλα σοβαρῷ καὶ καλῷ, πτερὰ ἐκ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντι, βέλη σμικρὰ ἅμα τοξαρίῳ φέροντι· τὸ δὲ ἐφαψάμενον ἀμφοτέρων ἑνὶ βέλει κελεῦσαι λοιπὸν ποιμαίνειν τὸν μὲν τὸ αἰπόλιον, τὴν δὲ τὸ

ποίμνιον. Τοῦτο τὸ ὄναρ ἰδόντες ἤχθοντο μὲν εἰ ποιμένες ἔσοιντο καὶ αἰπόλοι <οἱ> τύχην ἐκ σπαργάνων ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κρείττονα—δι᾽ ἣν αὐτοὺς καὶ τροφαῖς ἁβροτέραις ἔτρεφον καὶ γράμματα ἐπαίδευον καὶ πάντα ὅσα καλὰ ἦν ἐπ᾽ ἀγροικίας—, ἐδόκει δὲ πείθεσθαι θεοῖς περὶ τῶν σωθέντων προνοίᾳ θεῶν.

"…and Dryas and Lamon in the same night saw a dream of the following sort. It seemed to them that those nymphs, the ones in the cave, where the spring ran and where Dryas found his child, handed Daphnis and Chloe over to a handsome and haughty boy, who had wings growing out of his shoulders, and carried little arrows and a tiny bow; and he touched them both with a single arrow, and ordered them in future to keep flocks, him as a goatherd, and her as a shepherdess. And when they saw this dream, though they were troubled that they would be shepherds and goatherds, who were promised a better fortune by their tokens—on account of which they raised them in a more delicate manner and taught them letters and as many fine things as there were among rustics—, nonetheless they thought it right to obey the gods in regards to those who had been saved by the providence of gods" (*D&C* 1.7-8).

L2) Ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς λογισμοῖς οἷον εἰκὸς καὶ ὀνείρατα ἑώρων ἐρωτικά, τὰ φιλήματα, τὰς περιβολάς· καὶ ὅσα δὲ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν οὐκ ἔπραξαν, ταῦτα ὄναρ ἔπραξαν· γυμνοὶ μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἔκειντο.

"After these thoughts, as was likely, they even had erotic dreams, with kisses and embraces; and whatever they did not do during the day, they did in their dreams: they lay down naked with each other" (*D&C* 2.10).

L3) Καὶ αὐτῷ αἱ τρεῖς ἐφίστανται Νύμφαι, μεγάλαι γυναῖκες καὶ καλαί, ἡμίγυμνοι καὶ ἀνυπόδετοι, τὰς κόμας λελυμέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασιν ὅμοιαι. Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐῴκεσαν ἐλεοῦσαι τὸν Δάφνιν· ἔπειτα ἡ πρεσβυτάτη λέγει ἐπιρρωννύουσα. "Μηδὲν ἡμᾶς μέμφου, Δάφνι· Χλόης γὰρ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σοὶ μέλει. Ἡμεῖς τοι καὶ παιδίον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἠλεήσαμεν καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄντρῳ κειμένην [αὐτὴν] ἀνεθρέψαμεν. Ἐκείνῃ <καὶ> πεδίοις κοινὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τοῖς προβατίοις τοῦ Δρύαντος. Καὶ νῦν δὲ ἡμῖν πεφρόντισται τὸ κατ᾽ ἐκείνην, ὡς μήτε εἰς τὴν Μήθυμναν κομισθεῖσα δουλεύοι μήτε μέρος γένοιτο λείας πολεμικῆς. Καὶ τὸν Πᾶνα ἐκεῖνον τὸν ὑπὸ τῇ πίτυϊ ἱδρυμένον ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐδέποτε οὐδὲ ἄνθεσιν ἐτιμήσατε, τούτου ἐδεήθημεν ἐπίκουρον γενέσθαι Χλόης· συνήθης γὰρ στρατοπέδοις μᾶλλον ἡμῶν καὶ πολλοὺς ἤδη πολέμους ἐπολέμησε τὴν ἀγροικίαν καταλιπών· καὶ ἄπεισι τοῖς Μηθυμναίοις οὐκ ἀγαθὸς πολέμιος. Κάμνε δὲ μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναστὰς ὄφθητι Λάμωνι καὶ Μυρτάλῃ, οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ κεῖνται χαμαί, νομίζοντες καὶ σὲ μέρος γεγονέναι τῆς ἁρπαγῆς· Χλόη γάρ σοι τῆς ἐπιούσης ἀφίξεται μετὰ τῶν αἰγῶν, μετὰ τῶν προβάτων, καὶ νεμήσετε κοινῇ καὶ συρίσετε κοινῇ· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μελήσει περὶ ὑμῶν Ἔρωτι." Τοιαῦτα ἰδὼν καὶ ἀκούσας Δάφνις ἀναπηδήσας τῶν ὕπνων καὶ κοινῇ ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης δακρύων τὰ ἀγάλματα τῶν Νυμφῶν προσεκύνει καὶ ἐπηγγέλλετο σωθείσης Χλόης θύσειν τῶν αἰγῶν τὴν ἀρίστην.

"And the three Nymphs appeared to him, tall and beautiful women, half-naked and barefoot, loose-haired and looking like their statues. And first they seemed to be pitying Daphnis; then the eldest encouraged him, and said: 'Don't blame us, Dapnhis; for we care more about Chloe than you. We took pity on her even when she was a child, and we nurtured here as she lay in this very cave. She has nothing in common with the fields and sheep of Dryas. Now, too, we have taken care of her situation, so that she will neither be carried off to Methymna and become a slave, nor become part of the spoils of war. We have begged that Pan over there, the one seated under the pine, whom you yourselves have never honored, even with flowers, to be Chloe's defender; for he is more used to military camps than we, and he has already fought many wars, leaving the country behind; and he won't be a good enemy for the Methymneans, when he attacks. So don't weary yourself, but get up and be seen by Lamon and Myrtale, who themselves also lie on the ground, thinking that you too have become part of the plunder; for Chloe will come to you tomorrow, with the goats, with the sheep, and you will graze together and pipe together; everything else about you will be Eros' concern.' When he had seen and heard these things, Daphnis leapt up out of his sleep and weeping with pleasure and grief in the same instant, he worshipped the images of the Nymphs and pledged to sacrifice the finest of his she-goats if Chloe was saved" (*D&C* 2.23).

L4) τροφῆς τε ἐγεύσατο καὶ εἰς ὕπνον ὥρμησεν οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἄδακρυν, ἀλλ' εὐχόμενος μὲν αὖθις τὰς Νύμφας ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, εὐχόμενος δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν γενέσθαι ταχέως, ἐν ᾗ Χλόην ἐπηγγείλαντο αὐτῷ.

"He tasted some victuals and went to sleep, but even that was not tearless, but he prayed to see the Nymphs again in a dream, and prayed for the day to come swiftly, in which they had promised Chloe to him" (*D&C* 2.24).

L5) …αὐτὸς ὁ Πὰν ὤφθη τοιάδε λέγων· "Ὦ πάντων ἀνοσιώτατοι καὶ ἀσεβέστατοι, τί ταῦτα μαινομέναις φρεσὶν ἐτολμήσατε; Πολέμου μὲν τὴν ἀγροικίαν ἐνεπλήσατε τὴν ἐμοὶ φίλην, ἀγέλας δὲ βοῶν καὶ αἰγῶν καὶ ποιμνίων ἀπηλάσατε τὰς ἐμοὶ μελομένας· ἀπεσπάσατε δὲ βωμῶν παρθένον, ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει· καὶ οὔτε τὰς Νύμφας ᾐδέσθητε βλεπούσας οὔτε τὸν Πᾶνα ἐμέ. Οὔτ' οὖν Μήθυμναν ὄψεσθε μετὰ τοιούτων λαφύρων πλέοντες, οὔτε τήνδε φεύξεσθε τὴν σύριγγα τὴν ὑμᾶς ταράττουσαν· ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς βορὰν ἰχθύων θήσω καταδύσας, εἰ μὴ τὴν ταχίστην καὶ Χλόην ταῖς Νύμφαις ἀποδώσεις καὶ τὰς ἀγέλας Χλόης καὶ τὰς αἶγας καὶ τὰ πρόβατα. Ἀνάστα δὴ καὶ ἐκβίβαζε τὴν κόρην μεθ' ὧν εἶπον. Ἡγήσομαι δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ σοὶ τοῦ πλοῦ κἀκείνῃ τῆς ὁδοῦ." Πάνυ οὖν τεθορυβημένος ὁ Βρύαξις—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ στρατηγὸς—ἀναπηδᾷ καὶ τῶν νεῶν καλέσας τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐκέλευσε τὴν ταχίστην ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις ἀναζητεῖσθαι Χλόην.

"Pan himself appeared saying the following: 'O most unholy and irreverent men of all, how do you dare these things with your crazed thoughts? You have filled the countryside I love with war, and you have driven off the herds of cows, and of goats, and of sheep which are my charge; you've torn away from the altars a maiden, from whom Love wants to make a story; and you have shown no shame

before the Nymphs as they watched you, nor before me, Pan. So you will not see Methymna if you sail with these spoils, nor will you escape this pipe which disturbs you: instead I will send you, drowned, as food for the fishes, unless you give back Chloe and the herds, both sheep and goats, to the Nymphs forthwith. Stand up, then, and put the girl ashore, with the animals I mentioned. And I myself will lead you at sea, and her on land.' And so Bryaxis—for that was the general's name—leapt up thoroughly terrified and calling the captains, ordered them to seek out Chloe among the captives" (*D&C* 2.26-28).

L6) "ἐρᾷς," εἶπε "Δάφνι, Χλόης, καὶ τοῦτο ἔμαθον ἐγὼ νύκτωρ παρὰ τῶν Νυμφῶν. Δι' ὀνείρατος ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰ χθιζά σου διηγήσαντο δάκρυα καὶ ἐκέλευσάν σε σῶσαι διδαξαμένην τὰ ἔρωτος ἔργα."

"'Daphnis,' she said, 'you are in love with Chloe, and I myself learned this at night from the Nymphs. They came to me in a dream and told me about your tears yesterday and ordered me to save you by teaching you love-making.'" (*D&C* 3.17).

L7) Αἱ δὲ αὐτῷ καθεύδοντι νύκτωρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐφίστανται σχήμασιν, ἐν οἷς καὶ πρότερον· ἔλεγε δὲ ἡ πρεσβυτάτη πάλιν· "γάμου μὲν μέλει τῆς Χλόης ἄλλῳ θεῷ, δῶρα δέ σοι δώσομεν ἡμεῖς, ἃ θέλξει Δρύαντα. Ἡ ναῦς ἡ τῶν Μηθυμναίων νεανίσκων, ἧς τὴν λύγον αἱ σαί ποτε αἶγες κατέφαγον, ἡμέρᾳ μὲν ἐκείνῃ μακρὰν τῆς γῆς ὑπηνέχθη πνεύματι· νυκτὸς δέ, πελαγίου ταράξαντος ἀνέμου τὴν θάλασσαν, εἰς τὴν γῆν εἰς τὰς τῆς ἄκρας πέτρας ἐξεβράσθη. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν διεφθάρη καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐναὐτῇ· βαλάντιον δὲ τρισχιλίων δραχμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ κύματος ἀπεπτύσθη καὶ κεῖται φυκίοις κεκαλυμμένον πλησίον δελφῖνος νεκροῦ, δι' ὃν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ προσῆλθεν ὁδοιπόρος, τὸ δυσῶδες τῆς σηπεδόνος παρατρέχων. Ἀλλὰ σὺ πρόσελθε καὶ προσελθὼν ἀνελοῦ καὶ ἀνελόμενος δός. Ἱκανόν σοι νῦν δόξαι μὴ πένητι, χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ἔσῃ καὶ πλούσιος." Αἱ μὲν ταῦτα εἰποῦσαι τῇ νυκτὶ συναπῆλθον· γενομένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἀναπηδήσας ὁ Δάφνις περιχαρὴς ἤλαυνε ῥοίζῳ πολλῷ τὰς αἶγας εἰς τὴν νομήν…

"And they appeared to him as he slept at night in the same form in which they had appeared before; and again the eldest spoke: 'Another god is in charge of Chloe's marriage, but we ourselves will give you a gift, which will charm Dryas. The ship of the Methymnean youths, which your goats once ate the willow from, was blown far from the land that day; but that night, when the ocean wind stirred up the sea, it was cast to land on the rocks of the shore. So the boat itself and much of what was in it was destroyed; but a little bag containing three thousand drachmas was spit out from the waves, and lies covered over with seaweed near the dead body of a dolphin, which is why no passerby has come upon it, because they avoid the foul smell of the decay. But you go there, and having gone take it up, and having taken it up, give it. It is enough for now that you not seem poor; later on, you will even be rich.' After saying this, they departed along with the night; since it had become day, Daphnis leapt up with great joy and, with much whistling, drove his goats to the pasture…" (*D&C* 3.27).

L8) Τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐφρόντιζε καὶ ὠνειροπόλει μέχρι τῆς ἅλω…

"He [Dryas] debated these things with himself and daydreamed until he reached the threshing floor…" (*D&C* 3.32).

L9) Ἐκάθητο κλάουσα, τὰ πρόβατα νέμουσα, λέγουσα, οἷα εἰκὸς ἦν· "Ἐξελάθετό μου Δάφνις. Ὀνειροπολεῖ γάμους πλουσίους."

"She was sitting there weeping, grazing her flocks, and saying, such things as were likely: 'Daphnis has completely forgotten me. He is dreaming of a rich marriage.'" (*D&C* 4.27).

L10) Ὄναρ δὲ Διονυσοφάνει μετὰ φροντίδα πολλὴν εἰς βαθὺν ὕπνον κατενεχθέντι τοιόνδε γίνεται. Ἐδόκει τὰς Νύμφας δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἔρωτος ἤδη ποτε αὐτοῖς κατανεῦσαι τὸν γάμον τὸν δὲ ἐκλύσαντα τὸ τοξάριον καὶ ἀποθέμενον τὴν φαρέτραν κελεῦσαι τῷ Διονυσοφάνει πάντας τοὺς ἀρίστους Μιτυληναίων θέμενον συμπότας, ἡνίκα ἂν τὸν ὕστατον πλήσῃ κρατῆρα, τότε δεικνύειν ἑκάστῳ τὰ γνωρίσματα, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ᾄδειν τὸν ὑμέναιον.

"But the following dream happened to Dionysophanes, who fell into a deep sleep after much thought. It seemed that the Nymphs were begging Love to consent to the marriage at last, and that he loosened his little bow and put away his quiver, and ordered Dionysophanes to invite all the aristocrats of Mytilene to a drinking party, and when he had filled the last mixing bowl, to show the tokens to each one, and then to sing the wedding song" (*D&C* 4.34).

L11) "Οὐκέτι γοῦν οὐδὲ θυγατρίου γενέσθαι πατὴρ εὐτύχησα, ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ ὥσπερ γέλωτά με ποιούμενοι νύκτωρ ὀνείρους μοι ἐπιπέμπουσι, δηλοῦντες ὅτι με πατέρα ποιήσει ποίμνιον."

"'But in fact I haven't since been fortunate enough to be a father, not even to a daughter, but the gods send me dreams at night as though making fun of me, in which they show that a sheep will make me a father.'" (*D&C* 4.35).

Achilles Tatius

T1) φιλεῖ δὲ τὸ δαιμόνιον πολλάκις ἀνθρώποις τὸ μέλλον νύκτωρ λαλεῖν, οὐχ ἵνα φυλάξωνται μὴ παθεῖν (οὐ γὰρ εἱμαρμένης δύνανται κρατεῖν), ἀλλ' ἵνα κουφότερον πάσχοντες φέρωσι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ἀθρόον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον ἐκπλήσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἄφνω προσπεσὸν καὶ κατεβάπτισε, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ παθεῖν προσδοκώμενον προκατηνάλωσε κατὰ μικρὸν μελετώμενον τοῦ πάθους τὴν ἀκμήν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἶχον ἕνατον ἔτος ἐπὶ τοῖς δέκα καὶ παρεσκεύαζεν ὁ πατὴρ εἰς νέωτα ποιήσων τοὺς γάμους, ἤρχετο τοῦ δράματος ἡ Τύχη. ὄναρ ἐδόκουν συμφῦναι τῇ παρθένῳ τὰ κάτω μέρη μέχρις ὀμφαλοῦ, δύο δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ ἄνω σώματα. ἐφίσταται δή μοι γυνὴ φοβερὰ καὶ μεγάλη, τὸ πρόσωπον ἀγρία· ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν αἵματι, βλοσυραὶ παρειαί, ὄφεις αἱ κόμαι. ἅρπην ἐκράτει τῇ δεξιᾷ, δᾷδα τῇ λαιᾷ. ἐπιπεσοῦσα οὖν μοι θυμῷ καὶ ἀνατείνασα τὴν ἅρπην καταφέρει τῆς

ἰξύος, ἔνθα τῶν δύο σωμάτων ἦσαν αἱ συμβολαί, καὶ ἀποκόπτει μου τὴν παρθένον.

"The divine often likes to tell humans the future at night, not in order that they may guard against suffering (for it is not possible to conquer destiny), but so that experiencing it they may bear it more lightly. For a sudden and unforeseen rush astounds the soul by falling on it unawares and drowns it, but the thing that is foreseen before it is suffered by care felt bit by bit in advance, expends the extremity of the suffering. For when I was nineteen years old, and my father was planning the wedding for the next year, Fate began her drama. I seemed in a dream to grow together with the maiden at the bottom, up to the belly button, but from thence the top parts were two bodies. And then a frightening and huge woman, with frightening looks, stood over us; her eyes were bloodshot, her cheeks rough, and her hair made of snakes. She wielded a sickle in her right hand, a torch in her left. And so, falling upon me wildly and and stretching out the sickle, she drew it down from the groin, where the two bodies were joined, and cut the girl away from me" (*L&C* 1.3).

T2) τί μὲν οὖν ἔφαγον, μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἔγωγε οὐκ ᾔδειν· ἐῴκειν γὰρ τοῖς ἐν ὀνείροις ἐσθίουσιν.

"What I was eating, then, by the gods, I had no idea: for I seemed like people who eat in their dreams" (*L&C* 1.5).

T3) ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τότε μου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελθεῖν ἤθελεν ἡ κόρη· πάντα γὰρ ἦν μοι Λευκίππη τὰ ἐνύπνια· διελεγόμην αὐτῇ, συνέπαιζον, συνεδείπνουν, ἡπτόμην, πλείονα εἶχον ἀγαθὰ τῆς ἡμέρας· καὶ γὰρ κατεφίλησα, καὶ ἦν τὸ φίλημα ἀληθινόν· ὥστε ἐπειδή με ἤγειρεν ὁ οἰκέτης, ἐλοιδορούμην αὐτῷ τῆς ἀκαιρίας, ἀπολέσας ὄνειρον οὕτω γλυκύν.

"But not even then would the girl depart from my soul: for all of my dreams were of Leucippe; I talked to her, flirted with her, dined with her, touched her, and enjoyed many more pleasures than during the day. For I even kissed her, and it was a real kiss: so that when my slave woke me, I chided him for the untimeliness, since I had lost so sweet a dream" (*L&C* 1.6).

T4) Ὀλίγων δὲ ἡμερῶν διελθουσῶν ὁ πατήρ μοι τοὺς γάμους συνεκρότει θᾶττον ἢ διεγνώκει. ἐνύπνια γὰρ αὐτὸν διετάραττε πολλά. ἔδοξεν ἄγειν ἡμῶν τοὺς γάμους, ἤδη δὲ ἅψαντος αὐτοῦ τὰς δᾷδας ἀποσβεσθῆναι τὸ πῦρ· ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ἠπείγετο συναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς.

"A few days had passed when my father began putting our wedding together sooner than he had first resolved. For a dream kept disturbing him greatly. He thought that he was leading our wedding, and had already lit the torches when the fire went out: because of this he was all the more hasty to wed us" (*L&C* 1.11).

T5) ἄρτι δέ μου προσελθόντος εἴσω τοῦ θαλάμου τῆς παιδός, γίνεταί τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὴν τῆς κόρης μητέρα· ἔτυχεν ὄνειρος αὐτὴν ταράξας. ἐδόκει τινὰ λῃστὴν μάχαιραν ἔχοντα γυμνὴν ἄγειν ἁρπασάμενον αὐτῆς τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ καταθέμενον ὑπτίαν, μέσην ἀνατεμεῖν τῇ μαχαίρᾳ τὴν γαστέρα, κάτωθεν ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς. ταραχθεῖσα οὖν ὑπὸ δείματος, ὡς εἶχεν ἀναπηδᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς θυγατρὸς θάλαμον τρέχει (ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἦν), ἄρτι μου κατακλιθέντος.

"Just as I was entering the girl's room, something was happening to the girl's mother: a dream happened to disturb her. It seemed to her that a bandit holding a naked sword grabbed ahold of her daughter and dragged her off, then threw her down onto her back, and cut her up the middle of her stomach with the sword, beginning at the bottom from her pudenda. And so distraught with fear, she leapt up just as she was and ran to her daughter's chamber (for it was nearby) just as I was lying down" (*L&C* 2.23).

T6) "ἐπλάνα δέ με καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων φαντάσματα, τὸν δὲ ἀληθέστερον ὄνειρον οὐκ ἐθεασάμην. νῦν ἀθλιώτερον ἀνετμήθης τὴν γαστέρα· αὕτη δυστυχεστέρα τῆς μαχαίρας τομή…"

"'But the illusions of my dreams deceived me, and I did not see a very accurate dream. Now you have been wounded far worse in your belly: that cut is far more unfortunate than a swordcut would have been…" (*L&C* 2.24).

T7) Μόλις οὖν ἀναζωπυρήσας λέγω πρὸς τὸν Μενέλαον· "Οὐκ ἐρεῖς μοι, τί ταῦτα; οὐχὶ Λευκίππην ὁρῶ; ταύτην οὐ κρατῶ καὶ ἀκούω λαλούσης; ἃ οὖν χθὲς ἐθεασάμην, τίνα ἦν; ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἐνύπνια. ἀλλ' ἰδοὺ καὶ φίλημα ἀληθινὸν καὶ ζῶν, ὡς κἀκεῖνο τὸ τῆς Λευκίππης γλυκύ."

"When I recovered with great difficulty I said to Menelaus: 'Won't you tell me what this is? Do I not see Leucippe? Do I not cling to her, and hear her talking? But then what I saw yesterday, what was it? For either that or this is a dream. But see, this kiss is real and living, and its sweetness is that of Leucippe.'" (*L&C* 3.18).

T8) "ἡ γάρ μοι θεὸς Ἄρτεμις ἐπιστᾶσα πρῴην κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ὅτε ἔκλαιον μέλλουσα σφαγήσεσθαι, 'Μὴ νῦν,' ἔφη, 'κλαῖε· οὐ γὰρ τεθνήξῃ· βοηθὸς γὰρ ἐγώ σοι παρέσομαι. μενεῖς δὲ παρθένος, ἔστ' ἄν σε νυμφοστολήσω· ἄξεται δέ σε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἢ Κλειτοφῶν.' ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀναβολὴν ἠχθόμην, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίσιν ἡδόμην."

"For the goddess Artemis stood over me in my sleep the day before yesterday, when I was crying because I was about to be slaughtered, and said 'Don't cry, now: for you will not die, for I will be beside you as a helper. And you will remain a virgin, until I give you away as a bride; and no one will lead you away in marriage besides Clitophon.' And I was upset at the delay, but was pleased at the hope for the future" (*L&C* 4.1).

T9) ἐδόκουν γὰρ τῇ παρελθούσῃ νυκτὶ ναὸν Ἀφροδίτης ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἄγαλμα ἔνδον εἶναι τῆς θεοῦ· ὡς δὲ πλησίον ἐγενόμην προσευξόμενος, κλεισθῆναι τὰς θύρας. ἀθυμοῦντι δέ μοι γυναῖκα ἐκφανῆναι κατὰ τὸ ἄγαλμα τὴν μορφὴν ἔχουσαν, καί, "Νῦν," εἶπεν, "οὐκ ἔξεστί σοι παρελθεῖν εἴσω τοῦ νεώ· ἢν δὲ ὀλίγον ἀναμείνῃς χρόνον, οὐκ ἀνοίξω σοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱερέα σε ποιήσω τῆς θεοῦ." καταλέγω δὴ τοῦτο τῇ Λευκίππῃ τὸ ἐνύπνιον καὶ οὐκέτι ἐπεχείρουν βιάζεσθαι. ἀναλογιζόμενος δὲ τὸν τῆς Λευκίππης ὄνειρον οὐ μετρίως ἐταραττόμην.

"The previous night I seemed to see the temple of Aphrodite and the statue of the god was inside; but when I got closer to pray to her, the doors shut. And then a woman appeared to me, as I was disheartened, like the statue in form, and she said: 'it is not for you to enter into the temple now: but if you hold up for a short while, I will not only open the door to you, but will make you a priest of the goddess.' And thus I told thus dream to Leucippe and no longer undertook to violate her. But when I thought about Leucippe's dream I was in no small measure disturbed" (*L&C* 4.1).

T10) "Οἴμοι, φιλτάτη, δέδεσαι καὶ καθεύδουσα· οὐδὲ τὸν ὕπνον ἐλεύθερον ἔχεις. τίνα ἄρα σου τὰ φαντάσματα; ἆρα κἂν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους σωφρονεῖς, ἢ μαίνεταί σου καὶ τὰ ὀνείρατα;" ἐπεὶ δὲ διανέστη, πάλιν ἄσημα ἐβόα…

"'Alas, dearest, even asleep you are bound: you do not even have free sleep. What visions are you having? Are you at least sane in your sleep, or are your dreams mad as well?' When she awoke, she stilled cried out nonsensically…" (*L&C* 4.10).

T11) ἅπαξ οὖν ποτε καθεύδουσα, ταύτην ἀφίησιν πυρπολουμένην τὴν φωνήν· "Διὰ σὲ μαίνομαι, Γοργία." ἐπεὶ οὖν ἠὼς ἐγένετο, λέγω τῷ Μενελάῳ τὸ λεχθὲν καὶ ἐσκόπουν εἴ τις εἴη που κατὰ τὴν κώμην Γοργίας. προελθοῦσι δ' ἡμῖν νεανίσκος προσέρχεταί τις καὶ προσαγορεύσας με, "Σωτὴρ ἥκω σός," ἔφη, "καὶ τῆς σῆς γυναικός." ἐκπλαγεὶς οὖν καὶ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι νομίσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, "Μὴ Γοργίας," εἶπον, "τυγχάνεις;" "Οὐ μὲν οὖν," εἶπεν, "ἀλλὰ Χαιρέας· Γοργίας γάρ σε ἀπολώλεκεν." ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔφριξα καὶ λέγω· "Τίνα ταύτην ἀπώλειαν, καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ Γοργίας; δαίμων γάρ μοί τις αὐτὸν ἐμήνυσε νύκτωρ· σὺ δὲ διηγητὴς γενοῦ τῶν θείων μηνυμάτων."

"And then once while she was sleeping, she let loose this cry in her feverish state: 'I am crazy because of you, Gorgias.' And so at dawn, I told Menelaus what she had said and began investigating whether anyone in the camp was name Gorgias. And as we proceeded, a young man approached us and accosted me: 'I have come as your savior,' he said, 'and your wife's.' And so, amazed, and reckoning that the man was some divine messenger, I said 'You don't happen to be Gorgias, do you?' 'That I am not,' he replied, 'but Chaereas: for it is Gorgias who has destroyed you.' I was even more unnerved, and said: 'What sort of destruction was this, and who is Gorgias? For some god mentioned him at night: may you, then, become the interpreter of this divine communication.'" (*L&C* 4.15).

T12) κἀγὼ παρακαθήμενος ἔλεγον πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς ἀκούουσαν· "Ἆρά μοι σωφρονήσεις ἀληθῶς; ἆρά μέ ποτε γνωρίσεις; ἆρά σου τὴν φωνὴν ἐκείνην ἀπολήψομαι; μάντευσαί τι καὶ νῦν καθεύδουσα· καὶ γὰρ χθὲς τοῦ Γοργίου κατεμαντεύσω δικαίως. εὐτυχεῖς ἄρα μᾶλλον κοιμωμένη· γρηγοροῦσα μὲν γὰρ μανίαν δυστυχεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐνύπνιά σου σωφρονεῖ."

"And I, sitting down beside her, spoke to her as if she was listening: 'Will you really be sane? Will you ever recognize me? Will I hear that voice of yours? Prophesy something even now as you sleep: for yesterday you prophesied rightly about Gorgias. You are more fortunate asleep, then: for when you are awake you are unluckily mad, but your dreams are sane.'" (*L&C* 4.17).

T13) "σπεῖσαι κἂν νῦν, ἐλέησον· οὐκέτι δέομαι πολλῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ γάμου μακροῦ, ὃν ἡ δυστυχὴς ὠνειροπόλουν ἐπὶ σοί· ἀρκεῖ μοι κἂν μία συμπλοκή· μικροῦ δέομαι φαρμάκου πρὸς τηλικαύτην νόσον."

"'Make peace for now, have mercy: I no longer ask for many days and a long marriage, which I unhappily used to dream about you; just one union will satisfy me; I am asking for a very small remedy for so large an illness.'" (*L&C* 5.26).

T14) Ἔλεγον οὖν· "Τίς με δαίμων ἐξηπάτησεν ὀλίγῃ χαρᾷ; τίς μοι Λευκίππην ἔδειξεν εἰς καινὴν ὑπόθεσιν συμφορῶν; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκόρεσά μου τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, οἷς μόνοις ηὐτύχησα, οὐδὲ ἐνεπλήσθην κἂν βλέπων. ἀληθής μοι γέγονεν ὀνείρων ἡδονή."

"And so I said: 'What god deceived me with a brief joy? Who showed me Leucippe a new plan for misfortunes? But I did sate my eyes, by which alone I was fortunate, nor did I get my fill of seeing. The pleasure for me was truly that of dreams.'" (*L&C* 7.5).

T15) ἦν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τῷ Σωστράτῳ νύκτωρ ἡ θεὸς ἐπιστᾶσα· τὸ δὲ ὄναρ ἐσήμαινε τὴν θυγατέρα εὑρήσειν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ τἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱόν.

"And the goddess (Artemis) had also appeared to Sostratos in private by night; and the dream indicated to him that he would find his daughter and the son of his brother in Ephesus" (*L&C* 7.12)

T16) "Ἐπὶ τούτῳ με, δέσποινα, ἤγαγες ἐνταῦθα; τοιαῦτά σου τῶν ἐνυπνίων τὰ μαντεύματα; κἀγὼ μὲν ἐπίστευόν σου τοῖς ὀνείροις καὶ εὑρήσειν παρὰ σοὶ προσεδόκων τὴν θυγατέρα."

"Is this what you led me here for, mistress? Is this the sort of prophecy you make in dreams? And I trusted in your dreams, and expected I would, according to your word, find my daughter" (*L&C* 7.14).

Heliodorus

H1) …ὄναρ αὐτῷ θεῖον ἔρχεται τοιόνδε. Κατὰ τὴν Μέμφιν μὲν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τῆς Ἴσιδος ἐπερχόμενος λαμπαδίῳ πυρὶ τὸν ὅλον ἐδόκει καταλάμπεσθαι· πεπλῆσθαι δὲ βωμοὺς μὲν καὶ ἐσχάρας ζῴων παντοίων αἵματι διαβρόχους, προπύλαια δὲ καὶ περιδρόμους ἀνθρώπων, κρότου καὶ θορύβου συμμιγοῦς πάντα πληρούντων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐντὸς ἥκειν τῶν ἀνακτόρων, τὴν θεὸν ὑπαντῶσαν ἐγχειρίζειν τε τὴν Χαρίκλειαν καὶ λέγειν "ὦ Θύαμι, τήνδε σοι τὴν παρθένον ἐγὼ παραδίδωμι, σὺ δὲ ἔχων οὐχ ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄδικος ἔσῃ καὶ φονεύσεις τὴν ξένην· ἡ δὲ οὐ φονευθήσεται." Ταῦτα ὡς εἶδεν ἀμηχάνως διῆγε, τῇδε κἀκεῖσε τὸ δηλούμενον ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν ἀναστρέφων. Ἤδη δὲ ἀπειρηκὼς ἕλκει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν τὴν ἐπίλυσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ "ἕξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις" γυναῖκα καὶ οὐκέτι παρθένον ὑπετίθετο, τὸ δὲ "φονεύσεις" τὰς παρθενίους τρώσεις εἴκαζεν, ὑφ' ὧν οὐκ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τὴν Χαρίκλειαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄναρ τοῦτον ἔφραζε τὸν τρόπον οὕτως αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐξηγουμένης…

"…the following godsent dream came to him. In Memphis, his own city, he arrived at the temple of Isis, and the whole thing seemed to burn with torchlight; the altars and hearths had been soaked with the blood of all sorts of animals, and the entryways and aisles were packed with people filling it all with babbling and shouting. And then, when he arrived inside the shrine itself, the goddess met him, and handed him Charikleia and said 'O Thyamis, I entrust this maiden to you, but you having her will not have her, but you will be unjust and will slay the foreign woman: but she will not be slain.' When he had seen this, he was in some difficulty, turning the epiphany this way and that wondering what it meant. Finally he resorted to forcing the solution to fit his own wishes: he surmised that the "you will have and will not have her" meant as a woman and no longer as a virgin, and that the "you will slay her" depicted the wounds of defloration, from which Chariclea would not die. And he interpreted the dream in this way because his desires interpreted for him thus…" (*Aeth.* 1.18-19).

H2) Ἅπερ ὡς εἶδέ τε καὶ ἤκουσεν ὁ Θύαμις, ἐνθύμιον αὐτῷ τὸ ὄναρ γίνεται καθ' ὃ τὴν Ἶσιν ἑώρα καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἅπαντα λαμπάδων καὶ θυσιῶν ἀνάμεστον, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι τὰ νῦν δρώμενα· καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν προτέρων τὴν ὄψιν συνέβαλλεν, ὡς ἔχων οὐχ ἕξει τὴν Χαρίκλειαν, ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου ταύτης ἀφαιρεθείσης, καὶ ὡς φονεύσει καὶ οὐ τρώσει, ξίφει καὶ οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης νόμῳ. Καὶ πολλὰ τὴν θεὸν ὡς δολερὰν ὀνειδίσας…

"When Thyamis saw and heard all this, the dream came into his mind in which he had seen Isis and her whole temple filled with torches and sacrifices, and thought that this was the scene now unfolding: and he analyzed the dream in a manner quite different from before, that though he had Chariclea he would not have her, since she was taken away from him by war, and that he would kill her and not wound her, with a sword and not in the custom of Aphrodite. And he reviled the goddess a great deal as a trickster…" (*Aeth.* 1.30).

H3) τῇ Χαρικλείᾳ τῇδε ξυγκείμενον ὄναρ ἐφοίτησεν· ἀνὴρ τὴν κόμην αὐχμηρὸς καὶ τὸ βλέμμα ὑποκαθήμενος καὶ τὴν χεῖρα ἔναιμος ἐμβαλὼν τὸ ξίφος τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῇ τὸν δεξιὸν ἐξῄρητο. Ἡ δὲ ἀνέκραγέ τε αὐτίκα καί οἱ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν

ἀνηρπάσθαι λέγουσα τὸν Θεαγένην ἐκάλει. Καὶ ὁ μὲν παρῆν αὐτίκα πρὸς τὴν κλῆσιν καὶ τὸ πάθος ὑπερήλγει καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἐνυπνίων συναισθανόμενος, ἡ δὲ τῷ τε προσώπῳ τὴν χεῖρα ἐπέβαλλε καὶ τὸ μέρος ὃ κατὰ τὸ ὄναρ ἀπώλεσεν ἐπαφωμένη πάντοθεν ἐπεζήτει. Ὡς δὲ ἦν ὄναρ "ὄναρ ἦν," ἔλεγεν, "ἔχω τὸν ὀφθαλμόν· θάρσει Θεάγενες." Ἀνέπνευσε πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ὁ Θεαγένης καὶ "εὖ μὲν ποιοῦσα" ἔφη "τὰς ἡλιακὰς ἀκτῖνας ἀποσῴζεις. Τί δὲ ἦν ὅ μοι πέπονθας; ἢ τίς ἡ περί σε πτοία γέγονεν;" "Ἀνὴρ ὑβριστὴς," ἔφη, "καὶ ἀτάσθαλος καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν σὴν ἄμαχον καταδείσας ῥώμην κειμένῃ μοι πρὸς τοῖς σοῖς γόνασιν ἐπεκώμαζε ξιφήρης καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ᾤμην ὡς ἐξεῖλε τὸν δεξιόν· καὶ εἴθε γε ὕπαρ ἦν καὶ μὴ ὄναρ, ὦ Θεάγενες, τὸ φανέν." Τοῦ δὲ "εὐφήμησον" εἰπόντος καὶ διότι τοῦτο λέγοι πυνθανομένου, "διότι βέλτιον ἦν," ἔφη, "θατέρῳ με τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλαττωθῆναι ἤπερ ἐπὶ σοὶ φροντίζειν· ὡς σφόδρα δέδοικα μὴ εἰς σὲ τείνει τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὃν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐγὼ καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ πάντα ἐμαυτῆς πεποίημαι." "Παῦσαι" ἔλεγεν ὁ Κνήμων, ἐπηκροᾶτο γὰρ ἁπάντων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς βοὴν τῆς Χαρικλείας ἀφυπνισμένος, "ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἄλλῃ πῃ φράζεσθαι τὸ ὄναρ καταφαίνεται· καὶ εἴγε σοι πατέρες εἰσὶν ἀπόκριναι." Τῆς δὲ ὁμολογούσης καὶ 'εἴποτε ἦσαν' εἰπούσης, "οὐκοῦν τὸν πατέρα σοι τεθνηκέναι νόμιζε" ἔλεγε. "Τοῦτο δὲ ὧδε συμβάλλω· τοῦ προελθεῖν εἰς τὸν τῇδε βίον καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ φωτὸς μεταλαβεῖν τοὺς φύντας ἴσμεν αἰτίους, ὥστε εἰκότως ἐπὶ πατέρα καὶ μητέρα τὴν ὀμμάτων συζυγίαν ὡς ἂν φωτεινὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ὁρατῶν ὑπουργὸν οἱ ὄνειροι σοφίζονται." "Βαρὺ μὲν" ἔφη "καὶ τοῦτο" ἡ Χαρίκλεια "πλὴν ἀλλ' ἔστω γε ἀληθὲς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἕτερον, καὶ νικήσειεν ὁ παρὰ σοὶ τρίπους ἐγὼ δὲ ψευδόμαντις ἀποφανθείην." "Ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔσται καὶ χρὴ πιστεύειν" ἔλεγεν ὁ Κνήμων, "ἡμεῖς δὲ ὀνειρώττειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐοίκαμεν, ἐνύπνια μὲν καὶ φαντασίας ἐξετάζοντες, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς περίσκεψιν οὐδ' ἡντιναοῦν προτιθέντες…"

"A dream of the following form visited Charikleia: a man with matted hair and the look of a highwayman, brandished a sword in his bloody hand and cut out her right eye. And she immediately screamed and cried out to Theagenes saying that her eye had been ripped out. And he was at her side in an instant, as soon as she called, and he was as tormented by her suffering as if he had perceived even her dreams with her, but she put her hand to her face and touching the part that she had lost in the dream, felt all around. And as it was a dream, 'It was a dream,' she said, 'I have my eye: courage, Theagenes.' When he heard this, Theagenes sighed deeply and said 'It is well that you have escaped with those beams which shine like the sun. But tell me, what was it that you suffered? What fright was it that befell you?' 'A violent and wicked man,' she said, 'who did not fear even your overpowering strength assaulted me as I slept on your knees, bearing a sword, and I thought that he plucked out my right eye; and would that it had happened in reality and not in a dream, Theagenes.' When he said 'Do not say such things!' and asked to know why she said this, she replied 'Because it would be better that I should be deprived of an eye than fear for you so: for I am terribly afraid that the dream refers to you, whom I count as my eye and my soul and my all.' 'Stop,' said Knemon, who had heard everything after being roused by Chariclea's scream at the beginning, 'for the dream seems to me to mean something else entirely; and tell me, if in fact your parents are alive.' When she had answered in the affirmative and said 'if ever they were,' he said 'Then you must reckon that your

father has died. And I deduce this as follows: we know that our parents are responsible for our coming into this life and sharing in this light; so that is likely that dreams represent our father and mother as our pair of eyes, since are our means of sensing the light and partaking in visible things.' 'This too would be grave,' said Chariclea, 'but I would far rather it be true than the alternative; may the tripod on your side be victorious, and may I be shown to be a false prophetess.' 'You must believe that it will be so,' said Knemon, 'but we really do seem to be dreaming, since we are going through dreams and fantasies, but do not even propose the slightest consideration of our own concerns…'" (*Aeth.* 2.16).

H4) ...εἰ δέ που καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐκνικηθείη πρὸς ὕπνον, φεύγειν ἐδόκει καὶ θαμὰ πρὸς τὰ κατόπιν ὑπέστρεφε καὶ περιεσκόπει τὸν οὐδαμοῦ διώκοντα καὶ βουλόμενος καθεύδειν ἀπηύχετο τοῦθ'ὃ ἐβούλετο, χαλεπωτέροις ὀνείροις τῆς ἀληθείας ἐντυγχάνων…

"...and if ever he was overcome for a short time by sleep, he dreamed that he was fleeing and kept looking back over his shoulder and looking out for a pursuer who was nowhere to be seen, and though he wished to sleep, he prayed not to get what he wished, since his dreams turned out to be worse than reality…" (*Aeth.* 2.20).

H5) "…χρησμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ὄνειροι τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς τέλεσι κρίνονται…"

"'…for both oracles and dreams are for the most part judged by their outcomes…'" (*Aeth.* 2.36).

H6) …καὶ τὴν σπονδὴν ἀπέχεεν ἄλλους τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπικαλούμενος, εὐόνειρόν τε ᾔτει τὴν νύκτα καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ τοὺς φιλτάτους κατὰ γοῦν τὸν ὕπνον ἱκέτευε.

"…and he poured out his libation, invoking all the other gods, and especially Hermes, and he asked that the night be one of good dreams and begged that his dearest ones appear to him, even if only in dreams." (*Aeth.* 3.5).

H7) "Ἤδη δὲ μεσούσης τῆς νυκτὸς ὁρῶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ὡς ᾤμην, εἴ γε ᾤμην ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀληθῶς ἑώρων· καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸν Θεαγένην ἡ δὲ τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ἐνεχείριζεν· ὀνομαστί τέ με προσκαλοῦντες 'ὥρα σοι' ἔλεγον 'εἰς τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν ἐπανήκειν, οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μοιρῶν ὑπαγορεύει θεσμός. Αὐτός τε οὖν ἔξιθι καὶ τούσδε ὑποδεξάμενος ἄγε, συνεμπόρους ἴσα τε παισὶ ποιούμενος, καὶ παράπεμπε ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίων ὅποι τε καὶ ὅπως τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.' Ταῦτα εἰπόντες οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ὅτι μὴ ὄναρ ἦν ἡ ὄψις ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐνδειξάμενοι…"

"'Then in the middle of the night I saw Apollo and Artemis, as I imagined, if indeed I imagined it and did not see it in reality: and he entrusted Theagenes, and she Chariclea to me, and addressing me by name, they said 'It is time for you to return to the land of your birth, for thus does the decree of the fates bid you. And so you yourself go out and take charge of these youths and lead them; make them fellow travelers and like your own children, and send them on from Egypt to

whither and however the gods like.' And saying these things, they withdrew, and showed me that my vision had not been a dream, but waking reality…'" (*Aeth.* 3.11-12).

H8) "δεῖταί σου Χαρικλῆς" ἔλεγεν "ἀφικέσθαι παρ' αὐτόν· ἔστι δὲ πλησίον ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ καὶ ὕμνον ἀποθύει τῷ θεῷ τεταραγμένος τι κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους." Ἐξανίσταμαι παραχρῆμα καὶ τὸν Θεαγένην ἀποπέμψας ἐπὶ τὸν νεὼν ἀφικόμενος ἐπὶ θώκου τινὸς καταλαμβάνω τὸν Χαρικλέα καθήμενον ἄγαν περίλυπον καὶ συνεχῶς ἐπιστένοντα. Προσελθὼν οὖν "τί σύννους καὶ σκυθρωπὸς εἶ;" ἠρώτων. Ὁ δὲ "τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλω" φησὶν "ὀνειράτων τέ με διαταραξάντων…"

"'Charicles requests that you come to him;' he said, 'he is nearby in the temple of Apollo, offering a hymn to the god because he has been troubled by something in his dreams.' I got up at once and bid farewell to Theagenes. When I came to the temple to one of the seats I found Charicles sitting down, extremely upset and sighing repeatedly. And so I went up to him and asked 'Why are you thoughtful and grave?' He said 'And why should I not be, since my dreams were so frightening…" (*Aeth.* 3.18).

H9) "Ἐνταῦθά ποτε ἡμᾶς, δεκάτου παρήκοντος ἔτους ἐξ οὗ με γαμετὴν Ὑδάσπης ἐγνώρισεν οὔπω τε παίδων ἡμῖν γεγονότων, ἠρεμεῖν τὸ μεσημβρινὸν συνέβαινεν ὕπνου θερινοῦ κατακλίναντος, καί μοι προσωμίλει τότε ὁ πατὴρ ὁ σός, ὄναρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο κελεύειν ἐπομνύμενος, ᾐσθόμην δὲ παραχρῆμα κυοφορήσασα τὴν καταβολήν."

"'It was there, once, that we, ten years having passed since Hydaspes knew me as his wife and no children having yet been born to us, went together to have a midday rest, when the summer sleep made us lie down, and then your father had intercourse with me, swearing that a dream had commaded him to do this, and I knew in an instant that the deed had made me pregnant.'" (*Aeth.* 4.8).

H10) "Τί δὲ οὐ μέλλω, τῆς φιλτάτης μοι τὸν βίον τάχα πρότερον μεταστησομένης ἢ πρὸς γάμον, ὡς φῄς, συναφθησομένης, εἴ τι δεῖ προσέχειν ὀνείρασι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ οἷς τῆς παρηκούσης ἐξεδειματώθην νυκτός, καθ' ἣν ἀετὸν ᾤμην ἐκ χειρὸς ἀφεθέντα τοῦ Πυθίου καὶ ἀθρόον καταπτάντα τό τε θυγάτριον ἐκ κόλπων, οἴμοι, τῶν ἐμῶν ἀναρπάσαντα γῆς ἐπ' ἔσχατόν τι πέρας οἴχεσθαι φέροντα, ζοφώδεσί τισιν εἰδώλοις καὶ σκιώδεσι πλῆθον, καὶ τέλος οὐδὲ γνῶναι ὅ τι ποτὲ καὶ δράσειε, τοῦ μεσεύοντος ἀπείρου διαστήματος συνεκδραμεῖν τῇ πτήσει τὴν θέαν ἐνεδρεύσαντος;" Ταῦτα ὡς εἶπεν, ἐγὼ μὲν ὅπη τείνει τὸ ὄναρ συνέβαλλον, ἐκεῖνον δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀθυμίας ἀπάγων καὶ ὑποψίας εἶναι πόρρω τῶν ἐσομένων παρασκευάζων "Ἱερεὺς" ἔφην "καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ μαντικωτάτου τῶν θεῶν ὀνειροπολεῖν μοι δοκεῖς οὐκ ἔχειν ἐπιτηδείως, ὃς τῶν ἐνυπνίων σοι τοὺς ἐσομένους τῆς παιδὸς γάμους προμηνυόντων καὶ ἀετὸν μὲν τὸν ληψόμενον νυμφίον αἰνιττομένων, ταῦτα δὲ ἔσεσθαι, τοῦ Πυθίου νεύοντος καὶ ὡς ἐκ χειρὸς τὸν συνοικήσοντα προσάγοντος, εὐαγγελιζομένων ἀγανακτεῖς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄθυμον ἄγεις τὸ ὄναρ."

"'How should I not, since my dearest is about to abandon her life sooner than, as you say, participate in marriage, if we are to put any stock in dreams, especially those by which I was so frightened last night, during which I imagined that an eagle was released from the hand of the Pythian and swooped down in a rush and snatched up my daughter, alas!, from my lap, and went off carrying her to some place at the farthest reaches of the earth, full of dark and shadowy images, and I did not know what he did at the end, since the immense space in between prevented my vision from following along with his flight.' When he said these things, I myself understood what the dream referred to, but I, attempting to lead him away from his fear and suspicion of what was going to be, said 'As a priest, and for the most prophetic of all the gods no less, you seem to me not to be able to interpret dreams very well, who, when your dreams prophesy to you the impending marriage of your daughter, and symbolize the bridegroom who will take her away with an eagle, with the Pythian assesnting and assuring you that these things will be, and producing as though from his hand her future husband, with all of this good news, you are still distressed at the vision and drive the dream to a negative interpretation.'" (*Aeth.* 4.14-15).

H11) "Οὗτος γάρ, ἐπειδὴ Μαλέαν ὑπερβαλόντες ἀνέμοις τε ἐναντίοις χρησάμενοι τῇ Κεφαλληναίων προσέσχομεν, ὄναρ αὐτῷ προμαντεύειν τὴν μέλλουσαν Πυθιονίκην τὸν πάτριον ἡμῶν τόνδε θεὸν ἐπομνύμενος ἐκτραπῆναί τε τοῦ προκειμένου πλοῦ καὶ τῇδε κατᾶραι πείσας ἔργοις ἐπιστώσατο τὴν μαντείαν καλλίνικος ἡμῖν ὁ τέως ἔμπορος ἀναδειχθείς. Καὶ τήνδε τὴν θυσίαν ἄγει τῷ θεῷ τῷ φήναντι νικητήριόν τε καὶ χαριστήριον…"

"'For this man, when we were passing Malea and had met adverse winds, and put in at Kephallenia, swore that a dream in the form of this ancestral god of ours had prophesied to him that he would be a Pythian victor; he persuaded us to turn away from our course ahead and to put in here, and now he has confirmed the prophecy, and is lauded among us as victor who was then but a merchant. And he is leading this sacrifice to the god who appeared to him as a victory and a thanks offering…'" (*Aeth.* 4.16).

H12) Ἐπεὶ δὲ δείπνου πρὸς ὀλίγον μεταλαβόντες εἰς ὕπνον ἐτράπημεν, ὄναρ μοί τις πρεσβύτης ἐφαίνετο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατεσκληκὼς ἐπιγουνίδα δέ, λείψανον τῆς ἐφ' ἡλικίας ἰσχύος, ἀνεσταλμένου ζώματος ὑποφαίνων, κυνῆν μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπικείμενος ἀγχίνουν δὲ ἅμα καὶ πολύτροπον περισκοπούμενος καὶ οἷον ἐκ πληγῆς τινος μηρὸν σκάζοντα παρέλκων. Πλησιάσας δή μοι καὶ σεσηρός τι μειδιάσας "Ὦ θαυμάσιε" ἔφη, "σὺ δὲ μόνος ἐν οὐδενὸς λόγου μέρει τέθεισαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πάντων ὅσοι δὴ τὴν Κεφαλλήνων παρέπλευσαν οἶκόν τε τὸν ἡμέτερον ἐπισκεψαμένων καὶ δόξαν γνῶναι τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐν σπουδῇ θεμένων αὐτὸς οὕτως ὀλιγώρως ἔσχηκας ὡς μηδὲ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν προσειπεῖν, ἐν γειτόνων καὶ ταῦτα οἰκοῦντα. Τοιγάρτοι τούτων ὑφέξεις οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν τὴν δίκην καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐμοὶ παθῶν αἰσθήσῃ, θαλάττῃ τε ἅμα καὶ γῇ πολεμίοις ἐντυγχάνων· τὴν κόρην δὲ ἣν ἄγεις παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς γαμετῆς πρόσειπε, χαίρειν γὰρ αὐτῇ φησι διότι πάντων ἐπίπροσθεν ἄγει τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τέλος αὐτῇ δεξιὸν εὐαγγελίζεται." Ἀνηλάμην ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως παλλόμενος…"

"After we partaken of a bit of dinner, we turned to sleep, and in a dream some old man appeared to me, withered away to a skeleton everywhere else but his thighs, a remnant of his strength as a youth, which were showing because his tunic was hitched up; he wore a leather cap on his head and appeared clever and someone of many wiles, and he dragged one leg along in a limp as if from some wound. He drew near to me and grinning wickedly said: 'I am amazed at you; you alone have reckoned our affairs of no account, since everyone, as many as sailed by Cephallenia, has visited our house and been eager to learn of our glory; you yourself, however, have been so remiss as not even to have greeted me in the common fashion, even though you dwelt as near as a neighbor. And so you will receive your punishment for these things before long, and will see hardships the likes of mine, and will find sea and land together your enemies. But say hello to the maid you accompany for my wife, for she bids her be joyful because she holds chastity above all else; she gives her good tidings of a happy ending.' I leapt up shaking with fear from the dream…" (*Aeth.* 5.22).

H13) "Εἰ δέ μοι περισῴζῃ καλῶς γε ποιῶν, δεῦρο καὶ συνανάπαυσαι φίλος, ὄναρ γοῦν ὀφθείς· φείδου δὲ καὶ τότε, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, καὶ φύλαττε νομίμῳ γάμῳ τὴν σὴν παρθένον· ἰδού σε καὶ περιπτύσσομαι, παρεῖναι καὶ ὁρᾶν ὑποτιθεμένη."

"'If you are, as I hope, still alive and well, come here and rest beside me, my dear, appearing as a dream at least; even then spare me, noble sir, and protect your girl as a maiden for a lawful marriage; see, I embrace you, pretending that you are here and see me.'" (*Aeth.* 6.8).

H14) Ὡς δὲ τοῖς προθύροις ἐπέστη θυσίαν ἄγειν τῇ θεῷ λέγουσα ὑπὲρ τῆς δεσποίνης Ἀρσάκης, ἐκ τινῶν ὀνειράτων τεταραγμένης καὶ ἐξιλεώσασθαι τὰ ὀφθέντα βουλομένης, τῶν νεωκόρων τις διεκώλυέ τε καὶ ἀπέπεμπε, κατηφείας τὰ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐμπεπλῆσθαι φάσκων.

"When she stood at the gates saying she was making a sacrifice on behalf of her mistress Arsace, who had been disturbed by some dreams and wished to propitiate the visions, one of the priests prevented her and sent her away, saying that the temple was occupied in grieving." (*Aeth.* 7.11).

H15) "Ἱλήκοιτε, θεοί" ἀνεβόησεν "οἷον γάρ μοι νῦν ὄναρ εἴτε καὶ ὕπαρ ἦν ἐνθύμιον γέγονεν ὃ τῆς προτεραίας ἰδοῦσα νυκτὸς τότε μὲν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως τῆς διανοίας ἀπέβαλον νυνὶ δέ μοι εἰς μνήμην παραγέγονε. Τὸ δὲ ὄναρ ἔπος ἦν εἰς μέτρον ἡρμοσμένον, ἔλεγε δὲ τὸ ἔπος ὁ θειότατος Καλάσιρις, εἴτε καταδαρθεῖν λαθούσῃ φανείς, εἴτε καὶ ἐναργῶς ὀφθείς· εἶχε δέ, οἶμαι, ὧδέ πως

'παντάρβην φορέουσα πυρὸς μὴ τάρβει ἐρωήν,
ῥηίδι᾽ ὡς μοίραις χἄ τ᾽ ἀδόκητα πέλει.'"

"'Gods be gracious!' she shouted, 'What a dream I have just now recalled, if it was not in fact a waking vision, which I saw on the previous night, and then I threw it off from my mind, I know not how, but just now it has come back to my

memory. The dream was a saying fitted into verse, and the most godly Calasiris spoke the verse, whether he appeared to me when I had fallen asleep unawares, or else I saw him in reality; and it was, I think, something like this:

"Wearing allfear fear not the rush of fire;
Easy for the fates are even things which seem impossible."" (*Aeth.* 8.11).

H16) Καὶ ὁ Θεαγένης διεσείσθη τε ὥσπερ οἱ κάτοχοι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνεδίδου τὰ δεσμὰ ἀνήλατο καὶ "Εὐμενεῖς εἴητε, θεοί" ἀνέκραγε· 'κἀγὼ γάρ τοι ποιητὴς ἐξ ὑπομνήσεως ἀναδείκνυμαι καὶ χρησμὸς δή μοι παρ' ὁμοίου τοῦ μάντεως, εἴτε Καλάσιρις ἦν εἴτε θεὸς εἰς Καλάσιριν φαινόμενος, πεφοίτηκε καὶ λέγειν ἐδόκει τοιάδε

Αἰθιόπων εἰς γαῖαν ἀφίξεαι ἄμμιγα κούρῃ
δεσμῶν Ἀρσακέων αὔριον ἐκπροφυγών.

Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅποι τείνει τὸ χρήσιμον ἔχω συμβάλλειν γῆν μὲν γὰρ Αἰθιόπων τὴν τῶν καταχθονίων ἔοικε λέγειν ἄμμιγα δὲ κούρῃ τῇ Περσεφόνῃ με συνέσεσθαι καὶ λύσιν δεσμῶν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν. Σοὶ δὲ ἄρα τί φράζει τὸ ἔπος οὕτως ἐξ ἐναντίων πρὸς ἑαυτὸ συγκείμενον; Τοὔνομα μὲν γὰρ ἡ παντάρβη πάντα φοβουμένη δηλοῖ, τὸ παράγγελμα δὲ μὴ δεδοικέναι τὴν πυρὰν ἀξιοῖ." Καὶ ἡ Χαρίκλεια "Ὦ γλυκύτατε" ἔφη "Θεάγενες, ἡ συνήθειά σε τῶν δυστυχημάτων πάντα πρὸς τὸ φαυλότατον νοεῖν τε καὶ εἰκάζειν παρεσκεύασε, φιλεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ συμπίπτοντα τρέπειν τὴν γνώμην. Χρηστότερα δὲ ἢ ὡς σοὶ παρίσταται μηνύειν μοι τὰ μαντευθέντα φαίνεται, καὶ ἡ κόρη τάχ' ἂν εἴην ἐγώ, μεθ' ἧς σε πατρίδος τῆς ἐμῆς Αἰθιοπίας ἐπιβήσεσθαι ἐπαγγέλλεται, Ἀρσάκην καὶ δεσμὰ τὰ Ἀρσάκης ἀποφυγόντα. Τὸ δὲ ὅπως ἡμῖν μὲν οὔτε δῆλα οὔτε εὔπιστα, θεοῖς δὲ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ μελήσει τοῖς καὶ τὰ μαντεύματα φήνασιν· ἡ γοῦν εἰς ἐμὲ πρόρρησις ἤδη, ὡς οἶσθα, βουλήματι τῷ ἐκείνων τετέλεσται καὶ ζῶ σοι τὸ παρὸν ἡ παντοίως ἀπελπισθεῖσα…"

"And Theagenes shook like those possessed, and leapt up as far as his chains would allow, and cried out 'Be kindly, gods! For I too am shown to be a poet from my memory, and I too have an oracle from the same prophet, whether it was Calasiris or a god appearing as Calasiris; he came to me and seemed to say this:

"You will reach the land of the Aethiopians together with a maiden,
after escaping from the bonds of Arsace tomorrow."

I can interpret the oracle's meaning as far as I am concerned: it seems to mean the land of the underworld by that of the Aethiopians, and that I will be with Persephone by "together with a maiden," and by the release from bonds it means the freedom there from the body. But what does your verse say, composed as it is out of self-contradictions? For the name "allfear" indicates being frightened at everything, but the instruction bids you not to be afraid of the pyre.' And Chariclea said 'Sweetest Theagenes, your familiarity with misfortunes has prepared you to calculate and construe everything for the worst, for mankind likes to fit his opinion to his circumstances. But the predictions seem to me to communicate better things than the way you have approached it, and the maiden is clearly I myself, with whom it promises that you will journey to my fatherland Aethiopia, after escaping from Arsace and the bonds of Arsace. How this will be is not told, and it is neither clear nor easily believeable, but it is possible for the

gods, and will be their concern, who showed us these oracles: for the revelation about me has already, as you know, been fulfilled by their will, and I am alive in front of you, who before was completely without hope...'" (*Aeth.* 8.11).

H17) "Ἱλήκοιτε θεοί" φήσας αὖθις ἐπὶ συννοίας ἑαυτὸν ἥδραζε. Τῶν δὲ ἐν τέλει παρεστώτων ὅτι πεπόνθοι πυνθανομένων, "Τοιαύτην" ἔφη "τετέχθαι μοι θυγατέρα τήμερον καὶ εἰς ἀκμὴν τοσαύτην ἥκειν ἀθρόον ᾧμην· καὶ τὸ ὄναρ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ φροντίδι θέμενος νυνὶ πρὸς τὴν ὁμοίαν τῆς ὁρωμένης ὄψιν ἀπήνεγκα." Τῶν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰπόντων ὡς φαντασία τις εἴη ψυχῆς τὰ μέλλοντα πολλάκις <εἰς> εἴδωλα προτυπουμένης, ἐν παρέργῳ τότε τὸ ὀφθὲν ποιησάμενος...

"'Gods be gracious!' he said, and sat back in thought. When those of rank standing by him asked what was wrong, he said 'I imagined that I begat a daughter just like this girl today and that she immediately reached such an age; and I didn't give the dream a second thought, but now I am reminded of it by the similarity of the girl's looks to the vision.' Those who followed him around said that it was some apparition of the soul, which often represents the future in images, so he then put the vision in the back of his mind…" (*Aeth.* 9.25).

H18) "Ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ παῖς ἐτέχθη μοι κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν," γελάσας πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας, "εἴπερ τὸν νεανίαν τοῦτον ἀδελφὸν ὄντα τῆς κόρης καὶ ὁρᾶσθαί μοι μέλλοντα προειδωλοποιηθῆναι, ὡς φατέ, διὰ τῶν ὀνειράτων ἐχρῆν;"

"'But how is it that I did not also beget a son in the dream,' he joked to his followers, 'if indeed this young man, being the girl's brother, and about to be seen by me, ought to have been foreshadowed in the dream as well, according to your theory?" (*Aeth.* 9.25).

H19) Μειδιάσας οὖν αὖθις ὁ Ὑδάσπης "Ὀνειρώττει τῷ ὄντι" φησίν "ἡ ὀνειρογενὴς αὕτη μου θυγάτηρ, ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατὰ μέσην Μερόην τοὺς φύντας ἀναπεμφθήσεσθαι φανταζομένη."

"So Hydaspes smiled again and said 'My dream child really is herself in a dream, since she imagines that her parents will be sent down from Greece into the middle of Meroe.'" (*Aeth.* 9.25).

H18) "Τοῦτ' ἦν ἄρα" ἔφη "τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὃ κατὰ τὴν νύκτα ταύτην ἐθεώμην, κύειν τε οἰομένη καὶ τίκτειν ἅμα καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν εἶναι θυγατέρα γάμου παραχρῆμα ὡραίαν, διὰ μὲν τῶν ὠδίνων, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνίας διὰ δὲ τῆς θυγατρὸς τὴν νίκην αἰνιττομένου τοῦ ὀνείρατος."

"'This, then,' she said, 'was what the dream which I saw last night meant, in which I thought I grew pregnant and gave birth at the same time, and that the child was a daughter who was immediately of an age to be married; the dream symbolized, throught the labor pains, as it seems, the hardship of war, and meant, by the daughter, Victory.'" (*Aeth.* 10.3).

II. The Latin Novels

Petronius

P1) "An videlicet audirem sententias, id est vitrea fracta et somniorum interpretamenta?"

"'Or would you have me listen to his ideas, that is, broken glass and interpretations of dreams?'" (*Sat.* 10).

P2) "Et ideo medicinam somnio petii, iussaque sum vos perquirere atque impetum morbi monstrata subtilitate lenire."

"'And so I sought a cure in my dreams, and I was ordered to hunt you down and soften the blow of my illness by a clever technique I was shown.'" (*Sat.* 17).

P3) "Sed hic qui in pergula natus est aedes non somniatur."

"But he who was born in a hut does not dream of a palace" (*Sat.* 74).

P4) Vterque nostrum tam inexpectato ictus sono amiserat sanguinem. Ego praecipue quasi somnio quodam turbulento circumactus diu vocem collegi, tremebundisque manibus Eumolpi iam in soporem labentis laciniam duxi, et: "Per fidem," inquam, "pater, cuius haec navis est, aut quos vehat, dicere potes?"

"Each of us lost his blood at the blow of so unexpected a sound. And I particularly, like someone chased around in a disturbing dream, took a long time to gather my voice, and with shaking hands I pulled on Eumolpus' hem, as he was drifting off to sleep, and said 'Can you tell me faithfully, father, whose ship this is, or who its passengers are?'" (*Sat.* 100).

P5) "Videbatur mihi secundum quietem Priapus dicere: 'Encolpion quod quaeris, scito a me in navem tuam esse perductum." Exhorruit Tryphaena et: "Putes," inquit, "una nos dormisse; nam et mihi simulacrum Neptuni, quod Bais tetrastylo notaveram, videbatur dicere: 'In nave Lichae Gitona invenies'" — "Hinc scies," inquit Eumolpus, "Epicurum esse hominem divinum, qui eiusmodi ludibria facetissima ratione condemnat."

"'Priapus seemed to say to me in my sleep: "What you are looking for—that is, Encolpius—know that he has been led into your ship by me." Tryphaena shuddered and said 'You would think that we had slept together; for I also had a dream, in which a statue of Neptuni, which I had seen in the portico at Baiae, seemed to say: "You will find Giton in Lichas' ship."' 'From this,' said Eumolpus, 'you may know that Epicurus is a divine man, because by reason he rejects absurd jokes of that sort.'" (*Sat.* 104).

P6) “Deos immortales rerum humanarum agere curam, puto, intellexisti, o Tryphaena. Nam imprudentes noxios in nostrum induxere navigium, et quid fecissent, admonuerunt pari somniorum consensu. Ita vide ut possit illis ignosci, quos ad poenam ipse deus deduxit.”

“‘You understand, I think, that the immortal gods take an interest in human affairs, Tryphaena. For they led the evildoers onto our ship unawares, and disclosed what they had done by the equal agreement of dreams. So see, how is it possible to pardon those whom God himself has led to punishment?’” (*Sat.* 106).

P7) Nocte soporifera veluti cum somnia ludunt
errantes oculos effossaque protulit aurum
in lucem tellus: versat manus improba furtum
thesaurosque rapit, sudor quoque perluit ora
et mentem timor altus habet, ne forte gravatum
excutiat gremium secreti conscius auri:
mox ubi fugerunt elusam gaudia mentem
veraque forma redit, animus, quod perdidit, optat
atque in praeterita se totus imagine versat.

“Just as when, during sleepy nights, dreams mock our wandering eyes, and the earth, dug up, produces gold: our wicked hand runs over the take and seizes treasures, and sweat flows over our faces and a deep fear grips our thoughts, that by chance someone who knows the gold is hidden there may shake out our laden lap: soon, when the joys have fled the mind they mocked, and the true form returns, the soul yearns for what it has lost, and turns itself completely to the shadow of the past” (*Sat.* 128).

P8) Somnia, quae mentes ludunt volitantibus umbris,
non delubra deum nec ab aethere numina mittunt,
sed sibi quisque facit. nam cum prostrata sopore
urguet membra quies et mens sine pondere ludit,
quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit oppida bello
qui quatit et flammis miserandas eruit urbes,
tela videt versasque acies et funera regum
atque exundantes profuso sanguine campos.
qui causas orare solent, legesque forumque
et pavidi cernunt inclusum chorte tribunal.
condit avarus opes defossumque invenit aurum.
venator saltus canibus quatit. eripit undis
aut premit eversam periturus navita puppem.
scribit amatori meretrix, dat adultera munus…
et canis in somnis leporis vestigia latrat
[in noctis spatium miserorum vulnera durant].

"Neither the shrines of the gods nor the spirits of the aether send dreams, which play with our minds with shadows flying about, but each man makes them for himself. For when sleep presses the limbs stretched out with fatigue and the mind plays without restraint, whatever was during the day happens in the dark. The man who terrorizes towns with war and destroys pitiable cities with fire sees spears and lines drawn up and the deaths of kings and fields dripping with spilt blood. The men who are used to pleading cases perceive laws and the court and, fearful, see the tribunal enclosed by a crowd. The miser stores his wealth and finds buried treasure. The hunter beats the bushes with his dogs. The sailor pulls his wrecked ship out of the waves or clings to it about to die. The courtesan writes to her lover, the adulteress gives it up. Even the dog tracks the trail of the the hare in his sleep. The wounds of the wretched last into the night time" (Fr. 30/43).

Apuleius

A1) Aliquantum processeramus, et iam iubaris exortu cuncta conlustrantur. et ego curiose sedulo arbitrabar iugulum comitis, qua parte gladium delapsum videram, et mecum: "vesane," aio, "qui poculis et vino sepultus extrema somniasti. ecce Socrates integer, sanus, incolumis. ubi vulnus, ubi spongia? ubi postremum cicatrix tam alta, tam recens?" et ad illum: "non," inquam, "immerito medici fidi cibo et crapula distentos saeva et gravia somniare autumnant; mihi denique, quod poculis vesperi minus temperavi, nox acerba diras et truces imagines optulit, ut adhuc me credam cruore humano aspersum atque impiatum."

"We had got on some way, and already everything was lit by the rising of the sun. And I myself kept examining my comrade's throat most carefully, in the spot where I had seen the sword go in, and I said to myself: 'you crazy fool, you were buried in your cups and your wine, and had terrible dreams. Look, Socrates is whole, healthy, unharmed. Where is the wound, where the sponge? Where, finally, is the scar, so deep and so fresh?' and to him I said: 'Those honest doctors are not without reason when they assert that people who are engorged with food and boozing dream of serious and wild things; for example, because I didn't quite hold back last night with my drinks, the bitter night brought me fierce and terrifying images, so that even now I believe that I am spattered and fouled with human gore.'" (*Met.* 1.18).

A2) Ad haec ille subridens: "At tu," inquit, "non sanguine sed lotio perfusus es, verum tamen et ipse per somnium iugulari visus sum mihi. Nam et iugulum istum dolui, et cor ipsum mihi avelli putavi, et nunc etiam spiritu deficior et genua quatior et gradu titubo et aliud cibatus refovendo spiritu desidero."

"At this, he, smiling, said: 'But you are not soaked with blood, but with piss; regardless, I too, myself, in fact, seemed to myself in a dream to have my throat cut. For I was both wounded in the throat, and thought that my heart itself was plucked out, and now I am rather short of breath and my knees are shaking and I'm stumbling as I walk, and I want something to eat to restore my strength.'" (*Met.* 1.18).

A3) Et illa quidem magicis suis artibus volens reformatur, at ego nullo decantatus carmine, praesentis tantum facti stupore defixus quidvis aliud magis videbar esse quam Lucius: sic exterminatus animi, attonitus in amentiam vigilans somniabar; defrictis adeo diu pupulis, an vigilarem, scire quaerebam. tandem denique reversus ad sensum praesentium...

"And she, at least, is willingly transformed by her own magic arts, but I, not enchanted by any spell, but paralyzed with amazement only at the feat before me, seemed to be anything rather than Lucius: thus out of my mind, thunderstruck to the point of madness, I was dreaming while awake; I rubbed my eyes for so long a time, wishing to know whether I was awake. Then finally I returned to an awareness of the situation at hand…" (*Met.* 3.22).

A4) "sed ecce saeuissimo somnio mihi nunc etiam redintegratur immo uero cumulatur infortunium meum; nam uisa sum mihi de domo de thalamo de cubiculo de toro denique ipso uiolenter extracta per solitudines auias infortunatissimi mariti nomen inuocare, eumque, ut primum meis amplexibus uiduatus est, adhuc ungentis madidum, coronis floridum consequi uestigio me pedibus fugientem alienis. utque clamore percito formonsae raptum uxoris conquerens populi testatur auxilium, quidam de latronibus importunae persecutionis indignatione permotus saxo grandi pro pedibus adrepto misellum iuuenem maritum meum percussum interemit. talis aspectus atrocitate perterrita somno funesto pauens excussa sum."

"'But behold! My misfortune is now even renewed for me, or rather, indeed, heaped higher, by a most savage dream; for I seemed to myself to have been violently dragged off from my home, from my chambers, from my bedroom, even from my very bed, and to be calling out through trackless deserts the name of my most misfortunate husband. And he, as soon as he was deprived of me, still damp with perfume and flowery with garlands, seemed to be following in my tracks, as I fled on the feet of another. And when he called for the aid of the people, complaining of the kidnapping of his beautiful wife with a loud shout, one of the robbers, enraged at the importunate pursuit, snatched up a huge rock that lay at his feet, and striking the wretched youth, my husband, he slew him. I woke from my deadly sleep afraid, terrified by the horror of such a sight.'" (*Met.* 4.27).

A5) tunc fletibus eius adsuspirans anus sic incipit: "bono animo esto, mi erilis, nec uanis somniorum figmentis terreare. nam praeter quod diurnae quietis imagines falsae perhibentur, tunc etiam nocturnae uisiones contrarios euentus nonnumquam pronuntiant. denique flere et uapulare et nonnumquam iugulari lucrosum prosperumque prouentum nuntiant, contra ridere et mellitis dulciolis uentrem saginare uel in uoluptatem ueneriam conuenire tristitie animi languore corporis damnisque ceteris uexatum iri praedicabunt. Sed ego te narrationibus lepidis anilibusque fabulis protinus auocabo."

"Then the old woman, sighing at the girl's tears, began thus: 'Be of good cheer, mistress, and do not be frightened by the empty fabrications of dreams. For

besides the fact that the images of daytime rest are clearly false, then even nighttime visions sometimes predict opposite outcomes. Therefore, weeping and being beaten and sometimes even having one's throat cut signify a profitable and prosperous outcome; on the other hand, to laugh and to stuff one's belly with honeyed sweetmeats or to come together in pleasurable sexual intercourse will predict that one will be harried by a sadness of the spirit and a weakness of the body and all the other difficulties. But I will distract you right away with some pleasant storytelling and with an old woman's fairy-tales.'" (*Met.* 4.27).

A6) tunc inter moras umbra illa misere trucidati Tlepolemi sanie cruentam et pallore deformem attollens faciem quietem pudicam interpellat uxoris: "mi coniux, quod tibi prorsus ab alio dici iam licebit: etsi in pectore tuo non permanet nostri memoria uel acerbae mortis meae casus foedus caritatis intercidit, quouis alio felicius maritare, modo ne in Thrasylli manum sacrilegam conuenias neue sermonem conferas nec mensam accumbas nec toro adquiescas. fuge mei percussoris cruentam dexteram. noli parricidio nuptias auspicari. uulnera illa, quorum sanguinem tuae lacrimae perluerunt, non sunt tota dentium uulnera: lancea mali Thrasylli me tibi fecit alienum" et addidit cetera omnemque scaenam sceleris inluminauit. At illa, ut primum maesta quieuerat, toro faciem impressa, etiamnunc dormiens, lacrimis emanantibus genas cohumidat et uelut quodam tormento inquieta quiete excussa luctu redintegrato prolixum heiulat discissaque interula decora brachia saeuientibus palmulis conuerberat.

"Then during her delays the shade of the wretchedly slaughtered Tlepolemus bore before her his face bloody with gore and misshapen with pallor, and interrupted the chaste rest of his wife: 'My wife, a thing which will now be allowed to be said to you by no other: even if the memory of me no longer remains in your heart, or the accident of my bitter death has severed the pact of love, marry more happily whomever else you wish, only do not join with the sacrilegious hand of Thrasyllus, nor converse with him, nor lie down to sup, nor bed down with him. Flee the bloodstained right hand of my murderer. Do not seek auspices for marriage to a parricide. Those wounds, whose blood your tears did wash away, were not all the wounds of tusks: wicked Thrasyllus' lance made me a stranger to you…' and he added all the rest and illuminated the whole scene of the crime. But she, her face sunk in the bed just as when she had first fallen asleep in her sorrow, moistened her cheeks with streaming tears, and shaken from her restless rest as if by some instrument of torture, wailed for some time, her grief renewed, and shredding her nightgown she beat her lovely arms with savaging hands. (*Met.* 8.8-9).

A7) die sequenti filia eius accurrit e proxumo castello, in quod pridem denupserat, maesta atque crines pendulos quatiens et interdum pugnis obtundens ubera, quae nullo quidem domus infortunium nuntiante cuncta cognorat, sed ei per quietem obtulit sese flebilis patris sui facies adhuc nodo reuincta ceruice, eique totum nouercae scelus aperuit de adulterio, de maleficio, et quem ad modum laruatus ad inferos demeasset.

"The following day his daughter ran up from the nearest village, into which she had earlier been married, sad and shaking her loose hair and occasionally beating her breasts with her fists; she knew everything, although no one had announced to her the misfortune of the house, but the image of her poor father came before her in her sleep, with the noose still tied around his neck, and had laid open to her the whole crime of her stepmother: the adultery, the curse, and how he had descended to the underworld under the compulsion of a ghost" (*Met.* 9.31).

A8) Necdum satis conixeram, et ecce pelago medio uenerandos diis etiam uultus attollens emergit diuina facies; ac dehinc paulatim toto corpore perlucidum simulacrum excusso pelago ante me constitisse uisum est. Eius mirandam speciem ad uos etiam referre conitar, si tamen mihi disserendi tribuerit facultatem paupertas oris humani uel ipsum numen eius dapsilem copiam elocutilis facundiae subministrauerit…Talis ac tanta, spirans Arabiae felicia germina, diuina me uoce dignata est: "En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus…Adsum tuos miserata casus, adsum fauens et propitia. Mitte iam fletus et lamentationes omitte, depelle maerorem; iam tibi prouidentia mea inlucescit dies salutaris. Ergo igitur imperiis istis meis animum intende sollicitum…Nam hoc eodem momento, quo tibi uenio, simul et ibi praesens, quae sunt sequentia, sacerdoti meo per quietem facienda praecipio…Quodsi sedulis obsequiis et religiosis ministeriis et tenacibus castimoniis numen nostrum promerueris, scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia uitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere." Sic oraculi uenerabilis fine prolato numen inuictum in se recessit. Nec mora, cum somno protinus absolutus pauore et gaudio ac dein sudore nimio permixtus exurgo summeque miratus deae potentis tam claram praesentiam, marino rore respersus magnisque imperiis eius intentus monitionis ordinem recolebam.

"I hadn't yet quite fallen asleep when lo! from the midst of the sea there emerged the visage of a goddess, bearing a face that even gods would worship; and little after this her image shining through its whole body should off the sea and seemed to stand before me. I will attempt to convey to you too her amazing appearance, if the poverty of human speech nonetheless provides me with the ability to describe it, or if her very power assists me with the luxurious abundance of skill in speaking...Such and so great was her appearance as, exhaling the fertile blossoms of Arabia, she graced me with her godly voice: 'Lo I am here, moved by your prayers, Lucius...I am here out of pity for your misfortunes, I am here propitious and benevolent. Put away your weeping and cast away your mourning, send off sorrow; by my providence your day of salvation now shines upon you. And so therefore turn your mind attentively to my instructions to you...For at this very moment, in which I come to you, I am also present there, and I am telling my priest in his sleep what will follow and what he must do...But if by devoted obedience and loyal service and unflagging chastity you win the favor of our power, you will know that with me alone rests the power even to prolong your life beyond the span that has been allotted you by fate.' Thus reaching the end of its holy communication, the spirit withdrew unconquered into itself. Nor was there any delay before I was completely freed from sleep and rose confused by fear and joy, and then an excess of sweat, completely amazed by so clear an epiphany of

the powerful goddess; sprinkled with sea spray and intent on her grand commands I went over her instructions in order." (*Met.* 11.3-7).

A9) Nec fuit nox una uel quies aliqua uisu deae monituque ieiuna, sed crebris imperiis sacris suis me, iam dudum destinatum, nunc saltem censebat initiari.

"Nor was there a single night or any rest without a vision of the goddess, but she urged me, already dedicated to her, with her incessant holy commands to be initiated now at least" (*Met.* 11.19).

A10) Nocte quadam plenum gremium suum uisus est mihi summus sacerdos offerre ac requirenti, quid utique istud, respondisse partes illas de Thessalia mihi missas, seruum etiam meum indidem superuenisse nomine Candidum. Hanc experrectus imaginem diu diuque apud cogitationes meas reuoluebam, quid rei portenderet, praesertim cum nullum unquam habuisse me seruum isto nomine nuncupatum certus essem. Vtut tamen sese praesagium somni porrigeret, lucrum certum modis omnibus significari partium oblatione credebam…Quare sollertiam somni tum mirabar uel maxime, quod praeter congruentiam lucrosae pollicitationis argumento serui Candidi equum mihi reddidisset colore candidum.

"One night the high priest seemed to bring a full apron to me and to have answered, when I asked what that was, that these were my shares sent from Thessaly, and that my slave by the name of Candidus had also arrived from there. When I awoke I turned this vision around in my thoughts again and again, to determine what it predicted, especially since I was certain I had never had a slave of that name. Nonetheless, I believed that, however the dream's prediction turned out, some definite profit was signified in any case by the offering of a share…Because of which I was then greatly amazed at the wisom of the dream, which besides the confirmation of the promise of profit, had returned my white colored horse to me under the symbol of a slave named Candidus" (*Met.* 11.20).

A11) Nec me fefellit uel longi temporis prolatione cruciauit deae potentis benignitas salutaris, sed noctis obscurae non obscuris imperiis euidenter monuit aduenisse diem mihi semper optabilem, quo me maxumi uoti compotiret, quantoque sumptu deberem procurare supplicamentis, ipsumque Mithram illum suum sacerdotem praecipuum diuino quodam stellarum consortio, ut aiebat, mihi coniunctum sacrorum ministrum decernit.

"Nor did the powerful goddess' saving power fail me or torment me with a prolongation of time, but one dark night with commands that were not dark she told me clearly that the day was at hand which I had always longed for, on which she would grant me my greatest wish, and she told me how much I ought to pay to take care of the rituals, and she decreed that Mithras himself, her highest priest, who was united with me, she said, by a divine conjunction of the stars, was to be the minister of the rites" (*Met.* 11.22).

A12) Sed tandem deae monitu, licet non plene, tamen pro meo modulo supplicue gratis persolutis, tardam satis domuitionem comparo, uix equidem abruptis ardentissimi desiderii retinaculis.

"But at last by the goddess' command, though not fully, at least in accordance with my humble means, I dissolved my debt of gratitude, and prepared for my return home, late enough, since the bonds of burning longing by which I was kept there had barely even been broken." (*Met.* 11.24).

A13) …paucisque post diebus deae potentis instinctu raptim constrictis sarcinulis, naue conscensa, Romam uersus profectionem dirigo…

"...and after a few days, at the urging of the powerful goddess, with my luggage thrown together in haste, and a ship boarded, I set out in the direction of Rome…" (*Met.* 11.26).

A14) Ecce transcurso signifero circulo Sol magnus annum compleuerat, et quietem meam rursus interpellat numinis benefici cura peruigilis et rursus teletae, rursus sacrorum commonet. Mirabar, quid rei temptaret, quid pronuntiaret futurum; quidni? <qui> plenissime iam dudum uidebar initiatus.

"Lo, when the great Sun had completed the year, with the circle of the zodiac traversed, and once more the nightly attention of the benficent power interrupted my sleep, once more directed me to initiation, once more to her rites. And I wondered what affair she was undertaking, what future she was predicting; and why not? For I thought that I was already fully an initiate" (*Met.* 11.26).

A15) Nam proxuma nocte uidi quendam de sacratis linteis iniectum, qui thyrsos et hederas et tacenda quaedam gerens ad ipsos meos lares collocaret et occupato sedili meo religionis amplae denuntiaret epulas. Is ut agnitionem mihi scilicet certo aliquo sui signo subministraret, sinistri pedis talo paululum reflexo cunctabundo clementer incedebat uestigio. Sublata est ergo post tam manifestam deum uoluntatem ambiguitatis tota caligo et ilico deae matutinis perfectis salutationibus summo studio percontabar singulos, ecqui uestigium similis ut somnium. Nec fides afuit. Nam de pastophoris unum conspexi statim praeter indicium pedis cetero etiam statu atque habitu examussim nocturnae imagini congruentem, quem Asinium Marcellum uocitari cognoui postea, reformationis meae <minime> alienum nomen.

"For the following night I saw someone clothed in the holy linens, who wielded a thyrsos and ivy and certain things about which silence must be kept, and he placed these on my household altar and, sitting on my chair, announced a feast of full sanctity. And, I suppose to help me with a definite sign in recognizing him, with the ankle of his left foot twisted back a little, he walked along with a gently limping step. And so after this so obvious sign of the divine will, all the shadow of uncertainty was lifted, and as soon as the morning prayers had been completed, I began asking everyone around whether there was anyone with a gait like my

dream. Nor was confirmation lacking. For I suddenly saw one of the *pastophori* who matched my nighttime vision perfectly, not only in the sign of his walk, but in the rest of his appearance and dress. I found out afterwards that he was called Asinius Marcellus, a name not unfitting for my retransformation" (*Met.* 11.27).

A16) Nam sibi uisus est quiete proxima, dum magno deo coronas exaptat, * * * et de eius ore, quo singulorum fata dictat, audisse mitti sibi Madaurensem, sed admodum pauperem, cui statim sua sacra deberet ministrare; nam et illi studiorum gloriam et ipsi grande compendium sua comparari prouidentia.

"For he had seemed to himself the previous night, while he was decking the great god with garlands,…and to have heard from his mouth, by which he pronounces the fate of everyone, that a Madauran was being sent to him, one who was quite poor, to whom he was to administer his rites forthwith; for great glory in his studies was being prepared for this man, and for himself, and great reward" (*Met.* 11.27).

A17) Ergo duritia paupertatis intercedente, quod ait uetus prouerbium, inter sacrum ego et saxum positus cruciabar, nec setius tamen identidem numinis premebar instantia. Iamque saepicule non sine magna turbatione stimulatus, postremo iussus, ueste ipsa mea quamuis paruula distracta, sufficientem conrasi summulam. Et id ipsum praeceptum fuerat specialiter: "An tu" inquit "si quam rem uoluptati struendae moliris, laciniis tuis nequaquam parceres: nunc tantas caerimonias aditurus impaenitendae te pauperiei cunctaris committere?"

"And so with the harshness of my poverty preventing me, I was, as the old proverb says, tormented stuck 'between the stone and the knife,' but I was nonetheless goaded by the insistence of the divine. And finally, urged often and not without great discomfort, I at last, following orders, scraped together a sufficient sum by selling my very clothes, though they were meager. And this had been the specific order: 'You surely would not,' it said, 'spare even your garments if you were bent on some form of obtaining pleasure; do you now hesitate to entrust yourself to unrepentant poverty, when you are about to gain admission to such great ceremonies?'" (*Met.* 11.28).

A18) Et ecce post pauculum tempus inopinatis et usquequaque mirificis imperiis deum rursus interpellor et cogor tertiam quoque teletam sustinere.

"And lo, after a very short time I was once again disturbed by the unexpected and in every way astounding commands of the gods, and compelled to undergo even a third initiation." (*Met.* 11.29).

A19) Quo me cogitationis aestu fluctuantem ad instar insaniae percitum sic instruxit nocturna diuinatione clemens imago: "Nihil est" inquit "quod numerosa serie religionis, quasi quicquam sit prius omissum, terreare. Quin adsidua ista numinum dignatione laetus capesse gaudium et potius exulta ter futurus, quod alii uel semel uix conceditur, teque de isto numero merito praesume semper beatum. Ceterum

futura tibi sacrorum traditio pernecessaria est, si tecum nunc saltem reputaueris exuuias deae, quas in prouincia sumpsisti, in eodem fano depositas perseuerare nec te Romae diebus sollemnibus uel supplicare iis uel, cum praeceptum fuerit, felici illo amictu illustrari posse. Quod felix itaque ac faustum salutareque tibi sit, animo gaudiali rursum sacris initiare deis magnis auctoribus." Hactenus diuini somnii suada maiestas, quod usus foret, pronuntiauit.

"And while I was tossed about by this swell of thought, driven to the point of madness, the merciful vision informed me through a nocturnal prophecy thus: 'There is nothing,' it said, 'to fear in this repeated sequence of rites, as if something had been omitted before. Instead, be happy and rejoice in the honor of this continuous divine attention, rather exult that you will be thrice what others are scarcely once, and conclude rightly from that number that you are eternally blessed. Furthermore, the performance of the rites that will occur is completely necessary, if you just consider now that the clothing of the goddess, which you put on in the province, is being kept stored in that same temple, and that you are not able either to worship in them at Rome on festival days nor, when it is commanded, to be illumined by that happy garment. So may this be favorable and sacred and beneficial for you, and may you be initiated once more with a joyful heart with the great gods as movers.' Thus did the persuasive power of divine dream proclaim what was to be done" (*Met.* 11.29-30).

A20) Deus deum magnorum potior et maiorum summus et summorum maximus et maximorum regnator Osiris non in alienam quampiam personam reformatus, sed coram suo illo uenerando me dignatus adfamine per quietem recipere uisus est: quae nunc, incunctanter gloriosa in foro redderem patrocinia nec extimescerem maleuolorum disseminationes, quas studiorum meorum laboriosa doctrina ibidem sustinebat. Ac ne sacris suis gregi cetero permixtus deseruirem, in collegium me pastoforum suorum, immo inter ipsos decurionum quinquennales adlegit.

"The god more powerful than the great gods, and highest of the greater, and greatest of the highest, and ruler of the greatest Osiris, not changed into some other form, but deigning to address me openly in his own form, appeared to me in a dream: he told me to continue unhesitatingly my famous advocacy in the courts, which I now practiced, and not to fear the slanders of ill-wishers, which the serious pursuit of my studies was enduring there. And lest I should serve his mysteries mixed up with the rest of the flock, he inducted me into the college of his pastophori, or rather into the quinquennial board of directors itself" (*Met.* 11.30).

Historia Apollonii Regis Tyri

Vidit in somnis quendam angelico habitu sibi dicentem: "Apolloni, dic gubernatori tuo, ad Ephesum iter dirigat; ubi dum veneris, ingredere templum Dianae cum filia et genero, et omnes casus tuos, quos a iuvenili aetate es passus, expone per ordinem. Post haec veniens Tharsos vindica innocentem filiam tuam." Expergefactus Apollonius excitat filiam et generum et indicat somnium. At illi dixerunt: "Fac, domine, quod iubet."

“He saw someone in his dreams dressed like an angel who said to him: ‘Apollonius, tell your helmsman to set course for Ephesus; where, when you have arrived, go into the temple of Diana with your daughter and son-in-law, and narrate in order all of your hardships, which you have suffered from your youth. After this go to Tarsus and avenge your innocent daugher.’ When he woke up, Apollonius roused his daughter and son-in-law and told them the dream. And they said: ‘Do what he bids, lord.’” (*HART* 48).

APPENDIX B—DREAMS IN THE FRAGMENTS AND "FRINGE" NOVELS

One implication of the argument made in this work is that the trope of dreaming is particularly prevalent in the ancient novels, particularly on the Greek side, and that the manner in which this trope is employed is fairly consistent across the genre. This naturally raises the question of whether dreams are at all represented in the sources for the novels outside the canonical eight: are there any dreams in the fragments, which would thus suggest (though not prove) that dreaming *was* a frequent enough occurrence to have been represented in a random sampling of passages? Are there any references to dreaming, and in particular, reference that might suggest a similar use for dreams in the other novels, in the epitomes or booklist notices which survive? Are there, finally, dreams in the "fringe" novels? We will here consider these questions very briefly; a more thorough examination may perhaps be undertaken in the future. This appendix will be divided into two sections, corresponding to the two types of evidence mentioned above: first, dreams in the fragments and testimonia for other novels which, if extant, might well have been included in the canon; second, dreams in a selection of exemplary "fringe" novels.

Dreams in the Fragments

The collection edited and analyzed by Susan A. Stephens and John J. Winkler (1995) is the authoritative modern source for fragmentary evidence for the ancient Greek novels. Of the twelve definite novels to which they ascribe, whether confidently or tentatively, the fragments and other evidence in the first section ("Novel Fragments"), there are two definite dreams, one of which introduces one of the longer excerpts that exists, two

references to dreaming, and two places in which, I will argue, a dream *might* be inferred. Given the extreme brevity and lacunose nature of most of these fragments, as well as the random nature of the sampling they provide, this is quite impressive, and may support (though very weakly) my assertion that the phenomenon of dreaming was common and important across the novel genre. When we turn to the second section ("Ambiguous Fragments") we are on still shakier ground, yet the presence of dreaming in as many as four out of the ten fragments is worth noting at the very least. Beyond these simple statistical observations, various points are relevant to individual examples, and I turn now to an examination of the various fragments, taken in the order presented in Stephens and Winkler, and marking with an asterisk those works about which nothing illuminating may be said.

1. Novel Fragments (Stephens and Winkler, 23-388):

*Ninos**

Metiochus and Parthenope

While the fragments themselves do not contain any dreams, there are two reasons for suspecting that dreaming played at least some part in the novel as a whole. The first is more obvious: as Stephens and Winkler point out (79), the historical background of the novel is provided in part by Herodotus' account of the tyrant Polycrates, whose daughter (the Parthenope of the novel, though she is unnamed in Herodotus) has an ominous dream and as a result tries to dissuade her father from going to the court of Oroetes. Dreaming is thus already a part of the historical background of this novel; furthermore, there is derivative evidence in the form of a Persian poem based on the novel (see Stephens and Winkler, 72-76) that the novel included at least one dream of Polycrates which *summarized* the fate of his daughter, and in particular a happy return to her homeland after being forced to travel abroad: "…in the Persian poem her father interprets the following dream as a propitious omen for the birth of his child: an olive tree sprang up in his court, was torn from its place, passed through the island and other lands, and afterwards returned to cast its shadow over his throne" (Stephens and Winkler, 78).

Antonius Diogenes: *The Incredible Things beyond Thule*

Dreaming is notably absent from Antonius Diogenes' magnum opus. In addition to the fragments ascribed to this work, we have a relatively thorough summary of the novel from Photius. The complete absence of dreaming from this summary, though there is an

oracle (125), and though people do fall asleep (127), is a blow, albeit a very weak one (such an epitome of a twenty-four book novel in a few pages can scarcely be expected to give us everything, though one dream would have made me far more comfortable than none), to our theory. One obvious point suggests itself, however: given the radically different focus of this novel from the Greek novels that remain to us, it may be more fitting to include it in the category of "fringe" novels (see below). Stephens and Winkler caution against finding in the absence of "teen romance" an excuse for excluding *Beyond Thule* from the genre (109), yet we cannot help questioning why it should be included when, for example, Lucian's *True Stories* (or much of Herodotus, for that matter) so often is not.

The Love Drug

This fragment describes a scene in which a magician speaks to a father seeking magical help after his daughter has fallen in love with a "fair apparition" (173). We have very little context here, though the word Stephens and Winkler translate as "apparition" is εἴδωλον, which may be used to describe dreams (see e.g. van Lieshout 1980, 15), though it does not appear in the extant Greek novels. If we interpret it as a dream, it makes an interesting addition to the evidence for the centrality of dreaming in the ancient novels considered already in this study: here, it seems, the interruption of the social order is by a love that is itself *first formed in a dream*.

Iamblichos: *Babyloniaka*

There are two references to dreaming in Photius' summary of the *Babyloniaka*; it is thus quite possible that there was at least one more, which would make it as least as concerned with dreams as Xenophon of Ephesus' novel. In the first case, Rhodanes has a nightmare which wakes him and his lover Sinonis up from a drugged sleep; whatever the content of the nightmare, it seems to have led to a suicide attempt on Sinonis' part (Stephens and Winkler, 193, esp. n. 25). This reminds us both of Anthia's dream and Habrocomes' first dream in the *Ephesiaca*. The second reference to dreaming has to do with a temple of Aphrodite; when women visit it, they must publicly announce the dreams they while sleeping there (Stephens and Winkler, 194). More interesting still than Photius' summary, however, is the lengthy fragment in which a master accuses his slave of adultery with his wife, because she has *dreamed* that she had sex with him (Fragment 35; Stephens and Winkler, 231-233). If the identification of this fragment's original location as part of the digression on the temple of Aphrodite is correct (see Stephens and Winkler, 228), it reveals how much dream material may easily have been left out of Photius' summary. It is most unfortunate that we do not know how the case turned out, since the argument we have (for the prosecution) seems to rest on the "daytime residue" theory of dreaming; the mere presence of such a theory is already an oddity for a Greek novel, according to my analysis. The alternate theory, which is for the most part univocally presented in the extant Greek novels, is both represented and given an interesting twist in the final fragment of Iamblichus relevant to dreaming (Fragment 34; Stephens and Winkler, 210-211): τὰ ἐνύπνια ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ δαιμονίου πέμπεται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ἑκάστου ψυχῆς τῶν ὁρώντων πλάττεται· καὶ τῆς μὲν φύσεως αὐτῶν ὁ θεός ἐστι χορηγός, τῆς δὲ ἰδέας ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ δημιουργοί "Dreams are sent by the divine, but the soul of each individual dreamer shapes them. God is the principal patron of their nature, but we ourselves are the fashioners of their form."

*Sesonchosis**

Kalligone

The scene in the fragment depicts the heroine, greatly distressed at some news about her lover; she enters a tent, which her attendant/comrade Eubiotos empties, throws herself on the bed, and laments bitterly, then attempts suicide, only to find that she has been foiled by Eubiotos, who has prudently stolen her dagger; she rails against him, and the fragment ends. There is nothing overtly related to dreaming here, I would like to suggest, however, though it cannot be confirmed, that her source of information may be a dream; this would make the scene very much like that following Anthia's dream in the *Ephesiaca*, or Charite's in the *Metamorphoses*.

Antheia and a Cast of Thousands*

*Chione**

Lollianos: *Phoinikika**

*Iolaos**

2. Ambiguous Fragments (Stephens and Winkler, 391-466):

*Apollonios**

*Tinouphis**

The Apparition

This fragment is depicts a divine vision, and thus could easily be another example of dreaming in an ancient novel. This, in fact, led Kerényi and Rattenbury to assign the fragment to "dream literature," though there is an importance difference in the form of narration (see Stephens and Winkler, 409). More importantly, however, as my study of dreaming has shown, there is nothing about such a dream or vision scene that is at all out of place in a novel proper, and thus we may be more confident about the possibility of assigning this fragment to that genre.

*Goatherd and the Palace Guards**

Nightmare or Necromancy?

This fragment is extremely difficult to place, though it is undoubtedly a dream narrative. Stephens and Winkler are confident about the possibility of assigning it to a novel (422), and that is about as much as we can say. In form it is much closer to something from Apuleius than any of the extant Greek novels: the goriness, focus on death, and nightmare quality are singularly incongruent with the majority of the dreams discussed above.

*Staphulos**

Theano

In this fragment we have a protagonist receiving instructions from a goddess, possibly Artemis, in a dream, about how to overcome the hardship she faces (the loss of a beloved, in this case her child; see Stephens and Winkler, 438). This is quite similar to the use of dreams in the ancient novels, and if we do choose to assign this fragment to a novel, it fits perfectly with the pattern discussed with reference to the canonical novels.

*The Festival**

*Inundation**

Initiation

This extremely brief fragment *might* be part of a dream narrative, and if so, it *might* belong to an ancient novel (Stephens and Winkler, 461-2). Beyond the recognition of these possibilities as possible support for the prevalence of dreaming in the ancient novels, there is little else to add.

Dreams in Select Fringe Novels

In this brief analysis, I follow the works in the order in which they are treated in Schmeling's (2003) handbook on the ancient novel, since no particular order seemed necessary.

Lucian's *Verae Historiae*

This work has virtually no dreams; the one notable exception is the episode in which the hero, in the course of his fantastical adventures, visits the Island of Dreams (32-34). In this episode, the narrator shows no interest in the possibility of divinely sent dreams; indeed, the question of religion is utterly absent (the temples on the island are a temple of the Cock, and one each of Truth and Untruth). The whole episode is, like the rest of the work, constructed in a light-hearted and joking manner, and the sojourn on the island seems to have entertainment pure and simple as its only point…which seems also to be the purpose both of dreams as Lucian presents them, and of the work as a whole.

Dictys Cretensis' *Ephemeris*

There are only two dreams in "Dictys'" rewriting of the Trojan war from the perspective of a soldier in the Greek army. The first is a reference to Hecuba's dream about the birth of Paris (3.26), which is simply part of the mythological material with which the author was working; the second is a dream of Odysseus predicting his death at the hands of Telegonus (6.14). Thus, in terms of the dreams and their importance for the work, it hardly resembles the ancient novels; when the mythological material makes use of a dream, our author may or may not follow it, but he does not include any truly significant dreams beyond that.

Dares Phrygius' *Acta*

"Dares'" view from the Trojan side also has two dreams. The first is the judgment of Paris (7): our author recasts this crucial moment of motivation as a dream. The reasoning behind this is plain: the gods have otherwise been removed from the account as motivation, yet the crucial fact that Paris' abduction of Helen was in some sense authorized requires the Judgment, even if it must be relegated to a dream. Thus far dreaming is important, but only as a substitute for an epiphany that is a crucial part of his mythical material; in this respect he is very much like Dictys in his use of dreams. The second dream is that of Andromache (24): she manages to keep Hector out of battle because she is worried about what her bad dream might have portended. This is a narrative dead end: the only result is that the Greeks find it a little easier to have the upper hand for a time. Why, then, include it? We saw above that the dreams in the novels which have no specific narrative function may serve purely as ways of revealing a divine presence in events. Could that also be the case here? I do not think so, for the simple reason that it is the only such dream, and is fairly isolated from any sense of a broader scheme of divine orchestration.

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*

There is only one dream in the entirety of the *Cyropaedia*, a work that has sometimes been viewed as the precursor of the ancient novel.[464] This dream occurs very near the end of the work, and informs Cyrus that he is about to die (8.7.2-3); it is because of this that he can make a series of speeches to his followers, and divide his possessions among them. Thus, while an expedient means of convincing Cyrus he is about to die early enough for him to have time to harangue and prepare for his death, it is scarcely crucial to the plot (such as it is). This is not to say that there is no religious framework in the work; in fact, there are a number of bird signs, which seem to be Xenophon's preferred method of injecting a notion of divine interest in human affairs. What is crucial about these signs, however, is that they are not *interventions* like the dreams in the ancient novels: rather, they function (generally) to confirm the propriety of an action already planned. Thus, while the mere fact of its being largely fictional and in prose may tempt us to identify the *Cyropaedia* as a precursor of the ancient novel, the absence of a similar optimistic pattern of religious meaning indicates that one of the essential features of the ancient novel still had to be invented.

The Alexander Romance

Of the "fringe" novels, the Alexander Romance is by far the closest to the canonical novels in terms of its dreams. There are five dreams (as well as one metaphorical use of "dream" at 1.33 which we will not mention); several of these play a crucial role in the unfolding of the plot. In 1.4-5, the magician king Nektanebos uses his art to induce a dream in Olympias as a way of preparing her for his pretense to be a divine epiphany, by which he will impregnate her. Thus at the very beginning we have a dream of great importance in initiating the events which will follow, specifically one that is more or less responsible for the birth of the protagonist (like Hydaspes' dream in Heliodorus). This dream, however, is emphatically not god-sent, but king-sent: that is, the events of the

[464] e.g. Perry (1965), 153.

work unfold through the orchestration of a god-king who is establishing an heir. The historical/biographical focus of this work, by contrast with the novels examined above, has thus influenced this use of dreams, yet the structural framework is decidedly similar. More striking still is Philip's dream in 1.8, which is also induced by Nektanebos: he is told that his wife is pregnant by the god Ammon. Thus the life of Alexander and the attribution of his parentage to the god Ammon is secured by these two dreams, yet neither is a divine dream as such, but part of a scheme by which Nekatnebos sires a successor to his rule in Egypt. The other three dreams are less noteworthy, though they are important: we should probably read them as signs that Alexander had divine favor in his conquests; in this function they are similar to other dreams in historiography, or to the bird-signs in the *Cyropaedia* (see above). The first, in 1.35, prevents Alexander from going to Tyre as a messenger himself, thereby preventing his capture; the second, also in 1.35, is a curious punning dream which tells Alexander that he will be successful in conquering Tyre. The third and final dream in the work is at 2.13: the god Ammon appears to Alexander, telling him to go to Darius as emissary himself, and reassuring him that he has the god's protection in so doing. Thus in a curious reversal of the first of Alexander's dreams, he visits Darius' court and feasts with him, before he is recognized and escapes (after pocketing some costly tableware). Again, the purpose of these dreams is likely simply to show that Alexander's adventures are taking place with divine favor; there is no emotional pattern of hardship overcome or of reversals of fortune taken care of by the gods, however, and so we are still a long way from the novel proper.

Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*

The *Vita Apollonii* has only four references to dreaming, and none of these is particularly crucial to the plot. The first is a rather extensive discussion of the prophetic power of dreams (2.37), which at first glance seems somewhat promising for our purposes: Apollonius calls prophecy from dreams the "most divine" (θειότατον) of human possessions (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα). A consideration of the context of this statement, however, leads quickly to the realization that it is simply part of Apollonius' larger argument in explanation of his abstinence from alcohol: he brings up the distinction made between dreams before and after midnight (i.e. when we are still affected by drink and when the alcohol has worn off) and a number of other points as part of his argument that the divine is more accessible to the man who does not drink. Thus, what is an important theme in the canonical novels for interpreting the very meaning of the events narrated (e.g. Clitophon's dream theory with which he introduces *Leucippe and Clitophon*, or the dream theory offered to (and rejected by) Hydaspes in the *Aethiopica*, or the old woman's dream theory offered to comfort Charite, which introduces the longest and finest embedded tale in the *Metmorphoses*) is here merely ancillary to a larger philosophical point about the holiness of Apollonius practices. Still more striking is the passage in 4.11 in which Apollonius, visiting the sanctuary of Asclepius in Pergamum, instructs the pilgrims there in the best way to get good (i.e. healing) dreams, and then cures a number of them himself. The suggestion is thus made that the wisdom of Apollonius himself is as good as that found in a divine dream, and that he (and humans in general) can in some way influence the outcome of dreams himself. At 4.34, he is instructed in a dream to go to Crete before he carries out his plan to travel to Rome; this begins to look like one of the dreams in the ancient novels (the one dream in the *HART*, for example), but is once again disappointing: the dream is a narrative dead end; after

traveling to Crete and preaching, he goes to Rome, and the narrative proceeds as though nothing had changed. At most this dream, like those of Alexander considered above, simply shows that Apollonius enjoys divine favor; at the least, it shows his piety in following what he believes to be the commands of the gods. Finally, at 8.31, Apollonius himself appears in a dream to a young man who does not believe Apollonius, and persuades him to believe.[465] Again, this dream is concerned no so much with the plot of the "novel" but with Apollonius' authority as a sage.

Lucius, or The Ass

We come finally to *The Ass*, which is primarily interesting as evidence for Apuleius' sources for the *Metamorphoses*. This is a complicated issue which I will not go into here (see for example Harrison 2003, 500). For our purposes, it is enough simply to point out that the only reference to dreaming in this work is one which Apuleius (also?) retained: at 1.13, Lucius, after witnessing the transformation of a witch into an owl, and immediately before his own transformation, rubs his eyes and wonders if he is dreaming. This is hardly relevant to the plot as a whole; at most (if we stretch it a great deal) it provides an interpretive possibility to the skeptical dreamer who may choose then to read the whole novel as a dream (this possibility is made much more obvious in Apuleius; see Carlisle 2003). At a minimum, it is little more than a casual metaphor, and we thus have in *The Ass* a novel which, stripped of any religious framework such as we find in the other novels (the Isis-book is Apuleius' most striking addition to his source, and is also the most Greek-novel-like part of the main narrative), is also stripped of dreams and references to them.

Conclusion

Nothing can be asserted with particular certainty about the prevalence of dreaming in the novels from the fragmentary evidence, yet purely statistically, as well as in a few interesting cases, we find nothing to suggest that the framework suggested in the main body of this dissertation was not present in the works which survive only in a fragmentary state as well. Turning to the "fringe" novels, we see that the religious framework of the Greek novels (and its curious alteration in the two "comic" Latin novels) is absent from these works, as is any serious or consistent use of dreaming. This sort of negative proof is weak at best, yet at the very least it justifies the exclusion of

[465] Smith (2008) connects this to Lucius' final dream of Apuleius, as well as to the "we" passages in *Acts* and various other ancient exempla.

these works from the main argument of this study, and at a stretch supports the notion that there is something unique and significant in the novels use of dreams and, more generally, of religious structures of meaning.

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