

**IMPOSING LAW AND ORDER:
INTOLERANT IDEALISM IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most dominant ideological trends of the past three centuries in the foreign policies of Western powers has been the paradox of intolerance motivated by idealism. Such policies have been known by many names, from “good governance” and “best political practices” during the nineteenth century to “democracy exportation” and “freedom promotion” in recent years. Yet no matter the nomenclature, the underlying principle of these policies remains the same: intolerance for modes of political expression that deviate from the normative bases of the dominant nation’s system. The historical record of course does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question of what a dominant nation should tolerate in the social and political systems of its colonial sub-states. In all cases of imperial expansion—both formal and informal—there exists the challenge of finding the correct balance between aspects of self-rule that should be tolerated and those that should not.

This paper will examine some of these policies and the ideology underpinning them, both in the historical context of the British Empire and in their modern-day reincarnation as part of American grand strategic policies. First, we will outline the background and dominant principles of the Anglo-American imperial mindset, as well as their significance to the development of British and American political thought both historically and in the modern era. Second, we will consider the impact of intolerance in societal organization generally before examining it in the context of imperial control. Third, we will briefly discuss the rise of the British Empire and the development of the

British imperial mindset in order to understand how the combination of intolerance, idealism, and the desire for imperial control motivated the development of the British Empire and the British national consciousness. Fourth, we will look to the example of the Sepoy Mutiny in India as a case study of the limits of intolerant idealism as a means of social control. Following this we will examine the modern American incorporation of the doctrine of intolerant idealism into American imperial activities abroad, and the extent to which this represents a continuation of the British tradition. Finally the conclusion will discuss the modern practice of Western-led international institutions' encouragement of self-abnegation in the establishment of democratic regimes, and the implications this practice has for globalization and the future development of the international world order.

II. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN IMPERIAL MINDSET

To understand how intolerance and idealism have come to shape Anglo-American political thought, we must first recognize and understand the discourse of imperialism that is a fundamental component of the national ideology of both countries. To begin, the development of the western imperial mindset of the twentieth century stems almost entirely from the British experience of the two prior centuries, and therefore any assessment of the development of the Anglo-American imperial mindset must begin with an acknowledgement of the British understanding of their responsibility to shoulder “the white man’s burden,” a reference from the Kipling poem known to all students of empire. The poem begins with a call to imperial action:

Take up the White Man's burden,
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captive's need;
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child¹

This poem’s message appears to be an imperial call to arms, presumably intended for Kipling’s countrymen, to accept that with the great privilege of bearing the light of civilized society in the world comes the specific obligation of sacrificing to bestow this

¹ Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden" (1899), in *The Complete Verse* (London: Cathie, 1990), 261, lines 1-8.

light upon others. Indeed, at the time of the poem's publication the concept of the white man's burden quickly became the predominant British catchphrase to explain and justify paternalistic British colonial rule. This stanza of the poem suggests the core ideals the British emphasized in their articulation of their imperial duty: the Christian ideal of self-sacrifice for the betterment of others (note that it is unclear whether Kipling implies it to be the captives or the sons who will wear the harness), and the paternalistically degrading perspective with which they beheld the "new-caught, sullen peoples" of the non-white colonies.

However those who would identify a British audience as the intended target of Kipling's call are mistaken, as the poem was written in 1899 with an entirely different audience in mind: the United States. At the time of the poem's publication, the United States was immersed in its own colonial war in the Philippines, and Kipling's call was intended not to spur the British Empire to further expansion, but rather to motivate and legitimize the nascent American imperial drive. Most significant is the poem's concluding rhetoric concerning the substantive factors that should (in Kipling's mind at least) motivate America to imperial action:

Comes now, to search your manhood,
Through all the thankless years,
Cold-edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers!²

For Kipling, the most important group to be affected by American imperial action would not be the American colonists themselves, but rather America's peers, and in particular the British, who had earned a right through the previous century of imperial labor to expect American shoulders to share the imperial burden. Here the concept of bringing the

² Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," 262, lines 61-64.

stabilizing force of civilization to the underdeveloped is significant for America not in the obvious sense that it will benefit their colonies, but rather in the sense that it will further enhance American society *ipse* by bringing it closer in line with the British standard. British idealism here is colored by a subtle paternalistic intolerance towards the Americans themselves—a belief that America only deserves a position of parity with the Britain if it emulates Britain’s global posture, that is to say, by adjusting its goals and practices to resemble those of Britain. British imperialism developed during the Victorian era as an innate component of the British national identity, and because it was supported with justificatory Christian rhetoric as a force for good in the world, it could be confidently and publically discussed without the need to justify whether it ought to be a part of Great Britain’s grand strategy. Kipling’s organizing principle is that America and Britain must share a similar perspective on the role that empire should play in the development of the global society, and that the American colonizer should act in accordance with the example set forth by his British imperial predecessors.

This perspective is significant for the purposes of this analysis because it addresses the question at the heart of the British and American experiences with imperialism: By what means can an imperially motivated nation justify its colonial ends? Militarily and politically, British and American imperial mechanisms were in some ways markedly distinct. Consider the difference in national opinion concerning empire—the British embrace of the term as an essential component of the national identity, contrasted with American oscillations between aversion to casting American actions abroad in an imperial mold and active attempts to distinguish American imperial exceptionalism from what had gone on in previous empires. At their core, however, British and American

actions abroad were guided by the same principle, an idea of cultural self-promotion as a means of achieving stability and order abroad.

This motivating principle of empire might best be understood by contemporary readers when paired with its modern incarnation: globalization. Political Scientist Deepak Lal describes globalization as “a cyclical phenomenon of history for millennia, being associated with the rise and fall of empires.”³ Globalization today in certain circles is synonymous with cultural imperialism, a practice that, its proponents argue, has changed little in substance today from the time of the British and earlier empires, to the greater benefit of the global order as a whole. As author David Rothkopf writes, “globalization has economic roots and political consequences, but it also has brought into focus the power of culture in this global environment—the power to bind and to divide in a time when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to international relations.”⁴ Throughout the historical rise of empires, the need for military force as a method of obtaining territory has always been matched with the need for a force capable of controlling culture in order for imperial centers to maintain their hold of conquered territory and its peoples. Over time, the doctrine of intolerant idealism has emerged to serve this purpose, as we shall see in the following sections.

³ Deepak Lal, *In Praise of Empire* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), iv.

⁴ David Rothkopf, “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” *Foreign Policy* 107 (Summer, 1997): 39.

III. INTOLERANCE AS A MOTIVATING POLITICAL PRINCIPLE

To understand how idealistic intolerance can shape the dynamics of empire, it is necessary to consider how both tolerance and intolerance function within individual societies. According to John Locke and Michael Walzer, the concept of tolerance actually encompasses two distinct practices. In Locke's view, tolerance is the endurance of undesirable practices, whereas for Walzer, tolerance is respect for the identity of another individual or group. Locke argues that in actual human practice only his definition of tolerance is ever realistically achievable, and the extent to which such tolerance implies permissive allowance of alternate practices or is simply a passive manifestation of disapproval varies depending on the societal organization. Each society must also distinguish what it considers to be the appropriate limit of tolerance, as in practice, limitless tolerance can have destructive and divisive results (such as the "paradox of tolerance"⁵ in which tolerance of the intolerant has the effect of enabling intolerance).

To further illustrate this concept, let us consider by way of example the practice of permitting free speech in all forms, including extremist speech. If complete freedom of speech is permitted in an open society, an open forum becomes available to extremists who advocate the destruction of the democratic institutions that enable this speech, and who would, if successful in achieving this destruction, suppress the speech of others with

⁵ Michael Rosenfeld, "Extremist Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance." *Harvard Law Review* 100, no. 6 (April 1987): 1467.

whom they disagreed. In practice this situation has been anticipated in many western societies, and it might surprise those living in the United States, where freedom of speech has assumed a mantle of importance akin to that of a birthright, that in “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and in the constitutions and laws of the Western European democracies, extremist speech is not afforded legal protection.⁶ The perceived value of tolerance here must be balanced with the need for stability, or as Lee Bollinger writes in *The Tolerant Society*, “just as there can be no political freedom without constraints, particular prescriptions of tolerance create a need for certain instances of intolerance.”⁷

While contemporary pluralist democracies tend to value tolerance and condemn intolerance, states with imperial aims historically have been more openly cognizant of the complex relationship between the two. The example of free speech is significant to consider in the context of the British Empire. The concept of limited free speech would appear starkly anachronistic from an American perspective today because in modern American society, free speech generally functions beneficially to keep listeners open minded, but does not threaten the broad societal consensus. Contrast this with societies where such a consensus is not in place and where fundamental differences of opinion have the potential to upset the delicate balance between competing interests, as was the case in a large number of British colonial states. As Bollinger suggests, “Even if one concedes that self-restraint is a virtue and that tolerance of extremist speech would promote self-restraint, one wonders whether this goal justifies requiring a society to

⁶ *Ibid* 1458.

⁷ Lee C. Bollinger, *The Tolerant Society*. (New York: Oxford University Press 1986), 60.

tolerate harmful and offensive speech that may open the door to self-destruction.”⁸

Extremist dissent, when not properly tempered by a strong majority consensus, promotes instability. Empires—uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexity—seek to minimize both. This was the precisely the situation faced by the British in many parts of the Empire throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, climaxing in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.

The goal of fostering sustainable colonial stability lies at the base of British imperial intolerance. From this perspective it is impossible to consider that British intolerance was rooted solely in antipathy, prejudice, or moral reasoning. This pragmatic component of imperial intolerance—the value of creating control through uniformity—at first blush appears to be an unexpected counterpoint to Locke’s advancement of tolerance. Ultimately, however, the two ideas are founded upon the same end goal. Locke suggested that peaceful coexistence among individuals must be the stated aim of the governing body, and that the “best practice” for ensuring this end is to teach people to endure others whose values and practices differed from their own. Yet in the British imperial practice, it was not so much tolerance but rather intolerance that for a time was the means of fostering social peace. The result of these policies, however, was not consistent with the goal, as evidenced in the example of the Sepoy Mutiny. As both Walzer and Amy Gutman have observed, in many cases group identity and solidarity are strengthened (and as Walzer would say, thickened) in response to external challenges of intolerance. Walzer identifies the benefits of a group-martyr complex by stating explicitly that “intolerance has . . . group-sustaining effects.”⁹ Such a view flies directly in the face

⁸ *Ibid* 67.

⁹ Michael Walzer, *On Toleration*. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997), 33.

of John Stuart Mill's impassioned attack on the corrosive effects of intolerance, and also goes well beyond the measured pragmatism of Locke that allows for a certain degree of intolerance as an inevitable byproduct of human fallibility.

IV. INTOLERANT IDEALISM IN THE BRITISH IMPERIAL PROJECT: MORAL BRITANNIA?

Empires over time have demonstrated a unique capacity for integrating previously separated areas into a common economic sphere. As Lal states, “under their pax, empires promoted those gains from trade and specialization later emphasized by Adam Smith, leading to Smithian intensive growth.”¹⁰ Historically one can trace the economic development of human civilization along the lifelines of empires. Greco-Roman empires connected areas around the Mediterranean, while the Abbasid Empire of Arabs linked the world of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Simultaneously in the east the Mongol Empire linked China and Central Asia with the near East, while Indian empires linked areas of subcontinent.

The British Empire stands distinctly apart from these predecessors because it was the first global empire—one which established and maintained imperial sway beyond the borders of specific regions. The British Empire achieved the first truly global form of economic integration, and the branches of the liberal economic order grew out of this initial seed. Because this imperial development coincided with the Industrial Revolution, lowered transportation costs and wide trading of more cost-effective goods drove a new and historically unprecedented age of inter-colonial exchange. Domestically, the impact of this economic integration was a new convergence in domestic and foreign markets for

¹⁰ *Ibid* 32.

consumable goods, and a stratified global economy based on what Lal describes as “specialization along lines of comparative advantage and Smithian growth.”¹¹

The politics of empire emerged in Britain as a direct byproduct of the changes to British society fostered by this economic development and the requisite political stability and order that such a system required. In order to meet the three Humean goals of a stable society (securing life against violence, maintaining the ability of the state to keep its promises to its citizens, and stabilizing possessions through rules of property) the British had to establish a modern mechanism for controlling a vast and diverse group of multi-ethnic conglomerates, each with a level of autonomy and individual economic agency far greater than that which had existed within any previous empire. Historically, such empires were able to maintain peace and promote prosperity because they provided the basic protection of property required for economic growth. Domestic disorder and disintegration of these enlarged economic spaces resulted from a lack of such protection, a pattern consistently repeated in the ages leading up to the British Empire, and a trend of which the British themselves were well aware.

The aim of the British imperial policy was therefore to maintain a level of imperial control and harmony that would allow economic growth and development to continue unimpeded. To do this the British had to contend with the age-old imperial dilemma of balancing material and cosmological beliefs, or questions of morality and practicality in directing how the lives of their colonists ought to be conducted. While hegemony controls only foreign policy, true empires control both foreign and domestic policy, and the challenge of the British experience was the critical necessity of

¹¹ Lal, 39.

conducting policy that fostered stability (and therefore trade). When possible, this was done through indirect imperial rule, with princely states ruled through British political agents assigned to native rulers (similar to the earlier Roman system). At the same time, however, the British were aware of the Hobbsean principle that “covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”¹² Socially, this concept was enforced through a policy of social intolerance that favored an advancement of “transformative Britishness” to colonial populations.

To see how intolerant idealism became an important element of the British political consciousness during the mid to late nineteenth century, it is necessary to understand the impact of domestic unrest during this time. By the start of the Victorian era in the 1830s, the Industrial Revolution had brought to the British mainland a broadening of the franchise and a host of new tensions and problems. The Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867 had greatly expanded the franchise to meet the changing demands of the new industrial classes, but given that at this time England was experiencing huge population growth, producing hordes of industrial goods that needed markets, and fervently seeking outside raw materials to furnish this production, a simple broadening of the franchise was largely ineffective at alleviating social unrest and resolving economic tensions. At the same time, the rise of new Great Powers abroad was a harbinger to the end of nearly a century of relatively unchallenged British global hegemony.

Viewed through the lens of this new unstable world and domestic order, the Empire emerged as a potential source of strength and stability. The combined threat of democratization and the rise of competitive powers forced the British to look outside the

¹² Hobbes as quoted in Lal, 5.

boundaries of their island and to consider the implications of the destabilizing situation at home and the presence of these rival powers for the future of British power. During this period the Empire emerged as a central component of the ideologies of many who sought to combat the effects of these internal and external changes. Discussion of the potential role of the Empire in relieving domestic stresses and keeping Great Britain in step with other rising powers became a key element of the national discourse. Inherent within this discussion was the background concept of intolerant idealism; the reins by which the British had directed the course of imperial development in the past, and the means by which they hoped to shape and effectively control its future. Intolerant idealism was intended as a way to maintain stability within the Empire as a whole amidst the chaos of demographic, political and economic change.

While a complete history of the rise and development of the British Empire would no doubt be useful and informative in this discussion, for the purpose of this analysis it is necessary only to give a sketch of the outlines of the empire as the object of the overarching policy of intolerant idealism. Forged over a period of three centuries, at its maximum extent (between the two world wars) the British Empire spread over thirteen million square miles, roughly twenty-three percent of the world's land surface. The United Kingdom itself accounted for 0.2 percent of this total. At its zenith, therefore, the British Empire ruled between a fifth and a quarter of humanity.¹³ Beyond the mere acquisition of territory, the hay day of the empire as a source of global authority came during the final century of its existence, roughly the period from the 1830s until the

¹³ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: the Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. (London: Penguin 2005), 58.

1930s when the British were able to marshal the empire to successfully advance economic globalization. This was accomplished not simply through the export of its goods, but rather the export of its people, its capital, and especially its social and political institutions. By this time the Empire had served Britain profoundly as a source of international prestige, influence, and domestic prosperity, transforming a water-locked “island of shopkeepers” into the preeminent global force of its time, and arguably of any time to that point.

In the 1830s the empire also served Britain in an additional domestic capacity as a safeguard of democracy at home. During a time when social and demographic changes initiated by the Industrial Revolution introduced significant inequities and sources of domestic chaos, the Empire emerged as a source of stability. Tory leaders of the 1830s considered the empire in this sense as a kind of safety valve that could absorb the waves of unrest emanating from London and the urban centers of the British mainland:

There can be no danger of having too many safety valves. The old states of America . . . are fortunate in this respect; the new states and uncleared lands are to them as so many waste-weirs, over which . . . all who float loose upon its waters, are naturally drawn. Men . . . find here an outlet.¹⁴

Interestingly, fifty years later as America began to experience its own growing pains stemming from the Industrial Revolution, this same concept of free land as a safety valve would be an important part of Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier thesis. In “The Significance of the Frontier” essay, Turner described the abundance of space as providing citizens of over-crowded settled areas with “a gate of escape from the bondage of the

¹⁴ *English Quarterly Review* (London, Oct. 1823), 27.

past.”¹⁵ He saw a causal connection between free land and democracy, arguing that “space forbids the enumeration of the problems, economic, social and political—such as the democratization of the country—which have grown out of free land.”¹⁶ Parallels between this conception of the American frontier and the British Empire would also become an important part of the British national political discourse by the end of the nineteenth century and presented a strong case for the potential of the Empire to function as a safety-valve akin to the American frontier.

The Empire, then, could be a source of control: control over domestic disorder, over international economic markets, and over political uncertainties abroad with traditional rivals on the Continent. The incentives for maintaining a strong and prosperous empire were great. However, all of this was predicated upon an essential assumption: that the British themselves could control their empire. The maintenance of stability was unquestionably the highest priority of the Foreign Office and all political officials charged with the task of imperial oversight. There are innumerable examples of British efforts to achieve colonial harmony through intolerance of local practices in various regions from the Middle East to Africa and many places in between. This paper will focus on just one such area during one specific period: India during the 1850s, as an example of the force and limitations of the British use of intolerant idealism as a source of imperial control.

¹⁵ Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893*. (Washington D.C. 1894), 45.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 52.

V. CASE STUDY: INTOLERANT IDEALISM AND THE SEPOY MUTINY

One of the most vivid and illustrative examples of British intolerant idealism at work comes from the subtext of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The history of British relations in India is shot through with uncertainty and division on both sides concerning how to negotiate significant cultural, religious, and numerical imbalances. In British India a small, Christian, hierarchically structured Anglo-Saxon minority attempted to govern a large, ethnically diverse, religiously distinct and demographically enormous colonial majority. Add the fact that they were doing this by proxy, from a distance of more than 4,000 miles, and the various challenges the British might expect to encounter are manifestly apparent. The British mission in India in many ways was the convergence of the most dominant threads of Victorian imperial idealism: a source for greater economic prosperity through trade, a basis for strategic defense of British imperial interests as well as the maintenance of British international political power at large, and an ethnic and ideological culture in which to meet “the White Man’s burden” of Christianizing the unbaptized third world. While tensions from efforts to realize these goals are traceable to the earliest days of British colonization in India, the Sepoy Mutiny is an excellent example of the impact of these efforts over time. Because British use of intolerance in furtherance of these aims is clearly visible in the causes and motivating factors behind the

Mutiny, it is an ideal case study for consideration of the impact of intolerant idealism in this colonial context.

The cause most frequently cited as one of the critical motivating factors of the mutiny was the British disruption of the old political order in the decades immediately prior to the conflict; an act directly motivated by British intolerance of native Indian princely rule. As part of his plan for consolidation and expansion of British territory in India, Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India from 1848 to 1856, annexed territories by means of the “Doctrine of Lapse,” denying ruling princes their traditional right to adopt heirs. The course followed by Dalhousie significantly shaped the political environment of India at the time and was greatly influenced by the perception of the empire at home. According to the historian George D. Bearce, “the imperial mind of mid-Victorian Britain was growing mature; the British did not want to make an exhibition of their imperial growth; thus came a dignified pursuit of imperial power under Dalhousie that could reconcile Liberals, Conservatives, and humanitarians to the empire.”¹⁷

At the same time, despite some internal domestic discussion on the potential application of self-government in India, these maturing imperial minds had no intention of going so far as to promote self-governance or even joint collaborative government that involved local Indian rulers. Following years of traditional intolerant imperial policy of installing British colonial rulers in India, the previous decade had been one of great political, technological, economic and educational reform, following which many Manchester Liberals and some Anglo-Indian officials began to reassert the hope for Indian self-government that was originally proposed in the 1830s by British military

¹⁷ George D. Bearce, *British Attitudes Towards India 1784-1858* (London 1961) 203.

officials in India like Lord Macaulay and General Montstuart Elphinstone. Liberals in England such as MP Richard Cobden argued at the time that Indians “were becoming increasingly well-qualified for self-government.”¹⁸ MP T.C. Anstey summed up even the most cautious of liberal views by stating: “the natives were, nevertheless, at the very least, quite as fit to manage their own affairs as any other people.”¹⁹

Yet this supportive viewpoint on the question of self-government ultimately was never able to inspire a collective national following because it seemed to represent too far a departure from the long-standing British position of intolerance toward self rule of non-white colonies. Other imperial-minded British officials espoused the later view of Lord Curzon and others who saw self-government as the mark of the loss of British control of the jewel of the imperial crown. They were not overly anxious to mentor Indians on their way to self-government, and during the 1840s and 1850s these officials “altogether opposed the idea of associating Indians in the administration of their country and they took comfort in the expectation, that, because of diversities in religion and language, Indians could never co-operate in dispensing with British rule.”²⁰ Rather than seeking to foster and develop sources of unity between British nationals and native Indians, the British resorted to a posture of tolerance in its most limited form: tacit endurance of some local culture and tradition, but zero tolerance for any native activity that might threaten British control.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 231.

¹⁹ Anstey as quoted in Bearce, 231.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 232.

The result of this intolerance-driven dissent among so many powerful groups at home about the wisdom of training Indians for self-government was that the British Parliament saw no urgency in passing any legislation on the matter or in beginning the work of political progress. Instead of preparing Indians for self-government, the British declined to take even the minimalist step of educating some Indians for the civil service whereby a select few Indians might learn British governmental traditions and standards and then apply them to the context of the subcontinent. Bearce's interpretation in 1961 was that "the maintenance of imperial power thus had triumphed over the Liberal aim of encouraging the self-government of peoples."²¹ The dominant concept was that Indian leadership could not be tolerated even at the regional local level because it threatened the British ability to exert direct authority over Indian citizens. The alternate theory, that tolerating Indian participation in governance might have served as a bridge between the colonial leaders and the colonized, was never recognized in the British grand strategic plan, and the actions pursued to counter the "Doctrine of Lapse" clearly illustrate the considerable sway that the political doctrine of intolerance had in British colonial policy-making at the time.

Intolerance played a dominant role in the mutiny along a second front in the form of religion, as decades worth of tension from increased efforts to "take up the white man's burden" in Christianizing Indians was magnified by specific British acts of religious intolerance in the months prior to the Mutiny. There had long been a perceived onslaught on traditional social and religious customs through the activities of Christian missionaries and official government policies such as the abolition of *suttee* (voluntary

²¹ *Ibid*, 233.

suicide by widows following the death of their husbands) in 1829. Yet the aggressive policies pursued by the British in the 1840s and 1850s as part of a greater emphasis on social reform stirred up significant religious concerns among many Indians, who viewed many policies of the nineteenth-century reform as inextricably linked with Christianity and the subversion of native religions. In southern areas of India Muslims and Christian missionaries had long been engaged in uneasy contact. Both missionaries and Muslim scholars engaged in debates, referred popularly as *munazaras* (great debates), over the superiority of their respective religions. The most important of these was held in Agra in April of 1854 and was cited by the historian Avril Ann Powell as a significant cause of the uprisings of 1857 in the Agra region.²²

The gangetic core region that had been the focus of the *munazara* confrontation (Delhi, Lucknow and Agra) was also a central area for armed rising in the Mutiny. The new laws of the 1850s, which required sepoys to serve abroad, were also deeply offensive to traditional religious beliefs. This policy of ignoring and discounting the power deeply-held traditional native religious beliefs is one of the starkest examples of British intolerance motivated by a belief that uniformity and stability could only be achieved by promoting a strict adherence to the policies of the secular state: the colonial government. Here the central concept of the government's policies was to use intolerance to marginalize and dissipate the influence of religious and cultural traditions that it viewed as drains on the loyalty of the local citizenry. The intention of the government once the authority of these non-state sources of authority had been invalidated was to replace them with British norms, as evidenced in educational policies during this time such as Lord

²²Avril Ann Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India*. (United Kingdom: Curzon Press 1993), 107.

Macaulay's "Minute of Education" and the resulting British control over Indian schooling. Indeed, the motivation of Macaulay's plan was specifically to supplant Indian cultural teachings with British academic influences, and he stated his goal as seeing the effect a "single shelf of a good European library"²³ would have on an uneducated native population. Yet rather than sparking cultural homogeneity and enhanced loyalty in the Indian population, the policy of degrading Indian cultural practices and supplanting them with British educational norms in effect institutionalized racism and eradicated the rough balance of power of the eighteenth century between the authority of the colonial state and the religious and cultural influences.²⁴

There was a small group of British policymakers who recognized the problematic implications of pursuing a policy whose aim was to discredit the value of traditional Indian religious and cultural norms, but their efforts to promote a form of tacit tolerance were flatly rejected by the majority in power. Lord Ellenborough delivered a strong warning in the House of Lords on June 9, 1857, against "colonels connected with missionary operations . . . You will see the most bloody revolution which has at any time occurred in India. The English will be expelled."²⁵ Richard Cobden likewise considered the mutiny to be a civil war wherein which the root of evil was the British sense of superiority.

Following this lead conservatives and anti-imperialists banded together in an attack on

²³ Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Minute on Indian Education" (1835), 237-49, in *Selected Writings*, ed. John Clive and Thomas Pinney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1972), 241.

²⁴ Powell, 10-12.

²⁵ Ellenborough as quoted in Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*. (London: Little, Brown and Company 1997), 277.

the government's policies in India. They now agreed with Bearce that "the British programme for the intellectual, social, and material transformation of India and its people—however inadequate its British critics found the programme—was having its impact,"²⁶ and this impact was not positive. Conservatives had warned that too much change in India, too much propagation of Christianity and interference in the princely states, would bring about a sepoy mutiny. In November of 1857 Sir Charles Trevelyan wrote the "Indophilus" letters in the *Times* in which he stated that pride, overconfidence, and a lack of consideration for the Indian people had been the central reason for the revolt.²⁷ Yet even those in the best position to judge the effects of British reacculturation efforts, military officers like Ellenborough who saw the unrest forming among native regiments where commanders emphasized Christianity as an essential component of the sepoy military experience, were unable to impact the mindset of the British main.

It was thus through intolerance and the rejection of native culture that the British sought to gain the full loyalty of the Indian citizenry, or as it has been described more generally in modern terms, to win the battle for the "hearts and minds" of those whose actions they sought to influence. Culture itself in this context assumes an immense power, being nothing less than "the total patterns of human behavior and its products embodied in speech, action, and artifacts and dependant upon man's capacity for learning

²⁶ Bearce, 214.

²⁷ C.E. Trevelyan, *The Letters of Indophilus to 'The Times'* (London, 1858) *Quarterly Review*, civ. (July 1858), 235.

and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations.”²⁸ Additionally, as writer David Rothkopf argues, “culture is used by the organizers of society—politicians, theologians, academics, and families—to impose and ensure order, the rudiments of which change over time as needs dictate.”²⁹ Whosoever controls culture, therefore controls society, for just as culture is able to unite members around common practices, so too can it divide and barricade individual groups behind walls of distinct beliefs and social norms. For this reason, a review of the history of human conflict shows that conflict has most often occurred over cultural lines, as culture becomes tied to the root of personal identity, and a threat to one’s culture becomes a threat to one’s God, one’s ancestry, and therefore one’s core identity.

The goal at the heart of the policy of imperially motivated intolerance is to suppress the divisive and subversive elements of culture that threaten stability, such as exclusionary or separatist elements of religious, political or ideological beliefs. On paper, this goal to suppress that which is exclusionary or divisive might be seen as reasonable, but it encounters two problems in application. The first is that dominant cultures like the British in India historically have tended to have trouble distinguishing between cultural practices that were socially divisive and those that posed no threat to unity, stability and prosperity, such as the celebration of holidays, or traditions involving food, music or rituals. By adopting a policy of over-arching cultural intolerance in an attempt to foster over-arching cultural homogeneity, British policies had the effect of establishing a kind

²⁸ Rothkopf, 40.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 40.

of zero-sum identity game, in which being a proper British colonist required abandoning the core ideals of the Indian identity.

The second problem typified in the British experience is the inescapable reality that by attempting to supplant what were viewed as societally divisive cultural mores and ideology with supposedly “unifying” British norms and systems, the actual effect was simply to replace one restrictive normative system with another. By making Indian culture and the requirements of British colonial systems mutually exclusive, the British were in no way creating a system that was less restrictive than the one it was seeking to reform. Furthermore, because Indian social and cultural systems had been refined and repeated for hundreds of generations within India, they had assumed the form of the core Indian identity, an entity which, once attacked, would call forth the fiercest defense. Even those who would otherwise be motivated to follow some British normative directives in India would become reluctant to do so when it appeared that following British systems was a contradiction to what it meant to be Indian.

Ultimately, it was the Mutiny itself that finally sounded the first nationally audible alarm on the viability of continuing to pursue a colonial policy predicated upon this belief in British colonial policy’s ability to operate from a perspective of superiority. Central to the maintenance of the intolerant idealism that was the backbone of British policymaking in India was the misguided belief the British themselves were immune to harm at the hands of underdeveloped countries. Indian native culture could be marginalized and disrespected, the society could be “reeducated,” and sepoys could be commanded to follow orders that contravened religious dictum, all because the British were their superior in every category of conceivable significance. British reactions to the

events of the Mutiny did much to illustrate not only the development of British understanding of what had actually occurred in India leading up to and during the Mutiny but also to show how the British perception of the Empire as a whole was fundamentally altered by this event. The initial reaction of the public was, predictably, one of shocked indignation. Reformers had thought that they were bringing progress to India and expected the gratitude of the sepoys instead of news that they had murdered British officers, wives and children. At the same time, as the *Times* reported, “they were horrified that a people they believed were barbarous and backward could challenge or injure a civilized people.”³⁰ There was an immediate public demand on all sides for revenge. In June of 1857 after the first reports of the violence reached England the *Times* declared: “Justice, humanity, the safety of our countrymen, and the honour of our country demand that the slaughter of Delhi shall be punished with unsparing severity.”³¹ The Mutiny had clearly been caused by the wickedness of sepoys and the backwardness of the Indian people. Bearce stated that, to the British mind, “the revolt was the last stand of the Hindu mind against Western civilization” and according to the *Times* the best course to follow was to sweep away “every political establishment and every social usage” which prevented British power and Western progress from being “universal and complete.”³²

The force of this initial post-Mutiny surge of imperial intolerance eventually gave way to a newfound sense of internal questioning, as the British began to consider the extent to which their empire had become blind to the civilizing Victorian ideals it was

³⁰ *The Times*, 23 March, 1857.

³¹ *The Times*, 27 June 1857.

³² Bearce, 235.

supposedly created to advance. Governing attitudes in Britain gradually shifted away from vindictive thirst for revenge and began to consider the culpability of British role in the affairs of the Mutiny. *Times* writer William Russell wrote about savagery of British response toward Hindus and Muslims who were all British subjects:

“The Christianity of a Roman Emperor could not save his empire; . . . so might we fall unwept with many crimes, of which our people know nothing, in spite of our being Christian . . . Our Christian character in Europe, our Christian zeal in Exeter Hall, will not atone for usurpation, and annexation in Hindustan, or for violence and fraud in the Upper Provinces of India.”³³

Compare this sequence of righteous anger giving way to reconsideration of the appropriateness of the military action undertaken in the name of payback to the American public’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The pattern of public responses is remarkably similar.

The decades following the Mutiny marked the final stage of the British Empire, known as the “liberal empire period” when the British made efforts to reorganize their relationships with colonies along primarily economic lines. Yet this shift ultimately became a striking example of the policy of too little too late. While many early and mid-Victorians had assumed that the spread of industrialization under the auspices of free trade would bring about the end to all conflicts around the world,³⁴ the leaders whose outlooks were influenced by the closing decades of the nineteenth century would live to see that assumption come crashing down in the twentieth following the outbreak of World War I. Ravaged by debt and with no motivation to continue to the informal ties

³³ William Russell. *My Indian Mutiny Diary*. (London 1858), 113-114.

³⁴ Walter Houghton, *The Victorian frame of mind, 1830-1870* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 41.

upon which the Empire had rested for so long, the constitutional principles of representative, responsible government which the colonies had been granted during the mid-Victorian years began to run their logical course toward complete independence, fulfilling the predictions of all those who had ardently advocated for reform in the previous decades.³⁵

By 1900 nearly all British politicians—Conservatives, Fabians and Liberals—called themselves imperialists. By the time of the formation of Gladstone’s final ministry of 1892, the dominant political trends favored imperialism, not only among the general electorate but also among the younger Liberal leaders like Rosebury, Asquith, Haldane and Grey.³⁶ These new leaders, like the charismatic Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain, had developed their own perspectives on the Empire amidst the turbulent influences of the rise of democracy and the shift of global power, and their political outlooks were profoundly influenced by these forces.

The largely agrarian, feudal Britain of the early decades of the Victorian era bore little resemblance to the industrialized, democratic Britain of the turn of the century. The influence of previously powerful social systems like the church and the traditional nobility had faded. Only the Empire remained as a visible, tangible tie to the familiar old order. As biographer Peter Fraser described, “For Joseph Chamberlain as for so many of his generation the cult of duty, self-sacrifice and service to the community, nation or empire, became increasingly the antidote for waning religious belief and growing

³⁵ *Ibid*, 136.

³⁶ Peter Fraser, *Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914*. (London: Cassell and Company Ltd. 1966), 138.

materialism.”³⁷ Imperialism became a means to rally the people toward some larger purpose, a way to appeal to nostalgia for the storied past and hope for an equally bright future. Calls for imperial unity were, in their essence, based upon a blending of socialism and imperialism, the idea that feelings of social discontent and class hatred could be assuaged by stressing the importance of social loyalties, bonds, and traditions, combined with the idea of service to the community, the Empire and the English-speaking people of the world. However the distance forged by decades of policies of intolerance ultimately proved too great to bridge. Amidst the internal and external strains of modernization, British leaders accommodated themselves to democracy and at the same time struggled to determine how Great Britain could retain its place in the world in the face of the mounting pressures from growing world powers. Control was the aim, and intolerance of anything that appeared to threaten it seemed a prudent policy, to disastrous effect. Intolerance alone did not determine the fate of the Empire, but it proved to be a significant component of its decline,

³⁷ *Ibid*, xv.

VI. THE AMERICAN FUTURE?

In recent years the idea that the American destiny to further the democratic movement in the world begun by the British has returned to the American national consciousness, though the concept itself is hardly a new one. As the American historian Walter Russell Meade wrote: “Call it empire, hegemony, world order, or globalization, the question of global economic integration under British or American auspices and the political strategies that advance this great process have been at or near the center of both American and British foreign and domestic politics for centuries.”³⁸ Just as the question of how to manage this process captivated the attention of British leaders in the nineteenth century, so too today do American leaders struggle to deal with many of the same forces of change that affected the British Empire.

Historically there has been ample overlap between the British and American experiences with territorial expansion. British statesman and writer Charles Wentworth Dilke and American Frederick Jackson Turner both strove to account for the formation of a cultural whole (the British Empire in the case of the former, and the American nation-state in the latter) out of racially diverse citizenry; and both wrote of white colonization over new territory in response to perceived crises of empire. Perhaps most importantly,

³⁸ Walter Russell Meade Mead, *Special Providence*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 38.

each intertwined the British and U.S. “empires” analytically. Yet direct comparison in this manner begs the question as to whether the American experience in westward expansion was genuinely comparable to that of imperial development. As historian Paul Kramer writes, Turner’s hypothesis explaining American westward development was not based on imperial foundations:

In describing a pattern of innovation in America that flowed not from east to west but from west to east and by seemingly substituting a form of geographic for racial determinism, Turner sublimated “extirpation” into nation building: the settler, disposing of “free land,” conquered by the frontier, was himself not a conqueror. In this way, Turner was both drawing on and fueling a powerful language of American exceptionalism that would help define the United States as not simply free of European influence, but free as well of the taint of empire.³⁹

This American exceptionalism and unwillingness to cast American activities abroad within an imperial mold has persisted in some channels of American political discourse to the present day, but it is interesting to consider the extent to which American activities globally have had much the same effect on the advancement of Anglophone culture as earlier British imperial policies. Consider the policy-motivated conception of American interest that views a threat to U.S. interests and markets, regional peace, and the perceived U.S. ability to lead if foreign leaders adopt models that encourage separatism and culturally produced instability. David Rothkopf modernizes the sentiments of Kipling when he argues that American efforts to export American culture, modes of governance, and ideology are not only necessary, but preferable for enhancement of global stability. In his view, the American model is the best for the future, and in failing to act, America in effect is relinquishing control of the process to the less-qualified and less-beneficially

³⁹ Paul Kramer and John Plotz, “Pairing Empires: Britain and the United States, 1857 1947.” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*. 2001: 1.

motivated. Rothkopf points to the existence of a “Pax Americana” during the early years of globalization, and argues that American leadership has credibility in a global context because it oversaw the establishment of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Rothkopf concludes that it must be America’s objective to win the battle of the world’s information flows, as Great Britain did at the height of its imperial prowess.⁴⁰

American enthusiasm for imperialism is most visible in the so-called “neoconservative movement” of American foreign policy that assumed national prominence during the first and second Bush administrations. What is noteworthy for this analysis is the fact that the rhetoric of supporters of the neoconservative ideology bears striking similarities to mid-nineteenth century British rhetoric. The journalist Robert Kaplan described empire as “the most benign form of order,” while his contemporary Sebastian Mallaby proposed American “neo-imperialism” as the best solution to address the “chaos engendered by failed states.” around the world. Indeed, writer Dinesh D’Souza even went so far as to proclaim America “the most magnanimous imperial power ever.”⁴¹

Writers like these consider the beneficial effects of American democracy exportation, and draw comparisons between the British naval campaign against the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century to American attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Here the call to imperialism can even be heard in voices from the left—those labeled

⁴⁰ Rothkopf, 45.

⁴¹ Dinesh D’Souza, “In Praise of an American Empire,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 2002: 59.

liberal interventionists concerned with the so-called imperialism of human rights—who see democratization abroad as the best means of promoting a peaceful and cooperative world order, much like their British predecessors concerned with promoting Victorian Christian ideals. There are even American writers willing to go so far as to state that the American imperial model is superior to the British. Writer Max Boot describes the twenty-first-century American imperial incarnation as consisting “not of far-flung territorial possessions but of a family of democratic, capitalist nations that eagerly seek shelter under Uncle Sam’s umbrella.”⁴²

Statements of American foreign policy officials and military leaders in the Bush administration further show that imperial visions extend beyond journalistic rhetoric. Former Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the most senior Pentagon official associated with the “new imperialism” movement, argued beginning as early as 1992 that “the aim of U.S. policy should be to convince potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive policy to protect their legitimate interests.” And in 2000 General Anthony Zinni, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, said in an interview that he was “a modern-day pro-consul, descendant of the warrior-statesman who ruled the Roman Empire’s outlying territory, brining order and ideals from a legalistic Rome.”⁴³

The majority of overt American imperialists are neoconservatives, and their views have been the most prominent underpinnings of support for American grand strategic policies toward Iraq since 2003. As journalist James Kurt wrote, “Today there is only one

⁴² Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. (New York 2002), xx.

⁴³ As quoted in Ferguson, 5.

empire, the global empire of the United States. The U.S. military . . . are the true heirs of the legendary civil officials, and not just the dedicated military officers, of the British Empire.” Much has been made of the parallels between the British experience in Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century and the American experience at the start of the twenty-first. Their goals in entering Iraq, from at least a rhetorical standpoint, appear nearly identical. Consider the statement made by British commander Lieutenant General Stanley Maude to the people of Bagdad upon the arrival of British troops into the city in March, 1917: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors, but as liberators.” More than three-quarters of a century later, the American arrival in Bagdad was marked by the same promise to the Iraqi people in the words of Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, who said “We go to liberate, not to conquer.”⁴⁴ For these advocates of democracy exportation as a means of regime change, American grand strategic policy abroad is supported at its most basic level by a desire to assume the role of the benign hegemon.

This modern American imperial perspective is maintained through the promotion of free-market capitalism, expanding democracy and continued globalization. The writer Joshua Muravchik encapsulated the designs of the architects of the Iraq war when he argued that “change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world . . . a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the Middle East.” American belief in the transformative powers of democracy promotion as herein described is boundless, perhaps most fully embodied in a statement

⁴⁴ Geoff Eley, “Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name.” *History Workshop Journal* 63. 2007: 154.

by a member of the neocon group Project For a New American Century, who stated in the organization's report outlining suggestions on how to rebuild American defenses following 9/11: "After Baghdad, Beijing." ⁴⁵

In no area is the American imperial agenda more positively invoked than by neoconservatives and like-minded strategists who see an American embrace of its imperial role as the most effective means of combating global terrorism. According to Max Boot in "The Case for American Empire," contrary to those who viewed the 9/11 attacks as a form of payback for unbridled American imperialism, in reality the terrorist attacks were the byproduct of insufficient American involvement abroad. Far from seeking isolationism and cautious engagement with foreign nations, Boot states that American foreign policy must become more expansive in its goals and assertive in carrying them out. He identifies American unwillingness to stay the course in Afghanistan in 1989 as the actual proximate cause of 9/11, and cites the successful example of "American liberal imperialism" in addressing fundamentalist radical tensions in the Balkans as proof that American intervention yields success where isolationism will always be doomed to failure. Boot draws direct comparisons between the British and American experiences in the Middle East, pointing out that American troops today follow the footsteps of generations of British colonial soldiers on campaigns in Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Persia, the Northwest Frontier (Pakistan). These lands themselves are not new witnesses to the presence of imperial authority—indeed the British originally entered the region to quell disorder from

⁴⁵ 'Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century. The Project for a New American Century. September 2000 Report: 157.

the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which itself had replaced the Mughal empire before it.

Boot's argument is an articulation of the hopes and convictions of modern American strategists who, whether they openly accept the label of "imperialist" or prefer to categorize their ideology under a more domestically friendly title like "internationalist," strongly believe that American leadership in shaping the international world order must continue, for the benefit of American interests, but also for those of the international community. For Boot and others, the presence of a strong, democratically liberal regime at the helm of the international system is the only means of achieving lasting peace and stability in second- and third-world regimes whose ability to impact the international order can no longer be ignored. As Boot states, "Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets."⁴⁶ What was once the task of Kipling's countrymen continues today in sentiments like these as the destiny of their American descendents.

To those who respond to his call by decrying imperialism as "dusty relic of a long-gone era," Boot offers the modern example of colonies—fledgling democratic regimes such as East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, and Bosnia—what he calls the "wards of the international community,"⁴⁷ the adoption of which was widely supported by leftist political groups on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. The historical precedent for their "adoption" by the UN lies in the system of mandatory territories sanctioned by the

⁴⁶ Max Boot. "The Case for American Empire." *The Weekly Standard*. October 15, 2001, 16.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 17.

League of Nations in the 1920s, which came about when the colonial possessions of the defeated German and Ottoman empires were essentially distributed to Allied powers charged with guiding them toward eventual self rule. To those on the left who rebuke any calls for international involvement that invoke imperialism, Booth charges that the sentiment underlying the League-of-nations-sanctioned colonial system is the same rationale underlying the humanitarian interventions of today sanctioned by the U.S., the European Union, and the United Nations.

The goal, according to Booth and others, is to create a national consciousness, a task that can only be achieved through top-down direction from an external source both powerful enough to control domestic chaos and instability during difficult transitional periods following regime changes, and also secure enough in its own democratic principles to foster national consciousness without entirely subsuming the identity of the new state. There are countless historical examples of short-term colonial regimes achieving long-term successes in democracy building. Ironically enough for those Americans who disagree with the appropriateness of assuming an imperial role in international relations, the most prominent of these successes in the twentieth century have been American, beginning at the turn of the century in Latin American nations such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Philippines, and achieving the most dazzling successes in rebuilding the political infrastructures of Germany and Japan following World War II. American imperialists looking at those successes today see in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill's commitment in the Atlantic Charter to devote the collective resources of Great Britain and America to the creation of a liberal world order that was based on peace, stability,

and national self-determination. To them, calls to turn away from a program of progressive, imperially achieved reform in the Middle East, Asia and Africa are a repudiation of the core Anglo-American commitment to the advancement of democracy, and if America refuses today to shoulder “the White Man’s burden,” those living in underdeveloped nations who should benefit from democracy’s guiding hand are being intentionally cast aside, to the peril of the entire international system.

VII. CONCLUSION

In rejecting the argument of isolationists and others who perceive imperial influence as an unnecessary and unwanted force in the modern globalized era, Niall Ferguson offers the following assessment of what the international system requires to continue to develop along its present lines:

What is required is a liberal empire—that is to say, one that not only underwrites the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital but also creates and upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function—peace and order, the rule of law, non-corrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies—as well as provides public goods, such as transport infrastructure, hospitals and schools, which would not otherwise exist.⁴⁸

According to Ferguson, it is America, the nation which first viewed itself as “a city on a hill” during the age of John Winthrop and would later be described by Thomas Jefferson as “the empire of liberty,” that must continue to carry out the British imperial example to create the aforementioned conditions for peace and prosperity for the entire international order, in which both America and Great Britain are also participants. However we have seen that even in pursuit of the presumably laudable goals of Ferguson’s “liberal empire,” a nation seeking to alter the political and social structure of another must pursue policies that incorporate elements of intolerance and policies of self-abnegation, an act which contradicts fundamental American ideas about the nature of democracy. The question therefore remains as to whether policies that promote the ultimate aim of tolerance or

⁴⁸ Ferguson, 2.

intolerance are really the best means of achieving global stability. Recent decades have seen a number of successful experiments in political multicultural integration. Success of institutions such the European Union suggests that workable (even if not perfected) models of integration exist. Such aggregate political groups are premised on the idea that tolerance is crucial to social well being, and yet each at times has been threatened by both intolerance and a heightened emphasis on cultural distinctions. It would seem that in order to achieve the most successful and effective results, we must chart a course that navigates between the skylla of tolerance for that which divides and threatens global unity and the charybdis of intolerance for important sources of individual identity. The greater public good ultimately requires eliminating cultural characteristics that promote conflict or prevent harmony, but still celebrating and providing for the preservation of less divisive, more personally observed cultural distinctions. It is only in the balance of the two that a true global union can be formed, and ultimately hold.

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