

**PROTEST MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE**

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ABSTRACT

Mohammad Ali Kadivar: Protest Mobilization & Democratization in a Comparative Perspective
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman)

What is the effect of protest mobilization on democratic transition and durability? This dissertation argues that protest mobilization increases the odds for a democratic transition, but it is the length of the mobilization that matters for the durability of new democratic regimes. In particular, sustained unarmed uprisings have generated the longest-lasting new democracies – largely because they are forced to develop an organizational structure that provides a leadership cadre for the new regime, forges links between the government and society, and strengthens checks on the power of the post-transition government. I use quantitative methods, comparative case studies, and a detailed case study of Egypt to demonstrate this argument.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

What is the impact of protest mobilization on the democratization process? Social scientists for a long time have engaged with this question. This dissertation also tries to answer this question by breaking it down to two parts: What is the effect of protest on democratic transition? And how does protest mobilization influence democratic consolidation? Democratic transition refers to the transfer of executive power to a government elected in fair and free elections, and democratic consolidation points to the survival and durability of democratic regimes when a democratic transition occurs.

The first paper in this dissertation focuses on democratic transition in authoritarian elections. The paper takes this narrow focus because the effect of protest on democratic transitions in general have been studied both through quantitative and qualitative methods. Studies of election outcome in authoritarian context have recognized the importance of protest, but the lion share of attention has gone to post-election upheavals. This paper, instead, focuses on the effect of pre-election protest on election outcome. I argue that pre-election outcome makes incumbent defeat more likely in authoritarian elections, and also democratization through incumbent defeat more likely. The analyses of 190 elections in 65 countries between 1990-2004 confirm this hypothesis.

The second and third paper focuses on the effects of protest on durability of new democracies. I argue that the longer the unarmed movement for democratization, the higher the chance of a new democracy to survive. Sustained unarmed mobilization enhances the chance of

new democracy to survive in different ways. First, longer episodes of mobilization are more likely to build a momentum to marginalize elements of the previous regime, which makes the resurrection of the old regime against the new democracy less likely. Longer episodes of contention also require creation of an organizational infrastructure to sustain mobilization in a repressive context. This organization then provides leadership for the post-transition democracy and also contributes in the post-transition civil society. To demonstrate this argument I use a mixed method design. A survival analysis of original data on 112 democratic transition over last half century confirms an association between the length of unarmed contention and democratic durability. I then use five case studies to explore the mechanisms connecting unarmed mobilization and democratic survival. South Africa (long mobilization and democratic success), Poland (long mobilization and democratic success), Pakistan (no mobilization and democratic failure) are cases that perfectly fit the argument, while Russia (rather long mobilization and democratic failure), and Indonesia (short mobilization and democratic success) are anomalous cases.

The third paper presents a more detailed case study of Egypt as a case of short mobilization and democratic failure. The case of Egypt is important at least for three reasons. First, Egypt is in a way an unusual case as the same movement that brought down dictatorship also set the stage for a coup that ended the short and unstable democratic period. Second, closer examination of Egypt highlights related mechanisms that had not been revealed by previous case studies. Specially Egypt shows how short mobilization are more vulnerable than longer mobilization, because short waves of contention are formed around negative coalitions against dictatorship and do not have enough time to reach consensus about positive steps after the transition, policies, and democratic leadership. As a result, short waves of contention may result

in fractured elite and disputes about parameters of transition that may destabilize or even destroy the new democratic regime. In Egypt, the opposition movement to Mubarak split to two camps Muslim Brotherhood versus other secular groups. The protest wave that brought down Mubarak was also too short to create a large organization or political party, while Muslim Brotherhood had a large organization that could be used to its advantage in post-Mubarak elections. This organizational disparity made it also harder for these groups to reach an agreement because Muslim Brotherhood was confident of its electoral performance and secular groups lacked representation within electoral institutions to use it as leverage. On the other hand, the movement was also too short to build enough momentum to marginalize all elements of the old regime. When seculars became disappointed in curtailing Muslim Brother's power through electoral politics, in a miscalculated move they converged with the military. This tacit alliance led to the July 3rd 2013 coup that ended Egypt's short and fragile democratic interval.

CHAPTER 2: PRE-ELECTION MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

While elections are central to democracy, holding elections is not sufficient for a regime to be considered democratic. Most authoritarian regimes in the world hold elections in which the incumbents most often win because of nondemocratic advantages that they enjoy due to the abuse of power, violation of civil liberties, and electoral manipulation. Nonetheless, on some rare occasions the opposition manages to defeat an authoritarian incumbent and achieve a democratic breakthrough. Does pre-election protest contribute to such electoral outcomes? While many studies consider opposition mobilization only weakly related to political change in electoral authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010), others document the positive effects of protest mobilization on democratizing outcomes in such cases (Howard and Roessler 2006). I side with the scholarship favoring the effectiveness of electoral protest for democratic outcomes. Among these studies, the effects of post-election protests are well documented but pre-election protest has not received adequate theoretical and empirical attention. In this paper, I focus on pre-election protest and, building on existing studies of democratization and contentious politics (Fallon, Swiss, and Viterba 2012; Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Nepstad 2011; Opp and Gern 1993; Schock 2005; Wood 2001), I present a theoretical framework that illustrates why pre-election protest raises the odds of incumbent defeat and democratic breakthrough in authoritarian elections.

This paper's empirical examination and theoretical framework address important gaps within the social movements literature. First, although scholars have developed rigorous research

programs to investigate elections (Lijphart 2012; Norris 2004) and social movements (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2008) as major manifestations of politics in the modern era, only a few studies have considered the relationship of these two important political phenomena (Amenta 2006; Goldstone 2003; Kriesi 1995). In a recent reflection on this surprising disengagement, McAdam and Tarrow (2010:532) wrote that “the relations between social movements and elections have seldom been specified in a systematic way that could set us on the road to predicting how movements affect elections and vice versa.” To fill this gap, McAdam and Tarrow specified six mechanisms that connect social movement actors to routine political actors. This paper elaborates on and tests one of these mechanisms: popular mobilization before elections.

Democratization is one of the more significant consequences of popular mobilizations that has been understudied from the perspective of political process theory, the dominant approach of social movement studies (Tarrow 2012:21). The literature on the consequences of social movements, for instance, has mostly focused on the outcome of policy change since it studies the outcome of movements in the context of consolidated democracies (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni 1998). To fill this gap, this paper builds on the general social movements scholarship and the few existing studies of movements in authoritarian states (Almeida 2003; Goodwin 2001; Kurzman 2004; Moghadam and Gheytanchi 2010; Ray and Korteweg 1999; Robertson 2011; Schock 2005; Wood 2000) in order to theorize the ability for contentious collective action to empower opposition groups and thus affect electoral outcomes in authoritarian regimes. Pre-election protest has an independent effect on electoral outcomes because it shows there are viable alternatives to the regime, encourages defection within the

regime, signals the spread of grievances to both the regime and voters, and sometimes create new grievances when faced with repression.

I present empirical support for the effectiveness of pre-election contention by analyzing a dataset of 190 elections in 65 countries with electoral authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2004. My findings indicate an association between pre-election mobilization and incumbent defeat as well as between pre-election mobilization and democratization in the election. In what follows, I first introduce the concept of electoral authoritarianism, which specifies the universe of my cases. Then, I review the few existing studies that consider the impact of electoral contention on democratization in authoritarian elections. Next, I introduce my theory about the empowering effects of pre-election mobilization for the opposition. Finally, I introduce the data and test hypotheses derived from my theory against rival explanations for democratization in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarian Elections, Mobilization, and Democratization

Electoral authoritarianism is now the most common form of authoritarian rule in the world as there are very few non-democratic governments that do not hold national elections (e.g. Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Cuba, China). Electoral authoritarian regimes claim democratic legitimacy on the basis of regularly held elections. However, these elections are either formally limited to roles that would prevent a complete power rotation or, when authorized to change executive power on paper, they fall short of the conditions necessary for free and fair elections. Incumbents in these regimes abuse public institutions to advantage the playing field in favor of the ruling party, violate civil liberties, and manipulate the election process to guarantee their electoral victory (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Robertson 2011; Schedler 2006;

Teorell and Hadenius 2007). Accordingly, some scholars argue that incumbent leaders use these elections to consolidate their power (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2008).

Even though incumbents enjoy considerable advantages in these elections, on some occasions they lose the electoral battle to the opposition (e.g. Kenya 2002). In authoritarian elections, incumbents stand as the main obstacle to the democratic rotation of executive power in the eyes of the opposition. Thus, when incumbents lose and executive power is rotated to the opposition, a democratic breakthrough can be achieved. A democratic breakthrough could also occur without incumbent defeat in cases where incumbents hold fair and free elections and win (e.g. Ghana 1996). Under what conditions, then, does a democratic breakthrough of either sort occur?

To address this puzzle, scholars point to various factors such as the degree of competitiveness within the regime (Brownlee 2009a; Roessler and Howard 2009), linkage with democratic superpowers (Levitsky and Way 2010), international pressure on the fairness of elections (Donno 2013), regime strategies such as fraud and harassment of the opposition, and opposition strategies such as coalition building (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006). I propose that pre-election protest also contributes to incumbent defeat and democratization. In this paper I adopt a minimal definition of democracy as a set of institutional arrangements: procedures and institutions through which citizens can effectively express their preferences about alternative policies and leaders, and institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2011). Any improvements in the direction of establishing and consolidating these procedures and institutions would be considered democratization (for a similar approach see Wejnert 2005).

The effectiveness of mass mobilization for election outcomes in authoritarian regimes has been the subject of scholarly debates. One strand of classic studies of democratic transitions was pessimistic about the effectiveness of mass mobilization for democratization, arguing that contention is either detrimental to the transition process or ephemeral (Huntington 1984; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). This pessimism has been echoed in contemporary research on the outcome of authoritarian elections. These studies emphasize that, rather than opposition mobilization, it is the features of the incumbent regime itself, such as coercive capacity or degree of competitiveness that determine their trajectories. Levitsky and Way offer a metaphor to explain this theoretical approach:

Consider the story of the three little pigs. Setting normative preferences aside, imagine that the pigs are autocratic incumbents, their houses are their regimes, and the wolf represents prodemocracy movements. The wolf huffs and puffs at all three houses, but the impact of his huffing and puffing varies across cases: Whereas the houses of straw and sticks quickly collapse, the house of bricks remains intact. The key to explaining these outcomes lies not in the wolf's abilities or strategies but in differences in the strength of the houses (2010:54).

In contrast to this regime-centered approach, there are studies that explore the effects of opposition mobilization on incumbent defeat and democratization, with post-election protest receiving the lion's share of attention. Scholars in this area have empirically demonstrated that voters who are outraged about fraudulent elections and aware of the similar feelings of fellow voters turn to the streets to protest stolen elections. These uprisings can sometimes force the regime to withdraw and accept the election's real winners (e.g. Serbia 2000, Ukraine 2004). This model of electoral revolution has been adopted by a wide range of activists around the world as a plausible strategy for creating regime change (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Tucker 2007; Way 2008).

There are also a few studies of pre-election mobilization and its impact on electoral outcomes. Bunce and Wolchik (2011) in their important analysis of incumbent defeat in authoritarian elections in Eastern and Central Europe argue that pre-election tactics and strategic choices by the opposition offer the best explanation for the variation in election outcomes. “Forming a united front among opposition parties, forging close alliances between the opposition and civil society groups, and carrying out ambitious nationwide campaigns and voter registration and turnout drives” are among the most effective tactics deployed by the opposition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011:33). Although this analysis presents some informative insights about protest tactics, the focus of the argument is on electoral tactics rather than contentious collective action.

There are also a few studies that pay specific attention to contentious collective action undertaken by the opposition (Howard and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2009, 2013). While these studies find a positive impact for opposition mobilization on democratization in elections, they suffer from limitations in terms of conceptualizing mass mobilization as well as measuring protest. First, these studies’ concept of protest focuses exclusively on protests organized by the established opposition parties. This formulation excludes a variety of protest actions that could affect the incumbents’ power to control the election. I argue for the expansion of protest events to include those led by any number of social groups because, regardless of the organizing entity, pre-election protests can fundamentally affect the political strategies of regime incumbents, formal opposition groups, and voters. In contrast to a limited conceptualization of protest, this broader conceptualization of protests does not require specific demands about the election to affect the election outcome. Instead, demands for democratization often emerge from escalating protests that expand to include many social groups. The wave of protests in Tunisia during 2010-2011 is a recent example of how protests can take on a life of their own. Protest demands

initially addressed only unemployment and poverty, but escalated over the course of a few weeks to include the condemnation of repression and, finally, the resignation of the standing president Ben Ali to make way for free elections. In Tunisia, political parties were among the last to join the revolt while neighborhood youth and teachers unions played an active role in organizing protest events from the beginning (Hmed 2012; Saidani 2012).

The second limitation of previous scholarship stems from the way the concept of protest is operationalized. Howard and Roessler's (2006) study, for instance, uses data from the Cross-National Time-Series (Banks and Wilson 2013), which is based on coding of the average counts of demonstrations for the election year and the previous year in *New York Times* news articles. This approach is limited in three ways. First, this method conflates pre- and post-election protests, which does not allow for their differential effects on liberalizing outcomes to be disentangled. Second, a liberalizing outcome in an election may function as a political opportunity for contenders and increase the intensity of post-election protests, making causal inferences about the effect of protests on the election outcome drawn from these data dubious. Third, the use of *New York Times* articles as a comprehensive database of protest events is limited: the *Times* does not have bureaus in all countries, it provides uneven coverage of political events in different regions, and its coverage is likely biased towards reporting liberalizing outcomes. To address this issue, I use a daily measure of protest that allows us to distinguish pre-election contention from post-election mobilization.

Pre-election Protest and Opposition Empowerment

Pre-election contentious collective action may lead to democratization through incumbent defeat for several different reasons. This paper defines contentious collective action as collective

events that represent subversive acts such as protesting demonstrating or rioting versus methods of conventional politics such as voting and lobbying that challenge normalized practices and existing systems of authority (Beissinger 2002; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Contention might force the government to make concessions in terms of more competitive elections, encourage defection within the regime, or motivate voters to cast ballots for the opposition by signaling the spread of grievances and raising the level of grievances. This theoretical framework is similar to what Giugni (2007) calls an indirect-effect model, according to which protest makes a difference by influencing a certain aspect of the external environment—in this case incumbent defeat—and then subsequently affecting the major outcome of interest—in this case democratization.

Pre-election protests send signals to the regime, opposition, and voters about the viability of an alternative for the regime, challenge the myth of regime omnipotence, and increase the range and intensity of grievances. First, incumbent leaders realize they are facing a serious challenge and perhaps revolutionary threats when they witness contentious collective action. They may try to manage such challenges by holding more competitive elections (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boudreau 2009; Bratton and Walle 1994; Wood 2000). Since the government is trying to appease protesters, the regime may be less likely to resort to fraud under these circumstances, allowing the opposition to enjoy a greater chance at victory (Schedler 2013).

On the other hand, certain elements within the regime or third parties might realize that cooperation with the regime is not the only viable option. Pre-election protest could show that the regime is facing serious challengers. Insiders or third parties might then consider staying neutral or even cooperating with the opposition. Accordingly, popular protests against authoritarian governments on many occasions result in defections from the regime (Boudreau

2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Schock 2005). Under such conditions the incumbent would face difficulty in collecting the votes required for victory and the opposition enjoys a better chance of receiving electoral support.

During the period of military rule in Brazil, for example, the opposition organized a series of demonstrations in 1984 and demanded the replacement of an electoral college system with direct presidential elections. Although the movement failed to achieve this goal in the short term, it led to an important defection of the official National Alliance Renewal Party to the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement party. As a result, in the following year the opposition leader Tancredo Neves was indirectly elected as Brazil's president, which was the first time since 1960 that the military's candidate did not win the election (Haggard and Kaufman 1995:73).

Another example is Indonesia, where days of massive protests and rioting in May 1998 forced President Suharto to resign after 31 years of rule. Suharto's New Order was based on the claim that only his government could save the country from chaos. Days of urban rioting thoroughly discredited this foundational claim. Following this tumult, the ruling elite in the dominant Golkar party decided to abandon Suharto and called for his resignation (Aspinall 2005). After Suharto's departure, Vice-president Habibie immediately promised fair and free elections and electoral reform to appease protestors. Changes in electoral law stripped the reigning Golkar party of the privileges it had enjoyed for decades (Bird 1999), resulting in the fall of Golkar party in the 1999 presidential election after 33 years in power.

Protest events also signal to the opposition and voters that grievances against the regime are widespread and that there are a considerable number of people willing to defy the status quo.

This would matter particularly in the context of authoritarian regimes, since citizens might be unsatisfied with the incumbents but not dare to express their grievances and, accordingly, would be unaware of other citizens sharing their dissatisfaction and desire for political change (Kuran 1995). The option of going to ballot boxes and voting for the opposition, then, would appear a more reasonable option rather than a futile attempt that would only contribute to the legitimacy of a fake election.

Protest events also might raise the level of grievances or redirect them (Oliver 1989). Authoritarian governments usually try to manage their populations' grievances and channel them toward targets other than the regime through tactics such as disseminating pro-regime propaganda, censoring independent media, and monopolizing public discourse. Protest events can effectively challenge the regime's domination of political discourse by highlighting various grievances and blaming the regime for them. In addition, brutal crackdowns on protesters sometimes forge new grievances, escalating mobilization against regimes (Boudreau 2009). While new grievances could fuel further protest, they could also lead to changes in the electoral behavior of the voters. If citizens realize that electoral action could be an effective way to address their dissatisfactions, they are more likely to resort to the ballot boxes. The opposition also could use the new grievances in their electoral campaign against the incumbent regime.

In Thailand, for example, during the campaign for the September 1992 election, the press focused on the military's bloody crackdown on protestors. A widely used frame portrayed 'angels', opposition parties such as the Democrats that had challenged military rule, versus 'devils', the military leaders and provincial politicians that supported them in their successful election the previous March. Despite this defeat, the Democrats managed to win the September

election in a tight race with the military-backed party (Pasuk and Baker 2002). Similarly, in Serbia, the regime's crackdown on the young members of Otpor for their protest activities generated new grievances about the government's cruel tactics in dealing with the opposition. Otpor also used several innovative tactics to bring the brutalities and wrongdoings of Milosevic's regime to the public's attention (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Meyers 2009).

Since pre-election protest signals the spread of grievances to the voters and opposition, presents the opposition as an alternative option, encourages defection from the ruling elite, and also creates new grievances, we should expect a better chance for incumbent defeat as pre-election protests increase. Thus, I hypothesize that *pre-election protest increases the chance of incumbent defeat and, accordingly, democratization.*

Data and Method

This paper analyzes 190 elections in 65 countries with electoral authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2004 (see appendix for the full list). I rely on Roessler and Howard's (2009) conceptualization and measurement of regime type to determine the set of cases in this study: all 65 regimes that received a polity score between -8 and 6 according to Polity IV *or* a score between 2 and 7 for their political rights from Freedom House. The elections held in these countries were then extracted from a comprehensive dataset of elections, *National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA), which draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources to provide detailed information for all direct elections in 157 countries from 1946 to 2010 (Hyde and Marinov 2012). NELDA includes 58 variables concerning different aspects of each election such as pre-election polls, the level of reported fraud, violence

surrounding the election, limitations on the opposition, the presence of international monitors, and international reactions to the election.¹ Such detailed information about elections is not included in other major electoral datasets such as that of the International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (IDEA). Since some argue that the dynamics of the founding elections differ from regular elections in electoral authoritarianism (Howard and Roessler 2006), the first multi-party elections are excluded from the analysis bringing the total number of elections in the 65 authoritarian countries in my sample to 190.

Dependent Variables

Incumbent defeat: This variable, also based on NELDA, is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the party associated with the incumbent loses the election. In legislative elections, the variable is coded as 1 if the party associated with the incumbent in the executive loses the election. In my data, the opposition has managed to defeat the incumbent in 32 out of 190 elections (16.84%).

Liberalizing Electoral Outcome: A liberalizing electoral outcome (LEO) is defined in terms of improvement in the competitiveness of elections or political rights, regardless of whether the improvement entails the installation of minimally democratic institutions—in other words, a democratic transition. Following Howard and Roessler (2006), the dummy LEO variable is coded when there is a three-point or greater increase in Polity IV *and* there is one-

¹ For more information, see <http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>.

point or greater decrease in Freedom House political liberty score. By this measure, there are 18 (9.5%) LEOs in my analysis.²

Democratic Transition: I present a second measure for democratization to ensure my finding is not reliant on a single measure of this complex concept. Consistent with Roessler and Howard (2009), a transition to electoral democracy is marked if a country goes over a score of six on the Polity IV scale, which indicates a democratic system, or dips below a score of two according to Freedom House, which signifies a country that enjoys a wide range of political rights such as fair and free elections. According to this measure, there are 21 democratic transitions in 190 elections (11.05%).

These two measures of democratization do not overlap perfectly. There are seven LEOs in the analysis that are not identified as democratic transitions as they do not cross the threshold. Conversely, ten democratic transitions are not identified as LEO due to being identified by only Polity IV *or* Freedom House, or due to an increase of fewer than three points on the Polity IV index. As mentioned earlier, democratization may occur either through incumbent defeat or through incumbent victory in a free and fair election. In terms of this distinction, there are 7 LEOs without incumbent defeat (3.7%), 11 LEOs with incumbent upset (5.82%), and 21 incumbent defeats without LEO (11.11%). Similarly, there are 11 transitions with incumbent upset (5.79%), 10 transitions without incumbent defeat (5.26%), 20 elections with incumbent defeat in the absence of democratic transition (10.53%), and 154 elections with no change (80.62%).

² There were originally LEOs present in 20 out of 191 elections, but 2 of these were for elections held within a few days to one month of each other. In these two cases, I dropped the legislative election from the analysis to avoid over-counting LEOs. However, the major finding does not change even if these two elections are included.

Independent Variable

The independent variable for a particular election year in a single country is the cumulative count of protest events during the 365 days prior to the election. Data for the independent variable comes from the daily count of protest events in WHIV, the World Handbook IV of Political Indicators (Jenkins et al. 2012). WHIV is a refined version of contentious events from King and Lowe's (2003) "10 Million Dyadic Events," which are computer-coded events from Reuters' newsfeed. This original dataset has been used by social scientists to study various phenomena such as influence of human rights INGOs (Murdie and Davis 2012) , neo-liberal policy reform (Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 2009), and anti-government protest in democracies (Su 2015). WHIV has improved upon the original data in several ways. Most importantly, the event count decreased by about 14.4% when events previously coded by the computer as contentious were identified to actually be non-contentious. The WHIV data has been also checked both internally against a basecode and externally by comparing with other events datasets.³ An additional advantage of the WHIV data is the ability to separate protests into before- and after-election categories, whereas annual data such as *New York Times* annual counts does not allow for such precision. Since this detailed WHIV data only covers 1990-2004, I limit my analysis to this period.

My analysis considers the effect of different forms of protest on democratic outcomes. All forms of protest except sit-ins had positive and statistically significant effects on the electoral outcome. I then counted the occurrence of all forms of protest—protest demonstration, picketing,

³ For more information, see <http://sociology.osu.edu/worldhandbook>.

damaging property, sit-ins and rioting⁴—to construct the total count for protest events, which totals 1,444 events in the 365 days before each of the 190 elections. These events are not necessarily political protests targeting the election since, as it was argued in the literature review, political grievances in authoritarian contexts are not often clearly expressed in direct political terms in addition to the potential of non-political demands quickly escalating to political claims.

While both incredibly detailed and comprehensive, the WHIV data has its own limitations. For example, the innovative use of concerts and posters for protest activities are not coded in this dataset. Also, the “everyday forms of resistance” or “non-movements” that are more common in authoritarian settings (see Bayat 2010; Scott 1987) are not reflected in this dataset. The WHIV data does, however, provide good coverage of conventional protest tactics, or what is called the “modular repertoire” of contention (Tarrow 2011). Another limitation of the WHIV data is its lack of information on the size of protest events. However, from what we know about these elections, it seems that larger waves of protest are associated with larger numbers of events. For example, the Indonesian 1999 election witnessed the highest number of protest events, which reflects the massive protests and riots in Indonesia during 1998-9. Following Indonesia, the Albania 1997, Serbia 2000, and Russia 1993 elections show the highest frequency of contentious action. This quantitative ranking is supported by qualitative accounts of these countries documenting massive pre-election mobilization.

A straightforward bivariate analysis suggests a relationship between pre-election protests and election outcomes. The average protest count for elections without incumbent defeat is 5.83 compared to an average of 16.31 protest events preceding elections in which incumbents are

⁴ These protest events all belong to the category of unarmed protest. This dataset does not provide a good account of armed protest events. As a result, it is not possible to compare the effect of armed and unarmed pre-election campaigns.

defeated. The mean number of mobilization events before elections without LEO is 6.48, while the average count of events before elections with LEO is 17.83. Finally, the average number of contentious events before elections with no transition is 6.21 compared to a mean of 17.83 protests before elections with democratic transitions (Figure 1).

Control Variables

This analysis includes a series of control variables to address potential endogeneity problems as well as account for the following rival explanations: regime type, election type, socioeconomic context, international linkage, regime flexibility, regime electoral tactics, international pressure, and opposition electoral tactics.

First, I include a dummy variable to distinguish between competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, elections are held but repression and limitations on the opposition and voters are so severe that there is little uncertainty about the outcome. In competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition groups may compete for access to executive power through institutional channels. In such regimes, however, incumbents' abuse of state resources undermines the fairness of elections, violates civil liberties critical to election results, and renders the electoral playfield uneven (Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). Cross-national analyses of these two regime types have suggested that competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience a transition to electoral democracy compared to hegemonic and closed authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 2009a; Roessler and Howard 2009). Following Brownlee (2009b), this variable is constructed based on two indexes of legislative and electoral competitiveness from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.

2001). An autocratic regime is coded as competitive if the dominant party won less than 75% of the vote in the previous election. Including this variable addresses a rival explanation according to which the level of competition allowed by the regime drives both the election outcome and a high level of protest.

I also include a dummy variable to distinguish main elections, in which the executive is contested, from other elections. Presidential elections in presidential systems and legislative elections in parliamentary systems are main elections. There is also a variable indicating whether the incumbent is running in the election since absence of the incumbent in the election could be interpreted as a sign of regime weakness, which in turn may increase protest activity and the chance of opposition victory.

Scholars have also debated whether the level of economic development influences the probability of democratic transitions (Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). One might argue that in countries with higher levels of economic development, the opposition would have a better chance at winning because citizens would have more resources for organizing protests. Accordingly, my analysis includes measures from the World Bank to control for GDP per capita (World Bank 2012). The variable is logged and one year lagged. Similarly, one could argue that poor economic performance affects the incumbent's ability to win the election and creates grievances related to economic adversity that encourage protest. Thus, I include a control variable for the percent of GDP growth from the World Bank to address both economic rival explanations.

Scholarship on oil-producing countries suggests that authoritarian regimes with access to oil are more resilient in face of the opposition challenges because oil revenues enable these

regimes to build a strong security apparatus and pay off dissenters (Ross 2001, 2012).

Accordingly, one could expect a lower likelihood of opposition victory in oil-producing authoritarian countries as well as lower rates of protest activities (Smith 2004). Accordingly, the model includes a the logged version of oil production per capita in US dollars from Ross (2012).

Another rival explanation emphasizes that countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America have strong linkages with Western powers that play critical roles in their electoral dynamics (Levitsky and Way 2010). In this context, linkage is defined as the density of economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational ties as well as cross-border flows of capital, goods, services, people, and information between a given country and democratic superpowers United States and the European Union. One could also hypothesize that a strong connection with Western powers would make protestors more hopeful about the possibility of foreign support and eventual success. Thus, I include dummy variables for countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.

Another rival explanation suggests that it might be the internal dynamics of a given political regime that encourage or discourage protest activities and subsequently determine the electoral outcomes. To address this alternative explanation, I follow Howard and Roessler (2006) in using the mean of each country's Freedom House Civil Liberties Score in the X years prior to the election as a measure for regime openness. I also include a variable indicating the change in the Political Rights Score in the four years before the election, which controls for the extent to which a process of liberalization—or deliberalization—is underway.

My analysis also includes three dummy variables that measure the regime's tactics in each specific election. One variable from NELDA reports whether the regime harassed the

opposition before the election. A second variable from NELDA indicates whether there was bias in the media coverage favoring the regime prior to the election. Finally, a variable based on NELDA and an additional dataset of annual “Human Rights Practices” reports from the U.S. State Department (Kelley and Kolev 2010) denotes whether the government committed fraud on election day.

In addition to regime tactics, two variables account for international factors affecting each election. One dummy variable drawn from NELDA indicates the presence of international monitors at the election. Another variable, international conditionality, borrowed from Donno (2013) indicates whether Western powers and prominent international organizations⁵ made promises or posed threats conditional on the quality of the election during the four months leading up to the election. Both of these variables address a rival explanation according to which both the election outcome and protest activities are driven by international pressure.

Finally, we should also take into account the electoral tactics of the opposition. One might argue that, rather than contentious collective action, it is the opposition’s non-contentious mobilization that affects election outcomes. For instance, studies of democratization in electoral autocracies argue that there is a higher chance of democratization resulting from the election when the opposition forms a coalition. It might also be hypothesized that when the opposition is united, other contenders are more inclined to resort to protest activities. From Donno (2013), I include a dummy variable that accounts for whether opposition parties formed a unified

⁵ Following Donno (2013), my analysis considers the following Western powers and important international organizations: the United States, United Nations, European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, Organization of American States (OAS), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and African Union.

platform, coordinated their campaign, or united behind a presidential candidate (see Table 1 for a statistical summary).

Method: The unit of analysis in this study is a single election in a particular authoritarian electoral regime. Incumbent defeat and democratization are analytically separate, albeit related, concepts that both have binary outcomes: the result of each election might be incumbent defeat or no incumbent defeat, democratization or the status quo. Thus, I first use logistic regression models to estimate the covariates of each outcome separately in keeping with previous studies of authoritarian elections (Donno 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Howard and Roessler 2006).

Nonetheless, while incumbent defeat and democratization are conceptually separate, they also overlap. Elections may result in democratization alongside incumbent defeat, democratization in the absence of incumbent defeat, or incumbent defeat without democratization. Estimating the effect of covariates on these outcomes in a single multinomial logistic regression, I test whether there is a relationship between pre-election protest and incumbent defeat as a pathway to democratic transition. To adjust for dependencies across elections within a country, I use robust standard errors clustered by country.

Analysis

Table 2 presents the results for the effects of covariates on the probability of incumbent defeat. Models 2 and 3 show that pre-election contention has a statistically significant positive effect on incumbent defeat net of all control variables. In other words, an increase in the number of pre-election protests is associated with an increase in the odds of incumbent defeat. This

finding supports the hypothesis of this paper concerning the positive effect of pre-election mobilization on incumbent defeat. Among the control variables, only the covariate for opposition coalition is statistically significant: when the opposition is unified, the probability of incumbent defeat rises.

To interpret these results, I estimate changes in the predicted probability of the dependent variable under different conditions. That is, given our data and estimated model, I present the change in probability of the outcome of incumbent defeat occurring if we artificially shifted one key independent variable from a low value to a high value while leaving all other variables at their observed values. Accordingly, an increase from 0 to the median of 2 pre-election protests is associated with an 8.5% in probability of incumbent defeat. An increase to 7 protests (75th percentile) results in a 32.17% boost in the probability of incumbent defeat compared to no protests before the election. Finally, moving from 0 to 27 events (95th percentile) increases the probability of incumbent failure 2.62 times (see Figure 2 based on Model 3, Table 2).

Table 3 presents the estimates for the effects of the covariates on the probability of an LEO. The covariate for pre-election contention is statistically significant and positive across all three models. In Model 3, which drops 47 observations since the international monitors variable predicts the outcome perfectly, the coefficient for pre-election mobilization remains significant. In Model 4, I dropped the variable for international monitors resulting in a similar finding for the effect of pre-election protest. Among the control variables other than opposition coalition, the covariate for main election is statistically significant across all models meaning the chance for an LEO in legislative elections in parliamentary systems and executive elections in presidential systems is higher compared to other elections.

Table 4 presents the estimates for the effect of the covariates on the chance of a democratic transition. The covariate for pre-election contention is statistically significant and positive in Models 2 and 3, which supports the main hypothesis of this paper. An increase in the count of protest events is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition. Among the control variables, opposition coalition and main election are statistically significant and positive—very similar findings as those presented in Table 3. Additionally, the variables for regime openness and incumbent running are significant in this model for democratic transition. Since, these variables are not statistically significant in the previous models for LEOs, it seems that statistical significance is dependent on different measures of democratization.

Table 5 presents the result of analysis for electoral outcome as a categorical variable with four possible outcomes: LEO without incumbent defeat, LEO with incumbent defeat, incumbent defeat without a LEO, and status quo as the omitted category. The outcome of LEO with incumbent defeat is most relevant to evaluating this paper's hypothesis, namely that *pre-election protest increases the chance of incumbent defeat and, accordingly, democratization*. As Models 2 and 3 show, pre-election contention has a positive and statistically significant effect on that outcome in support of my hypothesis. Table 6 presents similar results replacing the measure of LEO with one for democratic transition, again with four possible outcomes: democratic transition without incumbent defeat, democratic transition with incumbent defeat, incumbent defeat without a democratic transition, and the omitted category of status quo. The coefficient for pre-election contention is also statistically significant and positively associated with the possibility of democratic transition with incumbent defeat. This finding supports the main hypothesis of the paper and also demonstrates that this finding is robust to different measures of democratization.

Keeping all variables at their observed values, an increase from 0 to the median number of 3 protests increases the probability of LEO through incumbent defeat by 19.78%. An increase to 9 (75th percentile) is associated with 65.74% boost in the predicted probability of transition with incumbent upset. Finally, an increase to 31 protests (95th percentile) raises the chance of a democratic transition through incumbent defeat 4.1 times (see Figure 3 based on Model 3, Table 5).

Among the control variables, opposition coalition results in a statistically significant effect on LEO and democratic transition with incumbent defeat, showing that when the opposition forms a coalition there is higher possibility of democratization through incumbent defeat. Main elections are statistically significant as well and are associated with likelihood of both LEO and democratic transition with incumbent defeat. The covariate for international monitors is also positive and statistically significant for the outcomes of LEO and democratic transition with incumbent defeat, which means when international monitors are present democratization through incumbent defeat is more likely. Opposition harassment is also statistically significant and negative for the outcomes of LEO and democratic transition without incumbent defeat. When the regime harasses the opposition it is less likely that the election would be counted as fair and free. Among the control variables, main elections and opposition coalition were significant in logit analysis for democratic transition and LEO. Tables 5 and 6 indicate that these two controls are important specifically for democratization through incumbent defeat. Opposition harassment and international monitors, however, were not significant, and their effects are only observable when we distinguish between democratization with and without incumbent defeat.

This paper's main finding is also robust to different specifications of the models. Extra control variables such as measures for global integration, dummy and continuous variables for time, and the size of the military were tried in all models to ensure the results were not sensitive to the inclusion of these factors. Furthermore, as another measure for democratization, I combined the scores from Polity IV and Freedom House's Political Rights scores to create a continuous measure of democratization as an outcome of pre-election protest in a fixed effects regression model.⁶ The substantive finding remained robust across these additional tests.

Discussion and Conclusion

While elections in authoritarian countries often function as a mechanism for incumbents to consolidate their power, on some occasions a democratic breakthrough is achieved when incumbents lose at the ballot box. The effects of pre-election mobilization on election outcomes in authoritarian settings have not been adequately addressed in existing studies. I argued that pre-election protest has an effect on election outcomes because it signals the viability of an alternative to the current order and illustrates the breadth of grievances to regime allies, opposition, and voters, which motivates defection from the regime and encourages voters to cast ballots for the opposition. I then examined the effects of pre-election protest on incumbent defeat and democratization in 190 elections in 65 authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2004.

Previous literature on democratic transitions via elections has suggested two pathways for achieving a democratic transition. First, a transition could occur when the incumbent loses the election and power rotates to the opposition. Second, a democratic transition could be achieved when the incumbent wins an election that is considered fair and free. I find that the greater the

⁶ The detailed results of the robustness tests are available from the author upon request.

number of protest events that occurred before an election, the more likely it was that the opposition defeated the authoritarian incumbent. It was also more likely to observe democratization in elections following an increased amount of protest activity. Treating the electoral outcome as a categorical variable, I found that the pre-election protest is associated with democratization through incumbent defeat. This finding is consistent with previous findings in the literature on the positive effect of protest on democratization via elections (Howard and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2013) while also advancing this finding in at least three ways. First, by dividing democratization into democratization with and without incumbent defeat, my analysis achieves more specificity concerning which outcomes are affected by mobilization. Second, this paper expands the concept of protest and demonstrates that protest by diverse social groups, rather than just by the established political opposition, matters for election results. Third, by using a daily measure of protest, the paper demonstrates the effect of protest without conflating the effect of pre and post-election contention.

The finding also confirms my speculation about the importance of pre-election protest for incumbent defeat and democratization in elections such as Thailand 1992, Serbia 2000, and Indonesia 1999. In these elections, protest waves contributed to defection within the ruling elite, reframing grievances, and increasing the competitiveness of elections. The results show that in parliamentary elections, such as Russia 1995, protest can contribute to incumbent defeat but may not mark a liberalizing electoral outcome if it is not a main election. There are, nonetheless, cases with high protest and no incumbent defeat or democratization, such as Malaysia 1999, as well as cases of democratization with low counts of protest, such as Ghana 2000. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, future research could enhance our understanding of the

democratizing effects of protest and other pathways to democratization by examining such anomalous cases.

Even though this study is an improvement on existing research on this topic, the data used in this analysis still has certain limitations. The data do not specifically identify which actors organized the protest, making it impossible to distinguish the electoral effects of protests organized by political parties from those organized by other civic organizations or from more spontaneous events.. As cross-national data on protest events advances, future research might be able to provide answers to such questions.

My findings of a robust association between pre-election contention and electoral outcome is limited to electoral authoritarian regimes. There are considerable differences between both protest and elections dynamics of such regimes and electoral democracies. Protest activities are less restricted in democracies and elections are supposedly more clean and competitive, leading us to expect a weaker effect for protest on electoral outcomes in democratic regimes. Future research should engage with this topic on empirical grounds and investigate potential similarities and differences.

In a survey of the literatures on elections and social movements, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) observe that, while both literatures have developed rigorous research programs, they have barely spoken to one another. Recent studies of retroactive mobilization and contentious collective action after fraudulent elections have started to fill this gap (Beissinger 2011; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Kuzio 2006; Tucker 2007). I contribute to this new strand of research by demonstrating that pre-election mobilization is important for empowering the opposition and achieving democratic transitions.

This paper also contributes to research about contentious collective action and democratization (Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Kurzman 2008; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005; Slater 2009; Viterna and Fallon 2008), which is now an emerging field within democratization studies. Documenting the association between pre-election protest and democratization, this paper offers a theoretical account as well as rigorous empirics showing how pre-election protest matters for democratization. Future research may examine factors that explain variation in pre-election mobilization.


My findings also have important implications for social movements studies. Recent studies of movement consequences have focused mostly on cases in industrialized democracies, such as the United States, to examine policy change as the major outcome of social movements (Amenta et al. 2010). This paper addresses an important gap in the literature by investigating the political consequences of protest activities on the outcomes of elections in authoritarian states, putting in conversation two major literatures of contentious politics and democratization, and thus expanding the literature on movement outcomes to contexts outside industrialized democracies.

Additionally, the major finding of the paper confirms recent scholarship on nonviolent campaigns. Recent quantitative as well as qualitative research argues that nonviolent campaigns are more effective than violent campaigns in achieving regime change and independence as well as ending occupation (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005). This paper uses different data for protest activities, focuses on a different outcome, and finds that unarmed protest is an effective method for incumbent defeat and even democratization. This paper does not, however, address the ineffectiveness of armed conflict because of data limitations.

In terms of methodology, my paper suggests new strategies for the study of election outcomes in electoral regimes. Concepts such as democratization and liberalizing electoral outcomes can be clarified by specifying whether they happen through incumbent defeat or incumbent victory in fair and free election. Factors affecting the outcome might affect either or both of these results. Specifying how a factor such as pre-election protest or opposition coalition affects democratization or liberalizing electoral outcomes helps to realize a more precise theoretical understanding of which factors shape election outcomes.

More practically, this paper suggests that pro-democracy activists should focus their efforts on pre-election campaigns for competitive multiparty elections using contentious collective action. Using protest tactics could be as important as utilizing non-contentious electoral tactics such as coalition building and using post-election protest tactics to reverse the outcome of fraudulent elections.

Figure 1: Pre-election Protest and Electoral Outcomes



LEO: liberalizing electoral outcome, DT: democratic transition

Figure 2: Predicted Probability for Pre-Election Protest and Incumbent Defeat




Figure 3: Predicted Probability for Pre-Election Protest and LEO Through Incumbent Defeat




Table 1 Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	P5	P95	SD
Pre-election Content	7.6	3	0	28	15.75836
Main Election	.5421053	1	0	1	.4995403
Incumbent Running	.4157895	0	0	1	.4941597
Oil Production per c	2.44008	.6561456	0	6.737132	2.766438
GDP per capita (ln)	6.741296	6.656703	5.147703	8.529875	1.117903
GDP Growth %	.0218529	.0254398	-.0644906	.1046682	.0709622
Competitive Authoritarian	.5947368	1	0	1	.49224
Opposition Coalition	.1894737	0	0	1	.3929198
Fraud	.5631579	1	0	1	.4973055
Opposition Harassment	.3	0	0	1	.4594683
Media Bias	.3105263	0	0	1	.4639316
International Condit	.131579	0	0	1	.3389255
International Monitors	.7526316	1	0	1	.4326226
Prior Liberalization	.037037	0	-2	2	1.007263
Regime Openness	2.352632	2	1	3.5	.8013668
Central & Eastern Europe	.1263158	0	0	1	.3330826
Americas	.0736842	0	0	1	.2619465

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for Protest & Incumbent Defeat

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Opposition Coalition			1.270* (2.41)
Fraud			-0.852 (-1.91)
Opposition Harassment			0.336 (0.67)
Media Bias			-1.291 (-1.83)
International Conditionality			0.519 (0.79)
International Monitors			-0.762 (-1.33)
Prior Liberalization			-0.103 (-0.48)
Regime Openness			0.231 (0.68)
Pre-election Contention		0.0528** (3.23)	0.0442** (2.83)
Main Election	0.0316 (0.07)	0.151 (0.32)	-0.0369 (-0.08)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	-0.131 (-1.35)	-0.206* (-2.01)	-0.150 (-1.38)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.118 (0.49)	0.131 (0.50)	0.0281 (0.10)
GDP Growth %	-0.560 (-0.14)	0.591 (0.14)	0.851 (0.17)
Competitive Authoritarianism	-0.0868 (-0.18)	0.0231 (0.05)	-0.0396 (-0.07)
Central & Easter Europe	0.793 (1.65)	0.320 (0.68)	0.298 (0.48)
Americas	0.391 (0.54)	0.434 (0.57)	0.364 (0.42)
Constant	-2.207 (-1.46)	-2.680 (-1.64)	-1.702 (-0.87)
Observations	190	190	189
Pseudo R^2	0.023	0.089	0.187

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Logistic Regression Results for Protest & Liberalizing Electoral Outcome

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Opposition Coalition			2.607** (3.16)	2.510*** (3.35)
Fraud			-0.869 (-1.26)	-0.520 (-0.85)
Opposition Harassment			-0.716 (-0.91)	-0.977 (-1.27)
Media Bias			1.048 (1.33)	0.860 (1.12)
International Conditionality			-0.222 (-0.20)	0.0420 (0.04)
International Monitors			.	.
Prior Liberalization			-0.353 (-0.91)	-0.373 (-1.00)
Regime Openness			0.993 (1.39)	1.248 (1.65)
Pre-election Contention		0.0374*** (3.59)	0.0481*** (3.47)	0.0453*** (3.74)
Main Election	2.659** (3.03)	3.216** (3.03)	3.093* (2.33)	2.916** (2.77)
Incumbent Running	-0.902 (-1.43)	-0.885 (-1.35)	-0.134 (-0.17)	-0.226 (-0.27)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.00518 (0.05)	-0.0710 (-0.59)	-0.0442 (-0.37)	0.0448 (0.37)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.177 (-0.68)	-0.128 (-0.46)	0.422 (1.06)	-0.233 (-0.86)
GDP Growth %	0.540 (0.25)	1.906 (0.71)	3.142 (0.74)	4.342 (0.79)
Competitive Authoritarianism	-0.492 (-0.81)	-0.367 (-0.56)	-1.663* (-1.99)	-1.504 (-1.64)
Central & Easter Europe	0.757 (0.94)	0.391 (0.44)	-1.128 (-1.00)	-0.185 (-0.18)
Americas	1.533 (1.59)	1.587 (1.56)	1.158 (1.14)	2.020 (1.85)
Constant	-2.559	-3.642	-9.702* (-1.99)	-6.680

	(-1.36)	(-1.78)	(-2.26)	(-1.92)
Observations	188	188	140	187
Pseudo R^2	0.154	0.224	0.389	0.395

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Logistic Regression Results for Protest & Democratic Transition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Opposition Coalition			2.110*** (3.49)
Fraud			-1.126 (-1.25)
Opposition Harassment			-0.406 (-0.38)
Media Bias			1.190 (1.06)
International Conditionality			-0.896 (-1.02)
International Monitors			0.971 (0.99)
Prior Liberalization			0.0173 (0.05)
Regime Openness			1.887** (3.25)
Pre-election Contention		0.0483* (2.51)	0.0680* (2.22)
Main Election	2.596*** (3.40)	2.962*** (3.67)	3.238** (2.69)
Incumbent Running	-2.737*** (-3.62)	-2.912*** (-3.70)	-2.710** (-2.94)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	-0.185 (-1.46)	-0.325** (-2.65)	-0.265 (-1.71)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.206 (0.60)	0.311 (0.89)	0.339 (1.14)
GDP Growth %	-4.615 (-1.50)	-3.749 (-0.81)	-2.333 (-0.38)
Competitive Authoritarianism	1.039 (1.51)	1.469* (2.09)	0.0222 (0.03)
Central & Easter Europe	1.319 (1.77)	0.954 (1.16)	-0.142 (-0.13)
Americas	0.316 (0.30)	0.314 (0.28)	0.199 (0.21)
Constant	-4.624* (-1.50)	-6.030** (-2.09)	-12.01*** (-3.94)

	(-2.21)	(-2.84)	(-3.94)
Observations	190	190	189
Pseudo R^2	0.247	0.335	0.516

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Multinomial Regression Results for Protest, Incumbent Defeat, & Liberalizing Electoral Outcome

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	Electoral outcome			Electoral outcome			Electoral outcome		
	LEO	Upset LEO	Upset	LEO	Upset LEO	Upset	LEO	Upset LEO	Upset
Opposition Coalition							3.047** (2.72)	13.21* (2.28)	0.657 (0.96)
Fraud							2.447** (2.62)	- 14.41** (-2.87)	-0.129 (-0.20)
Opposition Harassment							- 21.23*** (-8.23)	-0.109 (-0.07)	0.737 (1.14)
Media Bias							-1.811 (-1.17)	1.434 (0.65)	- 2.760* (-2.34)
International Conditionality							1.331 (0.67)	-1.001 (-0.42)	-0.327 (-0.42)
International Monitors							16.66*** (8.39)	41.39** * (3.82)	-1.225 (-1.67)
Prior Liberalization							-0.0246 (-0.03)	-1.727 (-1.63)	0.353 (1.53)
Regime Openness							1.601 (1.58)	1.598 (1.53)	-0.116 (-0.29)
Pre-election Contention				0.014 8 (0.74)	0.0697** * (3.71)	0.0388 * (2.25)	0.0037 1 (0.12)	0.266** (3.16)	0.057 7 (1.78)
Main Election	1.841 (1.47)	3.240* (2.79)	0.272 (0.39)	1.868 (1.49)	4.894*** (5.25)	0.336 (0.48)	0.493 (0.43)	20.06** * (3.34)	0.316 (0.37)
Incumbent	-0.284	-1.520	-	-0.278	-1.578	-1.212	1.529	-3.805	-1.240

Running	(-0.34)	(-1.83)	1.223 (-1.31)	(-0.34)	(-1.70)	(-1.35)	(1.01)	(-1.40)	(-1.22)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.179 (0.93)	-0.0741 (-0.51)	-0.221 (-1.88)	0.158 (0.86)	-0.220 (-1.08)	-0.264* (-2.13)	0.346 (1.04)	-0.176 (-0.41)	-0.318 (-1.61)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.897 (-1.81)	0.0807 (0.30)	0.162 (0.50)	-0.887 (-1.86)	0.165 (0.53)	0.144 (0.43)	-1.853* (-2.32)	4.852* (2.27)	0.0269 (0.06)
GDP Growth %	0.776 (0.24)	0.0359 (0.01)	-2.231 (-0.34)	0.848 (0.26)	2.904 (0.58)	-1.367 (-0.20)	-1.002 (-0.25)	-0.233 (-0.02)	0.0220 (0.00)
Competitive Authoritarianism	-0.0314 (-0.04)	-0.711 (-0.94)	0.220 (0.37)	-0.0150 (-0.02)	-0.535 (-0.64)	0.271 (0.46)	-1.434 (-1.51)	-9.629** (-2.91)	0.500 (0.69)
Central & Easter Europe	1.071 (0.89)	0.840 (0.88)	1.020 (1.40)	0.977 (0.75)	0.162 (0.17)	0.696 (1.12)	2.581 (1.25)	-9.920* (-2.13)	1.497* (2.09)
Americas	2.746* (2.41)	0.855 (0.67)	-0.444 (-0.46)	2.742* (2.39)	0.953 (0.68)	-0.392 (-0.40)	6.649*** (4.43)	0.438 (0.37)	-0.270 (-0.23)
Constant	0.682 (0.22)	-4.460* (-2.03)	-2.589 (-1.26)	0.556 (0.18)	-7.035** (-3.18)	-2.726 (-1.28)	-16.03*** (-3.47)	-96.97** (-2.90)	-1.033 (-0.36)
Observations	188			188			187		
Pseudo R ²	0.114			0.168			0.451		

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Multinomial Regression Results for Protest, Incumbent Defeat, & Democratic Transition

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	Electoral Outcome			Electoral Outcome			Electoral Outcome		
	Transiti on	Upset Transiti on	Ups et	Transiti on	Upset Transiti on	Upset	Transiti on	Upset Transiti on	Upse t
Opposition Coalition							1.398 (1.07)	8.276* (2.19)	0.682 (0.88)
Fraud							-2.376 (-1.65)	-2.537 (-0.98)	- 0.530 (-0.98)
Opposition Harassment							- 19.91*** (-12.44)	1.504 (1.11)	0.294 (0.47)
Media Bias							-0.104 (-0.05)	4.242* (2.17)	- 1.825 (-1.69)
International Conditionality							-1.897 (-1.17)	-2.718* (-2.00)	0.385 (0.58)
International Monitors							-0.593 (-0.62)	27.08*** (4.23)	- 1.009 (-1.50)
Prior Liberalization							0.188 (0.55)	-1.101 (-1.62)	0.068 4 (0.24)
Regime Openness							3.108*** (3.54)	4.244* (2.08)	0.201 (0.47)
Pre-election Contention				0.0496 (1.60)	0.0887** * (4.81)	0.047 1* (2.50)	0.0651* (2.26)	0.143** (3.09)	0.038 2 (1.93)

Main Election	2.327*	2.999**	0.29 1	2.446*	3.910***	0.309	4.028*	6.690**	- 0.046 9 (- 0.05)
	(2.45)	(3.06)	(0.3 5)	(2.57)	(3.62)	(0.38)	(2.30)	(2.98)	
Incumbent Running	-3.091**	-2.727**	- 0.78 2 (- 0.86)	-3.057**	-3.103**	-0.711	-3.649*	-3.529*	- 0.395 (- 0.38)
	(-3.17)	(-2.71)		(-3.21)	(-2.74)	(- 0.79)	(-2.45)	(-2.30)	
Oil Production per capita (ln)	-0.0943	-0.310	- 0.13 8 (- 1.24)	-0.180	- 0.646***	-0.182	-0.183	- 1.276***	- 0.143 (- 1.08)
	(-0.48)	(-1.69)		(-0.90)	(-3.43)	(- 1.57)	(-1.03)	(-3.33)	
GDP per capita (ln)	0.121	0.266	0.16 8 (0.5 6)	0.165	0.411	0.153	0.525	1.529	0.045 4 (0.15)
	(0.14)	(0.90)		(0.20)	(1.17)	(0.50)	(0.87)	(1.73)	
GDP Growth %	-6.564	-3.214	- 1.19 3 (- 0.20)	-5.935	-0.920	-0.589	-3.469	-12.33*	0.933 (0.18)
	(-1.28)	(-1.07)		(-0.94)	(-0.17)	(- 0.10)	(-0.50)	(-2.02)	
Competitive Authoritarianism	1.694	0.570	- 0.11 2 (- 0.19)	1.825	1.220	- 0.044 3 (- 0.07)	1.366	-3.733	0.153 (0.22)
	(1.60)	(0.65)		(1.78)	(1.28)		(1.42)	(-1.48)	
Central & Easter Europe	1.664	1.255	0.98 5 (1.4 8)	1.136	0.782	0.619	0.00417	0.509	0.856 (1.28)
	(1.83)	(1.15)		(0.98)	(0.69)	(1.11)	(0.00)	(0.39)	
Americas	0.460	0.166	- 0.28 8 (- 0.31)	0.423	0.280	-0.266	-0.551	-2.784	- 0.316 (- 0.34)
	(0.33)	(0.12)		(0.32)	(0.18)	(- 0.28)	(-0.48)	(-1.71)	
Constant	-5.216	-5.214*	- 2.69 4 (- 1.32)	-5.789	-7.648**	-2.889	-16.32*	-56.63**	- 1.725 (- 1.32)
	(-1.20)	(-2.29)		(-1.32)	(-2.88)	(- 1.32)	(-2.53)	(-3.07)	

		1.45)	1.50)	0.79)
Observations	190	190	189	
Pseudo R^2	0.141	0.207	0.413	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

CHAPTER 3: POPULAR MOBILIZATION AND THE DURABILITY OF NEW DEMOCRACIES

The literature on democratic survival rarely takes account of the role of social movements – instead, it focuses primarily on economic, institutional, and international factors (Kapstein and Converse 2008). The literature on social movement outcomes, for its part, rarely examines new democracies – it is focused primarily on consolidated democracies such as the United States -- and scarcely considers reversals in outcomes (Amenta et al. 2010). These two fields of study are partially bridged by the literature on nonviolent resistance, which have studied the role of contentious collective action in democratic transitions through cross-national time series (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008) and comparative case studies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Schock 2005; Tilly 2003; Wood 2000). But this literature focuses almost exclusively on the emergence of democracy, not the survival of democracy. Building on insights from these literatures as well as path-dependent analyses of democratic transition (e.g. Fishman 2011; Fishman and Lizardo 2013; Viterna and Fallon 2008), I argue that young democracies that originated in longer periods of nonviolent mobilization are more durable. Sustained unarmed mobilization under authoritarian regimes requires an organizational infrastructure that can help shape the leadership in the new democratic regime and maintain links between society and the new state in the crucial post-transition period.

I combine event history analysis and five cases studies of young democracies to demonstrate this argument. An event history analysis of 112 young democratic regimes in 80 countries from 1960 to 2010 provides evidence for an association between the duration of

unarmed contentious mobilization and the probability of survival for emerging democracies. To illustrate mechanisms linking nonviolent campaigns and democratic durability, I analyze five young democracies that vary both on the duration of unarmed contention as well as the failure or success of democracy in the post-transition period: South Africa, Poland, Pakistan, Russia, and Indonesia. Among these cases, the first three confirm the theoretical argument, while the last two may be considered deviant cases. Poland is a paradigmatic case for studies of society-led democratization, and South Africa witnessed one of the longest democratic movements in the twentieth century. The significance of these two cases for a theory of contentious democratization is similar to the importance of France and Russia for theories of revolution. Pakistan provides a contrasting case to investigate the relationship between the lack of mobilization and democratic failure. Russia, on the other hand, is a challenging case, since a lengthy mobilization did not generate democratic consolidation. Engaging with the case of Russia suggests that sustained unarmed contention may not be effective if it does not translate into the crucial mechanisms of leadership change and the strengthening of civil society. Finally, Indonesia, the third most populous democracy in the world, offers a contrasting story of democratic success despite a relatively brief period of mobilization, demonstrating that a lengthy popular transition is not the only route to democratic consolidation. Other social forces may strengthen civil society, compensating for the absence of long pro-democracy movements.

Democratic Breakdown

What shapes the fate of young democracies? The issue of democratic decay versus stability has long been a central issue in political sociology (Higley and Burton 1989; Lipset

1994). In his long *durée* study of democracy and contention in Europe, Charles Tilly noted that “although democracy has, indeed, become more prevalent in recent centuries, de-democratization still occurs frequently and widely” (2003:13). Why do some democracies breakdown through military coups or through the violation of democratic procedures by elected officials while other democratic regimes survive such challenges?

Research on democratic breakdown has focused on factors such as elites’ strategic choices and preferences (Linz and Stepan 1978; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013), economic development (Boix 2011; Lipset 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), the resource curse (Ross 2012), institutional design (Kapstein and Converse 2008), international context (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Wejnert 2005), the colonial past (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004), and the institutional form of the antecedent regime (Linz and Stepan 1996; Svobik 2008). Some years ago, an important body of work also proposed that the mode of transition also affects the fate of democratic regimes—namely, that democratic transitions led through elite pacts resulted in more sustainable democracies (Higley and Burton 1989; Munck and Leff 1997). Huntington, for example, affirms this observation, writing that “democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular actors” (1984:212). While relying on these studies’ insight about the influence of the mode of transition as on breakdown or survival, I turn this argument on its head with more systematic evidence demonstrating that more durable democracies emerge from transitions that involve popular campaigns.

This argument parallels studies that document long-term effects of mass mobilization during regime change. In her seminal work on revolutions, for example, Skocpol (1979) argues that social revolutions significantly increase the mobilizational capacities of emerging states. Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2013) demonstrate that post-revolutionary authoritarian regimes

boast higher survival capacity than other authoritarian regimes. Viterna and Fallon (2008) also argue in a comparative analysis that women's mobilization at democratic transitions helps women's mobilization in post-transition politics. Building on these studies, in this paper I demonstrate that democracies that have their origin in longer unarmed campaigns have higher chance of survival than other democratic regimes.

Mass Mobilization and Democratic Transitions

The role of popular upheavals in democratization has been an important subject of study in comparative historical sociology. Moore (1966) argued that democracy is achieved as a result of bourgeois revolutions. By contrast, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992)'s historical work demonstrated the democratization was achieved in Europe and Latin America through the collective struggles of the working class. Kurzman (2008) also documents the role of intellectuals in the democratic revolutions of the early twentieth century. Finally, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly conceptualized democratization as an important phenomenon in the broader family of contentious politics and contended that "Democracy results from, mobilizes, and reshapes popular contention" (2001:269). Case studies of more recent democratizations (Bermeo 1997; Bratton and Walle 1997; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005; Wood 2000) as well as cross-national analyses (Alemán and Yang 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013) have also documented the positive effects of popular mobilization on democratic transitions.

We also know that popular uprising is only one pathway among others toward democratization. Democratic transitions may occur as a result of international intervention as well as competition and compromise among the political elite (Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Stepan 1986). As Tilly (1995) once commented, democracy is like a lake: water may fill the lake from different origins and routes. One may ask, accordingly, if democracies emerging from

popular mobilization possess characteristics dissimilar to other democratic regimes. More specifically, are such democracies more or less durable?

Popular Campaigns and Democratic Durability

Despite pessimism about the repercussions of mass mobilization in the earlier literature of democratization, I argue that pro-democratic popular mobilization may increase the durability of emerging democratic regimes. In particular, popular campaigns that primarily utilize unarmed tactics over a long period of time may generate an organizational structure that provides a leadership cadre for the new regime, forges links between the government and society, and strengthens checks on the power post-transition government.

Studies of nonviolent resistance demonstrate that sustained and successful nonviolent campaigns usually engage a larger number of participants than violent ones. This is partially because of the nature of unarmed tactics such as strikes and boycotts. While armed operations may be carried out by a smaller group of activists, a successful boycott, strike, or demonstration requires the mobilization of a considerable portion of the population (DeNardo 1985; Nepstad 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). However, since a small segment of a movement can turn a campaign violent, participants must remain committed to principles of nonviolence to keep a movement peaceful. Accordingly, organizers must raise consciousness about the values and practices of nonviolence, and train and discipline participants in order to maintain nonviolent mobilization. As a result, a nonviolent campaign cannot be sustained or succeed without a broad organizational infrastructure to engage a large number of participants and instill in them nonviolent commitments.

Additionally, the principles of unarmed resistance are more compatible with democratic procedures than are methods of armed struggle. Although democracy might be achieved through nondemocratic means, leaders and activists that have maintained democratic principles and values throughout the democratic struggle may be more likely to practice such democratic convictions in the post-transition democracy, rather than opposition leaders who have resorted to violence against their foes or holdover political elites who were trained as cadres of a nondemocratic regime.

In addition, armed campaigns are more likely to create organizations with strict hierarchies, while unarmed campaigns may be more compatible with democratic organizational templates. As such, nonviolent campaigns risk falling into “hyper-democracy” and very loose decision-making practices that compromise the effectiveness of the organization (Fish 1995). However, unarmed campaigns that manage to survive for many years may develop a practical equilibrium between their democratic organizational template and effective decision-making procedures.

Aside from the armed or unarmed method of the campaign, then, the campaign’s duration also influences the post-transition democracy. Sustained nonviolent mobilization may require a solid organizational infrastructure (Andrews 2001), while short episodes of unrest may occur without much coordination and organization. The duration of mobilization, in other words, may indicate the degree to which mobilization has been translated into organization.

Highlighting this organizational infrastructure has important implications for studies of social movement outcomes. While some political sociologists argue that movements are rarely influential, as compared with state-structural and other factors (Giugni 2007; Skocpol 2003), others believe that movement mobilization matters for policy change. Studies on the

effectiveness of movements point to factors such as political mediation (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005), strategy (McCammon et al. 2008), or organization (Andrews 2001). This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of social movements in the context of democratic durability, and argues that the organization-building side of movement mobilization is significant in shaping the outcome.

I propose that sustained unarmed campaigns contribute to the durability of emerging democratic regimes through their influence on post-transition political leadership and civil society. First and foremost, such a campaign has a better chance of replacing authoritarian incumbents with democratic activists who have emerged as viable leaders during the years of struggle. Mass mobilization against an autocratic regime creates a remarkable momentum that may marginalize authoritarian leaders in post-transition politics. Short episodes of unrest may fail to launch new leaders into the new polity, while an important outcome of years of popular struggle is a set of leaders with credible democratic convictions and proven leadership experience to serve in the new regime. Studies of post-communist politics indicate that stable democracies resulted in cases where the opposition was powerful enough to replace the communists, while emerging democracies without powerful prior opposition faced serious incumbent turnovers, authoritarian setbacks, and even the resurgence of authoritarianism (McFaul 2002b). The presence of a committed democratic leader like Lech Walesa in Poland could maintain public support for the difficult process of democratic consolidation (Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova 2007).

Sustained mobilization may also place democratic forces in a hegemonic position to build new democratic institutions and rein in the privileges of authoritarian institutions such as the military. When such a hegemonic force is absent, contestation between holdover institutions and

new democratic institutions may involve actors with weak democratic convictions. Even when they do not lead to violence, such conflicts may lead to the creation of an institutional arrangement with weak checks and balances known as “horizontal accountability” (Diamond 2009).

In addition to providing emerging democracies with capable leaders, the organizational structure of a long pro-democracy campaign may form part of civil society in the new democratic regime. As a recent review of literature suggests, civil society can be created both through bottom-up and top-down processes (Riley and Fernández 2014). Bottom-up theories stress cultural factors such as customs (Tocqueville 2002; Putnam and Leonardi 1993) or economic factors such as capitalist production (Engels and Marx 1978; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992) in forging civil society. On the other hand, top-down theories of civil society stress political processes such as the role of dictatorial (Riley and Fernández 2014) or democratic regimes (Paxton 2002) in the process of civil society formation. Both perspectives, however, downplay the importance of bottom-up political processes in civil society formation: the role of mass mobilization as a mechanism that may forge important institutions of civil society. Such institutions enhance democracy in various ways: they may foster democratic values among citizens, teach political skills, offer resistance to power, promote the quality of representation, facilitate public deliberation, and provide opportunities for citizen’s direct participation in governance (Fung 2003; Diamond 1999; Putnam 2001).

Democracies that emerge from nonviolent campaigns are more likely to enjoy a civil society capable of fulfilling these functions for at least two reasons. First, the organizational residue of a pro-democracy campaign is in a good position to fulfill the representation function, connecting citizens with elected officials, because of its intimate linkages with the new

democratic government. As the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci (1971) once argued, civil society organizations function as an extension of the state and enhance the political regime by promoting the state's hegemony and incorporating citizens into the existing political order. Electoral democracies, as regimes of power, function more effectively when they are inclusive and well-linked to society.

Democratization campaigns may also contribute to post-transition civil society's capacity to check and balance political power. The campaign may provide an organizational structure to organize new protest activities that hold politicians accountable or make new demands on the government. Also, years of political struggle against an authoritarian regime may enhance protest tactics as a part of the claim-making repertoire and provide inspiration for new social movements and campaigns in the post-transition polity (Fishman 2011). In sum, I hypothesize that *sustained unarmed mobilization increases the odds of new democracies' survival*.

This paper does not, however, claim this is the only pathway for strengthening civil society and democracy. As there are multiple pathways of democratic transition, there are also various methods of democratic consolidation. For instance, semi-oppositional or non-oppositional independent groups might exist in the ancien regime that do not take active part in anti-regime mobilization, but then play crucial role in the post-transition polity both in terms of leadership change and vitality of civil society. The route specified in this paper is only one of these pathways.

The Universe of Cases

The pool of cases in this study consists of electoral democracies that have emerged after 1950. To generate the full set of such democracies, I use a new dataset of political regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012). A political regime is considered democratic in this data

when the executive achieves power through “a direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections” (Geddes et al. 2012:6). The election is not considered competitive if a major party is excluded from the competition, if there are widespread reports of violence or intimidation against the opposition, or if incumbents dominate resources. Using this measure, there are 115 electoral democracies from 1960 to 2010. Because of missing socioeconomic data, I drop two regimes from the analysis⁷. Of the remaining 113 cases I consider, 48 cases (42%) suffered democratic breakdowns between 1960 and 2010, and 65 regimes remained democratic in 2010. For each democratic regime, age is calculated from the first year of its existence until either democratic failure or the end of the analysis in 2010. The average age for failed democracies is 6.1 years, with a median age of 4 years. For democracies that survived until 2010, the average age is 17.6, with a median of 18.

Measures

Democratic Failure: The dependent variable of this study is time to democratic failure. Democratic regimes are considered failed when executive power is achieved through means other than reasonably competitive elections, including coups, foreign occupation, civil war, and rebellion. A democratic regime is also considered to have failed if freely elected incumbents subsequently limit political competition through changes in formal or informal rules. Such changes include banning opposition parties, forcing opposition parties to merge with the dominant party, closing the legislature unconstitutionally, harassing the opposition, engaging in

⁷ Ghana 1956-1960, and Tanzania 1960-1964.

vote fraud, and annulling election results. By these criteria, there were 48 democratic breakdowns from 1960 to 2010.

Mobilization at Democratic Transitions: I have created an original dataset for the primary independent variables of this study: the presence, methods, and duration of popular campaigns contributing to a democratic transition. Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2012), I define a popular campaign as comprising at least 1,000 people participating in a series of coordinated contentious collective actions to make demands on a government. I used a wide array secondary sources on each democratic transition to identify whether popular mobilization was influential in the course of transition, whether the mobilization was armed or unarmed, and over how many calendar years it occurred (for a summary of each case see Appendix 3). I have also checked my coding against two existing datasets. The first dataset by Chenoweth and Cunningham (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; also Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013) gathers an impressive list of violent and nonviolent campaigns. The second dataset by Haggard and Kaufman (2012) focuses on the role of mass mobilization prompted by economic grievances in democratic transitions from 1980 to 2000, covering a subset of my cases. While my coding usually matches that of Haggard and Kaufman (2012), my coding differs from Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) in many instances. Some popular transitions leading to failed democracies, such as Sudan in 1966 and Peru in 1981, are included in my dataset but not identified in theirs. In a few cases, such as Ghana in 2001, Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) identify a campaign as important for democratization, while the secondary literature describes an elite-driven transition with little or no reference to protest. I have coded such cases as lacking popular pro-democracy campaigns. Despite these differences, my findings hold up in models using Chenoweth and Stephan's coding of popular campaigns.

As a proxy for the strength of democratic movements, I use the number of years of the popular campaign. There is theoretical reason to believe that the duration of contention is a good proxy for organizational strength of a movement. Movements without solid organizational infrastructure are less likely to be sustained over the long term in the repressive context of authoritarian regimes. In practical terms, more detailed indicators of organizational strength would be difficult to collect in systematic fashion for 80 countries over six decades. It should be noted that this proxy has its shortcomings as well. There might be movements that took longer but did not build an effective organizational structure. A movement also might continue longer because of various reasons such as facing a stronger regime, which does not easily crumble but is not powerful enough to demolish the movement. In the absence of reliable cross-national data for membership, branches, and ties of opposition movements, nonetheless, the length of mobilization is the best existing measure to gauge the strength of an opposition movement at the time of transition.

According to these criteria, 75 of the 112 transitions in this study were accompanied by popular campaigns (67 percent): 18 with violent campaigns (16 percent), 65 with nonviolent campaigns (58 percent), and 8 with both (7 percent). Overall, popular mobilization and specifically unarmed mobilization has been the most common route for democratic transitions, while armed conflict has been a less typical, but still significant, pathway to democratization. Figure 4 and 5 shows the frequency of nonviolent and violent campaigns' duration during these transitions.

Among the 65 regimes that originated in unarmed contention, 39 regimes survived until the end of the analysis and 26 failed. Of the relatively few regimes that experienced significant violent contention during democratization, 13 democracies survived and 5 failed. Finally, among

the 51 regimes whose transition was not marked by mobilization, 17 survived and 20 collapsed (see Figure 6).

The average duration of nonviolent mobilization was 1.6 years. The average for newly democratic regimes that survived was 1.9 years, as opposed to only 1.2 years for democracies that eventually broke down. The mean duration of violent mobilizations was 0.9 years. The average duration of violent mobilization in new democracies that survived was 1.9 years versus 0.4 years for democracies that collapsed (see Figure 7). With or without violence, the duration of mobilization was longer in democratic regimes that survived – contrary to Huntington’s hypothesis.

Controls: This analysis also includes a series of control variables to test for rival explanations and potential endogeneity. First, I introduce controls to account for several economic confounders. It is possible that the association between the length of nonviolent campaigns and democratic survival is driven by the level of economic development given that economic prosperity promotes democratic consolidation (Boix 2011; Lipset 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), strengthens civil society, and provides more resources for opposition groups to campaign against the government (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Thus, a variable is included for GDP per capita. Scholars also argue that oil revenues undermine democracy (Ross 2001) and that oil-producing countries tend to have lower rates of protest activities (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2010; Smith 2004). Hence, it could be argued that the association between popular campaigns and democratic failure is determined by oil production. To control for this rival explanation, a variable is included for oil production per capita (Ross 2012). And since economic performance is an important predictors of both democratic survival (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and

Reenock 2001) and rates of protest (Caren, Gaby, and Herrold 2011), I include a control for GDP growth in annual percent (World Bank 2012).

I also introduce controls to test alternate political explanations of the association between democratic movements and democratic survival. Studies of democratic consolidation contend that the antecedent regime has an important effect on the survival of democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996), with democracies that follow military regimes having lower chances of survival (Svolik 2008). On the other hand, scholarship on social movements shows that the configuration of political opportunities is one of the most important factors in the emergence, trajectory, and success of social movements (Meyer 2004). Studies of authoritarian breakdown also demonstrate that military regimes are more vulnerable to collapse in the face of popular mobilization. Accordingly, one might argue that an association between democratic movements and democratic survival is a byproduct of previous authoritarian regimes. I include dummy variables from Geddes et al. (2012) to indicate if previous regimes exhibited military, personalist, or party elements. These variables are not mutually exclusive, and therefore account for authoritarian regimes that may have simultaneously featured elements of military, personalist, or party rule. A variable is also included for post-independence democracies. To address extensive scholarly debate on the effects of presidential versus parliamentary systems on democratic durability, I include dummy variables for mixed systems and presidential systems versus the excluded category of parliamentary systems. I use Beck et al. (2001) as my main source of coding and use Cheibub et. al (2010) and Banks and Wilson (2013) for country-years not covered in the first dataset.

Additionally, research also shows a strong regional effect on democracy promotion, as democracies are usually clustered in time and space. Similarly, waves of protest sometime

diffuse regionally (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Wejnert 2005). Thus, an alternative explanation for the association of popular campaigns and democratic survival could be a regional effect (Beissinger 2002, 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). To test this hypothesis, I include a variable that captures the proportion of democracies in each geographic region in each year.

Another international factor that may affect both the chance of democratic survival and democratic mobilization is economic linkage with a democratic superpower such as the United States. Accordingly, I included a variable from Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0 (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008, 2009) accounting for trade with the United States for each country.

The ethnic fractionalization in a country and exclusion of ethnic groups also might undermine a young democratic and also render armed conflict a more likely method of claim making. Accordingly, two variables are included from the Ethnic Power Relations Data Set, Version 3 (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009) to control for ethnic fractionalization and the size of the excluded population in each country.

Quantitative Method

To evaluate the impact of contentious transitions on the chance of democratic survival, I use Cox proportional hazards models, a well-established method for modeling event history also known as survival analysis (Cox 1972; Cox and Oakes 1984). As noted above, the unit of time is years, beginning with a country's democratic transition and ending with democratic failure or censoring at the end of the study period in 2010. Ties (i.e., countries that experienced democratic failure after the same number of years) were handled using the Breslow method. Democratic survival rates are modeled as a function of key independent variable(s) and potential confounding covariates. Robust standard errors are reported to adjust for the clustering of

multiple democratic regimes in a single country. The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that the effects of covariates on the hazard are constant over time. The Schoenfeld residuals test indicates the proportional hazards assumption is reasonable for my model (global test chi-square = 11.51, 14 df, p-value = 0.65).

Event History Analysis

Table 8 presents the results of these event history models of democratic survival. I first discuss the implication of the results for my main finding, then describe the size of the main covariate of interest, and then address different rival explanations through various control variables in the models. The covariate for unarmed mobilization duration is negative and remains statistically significant under various combinations of control variables (Models 2-7). The variable for armed mobilization is also negative and statistically significant in all models except Model 7, when all control variables are included. This variable also is not statistically significant across different robustness tests (see below). This result supports the main hypothesis of the paper indicating an association between the length of unarmed mobilization and the chance of democratic survival.

Keeping other variables at their observed values, the relative hazard of breakdown for a democracy with two years of nonviolent mobilization is 39.8 percent smaller than a democracy that emerged without nonviolent mobilization. A democracy that originated in five years of nonviolent mobilization then has a relative hazard of failure that is 53.4 percent smaller than a democracy with two years of nonviolent mobilization. In a similar vein, a democracy emerging from ten years of mobilization has a relative hazard of failure 71.9 percent smaller than a democracy with five years of mobilization, 86.9 percent smaller than a democracy with two years, and 92.1 percent smaller than a democracy in which nonviolent mobilization did not

occur. (These relative hazards were computed from Table 8, Model 7, using Stata's "margin" command.) Figure 8 shows the cumulative hazard of democratic failure for young democratic regimes emerging from different durations of nonviolent mobilization. The figure suggests that young democratic regimes consolidate in about two decades, but within these two decades they experience different levels of the risk of failure. Young democracies originating in longer nonviolent campaigns run smaller risks of failure than either democracies with shorter campaign durations or those without any history of nonviolent mobilization.

Based on the control variables in the models, we can address some of the rival explanations. An important alternative explanation argues that greater levels of economic development promote longer lasting popular campaigns as well as more durable democracies. The GDP per capita covariate is negative and statistically significant across all models. Young democracies with higher levels of economic development do have a better chance of survival. Nonetheless, the covariate for duration of unarmed mobilization is statistically significant, controlling for GDP. This suggests that the effect of unarmed mobilization duration on democratic survival is not reducible to economic development.

The covariates for GDP growth and oil production are in the expected directions, but oil is not statistically significant in any of the models, and economic growth is inconsistently significant. Since the duration of unarmed mobilization is negative and statistically significant while controlling for these two variables, alternative explanations citing oil revenues and economic performance as drivers of the association between unarmed mobilization and democratic survival can be rejected.

Model 3 includes dummy variables for the antecedent regime to address a major alternative political explanation, according to which the type of the previous regime determines

both the length of the campaign and the survival chances of the emerging democracy. All previous forms of authoritarianism, including military, personalist, and party forms, are shown to increase the chances of democratic breakdown—but consistent with previous research, only the dummy variable for military regimes is statistically significant. Perhaps it is the case that while military regimes are more likely than other forms authoritarian regimes to fail, militaries are also more likely to step back in politics. The introduction of controls for antecedent regimes in Model 3 does not remove the effect of unarmed mobilization duration. The persistence of this effect demonstrates the association between nonviolent mobilization and democratic survival is not simply attributable to the fact that both are shaped by the antecedent regime.

Model 4 include controls for the institutional design of the democratic system, accounting for mixed and presidential systems versus the excluded category of parliamentary systems. While several previous studies have found that presidential systems are more prone to authoritarian reversals, the covariate for presidential systems is not significant in these models. Instead, the covariate for mixed systems is both positive and statistically significant, indicating that mixed systems are more at risk of breakdown than parliamentary democracies.

Model 5 addresses an alternative explanation suggesting that a higher prevalence of democracies in a region encourages democratic movements by providing a more favorable context for democratic survival. The covariate for the proportion of democratic regimes in a region is statistically significant and associated with a decrease in the chance of democratic breakdown, confirming well-established research on the importance of regional context for the survival of young democracies. Nevertheless, the covariate for the duration of unarmed mobilization retains its size and statistical significance when we control for democracies in the region. Accordingly, we can reject a rival hypothesis according to which, the correlation between

unarmed mobilization and democratic survival exists *only* due to regional context. Other alternative explanations also fail to affect the statistical significance of unarmed mobilization: US trade (Model 5), ethnic fractionalization in a country, and exclusion of ethnic populations (Model 6).

Models 8 and 9 show the dummy variables for armed, unarmed, and both kinds of mobilization (labeled here as “popular campaign”). The coefficients for armed and unarmed mobilization are not statistically significant. The coefficient for popular campaign is statistically significant in Model 9, but does not retain its statistical significance across different robustness tests in Appendix 2, confirming the main hypothesis of this paper. The length of unarmed mobilization is associated with a decrease in the chance of democratic breakdown, but the mere occurrence of a mobilization—regardless of the use of violence--does not matter consistently for democratic survival. To observe the effects of mobilization, we must take into account both tactics and duration.

Robustness Tests: The correlation between the duration of nonviolent mobilization and democratic durability is robust to different model specifications. One might wonder if extreme values of nonviolent mobilization duration drive the size and statistical significance of the main independent variable. The main finding is, however, supported by additional models in which these longer mobilizations than are excluded or when the log version of mobilization duration is used (Appendix 2, Table 11, Models 1-2). The finding remains robust when the pool of cases is expanded to include all democracies that emerged after 1945, as well as when the pool is limited to democracies that emerged either after 1960 or before 1991 (Appendix 2, Table 11, Models 3-5).

The main finding is also robust to different specifications of regional and international effects, such as employing a dummy variable for Cold War-era and a dummy variable for each region (Appendix 2, Table 12). The finding is also robust to including more control variables such as previous colonizer, years under colonial rule, armed conflict, number of military personnel and military expenditure in the pre-democratic regime (Appendix 2, Table 13).

Since some studies of democratic survival have used event history models with the assumption of a Weibull distribution of hazard ratio, I confirmed the robustness of my model using this assumption (Appendix 2, Table 14).

I also tested Chenoweth and Stephan's (2012) coding of violent and nonviolent campaigns as an alternative to my own coding, with no change to the main finding of the paper (Appendix 2, Table 15). To make sure that the finding is not dependent on the identification of democratic regimes by Geddes, Writz, and Frantz (2012), I also coded democratic transitions according to an alternative dataset of political regimes (Cheibub et al. 2010) and reran the models. The association between the length of nonviolent contention and the time to democratic failure is robust to this alternative measure of democratic regimes (Appendix 2, Table 16). Finally, I ran all the models both with both the alternative measure of democracy and the alternative measure of campaigns. The main finding is also robust to these different specifications (Appendix 2, Table 17).

Case Studies

The event history analysis demonstrates a robust positive association between the length of nonviolent campaigns for democratization and the chance of survival for young democracies—but how can we explain this association? While statistical analysis is a powerful method for discovering empirical regularities in the occurrence of social phenomena, qualitative

methods are more effective in identifying causal mechanisms underlying such regularities (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ragin 1989).

Accordingly, I examine mechanisms by which nonviolent campaigns may affect the survival of young democracies through five case studies selected on the basis of variation in the duration of nonviolent mobilization and variation in the survival of democracy: South Africa (1994-present) with a lengthy mobilization and successful democratic consolidation, Poland (1989-present) with a long period of mobilization and democratic consolidation, Russia (1990-1993) with medium-length mobilization and democratic failure, Indonesia (1999-present) with a short mobilization period and democratic survival, and Pakistan (1988-1999) with no mobilization and democratic failure. The two positive cases of democratic survival have passed the 20-year period in which the risk of democratic failure is most pronounced, according to the event history analysis.

Using Gerring's (2006) terminology, I use extreme, typical, and deviant cases to demonstrate the mechanisms underlying associations between mobilization and democratic durability. South Africa and Poland have witnessed some of the longest periods of pro-democracy mobilization in the past half-century, highlighting the mechanisms through which popular transitions potentially affect democratic durability. South Africa and Poland are extreme cases because they witnessed rather long periods of mobilization. While extreme cases are not representative of the sample, they are ideal for studying rare phenomena such as revolutions or civil wars. Accordingly, these two extreme cases are useful for testing my theory because the theory is about the effectiveness of longer movement, and a typical case would not show a

sustained pro-democracy mobilization. South Africa and Poland as two instances of long movements, however, have certain differences. While Solidarity only relied on methods of nonviolence, anti-apartheid also resorted to armed struggle in its campaign. These cases are also historically influential movements that have inspired other social movements around globe and constitute paradigmatic cases in studies of democratization and social movements. Yet democratic movements in Poland and in South Africa exhibited different organizational features and unfolded differently in the post-transition period. In Tilly's terminology, they are different instances of the same phenomenon—long-term nonviolent mobilization—that are useful in examining how unarmed mobilization may take different trajectories when sustained over long periods of time. Russia is a deviant case, and at the first glance, appears to run counter to my argument, since democratic failure occurred even after a five-year period of mobilization. In fact, the case of Russia is crucial in illustrating how the duration of mobilization may not produce a democratic outcome if it fails to translate into specific mechanisms of leadership change and vibrant civil society. Indonesia provides a case of democratic survival despite a short period of mobilization, with close examination revealing that short-term mobilization opened the way for already existing organizations to enter the democratic leadership and contribute to post-transition civil society. Pakistan and Indonesia are also methodologically suitable cases for observing how the power of the authoritarian elite—in these cases, the military—may or may not abort the democratization process and how popular pressure may counterbalance such occurrences. Pakistan and Indonesia could be classified as typical cases, since there are a large number of cases that had no mobilization or a short mobilization period of one or two years. Pakistan is a negative case and highlights how absence of a movement at transition could lead to democratic failure. In this sense, Pakistan is representative of the experience of many young democracies

without mobilization. Russian and Indonesia in a way are anomalous cases, and are helpful for generating new hypothesis. In the case of my argument, they highlight the role of pre-existing civil society in complementing or filling in for a weak pro-democracy movement.

I use secondary sources to present a narrative about how mobilization length in each case contributed to the survival or failure of democracy. Narrative analysis is specifically a strong method of inference to address temporally sequence events and path-dependence. Narrative analysis, however, may create idiosyncratic accounts (Mahoney 1999). To compensate for this potential shortcoming and to highlight comparisons among the narratives, I present each case in five major components: pro-democracy mobilization and its organizational infrastructure, democratic transition, the effect of the mobilization on leadership change, the effect of mobilization on civil society, and the role of these factors in the survival or failure of the new democracy.

South Africa

South Africa experienced a long, contentious mobilization resulting in more than two decades of democratic survival, providing a good opportunity to observe the mechanisms linking contention and durability.

Campaign: The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa is one of the longest struggles for democratic rights in the world. In 1950, the African National Congress (ANC) launched the Defiance Campaign, which organized stay-aways and mass strikes to protest racist policies enacted by the apartheid regime. This and similar campaigns failed to achieve their immediate

political goals. Faced with severe repression, in the early 1960s the ANC changed its strategy to an armed struggle, expanding its organizational infrastructure in exile. Although armed struggle had significant consequences for the internal dynamics of the anti-apartheid movement (Seidman 2001), it failed to mobilize a large segment of the population within the country or to topple the apartheid regime. The ANC ended its armed struggle campaign in 1988, six years before the completion of the democratic transition.

On the other hand, the movement managed to grow massively through its unarmed tactics. The 1970s witnessed a revival of internal resistance led by students, unions, and “civics” (neighborhood committees). Isolated protests in the 1970s coalesced into the United Democratic Front, an umbrella organization founded in 1983, whose nonviolent campaign led to the collapse of the apartheid in 1994. The UDF took an inclusive strategy, affiliating with several workers, youth, church-related, and colored organizations and working closely with the largest trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) founded in 1985. With an extensive repertoire of protest tactics, the UDF was successful in mobilizing a massive number of South Africans in the anti-apartheid struggle (Schock 2005; Wood 2000; Zunes 1999).

Transition: As a result of widespread protests organized by the anti-apartheid movement, the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were legalized again in 1990, and their leaders were released from prison. The UDF was then disbanded, with ANC resuming leadership within the country. In 1994, the apartheid system ended in South Africa after several rounds of negotiations between the regime and opposition leaders.

Leadership Change: By 1994, the ANC was a vast popular political organization with a broad social base. The ANC formed an alliance with the SACP and COSATU and became the dominant political actor in South African democratic politics. Accordingly, the ANC’s leaders

took over the leadership of the new democratic regime, with many mid-ranking activists in the anti-apartheid movement entering public office in the post-apartheid government. The ANC's strict discipline, popularity, and diverse constituencies allowed it to manage the transition with no effective opposition and with the political stability needed for institution-building (Butler 2005; Heller 2009).

Democracy in South Africa has survived despite weakness of internal democracy within ANC. ANC has been criticized for not tolerating internal dissidence within its ranks. To sustain armed struggle against the repressive apartheid regime, the ANC had borrowed principles of “democratic centralism” from the SACP during their long cooperation, emphasizing a centralist and hierarchical organizational ethos. Such a hierarchical ethos, however, has severely limited democracy within the ANC party structure in the post-transition period (Butler 2003; Lotshwao 2009; McKinley 2001).

Civil Society: Years of organization building during the anti-apartheid movement also contributed to the density of civil society organizations in South Africa. Two of the most important civic organizations founded through the years of democratic struggle, COSATU and the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO), continued to operate in the post-apartheid polity. The biggest trade union in the country, COSATU played an important role in organizing workers in the anti-apartheid movement since its founding in 1985. After 1994, COSATU became a member of the tripartite ruling alliance and was successful in securing many pro-labor legislative initiatives and establishing corporatist institutions such as the National Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), which were intended to ensure labor unions' influence (Beckman 2011). COSATU has also tried to affect policy through efforts to contest right-leaning factions in the ANC. In that regard, COSATU's activities were influential in the

leadership change from Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, even though the latter's policies have not proven significantly more favorable for labor conditions. In addition to insider tactics, COSATU has also used militant mobilization in the workplace and on the street to push for labor rights (Webster and Buhlungu 2004).

SANCO is a civil society organization with massive membership that played an influential role in mobilizing neighborhoods during the pro-democracy movement. After 1994, many SANCO activists took government jobs and SANCO's leadership was coopted by the ANC. Rather than a civic structure that facilitates the bottom-up process of shaping policy, SANCO has operated as the ANC's vehicle to deliver policies to local sites (Grotsky 2012; Heller 2009; Sinwell 2011; Zuern 2004). In this sense, SANCO has still contributed to the density of civil society, but to the Gramscian image of a civil society that operates as the state's armor.

Finally, even though major organizations of the anti-apartheid movement such as the ANC have moved into government since 1994, the rate of protest activities in South Africa has not declined (Klandermans 2015). The methods of claim-making used in the anti-apartheid movement have been a source of inspiration for several new social movements addressing issues such as housing crises, the HIV pandemic, service delivery, and land rights (van Kessel 2009; Robins and Colvin 2015). Some of these movements have been also able to make policy gains, the most important example being the Treatment Action Campaign's success in winning a comprehensive AIDS policy through combining insider tactics of engaging with the government as well as outsider tactics of mobilizing grassroots support (Friedman 2012).

Political Outcome: The electoral democracy established in 1994 has survived for more than two decades. Long years of mobilization against apartheid demanded the involvement of

strong political, labor, and civic organizations that contributed to the longevity of electoral democracy after apartheid was dismantled. The ANC, as the leading organization in the pro-democracy movement, took political leadership after the transition and built new political institutions for a democratic South Africa, where it has remained the dominant political actor. Although the ANC has been criticized for its lack of internal democracy, it has abided by the rules of electoral democracy and has maintained power in South Africa by participating in and winning free and fair elections. Labor and civic organizations have also been able to provide linkages between the democratic government and South African society. The anti-apartheid movement continues to inspire new social movements in South Africa, which have in turn provided new channels for bottom-up claim-making in the democratic political process.

Poland

Poland also presents a case of sustained mobilization and democratic survival, though the effects of the long campaign have differed in some ways from South Africa.

Campaign: In Poland, the Solidarity movement led the transition from communism in 1989 and played an important role in the aftermath of the transition. The origin of the Solidarity movement goes back to 1980, when the government agreed to the creation of independent self-organizing unions following worker strikes. From August 1980 to December 1981, “Solidarity” emerged as an independent union with a central organizing committee and expanded throughout the country, with an estimated membership approaching three million. Solidarity operated as an umbrella organization under which different groups organized to represent farmers, artisans, and students. The institutionalization of Solidarity also provided an impetus for other groups to

organize. Millions of Poles developed political action skills through participation in these protests. After the declaration of martial law and a crackdown on the movement in 1981, Solidarity went underground until April 1989. The movement's repertoire of action in this period included clandestine publications, strikes, walkouts, boycotts, skirmishes with riot police, and underground lectures. During these years, the central coordinating structure of Solidarity was also restored. In 1985 a group of students also formed a new opposition movement, Freedom and Peace, that staged local protest demonstrations around environmental issues in 1986 and 1987 (Ash 2002; Kenney 2002; Osa 2003).

Transition: A new wave of strikes by Solidarity in April 1988 brought the communists to the negotiating table once again. In these historic "Round Table Talks," the communist regime agreed to open the electoral process to Solidarity. Solidarity formed local Citizens' Committees to mobilize the vote, won a landslide in the election, and ended communism on June 4, 1989.

Leadership change: Solidarity provided a group of experienced leaders who took over the government from the Communist Party. The new parliament elected Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent oppositional figure and an advisor to Solidarity, as the new prime minister. This new leadership put Poland on a track for liberal democracy and a market economy. Similarly, many Solidarity activists rapidly joined the ranks of government at the national and local levels. As a result, Solidarity disintegrated as a broad social movement (Paczkowski 2003).

Civil Society: Although Solidarity did not continue as a national social movement after 1989, the organization remained active as a trade union and contributed to the pluralistic character of trade union sector as well as the density of post-communist civil society in Poland. The Solidarity union also functioned as the main vehicle of popular protest during the broad waves of protest with mostly economic demands that followed the 1989 transition. Protest

activities and trade unions were crucial in structuring the process of economic reform (Osa 1998; Wenzel 2015). Farmers' unions created during Solidarity's peak in 1980-81 also continued to be active in organizing farmer protests (Forys and Gorlach 2015). Protest activities provided a channel for Poles who were unsatisfied with the new democracy's neoliberal policies to voice their discontent and opposition, drawing on skills developed during the pro-democracy campaign (Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Bernhard 1996:313). Protest activities were perceived as a legitimate way of securing interests and pursuing claims, and accordingly, tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of industrial action common in the democratic movement continued to be major actions for articulating interests also in the democratic regime (Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Wenzel 2015).⁸

Political Outcome: As in South Africa, the electoral democracy that emerged in Poland 1989 has managed to endure for more than two decades. After long years of struggle, the leaders of Solidarity became leaders in the new democratic regime and established democratic institutions in Poland. While it disintegrated as a national movement, Solidarity continued to operate as a trade union. In the first years of transition, Solidarity organized many strikes and protests in Poland in response to neoliberal policies implemented by the government, successfully providing channels within the young democracy for the expression and resolution of economic grievances.

⁸ Despite such evidence for the importance of a rebellious civil society in Poland's democratic consolidation, a group of scholars argues that post-communist democracies have a weaker civil society compared to other democracies, such as those in Latin America. This argument is, however, based on data that uses the number of individuals per capita engaged in civic associations, extracted from polls such as World Value Survey (Howard 2003:e.g.). While even some of these scholars recognize that Poland is an exception to this rule, the major claim of these studies has been challenged on the basis of alternative data sources, such as the number and growth of NGOs and civic organizations as well as the behavior of civil society actors. As noted in the text, civil society organizations in Poland have been active in organizing protest activities and, accordingly, contributed to the process of democratic consolidation (Ekiert and Foa 2011; Ekiert and Kubik 2014).

Pakistan

Pakistan also experienced a democratic transition in the late 20th century, but, by contrast with South Africa and Poland, the transition occurred without a major pro-democracy mobilization and failed to consolidate. This pattern confirms the statistical findings from the first part of this paper.

Campaign: In 1981, eight opposition parties organized a large-scale campaign, the Movement to Restore Democracy, in an attempt to put an end to General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorial rule. However, the military regime successfully repressed this campaign, and popular mobilization did not re-appear on a significant scale prior to Pakistan's transition to democracy in 1988.

Transition: Pakistan transitioned to electoral democracy when General Zia died in a plane crash in 1988 and military commanders decided to hand political power over to civilians after 11 years of military rule. The military elite led the process of transition in the absence of an active popular campaign for democratization (Wilkinson 2000).

Leadership Change: Under such conditions, the military, the most powerful pillar of authoritarian politics in Pakistan, was able to dictate its own role within the post-transition polity and remained the ultimate arbiter of the political scene. General Mirza Aslam Beg, the military chief, publically justified such a role for the military, stating that he wanted a constitutional role for the military in politics. While power was transferred to civilians, the institutional arrangement designed under Zia stayed in place, creating a powerful president and presidency with the constitutional right to sack the prime minister and dissolve parliament (Samad 1994; Shah 2014; Talbot 2010).

From 1988 to 1999, the prime ministry rotated between Benazir Bhutto from the leftist Pakistan People Party and Nawaz Sharif, a politician from the Zia era and the leader of Pakistan's Muslim League. Both prime ministers tried and failed to expand the power of the elected government in Pakistani politics. In the last episode of this power struggle in 1996, Sharif was elected as the prime minister for his second term, this time with a majority in parliament that allowed him to enact constitutional changes, annulling the president's constitutional privilege to dismiss the prime minister and asserting the prime minister's authority to appoint or approve military service chiefs, provincial governors, and superior-court judges. Although presidency was an indirectly elected office, such constitutional privileges of the president had been used after Zia's era as a safeguard by military to keep the elected parliament and the prime minister, the leader of the majority party in parliament, on a leash. Sharif even took a further step by sacking the army's Chief General Jehangir Karamat and appointing General Pervez Musharraf in his place. The military resented this decision, but civil-military relations did not collapse. The major crisis in civil-military relations broke out over foreign policy, when the military carried out a covert operation in the Indian-controlled area of Kargil in Kashmir, allegedly without informing the prime minister. India detected the operation, deployed troops to the area, and recaptured the majority of positions on the Indian side of the conflict zone. Prime Minister Sharif then decided to sack General Musharraf while he was visiting Sri Lanka. Sharif's plan failed, though, as the general rallied the military's support, sent troops to Islamabad, and arrested the prime minister. General Musharraf declared himself the ruler of Pakistan, suspended the constitution, dismissed parliament, and ended the new democracy (Rizvi 2000; Shah 2014).

Civil Society: Pakistan had a vibrant and dynamic civil society in 1960s and 1970s, which consisted of student groups, peasants, and worker unions. These groups mobilized for

democratic demands and opposed military dictatorship. Zia's military regime heavily cracked down on students, unions, and activists and even passed legislations that banned unions or politics on campus and workspaces after 1977 coup. After 1988 civic associations and NGOs emerged again in Pakistan but these groups were mostly interested in issues of development and delivering services rather than political activism. While before 1977 political parties such as Pakistan People Party used tactics of mass mobilization and worked closely with unions and student groups, due to changes in character of civil society after 1988 parties and civil society groups were disconnected. As a result of all these changes, Pakistan civil society had limited propensity and capacity to engage in democratic politics. When General Musharraf launched his coup in 1999 he did not face serious resistance from these groups. Some liberal NGOs even welcomed the coup and later participated in the military government (Shah 2004; Zaidi 2011).

Political Outcome: Pakistan is a straightforward example of democratic breakdown after a transition that did not originate in contentious collective action. The transition in 1988 occurred as a result of a decision by the military after the death of the military dictator. Accordingly, leadership replacement did not fully occur in Pakistan, and the military managed to keep its veto power in Pakistani politics. When popularly elected prime ministers tried to expand the power of the elected executive, they faced military resistance that led eventually to the collapse of the young democracy in 1999. Civil society, which had been thoroughly depoliticized during the years of dictatorship before 1988, failed to provide effective linkages between the government and society and did not foster grassroots pressure for further democratization in Pakistan.

Russia

Russia offers a counter-example to the statistical association between the duration of unarmed mobilization and the duration of new democracies: it experienced a relatively lengthy pro-democracy mobilization, but did not generate a long-lasting new democracy. Examination of Russia is therefore important for this analysis, because it allows us to identify mechanisms that link the independent and dependent variables in the statistical analysis, in particular the mechanism of turnover in government leadership positions.

Campaign: As a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union, hundreds, perhaps thousands of civic associations formed around local issues in 1986 and 1987. By 1988, many of these associations had turned to explicitly political activities and held demonstrations in which protestors demanded the democratization of the Soviet Union (Brovkin 1990), with the first large wave of protest occurring in 1989 (Beissinger 2002). These new groups, however, were mostly disorganized with loose leadership and fluid membership. As a reaction to the strict organizational ethos of the Communist party, these groups opted for nonhierarchical organizational principles and collective leadership, which is sometimes labeled "hyperdemocratic." This organizational form compromised the effectiveness of these organizations, and many opposition groups experienced splits and defections. Not only did they fail to achieve mass membership, but some prominent organizations even shrank in size. Many associations participated in the legislative election campaigns of 1989, the first to permit free competition, supporting a host of small new political parties.

Even the formation of an umbrella organization in 1989 did not compensate for the organizational weakness of the movement. Three of the leading opposition parties -- the Democratic Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, and the Democratic Platform -- formed an umbrella organization, Democratic Russia, and most pro-democratic parties and

many other political organizations joined this coalition. Nonetheless, Democratic Russia was not comparable in size or organizational strength to the United Democratic Front in South Africa or Solidarity in Poland, and failed to compensate for the organizational weakness of the democratic movement (Fish 1995).

Transition: Democratic Russia won about 40 percent of seats in Russia's Congress of Deputies, Russia's first freely elected legislature since the early 20th century. Conservative communists also won an equivalent number of seats. After four rounds of close voting, the most prominent advocate of the democratic movement, Boris Yeltsin, was elected chairman of parliament. One year later, Democratic Russia organized Yeltsin's successful presidential campaign. In August 1991, hardliners in the Communist Party launched a coup to oppose political reforms and the decentralization of the Soviet Union. The coup failed, however, due to the popular resistance spearheaded by Yeltsin and parliamentarians allied with Democratic Russia. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, Yeltsin emerged as the most powerful politician in the country. He disbanded the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union was dissolved within a year (McFaul 2002a).

Leadership Change: While Communist Party hardliners and even reformists such as Gorbachev were forced out of the Russian leadership after the coup, Democratic Russia and other pro-democracy organizations were unable to create sufficient leadership cadres to take over the new democratic regime or shape a hegemonic agenda for transition. Instead, they rallied behind Boris Yeltsin, who was the pro-democracy campaign's most prominent figure but had not been a member of any pro-democracy organizations. Yeltsin was not an organizer; he did not build a movement in the vein of Walesa in Poland or Mandela in South Africa. Rather, he relied on personalistic appeals to the public.

Afraid to create a drastic rupture from the previous order and comfortable working with people with a similar background and experience from the Soviet regime, Yeltsin did not call on many members of the democratic movement to replace Soviet officials. Instead of bringing activists to the executive, he relied on Reform Communists and loyalists during his time as president. His background as a communist functionary and his tense relations with pro-democracy organizations have been taken as signs that he was less motivated by democratic convictions than by hatred of the communist system (Fish 1995; Gill and Markwick 2000; Huskey 2000; McFaul 2002a, 2002b).

Civil Society: The democratic organizations that had emerged under Gorbachev withered away after 1991. During the transition from communist rule, Democratic Russia suffered the loss of its original *raison d'être* and experienced a severe identity crisis, developing schisms over the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin's increasingly authoritarian rule, and the market reform policies. The movement did not develop a platform for the post-Soviet era and lacked the organizational coherence to come up with new goals. Except for one small party, none of the groups that emerged during the pro-democracy campaign of 1987-1991 built political parties after the 1991 transition or became the foundation for civil society organizations. Since independent political, religious, or civic groups were prohibited during the Soviet era, there were no autonomous pre-existing political parties or civic organizations to fill the void created by the decline of Democratic Russia (Lussier 2011).

Political Outcome: From 1991 to 1993, a heated feud emerged between President Yeltsin and pro-democracy leaders in the Russian parliament, initially over economic reforms, but soon deepening into contention over the re-design of the country's constitution. While the president favored a constitution with a powerful executive, the remnants of the pro-democracy

movement advocated a parliamentary system that would limit the president's power (Huskey 2000; McFaul 2002a; Remington 2001). This dispute ended violently, when Yeltsin ordered the army to shell parliament, resulting in the deaths of more than one hundred people and the wounding of several hundred more. Soon after, a new constitution that weakened the legislature and dramatically strengthened the presidency was put to a referendum and passed (Huskey 2000; Remington 2001). Since then, the super-presidency in Russia has undermined horizontal accountability and served as a major obstacle to the formation of a more open political scene (Fish 2005).

This “deviant” case – a relatively lengthy pro-democracy campaign and the relatively quick collapse of the new democracy – pinpoints some of the mechanisms through which mass mobilization helps new democracies endure. If the democratic movement in Russia had generated a mass organization, such as the ANC in South Africa or Solidarity in Poland, perhaps it might not have fragmented after the democratic transition, leaving the new democracy vulnerable to factional disputes. If the democracy campaign had generated civil society institutions, perhaps the either the president or parliament could have appealed to public support in their rivalry with the other and solved the crisis through a political solution (Weigle 2000; Gill and Markwick 2000; McFaul 2002a). If pro-democracy organizations had trained a larger number of activists, perhaps it could have placed more committed defenders of democracy in positions in the new regime. Instead, the democratic movement in Russia failed to create lasting organizations or achieve a complete transition of state leadership.

Indonesia

Indonesia experienced brief mobilization resulting in democratic survival – an outlier in statistical terms -- that illustrates how short pro-democracy campaigns may not necessarily handicap democratic politics.

Campaign: The Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1998 triggered a massive upheaval in Indonesia. The pro-democracy campaign began with students calling for the fall of President Suharto; they were later joined by one of the largest religious organizations in the country. Following clashes between students and security forces, the urban poor joined the protests, which devolved into rioting that discredited the regime's claim to be the guardian of order in the country.

Although the wave of protest did not create any large-scale organizations, massive organizations independent from the state already existed in Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, two religious organizations, had millions of members. Political parties also competed for office during the Suharto era, though as in many other electoral authoritarian regimes they were not allowed to win legislative or executive power. Many of these groups joined the pro-democracy uprising, bringing their networks and resources to the anti-regime movement.

Transition: Cracks within the ruling elite appeared after the riots, and Suharto's allies called for his resignation. While the wave of mobilization was strong enough to bring down Suharto, the fragmented opposition failed to remove all elements of the ruling elite from power. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Suharto's vice president, stepped in as the new president. However, further protests and strong pressure forced Habibie to introduce political reform. In the 1999 presidential election, the dominant Golkar party was defeated after 32 years in power.

Leadership Change: While the focus of protestors was on President Suharto, there was also a strong anti-military tone in the demonstrators' discourse. Officers recognized that their engagement with politics had damaged the reputation of the armed forces, and subsequently avoided direct involvement in politics. In this sense, the wave of protests in 1998 and 1999 was partly a story about the reassertion of civilian control over the military in Indonesia (Aspinall 2010; Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006).

In contrast to Poland and South Africa, in which pro-democracy movement leaders served as the leaders of new democracy, the brevity of the pro-democracy campaign in Indonesia did not allow a political leader of that stature to emerge. Instead, the wave of mobilization opened the way for leaders of existing political and religious groups to contest political office in a more meaningful way than they had been permitted to under Suharto.

Civil Society: The brief pro-democracy campaign in Indonesia did not generate lasting organizations. However, it did instill a lasting "mode of opposition in society" (Aspinall 2005) that may have contributed to ongoing political participation and the durability of democracy. The student protests that led to the fall of Suharto have been reenacted regularly for political causes. In 2001, for instance, students surrounded the presidential palace and demanded the resignation of the first post-transition president, Abdurrahman Wahid, leading parliament to impeach him. Student protests continued during Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency over issues such as the pardoning of Suharto, shootings of protestors during 1998-99, and the rising cost of living (Nyman 2006:77-78).

Moreover, Indonesia already had a significant array of civic organizations, even before the pro-democracy campaign. Many of these organizations continue to be active in Indonesia's vibrant civil society after the transition, mobilizing to defend democracy on several occasions

when oligarchic forces tried to roll back democratic gains. In 2009, for example, a group of conservative politicians tried to take over Election Commissions, reverse electoral reforms such as direct elections, and curtail the power of Corruption Eradication Committee, which has limited patronage and collusion in Indonesian politics. In the 2014 presidential election, similarly, the conservative-backed candidate Prabowo Subianto planned to annul direct presidential elections in Indonesia. These efforts to limit democracy failed in part because of civil society's mobilization against them (Lussier and Fish 2012; Mietzner 2012, 2014).

Political Outcome: In Indonesia, popular mobilization was one factor among others that reasserted civilian control over the military after Suharto's New Order came to an end. Though the movement was too brief to create a new cohort of leadership or to forge major new organizations in civil society, already-existing political parties as well as civic and religious organizations managed to fill the void and provide vehicles for political participation. Civic and religious associations expanded under the young democratic regime and mobilized to block anti-democratic initiatives.

Conclusion

How does mass mobilization affect the fate of young democracies? I argue that the duration of unarmed mobilization during democratic transitions predicts the success of democratic consolidation. I collected original data on mass mobilization during democratic transitions for 113 young democracies from 1960 to 2010. An event history analysis of these

democratic regimes shows a robust association between the duration of nonviolent mobilization and the probability of democratic survival.

A puzzle still remains, however, about mechanisms driving this association. I contend that sustained nonviolent mobilization generates an organizational structure capable of providing a group of leaders with democratic convictions and leadership experience for the new democratic regime. It also creates linkages between society and the state and reinforces societal checks and balances on the government. To illustrate the mechanisms of leadership turnover and state-society linkages that explain this association between mobilization and democratic outcomes, I presented cases studies of five young democracies that vary both in terms of the duration of nonviolent mobilization as well as the survival of the new democratic polity.

The cases of South Africa and Poland show how a long period of mobilization created a new group of leaders that took over the new democratic regime. In Pakistan, the absence of sustained pro-democracy mobilization allowed the military to continue playing an influential role in Pakistani politics and eventually, to end the democratic experiment altogether in 1999. In Indonesia, however, a short period of mobilization contributed to the exit of the military from Indonesian politics, but was not sustained long enough to create opposition leaders that could serve in the new democratic regime. However, it opened the way for the leaders of political parties and religious organizations that had existed, albeit in limited form, under authoritarian rule in Indonesia to become leaders of the young democratic regime. Although Russia's mobilization period was longer than that of Indonesia, its fragmented and weak democratic movement failed to create a new group of leaders and instead rallied behind Boris Yeltsin, a communist-turned-opposition figure. With a weak democratic movement, the post-transition polity became little more than an arena of conflict between Yeltsin and his political rivals in the

Russian parliament, and ended in violence after a short existence. In contrast to the hegemonic position of ANC for instance in South Africa or Solidarity in Poland, neither Yeltsin nor his rivals enjoyed enough organized support within Russian society to push forward their political project and build lasting democratic institutions.

In terms of the role of civil society in promoting democratic consolidation, the lengthy periods of mobilization created vibrant civil societies in both South Africa and Poland. In the absence of popular mobilization during the democratic transition, civil society remained depoliticized in newly democratic Pakistan, with some parts of civil society even supporting the 1999 coup. In Russia, the already fragmented democratic movement and associational life that emerged after 1987 underwent further fragmentation after 1991, failed to create lasting organizations. Since independent civic groups did not exist in Russia under Soviet rule, there no other groups could compensate for the weakness of the democratic movement. In Indonesia, by contrast, the brief pro-democracy campaign did not create new civic organizations, but it could call upon strong civic and religious associations that had been formed under Suharto's authoritarian rule in Indonesia. Associational life continued and expanded in the new democratic regime, with the democratic movement providing inspiration and legitimacy for protest as a method of claims-making that played an important role in stopping efforts by the anti-reformist elite to roll back the democratization process in Indonesia.

My findings on the association between sustained mobilization and democratic consolidation have important implications for the literatures on social movements and democratization, which have largely developed in parallel (e.g. Della Porta 2014; Schock 2005; Wood 2000). In the few instances in which these two literatures have come into dialogue, the studies have focused on the role of popular mobilization in the emergence of democracy, not the

sustainability of democracy after its emergence. The finding of this paper extends that dialogue to considering the effects of popular mobilization on the issue of democratic survival.

The paper also contributes to the study of social movement outcomes, which has focused largely on policy change in long-established democracies, by arguing that movements may also contribute to the consolidation of the democratic system itself. This finding adds another perspective to important social-scientific debates about democratic consolidation, contributing to a literature that has privileged the role of economic factors, institutional features of the democratic regime, and the political structure of antecedent regimes. At its broadest, this paper contributes to a classic debate in the study of politics and society: political struggle does not handicap new democracies, as Huntington suggested, but contributes to its solidity.

Figure 4: Frequency of Unarmed Mobilization




Figure 5: Frequency of armed mobilization




Figure 6: Contention and Democratic Survival




Figure 7: The Length of Mobilization and Democratic Survival





Figure 8: Cumulative Hazard of Democratic Breakdown



Based on Table 4, Model 7

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	p5	p95	sd	Sd within	Sd between
Post-Military	0.4072553	0	0	1	0.4914914	0.1716252	0.4404555
Post-Personal	0.3620808	0	0	1	0.4807666	0.1600724	0.4458784
Post-Party	0.220397	0	0	1	0.4146563	0.0861951	0.4383079
Post-Independence	0.1998631	0	0	1	0.4000342	0.1267909	0.4080224
Presidential	0.5893224	1	0	1	0.4921253	0.1862294	0.4510386
Mixed System	0.1040383	0	0	1	0.3054148	0.2030413	0.2783102
Democracies in the R	0.5462273	0.5909091	0.0526316	0.8947368	0.2929421	0.1342608	0.2810393
US Trade (ln)	6.765738	6.830971	2.842581	10.07585	2.224839	0.8702629	2.468361
Linguistic fractionalization	0.3579464	0.2744	0.0056763	0.803757	0.2672268	0.0071532	0.2787032
excluded population	0.1319881	0.07	0	0.45	0.1586302	0.0623397	0.1498777
Oil Production per c	1.996339	1.125203	0	6.311915	2.294149	0.6684698	2.158207
GDP per capita (ln)	7.499513	7.576265	5.401502	9.336679	1.246992	0.3188021	1.28922
GDP Growth	0.0191804	0.0244032	-0.0724313	0.0839445	0.0553168	0.0517231	0.0450874
Population (ln)	16.22709	16.13897	14.12714	18.52889	1.277122	0.2201798	1.294281

Table 8: Regression Results for Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration		-0.218*	-0.198*	-0.223*	-0.195*	- 0.233* *	- 0.249* *		
		(0.0886)	(0.0855)	(0.0907)	(0.0814)	(0.0891)	(0.0939)		
Violent Campaign Duration		-0.165*	-0.181*	-0.130*	-0.134*	- 0.216* *	-0.166		
		(0.0644)	(0.0716)	(0.0589)	(0.0544)	(0.0809)	(0.0953)		
Popular Campaign at Transition								- 0.775* (0.369)	
Nonviolent campaign at Transition									-0.626 (0.353)
Violent campaign at Transition									-0.690 (0.522)
Post-Military			1.212* * (0.428)				0.876 (0.458)	0.756 (0.463)	0.754 (0.475)
Post-Personal			0.0649 (0.327)				0.538 (0.494)	0.609 (0.457)	0.554 (0.481)
Post-Party			0.355 (0.527)				0.697 (0.468)	0.688 (0.445)	0.617 (0.492)
Post-Independence			0.988 (0.510)				1.394* (0.619)	1.316* (0.560)	1.205* (0.581)
Presidential				0.150 (0.420)			0.422 (0.711)	0.329 (0.735)	0.337 (0.774)
Mixed System				1.649* *			2.115* *	2.048* *	2.103* *

					(0.506)		(0.594)	(0.619)	(0.658)
US Trade (ln)					-0.182 (0.105)		-0.138 (0.120)	-0.110 (0.117)	-0.127 (0.119)
Democracies in the Region					- 1.943* * (0.704)		- 2.515* * (0.803)	- 2.733* * (0.786)	- 2.669* * (0.847)
Ethnic Fractionalizi on						0.0132 (0.501)	-0.456 (0.762)	-0.495 (0.695)	-0.412 (0.714)
Excluded Population						1.597* (0.658)	0.720 (0.776)	0.671 (0.819)	0.845 (0.899)
GDP per capita (ln)	- 0.580* * (0.133)	- 0.569* * (0.141)	- 0.664* * (0.149)	- 0.605* * (0.155)	-0.214 (0.195)	- 0.530* * (0.150)	-0.355 (0.216)	- 0.433* (0.216)	-0.400 (0.213)
GDP Growth	-4.247 (2.236)	-4.957* (2.290)	-4.185 (2.588)	-5.470* (2.377)	-6.120* (2.428)	-4.452 (2.389)	- 6.463* * (2.304)	- 6.337* * (2.220)	- 6.673* (2.671)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.105 (0.0783)	0.0910 (0.0790)	0.0178 (0.0874)	0.124 (0.0954)	0.0737 (0.0807)	0.0577 (0.0878)	0.0650 (0.110)	0.105 (0.113)	0.0930 (0.126)
Population (ln)	-0.0741 (0.111)	-0.0134 (0.108)	0.0264 (0.123)	0.0268 (0.140)	0.178 (0.174)	-0.0250 (0.107)	0.149 (0.166)	0.0912 (0.164)	0.0948 (0.164)
Clusters	80	80	80	80	79	79	78	78	78
Subjects	112	112	112	112	110	111	109	109	109
Failures	48	48	48	48	47	47	47	47	47
Observations	1382	1382	1382	1382	1360	1344	1323	1323	1323
AIC	398.8	392.3	390.1	377.2	372.6	390.6	353.3	354.6	356.5
BIC	419.7	423.7	442.5	419.1	414.3	432.2	436.3	432.4	439.5

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 9: Case Selection

	Campaign Duration	Outcome
South Africa	13	Survival
Poland	6	Survival
Indonesia	2	Survival
Russia	5	Failure
Pakistan	0	Failure

Table 10: Case Study Summaries

	Campaign	Transition	Leadership Change	Civil Society	Outcome
South Africa	Long democratic campaign since 1983 Vast organizational infrastructure	Negotiations between ANC and the South African government ANC's landslide victory in 1994 election	ANC's hegemonic leadership and institution building	Movement's organizational residue providing linkage between state and society New social movements inspired by anti-apartheid movement	Survival
Poland	Long democratic campaign since 1980 vast organizational networks	Negotiation between solidarity and communist government led to free elections in 1989	Solidarity leaders become took over the Polish government in 1989	Solidarity disintegrated as a national movement, but continued to exist as a trade union High rate of protest activities after the transition	Survival
Indonesia	Two years of rapid and massive protest by students, intellectuals, and urban poor, 1998-1999 Too short to create organizations Existing civic organizations and parties under Suharto's rule	president Suharto's resignation in 1998 GOLKAR party's defeat in 1999 elections	Military withdrew from politics Protest wave opened the way for leaders of semi-opposition to become democratic leaders	The protest wave did not translate into new organizations in the democratic politics The protest wave encouraged protest activities in the new democratic order Existing civic organizations contributed in the vibrancy of civil society	Survival
Russia	Pro-democracy associations and political demonstrations started in 1987 Weak and fragmented organizations	Yeltsin's victory in 1990 presidential election Failed putsch in 1991	The movement not powerful enough to place opposition leaders in charge of the new regime. The movement rallying behind Yeltsin Yeltsin did not use movement members in the new government	Democratic Russia suffering from fragmentation and identity crisis No existing civic organizations or parties to fill the void	Failure
Pakistan	No significant popular pressure for democratization	Death of the military leader, general Zia in 1988. Military's decision to hand power to civilians	military kept its veto powers prime ministers attempts to expand the power of the elected government Military coup in response to the last attempt by prime minister Sharif	Depoliticized & weak civil society. Some support for 1999 coup	Failure

CHAPTER 4: PREDICAMENTS OF RAPID SUCCESS: EGYPT'S FAILED DEMOCRATIZATION 2011-3

On February 11th 2011 Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's president for thirty years resigned from presidency after eighteen days of massive protest. No one had expected after such a brief period of uprising. When the news of Mubarak's resignation was announced in Tahrir Square, Guardian correspondent reports that it took most people by surprise (Guardian February 11th 2011). Similarly, when a CBS reporter asked a mother celebrating in Tahrir with her daughter that if she believes that this actually happened, she said "No it's like a dream. It's like a dream that happened so sudden that we cannot imagine it at all. Everybody is happy and shocked at the same time." Husam El-Erian a prominent member of Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau wrote in an op-ed that "The Egyptian revolution was a surprise for everyone including Egyptians who had waited on their rulers and their increasing tyranny" (Al-Shorouk February 12th 2012). Protestors were jubilated in toppling Mubarak in less than three weeks, but were also aware that now it was time for them to build the new democratic Egypt and how difficult that would be. Political commentators soon started talking about many difficult tasks that history puts ahead of the revolution (Al-Shorouk February 13th 2011), and protestors in Tahrir changed their slogan the day after Mubarak's departure from toppling the regime to "let's rebuild Egypt" (Al-Masr Al-Youm February 13th 2011).

Mubarak's departure was followed by competitive legislative and presidential elections in 2012, but the uprising that initially brought down the long-standing dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011 later set the stage for a popular coup and crackdown on different factions that had

organized the 2011 revolt. How should we explain the eventual breakdown of democracy in Egypt in 2013? And why did the same forces of civil society that had participated in 2011 uprising contributed to democratic breakdown in 2013?

Studies of civil society and democracy specify different mechanisms through which civil society can promote democracy. To promote democratization, civil society should be able to articulate and promote societal interests; various groups in civil society should be able to cooperate and raise consensus regarding important public affairs; and finally, civil society should keep authorities under check and stop authoritarian tendencies within the government. The revolutionary movement of January 2011 failed to fulfill these pro-democracy functions, because of its rapid success. First, the movement did not gain enough momentum to marginalize all elements of the previous regime such as the military. In other words, civil society failed to push forward the movement's objectives about the fall of the previous regime. Second, the uprising brought together a negative coalition against Mubarak that lacked any agreement on the course of transition after Mubarak's departure. The movement did not have enough time over three weeks to build ties among different revolutionary factions and reach a consensus about the post-Mubarak polity. When the rebellion succeeded in toppling Mubarak, a visible division emerged between Muslim Brotherhood and secular groups. In other words, instead of cooperation between important parts of the civil society in Egypt, these groups split around parameters of the transition period such as civilians who would take control after the military, timing of the elections, and writing of the constitution. Third, the period of the revolutionary movement was also too short for the secular revolutionaries to expand their organization and counterbalance Muslim Brothers' organizational strength. As a result of this organizational disparity, no balance of power existed between the Islamist and secular strand. Muslim Brothers realized that they

could win elections on their own, and the secular camp saw no chance of electoral victories for themselves. When the secular strand became disappointed about counterbalancing Brotherhood through electoral politics, they converged with the old regime holdovers, and in a miscalculated move set the stage for 2013 July coup, which ended the short democratic interval in Egypt. Thus, the short mobilization resulted in the lack of consensus and imbalance of power between main factions in civil society, which pushed an important part of the civil society to ally with the authoritarian holdovers and at least unintentionally destroy democratic institutions rather than defending them.

Current explanation of democratic failure in Egypt highlights different explanatory factors such as ideology, structural legacies of the previous regime, and strategic choices made by different actors. One strand of ideological explanations stresses the lack of moderation on behalf of Muslim Brotherhood. Hamid (2014) for example argues that Brothers had moderated their ideological stances under the repressive era of Mubarak regime, but when repression declined after the revolution they left their moderate approach and even overreached for power, which in turn induced the reaction of liberal opposition and led to the coup. Kandil (2014) also claims that Muslim Brothers instead of trying to advocate a full democratic revolution decided to keep military and security apparatus intact and present itself as a substitute for the collapsed political apparatus of the old regime. He also argues that the fanaticism in Brotherhood's ideology disabled them to see the fact that Muslim Egyptians may turn against them because of their incompetence and ineptitude. On the other hand, other scholars argue that the liberal intelligentsia in Egypt did not really believe in democracy. From their earlier years, the Egyptian intelligentsia believed in state's intervention to implement liberal ideas. As a result, these intellectuals did not respect Muslim Brotherhood's victory in democratic elections, and

supported a military coup against Islamists (Abdel Meguid and Faruqi 2016). Others suggest that the liberal ideology of revolutionary groups was so anti-Islamist that it blocked the way for any sorts of cooperation between liberal opposition and Muslim Brotherhood (Gordon 2016). A second type of explanations emphasizes different mistakes made by different parties such as Islamists and their rival liberal opposition (Brown 2013). Finally, the third type of explanations highlight the structural legacies of previous regime, in the sense that Muslim Brotherhood and the regime's official party National Democratic Party (NDP) were the only organized political forces at the eve of Mubarak's departure, while leftist and liberal parties were organizationally very weak. The strategic mistakes by different sides then were made in the context of this strategic disparity (Brumberg 2013). This paper also highlights strategic choices made by different revolutionary factions, but also put them in the context of rapid and successful wave of mobilization that was not long enough to build a strong alliance between those factions, and also too short for secular faction to organizationally grow.

In what follows, I describe how the resilience of the previous regime holdovers and organizational disparity between Brotherhood and secular opposition, resulted from rapid successful mobilization shaped the trajectory and outcome of the democratization in Egypt between 2011 and 2013.

Civil Society and Democratic Failure

Studies of civil society have pointed to both positive and negative contribution of civil society in democratization. In terms of positive contribution, civil society may cultivate habits of cooperation and highlights the importance of public interest over private interest at the individual level; civil society provides channels to aggregate and articulate societal interest and bring them

to the political arena; civil society also can keep the democratic office holders accountable and resist authoritarian threats to democracy (Fung 2003).

This overly positive view of the relationship between civil society and democracy has been challenged over last two decades. Riley (2005) highlights the importance of ideological orientation of the associations and documents that robust Fascist associational sphere in Italy gave rise a hegemonic fascist regime in Italy after World War I. Armony (2004) also points that some civic groups may utilize their networks of trust to oppose expansion of civil rights to other groups. Jamal (2007) argues that civic groups in clientalist contexts reproduce patron-client relations rather than promoting democratic values. Most importantly, Berman (1997a) contends that the political context shapes the democratic orientation of civil society. She builds on Huntington's classic argument about the significance of political institutions in channeling participation (Berman 1997b). Huntington (1968) believed that if the political institutions do not have the capacity to absorb and channel high demands for participation, the political sphere suffer from instability and regime breakdown. Focusing on the case of Weimar Republic, Berman argues that civic associations were frustrated with political parties, because parties remained elite organizations and focused on narrow socioeconomic issues. Nazis then capitalized on this frustration, recruited disillusioned members of civic groups, and benefited from their organizational skills to expand their movement.

This paper highlights the length of mobilization as an important part of the political context in transition periods. I argue that occasions of short-term mobilization are more likely to lead to anti-democratic impact of civil society. Short-term mobilizations usually bring together a coalition of groups that share hatred of the incumbent dictatorship, but lack consensus and

cohesion around the leadership and agenda for the transition period. As Beissinger (2013:590) writes in his analysis of Ukraine's Orange revolution, "the reliance of urban civic revolutions on a rapidly convened negative coalition of hundreds of thousands fosters instead fractured elites, lack of consensus over fundamental policy issues, and weak commitment to democratic ends among revolutionaries." This fractured elite then is likely to engage in conflict about the leaders and features of the post-transition period. On the other hand, since the movement has not had enough time for organization building, they may face certain difficulties transiting from the protest phase to the electoral phase, when it is necessary for the movement to push forward their demands through elections. Short movements may be effective in mobilizing protestors on a massive scale, but when it comes to building the new democratic regime, they may not be as effective in translating their demands into electoral gains. This could create a situation similar to the conditions described by Huntington and Berman, when societal demands exist, but do not find a venue in institutional politics. Finally, short movements may succeed in creating a regime breakdown for dictatorship but may not gain enough momentum to purge all elements of the authoritarian rule. The previous regime holdovers then may reorganize and take advantage from fragmentation and organizational weakness of the movement, and play different factions of the movement against each other.

Data and Method

To illustrate this argument with the case of Egypt, I have collected data from newspapers, blogs, and organization websites. Mainly, I have gone through all issues of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masr Al-Youm from January 2011 to July 2013. I have reviewed the title of all political news and op-eds, roughly 25000 items, and selected pieces related to issues of leadership after transition, organizational strength of different groups, and their positions about

each other and elements of the previous regime specifically military. Al-Masr Al-Youm is ideologically a liberal newspaper and for the period of study covers almost all of the important groups involved in the transition process. I have supplemented this collection with other newspapers, blogs, and organization websites. These multiple sources provided about 250 relevant news articles and op-eds (for the full list of material cited in the paper see the appendix). Finally, I have also benefited from secondary sources such as published and unpublished analyses of the uprising and its outcome.

January 25th Rebellion, Too Short to Endure

The rebellion that toppled Mubarak regime and was known as January 25th uprising was inspired by the successful overthrow of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. More prominent groups that participated in this uprising included Cairo-based political opposition groups such as Kifaya movement, Mohammad El-Baradei and his supporters, Facebook pages such as We Are Khaled Said and April 6th Movement, labor NGOs and informal syndicates, and finally the Society of Muslim Brotherhood. Kifaya movement was a political campaign organized in protest in 2005 around the presidential election in that year, in which a victory was guaranteed for Hosni Mubarak. Kifaya was successful to bring together a group of activists and to use protest tactics against the regime, even though it failed in its political goal of ending presidency of Mubarak (Clarke 2011). Since 2005, however, Kifaya was not able to sustain its organizing activities in a massive scale. Mohamad El-Baradei was the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009, who became active as an opposition figure after his tenure ended in IAEA. He demanded for a number of political reforms and suggested that he might run for president. April 6th was a Facebook page and a group of activists that was established in 2006 in solidarity with a workers strike. We Are Khaled Said was another

Facebook page that was established when police officers killed a blogger Khaled Said in a very brutal manner. Someone caught the murder on video and then video went viral, and created a sense of outrage and anger on police brutality. The Facebook page then attracted thousands of followers there were also a group of independent labor syndicates and labor related NGOs that for previous years have been pressing for a number labor grievances resulted from Mubarak regime's neoliberal restructuring of economy (Clarke 2011, 2014; El-Ghobashy 2011; Kandil 2011b). Prior to the 2011 uprising, Egypt had witnessed a large number of worker strikes, but these were isolated instances of protest, and the claims remained limited to economic demands such as unpaid salaries (Beinin and Duboc 2011).

The Society of Muslim Brotherhood was the oldest among this group, founded in 1928 to Islamize Egyptian society and also liberates it from foreign domination. Muslim Brothers managed to attract membership in a massive scale mostly from Egyptian middle class. In 1952, they supported the Free Officers coup in an alliance with Naser, but that alliance ended soon. Naser brutally cracked down on Brothers and imprisoned all the leaders and many members of the group. Sadat released Brothers from prison in 1970s to counter the communist threat. A group of Brothers frustrated by violent treatment of the regime decided to resort to armed struggle. These members broke from Brotherhood and formed insurgent groups and launched operations against the regime. While the regime was able to crush this wave of insurgency, these campaigns of armed confrontation highlighted the importance of Brotherhood as a moderate Islamist group. Since 1982, a tacit deal was made with between Mubarak and Brotherhood. Mubarak let Brothers to be active as a cultural and religious network, and Brotherhood avoided any direct confrontation with the state. In this period, Brotherhood succeeded in expanding its network and penetrating different sectors of Egyptian society such as education, professional

syndicates, and religious establishment. Brotherhood attracted a lot of supporters among teachers; dominated student unions in many campuses throughout Egypt; and gained victories in the elections of professional syndicates such as Lawyers Syndicate and Medical Syndicate. Muslim Brotherhood also had its own network of members organized in units called a family [‘usra]. Each family meets every week and discusses religious and even sometimes self-help books together. Finally, Brotherhood has been also involved in variety of charity activities. Nonetheless, Mubarak regime exerted tremendous repression and surveillance over Brothers and made sure they would not use any of their social influence for political gains (Kandil 2011a; Lia 1999; Masoud 2014; Mitchell 1993).

Before the January 2011 rebellion these groups were disconnected from each other, and acted independently. There were groups with ties to these separated islands of opposition that could have acted as brokers, but these brokers had not been activated until the success of Tunisian revolution in December 2010 and January 2011. Inspired by the successful uprising in Tunisia, the brokers were encouraged to bring the opposition groups together and successfully did so (Clarke 2014). While these groups united behind the call to topple Mubarak, they did not have enough time over three weeks to discuss and reach a consensus over the pace and contour of the political change they were demanding. From January 25th to February 11th, the day Mubarak stepped down, the movement’s first priority was to survive and bring down the dictator. Once Mubarak was gone, there was no clear agenda for the rest of the transition to take place. While the opposition was not united behind any transition plan, there was also no hegemonic opposition group to set the agenda. Even though Muslim Brotherhood was organizationally stronger than the rest of the opposition, it was by no mean popular among secular opposition or the revolutionary youth.

Although Mubarak as the most powerful man in Egypt was toppled, important pillars of the authoritarian regime in Egypt remained intact. Military undoubtedly was the most powerful institution in the Egyptian politics on the eve of Mubarak's resignation. Indeed, the turning point in the rapid revolutionary events was when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) met on February 10th without their commander in chief, president Mubarak. The meeting signaled to the protestors and other observers that the military had abandoned the president. At that point, Mubarak had tried both concessions and repressive measures to quell the rebellion, but had appeared unsuccessful. When security forces proved unable to put down the uprising, military units were deployed to the streets. Mubarak's last hope was that military would be able to clean up the streets. While pressure from protestors was important in army's decision to abandon Mubarak (Ketchley 2014), there were also series of grievances that shaped military's decision. Geopolitically, military's ambitions for regional influence were restrained in exchange with the US military and financial aid. The US also made sure that the army's capabilities stay subordinate to Israel. In terms of domestic politics, even though after 1952 coup and under Naser military was in charge of both domestic repression and political management, under Sadat and Mubarak the Ministry of Interior became in charge of domestic repression, and NDP managed the political apparatus of the state. Finally, Mubarak's son Gamal and his capitalist allies beneficiaries from neoliberal policies were taking central positions within the administration and replacing the old guard in the regime. The military was not happy about being sidelined even further by this development (Kandil 2012). Even though the army received significant credit for its game changing role and its support of the revolution, these reasons behind military's decision show how institutional self-interest was behind the decision rather than a sincere support of the

popular democratic revolution. In the absence of a united revolutionary movement with a clear transition plan, the SCAF took the mandate as the actor in charge of the transition period.

Even though the revolution resulted in the new identity of revolutionary youth in Egyptian politics, and also endorsed values of democracy, freedom, and justice, it was too short to create a strong and popular organization to implement the values and objectives of the revolution. Small groups such as the Alliance of Revolutionary Youth were formed, but these were small protest groups and did not have the intention or capacity of turning to political parties contesting executive or legislature. On the other hand, existing leftist parties such as Tagamu' and liberal parties such as The New Wafd were organizationally weak and not confident about their electoral performance. Thus, when it came the elections neither the protest groups such as April 6th nor the Alliance of the Revolutionary Youth nor the older secular parties, either liberal or leftist, were able to electorally compete with Muslim Brotherhood. Since the alliance between Brotherhood and secular groups was just a negative coalition against Mubarak, these groups did not have an understanding about the transition parameters. On the other hand, because of the organizational weakness of the secular strand they lacked the organizational weight to counterbalance Muslim Brotherhood in electoral competition and then negotiate an agreement based on their balance of forces.

The Negative Coalition Crumbles

With departure of Mubarak one of the major questions dominating the public discourse in Egypt concerned the civilians that were going to take power after SCAF. This was among the most important questions about the transition that had not been discussed during the uprising, because of the very short time between the outbreak of the rebellion and Mubarak's fall. Now

with a lack of consensus over this issue, on the one hand, Muslim Brothers would see elections as an opportunity to finally enter executive and legislature, and on the other hand, secular revolutionaries were concerned about their electoral performance and thus having the chance to have a voice in the leadership of the post-transition democracy. Reflecting these concerns in the secular camp, two weeks after Mubarak's fall an op-ed in Al-Masr Al-Youm described the main challenge ahead of the revolution as creating a strong party to promote the goals of the revolution:

There will remain a real challenge facing the Egyptian revolution, which is building a new political movement based on real social forces, and the networks of civil social action, especially because the existing parties and the old political organizations are detached from realities, and the political path has remained isolated from the social. Now it's time to build a real communication between the two.

The real challenge for January 25th revolution is to transform principles of the revolution into a new party and political practices, to build a party or forge a large coalition based on new social forces such as trade unions, the second generation of entrepreneurs, and lower and middle classes keen in building a new Egypt with justice and democracy. The upcoming presidential and legislative elections are crucial (Al-Masr Al-Youm February 24 2011).

More specifically, journalists and intelligentsia pointed to the organizational weakness of the secular versus Islamic groups. They argued that the weakness of liberals and their

fragmentation is not because of their ideological inferiority but because of the lack of a unifying and broad organization:

The current scene indicates that the Islamic strand with its different forces is at the end an organized strand with the least fragmentation, regardless of its intellectual authority or political agenda, and it seems that other political strands do not have such level of cohesion. There is no doubt that nationalist and leftist strands need to re-organize and unite to gain political representation in any future democratic experience.

And that is necessary in the upcoming period to have a large political organization to include liberals of independent personalities in various fields of specialization. This strand is not united now, not because of intellectual reasons, but because of political and organizational matters. That is because, although it is a large elite segment, it does not exist in the form of organized parties (Al-Masr Al-Youm February 25 2011).

Liberal's awareness of their organizational disadvantage was also reflected in their comments about the upcoming elections. Prominent sociologist, Sa'dedin Ibrahim, for example, in his interview with WSJ said that holding election in six month is not wise and elections perhaps should be delayed for many years (Wall Street Journal February 26th 2011). Liberal intelligentsia argued that current political parties do not reflect the forces behind the January 25th revolution. Postponing elections would give an opportunity to those groups to organize (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 12th 2011). "Elections would do their function of representation after we give time to forces that made the revolution to build parties" (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 13th 2011).

Liberals also demanded to have a proportional representation system in the parliamentary election; so political forces with strong organizations such as Muslim Brotherhood and NDP would not dominate the electoral scene (Al-Masr Al-Youm February 28 2011). Accordingly, they demanded to have presidential election first, and then the parliamentary election (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 6th & 9th 2011). They perhaps thought their candidate would be able to defeat Brotherhood's candidate through personal appeal, and Brothers' organizational advantage is more likely to be defeated.

On the other hand Muslim Brotherhood was confident about its electoral performance and favored transition of power from military to civilians through early elections. This disagreement between Brothers and secular forces became visible before the Constitutional referendum in March. After the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF had suspended the 1971 Constitution, and appointed a committee of jurists to draft some changes. These changes along with a map of road were put in referendum on March 19th 2011. The map of road indicated that if the referendum passes first parliamentary election will be held; the new parliament will choose the Constitutional Assembly; then a new president will be elected; and finally new Constitutional draft would be put on referendum by the end of year 2012. While Muslim Brotherhood and the NDP favored a yes vote in the referendum, liberal and leftist parties advocated a no vote in the referendum. They were of the opinion that instead making a number of amendments a completely new constitution should be written, and drafting a new constitution and then holding parliamentary and presidential elections would give them a longer period of time to organize. Mustafa Al-Tawil, a member of the New Wafd party, for instance, said his party rejects the Constitutional change, "because political parties have not had the opportunity of going to the streets after thirty years of repression". He called supporters of the elections such as Muslim

Brotherhood and the NDP election professionals, as it is in their interest to implement the Constitutional changes and hold elections (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 15th 2011). Muslim Brothers on the other hand stated that the yes vote in the referendum would guarantee clean elections, and writing the constitution first would extend the transition period indefinitely, change the relationship between the national and army from cooperation to collision, and provide an opportunity for counter-revolution to act in the absence of a constitution (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 16th 2011). Despite such oppositions the yes vote won an overwhelming majority (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 21 2011).

The defeat of the no vote stood as an alert for the secular activists and highlighted the question of organization for them once again. Sociologist Sa'dedin Ibrahim reflected on the organizational weakness of the revolutionary youth, in particular. He wrote

the youth forces that sparked the revolution has more enthusiasm and dedication than experience, organizational, and material resources. Although some have recently started to organize themselves, and announced the formation of a new party, the majority of the Tahrir youth have not done that, either because of suspicions about the feasibility of parties originally, or preoccupation with the necessities of life, after months of devoting their time and energies for the revolution. They no doubt need several additional months to restore the balance, and then take off (Al-Masr Al-Youm May 21st 2011).

Another op-ed with a similar tone also encouraged the revolutionary youth to engage in electoral activities, forming parties, and forge committees to supervise elections, because going to Tahrir from time to time is not sufficient to protect the revolution (Al-Masr Al-Youm April 8th

2011). In their discussion of party-building Egyptian commentators even directly referred to Samuel Huntington's argument about the necessity of party building and institutional change:

[The chaos and violence involved in transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes] happens as a result of the absence of political institutions able to organize the magnitude of the sudden demand for political participation and expression of the interests and demands. Perhaps socioeconomic [fe'awiyya] demonstrations reflected this disparity between the size of the rapid uptake of political expressions on the one hand and the absence of political institutions in the form of parties or trade unions or organizations that can "organize" such participation on the other hand.

What is indicated by one of the theories is that «the establishment of political institutions must precede the broad political participation represented in the practice of democracy (Al-Masr Al-Youm May 2nd 2011).

While discussions were ongoing about the necessity of party building, another episode of confrontation emerged between Islamists and seculars around two campaigns of “elections first” or “Constitution first”. Islamists, confident of their organizational strength and accordingly electoral performance advocated the “election first” campaign, while seculars favored “constitution first” in the hope that drafting a constitution would postpone elections and give a better opportunity to organize. Groups such as the Assembly for Change affiliated with Baradei, Amr Musa, Kifaya, April 6th, Alliance of Revolutionary Youth organized a rally for May 26th under names of “The Second Friday of Rage” or “Milyuniya for Correction of Path” to demand a new constitution before the election, national dialogue before issuing any new law, and

postponement of election, while Brothers called this demonstration anti- nation (Al-Masr Al-Youm May 26th 2011, the Guardian June 21st 2011). At the same time, Amr Musa and Muhammad El-Baradei warned over the dominance of Muslim Brotherhood without giving the opportunity to parties and political youth movements to prepare for these elections (Al-Masr Al-Youm May 23rd 2011). Thirty-six secular political parties organized a campaign and collected ninety thousand signatures to delay elections. The Alliance of the Revolutionary Youth also claimed to have collected five million signatures for “Constitution First” (Al-Masr Al-Youm Al-Masr Al-Youm June 17th, 18th, 21st 2011).

They argued that the Brothers are a minority but has the biggest and most prepared organization. Comparing Brothers with followers of Khomeini in the Iranian Revolution, liberals argued that if elections are held, Brothers are going to win, but will not carry out any more competitive elections (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 19th 2011). Sa’dedin Ibrahim called on SCAF and asked why is the junta letting Brotherhood to kidnap the election (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 25th 2011; July 2nd 2011). Jamal Al-Banna, a liberal intellectual, and the younger brother of Hasan Al-Banna the founder of Muslim Brotherhood stated that the necessity at that point is stability and elections are just a means for such an end. The required stability for holding elections did not exist at that point. Instead,

The healthy form of rule right now is not possible with elections. The healthy form [of rule] then is cooperation between SCAF, the revolutionary alliance, and the administration. This is the kind of rule that the nation wants, which would be spoiled by an election that brings up Muslim Brothers and Salafis (Al-Masr Al-Youm August 10th 2011).

On the other hand, Mohammad Morsi, the head of the Freedom and Justice Party said the ones asking for delay in elections are followers of Israel and America (Al-Masr Al-Youm July 5th 2011). Brothers reminded the seculars to respect the will of the majority and the law, and claimed that those who asked for delay in elections were the ones that started preparing for elections before others (Ikhwanonline on June 23^h & July 27th 2011). Muslim Brothers contended that “those trying to postpone the parliamentary elections, thus the constitution, the election of the next president, and the continuation of the transition period, want to keep the junta in power” (Ikhwanonline on September 7th 2011).

The dispute between Brotherhood and seculars continued, even though some commentators found the polarization dangerous for the course of the revolution. These analysts warned that the biggest challenge for the revolution is the rift between the secular and religious strands, and they should enter into direct dialogue to rescue the revolution (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 14th 2011; July 27th 2011; August 5th 2011). Another author argued that it is true that Brothers had organizational advantage and a better chance for electoral victory, but other parties should still participate in elections.

Political forces should set aside their fears and participate in the election. Revolutions would not achieve their goals all at once. Such a thing might lead to a coup. If Brothers and Salafis have anything more than moral preaching, then good for them and the country; If they don't, that will be their end (Al-Masr Al-Youm September 30th 2011).

As the time approached for the parliamentary election approached through the end of the year, the chasm groups with strong and weak organization continued, this time about the

procedure of the election. Liberal parties such as Wafd, the Islamist group Jama'at Al-Islamiyya and revolutionary groups such as April 6th rejected the way electoral districts were divided in the new electoral law. With the new law, they said Brothers and former members of NDP would dominate the election, and that the new law is oppressive toward the revolutionary forces. On the other hand, Salafis and NDP welcomed the new law. Muslim Brotherhood criticized the law but stated they would abide by it (Al-Masr Al-Youm September 5th 2011).

Even though different parties recognized and discussed the organizational weakness of the secular strand in electoral politics, still protest groups such as April 6th declined the demand for turning into political parties. Instead, they preferred pressuring authorities through organizing protest events or lobbying (Al-Masr Al-Youm October 20th 2011). Maha Abdelrahman (2013) has also documented a preference for horizontal organizing and avoiding classic party politics among revolutionary groups. She argues that while such organizing mode was effective for the earlier phase of uprising, it did not appear very effective after the fall of Mubarak when it was time for election and translating street leverage to institutional power. Egyptian observers and analysts also expressed such criticisms of the youth mode of organizing. An article in Al-Masr Al-Youm blamed the revolutionary groups for limiting the political action to protest and demonstration and counting other forms of politics treason or betrayal to the revolution.

They succeeded in distorting the idea of party work and created a problem by separating party action and revolutionary action, and the assumption that they are contradictory, and put us in front of a miserable scene in which political parties don't practice politics in its fundamental sense and forces of revolutionary protest do not merge with the people and mobilize it to achieve the demands of the revolution (October 24th 2011).

In addition to timing of elections, Brothers and secular political forces also disagreed about the using protest or electoral tactics during the transition period. Brotherhood saw elections as a venue, through which they could finally enter into Egyptian state, and they did not want to spoil this new opportunity by destabilizing the political scene through protest tactics. Brothers not only avoided participation in protest events organized by revolutionary youth against SCAF but in occasions they criticized those events as violent or disruption of traffic, daily business around Tahrir Square, and stopping the shipment in Suez Canal (e.g. Ikhwanonline July 27th 2011). This split perhaps became the most obvious during the incidents in November 2011, when the interim government of prime minister Esam Sharaf released a document prepared by deputy prime minister Dr. Ali Selmi called the "Declaration of the Fundamental Principles of the New Egyptian State". This document was supposed to guarantee certain constitutional principles before the formation of the Constitutional Assembly. The most controversial among those principles were articles that were guaranteeing military's privileges and autonomy from civilian supervision. The document generated a backlash from opposition groups from different ideological orientation, even Muslim Brotherhood that had avoided using protest tactics against SCAF since the ouster of Mubarak despite other revolutionary groups frequently organized protest events against junta. On November 18th these groups organized a massive protest events in Tahrir Square, in which Muslim Brothers had a very visible presence and according some accounts even dominated the scene. Although Brothers had planned to be present for a day, a group of protestors stated in Tahrir Square and announced wouldn't leave until resignation of the interim government, and transition of power from SCAF to a civilian presidential council. Security forces brutally cracked down on protestors in Muhammad Mahmud street near Tahrir, resulted in more than tens death and a thousand people wounded. Muslim Brothers condemned

violence by SCAF, however, also decided to stay out of protests, as parliamentary elections were about to happen in about two weeks. Brotherhood was hoping to win a significant number of seats in parliament and did not want the clashes with security forces disrupt the electoral process. Brothers' absence from the Muhammad Mahmud incident deepened the divide between Brothers and secular revolutionary groups, and even resulted in internal tensions between the leadership and younger members of Brotherhood (Al-Masr Al-Youm November 19th, 20th, 23rd November 2011).

On the first day of election November 28th still Tahrir square protestors were divided between those who participated in the election, and the ones that boycotted the election and called the parliament illegitimate until the military junta steps down. Two weeks before the election, a judicial ruling also had banned members of NDP to enter into the electoral race. With NDP absent from the contest, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis dominated the parliament with in turn 37.5% and 27.8% of the votes followed by the liberal New Wafd and Egyptian Bloc by 9.2% and 8.9%.

In the discussions on the victory of Islamists and poor performance of secular parties, commentators highlighted the issue of organizational capacity once again. Members of the new parties such as Egyptian Social Democratic Party (ESDP) stated that they did not have enough time to establish party branches in all regions of the country. Abu El-Ghar, member of ESDP, said, "We're a new party, having registered exactly three and a half months before elections. ... We couldn't build the party in the Delta so we only worked in Cairo and southern Egypt." Other members of the party also added that they spent a lot of time and resources at protests and

demonstrations, while Islamists party focused on their electoral campaign and mobilizing their religious network (Ahramonline February 27th 2011).

On the other hand, even before the parliament starts its term, liberal commentators started talking about the dissolution of the parliament. One author argued that since this election occurred in a transitory phase, there might be a new election soon (Al-Masr Al-Youm December 28th 2012). Another journalist talked about an approximating “a new clash between the Parliament, whose members were elected through ballot boxes, and Tahrir Square whose revolutionaries are still Trustees of Egypt, among those who have their hands in the legislation of laws, and those in whose hands move the demonstrators” (Al-Masr Al-Youm January 24th 2012). Questioning the revolutionary legitimacy of the parliament, Tariq Al-Malat, the spokesman of Wasat party, a moderate Islamic party wrote that twenty percent of those participated in the revolution won eighty percent of seats in the parliament, thus the parliament did not represent revolutionaries (Al-Masr Al-Youm February 2nd 2012). Accordingly, on the first day of parliament February 1st 2012, a group of protestors gathered on parliament’s door and stopped new MPs from entering the building. Brotherhood, in turn, released a statement lamented protestors and those who "think the legitimacy of the square is greater than that of parliament" (Hamid 2014:151).

The old regime strikes back

As the new parliament started its term, its main task was to choose the members of the Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution. With Islamists dominating the parliament, a new dispute emerged around the procedure of choosing the members of the assembly. Salafis demanded to have 60% of the members of the Assembly from the parliament, while Brothers

asked for 40%. Secular groups, however, asked for a smaller percent of the Assembly members to be from the parliament, and a bigger portion from various groups outside the legislature (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 5th & 17th 2012). Secular groups however Brothers and Salafis of monopolizing the assembly and not being inclusive towards various groups and segments of the Egyptian society. Groups such as April 6th and the Alliance of the Revolutionary Youth organized protest demonstrations under the rubric of “Constitution for All”, and a number of the representatives withdrew from the Constitutional Assembly in protest (Al-Masr Al-Youm March 26th, 27th, 29th & 31st 2012). Finally, the Supreme Administrative Court dissolved the Assembly, because the assembly had included members of the parliament. Leaders of liberal and leftist parties welcomed this decision and called it a historical ruling (Al-Masr Al-Youm April 11th & 12th 2012).

Judiciary was another institution, through which the holdovers from the previous regime were exerting influence over post-Mubarak politics and now trying to limit the power of electoral institutions dominated by Islamists. Both Sadat and Mubarak had managed to place their loyalist judges in key positions within judiciary despite resistance from independent judges (Aziz 2016).

On the other hand, after taking a plurality of seats in the parliament Brothers tried to depose prime minister Kamal Ganzouri, who was a Mubarak era politician that had appointed as prime minister by SCAF after the November protests against the military Junta. One of the demands of the protestors at the time was the resignation of prime minister Esam Sharaf. After the protests Sharaf resigned, but instead of appointing a prime minister favored by revolutionaries SCAF appointed Ganzouri as a slap in the face of protestors. Despite Brothers’ dominance over the legislature and their organizing protest demonstrations, SCAF did not submit

to the parliament's demand to appoint a prime minister elected by the new government. SCAF's resistance to this demand meant that having a parliamentary majority would not be enough to bring a change in the executive.

Even though liberal parties demanded postponement of the presidential election until the Constitution is written, the first round of the elections were held on May 23rd, and 24th. As a surprise to many, Muhammad Morsi and Ahmad Shafiq took the first and second positions, while liberal politician Hamdin Sabbahi, and Abdul Mon'im Abolfutuh ended third and fourth. This result was very disappointing for the secular and revolutionary groups because it already meant that none of the candidates closer to them could make it to the run-off. Shafiq's victory meant a complete loss for the revolution, and Morsi's victory equated the domination of Muslim Brotherhood over the political scene.

Between two rounds of presidential election, the judiciary, this time the Supreme Constitutional Court, issued another important ruling this time annulling the parliament, because according the Court some of seats assigned to independent individuals had won by party members. The Court also ruled that Ahmad Shafiq Mubarak's previous prime minister was allowed to enter the presidential race. Shafiq was barred from the race before, because of law passed by the parliament that banned members of the ancient regime from entering into post-transition elections (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 15th 2012). Nonetheless, Morsi defeated Shafiq in a close race, and was elected as Egypt's first president elected in a competitive election.

The secular strand interpreted the election results and Morsi's victory as a defeat for the revolution. Going to ballot boxes at a wrong time, according to this interpretation, was a big mistake (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 21st 2012). One commentator wrote that evacuating the streets

through ballot boxes was the plan of the counter-revolution. The military did not succeed in this task accidentally. After the fall of Mubarak, there was not a clear agenda for change; clean elections could have brought in a new power to set the agenda. However, for this scenario to work there has had to be a strong organization to defend the democratic alternative, but such an organization did not exist. Instead, Muslim Brotherhood was the biggest national organization, a conservative movement with “a long history of fear and collusion with the ruling power” (Al-Masr Al-Youm June 20th 2012).

As the new president, Morsi in his first important move, reinstated parliament that was annulled a month before by the Judiciary. Morsi’s decision was a counter-attack against the resurrection of the ancient regime this time through judiciary. Secular politicians, however, did not share this perception. Instead, they said Morsi was not respecting the division of power and stepping out of his legal authority. El-Baradei said Morsi was wasting the judicial authority. Sabbahi stated that Morsi should have followed the order of the Supreme Court, and other secular parties as well condemned his decision. The Supreme Constitutional Court also stroke back at Morsi and annulled his order. Muslim Brotherhood organized demonstrations in protest to judiciary’s actions. The revolutionary youth and secular parties, as expected, declined to participate in those demonstrations (Al-Masr Al-Youm July 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, & 13th 2012).

Morsi also tried to counter military’s efforts against the electoral institutions. In a bold move, he retired military’s chief Field Marshal Hasan Tantawi, and appointed younger General Abdul-Fattah Al-Sisi as the new minister of defense and chief of military. Morsi described this move as flowing new blood in military’s veins after the revolution rather than a confrontation with military. Military resented this move but accepted president’s decree. One day later,

however, privately own newspaper Al-Dustur called for a military coup on its first page and wrote “Saving Egypt from the coming destruction will not occur without the union of the army and the people ... if this does not happen in the coming days, then Egypt will fall and be destroyed ... taking to the streets in peaceful protest is imperative and a national duty until the army responds and announces its support for the people” (Hamid 2014:155).

The treacherous alliance, civil society & old regime vs. the elected government

Shortly, a new dispute emerged soon about the second Constituent Assembly. This assembly was formed in June 2012 after a new deal was reached between representatives of various political parties, but after the Assembly started drafting a new constitution conflict emerged. Secular parties were specifically were dissatisfied about proposed article 2 that specified Islam is the main source of law making. Leftist parties organized demonstrations in September and asked for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. El-Baradei also refused to attend the assembly, stating that the assembly is illegal. Liberal politicians formed an alliance against Morsi and decided to withdraw from the Assembly and demanded the formation of a new one that represents all the parties. Demonstrations continued in October although they were very small in size. However, after violent clashes the opposition called Muslim Brotherhood responsible for the violence and protests slightly grew in size from hundreds to thousands.

In late November the conflict between Morsi and opposition entered a new round, when Morsi in a miscalculated move issued a constitutional declaration that gave him new authorities until the ratification of a new constitution. According to this decree, Morsi granted himself the power to override judicial rulings. He also ordered retrial of Husni Mubarak, and freed the Constitutional Assembly from judicial oversight. According to Morsi, this step was necessary to

protect the revolution from the remnants of the Mubarak regime and counter-revolution. The opposition, however, interpreted this move as autocratic and a step in Morsi's march toward dictatorship (Al-Masr Al-Youm November 23 2012, New York Times November 22nd 2012). Massive protests soon erupted in response to the decree. Leaders of the liberal opposition such as Bradae'i, Sabbahi, and Musa formed the National Salvation Front and called on Morsi to annul the decree. As the confrontation escalated, the military issued a statement and warned about the disastrous results of the escalation and stated that the armed forces would not let that happen. The Salvation Front supported the military's statement and wrote, "the statement is positive, and one can read between the lines army's anger over what has been coming from the ruling power crystalized in president Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood, and their followers" (Al-Masr Al-Youm December 9th 2012).

One day later violent clashes occurred between supporters of Morsi and the opposition around the presidential palace in Ittihadiya. At that night, security forces were not guarding the presidential palace. The opposition had called for a sit-in around the palace. To fill in for the security forces, Brotherhood members went to the building to support their president (Sallam 2012). Witnesses suggest that Brotherhood supporters attacked the protestors. In the clashes, about 11 people died, from which eight were Brotherhood members (Ibrahim 2015). The absence of the security forces at the scene suggested again that Muslim Brotherhood lacked control over deep state, even though the opposition over and over accused Brotherhood of "brotherization" [ikhwana] of the state. The violence at the Ittihadiya incident became perhaps the most important theme in opposition's discourse against Morsi and Brotherhood and important evidence for authoritarian and repressive manner of Brotherhood against opposition. This incidence is significant because it shows both Brotherhoods' lack of control over security

apparatus, and the role of ministry of interior in in the incidence by evacuating the presidential palace. The day after the clashes at the presidential president Morsi canceled the decree but stated that the referendum on the new Constitution would be still held later in December.

The confrontation then continued around the Constitutional referendum. The Salvation Front encouraged its supporters to cast a no ballot on the referendum day, while Brothers and Salafis supported the new Constitutional draft. Both sides organized demonstrations. Similar to previous electoral confrontations, Brothers again won the referendum with 63.8% voting yes against 36.2% voting no. The Salvation Front's general secretary said the Constitution is illegitimate, however, because of the low turnout and the Salvation Front called for protests to bring down the Constitution (Al-Masr Al-Youm December 26th, 27th, & 30th 2012).

On April 28th it was announced that members of the Kifaya Movement have launched a campaign called "Tamarrud" to collect signatures on a petition that calls for the fall of Morsi, and a large demonstration was also planned for June 30th the anniversary of Morsi's presidency (Al-Masr Al-Youm April 28th 2013). "Tamrrud" soon received the support of other secular and revolutionary forces such as Salvation Front and April 6th.

The old regime holdovers especially the military and the ministry of interior also facilitated the campaign in different ways. First, the security forces actively enabled and sanctions violent attacks to the headquarters and charity offices of Ikhwan in the run up to June 20th. Former NDP members also organized sit-ins and demonstration in support of the army in before places such as ministry of interior and faced on violent reaction from security forces. Officials in the ministry of interior published public announcements in newspapers and invited retired police officers to participate in June 30th protest. Evidence also suggest that police

officers both in uniform and civilian cloths played an active role in leading the crowd on June 30th (Ketchley forthcoming).

As June 30th approached the Army announced that they would support the nation. Such a statement signaled to the protestors that they were not going to face repression, and the costs of participation would be low. Earlier liberal opposition had said that they would not rule out the intervention of the Army. Al-Baradei also had said a few months back that it was military's national duty to intervene if order and law were absent. An op-ed on Al-Masr Al-Youm wrote a few days before the day of demonstration that "it is on the children of revolution and army to rise together to rescue Egypt before it gets wasted on the hands of Brothers." Such a tone could be even found in the scholarly analysis written on Egypt at the time. A political sociologist and expert on Egyptian politics wrote in London Review of Books in March 2013:

The best hope for the revolution is an alliance between the organisationally strong military and members of the extremely disorganised revolutionary camp. An alliance of that sort would compel the revolutionaries to give up many of their demands, but it would also place the country on a quite different path – which is why the security apparatus will do everything it can to prevent it (Kandil 2013).

This rather positive tone towards military was in contrast to protests that revolutionary groups such as April 6th had organized in 2011, when SCAF was still in charge of the government and transition process. Even though SCAF had initially gained popularity among revolutionaries when withdrew support from Mubarak, repressive measures taken by SCAF such as military trial for civilians, virginity test for detained female protestors, and avoiding the trial of Mubarak and his close aides really damaged its credentials and outraged revolutionaries. The

revolutionary youth groups organized a series of protest events against SCAF starting in July 2011 (Cole 2012). These protests were significant as they challenged and shattered military's picture as the main guardian and supporter of the revolution. Brothers were mostly absent from these protest events, even though they perhaps supported the objectives of the protestors. After revolutionaries failed in gaining any form of political representation within the executive and legislature, and Muslim Brotherhood dominated those branches the tone of those groups also changed about military and judiciary as important elements of the old regime.

By June 29th Tamarrud stated that they have collected 22 million signatures. On June 30th large demonstrations were held in many cities in Egypt. The opposition claimed that millions of people have participated, although it is not possible to confirm such claims with existing evidence. On July 1st, the army issued a statement and said if the political crisis would not end in two days, the military would intervene. Again in contrast to revolutionary's opposition to SCAF in 2011-2 this time they were supportive of military's intervention. Ahmed Maher of 6th April Movement for example stated on July 2nd that protestors should not fear military and Sisi's statement reassured them that the army was going to protect Egyptians and not to take a part in politics or government role (Daily News Egypt July 2nd 2013). On July 3rd military moved its tanks to the presidential palace and deposed democratically elected president Morsi, while enjoying the support of revolutionary groups, secular opposition, and even some Islamist groups. Secular forces mobilizing in Tamarrud were thinking that would dominate the political scene after the military deposes Morsi. The SCAF initially appointed Adly Mansour the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court as the interim president and Mohamad El-Baradei was

appointed as prime minister. However, Baradei and other revolutionaries soon recognized that SCAF is not going to hand executive power to civilians for a second time. Baradei resigned after the security forces killed about 900 brotherhood members protesting the ouster of Morsi. General Sisi the leader of the coup was elected as Egypt's new president in a sham election in March 2014.

Conclusion

Egypt provides an interesting example of the difficulties facing a young democracy emerged from short-term mobilization. The January 25th uprising managed to topple Mubarak in about three weeks, but lacked enough momentum bring down powerful pillars of the Mubarak regime such as military, politicized judiciary, and ministry of interior. These institutions then actively sought to derail the democratization process in the post-Mubarak era. In addition, the movement emerged and succeeded so quickly in overthrowing Mubarak that did not have time to engage in the conversation about the post-Mubarak period. The alliance between different participants of the January 25th revolution soon crumbled over the parameters of the transition period. Groups that had participated in January 25th uprising split about whether to protest tactics vs. electoral participation, who would lead the executive in the transition period, the victory of which groups represents revolutionary success, how soon election to be held, and in what order. On the one hand, Muslim Brotherhood, enjoying a strong organizations and confident of its electoral performance, favored early elections. On the other hand, secular opposition anxious about their organizational weakness and electoral performance demanded a longer transition period and postponement of elections. The rapid success of the movement did not require organization building that is often associated with longer popular campaigns. The secular revolutionaries, then, did not have an organization that could collect votes in the elections in 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood an eighty years old Islamist group had a large organization with different chapters throughout the country, that enabled it to succeed in several elections in 2011-2012. When revolutionaries and other secular parties failed to achieve their goals through electoral participation, they organized protest campaigns against presidency of Muslim brotherhood's Mohammad Morsi. This protest mobilization along with media campaign to legitimize Morsi prepared the stage for military's intervention to depose Morsi, and

the return of the previous regime's holdovers. If the movement had not succeeded so fast, it is likely that revolutionaries would have provided a larger organizational infrastructure and accordingly would have done better in the subsequent election. If the secular opposition then had secured more seats in the parliament or won presidency, it would have been more likely that Islamists and seculars would have reached a compromise because of their balance of institutional power. It is also likely that in a longer movement Islamist and secular forces would have agreed on the transition agenda despite their organizational disparities.

The case of Egypt suggests short movements might be effective in creating a rupture for authoritarian regimes, but do not appear as effective in leading the country to democracy through the transition period. However, when the transition period starts such factors may not be enough for guaranteeing a smooth transition to democracy. Opposition groups need to perform as effectively in the post-transition elections, which requires alliance making and party building on behalf of the democratic movements. Short mobilization periods may not provide enough time for democratic activists to form such alliances and also expand their organizational capacity for a better electoral performance. In such situations fragmentation of democracy movements and their organizational weakness could lead to destabilizing clashes between the opposition groups and prepare the political scene for the resurrection of the old regime holdovers and the restoration of authoritarian order.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In the first of this dissertation, I demonstrated that first protest matters for the outcome of authoritarian regimes and their transition to democratic regime. In the second and third chapter, I explored the effect protest mobilization on durability of new democracies. I argued that the length of the mobilization matters for democratic durability. The longer the length of the protest movement, the higher the chance of new democracies to survive. I then used case studies to investigate mechanisms underlying this association. Cases of South Africa, Poland, Pakistan, Russia, and Indonesia showed that the length of the movement matters because long movements require building a vast organizational infrastructure. Long movements also build the momentum to marginalize the authoritarian elite. When the transition occurs, the movement organization could provide popular leadership for the new democracy to build new democratic institutions. The organizational residue of the movement could also become part of the post-transition civil society. In chapter 3, I examined the case of Egypt more closely. While the incidents in Egypt between 2011-3 highlights the importance of these mechanisms, they also point to another mechanism affecting the relationship between democratic mobilization and durability, formation of alliances and reaching consensus over transition between opposition groups. The uprising that brought down Mubarak was too short to create strong ties between major factions of opposition in Egypt. This mechanism in addition to organizational disparity between Islamist and secular groups led to the alliance of secular revolutionary and elements of old regime in the popular coup of July 3rd 2013.

I plan to publish the first paper separately, and expand the second and third chapter into a book manuscript that focuses on protest mobilization and democratic durability. For the next step in preparing a book manuscript, I see three potential directions to take. First, the conclusions drawn from the case of Egypt made me rethink my analysis of Indonesia. In Indonesia, we also observe a fractured opposition after the transition. However, one important difference with Egypt was that Liberal forces were able to build a party quickly and gained the highest number of seats in 1999 parliamentary election, while Golkar party of the previous regime, ended second, and two parties associated with Muslim organizations became third and fourth. This rather more balanced division of seats in the parliament enabled liberal groups to follow their contest against the Islamist president Wahid through institutional channel rather than allying with elements of the old regime such either Golkar party or the Indonesian military.

Another potential direction to take is to add a case study of Tunisia. Tunisia was also case of rapid and successful mobilization. Even though Tunisian democracy has be alive to this day, we still observe some similarities in terms the consequences of short-term mobilization with Egypt such as fractured opposition, and the alliance of secular opposition and old regime politicians against Islamists. In the case of Tunisia we can see also the importance of large organizations such as the trade union Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). While there was no massive secular organization in Egypt, UGTT perhaps provided an important political force in Tunisia to counterbalance Islamist political dominance. The case of Tunisia, then, highlights the importance of the relations between regime and civil society before the transition and regime's strategy to control civil society organizations.

Finally in the R&R decision that I have received for the second paper, reviewers have asked about the effect of armed insurgency, and the fact that it is as likely for them to leave a

rich organizational legacy. Another potential chapter that I might add to the book manuscript revolves around the cases of armed insurgency and democratic durability. Based on reviews El Salvador would be one of the cases. It is a famous case in terms of contribution of armed insurgency in democratic transition, and might correspond with my general theory. After the end of civil war, FMLN transformed to a political party and became the main left party in El Salvador. It was able to gain majority in the parliament a few years after the transition. However, I don't think we will find many cases similar to El Salvador. In several other cases, armed insurgency at best provided a flank effect. In these cases, the insurgency did not end during the time of transition, so the insurgent organization was not involved in building democratic institutions. In cases of some other bloody civil wars, it was through international intervention that a settlement was reached and demobilizing insurgent organizations into the democratic politics was a challenge for building the new regime rather than those organizations being the active builders of regime and civil society. In this chapter, I would explore these different patterns and show the legacy of armed conflict is at best a mixed effect.

APPENDIX 1: THE LIST OF ELECTIONS IN THE ANALYSIS

Table 11: Elections in the Analysis

Country	Election Type	Date	Incumbent Defeat	LEO	Democratic Transition
Albania	Legislative	3/22/92	1	0	0
Albania	Legislative	5/26/96	0	0	0
Albania	Legislative	6/29/97	1	0	0
Albania	Legislative	6/24/01	0	0	0
Algeria	Legislative	6/5/97	0	0	0
Algeria	Executive	4/15/99	0	0	0
Algeria	Legislative	5/30/02	0	0	0
Algeria	Executive	4/8/04	0	0	0
Armenia	Executive	9/22/96	0	0	0
Armenia	Executive	3/16/98	0	1	0
Armenia	Legislative	5/30/99	0	0	0
Armenia	Executive	2/19/03	0	0	0
Armenia	Legislative	5/25/03	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Executive	10/3/93	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Legislative	11/12/95	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Executive	10/11/98	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Legislative	11/5/00	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	Executive	10/15/03	0	0	0
Belarus	Legislative	10/15/00	0	0	0
Belarus	Executive	9/9/01	0	0	0
Belarus	Legislative	10/17/04	0	0	0
Bosnia	Executive	9/12/98	1	0	0
Bosnia	Legislative	11/11/00	0	0	0
Bosnia	Executive	10/5/02	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	Executive	12/1/91	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	Legislative	5/24/92	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	Legislative	5/11/97	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	Executive	11/15/98	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	Legislative	5/5/02	0	0	0
Burundi	Legislative	6/29/93	1	0	0
Cambodia	Legislative	7/27/03	0	0	0
Cameroon	Legislative	6/30/02	0	0	0
Cameroon	Executive	10/11/04	0	0	0
Central African Republic	Legislative	11/22/98	0	0	0
Central African Republic	Executive	9/19/99	0	0	0
Chad	Legislative	1/5/97	0	0	0
Chad	Executive	5/20/01	0	0	0
Chad	Legislative	4/21/02	0	0	0
Comoros	Legislative	12/12/93	1	0	0
Congo Brazzaville	Executive	8/2/92	1	1	0
Congo Brazzaville	Legislative	5/2/93	0	0	0
Congo Brazzaville	Executive	3/10/02	0	0	0
Congo Brazzaville	Legislative	5/26/02	0	0	0
Croatia	Legislative	10/29/95	0	0	0
Croatia	Legislative	4/13/97	0	0	0
Croatia	Executive	6/15/97	0	0	0

Croatia	Executive	1/24/00	1	1	1
Dominican Rep	Executive	5/16/96	1	1	1
Egypt	Legislative	11/29/90	0	0	0
Egypt	Executive	10/4/93	0	0	0
Egypt	Legislative	11/29/95	0	0	0
Egypt	Executive	9/26/99	0	0	0
Egypt	Legislative	10/18/00	0	0	0
Gabon	Executive	12/5/93	0	0	0
Gabon	Legislative	12/15/96	0	0	0
Gabon	Executive	12/6/98	0	0	0
Gabon	Legislative	12/9/01	0	0	0
Gambia	Legislative	1/17/02	0	0	0
Georgia	Executive	10/11/92	0	0	0
Georgia	Executive	11/5/95	0	0	0
Georgia	Legislative	10/31/99	0	0	0
Georgia	Executive	4/9/00	0	0	0
Georgia	Legislative	11/2/03	0	0	0
Georgia	Executive	1/4/04	0	0	1
Ghana	Executive	11/3/92	0	1	0
Ghana	Legislative	12/29/92	0		0
Ghana	Executive	12/7/96	0	1	0
Ghana	Executive	12/7/00	1	0	1
Guatemala	Executive	11/11/90	1	0	0
Guatemala	Legislative	8/14/94	0	0	0
Guatemala	Executive	11/12/95	0	0	0
Guinea	Legislative	6/11/95	0	0	0
Guinea	Executive	12/14/98	0	0	0
Guinea	Legislative	6/30/02	0	0	0
Guinea	Executive	12/21/03	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	Executive	11/28/99	1	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	Legislative	3/28/04	0	0	0
Haiti	Legislative	5/21/00	0	0	0
Haiti	Executive	11/26/00	0	0	0
Indonesia	Legislative	6/9/92	0	0	0
Indonesia	Legislative	6/7/99	1	1	1
Iran	Legislative	4/10/92	0	0	0
Iran	Executive	6/11/93	0	0	0
Iran	Legislative	3/8/96	0	0	0
Iran	Executive	5/23/97	0	0	0
Iran	Legislative	2/18/00	0	0	0
Iran	Executive	6/8/01	0	0	0
Iran	Legislative	2/20/04	1	0	0
Ivory Coast	Executive	10/22/95	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	Legislative	11/26/95	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	Executive	10/22/00	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	Legislative	12/10/00	1	0	0
Jordan	Legislative	11/4/97	1	0	0
Jordan	Legislative	6/17/03	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	Legislative	12/9/95	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	Executive	1/10/99	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	Legislative	10/10/99	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	Legislative	9/19/04	0	0	0
Kenya	Legislative	6/27/94	0	0	0

Kenya	Executive	12/27/02	1	1	1
Kuwait	Legislative	10/23/96	0	0	0
Kuwait	Legislative	7/3/99	1	0	0
Kuwait	Legislative	7/5/03	0	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	Legislative	2/20/00	0	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	Executive	10/29/00	0	0	0
Lebanon	Legislative	8/23/92	0	0	0
Lebanon	Legislative	8/18/96	0	0	0
Lebanon	Legislative	8/27/00	0	0	0
Lesotho	Legislative	3/27/93	1	1	1
Malawi	Executive	5/20/04	0	0	1
Malaysia	Legislative	10/20/90	0	0	0
Malaysia	Legislative	4/24/95	0	0	0
Malaysia	Legislative	11/29/99	0	0	0
Malaysia	Legislative	3/21/04	0	0	0
Mauritania	Legislative	10/11/96	1	0	0
Mauritania	Executive	12/12/97	0	0	0
Mauritania	Legislative	10/19/01	0	0	0
Mauritania	Executive	11/7/03	0	0	0
Mexico	Legislative	8/18/91	0	0	0
Mexico	Executive	8/21/94	0	0	0
Mexico	Legislative	7/6/97	0	0	1
Morocco	Legislative	6/25/93	1	0	0
Morocco	Legislative	11/14/97	1	0	0
Morocco	Legislative	9/27/02	1	0	0
Mozambique	Executive	12/3/99	0	0	0
Mozambique	Executive	12/1/04	0	0	0
Nepal	Legislative	11/15/94	1	0	0
Nepal	Legislative	5/3/99	0	0	1
Nicaragua	Executive	2/25/90	1	1	1
Niger	Executive	11/16/04	0	0	1
Nigeria	Legislative	7/4/92	0	0	0
Nigeria	Executive	6/12/93	0	0	0
Nigeria	Legislative	2/20/99	0		0
Nigeria	Executive	2/27/99	0	1	0
Nigeria	Legislative	4/12/03	0	0	0
Nigeria	Executive	4/19/03	0	0	0
Pakistan	Legislative	10/10/02	0	0	0
Paraguay	Constituent Assembly	12/1/91	0	0	0
Peru	Executive	4/9/95	0	0	0
Peru	Executive	4/9/00	0	1	0
Peru	Executive	4/8/01	0	1	1
Romania	Executive	9/27/92	0	0	0
Romania	Executive	11/3/96	0	1	1
Russia	Legislative	12/12/93	0	0	0
Russia	Legislative	12/17/95	1	0	0
Russia	Executive	6/16/96	0	0	0
Russia	Legislative	12/19/99	0	0	0
Russia	Executive	3/26/00	0	0	1
Senegal	Executive	2/21/93	0	0	0
Senegal	Legislative	5/9/93	0	0	0
Senegal	Legislative	5/25/98	0	0	0
Senegal	Executive	2/27/00	1	1	1

Sierra Leone	Executive	5/14/02	0	0	0
Singapore	Legislative	8/31/91	0	0	0
Singapore	Executive	8/28/93	0	0	0
Singapore	Legislative	1/2/97	0	0	0
Singapore	Legislative	11/3/01	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	Legislative	8/16/94	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	Executive	11/9/94	1	0	0
Sri Lanka	Executive	12/21/99	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	Legislative	10/10/00	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	Legislative	12/5/01	1	0	1
Sri Lanka	Legislative	4/2/04	0	0	0
Taiwan	Legislative	12/19/92	0	0	1
Tajikistan	Executive	11/6/99	0	0	0
Tajikistan	Legislative	2/27/00	0	0	0
Tanzania	Executive	10/29/00	0	0	0
Thailand	Legislative	3/22/92	1	1	0
Thailand	Legislative	9/13/92	1	1	1
Togo	Executive	6/21/98	0	0	0
Togo	Legislative	3/21/99	0	0	0
Togo	Legislative	10/27/02	0	0	0
Togo	Executive	6/1/03	0	0	0
Tunisia	Executive	3/20/94	0	0	0
Tunisia	Executive	10/24/99	0	0	0
Tunisia	Executive	10/24/04	0	0	0
Uganda	Constituent Assembly	3/28/94	0	0	0
Uganda	Executive	5/9/96	0	0	0
Uganda	Legislative	6/27/96	0	0	0
Uganda	Executive	3/12/01	0	0	0
Uganda	Legislative	6/26/01	0	0	0
Ukraine	Executive	6/26/94	0	0	1
Yugoslavia	Legislative	11/3/96	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	Executive	9/24/00	1	1	1
Zambia	Executive	12/27/01	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	Executive	3/28/90	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	Legislative	4/8/95	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	Executive	3/16/96	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	Legislative	6/24/00	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	Executive	3/9/02	0	0	0

APPENDIX 2: DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN THE ANALYSIS 1960-2010

Albania 91-NA
Argentina 73-76
Argentina 83-NA
Armenia 91-94
Azerbaijan 92-93
Bangladesh 08-NA
Bangladesh 90-07
Benin 91-NA
Bolivia 82-NA
Brazil 85-NA
Bulgaria 90-NA
Burundi 05-NA
Burundi 93-96
Cen African Rep 93-03
Chile 89-NA
Colombia 58-NA
Congo-Brz 92-97
Croatia 91-NA
Czechoslovakia 89-93
Dominican Rep 62-63
Dominican Rep 78-NA
Ecuador 68-70
Ecuador 79-NA
El Salvador 94-NA
Estonia 91-NA
Georgia 04-NA
Ghana 00-NA
Ghana 69-72
Ghana 79-81
Greece 74-NA
Guatemala 95-NA
Guinea Bissau 00-02
Guinea Bissau 05-NA
Haiti 06-NA
Haiti 90-91
Haiti 94-99
Honduras 57-63
Honduras 71-72
Honduras 81-NA
Hungary 90-NA
Indonesia 99-NA
Kenya 02-NA
Korea, South 60-61

Korea, South 87-NA
Latvia 91-NA
Lebanon 05-NA
Lesotho 65-70
Lesotho 93-NA
Liberia 05-NA
Lithuania 91-NA
Macedonia 91-NA
Madagascar 93-09
Malawi 94-NA
Mali 92-NA
Mauritania 07-08
Mauritius 68-NA
Mexico 00-NA
Moldova 91-NA
Mongolia 93-NA
Montenegro 06-NA
Myanmar 60-62
Nepal 06-NA
Nepal 91-02
Nicaragua 90-NA
Niger 93-96
Niger 99-NA
Nigeria 60-66
Nigeria 79-83
Nigeria 99-NA
Pakistan 08-NA
Pakistan 71-75
Pakistan 88-99
Panama 55-68
Panama 89-NA
Paraguay 93-NA
Peru 01-NA
Peru 56-62
Peru 63-68
Peru 80-92
Philippines 86-NA
Poland 89-NA
Portugal 76-NA
Romania 90-NA
Russia 91-93
Senegal 00-NA
Serbia 00-NA
Sierra Leone 61-67
Sierra Leone 96-97
Sierra Leone 98-NA

Slovakia 93-NA
Slovenia 91-NA
Somalia 60-69
South Africa 94-NA
Spain 77-NA
Sri Lanka 94-NA
Sudan 65-69
Sudan 86-89
Syria 61-62
Taiwan 00-NA
Thailand 07-NA
Thailand 75-76
Thailand 88-91
Thailand 92-06
Togo 63-67
Turkey 61-80
Turkey 83-NA
Uganda 62-66
Ukraine 91-NA
Uruguay 84-NA
Venezuela 58-05
Zambia 64-67
Zambia 91-96

APPENDIX 3: MOBILIZATION LENGTH AT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 1950-2010

Albania 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

The protest wave leading to democratic transition in Albania started in 1990 with anti-communist demonstrations and silent protest events by students. The biggest protest event occurred in July 1990 when thousands of Albanians stormed foreign embassies in an attempt to flee the country. The regime responded by introducing limited political reform. However, after students organized protests in November and December 1990, the regime for the first time accepted to the existence of independent political parties. The protests and labor unrest continued in 1991, and communists agreed to hold a multi-party election. The communist party won this election, but protests continued in the wake of the election. After a protest episode in March 1992 communists agreed to a new round of election, in which they lost the opposition Democratic Party (Biberaj 1999; Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo 2012).

Argentina 1974

Unarmed mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

The democratic transition in 1974 mostly happened because of the splits and disagreements within the military regime between the military junta and the government. After

1966 coup General Juan Carlos Onganía acted as the first president and initiated economic reform to establish a corporatist economic order. However, he failed to retain political support from the armed forces and was toppled by the junta in 1970. An uprising by workers and students in the city of Cordoba was also influential in military's move against Onganía. General Roberto Marcelo Levingston led the government as president but again was overthrown by the military due to military's dissatisfaction and again similar to Onganía after an episode of civil unrest again after an uprising by students and workers in Cordoba. Subsequently, the military junta took control of the government with general Alejandro Lanusse as the president. The junta promised to hold democratic elections in 1971. Elections were held in 1974. Although military was hoping to manipulate the election, but this plan failed and the Peronist candidate won the election (Arceneaux 2002).

Argentina 1984

Unarmed Mobilization: 7

Armed Mobilization: 0

Popular mobilization played an influential role in Argentina's democratic transition in 1984. In 1976 a military coup toppled the democratically elected government in Argentina and commenced another period of military dictatorship in the country. The first challenge to the military regime emerged in a wave of labor strike in 1977 thorough out the country. This wave of mobilization encouraged union leaders to take a more confrontationalist approach. In 1978, an oppositionist labor union the Commission of "25" was formed. The leaders of the group from the

beginning specified that the countries problems could only be solved through free elections and establishment of full democracy. In 1979, “25” organized a national strike around the country. Labor protest exacerbated divisions within the military regime about how to deal with the labor issue and financial matters. Throughout this time the labor movement was divided, however, between the collaborationist and confrontationist approach. Despite attempts to unify the unions around a more oppositionist approach, the unity again collapsed when one wing tried to achieve demands through negotiations with government in 1980. In 1981, confrontational unions organized another general strike. The strike was so massive that it led to the resignation of general Viola, the military leader of the country at the time. Protest continued after the ouster of Viola. From 1981 protests were coordinated between labor unions and political parties. In 1982 the largest demonstration since 1976 coup was organized. In 1982, Argentina’s military lost the Malvinas war to the Britain, which was big blow to the military’s credibility. According to one interpretation, the military launched this war to gain nationalist credibility in response to opposition’s massive mobilization. Discredited by massive protest and military defeat, the military decided to extricate from political power in 1983. Protest and strikes by the parties and the labor unions also continued in 1983 until an agreement was reached about the conditions of the democratic transition (Collier 1999; Munck 1998).

Armenia 1991

Unarmed Mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

In Armenia popular mobilization started in 1987, as activists organized demonstrations in support of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh. In 1988 workplace committees were formed to

convey information to the population about this issue. Along with several new informal groups, an umbrella group, Armenian National Movement also emerged in 1988 to unify and coordinate activities in the movement. Street demonstrations then continued from 1988 to 1990. Similar to other republics parliamentary elections were held in 1990. Following the failed putsch in August 1991 and dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia gained independence (Dudwick 1997).

Azerbaijan 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 1

In Azerbaijan a short democratic interval started with a relatively fair and free presidential election in 1992. The election happened after tumultuous years of rapid political change in Azerbaijan since 1987 with the dispute over Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia. The dispute started in 1987 with an Armenian campaign to annex the region to Armenia. In 1988 Azeris demonstrated for the first time in protest to inactivity of the government in dealing with dispute. The government, however, deployed tanks and troops to put down the strikes and demonstrations. In July 1989 Azerbaijan Popular Front was formed. In December 1989 Armenia announced the annexation of Nagorno-Karabagh to Armenia. Azeris demonstrated again in protest to government's inactivity. The protesters, however, resorted to violence in 1990 and killed dozens of Armenians in Baku. The Azeri government allegedly did not try to stop the violence. In a week after the unrest, Moscow sent tanks and troops to Azerbaijan and in a bloody crackdown occupied Baku. The first secretary Vezirov was sacked, and Ayaz Mutalibov was appointed as the first secretary. In 1991 presidential election, Mutalibov let no opponent to run against him. However, Mutalibov was pressured to resign after the loss of the town of Khojaly

and a massacre there in February 1992. A Mutalibov crony Yakub Mamedov became acting president, and Mutalibov stayed as the speaker of the Azerbaijan Congress. However, as Azerbaijan still suffered defeats from Armenia, Mutalibov again was restored to presidency in a contentious session in the parliament in May 1992. He immediately cancelled the presidential election scheduled for March 1992. Popular Front supporters protested this decision and demonstrated at night. The next day a pro-Front military unit moved toward the presidential palace. Mutalibov fled and Popular Front forces took control of the capital. They held presidential election in June 1992 (Altstadt 1997).

Bangladesh 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

Democratic transition in Bangladesh is marked by in 1991 when the interim government held by the chief justice Shahabuddin. When the military dictator general Ershad resigned in the wake of massive mobilization by students and political parties, an interim government was formed in 1991. Earlier political parties had mobilized multiple strikes in 1987 and 1988 and called for Ershad's resignation, but that campaign did not succeed due to disagreement about the leadership of the opposition alliance. In 1990 students organized initial protests against the military regime. The government announced curfew and heavily cracked down on protesters. The bloody crackdown, nonetheless, backlashed. the outrage created by the killing of protesters increased the size of the protest and shamed brought the political parties also to the line of protesters. In December 1990 senior military commanders decided to withdraw support from

Ershad. Ershad resigned on the same day, and handed the power to an interim government (Maniruzzaman 1992).

Bangladesh 2009

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

A democratic transition occurred in Bangladesh after the caretaker government held elections considered fair and free in 2008 after 2 years of being in power. the caretaker government had been installed in a soft military coup in 2007 with a mandate of fighting against corruption and return to democracy. Although the caretaker government was not very successful in its anti-corruption mission, it kept the promise of holding elections. Pressures from Indian and United States also helped to carry out the election on time (Alamgir 2009).

Benin 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 1 year

Armed Mobilization: 0

The presidential election in 1991 marked the democratic transition in Benin after 19 years of dictatorial rule of President Mathieu Kerekou. Benin experienced an economic crisis through the end of 1980s. The austerity program led to a massive wave of protest in 1989 by teachers and public servants who had not been paid for months. In response to the protest wave, Kerekou proposed to hold a national conference including delegates from all major collectivities in the country. Although holding national conference was Kerekou's strategy to present him as a

reformer and to curb the opposition, the conference, held in February 1990, announced sovereignty and set the agenda for transition to a multi-party democracy with basic political rights (Bratton and Walle 1992; Decalo 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Bolivia

Unarmed Mobilization: 8 years

Armed Mobilization: 0

To legitimize his rule the military dictator general Benzer announce a six years presidency starting in 1974, following by an election in 1980, that he was confident to win and constitutionalize his personal rule. Due to pressures from Carter's administration that election date, however, was changed to 1978. Labor also commenced on oppositional mobilization in 1975. In the following year, the federation of mine workers organized a strike to demand wage increases, which was brutally repressed by the military. In December 1977, wives of four miners went on hunger strike to demand amnesty and military withdrawal from mines. The hunger strike rapidly turned to a national protest against the regime, and in a month after its start more than 1000 people were on strike.

Presidential election was held in July 1978, but Benzer resorted to fraud to announce his candidate victorious. Unions threatened to strike and political parties refused to accept the result. Benzer's project then had failed. Opposition mobilization continued through next year when a rather healthy election was held in July 1979. The democratic regime resulted from the election, however, was overthrown in a coup led by General Alberto Natusch in November 1st. Trade unions immediately reacted to the coup and called for strikes. Natusch's reaction was bloody and

brutal. Nonetheless, the strikes continued until Natusch resigned. In 1980 trade unions and political parties formed “Call for the Defense of Democracy” to coordinate mass mobilization in the fear of further coup attempts. Elections were held in 1980, but again in two weeks military launched another coup. Unions again went on strike but military reacted harshly and killed many strikers. From 1981 to 1982 miners organized a series of strikes. Under the pressure from mass mobilization, the government agreed to restore the 1980 congress and to hold elections in 1982 (Collier 1999; Dunkerley 1984).

Brazil 1986

Unarmed Mobilization: 6 years

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1974 soft-liners in Brazilian military initiated a process of political liberalization, and provided limited legislative and electoral space for officially recognized political parties. The goal of the liberalization project was to design an electoral system that favors government party and secures its dominance. The labor movement, however, derailed this project. Large waves of strikes emerged in 1977, 1978, 1979, in which millions of workers participated. This strike wave expanded the pro-democracy forces beyond the electoral arena. Labor activism also extended beyond workplace and diffused to working-class neighborhoods. Also, to support the strikers an alliance was formed between grass-roots organizations, social movement organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church, and labor unions. When government quit the project of two party system, union leaders formed an explicitly socialist Workers’ Party (PT). The strike movement also organized a strike in 1980 that lasted for 45 days. The level of strikes, nonetheless, dropped in 1980 but the new union movement continued organizing pro-democracy movements around

lower-class neighborhoods. In 1983 the labor movement resurged again with organizing a strike, in which 3 million workers participated. In 1984-85 labor and social movements organized a campaign using demonstrations and strikes for direct presidential election. Although the movement failed to achieve this goal in the short term, it led to an important defection from the official National Alliance Renewal Party to the opposition party Brazilian Democratic Movement party. As a result, in the following year the opposition leader Tancredo Neves was indirectly elected as Brazil's president, which was the first time since 1960 that the military's candidate did not win the election (Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

Bulgaria 1991

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

The transition in Bulgaria started when members of the communist party toppled Zhikov the Bulgaria's dictator since 1956 in a bloodless palace coup on November 10 1989. The United of Democratic Forces was created immediately by opposition figures, and immediately turned to the main opposition force. Mass rallies by students, workers, and others followed the coup. In January delegates of different groups came together and agreed on national roundtables to decide over an agenda for transition. The Roundtable Talks ended in April 1990. Reform Communists won the elections in June 1990. UDF supporters, however, called the election results fraudulent and massive protests took place in the capital Sofia. UDF leadership, however, recognized the results of the election. Although the election results were not annulled, in the face popular protest and a general strike, the communist prime minister elected by the Grand Assembly resigned, and

impartial politician was elected as prime minister, and the same communist-dominated assembly elected a UDF leader as president (Kralevska-Owens 2010).

Burundi 1994

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed mobilization: 3

In 1988, a violent rebellion by Hutus against Tutsi's led to a massacre of Hutus by the Tutsi-dominated government. The massacre created huge international and domestic pressure on the Tutsi government to initiate political reforms. Violent clashes in 1991-92 between Hutu rebels and Tutsi military was an important part of this domestic pressure. As a result of these pressures, the government first appointed a commission in 1988 to examine the question of national unity. A new constitution was ratified in a referendum in 1992, and a presidential election was held in 1993 (Lemarchand 1996).

Burundi 2006

Armed Mobilization: 10

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

The first democratic transition in Burundi in 1993 immediately failed when Tutsi officers assassinated the first majority Hutu president that was democratically elected a few months after his election. The coup led to a bloody civil war between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi. The United Nations from the beginning made continuous attempts since 1993 to end the civil war. Finally, Nelson Mandel, former South African president brokered a peace accord between many

Hutu and Tutsi parties in 2000. However, the civil war did not immediately end because there were insurgent Hutu groups that continued the rebellion. Finally in 2002 the government and these groups reached an agreement about remaining military and political issues, and the insurgent groups joined the government. An interim government held parliamentary elections in 2005, in which Hutu parties won, and multi-party democracy returned to Burundi (Brown and Kaiser 2007).

Central African Republic 1994

Armed Mobilization: 0

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Due to pressure from France and deteriorating economic situation, the Central African Republic dictator Kolingba held “National Debate” in 1992 to discuss political reforms in the country. Presidential election was held in October 1992, in which Kolingba was defeated. However, he canceled the election results and rescheduled another election for 1993. This was despite some opposition protests in 1991 and 1992. Again in 1993, two days before the release of the elections results, Kolingba announced changes in the electoral law. This was after polls had shown that an opposition candidate was ahead. This time, however, the French president, within hours, suspended all bilateral aids. As a result, Kolingba backed off from changing electoral rules, the real results were announced, according to which Kolingba lost the election. Since, he had repressed the opposition before, it seems that the crucial factor in enforcing the election results was the French pressure (Anonymous 1993; Haggard et al. 2012; O’Toole 1997).

Chile 1990

Unarmed mobilization: 6

Armed Mobilization: 0

After 1973 coup in Chile General Pinochet tried to institutionalize his dictatorial rule in Chile. Accordingly, he held a referendum in 1980, in which a new constitution was ratified. According to the new Constitution his rule was legalized and extended until a plebiscite in 1988. Opposition to the military rule existed in Chile in 1970s, but it escalated a massive level in 1982, when labor along with other groups organized mass rallies and strikes. The protests continued until 1986, but then petered out due to heavy repression from the region. While at that point the pro-democracy movement did not achieve its goals, it led the foundation for a broader social movement and coordination of different political organizations. In 1988 when Pinochet decided to hold a plebiscite about extension of his rule, these groups organized a no campaign. The No Campaign won the plebiscite, but Pinochete initially tried to announced the victory for the Yes vote. However, after military commanders did not support this decision, he accepted his defeat. In 1989 election was held, in which a left-wing candidate was elected as president (Collier 1999; Nepstad 2011).

Colombia 1959

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

Colombia's dictator Rojas Pinilla who had come to power in a coup in 1953 was planning to institutionalize and extend his rule by standing in an election in 1958. Unsure about his victory, he ordered the arrest of the opposition candidate Leon Valencia. The arrest order was

challenged by Valencia and followed by protests and student strikes in Bogota and in Cali. Valencia was released later, but demonstrations and riots continued for a week. The military dispersed the protestors and a curfew was imposed. Nonetheless, soon after the opposition organized a general strike that paralyzed commercial activity in Capital. The strike spread to other cities in the country. Pinilla, then, summoned his puppet legislature to revise the constitution and re-elect him for 1958-62. After this event, the Roman Catholic Church also joined the opposition and denounced the government. Military commanders immediately realized that the situation is hopeless and decided to oust the president. Pinilla was forced to resign on May 10 1957, and a junta took charge of an interim government with the promise of holding election in 1958. The two major parties in Colombia reached an agreement about the details of the transition, and election was held in 1958 (Martz 1962).

Congo 1993

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

The process of change started in Congo with discussions within the dominant party of the country, Congo's Labor Party about political reform in the first half of 1990. While initially the military leader of the country Colonel Denis Sassou was trying to control the contours of the political reforms, a general strike called by the country's sole official labor union forced the regime to hold a national conference and conceded to the demands of the workers and the political opposition. The national conference was formed in 1991. It appointed an interim government and scheduled legislative and presidential elections for 1992 (Clark 1994).

Costa Rica 1950

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 1

In 1948 a presidential election was held in Costa Rica, in which ex-president Calderon competed with the opposition candidate Utale. Utale won the election but the government party challenged the results. The negotiations between the two parties did not go anywhere. The impasse resulted in a civil war between the government and rebel forces led by Figueres, a politician who had been expelled from Costa Rica in 1942. The rebel forces won the civil war and a junta ruled the country for 18 months. The junta handed the power to president elect Utale in 1949 (Lehoucq 1991).

Croatia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Growing conflict between the ranks of the Yugoslavia's communist party led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia's Federal party in 1990. The dissolution of the federal party opened the way for reform communists in each region to hold regional multi-party elections. In Croatia Tudjman a nationalist dissident won the election on a nationalist, anti-Serb and anti-communist campaign, and Croatia announced independence in 1991 (Haggard et al. 2012).

Czech 1990

Unarmed Mobilization: 1 year

Armed Mobilization: 0

Routine repression of a student demonstration in November 1989 led to widespread protest and formation of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the main organizational vehicle of the opposition. The movement soon organized a general strike through the nation in the same month. With the success of the general strike the opposition forces escalated their demand to the resignation of president Husak and the removal the article from the Constitution that monopolizes power under the Communist party. The Civic Forum and the government agreed on an interim government to rule the country until free elections the next year (Glenn 2003).

The Dominican Republic 1963

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Dominican dictator Trujillo was assassinated in 1961. Balaguer, Trujillo's protégé, ruled the country with a seven members council, including Trujillo's assassins. An air force general Rodriguez, however, overthrew the council in 16 days. He was, also, overthrown by less senior officers, who restored the council minus Balaguer. The council then led the country to elections in 1963 (Hartlyn 1989, 1998).

Dominican Republic 1979

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1978 incumbent president Balaguer entered in competition with the opposition candidate Antonio Guzman from Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). PRD had organized a campaign of electoral mass mobilization to challenge the incumbent president, and managed to win the vote in May 1978. As it became clear that PRD is the winner of the election, a group of military officers tried to thwart the PRD victory through a coup attempt. However, due to domestic and international pressure the coup attempt failed and real election results were announced. Particularly, Carter's administration firmly position, backed up by a naval deployment, was influential in the failure of the coup and the success of the democratic transition (Hartlyn 1989, 1998).

Ecuador 1969

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

A military junta that had come to power in 1963 stepped down in the wake of a general strike in the country in 1966. The Chamber of Commerce initially organized the strike in protest to increasing taxes, and student groups and labor unions immediately joined the strike. A bloody attack to a university campus on March 29 1966 demoralized the junta and led to its resignation. An interim government led by civilians then ruled the country and held presidential elections in 1968 (Rudolph 1989).

Ecuador 1980

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1976 General Rodriguez Lara, the military leader of the country, was overthrown in a bloodless coup. Supreme Council of Government replaced him and put the return to civilian rule on the agenda. A national referendum was held In January 1978 to choose the constitution, and then the presidential election was held in July (Rudolph 1989).

El Salvador 1995

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 12

The end of civil war with FMLN was an influential part of democratization in El Salvador in 1994 election. FMLN was a revolutionary group with leftist ideology that started armed operations against the military government in 1980. As part of their Cold War foreign policy, the US supported military counterinsurgency operations against the gorillas, and also pushed for political liberalization in the country. A new constitution then was adopted in 1983 and presidential election was held in 1984, in which a Christian Democrat candidate won. However, FMLN as the main opposition party was excluded from these elections. In 1989 FMLN proposed a peace accord, according to which they would participate in 1989 presidential election if the election would be postponed. When the government held the election without delay, FMLN escalated the conflict and went on offensive. This guerilla offensive, a massacre of Jesuit students by the government, and the end of cold war convinced the US to opt for a negotiated settlement. A peace agreement then was reached in 1992, and FMLN for the first was allowed to compete in 1994 election (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2014; Montgomery and Wade 2013).

Estonia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 5

Armed Mobilization: 0

Estonia one of the three Baltic republics within the former Soviet Union was among the early risers in the popular mobilization within the Soviet. The mobilization started first in 1987 in the form of ecological protests. As demonstrations continued in 1988, the Popular Front was formed as a popular movement in support of perestroika. Mass demonstration grew in size, as in 1989 a human chain of over 600 kilometers was formed with the participation of over one million people to support independence. In 1990 the radical faction of the movement held elections for the Estonian Congress. The Communist party of the Estonia also disintegrated and the Popular Front took over the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. When the August coup in Soviet temporarily ousted Gorbachev, the leaders of the Estonian Soviet and Congress released a statement, stressed the independence of Estonia, and agreed on the formation of a constituent assembly. Demonstrations activities continued throughout these years (Beissinger 2002; Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart 2000).

Georgia 2005

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

The transition in Georgia occurred as the incumbent president Shevardnadze resigned in 2003 as a result of post-election protests against electoral fraud, and as the new parliamentary election was held in 2004. From 2000 the regime started to show signs of weakness. Among

these signs was the 2001 student protests that successfully stopped Shevardnadze to crack down on a TV station. Protests continued in 2003. The target of protests was government's resistance to reform a corrupt election commission. These protests led to defection from the ruling coalition to the opposition. Most importantly, Mikheil Saakashvili, minister of justice, resigned and joined the opposition. He led the opposition against Shevardnadze later in 2003. Parliamentary election was held in November 2003, and according to the announced results the coalition supporting the incumbent president Shevardnadze won the election. However, the opposition called the election fraudulent, and organized protest demonstrations. On November 22, Saakashvili and his supporters stormed the parliament and forced Shevardnadze to resign. Fresh parliamentary elections were held in March 2004 (Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

Ghana 1957

Unarmed Mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was founded as the first nationalist movement with the goal of self-government in Ghana. The first major protest against the colonial rule then was organized in 1948 in the form of boycotts, protest gathering, and rallies. In 1949, Kwame Nkrumah a major leader of the movement left UGCC and founded Convention's People Party (CPP). He soon gathered a massive following. In 1950 Nkrumah initiated a campaign of "Positive Action" to organize strikes, demonstrations, and other methods of Unarmed resistance. He was, then, arrested, after some incidents of violence occurred. While in prison, Nkrumah won a seat in the parliamentary election in 1951. He was immediately released and received an invitation to be the leader of the government. As prime minister, he started to cooperate with the

British rule. During the next year, the political system in Ghana gradually turned to a full parliamentary democracy. In 1954 a constitutional change ended election of the assembly by tribes and direct elections became the norm. In 1956 the British crown agreed to grant independence to Ghana, and general elections were held in July 1956 (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994).

Ghana 1970

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

A group of military officers overthrew the government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. They accused the government of corruption and non-democratic behavior. Coup leaders formed the National Liberation Council (NLC) to take charge of the executive. NLC appointed a civilian government a promised a return to democratic government. An assembly was appointed to draft a new constitution. Ban on political parties was lifted in 1968, and democratic elections were held in 1969 (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994; Pinkney 1972).

Ghana 1980

Unarmed Mobilization: 2 years

Armed Mobilization: 0

The military rule in Ghana started in 1972, but this time military rulers decided to establish a military dominated regime rather than a return to civilian rule. A referendum was held

on a union government, which was supposed to be a combination of military and civilian rule. Although the referendum confirmed the union government, the opposition organized demonstrations and contended that the election was not fair and free. The government cracked down on the protests, but in a surprise move in July the military leader Acheampong was deposed in another coup. The opposition, nonetheless, continued. In the absence of continuing strikes, the new military leader Akuffo legalized the formation of political parties. While a constitutional assembly was working on the draft of a new constitution, a new coup occurred in 1979 and overthrew Akuffo's government. Nevertheless, new parliamentary election was finally held in September 1979 (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994).

Ghana 2001

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

2000 election in Ghana marked the end of Jerry Rawling's rule in Ghana for about 20 years. Rawlings who had come to power in a coup d'état won elections in 1992 and 1996. However, he was not able to run according to 1992 elections. The elections in 2000 were fair and free, and the opposition conducted an effective electoral campaign. This was the first democratic turnaround in Ghana's history (Gyimah-Boadi 2001).

Greece 1975

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

General Papadopoulos who was leading Greece since a coup in 1967 announced the end of Monarchy in the country in 1973, and held a plebiscite on the presidential system. His presidency was confirmed in the plebiscite, and he started to relax some repressive measures. As a result, criticism to the regime took public manifestation. Specifically, the level of student protests increased. The reimposition of martial and brutal suppression of protests of the Athens Polytechnic students made the student opposition popular in the country. In November 1973 Papadopoulos was overthrown in coup for violating the principles of the 1967 coup. In 1974 escalation of conflict with Turkey over Cyprus and general mobilization left military leaders in Greece with no choice but the transfer of power to civilians. An exiled politician Karamanlis came back to country to serve as prime minister. Legislative elections were held in November 1974 (Veremis 1985).

Guatemala 1996

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 32

A process of political liberalization started in Guatemala in 1985. Part of the liberalization plan was to end the civil war with Marxist rebel groups that had started in 1961. In 1993 president Serano illegally dissolved the Supreme Court and Congress, and attempted to conduct a full-fledged “self-coup”. However, civil society organizations responded in energetic protests, and Serano’s plan failed. Thus, the civilian government stayed on track to push forward the peace process. In 1994 peace negotiations gained more momentum by United Nations

mediation. The negotiations led to agreements on human rights, resettlement of displaced people, and indigenous rights. In 1995 presidential elections were held. URNG the rebel umbrella group, also, suspended military action in 1995, and an indefinite cease-fired between URNG and army followed in 1996 (Booth et al. 2014).

Guinea Bissau 2001

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1998, Nino Viera, Guinea Bissau's president, tried to retire the Chief of Armed Forces, Brigadier Ansumane Mane. This led to a military uprising against the president, which continued for nine months. With international mediation and rounds of negotiations, an agreement was reached in November 1998. Attempts to form a unity government, however, failed in 1999 when the military deposed president Viera. The junta stressed that it has no intention of assuming power. The security situation improved in 1999 and last peacekeeping forces left the country. The interim government improved the human rights situation and held legislative and presidential elections at the end of 1999 and early 2000 (Ferreira 2004).

Guinea Bissau 2006

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

President Yala who had been elected in 2000 dissolved the parliament in 2002 and started to rule by decree. He also postponed parliamentary elections four times. The military intervened

in 2003, deposed Yala, and introduced Transitional National Council to return to democratic rule. Legislative election, then, was held in 2004, and presidential election was carried out in 2005. Former president Vieira won as Guinea Bissau's president once again (Freedom House 2006a).

Haiti 1991

Unarmed Mobilization: 4 year

Armed Mobilization: 0

Two years of mass uprising led to the the collapse of the dictatorial rule of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986 but failed to bring democracy to the country. Instead the country entered a period of chaos and instability from 1986 to 1990, during which different military juntas ruled. Colonel Avril who had come to power in 1988 promised to hold elections in 1990, but prior to the election date postponed the election. Riots broke out in response to this decision, however, and Avril fled the country. A civilian government took over and held elections with international monitors in December 1990, in which opposition leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide won (Fatton 2002; Haggard et al. 2012).

Haiti 1995

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Coup leaders that deposed Aristide's elected government in 1991 transferred power to a civilian government. General Cedras agreed to this process, after became clear that a US-led

military force of the United Nations is ready to be deployed to Haiti if the junta does not agree to the power transfer to the democratically elected government of Aristide. Following the power transfer Aristide came back to country from exile and was restored as country's legal president (Haggard et al. 2012).

Haiti 2006

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 1

Aristide won presidential election in 2000, while all opposition parties boycotted the election. Former army officers and political gangs led an armed uprising against Aristide in 2004. When France and the United States declined to send peace keeping forces, Aristide resigned and went to exile. An interim government was replaced Aristide according to the constitutional procedure. The he National Resistance Front for the Liberation of Haiti, led by the controversial Guy Philippe, a former soldier and the U.S.-trained chief of police of Cap Haitie entered the capital in March. Existing peace keeping forces did not stop the armed group, and looting continued in the capital. The UN peace keeping force expanded by contributions from Brazil and other South American countries. Elections were initially scheduled for 2005, but were postponed later. Finally elections were held in February 2006 (Freedom House 2006b).

Honduras 1958

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1954 Honduras entered a constitutional crisis, when none of the contenders in presidential election gained enough vote to elect as president and also because they failed to reach any agreement about the procedure to. Vice president Lozano Diaz, then, stepped up, suspended the legislature, and announced that he would act as president until new elections. Elections were held in October 1956, but boycotted by most parties since they called the process rigged. Although Diaz won the election, he was toppled in the same month in a military coup. A junta took charge of the executive and held elections in October 1957 (Haggerty and Millet 1993).

Honduras 1972

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

To cope with the devastating conditions of the short 1969 war with El Salvador and a hurricane at the same year, the military rule in Honduras called for a national conference in which delegates from political parties, labor, and peasant organizations participated. A pact was reached in conference that included free and fair elections in 1971. Elections were held in March 1971, in which Ernesto Cruz from the National Party was elected as Honduras president (Haggerty and Millet 1993; Morris 1984).

Honduras 1982

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Warned by the revolution in Nicaragua and civil war in El Salvador, the military rulers in Honduras decided to initiate political reforms in early 1980s. An election was called for a constituent assembly. The Liberal Party won the majority of seats in the assembly and played the main role in drafting the new constitution. Contrary to general expectations, the military led rather fair and free elections to be held in 1981, in which the Liberal Party won the presidency (Haggerty and Millet 1993; Morris 1984).

Hungary 1991

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In a May 1988 meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Kadar, the long-time leader of the communist party was replaced. Pro-reform communists overcame the hardliner in the party and started a series of political reform such as revising the electoral law, parliamentary procedure, and legalizing independent social groups. Roundtable negotiations were held in 1989 between the regime and the opposition, in which they agreed upon different conditions of the transition. Parliamentary elections then were held in May 1990 (Tökés 1996).

Indonesia 2000

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

The massive upheaval that brought democratization in Indonesia started in 1998, while Indonesia was struggling with Southeast Asia economic crisis. Students started the wave of

protest calling for the fall of Suharto. Later, one of the two massive religious organizations in the country joined the demonstrations. Following the clashes between the students and the security forces, urban poor joined the protests, and demonstrations escalated to rioting. The riots discredited the regime's claim about the main guardian of order. Following the clashes between the students and the security forces, urban poor joined the protests, and demonstrations escalated to rioting. Cracks within the ruling elite followed the riots. Suharto's allies abandoned him and called for his resignation. While the wave of mobilization was strong enough to bring down Suharto, the fragmented opposition failed to push all elements of the ruling elite out of power. Habibie, Suharto's vice-president stepped in as the new president, but the wave of protest continued and forced Habibie to immediately introduce political reform. In 1999 presidential election, the dominant Golkar party was defeated after 32 years incumbency in Indonesia (Aspinall 2005).

Kenya 2003

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

Kenyan transition to democracy happened through a protracted process. Massive protests in addition to international pressure in 1990 led to the constitutional change and the end of one-party rule. Despite the occurrence of multi-party election, the incumbent president was able to win the election in 1992. In 1997 the opposition again organized demonstrations and called for constitutional change. An agreement was, eventually, reached between the government and the opposition, but the opposition was divided, and Moi again managed to win the election. In 2002, Moi was not able to run according to the Constitution adopted in 1992. Although some of his

supporters advocated the idea of removing the ban from the Constitution on running for the third term, Moi decided not to run. He picked a successor instead to run for the incumbent party, Kanu. Kanu, however, was divided about Moi's picked successor. On the other hand, opposition parties for the first time were united behind one candidate. While in the last stage of the transition popular mobilization did not play a role, earlier mass mobilization was crucial in installing multi-party elections and putting a constitutional ban on presidency for more than two terms (Brown 2004b; Ndegwa 2003).

South Korea 1961

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In March 1960, Rhee Syngman South Korea's strong man and president since 1948 resorted to massive rigging to win the presidential election. Students launched demonstrations in protest to the rigging. Anti-regime rapidly spread throughout the country. Rhee's regime, first, resorted to repression and relied on its anti-communist propaganda, but repressive measures failed to curb the protest wave. Although the regime announced martial law the military refused to fire on demonstrators. Under pressure from the US, and faced with military defection, Rhee resigned on April 26th 1960. An interim government was replaced and carried out general elections in July 1960 (Kim 2000).

South Korea 1988

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1984 the military regime in South Korea started a stage of limited political liberalization out of confidence about its power to control the opposition. Students and laborers started organizing in different associations, and new oppositional political parties were also formed. These groups started building coalitions in 1985. The prodemocracy movement made public statements, collected signatures against the regime, and organized mass rallies in 1986. In April 1987 when the regime announced its decision to end debates about constitutional change, a huge wave of protest erupted. Government's crackdown on protestors, even, escalated the mobilization. Facing with nationwide protest, the government made concessions to the opposition in June and held direct presidential election in December 1987 (Kim 2000).

Laos 1953

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 7

Laos as a French colony was occupied by Japan in 1945, and reoccupied again 1946 by France. In 1949 a General Convention was signed between France and Laos that provided partial independence to Laos within French Union. At the same time, also, there were nationalist groups in exile that were demanding independence for Laos. They formed a government in exile in Bangkok, and launched guerilla insurgency against French domination over Laos. After 1949 convention, moderate members of the opposition in exile declared that the convention satisfies their main demands about independence and declared the dissolution of the government in exile. Radicals in exile, nonetheless, continued their insurgency against the French presence in Laos. The first multi-party election was held in August 1951 for the National Assembly. In 1953, insurgents made several victories against the French military. It was widely recognized then that

France would not be able to win the war. At the same time, a new government formed in June 1953 in France that recognized Laos's independence in exchange with reaffirmation of Laos's membership in the French Union (Stuart-Fox 1997).

Latvia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 5

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1986 a small dissident group Helsinki-86 was formed to pursue the independence of Latvia. In 1987 they called for ceremonial laying of flowers on the Freedom Monument in Riga on the anniversary of the day Stalin exiled many Latvians to Siberia. Despite all the efforts by the security apparatus, about five thousand people participated in the event. This event led to a series of coordinated protest demonstrations in the three Baltic States. In 1988 Latvian intelligentsia joined the demonstrations. The idea of a popular front was brought up, and the Latvian Popular Front first congressed was convened in October 1988. In July 1989 the popular pressure pushed the Latvian Supreme Soviet to declare a declaration of sovereignty and economic independence. Parliamentary election was held in 1990, and then two third of the delegates in the new legislature voted for transition to democratic and independent Latvia. Latvia eventually declared independent after the 1991 August coup in the Soviet Union. Demonstrations continued throughout the whole period (Beissinger 2002; Lieven 1994).

Lebanon 2005

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

Following the assassination of the Lebanon's Prime Minister Refiq Hariri, a wave of street protest against Syrian occupation of Lebanon swept across the country. These protests were called "Independence Intifada" or "Cedar Revolution." Syrian troops had been present in Lebanon since the end of the civil war in 1992. Following the protest wave, and under heavy international pressure Syrian military departed Lebanon in April 2005 (Blanford 2005).

Lesotho 1966

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In September 1961 Lesotho's legislative Council passed a motion about the country's self-government. At the time, Lesotho was still a British colony. Subsequently, a Constitutional Commission was formed to collect suggestions about the constitution from all over country. The Commission completed its report in 1962 and brought it to the Legislative Council. A delegate then went to London in 1963 to deliver the results of the constitutional discussions and negotiate the independence conditions. An agreement was reached in London and Lesotho was granted independence. General elections were held on April 29 1965 and the new Constitution became effective on April 30 1965 (Machobane 1990).

Lesotho 1994

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1986 the military overthrew the government of the dominant Basotho National Party (BCP). A power-sharing alliance was emerged between the military and King. The legislature was dissolved and all political activities were suspended in Lesotho. However, cracks soon appeared in this alliance over different issues. Workers strikes, particularly a 13 weeklong teacher strike, were among one of the events that deepened the split between the king and military. Due to such pressures, the alliance between the king and the military broke down. In 1990 the military decided to dethrone the king and sent him to exile in London. In 1991 the military formed a new Constituent Assembly with the participation of political parties to draft a new constitution for return to civilian rule. The Constituent Assembly finished its work in September 1991. International organizations then supervised elections in March 1993. BCP won the election, and the military handed the power to the new elected civilian government (Matlosa and Pule 2001).

Liberia 2006

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 4

After long years of civil war a peace accord in 1995 led to elections in 1996, in which Charles Taylor, a major guerilla leader in the civil war, was elected as president. The peace accord and Taylor's policy were not successful however, as armed rebellion again broke out in the country in 2000. With rebel's immanent threat o capturing the capital and under pressure from the United Sates, Taylor resigned in 2003. The civil war immediately ended with Taylor's

resignation, and negotiations were conducted to for a peace accord and a large UN peacekeeping force supervised demobilization and disarmament. Delegates to the peace-talks chose an interim government that ruled the country until elections in 2005 (Freedom House 2006c).

Lithuania 1992

Unarmed mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

Similar to other Baltic republics, in Lithuania also the protest movement started around ecological issues in 1988, when Moscow tried to build another nuclear reactor in the area. In that same year, Lithuanian intellectuals formed “Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania,” or Sajudis. Sajudis organized big demonstrations that awakened Lithuanian nationalism. The number of demonstrations increased in 1989 and continued through 1990 and 1991. Elections for the Supreme Soviet was held in 1989, in which the nationalist Popular Front won. In 1990 Lithuania declared session and independence. After the failed coup of 1991 the Soviet recognized Lithuanian independence (Beissinger 2002; Haggard et al. 2012; Lieven 1994).

Macedonia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

The communist party of Yugoslavia adopted a collective method of leadership after Tito’s death. Implementing IMF reforms exacerbated the conflict between the liberal elites in the federal government and the regional elite. By Mid 1980s Slovenia stopped paying taxes to the

federal government. Croatia, then, started doing the same thing. Escalation of conflict between the regional branches of the communist party led to the dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia in 1990. Reform members of each region then held multi-party election in 1990. In Macedonia the nationalist party won a majority, but the ex communist party formed a majority coalition. In 1991 Macedonia declared independence (Haggard et al. 2012).

Madagascar 1994

Unarmed mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1980s withdrawal of Soviet economic assistance created an economic and political crisis for Madagascar. In 1989 Didier Ratsiraka, country's president since 1975, legalized political parties, and held a presidential election to legitimize his rule. He won the election, but the election was considered highly fraudulent. In response, a broad civic opposition, the Vital Force, emerged under the leadership of the Christian churches. The new opposition organized strikes and demonstrations in 1990-1. Repression failed to put down the protest, and appeared more of damage to Ratsiraka's legitimacy. In 1991, he finally agreed to a pact that transferred power to the Vital Force and scheduled Constitutional Convention and presidential election for 1992. Clean elections were held in 1992-3, in which Vital Force's candidate defeated Ratsiraka (Haggard et al. 2012; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Malawi 1995

Unarmed mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

Hastings Banda had ruled Malawi since independence in 1963. In 1992, Catholic bishops issued a critical pastoral letter about regime's corruption and human rights abuses that was read aloud in Churches. The letter led to strikes and student protests. The protest wave led to the formation of two opposition parties for the first time. International donors also suspended aid and demanded political reform. Banda scheduled a referendum on multi-party elections for 1993, which the opposition easily won. Opposition, then, also won the presidential and national assembly election in 1993 and 1994 (Brown 2004a; Haggard et al. 2012; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Mali 1993

Unarmed mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

Musa Traore had served as the head of state in Mali, since a coup in 1968 by a group of young Malian young officers who named Traore as president of the military council. During 1980s Malian economics deteriorated and a program of economic liberalization was put in place with policies recommended by World Bank and Western donors. The economic policies led to a high level of social dissatisfaction. Three new opposition parties were formed in 1990 and organized massive demonstrations in capital Bamako. In January 1991 the official union of the country linked to the ruling party organized a series of strikes. At the same time military was splitting between conservative supporters of Traore and advocates of the democratic movement. Following the strikes and demonstrations, the regime prohibited all political activities. The repressive measures were not successful. Students organized bigger and more defiant demonstrations. Although student demonstrations were brutally repressed, they followed with a

large protest by women, and then general strikes by unions. The protest wave made Traore very isolated. In that context, a group of military officers overthrew him on March 26 1991. A transition committee was immediately appointed with 10 military and 15 civilian members from the opposition (Villalón and Idrissa 2005b).

Mauritania 2008

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 2005, a military coup overthrew the government of Maaouya Ahmed Taya, who had come to power in Mauritania through a coup in 1984. The junta issued amnesty for political prisoners and promised fair and free elections within a two years timeframe. A constitutional amendment was approved, then, in a referendum in 2006. Legislative and municipal elections were held in 2007, which were regarded generally fair and free by international observers (Freedom House 2008a; N'Diaye 2009).

Mauritius 1969

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Mauritius independence and democratization were achieved through a series of constitutional reforms starting in 1947. The 1947 Constitution considerably increased the number of voters. Elections for the Legislative Council under then new Constitution was held in 1948.

After 1958 election the Legislative Council extended the franchise even further. In 1961 a Constitutional Conference was held in London with the participation of all Mauritius parties. The Conference agreed on achieving self-government for Mauritius in two stages. Another Constitutional Conference was held in 1965 in London to negotiate independence. A new electoral system was adopted in 1966. Elections under the new system were held in 1967, in which supporters of independence gained majority. Mauritius started self-governance in August 1967, and the British government passed a resolution about Mauritius independence in 1968 (Addison and Hazareesingh 1984).

Mexico 2000

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed mobilization: 1

In 2000 the dominant party in Mexican politics since in 1929, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost the presidential election to the opposition party conservative National Action Party (PAN). This turnover occurred as a result of gradual electoral reforms that were implemented in Mexico since 1987. Economic liberalization, defection from PRI, and Zapatista rebellion in 1994 were among different factors that pushed the process of electoral reform (Schedler 2000; Trejo 2014).

Moldova 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 1

Major demonstrations took place in Moldova over Romanian language rights created the nationalist Popular Front movement. The Popular Front won the elections for Supreme Soviet in 1990. Mircea Snegur, a former communist, was elected as the head of the Soviet, and then in September he was elected as the president of republic. In the same year, also, violent clashes occurred between Romanian ethnic nationalists and Slavic-speaking regions supported by Russia. During the 1991 August coup in Soviet, Soviet troops tried to impose a state of emergency in Moldova, but the Moldovan government overruled them. When the coup attempt failed, Moldova declared independence from Soviet Union (Crowther and Fedor 1995).

Mongolia 1994

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

Following the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe the first opposition group in Mongolia, the Mongolian Democratic Union, formed in 1989. The group organized mass demonstrations and called for the end of the communist regime. The communist party became divided over whether to respond to protests with force or concession. Finally, the reformist faction won, the whole central committee of the party resigned, and two months later the parliament announced it would amend the Constitution to remove the leading role of the Communist Party in 1990. A new Constitution was ratified, and multi-party legislative elections were held in 1992, in which the communist party won the majority. In the 1993 presidential, the opposition defeated the communists, uniting behind Ochirbat, the initial candidate of the communist whom they had abandoned due to internal conflicts in the party (Ginsburg 1995).

Montenegro 2007

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

When Yugoslavia collapsed in 1992, Montenegro voted to stay as a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1997, a new group of prime minister Milo Djukanovic put Montenegro on a slow track toward independence. In 2002, under pressure from European Union two republics signed an agreement and made their ties weaker. Yugoslavia then was replaced with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Eventually, a referendum in 2006 approved Montenegro's independence (Freedom House 2007a).

Myanmar 1961

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1958 the civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu was toppled. Nu was from the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) the dominant party in Myanmar that had ruled the country since the end of Japanese occupation in 1945. The coup occurred after internal conflicts within AFPFL spilled to the military. Following the coup a military government ruled the country until 1960. In that year, a combination of certain factors such as military's growing unpopularity and the increasing friction between field and staff officers convinced the generals to

return to barracks in order to protect military's prestige. A competitive election was held in February 1960. Despite alleged attempts by military to fraud Nu's new opposition party of Pyidaungsu won the election (Callahan 2005).

Nepal 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 1 year

Armed Mobilization: 0

In late 1989, the Nepalese Congress party forged alliance with several leftist parties to push for democratic reforms in the country. The alliance organized campaigns of civil disobedience throughout the country, and announced the formation of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in February 1990. MRD organized different massive demonstrations and strikes and mobilized various segments of the population. King Birendra, who at the time, had all the executive power in the country started negotiations with the opposition, and then lifted the ban on political parties. In November 1990 a new Constitution for a parliamentary monarchy was promulgated, and parliamentary elections, then, were held in 1991 (Schock 2005).

Nepal 2007

Unarmed Mobilization: 3 years

Armed mobilization: 10 years

In 2001 the crown prince Gyanendra ascended to Nepals throne, after he shot king Birendra and nine other members of the royal family. In 2002 Prime Minister Deuba dismissed

the parliament and called for fresh elections. After Debua asked king Gyanendra to postpone the election, Gyanendra dismissed him, postponed elections indefinitely, and assumed executive power. Political parties called this decision illegal and organized protest demonstrations against this decision. In 2003 the cease-fire between government and Maoist insurgents also collapsed, and the rate of killing by both sides rose rapidly. In 2005, the king announced a state of emergency, shut down a lot of media outlets, and arrested thousands of party activists. Civil society groups continued to protest, however. The seven main political parties forged an alliance in support of a “road map” for restoration of parliamentary democracy, and organized protest demonstrations. In October 2005, political parties made an alliance with the Maoist insurgents. Protests and insurgent operations continued in early months of 2006. Finally after 19 days of protest in April by political parties, and a general strike organized by Maoists, the king ended his direct rule, and restored parliamentary government. Following the return of the parliament, a ceasefire was also reached between the government and Maoist rebels (Freedom House 2007b).

Nicaragua 1991

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 11

The incumbent Sandinista party held presidential elections in 1990, in which opposition candidate Violetta Barrios de Chamorro defeated Sandenista’s Daniel Ortega. Economic sanctions and contra insurgency sponsored by the US had deteriorated Nicaraguan economy. Contra insurgents fought the Sandinista government from 1979 to 1990. The opposition capitalized on this situation and emphasized on ending the war with contras and normalizing relations with the US (Booth et al. 2014).

Niger 1994

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1987 when president Kountche died, the armed appointed General Ali Saibou as the new president of Niger. Although labor unions were under tight control by the government, during 1980s some they started to distance themselves from the dominant party and become more independent. At the same time, the conditions for labor deteriorated due to structural adjustments programs. Clandestine oppositional movements were forged during 1980s in opposition to the regime, and made linkages with the labor unions. Throughout 1989 and 1990 the major union in the country called for a series of strikes, and students demonstrated against the government acceptance of policies recommended by the World Bank. Government's use of force against protestors made their demands explicitly political and focused on the democratization of regime. With the escalation of the protest wave, the government announced revision of the constitution and formation of a National Conference. The National Conference then dismissed the government and held general elections in March 1993 (Charlick 2007).

Niger 2000

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1996 presidential election, the incumbent president Bare stopped the vote counting in the middle of the process, replaced the electoral commission, and then announced himself the winner of the election. The opposition and labor unions did not accept these decisions. Protests,

strikes, and clashes then continued with no compromise. Protests continued in 1997, and as a result, Bare dismissed the government. Finally, in 1999 members of his presidential guard killed Bare. The new military rulers promised to hold free and fair elections, while protest activities continued. New presidential elections were held in November 1999 (Charlick 2007; Davis and Kossomi 2001; Villalón and Idrissa 2005a).

Nigeria 1961

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

By the end of the World War II and the growth of nationalism in Nigeria, the British government initiated a series of constitutional reform in 1946, 1950, and 1954 that granted independence to Nigeria at the end. One year before the first constitutional change, a general strike by labor unions effectively paralyzed the colonial government. The strike was supported through demonstrations and in the press. The general strike for the first time showed the ability of Nigerians to impose reforms on the colonial administration. Labor organization expanded after 1945 and a successful large strike happened in 1950. Other than labor unions political parties were active forces in Nigerian nationalism. Major constitutional changes were introduced through negotiations with Nigerian political parties through different national conferences. In a national conference held in Britain in 1957-8 delegates from different parties and regions discussed the Constitution for an independent Nigeria. Elections were held for a House of Representatives in December 1959. In October 1960 the British Parliament granted independence to Nigeria (Coleman 1971; Falola and Heaton 2008; Lovejoy 1991).

Nigeria 1980

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1975 a group of young officers overthrew the military government of General Gowon. The coup leaders chose General Murtala Mohammed as the head of state. Mohammed promised restoration of military's prestige and return to democratic rule. Nonetheless, he was assassinated in a coup attempt in 1976. The second in command General Olusegun Obasanjo ascended to power and led the transition to the civilian rule. A draft constitution then was published in October 1976. A constituent assembly started discussing the constitution in 1977, and the new constitution was adopted in 1979. The first election under this constitution was held in July and August 1979 (Falola and Heaton 2008; Lovejoy 1991).

Nigeria 2000

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1993, Nigerian political parties nominated candidates that had been approved by military in a presidential election. The results showed the victory for Moshood Abiola of the center-left Social Democratic Party. However, the regime voided the election within days. Riots erupted in Lagos and southwester cities, in which security forces killed about 100 people. Under pressure from the opposition and elements in military, the military regime agreed to transfer

power to a civilian council. The civilian council, however, was forced to resign in three months by General Abacha. In the anniversary of the 1993 election, a multi-ethnic coalition between politicians and notables emerged under the title of the National Democratic Coalition. Abiola also declared himself the legal president of the country. After the military regime arrested Abiola petroleum worker unions went on strike. Riots erupted and scattered protests happened in several southwestern cities. The government heavily cracked down on protestors. While Abacha was preparing the stage for a transition to civilian rule, in which he will serve as president, he died of heart attack in 1997. Military Provisional Ruling Council as Abacha's successor appointed General Abubakar. Abubakar announced a new plan for democratic transition. While the government was negotiating the transition conditions with the opposition, Abiola died during a meeting allegedly from heart attack. Riots erupted in the wake of Abiola's death. Abiola's supporters reproached the military government for his persecution and medical neglect. The authorities this time showed moderation in handling the unrest. Subsequently, legislative and presidential elections were held in 1999 (Lewis 1999).

Pakistan 1972

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

General Ayub Khan the military dictator and president of Pakistan who had been in power since 1958 resigned in 1969 after a wave of student and labor protest that had started in 1968. Pakistan People Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also had an active role in organizing and supporting the protests. General Yaha khan the new head of state in the country announced his plan for country's return to constitutional government. Elections were held in

1970. Awami League led by Mujib won the majority in East Pakistan and PPP gained majority in West Pakistan although with fewer seats. When these two parties failed to achieve an agreement about which party to form the government, the political stalemate led to violent clashes and military confrontation between East and West Pakistan. India entered the war in support for East Pakistan forces, and by December 1970 defeated the Pakistani Army, and East Pakistan declared independent as Bangladesh. At the eve of the military defeat demonstrations broke out against the military government. General Yahya resigned, and Bhutto assumed power as president (Baxter 1994; Talbot 2010).

Pakistan 1989

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1988, General Zia the military dictator of Pakistan died in an air crash. Following his death, the military decided to hand power to civilians. Following negotiations with Benazir Bhutto the leader of the opposition Pakistan People Party, elections were held in November 1988, in which PPP won the election and Bhutto became prime minister (Talbot 2010).

Pakistan 2009

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 2007, General Pervez Musharraf president and chief of Pakistan's military tried to dismiss chief justice Chaudhry. Musharraf was afraid that the judiciary would persecute members of his regime for corruption. Chaudhry, nonetheless, refused to resign and lawyers launched large protest demonstrations. The Supreme Court ruled against Musharraf's suspension of Chaudhry. Musharraf announced a state of emergency and arrested about 6000 activists and politicians. Feeling increasingly isolated, Musharraf cut a power-sharing deal with the former prime minister and leader of Pakistan People Party in exile Benazir Bhutto. The US also was pushing for this deal to make an anti terror alliance in Pakistan. Bhutto was assassinated following her return to the country. Her husband Asif Ali Zardari assumed the leadership of PPP and made an alliance with Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League. The alliance defeated Musharraf's party in the election, and planned to impeach him as the president, which led to Musharraf's resignation (Freedom House 2009; Khan 2008; Nelson 2009).

Panama 1953

Unarmed mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

In response to the increasing corruption of police force in Panama and its interference in politics, president Chanis dismissed the first commandants Remon in 1949. Remon refused to resign; instead, he asked for president Chanis resignation, and threatened to attack the presidential palace. President Chanis resigned, and Roberto Chiari was sworn to president office. Strikes and protests broke out in support of Chanis and civilian rule. In the next Assembly session Chanis took his resignation back, and claimed that the resignation had been issued with force. The Assembly also endorsed Chanis as president. Chiari still maintained that he is the

legal president. The Supreme Court, however, voted in favor of Chiari. In a preemptive move, Remon introduced Arnulfo Arias as the new president, claiming that he was the real winner of 1948 election. The movement for civilian rule continued its protest. In 1951 Arias suspended the 1946 and replaced it with his own decrees. Opposition protested the decision. The National Assembly convened impeached Arias and elevated Vice President Arosemena to president. Arias refused this decision. The police force attacked the presidential palace and Arias armed supporters and presidential guard resisted the attack, although eventually Arias and his supporters surrendered after a bloody clash between the two sides. The Arosemena administration held presidential elections in 1952 that was considered rather fair and free. Remon resigned from the police force and won the presidential election (Pippin 1964).

Panama 1956

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

President Remon who had taken repressive measures against the opposition since 1953 was assassinated in 1955. Following his death, the dominant party was divided about who has assassinated Remon. The new administration did not continue Remon's authoritarian rule and supervised competitive elections in 1956 (Geddes et al. 2012; Pippin 1964).

Panama 1990

General Noriega the head of Panama Defense Force (PDF) was Panama's de facto military ruler during most of the 1980s, while the country had civilian puppet presidents or as Panamanians called it "Kleenex president." In 1987 a coalition of civilian forces, the National

Civic Crusade, launched a nonviolent campaign to oust Noriega through protest demonstrations and general strikes. Noriega responded to the protest with heavy repression. The protests continued in 1988 and also after the stolen election of 1989. There were also coup attempts from within PDF to overthrow Noriega that failed. Although Noriega was in CIA payroll and initially supported by the US, the relationship between Noriega and Regan administration deteriorated as Noriega declined to cooperate with the US government about issues related to supporting contras in Nicaragua, and hosting deposed Philippines dictator Marcos among others. US froze Panama's asset and issued economic sanctions on Panama, but Noriega was able to deal with the sanctions through support from countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua. Eventually, in December 1989 in the operation known as Just Cause US troops invaded Panama, arrested Noriega, and disbanded PDF. Guillermo Endara the opposition candidate and the real winner of 1989 election was sworn into office (Fishel 2000; Perez 2000).

Paraguay 1994

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

A palace coup in 1988 overthrew General Alfredo Stroessner who had served as president since 1954. The coup leader announced transition to democracy as a main goal of the coup d'état. Three months after the coup, a presidential election was held, in which General Rodriguez who led the coup was elected as president. Colorado party, the dominant party in the country during Stroessner's rule, nominated Rodriguez. Election for the Constituent Assembly was held in December 1991. Then new presidential election was held in 1993, in which again Colorado candidate won. The election was considered free and competitive, but not necessarily fair.

Despite this victory for Colorado, it had to deal with an opposition that majority in the Congress for the first time (Lambert 2000).

Peru 1957

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1956 president Manuel Odira who had come to power in a coup in 1948 held competitive presidential elections in Peru, while many suspected that he would just continue his rule. By the time, Odira had lost the support of elements within military and also oligarchy in Peru. With the support of the opposition APRA, Manuel Prado managed to win the election. APRA put his support behind Prado, when he signaled that APRA would be legalized under his presidency (Klarén 1992).

Peru 1964

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1962 presidential election, none of the candidates managed to win one third of the vote specified in the Constitution. As a result, the Congress had to elect the president. APRI's candidate, Haya Dela Torre, the second candidate in the race cut a deal with Odira who had ended third. According to this deal, Odira would become president and an APRI member would serve as vice president. APRI made this pact because it was known that the military would not tolerate an APRI president. To preempt this deal, the military launched a coup in 1962. A junta

ruled the country until 1963, when they held a multi-party election, in which both Odira and Dela Torre participated, but this time Blaunde from Accion Popular won the election (Klarén 1992).

Peru 1981

Unarmed Mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

The military regime in Peru faced increasing labor activism by mid 1970s as a result of a severe economic downturn, regime's attempt to subjugate labor unions, and illness of the military dictator Velasco. In 1975, strikes and protests led to the fall of the Velasco's government. When the new government adopted new labor policies and announced a state of emergency in 1976, strikes by fishermen, municipal, and telepostal workers followed. Government responded by repression, but at this time labor protest took a political character and democratic restoration became a main demand of the labor movement. The strike wave also revived the confrontational approach within the movement. The most important event, nonetheless, was the general strike of 1977, which united all the labor unions in the country. In the wake of the strike, traditional parties and economic elite also called for a return to democratic rule. Nine days after the strike Morales Bermudez the military ruler of the country announced the election of Constituent Assembly for 1978. Strikes and protests continued until the election in 1978. With the new constitution in place, elections in 1980 inaugurated the civilian government in Peru (Collier 1999).

Peru 2002

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 2000 Alberto Fujimori ran for his third presidential term in Peru. The first round of voting ended very tightly with 49.87 for Fujimori and 40.24 for his main rival Alejandro Toledo. The opposition, however, called the election fraudulent and street protests erupted at the eve of the election. Toledo demanded certain electoral reforms to ensure a fair and free second round. Nonetheless, when the government did not respond to any of his proposals, he withdrew from the second round of the election. Fujimori then won the second round without a contender. The opposition protest continued, and street demonstrations and riots occurred at the day of Fujimori's inauguration. Three months after the election, a video tape was leaked that showed a security chief bribing an opposition congress member. The video showed what the opposition had been claiming for years. Fujimori then announced decreasing his third term to one year and announcing new elections. By November 2000 Fujimori was removed from presidency, opposition took charge of the congress, and an interim government head by a respected opposition figure took charge. New presidential elections were held in 2001 in which Toledo was elected as president (Taylor 2001).

Philippines 1987

Unarmed Mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 18

In August 1983, the oppositional politician Benigno Aquino, Jr. came back to country to lead a campaign against Marcos dictatorship. However, upon his return he was assassinated in the airport. From Aquino's assassination in August through April 1984 about two hundreds demonstrations and mass actions took place. The assassination was a turning point in the formation of mass opposition against Marcos. Massive protests and labor strikes continued in 1985. Although the opposition was divided in 1984 election over electoral participation or boycott, different opposition groups tried to unify behind one single candidate in 1986 presidential election. As it was expected the election was rigged and Marcos was announced as the winner. However, this time he faced with massive civic revolt against electoral fraud. Elements within the military also defected to the opposition. As massive resistance continued and defection rapidly spread within military, Marcos finally realized he has no option but to leave country. Corazon Aquino the real winner of the election started her turn as Philippines 11th president. It is also likely that leftist insurgency of New People's Army contributed to the transition by making the democratic opposition a more acceptable option. NPA started their armed rebellion against Philippines government in 1969 (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Franco 2001; Schock 2005).

Poland 1990

Unarmed Mobilization: 6

Armed Mobilization: 0

Transition to democracy in Poland occurred when Communists lost the legislative election to the Solidarity movement in 1989. The origin of the Solidarity movement goes back to 1980 worker strikes, in response to which the government agreed to the creation of independent

self-organizing unions. Then from August 1980 to December 1981 “Solidarity” as an independent union with a central organizing committee expanded throughout the country. The membership estimation at this time approaches 3 million. Solidarity operated as an umbrella organization, under which different groups such as farmers, artisans, and students became organized. Institutionalization of solidarity was also an impetus for other groups to organize. After martial law and crackdown on the movement in 1981, the movement went underground. From this point until April 1989, the movement continued its activities underground. The movement’s repertoire of action in this period includes clandestine publications, strikes, walkouts, boycotts, and skirmishes with the riot police, and underground lectures. During these years, the central coordinating structure of Solidarity was also restored. Millions of Poles participated in these protest campaigns and developed protest. In 1985 a group of students also formed a new opposition movement Freedom and Peace that staged local protest demonstrations around environmental issues in 1986 and 1987. A new wave of strikes in April 1988 brought the communists to the negotiation table once again. In this historic “round table” communists agreed to open the electoral process to Solidarity. Solidarity formed local Citizens’ Committees to mobilize the vote. Solidarity won a landslide in the election, and on June 4th 1989 communism ended in Poland (Kenney 2002; Kubik and Ness 2009; Osa 2003).

Portugal 1977

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

A coup by a group of officers in Portuguese military, Armed Forces Movement, brought down the dictatorial regime Salazar-Caetano. The coup followed by massive mobilization of

workers and peasants in form of strikes, factory occupation, and land seizures as well as street demonstrations from 1974 through 1976. The multi-faction junta governing the country immediately announced a timetable for democratic transition and held Constituent Assembly election in 1975 and general election in 1976 (Maxwell 1986).

Romania 1991

Unarmed mobilization: 2 years

Armed mobilization: 1 year

The rebellion against Nicolae Ceausescu started in Timisoara in December . Protestors took control of the city and disarmed army units. The protest wave rapidly spread to the adjacent cities and Bucharest. Ceausescu tried to repress the rebellion and counter-mobilize workers in his support. A mass gathering was organized in Bucharest for Ceausescu to address the crowd. The audience however booed Ceausescu and the images of the disruption broadcasted in the country. The crowd also tried to storm the building, from which he was giving his speech. The following days were the bloodiest days in the Romanian uprising. Ceausescu tried to flee the country but he was captured and sentenced to death in a military trial. The execution was immediately followed the trial. Violent clashes subdued after the execution. Following Ceausescu's departure, a group of Communist reform elite, the National Salvation Front (NSF), took control of the government. In January demonstrations occurred by students and opposition against the NSF. Parliamentary elections were held in May 1990, in which NSF won an overwhelming majority (Siani-Davies 2005).

Russia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 5

Armed Mobilization: 0

As a result of Michael Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union, hundreds or even thousands of associations came into being around 1986-7 around local issues. By 1988, these associations turned to explicitly political activities and held demonstrations, in which the protestors expressed their demand for democratization of the Soviet. The first large wave of protest occurred in 1989. The associations came together in the electoral campaigns of 1989 legislative elections, and shortly after that a host of new political parties came into the being. In September 1989, Democratic Party of Russia, Social Democratic Party of Russia, and the Democratic Platform, three of the leading organizations of the democratic movement, announced that they are forming Democratic Russia, an umbrella organization to coordinate activities of democratic associations. In 1989 Russia's Congress of Deputies started its session as the first elected legislative authority after decades. Boris Yeltsin the most prominent advocate of the democratic movement was elected as the chairman of the parliament. One year later, presidential election was held in Russia for the first time, and Yeltsin this time was elected in relatively fair and free election as the first president of the Russian republic. During this presidential race Democratic Russia organized electoral campaigns for Yeltsin. In August 1991, hardliners in the Communist Party launched a coup to oppose Gorbachev's political reforms and negotiations for a treaty that would decentralize the Soviet Union. The coup, however, failed due to the popular resistance spearheaded by the Russian president Yeltsin, and Russian parliamentarians. In the aftermath of the putsch, Yeltsin emerged as the politician with the most prestige and authority in

the Soviet Union with a great measure of power at hand. He disbanded the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union was dissolved within a year (Beissinger 2002; Brovkin 1990; Fish 1995).

Senegal 2001

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In march 2000 presidential election, Abdou Diouf of the Socialist Party to the opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade. The Socialist Party had ruled Senegal under different names since the independence in 1960. This electoral defeat was the result of the unraveling of the dominant party's patronage system and defections from the ruling coalition prior to the 2000 election. Some electoral reforms had been also introduced in Senegal after opposition protested the results of the 1988 elections (Galvan 2001; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Serbia 2001

Unarmed Mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

The incumbent president Slobodan Milosovic lost the 2000 presidential election but refused to accept the result. However, a general strike and massive street protest forced him to accept the results. Protest activities were a common feature of the Serbian politics in 1990s. Important waves of protest erupted in 1991, 1992, 1996-7, and 1999. The 1996-7 protests were specifically important as they were massive, brought students and political opposition together, and showed the core of Milosovic base is defecting. This wave of protest also led to the

formation of a youth group Otpor that focused on organizing and crafting innovative protest tactics against the regime. Otpor also pressured the political opposition to unite behind one candidate in the 2000 election. One year before 2000 election, a wave of spontaneous and organized protest also happened in the countryside that showed the depth of grievances to the both opposition and the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Meyers 2009).

Sierra Leone 1962

Unarmed Mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

Promises made by Americans and British during World War II raised Sierra Leoneans hope for independence and decolonization. However, instead of granting immediate independence Britain started a series of administrative and political reforms in 1946. Riots that broke out in 1948, 1949, and 1951 were crucial in forcing Britain to implement proposed reforms. General elections were held in 1951 and 1957 and Sierra Leone was granted independence in 1961 (Esedebe 1973).

Sierra Leone 1997

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 6 years

In 1991, Revolutionary United Front of Liberia (RUF) expanded their armed insurgency to Sierra Leone. RUF was initially a millenarian movement supported by Libya that was trying to find an audience within the disenfranchised population in Sierra Leone. In 1996, Brigadier

Maada Bio ousted Captain Valentine Strasser the leader of the National Provisional Ruling Council the incumbent military junta in the country in a coup. Bio started negotiations with rebels, and held elections in February 1996. Sierra Leone People Party with the leadership of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the election (Bangura 2000; Haggard et al. 2012; Zack-Williams 1999).

Sierra Leone 1999

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed mobilization: 8 years

In 1997, the army overthrew the civilian government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. A new authoritarian government formed led by Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with members from RUF and civilian elements from Kabbah's government. In 1998 an international alliance invaded Sierra Leone and reinstalled Kabbah's government. President Kabbah signed a peace accord with the RUF rebels and gave amnesty to participants of the civil war since 1991. Leaders of the 1997 coup were also given key position in the new coalitional government (Bangura 2000; Haggard et al. 2012; Zack-Williams 1999).

Slovakia 1993

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Demonstrations against communism in Slovakia started in June 1989 in Bratislava. New political parties and civic groups such as Public against Violence and the Christian Democratic

Movement were formed in 1989. Elections were held in June 1990. When the Federal Assembly debated the return of a hyphen to the official name of Czechoslovakia, demonstrations followed in the streets of Bratislava. Debates about Slovak independence continued in Slovak National Council, Czech National Council, media, and public demonstrations. A series of demonstrations occurred throughout 1990 and 1991 in support of Slovak independence in Bratislava and other cities. In 1992 parliamentary election, Movement for Democratic Slovakia with the leadership of Vladimir Meciar won a majority in Slovakia. Meciar negotiated the independence with Klaus who had won a majority with his Civic Democratic Party in Czech. Representative of both parties eventually agreed on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1st 1993 (Kirschbaum 2005).

Slovenia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

The communist party of Yugoslavia adopted a collective method of leadership after Tito's death. Implementing IMF reforms exacerbated the conflict between the liberal elites in the federal government and the regional elite. Due to these economic pressures the Republic started breaking down to its six republic members. Among these republics Slovenia's communist party was more tolerant than others and allowed more dissent and space for civil society and media activities. By Mid 1980s Slovenia stopped paying taxes to the federal government. Beginning in 1989 various political parties came into being in Slovenia and in 1990 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Belgrade recognized that the single-party system is dead. Reform communists in Slovenia held a free multi-party election in April 1990. With anonymous

agreement of all parties in Slovenia's parliament a referendum was scheduled for December 1990. Voters confirmed the independence with 95% majority, and Slovenia was announced independent in June 1991 (Bebler 2002; Haggard et al. 2012).

Somalia 1961

Unarmed Mobilization: 5

Armed Mobilization: 0

By the end of World War II Somalia was under British rule. In 1945 in the Potsdam Conference, Britain assigned a commission of four powers Britain, United States, Soviet Union, and France, and suggested different Somalia territory unite in a single government. In 1948, commission representatives went to Somalia to decide over the fate of the colony. The commission decided to united all the protectorates under one administration in a ten-year trusteeship overseen by an international body to lead the country to independence. The commission of four countries, nonetheless, failed to agree on a plan. They referred to matter to the United Nations in 1949, which decided to put Southern Somalia under Italian rule for 10 years. When British rule took over in Somalia they fired and imprisoned members of SYL. SYL also worried about Italy's colonial plans waged a campaign of civil disobedience and protest over 1950-53. The conflict ended by introduction of a seven years development plan in 1954. In 1956 for the first time territory wide elections were held in Somalia, in which SYL won the majority of seats. Abdullaahi Iise, the leader of SYL, became prime minister for the period of 1956-1960. In 1958 the franchise was expanded to women. In British Somaliland, political protests in 1956 made the British to introduce representative government. Small Legislative Council was formed in 1957 and expanded the next year to represent different tribes. In 1960

elections with secret ballot was held for the first time. Finally popular demands compelled the leaders of the two territories to agree on unification plans. British Somaliland received independence from Britain in 1960 and then joined the Somali Republic in July 1960 (Samatar 1992).

South Africa 1995

Unarmed mobilization: 13 years

Armed Mobilization: 7 years

The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa is perhaps one of the longest struggles for democratic rights in the World. In 1950 African National Congress (ANC) launched the Defiance Campaign in protest to racist policies enacted by the apartheid regime. This campaign involved series of stayaways and mass strikes. This campaign and other similar campaigns at the time failed to achieve their immediate political goals. Facing with severe repression, ANC changed its strategy to armed struggle led mostly from outside the country in early 1960s. ANC in exile expanded its organizational infrastructure, and became gigantic. However, external armed struggle failed to pose a serious threat to the apartheid regime. 1970s instead witnessed the revival of internal resistance led by students, unions, and civics (neighborhood committees). Large strikes started in 1973 and ended a period of labor calm and inactivity. In 1974 the strike wave faced employers' clampdown. In the face of this defeat, workers activists directed their attention to organizing and founded several important trade unions in 1979. Important waves of strikes again occurred in 1979-1980. In 1976, students carried out a protest in Soweto, which led to a bloody crackdown by the government. The isolated instance of protest in 1970s coalesced into the United Democratic Front, an umbrella organization, found in 1983. UDF took an

inclusive strategy and affiliated with several workers, youth, church-related, and colored organizations. UDF also worked closely with the largest trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), founded in 1985. With a vast repertoire of protest, UDF was successful in engaging a massive number of South African in the struggle as well as popularizing the ANC leadership in exile and in prison in Robben Island. As a result of strikes in 1970s and organizing efforts labor militancy was on a peak from 1982 onward. A new wave of protest in the form of rent-boycotts and stay-aways started in 1984 in objection to the new constitution introduced by the apartheid regime. A general strike was also organized in the country that was one of the biggest actions of this form in the history of South Africa. In 1985 ANC called for making the townships ungovernable. Reacting the wave of unrest, the regime announced state of emergency in 155 townships. The mobilization, however, continued, and the state of emergency was widened in 1986. In 1987 about three million workers participated in a three days strike that paralyzed the industry. In 1989 a new Defiance campaign was organized with the multiracial peace marches in different cities. ANC was allowed to carry out a rally of 70000 people though the end of the year. As a result of these massive protests, ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were legalized again in 1990 and their leaders were released. UDF was disbanded then, and ANC took the leadership again from within the country. In 1994 the apartheid ended in South Africa after several rounds of negotiations between the regime and the opposition leaders. ANC also launched armed operations against the apartheid regime. The operations started in 1981 and ended in 1988. The operations were not successful in bringing down the apartheid regime but had important influences on the internal dynamics of the anti-apartheid movement (Seidman 2001; Wood 2000; Zunes 1999).

Spain 1978

Unarmed mobilization: 6 years

Armed mobilization: 11 years

Labor strike and protest played an influential role in Spain's transition to Democracy. Both legal and illegal unions became a site of oppositional activities against Spain's authoritarian regime. By mid 1960s the agenda of labor movement switched from economic demands of workers to political issues. In 1967, illegal unions held a large demonstration in Madrid, in which workers were chanting "Franco no, Democracy yes". The Communist party and affiliated also decided to change their strategy from limited protest tactics to attempts for regime change. Labor unrest divided the regime about the method of dealing with the opposition. In 1970 strikes occurred in remarkable numbers. Prime minister Carrero Blanco initially decided to respond with repression. On the other hand, soft-liners emphasized on political opening as a preferred policy to address the unrest. Through 1972 and 1973, then, Franco and Blanco tried to introduce some political opening to the country. High level of labor protest in 1973 kept the regime in defensive. In the same year, Carrero Blanco was assassinated, and Franco appointed the moderate Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. Labor strikes, nonetheless, increased in 1974 to its highest level in Spanish history until that year. In 1975, strikes even broke a new record. It was in this context that Franco died. Labor demonstration and strike again reached a new and unprecedented level in 1976. The policy of limited liberalization seemed to be failing. Adolfo Suarez was appointed as prime minister at this point. In the context of instability created by labor unrest, Suarez negotiated Spain's transition to democracy with the regime and the opposition. Suarez convinced the Cortes to annul itself, and free legislative elections were held in 1977. Terrorist activities by Basque separatists contributed in destabilization of the country. Democratic transition was also

an attempt to empower moderates and marginalize radical separatists (Collier 1999; Bermeo 1997; Maravall and Santamaría 1986).

Sri Lanka 1995

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed mobilization: 19

In 1993 Sri Lanka's president Ranasinghe Premadasa was assassinated. He was the leader of Unity National Party (UNP) that had ruled the country that had ruled the country for 17 years. Parliamentary and Presidential elections held in August and November 1994 won by People Alliance and PA's Bandaranaike Kumaratun was elected as president. Ending the civil war with Tamil Tigers was a central theme in PA's campaign while UNP's campaign rejected any negotiations with Tamil rebels. Tamil Tigers had waged a civil war in Sri Lanka for 19 years at that point (DeVotta 2002; Keerawella and Samarajiva 1995).

Sudan 1956

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1948 and after World War II following nationalist demands, Britain permitted an elected nationally representative assembly replace advisory executive council. The nationalist movement in Sudan was divided between a group advocating Sudanese independence, and a group favoring unification with Egypt. National Unionist Party (NUP) the main pro-Egypt party boycotted 1948 elections. As a result, pro-independence Umma party dominated the legislature.

In 1952 the legislature negotiated the Self-Determination Agreement with Britain. Egypt objected to the self-determination plan, and announced King Faruk, the king of Sudan. In 1953 Colonel Naguib overthrew king Faruk in Egypt. He accepted Sudan's right for self-determination and signed an accord with Britain that specified a three years plan for Sudan's transition from condominium to a sovereign country. According to this plan, Sudanese and British troops would leave Sudan in three years and then Sudanese will decide about the political future of country in a plebiscite. In 1952, pr-Egypt NUP won a majority in the parliamentary election. A new government was formed with Azhari of NUP as prime minister. Azhari government initially halted the independence plan, in the hope of unification with Egypt. However, when Azhari realized that the public opinion has changed in favor of Sudan's independence switched party's policy and endorsed independence. In 1955 Sudanese parliament passed the declaration of independence. Southern Sudan was not happy about unification with the Arab north. Some southern battalions rebelled against the independence but were suppressed by the north (Ofcansky 1991).

Sudan 1966

Unarmed mobilization: 1

Armed mobilization: 5

The parliamentary democracy that was in practice since 1954 and especially since the independence in 1956 was overthrown by a coup d'état in 1958. The grievances in the south had taken the form of terrorist activities and armed insurgency against the military government, and military's repressive measures were not also successful in suppressing the insurgency. In October 1964 when police attacked an illegal student meeting in the university of Khartoum,

several students and police were wounded. When one of the students died from injuries the next day, angry demonstrations and riots broke out in Khartoum. Military's measures to crack down on riots failed and strikes by rail workers and airport and radio employees followed the protests. Eventually, General Abboud the military ruler of the country announced the dissolution of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and started negotiations with the opposition about the formation of a caretaker government. The caretaker government was formed on October 30th, and the constitution of 1956 was reinstated until the election of the new Constitutional Assembly. In November again riots broke out in response to alleged coup by Abboud who had stayed as the head of the state and the commander in chief of armed forces. In December another riot broke out in Khartoum regarding the grievances of southern Sudanese. Finally elections were held on April 21 1965 (Haddad 1973).

Sudan 1987

Unarmed mobilization: 1

Armed mobilization: 4

In 1985 Gaafar Nemeiri, Sudan's president was ousted in a coup d'état. Nemeiri had come to a power in a coup in 1969. Different forces in Sudan opposed Nemeiri's government. In the south separatist grievances culminated in armed insurgency against the central government. Introduction of sharia law in 1983 was also received by discontent and resistance from civil society forces. In 1985 demonstrations and riots broke out in Khartoum in protest to rising food and gasoline prices. Following the demonstrations Nemeir was ousted in a coup. Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab the leader of the coup released hundreds of political prisoners, promised to

end the civil war, and relinquish power to civilians within a year. General elections were held in April 1986 (Ofcansky 1991).

Syria 1955

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1949 the post-independence parliamentary government was overthrown in a series of military coups. By the end of the year, Colonel Adib Shishakli was in control of military while a civilian government was still in place. In 1951 he committed another coup and toppled the civilian government. A referendum in July 1953 changed the government from parliamentary to a republic with Shishakli as president of the republic. In the same year, however, opposition parties agreed to resist Shishakli's rule. Student strikes broke out in December. Shishakli announced martial law and cracked down on the opposition, but factions of the army allied with opposition parties staged a coup against him in February 1954. The constitution of 1950 was reinstated, civilian government of 1951 came back to power, and competitive elections were held in 1954 (Haddad 1971; McGowan 1987).

Syria 1962

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1958 Syria united with Egypt under the title of United Arab Republic. The division of power, however, was putting the Syria in an inferior position, and Syrians felt unsatisfied about this situation. In 1961 a coup was staged in Damascus that put an end to the United Arab Republic. In December 1961 a competitive election was held for the constituent assembly, in which all factions and political parties participated (McGowan 1987).

Taiwan 2001

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 2000, the dominant Kuomintang party lost after being in power for 55 years. Martial law had been lifted in 1987, and viable opposition to Kuomintang had been emerged in 1991 first multiparty election. The Democratic People's Party (DPP) won several seats in the national assembly. In 1997 local elections Kuomintang's support had been weakened because of its corruption, alleged engagement with organized crime, and factionalism. DPP defeated the Kuomintang in this election and set the stage for its victory in presidential election of 2000 (Freedom House 2001).

Tanzania 1961

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

Tanganyika was a United Nation trust territory under British administration after World War II. In 1954 Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was formed with the leadership of

Julius Nyerere. The organization's goal was to pursue country's independence. TANU's membership soon expanded and Nyerere was recognized as the leader of the independence movement. He visited the UN was appointed to the Tanganyika's legislative council. In 1957 the British authority held elections that gave equal representation to Africans, Asians, and Europeans, although Africans were the absolute majority in the country. TANU's candidates won all of the seats even among Asians and Europeans. Following this election Nyerere negotiated the expansion of franchise and abolishment of tripartite system of voting. In the new system each citizen could vote for anyone regardless of race. General election under the new system was held in 1960 and TANU won the majority of seats. Nyerere was elected as prime minister and Tanganyika was announced independent in December 1960. Tanganyika changed name to Tanzania after its unification with Zanzibar in 1964 (Hempstone 1961; Spalding 1993).

Thailand 1976

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1973, Thanom Kittikachorn's dictatorial rule in Thailand ended with public protests and demonstrations organized mainly by students. Field Marshal Thanom had ruled Thailand since 1963, when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat the military dictator and prime minister of Thailand died. After an experience with a limited democracy, Thanom staged a coup against his civilian government in 1971 and replaced it with military junta. In December 1972 he announced a new interim constitution. This new decision faced popular demonstrations by students. Thanom resigned as prime minister, and king Bhumibol appointed a civilian prime

minister favored by student demonstrators. A new constitution went into effect in 1974, and parliamentary elections were held in January 1975 (Race 1974; Seekins 1987).

Thailand 1989

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In March 1988 Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda dissolved the parliament and called for multi-party parliamentary elections. This decision was the result of the fragmentation of the dominant party between the ruling faction and dissident factions. The election resulted in the first civilian prime minister since the army ousted the civilian parliamentary government in 1976 (Niksch 1989).

Thailand 1993

Unarmed mobilization: 1 year

In February 1991 the Thai military ousted the elected government in Thailand, abrogated the constitution, and dissolved the parliament. The military junta promised to hold elections and return the power to civilians in a year. Parliamentary elections were held in March 1991, in which pro-military parties won a majority. However, after General Suchinda the leader of the junta was nominated as prime minister in May 1992, demonstrations broke out, in the largest protest wave since 1973. The military initially tried to suppress the protests, but the mobilization escalated. The King interfered and military agreed to some of the demands of the protestors. A general election was held in September 1992 (Bunbongkarn 1992, 1993).

Thailand 2008

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

A coup in September 2006 overthrew the government of Prime Minister Thaksin, who was struggling in a political impasse with the opposition. A junta was established, the Constitution was abrogated, and the parliament was dissolved. An interim constitution was introduced in October that promised drafting a new constitution in a year. Although the coup was initially popular, the legitimacy and popularity of the junta declined in 2007. The Democratic Alliance Against the Dictatorship (DAAD), the alliance of groups opposing the coup started organizing daily demonstrations against the junta. The junta took steps to limit the participation of Thaksin and his supporters in politics. Thaksin's party was dissolved but his supporters formed People's Power Party (PPP). Bans on political parties were lifted in June, and voters confirmed a new constitution in August. Parliamentary election then was held in December, and PPP won the won 223 out of 480 seats (Freedom House 2008b; Ockey 2008).

Togo 1964

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

The end of World War II divided the territory of Ewe people divided between a British mandate, a French mandate, and the Gold Coast. A pan-Ewe movement failed to unify these territories. In 1954, Britain made it clear that it will not continue administering British Togo, which meant the British Togo would unify with the Gold Coast as independent Ghana. This

made it difficult to justify continuation of its rule over the French Togo. France tried to tackle this predicament through a referendum. In 1955 in a UN-administered plebiscite people in British Togo confirmed unification with independent Ghana. France held a referendum in Togo in 1956 that confirmed Togo's ties with France, but the referendum did not receive international recognition. The option for independence did not exist in the referendum. Under international pressure, a referendum occurred in 1958 under UN supervision. This referendum confirmed Togo's independence (Digre 2004).

Turkey 1951

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1945 as a result of an internal dispute in the Turkey's dominant party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), 4 members of the party including Prime Minister Menderes left the party and formed Demokrat Parti (DP). In 1946 DP gained some seats in the parliament and played the role of the opposition to CHP. In 1950 DP made a huge victory in the general election, which ended the dominance of CHP since the inception of the Turkish Republic (Glazer 1996).

Turkey 1962

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1960 Turkish military ousted the civilian government of Demokrat Parti that had taken an authoritarian method of ruling since 1957. Coup leaders appointed the Committee of National

Unity (CNU) instead of the government consisted of coup leaders and a few civilians. General Gursel, Chief of General Staff, who had led the coup announced initially that CNU rules temporarily and the power will be returned to civilians. In January a Constituent Assembly was formed, which ratified the new constitution in May. The new constitution was affirmed in a referendum in July 1961. Parliamentary election was held in October 1961, in which 14 parties participated. Although DP was dissolved, Adalet Partisi, considered the heir of DP, participated in the election (Glazer 1996).

Turkey 1984

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

In 1980 Turkish military once again ousted the civilian government, abrogated the constitution, and dissolved the parliament in a coup. Many activists and politicians were arrested and all politicians from pre-coup era were banned from politics. Western European countries demanded the military to restore democracy, and European Community suspended financial assistance to Turkey. A new constitution was affirmed in a popular referendum in 1982. A new law for political parties became effective in 1983, and new parties were invited to form, but from fifteen parties that requested certification, the military only approved three. Parliamentary election was held in November 1983, in which Motherland party won against Nationalist Democratic Party that was perceived as the party of generals (Glazer 1996).

Uganda 1963

Unarmed Mobilization: 0

Armed Mobilization: 0

With Indian independence, spread of nationalism in west Africa, and more liberal policies in the British Colonial Office, started moving toward granting independence to Uganda in Early 1950s. The Legislative Council was reorganized to include African representatives elected from districts throughout Uganda in addition to unrepresentative interest groups selected by the British authority. There were oppositions from the kingdom of Buganda about unification with the rest of Uganda. However, separatist attempts for an independent Buganda failed, and Baganda agreed on participation in a national federal government. A coalition government was formed after April parliamentary election of 1962. Uganda was announced independent in October 1962 (Rowe 1990).

Ukraine 1992

Unarmed mobilization: 4

Armed Mobilization: 0

Following reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, informal and formal associations also came into being in Ukraine starting in 1987. These associations organized demonstrations both with environmental as well as political themes in 1988. Ukraine's Popular Front (Rukh) also was formed in 1988. Miners went on strike in July 1989 and labor unrest and some connections were made between the labor movement and the political opposition. Following the strikes a large number of worker unions were also formed. The size of protest events increased in 1989, and massive demonstrations continued in 1990 and 1991.

Similar to other republics parliamentary elections Ukraine also held parliamentary election in 1990. Following the failed putsch in August 1991, Ukraine declared independence (Kuzio 2000).

Uruguay 1985

Unarmed Mobilization: 2

Armed Mobilization: 0

The military regime in Uruguay in power since 1973 decided to implement a plan for return to a limited democracy in late 1970s. In 1980 a plebiscite was held on a new constitution, which was rejected by the voters. Limited political liberalization occurred after the plebiscite and social movements reactivated and unions began organizing in Uruguayan politics. Inter-Union Plenary of Workers (PIT) organized a big demonstration in 1983 and demanded the return of democratic liberties. A general strike organized by PIT in 1984 was also a key opposition action. Under such pressures military gave up its plans for transition to civilian regime under military control. In July after series of negotiations military made important concession, legalized several political parties, and agreed on holding multi-party elections (Collier 1999).

Venezuela 1959

Unarmed mobilization: 1 year

Armed Mobilization: 0

General Pérez Jiménez who had come to power in Venezuela in a coup in 1948. In 1952 he cancelled a scheduled election and called himself president. An election then was scheduled for 1957. However, afraid from losing the election Pérez cancelled the election and instead held

a fraudulent referendum that confirmed him as president. The referendum, nonetheless, outraged both civilians and military. In January 1958 a military faction tried to oust Pérez but the coup failed. Political parties, however, organized mass demonstrations in Caracas. Under pressure from streets, military officers forced Pérez to resign. Pérez was then replaced by a military junta, but as demonstrations continued civilian members joined the ruling junta. The junta supervised elections in December 1958 (Karl 1987; Rudolph 1990).

Zambia 1965

Unarmed mobilization: 3

Armed Mobilization: 0

North Rhodesia, along with South Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (later Malawi) became part of the African Central Federation in 1953. This was against aspirations of North Rhodesians and a big defeat for African nationalists. The biggest fear for North Rhodesians was the domination of European settlers in South Rhodesia over the majority Africans in the whole federation and especially north. The federation was a semi-independent entity under the authority of the British crown. At the time, African National Congress led by Harry Nkumbula was the major political organization representing African political demands in the north. The advent of the Federation was a political failure for ANC and marked an era of disintegration and decline for the organization. ANC, nonetheless, started reorganizing and also connecting with the major labor movement organization in the North, African Mine Workers Union (AMWU). ANC then collaborated with AMWU in organizing strikes in 1955 and 1956. In 1958 militancy within ANC was on the surge. Increase in house rents led to riots in that year. Although Nkumbula denied ANC's involvement with the riots, Court proceedings in the

following month confirmed ANC's involvement. Tactical differences within ANC led to its fragmentation. Kenneth Kaunda a major leader of ANC split from the organization and formed Zambia's African National Congress (ZANC), which had a more radical stance than ANC. In 1959 British government appointed the Monckston Commission to prepare the ground for a constitutional conference in 1960. The commission's report recognized the right of session for individual entities, despite European's opposition. While ANC supported the new constitution, ZANC boycotted the constitution and 1960 election. Kaunda was arrested for fomenting trouble and ZANC was banned. After Kaunda was released he formed United National Independence Party (UNIP). UNIP participated in 1962 election and gained a considerable number of seats. UNIP and ANC made an alliance and Kaunda formed the cabinet in Northern Rhodesia. A new constitution was introduced and became effective in 1964. The Federation finally dissolved, and Zambia announced independence (Mulford 1967; Ukpabi 1970).

Zambia 1992

Unarmed Mobilization: 1

Armed Mobilization: 0

Zambia was under one-party rule of United National Independence Party of president Kenneth Kaunda since 1973. In March Fredrick Chiluba, a major opposition figure and the leader of Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, called on president Kaunda and asked him to hold a referendum for democratic pluralism in Zambia. Kaunda in a preemptive action agreed on the referendum, confident of his victory in an early election. In June 1990 riots broke out in the capital city of Lusaka in response to price increases. In July 1990, A National Inerim Committee for Multiparty Democracy formed. This was a coalition of different civil society forces with

labor movement at its core. The group demanded multiparty elections rather than a referendum, and held opposition rallies across country. In September 1990 Kaunda agreed to hold multiparty elections. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in October 1991, in which the ruling party lost to the opposition and Chiluba was elected as president (Bratton 1992).

APPENDIX 4: ROBUSTNESS TESTS

Table 12: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Log Versions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration (ln)	-0.658** (0.234)				
Violent Campaign Duration (ln)	-0.511 (0.324)				
Nonviolent Campaign Duration		-0.240* (0.0955)	-0.245** (0.0928)	-0.257** (0.0787)	-0.275** (0.103)
Violent Campaign Duration		-0.163 (0.0963)	-0.205 (0.117)	-0.176 (0.102)	-0.171 (0.122)
Post-Military	0.797 (0.473)	0.864 (0.456)	1.248* (0.492)	0.744 (0.439)	0.388 (0.635)
Post-Personal	0.582 (0.489)	0.530 (0.494)	0.517 (0.649)	0.390 (0.472)	0.842 (0.549)
Post-Party	0.706 (0.463)	0.704 (0.464)	0.651 (0.456)	0.591 (0.471)	0.722 (0.750)
Post-Independence	1.414* (0.597)	1.358* (0.619)	1.966** (0.694)	0.992 (0.564)	0.951 (0.716)
Presidential	0.417 (0.734)	0.427 (0.714)	0.586 (0.709)	0.565 (0.695)	0.832 (0.695)
Mixed System	2.132** (0.610)	2.127** (0.602)	1.849* (0.754)	2.414** (0.622)	2.600** (0.675)
US Trade (ln)	-0.137 (0.121)	-0.143 (0.121)	-0.185 (0.175)	-0.224 (0.123)	-0.204 (0.134)
Democracies in the Region	-2.537** (0.819)	-2.541** (0.807)	-2.673** (0.871)	-2.043** (0.690)	-2.254* (1.014)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.477 (0.753)	-0.457 (0.765)	-0.804 (0.860)	-0.350 (0.831)	1.322 (1.055)
Excluded Population	0.910 (0.870)	0.702 (0.782)	0.846 (0.779)	0.627 (0.822)	-0.233 (1.199)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.380	-0.335	-0.409	-0.300	0.0249

	(0.220)	(0.225)	(0.237)	(0.208)	(0.275)
GDP Growth	-6.696** (2.390)	-6.508** (2.297)	-6.095** (2.231)	-6.132* (2.427)	-1.876 (3.379)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.0755 (0.118)	0.0626 (0.108)	0.109 (0.126)	0.0865 (0.0960)	-0.0639 (0.105)
Population (ln)	0.152 (0.169)	0.159 (0.170)	0.260 (0.214)	0.221 (0.164)	0.301 (0.203)
Observations	1323	1286	1197	1629	754

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

In this table model 1 and 2 control for whether the statistical significance of the nonviolent duration is driven by extreme values of the variable. Model 1 uses the log version of nonviolent duration, and model 2 drops democratic regime rooted in longer than 8 years of mobilization. Models 3-5 limit and expand the sample of young democracies. Model 3 limits the sample to democracies emerged after 1960; Model 4 expands the sample to democracies emerged after 1945; and model 5 limit the sample to democracies emerged before 1991. The main finding is robust to these different specifications of the sample size.

Table 13: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Regional and Temporal Controls)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration	-0.248** (0.0875)	-0.316** (0.0996)	-0.309** (0.0973)
Violent Campaign Duration	-0.159 (0.0935)	-0.153 (0.0879)	-0.158 (0.0931)
Post-Military	0.818 (0.496)	0.907 (0.515)	0.915 (0.529)
Post-Personal	0.528 (0.491)	0.487 (0.711)	0.509 (0.716)
Post-Party	0.751 (0.458)	0.824 (0.497)	0.912 (0.475)
Post-Independence	1.319* (0.637)	1.819* (0.720)	1.594* (0.739)
Presidential	0.428 (0.716)	0.386 (0.827)	0.451 (0.851)
Mixed System	2.027** (0.614)	2.191** (0.640)	2.073** (0.671)
US Trade (ln)	-0.140 (0.123)	-0.208 (0.139)	-0.175 (0.142)
Democracies in the Region	-2.313** (0.831)	-1.106 (1.076)	0.0862 (1.264)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.412 (0.764)	-0.397 (0.851)	-0.475 (0.916)
Excluded Population	0.671 (0.787)	0.852 (0.764)	0.827 (0.815)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.368 (0.233)	-0.0594 (0.209)	-0.0929 (0.212)
GDP Growth	-6.602**	-7.120**	-7.078**

	(2.386)	(2.380)	(2.359)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.0594 (0.113)	0.0560 (0.0891)	0.0490 (0.0882)
Population (ln)	0.149 (0.168)	0.142 (0.218)	0.1000 (0.223)
Cold War Era	0.225 (0.388)		0.681 (0.527)
Eastern Europe		-1.652 (1.290)	-1.927 (1.263)
Western Europe		-43.83 (0)	-44.98 (0)
Latin America and Caribbean		0.294 (0.835)	-0.240 (1.013)
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.585 (0.768)	0.658 (0.795)
Central Asia		1.378 (1.030)	1.815 (1.065)
South Asia		0.946 (1.325)	0.541 (1.345)
East and South East Asia		1.107 (0.923)	1.041 (0.962)
Observations	1323	1323	1323

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

This table includes additional variables to control for the regional and international context of democratization. Model 1 includes a dummy variable for cold war era, model 2

includes dummy variables for each region to control for potential historical background particular to regions, and model 3 include all these variables together.

Table 14: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Additional Controls)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration	-0.249** (0.0939)	-0.248* (0.0981)	-0.243* (0.0995)	-0.257** (0.0917)	-0.250* (0.0980)
Violent Campaign Duration	-0.166 (0.0953)	-0.167 (0.0938)	-0.179* (0.0908)	-0.180 (0.0947)	-0.199* (0.100)
Previous Regime Military Personnel		35.57 (64.20)			47.78 (81.66)
Previous Regime Military Expenditure		0.000689 (0.00813)			-0.00548 (0.0148)
Armed Conflict			0.367 (0.385)		0.630 (0.405)
Former British Colony				-0.146 (0.843)	0.0108 (0.845)
Former French Colony				-0.394 (0.891)	-0.537 (0.935)
Former Spanish Colony				-1.108 (0.738)	-1.100 (1.026)
Former Portugese Colony				0.233 (0.750)	0.283 (0.891)
Colonial Years				-1.394 (0.948)	-1.823* (0.881)
Post-Military	0.876 (0.458)	0.918* (0.457)	0.905 (0.468)	1.046* (0.487)	0.991 (0.530)
Post-Personal	0.538 (0.494)	0.826 (0.550)	0.520 (0.519)	0.850 (0.550)	1.117* (0.519)
Post-Party	0.697 (0.468)	0.842 (0.521)	0.570 (0.511)	0.784 (0.506)	0.789 (0.657)
Post-Independence	1.394* (0.619)	1.638** (0.628)	1.610* (0.629)	1.918** (0.726)	2.550** (0.686)
Presidential	0.422 (0.711)	0.392 (0.743)	0.444 (0.732)	0.583 (0.683)	0.623 (0.787)
Mixed System	2.115**	2.153**	2.067**	2.407**	2.446**

	(0.594)	(0.629)	(0.586)	(0.549)	(0.596)
Democracies in the Region	-2.515** (0.803)	-2.726* (1.078)	-2.695** (0.822)	-2.924** (0.928)	-2.944* (1.334)
US Trade (ln)	-0.138 (0.120)	-0.0834 (0.117)	-0.0972 (0.126)	-0.0712 (0.146)	0.0188 (0.146)
Excluded Population	0.720 (0.776)	0.962 (0.840)	0.532 (0.829)	1.059 (0.737)	0.942 (0.867)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.456 (0.762)	-0.275 (0.773)	-0.440 (0.770)	-0.548 (1.176)	-0.346 (1.259)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.355 (0.216)	-0.434 (0.280)	-0.433* (0.220)	-0.366 (0.237)	-0.417 (0.346)
GDP Growth	-6.463** (2.304)	-7.074** (2.396)	-6.253** (2.129)	-6.807** (2.405)	-7.649** (2.455)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.0650 (0.110)	0.0328 (0.113)	0.0663 (0.111)	0.0564 (0.113)	0.00962 (0.115)
Population (ln)	0.149 (0.166)	0.122 (0.174)	0.0740 (0.177)	0.0956 (0.190)	0.00288 (0.191)
Observations	1323	1298	1322	1323	1297

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

This table includes additional control variables for military power of the pre-democratic regime, armed conflict, and colonial years.

Table 15: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Weibull model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration		-0.219*	-0.206*	-0.231**	-0.188*	- 0.241**		
		(0.0885)	(0.0893)	(0.0870)	(0.0802)	(0.0932)		
Violent Campaign Duration		-0.155*	-0.173*	-0.116	-0.117*	- 0.216**		
		(0.0636)	(0.0720)	(0.0602)	(0.0556)	(0.0761)		
Popular Campaign at Transition							-0.728	
							(0.398)	
Nonviolent campaign at Transition								-0.603
								(0.366)
Violent campaign at Transition								-0.402
								(0.597)
Post-Military			1.301**				0.807	0.839
			(0.468)				(0.515)	(0.525)
Post-Personal			0.00114				0.519	0.488
			(0.365)				(0.455)	(0.471)
Post-Party			0.600				0.866	0.837
			(0.584)				(0.511)	(0.546)
Post-Independence			1.134*				1.139	1.069
			(0.558)				(0.626)	(0.646)
Presidential				0.0664			0.202	0.196
				(0.459)			(0.788)	(0.817)
Mixed System				1.848**			2.014**	2.046**
				(0.527)			(0.596)	(0.616)
US Trade (ln)					-0.242*		-0.112	-0.126
					(0.111)		(0.116)	(0.117)
Democracies in the Region					- 2.075**		- 2.921**	- 2.910**
					(0.756)		(0.848)	(0.923)

Ethnic Fractionalization						0.212 (0.567)	-0.329 (0.775)	-0.209 (0.773)
Excluded Population						1.782* (0.749)	0.641 (0.901)	0.672 (1.049)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.708** (0.142)	-0.701** (0.150)	-0.857** (0.162)	-0.739** (0.167)	-0.292 (0.207)	-0.626** (0.159)	-0.536* (0.239)	-0.493* (0.242)
GDP Growth	-5.061* (2.292)	-5.611* (2.338)	-4.479 (2.615)	-6.386** (2.461)	-6.451* (2.614)	-5.015* (2.535)	-6.036* (3.038)	-6.041 (3.300)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.105 (0.0841)	0.0987 (0.0819)	0.0189 (0.0936)	0.133 (0.102)	0.0959 (0.0864)	0.0525 (0.0942)	0.100 (0.118)	0.0944 (0.129)
Population (ln)	-0.0951 (0.127)	-0.0371 (0.122)	0.0378 (0.138)	0.0130 (0.149)	0.237 (0.198)	-0.0586 (0.122)	0.0732 (0.179)	0.0771 (0.179)
Constant	3.418 (2.447)	2.885 (2.456)	1.813 (2.702)	1.646 (3.205)	-2.541 (3.696)	2.434 (2.653)	-0.108 (3.791)	-0.514 (3.812)
ln_p Constant	-0.0951 (0.101)	-0.102 (0.100)	-0.0403 (0.111)	-0.000614 (0.112)	0.00251 (0.111)	-0.0779 (0.116)	0.128 (0.120)	0.129 (0.122)
Observations	1382	1382	1382	1382	1360	1344	1323	1323

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 16: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Alternative Measure of Campaigns)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Unarmed Campaign Duration (alternative)		- 0.303* *	- 0.234* *	- 0.295* *	- 0.277* *	- 0.302* *	- 0.238* *		
		(0.105)	(0.090 7)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.081 4)		
Armed Campaign Duration (alternative)		- 0.0365	- 0.0409	- 0.0202	- 0.0131	- 0.0432	- 0.0114		
		(0.033 6)	(0.038 6)	(0.031 1)	(0.036 3)	(0.035 8)	(0.047 9)		
Popular Campaign (alternative)								-0.393	
								(0.343)	
Unarmed Campaign (alternative)									-0.287
									(0.362)
Armed Campaign (alternative)									-0.208
									(0.350)
Post-Military			1.012* (0.442)				0.681 (0.460)	0.812 (0.486)	0.812 (0.486)
Post-Personal			0.140 (0.335)				0.526 (0.523)	0.521 (0.482)	0.531 (0.480)
Post-Party			0.151 (0.543)				0.603 (0.488)	0.600 (0.468)	0.582 (0.478)
Post-Independence			0.816 (0.520)				1.063 (0.581)	0.925 (0.584)	0.959 (0.579)
Presidential				0.0934 (0.431)			0.295 (0.693)	0.233 (0.720)	0.218 (0.732)
Mixed System				1.626* * (0.525)			2.035* * (0.629)	2.054* * (0.653)	2.022* * (0.638)
US Trade (ln)					-0.159 (0.102)		-0.102 (0.126)	-0.128 (0.125)	-0.112 (0.116)

Democracies in the Region	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.066*				2.720*	2.711*	2.794*		
	*				*	*	*		
	(0.689)				(0.788)	(0.760)	(0.766)		
Ethnic Fractionalizi on					0.0310	-	-0.319	-0.274	
						0.0908			
					(0.539)	(0.755)	(0.666)	(0.671)	
Excluded Population					1.026	0.345	0.393	0.309	
					(0.561)	(0.678)	(0.740)	(0.722)	
GDP per capita (ln)	-	-	-	-	-0.245	-	-0.292	-0.371	-0.361
	0.580*	0.553*	0.586*	0.591*		0.527*			
	*	*	*	*		*			
	(0.133)	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.182)	(0.163)	(0.242)	(0.210)	(0.224)
GDP Growth	-4.247	-3.617	-3.288	-4.366	-	-3.444	-	-	-
					4.835*		5.588*	5.813*	5.747*
	(2.236)	(2.174)	(2.512)	(2.331)	(2.353)	(2.254)	(2.277)	(2.536)	(2.524)
Oil Production per capita (ln)	0.105	0.101	0.0394	0.145	0.0813	0.0805	0.0783	0.0926	0.0929
	(0.078	(0.077	(0.086	(0.093	(0.080	(0.082	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.108)
	3)	0)	9)	6)	1)	8)			
Population (ln)	-	0.0281	0.0305	0.0268	0.214	0.0153	0.122	0.0944	0.0689
	0.0741								
	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.170)	(0.102)	(0.172)	(0.165)	(0.159)
Observations	1382	1382	1382	1382	1360	1344	1323	1323	1323

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 17: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Alternative Measure of Democracy)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Nonviolent Campaign Duration		- 0.389* *	- 0.366* *	- 0.348* *	- 0.318* *	- 0.473* *	- 0.341*		
		(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.134)		
Violent Campaign Duration		-0.128 (0.0679)	-0.105 (0.0560)	-0.123 (0.0740)	- 0.0803 (0.0554)	- 0.232* (0.110)	-0.112 (0.0607)		
Popular Campaign at Transition							- 0.792* (0.386)		
Nonviolent campaign at Transition									- 0.805* (0.411)
Violent campaign at Transition									0.178 (0.517)
Post-military Democracy			0.245 (0.464)				1.742* * (0.577)	1.683* * (0.511)	1.721* * (0.526)
Post-civilian Democracy			-0.830 (0.591)				0.709 (0.656)	0.713 (0.571)	0.684 (0.637)
Post-monrarchy Democracy			0.0784 (0.505)				1.608* (0.740)	2.011* (0.831)	2.133* (0.887)
Presidential System				-0.639 (0.380)			-0.791 (0.687)	-0.710 (0.748)	-0.777 (0.740)
Mixed System				- 1.065* * (0.397)			-0.408 (0.558)	-0.362 (0.538)	-0.280 (0.604)
Democracies in the Region					- 5.695* * (1.049)		- 6.909* * (1.476)	- 7.246* * (1.295)	- 7.709* * (1.397)

US Trade (ln)					-0.161 (0.145)		-0.318 (0.241)	-0.342 (0.254)	-0.353 (0.256)
Ethnic Fractionalizi on						0.902 (0.621)	1.570 (0.885)	1.471 (1.007)	1.619 (0.881)
Excluded Population						2.138* (0.734)	0.458 (0.930)	- 0.0506 (1.036)	-0.197 (1.008)
GDP per capita (ln)	- 0.647* * (0.146)	- 0.702* * (0.167)	- 0.658* * (0.170)	- 0.761* * (0.169)	- 0.842* * (0.234)	- 0.601* * (0.180)	-0.778 (0.400)	- 0.750* (0.367)	- 0.758* (0.379)
GDP Growth	-3.646 (2.048)	-4.335 (2.363)	-4.238 (2.563)	- 4.403* (2.167)	- 5.608* (2.737)	-3.907 (2.724)	-7.547 (3.853)	-7.485 (3.897)	-7.418 (3.979)
Oil production per capita (ln)	0.166* * (0.057 1)	0.220* * (0.067 1)	0.185* * (0.063 4)	0.257* * (0.069 7)	0.265* * (0.098 6)	0.175 (0.091 7)	0.291* (0.120)	0.274* (0.123)	0.299* (0.131)
Population (ln)	-0.139 (0.105)	-0.120 (0.099 6)	-0.137 (0.095 2)	- 0.204* (0.097 9)	- 0.0901 (0.194)	- 0.0902 (0.143)	- 0.0854 (0.341)	- 0.0260 (0.353)	- 0.0245 (0.357)
Observations	1477	1477	1477	1477	1450	1330	1307	1307	1307

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 18: Contentious Transition Legacy and Democratic Breakdown (Alternative Measure of Democracy and Campaign)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Unarmed Campaign Duration (alternative)		- 0.816** (0.306)	- 0.734** (0.272)	- 0.781** (0.294)	-0.679* (0.269)	- 0.740** (0.260)	- 0.600** (0.170)		
Armed Campaign Duration (alternative)		-0.0844 (0.0511)	-0.0728 (0.0523)	-0.0855 (0.0528)	-0.0626 (0.0533)	-0.0892 (0.0537)	-0.0432 (0.0547)		
Popular Campaign (alternative)								- 0.943* * (0.359)	
Unarmed Campaign (alternative)									-1.374* (0.613)
Armed Campaign (alternative)									-0.223 (0.424)
Post-military Democracy			0.543** (0.206)				1.025* (0.518)	2.138* (0.506)	0.857 (0.445)
Post-civilian Democracy			-0.389 (0.509)				-0.308 (0.838)	1.265* (0.521)	-0.292 (0.826)
Presidential System				-0.954* (0.477)			-1.159 (0.858)	-0.896 (0.692)	-1.108 (0.783)
Mixed System				-1.098* (0.483)			-1.112* (0.528)	-0.541 (0.543)	-0.906 (0.520)
Democracies in the Region					- 5.172** (1.494)		- 6.225** (1.547)	- 7.428* (1.428)	- 6.594* (1.448)
US Trade (ln)					-0.219 (0.152)		-0.305 (0.315)	-0.277 (0.234)	-0.296 (0.315)

Ethnic Fractionalization						0.770	1.763	1.421	1.749
						(0.612)	(1.025)	(1.192)	(1.053)
Excluded Population						1.279	-0.0171	0.0349	-0.434
						(0.805)	(1.256)	(1.068)	(1.364)
GDP per capita (ln)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.003	-0.880*	-0.872
	0.647**	0.708**	0.683**	0.819**	0.941**	0.621**			
	(0.146)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.225)	(0.318)	(0.206)	(0.639)	(0.435)	(0.520)
GDP Growth	-3.646	-4.304	-4.123	-5.461	-4.277	-4.610	-7.524	-7.709*	-7.849
	(2.048)	(3.263)	(3.377)	(3.209)	(3.407)	(3.188)	(4.368)	(3.916)	(4.414)
Oil production per capita (ln)	0.166**	0.229**	0.188**	0.279**	0.318**	0.194*	0.357**	0.252*	0.311*
	(0.0571)	(0.0695)	(0.0656)	(0.0689)	(0.107)	(0.0897)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.136)
))))))			
Population (ln)	-0.139	-0.0823	-0.0915	-0.249	-0.153	-0.0922	-0.275	-0.146	-0.219
	(0.105)	(0.0947)	(0.0916)	(0.137)	(0.204)	(0.139)	(0.485)	(0.310)	(0.411)
))						
Observations	1477	1220	1220	1220	1220	1131	1131	1307	1131

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

APPENDIX 5: NEWSPAPER ARTICLES CITED

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