The EU and Conflict: Critically Assessing the Success of the ESDP and its Impact in Conflict Areas

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Abstract

Devon Ritter: The EU and Conflict: Critically Assessing the Success of the ESDP and its Impact in Conflict Areas
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With the EU continuing to expand its foreign policy platform, including operating as conflict management actors, it is important to analyze their performance thus far. This thesis will outline the goals and capabilities of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), focusing on three varied attempts at conflict management in order to assess whether the EU can and should continue with ESDP. What will be shown is that while ESDP has had some mixed success, there is potential for the EU to be a significant actor in the future. Additionally, the thesis will show that along with conflict resolution and maintenance of peace, successful ESDP operations can lead to important improvements in long-term human welfare.
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Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the number of conflicts has been relatively low compared to the history of conflicts prior to the period from 1946-present. That being said, there has never been a point when conflict did not exist in some part of the world. For most of this period, Europe had an especially low number of conflicts to deal with. However, this has changed in recent years as shown by the flare up of war in the Balkans and more recently the Caucasus. Likewise, the number of conflicts in Africa and Asia, which threaten the stability of young independent states, is a worry for global security. Because of this, it is very important to have international bodies that can monitor and manage conflicts. Particularly in Europe and the EU’s backyard, it is more and more important that the European Union themselves have the capability to address conflicts. And because conflicts far away can have a significant effect in Europe, it is also important that the EU be more active in dealing with those distant crisis situations. It is no secret that as the EU has grown, security has become an issue of increased importance within the EU. While the expanding borders of the European Union have brought certain threats closer to home, the expanding resources, knowledge and power of the EU have also provided them with the tools to deal with threats specific to the EU as well as conflict on a global scale.

In this thesis I explore the growing relationship between the European Union and conflict via the EU’s efforts in conflict management through European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). By conflict management, I mean the use of EU resources and
manpower to help facilitate an end to violence. One form of this is peace making, such as initiating a cease-fire and helping to negotiate the terms of peace treaties. Though more commonly in the short history of EU conflict management, this means peacekeeping. Most of the EU’s ESDP operations thus far have been to secure and maintain an end to violence after peace agreements have been made. The specific purpose of this study however is to determine under what conditions ESDP has been successful in it’s conflict management attempts. What are the factors that account for why the EU has been successful in some circumstances and less successful in others? Additionally, how does the success or lack of success of EU operations impact the overall long-term well-being in those places where operations have taken place?

I argue that there are two distinct factors that play a large role in accounting for the success of the EU and ESDP. First of all, geographic proximity to the EU, specifically, whether or not operations take place within Europe itself. For those operations that do take place in non-EU Europe, the EU has a tool that is not available in any other case. That is willingness to offer and negotiate future EU membership. As will be shown, this has been very important in places such as Bosnia. The second factor is the variation in goals that different ESDP operations have. Those operations that have far reaching goals and mandates have shown to be much more successful in bringing about or maintaining an end to violence. In accounting for this factor, the issue of political will must be addressed, as political will is an important factor in itself when the EU creates operational mandates and sets out their goals. These factors explain the success of individual operations. Additionally, I argue that when the EU is successful, there is a benefit to long-term well-being for the populations where operations have taken place.
While the benefits of success vary from case to case, I also argue that when the ESDP operations fail to manage conflicts, the lack of improvement in well-being is very clear.

To support these arguments I will look at three case studies of ESDP operations. For each one, I will outline what the operations entail, and what the goals of the operation were, using primary source material from the EU to do this. After describing the missions themselves, I will use data to provide a picture of the current levels of violence within each of the three countries or regions where the ESDP operations took place. This data will support my conclusions on whether or not the individual operations were successful in managing conflict. To draw the relationship to long-term well-being, I will include evidence from the World Health Organization, OECD, and other research projects that shows GNP per capita levels, poverty levels, and percentage of populations affected by various diseases or viruses, to name a few categories. By showing changes, or the lack of change, to these figures from the time of conflict until now, the evidence will provide support for my argument that the success of ESDP operations is very important to long-term well-being.

In order to effectively make these arguments, the thesis will be split into five main sections. The first section will provide background on the ESDP. It will show how it developed out of the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy and how is has changed and evolved up until today. This will include a description of what the goals of ESDP are, as well as what the capabilities are. The following three sections will be devoted to the three individual case studies. In the first case study I look at Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first sub-section of this examines the ESDP mission, in this case EUFOR-ALTHEA. The second sub-section examines the impact that the ESDP has had on social welfare and
long-term well-being. In the second case study I focus on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Again, I first look at the ESDP missions, followed by a section describing well-being. The last case study is on Aceh, Indonesia, following the same pattern of the other two. The information from the three studies will show the varying success of ESDP and the impact that it can have in conflict areas. I will use that information in the final section to evaluate the EU’s performance in conflict management and the potential for ESDP as the EU goes ahead in conflict management operations.

**Table 1: Factors Affecting Outcomes of ESDP Operations**

<table>
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<th>Factors</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td><strong>BiH</strong> Success helped by use of SAAs and promotion of future EU membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Mandate/Political Will</td>
<td><strong>BiH</strong> Mandate that allowed for maintenance of peace, due in part to a strong political will.</td>
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**ESDP: Evolution, Tools and State of Play**

The details of the creation of European Security and Defense Policy are important for understanding how the EU came to a point where it could be a conflict management actor. Additionally, development and changes to ESDP help to explain the differences between various missions over the course of the last five years and why some have been more successful than others. In large part, ESDP was created because of the EU’s failure to act effectively in the Balkans when war broke out in the early 1990s. While the EU
had made positive strides with a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), which finally brought together shared concerns and strategies; they did not have the means to implement strategy. This became widely apparent when they took on the task of managing the conflict in Bosnia and failed to do so. Again in 1998, with the crisis in Kosovo, the EU relied on NATO military capabilities to resolve the conflict. Both of these situations were catalysts to what was one of the outcomes of the Cologne Council in 1999, which was the creation of ESDP. Later that year at the European Council in Helsinki, the EU agreed upon the Helsinki Headline Goal, which stated that by 2003, the EU must have the capacity to deploy a force of 60,000 troops within 60 days that could be sustained for a year. Having the adequate military tools to act, the EU has since been able to launch ESDP operations, the first of which was the EU policing mission in Bosnia, which began January 2003.

The development of the ESDP in 1999 and subsequent changes affecting foreign policy have given the EU increased opportunities to get involved in conflict management as well as larger capabilities for handling conflicts. ESDP was designed to “equip the EU with effective decision-making mechanisms and to develop credible military and civilian capabilities in order to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 140). While this does not mean there is an available European Army, there are organized troops available for ESDP missions. Since 2007, battle groups have been available which provide around 1,500 troops that can operate for 30 days, or up to 120 if they are properly re-supplied (EU Council Secretariat, 2007). The creation of these battle groups was prompted by the knowledge that having 60,000 troops available, as suggested
by the Helsinki Headline Goal, was not feasible. Battle groups of this size are probably not capable of forcefully ending a conflict, but they can be useful for military operations looking to maintain peace in post-conflict situations. Additionally, operations such as ALTHEA, where around 7,000 troops were initially used (European Union, 2008), prove that the EU can gather more soldiers when necessary. If the EU uses their diplomatic and civilian measures to bring about a period of peace, then the military aspects of ESDP could prove useful.

Another important development that has improved the capabilities of the EU has been the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP, occupied by Javier Solana. Solana’s presence has helped coordinate foreign policy and his commitment has been important in developing and implementing ESDP operations. There have been difficulties in past lead up to operations based on the fact that certain individuals or member-states have been hesitant to throw all their support behind a mission. Solana has not only been important in meeting with foreign governments and leaders to arrange potential operations, but also in enlisting the support within the EU. Such efforts have made the EU more capable in terms of getting missions started quickly in hopes of improving their potential success.

Looking beyond those aspects only related to CFSP/ESDP, the EU does have other elements at their disposal that can be used to assist in managing conflicts. While the EU may be expanding their foreign policy potential to show that they are not solely an economic presence, the fact that they are such a large economy helps. By having significant funds available and a market that foreign countries want access to, their economic position can be used in conflict resolutions. Even for those countries outside of
Europe, the prospect of developmental aid funds and increased access to the EU market can be an important motivational tool for working towards the goal of establishing a peaceful environment. However, in high-risk areas where the potential for renewed conflict is probable, these techniques are only likely to work in conjunction with some sort of military, peace stabilizing effort.

Finally, as I will discuss in more detail with the case of Bosnia, EU conflict management missions in Europe can use Stabilization and Association Agreements to negotiate conflict resolutions and outline development strategies. The idea behind SAAs was that, “to avoid further conflict greater international efforts would be needed to promote economic and political stability as well as regional cooperation” (Phinnemore, 2003, pg. 79). However, the purpose of SAAs is “not just association but, more importantly, in the short- to medium-term at least, stabilisation” (Phinnemore, 2003, pg. 79). This aspect of the agreements highlights why they would be important in areas dealing with conflicts. Before being able to successfully interact economically, or develop legitimate political systems, the country itself has to have a stable environment. With the prospect of greater integration and potential membership within the EU, regions such as the Western Balkans have more motivation to work with the EU in conflict management. The enhanced opportunities that SAAs offer, aid ESDP operations and may also lead European countries in conflict to seek out the EU to assist in resolutions rather than other international bodies such as the UN.

However, in order to evaluate the EU’s conflict management attempts with the ESDP, we must also understand the EU’s own standards for success. The European security strategy is designed to manage threats stemming from regional conflicts, state
failure and organized crime (Whitman Lecture, 2008). When taking action, the EU has stated they would follow the Petersburg Tasks, which include humanitarian rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking (Hyde-Price Lecture, 2008). Using diplomatic civilian efforts and the military tools mentioned above, the EU has to some extent, touched on all of the Petersburg Tasks in operations, however in varying combinations with various levels of success.

Looking at the missions that the EU has launched and completed, it appears that operational success is defined by meeting the goals they set when beginning a mission. While this may seem rather obvious and sufficient, if a mission’s goals are not high enough, then an operation may not actually meet the objectives of the ESDP as a whole, which are, “preventing conflicts and managing crises” and “strengthen[ing] the security of the Union in all ways” (European Commission, 2005). This discrepancy is something which needs to be addressed when the EU evaluates itself, and when others evaluate the EU.

That being said, ESDP is still rather new, and has had to battle limited resources and at times a lack of consensus among member states that is required for operations to take place. Having started with limited expectations may help to explain why the ESDP has been proclaimed more of a success than perhaps deserved at times. For example, the EU has completed operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo that they have been classified as successful, which as I will argue later, have really not been successful examples of conflict management. But as High Representative Javier Solana points out, “in the past few years, ESDP is probably the area where we have made the most progress in the EU” (Solana, 2007, pg. 9) and, “the days that European security and defence policy
could be dismissed as all talk and no action are long gone” (Solana, 2007, pg. 10). I will evaluate if this is indeed the case. Using the end of violence and maintenance of a stable peace as a gauge for success, I will use the following case studies to show situations where the ESDP has been both a success and a failure. I will demonstrate that the important factors of operating within a potential EU member state, and the variance in operational mandates and political will have led to these different outcomes.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

*ESDP Operation EUFOR-ALTHERA*

My case study of Bosnia Herzegovina shows that the EU has indeed come a long way since the early 1990s in terms of their capabilities for conflict management. The creation of ESDP has allowed them to take a lead in the region and manage effectively, in large part because of the EU’s willingness to discuss and facilitate future EU membership for BiH. Over the course of the EU’s foreign policy history, the Balkans has been both a black eye and an important motivational tool. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s was an opportunity for the EU to show that they could handle delicate crisis issues in their own backyard. Unfortunately, the EU was not capable of such serious conflict management during the early 90s. As mentioned above, the resources and military abilities of NATO and the United States were absolutely necessary to bring about the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, which brought an end to the war in Bosnia. However, by 2003 the EU had improved capabilities, which makes looking at recent operations, such as EUFOR-ALTHERA, helpful in assessing the EU’s foreign policy potential. This operation was launched by the EU to ensure that a peaceful
situation would continue in BiH despite the drawback of NATO in the country.

Specifically, the aim of Operation ALTHEA was to “provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH” (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP). The roles of those involved in the war that the EU was now charged to overlook were to:

“Establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Neither Entity shall threaten or use force against the other Entity, and under no circumstances shall any armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within the territory of the other Entity without the consent of the government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina…Establish lasting security and arms control measures…and refrain from all offensive operations of any type against each other” (GFAP, 1995).

Essentially, the EU is there to make sure that another war does not break out in Bosnia and that the country can rebuild or develop the institutions and systems needed for a democracy to run effectively and peacefully. ALTHEA was a significant milestone for the ESDP/EU because it had never before launched a mission of such a magnitude.

In fact, the initial transition to EU leadership in the conflict management effort after ALTHEA was launched was not easy. For one, “it took seven months after the EU mission was launched to transfer information fully from NATO to the EU” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 149). Overcoming these early logistical problems would be important for the success of the mission. It was also important that the EU not rely on NATO any longer. This would allow them to establish their own legitimacy in BiH and make it known that they were now in charge of the situation. However, this was not easy given the fact that there is often a lot of bureaucracy involved in ESDP, as well as budgeting concerns with operations that often draw on the resources of willing individual member states. “Even if some are willing to push for a mission, they are not always
willing to contribute the necessary resources. This was the case of EUFOR- ALTHEA in Bosnia, for instance, where considerable time was required to obtain contributions” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 143).

Despite these setbacks however, there has not been a major outbreak of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the ESDP ALTHEA operation has been launched, and institutional reform appears to be taking place. Whether this can be fully attributed to the presence of the EU, or other factors such as the lack of willingness for Bosnia Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks to get engaged in deadly conflict again, cannot be completely certain. There is no doubt however that the EU has played a positive role in maintaining peace. Militarily, this can be seen by the fact that troops are stationed and ready to intervene if there is another breakout of violence. EUFOR-ALTHEA is a military operation, so the idea that the presence of a deterring force has been beneficial to peace is logical. Just as important however has been the stated willingness of the EU to see the operation through and work to bring a lasting peace to BiH. “The persistence of the uncertainty in the Balkans emphasizes the need for ESDP and Community instruments to remain committed for the long haul in order to go through the complete cycle of conflict transformation to state-building” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 142). Considering that the EU is still there and no end date has been given for the operation, it appears that the EU is committing itself for an indefinite period of time to ensure that their success is maintained. However, the EU has drawn back its troops to 2,500 (European Union, 2008), showing that the operation has been working and that the EU believes Bosnia is becoming more stable. It is necessary however to point out the fact that the EU has an added tool for conflict management within Europe. In creating CFSP/ESDP, “the EU
approach was predicated strongly on the notion that regional integration offered the strongest contribution to democracy and conflict resolution” (Youngs, 2006, 337).

Nowhere is it more possible for the EU to facilitate regional integration than in Europe itself, due to the fact that the EU can offer membership. A large part of the strategy in Bosnia has been getting the country to work towards signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement, which would bring them one step closer to EU membership. Considering the EU would not let BiH sign this if they were involved in a conflict, there is some extra motivation for peace in Bosnia. However, the history behind the conflict has not made reaching this point easy. Srecko Latal discussed how as recently as a year ago there were still disagreements between the EU and local leaders concerning police reforms, which was an obstacle to signing the SAA (2007). On June 16, 2008 however, the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed, allowing BiH to join the rest of the Balkan countries as potential EU member-states.

Because of the EU’s proximity to Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR-ALTHEA has had a good chance of being successful. The capabilities of ESDP itself allowed the EU to launch and maintain this rather large and significant mission. However, the fact the Bosnia is located in Europe and the EU has the will to someday make them a member state has greatly increased the possibility for this conflict management attempt to be successful. Essentially, the EU has greater capacity for conflict management in Europe itself, and their operational success in Bosnia is due in part to this. If they are willing to wave the carrot of EU membership and get countries in conflict situations to bite, then the EU does not have to rely solely on the capabilities of the ESDP. Of course, this option is not really available to the EU in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which
makes it important for the EU to have the capacity to use other civilian or military measures to manage conflicts.

**Social Improvements and the Potential for More**

As will become more apparent, the Bosnia case study is much different from the other two. Unlike the DRC or Aceh, Indonesia, Bosnia in all likelihood will become an EU member in the future. Realizing this, the EU has helped Bosnia meet the social standards required to be a member state. Peace and stability in Bosnia is important in making sure social improvements are made. However, being on track to become a member state has also meant that Bosnia has received funding from the EU specifically for improving long-term well-being. Because of this variable, which is missing in the other cases, it is more difficult to say that improvements in Bosnia are a result of the success of the ESDP operation. That being said, the stability and lack of decline in well-being since 2004, when the EU took over for NATO in managing the conflict, does show that operation ALTHEA has been successful, and that the EU can deal with crisis situations.

The fact that the EU has worked with Bosnia towards membership has been beneficial for both parties. EU membership will stimulate the economy of Bosnia and give the government more tools for dealing with domestic social issues. However, to become a member, Bosnia must meet many guidelines set forth by the EU, which includes stabilizing and committing to peace. By motivating Bosnia to take initiative, managing the conflict has become easier for the EU. “EU members are promoting accession because they consider enlargement to be in their long-term economic and
geopolitical interest” and likewise, “East European States take part in the laborious accession process because EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits particularly as compared to the uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as others move forward” (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003, pg. 43). As Moravcsik and Vachudova point out, “One study forecasts long-term total gains to the new member states ranging from €23 to €50 billion” (2003, pg. 47). Whether this money manifests itself in the form of new jobs, investment in capital, or increased government spending on social welfare, there is no doubt that it will be beneficial to the long-term well-being of Bosnia. Of course, these improvements would be more directly related to EU membership than the success of ESDP operations in the country. Yet, considering that the Stabilization and Association agreements were a long-term goal of EUFOR-ALTHEA, if the gains to BiH are close to projected, a link between successful operations and improved livelihood of Bosnia’s citizens could be made.

There is however evidence already that this is the case. While there is limited data to compare between present day Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiH during the war, due likely to the fact that information was difficult to gather during the war, the information that is available shows two different situations. For example, according to the World Health Organization, per capita gross national income in 1994 was only $890. As of 2006 that number had risen to $6780, with the most significant year-to-year increase occurring between 1995 and 1996, directly after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, when GNI more than doubled. Another important measure cited by the WHO is the prevalence of Tuberculosis. During the conflict in BiH, TB ranged from 150 to 134 occurrences per 100,000 people. Between 2002 and 2006 that number has been cut down
more than half, affecting only 65 to 57 people respectively.

Of course, because of the fact that many of these improvements were made prior to the EU operations, the success of those operations cannot be used to explain the improvement in social well-being. The overall presence of third party actors can help explain this however, as there had been a strong UN or NATO presence in BiH before 2004 and it was due to US State Dept diplomats that the peace agreement in 1995 was made. What is important when looking at the EU’s effect is the fact that this improvement in well-being has not declined since 2004 when they took over for NATO in maintaining the conflict. Due to the EU’s past failures in Bosnia and their relative lack of experience in conflict management, there were some worries that the switch could have negative consequences. In reality however, those WHO statistics that could demonstrate well-being in Bosnia have not declined since 2004, suggesting that in this respect, the EU is doing fine, and their presence has not been detrimental to the long term well-being of the population. In fact some minor improvements could be noted. For instance, in 2002, 19.1% of people were living below the poverty line in BiH (Human Development Report-BiH, 2002, pg. 52). As of 2006, there had been a decrease to 17.8% of people living below the poverty line (National Development Report, 2007, pg. 70). While these figure do not necessarily stand out as a huge success, nor can they be fully attributed to the presence of the EU, they do show further evidence that the EU is fulfilling its mandate, and that some form of a double pay-off is occurring, in both a continued peace and an improvement in social well-being.

One area where Operation ALTHEA and the EU in general have had difficulty showing improvements is corruption in Bosnia. Due to the conflict and ethnic divisions
created by the war, corruption was able to seep into Bosnian society at many levels. One area in particular where corruption can take root is in the employment sector, where a type of gray economy is created. For this reason, employment/unemployment data can be somewhat misleading in BiH, giving a skewed image of social well-being. Most sources list the unemployment rate around 31.8% (2006), which is actually an improvement after a continual rise from 1997 to 2003, when it peaked at 44.1%. As the authors of the 2002 Human Development Report for BiH point out however, “Under current circumstances in BiH, the traditional concept of employment has lost much of its meaning and that more and more individuals are finding themselves in a twilight world between formal employers who pay only their social and health insurance and real employers who provide them with no labor rights or social entitlements” (pg. 37). When jobs in this twilight sector are accounted for, unemployment can be figured at closer to 16 or 17 per cent, which certainly shows how much corruption has impacted the lives of those in BiH.

The international community’s involvement in Bosnia has helped the situation somewhat, but more needs to be done. Ending the conflict was important, as that cut out one access point for corruption. Clearly however, that did not weed out all corrupt individuals, as it has still been a problem over the last decade. In fact, “All Balkan countries registered scores of below five on a scale of one to 10 on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ‘indicating that most face serious perceived levels of domestic corruption’” (Kathimerini, 2008). For this reason, it is very important that the EU follow their own guidelines laid out in their comprehensive anti-corruption policy while dealing with Bosnia. Additionally, European integration and future membership may help lessen
the corruption in Bosnia. For example, “progress with public administration reform has been significantly slower in countries without tangible European integration prospects, since their leaders had much weaker incentives to adopt reforms that were usually at odds with the immediate economic and political self-interest” (Pop-Eleches, 2007, pg. 150). If corruption does decline as BiH gets closer to EU membership, there will be continued improvement in the social well-being of its citizens.

Since the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995, the country has had a lot of help in getting back to the place it was prior to the outbreak of the war. Recently, the presence of the EU via EUFOR-ALTHEA has helped to bring peace and stability back to Bosnia. Additionally, the EU has the added tool in Bosnia of being able to pressure reform and improvement of social well-being with the possibility of EU membership. Successful conflict management does increase the chance for long-term well-being. This has been shown in part with this case study, and I will show it with more certainty with the case study on Aceh. For the case of Bosnia though, both the success of ALTHEA and the improvements in social welfare are linked to the fact that Bosnia is so close to the EU, and the EU hopes to have them integrated into the EU as a member state in the near future.

**Democratic Republic of Congo**

*Operation Artemis and EUPOL Kinshasa*

Unlike the case of Bosnia, ESDP operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo have not been very successful in managing and diminishing conflict. Along with showing that this is true, I will also use this case study to present and explain the factors
that have led to this result. Additionally, I hope to show that the problems associated with these operations can be fixed. Ultimately, this analysis of the ESDP operations in the DRC will provide evidence that the EU has at times been to quick and narrow-minded in declaring operations successful, but also that with changes in scope and technique, conflict management in places such as the DRC can be successful.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has been the location of conflict for over a decade. The conflict there has been “described by some as Africa’s first World War” and “has been the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II” (Shah, 2008). When considering this, it is almost no surprise that the United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping efforts there. Of course, considering that there has rarely been peace in the DRC since 1998, a peacekeeping operation may not exactly be effective in bringing about an end to the conflict. In addition to the UN presence however, a number of EU missions have been launched and completed in the DRC. The first, Operation Artemis, lasted from June-September 2003. Another, EUPOL Kinshasa, lasted from April 2005 until June 2007. These operations are similar in that they both had a rather limited focus in the overall context of the situation in the DRC.

The mandate of Artemis was for “stabilizing security conditions and the humanitarian situation, ensuring protection of the airport, of internally displaced people (IDPs), and of civilians and the UN humanitarian personnel” (Martinelli, 2006, pg. 384). All of this was needed and important, however Artemis was only to be carried out in the city of Bunia. Granted, Bunia was a center of the conflict, but the fact that the UN and EU limited the operation in such a way suggests that the EU either did not have the necessary capabilities for a larger, more inclusive mission, or simply did not have the will
for one. As I described in section one, and showed in the case of Bosnia, the EU has shown that they do have the capabilities for large-scale missions. However, unlike EUFOR-ALTHEA where over 6,000 troops were initially deployed, only 1,800 were used for Artemis (Hendrickson et al, 2008). This does suggest that it was more a matter of will than capabilities.

Furthermore, the goals and strategies of Artemis seem to be driven more at protection of civilians than actual resolution of the conflict, which is ultimately what is needed in the DRC. Providing security for government officials and humanitarians should be part of the operation. However, unless the conflict itself is ended, protection alone is not a satisfactory conflict management strategy. “The perennial lack of coordination is still present between CFSP diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction activities supported by the Commission: Operation Artemis in the DRC is, for example, said to have suffered from a 'failure to better link military crisis management with wider peace building’” (Youngs, 2006, pg. 336). Even had operation Artemis achieved all of its stated goals, the situation in Bunia, and the DRC as a whole, would not have been significantly improved.

Similarly, EUPOL Kinshasa was also limited in its potential from the outset. Its mandate was “to monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the academy Centre and according to international best practices in the field” (Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP). There is no doubt that a policing mission was important in the DRC, as some sort of effective civilian police unit is needed there, and rule of law must be established. It is also true that the EU was helpful in providing the DRC with knowledge
in this area. “EUPOL technical advisors are working with officers in the IPU to draft the regulations for the Unit; they assist during patrol operations and they go out in the field with the IPU to provide feedback on shortcomings and difficulties as well as advice on how to overcome them” (Martinelli, 2006, pg. 391). Again however, the fact that it was aimed just at the capital city of Kinshasa misses the fact that the conflict in the DRC was not limited to the cities or urban areas, but much more widespread. "In the remote regions of the DRC, hundreds of girls and women are being brutally raped every day. The perpetrators are rarely held accountable. The global community finally has to insist that the international humanitarian law is also implemented and observed in the most secluded areas of this country," (Malteser International, 2007).

However, there are those who would point out that EUPOL Kinshasa “is an operation intended to address only one of the huge problems that characterizes the situation in the DRC and as such it should not be burdened with excessive expectations” (Martinelli, 2006, pg. 389). While this may indeed be the case, and while EUPOL Kinshasa may have been successful in achieving it’s mandate, in addressing whether or not the EU is effective in conflict management, the entire conflict must be looked at. As Martinelli said, the lack of police was just one of many issues. Therefore, to successfully manage the crisis, these other issues would have to be addressed, which is something the EU did not really do in the DRC.

Unfortunately, the conditions in the DRC show that the conflict has not really been resolved or managed very effectively. “Although the Congolese war officially ended in December 2002 with the signing of a peace accord, fighting and insecurity have continued in large areas of the east of the country. Up to April 2004, a total of 3.9 million
excess deaths had been attributed to the conflict” (Brennan et al, 2006), and since 1998, “regional armed conflict across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has resulted in an estimated 5.4 million deaths, according to a January 2008 report by the non-governmental organization (NGO) International Rescue Committee (IRC)” (USAID, 2008). If these numbers were accurate, then that would mean that even since 2004, while the EU has been present in the region, some 1.5 million people have faced conflict-related deaths. With this in mind, it is hard to say that the EU’s capacity for conflict management has been very high in the DRC, even if individual operations have been somewhat of a success.

Much of the reason for continued conflict in the DRC is that those fighting have not been motivated to stop, or join together. “The failure to demobilize these troops or to integrate them into the army as part of the political transition permitted the confrontation that caused hundreds of civilian deaths” (Grignon and Kroslak, 2008). Additionally, and as stated above, not enough effort has been put into actually bringing about a sustained peace. While having military personal in place for protection, and training police is needed, these activities are designed more for post-conflict situations. When there are still groups willing and wanting to fight, such as in the DRC, other measures are needed. “The UN mission, the EU, and all major embassies were unwilling to decisively pressure the Congolese actors, Kabila in particular, to structure and sustain a reliable and successful political negotiation process, which ultimately is the only way to end such deadly insurgencies” (Grignon and Kroslak, 2008).

It is interesting that this was the case in the DRC, when considering that, “at one gathering of EU special representatives and other senior officials a common view was
that, in light of resource constraints, the EU should focus on containing immediate violent conflict rather than spending money and effort on long term social and political change” (Youngs, 2006, pg. 336). Perhaps it was in part due to hindsight and the fact that the EU’s efforts in the DRC were not producing a real end to the violence that motivated the development of these opinions. The truth of the matter is that while the EU may have declared both operations Artemis and Kinshasa a success, they certainly were not. The mandates of the operations were only good enough to provide a band-aid for a conflict that required much more attention. Fortunately, the political will that seemed to be lacking in 2003 and 2004 when these mission were launched may now be present in the EU. This is evident by the fact that the EU did launch another mission in the DRC, called EUSEC RD Congo. With more in depth goals and a mandate aimed more towards ending fighting, integrating the army and decommissioning arms, there is potential for the EU to make a larger impact. As this mission is still ongoing, and has been stalled at times, whether or not positive results will emerge is yet to be seen. If the EU continues to show a stronger desire for making ESDP function at a level it is capable off, then the EU can be successful conflict management actors, even outside of Europe. They must of course avoid missions such as Kinshasa and Artemis that seemed to have no chance of providing steps toward an end to the conflict in the DRC.

More of the Same in Social ‘Well-Being’

Unlike with Bosnia, the EU operations thus far completed in the DRC should hardly be called a success. As already mentioned, while they may have met operational goals, doing so has not brought about what should be the primary goal of conflict
management, bringing an end to all of the conflict. As such, the DRC has not experienced the secondary pay-off which successful conflict management can bring, an improvement in long term well-being for those where the conflict has taken place. The rest of this case study on the DRC aims to show this fact.

When looking at World Health Organization figures from 2000 and 2006, one can see almost no difference in the well-being of the population. For instance, the adult mortality rate per 1000 people in 2000 was 453, and in 2006 was still at 417, a very minor decrease considering the presence of the EU since 2003. Similarly, death from TB among HIV-negative people per 100,000 actually increased from 63 to 69 between 2000 and 2006, peaking at 72 during than time span. The same lack of improvement during the period of EU involvement in the DRC can be seen in infant mortality rates, incidence of TB, life expectancy, and sanitation.

The operations completed in the DRC have not had a positive effect on the population. In fact, what they were doing in the DRC is similar to what they are doing in Bosnia. The problem is that there are two major differences between the two cases. For one, violent conflict has been resolved in BiH while it clearly has not been in the DRC. This is evident in the fact that conflict has dictated the actions of the government even after the supposed peace treaty in 2002. “Government expenditure was much greater than expected in the second half of 2005 and several times in 2006” partly due to the “lawlessness in the eastern part of the country” (OECD, 2007, pg. 214). The lawlessness referred to likely stems from the “Eastern provinces of Ituri, Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu, which have twice been the seat of rebellions that have plunged the DRC into war, [and] are still the scene of ethnic tension and daily violence” (OECD, 2007, pg. 220). The fact
that the government has to divert or increase spending to deal with this conflict means that other uses for this money are being ignored. The above WHO statistics seem to support this conclusion. Further acknowledgment of this can be seen in the fact that “the fighting in recent years and the dilapidated state of the existing infrastructure have reduced access to drinking water from 37 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2004” (OECD, 2007, pg. 218). Because the government of the DRC (which is now a democratically elected one), and the EU and other third party organizations have not actually ended the conflict itself in the DRC, there has been almost no improvement in social well-being in the last decade, and more importantly, since 2003 when EU operations began there.

Another important difference between the EU efforts in Bosnia and the DRC is the fact that the EU cannot motivate anyone in the DRC with the possibility of EU membership. Within BiH that motivation has certainly helped to maintain the peace and improve social well-being, and had the EU been willing to discuss membership in 1995, it could have helped in the brokering of peace. Unfortunately, this is not a viable option for the EU in their conflict management strategy for the DRC. This reiterates the point that they need to be doing more to bring a complete stop to the violence, as that seems to be one of the most important things they can do which would have a significant effect on the long-term improvement in the DRC.

There are a number of reasons why the EU’s presence has not made a significant impact. As already mentioned, there has been a lack of will and operational failure. An additional issue, which has been more of an obstacle to the EU, is corruption. Like Bosnia and many other war torn countries, the DRC is plagued by corruption, which can
make progress difficult to achieve. “Corruption and mismanagement of natural resources is still a big problem…and Transparency International’s 2006 report ranked the DRC as the sixth most corrupt of 163 countries” (OECD, 2007, pg. 217). Such obstacles can certainly hinder the performance and effect of third party actors, and combined with the presence of violence, the DRC situation as a whole is a difficult one. Still, as has been and will be showed in this essay, the EU does have the skills and capabilities to bring about positive change. The following discussion of the operation in Aceh shows that they are capable of bringing about a peaceful resolution to conflict without violent outbursts to follow. Just as important is the fact that the EU is an economic union with years of experience in multinational trade and cooperation. By working with the government of the DRC, as well as surrounding nations, the EU can help establish solid economic unions in the region. The EU does recognize the benefits of this strategy, and have stated a desire for “establishing a strong relationship with the African Union and sub-regional organisations” (Assembly of WEU, 2007). The combination of utilizing national resources efficiently and working with regional partners could help legitimize economic practices and decrease the amount of corruption.

Thus far, EU operations have not produced many long-term benefits for the DRC. The combination of continued violence and corruption makes it difficult to believe that this will change if things continue on the same course. If however the EU committed themselves to ending the conflict, they could stop the violence, and take a major step towards improving the well-being of the population. An end to conflict should cut off one source of entry for corrupt individuals, as well as give the government more opportunities to focus on the needs of the nation. At that point, it will also be more
feasible to combat the corruption that has already taken root over the decade of fighting. 
Addressing there two issues will ultimately create an opportunity to see improvements in 
all of the areas mentioned above that have virtually been stuck at levels which are 
unacceptable and certainly not indicative of being well.

**Aceh Indonesia**

*AMM-Aceh Monitoring Mission*

The final case study is a clear example of the potential for the EU and ESDP to be 
successful in conflict management. Like the case of the DRC, this operation was 
performed outside of Europe, taking away the carrot of EU membership. However, 
unlike the DRC, this case study shows an EU with a strong political will, and a focused 
strategy capable of ending the conflict and being successful even without being able to 
offer membership into the EU. The Aceh case study is a positive example that the EU 
should build off of and reference when performing ESDP operations.

Aceh is a further example that the EU has been willing to perform ESDP operations 
outside of the European Continent. In this case they played a very important role in the 
resolution of conflicts in the Aceh province of Indonesia. While not as large as the 
conflict in the DRC, Aceh had been the site of political conflicts and fighting between the 
government military forces and Aceh based rebel forces for a number of years prior to 
EU engagement. In addition to being an example of a successful, legitimizing mission 
for the EU, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was a reminder of the larger 
importance that the international community can have in conflict management and 
resolution. Prior to the EU monitored peace, other breaks for peace had been attempted
in Aceh. “A first agreement was signed in May 2000. It focused on a ‘humanitarian pause’ in order to ease dialogue between parties. This potential breakthrough in favour of negotiations failed. Attacks by either sides on the ground did not halt” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 19). Without an outside or international body monitoring the peace, rebels were not willing to hand over their weapons to the government, and neither side could trust the other enough to bring an end to the conflict. It was for this reason that the government and the rebels sought out the EU in 2005 to monitor the forthcoming peace treaty.

While the EU was not actually present for the negotiations of the peace treaty, they took the lead in the post-conflict management, with the help of five ASEAN nations. Unlike some of the other ESDP operations, the AMM had a rather comprehensive mandate and set of goals:

“1. The AMM shall monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the GoI [Government of Indonesia] and the GAM [Free Aceh Movement] pursuant to the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding].

2. In particular, the AMM shall:

   (a) monitor the demobilization of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives;

   (b) monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops;

   (c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;

   (d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in points (a), (b) and (c) above;
(e) monitor the process of legislation change;
(f) rule on disputed amnesty cases;
(g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
(h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties” (Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP)

Compared to policing and humanitarian protection missions, the goals of the AMM were designed much more around the idea of ensuring the end of conflict and the ability for the peace process to play out, which is exactly what monitoring missions should do.

“Assessed against the Concept for EU Monitoring Missions and the subsequent steps towards setting up a real monitoring capacity for ESDP, the AMM measures up well to the outlined objectives and expectations” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 33). Successfully meeting each of these goals should mean that the conflict in Aceh would not continue.

Indeed, the situation in Aceh has been greatly improved since the signing of the peace treaty and the launching and completion of the AMM. It is important to note again that the conflict in Aceh was nowhere near as deadly as that in BiH or the DRC. Still, since 1999, there have been 20,17 battle related deaths in Aceh (Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research) and an estimated “15,000 people died in the conflict during its 30-year duration” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 16). What is most important is how few deaths there have been since the EU got involved in 2005. A “positive trend was that the violence decreased substantially after the peace accord was in place. For the entire 2005 there were 210 battle related deaths but only two of these occurred after the agreement was signed” (Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research). The major decrease in violent
activity is just one sign of the success of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, but this fact along with overall decrease in political tensions between Aceh and the Jakarta government allowed the EU to call this mission a success and leave in 2006.

There are a number of reasons why the ESDP mission in Aceh was a success for the EU and why it should be seen as an example of the EU’s capacity for conflict management. First of all, from early on, there appeared to be a strong political will shown by many within the EU to take a leadership position in Aceh, and get involved quickly after the signing of the peace agreement. Whereas “operations in the DRC, Macedonia and Bosnia all had long lead-in times for planning, and did not constitute prompt responses to crisis” (Youngs, 2006, pgs. 335-336), the AMM was in place just a month after the GoI and GAM signed their agreement. Not only that, but due to informal, non-ESDP activities during that interim month, the AMM was able to transition rather smoothly into operation. “Had a robust IMP [Initial Monitoring Presence] not been in place, it would have been difficult to set up a training course of comparable quality, tailor made for the environment and the goals of the mission” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 24).

This will and desire to get involved in Aceh, which was likely the result of realization that it could potentially help the image of the EU, as well as the fact that they were explicitly sought out by the GoI and GAM, can also explain how the AMM was successful despite the typical problems that the EU runs into when trying to organize ESDP missions. The implementation and running of the Aceh Monitoring Mission “should be welcomed as evidence of the ability to respond to an urgent request for EU intervention, in the absence of the financial and logistical means required for timely
planning and implementation” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 6). Even though the EU entered Indonesia without having a clear idea of how everything would be funded or run, they made it a priority to get involved quickly and accepted the fact that they would have to adapt while they were there. This was extremely important because in such a conflict, a very small spark could potentially reignite the conflict if no one is there to put it out, which the EU was. Additionally, in any conflict management situation, it would be very difficult to be map out the whole course of an operation and follow that through to a successful completion. Because unknown factors can be added, it is important to be able to adapt, and the speed in which the AMM was launched forced the EU to do this, and allowed them to learn how to do this, which will be important for future operations.

These factors allowed for perhaps the most important goal of the operation to be achieved, which was the opening of communications between the rebels and government and the establishment of some trust. “Implementation relies on an efficient monitoring mechanism to overcome the accumulated mistrust of the Acehnese towards Jakarta. In this perspective, the credibility and efficiency of the Aceh Monitoring Mission has been an important as the agreement to stabilize Aceh province” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 20). The effective running of the AMM brought together the two sides, which was the key step in achieving all of the other goals and ensuring the violent conflict was over.

Aside from just ending the conflict, the MoU was designed to allow for some self-determination and integration of Aceh into the government. The terms of the peace agreement required that “a new Law on the Governing of Aceh enter into force not later than 31 March 2006…[which] set the framework for the elections in April 2006.” Furthermore, “the Government of Indonesia has agreed to facilitate the legitimization to
the two Aceh-based political parties” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 27). Due to the efforts of the EU, this and other aspect of the MoU could be realized. “The AMM [had] been organized in such a way as to ensure both a capillary presence in the ground and mobility across the region to ensure the implementation of the MoU” (Braud and Grevi, 2005. pg. 28). Such organization permitted the EU to get a lot accomplished in a relatively short time. Essentially, the true success of the Aceh Monitoring Mission lays in the fact that the EU took on a robust mandate. The previous factors of course helped the EU meet all of these goals, but the fact that the EU identified what was needed to prevent conflict from re-emerging and pursued these issues meant that successfully meeting the missions goals would very likely successfully manage the conflict as a whole, meeting the larger ESDP goals.

Post-Conflict Improvements in Spite of Natural Disaster

Unlike with the cases of BiH and the DRC where violent conflict was probably the largest factor in people’s lives while it was going on, Aceh was in the unfortunate position to have to deal with two crises at once. Prior to EU involvement in bringing about peace in Aceh, the province was one of the hardest hit by the tsunami in December of 2004. Despite the devastation however, Aceh has rebounded, both in the tsunami affected coastal areas with the help of international aid, and those areas plagued by conflict, due to successful efforts of the AMM as mentioned above. In this section I will show how the EU efforts in conflict management have improved the long-term well-being of those affected by the conflict. Particularly, this section shows the changing trends in poverty levels and improvements in infrastructure and services due to the end of
fighting.

The conflict, which had existed in Aceh for decades and had intensified in the years prior to EU involvement, had been very devastating for many people. “Aceh has experienced very low or negative growth rates for most of the past three decades, lagging behind Indonesia and North Sumatra in most years. The main reason for this slower growth was the longstanding conflict affecting the province…As a result, Aceh has poverty levels well above those seen in most other regions in Indonesia” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 8). In addition to negative effects on poverty, “the conflict also impacted the physical infrastructure, in particular the road network and social services such as health and education” (WFP Post-Tsunami Emergency Needs Assessment, 2005, pg. 12), and “is likely to have been a contributing factor to the high morbidity levels in Aceh” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 47). Similarly to Bosnia and the DRC, conflict had led to more than just violence and death, but an overall decrease in the quality of daily life for the people of Aceh.

Fortunately, the post-conflict period has seen improvements in the well-being of those previously affected by the conflict. Where conflict had previously been a very large factor contributing to poverty, this trend has decreased of late. “In 2004, households in conflict areas were 29 percent more likely to be poor. This relative difference increased to 43 percent in 2005 but had disappeared in 2006 possibly suggesting that benefits from the end of conflict are beginning to emerge in those areas as well” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 16). Additionally, improvements in health and education can be witnessed in Aceh, particularly for those who were displaced by the conflict.

One significant reason for these improvements is directly related to the end of the
conflict and the peace agreement made between the Acehnese and Jakarta. With the continued decentralization and autonomy that Aceh was given after the peace settlement, the local government is much more in control of decision-making and resources. This is significant when considering that, “Aceh received an unprecedented amount of assistance from the Indonesian government and the international community, estimated at about US$7.5 billion over a period of five years” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 9). While much of this was funding was a result of the tsunami, in actuality the local government has control of these resources, which means they can also go use in improving the lives of those who lived in the conflict ridden sections of Aceh. It has already been shown that the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the EU’s ESDP operation in Indonesia, was very successful and can be seen as a great example of the EU’s peacemaking, and conflict management capabilities. In addition to having the direct effect of drastically reducing violence and decommissioning arms to prevent future conflict, it can also be seen that the success of the operation has the secondary effect of improving the long-term well-being of those in Aceh.

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<th>ESDP affects on Human Welfare</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Aceh</th>
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<td>1. Potential EU membership, which would bring economic benefits.</td>
<td>Lack of successful operations has translated into having no improvements in human welfare.</td>
<td>1. Decreases in poverty and significant drop in likelihood of becoming poor.</td>
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<td>3. Maintenance of improved well-being achieved prior to EU involvement (i.e. Increased GNI and decrease in infectious disease)</td>
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Evaluation and Potential of the EU and ESDP

It is very clear that the EU has embarked on a path towards becoming a major player in global security and would like to be involved in dealing with crisis situations both in Europe and abroad. By effectively handling these situations, the international community can not only bring about and maintain an end to conflict, but help countries or regions of the world prosper. The major question of course is whether or not the EU can actually live up to its’ own expectations and positively add to conflict management. From analyzing the various ESDP operations and attempts at conflict management in Bosnia, the DRC and Aceh, as well the looking at the EU’s capabilities in terms of conflict management, it does seem that the EU has the capacity to effectively involve themselves in conflict situations.

What the analyses show, is that in order to maintain a peaceful situation, the EU has to use their resources towards pursuing strategies such as integrating rebels in society, decommissioning arms, and monitoring to ensure peace treaties are upheld. This means that they will have to set out with more objectives in mind than is evident from past missions such as EUPOL Kinshasa or Operation Artemis in the DRC. In future cases that may be similar to the DRC, the EU must first deal with putting an end to the violence before trying to improve and change institutions. Given the improved tools of the EU, they should be better equipped to do this now than they were in their initial efforts in Bosnia for example. Once these conditions are met, the EU can use the example of their post-conflict successes in Aceh to maintain a lasting peace, and then attempt policing efforts where needed.

Furthermore, the improved conditions in BiH and Aceh, Indonesia, in contrast to
the continuing poor conditions in the DRC shows a correlation between the success of conflict management attempts and long-term well-being in the countries where they are taking place. Of course, success cannot just be measured in meeting the goals of an operation, unless the stated goals include bringing about, or maintaining an end to violence. As long as violence and the negative consequences of violence persist, such as corruption and displacement of people, it is unlikely that a population can see much long-term improvement in their lives, no matter what else a government does.

I do believe that CFSP and ESDP will continue to function and be successful into the future. One reason for this is the presence of Javier Solana. Not only does he himself seem extremely committed to maintaining an active foreign policy, but he also is the type of leader who can convince others. This will be important when attempting to receive resources from member states for ESDP operations. Also, given the fact that a number of operations have been very successful, I find it unlikely that the EU will back away from ESDP in the near future. If the EU as a whole continues to be as steadfast as Solana himself, and they work off of their past successes and learn from mistakes, I see no reason why they cannot be even more effective in future operations.

At this point the EU has had success in all types of individual operations, be they monitoring, policing or military. What has tarnished their overall capacity for conflict management has been the fact that while operations may be a success, the actual conditions in some of the countries they are in have not improved greatly. As long as the EU commits to strategies and designs mandates that will actually prevent the further breakout of violence, which they are capable of doing given their military, civilian and economic resources, they will have the capacity for effective conflict management.
Therefore, the future success of CFSP and ESDP, and the EU’s foreign policy as whole, rests largely in Brussels. If there is a willingness to do what it takes to be successful in the future, then the EU has the ability to be successful.
Works Cited


