

Migration Management and Development Policy
Issue-Linkage in European Union External Relations

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	5
2. Background	7
2.1. The Rise of Migration as a Subject of Political Contestation and as a Foreign Policy Priority in the European Union	7
2.2. Senegal as a non-EU Partner Country Case Study	12
3. Literature Review	15
3.1. Issue-Linkage and EU External Governance	15
3.2. The Migration-Development Nexus	21
3.3. The Securitization of Development	23
4. Research Design	26
5. Section A: Migration and Development Issue-Linkage within EU Governance .	28
5.1. The EU's Soft Law Framework for Migration Management	28
5.2. Divergence Among EU Institutions on the Issue-Linkage of Migration and Development	32
5.3. Parliamentary Scrutiny	34
6. Section B: The Impact of Issue-Linkage on Development Objectives	37
6.1. Introduction	37
6.2. Funding Allocation, Project Design and Implementation	39
6.3. Evaluating Conditionality and Securitization in the Migration- Development Nexus	46
6.4. Evaluating the Role of the EU as a Development Actor and Alternatives to Foreign Aid within Issue-Linkage	50
7. Section C: The Impact of Issue-Linkage on Migration Management Objectives	52
7.1. Legal Migration	53
7.2. Human Rights	55
7.3. Identification and Readmission	57
8. Conclusion	60
9. Bibliography	63
10. Appendixes	69

“La migration bouleverse les grands principes de l’État.”

“Migration uproots the fundamental principles of the State.”

Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017

1. Introduction

Federica Mogherini, High Representative and Vice-President of the EU Commission, in November 2015 summarized the European Union's approach to the migration management negotiations taking place in Valletta (Malta) between European and African leaders as:

“The only way of managing this phenomenon is by doing this together, building cooperation and building common instruments.”¹

The African-European 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration consolidated migration as a priority for EU-African cooperation on trade, security, and development. The Summit announced new cooperation instruments to formally link the management of migration flows with development policy, in an effort to delineate a comprehensive approach to migration aimed at reducing irregular flows and tackling the “root causes” of displacement through development initiatives. Mogherini's remarks (above) encapsulate the shift in rhetoric within EU institutions to discuss the European Union's supranational approach to migration in its external relations. European leaders set out to establish a “more for more” approach to migration management and development policy issue-linkage within the EU's growing network of partnerships with its neighboring countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, which include new development funding instruments, political platforms, and diplomatic visits.

¹ EU Commission, (2015). “Federica Mogherini on Valletta: Together is the Key Word of This Summit”.

After the increase in the European Union's interest in working with non-EU countries of migrant origin and transit to jointly tackle migration and development challenges, disagreements however persist with regards to the underlying premises and preliminary outcomes of the new issue-linkage instruments. During an interview at the Open Society Initiative for West Africa in Dakar (Senegal), the NGO's staff members working on EU-Senegal cooperation were skeptical as to the EU's commitment to interlacing migration management and development goals: "Our priorities are not the same ones."²

This study will examine the extent to which African and European goals diverge with respect to the use of migration as an instrument for development and economic growth. I use Senegal as a case study, which is one of the European Union's 16 priority partner countries for migration management cooperation.³ I bring to bear expert interviews at EU institutions and in Senegalese institutions to examine the increase in the EU's externalization of migration management and its linkage to development policy.

The objectives of this investigation are the following. First, I will aim to establish to what extent the issue-linkage of migration and development in EU external relations is the result of existing EU governance structures and policy path dependence. Section A will therefore analyze the self-reinforcing relationship between EU supranational governance limitations and the choice of issue-linkage as a policy instrument for the externalization of migration management. Secondly, Section B and Section C will evaluate the impacts of issue-linkage on development cooperation and migration management. To what extent has the interlacing of EU development policy with migration management led to goal displacement within the two linked policy

² Interview, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017

³ **Sixteen non-EU partner countries of priority focus:** Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

spheres? Section B will evaluate to what extent development cooperation goals have been displaced for the European Union and for non-EU partner countries. Section C will evaluate to what extent issue-linkage has led to the displacement of migration management objectives for the European Union and for non-EU partner countries. This research contributes to the newly emerging discussion on the long-term consequences of the EU's current short-term security priority of reducing irregular migration.

2. Background

2.1 The Rise of Migration as a Subject of Political Contestation and as a Foreign Policy

Priority in the European Union


In conjunction with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the destabilization of Libya in 2011, migration flows towards Europe started to increase on the Eastern Mediterranean route through Turkey and Greece and on the Central Mediterranean route through Libya and Italy. Between 2012 and 2015, EU member states collectively observed a 294.53% increase in asylum applications.⁴ Moreover, migration flows across the Mediterranean have been of mixed nature and include political refugees⁵ as well as people commonly defined as “economic migrants.”⁶

⁴ Europol, (2017). Dataset: “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex”, Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza] (accessed 18.01.2018)

⁵ According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a **refugee** is classified as someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”⁶

When considering the increase in migration flows across the Mediterranean, we must note that the European Union currently hosts only 6% of the world's displaced population. The European migration crisis should therefore be contextualized within the global economic and political pressures generated by the worldwide increase in forced displacement and economic migration. Also, consider that migration is not a unidirectional flow towards Europe as often presented in these studies and in EU documents and rhetoric – it goes in all directions and occurs at national, regional and continental levels. Despite the comparative contextualization of the EU's migration pressures, the percentage change in asylum applications and economic migration towards EU Member States is still generally regarded as a pertinent exogenous shock to EU policy-making, and will therefore be considered as such for the purposes of this study.

Graph 1: Asylum Application in EU-28 Member States



Source: Europol, Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants Dataset, 2017.

⁶ The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants defines a **migrant** as "any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country."

In addition to the rise in asylum applications to EU Member States, the politicization of migration and the electoral successes of right-wing populist parties in national elections have rendered migration a key subject of political contestation in domestic politics, and this has spilled over into the EU intergovernmental arena. As an official at the DG of International Migration and Italians Abroad at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “Elections are won and elections are lost over these issues.”⁷

As migration became a salient issue of political contestation in EU member states’ domestic politics, the demand for a response from the European Union increased. A press coverage report prepared for the United Nations High Commission of Refugees confirmed that newspapers in continental Europe overwhelmingly reported that the European Union’s response to the migrant crisis was widely seen as inadequate, yet it was still considered the primary institution responsible for solving the crisis.⁸

The divergence between electorate expectations and the EU’s response to the migrant crisis highlights the difficulty of achieving domestic migration reform. Three factors hinder EU internal reform on migration and asylum: (1) the incomplete integration of migration management competences at an EU supranational level, (2) the persistence of intergovernmental bargaining for national security interests, and (3) the politicization of migration in domestic and continental political discourse. Efforts to reform the Dublin Regulation and the Common European Asylum System so far have therefore stagnated, even while the EU’s pursuit of its foreign policy agenda has overall seemed to advance. In an interview at the DG for European Union External Relations at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when asked about Italy’s role

⁷ Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG for International Migration and Italians Abroad, Rome, 13.07.2017

⁸ Berry, M., Garcia-Blanc, I., and Moore, K. (2015). Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries, Report prepared for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (December 2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf> (accessed 01.02.2018)

in advancing EU migration legislation that focused on foreign policy rather than domestic reform for relocation⁹ and resettlement,¹⁰ Italian authorities answered: “The more we ask for internally, the more they give us externally.”¹¹

As domestic reform efforts continue to be a challenge for EU policy-makers, migration has become a key factor in structuring EU foreign relations. In 2015, with the publishing of the *European Agenda on Migration*,¹² migration was permanently introduced as a stated priority in EU foreign policy. In a 2016 memo entitled *EU Migration Policy at a Glance*, the European External Action Service, the diplomatic service and foreign and defense ministry of the European Union, outlined the centralization of migration in EU foreign policy:

“Migration management will become an important dimension in the EU’s foreign policies and instruments, ranging from diplomacy and Common Security and Defence Policy, to development and climate.”¹³

At the African-European Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015, cooperation instruments to tackle the “root causes” of migration were established. The Valletta Action Plan outlined five common pillars among African and European leaders to jointly tackle migration management

⁹ **Relocation:** the distribution among Member States of persons in clear need of international protection. (European Agenda on Migration, EU Commission, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52015DC0240>)

¹⁰ **Resettlement:** the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, on submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in agreement with the country of resettlement, from a third country to a Member State, where they will be admitted and granted the right to stay and any other rights comparable to those granted to a beneficiary of international protection. (European Agenda on Migration, EU Commission <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52015DC0240>)

¹¹ Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG for European Union External Relations, Rome, 07.07.2017

¹² EU Commission, (2015). European Agenda on Migration, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (Accessed 21.08.2017)

¹³ European External Action Service, (2016). *EU Migration Policy at a Glance*, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/1_eu_migration_policy_at_glance_-_fact_sheet_2016.pdf (accessed 18.01.2018)

and development cooperation (see associated footnote).¹⁴ Within development and migration issue-linkage, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was inaugurated as a financial instrument for the allocation of development funding to address the “root causes” of migration flows. Lastly, a year after the conclusion of the Valletta Summit, the EU Migration Partnership Framework was launched in 2016 to enhance bilateral cooperation with five African partner countries (Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ethiopia). The bilateral framework “proposes to frame the relations with partner countries through compacts, tailor-made to the specific circumstances of the partner countries and making full use of the broad range of policies at the European Union’s disposal.”¹⁵ This study examines these cooperation instruments in terms of their implications for development policy and migration management relations.

In addition to the formal centralization of migration in the EU’s external relations and the introduction of new issue-linkage instruments, the increased salience of migration is also reflected in the daily operations within EU institutions, as confirmed during an interview at the EU Commission DG for Development and International Cooperation:

“With the new partnership framework, [migration] became one of the central aspects in EU external policy and also in the development work that we are doing. Before it was one of many sectors. Now, it is always taken into account where a country stands in terms of migration management and where the EU is meeting that country. This is something that is now systematically looked at.”¹⁶

The introduction and subsequent centralization migration in EU foreign policy and external relations can therefore be understood as well established.

¹⁴ **The Five Pillars of the Valletta Action Plan:** 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement // 2. Legal migration and mobility // 3. Protection and asylum // 4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings // 5. Return, readmission and reintegration

¹⁵ European External Action Service, (2016). EU Migration Policy at a Glance.
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/1_eu_migration_policy_at_glance_-_fact_sheet_2016.pdf
 (accessed 18.01.2018)

¹⁶ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

2.2 Senegal as a Non-EU Partner Country Case Study

Within the EU's external relations for migration management, Senegal is one of the sixteen countries of priority focus and one of the five countries that signed the Migration Partnership Framework with the EU in 2016. Senegal serves as this investigation's partner country case study because of its cooperation history with the EU, its heterogeneity in migration flows, and its recent national migration policy developments.

As for their cooperation history, the EU and Senegal have been working jointly on development policy for approximately 50 years, in what officials at the EU Delegation to Senegal currently consider "an excellent relationship with Senegalese authorities."¹⁷ Specifically with regards to joint migration management, Senegal has a close working relationship with Spain and the European Union due to the 2005 surge in Senegalese migration flows towards Spain's Canary Islands. The EU's renewed interest in cooperating with Senegal for migration management as a result of the Libyan and Central Mediterranean crisis, but in the absence of a significant spike in Senegalese migration numbers (see Table 1), is noteworthy. With a budget of €161.8 million, Senegal is the largest beneficiary of development funding from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Under the Migration Partnership Framework, EU funding finances nine development projects across Senegal ranging from employment creation and food security in regions of high emigration potential, to diaspora investment facilitation and the setup of a national biometric identification system (See Appendix A for the full list of projects, funding allocation, and implementation partners).

¹⁷ Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017

Senegal is known for the heterogeneity of its migration flows. A country of migration origin, transit, and destination, Senegalese authorities work to tackle migration from a variety of perspectives and interested parties, among which the EU is also included. Beauchemin, Sakho, Schoumaker, and Flahaux (2014) summarize survey data collected by the MAFE project (Migration between Africa and Europe) and show that, between 1975 and 2008, there was neither an emigration surge from Senegal (despite the widespread belief in an African invasion in Europe in the early 2000s) nor the decline that should have been expected if restrictions had been effective.¹⁸ Table 1 summarizes data from the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix for the top nine countries of destination for Senegalese emigration (countries are ranked based on the 2013 data) and highlights the relative position of the top three European destinations, France, Italy, and Spain. While no time series data was available, the data from the 2010 and the 2013 Bilateral Migration Matrices are compared, showing that there was no discernable pattern in Senegalese emigration trends between 2010 and 2013. With its mixed nature of immigration and emigration flows, Senegal is therefore a provocative case study when evaluating the premises and outcomes of the EU's increased action for migration management with non-EU partner countries.

¹⁸ Beauchemin, C., Sakho, P., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M. (2014). New Patterns of Migration between Senegal and Europe. *MAFE Working Paper*, Vol 21. <https://www.imi-n.org/publications/new-patterns-of-migration-between-senegal-and-europe> (accessed 18.03.2018)

Table 1. Senegalese Emigration - Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010 and 2013

Destination Country	2010 - Number of Senegalese Migrants	2013 - Number of Senegalese Migrants	Difference between 2010 and 2013
France	91,446	115,393	Increase
The Gambia	177,306	100,736	Decrease
Italy	81,424	79,102	Decrease
Spain	51,672	57,450	Increase
Mauritania	64,557	45,775	Decrease
Gabon	21,959	29,057	Increase
Cote d'Ivoire	33,250	21,359	Decrease
United States	16,745	13,173	Decrease
Mali	11,895	12,310	Increase
World	636,633	540,363	Decrease

Lastly, in terms of domestic migration policy and developments, the Senegalese government is currently strengthening its national approach to migration management. Migration is already incorporated in the *Plan Sénégal Émergent (PES)*, President Macky Sall's policy framework aimed at getting Senegal on the road to development by 2035.¹⁹ Senegal's migration agenda has therefore taken a strong orientation towards the migration-development nexus. For example, an official at the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium underscored the role of Senegalese youth in the country's development and the subsequent "priority of Senegalese authorities to maintain young people at home."²⁰ Furthermore, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning is currently heading a shared institutional effort to draft the *Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal*, Senegal's national policy framework for migration management. Senegal's domestic migration policy developments are relevant when evaluating its foreign policy relations, its state agency, and its national interests when working with the EU for migration management. Van Criekinge (2010) in fact argues that the EU's need for strategic cooperation in migration

¹⁹ Presidency of the Republic of Senegal, *Plan Sénégal Émergent*, <http://www.presidence.sn/en/pse> (accessed 14.03.2018)

²⁰ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium and the EU, Brussels, 28.06.2017

management has increased Senegal's negotiation leverage to direct policies and development programming closer to its own national interests.²¹ Overall, Senegal therefore presents a case study for the issue-linkage migration and development in EU external relations that is historically, demographically, and strategically complex.

3. Literature Review

In order to analyze EU-Senegal migration management relations, I firstly draw from EU external governance and policy issue-linkage literature. Secondly, the study situates EU migration governance within the two international relations debates on the linkage of migration to the policy areas of development and security: the migration-development nexus for the former, and the securitization of development cooperation for the latter.

3.1 Issue-Linkage and EU External Governance

Issue linkage characterizes the practice whereby decision-makers tie one foreign policy area to another.²² Poast (2013) defines issue linkage as “the simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement” and “a bargaining tactic that (1) increases the probability of states reaching a negotiated agreement and (2) motivates states to remain committed to an agreement.” While issue-linkage can be used as an incentive or disincentive for cooperation and short-term

²¹ Van Criekinge, T. (2010). The EU-Africa migration partnership: a case study of the EU's migration dialogue with Ghana and Senegal. In: *EUI Migration Working Group*, March 2010, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

²² Buchanan P., 2012. “Analytic Brief: Issue Linkage in Foreign Policy”, Posted in *Analysis Assessment, Geopolitics, Politics, Rotate, Weekly Assessment*, December 19th, 2012. Link: <https://36th-parallel.com/2012/12/19/analytic-brief-issue-linkage-in-foreign-policy/> (accessed 18.01.2018)

agreements, it also informs long-term strategy for policy formation and implementation. Issue-linkage is often observed in security and trade: preferential trade agreements will regularly contain human-rights clauses (Hafner-Burton, 2005), while many security alliances are accompanied by trade concessions (Poast, 2013).

The concept of issue-linkage has been introduced in EU external governance to examine the interdependence of policy spheres and agendas. In order to understand the choice and the use of issue-linkage in the EU's external relations, we firstly consider the contrasting theories framing the EU's pursuit of external governance relations.

Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) conceptualize EU external governance as the expansion of the scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. They claim that differing theories can shed light on how the EU is able to expand its rules to the external environment. Institutional theories emphasize the role of policy legacies in shaping future policy, and power-based theories emphasize the bargaining position of the European Union within the international system and in relation to the partner country that it seeks to cooperate with.²³

The notion of policy legacies is central in historical institutionalism. Paul Pierson (2000) argues that political scientists must think critically about the role of time and history in policy analysis. Models of path dependency identify positive feedback loops as responsible for ensuring the consistency of institutional arrangements. The large set-up and fixed costs that are required for new policy paths, the learning and coordination effects, as well as the principle of adaptive expectations, all contribute to the persistency of institutional set-up and outcomes. Pierson therefore argues that “bounded change” takes place until shock episodes, called critical junctures,

²³ Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance”. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16:6, 791-812, DOI: [10.1080/13501760903087696](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903087696)

are able to spur a policy break.²⁴ North (1990) explains that while path dependence should not be considered as an inevitability principle, it can be used to conceptually narrow choice sets and link decision making over time.²⁵

Pierson's path dependency framework provides a useful hook to understand how migration might be linked to other foreign policy areas. Migration's new role at the forefront of EU foreign policy engagement in Africa and the Middle East enters a pre-existing framework of historical colonial legacies, development aid models within the international financial system shaped by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and well-rooted international cooperation mechanisms within EU external relations. The issue-linkage of migration to other policy spheres would therefore be considered a path dependent insertion of migration in EU external relations.

Power-based theories instead focus on the position of the European Union within international frameworks and bargaining regimes. In this view, external governance responds to external structures of power and interdependence. The bargaining power of the EU determines whether EU rules (rather than other rules) are selected, and whether these rules will be adopted and applied.²⁶ On the other hand, Van Crieking (2010) argues that the EU's need for strategic cooperation in migration management has given some African governments, including Senegal, a new scope for influencing the EU and getting their demands met. The increased importance of migration in Senegal's relations with Europe has allowed the government to use migration as a

²⁴ Pierson, P. (2000). "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251-267. Doi:10.2307/2586011

²⁵ North, D. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁶ Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig F., (2009).

negotiation “instrument” by soliciting closer cooperation in exchange for shifting policies closer to its own national interests.²⁷

Whether informed by policy legacies or induced by power, we now consider how the European Union has come to embrace issue-linkage as its primary approach to international cooperation for migration management.

A key point of departure is that the EU cannot be considered a unitary and hierarchical actor. As Sandra Lavenex (2014) puts it, the EU operates as a “conglomerate of loosely coupled sectoral regimes” that leverage transgovernmental networks and international organizations to catalyze new mechanisms of regulatory extension.²⁸

One implication is that the EU is often compelled to resort to softer approaches that rely on socialization and transgovernmental networking. Issue-linkage is often applied when policy conditionality mechanisms are weak or absent and cannot therefore facilitate effective policy transfer. Lavenex (2014) shows that the EU’s leverage is reduced when it finds itself in a demander position. For example, the EU suffered limits to its bargaining power when negotiating migration policy with Morocco because it depended on non-EU partner countries for the implementation of migration controls.²⁹ When attempts to devise traditional conditionality strategies fail, Lavenex (2014) argues that the EU Commission turns towards socialization and transgovernmental networking with partner countries. Within the realm transgovernmental networking, issue-linkage figures as an increasingly utilized strategy.

²⁷ Van Criekinge, T. (2010). The EU-Africa migration partnership: a case study of the EU's migration dialogue with Ghana and Senegal. In: *EU Migration Working Group*, March 2010, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

²⁸ Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(6), 885-903. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.910818

²⁹ Wunderlich, D. (2010). Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco, *Mediterranean Politics*, 15:2, 249-272, DOI: [10.1080/13629395.2010.485052](https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2010.485052)

Ramona Coman (2015) points out another limitation to hierarchical EU policymaking: politicization. Coman argues that when politicization raises the pressure for a supranational EU policy response but EU member states do not delegate more hierarchical powers, the European Commission applies a network approach to seek new policy methods and solutions.³⁰ When institutional legitimacy is questioned in times of crisis, new policy tools and modes of governance emerge to overcome the structural limitations of incomplete supranational authority. Migration policy is an example of the EU's supranational deficiencies, since member states prefer to maintain sovereignty over legal migration and visa approvals. In Coman's framework, the incomplete integration of migration policy sovereignty at a supranational level in a context of high politicization is a contributive factor to the EU Commission's network approach to external negotiations, explaining the increase in the use of issue-linkage strategies.

Thirdly, the absence of an international framework for the management of migration further explains the EU's utilization of issue-linkage in external governance. Internationally, there is no coherent legal framework, no hard rule of law on migration, no single authoritative actor, but rather a patchwork of soft law developed by diverse international organizations. In 2010, the International Labour Organization (ILO) highlighted the need for an international regime for migration management based on the rule of law in order to establish accountability, shared parameters, reporting and monitoring mechanisms.³¹ The ILO states "While many elements of migration policy will certainly remain in the domain of individual states, there is a clear need for more multilateral efforts in governing migration".³²

³⁰ Coman, R. (2015). Strengthening the Rule of Law at the Supranational Level: The Rise and Consolidation of a European Network. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 24(1), 171-188. doi:10.1080/14782804.2015.1057482

³¹ International Labour Organization, (2010). *International Labour Migration: A Rights-Based Approach*. Geneva, International Labour Office. Page 193.

³² International Labour Organization, (2010).

Alexander Betts (2011) defines global migration governance as a “fragmented tapestry” of institutions at the bilateral, regional, inter-regional, and multilateral levels. Rather than a “top-down” multilateral framework, a variety of international organizations, states, and non-state actors are building a “bottom-up” global migration governance framework.³³ Within this tapestry, the 1951 UNHCR Convention on the Status of Refugees establishes the global refugee protection regime and is arguably the strongest instrument for cooperation on migration. Secondly, treaties promoted by the International Labor Organization underpin a range of labor standards regulating international labor migration. Additionally, the *International Organization for Migration*, despite not being a UN agency, has grown rapidly since the 1990s into the most prominent international organization dealing with migration issues. Lastly, state actors such as the United States, EU member states, as well as the supranational European Union often exhibit agenda-setting power with regards to international migration and visa policy.

The lack of a unitary international legal regime for migration management, alongside the previously discussed increase in technocratic and loosely associated methods for EU external governance, help illuminate why the EU has turned to issue-linkage as a strategy for managing the politicized issue of migration. Migration policy overlaps with trade, security and development policy in EU external relations. Our focus here is on the migration-development nexus.

³³ Betts, A. (2012). *Global migration governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 2.

3.2 The Migration-Development Nexus

First coined in 2002, the term “migration-development nexus” explores the positive dimensions of linking migration and development. Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen (2002) argue that migration can be a “development resource” by highlighting the significance of remittances, labour movements, and human capital development for the domestic economic growth of a country of migrant origin. The authors therefore argue in favor of migration and development issue-linkage because migration can be utilized to catalyze development. Within issue-linkage, they also address the risk of policy divergence between migration and development: “Can long-term goals of global poverty reduction be achieved if short-term migration policy interests are to be met? Can partnership with developing countries be real if tackling illegal migration is the principal European policy goal?”³⁴

According to Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, cooperation efforts should place the human rights of individual migrants and the development of countries of migrant origin at the center of newly negotiated agreements. This, according to the authors, is essential to successfully link migration and development policy. The United Nations also sets guidelines that connect development to other policy fields. In its 2002 report, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development accepted that development assistance could be useful in reducing extreme poverty and attaining sustainable human development in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), but only if it is combined with other external inputs like increased policy autonomy, development-oriented poverty reduction strategies, and improved governance.³⁵

³⁴ Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Engberg-Pedersen, P., & Hear, N. V. (2002). The Migration-Development Nexus. *IOM Migration Research Series*. doi:10.18356/e48ad218-en

³⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (2002). The Least Developed Countries Report: Escaping the Poverty Trap. http://unctad.org/en/docs/lcd2002_en.pdf (accessed 27.04.2018)

However, when evaluating the role of external actors such as the EU in the migration-development nexus, it is important to interrogate the premises of “development agendas”. Extensive literature disputes the overall effectiveness of foreign aid and the historically produced discourse of “development”. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar (2012) argues that in the post-World War II period, Western economic and governance models were presented as the long-term goals of development programming and that “development has achieved the status of certainty in the social imaginary”.³⁶ Kenyan-American human rights scholar Makau Mutua (2013) interrogates the interests of foreign donor governments in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). When evaluating the international funding for human rights NGOs in Kenya during the country’s precarious wave of democratization, he notes “donor funding is essentially the story of the historically managed development of the African state.”³⁷

With a specific focus on the role of development in migration policy, authors Delgado Wise, Márquez Covarrubias, and Puentes (2013) argue that when the issue-linkage of migration and development is realized primarily through aid programs, these also overlook the realm of neoliberal globalization and unequal development in which contemporary migration is embedded. They suggest that the current development aid packages aimed at tackling migration’s root causes conceptually involve a one-way flow between two variables: development (seen as an independent variable) and migration (seen as a dependent variable).³⁸ The goal of stemming migration flows by realizing an external development agenda in countries of migrant origin is therefore argued as flawed.

³⁶ Escobar, A. (2012). *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Page 5.

³⁷ Mutua, M. (2013). *Human Rights NGOs in East Africa Political and Normative Tensions*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Page 158.

³⁸ Delgado-Wise, R., Márquez Covarrubias H., and Puentes R. (2013). Reframing the Debate on Migration, Development and Human Rights. *Population, Space, and Place*. Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 430-43.

3.3 The Securitization of Development

The concept of “securitization” was introduced in the study of international relations by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde at the Copenhagen School. “Securitization” delineates a process through which policy choices unrelated to security become “securitized” when actors attach a national security value to them and can therefore treat them through exceptional means. Thierry Balzacq (2005) defines securitization as: “a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion.”³⁹

Since the Cold War, securitization has affected the allocation and implementation of official development assistance (ODA), giving rise to the notion of “securitization of development”. Brown and Grävingholt (2016) define ODA “a major arena in the emerging global governance architecture.”⁴⁰ The issue of ODA instrumentalization was brought to the wider public attention in Western countries after the covert militarization of development in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Furthermore, concerns as to the securitization of ODA exist not only for the intentions of donor governments, but also in regard to the agendas of the governments that are receiving development aid. Fisher and Anderson (2010) problematized the role of governments in Africa that have embraced the securitization agenda and actively promoted its practice, citing

³⁹ Balzacq, T. (2005). "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp. 171 – 201, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960>

⁴⁰ Brown, S. and Grävingholt, J. (2016). *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Page 4.

⁴¹ Fisher, J. and Anderson, D. M. (2015), Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa. *International Affairs*, 91: 131-151. doi:[10.1111/1468-2346.12190](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12190)

the Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes' use of Western security initiatives since the 1990s to build militarized and strongly authoritarian states.⁴²

A security lens is therefore necessary to inform our analysis of the EU's issue-linkage of development and migration in its relations with Senegal and other countries of priority focus. In line with the Copenhagen School's securitization critique, Lavenex and Kunz (2008) introduce the persistence of security priorities as a limitation to the EU's stated objective of promoting the migration-development nexus in its foreign relations. The authors argue that while the EU has changed its rhetoric and is now embracing the linkage of migration and development programs, it has not yet implemented concrete policies that are consistent with the stated shift in outlook. For example, in analyzing the EU's policy response to the Ceuta and Melilla migration tensions between Spain and Morocco in 2005 and 2006, Lavenex and Kunz (2008) argue that the EU's approach was motivated primarily by security concerns instead of development objectives.⁴³ EU migration management therefore remains centered on the security priorities of the European migrant-receiving countries, resulting in the utilization of development instruments to supplement migration policy objectives in EU external relations.

Indeed, Europe's concerns with security seem to displace Europe's concerns with development. Baggio and Zanfrini (2006) also identify the securitization of migration as an impediment to constructive migration and development issue-linkage in international cooperation efforts. They argue that this is because the primary stated goal of migration policy in almost all developed countries is fighting irregular migration.⁴⁴ The *European Agenda for*

⁴² Fisher, J. and Anderson, D. M. (2015).

⁴³ Lavenex, S. and Kunz R. (2008) The Migration–Development Nexus in EU External Relations, *Journal of European Integration*, 30:3, 439-457, DOI: [10.1080/07036330802142152](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330802142152)

⁴⁴ Baggio, F. and Zanfrini, L. (2006). *Migration management and ethics: Envisioning a different approach*. Monza: Polimetrica. Page 65.

Migration, published by the EU Commission in 2015, also states the control of irregular migration as its central objective.

In a cooperative project across universities in Paris, Brussels, and Dakar analyzing African and European migration trends, Beauchemin, Kabbanji, Sakho and Schoumaker (2013) identify the primacy of security in European border management and control objectives, and accordingly argue that diplomacy between African and European leaders is centered on European readmission demands.⁴⁵ The external focalization of EU diplomatic efforts is aimed at formalizing new migration control policies. While the link between migration and development was introduced only recently in the Euro-African political agenda, the authors believe that the European historical priority for the securitization of migration policy remains central and prevents the effective issue-linkage of migration to other governance areas. Lastly, authors Keukeleire and Raube (2013) take the securitization debate one step further by identifying the concept of “security-development nexus”, arguing that the EU also uses development money to improve security structures in third countries and to fund security activities through other actors.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Beauchemin, C., Kabbanji, L., Sakho, P., and Schoumaker, B. (2013). *Migrations africaines: Le codéveloppement en questions; essai de démographie politique*. Paris: Colin. Page 10.

⁴⁶ Keukeleire, S. and Raube K. (2013) The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26:3, 556-572, DOI: [10.1080/09557571.2013.822851](https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.822851)

4. Research Design

The study draws evidence from expert interviews conducted between May and July 2017. I use qualitative data from interviews with EU policy officials in Brussels (Belgium) and Dakar (Senegal) representing the following EU institutions: the EU Commission Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the EU Commission Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the EU Parliament's Committee on Development, the European External Action Service, the EU Delegation to Senegal and HRVP Federica Mogherini's Cabinet. At the national level, interviews were conducted in Italian institutions, including the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and at the Italian Embassy to Senegal. Italy serves as the EU-member state of reference because of its significant involvement on the frontline of Europe's migrant crisis and because of its policy-driving role within the EU for the set-up of migration instruments, such as the drafting of the Migration Partnership Framework. On the Senegalese side, interviews concerning the non-EU partner country case study included the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finances and of Planning, the Senegalese Embassies to Belgium and to Italy, and the African Union Delegation to the European Union. Interview data also draws from non-governmental actors and the civil society sector, encompassing NGOs, think tanks, foundations, and academics.

Because approaches to migration management are affected by an actor's relative location and physical proximity to the crisis, the interview methodology was designed to engage with EU, Senegalese, and Italian actors across all three countries (Belgium, Senegal and Italy). Differences

in approach, for example between national government headquarters and embassies on foreign soil, are highlighted.

In addition to the interview-based qualitative data, the study also analyzes the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Migration Partnership Framework European Union as issue-linkage instruments. Other EU migration management documents, development policy platforms, and funding sources are also considered, including the European Agenda on Migration, EU Commission quarterly reports on the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework, the European Parliament Resolution “Addressing Refugee and Migrant Movements: the Role of EU External Action”, and press releases, among others. Senegalese national documents also contribute to the analysis: the *Plan Sénégal Émergent*, the *Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal*, and the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ *Plan Stratégique et Opérationnel* are accounted for.

5. Section A - Migration and Development Issue-Linkage within European Union

Governance

Migration has emerged as an issue capable of influencing the structural nature of EU governance and institutional relations. Within the rise of migration as a factor of political salience, this section evaluates the self-reinforcing relationship between EU governance limitations and the choice of issue-linkage as a policy instrument for the externalization of migration management. I argue that migration and development issue-linkage within EU policymaking occurs within a patchwork of (1) soft law instruments and (2) priority divergences across EU institutions and partner countries, within which EU Parliamentary oversight is identified as an example. These divergences affect the initial premise as well as the conclusive effectiveness of issue-linkage programs.

5.1 The EU's Soft Law Framework for Migration Management

The study places the EU's emerging soft law framework for international migration management within Alexander Betts's "fragmented tapestry" of migration global governance and Sandra Lavenex's "socialization and transgovernmental networking" interpretation of EU external governance mechanisms. Legally binding agreements within migration management are rare, and the EU's externalization efforts are no exception.

The realm of “soft law” begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation.⁴⁷ Soft law agreements often occur because legally binding “hard law” obligations for the delegation of authority entail contested restrictions of actors’ behavior and sovereignty. Consequently, while criticized by some as “window dressing” for its lack of enforcement powers or as “destabilizing” for its decreased accountability, soft law can also be a preferable institutional arrangement within incomplete global frameworks or issues of significant international tension, such as migration.⁴⁸

Table 2 categorizes the EU’s migration management instruments for the Central Mediterranean Route discerning between treaties (hard law instruments), policy frameworks, intergovernmental dialogue platforms, financial instruments, and political platforms signed before, during, or after the Europe-Africa Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015. The categorization highlights the heterogeneity in instruments by type, geographical groupings, and actors and shows the prevalence of a soft law approach to migration in EU external relations.

Table 2. Categorization and signatories of EU migration management instruments for the Central Mediterranean Route

EU Legal Instrument	Date, Type of Agreement and Signatories
<i>Before the Valletta 2015 Summit</i>	
Cotonou Agreement	<u>Treaty (2000)</u> - The framework for EU's relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). Article 13 states the joint commitment of signatories to migrant return and readmission agreements.
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)	<u>Policy framework (2005)</u> - The overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy.

⁴⁷ Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization*, 54(3), 421-456.

⁴⁸ Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. (2000).

European Neighborhood Policy	<u>Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2014)</u> between EU and partner countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine.
Rabat Process	<u>Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2006)</u> for the Western Mediterranean migration route: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, France, Italy, Mali, Morocco, Portugal Senegal, Spain, the EU Commission and the ECOWAS.
Khartoum Process	<u>Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2014)</u> - led by a Steering Committee comprised of five EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta), five partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) as well as the EU Commission, the EEAS and the AU Commission.
European Agenda on Migration	<u>Political platform (2015)</u> European Commission, 13th May 2015.
<i>Valletta 2015 Summit Results</i>	
Valletta Action Plan	<u>Political platform (2015)</u> Signed by Valletta Summit Participants, 11-12 November 2015.
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa	<u>Financial instrument (2015)</u> Followed the Valletta Summit on Migration to “provide additional funding and will contribute to a flexible, speedy and efficient delivery of support to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management. [...] to help address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration”
<i>After the Valletta 2015 Summit</i>	
Migration Partnership Framework	<u>Political platform (2016)</u> with third countries of origin and transit using all policies and instruments at the EU's disposal to achieve concrete results. 2016 Partners: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia 2017 New Partners: Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire
European External Investment Plan	<u>Financial instrument (2016)</u> Encourages investment in partner countries in Africa and the EU Neighborhood region

The fragmentation of the EU's instruments for migration management is also felt from the Senegalese and African Union perspective. At a basic negotiating level, multiple officials repeatedly underscored the continued persistence in priority difference for African and European

representatives at the negotiating table for migration instruments. An official at the African Union Delegation to the EU highlighted the AU's commitment to pursuing a continental policy framework based on the principle of mobility rather than migration.⁴⁹ Instead, as highlighted in Table 2, the EU often opts for a tapestry of bilateral or regionally focused instruments. The Senegalese Embassy to Belgium also criticized "The tendency of the EU to separate African countries for cooperation efforts."⁵⁰ An official at the AU Delegation to the EU described his surprise at the EU's bilateral approach in the Migration Partnership Framework in 2016 with five African countries (including Senegal), after the instruments at Valletta Summit on Migration had not forseen bilateral action.

"When Valletta came up, the AU's position was: we already have the continental framework. If Valletta is very much important to you, let us make sure all AU countries are involved, because for now your rationale is that you are focusing on hotspot countries, but what about us involving everybody before countries become hotspots tomorrow. But if you have been dealing with the EU, you realize that the EU as an institution is not a proactive institution. Mostly all EU policies are reactive."⁵¹

In response, Italian and EU officials cited the difficulty of negotiating with some African governments as a reason for their preference to cultivate bilateral structured relationships.⁵² Overall, the tapestry of soft law instruments renders the externalization of EU migration policy fragmented and affects its working relationships with partner countries and institutions such as Senegal and the African Union. However, the pursuit of a soft law approach is contextualized by Betts's framework for global migration governance and Lavenex's research on the EU's socialization networking approach to external governance.

⁴⁹ Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 18.06.2017

⁵⁰ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017

⁵¹ Interview, AU Delegation to the EU, Brussels, 19.06.2017

⁵² Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017, and Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 29.06.2017

5.2 Divergence Among EU Institutions on the Issue-Linkage of Migration and Development

When zooming in from the EU's larger international soft law framework to analyze intra-institutional dynamics, the fragmentation of mandates and instruments is replicated. An official at DG DEVCO summarized the EU's new institutional cooperation landscape as:

“There is indeed much more coordination and you feel like it is more embedded in external policy, which was not the case before. DG HOME is a lot more associated with DG DEVCO. Even within the Commission you have new actors like the Secretary General that became also quite active in coordinating, and of course with member states as well. In the past we have coordinated with them as well but never to this extent.”⁵³

While coordination among EU institutions on migration issues was reported as increased, the convergence of institutional priorities did not necessarily follow suit. Table 3 summarizes the interview outcomes across EU institutions with regards to institutional priorities within the linkage of migration management objectives to development policy instruments.

Table 3. Interview outcomes at EU institutions

EU Institution	Institutional Priority for Migration and Development Issue-Linkage
EU Commission, DG International Development and Cooperation (DEVCO)	Development
EU Commission DG Home Affairs (HOME)	Security
EU Commission European External Action Service (EEAS)	Foreign Relations
EU Parliament Development Committee (DEVE)	Human Rights and Institutional Oversight
HRVP Mogherini Cabinet	Migration Management
Delegation of the European Union to Senegal	EU-Senegal Relations, Development

⁵³ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

Even though migration policy is being directed at the highest levels of the EU Commission,⁵⁴ Table 3 shows the divergence in institutional mandates as pronounced. While officials at DG DEVCO expressed concern over the use of development funding for migration projects, officials at DG HOME instead focused on the role of issue-linkage instruments in facilitating the EU's negotiations for the increase in the identification and readmission of migrants in irregular status. The European External Action Service embraced a broader approach based on the importance of long-term foreign policy relations with partner countries, relations that the EU Delegation to Senegal was building and maintaining on the ground in Dakar. At the EU Delegation to Senegal, the new appointment in February 2017 of a Migration Liaison Officer as prescribed in the Migration Partnership Framework marked the increase in the externalization of EU migration policy.

At a national level, institutional discrepancies also complicate the position of EU member states on issues of migration and development issue-linkage. At the Italian Embassy to Senegal in Dakar, public officials stated that “There is not a unitary position within the Italian Government” with regards to the revision of development instruments for the pursuit of migration management objectives such as returns, readmissions, and border patrol.⁵⁵ Inconsistencies within EU member states also contribute to the network of interests at play within the European Union.

⁵⁴ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 23.06.2017

⁵⁵ Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017

5.3 Parliamentary Scrutiny

Within the fragmentation of EU institutional priorities and operations, one implication of the divergent technocratic nature of migration-development governance is that parliamentary oversight is severely hampered. Since the Migration Partnership Framework and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa are not binding legal instruments, governments are not required to present these texts for parliamentary approval. As a consequence, the European Parliament lacks oversight on the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework and on the allocation of funds via the EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa, which is managed by the EU Commission. This has stoked discontent in the European Parliament.

In a January 2017 press release, the EU Parliament Development Committee called for better oversight over the EU's Trust Funds and External Investment Plan and stated "Funding to tackle the root causes of migration is meant to help social development, not to stop refugees."⁵⁶ As a follow-up to the initial press release, the Development Committee proposed the resolution "Addressing Refugee and Migrant Movements: the Role of EU External Action", which was officially adopted by the Parliament on April 5th, 2017. In the resolution, the Parliament:

"Deeply regrets that in the EU migration policy framework and refugee movements response, the EU and its Member States have opted for the conclusion of agreements with third countries, which avoid the parliamentary scrutiny attached to the Community method."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ European Parliament Development Committee Press Release, (2017). 25 January 2017. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170124IPR59772/meps-set-priorities-for-a-new-impetus-in-development> (accessed 05.02.2018)

⁵⁷ European Parliament, (2015). *European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU External Action*, Article 70. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0124>

The resolution specifically addressed the lack of scrutiny afforded to the Parliament by the Commission over the linkage of migration management to development cooperation programming. The European Parliament:

“Draws attention to the intention to revise development cooperation programming documents to deliver on the new migration compacts; stresses that this revision needs to be carried out in line with development effectiveness principles and in dialogue with partner countries, European and local civil society organisations and the private sector; calls for Parliament to be fully involved at all stages of the revision, including programming documents under the European Development Fund (EDF).”⁵⁸

The European Parliament also expressed concern over migration instruments being negotiated outside of the Valletta Summit framework with other third countries, such as the *Joint Way Forward on Migration* political platform, signed by Afghanistan and the European Union in 2016 (Article 69, see associated footnote).⁵⁹ Overall, as a result, the European Parliament:

“Urges the Commission and the EEAS to provide Parliament and the public, at the earliest opportunity, with a detailed overview of the various funding instruments and programmes – and how they fit together with Member State programs – in the 16 priority countries with which the EU engages in high-level dialogues on migration.”

The Open Society European Policy Institute also highlighted reduced parliamentary scrutiny as an issue of democratic deficit with regards to the European Union’s external response to the migration crisis and noted the similarity of the situation in the Italian National Parliament,

⁵⁸ European Parliament, (2017). Article 63.

⁵⁹ **European Parliament, (2017). Article 69:** “Regrets the lack of consultation and transparency in the formulation of the recently signed Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU, which is mainly focused on readmissions and contemplates unlimited returns of Afghan citizens, whether on a voluntary basis or not; is worried about the possible consequences for Afghan asylum-seekers, who in 2016 constitute the second-largest national group in the EU applying for asylum.”

which has also not been granted oversight over Italy's border policing agreements with non-EU partner countries.⁶⁰

The European Parliament's oversight concerns underscore the friction among EU institutions with regards to the management of migration and development policy. Furthermore, the restriction of parliamentary scrutiny should also be interpreted as a securitization pattern. When actors attach a national security value to an issue, exceptional operational means are often justified. Consequently, the decrease in parliamentary oversight over the EU Commission's actions on migration management could be considered as a manifestation of the securitization of development policy through issue-linkage.

⁶⁰ Interview, Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels, 19.06.2017

6. Section B: The Impacts of Issue-Linkage on Development Objectives

6.1 Introduction

Described as “an instrument that helps to better target development aid towards countries of priority cooperation in the Migration Partnership Framework”,⁶¹ the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was launched at the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration as one of the primary tools for the linkage of migration management to development policy and funding sources. The Fund is officially aimed at addressing the “root causes” of destabilization, displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic opportunity, security, and development.⁶² An increase in development funding allocation for migration management purposes is one of the five goals outlined in the Valletta Action Plan. However, during the initial stages of cooperation, the increase in financial instruments has been the most utilized and cited of the five goals by EU leaders.⁶³ When asked about the EU’s increased focus on the instrumentalization of development funding within the five pillars of the Valletta Action Plan, officials in DG DEVCO observed that:

“I think that it has been the easiest, especially in the eyes of members. It's just been the easiest to pour more money, whether that's good or bad, whether it's useful or not. One year after we see the limitations.”⁶⁴

Officials at the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium also noted the “obsession with numbers as a solution” exhibited by EU officials when discussing migration-development cooperation

⁶¹ Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017

⁶² EU Commission, DG for International Development and Cooperation. (2018). https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en (accessed 12.02.2018)

⁶³ **The Five Pillars of the Valletta Action Plan:** 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement // 2. Legal migration and mobility // 3. Protection and asylum // 4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings // 5. Return, readmission and reintegration

⁶⁴ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 23.06.2017

efforts with African partners, both in relation to repatriation and migration flows, as well as to development aid allocation.⁶⁵ During an interview at the African Union Delegation to the European Union, an AU official expressed his reservations with regards to the strategy of tackling migration flows through development programming: “*Root causes* is the buzz word.”⁶⁶

The following section uses evidence from the expert interviews to evaluate the effects of issue-linkage on development cooperation. I will analyze the EU’s push to interlace migration and development cooperation in terms of funding allocation, project design, and project implementation. At the micro-level of project outcome, the implications of issue-linkage on development goals are that (1) resources are mostly displaced from development programs rather than increased, (2) committed resources are too small to make a difference, and (3) the financial instruments are not embedded in a long-term shared political vision. In the subsequent sections, I will show that the broader development goals of the migration-development nexus are undermined by two structural factors: the securitization of development and the disputed role of the EU as a development actor within non-EU partner countries. While European officials in interviews repeatedly denied the existence of strict conditionality, the effects of security-driven priorities are apparent.

⁶⁵ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017

⁶⁶ Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 19.06.2017

6.2 Evaluating Funding Allocation, Project Design and Implementation


Several developments seem to indicate goal displacement at the micro-level of development projects. For one, funding for the new EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has been diverted from pre-existing development funding sources, primarily the European Development Fund. Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). Out of the 2.6 billion euros pledged for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa at the 2015 Valletta Summit, 2.3 billion euros came from the 2015-2020 European Development Fund.⁶⁷ Effectively, most of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa therefore re-packages pre-existing development funding in a new issue-linkage instrument. The European Union External Action Service underscored this trend: “It has changed the way it is sold, not the substance.”⁶⁸ Understanding the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in terms funding diversion presents the Fund not as a new development cooperation instrument, but rather a re-packaged funding source subject to increased EU directional control for its linkage to migration goals.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is part of a broader financial envelope, which is visualized in the chart below. The chart shows higher resource allocation for action outside the EU (12.4 billion euros) compared to inside the EU (9.6 billion euros), confirming the EU's strong externalization outlook of migration management in terms of its financial instruments.

⁶⁷ EU Commission, DG International Cooperation and Development, (2018). *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa Factsheet*, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa-20180226_en.pdf (accessed 19.03.2018)

⁶⁸ Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 29.06.2017

Figure 1 - Source: European Agenda on Migration




Allocation of EU overseas development assistance (ODA) for the relief of migration's root causes must also be understood in relation to other sources of income and capital flow. In a 2017 discussion paper, the European Policy Center (EPC) challenged the effectiveness of using development funding for migration flow management. It claims that the EU's foreign aid commitment dwarfs with other investment sources linked to migration flows, such as foreign direct investment, remittances, and private debt and portfolio equity. Similarly, staff at the Open Society Initiative for West Africa stated, "the amounts are derisory", in relation to the EU's focus on project-based development assistance to tackle migration flows.⁶⁹ The EPC graph below shows the lower magnitude of ODA with respect to other sources of income and questions the effectiveness of the EU's use of ODA as the primary economic mechanism for the relief of root causes of displacement.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Interview, Open Society Initiative West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017

⁷⁰ Funk, M., Namara F., Pardo R., and Rose N. (2017). Tackling Irregular Migration Through Development – A Flawed Approach?, *European Policy Center*
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7693_tacklingirregularmigrationthroughdevelopment.pdf?doc_id=1857 (accessed 13.02.2018)

Graph 2: European Policy Center, Remittances to developing countries compared to ODA and private capital flow



Officials within Senegalese institutions also highlighted the importance of remittances. Personal remittances comprise all personal transfers in cash or in kind made or received by residents to or from nonresident households or individuals.⁷¹ At the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Human Development, the interviewed official focused on the domestic development catalyzed by remittances in terms of education and healthcare investment.⁷² In relation to remittance flows, the Senegalese Ambassador to Italy stated in an interview: “Italy has now become a factor of stability in Senegal”.⁷³ The research therefore not only supports the case that the EU’s cooperation efforts with countries of priority focus should increase their focus

⁷¹ World Bank, (2018). Metadata, Long Definition, Personal remittances, paid (current US\$). [http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=Personal%20remittances,%20paid%20\(current%20US\\$\)&Code=BM.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddISelectValue=TUN&ReportID=4001&ReportType=Table](http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=Personal%20remittances,%20paid%20(current%20US$)&Code=BM.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddISelectValue=TUN&ReportID=4001&ReportType=Table) (accessed 19.03.2018)


⁷² Interview, Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Human Development, Dakar, 06.06.2017

⁷³ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017

on other forms of investment and capital flow in order to work towards the migration-development nexus, but also that there is significant potential and openness to cooperation within partner countries for this avenue. Graphs 3 and 4 underscore the relevance of remittances as a % of national GDP in the 16 countries of priority focus of EU externalization efforts, with a particular focus on the evolution of Senegalese remittance percentages from 1980 to 2016 in conjunction with migration flow fluctuation and the shift in the economic conditions of the Senegalese diaspora. In Senegal, remittances from the diaspora are said to be the first source of foreign currency in the country.⁷⁴

Graph 3: Personal remittances received (% of GDP)


Data was drawn from World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.⁷⁵ The 16 countries of priority focus within EU migration management efforts were considered, although no data was available for Eritrea, Somalia and Niger.



⁷⁴ Devillard, A., Bacchi, A., and Noack, M. (2016). *A survey on migration policies in West Africa*. Vienna: ICMPD, International Centre for Migration Policy Development.

Graph 4: Senegal, Personal remittances received, 1980-2016 (% of GDP)

Data was drawn from World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.



During the study's expert interviews, the ownership of migration-related projects within the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was also discussed as a problematic factor. The Open Society Institute for West Africa admonished European Union representatives for excessive project development in Brussels rather than with Open Society Institute for West Africa in local Senegalese communities:

“What shocked me the most was that there are projects identified in Brussels, the appropriation of these projects, projects that are managed by European actors.”⁷⁶

In interviews with the delegations of European member states to Senegal (*Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo – AECID* for Spain, *Italian Cooperation for Development* for Italy), observations were also made with regards to what was

⁷⁶ Interview, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017

described as an “arbitrariness” of EU development funding distribution for migration-related projects. An official at AECID noted the renewed influx of funding and interest driven by EU officials, despite the stabilization of Spain’s cooperation efforts with Senegal for migration purposes since the 2005-2006 migration management crisis between the two countries. In the case of Senegal, nine development projects have originated from the Migration Partnership Framework and are being funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (See Appendix A). However, the Italian Cooperation for Development within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the funding that it is receiving for the projects is being managed primarily by Italian NGOs in Senegal. While all projects now have at least one Senegalese partner, concerns persist as to their design and the levels of local ownership.

The EU Delegation to Senegal responded to project ownership concerns by reporting the successful cooperation relationships for migration management as well as the strength of EU-Senegal relations overall. With regards to the ownership of projects: “The delegation feeds the analysis conducted in Brussels.”⁷⁷ The Senegalese human rights NGO “Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme” (RADDHO) noted its positive experience for a migration project that it applied and received EU funding for, underscoring the significance of local project ownership in non-EU partner countries.⁷⁸ The Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad remarked the concerns of project design and ownership as improved since the initial signing of the Migration Partnership Framework in 2016.⁷⁹

Various actors noted the lack of a “political vision” for the cooperation between the EU and partner countries for migration management. AECID officials stated: “The cooperation was

⁷⁷ Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017

⁷⁸ Interview, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, Dakar, 31.05.2017

⁷⁹ Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017

not directed at a political level for migration management, it was done through small projects.”⁸⁰

The absence of what Open Society Initiative for West Africa officials defined a “participatory approach” to a long-term partnership for migration management is perceived as a salient problem. A shared political vision for the issue-linkage of migration and development is warranted also because research has demonstrated that higher levels of economic and human development do not automatically result in a reduction of migratory flows; rather, they are associated with higher overall levels of migration.⁸¹ According to the “U-curve effect”, we can expect a decrease in emigration only after a long period of sustained economic growth, because the need for resources to migrate suggests that it is opportunity rather than income differential that determines the choice to migrate. In line with the “U-curve effect” model, it is not the poorest countries in the Sahel region that are sending the largest proportion of irregular migrants to Europe. Indeed, the majority of migrants originate from more developed and distant countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and Ivory Coast, despite the fact that countries such as Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso have lower UNDP Human Development Indexes and are also located on the Central Mediterranean migration route towards Europe.⁸² By further contextualizing Europe-Africa migration patterns, it becomes evident that a unidirectional approach to development through project sponsorship is not sufficient to fulfill the migration-development nexus.

⁸⁰ Interview, *Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo*, Dakar, 31.05.2017

⁸¹ De Haas, H. (2010). Migration Transitions: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers of International Migration. *IMI Working Papers*, No. 24. <https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-24-10>. (accessed 10.01.2018)

⁸² Ranieri, L. and Rossi, A. (2017). The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check. *Istituto Affari Internazionali*. (17), 26. <http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiw1726.pdf> (accessed 19.03.2018)

6.3 Evaluating Conditionality and Securitization in the Migration-Development Nexus

The following two sections argue that the broader development goals of the migration-development nexus are hampered by two structural factors: the securitization of development programming and the disputed role of the EU as a development actor within non-EU partner countries. This section considers the securitization of development as a circumstance that requires the expansion of the concept of “conditionality” when evaluating the displacement of development goals within EU issue-linkage.

Closely linked to rational choice logic, conditionality in international relations is defined as a mechanism of material incentives used by states and international institutions to influence the behavior of other states.⁸³ Conditionality relations expect that external incentives will change the utility calculations of actors by raising the costs of non-compliance or by offering additional benefits. In interviews, EU officials rejected the notion of conditionality with regards to the migration-development nexus by stating that it is neither the intention nor the desired outcome of EU external action. Still, the security narrative is an aggravating factor, and while it may not manifest in the form of rigid and conditional issue-linkage relations, it echoes the stricter models based on establishing conditions for the provision of financial benefits. Consequently, security-driven interests undermine the scope, legitimacy, and effectiveness of recent EU efforts to render development assistance an incentive for non-EU partner countries to cooperate on migration management.

Firstly, it is relevant to note that European institutional and national actors explicitly deny the existence of conditionality with respect to migration and development. As re-enforced by

⁸³ Koch, S. (2015). A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union. *World Development*, Volume 75, Pages 97-108.

HRVP Federica Mogherini at the EU Parliament High-Level Conference for Migration Management in June 2017, the European Union insists it is not imposing conditionality but instead chooses a “more for more” approach, which it describes as providing positive incentives for development cooperation with African countries on migration. Migration is a working priority at the highest levels of the EU Commission,⁸⁴ and the HRVP Cabinet directly addressed conditionality implications and concerns by stating:

“The HRVP has been repeated and crystal clear insofar no conditionality is sought in any way in relations to the Migration Partnerships. We are working on a “more for more” basis as also identified in all the policy documents issued by the European Commission. The EU Trust Fund for Africa is not a conditionality instrument; it is an instrument targeting some specific objectives set in its founding act and corresponding politically to the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan.”⁸⁵

Actors in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected conditionality:

“We are not on the frontline. Speaking about conditionality in such brutal terms is not warranted because it is neither Italy’s position nor the European Union’s.”⁸⁶

However, an official from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that on a bilateral basis Italy is prepared to pursue conditionality agreements for visas for Africans in exchange for cooperation on the identification and repatriation of illegal nationals from the same countries.⁸⁷ Italy’s bilateral pursuits point to a willingness among certain EU member states to consider conditionality structures within the framework of the Valletta 2015 instruments. An

⁸⁴ Interview, EU Commission, DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

⁸⁵ Interview via email correspondence, HRVP Federica Mogherini’s Cabinet, Brussels, 28.06.2017

⁸⁶ Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG International Migration and Italians Abroad, Rome, 13.07.2017

⁸⁷ Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union External Relations, Rome, Italy, 07.07.2017

official in the European External Action Service appeared to corroborate that the EU and its member states do not necessarily see eye to eye on conditionality.

“It is a sensitive issue. They [The ministries of interior and foreign affairs] have different views on aid conditionality. It is being continuously negotiated – some push for it within the EU, some do not.”⁸⁸

Divergent approaches also emerge across EU institutions. Officials at DG DEVCO expressed their support for utilizing issue-linkage as a current strategy. However, they also maintained a more cautious approach in comparison to other EU institutions, stating that it would be out of the question for DG DEVCO to undermine development objectives by endorsing funding conditionality to incentivize migrant readmission programs.

“With so much pressure to use more and more development aid as incentive and as leverage, that's a very thin line. There is a thin line between "more for more" and conditionality. It's not the same, and I think that we have to be very careful. But I don't think that at least for the moment, we are safe. We have good arguments and good basis.”⁸⁹

Even if one takes the European Union's stated absence of conditionality at face value, the interplay between development and security priorities within the EU's “more for more” system of positive incentives must be examined. More specifically, can securitization be considered as present within issue-linkage? A variety of actors certainly think so: officials from think-tanks such as Open Society European Policy Institute and the European Policy Center, the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, and the African Union Delegation to the European Union expressed concerns as to the nature of the EU's development aid offered by the EU Emergency Trust Fund

⁸⁸ Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 19.06.2017

⁸⁹ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

for Africa due to its links to articulated security prerogatives.⁹⁰ The securitization of development in Europe had sharply increased after the September 11 terror attack, and it appears to have intensified in response to Europe's migration crisis. The issues of migration and terrorism are themselves linked in policy discourses, as confirmed during an interview at the Italian Embassy to Senegal. When discussing the new programs implemented under the Migration Partnership Framework, an Embassy official stated, "More cooperation among police forces can only be beneficial in avoiding the most pathological outcome, namely terrorism."⁹¹

The prioritization of security was highlighted when a representative from DG HOME maintained a strong focus on security and readmissions in line with the overall mandate of the DG's operations, despite working a lot more closely with DG DEVCO for the realization of development goals within migration management.

"We are ready to give them [African partner countries] more support from the EU Trust Fund but at the same time we expect some help from their side on the topics that we need to advance. So we expect some sort of commitment and results on irregular migration for instance, and then we are happy to support them in better managing migration. [...] But on the other hand, if they don't show up to work with us, the EU is not going to continue with the Trust Fund. There is also mention of if the countries are really unwilling to cooperate, the EU and member states should look at all the leverage that they have at their disposal and use it either in a positive way or in a negative way. It did not mean linking aid, it meant whatever policy instruments we have, for example visa policy, or the number of student grants that we are offering."⁹²

The persistence of securitization, highlighted by the stated goals and actions of DG HOME and by a variety of external actors, calls for the expansion of our interpretation of

⁹⁰ Interviews: Open Society European Policy Institute (Brussels, 23.06.2017), European Policy Center (Brussels, 15.06.2017), Senegalese Embassy to Belgium (Brussels, 28.06.2017), African Union Delegation to the European Union (Brussels, 19.06.2017),

⁹¹ Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017

⁹² Interview, EU Commission, DG HOME, Brussels, 22.06.2017

systems of incentives beyond strict conditionality models. Securitization undermines the EU's "more for more" system of positive incentives and the realization of the migration-development nexus in EU-Senegal relations by contributing to the displacement of development goals within issue-linkage.

6.4 Evaluating the Role of the EU as a Development Actor and Alternatives to Foreign Aid within Issue-Linkage

Finally, when evaluating the displacement of development goals within issue-linkage, it is important to analyze the role of external actors such as the EU in the establishment and realization of development objectives. For example, the Open Society European Policy Institute noted "the irresistibility of EU money"⁹³ within migration management cooperation with Senegal, and echoed Arturo Escobar's (2012) case that in the post-World War II period "development policies became mechanisms of control that were just as pervasive and effective as their colonial counterparts".⁹⁴ In addition to the controversy regarding the EU's structural role as a development actor within the allocation of foreign aid through issue-linkage instruments, we must note that the EU's foreign aid commitment dwarfs with other investment sources linked to migration flows, as already discussed in Section 6.2.

However, in September 2016, the European Commission inaugurated a new effort to diversify the EU's financial cooperation mechanisms within issue-linkage. The European Investment Bank presented the European External Investment Plan as an instrument for the

⁹³ Interview, Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels, 23.06.2017

⁹⁴ Escobar, A. (2012). *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

expansion of structured investment by European parties in African countries of migrant origin and transit.⁹⁵ The European External Investment Plan is described by the EEAS as an instrument that will “help us mobilize the private sector that has to come more to the picture, to stimulate investments exactly where they are more needed and more difficult to reach.”⁹⁶

Senegalese representatives also welcomed the preliminary shift towards an investment-driven approach to economic growth within issue-linkage. At the Senegalese Embassy in Rome, officials recognized the importance of development within the broader management of migrations: “The European Union cannot control migration in Africa as long as Africa is an under-developed continent.”⁹⁷ Officials at the Senegalese Embassy to Italy and the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed their goal of creating opportunities and structures for the Senegalese diaspora to invest directly in Senegal: “It is necessary to integrate investment into migration policies.”⁹⁸ An official at Senegal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Senegal’s strategic engagement with the EU for migration and development issue-linkage:

“Today we are in a process of economic diplomacy. In this economic diplomacy process, it is important to favor the maximum amount of foreign direct investment. This is the reason why we are working to increase our network of economic offices [in Senegalese Embassies abroad].”⁹⁹

This quote not only highlights the Senegalese government’s national agenda for its cooperation with the EU, but also reinforces the continuous negotiation framework that defines the linkage of migration and development policy. Overall, the European External Investment

⁹⁵ European External Action Service, EU External Investment Plan Factsheet, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4_external_investment_plan_3pg.pdf (accessed 21.08.2017)

⁹⁶ European External Action Service, Remarks by Federica Mogherini at the Valletta Joint Action Plan 2017 Senior Officials Meeting, (Brussels, 08/02/2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20176/remarks-federica-mogherini-valletta-joint-action-plan-2017-senior-officials-meeting_en (accessed 24.02.2018)

⁹⁷ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017

⁹⁸ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017

⁹⁹ Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017

Plan is a promising new issue-linkage instrument that engages with the migration-development nexus outside of the predominant ODA models. However, its preliminary approach and outcomes are yet to be observed, as it is unclear what development role it will be able to play within the EU's predominantly security-driven agenda for migration management in Senegal and in other countries of priority focus.

7. Section C: The Impacts of Issue-Linkage on Migration Management Objectives

During an interview with the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, an official summarized Senegal's relations with the EU for migration management as: "There are two issues of tension with the EU: identification and human rights, as well as the difficulties associated with the conditionality of aid."¹⁰⁰ After aid conditionality and securitization were shown to be primary concerns in the displacement of development goals in Section B, now Section C focuses on the impact of issue-linkage on migration management objectives. The identified issues of contention within EU-Senegal migration management cooperation are the two broader reform needs for (1) legal migration and (2) the safeguard of human rights, in addition to (3) the short-term cooperation mechanism for identification and readmission. Each is respectively examined in terms of goal displacement.

¹⁰⁰ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017

7.1 Legal Migration

Despite being one of the five pillars of the 2015 Valletta Action Plan for the cooperation among European and African actors, legal migration has not been at the forefront of migration management efforts between the European Union and its countries of priority focus. Authors Nyberg-Sørensen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Hear (2002) consider legal migration opportunities as an essential tool for the realization of the migration-development nexus and for the economic development not only for the countries of migrant origin, but also for the countries of migrant destination.¹⁰¹

Legal migration is one of the primary points of divergence among African and European leaders. With regards to AU-EU cooperation relations leading up to the Valletta Summit on Migration, an African Union official stated:

“The discussion was mostly on migration; the EU was not interested in discussing mobility and employment. That was where the challenges started. Because for us it was important to continue the engagement, but we also realized that instead of a dialogue it was largely a monologue. [...] The European temple was not interested in mobility.”¹⁰²

The African Union Delegation to the European Union criticized the EU’s focus on stemming migration flows, rather than on the use of human mobility as a tool for local development and economic growth. On the EU side, the EU Migration Liaison in Senegal agreed by stating, “Currently, there are not enough legal migration opportunities”.¹⁰³ An interview with an official at the EU Commission DG HOME highlighted the DG’s continued focus on

¹⁰¹ Nyberg-Sørensen, N. N., Engberg-Pedersen, P., & Hear, N. V. (2002).

¹⁰² Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 19.06.2017

¹⁰³ Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 01.06.2017

identification and readmission efforts rather than on legal migration initiatives.¹⁰⁴ The EU's intergovernmental bargaining framework and security lens are therefore overshadowing international efforts to increase legal migration opportunities. Officials in the EU Commission DG DEVCO in fact indicated the incomplete supranational integration of migration management competences as a primary reason for the lack of progress on legal migration objectives:

“We are doing a lot. We can only work on intra-regional [migration], we cannot work on legal migration apart from strengthening the institutions that work on legal migration because that is not our competence.”¹⁰⁵

On the Senegalese side, an official at the Ministry for the Economy, Finances, and Planning stated that European and African actors must build on the mutual understanding with regards to the importance of legal migration and domestic opportunities that was established at the Valletta Summit.

“The points that are in it [the Valletta Action Plan] are consensual. It is necessary to develop alternatives in countries of migrant origin to create hope and allow for populations to reach fulfillment at home.”¹⁰⁶

An official at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the EU's responsibility in acknowledging the contribution of irregular migrant labor to Europe's economies: “There are young people who are in an irregular status but that contribute a lot to their [European] economies [...]. They must be legalized.”¹⁰⁷

Lastly, a variety of Senegalese officials indicated the importance of investing in alternative legal migration avenues. At the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, an official

¹⁰⁴ Interview, EU Commission, DG HOME, Brussels, 22.06.2017

¹⁰⁵ Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

¹⁰⁶ Interview, Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finances and of Planning, Dakar, 06.06.2017

¹⁰⁷ Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017

highlighted the role of university exchange programs and seasonal work permits in order for the country to invest in human capital development.¹⁰⁸ Senegalese officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead expressed the government priority of engaging the diaspora through investment programs, as outlined in the Ministry's *Plan Stratégique et Opérationnel*.¹⁰⁹

Conclusively, this section highlights the overall acknowledgement by both European and Senegalese actors of the importance of legal migration within the migration-development nexus. However, goal displacement and divergence in the prioritization of legal migration still persist within security-driven EU-Senegal cooperation efforts, despite the signing of joint political platforms such as the Valletta Action Plan.

7.2 Human rights

The lack of sufficient prioritization of individual migrant human rights is a second example of migration management goal displacement within issue-linkage. Two factors are primarily associated with the displacement of human rights as a cooperation priority: (1) the utilization of development programming for border security enhancement and (2) the outsourcing of migration management responsibilities.

The Open Society Institute for European Policy recalls that the intensification of border security in Africa along the Central Mediterranean Route needs to be consistently monitored to ensure that the human rights of migrants are upheld.¹¹⁰ The EU's agenda for the stemming of flows in Agadez, Niger's hotspot for migrant transit along the Central Mediterranean route, is

¹⁰⁸ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels 28.06.2017

¹⁰⁹ Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017

¹¹⁰ Interview, Open Society Institute for European Policy, Brussels, 23.06.2017

being carried out despite vocal opposition by an official at the African Union Delegation to the EU and by the Open Society European Policy Institute due to the risk of funneling vulnerable migrants into new smuggling networks and holding camps.¹¹¹

On the other hand, EU Commission officials in DG DEVCO argued that border security is not always a catalyst of human rights violations.

“Even border and security policy can have quite positive impact. Working on integrated border management is actually working for development and human rights because it actually helps goods and people to move better and more efficiently. It's not always negative, as long as it's done right and with the right objectives.”¹¹²

This argument presented at DG DEVCO brings us to the second cause for human rights concerns within issue-linkage: the EU's alleged outsourcing of responsibility. The international NGO *Human Rights Watch* in fact argues that the EU Commission has crafted issue-linkage instruments for the realization of migration control objectives rather than the safeguard of human rights, the protection of migrants from smuggling networks, and the provision of safe channels and opportunities for asylum and economic migration. While many EU programs (such as the improvement of border security services) have “laudable goals if implemented properly,”¹¹³ *Human Rights Watch* contends that linking EU foreign policy and aid to the external the stemming of irregular flows risks worsening the safeguard of human rights. In a November 2016 report, *Human Rights Watch* admonished the EU's lack of leadership and solidarity for human rights principles by not “sharing responsibility for them [asylum seekers and refugees] equitably”

¹¹¹ Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 19.06.2017, and Interview, Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels, 23.07.2017

¹¹² Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017

¹¹³ Human Rights Watch, (2016). “EU Policies Put Refugees At Risk”, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/eu-policies-put-refugees-risk> (accessed 21.08.2017)

and by endorsing policies designed to limit arrivals and outsource their management to countries outside the EU.¹¹⁴

Presenting another human rights setback due to issue-linkage, the European Parliament criticized the Migration Partnership Framework for overshadowing the issues forced refugee displacement and human rights violations by pivoting its attention to economic migration.¹¹⁵

Human Rights Watch also addresses the implications of issue-linkage's focus on economic migration and asserts that:

“Making development aid and EU foreign relations as a whole subservient to migration control objectives represents a sharp turn away from a forthright defense of human rights as a central plank of EU foreign policy, [...] in ways that could ultimately prove self-defeating by failing to address the human rights abuse that often drive forced migration.”¹¹⁶

Overall, the arguments put forward by the European Parliament and *Human Rights Watch* show that the EU's security priorities not only displace development goals within issue linkage (Section B), but also in affect cooperation efforts for migration management. This is reflected in the contested prioritization of the safeguard of human rights and of the provision of legal migration opportunities.

7.3 Identification and Readmission Cooperation Efforts

Lastly, both Senegalese officials and European officials cited the stagnation of the identification process for irregular migrants as a necessary point of improvement within short-

¹¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, (2016).

¹¹⁵ European Parliament Development Committee Press Release, 25.01.2017, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170124IPR59772/meps-set-priorities-for-a-new-impetus-in-development> (accessed 05.02.2018)

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, (2016).

term cooperation relations. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement (the only EU hard law instrument governing migration management relations between the European Union and 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) states the joint commitment of signatories to the return and readmission of irregular migrants.¹¹⁷ Issue-linkage instruments since the Valletta Summit aim to reinforce cooperation for returns and readmission. For example, under the Migration Partnership Framework, an identification mission of Senegalese officials was sent to both Italy and Belgium. The EU Delegation to Senegal cited the identification missions as a success indicator of the Migration Partnership Framework: “We were able to facilitate the sending of a delegation to Italy so that the Senegalese authorities could evaluate the conditions experienced by their citizens and provide support for their identification and repatriation to Senegal”.¹¹⁸ However, the mixed results of both identification missions confounded the efficacy of using national delegations as rapid identification resources. The low numbers of Senegalese identifications underscore the need of a more comprehensive commitment by non-EU partner countries to identify their nationals.¹¹⁹ Released by the Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Table 4 details the countries that Senegalese citizens were repatriated from between January 2017 and May 2017. The lack of Senegalese citizens repatriated from European countries is to be noted. An official at DG HOME declared, “The results on irregular migration are not so brilliant to put it mildly.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ **Cotonou Agreement, Article 13, Section 5.C.2:**

“Each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member State’s request and without further formalities. The Member States and the ACP States will provide their nationals with appropriate identity documents for such purposes”.

¹¹⁸ Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017

¹¹⁹ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels 28.06.2017 and Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union External Relations, Rome, Italy, 07.07.2017

¹²⁰ Interview, EU Commission, DG HOME, Brussels, 22.06.2017

Table 4. Readmissions of Senegalese Nationals, January-May 2017

Month (2017)	Number of repatriated citizens	Origin
January	87	Libya
February	341	Libya
March	427	279 Libya, 130 USA, 8 Mozambique
April	137	113 Niger, 7 Libya, 17 Tunisia
May	72	70 Libya, 2 Germany
Total	1064	

Source: BAOS/DGSE, République du Sénégal, Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur

With regards to readmissions and repatriations, Italian officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that the Italian government was treating repatriation negotiations very delicately and was exploring avenues for assisted voluntary returns in cooperation with international organizations such as UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and IOM (International Organization for Migration).¹²¹ Furthermore, Italian officials stated that “Senegalese authorities use the narrative of forced returns a lot,” causing Italian and European authorities to treat bilateral readmission negotiations tactfully.¹²² Readmission efforts therefore continue to be a source of discord among EU representatives and non-EU partner countries. Conclusively, issue-linkage instruments have been ineffective so far in incentivizing cooperation for the processes of identification and readmission. As summarized by an official at the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, “It is necessary to find the right equilibrium so that the focus is

¹²¹ Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union External Relations, Rome, 07.07.2017

¹²² Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017

not exclusively on readmission and returns,”¹²³ for example through the effective centralization of legal migration and human rights within EU-Senegal migration management goals.

8. Conclusion

In Brussels’s BOZAR Amphitheater sat Franco-Senegalese writer Fatou Diome. It was June 2017, and she was presenting her newest book entitled *Marianne Porte Plainte*, an exploration of national identity within France’s political scene dominated by the rise of Marine Le Pen’s populist right-wing party *Front National* and its anti-immigration platform. With the sober tranquility of someone whose eyes have not been spared the realities of Europe’s xenophobic streets, workplaces, or talk shows, Ms Diome recounted her analysis of Senegalese, French, and EU policies in response to Europe’s migrant crisis. The Senegalese-born French national did not excuse any stakeholders in her call for cooperation and integration, ranging from the Senegalese government and EU policy makers, to humanitarian organizations and private citizens: “Globalism, however, is the defining fact of our century, and its corollary is mobility. In my crystal ball, what will make or break our era is the management of migrations”.¹²⁴

This article confirms that Ms Diome is correct in identifying the central role of migration management within international relations and within the future of EU domestic and external governance. I argue that the EU’s shift in rhetoric towards a supranational development agenda is hampered by the continued presence of an intergovernmental security bargaining framework among EU member states and within EU institutions.

¹²³ Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017

¹²⁴ Diome F., *Marianne Porte Plainte* Book Presentation, Bozar Amphitheatre, Brussels, 18.06.2017

Starting off with the politicized insertion of migration into the EU's external governance agenda, this article identified how the EU's tapestry of soft law instruments and divergent institutional mandates produced a fragmented framework for the issue-linkage of migration and development and affected the EU's working relationships with partner countries and institutions such as Senegal and the African Union. Using evidence from expert interviews, the research then determined that the EU's push to interlace migration and development cooperation within a securitized cooperation framework has resulted in the displacement of development and migration management objectives.

Firstly, in terms of development cooperation, the implications of issue-linkage at the micro-level of project management were that (1) resources were mostly displaced from development programs rather than increased, (2) committed resources were too small to make a difference, and (3) the financial instruments were not embedded in a long-term shared political vision. From a structural perspective, while EU actors rejected allegations of strict conditionality within issue-linkage, the broader development goals of the migration-development nexus were still undermined by the securitization of development programming and the disputed role of the EU as a development actor within non-EU partner countries.

Secondly, in terms of migration management objectives, the prioritization of security concerns and narratives has prevented joint EU-Senegal progress on the two broader issues of legal migration and the safeguard of migrant human rights. Additionally, issue-linkage has not sufficiently incentivized short-term cooperation relations for identification and readmission efforts.

Overall, the migration-development nexus in EU-Senegal relations is currently not being realized by issue-linkage instruments such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the

Migration Partnership Framework. The fragmentation of EU external governance, the securitization of migration management, and the EU's disputed role as an agent for development in non-EU partner countries are all contributing factors to the inability of issue-linkage instruments to fulfill their stated goals. However, the research presented in this study's literature review shows that the migration-development nexus can be a useful vehicle within an incomplete global governance framework to ensure that migration contributes to the economic and social development in countries of both migrant origin and destination. Furthermore, despite the identified divergence in European and Senegalese approaches to issue-linkage in terms of development as well as migration management goals, the research also highlighted the reciprocal recognition by all interviewed actors of the importance of cooperative relations in order to work towards the migration-development nexus. The flexible nature of issue-linkage instruments therefore generates both opportunities and risks for cooperation, underscoring the increased need of checks and balances to ensure that short-term EU and Senegalese security priorities and financial considerations do not overshadow the mandate of the migration-development nexus.

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10. Appendixes

Appendix A – Funding allocation to Senegal under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

EU Trust Fund for Africa mission statement: Prevent irregular migration and forced displacement and facilitate better migration management. Address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa

EU Trust Fund for Africa - Senegal Total development funding: € 161.8 M <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic opportunities - € 105.9 M - Return and reintegration - € 28 M - Migration management - € 27.9 M 			
Project Number	Project Title	Implementing partners	Allocated funding
1	Developing employment opportunities in Senegal: re-enforcing the competitiveness of businesses and employability in areas of migration origin	<i>AFD - Agence Française de Développement</i>	€ 40 M
2	Normalizing the living conditions of populations directly affected by the Casamance conflict	<i>ICRC - CICR - International Committee of the Red Cross</i>	€ 4,5 M
3	PACERSEN: <i>Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.</i> Project to support the reduction of migration through the creation of rural employment in Senegal, facilitated by communal and individual agricultural farms in region of high emigration potential	<i>AECID - Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale au Développement, AICS - Italian Development Cooperation Agency</i>	€ 20 M
4	PASPED – <i>Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.</i> Program to contrast irregular migration through the private sector and employment creation in Senegal	<i>CDP - Cassa depositi e prestiti Spa</i>	€ 14,3 M
5	PARERBA – <i>Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier</i>	<i>BTC - CTB - Coopération Technique Belge</i>	€ 18 M

	Project to reduce rural emigration and increase re-integration in the <i>Bassin Arachidier</i> region through the development of a rural economy along irrigation areas		
6	Project for the reinforcement of food and nutritional security in the Matam region	<i>ACTED - Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement</i>	€ 1,1 M
7	Resilience of vulnerable population in times of food and nutritional crisis in the areas of migrant origin Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kanel	<i>AECID - Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale au Développement</i>	€ 8 M
8	Re-enforcement of migration management and governance, the return and long-term reintegration of migrants to Senegal, and the facilitation of investments by the Senegalese diaspora	<i>IOM - International Organization for Migration, AFD - Agence Française de Développement, AECID - Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale au Développement</i>	€ 27,9 M
9	Program in support of the re-enforcement of the civic information system and for the creation of a national biometric identification system	<i>CIVIPOL, BTC - CTB - Coopération Technique Belge</i>	€ 28 M

Appendix B – List of Expert Interviews Conducted, Governmental

Senegalese Government Officials	European Union Officials	Italian Government Officials
Direction du Développement du Capital Humain - Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances, et du Plan (Dakar, Senegal)	EU Delegation in Senegal (Dakar, Senegal)	Italian Embassy to Senegal, (Dakar, Senegal)
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Sénégalaises à l'Extérieure (Dakar, Senegal)	Irregular Migration and Return, DG HOME, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	Italian Agency for Development and International Cooperation (Dakar, Senegal)
Senegalese Embassy (Brussels, Belgium)	Migration Management, DG HOME, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	DG European Union External Relations, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome – Italy)
Senegalese Embassy to Italy (Rome, Italy)	International Coordination A3, DG HOME, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	DG International Cooperation for Migration, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome, Italy)
<i>African Union, Permanent representation to the European Union</i> (Brussels, Belgium)	Migration, Employment, Inequalities, DG DEVCO, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	<i>Spain: AECID, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo</i> (Dakar, Senegal)
	West Africa Division, DG DEVCO, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	
	Senegal and The Gambia Division, European External Action Service, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	
	HRVP Federica Mogherini Cabinet, EU Commission (Brussels, Belgium)	
	Development Committee,	

	European Parliament (Brussels, Belgium)	
	EU Parliament, “High-Level Migration Management Conference”, 21 June 2017 (Brussels, Belgium)	

Appendix C – List of Expert Interviews Conducted, Non-Governmental

Senegal, Non-Governmental	European Union, Non-Governmental	Italy, Non-Governmental
Open Society Institute West Africa (Dakar, Senegal)	European Policy Center (Brussels, Belgium)	Associazione ANTIGONE (Rome, Italy)
Ecole Normale Supérieure, FASTEF, Université Cheikh Anta Diop (Dakar, Senegal)	Open Society European Policy Institute (Brussels, Belgium)	
Rencontre Africain pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme and the West African Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Network (Dakar, Senegal)	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Brussels, Belgium)	
Institut Fondamental de l’Afrique Noire, Université Cheikh Anta Diop (Dakar, Senegal)		