THE ROMAN ARMY’S EMERGENCE FROM ITS ITALIAN ORIGINS

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ABSTRACT

PATRICK ALAN KENT: The Roman Army’s Emergence from its Italian Origins
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Roman armies in the 4th century and earlier resembled other Italian armies of the day. By using what limited sources are available concerning early Italian warfare, it is possible to reinterpret the history of the Republic through the changing relationship of the Romans and their Italian allies. An important aspect of early Italian warfare was military cooperation, facilitated by overlapping bonds of formal and informal relationships between communities and individuals. However, there was little in the way of organized allied contingents. Over the 3rd century and culminating in the Second Punic War, the Romans organized their Italian allies into large conglomerate units that were placed under Roman officers. At the same time, the Romans generally took more direct control of the military resources of their allies as idea of military obligation developed. The integration and subordination of the Italians under increasing Roman domination fundamentally altered their relationships. In the 2nd century the result was a growing feeling of discontent among the Italians with their position. Indeed, the vital military role of the Italians was reinforced by the somewhat limited use made of non-Italians in Roman armies. By the late 2nd century, the Italians were vestiges of past traditions that no longer fitted into a changing world. Feelings of discontent grew stronger and, eventually, led to widespread revolt in the Social War. As the Romans became masters of vast empire, they became increasingly divorced from their Italian origins and subjugated their once allies.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

*CIL* Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.


Introduction

This dissertation argues that the Roman army of the 4th century\textsuperscript{1} and prior was little different from other Italian armies of the day. The accepted scholarly view of the Roman army’s exploitation of Italian allies, which is ultimately based on an anachronistic application of Polybius’ rationalized model, is in need of revision. The sophisticated use of allied manpower in the 2nd century, which facilitated the creation of Rome’s Mediterranean empire, was quite divergent from earlier practices. Italy, in the 4th century, was still a peninsula filled with communities that were in a constant state of competition and cooperation. The personal relationships of individuals, which transcended community boundaries, facilitated a close interconnectedness in the Italian world and, combined with formal relationships, facilitated military cooperation. An examination of the later ancient sources, such as Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, reveals that military cooperation was not a unique Roman attribute, but was a feature of a larger tradition of Italian warfare that included Rome. It was the conquest of Italy in the early 3rd century and the military pressures of the first two Punic Wars (264-241, 218-201) that began a process which would propel the Roman army away from its Italian roots.

\textsuperscript{1} All dates are BC unless otherwise noted.
Traditional means of military cooperation then broke down as the other communities of Italy were subsumed within a new Roman military system. The role of personal relationships was replaced with the idea that formal alliances between the Romans and their allies obligated military assistance whenever Roman generals required it. Similar changes were taking place in the political organization of the Republic, as the Senate undertook closer supervision over annual magistrates, and regions beyond Italy were transformed into subordinate provinces. The peoples of Italy were placed in a position of increasing subordination inconsistent with their military importance; it was this shift that ultimately led to civil war in the early 1st century. Investigation into the development of a Roman army from the military traditions of early Italy reveals how the Romans with the aid of the other peoples of Italy succeeded in winning an empire and were transformed in the process.

1. Treaties and Military Cooperation in Modern Scholarship

Scholars’ interpretation of the military relations of the Romans and Italians has centered on theorizing about the nature of the foedera (treaties) that linked them together. It is a given fact that the Romans’ success relied a great deal on their use of the military resources of their Italian allies. While the interpretations have changed over time, the focus of modern scholarly investigation has remained firmly on these legal relationships. According to the 2007 Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, “as Rome expanded and conquered new territories, the places that were absorbed were with a few exceptions left free to govern their own affairs . . . their only obligation was to contribute troops.”2 In fact, the characterization of this obligation has remained remarkably constant.

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ever since the 19th century. The Romans are seen as systematically demanding the military resources of their allies. The mechanism for this exploitation was the establishment of treaties that dictated military obligation on the part of Rome’s allies. However, with this focus on formal treaties, the importance of informal relationships in the military interactions of the peoples of Italy has been ignored by and large, making it difficult to gain a full understanding of the combined role of formal and informal relationships.

Interpretation of the military relationships of the Romans and their allies comes from the work of historians in the late 19th century. In 1881 Mommsen asserted that “without a doubt the non-Latin allied communities . . . were registered on the list of contingent-furnishing Italians (formula togatorum).”3 The Romans thus controlled the military resources of their allies to supplement their own armies. Mommsen’s interpretation saw Rome’s allies as subsumed within a Roman state (reichsangehörig), which increasingly took on a national character during the conquest of Italy.4 As a result of the incorporation of the peoples of Italy, the Romans gained full control over their military resources. The tool for doing so was the foedus.5 Beloch (1880) likewise saw foedera as the key institution in Roman and Italian military cooperation within a confederate system.6 Many of the controversies of the military obligations of Rome’s allies come from these two authors, who emphasized the importance of treaties in facilitating Roman use of allied manpower.

Various scholars have expanded on these ideas, emphasizing the role of treaties (foedera) in the military obligations of Rome’s allies. Täubler (1913) refined Beloch’s

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3 “ohne Zweifel auch die nichtlatinischen föderierten Gemeinden . . . in das Verzeichnis der zuzugpflichtigen Italiker (formula togatorum) eingetragen,” T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (Berlin: 1881), 1:423.
5 Mommsen (1887), 3:672-676.
The interpretation of foedera into the concepts of equal (aequum) and unequal (iniquum) varieties. Central to the foedus iniquum was the so-called maiestas clause requiring allies to support the ascendancy of Rome, which Sherwin-White (1973) saw as the clause that allowed the Romans to exploit their allies for aggressive wars. Here Sherwin-White touches on a fundamental problem: how did the Romans obtain allied assistance in aggressive wars? Certainly, the foedus Cassianum, the only surviving example of an Italian treaty, makes no pronouncements on this specific possibility.

The foedus iniquum solved the problem by supposing that the Romans created unequal alliances designed to exploit allied manpower in any military situation. Those allies with foedera aequa were required to help in defensive wars, but retained the right to participate in any aggressive actions of their own choosing. This concept is pushed to its limit by arguing that any Italian community with an unequal treaty would have been presuming on the military control of the Roman state by voluntarily providing military resources as equal allies did for Scipio for his African campaign. More recently, historians have generally moved away from the idea of Italian foedera iniqua; as Badian (1958) argued, the evidence for unequal treaties within Italy is very poor. Indeed, Mommsen argued that the maiestas clause was a late development long after the conquest of Italy and only in

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7 Beloch (1880), 194-227; E. Täubler, Imperium Romanum (Leipzig: 1913).
9 The Cassian treaty stipulates that the Romans and Latins were required to aid each other with all of their forces in the event of an attack by an aggressor, see Chapter 2.2.a.
11 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: 1958), 25-28. D. W. Baronowski, “Sub umbra foederis aequi,” Phoenix 44, no. 4 (1990), 345-369 has argued for the existence of distinct equal and unequal treaties but is unable to prove they were employed in Italy or prior to the Aetolian treaty in 189.
evidence among extra-Italian allies. Nonetheless, the idea of the foedus iniquum speaks to the difficulty inherent in an investigation of Italian military cooperation that focuses on foedera.

Despite a movement away from the idea of foedera iniqua, scholars remain trapped in the same problem of military cooperation due to the focus on treaties. Toynbee (1965) acts as a kind of bridge; he propounds the idea of the unequal treaties, but also concentrates heavily on what became the new focus of historians, the formula togatorum. Nevertheless, in Toynbee’s work, Roman-Italian military cooperation is dictated solely by formal treaties. The idea of the formula togatorum, based on the few references to formulae in ancient sources, stretches back to Mommsen. He believed that the formula was the normal number of men demanded via treaty obligations from allied communities. Beloch argued that it dictated the maximum number of men the Romans could demand from an ally as well as the number of men available. Baronowski (1984), following Brunt (1971), saw the formula togatorum as “an administrative device by which the Romans customarily apportioned the burden of a partial levy among them.” As such, the formula was not itself a formal part of

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12 Mommsen (1887), 3:664.


14 For a discussion of the ancient sources on the formula togatorum, see Chapter 4.3.c.

15 Mommsen (1887), 3:672-676.

16 Beloch (1880), 201-210; Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (Leipzig: 1886), 353-355.

a *foedus*, but a tool to make efficient use of the military resources of Rome’s allies, who were required *ex foedere* to come to Rome’s assistance with all of their forces.\(^{18}\)

Regardless of how one interprets the *formula togatorum*, it, and thus military cooperation in general, is invariably linked to *foedera*. However, there is the question of when the *formula togatorum* developed. Brunt argued that it developed in the mid-3\(^{rd}\) century (linked to the invasion of Gauls in 225), while other push it back further. This study argues that the *formula togatorum* was a manifestation of the growing disparity of power between the Romans and Italians with no fixed definition. It was flexible in its application with a basis of precedent, not treaties. The idea of a formal idea of military obligation seems to have developed alongside the prefects of the allies and *alae* in the Second Punic War.

A great deal of the Romans’ success in their campaigns was thanks to large numbers of Italian allies. Relying on elaborate theories based ultimately on treaties, there is an inherent assumption of the nature that the Romans transcended the military environment of early Italy. In the 2007 Blackwell *Companion to the Roman Army*, Rawlings hinted at the complexity of military cooperation in early Italian warfare, although he was similarly constrained by a reliance on the *formula togatorum*.\(^{19}\) My study investigates early Roman use of allied manpower within the larger military environment of Italy. In fact, the Romans were not unique in their use of allies; it was a common feature of Italian warfare. This simple conclusion has a significant impact on the interpretation of Roman warfare, its development, and the impact of change on Roman-Italian relations. Historians have long recognized that the peoples of Italy (including the Romans) interacted on a variety of levels.

\(^{18}\) Brunt (1971), 546.

\(^{19}\) L. Rawlings, “Army and battle during the conquest of Italy (350-264 BC),” in P. Erdkamp, ed. *Companion to the Roman Army* (Malden, MA: 2007b), 52.
from formal treaties to individual personal relationships. However, insufficient attention has
been given to how all of these relationships shaped the military interaction of Italian
communities. What role did individuals and their social networks play in the recruitment and
operation of Italian armies? Without focusing unduly on the formal treaties, my study
investigates the larger Italian military environment in which the Romans existed. The
Romans and Italians are each be considered as the growth of Roman power fundamentally
altered their relationships.

2. The Ancient Sources

An investigation into the nature of community relations in ancient Italy relies heavily
on surviving literary sources. Roman historical writing began in the late 3rd century, but only
later works survive. For the Republican Period of the 2nd century and earlier, two major
narratives dominate: Polybius and the annalists (best represented by Livy), with others acting
as supplements. It is important to consider their strengths and weaknesses, especially with
regard to the period in question. By looking at the sources available, it is possible to use
them in a way that sheds more light on the nature of relationships between the Romans and
the other peoples of Italy than has been generally recognized for the period before the Punic
Wars and, in turn, how those relations changed in later years.

Nearly any study of Roman political or military history before the final century of the
Roman Republic begins with Polybius. Of particular interest are his surveys of Roman
political and military institutions, especially in Book 6. There he provides an outline of how
Roman politics operated, were organized, the division of powers, and checks and balances.
While his outline is useful, there are potential problems with his generalizations. As
Walbank has noted, the ‘mirage’ of divided powers and checks and balances has ‘blinded’ Polybius to the reality of Roman politics with regard to the control exerted by the nobiles.\(^{20}\) In other words, Polybius did not, in Book 6, acknowledge the complexities of everyday politics in Rome, which were just as important to the functioning of the Republic. That is not to say that he was unaware; he linked the rise of Scipio Africanus to the aristocratic nature of Roman politics.\(^{21}\) In terms of politics, Polybius provides a useful general outline of how the Republic technically operated, but that picture must be supplemented with examples from elsewhere in Polybius’ narrative as well as from other sources which shed light on how it worked in reality. He is an invaluable source, but not perfect. The same applies to military details.

With regards to the military relationship of the Romans and their Italian allies, Polybius, overall, has remarkably little to say. His outlines of Roman armies (recruitment, organization, and castramentation in Book 6) make limited mention of allies, who provided roughly half of Roman armies. Allied leaders, he tells us, were ordered by the consuls to bring men, who were then placed under Roman officers (prefects of the allies) and organized into legion-like units (\textit{alae}).\(^{22}\) We are not informed what mechanisms existed that facilitated Roman use of allied manpower (treaties, a \textit{formula togatorum}, or something else). With regards to an attack by Gauls in 225, Polybius mentions lists of allies, but he does not make mention of them when he discusses recruitment generally.\(^{23}\) Indeed, his discussion of allied recruitment in Book 6 is limited. Polybius often neglects or does not see as relevant the


\(^{21}\) Polyb. 23.14.1; Walbank (1972), 155, n. 150.

\(^{22}\) Polyb. 6.21, 26.

\(^{23}\) For a discussion of this passage, see Chapter 4.2.
distinction between the Romans and their Italian allies.\footnote{P. Erdkamp, “Polybius and Livy on the allies in the Roman army,” in L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio, eds. The Impact of the Roman Army (Leiden: 2007a), 49-55.} No doubt he was well aware of the differences, but in order to convey a less intricate picture to his Greek audience he did not distinguish. The same would seem to apply to his general political discussions, which were meant to provide an understandable outline without getting bogged down in excessive detail.\footnote{Polyb. 6.11.3-8.} For the modern historian, these tendencies obscure the details necessary to investigate the nature of Roman and Italian military cooperation.

Perhaps the most serious issue with Polybius’ characterization of the military relationship of the Romans and Italians is the lack of change over time, and thus the time period to which his characterization applies. It is not that Polybius was unaware of the Italians, but rather that he regarded them as existing solely within a Roman military system.\footnote{Erdkamp (2007a), 53-55; W. V. Harris, “The Italians and the empire,” in W. V. Harris, ed. The Imperialism of mid-Republican Rome (Oxford: 1984), 89.} The Roman organization of the allies that is discussed (prefects and \textit{alae}) appears as fully formed institution with no caveats of when or how it developed. Certainly such institutions did not exist as far back as the Regal Period, so when did they come into existence? It is here that Polybius’ weaknesses are most relevant for this study. Other sources must be used in order to fill in how the Rome’s Italian allies came to be integrated into the Roman military structure. It is quite true that sources for the period before the Punic Wars are poor, but good information can be discerned that reveals a system of Italian warfare where the Romans did not dictate its nature. Polybius is an invaluable source for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century and perhaps as far back as the Second Punic War, but it is necessary to look elsewhere to discover the nature of
Roman armies and allies in previous periods and to detect the impact of changes in military relationships over time.

Livy represents a Roman historical tradition that stretched back, in written form, to the middle of the 3rd century. The first Roman historian was Fabius Pictor, who lived and wrote (in Greek) in the late 3rd century. He was quickly followed by others. From the middle of the 2nd century until well into the 1st, Roman history was dominated by a series of authors known as the annalists, who relied on earlier historical works, a few outside sources, and their own imaginations to write elaborate histories of Rome.27 These writers served as major sources for surviving histories by Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dio Cassius, and Diodorus Siculus. Fabius Pictor has been accused of creating the narrative of Roman history, but that is to overstate his importance; he was very significant, but there was already a general sense of the Roman past in place.28 Pictor wrote during the Punic Wars and was able to use his own experiences as well as having access to other Romans at the time. But what sources survived from the period before him? That is to say, is there any reliable information in the literary sources from before the Punic Wars?

Evidence from the late 4th century and later seems to be generally reliable. The sources for early Roman history were likely pontifical records (providing an outline of events and some details) and family records that would have preserved the memories of great

27 Although a popular pastime of 19th and early 20th century scholars, it is nearly impossible to use fragments and citations in other writers to discern the nature of individual writers, T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of His History* (Princeton: 1977), 139-184.

individuals in an oral form.\textsuperscript{29} Obviously, oral traditions are subject to a great deal of distortion, especially the further removed they are from the time in question. However, Fabius Pictor wrote in the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} century and thus would have been able to speak to individuals who were alive back to the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} century (and perhaps in a few instances earlier) as well as making use of a relatively firm oral tradition stretching back a few more decades.\textsuperscript{30} To be sure, variations could and did occur, perhaps best represented in the disparities between Livy and Diodorus Siculus. The deeds of the Fabii also loom large. Certainly they were among the greatest families of Rome at the time (especially Fabius Rullianus), and Fabius Pictor no doubt had a hand in their importance in the narrative. Nonetheless, there is no reason to dismiss out of hand the evidence that survives from this period before the Punic Wars.

Livy looms large as one of the major surviving sources for Republican history before the 1\textsuperscript{st} century. His history (\textit{Ab Urbe Condita}) certainly merits a place alongside Polybius’, regardless of its late composition during the time of Augustus. Livy’s importance is painfully clear for those years when his narrative is lost. Livy primarily used the annalists as his sources, although he also consulted earlier historians (like Fabius Pictor and Polybius), as well as checking points firsthand on occasion. He was no fool, being quite aware that older sources likely were more reliable and putting some thought into trying to reach the truth of the matter when possible.\textsuperscript{31} He often lists variations of events he describes, thus providing, in some cases, a treasure trove of information for modern historians.\textsuperscript{32} Unlike Polybius, Livy


\textsuperscript{30} Oakley (1997-2005), 1:38-72.

\textsuperscript{31} Livy 6.12.2; 10.46.7; 25.11.20; 29.14.9.

\textsuperscript{32} For a list of variants in books 6-10, see Oakley (1997-2005), 1:13-16.
was willing, on occasion, to acknowledge differing traditions. At the same time, Livy and the other annalists had a tendency to retroject ‘modern’ aspects of Rome into the past or to fill out their narratives when details were seen as lacking. Taken together, these two characteristics mean that when their sources were insufficient, they most likely would have filled in the details with information from their own day, which means, in turn, that when pieces of evidence do not reflect later periods they can be taken as having some basis in an old tradition. Livy’s narrative preserves, at times, a great deal of information regarding Roman history before the Punic Wars, especially from the late 4th century onwards.

Perhaps a bit surprisingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus also proves an informative source for Roman and Italian military relations for the period before the Punic Wars. A Greek, he travelled to Rome during the same period that Livy was writing and became a well-known teacher and writer. His *Roman Antiquities*, which sought to demonstrate that Rome was a Greek city, originally contained twenty books. Dionysius made extensive use of the annalists as sources, which often served merely as starting points for him to incorporate his considerable rhetorical skills in the narrative and the speeches he composed. Despite Dionysius’ untenable thesis and his treatment of early Roman history, the fragments from his later books provide useful insights into Roman and Italian military history. As already discussed, information from the Roman historical tradition from the late 4th century onwards can often be reliable. However, Dionysius also used Greek sources. While early Roman historians relied on oral traditions and pontifical records for the times before the

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33 Today, the first eleven, from mythical times to 443, survive mostly intact with sometimes substantial fragments known from the rest, covering the years 442 to the beginning of the First Punic War.


35 Dionysius seems to have relied on Greek sources concerning Aristodemus of Cumae, Gabba (1991), 85; Alföldi (1971), 56; the conflict between Rome and Neapolis in 327, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:640-642.
Of particular interest are the fragments concerning the Pyrrhic War (Livy’s narrative of this period has been lost). According to his own statement, Dionysius used Pyrrhus’ own memoirs as a source.\textsuperscript{36} This he no doubt combined with Roman sources and perhaps local sources from Magna Graecia, preserving valuable information regarding Roman and Italian warfare that is quite different from Polybius’ outline. Despite the questionable nature of the earlier portions of his work, Dionysius proves an invaluable source for the late 4\textsuperscript{th} and early 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries, revealing precious details of early Italian warfare.

The surviving accounts of Roman history that deal with the period before the Punic Wars certainly have problems of reliability, but it is possible to use them to create a general picture of warfare in Italy that is distinct from the polished product found in Polybius. Indeed, accurate details concerning the nature of the military relationships of the peoples of Italy may have survived by the simple fact that they were not of major concern for Livy, Dionysius, and the others who describe early Roman history. A careful examination of these sources reveals a solid amount of information suggesting a system of military organization different from Polybius. It should be acknowledged that this evidence is not abundant. The various problems of sources, survival, and modification have obscured a great deal. However, what small pieces remain, while perhaps not amounting to much in isolation, suggest a larger picture. Perhaps what is most intriguing is the lack of real distinction between Romans’ and Italians’ warfare and the use of allies of each. When looking at military relationships, it is important to consider all sides. In fact, far from being unique in their use and treatment of allied military forces, the Romans operated within a larger Italian framework of military cooperation. By considering not only the Romans but also the other

\textsuperscript{36} Dion. Hal. 20.10.2.
peoples of Italy, the available data increases. In this manner, it is possible not to reject
Polybius’ descriptions of Roman armies, but to reevaluate them in light of how Roman and
Italian warfare changed over time and the impact of this transformation on the peoples of
Italy.

3. The Roman Army’s Emergence from its Italian Origins

This dissertation argues that military cooperation was a central component of early
Italian warfare, not unique to the Romans. Furthermore, subsequent changes in the military
relationships between the Romans and Italians during the 3rd century and culminating in the
Second Punic War resulting in the subordination of the Italians disrupted those relations. As
the Roman empire expanded and developed over the 3rd and 2nd centuries, the Italians
continued to play a vital military role that could not be filled by extra-Italian allies. Despite
this importance, the Italians were increasingly treated as subjects more than allies, resulting
in growing feelings of discontent. By the end of the 2nd century, the Italians were holdovers
of earlier practices that no longer fitted into the military and political system of Rome, which
ultimately led to the outbreak of the Social War as the Italians came to find their position
intolerable.

The first chapter looks at the phenomenon of military cooperation in Italy, which was
not confined to the Romans, but a common attribute of peoples on the peninsula. It argues
that, far from being unique, Roman armies were fully participating elements of a larger set of
Italian military traditions. The second chapter then investigates how Italian communities
interacted and how those interactions impacted warfare at the time. Community relations
during the period before the Punic Wars were often unstable. A wide variety of overlapping
formal and informal relationships bound communities together, sometimes resulting in conflicts. As a result, the Romans experimented with establishing stable relations, including the use of *civitas sine suffragio* and Latin colonies. Military cooperation was made possible by these same formal and informal relationships.

As the Romans came to dominate all of Italy, there was a drastic impact on military cooperation. Chapter three considers the integration of the Italians within an expanding Roman military system. Over the course of the 3rd century, Roman generals sought to better organize and control the mass of allies under their command. However, it was the military pressures of the Second Punic War that saw the Italians organized into conglomerate legion-like units (*alae*) and placed under Roman officers (prefects of the allies). The Italians were under the direct military control of Roman generals to a much greater degree. As the Italians were integrated, the Romans developed the idea of military obligation. By the 2nd century, the Romans came to assume direct control over the military resources of their allies. This idea was linked to treaties and anachronistically read into earlier periods of Roman history to justify Roman military domination.

As the Romans’ power expanded beyond peninsular Italy, they also made use of extra-Italian allies. Chapter four investigates how they used these non-Italians in their armies. Despite the use of Italian practice (using a blend of formal and informal relationships for the purposes of military cooperation), non-Italians did not fill the same role as the Italians. Non-Italian allies, for the most part, remained in their homelands, except in the few cases where they could transport themselves to distant campaigns. In the final chapter, the Italians are considered within the new imperial Roman system. Their strong relationships with the Romans provided certain benefits from the empire, but despite their continued
military importance the Italians were subject to increasing Roman political domination. The Italians found themselves in a peculiar position between allies and subjects, which led to widespread feelings of discontent. In time, these general feelings found expression within the call for citizenship and thus for stakes in the empire that they had helped build. It was only the Social War that corrected the divide that had come to separate the Romans from their fellow Italians.

This study re-imagines the development of Roman armies through the lens of military cooperation. Modern scholarship has focused its attention on the formal treaties that existed between the Romans and allies, without sufficient attention given to other means of interaction. In order to understand fully the development of Roman armies, it is necessary to begin with an investigation into early Italian warfare. Roman armies in the 2nd century were something unique, but that is not necessarily the case in the 4th century and earlier. In part, investigation into early Italian warfare is hampered by the ancient sources that survive. However, by looking at Italy as a whole and by sifting through the biases of the sources, a picture develops in which the Romans were fully participating members of the general trends in Italian warfare. In time, a series of reforms that would see their full realization at the end of the 3rd century resulted in the integration and subjugation of the Italians beneath the expanding power of Rome, ultimately resulting in the outbreak of the Social War.
Chapter One

Warfare in Early Italy

Italy was not a peaceful land. Its various peoples and communities often fought with each other. Early Italian warfare was a complex affair, revolving around the military cooperation of different groups. The Romans were not unique in their use of allies in their armies; rather, the practice can be found among all of the Italians. In addition, military forces were organized at and below the community level, further complicating the conduct of war-fighting. This chapter provides an overview of early Italian warfare before the Romans established themselves as hegemons (roughly 343 to 265), particularly the role of military cooperation. Warfare was not a simple affair, but involved a great many variables that affected not only how Italians fought, but how they interacted in general. It was from this set of traditions that Roman armies would ultimately emerge and would fundamentally alter the relationships of the Romans and their Italian armies in subsequent periods.

1. Warfare and Military Cooperation

Warfare was constant in early Italy, forcing peoples and communities to join together for military actions. Livy records that in 303 the Roman consuls conducted a campaign against a small group of bandits hiding in an Umbrian cave “that their year might not go by
without any war whatsoever.”¹ Indeed, for the period from 343 to 293 there are only two years in which no military action is recorded on the part of the Romans, and in the following period from 292 to 265, when Livy’s narrative is lost and other sources are equally scarce, there are, nonetheless, only three years without evidence of military activity.² Over the course of nearly a century, from the middle of the 4th century to the start of the Punic Wars, the Romans experienced perhaps five years without fighting within Italy. Although the sources are often inadequate, constant Roman warfare presupposes a similar situation among the other Italians. Certainly the fortifications of Etruscan, Latin, and Campanian cities, as well as the hill forts scattered throughout the entire length of the Apennines, speak to an environment where warfare was a continuous threat requiring careful preparation. Military cooperation proved a vital component of Italian warfare as a means of survival in a hostile world. In the period before the Punic Wars, many Italians combined their military resources for various campaigns and actions.

Long before the 4th century, which is the focus of this study, military cooperation was common. In 508, the Etruscan general Lars Porsena led a coalition of Etruscan cities against the peoples of Latium, prompting them to come to one another’s aid.³ The mythical Etruscan dodecapolis seems to have been a means of military cooperation, and perhaps the reason the Etruscans were able to project their power into Latium, Campania, and Cisalpine Gaul. The Romans, Latins, and Hernici pledged to come to each other’s defense in case of attack in the early 5th century in an attempt to fend off the encroaching Aequi and Volsci.⁴ In the latter

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¹ tamen ne prorsus imbellem agerent annum, Livy 10.1.4-6.
³ When Aricia was attacked, Tusculum and Cumae sent military assistance, Dion. Hal. 5.36.1-2; Livy 2.14.5-9.
half of the 4th century, when sources become far better, military cooperation appears as a major component of Italian warfare. Allied forces can be found often in Roman armies, but the Romans were not alone among the peoples of Italy in their use of allied manpower and resources.

Roman armies routinely included allied forces in the period between 343 and 265. For major battles, the Romans gathered large numbers of allies to bolster their forces in an effort to increase the chances of victory. The most detailed list of the allies accompanying a Roman army comes in 279 at the battle of Ausculum against Pyrrhus. Alongside the Roman army were Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volsci, Marrucini, Paeligni, and Frentani.\(^5\) In addition, a small force of Apulians independently attacked Pyrrhus’ camp during the fight, although it is not clear whether they were merely being opportunistic.\(^6\) These peoples represented Latium, Umbria, Campania, and the Abruzzo region into Apulia which was the extent of Roman influence at the time.\(^7\) Previously, at the battle of Sentinum in 295, it is said that 27,000 allies had joined the armies of Rome.\(^8\) Although Livy does not mention the origins of these allies, it can be inferred that they came primarily from Latium, Campania, the southern Abruzzo, and the smaller areas in between, which were the only

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\(^4\) This is the foedus Cassianum, see Chapter 2.2.a for discussion.

\(^5\) Dion. Hal. 20.1.5.

\(^6\) Dion. Hal. 20.3.2; Zon. 8.5.

\(^7\) The cities of Etruria had been locked in constant war with the Romans for centuries up to that point and would continue to fight for decades afterwards, W. V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and Umbria (Oxford: 1971), 41-84. The Samnites and Lucanians, who had been defeated previously by the Romans (or had been willing allies in the case of the Lucanians) joined Pyrrhus, Dion. Hal. 20.1.2-3. For the instability of alliances in Italy, see Chapter 2.1.

\(^8\) Livy 10.18.3.
regions not cut off by enemy activity in that year. These large numbers of allies (in 295 and 279) were a direct response to the scale of the enemies the Romans faced. Pyrrhus had defeated a consular army the previous year (280) at Heraclea and had gathered a great many allies of his own in southern Italy. At Sentinum in 295, the Romans faced a combined army of Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians. In these instances the Romans felt threatened enough to gather men from all of the allies they had available. Indeed, when the Romans faced the ‘revolt’ of large numbers of their allies in 341, primarily the Latins and Campanians, they joined forces with the Samnites with whom they had been at war the previous year. Without these allies, the Romans would not have been able to field a sufficient number of men to ensure victory, despite their large population.

At the same time, the Romans did not merely rely on allies when they were in dire circumstances. Allies were also used for more ‘typical’ campaigns, although on a more limited scale. In 294, both consular armies included allied contingents. The consul L. Postumius Megellus used two units of Latin cavalry to reconnoiter an abandoned town in Samnium. When the camp of the other consul M. Atilius Regulus was attacked by Samnites, two allied cohorts from Luca and Suessa defended the praetorium. The origins of these allies are informative. Drawing men from Latium (as Postumius did) was

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9 The Etruscans, Samnites, Gauls, and Umbrians had joined their forces and were operating in the area of southern Umbria and the northern Abruzzo. Obtaining men, should they have been friendly, from Lucania or Apulia would have been difficult at best. The Paeligni killed Samnite survivors after the battle of Sentinum (Livy 10.30.3), indicating their friendship with Rome (an alliance had been established in 304, Livy 9.45.18) and perhaps implying their inability to join the Romans at the actual battle.

10 Livy 10.18-31; Polyb. 2.19.5-6; Zon. 8.1; Front. Strat. 2.5.9. This coalition army may also have included the Marsi, Vir. Ill. 27.3-5.

11 See Chapter 2.1 for a discussion of these events.

12 Livy 10.34.7; MRR, 1:179.

13 Livy 10.33.1; MRR, 1:179.
logistically simple and could be accomplished in a short time thanks to the proximity with Rome. In the case of Atilius’ army, a similar use of nearby allies is apparent. Although Livy mentions Lucanians, he likely is referring to the people of a small Volscian settlement known as Luca, which has been suggested to be located at modern Castro dei Volsci near the Liris River. Suessa, a Latin colony, was located on the very northern edges of Campania on the Liris River. Atilius’ provincia was Samnium and he campaigned near Sora. Luca lies along the route of march from Rome to the area of Sora, while Suessa is a relatively short distance along the Via Latina running alongside the Liris River. Livy does not provide a comprehensive list of allied forces for the consular armies of 294 and it seems likely that other allies accompanied these armies. However, from what is known about the origins of these forces, they were likely gathered from allies that were near where the Roman armies were campaigning. Indeed, later Camerinum would promise military support for the army of Fabius Rullianus “if it came into that region.” Many Italian armies are said to have recruited allies while on campaign. Roman military activities in 294 were hardly pressing enough to require the large numbers required at Sentinum and Ausculum. Indeed, gathering a diverse number of allies would have introduced needless complications. Nonetheless, even in more normal campaigns Roman armies included allied forces.

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14 A Volscian settlement called Luca has been conjectured due to Livy’s statement that in 330 legati ex Volscis Fabrateni et Lucani Romam venerunt (8.19.1). Modern historians have rightly pointed towards this passage as unlikely to refer to the people of Lucania but more likely to a Volscian Luca, see Oakley (1997-2005), 2:606-7; E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge: 1967), 194, n. 4.


16 si ea loca intrasset, Livy 9.36.8.

17 When marching through the Central Apennines, the Romans picked up Samnite contingents, Livy 8.6.8. The Romans confronted a Samnite army with Marsi and Paeligni allies in the Central Apennines, Livy 9.41.4. In 306 a number of individual Hernici were found to have served in a Samnite army that was defeated near the Liris River; the Aequi were accused of having also participated, Livy 9.42, 45. A Roman army campaigning in Etruria apparently contained men from Caere, Livy 10.4.9.
As often as allies are referred to as accompanying Roman armies, they are just as often found in Samnite ones during this period. The details of First Samnite War are, unfortunately, quite exaggerated as they have come down to us. In the war, the Samnites appear as acting alone, which seems unlikely, but it is impossible to say more. It is the aftermath of this first war that proves fascinating in terms of Samnite military cooperation. The twists and turns of the war and its aftermath will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. Here it is important to note that after peace was established between the Romans and Samnites, Rome’s allies (the Latins, Campanians, and Sidicini) continued the war against the Samnites. The response from the Romans and Samnites themselves, enemies the year prior, was to join their forces together to defeat their common enemies. Although there was an effort from Roman historians to downplay Samnite aid in the battle itself, Livy gives them credit for playing an important role in the victory.\(^\text{18}\) Cooperation against a common enemy here did nothing to prevent near constant war between the Romans and Samnites during the following decades when both peoples draw heavily on the military resources of their allies.

The most famous, and detailed, account of Samnite military cooperation is in relation to the Sentinum campaign which began in 296 and culminated in a massive battle the next year.\(^\text{19}\) By the time of this campaign, the Samnites had long been under heavy pressure from the Romans. The Campanians were Roman allies and sporadic alliances existed between the Romans and Lucanians. The Abruzzi region had been settled with a number of Roman

\(^{18}\) Livy 8.8.19-11.2. However, Livy also says that some of his sources claimed that the Samnites waited until the battle was won before engaging (supported by Dion. Hal. 15.7.3).

\(^{19}\) The course of the campaign is recounted in the greatest detail by Livy (10.16-31). Zonaras (8.1) and Polybius (2.19) provide some minor details not included in Livy. For a general discussion, including other minor sources that provide little independent information, see Oakley (1997-2005), 4:197-339.
colonies, which facilitated Roman operations in Apulia. Samnium was slowly being surrounded. In response, the Samnite general Gellius Egnatius led a large force of Samnites north into Umbria, near the small community of Sentinum. Egnatius worked hard to gather Etruscan, Umbrian, and Gallic forces to his growing army. By 295, huge numbers of nearby peoples had joined the Samnite army, and were able to deal some defeats to the Romans. Through diversionary attacks on Etruria and Umbria, the Romans were able to draw off a number of these allies before engaging the united forces of the Samnites and Gauls at the battle of Sentinum. The battle was a close-run thing; even Livy admits that, had the Etruscans or Umbrians been present, the Romans would have been defeated.20

Like the Romans, the Samnites placed a great deal of emphasis on military cooperation, which was an important factor in Italian battles. In the period before the Punic Wars, numerous allies were to be found with Samnite armies, as well as other Italian armies. At various points during this period, Samnite armies included Romans, Etruscans, Gauls, Umbrians, Apulians, Hernici, Aequi, Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, and Greeks.21 Like Roman armies, Samnite armies would not have tried to gather all Samnite allies for every campaign except in times of great need. Other Italian armies were similar. When the Romans planned an attack on the Vestini in 325, they feared that the other Abruzzi peoples (the Paeligni, Marsi, and Marruccini specifically) would come to their aid.22 Etruscans and Umbrians

20 Livy 10.27.11.

21 The Romans in the Great Latin War, see page 22, n. 18. Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians and perhaps Marsi at the battle of Sentinum, see page 20, n. 10. Livy (8.37.5-6) has trouble discerning which side, Roman or Samnite, the Apulians took, cf. 9.1.5; 10.15.1. Hernici, Livy 9.42. Aequi, Livy 9.45. Marsi, Livy 9.41.4. Paeligni, Livy 9.41.4. Vestini, Livy 8.29.4. The Samnites, along with the Tarentines and Nolani, promised aid to Neapolis, Livy 8.23; Dion. Hal. 15.5. Samnites in Pyrrhus’ army, Dion. Hal. 20.1.2-3.

22 Livy 8.29.4.
joined their forces on occasion. The Lucanians offered their support to a number of people in the midst of their numerous changes in alliances.  

Military cooperation played an important role in the success and survival of Italian peoples and communities. Indeed, on several occasions Samnites responded to calls for help from their allies who were facing attacks. The Romans prided themselves on a similar emphasis of protecting allies, although on at least one occasion they purposefully delayed taking action in order to avoid unwanted entanglements. Through military relationships with more powerful neighbors, small powers could obtain a source of protection that their own military resources could not provide. Even when the relatively small Abruzzi tribes cooperated with each other, they still found it useful to ally with the Samnites or Romans for support. For larger powers, a large network of military alliances could provide a significant pool of military resources. When the Samnites and Romans faced off at Sentinum, both gathered significant numbers of allies to boost their own forces. Indeed, Dionysius of Halicarnassus seems to correctly summarize the importance of allied military resources in this military environment when he says that the Romans feared that Samnite conquest of the Lucanians would lead directly to the growth of Samnite power and the conquest of others. Similar hostility towards the growing number of Roman alliances likely prompted the coalition of peoples gathered by the Samnites at Sentinum. As in the conquest of the Mediterranean later, the Roman hegemony in Italy relied on the effective use of allied

23 See Chapter 2.1.

24 Livy 8.23.1; 9.21.4-5; 10.43.3; Diod. 19.72.

25 In 337, the Aurunci were attacked by the nearby Sidicini and requested Roman help, but the Romans delayed marching (due to religious concerns in the selection of a dictator) until the Aurunci were driven from their city, Livy 8.15. Over the next few years, the Romans did not directly attack the Sidicini due to their Samnite alliance, Livy 8.16-17.

26 Dion. Hal. 17/18.3.
military resources. However, it is important to realize that military cooperation was not unique to the Romans among the peoples of Italy. When contemplating a war with Rome, the Tarentines were right when they said, “it is dangerous to fight alone.” Success, and often survival, in early Italian warfare depended on military cooperation.

2. Allies, Mercenaries, and Communities

In the above discussion, Italian peoples and communities were referred to in general terms (i.e. Romans, Samnites, Lucanians), but the reality of the situation was more complicated. In fact, warfare was not solely conducted on the community level. Individuals and small groups played their role in the fighting and military cooperation. Warfare was not a simple affair between communities, but involved multiple levels of organization and interaction. The same was true for political interactions as well. Early Italian warfare was a fluid and perhaps chaotic military environment.

It was relatively common for elite individuals (sometimes accompanied by followers) to move between communities. Many of the early Roman kings were non-residents prior to their taking the throne. Numa was from Sabine Cures, Servius Tullius may have come from Etruscan Vulci, and the Tarquins came from Etruscan Tarquinii. It was not uncommon for this movement of individuals to be of a military nature. In 504, the Sabine Attius Clausus led thousands of people to settle in Rome to become the gens Claudia, one of the premier families of the Republic. These people no doubt made up, at least in part, Clausus’ military

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27 πολεµε/uni1FD6ν ἵμονους ἐπισφαλές, App. Sam. 7.3.

28 See Chapter 2.2.

29 Livy 2.16.4; Dion. Hal. 5.40.3. Suetonius (Tib. 1) calls the leader of the Claudii when they arrived in Rome, Attius Clausus, a princeps gentis. The story of Titus Tatius is similar, Livy 1.13; Dion. Hal. 2.46-47; Plut. Rom. 19-24.
followers. These men were quickly assimilated into the Roman community; within ten years another Ap. Claudius with the cognomen Sabinus was elected consul. Similar migrations of peoples are well-attested in Italy. An example of a Roman ex-patriot is to be found (albeit with the necessary caveats to the story). In the 5th century, Cn. Marcius Coriolanus left Rome due to political difficulties. He then fled to the neighboring Volsci, a people who had long been in conflict with the Romans, and led them against Rome, only to be convinced to back down by his mother. Coriolanus may have been a Roman warlord at the head of his own band of warriors. Regardless of the exact details of Coriolanus’ activities, he fits a general trend in early Italy. It was possible for elite individuals (and probably people of lower standing as well, although there is no evidence) to move between communities and become fully integrated members there. In military terms, openness to this sort of movement bolstered the military resources of communities and was quite desirable. Indeed, Servius Tullius may have been the Etruscan warlord Macstarna, and he has also been connected with the Etruscan military adventurers Caeles and Aulus Vibenna, who were all from Vulci.

Even within communities, individuals can be found with warriors following them. An inscription from Rome dated to around 500 records a dedication to Mars (Mamers) by the suodales (companions) of Poplios Valesios (perhaps the famous P. Valerius Publicola). It is interesting to compare Appian’s description of M’. Curius Dentatus, who was followed by

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31 See Chapter 2.2.b for further discussion.

32 As indicated by Dion. Hal. 7.19, 21, 64; Plut. Cor. 13 and supported by T. J. Cornell, “Coriolanus: Myth, history and performance,” in D. Braund and C. Gill, eds. Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome (Exeter: 2003), 73-97.


a band of young men, upsetting many senators (albeit in a social as opposed to strictly military context). In 280, named Oblacus Volsinius, a man who evidently came from Etruscan Volsinii, is to be found commanding Frentani cavalry, who are described as his *hetairoi*, or companions. The bonds that linked these men were significant. Among Oscan speaking peoples, warriors could exchange oaths of fidelity to form a warrior band. More than likely, similar oaths bound other such groups in Italy. Indeed, when Oblacus Volsinius died in combat, his companions fought hard to protect and recover his body, an act that no doubt reflected their mutual religious responsibilities. At the same time, these bands were joined in such a way that they could operate outside of the bounds of communities to the degree that they could migrate between them.

Personal military glory and achievement were a vital component of Italian warfare, and are reflected in the military traditions of the peninsula. Many of the greatest heroes of early Roman history performed spectacular deeds without the assistance of others. One such example was M. Horatius Cocles, who in 508 single-handedly held off the Etruscan army led by Lars Porsena, while the rest of the Romans destroyed the only bridge over the Tiber River behind him. As a reward for his personal bravery, Horatius Cocles was given land and gifts by the community and people of Rome.


37 One such example includes the *vereii*, G. Tagliamonte, “Alcune considerazioni sull’istituto italicco della *vereii*,” *PP* 49 (1989), 361-376; E. Isayev, *Inside Ancient Lucania* (2007), 132-133. The *ver sacrum* was similar in some ways, see O. de Czaranove, “Pre-Roman Italy,” in J. Rüpke, ed. *Companion to Roman Religion* (Malden, MA: 2007), 46-47, with bibliography and discussion. Indeed, Festus (150 L) says that the Mamertines stemmed from a *ver sacrum*.


39 Livy 2.10; Dion. Hal. 5.23-24.
Single combat was a well-established tradition in Italian warfare, providing a warrior
the chance to prove his prowess and gain prestige. The highest military award was the
spolia opima, won in single combat between two generals. Italian arms and armor
accentuated the importance of individual combat. Helmets left the ears and eyes
unobstructed while body armor was restricted to small heart protectors that allowed freedom
of movement. Helmets were embellished to ensure that the warrior stood out among his
peers. After all, why perform a heroic deed if no one notices? Weaponry reflected the
preferences of the individual, with archeological finds and artistic representations indicating
a great deal of variation.

An Italian man was a warrior who was expected to prove his prowess continuously.
While he might fight in an army among his fellow citizens, he did so as an individual. Men’s
social standing depended on their military accomplishments. Men like L. Siccius Dentatus
who fought in 120 battles, including eight victorious personal combats, and had forty-five
scars on his front (with none on his back), were to be admired. Horatius Cocles offers a
stark example. Despite the reputation he had achieved defending the bridge, a severe hip

40 For a list of formal duels involving the Romans, based on the ritual of a formal challenge and acceptance by
the participants outside of general combat, see S.P. Oakley, “Single combat in the Roman Republic,” CQ 35
(1985), 393-397. Many of those that the Romans fought in the period before the Punic Wars were Italians,
indicating a similar tradition among the other peoples of Italy as well.

41 For a general survey of the archeological remains of Central Italian arms and armor, see P. F. Starry, Zur

42 Italian weaponry included swords, spears, and axes, without any single type predominating. Many examples
of the Greek panoply have been found in Italy, primarily in Etruria, prompting many modern historians to
surmise that some Italian peoples fought in a phalanx formation, in general see P. F. Starry, “Foreign elements
Roman Army (Malden, MA: 2007b), 26-28. However, hoplite gear, adopted in the 7th century, served the same
ornamental function as early Villanovan type helmets, which were highly ornamental and likely not often used
in actual combat, N. Spivey and S. Stoddart, Etruscan Italy (London: 1990), 129-134. The individualistic
nature of Italian warfare and the highly aristocratic nature of Italian societies make it unlikely that a phalanx
would have been used, at least in the classical Greek sense.

43 Pliny Nat. 7.101-102.
wound left him lame and unable to fight, which ended any chance for him to gain future military commands or political offices.⁴⁴ He faded into obscurity, unable to do what was necessary to keep his name on the popular mind. While certainly more myth than reality, the tale of Horatius Cocles speaks to the Roman mindset, as well as being indicative of wider Italy.

By the 5th and 4th centuries some Italian communities began to exert greater control on the military activities of their members. Perhaps one of the most important events in early Roman warfare was the actions of the Fabii at the Cremera River in 479, which reveals a great deal about early Italian and Roman wars. The Romans were, at the time, at war with the nearby Etruscan city of Veii. Livy says that in that year the Veientes inflicted a heavy loss on one of the Roman consuls, and “from that time there was neither peace nor war with the Veientes; the matter had nearly fallen into a condition of banditry.”⁴⁵ As a result, the gens Fabia offered to take on the responsibility of the conflict privately, assembling 306 Fabii and several thousand dependents (cognati and sodales).⁴⁶ Two years later, the Fabii were ambushed and massacred, all but a single man, who would continue gens in Rome through a marriage to a Samnite family.⁴⁷ It is difficult to separate legend and reality concerning these events, in particular whether they should be taken as an example of gentilicial warfare outside of the control of the community or not.⁴⁸

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⁴⁴ Dion. Hal. 5.25.3.
⁴⁵ ex eo tempore neque pax neque bellum cum Veientibus fuit; res proxime formam latrocinii venerat, Livy 2.48.5.
⁴⁶ Livy 2.48.8-10; Dion. Hal. 9.15.
⁴⁷ See Chapter 2.3.
⁴⁸ The two positions are well summarized and argued on the one hand by J.-C.L. Richard, “Historiographie et histoire: l’expedition des Fabii à la Crémère,” Latomus 47 (1988), 526-553 and “Les Fabii à la Crémère,” in W.
The actions of the Fabii highlight the complexity of warfare at this time. Later Roman writers would differentiate between military actions by private groups (coniuratio) and militia legitima, but the distinction at this early date is unclear. The Fabii took the lead and acted as they saw fit. The language used to describe their actions, and the fact that they acted without any community oversight, is reminiscent of the warrior bands described above. However, they also first obtained the blessings of the Roman Senate and, if Dionysius is to be believed, during the two years of the operation Roman armies led by consuls may also have temporarily assisted the Fabii on two separate occasions. The intricacy of the situation, a blend of private and public actions, should be recognized. The same combination of formal and informal institutions was important in the use of allied manpower, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. It is also important to note that the actions of the Fabii at the Cremera River are unique in Roman history. Even when privati are to be found commanding Roman forces in later periods, they were granted military authority granted by the Roman community.

For other Italian peoples, actions similar to those of the Fabii continued much later. In 217, a man named Numerius Decimius led 8,500 men to aid a Roman army being hard pressed by Hannibal. According to Livy, he was able to do this because he “was foremost in

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Eder, ed. Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik (Stuttgart: 1990), 174-199, who argues that this was a private war of the gens Fabia; and on the other hand by K.-W. Welwei, “Gefolgschaft oder Gentilaufgebot? Zum Problem eines frürömischen familiare bellum,” Zeitschrift fur Savigny-Stiftung Rechtsgeschichte 110 (1993), 60-76.


50 Dion. Hal. 9.15.3, 16.3. Diodorus (11.53.6) says that the Fabii merely took heavy casualties as a result of a large battle that took place between the Romans and Veientes near the Cremera River.

51 See page 101-102.
family and wealth, not only in Bovianum, where he was from, but all of Samnium. .”

There is no mention of an institutional body to give its consent (akin to the Roman Senate), although perhaps one had done so in Bovianum; nor is there indication that this was anything but a local force led by an individual acting on his own. Indeed, he responded to a personal request for help from the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator as opposed to a request to Bovianum or the Pentri Samnites in general. Fabius had been forced to return briefly to Rome to attend to some religious rites, leaving his *magister equitum*, M. Minucius Rufus, in command of the army with explicit orders not to engage Hannibal. Minucius, however, immediately attacked and was in danger of defeat when Decimius arrived to save the day.

In his description of these events, Polybius makes no mention of Decimius or Samnites, but he does refer to an exaggerated version of the events at Gerunium, which may serve as the base of the more elaborate and exciting proceedings described in Livy’s narrative. Regardless of other exaggerations, it is unlikely that Livy, or his sources, would have invented the detail of a Samnite being responsible for Minucius’ victory (however large or small it may have been). The details preserved concerning Decimius and the origins of his men likewise suggest that this is not a fabrication. It is hardly surprising that Polybius does not mention it, given his propensity for failing to differentiate between Romans and the other Italians. Indeed, for Polybius the addition of Decimius would have only added what would have been in his eyes unnecessary details without really impacting the fact that Minucius did

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52 *principem genere ac divitiis non Boviani modo, unde erat, sed toto Samnio*, Livy 22.24.12.

53 In the Second Punic War, only the Pentri Samnites remained Roman allies, while the other tribes of Samnium joined Hannibal, Livy 22.61.11. It is interesting to note that the Fabii, after the disaster at the Cremera, married into a Samnite family, see Chapter 2.3.

not deserve the praise that he received for the ‘battle’ of Genusium.\textsuperscript{55} Decimius represents an independent military action taken by an individual similar in scale to that of the Fabii at the Cremera, and illustrates the continued traditions of warfare outside of the bounds of some Italian communities towards the end of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century.

The complexity of the relationship of individuals and communities is confirmed by a consideration of Italian mercenaries. Southern Italians (Oscans, Lucanians, and Bruttians) often served as mercenaries in the wars between the Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily as well as the Greeks in Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{56} Such groups were a natural extension of Italian warfare and warrior bands led by individuals with weak ties to specific communities. Without strong community bonds holding them back, the promise of adventure, wealth, and glory was likely irresistible to many. This lure is seemingly confirmed by the seizure and settlement of Sicilian cities by Oscan mercenaries, including the well-known Mamertines.\textsuperscript{57} Oscans were the most common mercenaries to be found perhaps due to their less-developed community structures. Well into the middle of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century, Carthage recruited Italian

\textsuperscript{55} See also the discussion of Polybius in Introduction.

\textsuperscript{56} Various Southern Italians took part in Athens’ Sicilian Expedition, Thuc. 7.57.11. Agathocles used Italians in his Syracusan armies, Diod. 19.106; 20.11; 21.3. Carthage’s Italian mercenaries in Sicily, Diod. 13.80.2; 14.95.1. Italians with the armies of Cleonymus, Diod. 20.104.2. Alexander of Epirus used Italians during his Italian campaign, Livy, 8.24.6. Pyrrhus likewise used Italians, Dion. Hal. 20.1.2-3, 2.3; Polyb. 18.28.10; Front. Strat. 2.3.21. When Pyrrhus invaded Sicily, the Carthaginians hired Italian mercenaries, Zon. 8.5. In general, see G. Tagliamonte, \textit{I Figli di Marte: Mobilità, Mercenari e Mercenariato Italici in Magna Graecia e Sicilia} (Rome: 1994).

\textsuperscript{57} In 404, a group of Campanian mercenaries had seized Entella in Sicily for themselves, Diod. 14.9.9. Agathocles seized Zancle using the Mamertines, who, after his death in 289, seized the city for themselves, Diod. 21.18; Dio fr. 40.8.
mercenary to fight in its armies.\textsuperscript{58} Such groups likely resembled that led by Numerius Decimius only a few years later.

Although Southern Italians were by far the most common mercenaries, they were not alone among the Italians. On a number of occasions, Etruscan mercenaries are to be found.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, according to Thucydides some Etruscans approached the Athenians with an offer of help.\textsuperscript{60} The Etruscans, like the Romans, did not lack for civic structures. Even more interestingly, a group of five hundred Romans is said to have served with a Carthaginian fleet in the war against Pyrrhus in the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} century.\textsuperscript{61} To be sure, the Romans (at least in later periods) would never have considered themselves mercenaries serving a foreign entity. In Polybius’ description of the treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians dated to around this time (279), he says that each side would come to the military aid of the other if attacked by Pyrrhus, Carthage was to provide the ships, and that either side would pay their own men.\textsuperscript{62} The Romans clearly envision their involvement as that of allies. But how would the Carthaginians have seen it? Certainly, the Carthaginians did not pay them (as the treaty stipulated), but these men still would have received a share in the booty from the campaign.

\textsuperscript{58} Some Italians took part in the general revolt of Carthage’s mercenaries in the Truceless War, Polyb. 1.69.4-5. In response, the Romans allowed the Carthaginians to recruit additional Italian mercenaries, App. Sic. 2.3. In general, see D. Hoyos, \textit{Truceless War} (Leiden: 2007).

\textsuperscript{59} Etruscan mercenaries during Sicilian Expedition, Thuc. 7.53.2; 7.57.11. With Agathocles, Diod. 20.61.6; 21.3.

\textsuperscript{60} Thuc. 6.88.6.

\textsuperscript{61} Diod. 22.7.5.

\textsuperscript{62} Polyb. 3.25.
Although it is speculation, it is entirely possible that the Carthaginians would have characterized these Romans as mercenaries.63

It is difficult to separate mercenaries from the allies who played a significant role in the traditions of military cooperation in Italy. In 327, the Romans and Samnites came into conflict over the Greek city of Neapolis, with both sides doing their best to retain (in the case of the Samnites) or gain (in the case of the Romans) them as allies. These events are described in detail in a fragment of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ history, likely drawing from a (perhaps local) Greek source.64 Livy’s own account is somewhat confused and does not preserve details concerning the nature of military cooperation.65 Dionysius, in fact, includes revealing information on the military assistance rendered by the Samnites to the Neapolitans. In response to Roman attempts to break the relationships of Neapolitan elites with Samnite elites and to replace them with their own, a force of Samnites arrived to garrison the city. In response, the Romans claimed betrayal by the Samnites (who formed a κοινόν according to Dionysius). The Samnite reply was to differentiate the military actions of their community from the those involved in Neapolis, claiming that they were “some individuals with private ties of friendship (ιδιόζευγια). . . and friends of the Neapolitans who are helping that city by their own choice, as well as some mercenaries who lack livelihoods.”66

63 Zonaras (8.5) does say that the Carthaginians recruited Italian mercenaries when Pyrrhus invaded Sicily, to when the 500 Romans may be connected. One enterprising Roman even found his way to Ptolemaic Egypt sometime in the mid-3rd century as a military settler, G. T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge: 1935), 243. As Griffith notes, this example is unique.

64 Dion. Hal. 15.5-8. See Introduction for a discussion of possible sources.


66 ιδιόζευγια δὲ τινὲς εἶσιν, ὡς πυθαγόμεθα, καὶ φίλοι τῶν Νεαπολίτων οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν προσάρθειν τῇ πόλει βοηθοῦντες καὶ τινὲς καὶ δι᾽ ἀπορίαν ἴσος βίου μεσθοφόροι, Dion. Hal. 15.8.4.
Militarily, these were armed men that were acting without the official support of the community but of their own accord.\textsuperscript{67} The ambiguity of their status is enlightening. Dionysius’ description evokes the image of warrior bands that were coming to the military assistance of personal friends and allies. At the same time, he labels them as mercenaries. In Italian warfare, the difference between allies and mercenaries is not clear-cut. The Samnites at Neapolis were supposedly acting without official sanction (although Dionysius may be overestimating Samnite political organization and underestimating the formal bonds that existed), akin to the groups that served as mercenaries in Sicily. However, Italian allies did not always represent their communities. Something similar occurred among the Etruscans in 397. According to Livy, the Etruscans had met at the shrine of Voltumna to decide whether or not to send assistance to Veii, which was under siege by the Romans at the time. Due to disagreements and potential hostilities from the Gauls, no official military aid was sent. Instead, the Etruscans decided that young men with personal ties to the Veientes could lend their assistance as they chose without any official support or condemnation from their home cities.\textsuperscript{68} The same may have been the case when, in 306, a number of Hernici, who were longtime Roman allies, were found among the captives of a defeated Samnite army.\textsuperscript{69} Warfare and military cooperation were not limited to the official actions of communities, but took place on more individual levels.

Italian warfare was a complicated affair. Wars were waged by individuals, small groups, and communities depending on a great many factors. Allied military cooperation, which was so central to Italian warfare, cannot be easily categorized. At the same time, there

\textsuperscript{67} The political implications of the Neapolitan Affair will be discussed in Chapter 2.2.c.

\textsuperscript{68} Livy 5.17.9.

\textsuperscript{69} Livy 9.42.7-11.
was great variation in the levels of community organization over time. Nevertheless, the same general principles existed in all Italian communities of a complex relationship of individuals and their communities; it was only the relative balance that was different. Roman elites may not have had active warrior bands in the late 4th century, but they did have groups of followers linked to them through social ties. At the same time, Italians shared a similar culture of military glory and aristocracy. The larger military and political environment in which Rome existed and excelled must be considered in order to fully understand the development of Roman armies, their use of allies, and how those relationships changed as the Romans gained an empire.

3. An Italian Army on Campaign

An Italian army on campaign was not a cohesive entity with well-defined organization, but reflected the looseness of warfare in the peninsula. To be certain, some communities and peoples were more organized than others but not to such a degree that their army was unrecognizably Italian. Roman armies appear little different from those of other Italian peoples. Logistical systems remained poorly developed, although the use of alliance systems allowed large armies to be assembled and operated. Likewise, battlefield tactics were literally straightforward with few examples of attempted maneuver. As such, emphasis was placed on gathering more men than an opponent and doggedly using them to press forward. Command and control was minimal in these armies, which made maneuvering difficult but facilitated adaptability. Thus, when the Romans and their Italian allies came up against Pyrrhus, they were outmaneuvered but were able to adapt, inflicting significant losses.
a. THE SIZE OF ARMIES AND LOGISTICS

The peoples of Italy regularly fielded armies of impressive size without the existence of sophisticated logistical systems. The size of Italian armies in the period before the Punic Wars is difficult to determine in detail, but at times they were unquestionably of significant size. From 296 to 295 during the campaigns and battles around Sentinum, well over 100,000 Italians were under arms, representing nearly all of the peoples of Central Italy. At the battle of Sentinum itself, the two Roman consular armies were said to be each accompanied by 12,000 and 15,000 unspecified allies respectively, which would have been a total of roughly 35,000 to 40,000 men. A similar number of allies likely accompanied the armies that faced Pyrrhus. Two consular armies, each accompanied by large numbers of allies, were raised each year of the Pyrrhic War. Certainly the number of men raised for Sentinum, and likely against Pyrrhus, represented the largest armies at this time. However, the Romans were able to field roughly 20,000 men (two consular armies) annually from their own citizenry in the late 4th century onwards. Other Italian peoples were able to field armies of similar size and over similar periods, although specific numbers are rarely preserved. While the exact numbers given for non-Roman armies are of very questionable reliability due to Roman bias, logic suggests similar sized forces compared to the Romans, who, after all, were not able to

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71 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20.1.8) provides specific numbers for the battle of Ausculum, saying that 50,000 allies accompanied 20,000 Romans (four legions), which is undoubtedly an exaggeration. He made use of Pyrrhus’ own memoirs (Dion. Hal. 20.10.2), which would have embellished the number of Italians that the king faced. More than likely the ratio was closer to that at Sentinum.

72 The Samnite Linen Legion was supposedly a very mathematically derived 16,000 men, accompanied by an additional 20,000 men, Livy 10.38. The Tarentines promised Pyrrhus the spectacular figure of 350,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry from Lucania, Messapia, Samnium, and Tarentum, Plut. Pyrr. 13.5.6. Other armies of similar size are also indicated (sometimes by the number of casualties suffered). Also see the discussion of Polybius’ numbers regarding the Telamon Campaign in 225 in Chapter 4.2.
simply roll over any opposition from other Italians. They often suffered defeats during this period. In addition, many smaller wars took place simultaneously in different regions of Italy, most of which were not considered worth recording by Roman writers. While the exact numbers of men under arms varied from year to year, depending on the circumstances that individual communities faced, impressive numbers of men were regularly under arms in the peninsula. Sometimes these men were combined to form armies of spectacular size.

The numbers of Italians regularly under arms represents an important part of warfare, the need for large numbers. If one community raised 40,000 men, other communities had to respond with similar numbers or face defeat. Rome itself boasted a very large unified citizenry (continually being expanded through extensions of citizenship, colonies, and land seizures at this time) able to rival any other single community, making its people a serious threat. Allies were therefore of vital importance in bolstering armies. For example, when the Priventines began a war with the Romans they relied on the support of the nearby people of Fundi. However, the same principles held true for the Romans as well, who likewise employed large numbers of allies. In 296/5, Gellius Egnatius put together a coalition of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls to face the Romans and their allies. The combined forces of these four peoples would have outnumbered even the large Roman population, and in this campaign large numbers of allies were raised by the Romans. Raising large numbers of men proved an important part of Italian warfare. To secure allies who could augment local forces proved an invaluable component of success (or survival) for any Italian people. The propensity for military cooperation among the Italians virtually guaranteed that any serious campaign involved large numbers of men, whether or not it was

73 Livy 8.19.4-21.10.
led by the Romans. Yet, as Italian armies grew in size, a fundamental problem arose in the need to supply such numbers.

Napoleon’s dictum that an army travels on its stomach holds true regardless of time or place. Italian armies consisting of tens of thousands of men would have required huge amounts of supplies, especially foodstuffs. Forty thousand men would have required roughly 60 tons of grain every day, not including any other supplies that were needed.\(^{74}\) At Sentinum, there are upwards of 100,000 men operating in the Abruzzo and Southern Umbria over the course of two years. Even during shorter and smaller campaigns, logistical supply was an important concern for Italian armies. Consequently, alliance systems played an important role in supplying these large armies.

There are several means for armies to procure supplies. In general, they can bring with them about 2 weeks’ worth of food, which could be supplemented with local plunder, but there were limits on the effectiveness of acting so haphazardly.\(^{75}\) Rather, campaigning Italian forces relied heavily on nearby allies to provide supplementary supplies. More than likely, military support by allied communities included supplies as well as men.\(^{76}\) Such support need not have been a formal requirement. We are told that Hiero of Syracuse and Masinissa of Numidia often voluntarily offered grain to the Romans.\(^{77}\) Indeed, both these rulers took it upon themselves to transport their grain to where it was needed. For smaller allies, providing supplies was a small price to pay to ensure that an allied army of sufficient

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\(^{75}\) Erdkamp (1998), 20, 122-140.

\(^{76}\) In 310, Camerinum promised men and supplies for nearby Roman armies, Livy 8.25.3; 9.36. The Roman alliances with the Lucanians and Apulians in 326 may have been similar, although supplies are not explicitly mentioned, Livy 8.25.3.

\(^{77}\) Hiero, Livy 21.50.7-11; 22.37; 23.21.1-6, 38.12-13. Masinissa, Livy 31.19.3-4; 32.27.2; 36.36.4.5-9; 42.29; 43.6.11-12.
size could campaign nearby when needed for local defense. At the same time, large armies could bully any reluctant communities. Allied communities likely served as supply depots for large forces, gathering supplies from the surrounding area and then sending it to nearby armies.⁷⁸ Word could be sent ahead by generals to allies in order to arrange support.⁷⁹ Again, these need not be orders; it would in any case have been in the best interests of local people to help armies avoid the need to plunder their land, which would have disrupted local food supplies as well as slowing down the armies.

Italian armies relied on their allies to furnish supplies and thus support a campaign.⁸⁰ It was an important task of Italian generals to arrange logistical support. It would seem that the general took care to arrange supplies for any allied forces that accompanied him, especially the further from their homes the campaign took them.⁸¹ Control of a large network of allies, and thus supplies, reinforced the preeminence of the most powerful peoples in Italy. Rome’s allies relied on them to provide supplies via their alliance network.⁸² Later, after the battle of Cannae in 216, Q. Fabius Maximus, as described by Livy, remarked that “everywhere around us is full of citizens and allies; they are helping us with arms, men,


⁷⁹ During the Second Punic War, Roman generals ordered supplies readied along their route of march through Italy, Livy 26.8.10-11; 27.43.10.

⁸⁰ The Sutrini brought provisions to the Roman camp as they approached, Livy 9.32. A Samnite force were supported by nearby Aequi in 304 (and likely the Hernici a few years earlier), Livy 9.45.5. Gellius Egnatius must have relied on local allied support during the Sentinum campaign in order to support the large numbers of men he was gathering. Roman operations in Sicily during the First Punic War were supported by locals, Polyb. 1.52.4-8. During the Second Punic War, Roman generals sent word ahead to ensure that supplies were readied along their route of march through Italy, Livy 26.8.10-11; 27.43.10. Roman and Carthaginian campaigns in Cisalpine Gaul relied on local support, Livy 21.25.14; Polyb. 3.66.7, 68.8.

⁸¹ Amongst Scipio’s demands for peace with Carthage were grain and pay for his allies, Livy 30.37.5; Polyb. 18.6.

⁸² According to Polybius (6.39.13-15), allies received the same allowance of grain as the Romans as a free gift.
horses, and supplies, and will continue helping us,” a sentiment echoed by Polybius. The same principle held true for Italy in general before the Punic Wars. A vital component of Italian campaigns was reliance on the support of nearby allies. By relying on friendly support, Italian armies could supplement the supplies they carried or pillaged. As Roman armies ranged further from home in the 4th century, it became normal practice for Roman generals to demand indemnities in the form of supplies (in addition to plunder) for their armies. Gellius Egnatius at Sentinum no doubt spent as much time arranging logistical support from nearby allies to support his massive army as actually gathering men to fight.

The Italians were able to field armies of impressive size and keep them supplied through their alliance networks. Italian armies relied on local allies to function as a dispersed logistical network. An extensive alliance system was vital to these armies not only as a source of additional fighting men, but also for this logistical support. For a community, such support lent added importance to maintaining a large and stable network of allies, especially the further from home an army ventured. Supplying armies was a difficult undertaking, made even more impressive by the lack of state institutions dedicated to the task. Alliances were a central component of the logistics of any Italian army, allowing Italians to field huge armies without large logistic networks of their own.

b. BATTLES IN LIVY’S NARRATIVE

Livy provides the most detailed and comprehensive narrative of the period from 343 to 293, describing many Roman campaigns and battles that shed light on the nature of

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83 omnia circa plena civium ac sociorum sunt; armis viris equis commeatibus iuvant iuvabuntque, Livy 22.39.11, cf. 16.4. Polyb. 4.89.9.

84 Cornell (1995), 188.

85 He was off foraging when his army was raided by the Romans in 296, Livy 10.19.14.
combat during this period. Naturally, most evidence is Roman and concerning Roman armies, but some detail survives regarding non-Roman Italian armies. What is revealed is a military system that emphasized numbers in order to create a massive forward crush of individual combatants. Command and control appears minimal, often taking the form of ordering the next line of men forward. Instead, there was a great deal of flexibility and adaptability by individuals and small units.

Armies in Italy were often annual in nature.\textsuperscript{86} To be sure, it was not abnormal for them to last into the fall agricultural season.\textsuperscript{87} For exceptional campaigns, such as those of the Romans and Gellius Egnatius at Sentinum, armies could remain in the field longer than a single campaigning season. However, the example of a Roman army being ordered to winter at Saepinum in 280 as a punishment for being defeated by Pyrrhus indicates that longer campaigns were not the norm at this time.\textsuperscript{88} Such forces were impermanent in nature. There was a constant cycle of armies that generally followed an annual pattern. Even so, the constant nature of warfare meant that individuals would have had a great deal of contact with a wide range of other individuals over the course of several campaigns.

In general, battlefield tactics of Italian armies were minimal, consisting only of a forward onslaught. At the battle of Veseris in 340 (near Mt. Vesuvius), the Romans and Latins fought a large battle that highlights the grinding of such tactics.\textsuperscript{89} The battle apparently consisted of a simple movement forward with no attempts at outflanking or other such maneuvers. In order to increase the chance at success, both armies kept significant


\textsuperscript{87} N. Rosenstein, \textit{Rome at War} (Chapel Hill: 2004), 26-62.

\textsuperscript{88} Front. \textit{Strat.} 4.1.24.

\textsuperscript{89} Livy 8.9-10; Oakley (1997-2005), 2:477-505.
numbers of men in reserve to be fed into the battle as needed. Thus arose the phrase “it has come to the *triarii*” for when a battle was difficult (and perhaps desperate) and the final line of men had to be committed. Indeed, against the Latins the battle was won by the Romans because the Latins had committed their *triarii* too soon. Consequently, they were exhausted when the Roman *triarii* attacked. Of course accounts of the battle of Veseris owe a great deal to later Roman elaboration, which calls into question their specific reliability. However, when compared to other battles of the period, Livy’s general description of a drawn out head-to-head clash is consistent with his other descriptions of battles.

In 293 the Romans and Samnites clashed in a battle near the town of Aquilona.\(^90\) (The Samnite army was the spectacular Linen Legion, which had taken oaths to win or die and was armed in gold and silver.) The Roman consul, L. Papirius Cursor, devised a clever stratagem to frighten the Samnites.\(^91\) One of his subordinates was ordered to take three cohorts of allies along with the army’s mules and stir up dust on the flank of the battle, thus appearing to be the army of the other consul coming to help. However, there is no indication that these infantry cohorts actually took part in the battle by driving into the Samnite flank. The dedication to a forward drive is further indicated by how Papirius used his cavalry. Instead of placing them on the flanks and trying to encircle the Samnites, he used them in the same manner as his infantry. At the height of the battle, the Roman cavalry drove forward through gaps in the Roman infantry straight into the Samnite front lines. As with the battle of Veseris, the battle plan was a forward assault. The only question of tactics was committing reserve forces. The battle of Sentinum a few years earlier in 295 was apparently fought along the same lines between the Romans and their allies on one side and the

\(^90\) Livy 10.39-41.

\(^91\) *MRR*, 1:180. For the reputation of Papirius Cursor, see Chapter 2.3.
Samnites and Gauls on the other. This battle, once more, played out as a forward push by both sides. Although a unit of cavalry was sent on an outflanking maneuver, it was a reckless charge into the front lines of the Gauls by the Roman consul P. Decius Mus who had dedicated himself to the gods and was sacrificing himself for victory that supposedly turned the tide of the battle. The tactics of Italian armies were relatively simple, consisting of management of reserve forces.

The role of Italian generals was to manage the deployment of reserve forces into combat. However, a general also often showed himself in the front lines as encouragement to his men and even engaged in personal combat, sometimes resulting in death. Such actions (especially being killed) would have hampered the general’s ability to manage his army. Papirius at Aquilonia serves as a good model. Before the battle, he and his consilium formulated a battle-plan, assigning the tasks of his subordinates in the coming fight. In the course of the battle, it was the job of those subordinates to see their tasks completed. Papirius himself encouraged his men near the front lines where the fighting was heaviest. Such a position would have made it difficult to give orders to his men. To be sure, many generals who were said to be in the front lines were not quite so far forward. Papirius himself was able to signal the cavalry charge through the infantry with a raised spear, suggesting he was not engaged in actual combat at that point where such an action was ambiguous. However, many Italian generals did fight personally in order to raise their reputations.

92 The cavalry movement, Livy 10.29.12. For the ancient sources on Decius’ devotio, see MRR, 1:177. For a discussion and modern bibliography, see Oakley (1997-2005), 4:290-291.

93 Livy 10.40.6-8.
While the general played an important role, Italian armies were capable of fighting without him. It was not unheard of for generals to engage in duels, sometimes resulting in their deaths. Neither was the *devotio* of Decius at Sentinum a unique occurrence. In the same year as the battle of Sentinum, the Romans captured the Samnite general Staius Minatius in the midst of a small battle.\(^4\) Often when an Italian general fell (or was captured), it had little impact on the battle save for morale. In the case of the armies of Decius and Minatius, the loss of the general inspired a renewed effort by their men. Italian armies were often, though not always, capable of operating without their generals. The men of these armies could react to their circumstances without the immediate oversight of a commanding officer. Certainly, the loss of the general was detrimental, but it was not necessarily catastrophic.

c. PYRRHUS: THE BATTLES OF HERACLEA AND AUSCULUM

Although the sources are far from ideal, the battles fought between the Italians led by the Romans and Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, showcase the nature of Italian warfare in opposition to the Hellenistic tradition. What makes these accounts of particular use is that both Dionysius of Halicarnassus (whose descriptions survive in fragments) and Plutarch relied in part of Pyrrhus’ own memoirs. Unlike the earlier portions of Dionysius’ history, his surviving descriptions of the Pyrrhic War seem based in reality. Pyrrhus was rated perhaps the greatest general of the Diadochi by ancient writers and was consistently considered among the best of the ancient world.\(^5\) In his first two battles against Roman-led Italian armies, Pyrrhus outmaneuvered his opponents but failed to deal a decisive blow. The

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\(^4\) Livy 10.20.1-16.

\(^5\) Plut. *Pyrr.* 8.2, 26.1; *Flam.* 8.2; 21.3-4; Dion. Hal. 20.10.1; App. *Syr.* 10.
Italians, on the other hand, tried to fight a head-to-head battle. Even when Pyrrhus got the better of the Italians, their flexibility and adaptability proved sufficient to prevent a complete disaster while inflicting heavy losses on Pyrrhus’ forces.

In both battles against Pyrrhus, the Italians, led by Roman generals, resorted to the simple tactic of marching directly against their opponent in a head-to-head fight. Pyrrhus roamed the battlefields sending in reinforcements, ordering maneuvers, and inspiring his men as needed. 96 There was no such activity in the Italian army by the Roman generals, although they too were likely near the front giving encouragements as Papirius Cursor had at Aquilonia. Indeed, the actions of a Frentani cavalry commander at Heraclea are telling of the nature of command and control in these armies. This man, Oblacus Volsinius, roamed the battlefield like Pyrrhus, but instead of coordinating men he sought out the Epirote king to engage personally. 97 He sought personal combat and the prestige he would gain in killing such an opponent. At the same time, there is no indication that the Roman general was in any way controlling Volsinius’ movement or that it was detrimental to the army as a whole to have a unit of cavalry freely ranging the field. Instead, Volsinius, most likely accompanied by his fellow Frentani, moved around the battle as he saw fit, reacting to whatever was their immediate situation. Volsinius found and charged Pyrrhus, only to be killed by the king’s hetairoi. While the tale of Volsinius may be exaggerated in its details, it seems to accurately reflect the importance of individuals and their bands of followers known from this period of Italian warfare, and thus likely reflects reality.

96 Dion. Hal. 19.12.1; Plut. Pyrr. 16.7-8, 17.1.

97 Dion. Hal. 19.12; Plut. Pyrr. 26.8-10. Volsinius’ name indicates that either he or his family had their origins in Etruscan Volsinii.
At Ausculum a similar flexibility was exhibited. The fourth Roman legion routed the portion of Pyrrhus’ army directly in front of them (which was composed of Bruttians, Lucanians, and Tarentines) and gave chase. Every indication is that this and subsequent actions were taken without the involvement of the Roman general or his subordinates. Upon seeing part of his army breaking, Pyrrhus ordered his elephants and cavalry to lend support to his fleeing allies and to catch the enemy troops in disarray, thus managing the situation. The fourth Roman legion, having seen the closing cavalry, reformed and occupied a nearby hill where they defended themselves. Like Volsinius in the previous battle, this group of Italians reacted and adapted to the situation on their own without any control (or contact) from the general. The Roman military oath involved swearing to stay in position “except to recover or fetch a weapon, save a friend or strike an enemy,” suggesting there was a great deal of freedom of movement despite an emphasis on group cohesion. Indeed, the cavalry engagement at Ausculum highlights the difference in tactics of the two armies. Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the Romans cavalry as straightforward, while the Greek cavalry tried to constantly outflank and outmaneuver them. As the Greek cavalry sought to outflank, the cavalry of the Romans and their allies reacted and engaged as if they were infantry. Dionysius says that the infantry engagement was similar. Pyrrhus’ army fought a battle of maneuver, which required careful coordination by the king, while the Roman-led Italian army did not. Instead, they fought in a head-to-head manner, ultimately inflicting significant losses on Pyrrhus’ army despite losing these battles.

98 Dion. Hal. 20.3. However, when describing the initial deployment of the Roman army (20.1.4) Dionysius indicates that it was the third legion that lined up against the Lucanians and Bruttians. The discrepancy may be due to textual corruption introduced by the copyist or a simple mistake by the author. Either way, it has little impact on the narrative.

99 Livy 22.38.2-5; Rawlings (2007b), 57.

100 Dion. Hal. 20.2.1.
The Roman generals who fought Pyrrhus were active, but not in the same manner as the king. At Heraclea and Ausculum, the Roman generals filled a similar role as others had in earlier battles, which is to say that they decided when to commit reserve forces into the front lines. When Pyrrhus sent elephants into the battle at Ausculum, it was likely one of the Roman generals who ordered wagons designed to counter them forward.\footnote{Dion. Hal. 20.2.4-5. The wagons are mentioned as deployed on the wings of the army (20.1.6-7), although it seems more likely that they were to the rear of the infantry where they could perhaps be sent forward through gaps in the infantry like the cavalry at the battle of Aquilonia, see above. This was a double consular army commanded by P. Sulpicius Saverrio and P. Decius Mus, \textit{MRR}, 1:192.} A force of cavalry was also sent to relieve the fourth legion that had pursued its broken opponents.\footnote{Dion. Hal. 20.3.6.} In addition, the gap in the line of battle left by the legion would have had to be filled by reserve forces. Such actions are consistent with the more limited role of Italian generals, compared to their Hellenistic counterparts, in the actual battle discussed above. Indeed, one of the generals at Ausculum, P. Decius Mus, intended to perform a \textit{devotio} like his father had at Sentinum, but was thwarted by Pyrrhus.\footnote{Dio fr. 40.43; Zon. 8.5.} Little direct tactical control was required. While the Roman generals performed their roles, sub-commanders and units were able to react and adapt to their own immediate situation without direct oversight. Pyrrhus, on the other hand, managed his forces directly and attempted a variety of actions, such as elephant charges and cavalry flanking maneuvers, in order to break his opponents’ line.

The Roman-led Italian armies at Heraclea and Ausculum were relatively simple in their overall tactics but they were also adaptable. The sophisticated command structure of Pyrrhus’ army allowed him to easily outmaneuver the Italians through outflanking movements. However, at Heraclea and Ausculum, the successful outflanking did not result in the immediate collapse of the Italian line. Instead, they stood their ground and inflicted
Such adaptability was necessitated, to some degree, by the limited nature of the command system. The sub-units of the army, such as the cavalry under Volsinius at Heraclea and the fourth legion at Ausculum, could react and adapt to changing circumstances, even as the general sent in reinforcements as needed into the front lines. The king of Epirus could outmaneuver Italian armies, but he was unprepared to overcome the strengths of Italian warfare. What’s more, Pyrrhus faced an Italian military system that could put huge numbers of men into the field over long durations of time. As Pyrrhus himself remarked, “If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.”

The reaction by the Romans after both losses at Heraclea and Ausculum, was to put more men into the field. Pyrrhus could call upon his own Italian allies, but these were far fewer than the network of the Romans by this time. At the same time, Pyrrhus found it difficult to replace the men that he had brought from Epirus, many of whom were mercenaries. The Italians were a many-headed Hydra able to absorb losses and continue to fight. At the same time, Italian armies could utilize their allies as a supply network, providing a great deal of strategic flexibility. It need be no surprise that, after the battles of Heraclea and Ausculum, Pyrrhus decided the best course of action was to campaign in Sicily and leave the Romans for another day.

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105 ἂν ἔτι μίαν μάχην Ῥωμαίους νικήσωμεν, ἀπολούμεθα παντελῶς,’ Plut. Pyrr. 21.9.

106 Pyrrhus likely could call on Bruttians, Lucanians, Messapians, Italiote Greeks, and Samnites (though perhaps not the northern Pentri), Plut. Pyrr. 13.5.6; Dion. Hal. 20.1.3. At Ausculum, the Italian army consisted of the Romans, Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Paeligni, Ferentani, and other subjects, Dion. Hal. 20.1.5. Campanians allied with the Romans occupied Rhegium, Polyb. 1.7; Dion. Hal. 20.4; Livy, Per. 12; Diod. 22.1.3.
Military cooperation was a central component of warfare in Italy. The Romans were only one of many Italian peoples who regularly used allied forces to bolster their own men. At the same time, cooperation involved the interaction of communities and peoples on a variety of levels from individuals to communities. Roman armies, based on Italian military traditions, were flexible and could draw on a huge pool of manpower. When the Romans began to expand outside of Italy, other peoples found it immensely difficult to overcome these strengths. The nature of Italian warfare reflects a complex pattern that defies easy categorization. As a result, it is necessary to reevaluate the means of community interaction and from there the impact of the rise of Rome to hegemon. Subsequent chapters will take up the questions raised here: the nature of Italian community relations, army organization, command structure and units, recruitment of allies and the idea of military obligation, how the Romans came to use non-Italians alongside their Italian allies, as well as the impact of empire on the military and political relationship of the Romans and their Italian allies.
The political relationships of the peoples of Italy, like their military interaction, were a complicated affair. Indeed, alliances between communities were often unstable and fluid in nature. A blend of formal and informal institutions existed that created overlapping and sometimes contradictory networks of relations. It was not merely connections at the community level that influenced how they interacted, but also the personal relationships of individuals. The Romans were able to succeed in building an alliance network that included all of Italy by working within this system. As Roman power grew, they sought ways to create stronger bonds, resulting in a number of experiments such as colonies and *civitas sine suffragio*. Community political and military interactions were complicated and closely related, with both sharing a great deal of similarity as war and politics were, for the most part, inseparable.

1. The Instability of Community Relations

The peoples and communities of Italy were tied together in a complex web of relationships. However, before considering the details of those relations it is important to look at the general trends of community interaction. Doing so illustrates the environment in
which the peoples of Italy existed and operated. In fact, the interactions of communities were quite fluid without any long-term stability. Alliances did not necessarily ensure cooperation or prevent hostility.

The events in Central Italy from 343 to 338 a mere five years that encompassed the First Samnite War and the Great Latin War are a particularly telling example of the fluid nature of alliances.\(^1\) Around the year 343, the Samnites launched attacks on the Sidicini (a people on the northern edge of Campania), who in turn called upon their Campanian allies for help. The Campanians responded by sending an army, which was routed by the Samnites, followed by a Samnite assault on Capua itself. Now it was the Campanians turn to call for help. They sent messengers to the Romans, with whom they had no previous relationship, and, after some difficulties, obtained a promise of aid against the Samnites. The Romans had been reluctant to agree to help the Campanians due to the fact that they had an alliance already with the Samnites.\(^2\) In the end, the Romans abandoned their prior commitment in favor of the Campanians. The Romans brought their own Latin allies into the fight, creating an impressive alliance system against the Samnites. After three years of fighting, peace was concluded between the Romans and Samnites to the dismay of Rome’s allies. As a result, the Latins, Campanians, Sidicini, and Volsci continued the war against the

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\(^1\) Livy 7.32-8.14. A great many difficulties arise in the specific details of these wars, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:307-311 with bibliography. While battles and events may have been greatly exaggerated, the general outline of the changes in alliances seems reliable and is a logical precursor for later events. It is unlikely that the lack of any mention of the First Samnite War by Diodorus indicates anything specific. He does not mention anything of the Samnite Wars until 318, thus leaving out the well-documented disaster at the Caudine Forks, while Dionysius of Halicarnassus (15.3) and Appian (\textit{Samn.} 1) both describe the mutiny that took place in the winter of 343/2 during the war with the Samnites.

\(^2\) The Romans and Samnites formed an alliance in 353, Livy 7.19.4. Salmon ([1967], 187-195) argues that the treaty established the Liris River as the boundary between the two, or rather defined the spheres of influence of each. However, such a clause is unprecedented and presupposes the long war between the two sides.
Samnites without Roman involvement.\(^3\) (Supposedly, these allies were also planning to attack the Romans after the Samnites had been beaten.) The Samnites then informed the Romans that they needed to control their allies. Despite an ambiguous reply, the Romans mobilized their own army to oppose their wayward allies. This force was joined by a Samnite army, with whom they had been at war only a year prior. Together the Romans and Samnites defeated the forces of the Romans’ former allies.\(^4\) Suffering defeat, the Sidicini became Samnite allies while the Campanians became Roman allies with \textit{civitas sine suffragio}.\(^5\) Two more years were spent by the Romans putting down the Latins, who were then largely incorporated into the Roman citizen body.

It is hard not to be impressed by the ease with which the Italians of the Central Apennines created and abandoned their alliances. Perhaps more surprising is their willingness to abandon past alliances in favor of those that seemed immediately profitable even when such actions meant war with former allies. At the same time, there seem to have been few qualms about joining forces with former enemies to fight former allies. Within a few years of the end of the events described above, the Sidicini relied on the threat of action by their new Samnite allies to prevent Roman retaliation when they raided Roman allies.\(^6\)

The events of these years are hardly unique.

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\(^3\) The Latins, Campanians, and Sidicini were the major driving forces, but the Latins called for Volscian aid after the battle of Veseris (Livy 8.11.8-9), suggesting that at least some of the Volsci were involved. In addition, several Volscian communities were subject to the settlement that followed the war.

\(^4\) Livy 8.8.19-11.2. Livy says that some of his sources claimed that the Samnites waited until the battle was won before engaging (supported by Dion. Hal. 15.7.3). Despite attempts by some Roman historians to downplay Samnite assistance, Livy nonetheless gives them credit for contributing to the victory, which is likely accurate.

\(^5\) See below for a discussion of this status.

\(^6\) Livy 8.15-16.
Fluid alliances were common in Italy. The Paeligni, an Abruzzo tribe, were Samnite allies in 308, Roman allies in 304, and proceeded to butcher Samnite survivors of the battle of Sentinum fleeing across their territory in 295. The Paeligni went on to become a common element in Roman armies. The Lucanians were particularly quick to change their alliances, constantly alternating between the Italiote Greeks (primarily the Tarentines), Sicilian Greeks (under the Dionysii), Samnites, Romans, and Bruttians in the 4th and early 3rd centuries. They showed little concern for maintaining their alliances over long periods of time. After 272, the Lucanians seem to have remained Roman allies until the Second Punic War, when they again changed sides on a number of occasions between the Romans and Hannibal. It was exceedingly difficult to create lasting alliances in Italy during this period.

The Romans were hardly immune to the instability of Italian alliances even after the settlements of the Great Latin War in 338. In the second war between the Romans and Samnites, the Romans suffered two major defeats at the Caudine Forks (in 321) and at Lautulae (in 315). The Romans managed to extract their army with minimal casualties

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7 Livy 9.41.4, 45.18; 10.30.3.
8 Most famously at the battle of Pydna in 168, Livy 44.40-41; Plut. Aem. 20; Front. Strat. 2.8.5. Also, Livy 25.14.3-6; 28.45.13-21; Dion. Hal. 20.1.5; Sal. Jug. 105.1-2.
9 The Lucanians fought against the Italiote Greeks with Dionysius I in the early 4th century, Diod. 14.100-103. They fought against his heir Dionysius II, Diod. 16.5. In 326 they established relations with the Romans, which were immediately abandoned thanks to Tarentine manipulation, Livy 8.25.3, 27. Sometime afterwards, the Lucanians returned to their Roman allies; in 299 the Samnites unsuccessfully tried to garner support from them, Livy 10.11.11. After 293, when Livy’s narrative is lost, specific information is nearly nonexistent. However, from 282 to 272, eight triumphs by Roman generals are recorded over the Lucanians in the fasti triumphales, often in conjunction with the Samnites, Tarentines, and Bruttians. Lucanian forces joined Pyrrhus for the battle of Ausculum in 279, Dion. Hal. 20.1.
10 The major narrative of the defeat at the Caudine Forks is found in Livy (9.1-16) although several other shorter accounts and references survive, Oakley (1997-2005), 3:3-38. Livy (9.23) claims that the battle of Lautulae was interrupted by darkness (a common motif, Oakley [1997-2005], 2:330-331), but ultimately he claims it was a Roman victory. However, he mentions there were other accounts that said the battle was a grievous loss, which is reinforced by Diodorus (19.72.7-8). Strabo (5.3.5) records that the Samnites at one point raided the land of Ardea in Latium, which may be linked to the aftermath of Lautulae, Salmon (1967), 235. The fact of a Roman loss is reinforced by the subsequent defection of Rome’s allies, Livy 9.25-26; Diod. 19.76.
from the Caudine Forks, suffering only a loss in prestige, but at Lautulae they suffered severe losses. As a result, many of the nearby Roman allies, including the Ausones, Volscians, and Campanians renounced or considered renouncing their Roman alliances. (Even Luceria in Apulia killed a Roman garrison stationed there.) These regions had been subject to Samnite political and military pressure for some time. Later, in 306, some Hernici, who had been steady Roman allies for nearly two centuries, were found in a Samnite army.¹¹ These events cannot really be considered surprising. It had not been unusual for the Romans to fight their Latin allies prior to their incorporation in 338. In fact, the Romans faced ‘revolt’ from nearly all of their Italian allies at one point or another. What later Roman historians termed revolt was hardly abnormal of early Italian communities, but reflects later Roman attitudes on the place of allies. After all, it would be odd to think of the Marsic alliance with the Romans in 304 as a revolt from the Samnites.¹² All Italian alliances were unstable and subject to abandonment without warning, including those that involved the Romans.

Military cooperation was an integral part of Italian warfare, but, at the same time, alliances were unstable. Battles required large numbers of men and if a community attempted to act alone, even the demographically superior Romans, they could be overwhelmed by hostile alliances.¹³ Thus a great deal of emphasis was placed on the creation of alliance networks to obtain more military allies. However, such relationships

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¹¹ Livy 9.42. The Aequi were subsequently implicated in providing aid to the Samnites, providing an excuse for the Romans to attack them as well, Livy 9.45. The Aequi had not been at war with the Romans for many decades.

¹² The Marsi are first recorded as allies of the Vestini, who were actively providing military assistance to the Samnites, as well as the Paeligni and Marrucini in 325, Livy 8.29.4. The Marsi and Paeligni provided military assistance to the Samnites in 308, Livy 9.41.4. In 304, the Marsi, Marrucini, Paeligni, and Frentani established treaties with the Romans, Livy 9.45.18. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (15.4.1) does describe a potential Neapolitan defection from the Samnites as revolt, but this too seems a loose use of terminology.

¹³ For estimates of the growth of Roman population, see Brunt (1971), 26-33.
were not a guarantee of assistance nor would they necessarily prevent hostility. In truth, it was potentially difficult to determine beforehand what side one’s allies were going to take in a war. Betrayal (what the Romans called revolt) was all too common. Indeed, the Romans themselves ultimately betrayed their Samnite allies in favor of the Campanians. The following sections of this chapter will explore the various formal and informal bonds that linked Italian communities, which contributed to the fluid nature of community relations, as well as measures taken by the Romans to create more stable relationships.

2. Formal and Informal Relationships

The communities of Italy were tied together in a web of formal and informal relationships. For legal-minded scholars the foedus formed the core Roman foreign interaction. This perspective stretches back to Mommsen, who saw foedera as the central institution of Roman hegemony in Italy. These treaties formed legal bonds enforced through the institutional structures of individual communities and they facilitated military cooperation. To be sure, treaties were of great importance and filled an important role in Roman interaction with many of their allies. But foedera were not alone in forming bonds between communities. A great many informal interactions took place on a variety of levels, from the individual to the entire community. Formal and informal relations were inseparable; they intertwined and overlapped to create a multifaceted relationship between communities that existed on a variety of levels. The relationships of communities were not solely defined by treaties. It was within this system that the Romans created their alliance network, which would, in time, encompass all of Italy.

14 See Introduction.
a. FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

*Foedera* (treaties) were an important institution in the relationship of many Italian communities. The nature of *foedera* has long been discussed among modern scholars who emphasize its central role in Roman relations with their Italian allies. Unfortunately, within Italy only a single *foedus* is described in detail, the *foedus Cassianum*. This treaty, formed in 493, established an alliance among the peoples of Latium, including the Romans. Dionysius of Halicarnassus relates that it read,

> Let there be peace between the Romans and all the Latin cities as long as the heavens and the earth remain in place. Let them not make war on each other nor bring in foreign enemies nor grant safe passage to those who would make war upon either. Let them assist each other with all their forces when either is attacked. Let each have an equal share of the spoils and booty taken in common wars. Let lawsuits regarding private contracts be settled within ten days and in the community where the contract was originally made. Let it not be permitted to add anything to or take anything away from this treaty unless both the Romans and all of the Latins agree.\(^{15}\)

The *foedus Cassianum* was, first and foremost, a military agreement. Only a single clause (making arrangements for contractual disagreements) was not of a military nature. As such, it was clearly meant to facilitate the military cooperation of the communities involved.

Indeed, Latium at the time was under constant pressure from neighboring peoples, making

\(^{15}\) Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ταῖς Λατίνοις πόλεσιν ἀπάσαις εἰρήνη πρός ἀλλήλους ἔστω, μέχρις ἂν ὑφανόν τε καὶ γῆ τὴν αὐτὴν στάσιν ἔχωσι καὶ μὴ ἃ αὐτοὶ πολεμεῖτοσαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μὴ ἂν ὕπαρξις πολεμίους ἐπαγέτωσαν, μήτε τοῖς ἔπφερομενοι πόλεμον ὁδὸς παρεχέτωσαν ἄφαλες, ἃς ἡμῖν ἂς ἑκατέρου τε τοῖς πολεμούμενοις ἀπάσῃ δυνάμει, λαφύρων τε καὶ λείας τῆς ἐκ πολέμου κοινῆς τὸ ἱσον λαγχανέτωσαν μέρος ἑκάτερο τοὺς τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν συμβολαίον οἱ κρίσεις ἐν ἡμέραις γεννῆσθωσαν δέκα, παρὰ ὅις ἂν γένηται τὸ συμβόλαιον. ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ταύταις μηδὲν ἔξεστο προσθεναι μὴ ἄφελεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὃ τι ἂν μὴ Ῥωμαίοις τε καὶ Λατίνοις ἀπαίτησεν δοκῆ. Dion. Hal. 6.95.2. Compare Cicero (*Balb.* 53) and Livy (2.33.9), who mention that the inscription remained on public display as late as the 1st century, but neglect to describe it in detail. The first two treaties with Carthage managed the interaction of the Romans and Carthaginians, but did not create the same level of cooperation as the *foedus Cassianum*, Polyb. 3.22-24; J. W. Rich, “Treaties, allies and the Roman conquest of Italy,” in P. de Souza and J. France, eds. *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History* (Cambridge: 2008), 58. Similar treaties were established by the Carthaginians with the cities of Etruria and were apparently aimed at economic interaction, Cornell (1997), 210-214. Dating the *foedus Cassianum* to the early 5th century, Beloch (1880), 196-197.
cooperation a necessity for survival as well as aggression. Likely one of the most important of topics, the distribution of booty, was covered to try to head off potential disputes. At the same time, the treaty also attempted to limit hostile cooperation with other peoples with the promise not to “bring in foreign enemies.” The *foedus Cassianum* sought to create a stable relationship that ensured military cooperation among friendly communities while discouraging taking part in other, potentially hostile, alliances. In fact, the very opening line of the treaty declares that it is permanent in nature, “as long as the heavens and the earth remain in place.”

In many ways, the *foedus Cassianum* represents an ideal. It will be useful to consider it with regards to the political and military framework described above. In 341, when war broke out between the Romans and Latins, the *foedus Cassianum* was still in place. In reality, it did little to actually prevent the war and its permanency was disregarded. At the same time, the two sides formed alliances that they ultimately used against the other. Whether the Latins, Campanians, and Sidicini really planned to attack the Romans after they had defeated the Samnites, as Livy claims, is impossible to determine.\(^\text{16}\) Nevertheless, both sides mobilized allies for hostile actions against the other. In general, treaties apparently did little to actually prevent warfare among Italian communities if those communities felt it necessary or profitable to do so. Although the *foedus Cassianum* sought to create a stable relationship centered on the idea of military cooperation, it evidently could not alter the fluid nature of Italian alliances.

Other treaties besides the *foedus Cassianum* existed among the peoples of Italy. It is likely that they were roughly similar in their clauses, with considerations made to immediate

\(^{16}\) Livy 8.3.2-3. The Romans were alerted to Latin discontent by the informal bonds of individuals with ties of hospitality. The Latins had planned an attack on Rome a couple of years prior, but instead campaigned against the Paeligni, Livy 7.38.1.
circumstances and the communities involved. Nevertheless, little evidence of these treaties survives. Only fourteen Italian communities (plus another eighth possibilities) of the hundreds of cities, villages, and settlements are known to have had foedera with Rome.\textsuperscript{17} To be sure, the evidence for this period is poor, but it is surprising to find so few Italian communities clearly described as having formal treaties with Rome. Indeed, many Italian communities or peoples may not have had actual foedera. Polybius himself seems to imply such when he says that Roman citizens could go into exile in Naples, Praeneste, Tibur, and other cities with Roman treaties.\textsuperscript{18} Specifying those cities with treaties suggests another category of those that had none.

In fact, the Romans seem to have only once established a foedus with any Etruscan cities. Only the half-Etruscan city of Falerii is known to have definitely had a foedus with Rome.\textsuperscript{19} The other cities of Etruria had indutiae (truces) for fixed lengths of time.\textsuperscript{20} Harris has argued that in the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} century, when Livy’s narrative is lost, indutiae were systematically replaced by foedera, which he saw as the only means of creating long-term relationships by the Romans.\textsuperscript{21} However, Harris’ eyes are clearly fixed on Rome and he does not give sufficient weight to the fluid nature of foedera themselves. At no other point do the Romans conclude indutiae with any other Italian people or community as they did with the Etruscans. These truces should be seen not as originating from Roman practice, but from

\textsuperscript{17} Rich (2008), 65-72. Centuries later in the Imperial Period, some Italian communities proclaimed themselves foederati in public inscriptions, although such claims were possibly symbolic, P. Veyne, “Foederati: Tarquinies, Camérinum, Capène,” \textit{Latomus} 19 (1960), 429-436.

\textsuperscript{18} Polyb. 6.14.8; Rich (2008), 70.

\textsuperscript{19} Livy 7.38.1; 10.45.6; Harris (1971), 85, n. 3.

\textsuperscript{20} Livy 4.35.2; 5.32.5; 7.20.8, 22.5; 9.37.12, 41.5-7; 10.37.4, 46.12; Diod. 20.35.5, 44.9. Some Etruscan cities are said to have requested foedera from the Romans only to receive indutiae, Livy 9.37.12, 41.7. If such requests did occur, not being the result of later Roman exaggeration, it is unlikely that it was typical.

\textsuperscript{21} Harris (1971), 85-98, but see Rich (2008), 70.
Etruscan, perhaps due to Greek influences where truces for set numbers of years were common. There is no inherent reason to think that it was necessary to replace *indutiae* with *foedera* in order to establish long-term relations.

The Romans often referred to their Italian allies as *foederati*, but what exactly did this word signify? Rich has convincingly argued that *foederati* did not refer to those “allied by treaty” but instead “those bound together by an oath.” As evidence he cites the Bacchanalian decree in 186, which forbad the practices of the cult for *foederati* who are elsewhere specified as Roman citizens, Latins, or allies. A comparison to Roman Sicily is enlightening. On the island only three cities had *foedera* (Messana, Tauromenium, and Netum) while others were declared *liberae* during the wars with Carthage. Badian has argued that scholars are too fixated on legal aspects of Roman relationships with other communities, arguing that a “*civitas libera* was a free state (originally), just as the client was a free men. Beyond this stretches the penumbra of custom, and of power to enforce it.” He sees such status as originating in the First Punic War, but it is possible to look further back and see Italian origins. It seems likely that not all Italian communities had formal treaties with the Romans. Their status as *foederati* may be connected to other less formal bonds cemented by oaths. Treaties should not be ignored in their importance in the interaction of Italian communities, including Rome, but there were other important bonds that also existed.

b. INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

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24 Badian (1958), 41, n. 6.
Formal alliances were not the only ways the communities and peoples of Italy were tied together. Treaties were only a single side of the coin. The other side was the informal relations that existed between the peoples of Italy. A great many bonds existed between them that were not based on formal institutions, but involved the interaction of individuals and groups of people within communities.

Aristocratic individuals commonly extended their personal relationships beyond their communities. Some great families from different communities intermarried. Individuals maintained networks of personal relationships based on the concept of hospitality (hospitium), and reinforced them through gift giving. Many inscriptions on pieces of pottery indicate that these artifacts were originally gifts. One interesting example is a lion figure found at the Sant’Omobono sanctuary, cut in half, with the name Araz Silketena of Spuriana carved into the cut side. Presumably it was cut in half so that two individuals could retain a piece as an indication of their friendship. In 310, a young Fabius Caeso was sent from Rome to Etruscan Caere to live with a family friend and receive an education, which Livy states was normal practice at the time. It was also in Caere that an inscription mentioning an individual named Kalatur Phapena (Kalator Fabius), dated to the 7th century,

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25 Leading families from Rome and Capua intermarried, Livy 23.2-8. The supposed only surviving Fabius after the battle of the Cremera River married the daughter of a powerful Samnite named Numerius Octalius Maleventanus, Festus 174 L.


28 Livy 9.36. Such practices would be replaced in later periods with education in Greek cities.
was found. The Fabii apparently maintained social connections in Caere over the span of centuries. Broadly speaking, all of the peoples of Italy were linked through these personal social relationships. It is important to note that social relationships were not limited to within the community, but were created with little regard for any sort of borders.

One of the more interesting aspects of the way the peoples of Italy interacted was the mobility of individuals. In 504, the Sabine Attius Clausus led thousands of people to settle in Rome. Clausus was made a patrician (with a name change to Appius Claudius) and within ten years another Ap. Claudius with the cognomen Sabinus was elected consul. There are many examples of individuals moving from one community to another. Once there, they were not classified as temporary or resident aliens, but were integrated into the local community. That is not to say that individuals would invariably leave one community for another; residences could be maintained in multiple cities as with Vitruvius Vaccus. The freedom with which individuals could move between communities was integrated as a central tenet in the founding of Rome by Romulus, who invited anyone, even those of a disreputable character, to come and live in his new community. The example of Coriolanus is likewise interesting as a Roman who was able to go to integrate himself among the Volsci, perhaps

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29 Kalator Fabius was also joined in Etruria by Tite Latine (Titus Latinus), Cornell (1995), 158; J. N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge: 2003), 162-163.

30 Livy 2.16.4; Dion. Hal. 5.40.3. Suetonius (Tib. 1) calls the leader of the Claudii when they arrived in Rome, Attius Clausus, a princeps gentis. Similar was the ver sacrum, de Cazanove (2007), 46-47, with bibliography and discussion.

31 MRR, 1:13.

32 Cornell (1995), 156-9. Titus Tatius, Livy 1.13; Dion. Hal. 2.46-47; Plut. Rom. 19-24. The Tarquins, who were kings in Rome, were from Etruscan Tarquinii, Livy 1.34; Dion. Hal. 3.47-48. A Frentanus named Oblacus Volsinius, who commanded a unit of cavalry against Pyrrhus, likely had ancestors that came from Etruscan Volsinii, Dion. Hal. 19.12.

33 See page 64.
thanks to previously existing relations.\textsuperscript{34} Italian communities were far more open to the movement of individuals and groups than any Greek \textit{polis}.

Indeed, the mobility of individuals meant that members of the same family or clan could live in separate communities. One of the great families of the early Roman Republic was the Furii. They provided many consuls, military tribunes with consular authority, and other magistracies, and the great M. Furius Camillus was hailed as the second founder of Rome after the Gallic Sack. During the same period, Furii are known to have lived in the Latin city of Tusculum.\textsuperscript{35} A similar, although later, example is known from Campania and Samnium. Minatius Magius was the descendent of a branch of his family that had moved from Capua to Aeculanum (located among the Hirpini Samnites).\textsuperscript{36} Such kinship links would have created bonds between communities and facilitated interaction of their communities.

Many Italian communities worshipped at common shrines, which often served as a base for regional \textit{nomina}. The most well-known \textit{nomen} was the \textit{nomen Latinum}, which encompassed all of Latium. Membership in such a group was apparently closely linked to common religious shrines and facilitated the interaction of the people of member communities.\textsuperscript{37} For peoples of Latium, sites included the Alban Mount, Ferentinum, Lavinium, Aricia, Tusculum, and Ardea. In Umbria and Lucania, similar sites are to be

\textsuperscript{34} See Chapter 1.2.

\textsuperscript{35} The military tribune M. Fourio(s), \textit{CIL} 1\textsuperscript{2}.48-49. A series of burials is also known, \textit{CIL} 1\textsuperscript{2}.50-57. Whether the Furii originated in Tusculum and then, in part, moved to Rome or vice versa is largely irrelevant here. The family existed simultaneously in both communities. Livy (8.3.3) agrees that the individuals of Latium were closely interconnected, which is reinforced by archeological evidence, Smith (1996); Holloway (1994). Samnite families likewise seem to have included members in different communities, C. Letta, “Dall’oppidum al ‘nomen’” in L.A. Foresti, A. Barzanò, et al. \textit{Federazioni e Federalismo nell’Europa Antica} (Milan: 1994), 390-395.

\textsuperscript{36} Vel. Pat. 2.1.2-3.

\textsuperscript{37} Cornell (1995), 294-5.
found, although on a smaller scale reflecting the nature of communities there. In the Iguvine Tablets various nomina are described, including the Etruscan, Narcan, and Iapudic. Nomina could be of various sizes. The Etruscan nomen mentioned in the Iguvine Tablets may refer to the all of the communities of Etruria or a smaller subsection centered on nearby Perusia. The Narcan nomen was apparently a small collection of Umbrian communities distinct from those centered on Iguvium. The rites and festivals associated with the shrines served as places of meeting and deliberation for the members. The shrine at Ferentina served as a site where military matters were discussed by the peoples of Latium. The shrine at Voltumna is often described as a place where the peoples of Etruria debated matters of common interest, often military. By participating in common rituals, Italian communities created bonds with each other that could be put to use for common purposes, including warfare as well as commerce.

Religious rites were often involved in these informal relationships as a means of enforcing observance. The example of Vitruvius Vaccus is a good illustration. Vaccus was from Volscian Fundi but maintained a house on the Palatine Hill in Rome. In 330, he became leader of a war against the Romans by Privernum, which was not his home city. As a result, his home in Rome was devoted to Semo Sancus, burned, and turned into a public


39 tusker naharcer iabuscer nomner, E. A. I. Devoto, Tabulae Iguinae (Rome: 1937), 128. The tablets were inscribed over a period of time from the 2nd century to the 1st, but portions may represent older elements.


41 Festus, 276, 277 L. Exactly how the Romans and Latins decided the issue of command is a matter of debate, Cornell (1995), 299; Alföldi (1965), 119.

42 Livy 4.23.5-7, 25.6-8; 5.17.6-8; 6.2.2.

43 Livy, 8.19-21; Cic. Dom. 101. Civitas sine suffragio was likely granted to Fundi in the aftermath of this affair (in 330), Vell. Pat. 1.14.3; Oakley (1997-2005), 2: 603-605.
park. Here Semo Sancus oversaw an agreement between Romans and Volscians, but his worship extended into the central Apennines, including Sabinum and the Abruzzi region.\(^{44}\) His worship was later merged with Dius Fidius, and was closely associated with Hercules and Jupiter, all of whom oversaw the observance of oaths.\(^{45}\) The king of the gods himself also oversaw oaths in the form of Jupiter Lapis and the archaic Diespiter. As with individuals, the worship of gods moved freely among Italian communities. A common god or gods overseeing oaths ensured, in the minds of the individuals involved, that the other party would observe them. The gods were likewise invoked to oversee formal alliances. A great many informal bonds existed that linked the people and peoples of Italy together.

c. BLENDING THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL

Italy in the time before the Punic Wars was a very diverse land. Although large urban centers developed in many areas, especially in the plains on the western side of the Apennines, many other areas had a much sketchier political organization. The internal organization of a community shaped its external relationships. There is an inherent question concerning the level of organization in Italian communities that was required for them to enforce community-level decisions on its members. While the community of Rome developed stronger institutional structures in its internal organization through the 5\(^{th}\) and 4\(^{th}\) centuries, this growth does not reflect universal trends. Samnites, Lucanians, and other ‘tribal’ peoples did not have the same level of organization as the Romans to control their

\(^{44}\) The Semones were archaic gods similar to the Lares; only Sancus seems to have had a name. W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic* (New York: 1899), 136-141; C. E. Evans, *The Cults of the Sabine Territory* (Rome: 1939), 237-240.

\(^{45}\) G. Bradley, “Aspects of the cult of Hercules in central Italy,” in L. Rawlings and H. Bowden, eds. *Herakles and Hercules* (Swansea, Wales: 2005), 129-152; Fowler (1899), 136-141. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.49.2) connects Semo Sancus with Jupiter Fidius.
populations. There was no real separation of formal and informal relationships. Many Roman innovations involving the relationships with their allies were aimed at creating stronger bonds based on a blending of formal and informal alliances.

In the political life of a community factions vied for political preeminence. Often these factions revolved around aristocrats or aristocratic groups seeking a higher position in the power sharing system. Many were based on families, and could maintain their stances through generations. A good example of the role of factions can be found in Capua in 314 during a general time of upheaval among the allies of the Romans. Roman-Capuan relations dated back to 343 and were reinforced with marriage ties between leading families of both communities. In the previous year, the Samnites had defeated a Roman army at the battle of Lautulae, where the Apennines meet the Adriatic Sea between Latium and Campania. As a result, many of the nearby Roman allies, including the Ausones, Volscians, and Campanians renounced or considered renouncing their Roman alliances. In Capua, the anti-Roman movement was led by two members of the Calavii family, Ovius and Novius. More than likely, these men had established family connections with leading Samnites, as other people did in Campanian and Volscian communities. When a Roman army approached Capua, the leaders of the anti-Roman faction committed suicide, returning those with Roman connections to power. Similar upheavals took place in Capua following

46 Livy 9.26.5-7; Diod. 19.76.1-5.
47 See page 54.
49 Powerful Samnites had ties of hospitality with leading (Greek) Neapolitans, Dion. Hal. 15.8.5. On several occasions, the Samnites managed to pry away communities allied with the Romans working through local agents presumably with connections to Samnite leaders, Livy 8.27; 9.25.3-9; Diod. 19.65.7.
the Roman defeat at Cannae in 216.\textsuperscript{50} Internal groups or factions had a major impact on the external relations of their communities.

The Roman and Samnite competition over Neapolis represents how informal relations could affect formal ones.\textsuperscript{51} Neapolis was allied with the Samnites but in 327 the Romans made efforts to entice them away. In order to do so, the Romans sent envoys with orders to make contact with local elites in order to prepare the city to revolt from the Samnites and then join the Romans in alliance.\textsuperscript{52} It should be kept in mind that Neapolis was a Greek city. However, the ways that the Romans and Samnites chose to exert their influence reflects Italian practice. Here the Romans clearly intended to influence the official standing of the city through the influence of leading individuals. The Samnites (along with the Greek Tarentines and Nolani) responded in the same manner, seeking to make use of their informal bonds with leading Neapolitans. What resulted was a struggle between the factions of the city. Ultimately the city sided with the Samnites. Immediately afterwards armed Samnites arrived in Neapolis, men with personal ties of friendship or mercenaries to help defend the city against Roman aggression. However, the city was ultimately betrayed to the Romans by individuals within the city friendly to them.\textsuperscript{53}

Often, local individuals played a key role in the political alignments of Italian communities. The Romans and Samnites competed for decades in exerting such pressure on the communities of the Liris River Valley. When factions rose to power in Volsinii (in 264) and Falerii (in 241) that were not friendly to Rome, the Romans put friendly factions back in

\textsuperscript{50} M. P. Fronda, \textit{Between Rome and Carthage} (Cambridge: 2010), 119-121.

\textsuperscript{51} Most of what follows is drawn from Dion. Hal. 15.5-8. See also, Chapter 1.2.

\textsuperscript{52} Dion. Hal. 15.4.1.

\textsuperscript{53} Livy 8.25-26.
place. While formal treaties between communities were important, so too was it vital to have informal relationships between the elites of those same communities. Multi-layered bonds were stronger, although even then they still could not ensure a truly stable relationship.

Individuals were also important on the Roman side. In 381, the peoples of Tusculum were granted citizenship rights in Rome. Instrumental in that grant was the Roman consul M. Furius Camillus, who led an expedition against the community due to rumors of its treachery. Camillus personally aided the Tusculani in their appeal to the Roman Senate for peace, which resulted in an extension of citizenship rights. The Furii would again act on behalf of the Latins when, in 338, the Romans defeated them in the Great Latin War and were considering what to do with them. The consul L. Furius Camillus is said to have given a speech emphasizing the close relationships between the Romans and other peoples of Latium, and he pushed for extending citizenship rights. He swayed the Senate and then oversaw the process, which also included extending partial rights (civitas sine suffragio) to various Volscian and Campanian communities. In the extension of citizenship rights to Latin communities in 381 and 338, it was a single family that facilitated the process. While the Furii assisted with these grants, they had to be authorized by the community as a whole, a process reflected in other community interactions, such as the creation and confirmation of alliances. Nonetheless, the fact that the Furii family included members in various communities, especially Tusculum, must have played a significant role in these

54 Volsinii, Zon. 8.7; Florus 1.16. Falerii, Polyb. 1.65.2; cf. the revolt of Fregellae in 125, see Chapter 6.4.
55 Forsythe (2005), 321-323.
56 Livy 6.26.8. Plutarch (Cam. 38.4) mischaracterizes this as isopoliteia, obscuring the Italian traditions at work. This date is supported by M. Humbert, Municipium et Civitas Sine Suffragio (Rome: 1978), 52.
57 Livy 8.13.
events. The rise, or more importantly the fall, of families in communities could potentially have a serious impact on external relationships, further adding to instability.

Even in the formal relations that existed between communities, individuals remained a central factor. Early in his history, when describing the mythical combat of the Horatii and Curiatii triplets, Livy provides a detailed account of the creation of a *foedus*, which showcases the role of individuals. He says that whatever the specific circumstances and terms, a single ritual was employed, overseen by the *fetiales*. An individual from each community, known as a *pater patratus*, was appointed to take the oaths and sacrifice an animal on behalf of the community as a whole. Although Livy says that the actual oath was not worth recording, Polybius perhaps paraphrases it, stating that the man appointed for the community said,

> If I faithfully swear my oath, may all good be mine. But if I have something else in mind or intention, let all others live in their own homeland, under their own laws, and with their own way of life, including temples and tombs. Let I alone be cast out, as with this stone.

The person taking the oath then threw a stone he had been holding. Here the *pater patratus* acted in place of the community, taking personal responsibility for the proper observance of the agreement, which would be overseen by the *fetiales*. Should the alliance be broken by the community, the punishment fell on him. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find individual

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58 See page 63, n. 35.

59 Livy 1.24.

60 εὐφρκόντι μὲν μοι εἰς τὰ γάμη: εἰ δ’ ἄλλως διανοηθεὶν τι ἢ πράξαμι, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων σωζομένων ἐν ταῖς ἰδιαῖς πατρίσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις, ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων βίων, ἱερῶν, τάφων, ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκπέσομι οὕτως ὡς δέδε λίθος νῦν, Polyb. 3.25.8. There is a debate over the exact nature of this oath and whether Polybius is describing the same fetial ceremony or confusing it with another by a *silex*. However, it most likely does reflect the fetial ceremony; for bibliography and discussion see Walbank (1957-1971), 1:351-353.

Italians being turned over as a result of broken alliances. The religious penalties were incurred by individuals, not communities, indicating their importance in community interactions. As such, individuals could be sacrificed when necessary. The position of *pater patratus* served in a system where community interactions were not solely dictated by treaties. In time, the *fetiales* would appoint someone out of their own number to act as the *pater patratus* as Roman interactions with their Italian allies took on the character of a patron-client relation as opposed to a relationship of equals.

Given the complicated nature of the internal organization of Italian communities, it is little wonder that multi-layered bonds were required. In the face of hostilities, fetial priests demanded “the plunder and the plunderers”, perhaps as a response by communities to private raiding “with the offenders’ community being required either to make good the offense by handing them over or to accept the responsibility collectively.” Indeed, when the Samnites attempted to make peace with the Romans just prior to the Caudine Forks disaster, they intended to hand over a man named Papius Brutulus upon whom they placed the blame of the war. This man was blamed for breaking the peace with the Romans, presumably through personal military actions that subsequently embroiled the rest of the Samnites in war once more. Many peoples in Italy did not have the political organization of the Romans or other major Italian urban centers. When Livy says that the Romans established *foedera* with the

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63 Wiedemann (1986), 487, sees the *pater patratus* as having origins in a pre-state society, which became defunct as state institutions developed and thus subsumed within the *fetiales*. However, even in the 2nd century individuals continued to play an important role in the interaction of the Romans and their Italian allies, see Chapter 6.


65 See above, n. 62. For the reliability of the name provided by Livy, see Oakley (1997-2005), 2:770.
Marsi and other Abruzzi tribes in 304, what does this entail? It is not likely that there was a collective political organization among the various villages of their territory that could enforce a treaty, nor is it likely that the Romans created treaties with every single village. Whatever the exact nature of the formal alliance between the Romans and Marsi, there were a host of other informal bonds. In Etruria, the Romans had *indutiae* (truces) with the cities there as opposed to *foedera*. More than likely, these *indutiae*, altered or not, became *de facto* permanent agreements. They existed alongside strong informal bonds that linked some Etruscans and Romans. The Romans interacted with different communities and peoples as was needed for the specific circumstance.

Not all agreements concluded by individuals involved the community as a whole. An alliance (*foedus* in Latin) was an agreement that was formally recognized by the community, while a *sponsio*, on the other hand, remained an agreement between individuals. If a *sponsio* was not accepted by the community, it remained solely the concern of the individual. By accepting an alliance on the part of the community as a whole, the agreements of individuals became the obligations of the community, although the individual remained the responsible party as a *pater patratus*. The permeable nature of Italian communities meant that individuals could, and did, interact with the people of other communities of their own accord. In order to be binding on the entire community, it was necessary for the community to transfer those personal obligations to itself.

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66 What Badian ([1958], 41) called a ‘moral’ obligation with regards to Sicily.

67 For instance, the Fabii and Etruscan Caere, see above.

The *deditio* of Capua in 343 is a good example of how formal and informal bonds interacted. When the people of Capua came to the Romans for help against Samnite aggression, the Romans were reluctant to act because of a preexisting treaty with the Samnites. The Campanian envoys insisted that by asking in their time of need, the bond between the Romans will be that much stronger as it would be built on compassion. There is a hint at the potential weaknesses of treaties that are not fortified with other relationships. There was apparently little contact between Rome and Capua on which to establish a foundation for their alliance. The envoys added that there was no stipulation in the *foedus* with the Samnites that the Romans not make further treaties, which was a nice legal dodge, but the Roman resisted and declined to aid Capua. It was at this point that the envoys performed the *deditio*, surrendering everything that belonged to their city into the possession of the Romans and thus obliging the people of Rome to defend what was now theirs. The exact role of *deditiones* in Italian politics is obscure due to lack of sufficient evidence. In later periods, it was common practice for the Romans to return a community’s previous holdings. The *deditio* could form an extra-legal relationship between communities, especially when *foedera* were not in existence. It is quite true that the act of submission represented in a *deditio* could create strong bonds, but this type of relationship was only one among many that tied communities together. Nevertheless, in the case of the events of 343,

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69 Livy 7.29-31; Oakley (1997-2005), 2:284-306. M. Frederiksen, *Campania* (1984), 193-194, argues that the *deditio* occurred in 338, not 343, which requires rejecting the chronology of Livy, D. W. Baronowski, “Roman treaties with communities of citizens,” *CQ* 38, no. 1 (1988), 175, n. 13. A *deditio* was the complete surrender of the envoys, the people of the community, the city, the surrounding land, the water, the boundary stones, the shrines, the moveable property, and all things divine and human of a hostile state/people, Livy 1.38.2; Polyb. 36.4.1-3; see W. Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung* (München: 1968), 5-109.

70 Livy 7.30.3.

71 Such restitutions are recorded in several inscriptions, Dahlheim (1968), 69-72; Rich (2008), 63.

72 Rich (2008), 66-75.
the act of submission represents how informal actions could influence the formal relations of communities. The Romans did in fact side with Capua against the Samnites thanks to this act, perhaps hoping that they would create a stable and long-lasting relationship as the envoys claimed. If that was true, they were sorely mistaken. Capua fought against the Romans alongside other Roman allies within a few years, contemplated abandoning their Roman alliance again in 314 after the battle of Lautulæ, and joined forces with Hannibal in 216.

d. ROMAN EXPERIMENTS IN CREATING STABILITY

Given the array of relationships that tied Italian communities together, the fluidity of alliances in this period stands out. It should be kept in mind that Italian communities were not concrete things; they were made up of a variety of parts that competed for control, regardless of institutional developments. The competition of families and individuals in Rome is well-known. At the same time, the many formal and informal bonds that linked communities and individuals overlapped and, in some cases, conflicted. Even when a community might officially support another community, portions of its population might still support a third community. For the Romans, this instability spurred some innovations in how they interacted with other communities aimed at creating more stable relationships.

Among the more notable creations of Roman foreign interactions was the status of *civitas sine suffragio* (citizenship without the vote). In order to venture an interpretation of the motivations of this peculiar status, it is necessary to provide a brief outline. Use of it began in the 4th century, becoming fairly widespread among Rome’s allies after the settlement of 338. In that settlement, most of the allies were either fully incorporated as citizens *optimo iure* (most of the Latins), or as citizens *sine suffragio* (primarily
Campanians). Only a few of Rome’s existing allies at the time received neither status. In the coming decades *civitas sine suffragio* was extended to include some Volsci (330), some Hernici (306), the Aequi (304), and the Sabines (290). By the start of the Punic Wars in 264, the Romans no longer extended the status to allies. Some of those with *civitas sine suffragio* were upgraded to full citizens, while others remained without the vote into the Second Punic War and the early 2nd century. At times, the ancient sources describe this status as a reward for faithful allies and at other times as a punishment. Speculating on what *civitas sine suffragio* was has been a popular pastime among modern scholars. The only general consensus coming out of these discussions has been an assertion that ancient writers did not fully understand what it was they were describing.

*Civitas sine suffragio* can be understood as a product of the political and military environment of Italy at the time, when there was an inherent instability in the alliances of communities. It was difficult for any Italian communities to create stable relationships with others. The Romans were no exception, as ‘revolt’ of allies was common in the late 4th and

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74 The Sabines obtained full citizenship in 268 (Vell. Pat. 1.14.7) as did the cities of Arpinum, Formiae, and Fundi later in 188 (Livy 38.36.7-10). The people of Capua were *cives sine suffragio* when they joined Hannibal in 216. There is no mention of *civitas sine suffragio* in the Social War, suggesting that the status no longer existed at that point, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:559.

75 Livy explicitly describes the granting of *civitas sine suffragio* to Fundi and Formiae as a reward (Livy 8.14.10, 19.11), but the Hernici and Aequi reacted as if it were a punishment (Livy 9.43.23-24, 45.5-9). For the granting of this status to Fundi and Formiae, see page 64, n. 43. When given the option, those Hernici communities that had remained loyal chose not to accept *civitas sine suffragio*, while the Aequi began a war. Paulus (117 L) based on Festus (126 L) suggests there was something negative about the status, but elsewhere Paulus suggests it was a sign of privilege (155 L). Sherwin-White ([1973], 39-58, 200-214) has argued that there was a fundamental change in the nature of *civitas sine suffragio*, while Humbert ([1978], 205-208) argues that the granting of the status was, from the beginning, a punitive action linked to Roman domination of weaker communities. Some communities with *civitas sine suffragio* are described as being linked by *societas* or a *foedus*, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:545; cf. Humbert (1978), 260-271.

early 3rd centuries. Indeed, the events of the Great Latin War were particularly dangerous as they seem to have involved most of Rome’s allies. It is little wonder that the Romans took steps to try to create more stable and long-lasting relationships in the aftermath. In the settlement of 338, *civitas sine suffragio* (as well as the incorporation of most of the Latin communities as full citizens and the use of Latin colonies) was a Roman attempt to create stable alliances. These practices would continue as Roman power expanded further.

Community relations did not depend solely on formal treaties, but existed on several different levels, including informal ones. By extending citizenship rights, both full and partial, the Romans were seeking to create strong informal bonds between communities as well as impose some control over them. *Cives sine suffragio* may have been subject to the *tributum* of Roman citizens, but their local affairs remained autonomous under local leadership and they remained outside of the legions made up of Roman citizens. As the relative position of Rome and individual allied communities changed over the course of the 4th to the 2nd centuries, the position of communities with *civitas sine suffragio* and Latin would have changed, perhaps enabling more intrusive Roman interventions. Nevertheless, they were the result of the mixture of formal and informal bonds between communities as well as the instability of community relationships.

Ultimately, the experiment of *civitas sine suffragio* failed to establish the stable relations that it was intended to create, leading to its abandonment. Lack of real stability remained. Some leading families in Capua moved for abandoning their Roman alliance in the wake of the Roman defeat at Lautulae in 315; the city of Fundi was directly or indirectly

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77 *Tributum*, Humbert (1978), 317-318, but questioned by Mouritsen (2007), 151. Local autonomy, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:552-554. Military service, Frederiksen (1984), 224-224; for general bibliography, see Pfeilschifter (2007), 27, n. 2. Mouritsen ([2007], 151) has suggested that the term *civitas sine suffragio* may have encompassed many different relationships, and was used anachronistically by later writers.
involved in Privernum’s war against Rome within a decade of receiving *civitas sine suffragio*; and the hostility of the Aequi’s reaction in 304 to the grant of the status was impressive.\(^78\)

However, where *civitas sine suffragio* generally failed, Latin colonies proved spectacularly successful. Unlike *civitas sine suffragio*, which sought to artificially create strong informal bonds, Latin colonies were formed at least in part from Roman citizens (who renounced their status) and thus had an indelible informal link to Rome.\(^79\) The relationships between Rome and its Latin colonies proved remarkably stable over time. At the same time, the informal bonds that linked the Romans and Latin colonists slowly extended from those colonies to surrounding areas, in essence acting as a kind of dispersed Roman social network.

The Roman use of *civitas sine suffragio* and Latin colonies were attempts to create stable relationships with other communities by creating strong informal and formal bonds. Indeed, such actions are not surprising considering the political and military environment of Italy at the time. Despite the challenging environment, it was possible for Italian communities to create and maintain strong relationships beyond these Roman experiments. Indeed, the Umbrian city of Camerinum was often described as having a glowing relationship with Rome. However, this was thanks to multi-layered relationships that were maintained along with common military cooperation.\(^80\) More generally, leading Roman men and families created social networks that ultimately spanned Italy alongside the establishment of formal alliances (*foedera*) by the community. Both worked hand in hand to create a vast

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\(^{78}\) See page 74, n. 75.

\(^{79}\) For Latin colonies, see Chapter 4.3.b. The reason that the Latin colonies were independent was that having large *municipia* of distant citizens was a difficult concept for the city-state of Rome in the 4th century, H. Mouritsen, *Italian Unification* (London: 1998), 118.

\(^{80}\) See Chapter 5.3.b and 6.1.
network of alliances that allowed the Romans to overcome their Italian competitors. This growth was facilitated by Latin colonies in particular, which aided in the creation of bonds with other Italian communities. There were a great many factors that both undermined and facilitated the interaction of Italian communities. The Romans were particularly successful, exploiting these interactions depending on circumstances.

3. Military Implications

Italian armies were extensions of the political environment in which they existed. By the middle of the 4th century the Roman army was organized in a manipular system, but was not drastically different from other Italian armies. Exactly how and when the Roman manipular army developed is a matter of debate, with firm conclusions made nearly impossible due to poor surviving evidence.81 The developments that took place in Roman armies down to the 4th century were extremely complex and took place over a long period of time, and that process has not been preserved in sufficient detail to make it possible to separate definitively reality from conjectures, mistakes, and anachronisms in the sources. Nevertheless, by the 4th century the armies of the Roman Republic increasingly came under the control of the community in terms of recruitment and supervision of generals.82 The example of the private war of the Fabii at the Cremera River in the early 5th century was not repeated. While the formal institutions of the Republic strengthened (and would continue to strengthen in the 3rd century), Roman armies retained older features that relied on the

informal influences of individuals, especially with regards to their interaction with other communities.

Roman generals often relied on their personal charisma to gather volunteers among the Roman citizenry. In 295 the Romans were preparing for a massive military effort against the coalition of Gellius Egnatius at Sentinum. Just prior to the election, the consul of the previous year, L. Volumnius Flamma, gave a speech to the Roman citizen body. He said that when he and his fellow consul had fought against the Italian coalition, the war had required both armies, but now Gellius Egnatius had also been joined by the Umbrians and Gauls and that a general was needed to fight the forces of four peoples. Volumnius was pushing for the election of Fabius Rullianus, the greatest general of his day, who had been consul four times previously, as well as dictator once. The implication here is that what made Fabius Rullianus the best choice was his ability to raise men as much as his tactical command ability. Rullianus was elected, reportedly with some reluctance on his part. When the time came to gather the army, “nearly all the younger men now crowded around the consul [Rullianus] and gave in their names; all this was due to their eagerness to serve under such a general.” From this pool of men, drawn by his reputation, and no doubt including many of his own clients and relations, Fabius Rullianus levied an army. A few years later, the Senate was upset that a group of young men were following M’. Curius Dentatus, perhaps

83 Livy 10.21.15.

84 concursus inde ad consulem factus omnium ferme iuniorum et pro se quisque nomina dabant; tanta cupido erat sub eo duce stipendia faciendi, Livy 10.25.1.

85 Fabius was said to have only taken 4,600 men with him initially, which inspired a great deal of hope, Livy 10.25.2. However, he may have returned for more men following the Roman defeat near Camerinum, Oakley (1997-2005), 4:285-288.
similar to the *suodales* of P. Valerius Publicola two centuries earlier. \(^{86}\) These men are specifically described as following Dentatus because of his grand reputation. In 290, he celebrated two triumphs over the Samnites and Sabines as well as an ovation over the Lucanians. Later Roman generals like Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus boasted of success, which attracted volunteers for campaigns against Carthage (once each) and Numantia. It is interesting to note the references to volunteers in Roman armies alongside the problems of the 2\(^{nd}\) century with pressing citizens to actually present themselves for the levy. \(^{87}\) Even within the developing institutional framework of the Roman Republic, informal bonds remained relevant for armies.

The same blending of formal and informal relationships that were typical of Italian political interaction existed in the military sphere. *Foedera* dictated mutual defense for the parties involved and no doubt were an important means of military cooperation. \(^{88}\) At the same time, there were other relationships that could be exploited in order to gain manpower. In 291, Fabius Rullianus’ son, Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges, served as consul, only to suffer defeat at the hands of the Samnites. \(^{89}\) The Roman people were furious with him and he was reportedly put on trial. However, with the intervention of his father, who recounted his own deeds and promised to assist his son, Fabius Gurges not only escaped being convicted of anything, but he was also restored to his command. The two Fabii then defeated the Samnites. The Romans were so pleased that they extended the command of Fabius Gurges as a proconsul, as long as his father still assisted him.

\(^{86}\) App. *Sann*. 5; *MRR*, 1:183-184. For Valerius, see pages 26-27.

\(^{87}\) Polyb. 35.3.4-6; Livy 25.5.5-9; App. *Iber*. 49. This topic will be discussed in Chapter 5.4.a.

\(^{88}\) For unequal treaties, see *Introduction*.

\(^{89}\) Dio fr. 36.30-31; Zon. 8.1; Livy *Per*. 11; *MRR*, 1:182-183.
So famous was Fabius Rullianus that “the allied forces assisted [him] in memory of his previous deeds.” Fabius Rullianus’ election to the consulship in 295 for the Sentinum campaign may have been linked to his ability to raise large numbers of men, which likely included allies. He was not unique in this attribute, as “a remarkable power of command was found in [L. Papirius Cursor] that was equally effective with citizens and allies.” Papirius Cursor, in the late 4th century, was also elected five times to the consulship as well as twice being selected as dictator. Fabius Rullianus was elected as consul five times, and selected as dictator once and magister equitum once. Both men commanded in many areas of Italy ranging from Etruria to Lucania and virtually everywhere in between. Both generals likely built up a huge network of contacts with the leadership of other communities. Just as multi-layered relationships bound communities together, so too could they facilitate military cooperation. Not all communities had the same institutional structures as the Romans, which would have required Roman generals to rely on other means to gather men. In some cases, other means would have been preferable given the factional divisions of many Italian communities. A personal relationship with friendly local leaders could avoid recruiting unfriendly individuals.

Although surviving sources are strongly biased in favor of Rome, similar practices can be seen among the other peoples of Italy. Around 280, during the war against Pyrrhus, a group of 800 Campanians and 400 Sidicini served as Roman allies under their commander

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90 Dio fr. 36.31.

91 Fabius Rullianus had established relations with the Umbrian community of Camerinum in 310 (Livy 9.36; Front. Strat. 1.2.2; Flor. 1.11.3) and Ocriculum in 308 (Livy 9.41.20), both of which were near Sentinum.

92 et vis erat in eo viro imperii ingens pariter in socios civesque, Livy, 9.16.16; cf. Dio fr. 36.24. Frontinus (Strat. 2.4.1) confirms allies in the armies of Cursor in 293.
Decius Vibellius. It would also be odd if the Romans recruited the Campanians and Sidicini and then placed them under Decius’ command, something not indicated by the sources. At the same time, it is very unlikely that Capua had the institutional authority to recruit Sidicini. They are something like a war band and the mercenaries found in Sicily, a characterization confirmed by their actions in Rhegium, which were based on those of the Mamertines. (The people of Capua were, by this point, Oscan.) The men under Decius’ command were evidently recruited through informal means. Perhaps Decius had family connections among them that allowed him to recruit there, similar to the later actions of the Capuan Minatius Magius among the Hiripni Samnites. The reputation of the Samnite Gellius Egnatius, although the details are lost to us, no doubt played a large part in his ability to gather Etruscan, Umbrian, and Gallic assistance through personal contact for the Sentinum campaign in 295. Numerius Decimius in 217 was likewise described as having a reputation that extended beyond his hometown of Bovianum to all of Samnium. Numerius himself was responding to the call for help from the dictator Fabius Cunctator. Relations between the Roman Fabii and leading Samnite families, in fact, went back to at least 477, when the only

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93 Dion. Hal. 20.4; Polyb. 1.7; Livy, Per. 12; Diod. 22.1.3. For a discussion of the problems associated with the sources for this story, see Walbank (1957-1971), 1:52-3. Livy calls the men under Decius a legio Campana and Polybius gives a number of 4,000, but these are probably inaccurate. Polybius or his sources may not have bothered to distinguish between the Campanians and Sidicini due to their proximity. The confusion over these events is confirmed by a duplicate account in Dionysius (20.16), which bears some similarity to Polybius’ account. See page 75 concerning cives sine suffragio serving in the legions.

94 Minatius Magius was the descendent of a branch of his family that had moved from Capua to Aeculanum, Vel. Pat. 2.1.2-3.

95 Livy 10.18.

96 Livy 22.24.11-14.
surviving Fabius after the disaster at the Cremera River married the daughter of Numerius Octalius Maleventanus.97

The many complexities of the Italian political and military environment are evident. Informal bonds linked individuals and groups alongside the formal treaties between communities. Military forces were made up of armies that operated with the official sanction of communities as well as smaller groups that can be called allies, mercenaries, and war bands, depending on how one wishes to characterize them. Such an environment is hardly surprising given the great deal of variety between the different peoples and communities of the Italian peninsula. By relying on formal and informal bonds, Italian generals could put together the massive armies, such as that gathered by Gellius Egnatius at Sentinum, that are known from this period. Without these ties, no Italian army could have even been put together on such a scale. Roman generals were no different. Where foedera were insufficient, personal relationships could be exploited, or vice versa.

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Early Italian warfare and politics were complicated and not easily made to fit any set categories. Warfare involved cooperation through a variety of means (formal and informal). Indeed, this pattern reflected the political situation in Italy generally. Community interactions took place on a variety of levels and included individual as well as community relationships. It was within this environment that the Romans succeeded through politics and warfare to forge a large alliance network that would eventually encompass the entire peninsula. Other Italian peoples controlled their own networks of allies, which expanded just as that of Romans. A loss at Sentinum in 295 may have turned the tide against the Romans.

97 Festus, 174 L.
in favor of a Samnite dominated alliance network. However, the nature of Italian warfare based on military cooperation made it inevitable that large alliance networks would build up. Whether they could be controlled and maintained was another matter, as the Etruscan collapse in the late 6th century demonstrated. Roman hegemony in Italy was mostly based on Italian precedent and tradition, even when they experimented with building stable community relations. In the end, the Romans came out victorious with a massive amount of military potential in their hands. Within a century of uniting Italy, the Romans controlled a vast Mediterranean empire. The Roman army in particular moved away from its Italian origins, integrating and subordinating the Italians, a shift which had major repercussions for the relationships of the Romans and their Italian allies.
Chapter Three

The Integration of Rome’s Italian Allies

As a result of Roman domination of Italy, the Italians came to be subsumed within a developing Roman military system that took shape in the opening years of the Second Punic War. Military integration meant that the traditional relationships of the Romans and their Italian allies began to change, a development which can be traced in their military relations. One of the most important changes was the subordination of the Italians and their integration into the Roman military system. In time, the Italians were formed into new legion-like units and placed within a direct Roman command structure. Through this process, the Romans stepped out of their Italian past and created a new military system that assumed greater military control of their allies.

1. The 3rd Century to 216

By the beginning of the 3rd century, the Romans dominated much of the Italian peninsula. Central Italy was under their firm control. The Etruscans and Samnites were increasingly unable to compete with the military power of the Romans, although they remained hostile for many years before seemingly giving in to what was by that point inevitable. By 265, the Italiote Greeks and the other Italian peoples in Southern Italy too
would come under Roman hegemony. The Romans’ domination of the peninsula heralded important changes in their relationship with the other peoples of Italy. A process of integration began to take place slowly and organically due to the simple fact that the Italians increasingly had to look to Rome for military leadership. It was over the course of the 3rd century that the foundations were laid for the full integration of the Italians into a Roman military system that would reach fruition at the end of the century. Unfortunately, the sources for the 3rd century are poor, providing only glimpses of this process, but a general movement towards integration can be discerned.

Roman domination of Italy, even when it was not yet universal at the dawn of the 3rd century, had important implications for the relationships of the peoples and communities of the peninsula. For those communities far removed from the edge of Roman power, the military opportunities were more limited. Attacking neighbors, a common enough activity in earlier periods, now had the danger of involving the Romans who were allied to both sides. It was necessary to look to Rome for leadership in wars that were increasingly separated from the local affairs they had once been. Allied Italians were far from unwilling conscripts fighting in Roman wars. Just as in Rome, war was an integral part of many Italian cultures. There was hardly need for a system of military exploitation. Warfare at this point was little different, save for the initially subtle impact of Roman hegemony. The Italians still contributed men as allies in the same manner that had long dominated Italian warfare, through a combination of formal and informal relationships. The limitations placed on local warfare meant that a great deal of martial energy lay in the hands of the Romans, which they channeled into the expansion of their own power. Roman hegemony in Italy did, however,

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1 Several campaigns lasted beyond the ‘normal’ campaigning season in the late 4th century, and would have interfered to some degree with agricultural life, see Chapter 1.3.b. For the First Punic War, see page 93, n. 24.
create an environment in which drastic change was possible. That process was long, stretching down to the end of the 3rd century. Slowly over the course of that period new features began to appear in the organization of Rome’s allies and their relative position to the Romans. This was a period when, in effect, Rome dominated Italian warfare. However, the roots of a new Roman military system were being laid in this time of transition as the Roman army slowly began to divorce itself from its Italian roots.

a. ORGANIZATION OF ALLIES

In the early 3rd century, Italian allied forces continued to be organized in small bands under local leaders. The force led by Decius Vibellius around 280 has been mentioned previously. He personally recruited 1,800 Campanians and Sidicini who fought with the Romans, serving as a garrison of Rhegium until they followed the example of their Mamertine cousins in Sicily and seized the city for themselves. Another example from the Pyrrhic War likewise shows Italian traditions. At the battle of Heraclea, a Frentanus commander named Oblacus Volsinius led a group of his fellows with the Romans. When Volsinius died heroically trying to engage Pyrrhus in single combat, his men fought valiantly to protect and recover his body. Such actions speak to the strong bonds associated with kinship and oaths. It was well-recognized in the ancient world that kinship and other personal ties were an effective means of creating solidarity between individuals in battle.

2 See Chapter 2.3.

3 Dion. Hal. 19.12; Plut. Pyrr. 16.8-10. He is described as ἱγαμών and praefectus turmae, see Appendix 2.4.

4 Homer Il. 2.362-368; Plato, Symp. 179; Onasander Strat. 24; Phokas PM 1.10-13.
Such traditions were alive and well in the early 3rd century in Italy.\(^5\) The Romans continued to operate within the traditions of Italy to access such groups as allied forces.

While there is clear continuity with earlier periods of Italian military history, there are also evident changes in how the Romans organized their allies as a whole while on campaign. While there were strictly speaking no *alae*, the legion-like conglomerate units of allies present in later Roman armies, precursors to their development are to be found in the early 3rd century. In a battle near Cominium in 293, Livy says that the Roman consul Sp. Carvilius Maximus ordered his legate, D. Brutus Scaeva, to take ten cohorts of allies, a legion, and the army’s cavalry to oppose a relieving force of Samnites.\(^6\) Unfortunately, we are not told the origins of these cohorts, as they may have represented the forces of a single community or people instead of a conglomerate force of multiple communities.\(^7\) It should be noted that ten cohorts correspond to the size of an *ala* and was roughly equivalent to the size of a legion. At the battle of Ausculum (279) the consuls P. Sulpicius Saverrio and P. Decius Mus combined their armies to face Pyrrhus.\(^8\) Dionysius says that “[the consuls] divided into four parts (µέρη) the Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Peligni, Frentani, and other subjects, and placed them between the Roman legions so that no part

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\(^5\) In 295, when their leader, Staius Minatius, was captured by the Romans in an ambush, a band of Samnites fought hard to save him a response similar to the efforts of Volsinius’ men. The Samnite Lollius led a band of men that seized a city in Samnium and used it as a base for raiding in 269, Zon. 8.7; Dion. Hal. 20.17.1. The men of Herius Potilius were likely similarly organized, Zon. 8.11; cf. Oros. Hist. 4.7.12; see below concerning the First Punic War.

\(^6\) Livy 10.43.3; *MRR*, 1:180.

\(^7\) Some allies raised large numbers of men. Decius Vibellius commanded 1,800 men (see above); Herius Potilius commanded perhaps 4,000 men (see page 96, n. 30); Numerius Decimiros commanded 8,500 men (Livy 22.27.11).

\(^8\) *MRR*, 1:192.
of the their line would be weakened.” These groups were apparently conglomerations, with at least eight allied peoples making up four μέρη. At the same time, four groups of allies correspond to the number of alae that would be present in a double consular army.

These descriptions of allied organization indicate that important changes were beginning to take place, but they should not be interpreted as fully developed alae. Livy describes the allies at Cominium as alarii, but as a generic reference to allies. Only once does Livy clearly refer to an ala before the loss of his narrative in 293, describing five hundred Campanian cavalrymen as an ala Campanorum at the battle of Sentinum. Livy is being loose with his terminology, as five hundred cavalry can hardly be accurately described as an ala. The same ambiguity of terms is found in Dionysius’ description of the battle of Ausculum. When describing the organization of Roman armies, Polybius says that the allies were “separated into two groups (μέρη); they call one the right wing (κέρας), the other the left.” The word μέρος was a group that could be equated with an ala, but was not necessarily one. Most importantly, these groups did not have Roman commanders, the prefects of the allies. Alae and prefects of the allies were inseparable, each requiring the

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9 Λατίνους δὲ καὶ Καµµανοὺς καὶ Σαβίνους καὶ Οµβριούς καὶ Όυσαλούσκους καὶ Μαρουγκίνους καὶ Πελίγνους καὶ Φερεντανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπηκόους, εἰς τέταρτα διελόντες μέρη, τοῖς Ρωµαιοῖς παρενέβαλον τάγµασιν, ἵνα μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἁσθενεῖς εἰπή μέρος. Dion. Hal. 20.1.5.

10 Alarius is an uncommon word choice for Livy, with only five or six uses, 10.40.8; 10.43.3; 35.5.8, 10; 40.40.9. At 10.41.6 the phrase dux alaribus cohortibus appears in some manuscripts, while others have cum auxiliaribus cohortibus or dux cum alaribus, see Oakley (1997-2005), 4:426 with bibliography. At 10.40.8 these same units are described as alaritii, making little impact on the interpretation of their organization. While ultimately derived from ala, alarii do not necessitate alae. Compare Livy’s use of the phrase socii navales, see Appendix 3.

11 Livy 10.29.12.

12 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διεῖλον εἰς δύο μέρη, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν δεξίον, τὸ δ’ εὐώνυμον κέρας. Polyb. 6.26.9.
other. Fully developed *alae* needed Roman officers in order to operate as they would in later periods. Indeed, it would seem that prefects of the allies and *alae* become fully developed alongside each other around the beginning of the Second Punic War, as discussed below. At Cominium and Ausculum, there is no indication that either group of allies was well-organized. Despite the problems of terminology, these passages clearly indicate important features in allied organization in Roman armies.

The grouping of allies was to be expected, although it did not necessarily require an imposed Roman command structure. The various bonds that linked communities and individuals may have meant that these allied groups closely resembled the coalition forces they formed before Roman involvement. Military cooperation was a longstanding Italian practice that apparently operated without hierarchical command structures. A lack of unified commanders for these groups is not surprising. When the Romans began drawing on a more diverse number of peoples and communities, it was only natural that they be positioned together in the battle line. The μέρη described by Dionysius may reflect the tendency of Roman generals to create two groups on the wings of their two legions. At the same time, placing them between the legions may simply have been a reflection of Pyrrhus’ own deployment.\(^{13}\) The constant turnover of Roman generals would have inhibited any uniform system from quickly coming into existence. The larger numbers of communities upon which Roman generals could call upon for men in the early 3rd century would have created a more cosmopolitan force. Steps were clearly taken to organize them, but they were not organized into the *alae* of later periods yet. The bonds that tied Italian armies together before Roman domination were no doubt still effective, but the stage had been set for further developments.

\(^{13}\) Pyrrhus deployed his Italian allies between units of his phalanx, Dion. Hal. 20.1.2-3. For similar instances of interspersing units within a phalanx, see Antigonus Doson at Sellasia (Polyb. 2.66.5) and Antiochus III at Magnesia (Livy 37.40; App. Syr. 32).
Unfortunately, the loss of detailed sources for the period from 293 to 218 makes it difficult to trace further changes in detail. However, other changes were taking place simultaneously that shed some light on the process of integration that had begun.

b. COMMAND

A hallmark of Romans’ military domination of their Italian allies was the position of prefect of the allies (praefecti sociorum). These men served as the commanders of alae. However, such a position did not exist in the early years of the 3rd century or before. Livy does mention prefects of the allies twice before the Punic Wars, but only as a part of stock phrases that cannot be taken as historically accurate. That is not to say that Roman commanders were never placed over units of Italian allies. As already mentioned, Brutus Scaeva, as legate, was given command of ten Italian cohorts, a legion of Roman citizens, and the army’s cavalry. The appointment of legates to command allied forces was not unusual in later periods. However, Brutus’ appointment was for a special operation; it does not appear to have been a regular position. Nevertheless, the appointment of Roman commanders, however often it occurred, was an important step towards the integration of the Italians within a Roman command structure. It would likely have proved problematic to systematically place Roman officers over Italian commanders.

As is to be expected, the task of directly leading allied units fell to local leaders who recruited them and served as commanders. These commanders filled an important leadership role. They sometimes operated without direct oversight of an imposed command structure by

14 Livy 8.36.5; 10.35.5; Oakley (1997-2005), 2:749-750.

15 See above. In that same year, Sp. Nautius commanded a small detachment of three allied cohorts as legate, Livy 10.40.8; Front. Strat. 2.4.1.

16 See below.
the central community (i.e. Romans, Samnites, etc.). At Rhegium around 280, the Campanian Decius Vibellius was not operating under any Roman leadership, but was the garrison commander in his own right. Oblacus Volsinius and his men at the battle of Heraclea roamed the battlefield with no apparent oversight as he sought to engage Pyrrhus in single combat. Volsinius’ cavalry operated closely alongside the Romans and other allies, but without a system of direct control, a lax arrangement which may also have applied to the infantry units. At the same time, Roman generals most certainly controlled their allies. In an earlier battle, a praetor from Praeneste had failed to bring his men forward in the line fast enough, prompting the consul L. Papirius Cursor to threaten punishment. However, there is no indication of any levels of command between generals and these allied commanders.

A variety of bonds linked the men of these armies, despite their diverse origins. Coordination was possible without an imposed Roman command structure, although it would not have been capable of complex maneuvers. The lack of sophisticated command and control may explain the rather simple tactics of early Italian armies. Social relationships were most likely the primary means of cohesion, built upon many years of military cooperation. The imposition of Roman officers would have severely undermined the position of allied leadership as well as the social bonds that linked them with Roman elites. Some of these allied commanders could field substantial numbers of men, up to several thousand. The appointment of Roman officers over them, essentially replacing any organization they already had, would not have been practical or feasible. Although allied commanders maintained a significant amount of importance and freedom, they increasingly operated within a Roman framework. Roman monopolization on the decisions of war gave

17 Livy 9.16.16-18. The date of the event mentioned in a summary of Papirius’ qualities is unrecorded.
them a substantial amount of power with regards to the command of their allies. This created an environment with the opportunity for change.

It is impossible to trace further changes with regards to the leadership of allies in Roman armies over the course of much of the 3rd century. However, this was an important period in the development of Roman command structure. Prorogation of generals had begun in 326 with the consul Q. Publilius Philo.18 Throughout the 3rd century, prorogued generals are to be found regularly commanding Roman armies.19 Prorogation was a valuable tool in times of military crisis when more armies than normal were required, such as the campaigns of 296/5 leading up to the battle of Sentinum, and the aftermath of the battle of Cannae in 216.20 In 366, the number of available Roman generals was expanded with the introduction of the office of praetor, with another coming in the late 240s, and two more in the 220s. The expansion of the praetorship was intimately connected with the expanding military horizons of the Republic. The military activities of the Romans steadily increased in the late 4th and throughout the 3rd centuries. As a result, the number of generals increased and there also arose the concept of extending their position beyond their elected year in office. The Roman command structure was becoming more sophisticated in response to new challenges.

With regards to the prefects of the allies, we are left largely in the dark. However, the title of prefect was well established already. Prefect simply meant ‘a person appointed over

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18 Livy 8.23.11-12. The fasti triumphales record that Philo was the first proconsul, FC, 95. Earlier descriptions of promagistrates in the early 5th century are likely erroneous, Oakley (1997-2005), 2:658-659.

19 Between 326 and 265, there were a total of twelve known pro-magistrates (five of whom served in 295), MRR, 1:146-202. In the First Punic War, there were eight (MRR, 1: 202-219), but see below concerning the impact of distance on the length of campaigns. See W. F. Jashemski, Origins and History of the Pro-consular and Praetorian Imperium (Chicago: 1950), 100.

20 The political importance of prorogation in preventing iteration of consulships should not be overemphasized, T. C. Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic (Oxford: 2000), 1:75. Prorogation may also explain the tribuni militum consulari poteste, although there were political concerns as well, F. E. Adcock, “Consular tribunes and their successors,” JRS 47, no. 1/2 (1957), 9-14.
something’ (from *praeficere*), with no real specialization in duties.\textsuperscript{21} The ambiguity of the title of prefect is reflected in its use by ancient sources to describe individuals whose titles were unknown or unclear, including non-Romans.\textsuperscript{22} From the outbreak of the Second Punic War, prefects were to be found performing various duties, including commanding garrisons, fleets, and, by 214, as prefects of the allies.\textsuperscript{23} More than likely, prefects began being appointed over allies in special circumstances, similar to the legate Brutus Scaeva, sometime in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century as part of larger command developments. Nevertheless, the prefects of the allies in the war against Hannibal show some irregularity that suggests their position was not yet well-established in the Roman command structure even by that point.

c. FROM THE FIRST PUNIC WAR TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE

When the Romans came into conflict with Carthage in 264, their Italian allies accompanied them to Sicily, where all of the major land campaigns took place. Whereas Roman campaigns in the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} century were increasingly distant, the war in Sicily was further still. Many of the annual campaigns stretched into the following year due to the distances involved.\textsuperscript{24} The Italians, no doubt, found themselves even more looking to Roman

\textsuperscript{21} In the mid-4\textsuperscript{th} century, the Senate twice dispatched prefects to Capua in order to quell local discord apparently without any military forces at their command, Livy 9.20.5, 26.5-12. Prefects were also to be found serving as commanders of Roman cavalry.

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix 2.

\textsuperscript{23} See Appendix 2 and below.

\textsuperscript{24} According to Polybius (3.68.14), an expedited march from the furthest point in Sicily, Lilybaeum, to Ariminum, just south of the Rubicon, took forty days. This length of time may have been shortened by the use of sea transportation, Livy 21.50.6-7. Roman generals needed to wait for their replacements as well as return to Rome for any triumphs they had earned, all of which took time and extended campaigns beyond a single year. In 258, C. Aquillius Florus continued with his army in Sicily until relieved by the consul A. Attilius Caiatinus; he celebrated a triumph as proconsul (*FC*, 100; Zon. 8.11). The next year (257) A. Attilius Caiatinus continued in command of his army as praetor until the consul, Cn. Cornelius Blasio, arrived and he returned to Rome for a triumph (*FC*, 100; Polyb. 1.24; Zon. 8.12). In 254, the consuls of 255 were prorogued in order for them to return to Rome to celebrate naval triumphs (*FC*, 100). In 253, Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina continued in
leadership. Roman generals decided when and where to campaign. The allies depended on them for logistical support as well. It was a Roman alliance with Hiero II of Syracuse that secured local logistical support, which was then distributed to Rome’s allies.\(^{25}\) The central and dominant position of the Romans was continually being reinforced. Much continued the same, however. Italian mercenaries had long served in Sicily, and campaigning alongside the Romans was little different. Unfortunately, little evidence survives concerning the First Punic War (264-241) and less about the role and position of the Italians. Nevertheless, what little does come down to us clearly indicates the continuing trend of the subordination of Rome’s Italian allies.

A few details survive concerning the position of Rome’s Italian allies. One such example involves the punishment of allies by a Roman general. The consul P. Claudius Pulcher was described as a particularly harsh man who flogged Italian allies.\(^{26}\) This punishment is connected to the unusual actions of the general, not routine punishments meted out by subordinates. Floggings were apparently abnormal and worth noting. Nevertheless, the Roman general was able to carry out these sorts of punishments with only a subsequent note of his harshness. Such an event should be seen as part of the continuing process of integration and subordination of the Italians.

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\(^{25}\) Polyb. 1.16.10.

\(^{26}\) Diod. 24.3. Compare the story about L. Papirius Cursor’s threatened punishment of a praetor from Praeneste, see above.
The close connections of the Romans and Italians were reinforced when, in 260, the Romans and their Italian allies camped separately from their Sicilian allies after a dispute over booty. The Romans and Italians camped as a single force, something that was easily distinguished from the non-Italian allies, a tendency that would continue long afterwards. The Italians were increasingly becoming an integrated part of Roman armies.

An important difference in the way the Romans fought wars in the First Punic War was the need for large naval fleets, forces that required a great number of personnel. The Roman navy up until the First Punic War had been small, consisting of no more than around ten triremes. When the first war with Carthage began, ships had to be borrowed from allies, although the Romans quickly began constructing fleets of quinqueremes. Although no more Italian ships are mentioned joining the Roman fleet after 264, it seems likely that the Romans would have made use of at least some of them, as they did in later wars. Polybius, after all, never goes out of his way to distinguish Romans and their Italian allies.

The term used to describe the personnel in Roman fleets, socii navales, has led to a misunderstanding of the nature of Roman fleets. To be sure, large numbers of Italian allies

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27 Polyb. 1.24.3; Walbank (1957-1971), 1:80; cf. Diod. 23.9.4. Polybius, who describes the situation, shows his usual disinterest in specificity regarding allied forces. He regularly did not distinguish Romans from Italians, and the separate camp of ‘allies’ likely represent the crews of Sicilian (Syracusan?) ships that had aided the Romans in a naval victory just prior.

28 When the Tarentines attacked a Roman fleet in 282, it consisted of ten ships, App. Sam. 7.1. Steinby (The Roman Republican Navy [Helsinki: 2007], 29-77) argues that as a large city near the sea the Romans must have had more than a passing interest in naval concerns and seem to have maintained a modest fleet; contra Thiel (Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War [Amsterdam: 1954], 1-60) who, for the most part, dismissed early Roman fleets.

29 For the year 264, Polybius (1.20.13-14) says that he borrowed 50 ships, which would appear to be far more than the Roman navy had at this time. He also states that Ap. Claudius requested ships because the Romans did not have any, but this seems to be an exaggeration to emphasize the adaptability of the Romans in taking to the sea. A few years later in 261, the Romans commissioned large fleets consisting of 120 ships (100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes), Polyb. 1.20.9.
served as rowers, such as the Samnite Herius Potilius and his 4,000 men.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, Potilius and his men closely resemble the allied bands of traditional Italian warfare, the only difference being naval as opposed to military service. However, that does not mean that Roman fleets were manned mostly by allies, or that a special category of Italian allies existed that provided ships instead of soldiers. \textit{Socìi navales} should be understood as ‘naval personnel’ instead of ‘naval allies’.\textsuperscript{31} There is no indication that Roman fleets used allied ships or men in any way distinct from earlier Italian traditions. At the same time, the large numbers of men required for the fleets of the First Punic War need not have placed any additional strain on the population, as it provided an outlet for military activity that was no longer viable within Italy or possible with only two consular armies campaigning in any given year.

In the opening years of the Second Punic War, the first two battles between the Romans and Hannibal were similar to those with Pyrrhus decades prior. At the Trebia and Lake Trasimene, Hannibal managed to outflank the Romans and attack them from all sides.\textsuperscript{32} Although outmaneuvered, the Romans and their Italian allies adapted and fought; “every man was his own commander.”\textsuperscript{33} In both battles, large contingents fought their way free (10,000 men at the Trebia and 6,000 at Lake Trasimene) on their own initiative. Indeed, at Lake Trasimene, the Roman general was already dead by the point of the breakout. The Roman

\textsuperscript{30} Zon. 8.11; Oros. \textit{Hist}. 4.7.12. The events surrounding the Samnite rowers and their involvement in an apparent slave conspiracy is obscure in the sources; it is questionable to draw any conclusions from it. Whatever the circumstances of the Samnite involvement, they apparently were not punished along with the slaves. Orosius labels this group \textit{socìi navales} (see Appendix 3), undoubtedly drawing directly from Livy, who, in epitome, was one of his major sources. It was not unheard of for the peoples of the Apennine Mountains to serve as rowers, Dion. Hal. 15.6.3; Livy 28.45.19.

\textsuperscript{31} See Appendix 3 and below.

\textsuperscript{32} Trebia: Polyb. 3.71-74; Livy 21.54-56. Trasimene: Polyb. 3.82-84; Livy 22.4-6.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{tum sibi quisque dux}, Livy 22.5.7.
armies were adaptable and flexible, but it was also possible to outmaneuver them as Pyrrhus and Hannibal did.

At the same time, the role of the Italian allies was not so different from what it had been prior. (Unfortunately, our sources do not differentiate Romans from Italians at the battles of the Trebia and Lake Trasimene.) However, a certain Dasius of Brundisium commanded the Roman supply depot at Clastidum in 218. Dasius ended up betraying his post to Hannibal. The next year, the Samnite Numerius Decimius brought 8,500 men, gathered thanks to his reputation and family connections, to the join the army of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator. He arrived in the nick of time to save the magister equitum, who had engaged Hannibal while Fabius was away. These allies were not yet fully subordinated and integrated into a Roman military system, but retained some measure of autonomy. Nevertheless, significant changes had occurred that were moving in the direction of Roman control over the course of the 3rd century. Under the military pressures of the Second Punic War, a war that was on a much larger scale than anything prior in Italian history, the Italians became fully absorbed into Roman armies. The slow developments that had been taking place over the course of the century reached fruition after the disaster at Cannae.

2. Military Crisis: The Battle of Cannae

The battle of Cannae was a battle of significant size and spurred a solidification of the changes that had been occurring in the armies of Rome and her allies. After suffering defeats at the hands of Hannibal at Trebia and Trasimene, the Romans gathered an army of their own

34 Livy 21.48.9-10.
35 See Chapter 2.3.
men and their allies that numbered around 80,000 men and dispatched it under the two consuls C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus.\textsuperscript{36} The Roman tactic was simple and classically Italian, a forward assault on Hannibal’s line. Their superior numbers were used to increase the depth of the line as opposed to attempting to outflank Hannibal. Although the numbers raised by the Romans were impressive, they were not without some earlier precedent in Italy. The outcome of the battle, however, was most certainly shockingly new. In one of the most renowned events in military history, Hannibal accomplished a double envelopment of a superior force. Somewhere around 50,000 Romans and Italians were killed in a single day.\textsuperscript{37} A few units managed to fight their way free of the battle and escape, which they did by their own initiative more than “under anyone’s command.”\textsuperscript{38} These losses were on top of those already suffered over the previous two years to Hannibal.

The narrative of the battle as presented in the ancient sources serves as a metaphor for the conflict of military tradition and innovation taking place. This conflict was embodied in the interactions of the two consuls at Cannae, Varro and Paullus. Paullus is the hero of the story, advising caution against the reckless abandon of his colleague and ultimately sacrificing his life for the good of the Republic. Varro, the villain (or at least antagonist), is cast as a simple-minded fool incapable of the common sense of military command. (He is even gave a plebeian agenda to reinforce his unseemly character.) Varro promised to seek

\textsuperscript{36} MRR, 1:247.

\textsuperscript{37} Livy (22.49.15) records 48,000 deaths, equally distributed between Roman citizens and allies, perhaps based on Fabius Pictor. This figure is followed by a majority of the ancient sources, App. Hann. 4.25; Plut. Fab. 16.8. Polybius (3.117) gives a figure of more than 75,000 dead and 10,000 captured.

\textsuperscript{38} imperio cuiusquam, Livy 22.50.12; cf. Polyb. 3.117.3. Similar to the battles of the Trebia and Lake Trasimene, see above.
out and destroy Hannibal as quickly as possible. Such a goal was hardly abnormal, and was in fact fully in line with Italian warfare, being relatively simple and direct in strategy. Paullus, on the other hand, advised caution, arguing that careful reconnaissance of the situation was necessary to prevent disaster. Such a line of thought was not represented in earlier Italian warfare, but was instead something that was to be expected in Hellenistic generals. Indeed, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator had already realized the dangers of engaging Hannibal in battle, only to be denounced as cowardly by a Roman citizenry who wanted aggression and immediate action.

Throughout the campaign leading up to the fateful battle at Cannae, the two consuls were constantly at odds. Varro time and again pushed for battle, encouraged by the men he commanded, only to face the opposition of Paullus; at one point only the warnings of the sacred chickens and the threat of the fate of P. Claudius Pulcher restrained him. Ultimately Varro pushed the situation to a point where Paullus could do nothing to prevent the fight. The results were horrific. On top of the huge casualties, the military disaster suffered by the Romans sparked widespread disaffection and revolt amongst their Italian allies. Such actions are hardly surprising, as similar examples were to be found in earlier periods in Italy. The conflict between Varro and Paullus can be seen as a microcosm of the larger changes that were taking place among Roman armies and their allies. The traditions of Italian warfare were insufficient for Rome to become a Mediterranean empire. New methods of

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39 Livy 22.38.6-7.

40 Livy 22.38.8-13.

41 Supposedly Fabius even warned Paullus before Cannae, Livy 22.39.

42 Livy 22.42.8-9. Paullus wanted to choose better ground, but Varro wanted to press the battle immediately, leading to an ambush, Polyb. 3.110. Argument between the two, Livy 22.44.4-7. Paullus realized that Hannibal was running out of supplies and sought to take advantage by not engaging quickly, Polyb. 3.112.
organization were required. Paullus served as an example of how the old and the new could come together.

The Roman reaction to Cannae was spectacular. Within five years, over 150,000 Italians were under arms against the Carthaginians. Carthaginian allied support was attacked in Italy, Spain, Cisalpine Gaul, and Macedon/Greece. The Romans fielded more men than had ever been raised in Italy and deployed them to regions far beyond the Italian peninsula, where they maintained them for years on end. The scale and tenor of Roman warfare changed drastically in the aftermath of Cannae. At the same time, the process of change that had been taking place over the course of the 3rd century with regards to the Italian allies developed into a new Roman military system. The effort necessary to defeat Hannibal and establish stability among Rome’s Italian allies fundamentally altered the traditions of Italian warfare. Cannae was more than a simple disaster, it was a tipping point. The scale of these disasters would herald change and spur the emergence of a Roman military system from its Italian origins.

3. After Cannae

Armies in Italy comprised numerous smaller units; the majority force was that of the strongest community, around which allied forces led by local leaders were arrayed. A single individual acted as the general, whose task was to organize and manage this conglomerate force on its way to the battlefield. These armies were tied together through a multi-layered and overlapping network of formal and informal relationships. Once battle was joined there was little in the way of control available, with generals often fighting personally. There was no real command structure imposed by the leading community on its allies. Unit
commanders (including allies) reacted as they saw fit in a semi-independent manner. While such a system was inherently adaptable and flexible, little could be done to coordinate the army as a whole. In the Second Punic War, Hannibal was able to exploit these weaknesses and inflict severe losses on the Romans and their Italian allies.

a. ROMAN OFFICERS AND ITALIAN COMMANDERS

After the disaster at Cannae, the Romans put more armies into the field beyond the number of magisterial generals they had available. This military reaction by the Romans was unprecedented, resulting in a great deal of variation in finding generals to command their armies. The established precedent of prorogation served in part. The number of prorogued magistrates during the war far outstripped the entirety of the previous century.\(^\text{43}\) This practice allowed generals to remain in the field for multiple years instead of being replaced annually. However, this measure was insufficient. A new practice of giving private individuals command positions (\textit{privati cum imperio}) developed and was used extensively from the beginning of the Second Punic War down to 198.\(^\text{44}\) The most famous, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, was given the command in Spain after the death of his father and uncle there, and subsequently the invasion of Africa. These \textit{privati} increased the number of generals available in a dire situation, but did so outside of the normal magisterial system. The war had created a situation in which the traditional Roman system of command was insufficient, creating the need for ad hoc appointments. In the aftermath of the Second Punic War, the Romans sought to remedy the variation of their generals. Two more praetors were

\(^{43}\) Between 216 and 201, there was an average of between eight and nine known pro-magistrates annually. \textit{MRR}, 1:247-323; Jashemski (1950), 102-111.

added, giving the Republic six praetors for on-going operations in the new provinces (Sicily, Corsica/Sardinia, and the two Spains. At the same time, the two consuls could be sent wherever they were needed. Praetors replaced the *privati cum imperio* who had been acting generals in Spain after Scipio’s departure. In addition, prorogation continued to be used as needed.

The same variation among Rome’s generals during the Second Punic War is evident in the command of allied forces as well. It is only in 214 that prefects of the allies appear in the sources, four years after the start of the war when Livy’s narrative is again available. (Polybius very rarely mentions prefects of the allies, and never in the course of his narrative.) In that year, Q. Naevius Crista was appointed as a prefect of the allies for a special mission to Apollonia by the propraetor M. Valerius Laevinius. This event suggests an ad hoc appointment under special circumstances, as opposed to a regular position. If prefects of the allies existed earlier, which is entirely possible, they were likely appointed in these sorts of situations, similar to the legates mentioned above earlier in the century. The example of T. Pomponius Veientanus is a particularly good example not only of what seems to be an early example of a prefect of the allies, but also of the variation of commanders in the aftermath of

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46 This high rate was clearly the result of the Hannibalic War, as from 200 to 188 the number of prorogations drops to an average of just under five annually, spiking to nine during the preparation for war against Antiochus III in 190, and from 187 to 167 the average further drops to between three and four, at which point most sources drop out; *MRR*, 1:323-437. By 190, the Senate assumed the right of proroguing Roman commanders without popular approval, Brennan (2000), 1:187-190.


48 Livy 24.40.8; Plut. *Arat* 51; cf. Zon. 9.4.

49 See Chapter 1.3.b.
Cannae. A key element of the Roman strategy was raising huge numbers of men to overwhelm the Carthaginians. Towards this end, Pomponius, as a prefect of the allies, waged an almost private war in Bruttium against Hannibal’s lieutenant Hanno, employing his existing connections in the area to gather men in a traditional Italian manner. Similar efforts to raise large allied Italian armies were not uncommon at this time. These sorts of appointments hardly fit into a hierarchical command structure. The prefects of the allies were, for the most part, the result of the military pressures of the war with Hannibal.

As the Second Punic War progressed, prefect of the allies became more of a regular position. Special appointments continued. However, there was a growing trend towards regularization. In 208, two prefects of the allies who were accompanying the consul M. Claudius Marcellus on reconnaissance were killed, presumably as part of his command staff. These were not special appointments. The next year the prefect of the allies P. Claudius was sent along with a military tribune in joint command of five allied cohorts and five Roman maniples to prepare an ambush. Again, the two commanders in this case appear to have been preexisting. They were drawn from a pool of officers who were already in command positions and could be easily paired with their respective units when needed for special assignment. The Romans were adapting to their new military environment, which involved more direct control of their allies’ military resources for the purposes of

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50 Livy 25.1.2-4. Livy (25.3.9) calls him a corrupt former publicanus.

51 C. Terentius, as proconsul, had been ordered in 215 to raise forces from Picenum and defend the area against Carthaginian raids, Livy 23.32.19. Tib. Sempronius Longus in Lucania, Livy 23.37.10-11.

52 C. Ampius, as prefect of the allies, was given an emergency force of two legions and four cohorts and ordered to invade the land of the Boii Gauls, Livy 31.2.5-9.

53 Livy 27.26.12, 27.8.

54 Livy 27.41.7.
coordination (in campaigns generally and on the battlefield particularly). The transition from special appointments to regular positions was likely uneven, given the multiplicity of Roman generals.

The prefects of the allies became regular fixtures of Roman armies and performed a number of functions. They were appointed at the discretion of the commanding Roman officer, often a consul. Twelve men were appointed to this position, six per ala, which corresponded to the number of military tribunes. The prefects of the allies could not be put over their units until all of the allies had joined the Roman army, which was sometime after the legions were formed. Prefects of the allies could be used as special commanders of small detachments of allied forces (a few cohorts or turmae). How they actually divided up the command of their respective alae is unknown; that is, whether they divided the unit into respective commands or rotated as the commander. It seems logical that, like other Roman officers/magistrates, the allied prefects commanded the alae collegiately, making more specific divisions as needed. In those instances where alae functioned as independent operational units similar to legions, they did so under legates as opposed to allied prefects (see below), a pattern which also generally held true for military tribunes and the legions. What role prefects of the allies had in combat is difficult to determine as no account or description has survived. In fact, heroic deeds of allied units are recorded when they were being led by their own leaders as opposed to prefects of the allies, see below.

56 As Polybius (6.26.5) indicates. Livy (22.38.1) agrees that it took time for allied forces to join Roman armies.
57 See Appendix 2.1.
58 The prefects of the allies M. Atinius and P. Sempronius died when Gauls assaulted a Roman camp in 194, but we are not told the circumstances of their deaths, Livy 34.47.2. Although some detail survives concerning the
The role of prefects of the allies was in many ways similar to the military tribunes in the citizen legions, although they were considered lower in rank. They were included, along with the other officers of the army, in the general’s consilium, which put them in an advisory role to the commanding general. As with the tribunes, allied prefects were empowered to punish the men under their command, that is, the Italian allies. For the most part, they served as an extension of the military tribunes over the allies, as opposed to the legions as the tribunes were. In essence, they were the means of direct control over allied forces by Roman generals.

In addition to the prefects of the allies, Roman generals would often assign legates to command allied soldiers. The position of legate at this time was still a special appointment made by the Roman general. While allied prefects would normally only be assigned special command of a few cohorts or turmae after the Second Punic War, legates were placed over larger numbers of allies, which could include entire alae. When the left ala was deployed against a Gallic army in 193, it was commanded by a consular legate. When the camp of the consul P. Cornelius Cethegus was besieged by Ligurians in 181, one legate was placed in command of the right ala, while another was given command of several allied cohorts (apparently in preference to a prefect of the allies). During the Jugurthine War, C. Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla both acted as legates commanding allied forces (under Q. Caecilius

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activities of Vibius Acca (Livy 25.14.4, 13; Val. Max. 3.2.20) and Salvius (Plut. Aem. 20.1-3; cf. Frontin. Str. 2.8.5), they were not prefects of the allies as the sources claim, see Appendix 2.


60 Livy 26.15.6; 42.58.4; App. Ib. 79; Hann. 19.

61 See below.

62 Livy 35.5.1.

63 Livy 40.27.3-6.
Metellus and Marius respectively). As prefects of the allies became regularized into the Roman command structure, their role as commanders for special missions seems to have been taken up, in part, by legates. In time, legates too would become a formal element of the Roman command structure.

Once allied soldiers had joined the Roman armies, they were led by their own commanders. There is no evidence of any levels of command between these local leaders and the Roman general in the period before the Punic Wars. In the opening years of the Second Punic War, the same holds true. In these instances, allied units were led by their own commanders without evidence of any accompanying or overseeing Roman officers. In addition, they each acted in a semi-independent manner. The continuation of past traditions of military cooperation is apparent, but the Second Punic War differed from any the Romans had faced before. This war was waged on an unprecedented scale, requiring a firmer and more centrally controlled military system, as is clear from the betrayal by Dasius of Brundisium. Unstable alliances and unreliable allies were far too dangerous in the war against Hannibal. It is in the Second Punic War that changes in the command structure of Roman armies with regards to allied soldiers become apparent, resulting in the subordination of local leaders to direct Roman oversight. The following chapter will look at the development of the idea of military obligations, which brought the general military resources of Italian communities under Roman control.

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64 Sall. Jug. 58.5, 105.1-2.

65 In 218, Dasius of Brundisium served as a garrison commander in Clastidum, a Roman granary for operations in Cisalpine Gaul, which he betrayed to Hannibal, Livy 21.48.9-10; Polyb. 2.69.1-4. After Marcus Anicius and his fellow Praenestians learned of the destruction of the Roman army at Cannae, on their own initiative they garrisoned the Campanian city of Casilinum with no assigned Roman officer, Livy 23.17-20. In the same year (216), the Lucanian Marius Statilius led a Lucanian cavalry detachment on a scouting mission for L. Aemilius Paullus, Livy 22.42.4-6; 43.7; Val. Max. 7.3.7; Frontin. Str. 4.7.36; Plut. Fab. 20.

66 See previous note.
The adoption of prefects of the allies into the Roman military structure did not mean that the leaders of allied contingents no longer had a role in Roman armies, just a diminished one. Local leaders were responsible for recruiting and bringing allied soldiers to Roman armies. They continued to lead their men in combat. Indeed, when allied units performed memorable deeds as recorded in the sources, it was under their own leaders, not Romans. Whatever oversight the prefects of the allies had, they did not replace local commanders. They added a layer of command between the general and these local elites. Nonetheless, some level of initiative was maintained by these men. As such, local leaders were still able to pursue military glory as commanders of local contingents, but from a more subordinate position. (On rare occasions Italian leaders were to be found in command positions themselves, although not explicitly in command of Roman soldiers.) Whereas before the Second Punic War, there was little if any level of command separating local commanders from the Roman general, by the 2
\textsuperscript{nd} century they were further removed. No doubt to some degree this distancing would have acted to disrupt the function of military service as a site for social interaction between the Romans and Italians as well as the position of local leaders in their communities. While such a command structure allowed for a more efficient military system, it also disrupted the precedents on which it had been built. We may well imagine that the leaders of allied contingents had some difficulty in accepting their new position.

After the Second Punic War, the number of Italian commanders mentioned in the ancient sources drops precipitously, as can be seen in the Appendix 2. In part this is due to the poor sources available after the middle of the 2
\textsuperscript{nd} century, but the decline began earlier in the century when sources are better. Such a change suggests that Italian commanders played

\textsuperscript{67} See Appendix 2.

\textsuperscript{68} Hantos (2003), 318.
a less significant role in Roman armies after the introduction of Roman officers over them. Extraordinary actions earned their way into the historical tradition, but the rather commonplace notices of non-Roman leaders from the Second Punic War and before disappear. The war with Hannibal introduced a military problem that the Roman solved by fully integrating their Italian allies into their military system. The result was the subordination of Italian leadership beneath Roman hierarchy.

b. **ALAE**

The first credible mention of an *ala* comes in 212, six years after the start of the Second Punic War.\(^{69}\) Like the prefects of the allies, this was well into a well-documented period with the detailed narratives of Polybius and Livy covering the period in detail. After 212, *alae* are regularly, although infrequently, mentioned. As with the prefects of the allies who commanded them, the *alae* were based on older precedents, but it would appear that it was only in the Second Punic War that they fully took on their developed form. In the war with Hannibal, there are no examples of *alae* being deployed on the wings of the legions, as their name would suggest, although it seems likely that they would have been at some point.\(^{70}\) At a battle in Apulia in 212, one legion and one *ala* formed the front line with the other legion and *ala* forming a second line; similar deployments were used down to at least 207.\(^{71}\)

The military pressure of the Second Punic War created a new focus on more efficient organization among the Romans. For example, in 193, the consul Q. Municius Thermus led

\(^{69}\) Livy 25.21.6.

\(^{70}\) Polybius (10.39) may indicate such a formation, but compare Livy (27.18).

\(^{71}\) Livy 25.21.6; 27.1.8-13, 2.6-7, 12-14, 14.3, 42.2-4. In 200, the two *alae* formed the front line in the army of L. Furius Pururio, with the two legions being deployed in a second line, Livy 31.21.1-7.
an army of two citizen legions and 15,500 allies to relieve a siege of Pisa by Ligurians.\textsuperscript{72} Livy says that he did not want to risk a fight with this force, which was collected from a variety of peoples and not used to interacting.\textsuperscript{73} This problem is a manifestation of the fact that allied forces were being drawn from a wider geographical area where the strong bonds that were once key in Italian military cooperation may have been lacking. Municius evidently attached great importance to the unity of his army, something that was not as great a concern earlier when there had been no \textit{alae} or well-developed command structure. The \textit{alae}, as with the prefects of the allies, were part of a new Roman military system that was much different from its Italian roots and required a new emphasis on unity only to be achieved through more a developed system of control.

By the early 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, the \textit{alae} began to take on their more classic role within Roman armies. During this period, the clearest description of the deployment of a consular army with accompanying allies comes from the battle of Magnesia (189) as described by Livy, who says that

\textquote{the Roman line of battle was, for the most part, uniform in its appearance as well as in the nature of men and armor. There were two Roman and two allied (socium ac Latini nominis) legions, which each had 5,400 men. The Romans held the center of the line, [the allies] the wings (cornua)\ldots \textsuperscript{74}}

This is the classic description of a Roman army and its allied forces. However, the battle of Magnesia is the first historical account of such a formation. In his overview of Roman

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{72} Livy 34.56.5. \; \\
\textsuperscript{73} Livy 35.3.4. \; \\
\textsuperscript{74} Romana acies unius prope formae fuit et hominum et armorum genere. Duae legiones Romanae, duae socium ac Latini nominis erant; quina milia et quadringenos singulæs habebant. Romani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuerunt\ldots \textsuperscript{\ \ldots} Livy 37.39.7-8. Appian (\textit{Syr.} 6.31) also describes the Roman line at the battle of Magnesia, but his account is confused.}
armies, Polybius says that the Italians “were separated into two parts (μέρη); they call one
the right wing (κέρας), the other the left”, indicating that he too imagined them as being
normally deployed on the flanks of the legions. Variations no doubt continued to be used at
the discretion of different generals, but, for the most part, the alae occupied a regular position
after the early 2nd century on the flanks of the legions. At the same time, Livy emphasizes
the uniformity of the men, which presumably included their equipment. Italian arms and
armor had long shared common features, but exactly when they became uniform is unknown.
More than likely, some sort of standardization paralleled increasing integration over the
course of the 3rd century.

The regularization of the alae meant that Roman generals had larger tactical units of
allies then they had ever had before. In Livy’s description of the battle of Magnesia, he calls
the allied units legiones, and while such a designation entails its own difficulties, the alae
had indeed become fully functional tactical units. In 193, the consul L. Cornelius Merula
was able to withdraw the left alae and the extraordinarii from combat while sending in two
legions which had been held in reserve.

More remarkable is the use of an ala in 181 by the propraetor Q. Fulvius Flaccus in Spain.
The left ala was deployed into an ambush position, along with 6,000 Spanish auxiliaries, against a force of Celtiberians. Here not only was the

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75 τούς δὲ λοιποὺς διεύλον εἰς δύο μέρη, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν δεξίον, τὸ δ’ εὐόνυμον κέρας. Polyb. 6.26.9.
Polybius’s use of the word κέρας equates to Livy’s cornu above.

76 It is possible that alae was dropped or omitted after duae by a later copyist, J. A. Briscoe, A Commentary on
Livy: Books XXXIV-XXXVII (Oxford: 1981), 347. However, there is no need to reject Livy’s characterization as
generally, if not technically, accurate. Livy’s apparent description of the alae as legiones is mirrored by
Polybios (10.16.4) who describes citizens and allies as forming stratopeda, the word he uses for legions.

77 Livy 35.5; MRR, 1:346. What exactly the right ala was doing, should there have been one, is not mentioned.

78 MRR, 1:385.

79 Livy 40.31; cf. Front. Strat. 2.5.8.
*ala* acting completely separate from the main Roman force, but it also acted as the core to which the Spanish auxiliaries could be attached, much as the Roman legions had done for allied Italian forces prior to the existence of the *alae*. The Italian allies no longer formed cooperative groups, but fully formed tactical units that could undertake a variety of roles for Roman generals. That is not to say that all, or even most, Roman generals used them creatively, but the integration of the Italian allies was an important development in Roman warfare that created a more efficient fighting force.

Polybius says that the number of allied infantry coincided with the Roman infantry, and allied cavalry was three times as numerous.⁸⁰ Overall, he suggests parity between the Romans and allies in Roman armies. Velleius Paterculus, on the other hand, states that twice as many allies normally served compared to Romans, a disparity which he asserts was a major cause of the Social War.⁸¹ However, it would appear that in general Polybius was correct.⁸² The Second Punic War was a massive effort by the Romans and their Italian allies in terms of manpower, with hundreds of thousands of men under arms. Large numbers of men were also raised in the early 2nd century, although not quite on the same scale, spiking during large campaigns.⁸³ From 167 to 90, sources do not provide enough information for us to form a clear impression, but it would seem that the near parity of Romans to Italians continued despite Velleius Paterculus’ statement to the contrary.⁸⁴ Variations occurred as

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⁸⁰ Polyb. 6.27.6-9; Walbank (1957-1971) 1:709.
⁸¹ Vel. Pat. 2.15.1-2
⁸³ See Brunt (1971), 424, for a list of men under arms, both Romans and Italians.
new armies were raised and the military needs of Rome changed, but overall Roman armies were roughly half citizens and allies.

c. CAMPS AND SUPPLIES

The integration of the Italians is clearly seen in Roman encampments. The origins of Roman camp-making are lost to history. Evidence for the practice does not appear until the 2nd century when Polybius described it in detail and archeological sites have been found in connection with the Celtiberian Wars at Numantia. Unfortunately there are difficulties reconciling the texts and finds. More than likely, a great deal of variation occurred between generals, armies, and campaigns, which Polybius attempted to generalize. What is clear is the integration of the Italians. Whatever exact circumstances, they had a place within the camp itself. Moreover, the extraordinarii occupied a place of distinction near the general’s tent. More than likely, the practice of camping together was long-established in Italian warfare as mere practicality. Indeed, an example comes from the opening years of the First Punic War. Italian incorporation into Roman camps further emphasizes their general integration.

With regards to rations, Polybius says that the allied infantry received the same rations as the Roman infantry, and the cavalry about 1/3 less than the Roman cavalry, which were given as a gift. The provision of rations can be associated with the growing disparity in relative power between the Romans and their Italian allies. In Roman eyes, it was the duty


86 Polyb. 6.30. For the extraordinarii in general see below.

87 See above page 96.

88 δίδοται δὲ τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις τούτων ἐν δωρεᾷ, Polyb. 6.39.15.
of their allies to march alongside Roman citizens across the Mediterranean Basin, but at the same time, as with any good master, it was the duty of the Romans to care for their subordinate allies while on campaign. As Roman armies and their allies marched further afield, especially beyond Italy, the control of rations no doubt proved more important and influential. Local allies were an important means of obtaining any supplies. It was the duty of the general to arrange for supplies, which was a more complicated task by the end of the 3rd century. When campaigns expanded beyond the peninsula, the Italian allies were much more dependent on the sources of supplies secured by the Romans. Control of rations reinforced Roman domination, at times being used as a means of punishment (see below).

d. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

As with Roman soldiers, the Italian allies received booty and rewards while campaigning. Before the Punic Wars, the sharing of booty was a common feature of Italian warfare and could be determined by *foedera*. It was up to the commanding general, whether Roman or not, to make the divisions in the field. When the Romans became the leaders of all of Italy, the distribution of booty came under closer Roman control. Polybius says that it was normal Roman practice for the booty to be divided equally, which is to be

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89 Many non-Italian allies are recorded as providing supplies for Roman armies. Carthaginians, Livy 31.19.2; 36.36.4-5-9; 43.6.11-12. Gauls, Livy 21.25.14. Hiero of Syracuse, Livy 21.50.7-11; 22.37; 23.21.1-6, 38.12-13. Masinissa of Numidia, Livy 31.19.3-4; 32.27.2; 36.36.4-5-9; 42.29; 43.6.11-12. Hellenistic kings, Polyb. 21.42; Livy 36.3.1-5; 37.37.5, 50.9-10; 38.13.8-10. Grain was often gathered from the provinces, and shipped to campaigning generals, although the islanders were not always very receptive to such requisitions, Livy 23.32.9, 41.6; 29.1.14, 3.1-5, 36.1.3; 30.3.2, 26.6; 36.2.12-13; 37.2.12; 41.17.2. There was no discord over the provision of supplies within Italy; for logistics in early Italian warfare, see Chapter 1.3.a.

90 Logistical concerns increasingly involved transportation (by sea and land) and setting up supply depots, while a breakdown in supplies could prove dangerous, Polyb. 1.52.4-8; Livy 23.21.1-6, 48.5; 26.8.1-11; 27.43.10; 29.36.1-3; 34.26.1.

91 *The foedus Cassianum* dictated a fair division of spoils, see Chapter 2.2.a.
expected given earlier Italian practice and confirmed by Livy. Like Roman soldiers, allies participated in Roman triumphs, after which rewards were given. When Q. Fulvius Flaccus in 187 triumphed, “he gave military awards to many tribunes, prefects, cavalrymen, and centurions, Romans as well as allies.” However, distribution was not always so equitable. In 177 C. Claudius Pulcher gave the allies only half the rewards that his Roman soldiers received. In response, the allied soldiers “followed [Claudius’] chariot in silence, so that you could sense their anger.” The distribution of rewards and booty shows the same signs of subordination of the allies within a Roman military structure. Non-Italian allied forces, once more, were separate. They did not take part in triumphs nor were they included in post-triumphal reward distribution. Instead, they would have taken their share of the booty immediately after combat. Roman generals could exert some controls over these activities, but not nearly the same level as with the Italian allies. The allies were in a position of integration, as seen in their differences with non-Italian allies, and subordination, subject to the whims of Roman generals. The only option in 177 was silent disapproval.

According to Polybius, the allies were subject to punishment from the prefects of the allies. This could include monetary as well as physical punishment. It is not surprising that as the Romans instituted a more regular system of command, that punishment of allies would fall to their new Roman officers. As a punishment for what he considered poor performance in battle in 209, M. Claudius Marcellus ordered that his Italian allies only be given barley

92 Polyb. 10.16.4-9; Livy 41.7.3; 45.43.7.

93 praefectos, equites, centuriones, Romanos sociosque, donis militaribus donavit, Livy 39.5.17. Twenty-five denarii were given to the common soldiers, while the centurions and cavalry received two and three times more respectively.

94 itaque taciti, ut iratos esse sentires, securi sunt currum, Livy 41.13.8.

95 Polyb. 6.37.8.
rations and the next day they were to form the front line again, where the heaviest casualties would be taken.\textsuperscript{96} Such extraordinary punishments were not the standard, nor were Roman legionaries free from harsh punishment.\textsuperscript{97} However, such treatment is indicative of the position of the Italians under the thumbs of the Romans. Punishment at the hands of foreigners was merely the most obvious sign of their subordination. Indeed, as Marius showed, being thus subject to the Romans created a great deal of separation between the Romans and Italians in their attitudes. The Italians were no longer free allies, and escaping what was in their eyes arbitrary punishment by the Romans was likely an important part in the desire for citizenship at the end of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century.\textsuperscript{98}

e. THE EXTRAORDINARII, A LINK TO THE PAST

The Second Punic War saw the integration and subordination of Rome’s Italian allies into their own military system. The subordination of the Italians introduced a problem as the role of Italian leadership and the allies in general were diminished as a result, which undermined the traditional relationship between themselves and the Romans. As a result, the extraordinarii developed as a manifestation of earlier Italian traditions within the new Roman dominated military system. The extraordinarii were a group of Italian forces that existed for about a century and were the direct result of the reorganization of Italian armies. They survived only as long as the problems associated with the general reorganization of Roman armies failed to modify the inherent subordination of the Italians. As soon as this social and military problem was solved (in the Social War), the extraordinarii disappeared.

\textsuperscript{96} Livy 27.12-14; Plut. Marc. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{97} Pfeilschifter (2007), 37, n. 40.

\textsuperscript{98} See Chapter 6.4.
Beyond the *alae*, the allies were also grouped into units as *extraordinarii*. Before the *alae* were organized, the *extraordinarii* were chosen from among the allies. The prefects of the allies selected the best men of the allied soldiers, totaling about 1/5 of the allied infantry (around 2,000 men for a consular army) and 1/3 of the cavalry (roughly 600).\(^99\) The *extraordinarii* were then subdivided into four cohorts of infantry and ten *turmae* of cavalry.\(^100\) While Roman armies were on the march, Polybius says that the *extraordinarii* were usually deployed in the van, unless attacks were expected from the rear, and then they brought up the back.\(^101\) Unlike the *alae*, there is no indication of a regular position in the battle-line. Instead, they were employed as the general saw fit, providing a flexible force of good soldiers.\(^102\) The infantry often acted as support for the legions or *alae*. The cavalry and sometimes the infantry of the *extraordinarii* were also sent on special missions, such as reconnaissance.\(^103\)

There is little in the way of command structure for the *extraordinarii* evident in the sources. At no point is a prefect of the allies found commanding them. At times, consuls personally directed their actions. When a Roman camp was assaulted by Gauls in 194, the consul Tib. Sempronius Longus personally dispatched a cohort of *extraordinarii* to reinforce men fighting at one of the gates.\(^104\) In fact, they regularly camped near the general and a


\(^{100}\) Livy does not mention more than four cohorts of *extraordinarii* at a time (see 40.27.2), which is the logical number given the overall number of around 2000 infantry with roughly 500 men in each cohort. At no point does any source give an indication of the number of *turmae*. However, the cavalry numbered 600 men with *turmae* of 60 men each.

\(^{101}\) Polyb. 6.40.8.

\(^{102}\) Pfeilschifter (2007), 34.

\(^{103}\) Livy 40.31.3; Polyb. 10.39.1 (cf. Livy 27.18.10).

\(^{104}\) Livy 34.47.3.
select group of them also acted at the consul’s discretion.\textsuperscript{105} When the \textit{extraordinarii} were deployed in combat, they were often led by a legate who had been appointed by the Roman general.\textsuperscript{106} The relationship between a Roman general and the \textit{extraordinarii} was of particular importance and represented a holdover from earlier Italian practice. Further structure can be discerned upon closer examination of their selection, which will also shed more light on the relationship between the Roman generals and the \textit{extraordinarii}.

Polybius’ description implies that the soldiers of the \textit{extraordinarii} were chosen from all of the allied soldiers and then formed up together. Pfeilschifter has rightly pointed out that such an arrangement is difficult to imagine, given the linguistic difficulties involved. Instead, he theorizes that the Latin allies provided the bulk of the \textit{extraordinarii}, who would have then been supplemented by those other Italian soldiers familiar with Latin.\textsuperscript{107} A similar difficulty lies in the question of who commanded the cohorts and \textit{turmae} of the \textit{extraordinarii}. There would seem to be a misunderstanding of the sources involved. Should we also accept Polybius’ implication that only individuals were selected for the \textit{extraordinarii}? He makes no mention of cohorts when describing the division of allies. It seems more likely that he is here being vague, omitting the fact that the \textit{extraordinarii} were chosen as units (cohorts and \textit{turmae}).\textsuperscript{108} Such an arrangement would have solved the linguistic problems. The \textit{extraordinarii} as whole or the cohorts that comprised them would thus have even been drawn from a single community. No doubt the Latin allies sometimes made up the \textit{extraordinarii}, but not necessarily more than any other allied community.

\textsuperscript{105} Polyb. 6.26.7-9; Walbank (1957-1971), 1:709. A similar selection of Roman soldiers was also made, Polyb. 6.33.7-12.

\textsuperscript{106} Livy 35.5.1; 40.27.3, 30.4; 42.58.13.

\textsuperscript{107} Pfeilschifter (2007), 35.

\textsuperscript{108} Ilari (1974), 146.
Furthermore, only the commander needed to be fluent in Latin, although many of the men likely were at least familiar with it.\textsuperscript{109}

Such an arrangement may also shed light on the close relationship that is evident between the \textit{extraordinarii} and the generals of Roman armies. The allied prefects that were apparently tasked with choosing the \textit{extraordinarii} were themselves extensions of the social network of the general, and thus they may have chosen the \textit{extraordinarii} based on that particular community’s or local commander’s relationship with the general. It is notable that the Roman general Tib. Sempronius Longus remained with his men when they were forced to join the army of L. Cornelius Merula, and that they continued to provide loyal service because of the mutual obligations of both parties despite being forced to continue to serve.\textsuperscript{110}

The \textit{extraordinarii} were relics of earlier traditions, while simultaneously exhibiting the integration of the Italian allies into the Roman military structure. While the rest of the Italian allies were grouped into \textit{alae} under the command of Roman officers, the \textit{extraordinarii} still operated in the same way that had been traditional before the Punic Wars. The relationship between local leaders and Roman generals played a significant role. The \textit{extraordinarii} represented a means for a Roman general to recognize certain allied leaders or communities, as well as a special distinction for the allies.\textsuperscript{111} Roman generals used this position to recognize those allies with whom they had close relations according to Italian traditions. Tradition and innovation were blended.

\textsuperscript{109} See Chapter 6.2.

\textsuperscript{110} Livy 34.56.12.

\textsuperscript{111} Liebenam (1909), 1697.
At what exact point the *extraordinarii* was no longer formed is unknown, although it has been suggested that it was around the end of the 2nd century.\(^{112}\) Sallust makes no mention of them in situations where one might expect them. Whether the *extraordinarii* were formed up to the outbreak of the Social War (91-88) is impossible to determine. They are not mentioned in the sources for that period, but those sources are generally poor. For certain, they were not formed after the Social War, when the Italians were no longer allies, but were fully integrated into the Roman state as citizens. As such, the *extraordinarii* ceased to exist no later than the early 1st century.

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The integration of the Italians into the developing Roman military system was a long process, culminating in the opening years of the Second Punic War. New organization and command structures came into existence that subordinated the Italians. Polybius reflects the integration of the Italians in the way that he describes them in his narrative. Almost invariably, he makes no distinctions between the Romans and Italians.\(^{113}\) For him, the differences were irrelevant to the story he wished to tell. The Romans and Italians were so closely intertwined that it was an unnecessary complication to acknowledge the Italians separately. The Romans and the other Italians had long been closely connected, but by the end of the Second Punic War the Italians had been subsumed as part of the growing Roman empire and its army. Their integration also had an impact on the Roman perception of them as allies. An idea of obligation developed that Rome’s allies were required to provide military assistance as the Romans dictated: this is the subject of the following chapter. Like

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\(^{112}\) Liebenam (1909), 1698.

\(^{113}\) Erdkamp (2007a), 49-55.
organizational concerns, the idea was the result of a long process that developed fully in the Second Punic War.
Chapter Four

Military Obligation

As a result of the growing trend of the military integration of the Italians, a concept of military obligation developed among the Romans with regard to their Italian allies. The Romans began to use the military resources of their allies as they wished, furthering the degradation of the Italians to something less than allies. Obligation is the belief that an action is required due to some prior commitment, in this case military support on the part of Rome’s Italian allies. This chapter examine the development of the idea of obligation from its Italian origins within the historical narrative. The bonds of Italian communities were a web of formal and informal relations that included the tradition of military cooperation, making it difficult for us to point to the exact source of the idea of military obligation that became predominant in Roman thinking by the 2nd century. As a result, the basis of the idea of military obligation is elusive in the sources, and has been much debated. The idea was based by the Romans on supposed historical precedent to justify the military exploitation of their Italian allies that resulted from the process of integration and subordination which reached fruition in the Second Punic War.

1. Anachronistic Obligations of the Latins and Hernici
The idea of military obligation is given ancient precedent by Roman writers. In the narratives of early Roman history, when Latium was under constant pressure from neighboring peoples, the Romans were portrayed as the military leaders of the Latins (and nearby Hernici). These allies were forced to come at Rome’s beck and call, submitting to Roman leadership in war. However, this characterization reflects later developments of the relationship of the Romans and Italians. Ancient writers retrojected details of their own day into the past, in part as justification for the increasingly dominant position of the Romans over their Italian allies. Such a depiction does not accurately reflect the nature of early Italian warfare that has been discussed in earlier chapters.

The peoples of Latium faced a dire military situation in the 5th century. Etruscan hegemony had collapsed and neighboring peoples were constantly attacking. The peoples of Latium joined their military forces together, increasing their chances for survival and success, while on the other side the peoples of neighboring lands did the same. In the years 459 and 458, Latium faced attacks from the Aequi, Volsci, and Sabines.\footnote{Livy 3.22-29.} In 459, the Volsci attacked the city of Antium, while the Aequi seized Tusculum. According to the sources, in both cases it was only with the assistance of the Romans that the invaders were driven away. Roman generals levied their armies, ordered the Latins and Hernici to provide men, and then led this coalition force to defend Latium. The next year, the Aequi renewed their attack on Tusculum, while the Sabines marched towards Rome. The Romans again came to the aid of their allies against the Aequi as well as defeating the Sabines.

Two important considerations emerge from this example. First, the combined armies of the peoples of Latium were needed to drive off these attacks. It was only by combining their military power that they were able to resist outside pressure and launch their own
attacks. Without military cooperation, each city and people would have fallen one by one. Although some cities were occupied, Latium did not fall to invaders as much of Campania had to Samnites. The Hernici likewise allied themselves with the Romans and Latins to ward off attacks by the neighboring Aequi and Volsci. The second consideration is the place of the Romans. Although military cooperation was a central factor in the interaction of the peoples of Latium, the Romans are clearly portrayed as dominant. However, the position and power of the Romans may not have been as supreme as depicted in the sources.

Roman writers insist that the military obligations of Rome’s allies in this period were linked to treaties. Livy says that in 459 “the Hernici and Latins were ordered to provide soldiers ex foedere.”\(^2\) This idea that allies were required to provide men as the Romans dictated is commonly found in the narratives of early Roman history. As Alföldi has written, “in the minds of the annalists. . . the Latins have nothing to say, nothing to undertake. They report only the approach of an enemy; Rome acts.”\(^3\) The Latins (and Hernici) merely provided men for efforts led by Rome. They were subordinate, even to the point that local threats resulted in calls for Roman assistance. In the above example, defense of Latium was laid at the feet of the Romans, while the Latins were relegated to a clearly subordinate position of support. Indeed, this perception of the position of the Romans is reflected in the terminology of Roman writers when they describe wars between the Romans and Latins. When the Romans and Latins went to war, Roman authors call them ‘revolts’ clearly expressing the perceived superiority of the Romans compared to their allies.

\(^2\) *Hernici et Latini iussi milites dare ex foedere*, Livy, 3.22.4. This same idea is echoed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. For a list of the supposed obligations to provide soldiers and other examples of Roman domination found in annalistic sources, see Alföldi (1965), 107-110.

\(^3\) Alföldi (1965), 108.
The relationship between the Romans and the other peoples of Latium was in fact complex and constantly changing. The city of Rome was by far the largest and most powerful militarily in the region from at least the late 6th century onwards. Demographically, the Romans far outstripped the other Latins, and thus could field far more fighting men than any other single Latin people. Rome was the most powerful city in Latium, which would have facilitated a certain amount of dominance, but not necessarily to the degree portrayed by Roman writers. Indeed, Festus preserves a passage from L. Cincius stating that at the spring of Ferentina a common council of the peoples of Latium decided which community would provide the general of their combined forces. The passage makes it clear that the Romans were most often chosen, but that a non-Roman Latin general was a possibility. At the same time, this body, the *nomen Latinum*, was bound by more than *foedera* (or the *foedus Cassianum*). In reality, the peoples of Latium were tied together through treaties, intermarriage, ties of hospitality, the movement of individuals, trade, and shared religious rites. Their military interactions was not solely dictated by formal alliances. Many other bonds were in existence which facilitated military cooperation. *Foedera* were merely one component.

Strictly speaking, the *foedus Cassianum* only dictated a mutual defense pact; participants were to come to aid of any others who came under attack. There was no legal basis for aggressive action. To be sure, it would have been easy enough to find an excuse to call any war defensive and thus manipulate legal relations as justification. After all, warfare

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4 Festus, 276, 277 L.

5 Forsythe (2005), 188; Alföldi (1965), 119. Cornell ([1995], 299) is right to point out that no example of a non-Roman general is preserved. However, that does not mean that it never occurred, only that evidence does not survive.

6 See Chapter 2.2.a.
in this period seems to have been exceedingly reactionary. However, this view oversimplifies the complexities of military cooperation. The Romans certainly held a dominant position, but it was *de facto* as opposed to *de iure*. There were many other relationships that could be exploited for war-making that did not rely on legalistic arguments. No doubt, many Latins would have been eager to fight alongside Romans with whom they had personal relationships without being forced by treaty obligations. Indeed, there has been no attempt to argue that Samnites used *foedera* to force their allies to participate in their wars. There were many other relationships that facilitated military cooperation in Italy, and the situation was no different with regards to the Romans and their Latin allies. The Romans existed within the military environment of Italy, they did not transcend it.

In fact, in the months between the end of the First Samnite War and the beginning of the Great Latin War, the Romans admitted that they could not legally control the military actions of their Latin allies. In that year, the Romans had made peace with the Samnites, with whom they had been fighting in the First Samnite War, but their allies, the Latins, Campanians, and Sidicini continued to fight. When the Samnites complained to the Romans, their answer was that there was nothing in the treaty between themselves and the Latins that made it possible for the Romans to dictate who the Latins went to war with. Indeed, such a stance seems an accurate reflection of the *foedus Cassianum*, but it certainly does not match the assertions of military domination on the part of the Romans. The lack of a clear legal authority did not stop the Romans from considering themselves the rightful leaders of Latium, and they did not abide the usurpation of their informal position in 341. They joined forces with the Samnites and defeated their own allies. In the resulting settlement, the Latins were incorporated as Roman citizens, which did give a legal basis for military exploitation.

\[7\] Livy 8.2.13.
Stability was sought in Rome’s other alliances with grants of *civitas sine suffragio*. The Roman domination of the Latins, as well as their other allies, was informal even as their relationship was legally established as equal by treaty.

Later writers erroneously retrojected the idea of military obligation linked to *foedera* into their narratives of this early period of history. Alföldi has laid the blame at the feet of Fabius Pictor, Rome’s first historian, although he perhaps goes too far in downgrading Roman power for the period. However, he is correct that Roman writers sought to portray the city of Rome as always being the dominant power in Latium and Central Italy. The idea that the Romans enjoyed a sufficient level of power in relation to their Italian allies in the 5th and 4th centuries (when most relationships were established), and that they could not only demand but also enforce an obligation to provide military assistance is an unlikely one, especially in the case of more distant communities. Different levels of domination must have simultaneously existed and changed over time as Roman hegemony grew. It was only over time that the Romans became powerful enough to take control of the military resources of the Italians generally, as when the Romans came to be masters of all of Italy in the early 3rd century. Indeed, the instability of alliances in early Italy would have made enforcing military obligations among potentially hostile ‘allies’ difficult and potentially dangerous.

It is useful to note Livy’s use of the phrase ex *foedere* with regards to military obligations in his surviving narrative. With regards to the Latins and Hernici, he is quick to make connections with treaties. However, he stops using the phrase *ex foedere* in the middle

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8 See Chapter 2.2.d.

9 Alföldi (1965), 123-175; see Introduction, page 11.
of the 4th century with regards to military obligations. Thereafter, only naval obligations are explicitly linked to treaties, while military obligations are sometimes linked to formulae. Both will be discussed below. If military obligations were linked to treaties with allied communities, it is odd that Livy would not continue to say as much when his sources became much fuller instead of switching vocabulary. By retrojecting the idea of military obligation, ancient Roman writers were, in part, justifying the military subordination of Rome’s Italian allies in later periods. The Romans may well have considered their community as hegemon of Latium with the right to run roughshod over their allies, but this attitude should not be conflated with the idea of military obligation that developed in later periods. It is important to discount the biases of later Roman writers and to keep in mind the complexities of military cooperation as well as formal and informal relationships in Italian warfare and politics. Military cooperation was a well established practice in Italy, including Rome.

2. Polybius’ Catalogue in 225

Polybius gives an account of the events surrounding the Telamon Campaign in 225 that seems to provide a great many details of the military relationships of the Romans and their Italian allies in the face of an invasion by Gauls. He records that the Romans ordered their subordinate allies to provide lists (ἀπογραφαί) of men of military age. He then goes on to list the peoples of Italy and the number of men they could put in the field. The total, including the Romans, he lists is 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry available to serve in Roman armies, which he contrasted with Hannibal’s army that came over the Alps

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10 The last instance in the surviving portions of his work is Livy 7.12.7.

numbering less than 20,000 men. Unsurprisingly, this passage has been touted as of supreme importance in our knowledge of the military resources available to the Romans and the relationship with their Italian allies. Taken at face value, it seems to showcase a high level of Roman control in the recruitment of their Italian allies. However, there are major concerns about its reliability. At best it reflects the growing trend of integration taking place in the 3rd century, but it is difficult to take the implication of military obligation at face value.

There are numerous problems with the reliability of the passage as a source for hard evidence. Perhaps the most obvious problem is how such lists were quickly and accurately compiled in such a rugged country with many remote settlements. In addition, later during the Second Punic War, the Romans demanded that their Latin colonies provide them with census results in order to obtain a sense of available manpower, which Livy says was the first time such a request was made. His statement does not match with Polybius’ assertions. Then there is the list of peoples. The Italiote Greeks, Bruttians, and a few minor peoples, such as the Paeligni and Volsci, are missing, eliciting debates on the implications of their absence. The Sabines represent another issue. They were full Roman citizens since 264 but are nonetheless recorded separately from the Roman citizens, while the Campanian cives sine suffragio are included among the Roman citizenry. At the same time, it does not appear that the Etruscans, Sabines, or Umbrians actually returned lists, although they raised armies to aid the Romans. In fact, Polybius says that the Etruscans, Sabines, Umbrians, and Sarsinates (a people beyond peninsular Italy) had come “to the temporary assistance of

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12 Livy 29.37.7. For discussion, see below page 133.
14 Afzelius ([1942], 101) has argued that the size of the forces raised by these peoples, as described by Polybius, is confused with their manpower totals.
There are also problems with the numbers given. The individual numbers do not add up to the total numbers given without modification. The basis for these Roman demands is unclear; there is no mention of treaties or military obligations.

While taken individually each of the corrections or explanations given for the problems in this passage are acceptable enough, but when taken as a whole the inconsistencies and problems throw doubt on the historicity of the passage. Indeed, numbers are notorious for being easily corrupted in the manuscripts. The danger may in fact be the high regard as a source that Polybius has enjoyed as a historian. One particularly well respected historian has warned that

there are some who do not pay attention to what is written, but to the writer himself and for that reason, keeping in mind that he was a contemporary... simply deem everything he wrote as authoritative. I, on the other hand, believe that it is necessary neither to disregard the authoritativeness of the historian, nor to judge him as unquestionable.

It is important not to give Polybius’ accounts undue credence, but to look at the reliability of his information in its own right. In fact, the above quote comes from Polybius himself who wrote it about Q. Fabius Pictor, one of his sources for early Roman history. Nonetheless, it also applies to the reputation of Polybius. While he is an invaluable source, he cannot be accepted without reservations based on the strengths of other portions of his history or because he was a near contemporary when so many problems present themselves here. Polybius was likely drawing his figures from Pictor, who wrote the first history of Rome and

15 τού καιρού προσβοηθησάντων, Polyb. 2.24.5.
17 ἐννοι γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τὸν λέγοντα, καὶ λαβόντες ἐν νῷ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε... πᾶν εὖδεως ἤγοινται τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦτο πιστόν. ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ μὲν δὲν οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελὴ δὲ κρίνειν, Polyb. 3.9.4-5.
participated in the Roman response to the Gauls in 225. Pictor seems to have had a strong hand in cementing the idea that the Romans had always maintained a position of dominance including the military exploitation of their allies. These anachronistic ideas were then reproduced by Polybius. Pictor’s involvement with the Telamon Campaign, while certainly lending credence to the given figures, cannot make up for the numerous difficulties that are present.

The passage numbering the peoples of Italy is a literary device, juxtaposing the manpower resources of the Romans and their allies with the meager army of Hannibal, implying the ultimate futility of the Punic invasion. The passage is quite effective in conveying a sense of wonder at the military resources available to the Romans. At the same time, the list serves as a catalogue of peoples in the Greek tradition. Gone are the Homeric heroes and their bands of followers; in their place is a systematic listing of the peoples of Italy reminiscent of a Roman census. The pan-Italian Roman armies of the Second Punic War were well suited to the format of a Homeric catalogue, as the poet Silius Italicus also demonstrated. (Silius was far less imaginative or creative in his own poorly composed adaptation.)

No doubt the description of forces in 225 represented an attempt to quantify and convey a very intricate system of tradition and precedent that defied a schematic definition, but it should not be used as proof for the military and political relations that existed between the Romans and their Italian allies. In general terms, it may reflect the trend of military integration of Rome’s Italian allies during the 3rd century. The Italians were increasingly becoming subsumed within a developing Roman military system at this time, but in a fairly

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18 See Introduction page 11.

19 Sil. Ital. 8.356-616.
limited way.\textsuperscript{20} Roman domination of Italy likely brought with it a sense of Roman superiority, reminiscent of similar attitudes in Latium in earlier periods. Once more, poor survival of sources prevents a more detailed discussion of how the idea of military obligation developed during the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century. Indeed, by about this time the Romans seem to have assumed the right of allowing the recruitment of mercenaries in Italy by foreign entities, suggesting some sort of sense of control.\textsuperscript{21} However, this process was not so well developed prior to the Second Punic War as Polybius seems to imply. Indeed, he may be following the Roman trend of retrojecting the idea of military obligation or perhaps simply generalizing a complex phenomenon for his intended Greek audience, as he was prone to do. Whatever the case, caution must be taken with reading too much into this catalogue.

3. Foedera, Formulae, and Military Obligations

Over the course of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century Rome’s Italian allies were increasingly integrated in Roman armies, a process that came together as a result of the military pressures of the Second Punic War. At the same time, the idea that all allied military resources were subject to the control of the Romans was fully expressed. Of particular importance was the ‘revolt’ in 209 of twelve of the Latin colonies, which claimed to be unable to provide any more men for Roman armies. In the end, the Romans asserted their dominance of the military resources of these communities and, by extension, the rest of their Italian allies. By the dawn of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, the Italians were subject to Roman military demands as never before. When the Romans wanted men, the Italians provided them. They were sent wherever the Romans

\textsuperscript{20} See Chapter 3.1.

\textsuperscript{21} The Romans authorized Carthaginian recruitment of Italians during the Truceless War (241-237), App. \textit{Sic.} 2.3.
needed, and they fought where they were told. This military obligation was expressed in a variety of ways, including the well-known *formula togatorum*, which was a justification of military exploitation built on supposed historical precedent that was in fact a manifestation of Roman dominance. In the 2nd century, the Italians found themselves increasingly removed from Italian traditions of military cooperation and subject to Roman domination. The idea of military obligation, first clearly expressed in the Second Punic War, became the basis of how the Romans viewed the military resources of their allies.

a. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The Second Punic War includes several examples of direct Roman control of the military resources of their allies. There was no doubt a growing trend of such domination over the course of the 3rd century, as Polybius’ catalogue in 225 suggests, but it was in the war with Hannibal that the idea of military obligation reached fruition. The military pressures of that war were immense, combined with the disaffection of a large number of Rome’s Italian allies. It was over the course of the war that the Romans took a greater amount of control over the military resources of their allies. However, these changes were uneven in their application. Not all Italian communities came under the same control at the same time, nor was the process complete by the end of the war in 201.

In 216, just after the Roman defeat at Cannae, the Campanian city of Capua joined in an alliance with Hannibal. Livy records that as part of their alliance the Campanians would not be subject to conscription by Hannibal.\(^{22}\) Politically, Capua had, since the middle of the 4th century, been an unstable Roman ally, resulting in several instances where Roman

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\(^{22}\) Livy 23.7.1.
magistrates interfered with its local politics.\textsuperscript{23} However, these instances of interference seem to have been limited. Nevertheless, it appears that the Romans put a garrison in the city early in the war, which was massacred when Capua joined Hannibal.\textsuperscript{24} Such an action by an Italian community is not surprising, given the instability of alliances in earlier periods. The question then becomes how to interpret the military control exerted on Capua by the Romans. There can be little doubt that the Romans were increasingly domineering over the course of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century with regards to their allies. This trend applied to Capua as well, as evidenced by the imposition of a garrison, although it may not have been entirely a Roman decision.\textsuperscript{25} However, the insistence that no Campanian citizen be forcibly conscripted seems aimed at Hannibal as much as it reflects grievances against Rome. Indeed, there is no evidence to support the idea of force being used to recruit Rome’s Italian allies, including those with \textit{civitas sine suffragio}.\textsuperscript{26} However, the relatively close proximity of Rome and Capua, made more so by the Via Appia, may have contributed to more domineering Roman actions in the use of Campanian military resources. If this was the case, there is no evidence of how widespread such practices were. As with Polybius’ catalogue in 225, the example of Capua suggests a precedent for later ideas of military obligation. Roman domination increased significantly when Capua fell to the Romans in 211.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} See Chapter 2; Frederiksen (1984), 228-230.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Livy 23.7; 26.13.5; 31.31.5.
\item \textsuperscript{25} It may be that a pro-Roman faction asked for a garrison, as occurred shortly thereafter in Nola despite the coexistence of hostile factions, Livy 23.14.7-13; cf. 23.15-17.
\item \textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 2.2.d.
\item \textsuperscript{27} According to the ancient accounts, Capua was, for a time, no longer permitted to have magistrates, a senate, assemblies, or any other governmental institutions, Livy 26.16.5. 34.1-12; Cic. \textit{leg. agr.} 2.88. Such measures were likely temporary, Frederiksen (1984), 248. Capua apparently had to provide Roman magistrates with census returns, which would have given the Romans knowledge of local military resources, Livy 26.34.4.
\end{itemize}
An important step in the development of the idea of military obligation occurred when a number of Rome’s Latin colonies ‘revolted’. In 209 twelve of the then thirty Latin colonies sent representatives to Rome to complain about the pressures that the war with Hannibal was putting on their populations and to assert their inability to continue to contribute men to Roman armies.28 The Roman Senate was in utter disbelief that people who were once Roman citizens could, as they saw it, betray their fatherland. In response, the consuls summoned representatives from the rest of the colonies, asking them whether they were also unable to provide soldiers. The other eighteen colonies assured the Roman magistrates that not only did they have the requested soldiers, but more if they were needed. There was little the Romans could do to stop the recalcitrant colonies in 209, and so the subject was dropped for the time being. However, in 204 matters were much different. The Romans had recovered their footing and had subdued many of their rebellious Italian allies. In that year, they demanded from the twelve wayward Latin colonies twice as many soldiers as they had ever provided for Roman armies since Hannibal had entered Italy.29 In addition, a tax of .1% was imposed (the colonies had also claimed not to be able to provide money in 209), and a census of their populations was ordered, the results of which were to be given to the Romans for the first time. The representatives of the colonies complained that they did not have the men to meet any demand, let alone an increased one, but the decision remained.30

The ‘revolt’ of some of the Latin colonies was relatively minor compared to the actual rebellions of Rome’s other Italian allies. Italian alliances had never been notably

28 Livy 27.9-10. For a list of the colonies involved, see Appendix 1.
29 Livy 29.15.6.
30 Livy 29.15.13.
stable. In the years before the Punic Wars, it was not unusual for allies to break their agreements only to reestablish them later. Even if a community remained loyal, factions or individuals within it may still have provided military assistance to enemies. Military cooperation was central to Italian alliances and, as a result, military defeat could spark the abandonment of those alliances, as the Romans had seen after the battle of Lautulae in 315. In the Second Punic War, following several disasters culminating in the defeat at the battle of Cannae in 216, large numbers of Rome’s allies joined Hannibal against the Romans. For Capua, there was the practical concern of Hannibal in Campania as well as the apparently declining prospects of Roman victory. Such defection is hardly surprising given the history of Italy, but it represented a serious threat to the Roman ability to continue to fight the war. Little could be done but slowly subdue rebellious allies. The Roman reaction to the representatives of the twelve Latin colonies is hardly surprising given the larger implications.

In 204, as soon as they were able to do so without the danger of inciting outright revolt, the Romans took measures to secure the military resources of those colonies and ensure that they would be fully under the control of Rome in the future. The relationship between the Romans and a portion their Latin colonies was fundamentally altered in 204 as a direct result of the pressures of the Hannibalic War. The heart of the Latin complaint had been the large numbers of men that were needed to continue the war on the scale it was being fought. As the representatives of the colonies complained, “the citizen who was enlisted as a soldier by the Roman was more lost to them than one who was captured by the

31 See Chapter 1.
32 Frederiksen (1984), 241.
For the Romans, the claim of inability to provide military support, the most important component of community relations in Italy, was a direct threat to their ability to make war effectively. The war against Carthage required vast amounts of manpower, including Roman citizens and their allies, with these colonies perhaps representing tens of thousands of troops. As a result, in 204 the Romans assumed greater control of the military resources of the twelve Latin colonies. Not only did the Romans demand large numbers of men immediately, but, more importantly, censuses would provide them with an accurate measure of manpower in the future. This measure was likely meant to ensure that a similar situation would not occur again, as opposed to the purposeful creation of a new exploitative system, but nevertheless such knowledge provided a great deal of power.

The settlement of 204 represents a tipping point in the direct control of allied military resources. In 204, only twelve of the then thirty colonies were affected, 40% of the total at the time. There is no indication that the other eighteen, who were quick to offer more men as needed in 209, were in any way impacted in 204. It is unknown whether those colonies founded after 204 were under the same control as the twelve, although there is no reason to assume that they were. While the census figures may have provided a means of ensuring the recalcitrant colonies contributed to the Roman army sufficiently, the aftermath of the ‘revolt’ of the Latin colonies apparently did not form the basis for any immediate mechanism to calculate the manpower obligations of any community beyond these twelve. That is to say, there was no list of Italian allies similar to Polybius’ catalogue during the Second Punic War. The measures taken with regard to the twelve Latin colonies was a step closer to full military control, but it was not complete.

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33 magis perire sibi civem qui ab Romano miles lectus sit quam qui ab Poeno captus, Livy 27.9.3.

34 Toynbee (1965), 2:112.
In another affair, this time involving the Bruttians, a similar step towards control was taken, although on a far deeper level. Instead of demanding a census or additional men for their armies, the Romans forbad any Bruttians to join their armies as punishment for their loyalty to Hannibal. 35 For any Italian people, whose cultures emphasized warfare, such a decree was severe. Such an action was made possible by the fact that the Romans controlled all of Italy. If the Bruttians were not allowed to fight in Roman armies, they would not be able to fight in any armies. (Mercenary service was no longer an option either.) Roman armies were by now the only outlet for Italian manpower. The Romans were regulating the military affairs of their allies in an unprecedented way thanks to their position. At the same time the Italians were becoming completely integrated into a Roman military system including the *alae* and prefects of the allies.

The military pressures of the Second Punic War resulted in the complete military subordination of Rome’s Italian allies. When the Romans had come into a hegemonic position in Italy in the early 3rd century, the Italians had, by necessity, looked to Rome for leadership. In the First Punic War, the same system of military cooperation that had typified Italian warfare was apparently still operating, albeit dominated by the Romans. However, the nature of the Second Punic War meant that the traditional system was no longer sufficient and serious changes occurred during the war. More men were needed for more armies in theatres far from Italy. Under this pressure the Romans stepped more firmly into a position of leadership. Revolts (of whatever severity) threatened the position of the Romans, spurring them to take more direct control of the military resources of their allies. Italian alliances before the Punic Wars were unreliable at best, a looseness that was unacceptable to the

35 App. Hann. 61; Gel. NA 10.3.19. Some Bruttians had followed Hannibal to Africa, Livy 33.5.6. Roman armies operated in Bruttium and garrisoned it from 203 to 200, Livy 30.1, 19.10-12, 37.7, 40.5, 41.1; 31.6.2, 8.7. A number of maritime and Latin colonies followed.
Romans as their military involvements became larger and more complex. As the Romans began to look beyond the Italian peninsula and to contend with larger and more dangerous opponents, they could no longer afford such a potential threat. The precedents set by the Romans with regard to Capua, the Latins, and the Bruttians set the stage for their increased control of the recruitment of allied forces and the full development of the idea of obligation. As the 2nd century dawned, the Italians were no longer the allies that they had once been.

b. NAVAL OBLIGATIONS

The expression of the idea of obligation can be seen in the Roman attitude towards, and use of, naval resources in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries. On several occasions Livy explicitly states that communities were required to provide ships for Roman fleets *ex foedere*. For example, he says that “[D. Quinctius] put together a fleet of twenty ships by demanding what was due from the treaty (*ex foedere*) from the allies as well as Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum. . .” Cicero says, with regard to the Mamertines of Messana, that “in their treaty itself (*in ipso foedere*) it was established and written down that it was necessary for them to provide a ship.” Polybius says of Italian Locri that they were “required by the Romans to send support over the sea according to their treaty (*κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας*).” However, upon closer examination, these passages do not support the idea of naval obligations linked to *foedera*, but instead indicate the developing idea of military obligation at the time.

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36 _postremo ipse a sociis Reginisque et a Velia et a Paesto debitas ex foedere exigendo, classem viginti navium, sicut ante dictum est, efficit_, Livy 26.39.5.

37 _Mamertinis in ipso foedere sanctum atque praescriptum sit ut navem dare nesses sit_, Cic. Ver. 2.5.50.

38 ἡν ὁφελον κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐκπέμπειν Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, Polyb. 12.5.2.
As in his use of the term *socii navales* when referring to naval personnel, Livy proves inconsistent and loose in his assertion of obligations *ex foedere*. He lists Paestum as having a naval obligation via treaty, but Paestum was in fact a Latin colony and as such did not even have a formal treaty with Rome. More telling, he says that prior to the war with Antiochus III, the Carthaginians offered to send grain and ships to aid the Roman fleet being prepared. In response, the Senate replied that “concerning the fleet, the Carthaginians were released [from their offer] beyond those ships they owed *ex foedere*.” There is no indication anywhere else that the treaty with Carthage had such a requirement in their treaty. In many ways, these statements reflect the earlier references to military obligations *ex foedere* by the Latins and Hernici. Livy cannot be trusted in his assertions of naval obligations based on treaties, as he is prone to inaccuracies in such matters.

At the same time, Cicero, despite his apparent specificity, is somewhat vague in exactly what the Mamertines were required to provide in their treaty. He describes the required ship generally as a *navis* as well as more specifically a merchant-vessel (*cybaea*) and a warship (*biremis*). It is possible that, like Livy (heaven forbid the comparison), Cicero is simply being loose in his terminology, perhaps attempting to diversify his word choice. In addition, there is the fact that Messana was in the province of Sicily, not in Italy. Appian indicates that the naval requirements of Sicilian communities were instituted *after* the

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39 *Socii navales* were not a special category of allies, but the term was used by Livy as a generic way to refer to naval personnel, see Appendix 2.


41 *de classe Carthaginiensibus remissum, praeterquam si quid navium ex foedere deberent*, Livy 36.4.9. According to Livy, the Carthaginians did in fact send ships, which not only participated in a large naval battle, but did so with a great deal of bravery and daring. Livy 36.44.5-7.


43 Cic. *Ver.* 2.4.17, 5.50-51.
First Punic War, when praetors began to be sent to the island.\textsuperscript{44} If the treaty with Messana, to which Cicero is referring, was concluded sometime around the beginning of the First Punic War when diplomatic contact was first initiated, it is odd that the Romans would limit their demands to a single antiquated bireme when they were in need of large numbers of ships with which to combat the massive fleets of Carthaginian quinqueremes, or a single merchant ship when they needed to ferry legions over the straits annually. The naval arrangements of the Sicilian city of Messana described by Cicero, however they were specifically defined in the treaty, were likely due to a later reorganization of the province by Roman governors sometime after the First Punic War. It may be that changes occurred sometime in the early 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, when similar adjustments were made with regards to military obligations in Spain.\textsuperscript{45}

Then there is Polybius’ statements concerning Italian Locri. The necessity of providing aid, according to him, was very burdensome. Polybius was familiar with the obligations of Locri as he claims to have personally interceded on their behalf release them from participating in campaigns in Spain and Illyria. What is important here is what Polybius does not say. He does not state that the Locrians were required to provide any ships or anything else specific, which is very different from the vessel (whatever it may have been) required of Messana or the statements from Livy concerning naval obligations. It is interesting to compare an earlier reference to Locri’s naval assistance made by Polybius. When describing Ap. Claudius’ effort to cross the Strait of Messana in 264, Polybius says that because they lacked a fleet of their own the Romans were forced to borrow

\textsuperscript{44} App. Sic. 2.2.

\textsuperscript{45} See page 145.
(συγχρησάµενοι) ships from the cities of Tarentum, Elea, Neapolis, and Locri. If Locri was under a specific treaty obligation, why did Claudius not demand the ships outright as (according to Livy) D. Quinctius is said to have done of Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum? There is little reason to think that the treaty with Locri involved any clearly unequal provisions. Relations between the Romans and Locrians were tense during the Pyrrhic War, but afterwards they seem to have stabilized. A clause demanding naval assistance on Roman command, which would clearly indicate inequality, seems unlikely. It would seem more appropriate to see the treaty between Rome and Locri as comprising a mutual defense pact akin to the foedus Cassianum, which the Romans used to demand naval support when, by the 2nd century, their power had eclipsed that of all their Italian allies. The same explanation may also clarify Carthage’s supposed naval obligations.

Naval obligations can be seen as developing in the late 3rd or early 2nd centuries as part of the larger trend of military obligations. The lack of consistency on the matter by ancient sources should not be surprising. As the idea of military obligations developed fully, Roman expression it varied. Polybius, the earliest source, uses a looser definition of what was required, while later writers (Livy and Cicero) make clear statements of naval obligations based on treaties. Indeed, such obligations were eventually written into treaties in Sicily and Spain, although not in Italy where the Romans’ relationships with their allies were more complicated. The Romans were increasingly exploiting the military and naval resources of their allies for their own purposes, a step often erroneously linked to treaties by later writers.

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46 Polyb. 1.20.13-14.

47 The Locrians even issued a series of coins that crowned the goddess Roma with πίστις. Walbank (1957-1971), 2:332.
c. THE FORMULA TOGATORUM

The formula togatorum has proved itself difficult to define. Various explanations have been posited: a schedule intended to distribute the burdens of military service evenly; a treaty clause dictating specific military obligations; or the annual lists sent out by Roman magistrates to Italian communities. All these explanations are related either directly or indirectly with the idea of military obligation linked to treaties between the Romans and their Italian allies. However, this perspective oversimplifies the complexity of relationships in Italy. The formula togatorum was a concept based on supposed historical precedent that was expressed in a variety of means to justify Roman military exploitation and Italian subordination. It was an expression of the development of a Roman military system and the rise of Rome to a Mediterranean empire that was not limited to a single easily defined idea.

Only once does the actual phrase ‘formula togatorum’ appear in any source. The lex agraria of 111 refers to “the socii and nominis Latini in the land of Italy from whom [the consuls] are accustomed to demand soldiers ex formula togatorum.” Unfortunately, the reference is far too vague to stand alone. There is no indication of the exact nature of this formula or its basis (legal or otherwise), although it is clearly linked to the idea of military obligation.

Nowhere else does the entire phrase formula togatorum appear, but Livy refers at several points to formulae with regards to military service. Regarding the levy of forces in

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216, he says that the consuls “also sent to the allies (socii and Latin allies), receiving their soldiers ex formula.” A few more details are preserved in the interaction of the Romans and the Latin colonies a few years later. In 209, when twelve Latin colonies insisted they could not provide soldiers, the consul asked the representatives of the other eighteen colonies “whether they had any soldiers ready ex formula,” to which they replied that “they had soldiers in readiness ex formula, and, if more were needed, more would be given.” Unable to do anything at the time, the Romans revisited the issue in 204, demanding twice as many men as had ever been given by the twelve recalcitrant colonies. The colonies complained “that even if a reduced number were required ex formula, it could hardly be met.”

Modern historians have connected these passages with others in order to try to build a more complete picture. With regards to the Telamon Campaign in 225, Polybius says that the Romans obtained lists (ἀπογραφαί) from some of their Italian allies that indicated the number of men available. This is the only place Polybius mentions lists, and the historical reliability of the passage is doubtful. In 177 representatives came to Rome from the Latin colonies, the Paeligni, and the Samnites to complain that thousands of their people had moved from their communities, which would, in time, leave them deserted and unable to provide soldiers. However, the complaint is not that their military burden was too high given their decrease in population, but instead targets the abuse of Latin rights and Roman citizenship that was taking place. The potential loss of entire allied communities was the

50 item ad socios Latinumque nomen ad milites ex formula accipiendos mittunt, Livy 22.57.10.

51 ecquid milites ex formula paratos haberent, Livy, 27.10.2. milites paratos ex formula esse, et, si pluribus opus esset, pluris daturos, Livy, 27.10.3-4.

52 vix, si simplum ex formula imperetur, ensiuros, Livy, 29.15.13.

53 Livy 41.8.6-8.
hyperbolic thrust of the argument, not a request for adjustment of military burdens. At the same time, there is no connection explicitly made with a formula.

Elsewhere, Livy and Polybius record how Roman generals actually levied men from allied communities. They say that Roman generals sent word to local Italian leaders letting them know how many men they were to provide and where.\(^\text{54}\) Brunt, relying primarily on this passage, has argued that the *formula togatorum* was, in reality, annual *formulae* that indicated quotas that were sent out the allied communities in this manner.\(^\text{55}\) But in this passage Livy does not use the word *formula*, nor does Polybius use ἀπογραφαί. To be sure, such an omission means little, especially in Livy’s case given his loose use of terminology. Instead of using the phrase *ex formula*, he here refers to the allies as those qui milites dare debebant (who were bound to provide soldiers). The formulation in this case is vague and indistinct, which is how the *formula togatorum* should be understood generally. What exactly bound these communities to give soldiers? When Livy refers to allies providing men *ex formula*, it should be understood as “according to (normal) practice”, which was ultimately based on precedent. The same holds for the *lex agraria* of 111, which closely parallels Livy. To be sure, this idea was linked to one of obligation, which was built on practice as opposed to legal dictates.

The *formula togatorum* was part of the trend of Italian military integration. It was not necessarily a list of manpower, although the Romans may have increasingly had access to such information, as with some of the Latin colonies in 204. It was not necessarily a specific treaty clause, but it was linked to the idea of military obligation. Livy’s assertions of naval obligations *ex foedere* are technically incorrect, while military obligations in early Roman

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\(^{54}\) Livy 34.56.3-7; Polyb. 6.21.4-5.

history are anachronistic. However, by Polybius’ day, in the mid-2nd century, the idea of obligation was well established. It is interesting to note that when he described the levy of allied soldiers more generally in Book 6, he treated the Roman use of Italian manpower as routine but does not mention obligations linked to treaties. The growing importance of military obligations tied to treaties can be seen in Roman relations in Spain. In 179, the propraetor Tib. Sempronius Gracchus (father of the later tribune) defeated various Celtiberian communities.\(^{56}\) He established a fairly stable situation by carefully cultivating informal relationships as well as creating formal treaties. These treaties stipulated that communities provide military contingents for Roman armies.\(^{57}\) Such actions by a Roman governor may also have taken place with regards to the naval obligations of Messana in Sicily. Gracchus’ Spanish settlements reflect changing Roman attitudes towards their allies at this time. Military obligation was increasingly being linked to treaties. In the case of Spain (and perhaps Messana), the outbreak of war and the level of Roman power in those regions meant that these obligations could be explicitly added to treaties.\(^{58}\)

The formula togatorum was an expression of Roman domination in the 2nd century as well as a method of military exploitation. The vagueness of the ancient sources is indicative of the vagueness of the concept of military obligation as it slowly developed over the course of the 3rd century. It took time for the Romans to develop a ‘suitable vocabulary’ to describe their own position.\(^{59}\) By the time of the lex agraria of 111, those allies subject to Roman

\(^{56}\) MRR, 1:393.

\(^{57}\) App. Iber. 9.43-44.

\(^{58}\) It is possible that a similar development occurred in Italy as the Romans defeated those Italian communities that had joined Hannibal, but no evidence survives and there was no grounds for such action with regards to those Italians that remained loyal to Rome.

\(^{59}\) Badian (1958), 145, referring to their political domination, see Chapter 6.
military exploitation were referred to generally as *togati*. The word literally translates as ‘toga wearers,’ a decidedly Roman term, which here indicates those liable for military service.⁶⁰ The loose use of terminology here is testament to the integration of the Italians into a Roman military system. Modern scholars have focused too much on establishing the legal nature of the *formula togatorum*, when it was a general expression of the concept of military obligation. A strict legal basis for military obligation was not necessary, as it was based on precedent, which was infinitely malleable and open to interpretation and saw expression in a variety of ways. The *formula togatorum* served essentially as needed. It is true that the Romans had access to manpower lists of a few of their allies. Capua and the twelve Latin colonies are named explicitly, but it is possible that over time the Romans applied these precedents more widely. In time, the military obligations of Rome’s Italian allies were routine and under the firm control of the Romans.

4. Recruitment and Discharge of Allies in the 2nd Century

The military integration of Rome’s Italian allies and the developed idea of military obligation had an impact on the recruitment and discharge of allied forces. The developing Roman state assumed some of the responsibility of recruitment. The Senate, which stepped into the role of leadership as the only long-standing body capable of leading the Republic, managed Roman generals and their armies more actively. Those generals could also rely on the idea of military obligation of Rome’s Italian allies to make up for shortfalls in their own informal relationships in recruitment. At the same time, the discharge of Italian forces was at Roman discretion, which was of particular importance as some campaigns lasted several years. Rome took control of its armies in a manner previously unknown.

Beginning the year after the end of the Second Punic War (200), the passages in Livy’s narrative regarding allied soldiers became different in character and are very indicative of the nature of Roman recruitment in the 2nd century. Now the military forces raised by Roman magistrates are systematically listed for every year. A good example comes from the year 200. In preparation for the war against Macedon, the Senate authorized the two consuls (P. Sulpicius Galba and C. Aurelius Cotta) to enroll four legions of citizens; two praetors (L. Furius Purpurio and Q. Minucius Rufus) were give 5,000 men from the Latins; another praetor (Q. Fulvius Gillo) was given 5,000 Latins and allies from one of the consular armies of the previous year in order to garrison Sicily; the propraetor M. Valerius Falto was to keep 5000 Latins and allies from the army he had commanded in Campania to garrison Sardinia; and finally two urban legions were to be raised and garrisoned in the City. This passage is a testament to the structure and formalization of the use of allied manpower resulting from the Second Punic War.

In the 2nd century, the Romans treated Italian military resources as theirs to do with as they pleased. In 193, the consul Q. Minucius,

sent an edict to the allies (socii and nominis Latini), or rather, to their magistrates and ambassadors, who were required to give soldiers, that they should meet him on the Capitoline. From these he apportioned fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, based on the number of iuniores.

Roman domination and control of the military resources of the Italians are clear. In the past, a combination of formal and informal relationships had facilitated recruitment. Here, it now

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61 Livy 31.8. Similar passages are to be found annually for the rest of Livy’s surviving books, and likely come from the annalistic tradition; the main sources for the Second Punic War (Polybius and Fabius Pictor) do not include similar accounts.

62 item sociis et Latino nominis, magistratibus legatisque eorum, qui milites dare debebant, edixit ut in Capitolio se adirent. iis quindecim milia peditum et quingentos equites, pro numero cuiusque iuniorum, disciprisit, Livy, 34.56.5-6.
appears in a much more institutional framework. Roman generals were typically authorized to raise men (both Roman and allied) by the Senate, which increasingly oversaw the affairs of the Republic. Indeed, Roman generals even took to praying on behalf of all of the Italians. 63 Such an action not only asserted the superior Roman position, but also assumed responsibilities on the part of their allies. More and more the Romans saw Italy and the peoples of Italy as theirs.

In the Second Punic War, signs of Roman domination began to be seen in the ways they treated allies during campaigns. With the defeat of Carthage at the battle of Zama (202) and the subsequent treaty, the Romans demanded that all those Latins that had deserted to Carthage be returned. These men were immediately beheaded. 64 The survivors of Cannae (Romans and Italians) were all summarily shipped off to Sicily on the orders of the Roman Senate for the remainder of the war. The Italians were generally subject to being punished by Roman officers and generals. 65 The Italians were no longer equal allies, but increasingly treated as subjects liable to the exploitation of their Roman masters.

The Romans’ control was clearly exhibited in the discharge of Italians from their armies. In the many conflicts before the Punic Wars in Italy campaigns were relatively short affairs conducted not too far from home. Over the course of the Punic Wars and the wars of the 2nd century Roman campaigns stretched over multiple years. In 206, the army of P. Cornelius Scipio threatened mutiny due to their extended service in Spain, led by C. Albius of Cales (a Latin colony) and C. Atrius, an Umbrian. 66 (Roman soldiers were implicated as

63 Livy 29.27.2; 31.5.4.
64 Livy 30.43.13.
65 See Chapter 3.
well.) Most likely, the cause was the men’s unhappiness at being kept in Spain so long. Later, in 180, similar a dispute occurred about which we have more a more detailed account. One of the praetors in Spain (Q. Fulvius Flaccus) requested that the Senate allow him to bring his army home in order to discharge them, arguing that Spain was peaceful. He added that many of the soldiers had served for extended periods of time and there was a possibility of mutinies if they were forcibly kept under arms. Some had been in Spain over seven years. However, Tib. Sempronius, who was to succeed Fulvius, insisted that the veteran army remain for his own campaigns and that any discharges be minimal. He added that if he was given a wholly new army he would not campaign with it, jeopardizing Roman efforts in Spain. The army in Spain exhibited its hostility, vowing that “they would either keep the general (Flaccus) in the province or go with him to Italy.”

The Senate was stuck in a quandary. Two Roman commanders waged a political fight while the army, made up of both citizens and allies, was caught in the middle and becoming very unruly. At the same time, the Senate needed to maintain its preeminence as overseer of the Republic and so decided on a compromise. Fulvius, if he saw fit, was to bring back with him those soldiers that had been in Spain since at least 186, those that had fought in two difficult battles with the Celtiberians that had occurred under his command, as well as any soldiers who exceeded the number that the Senate had deemed necessary for the war effort. The rest were to stay under the command of Sempronius. The compromise seems to have been successful and the discharge of men was handled smoothly. When

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67 Livy 40.35-36.

68 *aut imperatorem in provincia retenturos aut cum eo in Italiam venturos esse*, Livy 40.36.4.
Fulvius got back to Italy, he awarded military decorations to those he deemed deserving and 50 *denarii* to each infantryman, both Roman and Italian.⁶⁹

Throughout the 2nd century there was no regular system of discharging veteran allied soldiers, who had little means of recourse. In 180, they were able to make common cause with Roman citizens, but this was not always possible. Their discharge was a decision made by Romans. Unlike Roman citizens, allied soldiers were more exposed to abuses. We hear of Roman citizens being discharged, but allied and Latin soldiers being retained longer.⁷⁰ In 198, the consul Sex. Aelius failed to discharge the men he was ordered by the Senate to let go.⁷¹ Perhaps most telling about the status of non-citizen soldiers in Roman armies is the example from 193 when a force that had served in Spain under P. Cornelius and Tib. Sempronius, and had been discharged, was then ordered to assemble alongside a new army being gathered.⁷² Soldiers from allied communities had become incorporated into the Roman military system as a result of the pressures that the Roman state and its allies had faced in the Second Punic War, and it is no surprise that this trend continued into the 2nd century. Such treatment was a far cry from the military cooperation of (technically) equal allies of the past. The military relationship of the Romans and Italians had changed drastically.

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In many ways the military subordination of the Italian allies was the logical outcome of Roman hegemony in Italy. Either the Romans took more direct control, or their city

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⁶⁹ Livy 40.43.7.

⁷⁰ Livy 31.10.5, 39.38.5-12, 41.5.10.

⁷¹ Livy 32.9.5.

⁷² Livy 34.56.12. Tib. Sempronius continued as a legate commanding the *extraordinarii* perhaps as a means of placating disgruntled men, see Chapter 3.
would have fallen from its position of power during the Second Punic War. The development of an idea of obligation among Rome’s allies and their integration into the Roman military system were mutually reinforcing trends. The idea of obligation justified that integration, which was then anachronistically retrojected into earlier periods by historians who saw Roman exceptionalism at every turn. When Polybius wrote in the 2nd century, the idea of obligation had developed as Roman power grew in relation to their individual allies. The growing concept of obligation is seen in the provincial treaties, but in Italy there was no governor nor grounds to reorganize long standing treaties. Nevertheless, the idea of obligation was still applied in the peninsula. The Italian allies maintained a favorable relationship with the Romans as compared to the provinces, but they too were far from equal partners. The idea of obligations ex foedere or the formula togatorum was, and is, an attempt to rationalize the many changes that were occurring in Roman-Italian relations between the 5th and 2nd centuries.
The outcome of the military integration of the Italians was a new imperial army. Roman use of allied manpower was not limited to Italy. As Roman military activities expanded beyond Italy, a new source of military resources developed that was distinct from Rome’s Italian allies. These were men drawn from a diverse mix of allies from Spain to Africa to Asia. Some of these regions were formed into administrative provinces, while others remained mostly independent thanks, in part, to enthusiastic military support of Romans armies with men and supplies. When Roman generals first campaigned beyond peninsular Italy, they employed a mix of formal and informal relationships as needed to ensure military cooperation akin to Italian practices. In time, they used non-Italian forces as they saw fit. The use of non-Italian allies in Roman armies was a spectacular potential increase in manpower, but this exponential growth in military resources was not fully realized during the Middle Republic. There were key differences between the Italians and non-Italians. Italian allies fought alongside Romans regardless of where they were campaigning, while non-Italians remained in their homelands most of the time. The Italians continued to prove invaluable as they filled a military role that the non-Italians could not. The sustained military importance of the Italians only reinforced their place in the Roman
military system as well as their separation from those allies beyond Italy as they fought to expand and maintain Rome’s growing empire.

1. Early Use of Non-Italians in Roman Armies

The Romans first became involved with affairs beyond the Italian peninsula in 265 when the Sicilian city of Messana (occupied by Oscan mercenaries) became the center of a dispute between Syracuse, Carthage, and Rome. By 133, the Romans dominated regions spanning three continents and much of the Mediterranean Basin. It is to be expected that the Romans, coming from an Italian tradition that emphasized military cooperation, used non-Italian allies in these campaigns. The early use of non-Italian allied forces was an extension of Italian practices, employing a mixture of informal and formal relationships as the situation dictated. Unfortunately, little survives concerning the Roman use of Sicilian allied forces in the First Punic War. However, with the start of Second Punic War, much more evidence survives regarding Spain. Of particular importance are the activities of the Cornelii Scipiones and their relatives, who created a large network of relationships.

The Cornelii Scipiones were the first Roman generals sent to Spain in 218, and the family continued to play a central role in Roman involvement in the region long afterwards.\(^1\) One of the consuls of 218, P. Cornelius Scipio, and his brother Cn. Cornelius Scipio were sent to Spain after Hannibal had entered Italy.\(^2\) They were able to create personal relationships with local leaders that facilitated military and political cooperation in a way very similar to Italian traditions. When Gnaeus Scipio first arrived, he established contacts with a number of Spanish tribes south of the Ebro River, building a reputation “for clemency

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\(^1\) Richardson (1986), *passim*; Badian (1958), 116-125.

\(^2\) *MRR*, 1:237-239.
and justice,” which allowed him “to establish peaceful relations but even to conclude a military alliance with them, and several strong cohorts of auxiliaries were raised there.”

Indeed, according to the ancient sources, the army of the Scipiones at one point included 20,000 Spanish fighting men, who betrayed the brothers and led to their deaths. A few years later, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, son of the consul of 218, exploited these family contacts and expanded them further, eventually using them to augment his own armies and drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. His reputation was so great that the Spaniards supposedly tried to make him king. The importance of the Scipiones in maintaining Roman influence in Spain continued after the departure of Africanus. From 206 to 197, no Roman magistrates were sent there; instead, privati cum imperio who were predominantly either members of, or linked to, the gens Cornelia continued to exercise authority. Scipionic influence remained strong even after the death of Africanus. Tib. Sempronius Gracchus the Elder, son-in-law of Africanus and father of the tribune of the same name, likely employed his connection to the Scipiones to arrange a far-ranging peace in Spain in 180 and 179. The younger Tib.

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3 inde conciliatae clementiae iustitiaeque fame non ad maritos modo populos sed in mediterraneis quoque ac montanis ad ferociores iam gentes valuit; nec pax modo apud eos sed societas etiam armorum parta est, validaetque aliquot auxiliarum cohortes ex iis conscriptae sunt, Livy 21.60.4. The Carthaginians likewise seem to have relied on personal relationships in Spain centered on the Barca family, Richardson (1986), 59-60.

Gnaeus held imperium under his brother Publius, the consul of 218, although the exact details are unclear, Jashemski (1950), 22-24.

4 Livy 25.32-34; Polyb. 10.7.1; App. Iber. 16.

5 Scipio Africanus, like his father, released Spanish hostages taken from the Carthaginians to expand his local connections, Polyb. 10.18-19, 34-35, 38; Livy 26.47-48; 27.17. The city of Saguntum sent envoys to Rome in order to sacrifice on the Capitol in thanks for their preservation by the Scipiones, the younger Publius in particular; a statue of him was erected in Saguntum, Livy 28.38; CIL 2.3836; ILS 66.

6 Polyb. 10.38, 40; Livy 27.19.3-6.

7 Richardson (1986), 73; Brennan (2000), 1:159-163.

8 App. Iber. 9.44. In 179, Gracchus the Elder demanded forty of the most noble equites from a local town (Certima) to serve in his army (not as hostages); this kind of action cemented Gracchus’ reputation (Livy
Sempronius Gracchus (later tribune of 133) was likewise able to use his family connections (through his father and the Scipiones) in order to arrange a short-lived peace after the capture of a Roman army by the Numantines in 137. P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, adoptive grandson of Africanus, was able to use the reputation of his family in the struggle to defeat Numantia.

Personal relationships between Roman generals and Spanish leaders were of great importance in the wars of the late 3rd and the 2nd centuries. The Cornelii Scipiones and their relations (especially the Sempronii) were hardly alone in building networks of personal relationships on the Iberian Peninsula, but they are the best documented over time. What is particularly striking is the similarity of the campaigns in Spain and those that had resulted in Roman hegemony in Italy. Military resources were exploited through a mix of formal and informal relationships. Treaties were established with many Spanish communities that reinforced Roman domination alongside existing personal relationships. Roman generals were able to use these relationships to raise large numbers of Spanish allies for various campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula.

The Cornelii Scipiones did not limit themselves to Spanish connections. While in Sicily preparing the invasion of Africa, Scipio Africanus inserted himself into local matters there, pressuring local elites to accompanying him, gathering grain from the locals, and adjudicating local court cases between Italians and Syracusians.9 He also extended his relationships to people in Africa, most notably Masinissa.10 After securing the election of his

40.47.10). Thermus, a great Celtiberian chieftain, asked to serve with Gracchus in order to end Roman attack on his town (Livy 40.49.6-7).

9 Livy 29.1.

10 Scipio had captured and released the nephew of Masinissa, creating goodwill, Livy 27.19.9-12. Relationships were also established with other Numidian leaders, Livy 29.34.5. When Scipio Africanus landed
brother L. Cornelius Scipio, Scipio Africanus managed the diplomatic and military activities of the campaign against Antiochus III as a legate, establishing connections with Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus.¹¹ These relationships proved useful for later generations. Scipio Aemilianus was able to use family connections with Masinissa of Numidia to procure elephants for the proconsul L. Licinius Lucullus (in 150); he was asked at the same time by the Carthaginians and Numidians to mediate their disputes; and he was asked by Masinissa in his will to oversee the division of Numidia between his sons.¹²

The Cornelia Scipiones were able to exploit their increased standing abroad into power at home. They were a well-established family in Rome long before the wars with Carthage, but the Second Punic War greatly expanded their networks of relations. After driving the Carthaginians from Spain, the soon-to-be Scipio Africanus relied on volunteers for his African campaign when the Senate refused to authorize an official levy.¹³ His military reputation was a great draw for volunteers, who helped fuel greater victories. After the war against Antiochus, Africanus was named princeps senatus. He had built up a powerful network of personal relationships that included not only large numbers of Romans and Italians, but also people from Spain, Africa, and the Greek East. Extra-Italian expansion had created a vast new stage on which to forge relationships, which were vital in Roman

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¹¹ Scipio Africanus managed the diplomatic and military preparations for the campaign, Livy, 37.1.8-10; Cic. Phil. 11.17. MRR 1:356, 358.


¹³ Livy 28.45.
warfare and politics. Scipio Aemilianus and the Sempronii Gracchi were likewise able to use their individual and family connections to dominate Roman politics. Those relationships permitted members of the family to raise large numbers of men from allies, within Italy and beyond the peninsula, which allowed them to garner ever greater military renown.

In fact, Roman military actions and the use of allied manpower beyond Italy, in its early stages, closely resembled what had occurred within Italy. The earliest Roman activities in the Iberian Peninsula centered on the activities of individual commanders (most prominently the Cornelii Scipiones and those connected with them), but they were not alone in such activities beyond Italy. Other prominent Romans, such as T. Quinctius Flamininus, built up their relationships outside of Italy as well, though not quite to the same scale. Personal relationships of individuals created bonds on multiple levels alongside formal relations. As Rome’s campaigns extended further abroad, its use of allied military resources initially maintained a remarkable continuity with Italian traditions. The importance of individuals in how the Romans tapped into Italian manpower was reinforced by their use of non-Italians during the initial stages of their expansion beyond Italy.

2. The Effects of Empire on Rome

From the inception of the Republic, Rome had seen a gradual growth in magistrates and institutions. By the late 4th century, many laws defined or limited the power of magistrates (not always effectively) and the Senate, as the only long-term body, was playing an increasingly important role. Nonetheless, the Romans continued to interact with their Italian allies through a blend of formal and informal means. Over the course of the 3rd century, Roman affairs became much more complicated than they had ever been before. The

14 Badian (1958), 154-167.
role of the Senate greatly expanded, especially in controlling and managing magistrates, while administrative provinces overseen by Roman governors developed in regions beyond Italy. Greater emphasis was placed on formal institutions in an effort to control informal ones.

The Republic experienced a constant tension between aristocratic competition, which had spurred much of the Roman success, and the communal interests of the res publica, which were threatened by individuals with too much power. Over the course of the 3rd century, it became far less common for individuals to hold multiple consulships, as had been normal in preceding years. In the 2nd century, office-holding was further regulated. In the 180, the lex Villia Annalis established age qualifications for various offices, formalizing the cursus honorum. Magisterial candidates came from a broader range of individuals. The Senate controlled the rights of magistrates to triumph, awarding, denying, or otherwise controlling access to the most prestigious honor of a Roman political and military career. As Roman power grew, limits were seen as a necessity to prevent individuals from gaining too much influence in the Republic through the expanded military opportunities of the 2nd century. After all, the military glory and reputation gained from defeating a small Italian people like the Aequi, hardly compared to defeating Carthage, Macedon, or other Hellenistic

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15 Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley: 1990), 1-8.

16 From 366 to 291, fourteen men held a full third all the consulships those years. These were the great generals of their day, men like Q. Fabius Maximus Rulianus, L. Papirius Cursor, and M. Valerius Corvus. Attempts were made in the mid-4th century to limit such monopolization with little success. In 342, a lex Genucia barred holding more than one office at a time or the same office within a ten year period, but did little to stop the practice at the time, Livy 7.42.2.


powers. The military opportunities of the growing empire created more powerful individuals.

As a result of the possibility of larger achievements, the powers of Roman magistrates were increasingly regulated and managed. After 218, the Senate increasingly involved itself in foreign affairs, often sending out delegations to act on its behalf. By 190, the Senate assumed the right of proroguing Roman commanders without popular approval. The ability of a Roman magistrate to levy Roman citizens or obtain funding was denied several times by a Senate seeking to nullify a general’s plans. Consuls retained an important place in managing local relationships, but the Senate could involve itself whenever it felt it was needed, even in a magistrate’s assigned province. The ability of Roman generals to make requisitions for military purposes within a provincia was also regulated. In 149, a quaestio de repetundis, with Senators as jurors, was established to try magistrates for illegal acquisitions of money. All of these measures speak to greater centralized control of the affairs of the Republic, limiting the role of individuals and magistrates in favor of a stronger

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21 A. M. Eckstein, Senate and General (Berkeley: 1987), 319-324. In 171, C. Cassius Longinus tried to march from his assigned provincia (he was assigned Italy although he was campaigning in Cisalpine Gaul) to Macedon, but was stopped by Senatorial order, Livy 43.1.4-12. Cassius was so shaken that he did not return to Rome until 168, a few years after his command had ended. Such an example is hardly unique in the 2nd century.

22 In 191, whichever consul was to be assigned to fight Antiochus III was authorized to raise 5,000 men from allied communities outside of Italy, Livy 36.1.8. In 169, the Senate issued a senatus consultum that prevented Roman commanders from raising men from Greek communities without Senatorial approval, Livy 43.17.2-3; Polyb. 28.13.11. An inscription from Knidos, dating from 101 or 100, records a number of limitations on Roman magistrates, including forbidding campaigning outside of an assigned provincia, detailing the powers of a magistrate travelling to and from Rome, and dictating the responsibility of a magistrate for the actions of his subordinates, Crawford (1996), 1:234-270.

23 The lex Calpurnia repetundarum, CIL 1².2.583; Cic. Brut. 106; Ver. 2.3.195, 2.4.56.
institutional basis. The Republic was changing as a result of the pressures of the new imperial power.

Roman expansion beyond Italy did not immediately lead to the creation of provinces, but administrative provinces were the result of slow development alongside the institutional developments in Rome itself. A Roman provincia, in its earliest meaning, was not an administrative region or even necessarily a geographic area at all. Instead, it was a task, which, in the case of Roman consuls and praetors, involved the exercise of imperium usually in a political or military function.\textsuperscript{24} Roman expansion was not necessarily annexation.\textsuperscript{25} From the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} century into the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, the Roman empire changed from its hegemonic Italian origins into a form that took on more direct control of peoples and regions through the development of administrative provinces.

The development of administrative systems in the regions beyond Italy was chronologically uneven. While Sicily became significantly provincialized by the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} century, other regions (like Spain, Macedon, and Greece) did not have much in the way of Roman administration until the second half of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century. Although developments occurred at different times in different regions, they largely followed a similar pattern. There was no regular process of provincialization. The expansion of the praetorship in Sicily and Sardinia/Corsica occurred years after the islands came under Roman control.\textsuperscript{26} In Spain, from 206 (when Scipio Africanus left) down to 199, Roman generals in the peninsula were privati with imperium pro praetore or pro consule.\textsuperscript{27} Regular magistrates at this time were

\textsuperscript{24} Richardson (1986), 4-10.

\textsuperscript{25} R. M. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire (Berkeley: 1995), 2-5.

\textsuperscript{26} Brennan (2000), 1:91-93.

\textsuperscript{27} Richardson (1986), 64-75; Jashemski (1950), 30-32.
not regularly sent to Spain, although they were being sent to Sicily and Sardinia/Corsica. It was in 198, when six praetors were elected for the first time, that the problem of dealing with Rome’s extra-Italian holdings was solved.\textsuperscript{28} The primary duty of a Roman general was military. Over time, there was a slow increase in the role of these Roman commanders as judicial and administrative officials.\textsuperscript{29} Resources had to be managed and exploited, the collection of taxes overseen, judicial matters dealt with, as well as a host of small issues. On top of everything, military concerns remained paramount. At the same time that administrative provinces were coming into being, many independent entities tied to Rome by treaties remained, such as Numidia in Africa and Messana in Sicily. These developments were related to the military and political pressures of the Punic Wars and Roman expansion beyond Italy. Internal developments and provincial developments were interrelated and reflect a trend of greater institutionalization in the Middle Republic.

3. Non-Italians in Roman Armies

The Romans interacted with a variety of different peoples beyond Italy. These peoples were divided in a mixture of free allies and those within the provinces. Of most concern here are their military relationships with the Romans. The Romans made very effective use of the manpower available in Italy to expand their power, and many non-Italians were just as warlike. However, the use of these non-Italians was quite different from the peoples within Italy. Most did not campaign with Roman armies beyond their

\textsuperscript{28} Livy 32.27.6; Brennan (2000), 163-173; Richardson (1986), 76.

\textsuperscript{29} Judicial functions in Greece, Kallet-Marx (1995), 161-183. In the islands of the western Mediterranean, Roman commanders look after grain supplies, which were used to support the population of Rome itself as well as campaigns abroad, Livy 23.32.9, 41.6; 29.1.14, 3.1-5; 29.36.1-3; 30.3.2, 26.6; 36.2.12-13; 37.2.12, 50.9-10; 43.2. M. Valerius Laevinius is said to have roamed Sicily making sure that fields were being properly cared for so that they could benefit the Romans, Livy 27.8.18-19.
homelands. In other words, the Romans did not establish the same system of exploitation in regions beyond Italy, although they certainly made use of non-Italians locally. The reason is connected to the logistical concerns as well as the creation of subordinate provinces. Such circumstances served to reinforce the importance of the Italians in Roman armies. That is not to say that all non-Italians were provincialized. Some, such as Masinissa of Numidia and the Attalids of Pergamum carefully maintained their independence through zealous military support of Roman armies. However, in time these measures were not enough to maintain autonomy, and such allies too succumbed to direct Roman control.

a. NON-ITALIAN ALLIES BEYOND THEIR HOMELANDS

As Roman armies campaigned in regions beyond Italy, they were consistently accompanied by allied forces, and they tapped into local military resources. As in Italy, it was often in the interests of local peoples to side either with or against Roman armies, which could be either benefactors or plunderers. Significant differences between existed in how allied forces were used by the Romans. Italian forces accompanied all Roman armies, wherever they went. Non-Italian forces, on the other hand, were much more variable in their employment. Some non-Italians never accompanied Roman armies beyond their homelands, while a few can be found in distant regions. These differences and variations reveal the limits of the Roman military as well as the role of allies (Italian and non-Italian) in that system.

A striking facet of the use of Spanish fighting men in Roman armies is their lack of participation in campaigns beyond the Iberian Peninsula. During the Second Punic War and subsequent conflicts, Spanish soldiers were commonly found with Roman armies operating on the Iberian Peninsula. However, only two examples of Spanish soldiers beyond Spain are
to be found and both come in the Second Punic War. After 207 there are no recorded examples of Spanish soldiers serving in Roman armies before the Social War (91-88) beyond Spain itself. Such a trend is made all the more fascinating given the large numbers of Spaniards that served as *auxilia* in later Imperial armies throughout the Empire. However, the Spanish were not alone in this characteristic. Gauls can be found in Roman forces campaigning in Gaul and the immediate neighboring areas (Histria and Liguria). Men from Gaul likewise made up a significant portion of the Imperial *auxilia*, but only during the Third Macedonian War (172-168) are they to be found any distance from their homeland before the 1st century. A few examples of Sicilians with Roman forces beyond Sicily are known, but they too are scarce. Roman armies campaigning against Macedon made use of Greek support, which did not extend beyond Greece itself. The kings of Pergamum often sent forces to assist the Romans beyond their kingdom, but only in the immediate area (Macedon, Greece, and western Asia Minor). The rarity of these examples suggests that these examples were exceptions to the rule. It was only under certain circumstances that they campaigned with Roman armies beyond the homelands.

After the first two Punic Wars, which ended in 201, Roman naval operations were somewhat limited, but they too involved allied forces. Sicilian, Rhodian, Pergamene, Illyrian, and Carthaginian ships are all recorded. (Italiote Greeks were included among the Italians.) These peoples were, of course, those that actually had modern navies of the day. All of these examples come from the early 2nd century during campaigns limited to the area

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30 See Appendix 4.1.
31 See Appendix 4.4.
32 See Appendix 4.2.
33 See Appendix 4.7.
of the Aegean. For Rhodes and Pergamum, these were fairly close to home, but some distance from Sicily and Africa.

It is when the armies of Numidia are considered that the picture becomes much more complicated. Numidian forces (consisting of infantry, cavalry, and elephants) were to be found accompanying Roman armies in Spain, Sicily, Italy, Liguria, Macedon, and Asia Minor, as well as locally in Africa. During the Second Punic War, Numidian forces were sometimes deserters from the Carthaginians in Sicily, Spain, and Italy, or they were local allies during Roman campaigns in Africa. After 200, Numidian forces were often sent to join Roman campaigns by the king of Numidia, Masinissa. It was not until Masinissa came to the throne in the Second Punic War that the Romans had consistent access to elephants, which were sent to several armies fighting against Philip V and Perseus in Macedon. Only twice are Numidians found in Roman armies after 200 without explicit reference to Masinissa, but that does not mean that he was not involved in sending these as well. Overall, Masinissa is recorded eight times as sending or offering military assistance, twice more he was likely involved, with four more instances of Numidian deserters during the Second Punic War. Only the kings of Pergamum could compete with Masinissa and the Numidians in the number of times they are mentioned with Roman armies. However, the Pergamenes limited their assistance to the immediately surrounding areas, while Numidians were to be found much further abroad.

It is difficult to account for this disparity in the use of non-Italian peoples by Roman generals. Numidians certainly provided access to specialty troops (elephants, light cavalry, and light infantry), but so could other peoples who did not regularly accompany Republican armies in foreign lands. Using a final instance, the Ligurians, it is possible to move towards

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34 See Appendix 4.3 for all citations.
a conclusion about the nature of the Roman use of non-Italian allies. Only three examples of Ligurians in Roman armies survive: one in 173 and two more at the end of the century during the Jugurthine War.\(^{35}\) It is somewhat odd to find so few references to them with Roman armies, given that Ligurians commonly served in foreign armies in earlier periods, providing an excellent source of light infantry. Indeed, it was not unusual to find Ligurians in many Carthaginian armies, and numerous instances are known down to the Second Punic War.\(^{36}\) It is tempting to attribute simply the difference in examples to the sources. However, evidence for Roman military campaigns and the use of allied manpower in the early 2\(^{nd}\) century surely exceeds the entirety of evidence for Carthaginian armies prior to the Second Punic War.

The use of allied and mercenary forces among the Romans and Carthaginians was, in fact, fundamentally different. Those differences help illustrate the nature of Roman armies and their use of allies in general. Carthage employed large mercenary armies, with Carthaginian commanders gathering large numbers of men from various peoples and transporting them to where they were needed (often to Sicily to fight Greeks or Romans). The mechanisms to gather, transport, and pay foreign fighting men had to be quite sophisticated. A great deal of organization was needed on the part of Carthage. Less sophisticated peoples such as the Ligurians had no way of transporting themselves to distant campaigns. For the Carthaginians, this limitation was not a hindrance as they were more than capable of providing ships for such a purpose. Furthermore, the economic pursuits of the Carthaginians provided more than enough money to pay these mercenaries.

\(^{35}\) See Appendix 4.5.

\(^{36}\) Polyb. 1.17.4; 11.19.4; 15.11.1-3; Diod. 11.1.5; 16.73.3; 25.2.2; Livy 28.46.7-11. Ligurians are also recorded in an army of Agathocles, alongside Etruscans, Diod. 21.3.
No such apparatuses existed in the early or middle periods of the Roman Republic. There was no system of recruiters or transports. Ligurians, Spaniards, and Gauls were generally incapable of getting themselves to distant campaigns, and the Romans did not have the system to do so themselves. Indeed, there was no need for such a system, given the large manpower pool of experienced men close at hand in Italy. On those few occasions where less sophisticated allied forces are to be found in distant Roman armies, special circumstances seem to have been in play, especially proximity to Italy. It was a simple matter for Roman generals to utilize local allies in the provinces, but quite another to consistently ship them to distant campaigns. Moving men from Spain to Macedon would have proven difficult. However, not all Roman allies lacked the necessary resources. Masinissa, the king of Numidia, had a rich and well-developed kingdom. Numidian forces were fairly common in Roman armies, but that was due to the personal agency of Masinissa himself. The Romans did not ship Numidians around the Mediterranean; Masinissa himself did so in order to maintain a positive relationship with the Romans. Much can be said about the kings of Pergamum, although they only sent men within the general confines of the Aegean Basin.

The Romans were by no means incapable of transporting large military forces. They had to move their own armies (including their Italian allies) to various regions of the Mediterranean Basin. They did not have the organization to proactively recruit geographically dispersed non-Italians, but they had no problem providing transport for Italians. Indeed, the Italians were responsible for joining Roman armies within Italy prior to campaigns. The close integration of the Italians within the Roman military system is clearly evident. In fact, the inability to fully exploit non-Italian manpower only served to reinforce
the importance of Italians in Roman armies. Non-Italian forces remained something very separate and, in many areas, they were integrated within a developing provincial system.

b. MILITARY OBLIGATIONS OF NON-ITALIANS

Local leaders were a crucial link in the recruitment of allied manpower in regions beyond Italy, but in the 2nd century their relations with the Romans were changing. Some non-Italian allies were careful to maintain an independent but compliant relationship. Masinissa, king of Numidia, and the kings of Pergamum are good examples. Numidia and Pergamum were powerful entities; they were not as easily dominated as individual Spanish communities could be, thus laying themselves open to a less subservient relationship. Both Masinissa and the Pergamene kings were quick to offer the Romans military assistance on multiple occasions. These kings saw Roman alliances as beneficial to themselves, especially in the face of nearby threats (such as Carthage and the Seleucids respectively). They were not forced into their alliances with Rome, but actively sought them out and carefully maintained them through military cooperation.

It is instructive to note how Masinissa, the Pergamene kings, and the Romans characterized allied military assistance. There was no hint of coercion. In 168, Masinissa sent his son, Masgaba, as an envoy to Rome. He began by recounting the many times that his father had sent infantry, cavalry, and elephants to various Roman campaigns, highlighting his military assistance. According to Masgaba, two matters had made his father blush, that the Romans requested military assistance instead of ordering it, and that they had paid for grain that had been sent as gifts. He goes on to say that Masinissa owed everything to the Romans, so it was their right to do with his kingdom as they pleased; the king of Numidia

37 Livy 45.13.12-17. The king was by then at least 70 years old, making such a trip personally difficult.
would be grateful for anything that was left over. When, in 198, Attalus II of Pergamum asked to withdraw his military forces from the war against Philip V so that he could protect his kingdom from aggression from Antiochus III, the Senate replied that the Romans only used military resources of allies who willingly offered it and so he was free to withdraw his men.  

It would be easy to dismiss these kinds of statements as mere obsequiousness, but that would minimize their importance. The Romans did not demand men and materials; rather, they were, by their own estimations, assisted by allies of their own free will. The fact that these allies willingly submitted to Roman leadership played directly into Roman thinking. The reply given to Attalus was how the Romans liked to think of their use of allied manpower, reflecting earlier periods when they did not have the actual power to coerce the assistance of allied communities. The connections to Italian traditions from before the Punic Wars are clear. In Italian warfare, personal agency was central. Local and allied fighting men brought themselves to a campaign.

The Romans may have sought to maintain the principle that they used allied manpower only when offered, but changes were taking place. In Spain during the Second Punic War, local leaders were needed to recruit and lead local forces. Thereafter, there were no alliances that dictated military obligations in Spain until the reorganization of alliances by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus in 180. It reflects serious changes among the provinces. During this same period, administrative provinces were developing from the old *provinciae*. Small Spanish communities, unlike the kingdoms of the East, could be easily intimidated by Roman

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38 Livy 32.8.14; see page 191 for a full quotation. This humble request paid dividends, as the Romans sent envoys to Antiochus and halted his aggressive campaign.

39 App. *Iber.* 43.
magistrates. The formalization of military obligations in Spanish treaties reflects the same process that was occurring in Italy around the same time in a more informal manner.

Over the course of the first half of the 2
\textsuperscript{nd} century, there is evidence of significant alterations in the use of non-Italian allied manpower. Masinissa clearly recognized this fact, never denying Roman requests for help, but maintaining that he provided assistance eagerly, without Roman coercion, appealing to earlier idealistic thinking on the part of the Romans. That willingness to help assured Masinissa’s positive relationships. Roman generals were more and more exercising Roman power to exploit local manpower and resources with little regard for locals. For example, in 189, the consul Cn. Manlius Vulso intended to campaign in Galatia.\textsuperscript{40} He was upset to find the Pergamene royal house was not already present with men and material upon his arrival in Ephesus, and promptly ordered them to present themselves. Unfortunately, the king Eumenes was in Rome, but his two brothers, Attalus and Athenaeus, quickly joined the campaign with several thousand men, not daring to deny the Roman consul, despite the absence of the king. Thus, even a fairly large kingdom like Pergamum was increasingly subject to Roman pressure. Masinissa, on the other hand, actively sent men throughout the century to wherever Romans were campaigning.

Allied communities, Italian and non-Italian, were expected to provide military assistance upon ‘request’, whether they wanted to or not. Personal relationships continued to matter, but were not essential to recruitment. Those allies that provided men and supplies quickly and without complaint could maintain very good relationships with the Romans, although extreme care had to be taken to maintain autonomy. For Masinissa, his relationship to the powerful Cornelii Scipiones was vital. Over the course of the 2
\textsuperscript{nd} century, the military demands made of non-Italians took on a much more imperialistic tone than they had

\textsuperscript{40} Polyb. 21.33-39; Livy 38.12-27; Diod. 29.12-13.
previously. In the same manner as the Cornelii Scipiones and Italian generals from the period before the Punic Wars, Roman magistrates ‘requested’ military support from non-Italian allies. In some cases, such requests maintained an increasingly illusionary equality. However, as time went on, magistrates like Manlius Vulso demanded military support with little regard for allies, occasionally prompting ineffectual protests.

4. Roman Armies from the Second Punic War to the Social War

Roman armies in the 2nd century show clear signs of separation from their Italian roots. Adaptability and flexibility remained, but with new possibilities for tactical control by Roman generals. An important part of this change was the integration of the Italians into the Roman military system. A Roman general could exert the same control over Italian troops as Roman, increasing the effectiveness of both. From the Second Punic War down to the Social War, Roman armies often proved invincible against a wide range of opponents from Spain to Asia thanks to the blending of traditional practice and innovation. The use of Italians versus non-Italians reflected this blending of the old and new. However, despite their continued military importance, the Italians were stuck in a position between allies and subjects.

Developing command and control systems created a system that could be used by Roman generals for more sophisticated battlefield actions. Perhaps the most significant example of the potential of the Roman military system was at the battle of Zama in 202, where Scipio Africanus faced Hannibal. The Carthaginian army was deployed in three lines, with Hannibal’s veterans from Italy forming the final one. Elephants were positioned in front of the infantry with cavalry on the flanks. This army comprised of mercenaries, local Libyo-Phoenician levies, and Hannibal’s Italian veterans was not of the quality of the one

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41 Polyb. 15.11.1-3; Livy 30.33.4-7.
with which Hannibal had defeated the Romans in Italy, but it was dangerous and Hannibal was still an able general. The Roman general Scipio Africanus took care to develop and use a sophisticated battle plan. He positioned his maniples in line with those in front, instead of the normal checkerboard formation with velites in the gaps.\textsuperscript{42} Such a formation was intended to provide avenues for Hannibal’s elephants to pass through without disrupting the Roman line, which is what occurred. In addition, during combat Africanus was able to direct the movements of his men, moving his rear cohorts to protect the army’s flanks from encirclement.\textsuperscript{43} Africanus, who was the most skilled Roman general of his day, was able to realize the full potential of the system that fully developed in the Second Punic War. There were new possibilities for Roman armies with generals skilled enough to realize them.

The propraetor Q. Fulvius Flaccus was also able to use his army effectively in 181 when he faced an army of Celtiberians.\textsuperscript{44} Just prior to the battle, he dispatched one of the alae of Italian allies along with 6,000 Spanish allies under a Roman officer to a hidden position to outflank the Celtiberians. Flaccus’ battle plan is impressive in its complexity. A cavalry force was dispatched to lure the Celtiberians into an ill-advised pursuit. He then led the Romans and their allies out of their own camp to oppose the now disorganized enemy. At the same time, the hidden ala attacked the Celtiberian camp and burned it, which only added to the disorder of their main force. The Celtiberians were surrounded and killed, although they put up a great deal of resistance. The Roman general was able to deploy and control large numbers of allies in a way that required a great deal of coordination,


\textsuperscript{43} Polyb. 15.14.4; Livy 30.34.11.

\textsuperscript{44} Livy 40.31-32; \textit{MRR}, 1:385.
reminiscent of how Hannibal was able to do similar actions to defeat the Romans at the beginning of the Second Punic War. Flaccus too was able to direct his men in combat, both personally and through his subordinates, in a battle the following year (180). While these sorts of sophisticated maneuvers were not universal, they were still possible thanks to the military developments of the 3rd century.

The flexibility and adaptability of Italian warfare remained in Roman armies as well. In wars in the Greek East, such features were on full display. At the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197, the Roman and Macedonian armies were split, with the right wings of each pushing their opponents back, creating a significant gap. An unnamed Roman tribune, on his own initiative, led 20 maniples from the victorious Roman right to hit the successful Macedonian right in the rear as they passed by. Similar independence was later shown at the battle of Pydna in 168 where Paelignians and Marrucini led by an Italian named Salvius launched an ill-advised frontal assault on the Macedonian phalanx, even as the rest of the army was being pushed back, followed by similar actions by Roman units at the command of the Roman general. Indeed, Scipio Africanus’ army at Zama also displayed old Italian adaptability. When the hastati had fallen into some disorder at Zama, the commanders of the principes, on their own initiative, moved up in support without apparent oversight by their general.

In the 2nd century, the integration of the Italians created a system of close coordination, so close in fact, that Polybius often fails to distinguish them in his narrative. Italian integration, represented in their organization and command, was a source of cohesion

45 Livy 40.39-40.
46 Polyb. 18.26.1-3; Livy 33.9.8; Plut. Flam. 8.4.
47 Plut. Aem. 20; Livy 44.41. These actions eventually managed to disrupt the Macedonian phalanx and, in combination with the forward movement of the phalanx, created gaps that were exploited by the Romans.
48 Polyb. 15.13.7.
as well as providing a means of utilizing the flexibility still inherent in Italian armies. Romans had always walked a careful line when it came to numbers. Within Italy, it would seem that Romans kept about half of all armies Roman, which meant that the Romans outnumbered any other individual group as well as ensuring that, if worst came to worst, they would not be drastically outnumbered by a coordinated attack from an army’s allies. The same held true for the use of non-Italians. However, in the calculations of who constituted allies and who did not, the Italians were in a kind of limbo. A Roman army could consist of large numbers of Italian and non-Italian forces that, together, greatly outnumbered the number of Roman citizens. However, the Italians were apparently sufficiently integrated that they counted as ‘Roman’. Indeed, in one battle Livy notes that the Italians fought just as effectively as the Roman legionaries themselves.\textsuperscript{49}

The changes that had occurred in Roman armies over the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century created a great deal of potential, but it was not always fully realized. Generals like Scipio Africanus and Fulvius Flaccus were hardly typical. More often, the issues of planning and maneuver were simpler. At the battle of Magnesia in 189, L. Cornelius Scipio (brother of Scipio Africanus) fought a rather simple forward battle akin to Italian practice.\textsuperscript{50} Cynoscephalae and Pydna were similar, although at Cynoscephalae the Roman general T. Quinctius Flamininus moved between the two parts of his army in order to manage them and provide leadership.\textsuperscript{51} An important component of the maneuvers of Scipio Africanus’ army at Zama was the care he took in training them in Sicily in the months prior to the invasion of Africa. Fulvius Flaccus

\textsuperscript{49} Livy 40.40.1.

\textsuperscript{50} Livy, 37.39-44; App. Syr. 31-36; B. Bar Kochva, \textit{The Seleucid Army} (Cambridge: 1976), 163-172. It was the personal initiative of Eumenes of Pergamum that won the battle, as he scattered Antiochus’ cavalry on the left wing and encircled the Seleucid phalanx with light infantry and cavalry.

\textsuperscript{51} Polyb. 18.25.4; Plut. \textit{Flam.} 8.
in Spain commanded a veteran army, with many men having served for more than five years. Indeed, when Flaccus tried to discharge his veterans, his successor threatened not to campaign.\textsuperscript{52} Time, experience, and training were of great importance in order to realize the full potential of these armies.\textsuperscript{53} These factors were not universal in Roman armies of this period, which served for relatively short amounts of time generally. In addition, much depended on the skill of Roman generals. The reforms of Marius at the end of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century went towards solving these problems. Armies served for campaigns of longer duration and the best generals took care to train them carefully. It was when Roman generals took advantage of the potential of command and control alongside inherited traditions of Italian flexibility that Roman armies proved truly unbeatable. Over the course of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, the Roman army became a professional one.

\paragraph*{a. ITALIANS VS. NON-ITALIANS IN ROMAN ARMIES}

There is no indication of the organization of non-Italians into larger conglomerated units or their being subsumed and absorbed into a Roman command structure during the period of the Middle Republic. Some provincial peoples could field significant numbers of men reaching into the thousands. Whatever internal organization existed is not recorded, but it was undoubtedly based on local military traditions, not an imposed Roman system. At the same time, there is no indication that they were regularly placed under any Roman officers (such as the prefects of the allies for the Italians). In part, the lack of imposed organization

\textsuperscript{52} See Chapter 4.4.

\textsuperscript{53} The consul Q. Municius Thermus did not want to engage Ligurian forces besieging Pisa because his army was insufficiently trained or unused to working together, Livy 35.3.3-4.
was a product of the relative levels of Roman power. Such changes did not occur in Italy until decades after the Romans had become the hegemonic power of the peninsula.

Roman generals in the 2nd century do not seem to have placed marked emphasis on recruiting troops based on specialties. Allies forces were used regardless of their armament or tactics. Phalangites and hoplites were very different from Roman legionaries, but that did not stop Roman generals from making use of them on occasion, especially in local campaigns. Indeed, Pyrrhus had little difficulty in using Italians in his own phalanx. On a few occasions, Roman generals went out of their way to secure non-Italian cavalry or light infantry for their campaigns. However, such actions were not because of a low quality or lack of Italian light infantry or cavalry. Roman armies consistently contained large numbers of Italian cavalry, which often performed well. Italian light infantry are more difficult to discern as they easily blended in with the Roman velites who are themselves not often mentioned. In the many cases of Numidian cavalry and light infantry accompanying Roman armies, the initiative seems to have almost always been on the part of Masinissa as opposed to Roman generals looking for specialty troops. The use of elephants, which came from Numidia, followed the same patterns. They also proved mostly useless in Roman campaigns and were often not worth the trouble. Indeed, as discussed above, non-Italian military forces

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54 Throughout the Macedonian Wars, Roman armies were often accompanied by Greek forces. At the battle of Magnesia, L. Cornelius Scipio left Macedonians to guard the Roman camp, Livy 37.39.12.

55 See page 89, n. 13.

56 In 173, the consul P. Licinius going to Macedonia wanted auxiliary troops: 2,000 Ligurians, Cretan archers, Numidian cavalry, and elephants, Livy 42.35.6-7. In 168, Cn. Servilius sent word in Gaul to enroll 600 cavalry there, which he was to send to Macedonia, Livy 44.21.7-8.

57 Samnite cavalry, Livy 22.24.11; 27.43.5; 44.40.5-6. Cavalry from Fregellae and Etruria, Livy 27.26.11-12; cf. Polyb. 10.32.2. Latins, 29.15.7; 26.17.1; 33.36.10. Capua, Livy 23.5. Unspecified Italians, Livy 30.8.6; 30.33.2; 40.31.1; 42.58.12-14; Polyb. 14.8.6; 15.9.8; Sall. Jug. 95.1. Polybius (2.23-24) lists significant numbers of cavalry in 225, see Chapter 3.2. These are only specific references. In the lists of authorized levies of citizens and allies in the 2nd century found in Livy, Italian cavalry are always mentioned, which Polybius (4.107.10-13; 6.26.7-9) says outnumbered the Roman cavalry.
were, for the most part, limited to local campaigns except in cases where they could transport themselves to distant regions. As the Romans’ empire became more powerful, they slowly began to make more use of non-Italian forces, which they were increasingly willing to ship to campaigns, as seen with the Ligurians. Heavy infantry from Spain and Gaul who were armed with swords and fought in a manner somewhat similar to the Romans are rarely found beyond their homelands at this time, but were to prove a staple in Imperial-era armies.

The integration of the Italians indicated a certain level of trust on the part of the Romans. After the battle of Cannae, there are no known examples of Italians betraying the Romans while on campaign or in battle. The same cannot be said for non-Italians, with betrayal and desertion distinct possibilities. Thus Scipio Africanus was careful to avoid putting too much reliance on Spanish soldiers in his army, fearing betrayal. No such concerns are evident from Roman commanders with regard to Italian soldiers. The Romans relied heavily on them, and placed a great deal of trust in their military cooperation. The Italians continuously proved themselves capable and loyal. In many battles during this period Italian troops were noted for their bravery. They were relied on to perform well in battle and did so.

Roman armies of the 2nd century comprised a wide range of allied forces. In some ways, such a characteristic was not much different from earlier periods of Roman history. Indeed, as Roman power grew, so too did the allies that fought with them, from Latins to Italians to non-Italians. The same idea of military obligation that had developed with regards to Rome’s Italian allies also applied to allies beyond Italy. However, there were significant

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58 The brothers Scipio died when their Celtiberian allies betrayed them in 211, see above. In the Jugurthine War, Ligurians and Thracians were bribed by Jugurtha to abandon a Roman army, Sall. Jug. 38.6.

59 Polyb. 11.20.
differences in the use of Italian and non-Italian forces. Over the course of the 3rd century, developing fully in the Second Punic War, the Italians had become integrated into a Roman military system. They were formed into legion-like units (alae) under Roman officers (prefects of the allies). Non-Italians remained outside of this system. Some non-Italians retained a significant amount of freedom and autonomy through active military cooperation, such as Masinissa, but most became subsumed within developing provinces and subject to direct Roman domination. The Romans and Italians were intimately connected through a variety of overlapping bonds. Although Roman generals used these same formal and informal bonds to establish relationships beyond Italy, there were no long-standing ties to build on. Roman hegemony in Italy was built on existing tradition and relationships, which did not exist beyond the peninsula. Unlike the Italians, non-Italians remained outside the Roman military system during the 2nd century.

Fighting in Roman armies had a serious impact on the Italians. Afzelius has argued that the allies were recruited in numbers comparable to the Hannibalic War for decades afterwards, and that they tended to remain active longer than Roman legions and were assigned to difficult war zones (Spain and Gaul) more often. It has already been seen that the Italians were potentially subject to longer service as they were not always discharged along with Roman soldiers. Wars in Spain were certainly unprofitable, dangerous, and generally undesirable. In the 2nd century, there are several examples of Roman generals finding it difficult to recruit men, not because of population decline but the unpopularity of campaigning theatres. The move towards a more institutional means of recruitment no

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61 Recruitment problems, Polyb. 35.3.4-6; Livy 25.5.5-9; App. *Iber*. 49. Cincius (Gell. *NA* 16.4.3-4) says that religious considerations could delay being present at the levy, but only temporarily with the threat of branding
doubt also contributed to these problems as it undercut the importance of social networks in gathering men. As a result, Roman citizens agitated for some concessions with regards to recruitment, which the Italians could not. The Italians were politically easier to send to difficult theatres for extended periods, although there is a marked solidarity among Roman and Italian mutineers (Flaccus and Africanus). The increasingly haughty attitude of the Romans towards the Italians is also seen when Polybius remarks that in 157 the Romans fought the Dalmatians so that the Italians would not become weak through peace. The Italians may have continuously proved themselves invaluable to Roman armies, but they were increasingly treated as tools to be used at Roman discretion and with little regard.

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The armies of the 2nd century were quite different from what they had been two centuries prior. Roman expansion beyond Italy introduced a new source of manpower, which was exploited in a way consistent with earlier Italian practices. Control of an empire reshaped Rome and saw the development of administrative provinces to manage many areas beyond Italy directly. A few non-Italians managed to retain their autonomy, especially through active military support of Roman armies. Indeed, military cooperation continued to prove to be a key aspect of Roman relationships with their allies, even those beyond Italy. However, due to the limitations of Republican institutions, non-Italians could not play the same part as the Italians. Only Italian troops regularly accompanied Roman armies wherever for failure to arrive. Population was not declining in Italy and may have, in fact, been increasing, Rosenstein (2004), 12-17.

63 See Chapter 4.4.
64 Polyb. 32.13.6.
they marched. The integration of the Italians created the potential for armies that were much more effective than they had been in earlier Italian warfare, although it took skilled generals to realize the potential. The military position of the Italians had changed dramatically, which had an impact on their place in the growing Roman empire as they increasingly found themselves somewhere between partners and subjects. The Italians were vital to Roman wars, but found themselves in a much lower status than they had once been. In the late 2nd century, Italian dissatisfaction with their position would begin a process that would lead to the outbreak of the Social War.
By the 2nd century, the Italians were subject to direct Roman domination. Over the course of the 3rd century and culminating in the Second Punic War, they had become fully integrated into Roman armies. This process, combined with the simultaneous development of the idea of military obligation, subverted the old traditions of military cooperation. While Italy had no actual governor, the Roman Senate increasingly acted as such. Old informal relations between technically equal allies were replaced by a setup that resembled patrons and clients. Despite the subjugation of the Italians, they remained a vital component of Roman warfare as they had for centuries. However, they were now vestiges of past Italian traditions that no longer truly fit into the developing Roman imperial system, leading to widespread discontent by the end of the 2nd century. In time, the issue of citizenship came to embody a wide range of Italian grievances, and eventually led to the outbreak of the Social War.

1. Political Subordination of Italy

The political subordination of the Italians followed close on the heels of their military integration and subordination. As with military integration, political subordination was not a
new process, but one that took on a new scale and importance with the military pressures of the Second Punic War.¹ In the 2nd century, following war, the scale of political subordination increased drastically. Italian communities were subject to direct Roman interference with no access to positions of political leadership in Rome for Italian elites. Abuses by Roman magistrates occurred, while the Roman Senate became the de facto governor of Italy. Throughout this process, the position of the Italians fell from that of allies to something more akin to subjects.

In the Imperial period, Plutarch warned his fellow Greeks that inviting Roman participation in local affairs would, in time, bring more direct Roman domination to the detriment of local autonomy.² This proved true in Italy. As the head of a large (and expanding) alliance network, the powerful Roman community was called on to act as arbiters between their allies at times as well as within communities.³ Such involvement increased drastically in the 2nd century. When the Roman Senate became concerned about Bacchanalian cults in 186, they ordered investigations, resulting in inquiries and trials throughout Italy with little regard for local autonomy of communities.⁴ When the Romans felt it necessary, Italians were subject to laws passed in Rome.⁵ As time went on, the Romans extended their dominance “precedent by precedent, until what allied autonomy remains (and it is still considerable) is guaranteed not so much by treaty as by the Senate’s

¹ Badian (1958), 141-153.
³ Badian (1958), 146-149.
⁵ As in 193, when the Italians were ordered to have the same lending laws as in Rome to avoid usury, Livy 35.7.1-5.
ingrained unwillingness to assume avoidable administrative responsibilities.” Indeed, when describing the position of the Senate, Polybius presents it as acting as a kind of collective governor overseeing treason, conspiracy, poisoning, and assassination, as well as arbitrating disputes. Such a description is somewhat jarring considering the technically equal alliances between the Romans and their Italian allies. The position of the Italians was changing.

Indeed, perhaps the most glaring change in the political status of the Italians is reflected in the abuses of Roman magistrates. Traditionally, travelling Roman officials had stayed in the houses of individuals with whom they had ties of hospitality in other communities, but in 173 the consul L. Postumius Albinus demanded transportation and housing from the people of Praeneste. According to Livy, before his consulship noone had ever made this sort of demand of any Italian community, but the lack of rebuke by the Senate or any other body in Rome set a precedent that was exploited by later magistrates. In that same year, the censor Q. Fulvius Flaccus took the roofing tiles from the temple of Juno in Lacinia in Bruttium for the temple he was constructing in Rome. (In this case the Senate forced him to return the tiles, but noone knew how to put them back on the temple so they never were.) The people of Cales passed a law that no one should use the public baths after the official of a nearby town was beaten when those baths were not sufficiently clean for his wife. More broadly, the Italians were likewise seemingly left out of the Gracchan land

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6 Badian (1958), 144.
7 Polyb. 6.13.4-5.
8 Livy 42.1.7.
9 Livy 42.3.
10 Gel. NA 10.3.3.
reforms, prompting them to approach Scipio Aemilianus for help.\textsuperscript{11} Arrogant actions by Roman magistrates were also to be found in the provinces.\textsuperscript{12} To find these sorts of abuses in the provinces, which were clearly subordinate, was to be expected, but in Italy it was a testament to the degradation that was taking place there.

Many great Italian individuals and families, including those of Rome, were linked through personal relationships, such as \textit{hospitium}.\textsuperscript{13} The rise of Rome to a Mediterranean power saw a drastic change in the nature of those relationships. \textit{Hospites} became \textit{clientes}; equals became subordinates.\textsuperscript{14} Such a change is hardly surprising. In the 4\textsuperscript{th} century when many of these relationships were created, at least beyond Latium and the immediate surrounding area, the Romans were \textit{primus inter pares}. They were the most powerful single community in Italy, but they were not so drastically different from their fellow Italians. As Italy came under their control, followed by regions beyond, the position of Rome grew far removed from their Italian allies. As seen above, Rome was approached increasingly to oversee the administration of Italy. In the same way, individual Italians looked to their Roman counterparts to act on their behalf, tacitly acknowledging their superiority.

It is in the context of political subordination that the concept of equal treaties (\textit{foedera aequa}) developed. A few Italian communities were said to have such alliances with Rome. Among the best documented is Camerinum, an Umbrian city, whose treaty was described as

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\textsuperscript{11} See below page 199.
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\textsuperscript{12} When M. Licinius Crassus was travelling through Athens as a \textit{quaestor}, he was angry that the Athenians would not repeat the Eleusinian Mysteries just for him, Cic. \textit{De Or.} 3.75; cf. . Cic. \textit{Ver.} 2.1.44-46, 49-54; Polyb. 28.13.
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\textsuperscript{13} See Chapter 2.2.b.
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\textsuperscript{14} Badian (1958), 154-167.
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‘most equal’ (*aequissimum*).\(^{15}\) Such a relationship was not based on differing categories of *foedera* during the Roman conquest of Italy, but on the careful maintenance of positive relations by the people of Camerinum as Roman power grew. Of particular importance was military cooperation. Camerinum always proved willing, if not eager, to provide military support. The city had established a relationship with the great Fabius Rullianus in 310 and offered military support for any Roman armies campaigning in the region; a cohort was sent to accompany Scipio Africanus in his African campaign; two cohorts were later sent to aid Marius against the Cimbri.\(^{16}\) The attitude of this most equal ally no doubt closely resembled that of Masinissa of Numidia and the Attalids of Pergamum, providing willing support in order to maintain a positive relationship. Carefully maintained positive relationships likely entailed some benefits, such as more respect for local autonomy by Roman magistrates, but in reality, *foedera aequa* were artifices based on the continued submissiveness of the community in question. Of particular importance was unconditional military support when the Romans ‘asked’. Having an equal treaty merely reflected the nature of the community’s relationship with Rome, not a special type of treaty.

As their power grew and fundamentally altered their relationships with the Italians, the Romans gradually developed a ‘suitable vocabulary’ that legitimized various kinds of political interference and domination.\(^{17}\) No date or event can be singled out as the point where the Italians became subject-allies. Their subordination was the result of a long process that stretched far back into the distant past. The political domination of the Romans was a

\(^{15}\) Cic. *Balb.* 46-47, 50; Livy 28.45.20; *ILS* 432. For a discussion of *foedera aequa* and supposed *iniqua*, see Introduction.

\(^{16}\) Fabius Rullianus, Livy 9.36. Scipio Africanus’ campaign, Livy 28.45.20. Marius gave citizenship to several cohorts from Camerinum after the war with the Cimbri and Teutonis, Cic. *Balb.* 46-7; Val. Max. 5.2; Plut. *Mar.* 28.3.

\(^{17}\) Badian (1958), 145. Compare the concept of obligation and the *formula togatorum*, see Chapter 4.3.
reflection of the military integration of the Italians. Both processes went hand-in-hand, with neither being possible without the other. The old relationships that had dictated Roman and Italian interaction, based on Italian traditions, were slowly eroded as Roman power grew. Of particular importance was the Second Punic War, which saw a major increase in existing trends of subordination. Over the course of the 2nd century, the Italians became further subject to the whims of the Romans, politically and militarily. Those communities that were proved themselves most acquiescent to Roman domination earned the continued façade of equality.

2. Romanization and Military Service

The question of ‘Romanization’ and military service is a difficult one. Some historians see the Romans army and its plethora of allies as a melting pot that facilitated Italian acculturation, while others have seen the separation of the Italians into their own units and differences of language as too much of a barrier to overcome. To be sure, Italy was a diverse land of language and culture, but there was also a remarkable interconnectivity. The long tradition of military cooperation in Italy facilitated such interaction and familiarity, but the Roman hegemony of Italy created a new context for that interaction focused on Rome. As a result, Latin and Roman culture became more familiar to the peoples of Italy, facilitated by existing similarities. However, this does not mean that these people adopted

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19 See Chapter 2.
Roman culture wholesale. Romanization here is used to refer to familiarity with Roman culture and its natural influences, as opposed to its adoption at the expense of local cultures.

Common military activities had long been a tradition among the various peoples of Italy. Such military cooperation brought those that fought into contact with a variety of other Italian peoples, but not necessarily consistently with the same people. Nearby communities would naturally have cooperated more often than distant ones, reinforcing other means of local contact such as trade, but alliances were often broken and reformed creating different patterns of interaction with a variety of peoples. Given the instability of alliances and the common feature of military cooperation, military interaction was varied. When the Romans became hegemons of Italy in the early 3rd century, that fluidity changed. Italians might find themselves fighting alongside a variety of people, depending on the campaign, but always within a Roman context. The Romans were the common feature of these armies, which had a major impact on the nature of interaction among their allies.

Interaction of common soldiers would have occurred frequently in Roman armies. Warfare was common in Italy and Roman armies, accompanied by their Italian allies, campaigned annually, providing a ready site of interaction. Men would have spoken, if for no other reason than to complain about the food or to trade booty. The linguistic barriers to these kind of exchanges would have been minimal. Italians, including Romans, interacted in a variety of ways and had done so for centuries. To be sure, fluency would have been restricted to the higher classes who had more reason to learn Latin, Oscan, Etruscan, or one of the other languages of Italy. Complaining about porridge does not require fluency, only a rather limited vocabulary as the grammatical differences in the languages of Italy were not so

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20 See Chapter 1.
great. In the context of Roman armies, the natural *lingua franca* would have been Latin.\textsuperscript{21} The motivations for bilingualism would not have been linked to any kind of idealization of Roman language or culture.\textsuperscript{22} Nor would Latin have been adopted in place of one’s primary language.

The influences of Latin on the other languages of Italy can be connected to military service, although the patterns of that influence were uneven and multifaceted. The Abruzzi tribes of the Central Apennines were among the most common allies in Roman armies. The Marsi in particular boasted of how often they fought alongside Rome, saying that there was “no triumph over, or without, the Marsi.”\textsuperscript{23} The earliest example of Latin used outside of Latium, dated to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century, comes from this area.\textsuperscript{24} This inscription was not in pure Latin, but was heavily influenced by local Oscan. However, the Paeligni, who are perhaps most often represented among Rome’s Italian allies in the surviving sources, show little influence from Latin in the inscriptive evidence as early as their neighbors.\textsuperscript{25} The impact of Latin on the various languages of Italy in general reflects the same complexity of influence, adaptation, and resistance.\textsuperscript{26} This evidence is drawn from inscriptions, which were subject to a variety of local circumstances in how they created. There were also a variety of other factors, including trade, Roman colonization, and the general spread of Roman citizenry. Nevertheless, many regions show at least familiarity with Latin by many Italians,


\textsuperscript{22} Mouritsen (1998), 80.

\textsuperscript{23} οὐτε κατὰ Μάρσων οὐτε ἄνευ Μάρσων γενέσθαι θρίαμβον. Appian *BC* 1.46.

\textsuperscript{24} *ILLRP* 7.

\textsuperscript{25} E. Bispham, *From Asculum to Actium* (Oxford: 2007), 5.

\textsuperscript{26} See Bispham (2007), 4-5; Benelli (2001), 7-16; Mouritsen (1998), 77-81.
which was likely born from familiarity over long periods of time rather than necessarily conscious efforts at imitation.

Organizationally, there is no reason to think that linguistic barriers were a significant impediment. Rosenstein is quite right to point out that immediately after the Social War there was no obvious degradation of fighting ability due to levies of men, who were all now Roman citizens, drawn from all of Italy. 27 There is no indication that commanders of allied contingents were chosen due to their familiarity with Latin and whatever the primary language of the men in their cohorts was. 28 Indeed, there was a clear continuity of these commanders from those that had led men long before Roman hegemony. Nor is there evidence that segregation into separate units (legions vs. alae) inhibited interaction or cultural exchange. 29 In those instances of discontent in Roman armies, Roman citizens and Italian allies showed some solidarity. 30 Common military service, which could be for extended periods of time in the 3rd and especially 2nd centuries, bred familiarity among the peoples of Italy. Their interaction would have come naturally, based on centuries-old traditions of military cooperation.

Service in Roman armies may have increased the sense of local identity while also increasing the impact of Roman culture. In Umbria, communities or groups of communities were often at war with each other prior to Roman hegemony, but afterwards they likely fought in contingents raised from a wider area, more often encouraging a stronger sense of

27 Rosenstein (forthcoming).


29 contra Pfeilschifter (2007), 27-42.

30 See Chapter 4.4.
Similar processes no doubt took place elsewhere in Italy. At the same time, fighting in Roman armies created a sense of *Italia*. The first known example of a representation of peninsular Italy as a geographic unit came in 268 as Roman hegemony was nearly complete. Bispham has argued that the phrase *terra Italia* was connected to the military efforts against foreign entities (Pyrrhus, Gauls, and Carthaginians) in the 3rd century after the battle of Sentinum. Common military service, especially during the massive efforts of the Second Punic War, contributed to a larger sense of community. Indeed, the *lex agraria* of 111 makes several references to *Italia*. Of particular importance is its use in connection to the *formula togatorum*; military cooperation was a fundamental bond. At the heart of *Italia* was Rome, which served as the military, political, and cultural element that linked the other peoples of Italy together. Roman armies had a complicated impact on Italian identity. The idea of a larger *Italia* was reinforced by the strong interconnections that had existed for centuries. At the same time, local identities were strengthened. Roman culture was a strong influence, but it certainly did not create a unified Italy before the Social War. Romanization is a misnomer for the processes occurring in Italy; the Italians were being drawn closer together as well as reinforced as individual communities.

3. Italy vs. the Provinces

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31 Bradley (2000), 199.

32 P. Sempronius Sophus included the map as part of a triumphal temple, Varro *RR* 1.2.1; J. H. C. Williams, *Beyond the Rubicon* (Oxford: 2001), 129.

33 Bispham (2007), 53-68.

34 For the complexities of identity during this period, see E. Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men* (Oxford: 1995).
The nature of Roman relations varied between Italy, non-Italian allies, and the provinces. Over time, administrative provinces had developed directly overseen by Roman governors, exhibiting the inferior status of the peoples in those areas. Non-Italian allies were subject-allies. Although some maintained positive relationships with the Romans, they too were clearly subordinate in their treatment. The Romans themselves were the masters who oversaw these peoples. The position of the Italians was less clear. Going back centuries, the Italian communities could point to their technically equal status with Rome. However, in the 2nd century the Italians were hardly treated as equals, despite their continued importance in the empire. They were stuck in a position somewhere between equal ally (as they had once been) and subject; they were not provincials but they were certainly not partners either. The Italians were vestiges of older traditions that no longer fit into the new Roman world, contributing to a feeling of dissatisfaction.

The Romans of the 2nd century were deeply impacted by the acquisition of an empire. Roman hegemony in Italy was based on careful maintenance of technically equal alliances on and below the community level. The Romans certainly continued to establish alliances with foreign entities, but at the same time regions were conquered and provincialized. The Roman empire of the 2nd century boasted provinces that were subject to direct Roman control and exploitation. They were able to extract tribute and other resources from the lands beyond Italy as they saw fit, and increasingly they did so. Even those communities who remained independent allies (such as the Italians, Numidia, and various Hellenistic states) were expected to bend to Roman ‘suggestions’. Those that defied the expressed wishes of the Senate and People of Rome risked a great deal. In a Mediterranean world that increasingly came under the direct or indirect influence of the Romans, there was little room for equal
allies. Even the Italians, who had played and continued to play an important role in the expansion of Roman power, were not immune.

The Roman empire of the Republic had become something quite different from the Italian traditions that built it. Nevertheless, the Italians continued to play a vital role. They provided at least half of Roman armies and campaigned alongside the Romans anywhere they went. Italian soldiers continuously proved themselves capable and reliable. Although military integration and the idea of obligation had developed that put Italian military resources under greater Roman control, the means of this exploitation remained based on old Italian traditions of military cooperation. There were no Roman conscription officers roaming Italy. Local leaders, many of whom continued to maintain relationships with Roman elites (although more as clientes than hospites), were a vital link in obtaining allied manpower.

Indeed, the façade of equality was maintained by the Romans, who replied to Attalus II of Pergamum in 198 that

> the Roman people had always employed the property of other peoples with their consent; the decision to provide assistance, both the beginning and the end, was under the control of those who wished the Roman people to enjoy their aid.\(^{35}\)

The same sentiment no doubt reflected how the Romans liked to think of their relationship with their Italian allies. Indeed, this statement by the Senate would seem to neatly describe the tradition of military cooperation in early Italy. Allies assisted each other as they saw fit and according to immediate circumstances. The proclivity of Italians combining forces with many different communities and peoples in the 4\(^{th}\) century certainly suggests relative

\(^{35}\) semper populum Romanum alienis rebus arbitrio alieno usum; et principium et finem in potestatem ipsorum, qui ope sua velint adiutos Romanos, esse, Livy 32.8.14.
equality, which is reinforced by the general instability of alliances at that time. The Romans went to a great deal of trouble in the 4th and 3rd centuries to create more stable alliances, with the result that by the 2nd century the reality of Roman relationships with their allies were far from equal. Like the provinces, the Italians were subject to Roman control and interference. There was a deep divide in how Roman-Italian relations were imagined and reality.

To be sure, the Italians were in a far superior position than non-Italians and provincials. Italian soldiers were included in Roman triumphs, and they profited directly, receiving booty and gifts from Roman generals. Italians were also able to take advantage of many of the economic opportunities of empire alongside the Romans. Italian negotiatores could be found throughout Roman territory. The island of Delos was a center of trade with a great number of Italians attested in inscriptions found on the island, sometimes spanning generations.36 Italian merchants (likely including some Romans) became targets of foreign kings, including Jugurtha and Mithridates.37 The economic opportunities that the empire presented brought massive amounts of wealth into Italy. The Etruscan Sextus Roscius owned a number of properties in the Tiber Valley, while L. Belilienus Varus added a number of public buildings to his hometown of Aletrium.38 The Romans took care to include their Italian allies in economic arrangements with communities outside of Italy.39 In the 2nd century, the empire brought wealth to Italy, spurring many building projects throughout the peninsula. However, while the Italians certainly gained from the Roman empire, they were not a true partner in ruling it. The Romans made many decisions impacting Italian

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37 Sal. Jug. 21, 26; App. Mith. 22.
39 Livy 38.34.4.
negotiatores both within and beyond Italy without any input from them. To be sure, the Romans took measures to protect Italian traders (as against pirates), but they also disregarded them at times.

There was a growing importance attached to being Roman. The idea of being a Roman was not necessarily linked to the idea of citizenship, although in time the two were increasingly tied together. The old bonds that linked the Romans and other peoples of Italy were breaking down. Roman officers existed between Italian commanders and Roman generals, recruitment took on a much more institutional character, the Roman Senate and magistrates dictated to their allies, hospites had become clientes, and in several instances aliens were removed from Rome. As these changes were taking place, the Romans also stopped the extension of citizenship. Citizenship extensions had ended in the 3rd century, likely as a result of the level of Roman power which could be directly exerted to keep allies in line as well as the growing importance of being Roman. Being Roman was worth something tangible in a way that was not true earlier. The issue was not necessarily concerned primarily with the ideology of citizenship as the concrete benefits it represented. The Italians gained a certain status by their traditional relationships with the Romans, but they were also increasingly treated as subjects by Romans who found themselves ruling a vast empire.

In many ways the changes that were occurring were the result of a growing Roman identity as something unique. Such an attitude was reinforced with the development of

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40 Salmon (1967), 330-331; Sherwin-White (1973), 140-141.

41 Mouritsen ([1998], 87-99) is right to sound a note of caution in retrojecting Imperial ideals of citizenship, see below.

42 The instability of alliances had played a major role in the extension of citizenship, see Chapter 2.
historical writing in the late 3rd century. The first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, sought to show that the Romans had always been the leaders of Central Italy.\textsuperscript{43} Such views are reflected in the early books of Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus where the Romans are usually masters of Latium (or putting down Latin attempts to overthrow them). Polybius, writing in the middle of the 2nd century, rarely even deems it worthwhile to acknowledge the role of the Italians in Rome’s success, and makes little distinction between Italians and Romans. The exceptionalism of the Romans in his histories is abundantly clear throughout. Some Roman writers were careful to recognize the important role of the Italians and their connections with the Romans, but always under Roman hegemony. It is the narrative of Livy where the most detail about Italian allies survives, which was likely a reflection of the importance placed on the role of the Italians in Roman affairs by the annalists who wrote after the Social War.\textsuperscript{44} Earlier, the strong connections between the Romans and other Italians were emphasized in Cato’s \textit{Origines} and in a speech by Tiberius Gracchus.\textsuperscript{45} Italian morals and actions were praised by Roman writers. However, as with other historical writers, the Romans and Italians were considered distinct despite the acknowledged similarities and connections that existed. Roman historical writings emphasized the exceptionalism of the Romans. The Italians were sometimes given acknowledgement, and sometimes not, but always under Roman leadership. The development of written history reinforced the growing sense of self-worth among the Romans.

\textsuperscript{43} Alföldi (1971), 123-175.

\textsuperscript{44} See below.

\textsuperscript{45} Sherwin-White (1973), 138. The purpose of Cato’s work has been debated by scholars, see Dench (1995), 17-18. The debate is hampered by the fact that only fragments of the \textit{Origines} survive.
As a result of the changes taking place as the Romans emerged from their Italian roots, the Italians found themselves in a difficult position. There were certainly benefits to be had, especially in expanding economic opportunities. The empire brought wealth and prosperity to Italy on an unprecedented scale. At the same time, Roman hegemony had created peace for the first time in Italian history. From the end of the Second Punic War in 201 down to the outbreak of the Social War in 91 there was only a single instance of warfare among the peoples of Italy.\(^{46}\) Populations were booming and intellectual pursuits reached new heights. However, the Italians were far from equals. Communities found themselves at the mercy of the Roman Senate and capricious magistrates, who felt little compunction about using their position to achieve their own selfish goals. The Italians had no access to positions of leadership and the running of the empire; they could only do their best to urge Roman patrons to act on their behalf. Military glory was a central component of a man’s status and position in his community, but Italian elites found themselves in a position subordinate to Roman generals and officers. Nevertheless, they were expected to fight and die to maintain the preeminence of Rome. The position of Italian individuals and communities was being undermined by the growth of Roman power, leaving them somewhere between partner and subject. The peculiar position of the Italians contributed to a growing feeling of discontent among Rome’s Italian allies.

4. Buildup and Outbreak of the Social War

In the late 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century, the discontent of the Italians began to come to a head as a result of the growing separation of the Romans and their Italian allies. Italian dissatisfaction saw expression in a variety of ways, including the idea of enfranchisement as Roman

\(^{46}\) The case of Fregellae in 125, see below.
citizens. However, at the heart of these problems lay the changes in military relationships. The Italians continued to play a major military role, but as subordinates with no access to political or military leadership. By the beginning of the 1st century, the Italians were increasingly dissatisfied and in 91 war broke out. The Social War was a correction to the growing disparity of the Romans and Italians, but the buildup to it was a complicated affair as the Italians found themselves disunited and lacking universal goals.

The causes of the Social war and the goals of the Italian rebels are a matter of scholarly debate. Scholars have focused especially on the role of citizenship, which Appian portrays as a central component in the buildup to the Social War. However, as Mouritsen has more recently noted, their focus on the importance of citizenship potentially introduces anachronistic ideas from the Imperial era about citizenship based on the interpretations of Appian. Instead, Mouritsen argues that the ultimate goal of the Italians in the Social War was the overthrow of the Romans to escape their subservient position. A great deal of Appian’s narrative of this period, the only surviving continuous account, revolves around the idea of incorporation within a larger framework of the Civil Wars. Despite possible anachronisms, there is ample emphasis placed on enfranchisement by the ancient sources beyond Appian, but at the same time there is plenty of variety in the apparent goals of the Italians who revolted.

Judging by the actions of the various peoples during and after the Social War, the Italians did not all share common goals. The Marsi, who came from a region heavily influenced by Roman culture and served most often in Roman armies among their allies (or at least boasted that they did), were among the leading peoples of the war, which was

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47 See Sherwin-White (1973), 134-149 for discussion and bibliography.
sometimes labeled the Marsic War. Nevertheless, after suffering some defeats they laid
down arms when offered citizenship in 88. The Samnites, on the other hand, do seem to have
had Rome’s destruction in mind. A well known Italian issued coin from this period depicts
the Oscan bull goring and trampling the Roman wolf. Even when the rest of Italy ended the
war, the Samnites continued fighting for many years until they were put down by a vengeful
Sulla. Among the rebellious Italians was to be found at least one Latin colony (Venusia).
However, not all of the Italians joined the rebels. Most of the Latin colonies remained loyal,
along with other Italian communities. The Etruscans considered joining the rebels until they
were offered citizenship, which they gladly accepted. After the war, at least two
communities, Heraclea and Neapolis, had trouble deciding whether to accept Roman
citizenship or retain their autonomy under their treaties. Mouritsen is right to point out that
Italian disaffection cannot be laid wholly at the feet of a desire for citizenship (although he
overemphasizes the goal of overthrowing Rome). There were a variety of reasons for going
to war with Rome depending on the circumstances of the particular people involved, but the
outbreak is ultimately to be linked to an underlying discontent among Rome’s allies that had
been building for decades prior.

The political subordination of the Italians in the 2nd century contributed to the slow
buildup to the Social War. One clear sign of the changing relationship of the Romans and
their Italian allies was the removals of aliens from Rome that happened on several occasions
over the course of the century. Before the Punic Wars, Rome, as with any Italian

49 App. BC 1.39.
50 App. BC 1.49.
community, had been relatively open to the movement of individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, those allies with Latin rights enjoyed an \textit{ius migrationis}, which came with Roman citizenship upon moving. Nonetheless, the Roman Senate expelled even those Latins who had legally moved to Rome and obtained citizenship in 177.\textsuperscript{53} The mobility of Italian individuals and groups, long an Italian tradition, was actively discouraged when it suited immediate Roman purposes. Later, the unhappiness of the Italians was reinforced when the tribune Tiberius Gracchus proposed his agrarian law in 133, which negatively impacted the Italian allies. The Italians became very upset by the actions of the land commission set up to oversee implementation of the law. The exact reasons are somewhat unclear, such as whether they were having their land directly taken, but the Italians were certainly not eligible for the land redistribution themselves.\textsuperscript{54}

Italian discontent over the land commission was such that many Italians approached Scipio Aemilianus to intercede on their behalf. Scipio walked a fine line, hobbling the commission while also mollifying the Roman poor, but his sudden death ended the hope that he would fix the problem.\textsuperscript{55} With his untimely death, Italian unrest continued.\textsuperscript{56} Evidently Tiberius Gracchus’ land reforms had inflamed a simmering discontent among the Italians. Even after his death and the obstruction of the land commission thanks to Scipio, Italian

\textsuperscript{52} See Chapter 2.2.b.

\textsuperscript{53} Envoys from the Latins complained of population movements to Rome, prompting the Senate to expel any Latins who claimed Roman citizenship after 189 (the last time censors were elected), Livy 41.9.9-12.

\textsuperscript{54} Badian (1958), 169-173. Sherwin-White ([1973], 217-218) may be right that Latin allies may have been eligible for land as colonists, as had last occurred in 173-172 (Livy 42.4.4). See also, E. Bispham, “\textit{Coloniam deducere}: how Roman was Roman colonization during the middle Republic?” in G. Bradley and J.-P. Wilson, eds. \textit{Greek and Roman Colonization} (Oakville, CT: 2006), 73-160.


\textsuperscript{56} Livy \textit{Per.} 59; Dio fr. 84.2.
disgruntlement continued. The subordination of the Italians had led to mistreatment and exploitation by the Romans. Their political subordination had been the result of a long process that is particularly clear over the course of the 2nd century, and it began to come to a head after 133. There was no single act that signaled the transition into a subject status, but by the end of the 2nd century the Italians began to realize the changes that had been taking place around them, fueling discontent.

Within a few years, the general feelings of dissatisfaction among the Italians found a new standard to rally behind. In 125, the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus proposed some sort of grant of citizenship for at least a portion of Rome’s Italian allies.\(^57\) The exact nature of this proposal is unclear, but it was likely not meant as a general enfranchisement of Italy.\(^58\) Indeed, the allies could supposedly choose to obtain \textit{ius provocationis} instead. More importantly, there is no indication that Flaccus made his proposal due to Italian pressure. It should be noted that this Flaccus was the son of the propraeter Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who in 180 had gone to so much effort to see to the discharge of his veterans from Spain, both Romans and Italians.\(^59\) Presumably, the consul of 125 was well-acquainted with the issues faced by the Italians and may have crafted his proposal appropriately. In the end, the Roman Senate proved unreceptive to the measure and sent Flaccus to Gaul as his \textit{provincia} so that he could no longer pursue the matter.

In the aftermath of Flaccus’ proposal, citizenship took on a much greater importance. From the middle of the 120s down to the outbreak of the Social War thirty years later, the

\(^{57}\) App. \textit{BC} 1.21; Val. Max. 9.5.1; \textit{MRR}, 1:510.

\(^{58}\) Mouritsen ([1998], 112-113) argues that the focus on enfranchisement concerning the proposal was a product of Appian’s interpretation. Badian ([1958], 391-393) argues that it was the landholders who were subject to having their land redistributed by the land commission that were the subject of Flaccus’ offer, but Mouritsen is right to point out that this claim poses its own problems in practicality and the interpretation of sources.

\(^{59}\) See Chapter 4.4.
question of citizenship continually resurfaced. Appian’s narrative certainly suffers in his overemphasis on the subject, but without doubt it seems to preserve an important issue even while distorting it to fit a larger literary purpose. The unsatisfactory nature of the Italian position was plainly felt by the Latin colony of Fregellae, which revolted in 125 and was crushed in a manner that reminded some of how Numantia, Carthage, and Corinth had been treated. The actions of the Fregellans were linked to enfranchisement by the ancient sources; Gaius Gracchus was even implicated. The goals of the Fregellans are unclear, as is what their ‘revolt’ exactly entailed. The city certainly had no hope of defeating the Romans in battle and no other communities came to their aid. It may very well be that the Fregellans did not anticipate the level of the Roman response to this challenge to their authority. Their actions speak to discontent, and the Roman reaction suggests awareness of the feelings of the allies and eagerness to put out the fire before it became a blaze. Indeed, shortly thereafter, Latin magistrates were given Roman citizenship after their time in office. Such a measure was likely both an attempt to mollify the increasingly unhappy allies and to integrate Latin elites. The question of enfranchisement became a rallying cry for Italian discontent concerning their position in the Roman empire in the 2nd century. Whatever the exact nature of Fregellae’s revolt, it was only the beginning.

When Gaius Gracchus became tribune in 123, he again proposed citizenship. However, his proposal would have given full Roman citizenship to the Latins and Latin

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60 Cic. Phil. 3.17; de Fin. 5.62; Rhet. Her. 4.9.13, 15.22, 27.37; Livy Per. 60; Val. Max. 2.8.4; Vell. Pat. 2.6.3; Strabo 5.237. There seems to be no reason to connect the revolt to the influx of Oscans, Mouritsen (1998), 118-119.

61 Plut. C. Gracch. 3.1; Vir. Ill. 65.

62 Badian ([1958], 179) sees this as a half-measure or disingenuous attempt to mollify the allies; but Sherwin-White ([1973], 215) sees it as a bona fide effort on the part of the Romans to integrate Latin aristocrats.
rights to the Italians generally.\textsuperscript{63} Just as Flaccus’ proposal had contributed to the assumption of enfranchisement as the embodiment of Italian discontent, so the political disputes of Gaius Gracchus’ tribunate altered the Roman perception of citizenship grants. Up until now, the urban population of Rome, which was increasingly serving as a political tool for politicians, had not shown opposition to the idea of Italian enfranchisement. It was the efforts of Gaius Gracchus’ opponents, who were against all of his proposals generally, that turned the urban population of Rome against the idea of citizenship extensions.\textsuperscript{64} The question of enfranchisement, which represented serious Italian dissatisfaction, became a political tool for Roman politicians used for their own purposes, which only served to highlight the lower status of the Italians. At the same time, the urban poor of Rome became hostile to the idea of Italian enfranchisement, creating a greater divide between the Romans and their Italian allies.

The issue of citizenship remained significant in the decades following Gracchus’ death. There were no more proposals of enfranchisement on a large scale, but smaller grants did occur. Allied Italian units and individuals obtained citizenship especially in the campaigns of Marius.\textsuperscript{65} In 95, the \textit{lex Licinia Mucia} prosecuted foreigners (Italians) who falsely claimed Roman citizenship.\textsuperscript{66} In 91, the tribune M. Livius Drusus again proposed citizenship for the Italians, apparently on a more comprehensive scale than his predecessors, as part of a larger legislative proposal to ease the growing tensions in Rome and Italy.\textsuperscript{67} In Livy’s epitome, there is a description of the supporters of Drusus’ bill showing up in Rome,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Badian (1958), 186.
\item Badian (1958),187-8.
\item Sherwin-White (1973), 140.
\item Mouritsen (1998), 121; Badian (1958), 213-214.
\item For the many ancient sources on Drusus, see \textit{MRR} 2:21-22. For a bibliography of modern discussions on Drusus, see Mouritsen (1998), 114, n. 11.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
taking part in the voting, and attacking opponents.\textsuperscript{68} Whether these were Italians generally or Latins is unclear. Mouritsen argues that these cannot be Italians generally, but were Latins who could legally take part in Roman politics to a limited degree, which is supported by some ancient sources.\textsuperscript{69} However, there may well have been Italians in Rome to agitate for the bill’s approval who did not actually participate in the voting process. Livy’s epitomizers may here be telescoping a very complicated set of events. Drusus’ enfranchisement proposal, along with the rest of his measures, was defeated and shortly thereafter he was assassinated by an unknown person followed by a general uproar throughout Italy.\textsuperscript{70} Within weeks the Social War broke out.

Mouritsen is right in his caution in retrojecting Imperial attitudes towards citizenship deep in to the Republican period, but Italian discontent in the four decades leading up to the Social War was increasingly linked to enfranchisement. This connection was not linked to an ideological idea of equality, but to the correction (in Italian eyes) of growing inequalities. Citizenship came to embody the general feelings of discontent that were spreading among Rome’s Italian allies. It may very well be that the changing attitudes towards citizenship in the decades leading up to the Social War helped shape the way that it was perceived in the Imperial Period. Within weeks of the death of Drusus in 91, rumors of rebellion prompted Rome to send out men to allied communities. One of these, a praetor, supposedly made threatening comments in Ausculum, scaring the locals and prompting a massacre of Roman

\textsuperscript{68} Livy \textit{Per.} 71.

\textsuperscript{69} Mouritsen (1998), 120-122.

\textsuperscript{70} Florus (2.5.9) describes the strong outcry among the Italians, perhaps based on Livy’s account.
citizens there.\textsuperscript{71} The events at Ausculum were seen as the beginning of the Social War, although both sides had apparently seen it coming.\textsuperscript{72} The revolt of Fregellae no doubt remained a potent symbol of Italian discontent even thirty-five years later.

Just because the massacre at Ausculum was linked to the failure of enfranchisement does not mean that all of the Italians in fact wanted to be incorporated as citizens. The goals of the Marsi and the Samnites were quite divorced, as mentioned above. Citizenship had increasingly served as a standard behind which the Italians could voice their discontent. Prior to the war it served as a unifying element, but once the war began that was no longer the case. When the actual war broke out, each community saw the chance to pursue its own goals, enfranchisement, the overthrow of Rome, or whatever it wanted in particular. At the heart of the matter, however, was the problem of inequality that can be traced in the military integration and subordination of the Italians into Roman armies.

Velleius Paterculus, who offers a brief narrative of the war and whose ancestor took part on the side of the Romans, saw the Italian cause as just, since they merely wanted an equal part (citizenship) in the imperium that they were supplying men to defend.\textsuperscript{73} The Italians were fighting and dying for the Roman empire, but were relegated to a subservient status. The connection of military service and citizenship was explicit when Marius rewarded cohorts from Camerinum with enfranchisement following the war with the Cimbri.

\textsuperscript{71} App. BC 1.38. The death of Drusus and thus his citizenship proposal are explicitly linked by ancient sources, Vell. Pat. 2.15.1; Florus, 2.6.4.

\textsuperscript{72} Hostages were exchanged by various Italian communities, App. BC 1.38; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.15.1. The Romans too likely saw this coming, garrisoning some Italian cities (Nola, Aesernia), Mouritsen (1998), 130-131.

\textsuperscript{73} Vel. Pat. 2.15.2. Minatius Magius, a Campanian and one of Velleius’ ancestors, raised a legion in support of Rome from among the Hirpini Samnites, Vell. Pat. 2.16.2-3.
and Teutonis. Indeed, the Romans in general and Tiberius Gracchus in particular were concerned that military pressures were whittling away at the Italian population. Appian says that the Italians desired to be partners instead of subjects, which they could no longer bear. One of the most fundamental means of interaction for the Romans and the other peoples of Italy had been military cooperation, a tradition that stretched back for centuries. The combination of military forces, both on the community level and below, was a central component of the relationships of communities and individuals. Over time, that relationship had been undermined by the rise of Roman power, especially in relation to their once equal Italian allies. The result was the integration and subordination of the Italians, symbolized in the development of the idea of military obligations.

Most of the Latin colonies (save Venusia) remained loyal to Rome, a stance which is likely linked to political and military concessions made by the Romans over the course of the buildup to the Social War. The Latins had already enjoyed the right to vote in Rome (in a single tribe), but the magistrates of the colonies were granted full Roman citizenship after their time in office. However, just as importantly was the concession that Latin soldiers were no longer subject, to some degree, to punishment in armies by Roman generals. To a degree, the Latins had been granted what the Italians in general desired. While they were still subordinate, some protection was apparently afforded. At the same time, Latin elites

74 See page 184, n. 16.
76 App. BC 1.34.
77 Latins voting in one tribe, Mommsen (1887), 3:396-397. The enfranchisement of Latin magistrates, see page 200.
78 The leges Porciae (Cic. Rep. 2.31. 54) were made applicable to the Latins during military service by Drusus in 91, Plut. C. Gracch. 9.3. It is unclear whether these laws entailed ius provocationis, Badian (1958), 190, n. 2.
could gain entry to political leadership in Rome (although it was likely unofficially regulated like freedmen). The Latins, however, were much closer tied to the Romans in culture, language, and blood, which gave these small concessions more weight. Nonetheless, they served to secure an important source of manpower.

In a speech given by Latin envoys to the Roman Senate with regards to the Great Latin War in the 4th century, Livy retrojects Italian complaints from the Social War that centered on the changing nature of military cooperation. In fact, many of the annalists who served as Livy’s major sources lived during or just after the events of the Social War. Thus he has Annius, leader of the Latins, complain that although the Latins still technically had an equal treaty with Rome and provided half of their joint armies, they were expected to do as the Romans ordered with their armed forces. He expressly contrasts the important military role of Rome’s allies with their subordination. The allies, after all, were a large part of Roman success, which they felt was unappreciated. The Italians in the late 2nd century were becoming aware of their subordinate role in an empire they helped to create. Ultimately, Rome’s allies desired political equality, which had degraded over time. But the justification for such a demand was the military role of Rome’s allies. The Romans relied heavily on their allies for military support. Without these allies, the Romans would not have been able to fend off Hannibal, conquer their empire, or maintain it. The growth of Roman power was, in part, thanks to the Italians. However, their reward was subordination. Provincials retained many military traditions, and continued to aid Roman armies, but they were not a vital

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80 Livy 8.4; Oakley (1997-2005), 2:413-418.

component of Roman armies in the 2nd century as the Italians were. The Latins supposedly in 341 and Italians in the Social War no longer waged war on their own, but at the behest of the Romans. The allies were no longer equals, capable of independent action. Annius emphasizes the strong interconnections of the two sides, the commingling of their blood. Nevertheless, as Annius makes clear, the allies still had the technical status of equals, linked by foedera, but the reality of the situation was quite different. The degradation of the allies had been slow, but by the beginning of the 1st century it was no longer tolerable.

The military positions of the Italians are still based on what they had been long before when the Romans were merely first among equals, but they no longer fit into the system that the Romans had created. The Italians were a vestige of older Italian traditions in a new imperial system and they are now out of place. The development of Rome away from its Italian traditions created a divide between them and the other peoples of Italy but they still exploited the Italian tradition of military cooperation. The Italians were dangerous to the existence of Rome. They were relied on to provide a huge amount of Roman manpower, the loss of which could potentially cripple the Republic and its empire. The Romans were increasingly putting their allies in an untenable position. It was not merely the military position of the Italians that was affected. Long-standing political and social practices were changing as well in favor of Roman domination. By the end of the 2nd century, the question of enfranchisement became a standard behind which the Italians could express their discontent with their situation. The Social War was a correction to the inherent inequalities that had developed slowly over time as the Roman army developed and emerged from its Italian roots.
Conclusion

With the end of the Social War in 88 (albeit with some Samnite and other holdouts), there were no more Italian allies. Instead, the Italians were able to become full citizens of Rome. As such, they were subject to military service like any other Roman citizens. The course of events that led from the military cooperation of allied communities in Italy before the Punic Wars down to the complete integration of the Italians into the Romans’ citizen body is also the story of the rise of a unique Roman military system. As Roman interests expanded, military pressures resulted in a series of changes that reshaped their armies and their use of allied military resources. These changes contributed to the outbreak of the Social War. The evolution of Roman armies and their allies during the Republic would subsequently repeat itself in the first few centuries of the Roman Empire with regard to the auxilia then. Understanding the impact of the Roman army’s development from its Italian origins is necessary in order to understand the role of Roman and Italian relations in the history of the Republic.

In the time before the Punic Wars, the Romans existed within a larger framework of Italian military traditions. It was common for Italians to combine their military resources and campaign together as allies. Roman armies seem to have always marched with allied forces,
and so did the other peoples of Italy. Samnites, Etruscans, and others all called upon their allies to bolster their own military forces. This military cooperation was a complex phenomenon that relied on a number of factors. While modern historians have focused on the role of formal treaties, many informal relationships existed between communities and individuals that facilitated the various aspects of military cooperation. Overlapping formal and informal relationships tied the communities of Italy together. Military cooperation played an important role in the creation and maintenance of these relationships. However, while Italians could field impressively large armies at times, there were inherent difficulties in organizing and controlling allied contingents. For the Romans, this problem became more acute as their hegemony spread over more of Italy and encompassed a wider range of allies.

During the 3rd century, changes began to appear in how Roman generals organized and controlled allied Italian contingents, but it was not until the pressures of the Second Punic War that the Italians were fully integrated into Roman armies. Allied forces were grouped into conglomerate units and placed under Roman officers. Italian elites commanding allied forces found themselves further separated from their Roman counterparts, and placed in a clearly subordinate position. These changes were built on decades of precedent and occurred in the difficult circumstances of the war with Hannibal, which meant that their full importance was only realized afterwards. It was this integration that separated Roman armies from their Italian armies, although many Italian elements survived. For the Italians themselves, these changes were quite significant and reshaped their relationships with the Romans.

Over the course of the later 3rd century and into the 2nd, the Italians became increasingly subsumed within the developing Roman military system. Italians were at the
beck and call of the Romans, and were subject to punishment by Roman generals and officers. In addition, an idea of military obligation developed, which asserted that the Romans had the right to make use of the military resources of their allies however they wished. In time, this concept was linked to treaties and retrojected back into the distant past by Roman historians. The integration of the Italians into Roman armies resulted in a very effective fighting force. Roman generals were able to combine the adaptability of Italian warfare with increased command and control, allowing them to confront and defeat a wide variety of military systems across the Mediterranean Basin. However, the Italians increasingly found themselves in a difficult position between ally and subject; the Italian military traditions of military cooperation had broken down, but nonetheless the Romans continued to lean heavily on Italian manpower.

It is important to recognize the changes that occurred in the military relations of the Romans and their Italian allies, which had a major impact on the history of the Republic. As Roman power expanded, there arose a conflict between tradition and innovation. Roman domination of Italy had relied on success in creating an alliance system based on Italian military traditions, but when Roman power expanded beyond Italy, those traditions proved insufficient. In order to assure their position of dominance, the Romans seized greater control, both politically and militarily, over their Italian allies. The result was the development of a Roman army and a very different position for the peoples of Italy. The Italians were key to Roman military success. Without them, the Romans would never have been able to conquer the Mediterranean Basin or maintain their dominant position. Nonetheless, by then the position of the Italians was a vestige of older traditions that no longer fit into a changing world. The Roman empire, like its armies, had moved beyond its
Italian roots. The Italians were neither partners nor provincials. As the Romans adapted and innovated, they maintained their reverence for the *mos maiorum*. The Italians represented the clash of old and new ideas.

The full integration of the Italians as citizens did not end Roman use of allied military resources. As Roman power expanded beyond Italy in the 3rd century, they used the military resources of many non-Italians. For most of the Republic, these forces played a relatively minor role when compared to the Italians. They usually only contributed forces for local campaigns, while the Italians accompanied Roman armies everywhere they campaigned. However, by the time of the establishment of the Empire under Augustus, the Romans were able to make more use of provincial military resources. In part, earlier difficulties in using them in distant campaigns had reflected a lack of sufficient organization and infrastructure on the part of the Romans to ship allies vast distances, as well as a level of power that was insufficient to force non-Italians to submit to full Roman military exploitation. In the early decades of the Empire, things were different.

By the end of the 2nd century, the Italians were having trouble tolerating their position of subordination. To be sure, their status was higher than those allies and provincials beyond Italy, which brought a certain amount of prosperity from the riches of empire. At the same time, the Italians were heavily impacted by Roman culture, although not to the degree that it replaced local cultures. In fact, local identities were strengthened. However, the fundamental relationships of the Romans and Italians had been undermined by Italian military and political subordination. The Italians had some access to the benefits of the Roman empire, but they were far from being partners in it. They were tools to be used by Roman elites. Over the course of the 2nd century, feelings of discontent began to spread
among the peoples of Italy. In time, the general feelings of dissatisfaction resulting from their position in Rome’s empire coalesced behind the idea of citizenship. Certainly not all Italians desired citizenship, but it became a rallying cry for many grievances. The clash over citizenship polarized the two sides (Roman and Italians) as the issue became a contentious one in Roman politics. By the beginning of the 1st century, the Italians’ discontent came to a head and many revolted from Rome in the Social War. At the heart of the issue remained their military subordination, which was expressed in a variety of ways by the different peoples of Italy and their goals in the war. A gulf had developed between the Romans and their Italian armies that was only remedied by war.
Appendix One

List of Latin Colonies in the Revolt of 209

1. Colonies Founded in Conjunction by the Latin League and Romans before 338

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Foundation Date</th>
<th>Status after 338</th>
<th>Revolted in 209</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidenae</td>
<td>Unknown/Romulus</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cora</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signia</td>
<td>495</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velitrae</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norba</td>
<td>492</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antium</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardea</td>
<td>442</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labici</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitellia</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circeii</td>
<td>393</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satricum</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>Given Roman Citizenship</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setia</td>
<td>c. 382</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutrium</td>
<td>c. 382</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepet</td>
<td>c. 382</td>
<td><strong>Remained a Latin Colony</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. Colonies Founded after the Settlement of 338

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Foundation Date</th>
<th>Revolted in 209</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cales</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fregellae</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luceria</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saticula</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suessa Aurunca</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontiae</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interamna</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sora</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alba Fucens</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narnia</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carseoli</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venusia</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadria</td>
<td>289-283</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosa</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paestum</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariminium</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneventum</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmum</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesernia</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brundisium</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoletium</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placentia</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cremona</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Prefects and Allied Commanders

There are a number of prefects and allied commanders known from the period of the Republic.¹ The lists in this appendix cover the period from around 280 (the first known examples of prefects or allied Italian commanders) to 91 (the beginning of the Social War). Only those prefects who were involved in the commanding of allied soldiers are listed. After the Social War, the Italian allies were incorporated into the Roman citizen body, a step which eliminated prefects commanding allied Italian soldiers. The position of prefect continued after 91 to be an important one in Roman armies. The impact of the spread of citizenship on local Italian leaders and their role in Roman armies afterwards is beyond the scope of this study. The sources of information regarding prefects and allied commanders are limited. The most important source is Livy, who preserves most references. Naturally, for those periods covered by Livy’s lost books (293-219, 166-9) the number of known individuals drops drastically. Beyond Livy, scattered references to prefects and allied commanders are known from a variety of authors.

The entries give the name of the individual, followed in parentheses by the title given in the sources, and the date. Included in the entry are the sources and a brief description of

¹ These lists are adapted from the relevant sections of Broughton’s *MRR* and Suolahti (1955), Appendix IIC. For the period of the Republic down to the beginning of the Social War (91), Suolahti, in his search for a larger sample size for his sociological study of junior officers, has included a number of individuals that should not be considered prefects (#12, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 51).
their activities. For those entries where no title is given, the position of the individual is conjectured based on their duties.

1. Prefects of the Allies

- Q. Naevius Crista
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 24.40.8; Plut. Arat. 51; cf. Zon. 9.4
  - MRR, 1:261
  - Sent to Apollonia with a small force of men. He took command of local forces and routed a besieging force under Philip V.

- Unnamed
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 24.20.1
  - Commanded a force of cohorts raised in Lucania on a raiding mission.

- T. Pomponius Veientanus
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 25.1.2-4; cf. 25.3.9
  - MRR, 1:265
  - A corrupt publicanus, who raised local force of Bruttians. Managed to turn some Bruttian cities back to their Roman loyalty. His force was crushed by one of Hannibal’s lieutenants (Hanno).

- L. Arrenius
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 27.26.12, 27.8
  - MRR, 1:293
  - Accompanied the consul M. Claudius Marcellus on scouting mission. Captured in an ambush and then killed.
  - See M’. Aulus below.

- M’. Aulus
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 27.26.12, 27.8
  - MRR, 1:293
  - Accompanied the consul M. Claudius Marcellus on scouting mission. Killed in an ambush.
  - See L. Arrenius above.

- P. Claudius
  - praefectus sociorum, Livy 27.41.7
  - MRR, 1:297
  - Sent with a military tribune in joint command of five cohorts of allies and five maniples of citizens to prepare an ambush.

- C. Ampius

215
- *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 31.2.5-9  
  - MRR, 1:322  
  - Given an emergency force of two legions and four cohorts and ordered to invade Boii land. Killed while leading a raid.

- M. Junius Silanus  
  - *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 33.36.5  
  - MRR, 1:338  
  - Fell in an ambush by the Boii with the consul M. Claudius Marcellus.  
  - See T. Sempronius Gracchus below.

- T. Sempronius Gracchus  
  - *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 33.36.5  
  - MRR, 1:338  
  - Fell in an ambush by the Boii with the consul M. Claudius Marcellus.  
  - See M. Junius Silanus above.

- M. Atinius  
  - *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 34.47.2  
  - MRR, 1:345  
  - Killed in an assault by Gauls on a Roman camp.  
  - See P. Sempronius below.

- P. Sempronius  
  - *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 34.47.2  
  - MRR, 1:345  
  - Killed in an assault by Gauls on a Roman camp.  
  - See M. Atinius above.

- C. Scribonius  
  - *praefectus sociorum*, Livy 40.31.3-6  
  - MRR, 1:386  
  - Sent *cum equitibus extraordinariis sinistrae alae* to scout Celtiberian camp and draw them out into an ambush.

- C. Annius  
  - *praefectus*, Sall. *Jug.* 77.4  
  - MRR, 1:550  
  - Given command of four cohorts of Ligurians in support of Lepcis.

- M. Gratidius  
  - *praefectus*, Cic. *Brut.* 168; Leg. 3.36; cf. *De Or.* 2.2  
  - MRR, 1:569  
  - Prefect for, and close friend of, M. Antonius during his campaign in Crete.

UNCERTAIN *PRAEFECTI SOCIORUM*  

216
- Unnamed
  - praefecti sociorum, Livy 23.7.3; cf. 26.13.5; 31.31.5
  - Details of the situation are difficult to determine. Livy suggests multiple prefects and connects them in later passages to a garrison in Capua. They and other Roman citizens were killed in Capua’s revolt to Hannibal.

- C. Livius Salinator
  - No title given, Livy 35.5.8
  - MRR, 1:349
  - Commanded an unknown number of allied cavalry.

- C. Titius
  - praefectus equitum, Val. Max. 2.7.9; Frontin. Str. 4.1.26
  - MRR, 1:495
  - Commanded a unit of allied cavalry in Sicily. Punished for ignominy.

2. Garrison Prefects

- Dasius of Brundisium (non-Roman)
  - praefectus praesidii, Livy 21.48.9-10; Polyb. 3.69.1
  - MRR, 1:239
  - Commanded a supply depot at Clastidum, which he betrayed to Hannibal.

- M. Junius Silanus (Roman)
  - praefectus Romanus, Livy 23.15.2
  - MRR, 1:251
  - Requested by Neapolitans in the face of Carthaginian attacks.

- L. Atilius (Roman)
  - praefectus praesidii, Livy 24.1.9
  - MRR, 1:257
  - Garrison commander in Locri. Escorted out of the city before it went over to Hamilcar.

- M. Livius (Roman)
  - praefectus, Livy 24.20.12-13; 25.10.3; 25.25.3-5; Polyb. 8.26-36
  - MRR, 1:261, 265, 270, 276, 281, 288
  - Garrison commander in Tarentum. Held the citadel for a number of years.

- L. Pinarius (Roman)
  - praefectus praesidii, Livy 24.37-39; Frontin. Str. 4.7.22
  - MRR, 1:265
- Garrison commander in Henna, Sicily. Heard of betrayals in other parts of Sicily and, suspecting a plot, killed large numbers of the people of Henna.

- M. Cincius Alimentus (Roman)
  - praefectus is Pisas, Livy 34.56.1
  - MRR, 1:349
  - Prefect in Pisa. Warned the consuls of disquiet among the surrounding Ligurians.

- A. Baebius (Roman)
  - praefectus praesidii, Livy 45.28.7-8, 31.2
  - MRR, 1:436
  - Garrison commander in Demetrias, Thessaly. Killed the local senate during local disturbances and convicted of participating in the massacre that took place in the city.

- T. Turpilius Silanus (Roman)
  - praefectus oppidi, Sall. Jug. 68-69; φρουράρχος, Plut. Mar. 8.1-2; Appian Num. 3
  - MRR, 1:547
  - Garrison commander in Vaga, Numidia, which was betrayed to Jugurtha. Flogged and executed by C. Marius for suspected involvement. Born a Latin, he owed his citizenship, position, and perhaps his subsequent execution at the hands of Marius, to a close relationship with the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus.\(^2\)

**UNCERTAIN GARRISON PREFECTS**

- M. Atinius
  - No title given, Livy 25.15.7-17
  - MRR, 1:270
  - Garrison commander in Thurii. Escorted out of the city when it was turned over to Hannibal.

- Sex. Orfdienus
  - MRR, 1:355
  - Garrison commander of Chyretiae in Thessaly.

**3. Naval Prefects**

- L. Valerius Antias or P. Valerius Flaccus
  - No title given, Livy 23.34.9, 23.38.7
  - MRR, 1:257
  - Commanded a fleet that was to escort captured envoys of Hannibal and Philip V.
  - The same fleet was said to be under the command both Valerii at different points of Livy’s narrative, perhaps the result of confusion in Livy’s sources.

\(^2\) Badian (1958), 196-197.
- M. Valerius Messalla
  - praefectus classis, Livy 27.5.1, 27.7.16
  - MRR, 1:281, 288
  - Sent to conduct naval raids of Africa.

- C. Laelius
  - 209
  - praetor, praefectus classis, Livy 26.42.5, 48.7, 49.4; cf. Polyb. 10.9.1
  - MRR, 1:288
  - Led a naval attack on New Carthage during P. Cornelius Scipio’s siege.
  - 205
  - No title given, Livy 29.1.14, 3.6-5.1
  - MRR, 1:305
  - Sent to conduct naval raids of Africa.
  - 204
    - praefectus classis, Livy 29.25.5-13, cf. 33.9
    - MRR, 1:309
    - Commanded the right wing of Scipio’s fleet sailing for Africa.
  - 204
    - Legate, Frontin. Str. 1.1.3, cf. 2.1; cf. Livy, 30.4.1; Polyb. 14.1.13
    - MRR, 1:309
    - Sent as legate (and spy) to Syphax, king of Numidia.

UNCERTAIN NAVAL PREFECTS

- D. Quinctius
  - No title given, Livy 26.39.2-19
  - MRR, 1:281
  - Killed while commanding a fleet that was bringing grain to the garrison at Tarentum.

- L. Porcius
  - praepositus, Livy 42.27.7
  - Appointed to take a fleet to Brundisium. Although he is given the title of praepositus, he seems to have performed the same duties as a naval prefect.

- Q. Calpurnius
  - praefectus, IG 12.5.841
  - MRR, 1:577
  - Recorded in an honorary inscription at Tenos, Greece.

4. Allied Commanders
It is difficult to know how to view the various titles, including that of *praefectus*, with regards to allied commanders. Varieties of titles are given by different authors. Decius Vibellius, the garrison commander in Rhegium around 280, is an interesting example. Livy, via epitome, calls him a *praefectus*, while Diodorus calls him a *χιλίαρχος*, and Appian a *φρουράρχος*. Both titles are themselves consistent with Decius’ position and perhaps could be considered translations of the Latin *praefectus*. Polybius, who transliterated *praefectus* as *πραίφεκτος* when discussing the position in general as opposed to translating it (6.26.5), does not specify Decius’ title. The same inconsistencies are found elsewhere. Around the same time Oblacus Volsinius was called a *ηγεμών* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Florus, presumably relying on Livy, calls him a *praefectus turmae*. The question becomes whether the title of *praefectus* should be considered a technical one, as it most surely was in the 2nd century and later. For most allied commanders for whom a title other then *praefectus* is preserved, they seem to have generic titles of authority (e.g. *ηγεμών*, *ἀρχων*). The title of *praefectus* was used to describe a variety of positions. Often those duties were reflected in the title itself, which then acquired a technical sense (i.e. *praefectus classis*). For those allied commanders described as *praefecti*, the title was used as a generic term for a commander when their actual title was unknown. When it was known, their native title was given, such as that of praetor for M. Anicius. These commanders led units of men from their native communities, cohorts and *turreae*. As allied commanders came to be further integrated into the Roman military system, the title of *praefectus* was probably increasingly adopted or applied, although in such a way that they could still be labeled as *ηγεμών* and *ἀρχων*.

- Oblacus Volsinius
- *ηγεμών*, Dion. Hal. 19.12.1; Plut. *Pyrr.* 16.8-10; *praefectus turmae*, Florus 1.13.7
- Frentani. Led a contingent of Frentani cavalry at the battle of Heraclea. Attempted to engage Pyrrhus in single combat. Killed by Pyrrhus’ companions

- Decius Vibellius c. 280
  - χιλίαρχος, Dion. Hal. 20.4; φρουράρχος, Polyb. 1.7; praefectus, Livy Per. 12
  - Campanian. Commanded the garrison at Rhegium. He and his men seized the city for themselves. Rhegium later taken by the Romans and the garrison executed.

- Herius Potilius 259
  - ἄρχων, Zon. 8.11; cf. Oros. Hist. 4.7.12
  - Samnite. Led a group of Samnites to serve as rowers in Roman fleets. His men conspired with slaves in Rome to attack the city. Informed the Romans of the conspiracy.

- Numerius Decimius 217
  - No title given, Livy 22.24.11-14
  - Samnite. Led 8,500 Samnites to the army of dictator Q. Fabius Maximus. Saved the magister equitum M. Minucius Rufus from Hannibal with his timely arrival.

- M. Anicius 216
  - praetor, Livy 23.17-20
  - Latin from Praeneste. Supposed to bring his cohort from Praeneste to Cannae, but garrisoned Casilinum after learning of Cannae's outcome, which was then attacked by Hannibal and eventually surrendered. Anicius and his men were ransomed by the Romans and offered citizenship as a reward, which they refused.

- Hegeas of Neapolis 216
  - praefectus equitum, Livy 23.1.9
  - Neapolitan. A young Capuan noble who was killed while sallying out against Hannibal’s marauding Numidian cavalry.

- Marius Statilius 216
  - praefectus cum turma Lucana, Livy 22.42.4-6; 43.7; Val. Max. 7.3.7; Frontin. Str. 4.7.36; Plut. Fab. 20
  - MRR, 1:251
  - Lucanian. Commanded a troop of Lucanian cavalry. Questionable loyalty.

- Vibius Accaeus 212
  - praefectus, Livy 25.14.4, 13; Val. Max. 3.2.20
  - MRR, 1:270
  - Paelignian. Threw his cohort’s standard into the enemy camp and led his men to assault it.

- Unnamed 209
  - praefecti navium, Livy 26.43.1
- Scipio, in preparation for an attack on New Carthage, reminded these naval prefects to keep vigilant, implying the individual ship commanders as opposed to the overall commander, see C. Laelius above.

- M. Trebellius
  - No title given, Livy 43.21.2
  - Latin from Fregellae. Sent by legate L. Coelius with a detachment to receive hostages from the Penestae in Illyria.

- Salvius
  - ἠγεμόν, Plut. Aem. 20.1-3; cf. Frontin. Str. 2.8.5
  - Paelignian. Threw his cohort’s standard into the Macedonian phalanx at Pydna. Led his men to a failed attack on the phalanx.

ALLIED COMMANDERS OF UNCERTAIN ORIGINS

- Biesius
  - ἵππορχος ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν, Appian Ib. 47
  - Perhaps Spanish. Sent to gather cavalry from nearby Spanish allies. Killed in an ambush while returning.
The socii navales are an odd facet of Roman history. The term only occurs in Livy, who uses it to describe Roman naval personnel, which has led to the idea that Roman navies were in fact manned almost exclusively by foreign men. Livy, in fact, did not use the term socii navales in any kind of technical manner, but as a generic term to refer to naval personnel.

In the surviving ancient sources the term socii navales occurs only in Livy’s narrative. No other Latin writer uses it independently, nor does any Greek writer use an equivalent term. (The term socii navales beyond Livy is only found in Orosius, who used it in his description of the events of the First Punic War; he likely reproduced a term that he found in Livy’s narrative, which served as his major source for Republican history.) The importance of the fact that Livy alone uses the term cannot be overemphasized. In order to understand how the term was used, more careful examination of Livy is necessary.

In every instance Livy uses socii navales as a synonym for naval personnel, and never in reference to communities. For instance, he wrote that Hiero II said that “he would provide grain and clothing to the consul’s legions and the socii navales for free,” clearly referring to the naval personnel that accompanied the consul’s legions to Sicily. The distinction between the socii navales and land forces is, as we would expect, quite explicit, although

1 Oros. Hist. 4.7.12.

2 frumentum vestimentaque sese legionibus consulis sociisque navalibus gratis praebitum, Livy 21.50.10.
they did occasionally act as raiders when the situation demanded. The use of the term to refer to naval personnel allows for a number of interpretations. Thiel argued that the Romans had no experience with the sea, instead relying on allied communities to provide ships before 261 (which Mommsen saw as a special category of allies) and personnel after 261, when the Romans commissioned their first great fleet of the First Punic War. For Thiel, *socii navales* as a general term for naval personnel reinforced his interpretation that the Romans had no wish to be involved with the sea. In addition, the nature of Roman power with regards to their allies can be seen in the use of solely allied resources to make up Roman fleets.

However, Livy’s loose use of technical terms, especially regarding military matters, has long been recognized. A closer inspection reveals a great deal of inconsistency in the classification of *socii navales* within the rather large category of naval personnel. First, Livy is unclear as to whether the term referred to all personnel involved with Roman navies, or more specifically rowers, sailors, marines, or some combination thereof. He recounts that the Rhodian mercenary admiral Polyxenidas said that “he would not have sufficient rowers or *socii navales* with his fleet.” Elsewhere Livy specifically equates *socii navales* with rowers. These inconsistencies within Livy’s own narrative and their clash with modern interpretations reveal a great deal about how the topic has been approached and misinterpreted.

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3 Livy 22.31.3; 23.40.2; 26.48.1; 27.17.6; 29.35.7; 34.29.5; 34.38.1.

4 Thiel (1954), 39-41, 70-74; Mommsen (1886), 3:676.

5 All naval personnel: 21.49.7-8; 23.21.2; 23.48.4; 23.48.12; 26.48.3; 27.22.12; 29.35.14; 34.6.12; 43.8.7; 45.2.1-2; 45.39.4; 45.43.7. Differentiated from soldiers serving with the fleets: 21.61.2; 22.11.7; 37.16.11. Differentiated from ship captains: 43.8.7; 45.42.3. *Socii navales* as rowers: 37.16.11.

6 *non remigem, non socios navales ad classem frequentes habiturum*, Livy 37.10.9.

7 Livy 37.16.11.
In addition to his lack of specificity about the duties of *socii navales*, Livy is not clear about the origins of the people who comprised them. Polybius, often seen as the better historian, asserts that at the beginning of the First Punic War in 264 the Romans had no experience with the sea and were forced to rely on their allies for ships and sailors.\(^8\) When combined with the term *socii navales* in Livy (read as ‘naval allies’) it is easy to see why historians have seen Roman fleets as having been manned mostly by allied Italian forces. However, a closer examination of Livy reveals a much less straightforward picture. Roman citizens are labeled as *socii navales*; usually these are freedmen, but not always.\(^9\) Men from allied Italian communities were also included.\(^10\) They could even be slaves, notably, Roman slaves.\(^11\) However, an Italian origin or even service in Roman fleets was apparently not necessary for Livy. Sicilians, Macedonians, Pergamenes, and Rhodians are all labeled, at different points, as *socii navales*, even when they had nothing to do with any Roman fleets.\(^12\) For example, he says that in 168 BC “the *socii navales* of the Romans, Macedonians, and Eumenes intermixed in the temple [on Delos] thanks to the religious truce offered in that place.”\(^13\)

Given such inconsistencies, it is difficult to accept that Livy was using some sort of technical term referring to ‘naval allies,’ from which modern historians can draw firm

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\(^8\) Polyb. 1.20.13-14.

\(^9\) Livy 24.11.7-9; 36.2.15; 40.18.7; 42.27.3; 43.12.9. At 40.18.7, Livy says that freedmen made up the *socii navales* of the Roman fleet being prepared and that free-born citizens only served as ship captains, suggesting that at times free-born citizens did serve in lesser stations.

\(^10\) Livy 32.23.9; 32.28.10; 34.6.12; 37.2.10; 42.31.7; 44.21.10. Orosius, in his single use of the term, apparently uses it to describe Samnites, *Hist.* 4.7.12; Zon. 8.11.

\(^11\) Livy 24.11.7-9.

\(^12\) Livy 24.23.10; 31.17.3; 32.35.10; 42.45.6; 43.12.9; 44.20.6; 44.29.2.

\(^13\) *itaque permixti Romanique et Macedones et Eumenis navales socii in templo indutias religione loci praebente versabantur*, Livy 44.29.2.
conclusions. It is impossible to determine which of Livy’s categories of the *socii navales* is correct. Were they anyone who served in a fleet? Were they just rowers? Did Rhodes, Macedon, and Pergamum all employ fleets predominantly manned by foreigners? Hellenistic states relied mostly on foreigners. Descriptions of Hellenistic personnel as *socii navales* (meaning naval allies) can easily be written off as a false assumption on the part of Livy. However, when taken as a whole, there are serious discrepancies in Livy’s use of the term as historians have interpreted it.

Indeed, there is evidence of large numbers of Romans serving in their fleets, despite Polybius’ assertions of their inexperience with the sea prior to the first war with Carthage. The Romans had a small fleet of ships, which were maintained by the *duumviri navales* back at least into the 4th century. Indeed, in 282 BC, well before the First Punic War, a small Roman fleet was attacked by the Tarentines, ultimately setting off the Pyrrhic War. Later, in 181 BC, a Roman fleet was almost exclusively manned by Roman citizens (freedmen specifically), as opposed to allied personnel. Later still, during the Third Macedonian War, the praetor M. Lucretius was instructed by the Senate “to inspect the *socii navales* [at Brundisium] and, after dismissing those who were no longer fit, to enroll and put to work additional men from among the freedmen in such a way that two parts were Roman citizens and a third allies.” The same reinforcement ratio of 2:1, Romans to allies, is also recorded later in the war. In a less authoritative story set during the First Punic War, the

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14 Appian *Samm. 7; Livy Per. 12; Zon. 8.2; Oros. Hist. 4.1.1. See Steinby (2007), 35-77 for a discussion of Roman fleets before 264, which takes a much more positive stance compared to Thiel.

15 Livy 40.18.7.

16 *recognoscere socios navales, dimissique si qui parum idonei essent, supplementum legere ex libertinis et dare operam ut duae partes civium Romanorum, tertia sociorum esset*, Livy 42.31.7.

17 Livy 43.12.9.
noblewoman Claudia remarked that she wished that her brother, who had suffered a severe naval disaster, were still alive to thin out the crowd that was making it difficult for her litter to move through the City, implying many Romans had died in the debacle.\(^{18}\) Polybius is undoubtedly wrong in his assertion of Roman inexperience with the sea and navies, and Livy, as has been seen, cannot be used to support such an argument. We know that large portions of Roman fleets were manned by Romans, and that they had a long, although somewhat limited, naval tradition prior to the First Punic War. Polybius was likely trying to minimize Roman naval experience in order to emphasize Roman adaptability for his Greek audience. Perhaps it would be good to keep in mind Polybius’ own statement, regarding the Roman constitution, that he has left out “certain details” for the purpose of creating a clear narrative.\(^{19}\)

It is clear that Livy did not use the term *socii navales* in a way that makes it possible to consistently translate it as a technical term meaning ‘naval allies’. Due to the poor survival of sources, it is impossible to trace the origins of the term, but it is possible to suggest a different interpretation. Perhaps the problem is not to be found in Livy’s perceived shortcomings, but in the modern interpretation, or more accurately the translation, of *socii navales*. The translation ‘naval allies’ brings with it inherent difficulties. It is true that often *socius* is used to refer to allies. However, here *socius* should be taken it its basic meaning as someone who shares something, which could include allies but also general associates or companions. In particular a *socius* is a person who shares a duty or responsibility. Thus Livy’s *socii navales* can be taken a generic term referring to a group of people sharing a

\(^{18}\) Gel. *NA* 10.6; Livy *Per.* 19; Suet. *Tib.* 2.3.

\(^{19}\) Polyb. 6.11.3-8.
naval duty and translated as ‘naval personnel’ and applied to a wide range of people.\textsuperscript{20}

Comparison with a line from Horace is useful, “wherever and whenever Fortune, as a better parent, carries us, let us go there – O comrades and companions (\textit{o socii comitesque}).”\textsuperscript{21}

Here Horace uses \textit{socii} to refer to people sharing a duty, and very interestingly, doing so as a naval crew. Tacitus also uses the word referring to the sharing of common work and difficulties by wives with their husbands.\textsuperscript{22} For Livy, it would seem that \textit{socii navales} were people who shared a common naval duty, or simply crews. By translating \textit{socii navales} as naval personnel or crews, Livy’s inconsistencies become largely immaterial.

\textsuperscript{20} In the Loeb translation of Livy the term \textit{socii navales} is usually translated as ‘naval allies’ (in the books translated by F.G. Moore, B.O. Foster, and E.T. Sage). However, Moore once translates it as ‘crews’ (24.11.9). In the later volumes A.C. Schlesinger prefers to translate the term as ‘sailors’ (42.27.3, 42.31.7, 43.12.9, 45.2.10), wholly rejecting ‘naval allies’.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{quo nos cumque feret melior fortuna parente \ ibimus – o socii comitesque} (Hor. Carm. 1.7).

\textsuperscript{22} Tac. \textit{Ger}. 18.4.
Appendix Four

List of Non-Italians in Roman Armies beyond their Homelands

1. SPANIARDS

215 (Livy 23.46.6-7)
- 272 Numidian and Spanish horsemen deserted to Marcellus after his victory against Hannibal at Nola. They continued to serve Marcellus in Italy and provided good service.

207 (Livy 27.38)
- 10,000 Spaniards, Gauls, and Numidians sent to Rome by Scipio from Spain.

2. SICILIANS

210 (Livy 26.40.16-18)
- 4,000 Sicilian brigands sent to Rhegium to harass Hannibal’s Bruttian allies.

208 (Livy 27.25.11)
- Ships and siege engines taken from Sicily (Syracuse?) for an attack on Locri.

207 (Livy 27.38)
- 3,000 Sicilian archers and slingers sent to Rome from Sicily.

193 (Livy 35.2.8)
- Sicilians enlisted by Flaminius on his way to his provincia.

169 (Livy 43.12.9)
- 1,500 Sicilians raised for service with a Roman fleet for the war against Perseus.

3. NUMIDIANS

215 (Livy 23.46.6-7)
- 272 Numidian and Spanish horsemen deserted to Marcellus after his victory against Hannibal at Nola. They continued to serve Marcellus in Italy and provided good service.

211 (Livy 26.10.5-7)
- 1,200 Numidian deserters in Rome camped on the Aventine. Sent to engage Hannibal’s scouts, but caused a panic in Rome as they rode through the City.

209 (Livy 27.8)
- Numidian deserters and Sicilians who had been in the armies of Epicydes and the Carthaginians.

207 (Livy 27.38)
- 10,000 Spaniards, Gauls, and Numidians sent to Rome by Scipio from Spain.

200 (Livy 31.11.10, 19.3-4)
- Masinissa sent 1000 Numidian cavalry for the war against Philip V.

198 (Livy 32.27.2)
- Masinissa sent 200 cavalry and 10 elephants to the Roman army in Macedonia.

193 (Livy 35.11.4)
- 800 Numidian cavalry in Liguria.

191 (Livy 36.4.5-9)
- Masinissa offered 500 cavalry and 20 elephants for the army in Greece.

188 (Livy 38.41.12-13)
- Manlius marched back to Rome after campaigning in Asia Minor and his army was attacked by Thracians. A Numidian named Muttines was scouting ahead with 400 Numidian cavalry and a few elephants, engaged and defeated a force of Thracians.

173 (Livy 42.35.6-7)
- The consul P. Licinius on his way to Macedonia wanted and recruited auxiliary troops: 2,000 Ligurians, Cretan archers, Numidian cavalry, and elephants.

171 (Livy 42.29, 35.6-7, 52.8, 62.2, 65.12-14)
- Masinissa sent light infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 22 elephants under Misagenes to the Romans for the war against Perseus. Roman army also accompanied by Lydians, Phrygians, Thracians, Gauls, Pergamenes, and Greeks.

170 (Livy 43.6.13)
- Masinissa offered 1200 cavalry and 12 elephants for the war against Perseus.

4. GAULS
216 (Livy 23.14.2-4)
- The dictator Marcus Junius Pera raised cohorts from Gallic districts for use against Hannibal in Italy.

207 (Livy 27.38)
- 10,000 Spaniards, Gauls, and Numidians sent to Rome by Scipio from Spain.

178 (Livy 41.1.8)
- 3,000 Gauls under their leader Catmelus accompanied a Roman campaign in Histria.

178 (Livy 41.5)
- The consul M. Junius sent into Gaul to demand as many fighting men as possible after a Roman army was rumored destroyed in Histria. They were released when the rumors proved false.

176 (Livy 41.17.9)
- Emergency forces from Gaul were raised and moved to Liguria. These troops may have been drawn from Latin colonies in Cisalpine Gaul as well as the Gauls themselves, see Livy 41.5.10.

171 (Livy 42.52, 55, 58.12-14)
- Roman army accompanied by Lydians, Phrygians, Numidians, Thracians, Gauls (including 200 Gallic cavalry), Pergamenes, and Greeks.

169 (Livy 44.14.1-2)
- A Gallic chief of unknown tribe named Balanos offered aid against Perseus in Macedon.

168 (Livy 44.21.7-8)
- Cn. Servilius sent word in Gaul to enroll 600 cavalry there, which he was to send to Macedonia.

5. LIGURIANS

173 (Livy 42.35.6-7)
- The consul P. Licinius on his way to Macedonia wanted and recruited auxiliary troops: 2,000 Ligurians, Cretan archers, Numidian cavalry, and elephants.

Jug. War (Sall. Jug. 38.6)
- A cohort of Ligurians and two turmae of Thracians served under the consul Albinus in Numidia.
Jug. War (Sall. Jug. 93.1-6)
- A Ligurian from the auxiliary cohorts, in the army of C. Marius accidently found a way to ascend a Numidian fortress.

6. GREEKS, MACEDONIANS, AND OTHER HELLENISTIC STATES BEYOND THE AEGEAN

217 (Livy 24.30.13)
- 600 Cretan archers served in the Roman army against Hannibal at the battle of Lake Trasimene; they are captured by Hannibal and eventually lent to Syracuse.

190 (Livy 37.37, 39)
- Eumenes of Pergamum joined the consul L. Cornelius Scipio on his way to Magnesia. Pergamene forces, consisted of light infantry and 800 cavalry, fought at Magnesia against Antiochus IV. Pergamene light infantry were combined with Achaeans, totaling around 2,000 men. Tralli and Cretan archers positioned on extreme right (about 500 men each). 2,000 Macedonian and Thracian volunteers left by the consul to guard the Roman camp.

189 (Livy 38.12-13, 20)
- Consul Manlius demanded that Attalus (brother of king Eumenes of Pergamum) join his campaign in Galatia. Attalus arrived with 1000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Athenaeus (another brother of Eumenes) later arrived with 1000 infantry from diverse origins and 300 cavalry.

Jug. War (Sall. Jug. 38.6)
- Two turmae of Thracians and a cohort of Ligurians served under the consul Albinus in Numidia.

7. NAVAL ASSISTANCE

198 (Livy 32.16-17)
- Roman, Pergamene, and Rhodian fleets joined forces and ravaged the coast of Macedon.

195 (Livy 34.26.11)
- Rhodian and Pergamene fleets joined the Romans against Philip V.

191 (Livy 36.42, 44)
- Roman fleet was joined by Pergamene ships near Scyllaeum under Eumenes of Pergamum. Carthaginians ships participated in subsequent fighting.
171 (Livy 42.56.2)
- M. Lucretius besieged a Macedonian town with naval forces which included 2,000 Pergamene soldiers under Athenaeus, brother of King Eumenes of Pergamum.

170 (Livy 42.27.1-3)
- Praetor of Sicily ordered to prepare the ships in Sicily for the war against Perseus.

169 (Livy 43.12.9)
- 1,500 Sicilians raised for service with a Roman fleet for the war against Perseus.

169 (Livy 44.10.12)
- Roman fleet commanded by a praetor joined by 20 decked ships from Eumenes and 5 from Prusias of Bythinia near Cassandrea for use against Perseus.
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