Sleeping with the Enemy:
Winning Coalitions against Within-Group Power Transitions and Unstable Civil War Settlements

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ABSTRACT

Kiyoung Chang: Sleeping with the Enemy: Winning Coalitions against Within-Group Power Transitions and Unstable Civil War Settlements
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi)

In many civil wars, each warring side often consists of multiple internal groups. In such a case, a leader’s political survival may be threatened not only by fighting with the enemy but also by power competition among in-groups. Within-group power transitions refer to a situation in which a dominant group is overtaken by a challenger group on the same warring side. In this paper, I argue that the risk of within-group power transitions creates an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy side. Assuming recruiting enough supporters is the *sine qua non* of a dominant group’s status, attracting extra supporters would provide insurance against internal power transitions. Given the internal power competition, negotiated settlements help a dominant leader save more resources to recruit additional supporters by minimizing the uncertainty from fighting with an enemy. Thus, negotiated settlements are beneficial to control internal rivals. A leader’s consideration for such a strategic settlement, however, inevitably entails the risk of the conflict recurring.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In many civil wars, there are often multiple groups that form one warring side: the government and the rebels. While many existing studies have explored the issue of how to end civil war and to increase durable peace (Fearon 2004; Fortna 2004; Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002; Walter 2004), conventional wisdom suggests that it is difficult to end civil wars with multiple actors by means of negotiated settlements. As long as there is no condition that favors a decisive victory, a multiparty civil war tends to last a long time due to fewer acceptable agreements, acute information asymmetries, and shifting alliances and incentives (Cunningham 2006; Fearon 2004).

In this multiparty civil war, within-groups may engage in competition for internal hegemony. Internal power games on the government side are mainly analyzed by the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), which posits that groups that do not receive private goods under the existing regime have the greatest interest in overthrowing an incumbent. On the other hand,
scholars argue that the rebels also often compete against not only the government but also each other. Each rebel group is in competition to form the dominant rebel group, which can dictate the terms of the rebellion (Gates 2002, 127; Weinstein 2005, 619; Cunningham 2006, 877-878). Taken together, this multi-party civil war implies that a civil war leader should fight against the adversary side, while simultaneously competing against an internal rival. To the best of my knowledge, however, the literature tends to ignore the internal power dynamics of the government and the rebels in terms of civil war settlement characteristics and stability. Internal power dynamics provoke some interesting theoretical and empirical questions. Given no favorable conditions for a decisive victory, why does a civil war leader have an incentive for a negotiated settlement? If there is a negotiated settlement, how can these internal power dynamics influence the post-settlement risk of conflict?

In this study, I employ the concepts of the winning coalition and within-group power transitions to explain the internal power dynamics of each warring side and a leader’s conflict behavior. In my analysis, the winning coalition is a proportion of supporters sufficient to sustain a dominant leader in office (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). On the other hand, within-group power transitions refer to the situation in which the dominant group is overtaken by the
challenger group on the same warring side based on approximate power parity and dissatisfaction with the dominant group. Power transition theory maintains that war is more likely when a challenger enters into the approximate parity and is dissatisfied with the dominant state (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Werner 1999). The concept of within-group power transitions also assumes group-based hierarchy inside each warring side. Within-group power transitions can contribute to a better understanding of negotiated settlements and post-settlement conflicts by underpinning a focus on two key variables: relative power among internal groups and the degree of dissatisfaction with the dominant civil war actor. Unlike power transitions in the international system, however, within-group power transitions inside either the government or the rebels may create incentives to negotiate peace with an adversary side in order to control an internal rival.\footnote{Toft (2007) applies power transition theory to the context of civil war to test the proposition that shifts in the distribution of ethnic group populations within a multinational state. She also concludes that the logic of power transition theory transports well to the question of the likelihood of civil war.} With this negotiated settlement, though, there is a relatively good chance the conflict would recur.

Figure 1 shows my causal mechanism linking the internal power transitions and unstable civil war settlements. The imminent within-group power transitions bring out more uncertainty to a dominant leader’s political survival. Due to internal power games, a
leader has incentives to increase the size of the supporting members because this provides insurance against losing office. Given the limited resources to be distributed, a leader is more likely to negotiate for peace with an enemy, which helps to consolidate the internal leadership by minimizing the uncertainty from fighting. This negotiated settlement, however, is unstable for two reasons: first, because the process of the negotiated settlement tends to leave out some warring parties, which tends to wreck the peace, and second because the original signatories will reconsider conflict after establishing an internal hegemony.

FIGURE 1. Causal Mechanism

Risks of Within-Group Power Transitions → More Uncertainty About Political Survival → Incentives to Increase Supporters → Negotiated Settlements → Unstable Peace

This study has three limited purposes. First, taking the leader-level approach, this study aims to develop a rationalist mechanism to understand civil war settlements and post-settlement conflicts. A civil war leader is assumed to estimate the expected gains from conflict action and compare them with the expected losses. Taking into account the returns of civil war outcome, a leader would maintain the minimal coalitions to maximize his payoffs. Increased political uncertainty influences the cost function of a civil war
leader, however, and creates an incentive to recruit extra supporters. Second, this research intends to describe a more dynamic picture of the civil war settlement and post-settlement conflict based on a leader’s strategic decision. In my analysis, a leader’s strategic consideration leads not only to a negotiated settlement but also to the instability of the peace agreement. Third, my study provides empirical support for within-group power transitions and unstable civil war settlements. My findings suggest that a leader has the incentive to negotiate for peace with an enemy provided a challenge from an internal rival and that peace after the negotiated settlement is not very stable.

The article proceeds as follows. In the following four sections, I develop a new framework to analyze the relationship between a leader’s risk of political survival and unstable settlements according to the causal mechanism shown in Figure 1. The sixth section describes the main variables and the research design. I employ logit and duration analysis to examine the effect of within-group power transitions on the negotiated settlements and their post-settlement effects, respectively. In the seventh section, I report the results of empirical analyses. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings.
Chapter 2

Political Uncertainty and Threats from Within

Civil war consists of a series of battles over wealth or territory, and people are exposed to unpredictable risky events. During conflicts, the government tends to increase spending on the military, while focusing less on the public peace. People often suffer from guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or irregular violence. Civil war also has a profound effect on economy. The increasing war cost from the long dragging war and high commodity prices disrupt markets. As a result, the actual volume of transactions will decrease and people can become deprived. Given the lack of peace and prosperity, people tend to shorten their time horizons and discount the future more heavily as civil war becomes less predictable. They become more opportunistic and focus more on current opportunities for profit (Collier 2000, 101).

If holding office is a primary motivation, a civil war leader needs to minimize uncertainty regarding political survival. A defeat in civil war may mean exile, imprisonment, or even death to a civil war leader, and the fate of a leader is highly
sensitive to the outcome of war. Thus, political uncertainty influences a leader’s conflict strategy by affecting costs and benefits of civil war outcome. In a multiparty civil war, a leader tends to face higher uncertainty because each actor has a diversity of goals and divergent interests. In this case, a leader can have more risk of losing office. Even in a multiparty civil war, though, a leader’s perception of uncertainty can vary according to the evolution of civil war. During conflicts, a leader’s political survival may also be threatened by either internal or external events he does not expect to occur. An unexpected involvement of a third party, a rebel leader’s death, a sudden offer of peace agreement, or the split of the warring side might influence a leader’s office-seeking. Likewise, as political uncertainty can affect the probability of losing office, a leader has an incentive to remove uncertainty when possible.

Many existing studies regard political uncertainty as one of the critical factors in terms of solving conflicts. Scholars argue that conflict may be avoidable when each warring side has complete information about resolve or capabilities (Fearon 1995; Powell 2002). In civil war, each side can never be sure what type its enemy is or overestimate its chance for military victory due to the lack of information. As a result, a conciliatory actor might bluff to avoid a series of concessions (Walter 2006).

Previous literature tends to focus on uncertainty from fighting with an enemy
side. Given multiple internal actors, however, political uncertainty can also be generated from within. As argued above, many people are not patient enough to consider future opportunities, so a government or a rebel leader cannot expect consistent loyalty from the supporting group. Through a series of battles, a challenger can increase his capability and attempt to remove an incumbent leader. Yesterday’s friend can be today’s enemy.

An internal threat can occur on either the government side or the rebel side. During protracted conflicts, a government’s capacity to control a challenger on the government side weakens. If a state’s weak capacity is a precondition for the protracted conflict, a government leader cannot always gain support among opportunistic people in civil war.² Sometimes a rival can threaten an incumbent’s political survival when a leader cannot provide what government supporters want. This includes a regime change through a legitimate procedure such as an election or use of force such as a military coup. On the other hand, conflicts might occur among multiple rebel groups. In civil wars in Congo, Sudan, and Columbia, there were multiple insurgent groups with divergent preferences. In those countries, the rebels competed against not only the government but also each other. Sometimes rebel groups compete with each other to be a dominant rebel group in order to dictate the terms of the rebellion and exploit resources to continue the

² Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that, as civil wars are less likely to occur in states with capacity, “state capacity” is highly associated with the outcome and the duration of civil wars.
civil war (Gates 2002, 127; Weinstein 2005, 619; Cunningham 2006, 877-878). Thus, the political survival of a dominant rebel leader can be threatened by a rival in that both rebel leaders compete with each other for securing resources, recruiting supporters, or even gaining legitimacy from domestic audiences or the international community for the insurgency. Before the 1990s, the Palestinians were represented by the Palestine Liberal Organization (PLO), which had monopolized resources and the capacity for mobilization to fight against Israel. However, Hamas rose to power and threatened the foundations of the PLO’s authority. The rise of Hamas weakened Arafat’s capacity to hold together a unified secular nationalist organization with a goal of statehood (Aburish 1998, 321-325). In this case, civil war means no more conflicts between the government and one rebel group.

When faced with an internal challenge, the threat from within adds more uncertainty about a dominant leader’s tenure and the outcome of civil war. This means a leader should fight against his principal adversary while simultaneously competing against an internal rival. Waltz (1964; 1979) has argued that bipolarity is associated with more certainty because political leaders are better able to judge the preferences of a potential adversary. Likewise, the presence of an internal rival brings more uncertainty to a dominant leader, indicating holding office might be threatened from within. With regard
to the rebels, when there is a dominant rebel group, its leader uses more resources to continue civil war because other groups tend to follow what the dominant group does. But if a rival rebel group challenges, a dominant group cannot take the initiative in rebellion. What is worse, this might decide a leader’s fate. Therefore, a civil war leader has more political risk when he faces an internal challenger. Inevitably, the threat from within would influence a leader’s expected utility of civil war, and a leader may seek conflict behavior to minimize uncertainty about political survival.
Chapter 3

Winning Coalitions and Incentives to Increase the Size

In this section, each warring side consists of three subgroups such as a dominant group, a challenger group, and supporters to explain the internal constraints and within-group power transitions. Following the selectorate theory, I assume that to recruit enough supporters is the sine qua non of the status of a dominant group on each warring side. What is different from the selectorate theory is that the rebels are also regarded as one independent entity. In other words, both a government leader and a dominant rebel leader have an independent “winning coalition” in my analysis. In this case, the rebels’ winning coalition indicates a portion of the rebel supporters sufficient to sustain the status of a dominant rebel group. Like a government incumbent, a rebel leader needs to provide

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3 According to Cunningham (2006), the multiple-party assumption is helpful for understanding the dynamics of the duration of civil wars. He argues that many conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia have contained more than two parties.

4 In many civil wars, rebel-supporting civilians are critical to the rebels. An IRA man’s retrospect shows that civilian support is also critical even to the rebels. He says, “Without the community we were irrelevant. We carried the guns and planted the bombs, but the community fed us, hid us, opened their homes to us, turned a blind eye to our operations” (Collins 1999, 225 quoted in Kalyvas 2006, 92).

5 The winning coalition is usually defined “as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of society” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 51).
private goods to hold the loyalty of coalition members. To depose a main rebel leader, a rival rebel leader also needs to convince a sufficient number of rebel supporters who were loyal to a dominant leader to defect to him. The assumption of the winning coalition for the rebels is useful for analyzing internal dynamics among multiple rebel groups as the above Palestine case shows. Figure 2 shows the winning coalition of a warring side A under the risk of within-group power transitions.

FIGURE 2. The Winning Coalition and Within-Group Power Transitions

In fact, the size of the winning coalition can be affected by the progress of civil war. A leader’s capability and expectation for civil war outcome affects the choice of the
size of the winning coalition. A leader would decide how many supporters are necessary for his political survival. When a unilateral victory is expected, a leader focuses on using discretionary resources for the war effort rather than spending more on private goods for political survival (McDonald 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). In this case, a leader would focus on the current coalition members or attempt to decrease the size of the winning coalition through civil war. A leader can sustain his position based on minimal winning coalitions. On the other hand, when decisive victory is not expected, each leader cannot always keep minimal coalitions. Sometimes a leader needs to draw more supporters to continue or win civil war. Logically in prolonged civil war, there are two possibilities regarding the size of the winning coalition. First, the size of the winning coalition can be increased after civil war. This implies that the previous size of the winning coalition is not enough to end continuing civil war. In regimes with small coalitions, coalition members have more incentives to be loyal to an incumbent leader. Even if all previous coalition members before civil war still support a government leader, this size is not large enough to appease people who support the rebels. Second, the size of the winning coalition may remain constant after civil war. This implies some of the previous members have defected for some reason. For example, an incumbent leader might have no capability to provide private goods to his coalition members. Even in
democracy with a large winning coalition, not every coalition member always supports an incumbent leader. Some members of the winning coalition might defect when they cannot expect to receive benefits from the incumbent. In this case, a leader needs to find other members to replace those defectors.

Given high levels of uncertainty, however, the first case is more common than the second one. If there is no uncertainty, expanding the coalition would be unattractive because it includes the surplus members to maintain a leader’s position (Riker 1962; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Heger and Salehyan 2007). In other words, both a government leader and a rebel leader want to build minimal winning coalitions when possible in order to reduce the size of payments that must be made to supporters, the remainder of which can be privately consumed. When there is less uncertainty, a leader can expect that many supporters will stay in the winning coalition as long as private goods are continuously granted. Thus, a civil war leader might keep the minimum size of the winning coalition. In prolonged civil war, however, the political situation can become unpredictable, and each leader has limited information on the exact size of the future winning coalition. Taking political uncertainty into consideration, it is hard to manage a

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6 Heger and Salehyan (2007, 387) introduce the argument that even democratic regimes will “provide pork to core supporters through measures like subsidies, targeted projects, and favorable contract terms.” This implies that other coalition members, except core supporters, rely more heavily on public goods. Thus, if those members are not satisfied with the level of public goods or if a rebel leader makes a credible promise to provide more benefits, there can be some incentives to defect from the current coalitions.
minimal size of the winning coalition. Given high levels of uncertainty, keeping the minimal coalition may threaten a leader’s political survival.

One might argue that a civil war leader fights to sustain the current situation. For example, if a rebel leader obtains drug revenues or controls his territory outside the control of a recognized government, he might enjoy the continuation of a state of lawlessness (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004, 255). Likewise, a civil war leader might gain from an ongoing civil war even though this fighting inflicts costs upon society. But even in this case, political uncertainty creates incentives to increase the size of the winning coalition. People are willing to be insured for the expected value of losses from a set of uncertain events. When uncertainty is high enough, it is optimal for a civil war leader to increase the size of the winning coalition. Keeping the minimal coalitions would be beneficial to minimize the amount the ruler must pay to sustain the base of support at the present, but this cannot guarantee a leader’s position in the future. Thus, the high level of uncertainty accompanying political risk should be considered in order to understand a civil war leader’s behavior. For this reason, it is wrong to assume that a leader can always maintain the minimal coalitions.

The maximum size that a leader will be willing to keep depends on his capability and degree of risk aversion. Stinnett (2007) and Indridason (2008) argue that the
government leader under uncertainty tends to establish an oversized coalition government. For example, both Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Ehud Barak attempted to increase the size of the winning coalition under high levels of uncertainty. This uncertainty regarding the reliability of coalition members makes political coalitions diverge from minimal winning status. Coalitions including extra parties, factions, or members can provide a leader with insurance against the risk of collapse of the regime (Riker 1962; Luebbert 1986; Stinnett 2007). A civil war leader also needs to prepare for the highly uncertain and risky future. A leader has an incentive to win extra supporters over to his side, which provides insurance against the unpredictable future.

The relationship between the size of the winning coalition and political uncertainty leads to the conclusion that either a government leader or a rebel leader will recruit more supporters given high levels of uncertainty. As argued earlier, the presence of an internal rival brings more uncertainty to an incumbent because an incumbent and a rival compete with each other for enough supporters to sustain the status of a civil war leader. I have argued that the choice of the winning coalition is highly associated with political uncertainty during conflicts. Theoretically, a leader should provide some resources to attract additional supporters. The next section deals with how a civil war leader can achieve more resources for extra supporters.
Chapter 4

Within-Group Power Transitions and Civil War Settlements

As argued earlier, a civil war leader needs to recruit extra supporters under a high level of uncertainty. An internal power competition deepens uncertainty and risk while fighting with an adversary. In prolonged civil war, within-group power transitions commonly occur on each warring side. During a civil war, a dominant leader may be overtaken by a challenger. For this reason, when an internal power transition is expected, a leader attempts to accommodate the dissatisfied for political survival. The existence of a challenger creates more risks for a leader’s political survival and imposes more uncertainty on the expected outcome of civil war. Thus, when a potential rival appears, a leader needs to minimize risks and uncertainty from fighting with an adversary and to maximize his capability to consolidate internal leadership.

Power transition theory argues that conflict is more likely when the power distribution between two actors approaches parity. However, this particular distribution of power does not always lead to conflict. If there is joint satisfaction with the status quo,
there would be no conflict because satisfied actors have no incentive to challenge the status quo (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Werner 1999). For this reason, power transition theory focuses on power parity as opportunity and negative evaluations of the status quo as willingness (Lemke and Werner 1996). If a dominant actor anticipates a rival actor’s challenge, a dominant actor will use his power over the power distribution of value in an attempt to preserve his privileged position (Bussmann and Oneal 2007, 91).

During civil war, an internal challenger may increase power and negatively evaluate a dominant leader. A series of battles without a decisive victory might be advantageous to a challenger. The protracted civil war would not win opportunistic people’s hearts, and the frequent fights with an enemy would sap a dominant leader’s resources. As a leader has no resource to accommodate the discontented, a challenger tends to have negative evaluations of an incumbent’s leadership. In this case, a challenger would wait and pick the time to remove a dominant leader. While fighting with an enemy, however, it is costly for a dominant leader to deter an internal challenge beforehand due

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7 During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) formed a united front against Japan. The war against Japan greatly weakened the KMT’s military capability. This cooperation was advantageous for the beleaguered CPC. In the midst of the guerrilla operations, the CPC heightened popular perception that the Communists were in the vanguard of protecting China against Japan, although this operation had limited military value.
to the weakened capability. Moreover, the premature use of a punishment mechanism might lead supporters to criticize a leader for the abuse of power because people tend to consider external danger more seriously.\(^8\) This may signal the lack of cohesiveness to an enemy. For these reasons, it is hard for a civil war leader to use his power to constrain a potential rival with power parity and negative evaluations of the status quo.

Thus, a leader needs to provide private goods to control the discontented on his side. A leader has some difficulties providing additional rewards to the potential coalition members, however, when there is no decisive victory or suitable outside aides. Thus, expected internal power transitions make a leader seek to negotiate peace with an enemy. Under the threat from within, a civil war leader has an incentive to minimize risks of political survival through negotiating peace with an enemy. A negotiated settlement helps a leader spend more on the butter in a “guns vs. butter” trade-off. He may allocate surplus resources to drawing additional supporters to maintain his status. By spending less on the guns, an incumbent leader can attempt to provide private goods to the targeted supporters.

To illustrate my argument, Figure 3 shows the tradeoff between guns ($G$) and butter ($B$) given constant resources ($R$) ($R = G + B$). What is crucial is that the tradeoff

\(^8\) The diversionary war theory is also based on this idea. It argues that domestically weakened leaders often undertake risky policies under the expectation that personally undesirable developments will take place. Even if I follow the basic assumption of this theory, my argument directly contradicts the diversionary theory of war because of the different context of the prolonged civil war. The longer civil war lasts, the more people suffer from the war costs.
ratio between $G$ and $B$ can vary according to civil war situation. Suppose more violence is needed at point $b$, and less violence is needed at $a$. To fight with an enemy side, a civil war leader needs to distribute his resources to produce a large amount of guns ($G^b$). As there are only $B^b$ resources to be distributed to coalition members, a leader can maintain relatively minimal coalitions ($n$). At point $b$, each member of the winning coalition receives $B^b/n$ in private goods and pays a cost $c$, where $B^b$ represents the resources to be provided for private goods, $n$ is the number of supporters in the winning coalition, and $c$ is the cost regarding an individual’s safety. Thus, the expected utility of each member is $B^b/n - c$. When a challenger threatens, a leader has an incentive to increase the size of the winning coalition ($n \rightarrow n+k$). If the tradeoff ratio between $G$ and $B$ does not vary, including additional members ($k$) would lead to a decrease in each member’s expected utility ($B^b/n - c > B^b/(n+k) - c$), thereby decreasing loyalty. By negotiating for peace with an enemy side, however, a leader can move point $b$ to point $a$ in the graph below. If coalition members are not concerned about their own security and a leader has surplus resources ($B^a-B^b$) to be distributed, more supporters can be included in the winning coalition. Each member in a new coalition receives $B^a/(n+k)$ in private goods and does not need to pay cost $c$. Therefore, a leader can recruit more supporters and keep coalition members’ loyalty as long as $B^a/(n+k)$ is greater than $B^b/n - c$. 
In addition, a leader can expect other benefits from the negotiated settlement, which helps strengthen the base of an incumbent’s internal hegemony. First, a leader may use the negotiated settlement as an opportunity to raise domestic and even international awareness about his leadership. Given the negotiated settlement is a salient event, the public or the international community may think that an incumbent who is willing to bargain is more “moderate” or at least “less radical.” A leader might attempt to seek domestic or overseas recognition through the process of the negotiated settlement. Even a leader with low publicity can use the negotiation process to raise awareness. Second, civil war tends to be very costly and destructive, and the protracted war can inflict the accumulated costs of conflict even on a victor. In this case, the negotiated settlement might prevent a potential victor’s expected utility from being reduced.

As argued above, through the negotiated settlement, a leader may engineer
satisfaction within the war-stricken people by rewarding the members of the winning coalition. This helps to prevent current supporters’ defection and incorporates the extra members required to control a potential rival. At the same time, a leader might attempt to gain recognition domestically or internationally as a moderate leader. Thus, a leader needs to have a break in fierce fighting and to secure wealth to increase the size of the winning coalition.

My argument contrasts starkly with the previous approach. While a negotiated settlement occurs as a consequence of an internal power transition in this study, existing literature posits that the risk of losing office is associated with the use of force. Given an internal challenge, the diversionary war theory holds that a political leader tends to pursue “gambling for resurrection.” Tir and Jasinski (2008) argue that a domestic diversion would be more beneficial and less risky than diverting against another state. This domestic diversion scenario is based on three assumptions: leaders with a tenuous hold on power, fear among the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of propagators of violence (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999, 263). The mounting unpopularity resulting in the internal challenge might make a civil war leader consider more violence to divert people’s attention.9 However, this scenario would make sense as

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9 For example, Gagnon (1995, 165) points out that the war in Yugoslavia occurred by “the provocation of
long as there would be less political risk after the use of force (Mueller 1973; Cotton 1987; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Oneal and Tir 2006). During civil war, it is hard to use violence to divert citizens’ attention due to the increased political risk. Further, the public might “update their beliefs that their leaders may be manipulating their fears and are positively predisposed to violence” (Sambanis 2002, 228). Thus, logically, a civil war leader is more likely to become dovish under the risk of the internal challenge.

Many cases support my argument. Wood (2000) points out that the split of the government side in South Africa and El Salvador induced a leader to accept the negotiated settlement with the rebels rather than pursue a more hostile strategy. In those countries, a government leader had maintained the small size of the winning coalition and so a leader could reduce the total size of private goods for supporters and consume the remainder privately. Due to the split among the government groups, a leader wished to increase the size of the winning coalition. The split of the government side implies some members of the previous winning coalition do not show loyalty to an incumbent. If there was strong social cohesiveness among the government groups, negotiated settlements would not take place.10

violence by threatened elites.” Milosevic fomented Serbian people’s fear or hatred of an aggressive Croatian regime to draw support for war with Croatia.

10 Regarding the defection of some members from the previous winning coalition, Wood (2000) focuses on
The degree of political uncertainty may vary according to the evolution of civil war, and the existence of an internal rival deepens political uncertainty of a leader. Thus, potential power transitions in either the rebels or the government can give each civil war leader an incentive to negotiate peace with one other. Given limited resources, a series of battles may reduce each side’s resources necessary to keep the winning coalition. For this reason, a leader attempts to stay in his office through “sleeping with the enemy.”

**Hypothesis 1:** When there is a risk of within-group power transitions, a leader is more likely to negotiate peace with an adversary.

**Hypothesis 2:** When one side is under the risk of within-group power transitions, it is more likely to make a negotiated settlement.
Chapter 5

A Strategic Behavior and Unstable Peace

Sleeping with the enemy might lead to a pause in the conflict. Literally, however, this has some problems in establishing peace between the government and the rebels. A negotiated settlement motivated by within-group power transitions has a relatively good chance that conflicts would be escalated again. Each actor has difficulty sticking to peace. I believe a leader’s strategic consideration makes it hard for each warring party to stick to peace after negotiated settlements.

When one side consists of multiple internal actors, it is necessary that those actors’ bargaining ranges should overlap each other to end conflicts. Conflicts with multiple actors are hard to end because of fewer acceptable agreements, acute information asymmetries, and shifting alliances and incentives (Cunningham 2006).¹¹

¹¹ While his veto player approach emphasizes an internal cohesiveness and an individual capability of each rebel faction, my analysis assumes that there is the constant tug of war between an existing leader and a challenger inside each warring party over internal hegemony. According to Cunningham, both “original rebel groups” and “splinter factions” have the ability to continue the war unilaterally if the other parties to the conflict reach an agreement. Because his perspective ignores the internal hierarchy inside the warring party, however, it is hard to explain why there is a (perhaps partial or temporary) negotiated settlement when there is an internal challenge. In fact, there was a drastic switch in Palestinian attitude towards the PLO and Hamas after the 1990s, and this decided the status of a dominant group to represent Palestine. I believe this change may influence the PLO’s attempt to negotiate with Israel. But my argument here does
For these reasons, the process of civil war settlements induced by internal disputes tends to leave out other groups with divergent preferences. Previous research also maintains that excluded factions can threaten the agreement and increase the risk that the signatories return to conflict by a consequence of their violence. Excluded groups may act like spoilers “who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997, 5). If excluded actors continue to pursue their war, the signatories can be influenced by direct spoiler attacks intended to wreck the peace, and it may be more difficult for the signatories to stick to peace (Nilsson 2008, 481). Moreover, spoilers can influence the credibility of an agreement. When two sides negotiate peace, the problem of credible commitment arises because there is uncertainty about whether the other side may carry out the bargain. As each party fears being exploited, they are very sensitive to any sign that their former enemy will violate an agreement. In such a case, spoilers can use force strategically in order to increase fear and foster mistrust between negotiated parties. Even if it is not effective in a military sense, a spoiler’s strategic use of force can exacerbate doubts among signatories (Kydd and Walter 2002).

In addition, conflicts might recur by the original signatories. As argued earlier, a

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not directly contradict the veto player approach.
leader attempts to minimize uncertainty through a negotiated settlement when an internal challenger comes out. Whether to fight or negotiate is determined by the relative costs and benefits of a unilateral victory or a compromise settlement. When each warring party believes it can do no better by continuing to fight than by bargaining, a negotiated settlement can occur (Walter 2002, 8). This implies that when an internal leadership becomes established again, a leader may reconsider his original payoffs of civil war. For a better outcome, a leader may try to achieve a decisive victory without any concession. When a military coup occurred in 1989, the Sudanese government declared a unilateral ceasefire and offered amnesty for all rebels who laid down arms. But three months after the government leadership was established, the government rejected the rebels’ demands, and the talks broke down.

One might ask why a leader has an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy leader even when the enemy side is suffering from internal power transitions. A leader might consider more violence to make a civil war situation turn to his advantage. Three possible scenarios can be suggested to explain a leader’s incentives for a negotiated settlement. First, a leader can expect more concessions from an adversary leader during the bargaining process. The internal power competition on the enemy side may increase a leader’s leverage during the bargaining process. For example, a leader negotiating with
one group of the enemy may have the option of starting to bargain with the other. This bargaining leverage might lead to more concessions from the enemy side. Second, a leader may pursue a strategic negotiation to foster a schism among the enemy groups. In many cases, negotiations and the following peace agreement were not seen as valid among the other parts of the rebels. In Chad in 2006, FUCD was one out of three groups that formed the rebel group, United Front for Democratic Change (UFDD). But when FUCD started negotiations with the government, this resulted in an FUCD breakaway from UFDD when they signed an agreement with the government. Thus, if the government is a strategic actor that looks ahead when it makes decisions, it would have a seat at the negotiation table for the purpose of weakening the capability of the rebels. This strategic behavior might partly answer why a forward-looking leader has an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy challenged by an internal rival. Third, a leader might be concerned if more violence leads to internal cohesion on the enemy side. When there are high levels of external threat, people tend to coalesce to face the common enemy.\textsuperscript{12} During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), while the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) were

\textsuperscript{12} As pointed out in the previous section, despite this rally around the flag effect, it is hard for a leader to manipulate the use of force for diversionary purposes in the context of protracted civil war.
competing for territorial advantage in areas not occupied by Japan, they formed a united front against the outside threat.\textsuperscript{13} Likewise, a civil war leader’s strategic consideration might lead to temporary peace but entails risks of conflict recurrence. Thus, a peace agreement motivated by internal disputes may not lead to long-term peace but rather to a temporary reduction in the level of conflict.

*Hypothesis 3*: A negotiated settlement motivated by the risk of within-group power transitions is less likely to become durable.

\textsuperscript{13} Chiang Kai-shek was reluctant, but many Chinese pressured him to form a united front with the CPC.
Chapter 6

Research Design

First, I examine the impact of within-group power transitions on the likelihood of the negotiated settlement of civil war to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. For this empirical analysis, I collected data on every civil war between 1989 and 2003 for which there are multiple actors in either the government or the rebels included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP). My analysis is limited to cases where at least one warring side consists of more than one “active” internal group. For the rebel side, I selected the cases where each troop size of at least two rebel groups is more than 1000 because to have enough supporters may not be very important to small-sized rebel groups. Small-sized rebel groups might pay off through looting or terror during conflicts. To apply the concept of winning coalitions to the rebels, the rebel group should not only sustain its own system of governance but also have the capability to continue the unilateral conflict against the government. If at least two rebel groups are able to keep the troop size more than 1000 through civil war, this implies the rebel force has independent power against the
government and that there are many rebel sympathizers. On the other hand, I assume the government side originally consists of multiple actors. Each multiparty conflict represents one case in the analysis and four different models are employed to examine the effect of the risk of power transitions in each warring side on civil war settlements. Given the dichotomous dependent variable and the structure of the cross-sectional time-series data, I use logit regression to estimate the effect of internal power transitions on negotiated settlements. To deal with temporal autocorrelation, I include a variable counting the number of years since the last event as well as a natural cubic spline of those years (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).

Second, I conducted the empirical evaluations using duration analysis to test Hypothesis 3 regarding the stability of negotiated settlements. I use the dataset of peace duration from Nilsson (2008) originating from the UCDP, which provides all peace agreements signed by the government and one or several rebel groups. For the rebel side analysis, I dropped cases where the conflict involves only two parties. In order to consider the effect of internal power transitions on the long-term duration of peace following a civil war settlement, I use a Cox proportional hazards model because it does not assume any specific probability distribution for the time until an event occurs. This

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14 A typical example is the military. The military is assumed to originally belong to the government. Thus, if military coups occur, this indicates a split between government actors.
Hazard-rate analysis predicts duration of successfully negotiated outcomes.

**Key Independent Variable: Risk of Within-Group Power Transitions**

The key independent variable is a civil war leader’s perception of impending within-group power transitions. But it is not easy to find a proxy for power transitions between internal civil war groups in comparison with power transition between major powers in the inter-state conflict.\(^{15}\) Thus, I code whether or not a civil war leader perceives the risk of power transitions on either side in a given year by the following criteria. There are two essential factors to measure power transitions: (1) power parity, and (2) dissatisfaction with the status quo. As for power parity between internal actors, I use the troop size of each warring party. As the UCDP has annual data on the troop size of each warring party from 1989, changes in relative power are used as a proxy for power parity. In this analysis, each internal group was coded as having “power parity” if a second largest group has more than 80 percent the troop strength of a dominant group.\(^{16}\) On the other

\(^{15}\) For example, to measure states’ power parity, the Correlates of War composite power index includes each state’s share of the system’s total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron or steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures. On the other hand, states’ dissatisfaction with the status quo can be measured by using S score (Signorino and Ritter 1999).

\(^{16}\) In the UCDP data, there are missing data for some of the warring parties. Additionally, these data do not show up in any shift in the middle of a year. Thus, it requires a judgment call to code power transitions by troop size. Organski and Kugler (1980) use 80 percent of the capabilities of the most powerful country in the system as a threshold. In my analysis, when range is used to indicate each troop size, a dominant group’s smallest value and a challenger’s largest value are taken to capture the perception of a dominant leader’s risk of power transitions.
hand, I assume there is a high degree of “dissatisfaction” with a dominant group in the following two cases: (1) when a dominant group splits, and (2) when there are military clashes between a dominant group and others. A dominant group often splits due to different policy preferences or leadership disputes (Cunningham 2006). Military clashes among internal groups may also occur for similar reasons. In either case, a dominant leader’s leadership has been seriously damaged because this means some resources (including the size of supporters) that a leader has used are no longer available.

On the government side, it is infeasible to measure power parity among actors. Instead, there are some ways to measure a degree of dissatisfaction with an incumbent leader. First, when there is the direct risk of regime change such as an attempted coup, I assume there is a high level of dissatisfaction with an incumbent’s leadership. This allows me to capture the degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo on the government side in as consistent a way as the dissatisfaction on the rebel side. Second, as the state of the economy is a commonly cited predictor of a government leader’s popularity, GDP per

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17 As for the government side, an attempted coup is a typical example of the military clashes (or the split among government factions) because the military is assumed to belong to the government. For example, on 16 May 1989 in Ethiopia there was a coup attempt by a military faction to overthrow government leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, but it failed and the coup was defeated by Mengistu loyal forces. Likewise, a military coup shows there is an internal challenger with different policy preferences in the government side.

18 For example, in 1998, the Burundian insurgent group CNDD-FDD broke from the original group CNDD led by Léonard Nyangoma. The CNDD-FDD consisted of the armed wing of CNDD that rebelled against the CNDD political leadership in 1998 and followed the new leader Jean Bosco Ndayingengurukiye.
capita is a proxy for a leader’s economic performance. To retain office depends on the support of coalition members adversely affected by a poor economy. According to Londégrans and Poole (1990), military coups often follow declines in personal income, which may threaten a leader’s position. A government leader may have strong incentives to promote economic growth for coalition members (Oneal and Tir 2006, 758). These data are taken from Cunningham’s (2006) annual measure of real GDP per capita in 1996 dollars (log GDP per capita in 1996 dollars), originating from Gleditsch (2002).

**Dependent Variables**

(1) Negotiated Settlements

In order to see the effect of internal power transitions on the negotiated settlement, two dependent variables are employed: a dichotomous measure of a negotiation and a peace agreement between the government and the rebels. According to the UCDP, to be considered as a negotiation, the talk should involve the conflict party and concern a conflict-related issue such as ceasefire. On the other hand, a peace agreement has to be signed between at least two opposing primary warring parties active in an armed conflict and should concern the incompatibility. The UCDP provides yearly information on each dependent variable. Each dependent variable was coded 1 when the government and the
rebels negotiate for peace and make a peace agreement in any given time period and otherwise 0.\textsuperscript{19}

(2) Peace Duration

In order to examine the duration of a peace agreement signed after the risk of internal power transitions, I use two different models to distinguish the spoilers from the original signatories. I use Nilsson’s data (2008) originating from the UCDP because her data distinguish the overall peace duration from the signatory peace duration. While the signatory peace duration measures the number of years of peace from the signing of the agreement until the government and any rebel party engage in violence, the overall peace duration includes the conflict behavior of a non-signatory to measure the duration of peace. In line with my theoretical argument, I use the overall peace duration in order to test Hypothesis 3. The dependent variable is an event – the failure of a peace agreement. In this analysis, “peace process agreements” are dropped because those are merely “outlining a process for regulating or resolving the incompatibility” (UCDP 2006; Nilsson 2008, 484).

\textsuperscript{19} However, sometimes each warring party can declare a unilateral ceasefire successively. For example, the Philippine rebel group National Democratic Front (NDF) declared a unilateral temporary ceasefire for Christmas and New Year in 1989. The following day, government forces also announced a ceasefire for these days. For this reason, I also used a ceasefire with a unilateral announcement as a dependent variable. The results show that the risk of internal power transitions still affects the likelihood of the ceasefire.
Control Variables

I consider a number of variables to control for spurious relationships. First, I include a variable for diplomatic intervention. Diplomatic intervention is counted when there is external diplomatic third-party involvement (mediation) in the conflict. I take these data from Svensson (2007), originating from UCDP. Second, when a country is highly fragmented, a negotiated settlement tends to be difficult because of divergent preferences and fewer acceptable bargaining ranges. Thus, I add a variable for the ethnic fractionalization measured by Fearon (2003). The index of the ethnic fractionalization ranges from 0 to 1. Third, larger countries tend to have longer civil wars (Fearon 2004). The log of country population is used to control for this effect. Fourth, previous literature argues that relative capability between the government side and the rebel side is important to determine what direction the conflict will take (Buhaug 2006). While DeRouen and Sobek (2004) use the size of the government army, I use the total troop size of each warring side to measure power parity between the government and the rebels, which was calculated as follows: power parity = 1 - abs\(1 - \frac{|\text{Troop Size}_G - \text{Troop Size}_R|}{|\text{Troop Size}_G - \text{Troop Size}_R|}\). When there are outside interventions, foreign troops are also added to the total troop size of each warring side. I believe this indicator is more useful to assess whether a state’s military capabilities are balanced with those of the
rebels. For example, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008) argue that third-party interventions on both sides increase the time until a negotiated settlement. But in this case we cannot say whether these interventions make relative capability more balanced or less balanced (Fearon 2004, 296). Fifth, I include a variable for war costs or the log of average deaths per year (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) because more costly wars tend to end more quickly. Sixth, I include the variable regarding the exclusion or inclusion of the rebel group. Following the coding rule of Nilsson (2008), exclusive-multiple is coded 1 when there is one or more excluded warring parties that engages in conflict with the government in a given year and otherwise 0. Seventh, I use the dummy variable power-sharing, which was coded 1 if the peace agreement contained at least one pact regarding the power sharing and otherwise coded 0 (Nilsson 2008). Finally, territorial conflicts are less likely to experience negotiated settlements than conflicts for the control of government. UCDP codes two types of incompatibility. While government conflicts deal with regime type and the composition of the government, the incompatibility in territorial conflicts concerns the status of a territory and may include demands for secession or autonomy (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006). Thus, in line with previous literature and the UCDP coding of the characteristic of civil war, the dummy variable for territorial conflicts is included.
In this section, each result is reported by employing two specific methods. First, I report the results of tests designed to estimate the effect of the risk of power transitions on the likelihood of negotiated settlements. Next, I estimate the duration of the peace agreement motivated by the risk of power transitions. As suggested by the theoretical expectation, each empirical analysis shows that conflicts where a leader perceives threats within his warring side are more likely to be ended through civil war settlements, but those negotiated settlements do not guarantee the stability of peace between the government and the rebels.

*The Effects of Within-Group Power Transitions on Civil War Settlements*

The left side of Table 1 describes the effect of the risk of power transitions on the rebel side given the likelihood that the parties will make negotiated settlements. On the other hand, the right side deals with power transitions on the government side. Both Model 1
and Model 3 show the results of a logit regression with a negotiation as the dependent variable to test Hypothesis 1 on each warring side. The total number of observations is 58 and 95 conflicts respectively. Each presents the effects of impending power transitions on the negotiations between each warring side. As predicted, in Model 1, power parity between a dominant rebel group and a challenger group has a positive effect on the likelihood of negotiations at the conventional level (p < 0.05). Moreover, dissatisfaction with a dominant rebel leader has a weak effect on the probability that the government and the rebels have negotiations (p < 0.10). Model 3 deals with the risk of power transitions on the government side. As in Model 1, it also shows that a government leader’s risk of political survival creates incentives to have negotiations with the rebels. These results offer strong support for Hypothesis 1.

Model 2 and Model 4 treat a peace agreement as a dependent variable. As a peace agreement requires the consent of at least two opposing warring parties, both results show that a civil leader also has an incentive to negotiate peace with an enemy leader who is under the risk of power transitions. This supports my expectation that a forward-looking leader has incentives for negotiated settlements when an enemy side is under power competition (H-2). In Model 2, however, I could observe only a significant effect of dissatisfaction on the probability of negotiated settlements (p < 0.05). While the
power parity does not have a positive result, the effect of dissatisfaction with a dominant rebel leader is positively significant even when controlling for the effect of time. Model 4 also supports Hypothesis 2 on the government side. In both models, the inclusion of the years since last settlement yields a significant effect for the likelihood of a peace agreement ($p < 0.01$).

Among other control variables, relative capability between the government and the rebels serves to increase the likelihood of a peace agreement as Model 4 shows ($p < 0.05$). Relative capability influences the probability of one side winning decisively. This result indicates that the balance of capability between the government and the rebels increases the likelihood of a peace agreement because the probability of stalemate is much higher. In Models 1, 2, and 4, mediation serves to increase the likelihood of civil war settlements ($p < 0.05$). Model 3 shows that ethnic fractionalization influences the likelihood of a negotiation ($p < 0.05$). This result shows that as a society is ethnically fractionalized, it is hard for warring parties to negotiate for peace. It is somewhat reasonable because ethnic fractionalization implies the multiplicity of interests that it brings to the bargaining table. However, this variable does not show a significant effect in other models. None of the other control variables has a significant effect.

For power transitions on both sides, I commonly use the event where a dominant
group splits or military clashes occur between internal actors on the same side as a proxy for the dissatisfaction with an incumbent leader. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for dissatisfaction in every model suggests that when one warring side is undergoing internal dispute, a conflict is more likely to make a civil war settlement. As for the government side, GDP per capita does not seem to serve to influence civil war settlements. As the dissatisfaction variable reflects more direct risk of an incumbent’s political survival than GDP per capita, I can conclude that the internal power dynamics inside the government create incentives to negotiate peace with the rebels. As for the rebel side, I use the difference in troop size between a dominant group and a challenger group as a proxy for power parity. This variable affects the likelihood of civil war negotiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Side</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(between rebel groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Real GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.558)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Battles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Population</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year since Last Settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic spline 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic spline 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic spline 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Robustness Checks

To test whether conflicts with many veto players are longer, Cunningham (2006) uses three criteria to measure veto players: autonomy, cohesiveness, and viability. Instead of using a troop size of 1000, here I employed his three criteria to select the rebel group with
enough capability. I dropped the cases where at least two rebel groups are not veto players. Models 5, 5-1, and 6 in Table 2 are the result of accepting the criteria of veto players. In Models 5 and 5-1, power parity and dissatisfaction are nearly significant at the conventional levels (p = 0.057 for power parity, p = 0.056 for dissatisfaction). In Model 6, the effect of dissatisfaction with a dominant rebel leader on negotiated settlements is highly significant (p < 0.01). The results in Models 5, 5-1, and 6 show that the power parity and the degree of dissatisfaction on the rebel side have a significant effect on the negotiated settlement even when accepting different criteria.

More importantly, however, what is less clear at this point is whether the risk of within-group power transition leads to the negotiated settlement or vice versa. An internal rival group might emerge out of disputes over whether to negotiate with the enemy or keep fighting (Cunningham 2006, 878). To deal with the reverse causality, I employed the lagged variable of the risk of power transitions. Model 7 and Model 8 in Table 2 address this issue by using a one-year lagged variable of power parity and dissatisfaction (p < 0.01 for one year lagged dissatisfaction, p < 0.05 for one year lagged power parity). Nonetheless, the results in Table 2 suggest that the internal power dynamics inside the rebel side create incentives to negotiate for peace with the government side even after
using a one-year lagged variable of power parity and dissatisfaction on the rebel side.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Robustness Analysis: Alternate Estimations of Civil War Settlements: 1989–2003}
\begin{tabular}{lccccc}
\hline
 & (5) & (5-1) & (6) & (7) & (8) \\
\hline
Negotiation & & & & & \\
Power Parity & 3.800$^+$ & (1.996) & & & \\
Dissatisfaction & 1.572$^+$ & 4.415$^{**}$ & (0.822) & (1.562) & \\
& & & & & \\
Agreement & & & & & \\
Power Parity (lagged 1 year) & & & 2.245$^*$ & (1.044) & \\
Dissatisfaction (lagged 1 year) & & & 2.091$^{**}$ & 1.151 & \\
Ethnic Fractionalization & -1.982 & -1.746 & 4.337 & -2.746$^*$ & 5.992 \\
Fractionalization (lagged 1 year) & (2.464) & (1.801) & (4.015) & (1.400) & (7.823) \\
Log real GDP & 0.519 & 0.136 & 1.732$^+$ & 0.032 & 1.474 \\
& (0.472) & (0.504) & (0.903) & (0.325) & (0.933) \\
Log Battles & 0.528 & 0.297 & 0.431 & 0.179 & 0.498 \\
& (0.330) & (0.326) & (0.504) & (0.206) & (0.818) \\
Log Population & 0.714 & -0.192 & -0.888 & -0.195 & 0.523 \\
& (0.964) & (0.471) & (0.556) & (0.245) & (0.331) \\
Mediation & 1.796 & 1.362 & 4.431$^+$ & 1.508$^*$ & 3.308 \\
& (1.313) & (0.930) & (2.070) & (0.761) & (1.913) \\
Intensity & -0.731 & -0.980 & 1.041 & 0.004 & 0.093 \\
& (0.632) & (0.821) & (1.255) & (0.719) & (1.483) \\
Relative Capability & -0.062 & 2.484 & -0.082 & 0.743 & 2.223 \\
& (0.966) & (1.705) & (1.519) & (1.074) & (1.644) \\
Territory & -0.062 & 0.153 & -1.496 & -0.468 & -1.988 \\
& (0.966) & (0.837) & (1.232) & (0.554) & (1.398) \\
Years since Last & & & & & \\
& 3.323$^*$ & & & & 2.705$^*$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{20} Unfortunately, when I employed a lagged variable of the risk of power transitions, I could not find a significant result on the government side. One possible answer is that the split on the government side can last only a couple of months. Fearon (2004) argues that coups lasted 2.5 years on average. If the split on the government side lasts less than a year, a one-year lagged variable may not capture a government leader’s risk of political survival.
\[
\begin{array}{c|ccc}
\text{Settlement} & (1.462) & (1.305) \\
& -0.009 & -0.049 \\
\text{Cubic spline 1} & (0.017) & (0.048) \\
& 0.377 & 0.149 \\
\text{Cubic spline 2} & (0.235) & (0.268) \\
& -0.071 & 0.096 \\
\text{Cubic spline 3} & (0.085) & (0.182) \\
\text{Constant} & -13.895 & 28.319^{**} & 1.724 \\
& (12.465) & (9.843) & (4.374) \\
\text{Observations} & 53 & 59 & 94 \\
\text{Log-likelihood} & -24.590 & -29.668 & -49.521 & -15.952 \\
\end{array}
\]

*Note:* Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.

\[+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01\]

**The Effects of Power Transitions on Peace Duration**

A civil war leader has an incentive to negotiate for peace with an enemy when facing threats from within in order to consolidate an internal leadership. However, this peace entails the risk of the conflict recurring. As a result of the analysis, I found 20 peace agreements motivated by the risk of power transition on either warring side. Table 3 shows that the same parties returned to violence within five years in 55 percent of cases involving peace agreements and that sixteen out of 20 peace agreements did not terminate the whole conflict within one year.

**TABLE 3. Instability of Peace Agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Recurring within 5 years</th>
<th>Fail to Terminate the Whole Conflict within 1 year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55% (11/20)</td>
<td>80% (16/20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 describes the risk of post-settlement conflict using duration analysis. This analysis finds that the presence of threats from an internal rival before the signing of a peace agreement increases the likelihood of a return to civil war after the signing of a peace agreement. The duration of overall peace reflects the conflict behavior of both signatories and non-signatories after the negotiated settlement. In Model 9, power transition in the government has a significant effect on overall peace duration. Internal disputes before the signing of an agreement can increase the risk of post-settlement conflict by 580% (p < 0.01). Model 10 deals with the relationship between power transitions on the rebel side and the risk of post-settlement violence. According to this result, negotiated settlements after the internal competition within rebel groups increase the risk of conflict recurrence by 340% (p < 0.01). Both results show that it is considerably difficult to establish peace between the government and the rebels. Each warring party has difficulty sticking to peace. Moreover, in Model 9 and Model 10, the exclusive-multiple variable has a significant effect on the risk of post-settlement conflict (p < 0.05). It suggests that a negotiated agreement excluding one or more rebel groups increases the risk of violence by 244% and 285% respectively. Taken together, these findings are consistent with my argument that focuses on the effects of strategic behavior on the risk of post-settlement conflict. On the other hand, both results show that power-
sharing has a significant effect on the establishment of peace \( (p < 0.01) \). As can be seen in Model 9 and Model 10, when power is shared after a negotiated settlement, the risk of peace failing is reduced by 79% and 86%, respectively. This indicates that warring parties will sign and implement a peace settlement when their safety is guaranteed (Walter 2002).

### TABLE 4. The Risk of Post-Settlement Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Peace Duration</td>
<td>Overall Peace Duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT on the Government</td>
<td>6.810**</td>
<td>4.403**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.949)</td>
<td>(2.346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT on the Rebels</td>
<td>3.441*</td>
<td>3.858*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.720)</td>
<td>(2.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive-multiple</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party conflict</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>1.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td>(0.740)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-sharing</td>
<td>0.212**</td>
<td>0.144**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Failures</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-202.299</td>
<td>-136.807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.

\* \textit{p}<0.1, \textit{p}<0.05, \textit{**} \textit{p}<0.01
Chapter 8

Conclusion

This study makes significant contributions to the literature on civil war settlements and peace duration. First, while many of the previous studies have ignored the internal dynamics of each warring side, this research finds that an internal dispute within either the government or the rebels plays a role in civil war settlements. An individual leader’s political survival can be threatened not only by fighting with the enemy but also by competing for power with an internal rival who has power parity and negative evaluations of the status quo. Second, the framework of the winning coalition provides a more dynamic picture of the process of civil war settlements. A civil war leader generally cares about the risk of political survival as well as the return of civil war. Considering only the outcome of current return of civil war, either a government leader or a rebel leader will always try to build minimal winning coalitions when possible because it might help to maximize a leader’s utility. A leader should also take into account, however, the uncertainty that might affect his political survival. Given high levels of uncertainty, a
leader has an incentive to increase the size of the supporters, which provides insurance against losing office. Third, this research provides some unique insights into the relationship between a leader’s strategic behavior and civil war settlements. A leader’s strategic consideration is highly associated with unstable peace after negotiated settlements. Spoilers may wreck the peace or signatories may reconsider their original payoffs of civil war after establishing an internal leadership. This implies that recurring civil war is related to the characteristic of previous bargaining.

My empirical analysis also generates several interesting findings. For a test of three hypotheses, two specific methods were employed. First, I estimated the influence of a civil war leader’s risk of power transitions from within each warring side on the likelihood of the negotiated settlements. Second, I also estimated the duration of a negotiated settlement motivated by those internal threats. In line with my argument, these empirical analyses show that a leader has an incentive to negotiate for peace with an enemy when an internal power transition is perceived, but this post-settlement peace entails the risk of conflict recurring.

A warring side which consists of multiple actors does not behave in a unitary manner. Thus, it is difficult to end civil wars with multiple actors by means of negotiated settlements. However, the policy implications of my findings suggest that power
competition among in-groups can lead to a negotiated settlement even under the continuing stalemate. Following the logic of within-group power transitions, it would be possible to create a temporary peace by fostering internal competition. In this case, relations with one group of the warring side might be used as a counterweight to relations with another, which may be helpful in leading to negotiated settlements. My findings suggest that within-group power transitions might create the eye of the storm characterized by a break in fierce fighting in protracted civil war. At the same time, my study shows that this eye of the storm in itself cannot guarantee the stability of peace.
REFERENCES


