

# THE PROMISE OF PEACE

UNSC RESOLUTIONS 2098 AND 2147 AND  
THE PROTECTION OF CONGOLESE  
CIVILIANS



# RESOLUTIONS 2098 AND 2147

- **Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the first explicitly offensive contingent in UN history**
- **Use of drone surveillance technology to monitor armed groups**
- **Four objectives: protect civilians, neutralize armed groups, monitor, enforce regional arms embargo**
- “The text of the mandate is fine. Unfortunately, the translation of the text into practical action on the ground does not match” (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014).



# MONUSCO BY THE NUMBERS

- **Authorized: 2010 (predecessor: MONUC, authorized 1999)**
- **Budget: nearly 1.4 billion USD annually**
- **Personnel: over 22,000 total; nearly 20,000 military**



# THE DR CONGO: A BRIEF HISTORY

- **Congo Free State (CFS): 1885-1985; private possession of King Leopold II**
- **1908-1960: Belgian colony**
- **The rise and fall of Patrice Lumumba**
- **Mobutu's Congo: 1965-1997**
- **The 2 Congo Wars: 1996-1997; 1998-2003**
- **Transitional government: 2003-2006**
- **The Kabila administration: 2006-present**



# PEACEKEEPING PHILOSOPHY: AN EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS

- **The Cold War years (1945-1990): 100 major conflicts, 20 million lives lost, 279 UNSC vetoes**
- **Rwanda (1994): The Case of UNAMIR- UN troops reduced from 2,548 to 270; Chapter VI mandate**
- **The Brahimi Report (2000), ICISS (2001), Responsibility to Protect**
- **UN Group of Experts on the Protection of Civilians (2009)**



# EVALUATING MONUSCO: METHODOLOGY

- **Semi-structured interviews**
- **Bukavu and Kalehe, South Kivu, DRC**
- **9 Congolese community members and 6 UN personnel (foreign and Congolese)**
- **Evaluating MONUSCO in light of UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013)**



# STALLED PROGRESS: OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS

- **Internal: ambiguity in “intervention,” poor geographic strategy, problems with troop capacity**
- **Collaboration with the host country: failure to substantively include Congolese communities, difficulties of working with the Congolese military (FARDC)**



# INTERNAL LIMITATIONS: THE MEANING OF INTERVENTION

- “When we went out to the field, we would always get updates from peacekeepers on the security situation. We would ask what they were doing to protect the civilian population. A common answer was, ‘We do patrols on market days.’ They would go in the car and patrol the market on specific days. To my understanding, this was not civilian protection. There is more to civilian protection than that.”  
-UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014





# INTERNAL LIMITATIONS: GEOGRAPHIC MISMATCH

- **DR Congo: largest country in Africa, 11<sup>th</sup> largest globally**
- **Urban v. Rural, East v. West**
- **2003-present: insecurity concentrated in eastern provinces**
- **MONUSCO headquarters remains in Kinshasa, 1,500 miles from Bukavu and Goma**
- **Personnel reassignment: first round completed May 2014**
  - “MONUSCO should go to places where atrocities are actually occurring, rather than remaining in town centers” (UN interpreter, interview, July 2014).




# INTERNAL LIMITATIONS: GEOGRAPHIC MISMATCH



# INTERNAL LIMITATIONS: TROOP QUALITY

- **Rotational deployments of 4-6 months, most peacekeepers will serve a maximum of one year in the DRC**
- **Individual commitment:**
  - “How can we expect troops to die for a country that is not their own?” (UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014).
- **Troop quality: lack of uniformity**
- **Troop quality discrepancies and the structural racism of UN peacekeeping**
  - Discrepancy between the world’s top-spending militaries (the U.S., China, Russia, the U.K. and Japan) and top troop contributors (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia and Rwanda)
  - 9 of 16 active UN peacekeeping missions operate on the African continent



# COLLABORATION BREAKDOWN: COMMUNITY EXCLUSION

- **Default: consultation with government officials**
- **Elected officials and the will of the Congolese people: a weak link**
- **2011 elections**
- **Will Kabila cede power in 2016?**
- **UN strategies superimposed on Congolese realities**
  - “If MONUSCO came to us civilians, we could more accurately advise them on what they need to succeed and on what needs to be done. The problem is that they go to the government and the government does not know what we need” (Congolese Community Member, Interview, June 2014).
- **Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) and the Community Action Network (CAN)**




# COLLABORATION BREAKDOWN: WORKING WITH FARDC

- **Historical context: institutionalized state violence in the Congo**
  - Forced conscription in the Force Publique, post-independence tension between Congolese soldiers and Belgian officers, Mobutu's paramilitaries, cooperation between the FARDC and the FDLR
- **Legal obligation to work in tandem with the FARDC**
  - “Most of MONUSCO's activities are done in collaboration with the national government. MONUSCO has its objectives, but implementation of these objectives requires [cooperation with] local partners. As MONUSCO, we do not determine all of the factors that influence success” (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014).
- **Solutions: Unilateral action? Capacity development?**
  - Are these mutually exclusive?



# WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR CONGO?

- **2016 elections: ambitious timeline and 1 billion USD budget**
- **The Telema (“Stand Up”) movement, January uprisings, and youth activism**
- **Counter-FDLR operations and fissures between MONUSCO and the Kabila administration**
- **MONUSCO’s current mandate expires March 31**









# SUGGESTED READING

- The Congo From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History (Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja)
- King Leopold's Ghost (Adam Hochschild)
- Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (Jason Stearns)
- Lumumba Speaks (Patrice Lumumba)

