THE ANACHRONISTIC CHARACTER OF THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, the U.S. immigration policy that gives Cuban immigrants a unique advantage to permanently settle in the United States, is no longer working as intended. The policy was originally created to aid Cubans fleeing Fidel Castro’s communist regime and the nationalization of private industries, amongst other decrees. I provide this evidence through a set of six longitudinal analyses demonstrating the changing demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Cuban immigrants between 1959 and 2014. Using data from U.S. Decennial Census and the American Community Survey, I show how the average age, percentage of males, educational attainment, percentage of white-collar workers, average personal income, and the percentage of self-identified whites have changed within the Cuban immigrant population during this time period. More specifically, my study finds that the likely profile of a Cuban émigré has evolved from a political refugee (a wealthy, college educated, white-collar worker) into what appears to be an economic émigré (middle class, no college education, blue-collar worker) between 1959 and 2014. My results substantiate the existing claim that Cuban immigrants have evolved from political to economic émigrés with quantitative evidence, thereby offering policymakers a compelling argument to revisit the outdated policy since it is no longer chiefly supporting political exiles. My findings offer an opportunity for further discussion to craft a new immigration policy with Cuba following the restoration of diplomatic relations in December of 2014.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completing this study was not at all an easy feat, and I have many people to thank for supporting me throughout this process. First, I would like to thank Dr. MacKay, the chair of my Honors Thesis. Despite not having known me prior to this process, Dr. MacKay voluntarily took me under his wing and very thoroughly helped me edit the many drafts of my study. He challenged me to think beyond my obsession with acquiring quantitative evidence to begin exploring the ethics of certain immigration policies. Next, I would like to offer my utmost gratitude to Dr. Moulton of the Department of Public Policy for consistently allowing me to take over his office hours to help me run my data. Professor Moulton introduced me to the stata software system (a widely-used data analysis and statistical software system) during his course on quantitative analysis, and I fully credit him with sparking my interest in quantitative research methods. I would also like to thank Dr. Meier of the Department of Public Policy for his incomparable enthusiasm and role as my greatest cheerleader in Abernathy Hall. Throughout this process, Dr. Meier always kept his door open to me to discuss my thoughts, listen to my fascination with Cuba, and encourage me to “keep pushing ahead” when my research became intimidating. Finally, I would like to thank my second reader, Dr. Louis Pérez, for being one of the most inspiring professors I have ever had the privilege of taking a class with at UNC. His passion for teaching Cuban history and discussing U.S.-Cuba relations manifests itself in every session he teaches, and I am so thankful for the opportunity to take advantage of his expertise during my time here at UNC.
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CHAPTER 1. SIGNIFICANCE AND SPECIFIC AIMS

Normalizing Relations

After 54 years of severed diplomatic relations, U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro announced the historic restoration of diplomatic relations on December 17th, 2014 (NY Times, 2014). For over half a century, a Cold War-era framework in which trade, travel, and foreign aid to the island were severely restricted by the U.S. government, dominated U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States still maintained its firm stance against any revival of “friendship” with its offshore neighbor. In fact, U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba was arguably made even harsher after the end of the Cold War: U.S. subsidiaries were prohibited from engaging in trade with Cuba under the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and the notorious embargo was codified into law under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, also referred to as the Helms-Burton Legislation (Sullivan, 2014: 23).

President Barack Obama publicly recognized the anachronistic character of the current foreign policy in the December 2014 statement, calling it “an outdated approach, that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests” (The White House, 2014). In the summer of 2015, the world stood in awe as the Cuban flag was raised over the embassy in Washington D.C. and later the American flag over the old U.S. Interests Section in Havana, officially symbolizing the normalization of relations.

Yet, while the inauguration of the embassies is indeed a milestone in warming U.S.-Cuba relations, many key foreign policies still remain intact despite their anachronistic character, including the United States’ widely-contested immigration policy towards Cuba: the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) of 1966, which has evolved into what is now known as the “Wet-Foot
Dry-Foot” policy. Under this unique framework, Cuban migrants who step foot onto U.S. soil are admitted into the United States and have the opportunity to apply for permanent residency after one year of physical presence in the U.S., whereas Cubans interdicted at sea are immediately returned to the island (Wasem, 2009: 2-3). The CAA was originally created to aid political refugees fleeing the Castro regime and to promote a “brain drain” of the island, whereby Cuba would be deprived of its professional workforce including doctors, lawyers, businessmen, etc. However, immigration policy experts have argued that the CAA is outdated since the primary motivations for Cuban immigration have substantially changed since the triumph of the revolution; according to these experts, the act no longer principally supports politically motivated émigrés nor attracts professional elites, but rather privileges Cuban immigrants above other national groups motivated by greater economic opportunity in the United States.

This study seeks to determine whether the aforementioned claim for the outdated character of the CAA is substantiated by quantitative evidence. By analyzing the demographic and socioeconomic trends of immigrants between 1959 and 2014, we may infer the evolution from politically to economically motivated immigration. While a similar analysis demonstrating the occupational and income distribution of earlier immigrants does exist (Fagen & Brody, 1968: 390), other studies [with more variables such as income, race, and educational attainment] have not been conducted with the most recent Cuban immigrants, nor have such studies involved a longitudinal analysis comparing recent Cuban immigrants to the first Cubans who immigrated in the immediate aftermath of Castro’s takeover.

History of US-Cuba Immigration Policy

*The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA)*
As a result of the triumph of the Cuban revolution, normal immigration policies between the U.S. and Cuba have remained elusive for more than 50 years. As aforementioned, the current “Wet-Foot Dry-Foot” policy has its basis in the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which allows certain Cuban nationals who have been present in the United States for at least one year to adjust to permanent residency under the discretion of the Attorney General (Wasem, 2009: 2). The aliens must be eligible for an immigrant visa and Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) status in the United States (not excludable under health grounds, national security or criminal grounds, Nazi persecution grounds, etc.). Spouses and children of the alien applying for permanent residency under the CAA are also covered by the act (Wasem, 2009: 2).

*The 1980 Refugee Act*

The CAA predates the 1980 Refugee Act, which made the process for Cuban nationals settling in the United States even easier. The 1980 Refugee Act, an amendment to the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), laid out systematic procedures for the permanent resettlement of refugees of special humanitarian concern to resettle in the United States, whereas the CAA does not use the language of “refugees” or “asylees” in its statues (US Congress, 1980). Under the 1980 Act, a majority of people fleeing Cuba were presumed to be refugees under international law and therefore were given an advantage in resettlement.

*Cuban Migration Agreement, 1994*

In September of 1994, the U.S. and Cuba signed the “Cuban Migration Agreement” with the goal of normalizing immigration policy to make immigration both safe and orderly (Wasem, 2009: 2). The Agreement relied on the following points (Wasem, 2009: 3):
• Cubans intercepted at sea would not be permitted to come to the United States. They would be placed in a safe haven camp in a “third location” (Guantanamo Bay) to discourage Cubans from risking their life at sea.

• The two countries pledged to take a firm stance against “alien smuggling” in support of the UN General Assembly resolution on migrant trafficking.

• The U.S. agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants annually, not including the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.

Since 20,000 immigrants could not enter legally under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) preference system or refugee provisions because of strict eligibility criteria, the U.S. began a lottery program to implement the Special Cuban Migration Program. Lottery winners are granted a visa and are given parole status in the United States. (Parole status allows people who are “otherwise inadmissible to the United States” to stay for a temporary period of time (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2015).)

*Cuban Migration Agreement, 1995*

In May of 1995, the Clinton administration added two new points to the existing Migration Agreement, most importantly to address the high number of Cubans encamped at Guantanamo Bay (Wasem, 2009: 3):

• 33,000 Cubans encamped at Guantanamo would be paroled into the United States under humanitarian provision of the INA. These admissions would be credited towards the 20,000 minimum LPRs granted permanent residency under the 1994 agreement, with 5,000 charged annually over 3 years.
Rather than placing Cubans intercepted at sea in safe haven camps, they would be sent back to the island. Interdicted Cubans who meet the definition of a refugee or asylee are resettled in a third country.

The current “Wet-Foot Dry-Foot” practice has evolved out of this second point: Cubans who reach land in the United States are inspected by the Department of Homeland Security and generally accepted into the U.S. with the opportunity to apply for LPR status under the CAA the following year. Those interdicted at sea are either sent back to Cuba or resettled in a third country if they site adequate fears of persecution.

**Getting Current: Migration talks, 1995-2015**

Beginning in 1995, semi-annual migration talks have been held between the U.S. and Cuba, though they were suspended for a five-year period in 2004 and were resumed in 2009. There was also another 18-month suspension between 2011 and 2013 upon the imprisonment of USAID contractor, Alan Gross. The 2013 talks ended in a successful cooperation on “aviation safety and visa processing and identifying needed actions…with regard to safeguarding the lives of intending immigrants” (Sullivan, 2014: 55). The 2014 talks resulted in positive statements on both sides, highlighting cooperation “on aviation security, search and rescue, consular document fraud, and visa processing” (Sullivan, 2014: 55). The most recent of the biannual migration talks were held on November 30th, 2015 at the U.S. Department of State (US Department of State, 2015). During the talks, Cuban and American delegates discussed the continued implementation of the 1994-95 Migration Accords to support safe and legal migration to the United States. More specifically, the groups “discussed recent trends in migration, such as the entry of Cuban migrants into the United States and human smuggling” through Central America en route to the Mexican border and eventually the United States (US Department of State, 2015). While the
Cuban delegation expressed its continued concern with the CAA policy as a mechanism that fuels illegal immigration, the U.S. delegation offered no plans for future alteration of the policies.

For now, the US State Department says that it remains fully committed to upholding the Cuban Adjustment Act and the subsequent “Wet-Foot Dry-Foot” policy. Perhaps this is because the United States still wants to promote emigration from the island as part of its new foreign policy strategy to empower the Cuban people through “subsidizing the emergence of a market economy and the creation of a new civil society,” which would in part be powered by remittances (Pérez, 2015). (The United States may understand that the CAA is no longer principally helping political émigrés nor attracting professional elites, but it may now work through a different means to achieve the same ultimate end: the dissolution of the Castro regime.) But some experts on U.S.-Cuba migration do foresee Cubans being subjected to the same criteria as every other nationality group once the embargo is lifted. This would entail Cubans having to be sponsored by a U.S. citizen relative, U.S. lawful permanent resident, or a prospective employer (with a few exceptions) in order to obtain an immigrant visa (US Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2015). Obtaining an immigrant visa is the first step towards becoming a lawful permanent resident in the United States for all nationalities of prospective immigrants, including but not limited to Mexicans, Salvadorans, Dominicans, and Hondurans. Should the CAA be abrogated, immigration to the U.S. will become exceedingly more difficult for Cuban émigrés compared to the current status quo.

Policy Significance

This study seeks to answer the following question: how do Cuban nationals immigrating to the United States between 1959 and 2014 differ in demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics? Using such a large data set allows us to analyze the evolution of immigration motives from the immediate aftermath of the revolution to 50+ years into the Castro takeover. The six variables used to analyze demographic and socioeconomic trends are the following:

1. Age
2. Sex
3. Level of education
4. Current occupation
5. Total personal income
6. Race

Carefully observing the difference in socioeconomic status and demographics of Cuban immigrants over this time period will offer policymakers insight into who is immigrating from the U.S. to Cuba, and how this has changed over time. Understanding the evolving profiles of these immigrants will highlight possible reasons as to why these particular groups of immigrants chose to leave the island and come to the U.S., and how these “push” and “pull” factors have also changed over the past 50 years. Policymakers may then use this information to assess whether or not the Cuban Adjustment Act, which was originally created as a “foreign policy weapon” to encourage “large numbers of disaffected Cubans to leave the island and come to the United States,” is still working as intended (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 31). Rather than facilitate an easy transition for Cuban immigrants searching for the “American Dream,” the CAA hoped to undermine the Cuban Revolution by diminishing its basis of popular support and prompting a brain drain of the island. Current immigration policy experts characterize the first Cuban immigrants in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution as belonging to the elite professional and skilled classes, pushed out of the island by a new political regime that did not align with their social and economic interests. Now, though, we see a different demographic of immigrants, middle and lower-class Cubans who are “pulled to the U.S. by the attractiveness of a new society” with greater economic opportunity (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 11).
Furthermore, giving policymakers a sample sketch of the demographic makeup of the Cuban community in the United States today may help guide the revision of the CAA. Although I will not defend the following position in this study, Cuba expert Matias F. Travieso-Diaz argues that “those who study the Cuban economy are essentially unanimous in predicting that a transition to a free-market-economy is the only way in which the island is going to recover” from its current economic crisis (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 2). This transition, Travieso-Diaz further argues, would require the relatively free flow of foreign investments, goods, and people across international borders in order to make this transition successful (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 2). But, the U.S. needs to be weary of a “mass exodus of Cubans to the United States if economic conditions take a turn for the worst” as often happens during the early stages of free-market transitions (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 3). Therefore, the U.S. will need to carefully craft and implement a new immigration policy establishing strict criteria for Cubans entering its borders. My study could help experts craft such a new policy by informing them of historical and more recent immigration trends, which might give them an insight into future patterns.

Framework

In the ensuing chapters, I will provide policymakers with a preliminary insight into the possible reasons for Cuban immigration to the United States by highlighting the immigrants’ changing demographic and socioeconomic profiles. In chapter 2, I will examine the existing literature on Cuban immigration, detailing the trends in numbers, trends in socioeconomic characteristics of some of the earlier Cuban immigrants, and current calls for changes of the CAA. Following the literature review, I will outline the methods used to answer my research questions in chapter 3. This section will introduce IPUMS USA, the database that houses records from the US Decennial Census and the American Community Survey from which I extracted my data. I will
also explain the methods employed to answer each of my six questions individually (one question for each variable) using the *stata* software system. I will display the results of this study in chapter 4 using individual sections for each question. Each section will contain a graph that depicts my results, a basic analysis of these results, and implications as to how these results may imply reasons for immigration. In chapter 5 I will conclude my study by demonstrating how my findings help prove that the CAA is outdated. I will suggest how policymakers may incorporate my findings into a dialogue for revisiting the immigration policy. Lastly, I will present a brief list of study limitations and opportunities for further research on the Cuban immigrant community in the U.S. and the CAA.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since Fidel Castro’s claim to power in 1959, immigration policy analysts and Cuba experts have produced a wide body of literature documenting Cuban immigration patterns to the United States in terms of both 1. numbers and 2. demographics/socioeconomic characteristics. They consider these patterns in relation with unique events on the island and changes in U.S. immigration policy. The demographic/socioeconomic character of these patterns has largely been analyzed qualitatively, based on oral interview and collected life stories of Cuban immigrants. Yet with each subsequent year between 1959 until 1980, these analyses have become more sophisticated by incorporating more variables such as gender, age, occupation, race, etc. In each subsequent wave of immigration we see an emerging chasm between Cuban “political” versus “economic” émigrés, with a majority of experts arguing that the former have transitioned into the latter over time. Prominent political figureheads from both Cuba and the U.S. have used this evidence to argue that the Cuban Adjustment Act has become more of an economic magnet than an escape mechanism from a tyrannical political regime, and to call for a change in U.S.-Cuba immigration policy.

The Number Trends

Cuba expert Matias F. Travieso-Díaz neatly lays out post-revolution immigration trends and policies in his article “Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition Cuba.” Before communicating these trends in the following six stages, he briefly mentions that throughout the first half century of Cuban independence (1902-1959), there was no separate U.S.-Cuba immigration policy. Cuba was not considered a “problem” country, and there was little illegal immigration (Travieso-Díaz, 1998: 4).

Stage 1 (1959-1964)
Everything changed in 1959 with the overthrow of the Batista regime and the beginning of Castro rule. Approximately 200,000 Cubans fled the island between 1959 and 1964. Cubans were allowed free entry into the U.S. under the Attorney General’s parole authority, a “stopgap status that gave them no rights, privileges, or path to permanent residency or citizenship” (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 6). If they came illegally, Cubans were permitted as refugees. According to Philip Peters, Vice President of the Lexington Research Institute, the majority of these immigrants coming in the immediate aftermath of the revolution did not intend to stay in the U.S. permanently “as evidenced by their participation in efforts to depose the revolutionary government” (Peters, 2012: 4). Along with the U.S. government, they were doubtful that the socialist revolution would survive for more than a few years. Yet when the CIA-led Bay of Pigs attempt to overthrow the Castro regime failed in 1962, the realization of the triumph of the revolution struck a deep, scared chord with the Cuban immigrant community. In order to address the ambiguous status of the nearly 200,000 Cuban parolees in the United States, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966 (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 7).

Stage 2 (1965-1973)

In the fall of 1965, Fidel Castro opened the port of Camaricoa to Cubans with relatives in the United States, prompting the second major wave of immigration (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 8). Through Camaricoa, these Cubans could freely travel to the U.S. and Cuban-American exiles could return to the island to retrieve their family members. An outstanding 5,000 Cubans fled the island within the first few weeks of the port’s opening, so the U.S. quickly stopped the Camaricoa boatlifts (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 8). Cuban and U.S. officials then hashed out an agreement to operate government chartered “Freedom Flights” between 1965 and 1973 (Rusin, Zong, & Batalova, 2015). More than 260,000 Cubans entered the U.S. on these flights before
Castro terminated the flights in April of 1973, bringing the total Cuban immigrant population in the U.S. to approximately 470,000 (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 8).

**Stage 3 (1973-1979)**

The third stage of immigration between 1973 and 1979 was relatively slow due to Castro’s ban on the flights and a “virtual suspension on Cuban immigration the United States” (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 8). Approximately 33,000 Cuban nationals reached the U.S. during these seven years (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 8).

**Stage 4 (1980)**

Castro lifted exit restrictions in April of 1980 and allowed Cubans to migrate freely to the United States from the port of Mariel, beginning the fourth major stage of migration. During the so-called “Mariel Boatlift,” Cuban-Americans mobilized boats to pick up their relatives on the island resulting in a mass exodus of 125,000 Cubans in just seven months (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 9). Despite this massive influx of immigrants, U.S. President Carter stood firm on maintaining an open-door policy for Cuban immigrants.

**Stage 5 (1982-1994)**

The fifth stage of Cuban immigration began with a lull in the aftermath of Mariel: fewer than 75,000 Cuban nationals arrived in the U.S. between 1982 and 1990 (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 9). The fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing Cuban economic crisis of 1994, though, prompted a growing number of Cubans to risk their lives on makeshift boats and rafts to make the treacherous journey by sea to U.S. soil. The immediate rush of Cubans towards the dangerous waters “had the potential to reach the proportions of the Mariel boatlift” (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 10). In order to discourage Cubans from making this dangerous journey, U.S. President Clinton
announced in August of 1994 that the U.S. would bar entry to Cuban *balseros* rafters, and they would be captured at sea for transport to Guantanamo Bay. The *balsero* crisis continued and even multiplied in the weeks after Clinton’s announcement until the September 1994 migration accords when Cuba agreed to deter unsafe departures from the island. The exodus came to an end in December of 1994, but only after about 35,000 Cubans had fled the island in their rafts (Santiago, 2014).

**Stage 6 (1995-2013)**

After the 1994 migration accords and the subsequent 1995 accords, which allowed all refugees detained at Guantanamo to be admitted to the U.S., anti-immigration sentiment and a growing concern of “stealing” political dissidents away from the island who could potentially bring about a democratic transition in Cuba threatened to put restrictions on the CAA (Travieso-Diaz, 1998: 12). However, the anticipated hardening of U.S.-Cuba immigration policy in the aftermath of the *balsero* crisis never ensued. Since 1995, Cubans have continued fleeing the island in large numbers, with almost 300,000 immigrants coming in between 2000 and 2013 (Rusin, Zong, & Batalova, 2015). An estimated 1.15 million Cuban immigrants were living in the United States by 2013 (Rusin, Zong, & Batalova, 2015). Following President Barak Obama and Raul Castro’s public announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations, immigration from the island immediately surged: “43,159 Cubans entered the U.S. via ports of entry in fiscal year 2015, [which] represents a 78% increase over the previous year, when 24,278 Cubans entered” (Krogstad, 2015).

**The Demographic Trends**

Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, a professor in the department of sociology at Washington University, offers readers a portrait of the different types of Cuban immigrants coming to the
U.S. between 1959 and 1980. Utilizing a theoretical framework of refugee migration and the oral histories of Cuban immigrants collected by past researchers, she describes the profiles of these immigrants against the backdrop of the different phases of the Cuban Revolution. Pedraza-Bailey summarizes her argument by stating that “the Cuban migration is characterized by an inverse correlation between date of departure and social class of the immigrants,” with wealthy anti-Castro upperclassmen moving to the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of the revolution and this trend in migration moving towards middle-income families over time (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 9).

I have organized Pedraza-Bailey’s demographic analysis into the following six stages:

**Stage 1 (Bastianos)**

According to Pedraza-Bailey, the first wave of immigrants were *Batistianos* (supporters of President Fulgencio Batista) who began immigrating in large numbers to the United States once Fidel Castro proclaimed the nationalization of industries in 1960. These first immigrants tended to be upper and upper-middle class Cubans who were bound to a political and economic structure completely destroyed by the revolution. These elites were supported by the demands and initiatives of American capital and included big merchants, sugar mill owners, representatives of foreign companies, etc. (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:10). Common amongst all of the first wave immigrants was the anticipation of personal losses with the nationalization of Cuban industries, agrarian law reforms, and U.S. severance of economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba. They expected to return to the island upon the overthrow of the Castro regime, which they did not think was far from sight.

**Stage 2 (Escapees)**

Pedraza-Bailey characterizes the second wave of immigrants as “those who escaped” between April 1961 to October 1962 (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 11). The majority of these escapees
were part of the middle-class, a transition from the upper-class status that characterized the majority of the first wave. Pedraza-Bailey characterizes the first two waves of immigrants as being *pushed* out of the island as opposed to being *pulled* by the attractiveness of a new society. Professors Richard R. Fagen and Richard A. Brody of Stanford University validate Pedraza-Bailey’s claim by demonstrating the elitist nature of the first two waves of immigrants. In their demographic analysis of exiled Cubans, the professors include a sample of the occupational distribution of Cuban refugees registered by the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami. They then compare this data to the occupational distribution of the Cuban population at the census of 1953. According to Fagen and Brody, occupation is the most powerful demographic variable for investigating what kinds of Cubans left the island and how they differed from those they left behind (Fagen & Brody, 1968: 390).

### OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CUBAN IMMIGRANTS AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES COMPARED TO THE CUBAN POPULATION IN 1953

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<td>18.1</td>
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<td>Service</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
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**SOURCES:**

a) Faegan et al. (1968), Table 7.1
b) Casal, (1979), Table 1.
c) Aguirre (1976), Table 2.
d) Adapted from Portes et al. (1977), Table 6.
e) Adapted from Bach (1980), Table 1 and Bach et al. (1981/1982), Table 6.
As seen from this table, professionals and semi-professionals were overrepresented in the refugee community between 1959 and 1962, while agricultural and fishing are drastically underrepresented (Fagen & Brody, 1968: 390). Although not apparent in this table, it is also important to note that women contributed more heavily to the refugee workforce than the island work force (Fagen & Brody, 1968: 392).

Stage 3 (Acute Refugees)

The next major wave of immigration took place between 1962 and the fall of 1965. This wave was characterized by what Pedraza-Bailey terms “acute refugee movements,” in which refugees “fly in mass or burst in individual or group escapes” (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:14). These bursts of escapes formed in response to the cessation of flights between Cuba and the U.S. after the October 1962 missile crisis, forcing consistent patterns of mass migration to slow down. During this wave, the number of exiles equipped with professional skills dropped to 18.1 percent, and close to half of the arrivals were blue-collar workers (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 15).

Stage 4 (Seekers)

The opening of the port of Camarioca and the beginning of Cuban chartered freedom flights set the stage for the next wave of migration, which was characterized by “those who search” (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 16). In response to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “open door” policy statement welcoming refugees from communism in 1965, working class and “petit bourgeoisie” including employees, independent craftsmen, and small merchants exited Cuba searching for greater economic opportunity than were offered in socialist Cuba (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 16). Although the Cuban Adjustment Act remained in place to ease the transition for what were de jure considered to be political immigrants, de facto the immigrants became increasingly economic immigrants during this period, resembling the “classic immigrant” searching for
greater economic opportunity. The Cuban government also banned professionals, technical, and skilled workers from leaving the island whose exit would cause “‘a serious disturbance’ in delivering social services or in production” (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 16). The freedom flights helped foster an organized and concerted relocation of Cubans throughout the United States.

Now the demographic makeup of Cubans in the United States took on a heterogeneous color, varying widely in social class origins: At the start of migration in the early 1960s, 31% of the Cubans who arrived in the United States were professionals or managers. By 1973 when they “freedom flights” were terminated, only 10% were professionals or managers as shown in table 1. More than half of the arrivals were blue-collar, service, or agricultural workers (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 18).

**Stage 5 (Marielites)**

With the end of the “freedom flights,” the flow of Cuban refugees halted for a few years until the unprecedented Mariel exodus of 1980. In response to a dramatic plea for political asylum outside of the Peruvian Embassy in April of 1980, Castro opened the port of the Mariel to all who wished to leave the island (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 22). The exodus brought more than 125,000 Cubans to America in just a few months. However, what set this wave of immigration apart from any other wave was a lack of order and process: angry Cuban officials filled the boats in the Mariel harbor with their “social undesirables,” including many who were imprisoned in asylums, homosexuals, blacks, and criminals (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 22). An estimated 20% of the 125,000 Mariel refugees had been in jail in Cuba according the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 26). Furthermore, black Cubans constituted 40% of the Mariel refugees, while earlier waves consisted of predominantly white Cubans. In Cuba, because social class and race overlapped with blacks largely left out of skilled positions, this
wave of immigration resulted in a large influx of blue collar labor into the U.S: 70.9% of this last exodus were blue-collar workers (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985: 26).

**Stage 6 (Mariel-Present)**

Since the Mariel boatlift, Cuban immigration to the U.S. has continued to rise with more than half of Cuban immigrants living in the United States entering the country after 1990 (Rusin, Zong, & Batalova, 2015). However, there has yet to be a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics of these immigrants in waves such as that done by Pedraza-Bailey. Rather, two main demographic analyses have been done in the past two decades: 1. continuously updated analyses comparing the Cuban-American population to other Latino groups present in the United States, and 2. differing attitudes towards U.S. politics and U.S.-Cuban relations between immigrants who arrived before 1990 and after 1990. With reference to the former analysis, according to the 2004 American Community Survey (ACS) of the Census Bureau, Cubans had a higher median household income, lower poverty rates, a greater percentage of college graduates, and higher voter turnout than their Hispanic counterparts (Pew, 2006). In regards to voter turnout, there is a distinct difference in political party affiliation between immigrants who came before 1990 and those who came after, with more recent arrivals leaning towards the Democratic Party than their older counterparts (Krogsstad, 2014). Furthermore, with respect to warming relations between the U.S. and Cuba, 80% of recent Cuban immigrant arrivals said they favor re-establishing diplomatic relations, whereas only 47% of Cuban immigrants who arrived before 1965 said the same by comparison (Krogsstad, 2014).

**Calls for Change**

Even before the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2014, both U.S. and Cuban officials had been calling for an end to the Cuban Adjustment Act, arguing that the act only privileges
Cuban immigrants above other national groups and promotes dangerous migration patterns. In 2013, Florida Senator Marco Rubio remarked “[the policy] is becoming increasingly difficult to justify to my colleagues” (Adams, 2013). Phillip Peters of the Lexington Institute further argued that “it’s not an exile community anymore,” referring to the Cuban-American community who have left the island no longer out of fear, but rather to seek better economic opportunities (Adams, 2013). During the most recent migration talks on November 30th, 2015, the Cuban delegation expressed “profound concern over the continued politicization of the migration issue…and the wet foot/dry foot policy that allows Cubans who reach U.S. territory to enter the country — regardless of whether they came with a visa or were brought in by people smugglers” (Whitefield, 2015). The talks consisted of discussion over recent trends in migration and the realities of human smuggling, however there was no mention of introducing changes to the outdated policy.

As for how reestablishment of ties has affected potential Cuban immigrants, most fear a change of the CAA in the near future. This palpable fear has materialized in a dramatic increase of emigration from Cuba in the months immediately following the public announcement: “from January to March 2015, 9,900 Cubans entered, more than double the 4,746 who arrived during the same time period in 2014” (Krogstad, 2015). Furthermore, this increase in immigration is resulting in more strenuous travel patterns via Central America into Mexico, and then across the border into the United States. Such extensive routes are subjecting other nations to the politics of the CAA as they are forced to cope with the influx of Cuban immigrants passing through their territory.
Study Proposition

My study will begin to close a hole in the literature by comparing the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the most recent Cuban immigrants to those who came in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. While information on these characteristics for the most recent immigrants do exist from the American Census Bureau, such a comparison and/or longitudinal analysis has not yet been done.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

In this descriptive study, I will conduct a series of longitudinal data analyses to examine the change in specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Cuban immigrants to the United States between 1959 and 2014. This study will answer the following questions:

1. How does the average age differ between Cuban immigrants who immigrated between 1959 and 2014?

2. How does the percentage of males amongst Cuban immigrants change between 1959-2014?


4. How does the percentage of white-collar workers amongst Cuban immigrants change between 1959-2014? (See “question 4 methods” for categorization of white-collar workers)

5. How does the mean total personal income differ between Cuban immigrants of age 30 who immigrated between 1959-2014?

6. How does the percentage of self-identified whites amongst Cuban immigrants change between 1959-2014?

I will investigate these questions using data from IPUMS USA (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series). IPUMS USA is run by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota and offers researchers “more than fifty high-precision samples of the American population drawn from fifteen federal censuses and from the American Community Surveys of 2000-present” (Ruggles, Grenadek, Goeken, Grover, Sobek, 2015).
Variable Selection

I chose each of these six variables to inform my research questions for the following two reasons: 1. Each of these variables has numbers for all of the sample sets from which I extracted my data, and 2. Each of these variables allows me to draw inferences regarding potential motivations for immigration. Beginning with age, the age of an immigrant may help us determine his/her motivation for immigration since older immigrants have had more time to achieve financial stability and are arguably not looking to “start life anew” with greater economic opportunities. Studies have found that people who immigrate in search of economic opportunity tend to be of younger age since they increase the time period for expected income (Todaro, 1969: 138-148.). Similarly, immigrants who already hold high paying jobs that require a professional skillset would presumably not emigrate for economic reasons; rather, they must be motivated by factors other than prospects for greater income since they are already financially well-off. This same assumption applies to immigrants with greater educational attainment: in a survey study of available literature published by the World Bank, professor Gary Fields of Cornell University shows that “in every country where studies have been done, the evidence is that educational attainment raises income and reduces poverty, often by a very substantial inverse relation between education and poverty” (Fields, 1990: 238). Furthermore, regarding race, there is a large overlap between socioeconomic class and race in Cuba with non-white Cubans largely left out of the emergent hard currency sector and managerial positions (Prieto & Ruiz, 2010: 167). Therefore, we would expect more non-white Cubans to emigrate over time if these immigrants are indeed increasingly motivated by economic reasons. Finally, in regards to sex, emigrating in search of economic opportunity is arguably riskier than emigrating in search of safety from a political regime, for there are more regulations and stricter criteria placed on
immigrants seeking a better job than on political exiles or refugees. Given this risk, we can assume that families trying to boost the income of the entire unit may send only the primary earner of the household—usually a male—to a foreign country, whereas families emigrating for political reasons are more likely to move as an entire unit given the low probability of returning back to the country of origin. Therefore, we would expect the percentage of Cuban male immigrants to increase over time if the political émigrés have indeed evolved into economic émigrés.

Data Collection Instruments

The U.S. decennial census has been conducted in years ending in “0” since 1790 as required by the U.S. Constitution, yet with each subsequent decade the data collected has changed: the census of 1790 began as merely a six-question survey, and now it has evolved into a two-part questionnaire entailing over fifty questions in a short and long form portion (US Census Bureau, 2015). By census 2000, “the short-form asked seven questions of all residents, while the long-form added 26 population and 20 housing questions for about one in every six households” (US Census Bureau, 2015a). In 2000, the American Community Survey (ACS) replaced this long-form portion, thereby shortening the census to just ten questions per person (US Census Bureau, 2015b). The ACS has been conducted on an annual basis since 2000 to provide more detailed socioeconomic data about all communities every year, rather than every ten years.

Each census asks a random sample of U.S. citizens a number of questions about their demographics and socioeconomic status, including but not limited to name, age, sex, race, income, etc. Each record in every sample represents an individual person with all characteristics
numerically coded. Copies of all questionnaires used since 1970 are available on the website of the Census Bureau (US Census Bureau, 2015b).

**Data Cleaning**

This study uses sample sets from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial census and the 2014 American Community Survey. The variables chosen when extracting each set include the following (variable names are in parentheses):

- Sex (sex)
- Age (age)
- Race (race)
- Hispanic origin (hispan)
- Year of immigration (yrimmig)
- Birth place (bpl)
- Educational attainment (educ)
- Occupation, 2010 basis (occ2010)
- Total personal income (inctot)

To begin my data cleaning, I first deleted all observations of persons who were not of Cuban origin (hispan ≠ 300) and were not born in Cuba (bpl ≠ 250). This left me with 18,959 observations. This sample size included Cuban immigrants who immigrated as early as 1910, however for the purposes of this study I removed everyone who immigrated prior to 1959. This reduced my sample set to 114,130 Cuban immigrants living in the United States between 1959 and 2014. I will now explain the methods employed to answer each question.
Question 1 Methods (Age)

In order to address question 1, I collapsed the data set to obtain the mean age of all Cuban immigrants per year of immigration. However, this data represented the age of each Cuban immigrant taken during the census, not the age of each Cuban immigrant when he/she immigrated. Therefore, I created a new variable (newage) by taking the age of each immigrant recorded in the census and subtracting the number of years since he/she had immigrated:

Command: generate newage= age - (censusyear- yrimmig)

Example: newage=50 - (1970-1959)

newage= 50-11
newage=39, the age at which this Cuban immigrated in 1959

Question 2 Methods (Sex)

To answer question 2, after checking that there were no missing observations, I created a new variable (gender) with all males coded as “1” and all females as “0.” I then collapsed this data to get the “mean gender” of all Cuban immigrants per each year of immigration, which represented the percentage of males in the Cuban immigrant community per year of immigration.

Question 3 Methods (Education)

The methods I employed to answer this question were very different than the first two, for it would prove more useful to show the different educational attainments per year of immigration rather than just one average number of years of educational attainment per year of immigration. To begin answering this question, I split up years of immigration into the following
5 cohorts: 1959-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2014. The lack of continuous 10-year increments used for this research resulted in some cohorts being larger than the others, however this is negligible for the purpose of this study and will not distort my data in answering this question. After dropping all missing observations, I generated a new variable (education) with 5 different categories: “less than or completed middle school,” “some high school,” “completed high school,” “some college,” and “4+ years of college” to account for the different number of years required to complete a University degree in the United States vs. Cuba. Once these new categories were generated, I summed the number of observations in each educational category per cohort of years. I then divided these numbers by the total number of observations per cohort and multiplied by 100 to produce a percentage value of immigrants in each educational category per cohort of years.

Question 4 Methods (Occupation)

The first step in answering this question was to analyze the codes used to represent each occupation used by IPUMS USA. Since there were over 100 occupations used by IPUMS, I was not able to run the data to find the top five occupations per cohort of years [used in question 3], as originally planned. Therefore, I split up the occupations into two categories: white-collar and blue-collar jobs. The white-collar jobs include the following groups:

- Management, business, science, and arts
- Business operations specialists
- Financial specialists
- Computer and mathematical

- Architecture and engineering
- Technicians
- Life, physical, and social science
- Community and social services
- Legal
• Education, training, and library
• Arts, design, entertainment, sports, media
• Healthcare practitioners and technical
• Healthcare support

The blue-collar jobs include the following groups:

• Protective service
• Food preparation and serving
• Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance
• Personal care and service
• Sales and related
• Office and administrative support
• Farming, fishing, and forestry
• Construction
• Extraction
• Installation, maintenance, and repair
• Production
• Transportation and material moving
• Military specific

I coded the white-collar jobs with numbers less than or equal to 3650 and the blue-collar jobs as numbers greater than 3650. I generated a new variable (occu) with all white collar jobs coded as “1” and all blue collar jobs as “0.” I dropped “unemployment” when coding this new variable. I then collapsed this data to get the percentage of white-collar workers in the Cuban immigrant community per year of immigration.

Question 5 Methods (Income)

To begin answering this question, I dropped all missing values. Then, in order to address the concern of having incomes reported at different rates of inflation because of the changing Consumer Price Index (CPI), I generated a new variable (inccpi) (US Department of Labor Statistics, 2015). Using CPI data from the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, I
converted each income total (inctot) to a baseline using 2014 as the reference period (US Department of Labor Statistics, 2016):

- inccpi = inctot x 6.101 if year = 1970
- inccpi = inctot x 2.873 if year = 1980
- inccpi = inctot x 1.811 if year = 1990
- inccpi = inctot x 1.374 if year = 2000
- inccpi = inctot x 1 if year = 2014

Then, I collapsed this data to get the mean personal income of all Cuban immigrants per each year of immigration. However, this exercise did not take into account that people who immigrated earlier also tended to be older, and age is positively correlated with higher income. Therefore, in order to control for age, I ran a regression between the years of immigration and age fixed effects for every age. I then predicted the income at each year of immigration for a Cuban immigrant who was 30 years old at the time of the census. (e.g. if two Cuban immigrants were 30 years old during the 1970 census but one immigrated in 1959 and the other in 1969, the ensuing graph would show us the different in their incomes in USD$ 2014.) To check for outliers, I took the log of this regression to make sure that the results were still fairly similar once being logged.

**Question 6 Methods (Race)**

To answer question 6, after checking that there were no missing observations, I created a new variable (newrace) with all whites coded as “1” and all non-whites as “0.” (The groups in this data categorized as non-white include “Black/ Negro,” “American-Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Chinese,” “Japanese,” “Other Asian or Pacific Islander,” “Other race,” “Two major
I then collapsed this data to get the percentage of whites in the Cuban immigrant community per year of immigration.
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

After I ran my data through the stata software using the methods outlined in the previous chapter, I was able to produce the following six graphs for my longitudinal descriptive analysis. In the ensuing six sections, I will show each graph, analyze its results and offer implications as to how these results may inform us about the evolving reasons for immigration.

Question 1 Results (Age)

This graph depicts the average age of Cuban immigrants for each year of immigration. Contrary to what previous studies have shown about economic émigrés (pg. 29), the data shows an increasing trend in age over time; the average age of Cuban immigrants generally increases with each subsequent year of immigration. These results alone may rebuke the idea that Cuban immigrants are transitioning into economically motivated émigrés. However, we cannot
completely discredit the idea that these Cubans are now immigrating for economically motivated reasons based off of these results alone. Furthermore, the average age of Cuban immigrants in 2014 was 36.4 years, which is still relatively young when we consider that this is less than half of the average life expectancy in Cuba (79.97 years) (World Bank, 2013).

**Question 2 Results (Sex)**

This graph displays the percentage of Cuban immigrants who are male per year of immigration. As shown, the percentage of males in the Cuban immigrant community increases over time, however this increase is very slight as shown by the relatively flat line-of-best-fit. Perhaps this can be explained by more single family members (usually the male head of the household) immigrating in search of economic opportunity to support the family unit still in Cuba (pg. 29). In the immediate aftermath of revolution, we could expect more families to move as a unit since
their reasons for immigration could be explained by a desire to escape the Castro regime.

**Question 3 Results (Education)**

In this table, we can analyze the different levels of educational attainment each per cohort of years mentioned in question 3 methods on page 31. The cohort with the largest percentage of Cuban immigrants with the highest level of education (4+ years of college) was 1959-1969, which echoes Professor Pedraza-Bailey’s claim that the first wave of Cuban immigrants was comprised of mainly elite, well-educated émigrés. This cohort also contains the largest percentage of Cuban immigrants with the second highest level of education (some college). Moving on to the next levels of educational attainment, the largest percentage of Cuban immigrants who completed high school falls in the most recent cohort of years (2000-2014), and the fourth cohort (1990-1999) contains the largest percentage of Cuban immigrants with some high school education. Finally, the second cohort (1970-1979) holds the largest percentage of
Cubans with some middle school or less than middle school education. These results echo the argument that Cuban immigrants are emigrating in search of better economic opportunities over time since the educational attainment of the Cuban immigrant population is generally decreasing between 1959 and 2014.

**Question 4 Results (Occupation)**

We can extract the percentage of Cuban immigrants with white-collar jobs between 1959-2014 from this graph. As shown, the years immediately after the revolution contained the highest percentage of Cuban émigrés with white-collar jobs, which validates Professor Fagen and Professor Brody’s research findings on the overrepresentation of professional and semi-professional workers in the first wave of immigrants. Over time, the percentage of white-collar workers falls fairly drastically as evidenced by the steep line-of-best-fit. This result helps
promote the idea of the evolution from politically to economically motivated immigrants as more blue-collar workers tend to move in search of better job opportunities.

**Question 5 Results (Income)**

![Mean Total Personal Income of Cuban Immigrants (1959-2014)](chart)

This chart informs us of the average total personal income for a 30 year-old Cuban immigrant for each year between 1959 and 2014. As depicted by the chart, there is a decreasing trend in the average income over time from $37,491 in 1959 to just $9,679 in 2014. However, this income appears to fluctuate as depicted by the absence of a smooth line; the average income does not necessarily drop with each subsequent year. This result helps promote the idea of the evolution
from politically to economically motivated immigrants as those with lesser incomes tend to move in search of better economic opportunities.

**Question 6 Results (Race)**

![Image: Racial Composition of Cuban Immigrants (1959-2014)](image)

This graph depicts the percentage of white Cuban immigrants between 1959 and 2014. According to the graph, there is no general upward or downward trend in the percentage of white Cuban immigrants over time as seen by the various fluctuations. For example, both during and immediately after the Mariel boatlift of 1980, we see a significant decrease in the percentage of white immigrants [which reinforces Professor Pedraza-Bailey’s finding that there was an unprecedented number of black immigrants during this exodus], but then there is almost an immediate 10% increase in the percentage of whites between 1981 and 1982. White Cubans are always in the majority of this population between 1959 and 2014. Although I initially predicted
that the percentage of non-white Cuban immigrants would increase over time given their lower socioeconomic status (pg. 30), perhaps these results can be explained by the fact that non-white Cubans may not have the necessary resources required to make the journey to the United States.
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

This longitudinal descriptive analysis sought to provide evidence for the outdated nature of the Cuban Adjustment Act by showing that the policy is no longer supporting Cuban political exiles as originally intended. I intended to demonstrate the evolution from politically motivated to economically motivated reasons for immigration by answering the following question: how do Cuban immigrants to the United States differ in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics between 1959-2014? Using data from the US Decennial Census and the American Community Survey (ACS), I was able to directly answer this question for the following six different characteristics: age, sex, education, occupation, income, and race.

The results of these questions provide preliminary evidence for the evolution of Cuban immigrants from political émigrés to economic émigrés, namely through the findings on education, occupation, and income. There was a clear negative relationship between almost all levels of education and year of immigration, demonstrating that more educated Cubans immigrated in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. Furthermore, the percentage of white-collar workers significantly dropped between 1959 and 2014, indicating the decline in immigrants with professional skills over time. Finally, there was a clear downward trend in total personal income over this time period as well, alluding to the search for further economic opportunity in more recent years as less wealthy immigrants are moving in increasing numbers.

The results of the questions on age, sex, and race are not as clearly indicative of the evolving reasons for immigration. Regarding age, this study found that the average age of Cuban immigrants increased between 1959 and 2014, however we would expect economic émigrés to be younger. Furthermore, the percentage of males only slightly increased during this time period, though it is not clear as to why this may be the case when trying to infer reasons for immigration.
Finally, although studies have been done on the correlation between race and socioeconomic class in Cuba which might give us some insight into changing reasons for immigration, no clear trend was found in the percentage of non-white Cuban immigrants between 1959 and 2014.

**Study Limitations**

**Variable Selection**

This study only looked at six variables to determine changes in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Cuban immigrants. Many more variables could have been included to provide further evidence for changing immigration motives such as marital status, number of children, industry, total family income, etc.

**Census Year vs. Year of Immigration**

With the exception of the question on age, all of the findings in this study come from the immigrants’ responses during the *year of the census*, rather than from their responses during their perspective *year of immigration*. This can distort some of the conclusions drawn from my graphs. For example, if an immigrant is sixty years-old during the 1980 census and immigrated in 1959, and another immigrant is twenty years-old during the same 1980 census and immigrated in 1979, the older person would be expected to have a higher educational attainment than the younger immigrant, not because he/she immigrated earlier, but because he/she is older. It was not possible to extract the responses of immigrants during the *year of immigration* for this study.

**False Inferences**

Perhaps the largest limitation of this study lies in the possibility of making false
assumptions: although we can draw possible inferences of the changing motivations for immigration from the graphs above, we cannot establish with absolute certainty the reasons for immigration based off of a few trends [in demographic/ socioeconomic characteristics] alone. While we may logically conclude that someone with high educational attainment, a professional skillset, and a high-paying salary in his country may not immigrate to seek better economic opportunity, for example, we cannot be absolutely certain of this fact.

**Revisiting the Cuban Adjustment Act**

This study reinforces the existing claim that Cuban immigrants to the United States have evolved from political to economic émigrés by providing quantitative evidence of the changing demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of these immigrants over time. The findings of this study strongly suggest that the CAA is not working as intended, since it was originally created with the purpose of providing a permanent escape from Fidel Castro’s regime, not as a mechanism for easy access to better economic opportunity. However, we now see that the CAA may be used as a part of our new foreign policy strategy to empower the Cuban people economically [predominantly through remittances] and subsequently call for the restructuring of the island to become a more democratic, open market society. Revisiting the CAA will require careful consideration by policymakers even beyond the scope of this study, although the findings presented in the preceding chapter may add to the existing body of evidence for the outdated nature of the fifty-yearlong policy.

Other considerations by policymakers will include analyzing both historical and current immigration policies with other countries that we can mimic in the future for Cuba. It will be important to consider, though, the different historical circumstances that led to creation of each
of these policies. Policymakers may also study the emigration patterns from these various countries, keeping in mind the specific characteristics of each country (geography, population, economic climate, political scene), to predict how a change in the CAA would affect emigration patterns from Cuba to the U.S. Furthermore, this analysis would need to be taken a step further to get a sense of how such patterns would affect the economy, culture, and politics of the U.S. itself. Prior research has already shown that the Cuban immigrant community has a large influence in U.S. politics and the economy. Finally, policymakers must clearly establish the role that the CAA plays in the grander scheme of U.S.-Cuba relations and how a change in this policy may affect our changing relationship. This will be done by working with politicians on both sides of the table at the biannual migration talks, for example.

**Opportunities for Future Scholarship**

The results of this study provide opportunities for further research to demonstrate the outdated nature of the CAA. First, a future researcher could conduct a similar longitudinal analysis using different variables that already have a clearly established relationship with economically motivated immigration and/or politically motivated immigration. Such variables that are available on IPUMS USA include occupation 5 years ago, occupational industry, total family income, etc.

Second, another researcher could conduct oral interviews with a random sample of members from the Cuban immigrant community to understand their motivation(s) for immigration. These responses could then be compared across years of immigration. Such a study could be done executed using a qualitative coding software, such as atlas.ti, or a similar program.

Finally, it would be worthwhile to conduct a demographic analysis similar to that of
Professors Richard Faegan and Richard Brody (pg. 20) comparing the occupational distribution of the Cuban immigrant population to the occupational distribution of the Cuban population census for each year of immigration. This analysis would reveal which occupational categories are over and underrepresented in the Cuban immigrant population, alluding to potential motivations for leaving the island. Such an analysis could also compare the two populations across other variables as well, including income, family size, etc.
References


