

This is an interview with James E. Hall, Franklin Haney for Governor of Tennessee Campaign Manager, and Former Aide to Albert Gore, Knoxville, Tennessee, August 21, 1974. The interview was conducted by Jack Bass and transcribed by Susan Hathaway.

JACK BASS: . . . some analysis of the various candidates for Governor.

JAMES HALL: I would say that Tommy Wiseman probably represented at the time that he got in, basically the middle Tennessee liberal wing of the party, the labor unions and your basic . . . the Gore - Hooker vote in middle Tennessee. What Tommy was unable to do was to extend that in the other parts of the state. I think one of the reasons it was not extended was because the candidacy of Haney and Butcher, because you had Jimmy Powers and Ross Bass who were basically put in the race, and both I think, were put in effectively by the group around the Tennessean and ran their campaigns, with basically the direction from that group, and neither were much of a factor. Then you had, of course, David Pack, who was just unable to financially get off the ground, and you had Crockett and Snodgrass. Snodgrass was just crippled by 1970 and I don't think . . . I don't know if he had read a poll or what happened, he should have known because it was clear in our polls that he was

. . . that as a result of his not supporting the ticket in 1970, he had no hope of getting the nomination.

J.B.: What did he do in 1970?

J.H.: Well he ran for Governor and was against Hooker who was the Democratic nomination and was defeated, but he didn't support the ticket, and Crockett did not support the ticket, although Crockett made token appearances on behalf of the ticket. I mean one of the main reasons that everything is stressing unity this time and everyone is getting behind so quickly . . . behind the nominee is that those people who are ambitious saw what happened to Snodgrass and Crockett as a result of not supporting the ticket, in 1970 . . .

J.B.: Did Snodgrass just sit it out completely, or did he . . .

J.H.: He sat it out completely.

J.B.: He didn't endorse the Republican though?

J.H.: No. Supposedly this was because he had a deal with Jimmy Stallman, who was the publisher of the Nashville Banner, which was sold in about '72 to the Gannett newspaper chain, that in return for their editorial endorsement, Snodgrass would not support Hooker, if Hooker were the nominee. It took four years, but after the four years with that knowledge slowly filtering down through the rank and files, that it was foolish for Snodgrass to run again. Because had Stan gotten in and actively supported the ticket, he is articulate, intelligent, he was State Senator, headed the Humphrey - Muskie campaign in this State, and so

he was not with the liberals at all, had he supported the ticket, then I think he could have been the definite front runner and probably the nominee. But basically you had three people dividing up the black vote, which was Buther and Haney and Wiseman, and to some extent, a much smaller extent, Washington Butler and Wallace Bass. The white liberal vote . . . you basically had two people . . . three people dividing that up; Wiseman and Haney and to some extent Blanton and Butcher. Blanton mainly because a lot of liberals had supported him in '72 because they felt it was their party responsibility. In '74 they stuck with him because in Tennessee, the Governorship is not looked upon along ideological lines that much. Then you had, of course, the conservative vote . . . it was split among Crockett and Blanton and Snodgrass and to some extent Pack. Regionally, though, what you saw was that no one really was able to . . . there weren't any say code words in the race. So you had a real diffusion, I think because people really didn't know how to identify who their man was, and where is the conservative out of this group, and where is the moderate, and where is the liberal.

J.B.: So it ended up on sort of a friends and neighbors vote, didn't it?

J.H.: Yeah, I think it ended up on name recognition and who had the best organization, and I think that Blanton had the best organization just from the standpoint that he had been Congressman in that district three terms, and had run state wide most recently.

J.B.: I have seen one map which showed . . . on who led in each county and it was pretty much . . . Blanton's color was green, it was pretty much green in West Tennessee, with a little bit scattered around. It was pretty much . . . I think Butcher was red . . . East Tennessee was almost all red. The third district was almost solid Haney. Wiseman was strong in the Davidson . . . middle Tennessee area around Nashville, those counties, and the rest were sort of scattered.

J.H.: I think that everyone is going to get behind the nominee because I think the people realize . . . I think almost everyone realizes that we have got to have a Democratic Governor this time, or we are going to be shut out for a long time. Regardless of where people stand in regard to Blanton . . . now whether that is going to be enough to get him across, I don't know because, you know, you've had these developments with Ford and with . . . the Republican party is strong anyway, and they are going to get a heavy vote out of East Tennessee, and I think Lamar is going to attract a lot of young people to his campaign just because of his age. But, as I have said before, I think the sad part is that there was a real failure on the part of the leadership of the party to try and sit everybody down and force a decision, as far as the . . . at least the modern peripherals and the new basis, and pick the person with the best chance of winning. So I hope we are going to win, but I am not that optimistic. I mean, with this Governors race, the

only reason that we got into the race was because the press in the state pretty well shut out the Governors race. I mean Watergate so dominated the news the first five months of 1974, that you didn't have the attention focussed on the gubernatorial candidates. I think that was one factor and second, the large number of candidates, the press in the state just didn't know how to handle them. So while the press criticized heavily in some areas . . . I say the press, I mean mainly the Tennessean and the Banner criticized the spending of Butcher and Haney, they basically set it up for someone that could spend a large sum of money set up that situation because no one else has been able to get the amount of print and media they needed to get their ideas across to build any type of organization. So, in that situation, the person who could come on the last ten days or two weeks with heavy paid communications and heavy paid media was sitting in an ideal situation.

J.B.: You said that Haney's success in the third district, though, was more an organization than a name recognition . . . being friends and neighbors sort of thing?

J.H.: Well, I think it was basically the fact that he is well known in that area. It is well known what he has done in that area in the way of development, and we have been able to computerize, which we didn't have time to do state wide, because we had thought at one time that he might run for Congress, we have been able

to computerize all the registered voters.

J.B.: Did you use heavy direct mail there and no place else?

J.H.: Yeah. So we used heavy targeted direct mail in that district. I think that paid off. It . . . it's just like Butcher, I mean Butcher was a well known family in the counties surrounding Knoxville, Anderson, Union where he got a big vote. Just like Franklin's family is well known in Bradley and McMann. It was mostly voting for a local boy in those areas that had an impact. I think that most everyone ran well. I know that David Pack carried Severe County, Jimmy Powers carried his home county. I don't know whether Ross Bass carried his home County or not, but of course Hudley Crockett carried Davidson County where he is . . .

J.B.: What happened to Ross Bass. I mean, just by not being familiar with the background, did he just become dissipated after that last campaign?

J.H.: Ross Bass has been out of the state for eight years. I don't know why . . .

J.B.: Where has he been?

J.H. In Washington as a lobbyist.

J.B.: Oh, I didn't realize that.

J.H.: I don't know why . . . most of Ross's money came from organized labor for him to run. I don't know whether Ross looked at it as thinking well, here's my shot on my name recognition, and I can get the black

vote, on the basis of my civil rights record and get all the liberals and win. Ross was just a has been. By the time he showed up in the state, I mean, there wasn't anybody left. He comes out of that same group in middle Tennessee that pretty well surrounds the Tennessean and promotes middle Tennessee Democrats.

J.B.: Is there likely to be a repeat of this Floyd Shield in the '76 Senate race?

J.H.: No, I don't think so.

J.B.: I have just gotten the impression that a heck of a lot of people are interested in him.

J.H.: Ahhh.

J.B.: To depend upon somebody . . .

J.H.: Until the laws are changed, I think it is going to be whoever has the money to run. I think John Hooker would have run for Governor this time if he had had the money to run.. .

J.B.: Say if Fulton were to get in that race, would that be expected to keep a lot of other people out?

J.H.: I think it could. I think, you know, whether John Hooker, or Fulton, or who gets in the race . . . the Senate race in Tennessee, and I mean, in most southern states it is a lot different from the Governors race. You have traditional groups, and those traditional groups always have their candidate. It isn't as much personality politics, although it isn't issue oriented politics that you find up East, but at least you are looking at the

young, you're looking at the liberal vote, the liberal constituency, you're looking at a conservative constituency, you're looking at labor unions, blacks . . .

J.B.: How significant is organized labor in Tennessee politics . . . Democratic politics?

J.H.: You can't say that it's not significant, but I would say it is significant from the time people spend courting them. I don't know that it has been significant from what they have been able to produce lately. But they are a factor. They are certainly not a strong factor here as they would be in another state.

J.B.: How about the other southern states?

J.H.: Well, in my experience, probably as much as in other southern states. You have a couple of unions here like the UAW, and the Teamsters. You have the Ask me (?) Union down in Memphis, who in a specific area are quite effective.

J.B.: That's the . . .?

J.H.: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. There are some areas where unions have quite a sting, but it isn't here like it is in some eastern states where the AFL-CIO are the . . . really carries any weight. I mean, they carry financial weight, but the leadership has not been able to deliver their rank and foul up the polls. Of course, here, as everywhere else, the most obvious indicator of that is the Wallace vote in many of the Presidential elections, particularly in '68.

J.B.: Of course there really aren't really any state wide races except Governor and Senate.

J.H.: No, which to a large degree brings on them this big field. If there had been a Lieutenant Governors race, you probably would have found a Haney or a Butcher, you know, or Jimmy Powers or some of these people in a Lieutenant Governors race because they were building for the future. But here you have to go for the big prize. It is very difficult . . . like Dick Fulton, everybody in Nashville would think Dick Fulton . . . if Dick Fulton announced there would be a big deal, but Dick Fulton probably has zero percent recognition in East Tennessee. I mean, you know, I guess North Carolina is the same way. It wouldn't be like Atlanta where, for example, the Congressman from Atlanta, probably because of the reach of the Atlanta press and television would probably be known in two-thirds of Georgia.

J.B.: That would be true. The rank and file in regard to Fulton, but what about the party activist?

J.H.: Well they know him as a Congressman, but that is about it. It is quite a bit different in this state. I mean, being a state wide figure and being a . . . well, for example, John Hooker or Ray Blanton or Hudley Crockett, or anybody that runs state wide would get much more attention here than this press or the Chattanooga press, or probably the Memphis press than probably Congressman Fulton would. There is just some distinction between being a state wide figure, and being a . . . representing a specific area.

J.B.: How much buying is there of the black vote?
To put it very bluntly.

J.H.: Well, I think . . .

J.B.: And what does the term mean anyway?

J.H.: Well, this is just my personal opinion, I mean I think that you know, you've had the of black people in the South has been, of course, that most of them came from a very controlled situation, or tribal, or family situation, in Africa to here, where they were put on plantations and were controlled by a central authority figure, and then ever after that period, you had . . . you have black politicians today still playing the central authority figure in the lives of most of the black voting public. One man, one vote has made a real change in how people approach the black community and the black vote. It was probably the most significant thing in the whole civil rights package. You now have people in Tennessee that even four years ago when I worked for Gore, I mean, people would pad in in the dark of the night to do their campaigning in the black community, or the Sunday before the churches of the last week, and you had here, three candidates that were actively campaigning in the black community with the black vote, using radio, using direct mail, using the techniques that anyone uses for the white vote. This process is going to take another 20 to 50 years to develop a truly independent black vote, that is not going to be a block vote, and is not going to be

subject to somebody going to a so called central authority figures and saying for a donation to your church, or a donation to something, you know, will you help me to get your vote out. I think that when some people talk about that, . . . but buying the black vote is usually just a racist term, it's used to develop fears and drag out the old racist cloth again, because, you know, to the extent that you spend money in any campaign, you are attempting to exercising leverage of dollars on . . . in return for something, and in that extent, you mean votes, and you go to Memphis, you go to anyplace, in the South, the main problem in our country, and the one reform that is needed so badly is to open up the election process, I mean by having adequate voting machines, and adequate voting places, and having an election commission that isn't in cramped quarters and tries to keep the list of registered voters from everybody that runs, and tries to . . . I mean we actively try to discourage voting in this country, and we make it difficult for people to vote. To that extent we are afraid in this country of the Democratic process. In these counties in Tennessee, where you have a predominantly black population, you definitely have a fear of the Democratic process, a fear of letting everyone vote, and you know, to some extent we are paying the price for not having people . . . black people participate, and educating them properly, giving them decent schools, and bringing them into the process because all of a sudden with the one man one

one vote rule, all of a sudden they have been brought into the process, and by having not participated, by not having the benefits of the process, being under-educated and not very well informed, then they are subject to the pressures of having someone telling them how to vote because this is traditionally how they have been able to express themselves in the process

J.B.: But is money spent differently?

J.H.: Oh sure it is.

J.B.: In going after black votes and white votes.

J.H.: Yes it is. I mean, I think from the stand point of . . . if you are dealing in Memphis or Shelby County, you know, you have to have automobiles, for example on election day, and people are . . . you pay the drivers of cars to take people to vote. Now, you don't do that in Belmeade or Chickasaw Gardens down in Memphis because almost every family in Memphis and Chickasaw Gardens, number one has an automobile, number two, knows where their polling place is.

J.B.: Is this money usually provided by candidates?

J.H.: Yes. I think it is a legitimate expense and until you get to the standpoint of making voting something that is easy and available to people.

J.B.: What type of expenses don't fall under the legitimate category? Is there a substantial amount of money that goes to individuals that are presumed to be able to influence votes . . . that goes for purposes other than getting people to the polls, setting up

telephone banks, distributing literature?

J.H.: I mean, I don't know; there are people that claim that certain people are for sale and that for a sum of money, they will be able to deliver their organization or deliver individual groups. I personally do not know . . . I can't tell you of any of that happening, from the standpoint, you know, . . . there are a lot of people who have alleged that it has happened, they say that it happened.

J.B.: In Shelby County, Butcher and Haney got . . . Butcher got about 35% of the black vote, Haney got about 20% of the black vote; they were the two candidates who spent more money than any of the other candidates, and therefore, some people are making allegations that they are the ones that are "buying votes." What sort of money goes into those campaigns, is it more than just paying the cost of car pools, drivers . . .

J.H.: Well in our campaign, I think that every dollar we spent on the black community . . . I thought was a legitimate expense. I mean, as I say, what you need to come to grips with in this country is how to reform the process. Right now there is no politician in that race who wouldn't spend every dollar he could get his hands on. In a lot of them they probably took out loans and notes, and you know, sacrificed a great deal, maybe even put their own personal security and their families in danger to run for public office. I don't think that is a very good way to run any type of political operation. What I am saying is that, I think,

that any politician that talks about buying the black vote without directing themselves to the problem, you know, is mostly racist talk because every politician in this state . . . not one of them ever mentioned putting any limitation on what he would spend on this campaign; secondly, there wasn't a newspaper or TV outside of, I think, one television station in Nashville, . . . a lot of them preached about spending too much money, but no newspaper turned down any of our ads or any of Jake Butcher's ads. No TV station except one that I know of put any limitation on the amount of advertisement that you could buy . . . I mean, this only works if you can buy the time, and buy the newspaper space and pay for the blitz. So I think it is mostly all hypocrisy and if people address themselves to what is necessary to reform the system, but you have, in this state, you have a one man one vote has made, I think a tremendous impact throughout the South in politics. I think we saw part of the evolution of that in Tennessee this time, when for the first time you had people actually campaigning in the black community for black votes, and most Democratic politicians know . . . I haven't seen the final figures, but I assume the black vote was 20% to 25% of the total vote.

J.B.: Are Haney and Butcher out actively personally campaigning in Shelby County for the black vote?

J.H.: Yes.

J.B.: Who were they seeing, I mean, were they sort of just seeing people at random . . .

J.H.: Well, we had rallies in the black community, we used direct mail in the black community, we campaigned door to door in the black community, we had phone banks in the black community; in other words, we campaigned in the black community like we would campaign in the white community. There were other candidates that used more traditional means of campaigning in the black community. That means getting the endorsement of certain clubs, certain individuals, and not actively seeking the individuals black vote, but . . . the vote of individual blacks but the vote of blacks through their group leader.

J.B.: Are you saying then that Butcher and Haney ran substantially ahead of everybody else in the black precincts in Shelby County because of their more active campaigning, or was it a function of money, or both?

J.H.: I would say . . . the point is, we spent . . . no one was criticizing us for spending probably three-fourths of our money in the white community. Nobody said that we were trying to buy the white vote. I would say that we probably spent 20% - 25% of our budget in the black community, and you are talking about 20% - 25% of the white vote. But the money that was spent in the white community, opening headquarters, having functions, and the extent to which you feed people at rallies and things like this, no one was trying to buy the vote.

J.B.: Were you present at the rally which Haney was reportedly booed off the stage.

J.H.: No.

J.B.: Do you know what happened there?

J.H.: No I don't. I don't know. I think that whole incident hurt us, and I think Maynard Jackson coming into the state probably was negative because of that event. I was not there, and I don't know what transpired.

J.B.: Do you know how it occurred. I mean how did Maynard Jackson and Haney get together on that?

J.H.: Well, Maynard Jackson was in the state campaigning on behalf of Franklin, and he had . . . they appeared at that function down there but exactly how they . . . first of all, it was not accurate that they got booed off the stage, that was not accurate, I mean they got cheered . . . most of the boos were because the program was interrupted by some politicians, but, you know, the publicity . . .

J.B.: What was the relationship between Haney and Jackson?

J.H.: Well the relationship was that David Franklin . . . that Maynard Jackson had been Franklin's attorney and had represented him in Atlanta on some development projects that he had been looking into down there . . .

J.B.: Just recently? Since he was Mayor, or before?

J.H.: Before, when he was Vice-Mayor, and David Franklin who had handled Maynor Jackson's campaign, was also working on our campaign in the black community, but I treat most of that . . . unfortunately, in Washington and down here, where you are dealing with . . .

J.B.: Do you know if Jessie Jackson was supporting Butcher?

J.H.: I don't know. I know he wasn't on Saturday or Sunday, it seems that he was on Monday, I don't know. As you know events transpired, the rally was Saturday night and not a word was said Sunday about anyone being upset about it, and then all of a sudden on Monday a press conference . . .

J.B.: I don't even know the whole background. On Monday, did Jessie Jackson call the press conference?

J.H.: Yeah.

J.B.: What was the thrust of the press conference?

J.H.: Criticizing Maynard Jackson and Franklin for being at the rally.

J.B.: Was it a push rally?

J.H.: Yeah. It was a push rally, it was a national convention, I think . . . but Butcher had the support of the people down there with Stacks records . . .

J.B.: I mean, the impression I got was there was there various rivalries going on in the black community and you all kind of walked into it.

J.H.: That is exactly, I think, what happened.

J.B.: That was the impression I had, but I didn't know much about it.

J.H.: Definite rivalries and personality thing exposed to Jackson enough to know that both of them . . .

J.H. Of course I wish it hadn't happened, but I think that . . .

J.B.: That both of them have territorial jealousies?

J.H.: Yeah. I think that that was damaging to our campaign.

J.B.: Is there any changing role of women in politics in Tennessee?

J.H.: Oh yes, I think so. I mean in the urban areas.

J.B.: Are there more candidates?

J.H.: I haven't seen any serious candidates emerge state wide yet, but I think in the urban areas you see women take a more active role and assume positions that have been reserved for men . . . Political . . .

J.B.: In party activity or . . .

J.H.: In party activity. You know, you always had in Tennessee, it's hard to measure, you have always had a few women in the state house as representatives.

J.B.: Let me bounce one theory off you that we heard and just let me get your reaction to its validity. If you went back ten to fifteen years ago, insofar as black politics was concerned, the key man in most instances was either going to be a preacher or an undertaker, this was the traditional, independent guy who either had money or independence and some leadership function in the black community, then came the civil right movement and because of the nature of the civil rights movement being a legal challenge, black lawyers moved much more into the forefront and became . . . there became much more dependency on black lawyers and there also became many more black lawyers, and the political role of black lawyers began to supplant that of the

preachers and morticians, and that the trend now for emerging new political black leadership coming out of the labor movement partly is the result of the people at Randolph Institutes and the fact that organized labor is now putting its money that goes into political campaigns for the black community . . . I phrased that awkwardly, but anyway, the labor money that goes into black politics is now being funneled through black labor leaders rather than those previously perceived to be the leadership in the black community.

J.H.: Well let me say that in Tennessee, from what I have seen, I . . . if I had to go with anybody, I would still go with black preachers. I think that the process you are talking about is taking place, the problem is that it is the older blacks that are the ones to vote. I mean they were disenfranchized for years. The more blacks you find in churches, then the more religious blacks. I mean they feel the obligation to go out and vote, and they go out and vote. The younger blacks are more turned off to the process and they don't vote. So, while the leadership is changing, I think from the practical standpoint of who can provide the most votes, I would say that it is still the black minister.

J.B.: Does the tradition still prevail there, of candidates at least frequently making contributions to the church?

J.H.: Yes.

J.B.: Is this what is called the term "buying the black vote", is that what it is referred to?

J.H.: I would say that to some extent, that is . . . I think when people are talking about buying the black vote, I think people are looking for someone getting some sort of pay off for their endorsement or, you know, a contribution to a church in exchange for the minister preaching a sermon on behalf of the candidate or something in that nature. You know, you still have that in both black and white churches. Ministers in this state have . . . whether they are AME or Church of Christ or Baptist have a tremendous influence, but I would say yes, that . . .

J.B.: But the tradition of actually making a contribution to a church is much more strong within the black community, right . . . in part because white ministers tend to refrain from getting involved in politics.

J.H.: That's true, but there are some that don't. I mean, we had the largest religious political rally in the nations history when Bill Graham had Richard Nixon and Howard Baker and Bill Brock and all the Republicans at his crusade here in Knoxville in 1970.

J.B.: What was that?

J.H.: Well, it was during the war campaign, and Billy Graham was having a crusade in Knoxville; Richard Nixon appeared along with every Republican state wide official in the state.

J.B.:

J.H.: Gave a sermon that sounded exactly like a Republican campaign speech.

J.B.: I haven't heard him say much about Watergate recently. Has he said anything at all since the resignation?

J.H.: I haven't heard of anything. That didn't help ^hhis creditability very much. I guess with the

backwards it didn't hurt him. I mean if you took a poll . . . Bill Graham is leading a whole lot different life as a result of all of that.

J.B.: And Gerald Ford is apparently going to quit bringing God to the White House and go to church.

J.H.: He's a good Episcopalian. He believes that religion is a personal thing. I don't know, the most interesting thing of all is as I say, what distinguishes the Tennessee gubernatorial race in 1974. I would say . . . you would have to say that to some standpoint that number one the people campaigning . . . actively campaigning for the black vote for the first time. I think secondly, . . .

J.B.: Hooker didn't do that in '70?

J.H.: Not to the I'm talking about campaigning for the black vote and treating the black voter, you know, as an individual, as an independent person, who you are appealing to. I'm not talking about getting the five or six major clubs . . . labor leaders, and trying to get them to deliver the black vote on election day. I'm talking about going out into the black areas, shaking hands, campaigning . . .

J.B.: Was there a difference between Butcher's and Haney's approach to that?

J.H.: I think that Butcher used the more traditional approach, and that is probably one of the reasons why he was more successful. We used an approach that had been used in Atlanta very successfully on behalf of a black candidate, and we thought, at least the people who were handling our black campaign thought that that approach could be used here. I think we were probably ahead of our time, mainly because you had someone that had the resources to compete. But I think Jay went more through the unions and the clubs and leadership. I mean you can look at the endorsements and see that. We tried to pitch our campaign more on actually going underneath the structure and trying to get to the individuals. I think that that didn't work, mainly because your black vote at this time is not that independent, that sophisticated.

J.B.: Whatever you did, it worked in Chatanooga.

J.H.: Well, it was a different situation in Chatanooga. Remember that when you talk about the black vote, you are talking about Memphis. That is the only place that there is such a block that it almost has to be treated differently. I mean in Chatanooga, Franklin had run a campaign before, and they knew where he stood on the issues. He knew the black leadership in the city through working in the city. They knew what he had done for the city, and they knew what he had done for black people in the city. So, it wasn't quite the situation where you have both Butcher and Haney and Wiseman who went in . . . I mean, Butcher was able to do a very interesting thing in West Tennessee, and I think that he was able to get quite a few white and

black votes. So from whatever the standpoint of publicity that he got over there over buying the black vote, he was still able to get a good white conservative vote.

J.B.: Was Walker using basically the same ads that he used in the Bumpers and the Waller's campaigns for Butcher?

J.H.: As I understand, he was. I had never seen any of the media. A newspaper man who had been in the Bumpers campaign, he said the Butcher campaign looked like a mere image of it, with the exception of changing the candidates.

J.B.: We heard that in Mississippi that in the Waller campaign there were some of the same ads that had been used in the Bumper campaign with a different picture.

J.H.: I haven't seen . . .

J.B.: The total copy was unchanged.

J.H.: They ran a very good campaign and had we known probably the type of organization they had built and the amount of money they were going to spend because they clearly spent more money than we did. I mean one of the unfortunate things was that we got tagged as the big spender when it was very clear who spent the most money . . . it wasn't the Haney campaign, it was the Butcher campaign.

J.B.: Let me get your reaction to one other theory, and that is, with some basic understanding of the tradition of the three Tennessees, the difference in the political

tradition in the three sections of the state and the historic differences and so forth, that it struck me that that sort of a single unifying thread that runs across the state is that in religion, in all three sections is still basically Protestant, white Protestant and basically toward conservative white Protestant . . . meaning that the Methodist Church would sort of be towards the left of the religious spectrum across the state of the bulk of the Tennessee voters. My question is what would . . . was that a major factor in Brock's victory in his use of the prayer thing, and just how much impact did that have? Say compared with bussing in the Gore campaign?

J.H.: I think it had quite an impact. I think religion is extremely important in this state. It . . . like any other era (?) or region of the country the importance diminishes in the urban areas among both blacks and whites (break in conversation to flip tape) . . . is extremely important and I think that had quite an impact on the Gore campaign.

J.B.: How about the Graham rally?

J.H.: I think that had a tremendous impact.

J.B.: How do you view Billy Graham's political role? Not only in Tennessee but in the South as a whole?

J.H.: Well I think he is . . . been identified with the southern strategy. The only experience I have had, or exposure to him, I knew of the rally in

Charlotte and the rally here in Knoxville. In both of those incidences I think it was a religious crusade that was turned over to be used as a political purpose.

J.B.: Are you familiar with the one he had in Columbia, South Carolina in '64?

J.H.: No.

J.B.: I think it was the Saturday before the election for Goldwater.

J.H.: Tennessee is a conservative state, and it's a conservative state right now, not only because of its religion but because over the last fifteen or 20 years it has lost most of its young people. So any state that is sort of moderate to conservative to begin with and then has such an old median age of the population, you've got to look at it as a conservative state. That doesn't mean that liberals like, you know, Kefauver or Gore or Clemmon couldn't get elected again, because it is also a very personality oriented state. That is why somebody like Billy Graham can have a tremendous impact. I mean, it's the country music center, it's the big following of individuals. But personalities, not issues have traditionally been the big concern in almost all of the gubernatorial elections since I have been active you know, in my lifetime in this state.

J.B.: What would have to happen again for Tennessee to go Democratic in a Presidential election?

J.H.: Well, I think if the economy keeps going to hell, that it could easily go Democratic in '76. You know, if you had the right ticket. I think that

you have got to have somebody that is not perceived as being out of the eastern liberal wing in the party, and someone that can identify with the people in this state. But I think that the main reason that you have had the Republicans take over this state is very simple. They have been able to organize and get their vote out. For the last 15 years . . . the entire century, the Republicans have been a minority party, and the only way a minority party ever wins is to get their vote out. Now recently, since about 1970, I think you have seen in Tennessee, as elsewhere around the South, a growing number of independents, and in the future, they may hold the balance. But right now, if you had a strong effective Democratic organization that could get out the Democratic vote . . .

J.B.: Is that developing?

J.H.: I mean, you know, Beaufort Ellington sat on his hands in '68, that is why Hubert Humphrey got 28% of the vote. I mean, I don't whether Hubert Humphrey could have carried this state, it is very doubtful, but he could have come damn close.

J.B.: Who won this state in '68?

J.H.: Nixon . . . Nixon had about 38%, Wallace about 33% and Humphrey 28%, or something like that. I don't know what the figures were.

J.B.: Is the Democratic party developing a stronger organization?

J.H.: Not that I can see right now. Strong organizations are developing around strong individuals. Butcher is surrounded by people who I think if they had gotten

the Governor's chair, would have built a strong organization. I think our campaign and some of the others probably . . .

J.B.: How significant were both the election and the selection procedure of the Democratic nominees of the Supreme Court?

J.H.: I just don't know that much about it. I came in late and was totally involved in the Governor's race. I mean, I think it was rather significant. Well tell me, what are your observations?