

Global Africana Review

VOLUME 3, SPRING 2019

Department of

African, African American, and
Diaspora Studies
at
UNC-Chapel Hill

Global Africana Review
Volume 3
Spring 2019

The Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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Global Africana Review

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Chair's Note

I am very delighted to launch Volume 3 of our annual undergraduate research journal: *Global Africana Review* (GAR). Special thanks to the students who made this volume possible and their faculty mentors. Further, thanks to Rebekah Kati and Julie Renee Rudder of Davis Library and the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for supporting the publication of this journal.

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Emily Venturi graduated from UNC-Chapel Hill in May 2018 with a B.A. in Political Science and Economics with Highest Honors. Interested in the safeguard of migrant and refugee rights within international law and political economy, Emily completed her research on the migration-development-security nexus in EU–Senegal relations under the guidance of Dr. Eunice Sahle from the Department of African, African-American, and Diaspora Studies. She currently works on humanitarian-development partnerships for refugee protection at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, and will conduct her postgraduate studies on China’s role in forced displacement crises at Tsinghua University in Beijing as a Schwarzman Scholar.

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Introduction

Charlene Regester

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The *Global Africana Review* (GAR) is now in its third year of publication and remains an example of our commitment to our goal of featuring student academic research conducted in the Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, which represents disciplines that include Anthropology, Comparative Literature, Development Studies, Film, History, Human Rights, Linguistics, Music, Political Science, and Public Policy.

The volume begins with Emily Venturi's article, which examines migration as an extension of the foreign policy agreement established between Senegal and the European Union to determine how this relationship impacts migration management within security development. The next article by Bailey Nelson explores how lawyers during the Civil Rights Movement empowered others, by becoming what she terms "activist lawyers," and in the process helped propel social change that led to desegregation and the end of the Jim Crow era. In his article, Alexander Peeples examines how women in Tanzania organized political movements from the era of liberation movements to the contemporary period. The article argues that "non-elite women continue to be disproportionately politically marginalized" in discourses about women's equality. Finally, Angum Check's article on US anti-apartheid activism and the work of the Anti-Apartheid Support Group (AASG) at UNC-Chapel Hill demonstrates the group's contributions and the challenges underpinning its emergence and evolution on campus.

This volume offers two scholarly book reviews. Andre Tyson's review of *Double Negative: The Black Image and Popular Culture* by Racquel Gates (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018) examines Gates' work on how certain reality television shows use negative images to challenge the limits of black respectability politics. Kevyn Robinson discusses *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics* by Adam Ewing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Robinson interrogates how Ewing examines Marcus Garvey's life, looking into his ideology and efforts in a way that contextualizes his early life and ascent, and, uniquely, humanizes the black leader.

We are very proud of the work produced by our students, and as the Executive Editor of this volume of the GAR, I applaud them for their contributions and commitment to research.

Dr. Charlene Regester

Executive Editor, *Global Africana Review*

Associate Professor, Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies

Migration Management Within Security and Development Narratives: A Case Study of Bilateral Relations between Senegal and the European Union

Emily Venturi

ABSTRACT

The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration between African and European leaders brought migration management to the forefront of foreign policy and cooperation relations. With a focus on bilateral relations between Senegal and the European Union since the launch of new instruments linking migration and development policy, the following study analyzes the driving interests for Senegalese and European counterparts regarding the treatment of migration as a foreign policy topic and its linkage to development and security issues. The research draws on evidence from interviews conducted in 2017 in Dakar, Brussels, and Rome with representatives from the Senegalese government, the Italian government, European Union institutions, the African Union Delegation to the EU, national embassies, NGOs, and think-tanks, among others. All interviews were conducted by the author. While bilateral relations for migration management were found to be of strategic interest for both parties, this article concludes that their securitization framework places a strain on development objectives and long-term relations between Senegal and the EU, due to the EU's short-term prioritization of readmission demands and the reduction of irregular migration.

Keywords: Senegal, European Union, migration, development, securitization

Introduction

Since the attention sparked by what is commonly referred to as the “Central Mediterranean migration crisis” in 2014,¹ the insertion of migration into bilateral relations between African and European states has steadily increased through new cooperation instruments, funding packages, political statements, and diplomatic visits. During an interview at the EU Commission, an official stated: “With the new *Partnership Framework*, migration became one of the central

¹ In conjunction with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the destabilization of Libya in 2011, between 2012 and 2015, EU member states collectively observed a 294.53 percent increase in asylum applications (Eurostat 2019). We must also consider that the European Union currently hosts only 6 percent of the world's displaced population, and that migration is not a unidirectional flow toward Europe, as is often presented in studies and in European rhetoric. Despite the comparative contextualization of the EU's migration pressures, the percentage change in asylum applications toward EU member states is still generally regarded as a pertinent exogenous shock to EU policy-making, and will therefore be considered as such for the purposes of this study.

aspects in EU external policy and development work. Before it was one of many sectors. This is something that is now systematically looked at” (Interview, EU Commission DEVCO).

The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration formally consolidated migration as a priority for European–African cooperation on trade, security, and development, and announced the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)* as a development funding package aimed at tackling the “root causes” of destabilization, displacement, and irregular migration (EU Commission 2019), effectively linking the management of migration flows to development cooperation. Shortly thereafter, the *Migration Partnership Framework* was also launched as a set of bilateral agreements between the EU and five priority countries: Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and Senegal. This article expands upon a broader research study that used Senegal as a case study to examine the issue-linkage of migration management and development policy in EU external relations through instruments such as the EUTF and the *Migration Partnership Framework*. It showed the instruments’ preliminary outcomes to be compromised within a securitized cooperation framework, both in terms of strengthening development cooperation as well as managing migration (Venturi 2018). This article examines evidence from the aforementioned research study to analyze in depth the implications of the current cooperation arrangements on migration, development, and security on bilateral relations between Senegal and the European Union. Drawing from expert interviews, a literature review, and the analysis of key multilateral and international agreements, the article will first evaluate the implications of Senegal’s domestic and international roles in managing migration flows, and the country’s cooperation history with the European Union. The study then presents and analyzes the driving interests expressed by Senegalese and EU authorities to: (1) treat migration as a foreign policy issue; and, (2) treat it through issue-linkage instruments with development policy. Finally, by introducing a securitization lens and arguing in favor of broadening the debate to a tripartite nexus of migration, development, and security in the Sahel region, the article uses this framework to present its findings on the evolution of Senegal’s relations with the EU and with Italy, an EU member state that holds a policy-driving role in the setting up of migration management instruments. While bilateral relations and cooperation on migration management are found to be of strategic interest for both parties, this article concludes that a securitization framework places a strain on development objectives and the long-term relations of Senegal with Italy and the EU, due to the EU’s short-term prioritization on reducing irregular migration and Italy’s prioritization on advancing readmission demands.

Research Methods

The article draws on evidence from interviews conducted with EU policy officials between May and July 2017. I use qualitative data from interviews with officials located in Brussels (Belgium) and Dakar (Senegal) representing the EU Delegation to Senegal, and from the European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the EU Parliament’s Committee on Development, the European External Action Service, and High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini’s Cabinet. At the national level, officials were interviewed from the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning, the Senegalese Embassies in Belgium and Italy, as well as the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, and the Italian Embassy in Senegal. Because approaches to migration management are affected by an actor’s relative proximity to a crisis, the interview methodology was designed to engage with

EU, Senegalese, and Italian actors across locations and contexts. Differences in approach, for example, to national government headquarters compared to embassies on foreign soil are highlighted. Interview data also includes information gathered from interviews with the African Union Delegation to the European Union and with non-governmental actors such as NGOs, think-tanks, foundations, and academics.

Senegal's Migration History and Recent Developments

Senegal is historically known for the heterogeneity of its migration flows. As it is a country of migration origin, transit, and destination, Senegalese authorities work to tackle migration from the perspectives of a variety of interested parties, including the EU. Within the EU's external relations for migration management, Senegal is one of sixteen countries of priority focus and one of the five countries that signed the *Migration Partnership Framework* with the EU in 2016.

Domestically, the Senegalese government is currently strengthening its national approach to migration management. Migration is already incorporated in the *Plan Sénégal Émergent*, President Macky Sall's policy framework aimed at getting Senegal on the road to development by 2035. Senegal's migration agenda has therefore taken a strong orientation toward the migration–development nexus. For example, an official at the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium underscored the role of Senegalese youth in the country's development, and the subsequent “priority of Senegalese authorities to maintain young people at home” (Interview, Senegalese Embassy in Belgium). Furthermore, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning is currently heading a shared institutional effort to draft the *Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal*, Senegal's national policy framework for migration management. Senegal's domestic migration policy developments are relevant when evaluating its foreign policy relations, its state agency, and its national interests in working with the EU on migration management.

As for their cooperation history, the EU and Senegal have been working jointly on development policy for approximately fifty years, in what an official at the EU Delegation to Senegal described in 2017 as “an excellent relationship with Senegalese authorities” (Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal). In terms of joint migration management, Senegal has a close working relationship with Spain and the European Union due to the 2005 spike in migration flows departing from Senegal for Spain's Canary Islands. Since the EUTF's launch in 2015, Senegal has been one of the largest beneficiaries of development funding from the EUTF, with a total budget of EUR 161.8 million (USD 183.7 million). EU funding finances nine development projects across Senegal aimed at tackling “root causes” of migration, ranging from employment creation and food security in regions of high emigration potential, to diaspora investment facilitation and the setup of a national biometric identification system. However, the EU's allocation of development funding within the EUTF and its renewed interest in cooperating with Senegal since the Central Mediterranean crisis have occurred in the absence of a significant spike in Senegalese migration rates to Europe between 2010 and 2017 (World Bank 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). This consideration is noteworthy because it raises questions that will be addressed in this study with regard to the evidence of and driving interest in the recent increase in bilateral cooperation between Senegal and the EU.

Mapping Senegalese and EU Interests in Bilateral Engagement on Migration Issues Within Development and Security Narratives

At an EU institutional level, significant evidence highlights the EU's push to include the management of migration in foreign policy and development cooperation relations with partner countries. In 2016, the European External Action Service, the diplomatic service of the European Union, outlined the centralization of migration in EU foreign policy: "Migration management will become an important dimension in the EU's foreign policies and instruments, ranging from diplomacy and the *Common Security and Defence Policy*, to development and climate" (n.p.). Evidence at the EU member state level points toward the stagnation of strategies for burden-sharing arrangements, and domestic reforms such as the Common European Asylum System and the Dublin Regulation, as factors that encourage an external and foreign policy approach in order to deliver responses on migration management (Interview, Open Society for European Policy). When asked about Italy's role in advancing EU migration legislation that focused on foreign policy rather than on domestic reform for integration, relocation, and resettlement, a representative from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation answered: "The more we ask for internally, the more they [EU institutions] give us externally" (Interview).

This study also uncovered evidence of Senegalese interest in including migration management as a foreign policy issue with European counterparts. An official at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the Senegalese government's interest in engaging with the European Union on migration issues. From an economic standpoint, the official stated: "Today we are in a process of economic diplomacy. In this economic diplomacy process, it is important to favor the maximum amount of foreign direct investment" (Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad). Van Criekinge (2010) not only underscores the same point, but also further argues that the EU's need for cooperation in migration management has increased Senegal's negotiation leverage in terms of direct policies and development programming closer to its own national interests.

In addition to Senegalese and EU interest in engaging on migration in foreign relations, the specific linkage of migration management to development programming can be argued to be a path dependent on insertion into pre-existing bilateral relations. Migration management enters a pre-existing framework of historical colonial legacies and development aid structures. Models of path dependency identify positive feedback loops as responsible for ensuring the consistency of institutional arrangements. For example, an official at the EU Commission described the choice to link migration management to development funding: "I think that it has been the easiest, especially in the eyes of members. It's just been the easiest to pour [in] more money, whether that's good or bad, whether it's useful or not. One year after we see the limitations" (Interview, EU Commission DEVCO). This is evidence of a short-term and consensus-driven approach in the decision to link migration to development funding as a primary instrument for the externalization of migration management accountabilities.

Within issue-linkage, Nyberg-Sorensen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Hear raise the risk of policy divergence between migration and development objectives, asking: "Can long-term goals of global poverty reduction be achieved if short-term migration policy interests are to be met? Can partnership with developing countries be real if tackling illegal migration is the principal European policy goal?" (2002, 50). Extensive literature challenges the utilization and instrumentalization of a historically produced "development discourse" (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002, 59). Anthropologist Arturo Escobar argues that in the post-World War II period, Western

economic and governance models were presented as the long-term goals of development programming, and that “development has achieved the status of certainty in the social imaginary” (2012, 5). Kenyan-American human rights scholar Makau Mutua interrogates the interest of foreign donor governments in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). When evaluating the international funding of human rights NGOs in Kenya during the country’s precarious wave of democratization, he notes that “donor funding is essentially the story of the historically managed development of the African state” (Mutua 2013, 158).

Lastly, in addition to the risk of instrumentalization of development programming, security objectives need to be considered when setting the stage for the drivers of EU–Senegal relations for migration management. The concept of “securitization” was introduced by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (2013) of the Copenhagen School. Securitization delineates a process through which policy choices unrelated to security become “securitized” when actors attach a national security value to them. Since the Cold War, securitization has also affected the allocation and implementation of official development assistance (ODA), giving rise to the notion of “securitization of development.” Concerns around the securitization of ODA exist not only with regard to the agendas of donor governments, but also with regard to the use of the development funding by governments receiving aid, such as the Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes’ arguable use of Western security initiatives in the 1990s to build militarized and strongly authoritarian states (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Because the primary stated goal of migration policy in almost all developed countries is fighting irregular migration, Baggio and Zanfrini (2006, 65) identify securitization as an impediment to the constructive issue-linkage of migration and development. Indeed, the *European Agenda for Migration* states the control of irregular migration as a central objective (European Commission 2015).

In this study, security interests were expressed in interviews by EU officials, who cited irregular migration and policy pressures from EU member states as reasons for such a framework, as well as by Senegalese government officials, who cited the issues of counter-terrorism, regional migration flows, and cross-border security. In particular, when discussing the *Migration Partnership Framework*, an Italian Embassy official stated: “Increased cooperation among police forces can only be beneficial in order to avoid the most pathological outcome, namely terrorism” (Interview, Italian Embassy in Senegal). Interview outcomes therefore illustrate a significantly securitized context for cooperation on migration policy.

Within the identified Senegalese and EU strategic precursory interests in treating migration as an issue within foreign policy, the use of development funding and the centrality of security prerogatives are also shown to affect bilateral cooperation. Next, I evaluate the preliminary effects of issue-linkage instruments for migration management on bilateral relations.

Preliminary Outcomes for Senegal–European Union Relations

In light of the new instruments created after the 2015 Valletta Summit, the preliminary observations and outcomes of Senegal–EU relations focus on three issues: (1) the controversial node of readmission demands; (2) project ownership within development programming; and, (3) bilateral and continental approaches to mobility and irregular migration.

In their 2013 study, Beauchemin, Kabbajji, Sakho, and Schoumaker demonstrate the primacy of security in European border management and control objectives, and accordingly argue that diplomacy between African and European leaders is centered on European readmission demands. Building on the trend identified by Beauchemin et al. in 2013, this article further reveals that after the 2015 Valletta Summit, representatives from the Senegal and EU

institutions also identified the primacy of European national government readmission demands within EU–Senegal relations. An official from the EU Delegation to Senegal in Dakar explained, “It is important that the priority of some EU member states to send migrants back does not take hostage our relations, which are much larger and much richer than this” (Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal). An official at the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium also noted: “It is necessary to find the right equilibrium so that the focus is not exclusively on readmission and returns” (Interview, Senegalese Embassy in Belgium). The centrality of identification and readmission demands within European national security and irregular migration narratives, coupled with the absence of a significant increase in readmissions despite the new cooperation instruments (Interview, EU Commission DG HOME), is thus found to be a point of strain within bilateral relations.

Secondly, the use of development funding for migration management has generated Senegalese pushback in terms of project ownership within the activities funded by the EUTF and within the *Migration Partnership Framework*. As one interviewee stated, “What shocked me the most was that there are projects identified in Brussels, the appropriation of these projects, projects that are managed by European actors” (Interview, Open Society Initiative for West Africa). Interviews with the delegations of European member states to Senegal also uncovered concerns with regard to what was described as an “arbitrariness” of EU development funding distribution. An official at AECID (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo) noted the renewed influx of funding and interest driven by EU officials, despite the stabilization of Spain’s cooperation efforts with Senegal since the 2005 migration management crisis between the two countries (Interview). Officials at the Italian Embassy also noted that the money that Italy received from the EUTF was being managed primarily by Italian NGOs (Interview, Italian Embassy in Senegal). While all projects are now reported to have at least one Senegalese partner, significant concerns persist as to their design and the levels of local ownership, and the long-term goals for the country’s partnership with the EU.

Lastly, multiple officials repeatedly underscored the difference in the approach of African and European representatives to cooperation for migration management. An official of the African Union Delegation to the EU highlighted the African Union (AU)’s commitment to pursuing a continental policy framework based on the principle of mobility and development, rather than a focus on border control and migration management. When describing the AU’s discussions with the EU in the lead-up to the Valletta Summit, an AU official stated: “The discussion was mostly on migration...the European temple was not interested in mobility” (Interview, African Union Delegation to the EU). Furthermore, with regard to the EU’s push for bilateral rather than continental coordination, the official stated: “For now your rationale is that you are focusing on hotspot countries, but what about us involving everybody before countries become hotspots tomorrow. But if you have been dealing with the EU, you realize that the EU as an institution is not a proactive institution. Mostly all EU policies are reactive” (Interview, African Union Delegation to the EU). A representative of the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium also criticized “the tendency of the EU to separate African countries for cooperation efforts” (Interview). Overall, preliminary observations on Senegal–EU relations underscore the role of short-term issues such as readmissions, project ownership, and hotspot security within the broader long-term framework for a partnership effort.

Preliminary Outcomes for Senegal–Italy Relations

Due to the incomplete delegation of migration and asylum competencies by EU member states to EU institutions, it is necessary to also analyze Senegal’s bilateral relations with EU member states. Interview outcomes with regard to Senegal’s relations with Italy focused on the primary themes of: (1) identification and readmission; (2) legal migration; (3) politicization and the role of public opinion; and, (4) remittances.

The issue of readmissions arose as central within Senegal–Italy relations due to a push for increased collaboration on migrant identification, and inclusion of irregular migration as part of the *Migration Partnership Framework*. A representative from the EU Delegation to Senegal highlighted how the EU had facilitated a mission to Italy for Senegalese authorities to verify the conditions of Senegalese nationals, and to collaborate with the Italian government for their identification and return (Interview). In interviews, both Senegalese and Italian counterparts noted the limited utility of the Senegalese identification mission. A representative from the Italian Embassy in Senegal highlighted the absence of a “unitary position” within the Italian government on bargaining tools for the reduction of irregular migration and the need to treat readmissions delicately (Interview). Parallel to that of readmissions, observations around bilateral relations also arose with regard to the comparatively lower focus on the expansion of legal migration opportunities in Italy and EU member states, despite the *Valletta Action Plan*’s pillar on increasing avenues for legal migration. During an interview at the EU Commission DEVCO, officials underscored that EU member states have maintained control over legal migration issues: “We cannot work on legal migration apart from strengthening institutions that work on legal migration because that is not our competence.” An official from the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad also spoke of pressuring the national authorities of Italy and EU member states to allow the legalization of Senegalese workers: “There are young people who are in an irregular status but that contribute a lot to their [European] economies...They must be legalized” (Interview). When discussing readmission and legal migration, a driving issue in interviews with Italian and EU officials was the concern for public opinion outcomes. As one representative expressed, “Elections are won and elections are lost over these issues” (Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation). In response to European concerns about public opinion, an official at the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium stated, “It must [be] remembered that African leaders also have a public opinion that they need to satisfy” (Interview).

Despite the above-described issues within Senegal–Italy relations, interview outcomes also point to an overall shared understanding and commitment to the importance of bilateral relations for migration management. For example, the issue of remittances was widely cited as a primary factor of consideration within bilateral relations. For Senegal, personal remittances are the first source of foreign currency and accounted for 10.62 percent of the national GDP in 2017 (World Bank 2019d). Accordingly, the Senegalese Ambassador to Italy stated: “Italy has now become a factor of stability in Senegal” (Interview). The long-term strategic interests in managing remittances and in increasing channels for mutually beneficial legal migration are juxtaposed with short-term readmission demands, security narratives, and public opinion concerns within Senegalese and Italian bilateral relations.

Conclusion

While the insertion of migration into foreign policy relations was shown in this study to be of strategic interest to Senegal and the European Union, the instrumentalization of development discourse and practical programming, as well as the prominence of security priorities and securitization trends, were also identified as precursory factors to be considered when evaluating bilateral cooperation – not only in terms of effectiveness, but also in terms of its influence on the long-term relationship between Senegal and its EU counterparts. The centrality of short-term securitization narratives within the EU priority of fighting irregular migration and advancing readmission demands plays a primary role in cooperation relations, and is also met by strategic Senegalese economic and security interests within negotiations for migration management. Overall, the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa* and the *Migration Partnership Framework*, as issue-linkage instruments for migration management, play a role not only in short-term cooperation prioritization, but also in the long-term nature of the partnership between Senegal and the European Union, and must be closely analyzed as their implementation continues to unfold.

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More than Your Average Lawyer: Beyond the Call of Duty

Bailey Nelson

ABSTRACT

The civil rights era was a period of unveiling and combatting discrimination against, and unjust legal treatment of minorities in the United States. This article discusses how the unconventional participation of influential lawyers in the civil rights movement was necessary in counteracting these norms. It was crucial both during and after this period for these legal advocates to ensure the public of their commitment to a transformation of the justice system by connecting with the diverse members of their community. This article serves to trace the valiant efforts of such lawyers in North Carolina and the South, allowing for a better understanding of the actions that were needed to provide change that has benefitted all minorities in this country, and by extension, the world.

Keywords: Lewis Pitts, lawyers, transformation, Julius Chambers, justice, civil rights

Introduction

In the midst of the civil rights movement, activists acted as the voice of oppressed Americans. However, many cases arose where activists needed the assistance of lawyers when their efforts were blocked by the legal system. This article examines how representatives of the Southern Justice Institute were not only prepared to defend activists in this situation, but were also willing to fight among them as activists themselves. It was common for many lawyers during and after this period to simply offer assistance in proving one's innocence to the court. However, this firm made an extensive effort to become involved in the movement in a way that was much larger than the courtroom. Looking at how lawyers worked outside of the normal requirements of their position raises a series of questions that demonstrate how the members of the Southern Justice Institute and other firms battled outside forces – and even some within their own legal system.

The literature that was analyzed for this research portrays the extent of direct and indirect influences that lawyers faced during the civil rights era and even beyond this period. This article asks if there is any real difference between activists for social movements and lawyers, and, if so, how do these roles differ? Finally, what were the underlying motivations for these lawyers to take on these cases? Through analyzing scholarly articles and archival sources that address the specific practices of lawyers, this article examines the unique strategies employed by those of the Southern Justice Institute and other lawyers of the period. Observing the life of lawyers outside of the Southern Justice Institute helps to create a thorough understanding of the motives behind the actions of lawyers who doubled as activists, such as Julius Chambers. In spite of the odds he faced, Chambers grew to become a dedicated lawyer who practiced putting the needs of the community above anything else. Growing up in the Jim Crow era motivated him to fight against oppressive conditions and help to provide a progressive future for generations to come.

The Creation of a Civil Rights Ally

During the civil rights era, lawyers and law firms exposed many injustices related to human rights and had a significant impact on attempts to remedy them. The Southern Justice Institute is a unique example of the determination and effort expended by a collective group of people, in order to bring justice to those treated unjustly. The lawyers of this firm prided themselves on their commitment to revealing the unfair treatment of minorities at the local and national levels. Additionally, their efforts brought social transformation by addressing these mistreatments through the use of activism. The firm also produced skillful and effective lawyers who used varied approaches that gained them national attention, and who possessed the essential characteristics necessary for making an enduring impact on the civil rights movement. These lawyers, along with others in the southern states, demonstrate the capacity required to ensure positive outcomes in the civil rights era from a legal and social perspective. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, they led by example, providing other lawyers throughout the south with approaches that focused on a broader goal than simply gaining victory in court.

The Southern Justice Institute began in Washington DC as the southern division of the Christic Institute, but was subsequently moved to several other locations. It was opened in 1985 under the direction of Lewis Pitts in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, as the Christic Institute South, then was moved to Carrboro in 1986, and then to Durham in 1991 (“Southern Justice Institute Records, 1978–1993” n.d.). Its first board, created in Winston-Salem in 1986, was made up of members representative of the diverse community. Over a short span of time, the board had four black members, two women members, and three who lived below the poverty line (*Christic Institute-South* n.d.). The diverse array of members illustrates the firm’s dedication to not only supporting racial equality, women’s empowerment, and income equality, but also its validation of and faith in these particular groups facing discrimination. The firm’s chosen board members had a crucial role in the firm’s mission to assist minorities in the community, and many of these members had a history of contributing to social movements. One member, Sara Nelson, served as the executive director of the firm for many years and was an essential member in fighting for women’s rights. She was greatly involved in the National Organization for Women and also the Equal Rights Amendment ratification campaign in Oklahoma (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). Another skilled board member and lawyer who specialized in the field of income equality and racial justice was Lewis Pitts, whose involvement and expertise in certain cases demonstrated the importance of his role in the firm and several social movements. Pitts was a longtime activist of the Southern Justice Institute and his many contributions helped it prevail as a well-known public interest law firm (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). While these board members were greatly responsible for the success of the firm as well as progressive role models in the community, many other factors can be considered equally beneficial to the firm.

Due to the ample outpouring of support of the board members, various organizations, and community members, the Southern Justice Institute was able to participate in many arduous civil rights cases. The firm was fortunate to have dozens of financial contributors, many of which were organizations such as foundations and churches, as well as other movements dedicated to supporting racial equality and women’s rights. The firm’s major funders in the late 1980s included the Boehm Foundation, Fund for Southern Communities, Deer Creek Foundation, News World Foundation, and J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). These organizations and others assisted the firm in any way they could, but the funding they provided dramatically propelled the firm’s efforts to serve

justice. The financial support also helped with initiating various projects throughout the years. In analyzing the firm's finances through balance sheets and its fund balance statements, a spike in donations is evident from 1989 to 1990. At the beginning of 1989, the firm had a fund balance of \$346,741 that decreased to \$192,183 by the end of the year. However, due to an increase in various contributions from donors and revenue from special events and projects, 1990 saw an increase in the fund balance, which began the year at \$192,183 and ended the year with \$482,096 (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). This illustrates the support and allegiance of contributors committed to achieving the same goals as the firm.

As a public interest law firm, the Southern Justice Institute's motives and approaches can be understood as focusing on unveiling injustices and bringing attention to social issues, rather than simply seeking justice for their charged clients. The firm was adamant about representing those that truly needed their help in order to advance their cause, so to qualify to receive their representation one had to be "a leader or political activist in a local empowerment or progressive issue group" (*The Christic Institute South – Serving the Movement for Peace and Justice* n.d.). This illustrates one of their overall goals of providing equality to those affected by social issues. By providing this assistance, the lawyers were using their status to present the voices of these activists to the community. Law firms generally want the best for their client, but this law firm was dedicated to striving for a broader goal than solely winning in court. This institution also sought to use the benefits of grassroots support through educational and religious resources to gain momentum in effecting social change.

The Southern Justice Institute often used approaches such as creating media and educational resources to draw attention to topics and issues, due to the belief that increasing awareness would, in turn, create a larger support system for combatting social injustices. One way that they used the media to attain this goal was through creating magazines, periodicals, books, audio tapes, and videos that could be circulated within the community and beyond (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). Pamphlets and brochures were also created that included an overview of cases, lawyers, funding options, and other topics to convey their mission. The firm also had board members and lawyers speak at churches, colleges, seminars, and political organizations. In order to reach a broader audience, the firm was committed to communicating the efforts of their lawyers and their overall motives by outsourcing to international television, computer networks, and national broadcasts (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). These types of communication can be viewed as much more complex and extensive than those performed by most law firms in this period, but their mission was also much larger than that of a typical firm.

The firm usually only took on three or four cases a year in order to commit adequate time to each case, and its lawyers were adamant about being focused on revealing social problems. They believed that defending their clients should come second to this goal. The institution strived to address many local cases that would benefit their community because of their firm belief in creating a change at home that could eventually branch out to have a significant social impact nationwide (*The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy* n.d.). Aside from this belief, they also felt passionate about representing cases that would have an effect at the national level, especially with regard to empowering women and people of color (*Christic Institute South – Defending the Movement for Racial Justice and Political Empowerment in the South* n.d.). Another characteristic of the firm was its keen focus on giving the most attention to cases that would receive little attention from the press or even a fair trial in court. Cases that were thought to have little chance in making progress could often be overlooked, and the

Southern Justice Institute's lawyers felt it was their responsibility to give a voice to these community members and activists. A good example of this were the cases involving the harassment of government officials, which received much of the firm's funds and other resources. These cases received a lot of attention both locally and nationally due to their controversial nature, as they stemmed from racial biases in the government that were common during this time. The interest that the Southern Justice Institute took in their clients' cases further serves as evidence of their courageous endeavors to challenge higher powers.

Activism in the Civil Rights Era and Beyond

The cases involving the harassment of government officials were rooted in racist motives, and the Southern Justice Institute sought to expose those involved who were making false accusations. The actions of the firm and its lawyers had an impact that lasted far beyond the civil rights era. Beginning in 1987, the FBI launched an investigation that brought an extensive amount of resources to bear, in order to find any information on possible illegal efforts of elected officials in Winston-Salem. In the summer of 1991, four elected officials and business people were wrongfully charged with various crimes ranging from perjury, conspiracy, mail fraud, and laundering (*Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four* n.d.). Coincidentally, the witnesses were comprised of white male businessmen and an undercover FBI agent. Rodney Sumler, Larry Womble, Patrick Hairston, and Reverend Lee Faye Mack were victims of the false allegations. The investigation was referred to as "Operation Mushroom Cloud," and was initiated by a white male. These victims, all prominent members of society, were coined as the "Winston-Salem Four." Rodney Sumler was a political consultant and a lobbyist for the community. Larry Womble was a member of the Winston-Salem Board of Education and a founder of the N.C. Black Elected Municipal Officials. Patrick Hairston was known for his activism and also his participation in the NAACP. Lastly, Reverend Lee Faye Mack was known for her community activism, and was "highly respected for her outspoken advocacy and action on behalf of the most downtrodden members of the community" (*Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four* n.d.).

The Southern Justice Institute was aware that more than just litigation was required to make progress in this case. Reverend Mack was represented by both Lewis Pitts of the Southern Justice Institute and Gregory Davis, a lawyer in Winston-Salem. Mack had a large community support system that knew these accusations were incorrect based on her years of public service and dedication to the community. Additionally, Mack's case was especially unique because, during the trial in 1992, the government dropped the racketeering and corruption counts with which she had previously been charged. The judge ordered that she be tried separately from Sumler, Womble, and Hairston on two remaining counts when their trial was over (*Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four* n.d.). The only two remaining counts for Mack were those of conspiracy to obstruct and perjury, and this is where the Southern Justice Institute worked to represent Reverend Mack (Folder – Harassment of Black Elected Officials (Charges) n.d.). It was noted by the government that all of the previously mentioned counts were dropped because there was not enough evidence to back up the charges. The other three accused were represented by different lawyers, but they were connected through the counts for which they were charged. In addition to Mack's counts that were dropped, the government also dropped all gambling charges for the remaining three officials, admitting that there was not the evidence required to back up the charges, "an admission that the government never had the right to bring those charges in the first place" (*Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four* n.d.). This

admission marked the beginning of the government's loss of credibility, even though there was little evidence from the start – to the point that even the case's prosecutor claimed there was nothing that proved any guilt on the part of the officials. The case of Reverend Mack was significant for many reasons, as were the cases of the other government officials, but the involvement of Pitts in Mack's case was one of the most striking components.

With Reverend Mack's case being tried separately, Pitts and Davis also received assistance from Gayle Korotkin. Gayle was another lawyer from the Southern Justice Institute who was determined to fight on Mack's behalf for the justice she deserved (*Christic Institute-South* n.d.). However, during the trial, Korotkin and Pitts received a scornful letter from Davis with regard to a newsletter released by the Southern Justice Institute. The newsletter updated followers of the firm on ongoing or completed cases and other events the firm was involved with, along with sections that dealt with social issues. Davis's letter expresses his frustration with the firm and their stance on the case, which he extracted from the newsletter. The newsletter included commentary that illustrated the firm's contempt for the government and its racially motivated prosecution, along with the cowardly actions of the lawyers prosecuting Reverend Mack (Davis 1992). Davis continues on, expressing his belief that taking this bold approach was the incorrect strategy, and his unwillingness to move forward in the case with the assistance of the Southern Justice Institute because of the comments in the newsletter. Additionally, Davis expressed that, while this strategy may have appealed to some of Mack's supporters who were certain of her innocence, this was not how he wished to pursue the case. This resulted in him giving the ultimatum that either he or the other lawyers had to withdraw as Reverend Mack's representation (Davis 1992). In response, Pitts and Korotkin explained their confidence in the Reverend Mack's case receiving a reversal, due to the denial of cross-examination and the lack of materiality presented by the opposing side. One of the closing sentences of the letter that can be assumed to be written by Pitts, in which the two announce their withdrawal from the case for the best interest of the client, states: "I assume the Judge will jump with joy over our departure – unless he wants to cause hardship for us" (Pitts and Korotkin 1992). This sentence highlights Pitts' acceptance of the legal system's almost antagonistic attitude concerning his advocacy for justice in this case and his disgust over the system as a whole.

Lewis Pitts as Activist

The reaction of Lewis Pitts as he and Korotkin were withdrawing from Reverend Mack's case accurately depicts a recurring theme of his insight on the dynamics of lawyers and the legal system altogether. As he was the director of the Southern Justice Institute, his beliefs and actions, which were oriented around helping a larger cause, were representative of the firm and its motives. Due to his devotion to children's rights during his time at the Southern Justice Institute, he accepted the position of Legal Director for the National Committee for the Rights of the Child in the mid-1990s. Even at this time, his opposition to the behavior of lawyers was apparent. In a letter asking for a grant from none other than Bill Gates himself, Pitts states, "I do not think well of lawyers as a whole; they lack courage to stand up to the Power Structure and routinely ignore the ethical principles in the Rules of Professional Conduct which state, among other things, that we as lawyers have a 'special responsibility for the quality of justice' in our nation" (Pitts 1993). This seemingly small comment was not the first time Pitts had openly expressed his hesitance around the legitimacy of the legal system, and would certainly not be the last. Additionally, his commitment to providing justice for those he felt deserving of it is illustrated when he reiterates in the letter to Mr. Gates that he made less than legal service wages in his twenty years of being a

lawyer, a clear indication that he was not invested in the institute for his own personal gain (Pitts 1993). This supports the argument that, as an activist, his main priority was to fight for equality in all realms of life. His involvement in civil rights and passion for bringing others justice did not solely take place in the legal sector, and his distaste for lawyers acting unethically did not abate.

The work of Lewis Pitts is commendable for many reasons, but it is his mistrust of the legal system and its processes that make him a unique lawyer and activist dedicated to providing justice. Purposefully choosing to resign from the Bar in 2014, as opposed to simply retiring his membership, Pitts was adamant about completely withdrawing from the system. His feelings on this decision were reflected in his letter of resignation, where he stated that being inactive would mean that he would still abide by the rules of the Bar. He stated, “my resignation is because I see an overall breach by the Bar as a whole of the most basic notions of professional conduct and ethics such that I do not want to be associated with the Bar” (Pitts 2016). The breaches that he goes on to address in detail go against the very qualities of justice and equality that the Bar vows to uphold and provide, and Pitts suggests that these qualities are only sought in the system when those in power are able to benefit. He also attributes many unethical practices within the system as stemming from the norm of profits outweighing the importance of bringing justice. Moreover, Pitts believes the system has turned into a market where “the quality of legal representation on either the criminal or civil side depends on the amount of money one has. What a travesty: millions of people desperately need legal representation while there are a flood of lawyers who cannot find work such that bar associations discuss the crisis of too many law schools” (Pitts 2016). This emphasizes, from an intimate perspective, his strong feelings for others and also speaks to his advocacy during his time working with the Southern Justice Institute.

Julius Chambers as Activist

Pitts is just one of many lawyers who faced oppression due to his stance on racial injustices and other controversial social issues. Julius Chambers, a lawyer in Charlotte, North Carolina, was unique in his many accomplishments as a black lawyer during and after the civil rights era. His involvement in many desegregation and discrimination cases earned him respect in the courtroom, even though some were against his advancement and would often attempt to thwart his progress in cases. Ignoring the many acts of terror involving bombings and fires inflicted on Chambers, his family, and his firm, his largest opposition could be viewed as his fellow lawyers and judges within the courts. In several cases, Chambers had a clear victory in sight due to the obvious discrimination exhibited by the defendants, until those within the court system attempted to impede his success. For example, Chambers was deliberately denied a fair trial in *Wooten vs. Moore* [1969], a discrimination case. In this case, a restaurant wished to not serve blacks in New Bern and was managing to avoid being made to do so because of a business loophole. During the case, judicial ethics were ignored and Chambers was conspired against by Moore’s lawyer, who discussed his case with the judge outside of the courtroom (Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 110). This blatant disrespect for Chambers and his clients reflects the overall attitude of many bar members, and the superiority that these members believed to possess over Chambers and the black community.

In another instance where Chambers filed a complaint against the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the YMCA locations in Charlotte and Raleigh both appeared to ignore the Civil Rights Act [1964] with regard to discrimination. These locations were both determined to keep some parts of the organization segregated and unavailable to blacks. Chambers quickly forced the Charlotte location to reverse their decision by filing a lawsuit. However, the Raleigh

YMCA would attempt to make concessions to the black community in various ways that could avoid their objections to seemingly concealed racist motives. This case became known as *NeSmith v. YMCA of Raleigh* [1967] (Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 119). The case was eventually ruled in Chamber's favor when it reached an upper-level court upon appeal, but not before the appearance of racial bias in the courtroom when a judge initially ruled in favor of the YMCA (Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 105). To be in favor of the YMCA in this instance represents a clear disdain for the Civil Rights Act [1964] and its implications. The judges in these cases only illustrate some of the obstacles faced by Chambers, but with his dedication to his clients and the cause, he was able to overcome them and bring justice to the black community. With these cases, Chambers became a crucial activist for blacks in the area during the civil rights period, and set an important precedent that does not accept any loopholes and that demands equality without businesses being able to intervene on technicalities.

Lawyers during the civil rights era were effective in the judicial arena, but their activism outside of the courtroom offered a holistic support system for the cause. Lewis Pitts and Julius Chambers can certainly qualify as activists for their tireless efforts to change the system, as opposed to lawyers who worked for their own economic benefit, as Pitts suggested. Another lawyer connected to Lewis Pitts, and who greatly supported equality during this era, was Alan McSurely. An attorney from Washington D.C., he and his wife dedicated a home in Carrboro, North Carolina, funded through the winnings of a prior case, where action-oriented groups could meet. The Southern Justice Institute was among these groups, which eventually led to the close relationship between Pitts and McSurely. In commenting on the generous donation provided by him and his wife, McSurely said, "we're just trying to see if we can't help organizations that are doing good work" (Trincia 1987). This act of recycling funds back into a cause that McSurely felt was essential to the fight for civil rights depicts true activism at work, and steps such as this are necessary for the advancement of certain groups.

Lawyers and Activists

Many practicing lawyers during the civil rights era can collectively be assumed to have benefited the black community as a whole. However, the goals of lawyers and activists do not often overlap, as they have varying approaches and motives in certain cases. Speaking of this, Leroy Clark stated: "the lawyers understandably thought of 'winning' cases; the activists did not care if a case was 'lost' if the movement was advanced. The lawyers had experienced a progressive series of court victories and did not see the law as ultimately antagonistic to social change. The activists had known jails, beatings, and coercion – even when their cases were 'won'" (Clark 1970, 465). This stark contrast is the main difference that separates the two, and there would be some situations where these actors would remain on completely different spectrums for the goals they strived to reach. Even lawyers and activists who had the same goals could have different action plans for implementing justice, such as in the case of Reverend Mack. As discussed, Davis criticized Pitts and the Southern Justice Institute for their activism and the radical approach used in their newsletter to draw attention to the racial bias presented by the government in their inaccurate and unsupported claims (Davis 1992).

Regardless of the disconnect that may occur between lawyers and activists, the combined effort of these groups is required in order to fulfill the needs of community members struggling to obtain their rights. Activists are important for they voice their opinion on injustices, while lawyers must then bring attention to these issues and demand a change. Also, Clark argues that "on a day-to-day basis a civil rights lawyer was crucial to the momentum of direct-action

techniques, for he devised ways to quickly secure the release of demonstrators from jail so that they could continue demonstrating and keep the political and moral pressures on” (1970, 465). This emphasizes the imperative role of lawyers in this time, even if they were not considered activists.

Lewis Pitts, Julius Chambers, and Alan McSurely undoubtedly proved their activist status through their many years of hard work and commitment to the cause. The involvement of these lawyers in the community and in nationwide struggles brought much legitimacy to their firm in their unified fight to better the community and provide social, economic, and racial equality. Their assistance in this struggle from a legal perspective is admired and appreciated from an activist’s viewpoint, but this also begs the question: exactly how much did their participation in the civil rights movement really help?

Conclusion

Lawyers are presented with the ability to alter a system slightly when there is an injustice, but to what extent they are able to change the system is questionable. The unique and recurring concept of preservation-through-transformation was introduced by Reva Siegal and can be attributed to the efforts of many lawyers during the civil rights period. This idea describes the process of status hierarchies being perpetuated through legal reform over the years because the change that occurs is not enough to bring about a structural change. For example, though there has been significant progress in the advancement of women’s rights and in the past 100 years, the social hierarchy has not altered much. John Calmore mentioned in regard to this theory that “legal changes have been significant, at least in formal senses, and those changes have produced real progress in improving the lives of people. Yet, because the legal changes have not gone far enough, have not been sustainable enough to resist backlash and retrenchment, those changes have not been fully transformative” (Calmore 2004, 620–21). So, how permanent were the changes brought upon by the lawyers and the legal system during the civil rights era?

Though well-intentioned, the efforts of many lawyers during the period discussed in this article were clearly temporary and insufficient as racial and even gender injustices are still exhibited in society. Herein lies the primary reason why the role of activists proved to be so necessary for the period due to their calls for a change in the system, and why they can today be perceived as equally essential. Lawyers can publicize issues in their cases when fighting for justice and potentially bring justice to their client, but this is not necessarily an act of calling for reform in the structure of hierarchies. Calmore speaks about this from a lawyer’s perspective: “sometimes, we have a tendency to focus too narrowly on the legal issue and, consequently, law reform efforts are reduced to stopgap or, increasingly, hold-harmless measures” (2004, 621). A transformation that has deeper roots in a broader change – as opposed to a focus on specific cases or situations – is required to see a genuine, permanent difference, which is what Pitts, Chambers, and McSurely exhibited through their activism.

The Southern Justice Institute was able to be so well known for its political activism because of its lawyers and the support it received. Its origins allowed it to develop above and beyond what could have been expected of a public interest law firm. The lawyers and the board members provided a solid background for the institution and proved their commitment in their time at the firm. The infamous case of Reverend Mack that was prompted by racial incentives exemplified the willingness of the Southern Justice Institute to risk withdrawing from a case in order to publicize all that was unjust about it, demonstrating what was of true importance to Pitts and the Southern Justice Institute. Lewis Pitts and Julius Chambers knew the consequences they would

face when they took on the positions of both lawyer and activist in working to ensure civil rights for the community, and they were not willing to back down or hesitate in this fight. They wanted to do whatever was necessary to bring social change, and not just keep their clients happy by winning certain cases – assuming the role of activist while being a lawyer came second. Such lawyers were trying to do more than the bare minimum, and, contrary to Pitts’ idea of lawyers, were not concerned with appealing to those in a higher position of power.

Social justice and equality for all were the primary, driving factors for these lawyers, and the standing of lawyers in this particular social construct allowed them to use their power and status to provide a more substantive support system for certain movements. The readiness of the firm to combat the legal system represents their dedication not only to their clients, but to a complete social transformation.

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Women's Works: The Evolution of Tanzanian Women's Movements from Late Colonialism to Post-Structural Adjustment

Alexander Peeples

ABSTRACT

Gender has become an important area of increased focus in discourses on human rights and development over the last thirty years, but unfortunately that focus has primarily been on liberal approaches to gender as mediated through international organizations. The history of Tanzania offers an opportunity for more expansive scholarly interrogations of gender within political action in Africa. In particular, the evolution of women's movements in Tanzania from the early independence era to post-structural adjustment is instructive for understanding the potential of non-elite women's subaltern mass movements and the limitations of liberal institutionalism. This article examines that evolution, tracing these movements after first identifying theoretical entry points that allow for a better understanding of the work of Tanzanian non-elite women.

Keywords: Tanzania, Women's Movements, Ujamaa, Gender, Subaltern

Introduction

The increasing prevalence of feminist gendered discourses within international governance bodies is one of the most important developments of the past thirty years. Unfortunately, the increasing utilization of gendered analysis has been siloed. Discreet aspects of policy around political liberation and economic development have been reformed in the name of gender equity, but larger areas of sustained gender-conscious justice have yet to be integrated into global economic and political systems. Indeed, gendered reforms are often explicitly liberal and singular, like gender quotas for state parliaments, or ill defined, like the vague but popular goal of women's "empowerment." These efforts are not without impact, but they are rarely intended to fundamentally alter larger social realities. As a result, non-elite women continue to be disproportionately politically marginalized, despite policy modifications supposedly intended to create equality. In African contexts, this global reality has been exacerbated by a history of colonial looting predicated on creating poverty and ignoring grassroots desires that extends into the present day.

Ensuring that the needs of African non-elite women are met through future policy reform requires more than a reworking of Western discourses and institutions. A truly egalitarian project of gendered reform requires drawing on the work of non-elite women in specific and historicized African contexts. The case of Tanzanian non-elite women in the second half of the twentieth century is particularly generative, given the centrality of both women and egalitarianism in Tanzanian politics and the post-independence state. Comparing the political contributions of Tanzanian non-elite women during the anti-colonial independence movement to women's movements working in the ongoing aftermath of structural adjustment demonstrates both the

potential of feminist discourses that explicitly consider class as a gendered concern within development and the limitations of gender advocacy movements that fail to fundamentally alter systems of poverty. This article attempts to serve as an entry point to that comparison by identifying theoretical frames for best understanding the work of Tanzanian non-elite women, evaluating the structure and impacts of movements in both eras, and suggesting a path forward for similar scholarly work.

Prioritizing the Knowledge of Tanzanian Women

Before examining the local and global implications of Tanzania's history, it is useful to first acknowledge the theoretical constraints of this article. While this research primarily looks at the work of non-elite women, it is not possible to ascribe a singular experience to non-elite women at any point in Tanzania's history. So, the most effective pathway to understanding their movements is to recognize the concerns and actions they mobilized around. This methodology precludes mapping the experience of European or Western women's movements onto the experiences of Tanzanian women, as the experiences of non-elite women in Tanzania are not necessarily analogous to those of women in other contexts. Scholarship on their work should not default to presuming a singular experience of womanhood. Although some aspects of patriarchy in Tanzania require external critique, it is important not to assume that patriarchy is universal or that prominent external representatives of powerful feminisms have greater relevance in feminist debates than local actors. As a foundational work on the colonizing impacts of academic feminism, Chandra Mohanty's seminal article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" is particularly useful for framing this conversation. As Mohanty (1988) suggests, essentializing analysis only reinforces neocolonial norms of knowledge production and undermines the goal of allowing for autonomy among non-elite African women. In fact, at varied moments in the historical arc of women's movements in Tanzania, the efforts of non-elite women have run directly counter to dominant Western feminisms that emerged in response to European and American forms of patriarchy.

In order to avoid the prioritization of hegemonic external opinions, it is powerful to acknowledge the women involved with specific movements as the primary experts on the value of those movements, embracing them as organic intellectuals, following Gramsci (Zompetti 1997). Gramsci's model notes that cultural and political knowledge are created and embodied across class, race, and gender hierarchies, and that those individuals closest to the embodiment of any group's particular reality have a unique understanding of that reality, and, by extension, a knowledge of movements that can change their lived experiences (Zompetti 1997). This approach is valuable in the case of Tanzanian women's movements for a number of reasons, not least of which is because it is instructive on how to handle global contestations of the label of woman. It might be valuable to question the particular value of womanhood as an identity given its connection to essentialized binaries of sex. However, such an interrogation should not take priority in the case of Tanzania given the wide popularity of womanhood as an identity with significant meaning shared by women in both internal and external liberation struggles. Similarly, while the power of singular feminized motifs like motherhood has been critically interpreted by scholars such as Carole Pateman (2005), the limitations and efficacy of such motifs receive little attention here given their productive use in examining Tanzania.

The Possibility of Letting the Experiences of Non-Elite Women Speak

An intention to think and write through a decolonized lens does not inherently lead to effective execution of decolonial scholarship. The legacy of Western movements like Marxism or the Enlightenment cannot be simply waved away as if ignoring them dispels their relevance or prevalence. As a result, the arguments that follow are still framed within an academic set of norms that prioritizes the voices of specifically credentialed individuals who are given the bulk of unevenly divided resources. Given this structural limitation, it is important not to build scholarship on Tanzanian women's movements in a way that further limits the capacity for the experiences of non-elite women to be heard. In the face of dominant discourses, the non-elite women of Tanzania are particularly susceptible to erasure. At the intersection of African, black and brown, women, and poor identities, the communities that comprise Tanzania's non-elite classes are antithetical to the hegemonic value systems that organize global economic and social value. By the very nature of their exclusion, they represent the global apotheosis of another Gramscian idea that Gayatri Spivak (2010), among others, has widely expanded – the subaltern. Defined simply, the subaltern are those members of society who are marginalized and silenced by hegemonic values.

As Spivak (2010) argues, it is nearly impossible to represent subaltern voices or interests since dominant existing methods of knowledge creation and representation are rooted in disregarding their needs and desires. This manifests as a scarcity of scholarship around Tanzanian women generally, and in an even greater absence of opinion polls, social histories, and political treatises geared toward understanding Tanzanian women peasants. Such absences make it difficult to examine the meaning of Tanzanian women's actions, let alone interrogate the complicated nuances of race, kinship, and religion that further complicate their intent. Tanzania has consistently ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest nations in the world, so even comparatively middle-class women have lacked the ties to financial and political power that might classify them as elite in a comparative sense (Mtonga 1993). This means that, at least within the context of current study, the elite woman status in Tanzania is largely confined to those with unique access to wealth and education, whose contact with success and/or power has primarily stemmed from connections to patriarchal systems of control. As such, existing scholarship primarily excludes wealthy individuals who have operated outside grassroots movements. One such woman is Saira Dewji, whose complicity in extractive economies has done little to add to gendered attempts at political change (Pederson and Kwek 2017). Similarly, less attention is paid to liberal discourses that have already been deeply interrogated, like legislative gender quotas, which have helped to elevate well-connected women into the halls of power, but have done little to reshape the actual nature of those same halls. Naming these scholarly restrictions amplifies those activists and methods most closely aligned with or tied to the actual development of non-elite Tanzanian women. Attempting to demonstrate the lessons of Tanzanian subaltern women for the larger context of gendered liberation policies in Africa would not be effective, or perhaps even possible, without understanding that the most important women involved come from the subaltern.

Independence-Era Tanzania as an Exceptional Case for Women

With those intellectual preconditions established, it is possible to examine the successes of non-elite women in building political power during the early political creation of an independent Tanzania. Starting in the mid-1950s and continuing through the early 1960s, non-elite women

helped create an early vision of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) as a radically egalitarian state, and coordinated networks of political and social collaboration for subaltern women that shaped the future of Tanzanian policy. With that early push, and perhaps more than in any other early post-colonial African state, poor and marginalized women directed the actual priorities of the independence movement, and the newly-created state rewarded them with universalized public goods like education and healthcare. Support for gender justice, or at least a greater degree of gender equity, was advanced through the power of a new politics of liberation and shared networks of organic political participation.

In some scholarship, this gendered success is attributed to the radical and inclusive vision of Julius Nyerere, the most prominent pro-independence leader in colonial Tanganyika and the independent nation's first president (Ladner 1971). He espoused Ujamaa – an influential political theory of specifically African socialism that roughly translates from Swahili to “familyhood” and includes a comparatively enlightened understanding of women as equally valuable to men, if in compatible roles rather than integrated ones. This helped set the tone for the inclusion of poor and socially marginalized women in Tanzanian politics (Lal 2010). However, this was not a spontaneously offered gift of power and enfranchisement given to powerless masses out of pity. Nyerere's personal politics certainly made him receptive to poor women's inclusion in the advocacy and actions of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), but it was the pre-existing acuity and determination of subaltern women that made it necessary for him to act on his most inclusive impulses.

As Susan Geiger has documented, in these early days, Nyerere was himself taught by a variety of women about the importance of gender equity, African specificity, and emancipatory politics (Geiger 1996). Their input carried weight both because of the limitations of Nyerere's own personal context, and because of the power that the sheer number of Tanzanian women carried as a collective. While Nyerere, possessing a Scottish graduate degree, was the most educated person in Tanzania and the lineal son of the chief of his local kinship network, it was not solely his social standing that granted him primacy among early Tanzanian leaders (Bjerk 2017, 41). The popularity of his well-articulated belief in a post-colonial system that would distribute prosperity more fairly, but avoid solely relying on the external ideology of Leninism, probably played a larger role in his pre-independence ascendancy and certainly in his post-independence popularity. This politics of socialism might seem to avoid the explicit question of gender, but it was actually especially dependent on the thoughts and needs of poor women. Material needs require poor Tanzanian women to labor, and, in Nyerere's conceptualization of Ujamaa, society would reflect the industrious norms of poor women rather than the apathy of elite women (Nyerere 1968).

Further, Nyerere's experience of comparative privilege isolated him from some of the impacts of gendered coloniality, but the extensive contributions of women helped ensure that his emancipatory politics did not fall into the rigidly exclusionary sexism of other African leaders like Leopold Senghor (Eko 1986). It was also after conversations with women who were politically marginalized by chiefs when they attempted to attend TANU meetings and women who led recruitment tours that Nyerere actually began to shape more aggressive recruitment plans for TANU (Geiger 1982). In his words, “women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968). The claim of one prominent woman leader that it was she who had to teach Nyerere Swahili as an adult was likely a vast overstatement, but it speaks to the larger role that Tanzanian women played on an interpersonal level, using their experiences to shape responsive leaders (Geiger 1996). Women without traditional social power thus fostered

the roots of Tanzania's earliest national political reality. They were not simply relegated to advisory positions though. Non-elite women were also able to assume positions of leadership and power, contradictory though this might seem in light of their status as subaltern.

The Roles of Non-Elite Women

Bibi Titi Mohammed is undoubtedly the most famous of the non-elite women political leaders, and, after an unfortunate period of scholarly neglect, her impact on the success of independence is now often cited. Her independent contributions are worth noting, but she also more broadly represents a certain kind of non-elite woman leader in Tanzania who effectively shaped greater gender equity through grassroots organizing. In 1955, Titi Mohammed was a working member of a dance and music group in Dar es Salaam (Geiger 1982). She was sporadically involved with the early movement. However, when a colonial administrator came to Tanzania and asked to meet with the head of TANU's women's auxiliary, an organization that did not exist, Titi Mohammed filled the imaginary role (Geiger 1987). This quickly escalated into her founding and leading an early version of a TANU women's organization, recruiting 5,000 members in under 3 months. Under Bibi Titi Mohammed's leadership, the group was not a passive women's auxiliary, like earlier local elite social clubs that discussed knitting and small-scale charity work (Geiger 1987). To the contrary, it was in some ways the foremost engine of independence. Unlike in Kenya, the Tanzanian push for independence involved little violent conflict, so the hierarchical and masculine trappings of militarization were not a barrier to entry for women (Geiger 1987). Even more importantly, because of gendered assumptions around roles, women of the colonial era were better positioned than men to organize support for independence through events like concerts, rallies, and meetings.

Using preexisting social spaces like dance halls and family homes, Bibi Titi Mohammed helped create a network of women leaders who spread TANU's vision of egalitarian independence across the country (Geiger 1987). These women were not rich socialites, but rather working-class fish mongers, fruit merchants, and beer brewers. Bibi Titi Mohammed herself was Muslim – part of a religious community purposefully disenfranchised by colonial administrators – as well as illiterate (Geiger 1996). At the same time that she coordinated the birth of Tanzania through her barnstorming cross-country advocacy, she still worked as a music leader. Her working spirit fueled the movement and demonstrated the dedication of working women to the cause of independence. She represented the localized woman leaders, who ranged in age from 17 to their 80s, across the country (Geiger 1996). These women were active in the movement because they believed independence would bring greater justice, and because there seemed to be no other way to demand the education, enfranchisement, and political autonomy that most of them craved.

The Roles of Elite Women

The prevalence of working-class women leaders did not completely preclude elite women from holding positions of power, but it did shape how those elite women approached their accountability to womanhood as a political identity and the roles available to them. In many young independent African nations, local elites parlayed the vacuum left by colonial powers into personal riches. Elite women, particularly the collaborating African quasi-gentry, benefited enormously from this exploitation of power, and, as such, even when they supported policies that challenged gender inequities, they were often limited in their advocacy as they prioritized class

exploitation over gendered liberation. This resulted in meaningful, but very limited, gains like finishing schools for young girls. In postcolonial Tanzania, this was far less frequently the case, and elite women leaders were usually the most committed allies of working-class women.

Two women emblematic of this allyship were Lucy Lameck, an Oxford-educated daughter of a politically influential Christian family, and Lady Marion Chesham, a white American-British expat whose husband had been a wealthy landowner (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Alongside Titi Mohammed, both Lameck and Chesham served in the first post-independence session of the Tanzanian legislative assembly in 1962, and tirelessly advocated for poor women as members of parliament through to 1975 and 1972, respectively. Both women used their legislative roles to support Titi Mohammed as a voice for working women in matters as serious as the provision of equal parental status for women, and as mundane as rebuking a male member of parliament who insinuated that poor young women were destroying the social welfare of Tanzania with their covertly sexual dancing (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Lucy Lameck supplemented this commitment in her cabinet role as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives and Community Development, where she helped ensure that Tanzania's development policies benefited the rural poor. In total, she led programs that expanded new craft and agricultural skills to over 100,000 women (Jellicoe 1962).

Similarly, outside of her legislative duties, Lady Chesham helped found the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF), which funneled external aid to internal development projects in Tanzania (Black 1992, 146). During Chesham's tenure, the CDTF encouraged projects targeted at eliminating burdens for poor women, based on the idea that women would be the driving force behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and opportunity – a premise that was a radical approach to development aid at the time. After she stepped down, Chesham passed leadership of the agency to a working-class Tanzanian woman named Martha Bulengo (Black 1992, 146–48). This type of early leadership of poor women encouraged their elite counterparts to prioritize the needs of poor women in gender equity advocacy, and also stymied the class divisions that limited the efficacy of female political figures elsewhere. This contributed to stronger political coalitions around the identity of womanhood, and helped expand access to social services like education, health care, and agricultural training, which was limited by class or gender in comparable contexts.

The Impact of these Early Women's Movements

The wide scope of the contributions of poor Tanzanian women resulted in both the kind of prescriptive representation now widely celebrated in liberalized contexts, and more broadly beneficial reforms like the expansion of more equal educational opportunities that erased racial segregation (Lewis et al. 1962, 34). By the time independence was actually achieved in 1961, Bibi Titi Mohammed was described as the second most popular and well-known politician in Tanzania (Geiger 1996). By 1955, women had constituted most of TANU's registered membership and poor women made up the vast majority (Geiger 1996). Many of the women involved in the independence movement had joined in part because the party promised an expansion of education, and, eventually, an expansion of accessible health options – promises that were partially fulfilled.

Women constituted an undeniable part of the body politic, and gendered advocacy was embedded in the fiber of the country's egalitarian politics. In many other newly postcolonial contexts, singular women who helped build independence movements were often uninterested in broad reforms that benefited the majority of women. Thus, the above successes, while impressive

on their own, are even more surprising given the external pressure to marginalize poor women. In the case of education, for example, the very first relevant UNESCO reports actually suggested reducing investment in women's education, a request the Tanzanian state ignored (Lewis et al. 1962, 54). This early context suggests some important lessons for modern gendered movements. Central to the success of Tanzanian women's success were specific policy asks, a connection to the larger ideology of equality, explicit acknowledgement of gender, and open democratic organizing led by non-elites. In coordination, these made the contribution of the early women's movement particularly effective. Nevertheless, there were obvious limitations. The upper echelons of leadership remained primarily in the hands of men and the political arena remained frustratingly androcentric. More broadly relevant to poor women, their concerns around land rights and protection from domestic violence were largely ignored for the time being. In a sense, these early successes were meant to hold a promise of continued reforms. Unfortunately, that promise later went partially unfulfilled.

The Decline and Inflection Point of Early Women's Movements in Tanzania

If the political action of working-class Tanzanian women during the independence movement was rooted in optimism about the possibility of socialist class politics, then the growth of women's movements after structural adjustment was at least partly imagined as a response to the failures of the utopian Ujamaa vision. After maintaining relative political stability for most of the 1960s, the Tanzanian government started rapidly accelerating their commitment to radical socialism in 1967 (Nyerere 1968). The expanded implementation of Ujamaa continued throughout the 1970s. In many instances, Ujamaa drastically improved measurements of human welfare like literacy and gender parity in primary schools, but these benefits were somewhat offset by a villagization scheme that coercively relocated over 4 million people (Scott 1998, 223). The expansion of the state greatly benefited social welfare projects, but also limited space for dissent. Non-elite women sat at the crux of these contradictions. Under Ujamaa, many of the aims of women's movements around education, employment, and political equality were met (Scott 1998, 223). However, during the same period, the political power of the women's organization was largely undermined, and most prominent women leaders were removed from official office for various reasons, including the charges of treason that would functionally exile Bibi Titi Mohammed from public life (Geiger 1996).

The uncomfortable balance between increasing human welfare for women and decreasing political space for women's voices was not the low point for Tanzanian women's movements. The nadir emerged as the larger project of Ujamaa began to collapse. Starting in the late 1970s, a war with Uganda, growing national debt, and the global oil crisis pushed the Tanzanian economy into collapse. By 1985, Nyerere had resigned, and by 1986, the Tanzanian government had signed an agreement with the IMF that implemented neoliberal austerity across the board (Hodgson 2002). At this point, women's potential for political power became more limited, due to the increased domination of international neoliberal reforms within Tanzanian politics; at the same time, those same policies undermined the human welfare programs that had benefited poor women in the past. The breakage created space for new kinds of movements. After the implementation of structural adjustment, women's movements in Tanzania followed the global trend toward NGO-ification with mixed results. Non-elite women increasingly benefited from organizations that catered to needs the state had previously ignored, but were also generally harmed by the reduction of direct governmental accountability (Badri and Tripp 2017).

Successes and Failures of Post-Structural Adjustment Women's Movements

Several particularly notable organizations focused on women's advocacy grew out of a blossoming moment for Tanzanian NGOs, including national groups Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) (Badri and Tripp 2017). In the growing space for dissent in the 1990s, both organizations saw an opportunity to combat remaining gendered inequalities and injustices that had gone ignored under the politics of Ujamaa. Leaders at TAMWA have since described their organization as having psychologically rejected dependency on state reform to embrace the gender-oriented development and social change that flourished under Ujamaa (Badri and Tripp 2017). Building from this approach of external activism and international events like the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 which resulted in the Beijing Declaration, both organizations have experienced meaningful success in advocating for political reforms that create legal protections for women's equality, such as the Laws of Marriage Act and Village Land Act of 1999, which codified that customary practice could not be utilized to deny women the ability to own land (Badri and Tripp 2017). TGNP, in particular, has boldly advocated for LGBTQ individuals, vastly expanding the gender purview of feminist organizing in Tanzania. Smaller NGOs have used similar approaches to advocate for the specific needs of disabled women and women from ethnic minorities like the Maasai (Hodgson 2002). Some scholars, like Ali Mari Tripp, have argued that this growth of gender-focused NGOs in Tanzania, and in Africa more broadly, represents an unprecedented opportunity for activists and organizers interested in advancing the social and civil rights for non-elite Tanzanian women (Tripp 2003). This approach understands the modern growth of NGOs that are interested in supporting women as a continuation of the work done by women during the independence movement.

However, the success of these independent NGOs as replacements for a unified political movement of liberation grounded in gendered analysis should not be overestimated. As one example, the scholarly optimism of those such as Tripp (2003) ignores that the neoliberal political reality that enables the growth of NGOs is a rupture with the socialist politics that enabled past gendered advocacy. In the past, poor women in Tanzania were able to push for significant change because political organizing had few barriers to entry, which allowed them to reimagine their existing social connections as vectors for political engagement. In contrast, NGOs are funded through complex international financial structures that require technical skills like grant writing and bilingual or multilingual fluency, not to mention the more basic prerequisites like advanced literacy and numeracy. As a result, Tanzanian NGOs working on gender are unable to employ the poor women they advocate for and claim to represent. Working class women are effectively barred from participating in their own liberation. Tripp implicitly acknowledges this undemocratic reality when she lists modern faces of Tanzanian feminism and is only able to draw on elites like academics, consultants, and politicians (Badri and Tripp 2017). By the same token, Tripp describes poverty as the foremost issue facing Tanzanian women, but only a few of the legislative reforms she describes being passed are directly tied to combatting poverty in any substantial and structural way (Badri and Tripp 2017).

These flaws in representation and legislation point to a larger failure. Fettered by their reliance on international donors, and unable to meaningfully appeal to any universal mandate, NGOs like TAMWA and TGNP lack the capacity to advocate for the kind of radical reforms that are most likely to change the systemic and continuing issue of poverty for women in Tanzania. The cost of structural adjustment has not only been political for poor women. By most human development metrics, women in Tanzania are worse off under the newly liberalized system than

they were under the socialism of the 1970s. In fact, structural adjustment programs generally tend to create significant inequality, which in turn exacerbates the marginalization of the poor (Babb 2005; Elson 1988; Gindling and Robbins 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). In Tanzania, this has held true for everything from maternal health outcomes to education equity, leaving most metrics worse off than comparable measures from almost any point during Ujamaa (Lugalla 1995, 53).

Unfortunately, the most recent developments in Tanzanian politics suggest that the strength of gender equity movements will continue to shrink. In recent years, the Tanzanian state has grown more authoritarian under President Magufuli, who was elected in 2015. Increasingly, individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments in Tanzania's history (Reuters 2017). This all leaves little room for new gendered political advocacy. TGNP, for example, has already experienced such significant backlash from its LGBTQ advocacy that it has had to reduce its public visibility. Without the widespread political support of peasant women, NGOs and activists will become even more susceptible to the coercive limitations of the state. In turn, the deteriorating social conditions of non-elite women will continue to unravel. President Magufuli's recent decision to reverse existing policy norms and expel any school girls who become pregnant before graduating suggests that the legislative victories for women's rights from the past few decades are at risk of vanishing as quickly as the social welfare successes of Ujamaa (Aglionby 2017). In this historical moment, Tanzania stands at the precipice of another possible radical shift in the structure of political organizing around the needs of non-elite women.

Conclusion

There is no inherent virtue in romanticizing Tanzania's early post-colonial past. Bibi Titi Mohammed and Julius Nyerere are not mythical figures, and the political compromises of the early independence movement are not above criticism. It is not hard to see how the political marginalization of women under later Ujamaa represented a failure of the supposedly equality-focused mandate of the country's leaders. However, by the same token, it is also important not to undervalue the successes of the era. Since the early 2000s, it has become popular in development circles to celebrate Tanzania's supposed recovery from economic collapse. While Tanzania's economy has largely stabilized, it is important not to underestimate what was lost when the IMF used austerity to crush one of the most heterodox and revolutionary African governments of the twentieth century. Given the continuing futility of trying to solve gendered, racial, and geographic inequities as independent development problems, the work of subaltern women in shaping the Tanzanian state's most effective politics and policies is a historical touchstone. The legalistic gender advocacy that has gained global dominance in the modern era is impressive, but in comparison to earlier Tanzanian liberation movements, it lacks a cohesive politics of systemic change. This is reflective of a broader failure among policy analysts to consider the factors of class and power in the implementation of feminist politics.

In Tanzania, non-elite women's early integration of gendered development norms into a larger politics of postcolonial freedom and egalitarian wealth distribution not only allowed them greater access to powerful movements of liberation, but also forced self-proclaimed ally communities, like elite women, to more radically address their needs in the long term. On a localized scale, this historical legacy of class and gender collaboration seems to be a uniquely

powerful tool for any attempt to resist authoritarian neoliberalism in Tanzania. On a global scale, policy makers and scholars need to use historical movements like those of pro-independence women in Tanzania to imagine and support new movements that center the needs of intersectionally marginalized groups, particularly at the nexus of class and gender. Committing to this class-conscious and gendered justice of solidarity is one part of reimagining the limited politics of liberal intervention that have failed to substantively undermine patriarchies across the world.

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The Power of Solidarity: Anti-Apartheid Activism on US Campuses and at UNC-Chapel Hill

Angum Check

ABSTRACT

This article explores solidarity as an important political praxis with diverse ways of participation through a case study of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's student anti-apartheid movement. Research heavily draws upon primary resources from the Southern Historical Collection at the Wilson Library. Secondary resources are utilized to contextualize the history of apartheid, internal resistance, and anti-apartheid solidarity within the global community. The focus is placed primarily on the Anti-Apartheid Support Group (AASG) due to limited archival materials. This article explores the AASG's organizational structure, influences, collaborating organizations, strategies and tactics employed, challenges, and gains to argue that student solidarity efforts made an impact on the national anti-apartheid movement by influencing public awareness and policies that eventually aided the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa. While the AASG was a prominent student organization, it does not represent the entire UNC-Chapel Hill student movement nor paint a picture of the exact way the movement occurred, as there were various students who participated outside of university-recognized organizational bodies. Additionally, there were other student organizations such as the Black Student Movement and Action Against Apartheid, the participation of which is not fully accounted for due to the lack of an archival collection.

Keywords: apartheid, divestment (divestiture), disinvestment, UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees, campaign

Introduction

The acts of coalition building and solidarity can amplify the concerns of multiple groups working toward a similar goal. The modern system of apartheid began when the Afrikaner National Party came into power in the Republic of South Africa in 1948. Their campaign promises capitalized on the white population's interest in their own preservation by legally codifying and exacerbating already existing segregationist practices. Apartheid, referring to the systematic separation of races, developed as a method of racial control to ensure that the minority white population continued its legal and social dominance over the majority non-white population. Global opposition against the apartheid regime's reign of terror, both within the South African state and in the greater southern African region, led to the formation of various international coalitions and solidarity movements, including student-led efforts on college campuses across the United States. This article analyzes the impact of solidarity efforts from US colleges, based on their influence on policy and public awareness, through a case study of a student-led anti-apartheid organization at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-Chapel Hill).

Organized anti-apartheid solidarity in the US began in the early twentieth century with black activist organizations like the Council on African Affairs (CAA) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The CAA and NAACP promoted pan-African philosophies and saw apartheid as an injustice to all black people. These two organizations helped launch the first international campaign for sanctions against South Africa at the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 (Nesbitt 2004, 7). The CAA had a strong relationship with the African National Congress (ANC), an organization of South Africans committed to multiracial rule and most commonly associated with Nelson Mandela. The CAA engaged in mass educational efforts to connect the plight of South Africans to black Americans in the Jim Crow era (Ransby 2013, 152). Early gains in this period included the nonbinding UN Resolution 1761 of 1962, calling on all members to end economic and military ties with South Africa. Despite this, US leaders were reluctant to strongly condemn or embargo South Africa. US militarism was fueled by natural resources produced in South Africa, and both nations had an interest in quelling the perceived threat of communism (Nesbitt 2004, 5–7). Thus, direct American corporate investment in South Africa continued to rise, from \$50 million in 1943 to \$490 million by 1966 (Jackson 1989, 27–29), and South Africa's defense and military budget more than quadrupled in the 1960s alone (Jackson 1989, 23–24). With the lack of formal pressure from the US government, small local radical organizations and civil rights organizations were the engines that sustained American efforts against South Africa's regional imperialism and its effects on bordering states, as well as internal anti-black terrorism. Eventually, college students joined the anti-apartheid movement as a way to directly influence the contributions their institutions made to the South African economy. The student divestment movement occurred in three waves, each categorized by its organizational structure, major influencing organizations, types of resources, and tactics employed. The case study undertaken in this research is the movement at UNC-Chapel Hill during the third wave; however, the argument that student solidarity efforts had an impact on the anti-apartheid movement through influence on public awareness and policy is a culmination of all three waves.

The First Wave: 1965–1970

The first wave began on March 19, 1965 with a demonstration of five hundred students at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City, opposing the renewal of bank loans to South Africa's government (Jackson 1989, 21–22). The demonstration was followed by a sit-in where forty-nine people were arrested. Organizations involved in the demonstration included Students for a Democratic Society, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). These organizations, particularly the black civil rights organizations, increasingly began linking the destinies of black people in the United States to that of those on the African continent. They recognized that America's exploitative economic and racial system was deeply married to the continued existence of imperialism and colonialism abroad.

The SNCC and CORE, alongside religious organizations and churches, were the main organizers of demonstrations. The anti-apartheid movement at this stage had no single centralized national leadership. The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953, was a major organization within the anti-apartheid movement that played a consulting role for student activists who were developing demands and divestment petitions for their respective universities. Other tactics utilized by students were marches, sit-ins/building occupations, and rallies (Jackson 1989, 23). Several universities such as Cornell and Princeton sold their stocks from companies with ties to South Africa due to student pressure, but most institutions refused to

capitulate to student demands (Jackson 1989, 25). The first wave of the student divestment movement was able to wield influence that led to the termination of over \$40 million dollars in bank loans (Jackson 1989, 26). As the immediate goals to shut down such bank loans and institutional investments in South Africa were partially met, perceived success led to a decline in movement participation (Jackson 1989, 28–39). Other factors that led to the decline of the first wave were the instability of college students' four-year academic schedules and the urgency of domestic issues like the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement (Jackson 1989, 30–33). The first wave succeeded in drawing awareness to the power that college institutions had due to their investments in the form of bonds, shares, and loans, and also created a blueprint that would be revived and reconstructed during the second wave.

The Second Wave: 1977–1980

The second wave of the student-led anti-apartheid movement in the US was triggered by internal resistance in South Africa and was characterized by more developed organizations focusing on apartheid. The Soweto uprising of 1976 and the killing of South African activist Steve Biko while in police custody sparked international outrage. During the Soweto massacre, over five hundred peaceful youth demonstrators were killed (Jackson 1989, 40). Images from the massacre and the resulting uprisings in over one hundred cities inspired a new wave of solidarity movements that spread internationally. Representatives from six national organizations including the Washington Office on Africa and ACOA mobilized to form the National Coalition for the Liberation of South Africa (NCLSA) (Chapman Papers, Folder 69). The NCLSA planned national conferences beginning in 1978, and student participants from over forty-eight colleges helped to organize national days of protest and the distribution of educational newsletters. Other regional conferences were held for the midwest at Northwestern University and the southeast at Duke University in 1978. Regional student coalitions within the NCLSA worked closely with ACOA's National Student Coordinator to manage student divestment efforts within national divestment campaigns and to advocate for tactics such as student referendums and proposals for investment advisory committees (Jackson 1989, 38).

The second wave was mostly characterized by institutionalization and selective or partial divestment gains (Jackson 1989, 40–50). Universities, aiming to quell student activists, established investment advisory committees tasked with reviewing investment policies, taking into account shareholder resolutions and grievances regarding the companies they held shares in. As the student anti-apartheid movement became more institutionalized, universities were able to control the demands of the movement through negotiation and minimal reform. One reform method of note was the Sullivan Principles, created in 1977 by respected black activist Reverend Leon Sullivan as a guide to achieving better corporate ethics practices in South Africa. Among other objectives, the principles called for the equal treatment of employees regardless of race as a condition for doing business (“Anti-Apartheid Support Group Report to Board of Trustees” n.d.). Most student activists in the US only achieved partial or selective divestment; however, by 1978, about forty colleges had adopted the Sullivan principles and/or established investment advisory committees to make ethical recommendations. Although mainly minimal reform was achieved, more institutionalized methods of activism allowed awareness initiatives to reach vast audiences. Through student polls, lectures by exiled South African activists, referendums, film screenings, fundraisers, and newsletters on and from South Africa, popular support against apartheid increased and made way for the third wave of student activism.

The Third Wave: 1984–1987

During the third wave of student activism, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill developed a sustained anti-apartheid movement as a result of characteristics distinct to the new national campaign. After student pressure and like many other institutions, the university adopted the Sullivan principles in 1982 (“Report to the Trustees of the Endowment Board” n.d.). The third wave was triggered in 1983 by the creation of a tri-cameral South African Parliament that still excluded black South Africans from participation. On November 21, 1984, a pan-Africanist organization named TransAfrica launched a sit-in at the South Africa Embassy to protest US complacency toward the South African government (Nesbitt 1989, 51). TransAfrica leader Randall Robinson was arrested alongside Congressional Black Caucus member Walter E. Fauntroy and Congresswoman Mary Frances Berry. This sit-in launched a series of demonstrations at embassies across the nation that resulted in the arrests of several hundred people, including Yolanda King, daughter of Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesse Jackson, effectively creating the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) and the third wave of student activism.

Spearheaded by national anti-apartheid organizations, the FSAM catalyzed the third wave of student activism by creating accessible points of entry to mass protest. TransAfrica coordinated the naming of March 21 to April 6 of 1985 as the “Week of National Anti-Apartheid Action” and April 4 as the “National Protest Day for South African Divestment” (Nesbitt 1989, 60–77). Hundreds of colleges across the nation reintroduced disruptive tactics by holding demonstrations during the week of action. The third wave of activism was aimed at employing diverse tactics in an effort to avoid the minimal or “progressive” reform seen in the second wave.

At UNC-Chapel Hill, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group (AASG) emerged as a leading front for student activism. The AASG was officially recognized as a student organization on October 16, 1985 (“Office of Vice Chancellor and Provost” 1985). The group’s constitution proclaimed racism to be “the heaviest burden carried on the shoulders of humankind” and South African apartheid to be a curse (“UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group Constitution” n.d.). Despite the adoption of “ethical business” policies through the Sullivan Principles, UNC investments in companies operating in South Africa increased (“Report to the Trustees of the Endowment Board” n.d.), convincing the AASG that a movement for full divestiture was the only way forward. Its stated goal was to achieve the “abolition of racism, particularly South African apartheid, and the establishment of majority non-racist rule in South Africa” (“UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group Constitution” n.d.). The organization’s membership was open to all so long as there was a desire to fight apartheid. Although the acting president of the AASG was Herman Bennett, the organization aimed to have a non-hierarchical leadership model by rotating the position of chairperson for the committee as a whole between members, based on majority vote, at each meeting. The AASG forged three committees to accomplish its missions: Education, Coordinating, and Program. Its membership base grew from thirty to over one hundred members within the first few months, and the organization thrived in its mission by constantly appealing to mass members of the campus and the local community.

Coalitions – Students and National Organizations

As exhibited in the case of UNC-Chapel Hill, the third wave of student activism greatly utilized diverse coalitions comprised of local and national organizations, students, public representatives, religious institutions, and the faculty and staff of universities. The student anti-apartheid

movement and the AASG heavily relied on the support provided by national organizations for resources including propaganda, contacts, action items, and guidelines. The Africa Fund, a non-profit organization founded in 1966 in association with the American Committee on Africa, was a pivotal directory for consistent and reliable updates. The Africa Fund published scholarly articles in the Literature List that acted as directories of information related to the anti-apartheid movement for easy access and redistribution (“Literature List” n.d.). The Africa Fund also produced a magazine called *Southern Africa Perspectives* that featured direct eyewitness reports from South Africans describing the grave living conditions, displacement, and other injustices (“Southern Africa Perspectives” n.d.). The magazine included columns that debunked objections to divestment and gave other movement-related updates. Another magazine that aided students was the *United States Anti-Apartheid Newsletter*, published by the American Friends Service Committee. The Washington Office on Africa produced single pieces of literature as needed called “Action Alerts” (“Washington Office on Africa Action Alerts” n.d.). These alerts contained information on legislation related to southern Africa and on immediate steps for individuals to take by referencing which congressional representatives to target. National organizations also communicated to student activists directly through national calls and emails. The “Call to Conscience” emergency response network was another system for rapid dissemination of information and action items within the movement. In August 1986, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group published the first issue of its own newsletter titled *UNC/Soweto* (AASG collection), which largely mirrored and referenced the magazines produced by national anti-apartheid organizations.

Coalitions – Students and Local Entities

Almost immediately after its inception, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group began building coalitions with groups in the UNC-Chapel Hill area. Most of these partnerships, based on the records collected, were tied to the university institution. The faculty council chaired by George A. Kennedy created the “Faculty Resolution of 1985” on November 15 to reflect their official position on apartheid. The resolution proclaimed the moral problems within the system of apartheid to be incompatible with “principles of intellectual freedom and human dignity” (“Faculty Resolution of 1985”), and proposed that all funds associated with companies operating in or with South Africa’s government be eliminated from the university’s portfolio and the State Retirement Fund portfolio. The faculty council understood the importance of solidarity with students’ efforts. In their November 15 meeting, they discussed student activists’ actions on November 14, stating that the “student body presented a similar resolution to the Investment Committee of the Board of Trustees (BOT),” which was turned down (“Faculty Meeting Notes, Section V” 1985). The council hoped that by adopting the resolution, “[students and faculty] can do together what could not be done alone” (“Faculty Meeting Notes, Section V” 1985). Chancellor Christopher Fordham expressed his support of the students and faculty resolutions, but had little power to take any action without support from the BOT. Students, however, capitalized on the presence of progressive faculty and made attempts to network. In the spring of 1986, the AASG sent a mailout to professors, admitting, “Students alone cannot affect the desired policy changes” (“UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group Letter to Professors” n.d.). Professors and departments responded by supporting the AASG through educational events, posting flyers created by the group, and donating to and/or dispersing information on the group’s fundraising efforts for *UNC/Soweto* and other campaigns (AASG Collection). The AASG partnered with the African and Afro-American Studies department to co-host a talk with exiled

South African Don Ngeubeni, called *Living Under Apartheid*, on March 19, 1986 (“Living Under Apartheid Flyer” n.d.). Later that year, on December 12, the faculty council adopted another resolution calling for the establishment of an investment review board comprised of faculty and students. The Board of Trustees voted six to five against a divestment resolution that same day; however, it was the “closest the university [had] ever come to full divestment” (“Jerry Jones” n.d.). Although the AASG had previously made the same request for a review board, faculty cooperation helped amplify the AASG’s efforts to move closer to divestment.

The AASG collaborated with student organizations to address the issues of sustaining visible support and building on-campus involvement. As advertised in an issue of *UNC/Soweto* published on October 29, 1986, the AASG and the Carolina Committee on Central America hosted a three-day conference called “Students Organizing Students (SOS)” from October 3 to 6 that was based on skill sharing and building progressive consciousness. The schedule included educational programs on South Africa, group strategy sessions, and workshops on civil disobedience, recruitment, lobbying, and organizing (“Students Organizing Students Agenda, *UNC/Soweto*” 1986). Over one hundred people attended the conference keynote given by chief US representative of the ANC Neo Mnumzana (*The News and Observer*, October 4, 1986). The AASG also had a positive relationship with the Black Student Movement (BSM) and used their mailing list for contacts (“BSM Mailing List” n.d.). Beyond the BSM and the Carolina Committee on Central America, the extent of collaboration with other campus organizations is unclear through the available archived documents. However, the AASG also joined a Triangle Area¹ coalition made up of the Committee for Peace with Justice in South Africa (Durham), the North Carolinians Against Apartheid (Raleigh) group, and other concerned individuals and medical personnel, to launch the Southern Africa Medical Aid project in the fall of 1986. They were able to raise over \$16,000 for the project by April 1987 (“Students Organizing Students Agenda, *UNC/Soweto*” 1986). The AASG’s ability to build support networks of community members, faculty, and staff greatly contributed to their success.²

The New Divestment Campaign

New divestment campaigns focused on total, rather than partial, divestment as the primary goal that would bring about disinvestment – the process of eliminating private corporations’ ownership of physical assets (Lowenberg et al. 1987, 459). In 1985, at least one hundred organizations focused on divestment and/or disinvestment were created on college campuses across the nation. New and existing organizations conducted reviews of their own university’s investment policies and demanded that endowment boards abandon the Sullivan Principles for being ineffective. In a letter to the UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees on November 14, 1985, the AASG wrote: “The codes cannot and do not attempt to address themselves to the basic structures of apartheid such as the homelands, migratory labor, cheap labor, pass laws and the

¹ The Research Triangle of North Carolina is comprised of Raleigh, Durham and Chapel Hill. See <https://www.researchtriangle.org/>.

² The extent to which the AASG collaborated or was influenced by local entities is not represented in this article due to limited archival materials. Much of the AASG collection focuses on the group’s interactions with national organizations, and mostly leaves out the pivotal role of local entities and more radical organizations in sustaining the anti-apartheid movement.

complex legal restrictions on regime opponents...the University should abandon its support for the Sullivan Principles and adopt a total divestment strategy” (“Letter to the UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees” 1985). AASG demands included a timeline for when the university system should sell all assets connected to South Africa, an immediate end to any purchases with corporations doing business in South Africa, and the establishment of a committee comprised of representatives from the AASG, Faculty Council, Black Faculty Caucus, Graduate and Professional Students Organization, Student Government, and the Board of Trustees to re-evaluate the university’s investment policies.

The AASG’s demands were ignored, and five months later it released the *Report to the Trustees of the Endowment Board* on April 4, 1986. This report showed that under the university’s current policy, which made use of the Sullivan Principles, stock holdings had grown from \$5.7 million to \$8.8 million between November 1985 and March 1986. The detailed report provided a list of all the companies the university was engaged in with ties to South Africa and argued for the importance of divestment before restating the policy demands the AASG had previously introduced.

Simultaneous efforts to pass divestment legislation were both fueled by and benefited student divestment movements. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), an organization of black congressional members founded in 1971, was a pivotal vehicle for legislative sanctions against South Africa (Nesbitt 2004, 130). The CBC fiercely opposed President Reagan’s complacency around South African apartheid, called “constructive engagement,” and drew on connections between apartheid and America’s own system of racial hierarchy (Nesbitt 2004, 130). The CBC made passing a sanction bill a chief priority and mobilized to gain the support of both Democrats and Republicans, who increasingly wanted to dissociate from apartheid. On October 2, their efforts came to fruition and the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986 was passed, overriding Reagan’s veto (Nesbitt 2004, 130–40). This moderate version of the act, which was first proposed in 1972, prohibited new investments in South Africa, made restrictions on government and commercial ties, and prohibited the importation of some products (Nesbitt 2004, 143–44). The *News and Observer* reported that, in his keynote at the SOS conference at UNC-Chapel Hill, ANC member Neo Mnumzana praised the sanction bill as a step in the right direction that “may encourage other countries...to oppose apartheid more actively” (October 4, 1986). Students played a role by writing letters, calling, and lobbying to congressional representatives. Mass demonstrations that attracted negative international attention to the US also considerably influenced the increase in public and congressional support for economic consequences for South Africa in light of its apartheid system.

In January 1987, new guidelines for divestment were issued by five national organizations involved in the Free South Africa Movement. The Africa Fund produced a “Unified List of United States Companies with Investments or Loans in South Africa and Namibia” from June 1985 to March 1987, to be used as a resource for students to create investment reports and divestment proposals based on the new guidelines issued by the five prominent organizations.

Tactics

The third wave of student activism saw the employment of diverse tactics with educational, direct action, and artistic components. These tactics, some already discussed above, included lists of demands, referendums, investment reviews and policy recommendations, newsletters, lecture series, film screenings, sit-ins, and marches. Upon its inception, the first event the AASG held was a rally on October 1, 1985 (“Educate Yourself! AASG Rally Flyers” n.d.). In February of

1986, the UNC-Chapel Hill Endowment Board refused to abide by the wishes of seventy percent of students, who had voted in campus elections for divestment. As a result, the AASG erected shanty towns on the Quad (“UNC Divestment History” n.d.). The shanty homes were built with metal scraps and other makeshift materials to represent the deprived conditions that black South Africans lived in. AASG members aimed to amplify awareness and draw attention to the divestment solutions proposed to the BOT. The erection of shanty towns on campuses as a means of peaceful protest first occurred at Cornell University in 1985, but this tactic soon spread to a number of other universities, including Johns Hopkin, Georgetown, and George Mason. The AASG utilized quantitative research and referendum results in their November 1985 *Report to the Trustees of the Endowment Board* to illustrate a convincing argument to the BOT before escalating to build shanty towns in March 1986. The AASG’s policy advocacy, as well as direct-action demonstrations, sustained a diversity of tactics meant to pressure the Board of Endowment to approve a full divestment.

Challenges

Like other student organizations within the movement, the AASG experienced both in-group and outside challenges around tactics and ideologies. For instance, College Republicans (CR) and Students for America (SA) came out in opposition to the shanty towns one month after the demonstrations began. In a letter sent to Chancellor Fordham on March 27, 1986, the CR and SA claimed that the shanties were defacing the university and demanded that they be removed by noon on April 1 (“Letter to Chancellor Fordham” 1986). The CR and SA threatened to erect a Berlin-type wall to “protest the oppression by the Soviet Union...and the left’s hypocrisy for addressing only one case of human rights violations,” if the shanties were not removed (“Letter to Chancellor Fordham” 1986). The April 1 deadline was not met, and the CR attempted to erect a wall made of wood, chicken wire, and sheets, but it was quickly vandalized and abandoned (“Students Demand that Hypocrisy End” n.d.). Chancellor Fordham set an April 7 deadline for students in the shanties to disperse. Five students were arrested for trespassing after refusing to leave their shanties when crews came to tear them down. All charges against demonstrators were later dropped, and no serious violent acts occurred on the UNC-Chapel Hill campus.

AASG members frequently engaged in heated exchanges with individuals who did not believe that divestment was the right strategy to help advance the anti-apartheid struggle. Despite support from Chancellor Fordham and the newly-elected student body president Bryan Hassel, the Endowment Board of the Board of Trustees was the primary obstacle. The board objected to divestment on the grounds that it went against their responsibility to uphold the financial interest of the university. The board estimated that they would lose “approximately one million dollars a year” with divestment, with some members promoting the congressional *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* as the best course of action (“UNC Divestment History” n.d.).

Student organizers also understood the difficulty of sustaining a student movement to influence the BOT: “students come and go but Trustees have all the time they want” (“Donnie Trevathan” n.d.). The creation of a new organization called the South Africa Scholarship Fund (SASF) by Richard Hoile and Francesca Varcoe became a point of contestation about different strategies. The SASF was established to sponsor the education of a black South African at a predominantly white, higher education institution in South Africa. The group then formed an agreement with the Endowment Board, which pledged to match each dollar raised. AASG member Donnie Trevathan noted in an open letter that divestment was never introduced as the “be all end all” solution or as the only way to perform solidarity (“Cindy Hahamovitch:

Counterpoint” n.d.). The AASG emphasized that it endorsed a diversity of tactics to amplify the anti-apartheid struggle; so, while the efforts of the BOT in supporting the SASF were good, it did not mean that full divestment should not continue to be pursued.

Furthermore, the AASG faced criticism from individuals who felt that while divestment was the right path, the AASG was not radical enough in its direct-action tactics. In an op-ed to the March 20, 1986 edition of *The Daily Tar Heel*, one student criticized the shanty towns erected on the UNC-Chapel Hill campus for not “replicating in great detail” the degree of gruesomeness in South Africa, writing that “the three shanties...project an image not of oppression and institutionalized racism, but of poverty” (*The Daily Tar Heel* 1986). The author also critiqued the AASG for negotiating with Chancellor Fordham about when to remove the shanties, arguing that it was a form of “constructive engagement.” Disagreement within the AASG membership resulted in the formation of a new group called Action Against Apartheid. In “An Open Letter to UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group,” this new faction cited ideology and tactics as the reason for separation, stating that “Action Against Apartheid will be built around the philosophy of action through education and education through direct action” (AASG collection). No further archival documents were located indicating the group’s presence on campus beyond this introductory letter.

Small Gains to Large Triumphs

Despite the challenges of student organizing in general, the third wave of the student anti-apartheid movement in US colleges accomplished significant gains. On October 1, 1987, organizers declared a win when the UNC-Chapel Hill Endowment Board agreed to divest all funds from South African companies (*The Daily Tar Heel* n.d.). On a national scale, between 1985 and 1987, seventy-five universities committed to either full or partial divestment of their South African stock; by 1988, a total of 155 colleges had divested their portfolio, with more institutions committing to full divestment than in any other wave (Jackson 1989, 64–67). Between 1986 and 1987 alone, ninety-six US firms withdrew from South Africa and the total amount from state and local actions surpassed \$18 billion dollars. Duke University was the first to adopt a full divestment timetable in 1986 in the Raleigh–Durham Triangle area, serving as local inspiration for the AASG’s own persistence (*The News and Observer*, October 4, 1986). By 1989, the US was among twenty-two countries around the world with economic penalties against South Africa’s apartheid regime. South Africa experienced massive capital flight as businesses and investors left, causing its national currency to become devalued and inflated (Gethard 2008). As a result, Prime Minister Frederik W de Klerk began to undo components of apartheid beginning in 1990, until its eventual demise in 1992 with the Apartheid Referendum.

Conclusion

Along with influencing investment policies, student activists were able to raise and sustain public awareness on the conditions of apartheid through literature, lectures, rallies, and other direct-action tactics. The gains made by student activists were actualized through crucial partnerships with other students, community members, local and national organizations, South Africans, and the faculty and staff of their institutions. The momentum of the divestment movement at both local and national levels gained international attention, amplifying the moral and political threat of South Africa. After its win for full divestment, the AASG dwindled both in purpose and presence on campus, and there are few archival sources to help formulate an explanation of their

whereabouts post 1987. Nevertheless, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group at UNC-Chapel Hill provides a valuable case study of the methods, challenges, and accomplishments of the student anti-apartheid movement in the United States, and what it was able to achieve through acts of solidarity with those oppressed under the South African regime.

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Review of Racquel Gates' *Double Negative: The Black Image and Popular Culture*

André E. Tyson

Disparaging portrayals of African Americans in American media outlets have long been a site of much critique and protest. In *Double Negative: The Black Image and Popular Culture* (2018), Racquel Gates critically analyzes the ways in which African Americans potentially benefit in terms of economic, political, and social gains as a result of these negative images. In exploring the negative African-American images that proliferate contemporary media representations, Gates establishes a theoretical framework to approach and study such images, and calls for a critical analysis of their use. She references films like *Boyz n the Hood* (1991), *Coming to America* (1988), and *New Jack City* (1991); stars like Flavor Flav, Halle Berry, and Katt Williams; and, current reality television shows like *Real Housewives of Atlanta* (2012–present), *Basketball Wives* (2010–present), and *Love & Hip Hop Atlanta* (2012–present). Gates proposes that negative images are able to be used to confront issues that impact the black community and American society in ways that more positive images cannot.

Gates insists that shows like *Real Housewives of Atlanta* – though considered by many as problematic for their depiction of black women – utilize negative images to challenge the limits of black respectability politics. These black respectability politics encompass what we typically deem as acceptable representations, especially in the context of uplifting African Americans within the larger society of the United States. This reviewer found Gates' *Double Negative* to be a useful intervention that successfully explores the positive impacts of negative images, particularly those used in reality television.

In establishing her theoretical framework, Gates categorizes negativity into five distinct types: formal, relational or comparative, circumstantial, strategic, and false. By grouping negative images this way, Gates can explore each in great detail. Subsequently, she offers suggestions regarding how such negatively perceived images may, unexpectedly, result in positive outcomes. For example, in her work on strategic negativity, Gates theorizes that the black women on the reality television show *Real Housewives of Atlanta* embrace the negativity associated with “ghetto” or “ratchet” characteristics to achieve personal and professional agency. Gates highlights how these women often use negative behaviors to brand themselves and even market products, in order to further their own career and personal objectives. In fact, Gates asserts, “Beyond the coded forms of labor that occur on the show, reality television also offers an excellent platform for cast members to launch and promote their own products and business ventures” (156). She reports that the women on *The Real Housewives*, *Basketball Wives*, *Love & Hip Hop Atlanta*, and many other reality television shows, “pitch a wide variety of merchandise including T-shirts, lingerie, lip gloss, hair extensions, and even specialty cognac” (156). She goes on to highlight how stars without products instead brand themselves for financial and employment gain:

Leakes has managed to translate her larger-than-life persona and penchant for coming up with memorable catchphrases into a legitimate career beyond Housewives....Beyond the

world of reality television, Leakes caught the attention of the television producer Ryan Murphy, who first cast her as the recurring character Roz Washington on his popular musical dramedy *Glee* (FOX), and then later as Rocky Rhoades on his sitcom *The New Normal* (NBC). When *Normal* was canceled after only a season, Leakes appeared on Broadway as the wicked stepmother in a production of *Cinderella* and then as Mama Morton in *Chicago*. In addition, Leakes has cohosted entertainment programs like *The View*, *Live with Kelly and Michael*, and *Fashion Police*, has made guest appearances on a variety of sitcoms, talk shows, and other TV programs, including *The Real Husbands of Hollywood*, *Jimmy Kimmel Live!*, and the *Ellen DeGeneres Show*; and toured the country in a one-woman standup show (157–58).

Accordingly, Gates proposes, the women deliberately perpetuate attitudes, behaviors, and expressions that many consider to be negative, in order to negotiate economic and political advancement within the constrained system of reality television. For example, while many criticized women like Nene Leakes for the considerable degree to which she perpetuated these types of negative images, by neck-rolling and speaking African-American Vernacular English, among other behaviors, she was able to successfully set herself apart from other cast members, thereby positioning herself for a greater degree of financial success.

As Gates emphasizes, reality television has largely been excluded from academic journals, which limits critical scholarship on the genre and its potential benefits. When important discussions do arise in the public sphere, scholarly critiques often focus on deconstructing the negative imagery that reality television promotes. This rhetoric encompasses sexism, homophobia, and racism. Such rhetoric also dismisses the fact that this genre is capable of tackling germane social issues. She goes on to argue that such dismissals are, in part, what fuels the women's ability to strategically highlight topics that those deemed as decorous individuals fail to address, because reality television is "a genre that truly occupies the 'gutter' within qualitative assessments of the media landscape" (145). She points out that, "Beginning in roughly 2004, Bravo and VH1, in particular, have enjoyed a ratings bonanza when they began producing content aimed at African American women audiences" (147). An additional positive outcome is that this content reaches certain demographics, and allows those who otherwise may not have a voice to engage in social discussions that are articulated in a familiar vernacular.

Double Negative skillfully investigates these and many other negative images portrayed in the modern context, making it a significant critique on contemporary black representation. This book challenges pre-existing views that consume the public discourse regarding the magnitude of negative images, and provides an alternative perspective. Gates' book is therefore a critical intervention on the proliferation of negative images, and the ways that such images can be used to make a lasting, and even positive, impact.

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Review of Adam Ewing's *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics*

Kevyn Robinson

Adam Ewing's book, *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics* (2016), illustrates the climate that gave rise to twentieth-century Pan-Africanism, and specifically, Garveyism. Notably, Ewing does not delve into either the life of Marcus Garvey or his philosophy at the onset of his book. This is intentional so that he can contextualize the core themes of the book and introduce twentieth-century questions of race. His core themes include Pan-Africanism, black self-determination, and discourse around black leadership, and Garvey's efforts are examples of these themes as much as they are results of them. It is important to explore the impact of these themes both globally and within the United States, as well as how they may have changed the way blacks assert their understanding of race. *The Age of Garvey* (2016) provides valuable insight into the birth and spread of the Pan-Africanist movement, as well as grapples with problems faced within the movement, such as leadership, strategy, and how to unite blacks.

Pan-Africanism, or the idea that everyone of African descent should unite to uplift the black race, is one of the most prominent themes Ewing covers in the book. It is the foundation on which most of Garvey's rhetoric lies. Marcus Mosiah Garvey, born in 1887 in Jamaica, was a twentieth-century civil rights leader most known for his tailored vision of Pan-Africanism, which was an amalgamation of global ideas of race. Though he was born in Jamaica, Garvey was educated in London and carried out most of his work in the United States, specifically in Harlem (Ewing 2016, 14). Notably, Garvey's Pan-Africanism included the eventual return to a politically and economically separatist Liberian colony, of which he would be named the leader (Ewing 2016, 137).

The majority of the first half of this book is *not* about Garvey. Instead, Ewing uses this part of his study to contextualize Garvey's life and ascent to civil rights leader. He begins with the political and racial climate of Garvey's home country of Jamaica, focusing initially on the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865. Despite slavery having been abolished on the island decades earlier, there were colonialists who refused to enfranchise blacks. The rebellion is Ewing's first introduction of blacks' attempts at nation-making and attempting to seize their rights (Ewing, 2016, 29). Garveyism is initially introduced here, and Ewing helpfully situates it as neither radical nor conservative, but as an amalgamation of ideas, discourse, and events happening to Africans and African descendants (31).

Ewing also uses European countries' racially-based perceptions of their colonial subjects to contextualize Pan-Africanism. For example, England envisioned a plan for citizenship and independence for colonies such as Australia and Canada, yet saw their African and Caribbean subjects as perpetual children who could never be independent. This racist paternalism compelled blacks in colonies and newly-liberated countries to seek institutions to remedy the oppression they faced. The resulting conflict manifested in rebellion across African colonies and the Caribbean, inspiring the rallying cry of "Africa for Africans!" (Ewing 2016, 89). Discourse

varied on who should lead these movements – from Garvey in Jamaica, Washington or DuBois in the United States, or Harry Thuku in Kenya (Ewing 2016, 119).

The latter half of the book focuses more on Garvey and what Garveyism looked like in action. Garveyism's central focus was to uplift the black race through means such as education and economic empowerment. One such method included bringing blacks across the colonized world and closer to what Garvey viewed as modernity – minus the air of paternalism that accompanied white imperialism. These desires prompted Garvey's ambitious efforts, such as establishing the "Back to Africa" Movement in the 1920s, creating the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and opening of his own shipping line, the Black Star Line. His movement gained global political and financial support from blacks in the first quarter of the twentieth century, with many believing that he might hold the key to the post-emancipation future of the black race (Ewing 2016, 151). The UNIA, founded on the principles of Garveyism, advocated territorial separatism as the solution to black subjugation, and counseled its followers to work and suffer as a collective to achieve liberation as an entire race (Ewing 2016, 151).

It is impossible to analyze Garvey and his efforts outside of the context of Pan-Africanism. Though Garvey did not invent Pan-Africanism, he subscribed heavily to it, putting the needs of the black race before all others (Ewing 2016, 29). Pan-Africanism, however, in and of itself is not a solution to racism nor a way to escape it. On this front, Garvey was tasked with determining how he wanted his vision of Pan-Africanism to materialize and what exactly he expected to achieve. Garvey's ideal version of Pan-Africanism included creating institutions for blacks, encouraging brotherhood, and instructing his followers to not let fear deter them from uplifting the black race (Ewing 2016, 157). His principles rested largely on a foundation of self-determination. Because of this, Garvey appealed not only to African Americans, but also to those Africans living in colonies, who were considered second-class citizens in their homeland. His work inspired extra-governmental welfare programs and self-help economic practices from the United States to the African continent, especially in places such as Nyasaland (part of present-day Malawi) (Ewing 2016, 216). Uniting was a way to solidify and draw upon the strengths of black cultures to dismantle white supremacy, rather than beg for acceptance in a Westernized world.

Within black communities, there oftentimes existed the idea that there had to be *one* leader to advance the race. Garvey's time was no different, and Ewing references this throughout his book. He especially does so through his mention of Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, black American leaders who also had the goal of racial uplift, but who had contrasting ideas on how to achieve such a feat. Ewing creates a stark contrast between Garvey and DuBois by pointing out similarities between Washington and Garvey, such as their beliefs in vocational competency and desire for separatism (Ewing 2016, 47). DuBois, adamant about being accepted into white society, opposed these sentiments, asserting that select groups of blacks should seek respect through academic betterment. DuBois also suggested that blacks fight for their countries in World War I (including colonized Africans), and then use their loyalty as grounds to request better treatment after the war was won (Ewing 2016, 71). This approach, of course, differed greatly from Washington and Garvey's beliefs on the war. Garvey and Washington believed blacks had no place in the war and should not risk their lives to defend countries that did not treat them as citizens.

Ewing also relates how the desire to unify the black race combined with wartime nationalism inspired a Moses complex among some black leaders. This sentiment was evident once Garvey was arrested in the United States, and after his Black Star Line and the UNIA failed. It was at

this point that DuBois proudly stated that blacks had not fallen prey to Garveyism or Washingtonianism (Ewing 2016, 121). Despite his efforts and intentions, Garvey could never achieve his goal of uniting the black community, simply because of the diversity of opinions regarding how best to do this. This begs the question of what is more important: is it who is credited with leading a movement, or what goals are actually achieved? Such a question extends to Garvey, whom Ewing characterizes as more interested in being the authoritarian face of his movement than letting what he intended to achieve take precedence over his leadership (Ewing 2016, 121).

In terms of content, Ewing made a smart choice in not telling the story solely from Garvey's point of view or making the book strictly a biography. Such an approach would have failed to serve his purpose of both analyzing Garvey as the individual, and the climate that shaped his ideas. This also fits the theme of Pan-Africanism, as Garvey's ideas did not come from one country or school of thought, but from a combination of racial discourses throughout the diaspora. Ewing expounds heavily on global resistance, such as in Kenya, Zambia, Jamaica, and the United States. In addition, he introduces other prominent twentieth-century black figures and develops them as people, which allows for a better comparison of Garvey. Mentioning the black leaders tangentially would limit the reader's ability to make informed opinions about them.

The Age of Garvey (2016) illustrates that Pan-Africanism, attempts at black self-determination, and the desire for centralized leadership existed throughout the African diaspora and on the continent, rather than mainly in the United States, as is often taught. Not only does the book provide a more in-depth look into Marcus Garvey's ideology and efforts, but this particular author has made the decision to humanize him, rather than dismissing him as radical or short-sighted and destined for failure. This approach differs from this reviewer's previous encounters with versions of the Garvey story, which often depict the leader as overly ambitious and as a cautionary tale of one wanting too much for one's people too quickly. Despite Garvey's efforts having failed, there is much to be learned from a man who inspired a movement to make an entire race as independent as the people who once owned and continued to exploit them.

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