JUDGMENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, 1580-1615

Patricia Davis Patrick

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of English and Comparative Literature.

Chapel Hill
2007

Approved by:
Jessica Wolfe
Reid Barbour
Mary Floyd-Wilson
Mary Pardo
Ennio Rao
ABSTRACT

PATRICIA DAVIS PATRICK: Judgment in Early Modern England, 1580-1615
(Under the direction of Jessica Wolfe)

My dissertation explores how Samuel Daniel, Robert Dallington, and George Chapman understand the notion of judgment. For early modern thinkers, both in England and on the Continent, a variety of terms – judgment, decorum, prudence, equity, and discretion – all denote a faculty that enables accommodation to circumstances while maintaining constancy. The dissertation examines how these authors synthesize ideas from art theory, poetics, and political theory to construct models of judgment that offer ethical and epistemological stability while enabling adaptation to variable circumstances and human fallibility. Samuel Daniel sees judgment as obfuscated to some degree by custom, but also sees divine grace as sustaining both custom and judgment. Robert Dallington offers his readers a winding, twisting path to prudence. George Chapman synthesizes ideas from art theory and religious ceremony to suggest a remedy for fallible moral judgment.
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Reid Barbour, Darryl Gless, and Jessica Wolfe for encouraging me to undertake the doctoral program. Jessica Wolfe has been an unparalleled advisor, sharing her impressive breadth of knowledge and her unstinting enthusiasm for learning. I am amazed and grateful for the time, kindness, and intellectual generosity she has offered me. Reid Barbour’s example of scholarly integrity and intellectual rigor has constantly motivated me to strive for a clear-sighted, historically grounded understanding of the early moderns. Mary Floyd-Wilson generously went out of her way to provide several rich, happy opportunities for me to become acquainted with Jonson, Shakespeare, and Marlowe. Mary Pardo and Michael Cole offered a memorable introduction to the visual and intellectual beauties of early modern art. Throughout the dissertation Mary Pardo has provided thought-provoking conversation and reviving hot chocolate. Ennio Rao has been an inspiring example not only of great erudition, but also of deep feeling for Italian authors.

I am grateful for the support of my family. My parents, William and Gayle Davis, have offered love and support, a home full of books, and examples of lives devoted to service. I am blessed with the companionship and example of my husband, Scott Patrick. His curiosity, commitment to the well-crafted, and good heart are a constant inspiration.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Chapter**

1. The Circumstances of Early Modern English Notions of Judgment ........... 1  
   - Milieu .................................................................................................................. 6  
   - Political Prudence.............................................................................................. 10  
   - Decorum ............................................................................................................. 15  
   - Perspective, guidizio dell’occhio, and proportion........................................... 20  
   - The view from on high...................................................................................... 31  
   - Chapter summaries.......................................................................................... 39  

2. “Custome that is before all Law, Nature that is above all Arte”:
   - Samuel Daniel’s Natural Judgment ................................................................ 54  
   - *Aminta* ........................................................................................................... 55  
   - *The Queenes Arcadia*..................................................................................... 73  

3. Robert Dallington’s *Aphorismes*: An Odyssean Route to Prudence ........... 113  

4. “Mutuall Raies”: The Eucharistic Perspective in George Chapman’s  
   - *Hero and Leander* ........................................................................................... 152  

5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 194  

Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 199
CHAPTER ONE

The Circumstances of Early Modern English Notions of Judgment

This dissertation explores concepts of judgment developed by Samuel Daniel, Robert Dallington, and George Chapman. Judgment is a pervasive concern between 1580 and 1615, related to crucial moral and epistemological issues. As I examine how these authors think about judgment, I hope to convey the creativity, beauty, and urgency with which they engage this concept. I also hope to suggest broader insights into early modern habits of thought on intercultural exchange, the problem of negotiating the often distorting media of perception, and the relationship of reason and emotion.

By judgment – and the allied concepts of prudence and decorum – early modern writers mean the ability to make sound evaluations of how to act morally and wisely in circumstances that change and vary. Judgment is a faculty permitting accommodation to potentially infinite configurations of time, place, and persons; it enables its possessor to make sound decisions when precept alone cannot provide an adequate guide. While early modern thinkers value a capacity for accommodation to variable circumstance, they also often seek foundations for what might otherwise be undesirably subjective and morally unreliable standards. This dissertation explores how these authors strive to stabilize the workings of judgment. This dissertation also argues that, while Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman all see judgment as almost too protean to capture in books, they all try to teach judgment in innovative and powerful ways.
The kind of judgment that will be considered in this dissertation takes root in Aristotle’s definition of prudence in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle here defines prudence as a kind of knowledge that is focused on particulars, oriented towards action, and based on experience. Prudence is a “truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings.” Because prudence is concerned with action and with the potential subjectivity of notions of what is “good and bad for human beings,” prudence [phronesis] differs from a sure knowledge of those things that are stable and verifiable [epistême]. Prudence functions in the more uncertain realm of opinion, change, and circumstance. Some early modern definitions of judgment conflate Aristotle’s definition of prudence, which operates in relation to variable particulars, with his image for equity, a flexible measure that can be applied to particular cases. According to Aristotle, when a general, absolute rule would be unjust, equity serves “like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid, but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case.” The essentials of this definition, prudence as both a “truth-seeking” quality, and as a flexible rule, unite the concepts of prudence, decorum, ragione di stato, and perspective from which Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman draw their understanding of judgment.

One of the foundational arguments of this dissertation is that early modern notions of judgment are eclectic. Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman draw terminology and constructs from such diverse endeavors as the visual arts, politics, poetics, and natural science. The breadth of their gatherings demonstrates that interest in negotiating variable circumstances is a key concept, pervasive in early modern culture.

Understanding what judgment means thus requires an interdisciplinary study. My inquiry into judgment is informed and inspired by scholars who study early
modern culture from many perspectives. Their work illuminates connections between prudence and related notions. According to Victoria Kahn, Aristotle sees prudence and decorum as equivalent faculties that deal with the practical and particular. This connection persists in early modern notions of prudence and decorum. Kahn also discusses Cicero’s influential sense of the pervasive nature of decorum. In his Orator, Cicero defines decorum as an awareness of what is fitting to time, place, rank and other circumstances. This principle has broad application: it “must always be considered in every part of oration and life” [semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat est considerandum]. Cicero’s understanding of decorum as impinging on all aspects of life informs subsequent notions of decorum and the related concepts of prudence and good judgment.

Decorum dictates ideals of both visual beauty and moral rectitude. Alison Thorne argues that early modern thinkers see decorum as reflecting the harmony and proportion of an orderly universe. As Thorne points out, Cicero’s De officiis is foundational for their sense of an affinity between moral and aesthetic beauty. Cicero argues that observance of moral decorum engages the attention of others just as physical beauty attracts the eye with a harmonious and graceful arrangement of parts:

For as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed. [Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum quod eluctet in vita, movet approbationem eorum quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.]
Cicero associates aesthetic harmony, the orderly arrangement of features, with behavior that is beautiful because it is fitting. Cicero’s understanding of connections between aesthetic and moral beauty links the concerns of the visual arts, poetics, and moral philosophy.

Other studies of early modern culture show that eclectic notions of judgment, decorum and prudence inform a wide range of early modern endeavors. In Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature, Jessica Wolfe studies notions of judgment and subtlety that span the visual arts, poetry, moral philosophy, courtly behavior, and political prudence. Reid Barbour demonstrates the centrality of accounting for circumstances by seventeenth-century “advocates of the Church of England, [who] are deeply committed to the investigation of religious circumstance as the most pervasive and pious level of religious experience.” Barbour’s study considers the broad range of the circumstances seventeenth-century thinkers find relevant to religion, encompassing, for instance, notions of heroism, ceremony, social decorum, and the natural world. Karen Hern suggests the breadth of notions of judgment as she discusses how Lucy Harington was admired for the judgment “both moral and aesthetic” which she demonstrated not only as a patron of poets and painters, but also as a committed Protestant.

Art historians point out that the sixteenth-century notion of giudizio dell’occhio, the artist’s ability to determine right proportion and beauty with his own eyes rather than by rules, is related to prudence, decorum, and discretion. Robert Klein argues that the artist’s giudizio dell’occhio is comparable to Guicciardini’s sense of discrezione as a “sort of compass” to be employed “in the face of a political reality too complex to be fathomed” by ordinary reason. In his discussion of the sixteenth-century “language of art,” David Summers defines giudizio dell’occhio as a practical kind of judgment that resembles prudence, discretion, and decorum. Summers shows that sixteenth-century art theorists connect giudizio and discrezione as faculties
that discern distinctions and thus enable graceful accommodation to particular circumstances.¹²

Judgment is a key concept not only because it is pervasive, but also because it is a concept undergoing revision. Barbour, Kahn, and Wolfe have all shown that pressure on ideals of judgment comes with the increasingly powerful role that skepticism plays in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century English thought. On one hand, as a practical rather than an absolute knowledge, prudential judgment seems compatible with the skeptical notion that truth comes mediated. Nevertheless, skepticism about the reliability of the senses and intellect and about the accessibility of truth also erodes confidence in some of the grounds upon which confidence in this practical judgment rests. Michel Montaigne’s skeptical writings, for instance, both validate custom and challenge the accessibility of universal natural laws, the basis of consensus. As Victoria Kahn observes, skeptics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries question “whether there is a common sense or natural reason shared by all individuals that informs our speech and action, that founds communities and commonplaces.”¹³ Barbour demonstrates that apologists for the English church feel the necessity of addressing such “lapses in consensus.”¹⁴ Wolfe points out that interest in instrumentality highlights the skeptical perception that “sense and intellect are themselves mediating instruments.”¹⁵ George Chapman and Ben Jonson chose for themselves emblems that proclaim the imperfection of human judgment. Jonson’s broken compass and Chapman’s *baculus in acqua*, the stick that appears bent in water, symbolize their assessment of the fallibility of both sensory and moral perception.¹⁶ Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman are also influenced by what Richard Tuck has called a “new humanism.” The combined influence of Tacitus, Stoicism, and Skepticism sharpens a sense of the tenuous nature of judgment and spurs a reassessment of traditional morality.¹⁷
Daniel, Chapman, and Dallington are also reassessing the grounds on which good judgment may rest. They search for new grounds of consensus and foundations for solid judgment; however, they also accommodate and even embrace human fallibility in powerful ways. Skeptical modesty about individual judgment and skeptical inquiry into the grounds of consensus makes works by Daniel, Chapman, and Dallington adventurous and challenging. They share the process of inquiry with their readers, uniting gnosia and praxis. As Kahn argues, it is a humanist commonplace that “reading not only persuades us to prudential action but is itself a form of prudence.”¹⁸ One of the main lines of inquiry in this dissertation is how Daniel, Chapman, and Dallington posit grounds of practical certainty, but also immerse their readers in variable, shifting circumstances.

**Milieu**

The particular circumstances which Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman inhabit shape which notions of judgment are important to them and how they see judgment as useful. Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman all had some connections with the group that successively orbited around Robert Dudley, Earl of Leceister; Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex; and finally Henry, Prince of Wales. The members of this group were diverse, but they shared common interests that informed their understanding of judgment. Members of this group shared a commitment to international Protestantism and a disenchantment with court policies. Most members of the group traveled in Europe, cultivated European contacts, and were interested in European art and literature. Such interests and experience placed them in contact with revisionary approaches to history, politics, and the arts.

Members of the Leceister-Essex circle shared a commitment to militant Protestantism that put them at odds with their rulers. Leceister and Essex were impatient with Elizabeth’s less than fervent commitment to international
Protestantism. The members of their circle were drawn to Leceister and Sidney as heroes who fought for their religious ideals. Essex was also seen as a “Protestant champion,” the focal figure of a group deeply committed to international Protestantism and a warrior’s code of honor. As Roy Strong points out, Prince Henry was considered the “heir to Sidney and Devereux.” After the rebellion and execution of Essex, Henry attracted many members of Essex’s following, cultivating a court whose characteristics countered those of James. Henry supported an atmosphere of strict morality, of commitment to militant Protestantism, and interest in imperialist ventures.

Earlier members of the group were discontented with Elizabeth’s unwilling intervention in the Protestant cause abroad. Later group members, who cluster around Henry, were alarmed by King James’s pacific attitude towards Catholic Spain.

Impatience with their rulers’ less than fervent commitment to militant Protestantism distanced Essex group members from the court. Their discontent was also fed by their interest in Stoic and Tacitean thought. Reading Tacitus’s accounts of intrigue and deceit fueled and directed the discontent of Essex, who felt his setbacks were due to courtly jealousies and machinations. As J. H. Salmon and others have argued, a keen interest in Seneca and Tacitus predisposed Essex and the members of his circle to see the court as a dangerous place of intrigue and tyranny.

Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman develop their notions of judgment partly as a mode of coping with living in regimes that they perceive as hostile to some of their deepest ideals. All suffered experiences that reinforced their sense of how perilous it could be to criticize the current government. Robert Dallington was imprisoned along with his patron, the Earl of Rutland, in the aftermath of the Essex rebellion. In 1605 Daniel was charged by the Privy Council with presenting an overly sympathetic portrayal of Essex in his tragedy *Philotas*, and Chapman was imprisoned for
making fun of James’s court in *Eastward Ho*. Such experiences sharpened their interest in finding prudently indirect modes of critique.

The Essex circle’s interest in Seneca and Tacitus motivated them to develop judicious, prudent response to hostile authority. This reading also reflected their interest in revisionary movements in Continental thought. The Essex group came by their combination of Seneca and Tacitus through the Dutch moral and political philosopher, Justus Lipsius, a key figure in “new humanism’s” reevaluation of political prudence. The Essex circle was also reading works by Machiavelli and Guicciardini that were transforming notions of history and politics.

This particular group was open to new idea in the arts as well as in politics. Members of the circle include patrons and poets who were curious about developments in European art and literature and eager to shape a national aesthetic. Leicester, a large-scale patron of the arts, had extensive art collections and helped to bring the Italian artist Federico Zuccaro to England. Michael Wyatt calls the Earl of Leceister “the most prominent advocate of things Italian” in Elizabethan England. Sidney and Spenser not only advocated the circle’s interest in international Protestantism, but they also shared a passionate curiosity about European aesthetics. They powerfully adopted and transformed Petrarchan sonnet and Italian epic, and their works are full of homage to the visual arts. Sidney had an impressive knowledge of Italian artworks and art theory and was probably acquainted with the art treatises of Leon Battista Alberti and Paolo Pino. John Harington’s translation of Ariosto’s *Orlando Furioso*, with extensive footnotes that allude to his English contemporaries, is a monumental effort to adapt the Italian poem for English readers. The artist Marcus Gheerarts, whom Roy Strong calls “the most important artist of quality to work in England in large-scale between Eworth and Van Dyke,” was patronized by Essex and his associate Henry Lee. Essex also patronized the artist William Segar. Lucy Harington was another dedicated patron of the arts. She supported
Jonson, Donne, and Daniel; avidly collected art; learned Italian from John Florio and supported his translation of Montaigne. Prince Henry’s passionate interest in the arts is extensively documented by Roy Strong, who argues that had Henry lived, he “would have effected in England a successful marriage of all the achievements in the arts of Renaissance Italy with an unshakeable and fiercely Protestant ethic.” Henry gathered together such influential artists, architects, and poets as Ben Jonson, Inigo Jones, Isaac Oliver, and George Chapman.

This lively cultural exchange powerfully shapes notions of judgment for most members of the Essex circle. One of the most influential movers of this exchange was John Florio, a second-generation Italian living in England, who married Daniel’s sister and was patronized by Lucy Harington. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, Florio gets credit for the first use of the word judicious. Guidicioso – defined as ‘judicious, learned, wise, discreet” – appears in Florio’s A Worlde of Words, published in 1598, the first of his two English-Italian dictionaries. Judgment is a key concept in many of the works which Florio promotes and for which his dictionary prepares budding readers of Italian. The possession of giudizio is crucial to the success of Baldassare Castiglione’s courtier, who adapts his behavior to times, places, and persons. Torquato Tasso and Giraldi Cinthio describe the poet observant of decorum as giudicioso. Giudicio and discrezione enable the artists in Giorgio Vasari’s art history to shape their works to fitting proportions and their lives to worldly success. Judicious accommodation to circumstances is one of the most controversial and influential notions advocated in the works of Nicolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini. A skeptical account of the fallibilities of judgment is also a central theme for one of Florio’s most significant French imports, his translation of the essays of Montaigne.

Members of the Essex circle were exposed to concepts of judgment that come from a variety of disciplines and that were the subjects of debate and revision. The
concepts of judgment developed by Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman emerge from a stimulating contact with revisionary European thinking as well as with classical thought. All the authors considered in this dissertation are influenced by the Stoic elements of Seneca's philosophy and by Cicero's notions of decorum. Daniel's conception of judgment owes much to his interest in Lucretius, Montaigne, Italian pastoral, and Castiglione. The entire corpus of Dallington's work involves some kind of intercontinental exchange. Dallington's first work, undertaken anonymously, is a translation of Francesco Colonna's *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, a romance packed with fanciful accounts of classical architecture. While working for the Earl of Rutland, Dallington wrote guidebooks to Italy and France, which treat both politics and art. Dallington's *Aphorismes*, the work most closely considered in this dissertation, combines an epitome of Guicciardini's history of Italy with pithy bits of wisdom from Latin, Greek, French, Italian, and Spanish sources. Chapman's concept of judgment derives from Stoicism, Italian Neoplatonism, and Italian art theory.

Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman shape their concepts of judgment from Classical and continental notions, such as prudence, *ragione di stato*, and decorum. These are, in some ways, distinct types of judgment with applicability to particular, differing circumstances. However, early modern writers also work with these notions eclectically, seeing them as parallel kinds of constructs. These different concepts of judgment all advocate flexibility and attention to particulars rather than general rules, and they convey a sense that judgment is an imperfect kind of knowledge.

*Political Prudence*

The Essex group is keenly attuned to Continental developments that are transforming the arts of government, the nature of history, and notions of prudence. According to F. J. Levy, Sidney, Essex and their associates spearheaded the English development of a new approach to history, reading and imitating Tacitus,
Machiavelli, and Guicciardini. They read for lessons in prudence, looking to Tacitus for instruction for living in corrupt times. In Guicciardini and Machiavelli, they found instruction in how to learn from history. Guicciardini and Machiavelli offer revisionary ways of imparting a kind of practical knowledge which cannot be contained in simple examples or precepts. Their new approach to history offers lessons in prudence.

The histories written by Machiavelli and Guicciardini break away from a traditional focus on tracing the workings of Providence in history. Instead, they analyze secondary causes of personality and fortune. As Levy puts it, they inquire into “the extent to which men could plan for the unpredictable.” Thus, the new history is notably engaged with prudence. As Felix Gilbert argues, Guicciardini seeks to employ and to inculcate a “rational efficiency,” a kind of prudence that attempts to understand changing circumstances well enough to enable good policy-making. Guicciardini’s focus on secondary, rather than providential, causes puts historical analysis into the realm of prudence, which deals with uncertain, changeable things.

While members of the Essex group are eager to absorb the lessons of prudence offered by Italian history, they also wrestle with the way Machiavelli challenges traditional humanist morality. As Quentin Skinner points out, Machiavelli directly counters the traits of virtuous princes espoused by Seneca’s De clementia and Cicero’s De officiis, arguing that such accepted virtues as clemency and generosity are not always expedient for rulers. Machiavelli divides virtù from virtue, justifying even immoral actions for the sake of preserving the state. For many of his English readers, Machiavelli’s view on the importance of dissimulation is particularly influential and problematic. Machiavelli argues that seeming to have the virtues is more advantageous than actually possessing them; a successful ruler “must be a great feigner and dissembler.” Machiavelli’s challenge to humanist morality characterizes what Tuck calls a “new humanism,” a skeptical inquiry into received notions and
morality. The “new humanism” especially interests the Essex group. As Malcolm Smuts points out, however, traditional Ciceronian thinking is equally pervasive.\textsuperscript{46} Notions of prudence espoused by early modern English thinkers attempt to reconcile these apparently inimical modes of thinking. Members of the Essex group appreciate Machiavellian realism and flexibility; however, they also champion humanistic morality. Their notions of prudence reconstruct both Machiavellian and humanist teaching to combine flexibility and stability.

The Essex group’s thinking on flexible but moral prudence is especially influenced by Justus Lipsius. Essex group members are familiar with his editions of Tacitus and Seneca and his \textit{De politica}, a work particularly influential on Robert Dallington. Lipsius’s \textit{De politica} draws on Tacitus and Seneca as well as contemporary political writers, notably Machiavelli, to construct a prudent approach to contemporary politics. Lipsius’s work influentially outlines the contours of prudence, reaffirming classical humanist notions, but also synthesizing them with Machiavellian expediency.

Lipsius’s definition of prudence recalls Aristotle’s image of the Lesbian rule: “And like as the carpenters worke cannot wel go forward without the plummet and the square, so can we not in like manier enterprise any thing, without this guiding rule, which I define to be an understanding and discretion” [Atque ut Architectis opus nullum recte processerit, sine libella et linea; non item nobis, sine norma hac directrice. Quam definio, intellectum et dilectum rerum].\textsuperscript{47} Prudence is a principle of stability. However, Lipsius also sees prudence as allied to flexibility, even instability: “that which we call Prudence is indeed, unstable and wavering. For what other thing is Prudence than the election of those things, which never remaine after one and the same manner” [quia revera instabile totum et fluctuans est, quod Prudentiam vocamus. Quam enim aliud ea, quam electio rerum quae aliter atque aliter sese habent].\textsuperscript{48} Because Prudence engages with infinite variety, it “can hardly
be tied to precepts. That it extendeth very farre, that it is uncertaine and covered.
Which is the cause why there can no certaine rules be given thereof” [praecceptis
difficile alligari. Late fusam esse, Instabilem, et Obtectam. Itaque aliquid de ea, non
plene a nobis praecipi].49 Prudence cannot be taught by general precept. It is a widely
ranging kind of ability, a readiness to adapt to variable particulars.

As the ability to adapt to variability, prudence involves discretion, a kind of
good judgment that consists, as its Latin roots suggest, in “the action of separating or
distinguishing.”50 Lipsius’s affirmation that prudence “can hardly be tied to precepts”
recalls a similar argument by Guicciardini, who defines discretion as the ability to
focus on discreet particulars rather than to apply general rules:

It is a great error to speak of the things of the world indistinctly and
absolutely, because almost everything differs because of the variety of
circumstances, which cannot be evaluated with the same measure, and these
distinctions are not written in books, but taught by discretion. [È grande
errore parlare delle cose del mondo indistintamente e assolutamente e,
per dire così per regola; perché quasi tutte hanno distinzione e eccezione
per la varietà delle circumstanze, le quali non si possono fermare con una
medesima misura; e queste distinzioni e eccezioni non si trovano scritte in
su’ libri, ma bisogna le insegni la discrezione.]51

Discretion brings particulars into focus. The discreet statesman accommodates to
varying circumstances by being able to isolate the crucial details in which events
differ from each other.

While political writers strive to prepare their readers for a variety of
circumstances, the moral limits of accommodation are keenly debated. Machiavelli
challenges humanist fundamentals of political thought with his contention that the
preservation of the state justifies departures from strictly moral conduct. Responses
to ragione di stato, as this notion comes to be known, often strive to reconcile
humanist morality with the slippery world of contemporary politics.52 Lipsius
argues that those who understand the treacheries and dangers of contemporary politics would not “so strictly condemne the Italian faulte-writer,” Machiavelli [nec Maculonum Italum tam districte damnandum]. Lipsius agrees with Machiavelli on the necessity of deceit, but he puts moral strictures on it. Following Aristotle, Justus Lipsius declares that prudence unguided by virtue is nothing but “subtill craft” [calliditas]. Lipsius advises that the ruler may “decline gently from the laws” [abire leviter ab humanis legibus] only when necessary for preservation, not for aggression.

Lipsius reconciles flexible prudence with a more stable system of morality by shading in the areas between the absolutes of morality and necessity. He adapts Machiavelli’s radical notion of justifiable deceit to a stricter moral code in a formulation that could be considered a display of prudent discretion. Lipsius distinguishes among four grades of deceit ranging from justifiable dissimulation to damnable perfidy. Lipsius thus makes room for flexible prudence to move while also setting moral bounds on this movement. Lipsius’s spectrum of dissimulation probably influences Francis Bacon’s 1612 essay “On Simulation and Dissimulation.” Bacon, like Lipsius, distinguishes among degrees and circumstances that makes veiling one’s purposes or convictions more or less culpable. Deceit ranges from the relatively innocuous practice of Secrecy to the vice of Simulation: “The best composition and temperature is to have openness in fame and opinion; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable; and a power to feign, if there be no remedy.” Bacon and Lipsius apply discretion, the ability to make fine distinctions, in order to adapt to Machiavelli’s appealingly pragmatic but potentially amoral politics. Their discriminating distinctions suggest deep commitments to both flexibility and moral bounds.

A dialogue between worldly savvy and strict morality characterizes many early modern notions of prudence. Francis Bacon argues that Machiavellian insights can
serve innocent ends: “We are much beholden to Machiavel, and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent.” Chapman seeks a similar balance between the wisdom of serpents and the harmlessness of doves. In An Epicede or Funerall Song, Chapman praises Prince Henry’s ability to combine serpentine politics with transparent truthfulness: “His heart wore all the foldes of Policie, / Yet went as naked as Simplicitie.” Dallington advocates prudent “sailing besides compasse, and swarving from the direct line of sincere and ouvert dealing.” However, Dallington gives swerving some firm moral boundaries: “Yet may he by no means, nor for any end whatsoever, be false of his faith or breaker of his word.” Early modern English notions of prudence often attempt to encompass both flexibility and stable moral grounds.

Decorum

When Lipsius defines prudence as kind of judgment “having regard unto the time, the places, and to men” [tempora, loca, homines adspicit], he alludes to the notion of decorum. For early modern thinkers, prudence and decorum present slightly different faces of the same principle. Both prudence and decorum involve practical, active matters, accommodation to circumstances, and attention to particulars. Both characterize imperfect rather than certain knowledge. Thus, these terms are often used synonymously or in conjunction with each other. The lively discussions about the genres of epic, romance, and pastoral thus have implications not only for poetics, but also for political and private conduct. Writers who discuss poetics inquire into the right use of dissimulation, treating it as a moral issue that crosses disciplinary bounds, and they question the moral boundaries of accommodation to times and places.
Parallels between prudence and poetic judgment are made by some of the more prominent critics in the Italian sixteenth-century battles over the genres of epic and romance. In his 1554 Discorso dei Romanzi, Giovambattista Giraldi Cinzio devotes considerable attention to the poet’s judicious accommodation to times, places, and persons, an essential principle in his argument that romance is the genre best suited to his times. To describe this judicious attention to circumstances, Cinzio uses the word prudence [prudenza], suggesting alliances between poetic judgment and a parallel, but wider, range of concerns implied by prudence.62

Tasso links poetic judgment with political prudence, courtly dissimulation, and equity in his dialogue “La Cavaletta overo de la Poesia Toscana” (1585). Tasso’s spokesman, the Forestiero, justifies poetic license by appealing to Aristotle’s definition of equity: “But have you not observed that when the material cannot accommodate the rule, that the rule bends to fit the material, as is the case with what is called the Lesbian rule?” [Ma avete voi osservato ch’alcuna volta, non potendosi la materia adattare a la regola, la regola si piega a la materia, come aveniva di quella che fu detta regola lesbia?]63 The Forestiero goes on to argue that “the material of contingent things … requires that the rule bend itself to circumstances,” and that “this bending shows the artist’s judgment” [la material de le cose contingenti … recerca che la regola sua si torca e si pieghi secondo l’occasioni: il qual piegamento è il giudicio de l’artefice].64 For Tasso this notion of flexible judgment has applications beyond poetry.

Tasso links poetic judgment with political and moral prudence in his Discorsi del poema eroico (1587), a second, revised, version of his discourses on the epic. Tasso extensively rewrites the section on poetic judgment. Originally a brief discussion identified judgment as the ability to select appropriate material.65 In the second version Tasso renames this virtue “prudence” and adds several pages that give this
Tasso defines prudence as an essential skill for poets who deal with the vast variety of the world:

The great diversity of opinions, or rather the discords of judgments, the change of languages, of customs, of laws, of ceremonies, of republics, of kingdoms, of emperors, almost of the world itself [la diversità de le opinioni, o più tosto la contrarietà de’ giudicii, la mutazione de le favelle, de’ costumi, de le leggi, de le cerimonie, de le republiche, de’ regni, de gl’imperatori, e quasi del mondo istesso].

The poet enjoys considerable freedom to modify these customs to contemporary taste and utility. However, while Tasso praises rule-bending prudence, he also gives it bounds. In this discourse, Tasso defends the traditional unity of the epic poem by distinguishing between flexible and inflexible rules. Some customs common to the classical epic may be brought up to date, “accommodated to that use which presently rules the world” [come piace a l’usanza che oggi vive e signoreggia il mondo, si possono accomodare]. However, poets may not alter certain eternal tenets of moral behavior and fundamental laws of poetics.

Tasso celebrates poetic judgment bounded by fundamental, unchanging moral and poetic laws; his attempt to embrace both flexibility and stability parallels Lipsius’s and Bacon’s accommodation to Machiavellian prudence. Tasso is also responding to other important currents in early modern thought. As world exploration revealed an expanding array of differing cultural norms, universal standards of morality were questioned. The concept of flexible decorum in poetics was invoked as a response to cultural difference. For some thinkers the notion of norms that reflect different circumstance was threatening. The Jesuit Antonio Possevino, for instance, criticizes Bodin’s conception of culturally specific norms as overly flexible, a threat to the stability of universal morality and religion:
There will be no straight way of the Lord, no unchanging law of nature, no common gift of grace, nor a Church, when, according to this man, it ought to change according to time, place and persons just as by a Lesbian rule. [Non erit aequa via Domini, neque permanens naturae lex, nec commune gratiae donum, neque una Ecclesia, quando per hunc, pro tempore, loco, personis, tamquam regula Lesbia mutanda sit.]  

Possevino sees “a Lesbian rule” of decorum as far too flexible. His sense that an overly tolerant acceptance of cultural difference might threaten stability gives some idea of why Tasso and others might want to affirm stability as well as flexibility.

Throughout his essays, Montaigne makes the kind of argument that Possevino finds so perilous. Montaigne criticizes a false sense of certainty about what is universally valid. Such misplaced certainty leads to cultural arrogance and factional violence as individuals try to enforce faulty notions of absolute truth. In his essay, “Of Canniballes,” Montaigne argues that universal natural law is inaccessible to fallible human reason, “As indeede, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, than the example and Idea of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live in.” In the absence of reliable access to universal law, Montaigne advises a decorous adherence to local custom.

The way that Tasso and Montaigne connect poetic and moral decorum has roots in Cicero. As mentioned above, Cicero influentially argues that decorum is the principle to be observed in all aspects of life. This notion has a more contemporary exposition in Castiglione’s Courtier. Discussing how the appearance of grace may be achieved by those that do not have it straight from the heavens, Castiglione’s Ludovico da Canossa offers no easily mastered precepts and no absolute rules, except for one. The successful courtier must observe the “most universal rule” [regola universalissima] of avoiding affectation, cultivating the effortless attitude of sprezzatura that makes all actions appear gracefully natural and artless. Such naturalness is achieved by observing the “regole universali” of accommodating to
times, places and persons, essentially by practicing decorum. When, in his essay “Of Custome,” Montaigne defends following local custom as the “rule of rules, and generall law of lawes,” he is probably echoing both Castiglione and Cicero’s Orator.

Throughout the Courtier, Castiglione argues that this “universal rule” is gained not through precept but experience. In the first book, his characters discuss how to judge the best style in prose. Ludovico da Canossa defends a natural style based on the usage of those with a prudential judgment born of experience:

With learning and practise [they] have gotten a good judgement, and with it consent and agree to receive the wordes that they thinke good, which are knowne by a certaine naturall judgment, and not by art or any manner rule.

[Con la dottrina ed esperienzia s’hanno guadagnato il bon giudicio, e con quello concorrono e consentono ad accettar le parole che lor paiono bone, le quali si conoscono per un certo guidicio naturale e non per arte o regula alcuna.]

Good prose style is measured by the consensus of those with good judgment rather than by static precept. Castiglione defines the good judgment of the courtier in a way that parallels notions of political prudence. The graceful courtier pays attention to particular circumstances and meets them with flexibility.

Tasso draws on Castiglione not only for this principle of flexibility, but also for his sense of the utility of dissimulation. Castiglione’s prudent courtier practices sprezzatura, the art of achieving graceful actions by dissimulating effort. Castiglione argues that the courtier’s skills of artful dissimulation may serve public as well as private good. A good counselor employs a “healthy deceit” [inganno salutifero] to construct the kind of counsel that artfully and pleasurably leads a patron to virtue. In the dialogue “La Cavaletta,” Tasso argues that poets, orators and rulers not only bend rules to expediency, but they also clothe truth in a more pleasing or palatable guise in order to serve the public good.
The Sidney-Essex circle sees dissimulation as potentially useful. As Daniel Javitch argues, Sidney, Puttenham, and Spenser adapt Castiglione’s aesthetic of courtliness, its commitment to “ornament, dissimulation, playfulness.”77 Javitch shows that, while Spenser is wary of deception, he also practices a poetics of courtly dissimulation, veiling political criticism with playful, poetic, allegorical guises.78 In his *Defense of Poetry*, Sidney also defends the value of poetic feigning as a way of instructing readers with better examples than are available to the truthful historian.79 Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman follow Castiglione, Spenser, and Sidney as they construct innovative kinds of “healthy deceit” that lure resistant readers and protect dissenting authors.

**Perspective, giudizio dell’occhio, and proportion**

The themes of decorum and deceit, both beneficial and insidious, are also central to early modern art theory. Art theorists present a significant and influential body of ideas about judgment that help to create affinities between political prudence and aesthetic and moral decorum. These discussions also fuel debate about the reliability of judgment. Many of these ideas have some relationship to one of the most transformative developments in early modern visual art, the creation of systems of perspective. The application of the science of optics to the visual arts enables painters to create the illusion of three-dimensionality on a flat surface. The development of perspectival art influences notions of judgment because it incites an increased interest in notions of proportion and their relationship to decorum. It also highlights debate about the reliability of the senses and of individual perception.

Leon Battista Alberti’s *On Painting*, one of the most influential early treatises on artificial perspective, posits a central viewpoint from which a painting most successfully achieves an illusion of depth and appropriate proportion. This perspective system is based on the concept of sight as a pyramid of rays emanating
from and returning to the eye. The painter constructs an equivalent triangle of lines, whose measurements are based on those of a human figure to be depicted in the painting. The raying lines begin along the bottom edge of the canvas, spaced apart at the distance of one arm-length of this model figure. These lines converge at a central point set at the horizon or at the height of the top of the model figure’s head. This triangle is intersected by parallel lines, thus constructing a grid that enables the painter to construct figures in proportion to one another.\(^{80}\)

Alberti’s system of perspective exemplifies a widespread sense of connections between decorum and proportion. Mary Pardo points out that Albertian perspective, based on the dimensions of a human figure, refers to the belief that there is an analogical proportion between the body and the cosmos. The painter regulates his work by drawing from the known dimensions of the body to the unknown, but assumedly parallel dimensions of the objects to be depicted.\(^{81}\) Such analogical thinking, as Alison Thorne demonstrates, underlies early modern conceptions of decorum as an expression of cosmic harmony.\(^{82}\) The idea that art should reflect the order of the cosmos is explicitly expressed by the Italian art theorist Paolo Pino. Describing the central organizing point of a perspectival work, Pino argues that “just as the earth is the center of the universe, so this point of ours is a limit and a regulator in all our work.”\(^{83}\) As Mary Pardo argues, Pino is here “concerned with a kind of cosmic propriety.”\(^{84}\) This language of propriety and proportion also informs Pino’s discussion of how to recreate the distortions of vision created by distance. A painter needs to choose an “appropriate distance [porzionata distanzia] … because in a painting [seen] at some distance the figures appear more graceful.”\(^{85}\) The language of decorum employed by Pino permeates other influential accounts of the artist’s judgment.

Alberti’s approach to perspective offers a mathematical method of regulating shifting appearances; later accounts of perspective by Pino and Vasari move it
closer to the inexact knowledge of prudence. Perspective is thus also associated with decorum not only as a reflection of cosmic order, but also as a flexible accommodation to circumstances. This shift from exacting measure to the looser judgment of individual eye expresses confidence in prudential judgment, but also ultimately highlights its fallibility.

Vasari breaks away from the Albertian grid or exact measure, advocating the “judgment of the eye” as an ability much like the politician’s prudence or the poet’s sense of decorum. For Vasari, achieving proportions that look gracefully appropriate is more a matter of accommodation and experience than fixed rules. In his *Lives*, Vasari imagines Renaissance art as steadily progressing from rough beginnings to full flowering in the works of Michelangelo and Raphael. One of the key distinctions between the cruder earlier stages and the glorious Third Age is the development of an intuitive judgment that does not rely on exact measure. Vasari argues that the second age lacked that kind of “right judgment” that would make it possible to create figures without exact measurements, thus achieving a “grace that exceeds measurement.” [Nelle misure mancava uno retto giudizio, che senza le figure fussino misurate, avessero in quelle grandezze ch’ele eran fatte una grazia che eccedesse la misura.]86 Vasari argues that a sculptor can rely on “no better measure than the judgment of the eye.” Even after perfect measurements have been calculated, the work will not look proportional until it has been adjusted to what the eye sees:

The eye must add and subtract with judgment, where it sees the work as disproportioned [or disgraced], in order to give it correct proportion, grace, design, and perfection so that it will be praised by every sound judgment. [Ma non si debbe usare altra miglior misura che il giudicio dello occhio …l’occhio nondimeno ha poi con il guidicio a levare e ad aggiungere, seconda che vedrà la disgrazia dell’opera, talmente che e’ le dia giustamente proporzione, grazia, disegno e perfezione acciò che el sia in se tutta lodata da ogni ottimo giudizio.]87
Giudizio dell’occhio is more a matter of experience than precept, more a matter of intuition than measurement. Vasari’s notion of giudizio dell’occhio is thus closely tied to prudence and decorum as a faculty that flexibly accommodates to circumstances.

Vasari’s conception of giudizio dell’occhio links the artist’s judgment with multifaceted notions of decorum. When Vasari advocates a looser, more intuitive approach to determining proportion because this makes a work look more graceful, he is pointedly alluding to Castiglione’s courtier who achieves grace through judicious, apparently thoughtless sprezzatura rather than through studied adherence to precept. Similarly, Vasari’s description of the sculptor who intuitively adds and subtracts until his work becomes graceful closely follows Castiglione’s description of the courtier who adds and subtracts from his behavior to achieve grace:

Therefore the well behaving of a man’s self in this case (me thinkes) consisteth in certaine wisedome and judgment of choice, and to know more and lesse what encreaseeth or diminisheth in thinges, to practise them in due time, or out of season. [Però il governarsi bene in questo parmi che consista in una certa prudenzia e giudicio di elezione, e conoscere il più e ‘l meno che nelle cose si accresca e scema per operarle opportunamente e furor di stagione.]

Vasari suggests that artists and courtiers share a faculty of prudent, judicious accommodation to circumstance. Vasari also parallels the ideal artist and the perfect courtier in his life of Raphael, whom he describes as achieving grace both in life and art. As Patricia Rubin puts it, with Raphael, “the craftsman has turned courtier.”

Vasari’s links artists and courtiers in order to elevate the social standing of the artist. He also, though, cites Castiglione out of a shared conviction of connections among flexibility, grace, and aesthetic and moral beauty.

How directly Alberti and Vasari may influence Dallington, Chapman, and Daniel is uncertain. However, a similar account of intuitive giudizio dell’occhio
and of its relation to decorous graces was more widely available to English readers in Richard Haydocke’s translation of the first five books of Giovanni Lomazzo’s *Trattato dell’Arte della Pittura, Scultura et Architettura*, first available in the late 1580s and in a second edition in 1598. Lomazzo divides his work into the theoretic “rules of Arte” and the practical “preceptes of Discretion and Judgment.” These precepts of discretion, which tend to permeate even the more theoretical discussion, delineate connections among *giudizio dell’occhio*, prudence, and decorum.

Like Pino and Vasari, Lomazzo treats proportion as closely related to decorum. Lomazzo admonishes his artist to “make an especiall choice of a convenient distance” from which to depict the subject. For Lomazzo, decorous considerations of “convenience” and grace, rather than empirical measurement, determine the distance between artist and subject. Lomazzo urges the artist to select a distance that would be “the most proportionable to the eie that can be devised, and ... which makes all painted workes appeare more gratiously to the eie, then the extreames can doe.” Lomazzo, like Pino and Vasari, makes grace the result of a decorous sense of distance. Lomazzo here implies that his touchstone is the *giudizio dell’occhio*, when he makes his standard what looks “more gratiously to the eie.” Echoing Vasari more directly, Lomazzo argues that proportion should be ruled not by exact measure, but by the eye’s judgment. For Lomazzo, an intuitive rather than mathematical judgment shapes the gracefully proportioned work of art.

Lomazzo connects decorum with movement and grace. Lomazzo argues “For the greatest grace and life that a picture can have, is, that it expresse *Motion*: which the Painters call the *spirite* of a picture.” To achieve this lively grace, Lomazzo recommends shaping the figure and its limbs in the curving form of letter S, “because then it hath his beauty.” Lomazzo argues that such movement is decorous, defining motion as “that comelines, and grace in the proportion and disposition of a picture, which is also called the spirite and life of a picture.” For Lomazzo, curving motion
confers liveliness and grace in a way that recalls how flexible *giudizio dell’occhio* bends mathematical proportion to take into account the real circumstances of sight. Bending is necessary for the creation of a lively, graceful work.

Lomazzo’s flexible prudence not only bends to real particulars, but also flexes in the opposite direction, striving to make imperfect reality fit ideal proportion. Lomazzo advocates painting subjects not as they are but with that “Decorum which truly belongeth to them.”99 Lomazzo defends this decorous representation both as conforming to a truer proportion than can be represented in nature and as a bending from Stoicall rigidity:

> And this is the order and method of judgment, …supplying the defectes of nature, by the helpe of arte. So that if a ladie have anie disproportionable parte in her bodie, the Painter shall not expresse the same too strictly in her picture: or if her complexion, shall faile of that perfection which were to bee wished, hee must not be so Stoical, as to represent it so; but rather helpe it a little with the beawties of his colours; yet with such a sweet discretion, that the counterfeit loose nothing of his resemblance: but onelie that the defect of nature, may bee pretilie shaddowed with the veile of Arte.100

Lomazzo’s “sweet discretion” involves a beneficial kind of dissimulation, a gentle bending from nature or strictness. The idea somewhat resembles politic dissimulation. However, the artist bends particulars to an ideal rather than accommodating to real circumstances.101 The artist strives after a grace that not only exceeds measure, but also exceeds nature.

The notions of decorum, perspective, and grace expressed in Italian art theory may inform early modern English notions of judgment. Or, at least, art theory provides illuminating and useful parallels to English thinking. Probably following Lomazzo, the English miniaturist Nicholas Hilliard also praises a judgment of the eye which comes from practice rather than precept: “Ower eye is cunninge, and is learned without rulke by long usse, as littel lads speake their vulger tonge without
gramour Rulles."\textsuperscript{102} Donne may echo Lomazzo or Pino when he places the edified observer of the lovers in "The Ecstasy" at a "convenient distance," the appropriate position for maximum edification.\textsuperscript{103}

Like Lomazzo, early modern English writers see affinities among grace, proportion, and decorum. Probably alluding to Cicero's \textit{De officiis}, but perhaps also newly inspired by Italian art theory, George Puttenham invokes a conflation of beauty, proportion, and decorum similar to that espoused by Vasari and Lomazzo. Decorum, "this good grace of everything," governs "all good, comely, pleasant and honest things, even to the spirittuall objectes of the mynde, which stand no lesse in the due proportion of reason and discours than any other materiall thing doeth in his sensible bewtie, proportion and comeliness."\textsuperscript{104} In the dedicatory epistle to Prince Henry that prefaces his translation of the \textit{Iliad}, Chapman argues similar connections among proportion, decorum and grace:

\begin{quote}
So Truth, with Poesie gra\textsuperscript{t}, is fairer farre,  
More proper, moving chaste, and regular  
Than when she runnes away with untruss\textsuperscript{t} Prose:  
Proportion, that doth with order dispose  
Her vertuous treasure and is Queene of Graces.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

Like Vasari and Lomazzo, Chapman argues that graceful art is achieved by observing decorous proportion, the principle that orders the cosmos.

Both English poets and Italian art theorists believe that decorum requires the observance not only of actual circumstances, but also of ideal proportions. Lomazzo's sense of the value of discreet fictionalizing is much like the feigning that Philip Sidney advocates in his \textit{A Defense of Poetry}. Sidney approves of the painter who presents not Lucretia's outer form, but her exemplary virtue. Similarly, the poet does not follow "what is, hath been, or shall be" but ventures "only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be."\textsuperscript{106}
For Sidney decorum means not only that the poet should observe harmony between subject and genre or a match between stations and manners, but also that the poet should adjust the real to fit the ideal. Fictions are intended “to show what men of their fames, fortunes, and estates should do.”

In a sense, such fictionalizing is a kind of grace that improves on nature.

Daniel and Chapman think of judgment as being connected with proportion, grace, and decorum. Daniel’s understanding of how to respond judiciously to foreign custom is informed by his sense of decorum’s connection with order and grace. A sense that good judgment is allied to beauty and order is central to Chapman’s thinking. In the introductory epistle to The Shadow of Night, Chapman argues that decorum shapes both aesthetic and moral beauty – rational, proportional judgment that triumphs over malformed, “monstrous affection” is “most beautifull.” How to understand the relationship between proportion, beauty and grace is a central theme of Chapman’s Hero and Leander.

Early modern thinkers link perspective with ideals of decorum and proportion that evoke cosmic orderliness. However, they also have a strong, skeptical sense that all knowledge comes mediated. As Mary Pardo argues, “The growing prominence of giudizio … was the acknowledgement that at every stage, the manifestation of beauty in artifice was mediated by individual vision.” While giudizio dell’occhio suggests a kind of ability to perceive proportion, its looseness also emphasizes that this is an approximate and subjective kind of knowledge.

A sense of the subjectivity of perception is inescapable even in Alberti’s more mathematical approach to perspective. Alberti’s concept of perspective offers a means of regulating varying appearances with a rational system that seems to transcend the errors and deceptions of sense and, metaphorically, of emotion. However, it does not entirely escape subjectivity. As Panofsky puts it, “perspective subjects the artistic phenomenon to stable and even mathematically exact rules, but on the other
hand, makes that phenomenon contingent upon human beings.” The perspective grid enables the painter to create figures in mathematically proportional relation. However, the source of these measures in the dimensions of a human figure and the system's reliance on the point of view of a human eye argue the ultimate subjectivity of this apparently objective system. The connection between perspectival art and optics underscores the sense that vision – physical, moral, and aesthetic – is ultimately mediated and therefore imperfect.

Early modern English writers use perspectival metaphor to depict judgment both stable and distorted. George Chapman uses perspective as a metaphor for right reason that regulates sense and emotion. However, other authors see perspective as emblematic of the way sense and passion distort perception. As Gent points out, the development of artistic perspective heightens the consciousness “that the very means to perceive the truth has a physical, as well as moral dimension, which dictates that it shall be inseparable from falsehood.” As the study of optics and the creation of perspective emphasize the physical grounds of sight and its propensity for distortion, early modern thinkers become especially conscious of the mediated nature of all judgments.

Perspectival metaphors often symbolize the encumbrance of judgment by the faulty senses and by emotion. When Donne avers that in heaven, “thou shalt not peepe through lattices of eyes,” Ernest Gilman argues that he has the Albertian perspective grid in mind. In the case of moral judgment, writers are especially concerned with the way the affections may distort judgment. In 1602 Daniel prefaces a poem on a moral dilemma with protestations about the limits of his own passion-driven judgment:

The judgments of men are ever according to the set of their affections, and as the images of their passions are drawn within, so they send forth the forme of their opinions and accordingly must I judge of this case … as my
Daniel’s painterly, perspectival imagery for distortion reflects the heightened sensitivity to the mediated nature of perception that accompanies interest in optics and the creation of perspective art. The prospective Daniel describes himself as looking through is probably a perspectival device through which a viewer would see a distorted image. The imagery in this particular passage also alludes to Montaigne’s skeptical sense of the mediated nature of judgment. Daniel, who was deeply acquainted with Florio’s 1603 translation of Montaigne’s essays, is echoing Montaigne’s “Apology for Raymond Sebond” on the variability and unreliability of judgment, which he characterizes as “the waving sea of a peoples or of a Princes opinions, which shall paint me forth justice with as many colours, and reforme the same into as many visages as there are changes and alterations of passion in them.” Conflating Montaigne’s painterly image of how affections distort judgment with the image of the perspective glass, Daniel emphasizes that both physical and emotional judgment are filtered through sense and personal bias.

Shakespeare also employs perspectival metaphors that underscore the mediated nature of knowledge, emphasizing the way emotions color perception. Claudio Guillén argues that the perspectival metaphors in Richard II express a preoccupation with perception. Judith Dundas observes a similar use of perspectival metaphor in Shakespeare’s Alls Well that Ends Well. Dundas comments on Bertram’s admission of his failure to appreciate Helen, “Contempt his scornful perspective did lend me, / Which warp’d that line of every other favor” (5.3.48-49). According to Dundas, Shakespeare here argues that “the mind can supply its own perspective glass distorting whatever the eye sees.” In this passage, it is strong emotion that provides the distortion.
Shakespeare’s use of perspectival metaphor to illustrate how emotions distort judgment reflects a more widespread concern. Many early modern definitions of good judgment insist on emotional detachment. Thomas Wright, author of an early seventeenth-century treatise on the passions, argues that emotions warp judgment: “They are called perturbations, for that … they trouble wonderfully the soule, corrupting the judgment and seducing the will.” Similarly, Ben Jonson cautions that feelings of partiality lead both to overly critical and excessively generous judgments: “we care not to discredit, and shame our judgments, to soothe our passions.” In the general condemnation of distorting passions, a defense of emotional judgment is unusual. In his 1587 discourse on heroic poetry, Tasso argues that judgment is aided by feelings of benevolence and friendship because one virtue assists, rather than impedes, the workings of another: “né la benevolenza o l’amicizia possono impedire in lei il concoscimento; perché l’una virtù non impedisce le operazione d’un’altra, ma più tosto suole agevolarla.” Tasso’s sense that friendship may actually inform better judgment is rare, as he acknowledges himself. However, he is not alone in doing some revisionary thinking on the relationship between judgment and emotion.

While wariness about judgment-warping affection is commonplace, early modern authors also advise against wholly eliminating passions, chiefly because they incite good deeds. One of the speakers in Bacon’s “Of Tribute” argues that the affections “make the mind heroic” Passions inspire noble action. While Wright sees the passions as a threat to good judgment, he also argues that they are a necessary spur to good: “Passions, are not only, not wholly to be extinguished (as the Stoicks seemed to affirm) but sometimes to be moved and stirred up for the service of vertue.” In “Euthymiae Raptus,” George Chapman argues that there are some useful passions and admonishes, “To stand at gaze / In one position, is a stupide maze, / Fit for a Statue.” While the passions can obstruct judgment,
they also motivate action, the realm with which prudence is explicitly concerned. A sense of the importance of active engagement qualifies the traditionally adversarial relationship between judgment and the affections.

The view from on high

Perspectival metaphor often represents judgment’s distortion by sense and affection. Another metaphor of vision describes an ideally unfettered, detached judgment, the view from on high. In his “Of the Progress of the Soul: The Second Anniversary,” John Donne describes this ideal:

Thou look’st through spectacles; small things seem great
Below: but up unto the watch-tower get,
And see all things despoiled of fallacies:
Thou shalt not peep through lattices of eyes,
Nor hear through labyrinths of ears, nor learn
By circuit, or collections to discern.
In heaven thou straight know’st all.¹²

This ideal judgment, unfettered by the delusions of the imagination and senses, is fully available only after the soul sheds its body. However Donne also seems to exhort his readers to some kind of emulation of the heavenly view. Variations of this image of a view from on high express how early modern thinkers imagine the nature and possibility of clear-sighted judgment.

Donne’s ideal of the view from the watchtower is one of a number of images of good judgment that ultimately derive from Lucretius’s De rerum natura. The second book opens with an image of the tranquil philosopher looking down in complacent bliss on the errors of other less happy mortals. Lucretius pictures the Epicurean philosopher who inquires into the true nature of things, thus freeing himself from superstitious fears and cultivating a state of mental and emotional tranquility:
Pleasant it is, when on the great sea the winds trouble the waters, to gaze from shore upon another’s great tribulation: not because any man’s troubles are a delectable joy, but to perceive what ills you are free from yourself is pleasant … . But nothing is more delightful than to possess lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by the teachings of the wise, whence you may look down upon others and behold them all astray, wandering abroad and seeking the path of life. [Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, / e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem: / non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, / se quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est. …sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere / edita doctrina sapientum templae serena, / despicere unde queas alios passimque videre / errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae.]\textsuperscript{127}

Lucretius provides an image of good judgment that is attractive to many early modern thinkers. They variously embrace the ideals of tranquil detachment, conquest of superstition, and elevation above the petty struggle for specious worldly goods that are implied in this image.

Early modern authors conflate Lucretius’s image with ideals coming from Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Christianity. One important source is Seneca who, throughout his works, argues the necessity of cultivating mental tranquility through controlling the passions, and who also uses the image of a view from on high as a metaphor for the superior judgment of the philosopher. In his \textit{De vita beata}, Seneca argues that people who criticize the foibles of a philosopher, while being unaware of their own failings, are like an audience obliviously absorbed in a play while their homes burn:

The many … lounge in a Circus or theatre, while their home is already wrapped in mourning and they have not heard the evil news. But I looking from the heights, see the storms that threaten. [Sicut plurimi quibus in circo aut theatro desidentibus iam funesta domus est nec adhunctiam malum. At ego ex alto prospeciens video quae tempestatibus aut immineant…].\textsuperscript{128}
Seneca’s early modern readers often equate his sense of the superior vision of the philosopher with his doctrine of mental imperturbability. They see his notion of imperturbability was related to Lucretius’s Epicurean ideal of tranquility. A detached, disengaged view becomes an element of some conceptions of ideal judgment.

A conflation of Christian, Neoplatonic, and Senecan ideals characterizes one use of this image that is likely to have influenced members of the Sidney-Essex circles. In 1576 Phillipe De Mornay wrote a treatise on overcoming the fear of death, which Mary Sidney Herbert translated into English in 1590. De Mornay’s use of the image of a view from on high is influenced by Seneca, from whom he borrows throughout the treatise, and possibly also by Lucretius. De Mornay gives the image a Christian and Neoplatonic cast as well. He argues that a view from on high is achieved after death, once the soul sheds its physical impediments. From the heavenly heights, worldly ambition is revealed as petty: “wee shall highly bee raised above all heights of the world, and, from on high, laugh at the folly of all those wee once admired.” The soul will shed the distorting affections and senses: “our passion [will be] buried and our reason in perfect libertie,” and we will no longer look “through false spectacles.” De Mornay, reserves this perfect and unmediated judgment for the afterlife. Other early modern authors take up the image to represent the best mortal judgment. However, the sense of self-satisfaction and the uncharitable isolation from others that could be implied in Lucretian and Senecan views from on high also shapes the way they respond to this image.

The Lucretian and Senecan image of a view from on high is often conflated with the Neoplatonic and Christian idea that greater order resides in the higher spheres of the universe and in the loftier faculties of the microcosmos of a human being. The viewer from on high is one who achieves the ability to order senses and passions through reason. Learning, an honest search for truth, or a commitment to controlling passions can place one in a superior place of judgment. A detached philosophical
perspective, which allows escape from the tyranny of the senses and emotion, the false show of courtly hypocrisy, and the empty frustrations of power struggle is attractive. Authors who use this image find appealing the notion of a superior insight that penetrates mortal delusions, challenges superstition, and soars above the bewildering variety of mere opinion.

Of the authors considered in this dissertation, Daniel most often and most explicitly uses images of a view from high. Daniel approvingly employs the image to represent detachment from passion and elevation above mortal vicissitude. In a poetic epistle to Anne Clifford, Daniel depicts virtuous behavior as the sign of mind raised above the confusion and disorder that rules the lower realms of the universe and the soul: “For low in th’aire of grosse uncertaintie / Confusion onely rowles, Order sits hie.” In another verse epistle to Margaret Clifford, Daniel argues that controlling the passions puts one in possession of a view from on high. Daniel celebrates the “cleere judgment,” that gives Clifford the safe vantage of a view above the stormy life of the passions: “And with how free an eye doth he looke downe, / Upone these lower Regions of turmoyle, / Where all these stormes of passions mainly beate.

Knowledge also offers this elevated view. Daniel’s epistle to Lucy Harington claims that her commitment to learning has elevated her above changing, limited circumstance “…into the freedome of that blisse /That sets you there where you may oversee / This rowling world, and view it as it is.” Daniel argues that knowledge and the control of the affections offer a clear-sighted view from on high. These themes surface in other uses of this image, most notably and influentially in the works of Francis Bacon.

Francis Bacon adopts Lucretius as a model for his own iconoclastic attack on individual bias and communal delusion. Bacon paraphrases Lucretius’s praise of a view from on high in his 1625 essay “On Truth”: “‘No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of Truth’ (a hill not to be commanded, and where
the air is always clear and serene,)’ and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale, below.™ Bacon sets the pleasure of possessing the truth above the “vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, [and] imaginations” that possess most minds.³⁵ Bacon’s ambitious program for the reform of all branches of knowledge aims to achieve a clear view from the “vantage ground of Truth.”

Bacon frequently appeals to the passage from the second book of Lucretius as he exhorts readers to clear their judgments of the distortions of sense, affection, debilitating dependence on scholastic learning, opinion established by custom, and other false constructions of knowledge that are more appealing than true. Bacon argues that the pleasure of knowledge surpasses the pleasures of the senses and affections. In his essay, “Of Tribute,” Bacon stages a conversation among four speakers who each defend their version of the highest good. Speaker D argues that the pleasures of the mind exceed those of the senses and the affections. “Is there any such happiness as for a man’s mind to be raised above the confusion of things, where he may have the prospect of the order of nature and the errors of men?”³⁶ In his Advancement of Learning (1605), Bacon again quotes Lucretius on the pleasure of knowledge. Bacon argues that this pleasure is elevated above the senses and passions and grounded in a kind of certainty: “But it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed and fortified in the certainty of truth.”³⁷ The notion of a clear, detached judgment embodies the attractions of serenity and stability. However, the ideal of a detached perspective from on high also suggests a detachment that could become inhumanly unemotional, removed from charitable commitment to the welfare of others, blindly convinced of its own superiority, out of touch with local circumstances and particulars, or passively immobile.

The question of how the circumstances of community relate to judgment pervades accounts of views from on high, particularly those that allude to Lucretius and Seneca. In his poetic epistles, Daniel tends to present the view from on high as
a counter to the corrupt community of the court, where true selves are “let out to
custome fashion and to shew.” As John Pritchard points out, Daniel’s 1616 epistle
to Lucy Harington alludes to Lucretius’s view from on high as he congratulates
her on a disenchantment that enables her to see through the masque-like spectacle
of courtly pretence. Daniel is bit ambivalent as to how the possessor of truth
should react to those he perceives to be in error. In his epistle to Margaret Clifford,
Daniel admits that a “hart so neere allied to earth, / Cannot but pittie” the struggles
of mortal life. Still, this pitying heart is expected to steel itself against impious
sorrow for wickedness, to regard it “as from the shores of peace with unwet eye,
[bearing] no venture in impietie” Daniel expects his Christian philosopher viewing
from on high to banish pity that might interfere with a pious regard for divine justice.
This claim that pity might be a kind of impiety recalls the way Dante’s pilgrim is
instructed to overcome his impious sorrow for the sufferings of the damned.

Daniel probably also draws on an even more controversial and pervasive
argument about pity, though. Seneca not only reinforces the attractions of mental
tranquility, but also raises the problematic notion that the ideal, detached judgment
is free from pity. In his De clementia, Seneca argues that “pity is a sickness of the
mind” [aegritudo animi] that obscures the light of judgment. Seneca banishes the
perturbations of passion from the clear judgment.

This banishment of the affections, particularly of compassion, does meet with
some sharp resistance. In his commentary on De clementia, Calvin criticizes the
sequestered sage who would look down “from his lofty citadel” [ex editissima arce].
He sharply defends pity as an active virtue:

Obviously we ought to be persuaded of the fact that pity is virtue, and that
he who feels no pity cannot be a good man – whatever these idle sages may
discuss in their shady nooks. [Illud sane nobis persuasum esse debet, &
virtutem esse misericordiam, nec bonum hominem esse posse, qui non sit
misericors, quicquid in suis umbris disputent otiosi isti sapientes.]
Calvin’s dissatisfaction with the uncharitable and inactive detachment of a view from on high is shared by others who condemn the claim to superior judgment as an arrogant denial of one’s own weaknesses.

In *Measure for Measure*, Shakespeare stages an inquiry into the viability of the ideal of detached judgment. Duke Vincentio leaves Vienna in the charge of a model of unswerving rectitude, Angelo, who purports to have achieved a Stoic control over his own passions. Claiming the lofty view, Angelo undertakes to reform the morals of the citizens with starkly draconian measures. When her brother is condemned to death, Isabella asks mercy for him on the grounds that no one is immune from sin:

Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once,  
And He that might the vantage best have took  
Found out the remedy. How would you be  
If He which is the top of judgment should  
But judge you as you are?  

Isabella argues that no mortal is in absolute possession of a view above others; only Christ actually possesses “the top of judgment.” She claims that a truly superior judgment, modeled on this divine judgment, would be merciful rather than retributive.

Angelo responds by appealing to a more detached, abstract notion of justice. He argues that “I show [pity] most when I show justice, / For then I pity those I do not know.” To his argument, Isabella responds that Angelo can claim this degree of detachment only if he is sinless himself. She enjoins him to “ask your heart what it doth know / That’s like my brother’s fault.” Angelo’s prideful appropriation of the moral high ground ultimately leads him not to judge rightly, but rather to act both unjustly and unmercifully. Shakespeare may imply that human judgment, inevitably flawed by frailty, should err on the side of mercy.
Throughout his works, while Bacon champions the reform of judgment, he also cautions against arrogance and consistently reminds his readers that knowledge is meant to serve charitable ends. For Bacon, as Barbour points out, “Lucretius’s distant repose is valuable to the extent that it remains intellectually dynamic (rather than self-satisfied) and concerned for human welfare at large (rather than gratified by public misery”).

Bacon’s 1595 “Of Love and Self-Love” pits the followers of Philautia, self-love, against love for its own sake, Erophilus. The squire of Erophilus counters self-serving definitions of the ultimate good made by a hermit, a soldier, and a politician. The squire questions whether the hermit is not deluded in imagining he possesses a superior viewpoint like the one Lucretius extols: “How are you assured that you adore not vain chimeras and imaginations? That in your high prospect, when you think men wander up and down, that they stand not indeed still in their place, and it is some smoke or cloud between you and them which moveth, or else the dazzling of your own eyes.”

Bacon argues that a truth-seeker deluded by self-love rather than motivated by charity is as mistaken as the erring multitudes he pretends to look down on. In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon argues the dangers of this kind of delusion with a characterization of the high place of judgment that suggests battle, faction, and unjustified dominion: “a terrace, for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground.”

Bacon argues that the proud mind that imagines itself to be above variability may actually embody it, or that its imagined stability may provide grounds for conflict.

In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon leavens knowledge with charity. Bacon argues that knowledge should not simply serve one’s own intellectual bliss, but be directed “to the good of man and mankind.” Citing Saint Paul’s assertion that true knowledge is not swollen with self-importance, Bacon argues “This corrective spice, this mixture which maketh knowledge so sovereign, is Charity.”

Bacon’s
commitment to charity and to active, practical knowledge results in his modifying the
Advancement’s ideal of being “settled, landed and fortified in the certainty of truth.”
In his essay “On Truth” (1625), Bacon insists, “So always this prospect be with pity,
and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven on earth, to have a man's mind
move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.” Bacon’s ideal
of judgment is both grounded and mobile, clear-sighted and charitable.

Chapter Summaries
Bacon’s notion of judgment epitomizes the combination of stability and
flexibility sought by Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman. They all seek a judgment
that is responsive to particulars, whether of political exigency or local custom. Part
of the flexibility they seek includes an accommodation to the frailties of their own
judgment. At the same time, they search for foundations that give judgment a moral
and epistemological stability.

Chapter two discusses how Samuel Daniel thinks of the relationship between
judgment and custom in his pastoral drama, The Queenes Arcadia. Daniel develops
his sense of this relationship as he thinks through two continental works, Tasso’s
Aminta and Montaigne’s Essais. The chapter begins with a reading of Tasso’s Aminta.
I argue that the disputed golden age chorus, which celebrates a “natural law” of
hedonism, is just one of many speeches in which Tasso argues the subjectivity of
individual judgment, particularly when judgment arises from widely divergent
notions of pleasure. Tasso’s Aminta not only supplies Daniel with some of the plot
and characters for his Queenes Arcadia, but also informs his own argument about
the limitations of individual judgment. Daniel also develops his understanding of
judgment in relation to Montaigne. Montaigne argues that custom, both individual
habits and the traditions of one’s native country, obfuscates our perception of natural
law. In the absence of absolute certainty about moral law, Montaigne thus advocates
a judicious, decorous accommodation to local custom. While Daniel sees natural, universal laws as more accessible than Montaigne does, he shares Montaigne’s strong sense of the limitations of judgment. Daniel’s notion of judgment sits somewhere between advocating accommodation to custom in the absence of greater certainty and a sense that a perceptible divine grace informs custom and judgment.

Chapter three argues that Robert Dallington’s *Aphorismes Civill and Militarie* takes an uniquely creative approach to the problem of teaching prudence, a virtue which inherently adapts to a wider range of circumstances than can be contained in an instructional volume. With its condensed sections from Guicciardini’s *History of Italy*, and its tidy list of applicable aphorisms, Dallington’s work may appear to imitate the usual collections of handy political advice. However, Dallington constructs his collection to reflect the virtue that he is teaching. Dallington takes into account criticism by Guicciardini and Bacon of the inadequacy of the static aphorism. Adopting an innovative use of romance interlacement, Dallington introduces tensions between aphorism and circumstance that mirror the variety of the real world and that immerse the reader in the difficulties of judicious decision-making. The work further exemplifies prudence as Dallington judiciously, indirectly criticizes the policies of the current regime.

Chapter four shows how Continental art theory, especially the development of artistic perspective, informs Chapman’s construction of good judgment in *Hero and Leander*. Chapman presents the problem of judging the erring lovers as a kind of anamorphic puzzle, offering a confused, dual image until the viewer locates the correct perspective. Chapman’s narrator veers between apparently irreconcilable and erring perspectives of eroticized pity and uncharitable detachment that offer no certain foundation for the reader’s own judgment. Chapman resolves these issues, not as one would expect, by offering a perspective that remedies the fallibilities of
judgment. Rather he argues that embracing one’s own mortal frailty paradoxically results in the only just judgment.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., 5.10.7.


7. This passage is discussed by Alison Thorne 88, 87-103.


15. Wolfe, 4.


27. Smuts, Court Culture, 80.

28. Salmon 202, Tuck 45-64.

29. Levy, 4-28.


34. Ibid., 18.


39. For Dallington’s probable authorship and a discussion of the work, see Höltgen, 155-57.


42. Levy, 4.


48. Ibid., 4.1.59 [4.1.382]
49. Ibid., 4.1.59 [4.1.382], chapter heading


51. Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi, a cura di Vincenzo di Caprio (Roma: Salerno Editrice, 1990), 47.

52. On Lipsius, see Skinner, Foundations, 248-54 and Tuck 45-64.

53. The marginal note is more explicit about who Lipsius refers to: “Some kinde of persons rage too much against Machiavell.” (4.13.114). [In Machiavellum nimis quidam saviunt (4.13.510)].


61. Lipsius, 4.1.60 [4.1.384].


64. Ibid., 714.


66. Ibid., 515.

67. Ibid., 585.


71. Ibid., 61.

72. Montaigne, 52.


74. Castiglione, 62.

75. Ibid., 291.


78. Ibid., 158. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss poetic dissimulation.


82. Thorne, 88-89.

83. Pardo, trans., 306.

84. Pardo, 184.

85. Pardo, trans., 308.


87. Ibid., 186.


90. Castiglione 111; Hoby trans., 93.

91. Rubin, 375. She discusses Vasari’s life of Raphael on pages 370-77.

92. See Gent 26, 68, 72, 73, 80, 85.

93. Smuts, Court Culture, 146.


95. Ibid., 5.200.

96. Ibid., 5.181.

97. Ibid., 1.17.

98. Ibid., 1.23.

99. Ibid., 1.23.

100. Ibid., 1.23.

101. See Klein on how Italian notions of judgment range from Neoplatonic idealism to empiricism, 163-64.


107. Ibid., 54.


109. Pardo, 143.


111. Ibid., 37-59.

112. Waddington, 124.

113. Gent, 54.


116. For a discussion of perspectival devices and their relationship to skepticism, see Wolfe, 106-09. Gilman also describes perspective glasses, 44-49.

117. Montaigne, 337.


122. Tasso, Prose, 490.

123. Francis Bacon, Major Works, 29.

124. Wright, 17.


135. Ibid., 341.


140. Daniel, “To the Ladie Margaret, Countesse of Cumberland,” in _Poems_, lines 43-44.

141. Ibid., lines 58-9.


143. Jean Calvin, _Commentary_, 370-71.

144. Ibid., 358, 359.

146. Ibid., 2.2.103-04.

147. Ibid., 2.2.139-40.

148. Reid Barbour, “Moral and Political Philosophy: Readings of Lucretius from Virgil to Voltaire” forthcoming, 22-23. My discussion of Bacon and the view from on high is much indebted to this essay.


150. Bacon, 147.

151. Ibid., 124.


“Custome that is before all Law, Nature that is above all Arte”:
Samuel Daniel’s Natural Judgment

In 1605 Daniel presented his pastoral drama *The Queenes Arcadia* to an audience that included Queen Anne and Prince Henry. While the play does not appear to have been written expressly for this occasion, it addressed a sympathetic audience. Anne and Henry had been attracting a coterie of those disaffected with what they perceive as the alteration of English customs by James I. Originally titled *Arcadia Reformed*, Daniel’s drama recounts the invasion of innocent, unsophisticated Arcadia by a gang of overly cultivated and corrupt con-artists who threaten its simple laws and institutions; they import the vices of infidelity and tobacco-chewing and attempt to introduce religious and legal innovation.1 The primary threats are Techne, “a subtile wench of Corinth,” and Colax, “a corrupted traveller,” who introduce artifice and intrigue to the youth of Arcadia. Daniel does more than present a fairly transparent fable of Stuart court corruption, however. He makes a deeper and broader inquiry into the foundations of moral judgment. Daniel examines to what extent moral judgment is subject to custom – to individual habit and to the deeply ingrained mores of one’s native country. The play inquires into whether there are universal norms of behavior arising from nature and whether they can be determined with any certainty by a mind immersed in the mores of a particular culture.

Daniel’s inquiry into these questions is informed and complicated by his own relationship to foreign mores. He imports two much loved foreign texts, Tasso’s *Aminta* and Montaigne’s *Essais*, into a drama that apparently celebrates the
expulsion of corrupt foreign custom. Daniel develops his own notion of judgment in
generation with how Tasso and Montaigne position moral judgment in relation to
custom and nature. In Montaigne and Tasso, Daniel finds support for championing
the “natural” as an authentic foundation for character and culture. However,
both Montaigne and Tasso also argue that nature may not be distinguished from
custom with any certainty. Their works suggest that immersion in one’s native
customs obscure distinctions between nature and custom. Additionally, and more
perniciously, individual temperament and self-interest also shape and distort
conceptions of nature. Daniel defends natural and divine sources for stable and
accessible moral norms, but he also argues the necessity of accommodation to the
limitations of human judgment.

1. Aminta

Torquato Tasso’s pastoral drama Aminta (1573) was published in England by
John Wolfe in 1591 together with Battista Guarini’s Il Pastor Fido. From these works,
Daniel draws the outlines of a number of the subplots of The Queenes Arcadia.
However, he is also engaged in a more significant kind of importation of ideas. In
Aminta, Tasso suggests relationships between judgment, nature, and custom that
Daniel wrestles with not only in The Queenes Arcadia, but also throughout his works.
Because Tasso’s complex approach to these relationships is so important to Daniel
and because this work itself has inspired much conflicted scholarly discussion, this
chapter begins with a discussion of Aminta.

Tasso’s Aminta recounts the hero’s unrequited love for the chaste huntress
Silvia. The older, but not necessarily wiser, Dafne and Tirsi attempt to smooth
Aminta’s rocky courtship of the reluctant Silvia. They concoct a plot to have Aminta
surprise Silvia as she is bathing. Aminta agrees reluctantly. The adventure turns out
fortunately in that Aminta thus is able to rescue Silvia from a lustful satyr and to
prove his own gentle heart. However, the shamed Silvia runs away and is mistakenly reported to have been devoured by wolves. When the devastated Aminta is rumored to have killed himself, his unhappy plight melts Silvia’s heart and all ends happily.

The chorus that follows the first act of Tasso’s *Aminta* seems to offer an alternative to the trials of love repressed. The chorus breaks into a nostalgic paean to the Golden Age, celebrating this lost paradise not so much because it featured fair weather and peace, but rather because it offered free rein to desires now restrained by honor: “that empty word without substance, that idol of errors, idol of deceit, which was later called honor by the unsound mob, which made it the tyrant over our nature” [quel vano / nome senza soggetto, / quell’idolo d’errori, idol d’inganno, / quel che dal volgo insano / onor poscia fu detto, / che di nostra natura ’l fe’ tiranno]. The happy golden agers are said to have lived only by “a golden and happy law sculpted by nature: If it pleases it is permitted” [legge aurea e felice / che natura scolpì: S’ei piace, ei lice] (679-80). The artifice of honor has now smothered nature: “You, first Honor, veiled the font of pleasures … put a rein on speech, imposed art on movements …” [Tu prima Onor velasti la fonte dei diletti … a i detti il fren ponesti, a i passi l’arte] (705-07). The chorus beseeches honor to leave them to the “custom of the ancients” [l’uso de l’antiche genti] (718).

The chorus has sparked quite a bit of critical debate. Some critics argue that the play depicts the author’s own longing for a less restricted era. Nino Borsellino interprets the play as a protest against the strictures of the Counter-Reformation, and Domenico Chiodo appears to sympathize with the “libera visione della vita” that he sees Tasso as portraying. Others argue that Tasso has no particular ideological agenda. Lawrence contends the passage is more literary exercise than manifesto, a “tissue of classical poetic precedent.” My own reading of the play is informed by critics who argue that the chorus is not a statement of Tasso’s personal view, but one perspective that he sets in meaningful dialogue with others in the poem. Maria
Grazia Accorsi criticizes readings that tend to privilege the chorus as “the mouthpiece of the ethos of Tasso’s pastoral” [unico portavoce dell’ethos della pastorale tassiana]. She suggests that the chorus offers just one of many perspectives from which Tasso discusses love. Sergio Zatti does argue that the chorus presents “the work’s ideological key” [chiave ideologica dell’opera], a lament for the loss of pleasure as the price of civilization. However, Zatti places this reading in the context of a discussion of Aminta as characterized by “a contrapuntal technique that renders ambiguous every encomium and ambivalent every retraction, creating a sense of ideological relativism” [una tecnica del contrappunto che rende ambigu ogni encomio e reversibile ogni smentita, sortendo effetti di relativizzazione ideologica]. My reading follows Zatti’s to the extent that I see Tasso as intentionally setting views in contrast with each other. Tasso complicates the access to nature claimed by the chorus. His Aminta is no nostalgic paean to life lived according to nature. Rather Tasso sets forth contrasting views of nature to argue that widely divergent notions of “natural” behavior arise from fallible and self-interested judgments.

As Sergio Zatti argues, Tasso wrestles throughout his works with how to reconcile his faith in immutable principles with his sense of the diversity and mutability of the human world. This issue is central to Tasso’s discourses on epic poetry. The Discorsi dell’arte poetica, begun around 1565, are published together with their greatly expanded version, the Discorsi del poema eroico in 1587. As Tasso defends epic unity against romance multiplicity, some of the most extensive and significant revisions express Tasso’s passionate affirmation of unchanging truth. At the same time, Tasso expands his discussion of prudence, the characteristic that enables the poet to negotiate the mutable, multiple, and variable aspects of experience, and he revises his account of the grounds on which certainty rests. Tasso challenges certainty at the same time that he defends it.
Tasso’s understanding of nature is complicated partly by his allegiance to a Platonic understanding of nature. This Platonic vision of the almost intractable nature of variable material exalts the greatly expanded role Tasso gives to prudence in his 1587 *Discorsi*. The passage opens with exceptionally high praise for prudence: “Among all the operations of our human reason nothing is more difficult, nothing more worthy of praise than choice” [Fra tutte le operazioni de la nostra umana ragione niuna è più malagevole, niuna più degna d’esser lodata de l’elezione]. The ability to choose well is worthy of great praise, especially when it involves choosing among uncertain things. The poet “must be most prudent if he is not to be deceived in his choice where there is so much change and inconstancy in things, and the material is like a dark wood” [Prudentissimo dunque conviene che sia colui il quale non s’inganni ne lo scegliere dove è tanta mutazione e tanta incostanza di cose, e la materia è simile ad una selva oscura]. Tasso lists a vast array of inconstant things that demand the exercise of poetic prudence:

The great diversity of opinions, or rather the discords of judgments, the change of languages, of customs, of laws, of ceremonies, of republics, of kingdoms, of emperors, almost of the world itself [la diversità de le opinioni, o più tosto la contrarietà de’ giudicii, la mutazione de le favelle, de’ costumi, de le leggi, de le cerimonie, de le repubbliche, de’ regni, de gl’imperatori, e quasi del mondo istesso].

In this passage, Tasso appears to relish the variety of the world and the power of human prudence.

Still, he does not lose his sense that the poet is walking in a “selva oscura,” a dark wood of error in which judgment may lose itself. Tasso argues that some things appear good or bad according to “mutabilissimo” use. Manners of arming, ceremonies, and banquets may be “accommodated to that use which presently rules the world” [come piace a l’usanza che oggi vive e signoreggia il mondo, si possono
accomodare]. However, opposed to “mutabilissimo” use are certain stable, eternal tenets of moral behavior and fundamental laws of poetics. These laws appear to arise from constant nature:

Nature is most stable in its workings and always works along a sure and constant way, except when due to the defects and inconstancy of its material it varies a bit: because, guided by a light and an infallible guide, it ever tends to the good and perfect. [È la natura stabilissima ne le sue operazioni, e procede sempre con un tenore certo e perpetuo, se non quanto per difetto ed incostanza de la materia si vede talor variare: perché guidata da un lume e da una scorta infallibile, riguarda sempre in buono e l perfetto.]

The clear division Tasso here makes works better in theory than in practice. Even within the Discorsi, the defects of inconstant, variable material threaten to overwhelm the clear light that guides nature, and there is apparently some fluidity about the boundary between the stable and the fluctuating.

Tasso’s Platonic sense of nature’s variability and corruptibility may influence other revisions that he makes in the Discorsi. In the first version Tasso argues that, while the accidental traits of poetry may change, some principles are founded on immutable natural law:

Those things that are closely founded on nature, and that in themselves are good and praiseworthy, have nothing to do with habit nor does the tyranny of custom hold any sway over them. [Quelle che immediatamente sovra la natura sono fondate, e che per se stesse sono buone e lodevoli, non hanno riguardo alcuno a la consuetudine né la tirannide dell’uso sovra loro in parte alcuna si estende.]

In the second version, Tasso repeats this formula almost word for word, except that he omits “closely founded on nature” [immediatamente sovra la natura sono fondate]. For Tasso, these immutable principles include the unity of plot and the
depiction of manners that have their roots in nature, such as age and social class. In his first version, Tasso argues that these aspects of poetry “are not those that fall under the category of custom, but have their roots in nature” [non quelli che con nome d’usanze sono chiamati, ma quelli che nella natura hanno fisse le loro radici].18 Tasso revises this phrase in the later version to read “those things from which we form those habits that can be considered among the constant causes” [quelli de’ quali formiamo gli abiti che si possono aggiungere fra le cause costanti].19 Rather than founding laws of behavior on nature, Tasso now argues that the immutability of virtues arises out of constant practice. In other words constant laws of behavior are founded on habit, a foundation that appears to be quite near the unstable custom from which Tasso wants to distinguish eternal principles.

The basis of Tasso’s argument from habit has ancient roots. As Mazzali points out, this argument derives from Aristotle and Boethius.20 However, Tasso’s account of the role of custom may also have a more recent, and more controversial, influence. Tasso’s view here resembles Montaigne’s contention in “Of Custome” that “the laws of conscience, which we say proceed from nature, rise and proceed of custom.”21 Montaigne’s essays “Of Custome” and “On Cannibals” were published in 1580, in time for Tasso to read them before completing his second version of the poetic discourses. The essays may have influenced Tasso’s doubts on natural law as well as his increased insistence on some eternal principles. In his essay, “Of the Canniballes,” Montaigne argues that immersion in one’s native customs obscures a sense of what is truly natural behavior or universal law. Montaigne argues that supposedly barbaric societies, living closer to nature, may actually show much less savagery than those that claim a superior level of civilization. Aiming to awake European audiences to a sense of their own brutality, he argues that even cannibalism is less savage than the practices of European nations at war.
Tasso’s argument may reflect Montaigne’s insistence on founding moral behavior on custom rather than an imperfect sense of what is natural. However, Tasso also firmly defends the existence of universal principles. Perhaps with Montaigne’s essay on cannibals in mind, Tasso adds cannibalism to the later Discorsi’s list of things that are clearly right or wrong: “for instance, eating human flesh will always be considered savagery, even though it may be the custom in some countries” [laonde il pascersi di carne umana sempre sarà riputato ferità, benché appresso alcune nazione fosse in uso].\(^2\) The second version of the Discorsi also insists on the unchanging verity of certain laws even as the discovery of new countries reveals the potentially infinite variety of custom. Tasso adds a number of paragraphs that compare poets who would defy established rules to explorers who are more audacious than prudent. Even in newly discovered lands, the same stars guide explorers: “truth is that which never changes nor disappears from the eyes of the mind” [e questo è il vero, il quale non si muta già mai, né sparisce a gli occhi de la mente].\(^2\) In these two passages from the Discorsi Tasso offers opposing views of judgment that reflect both his commitment to eternal unchanging law, the “eyes of the mind” that see unchanging truth, and his sense of the variability and mutability in which these truths are embodied, the “diversity of judgments” that figure among the variable things the poet must negotiate with his own imperfect judgment.

This tension between multiplicity and unity is one of the central ideas of Aminta. Tasso interrogates rather than upholds the “natural law” at the heart of the chorus’ golden age speech. Where the chorus formuates “natural law” as “what’s pleasurable is licit,” the rest of the drama spells out the unreliability of individual pleasure as an index to universal happiness. Far from offering one vision of paradise in the golden age speech, Tasso’s Aminta lays out a number of conflicting utopias. Perceptions of ideal nature are all shown to be grounded in the subjective and widely
diverging ideals of each of the characters. Characters rhetorically shape views of nature in their own images and use them to justify themselves or to persuade others.

Tasso’s chorus argues that pleasure is a natural law. Tasso elsewhere argues that, far from being an index to natural, universal, and unchangeable law, pleasure is allied with the changeable and diverse. In his dialogue on beauty, “Minturno overo della bellezza” (1592-93), Tasso rejects the notion that pleasure is a reliable measure of beauty. The pleasure one takes from beauty reflects a personal preference rather than a universal principle: “what pleases one person rarely pleases others” [quel che piace a l’uno rade volte suol piacere a gli altri]. Standards of beauty founded on the subjective rule of pleasure would be changeable and superficial:

Like a chameleon [beauty] will take on different colors, different forms, and different images and appearances. But I should rather believe that the beautiful appears beautiful to everyone and makes everything beautiful, for I am not looking for what is beautiful according to some usage or convention, which may indeed be most pleasing, but for what is beautiful of itself. [Trasmutabile, e a guisa di camaleonte prenderà diversi colori, diverse forme, e diverse imagine e apparenze; ma io crederei più tosto che il bello paresse bello a tutti e facesse belle tutte le cose; perch’io non ricerco quel ch’è bello per alcuno uso, il quale suole esser ancor soavissimo, ma quel che per se è bello.]

Pleasure reflects the personal and variable. It cannot be a foundation for universal standards of beauty or behavior.

In Aminta, ideals of pleasure divide characters from one another, rather than uniting them in a dream of universal delight like that praised by the chorus. In the opening scene, Cupid announces that he has fled the heavenly court, so that he can please himself rather than his ambitious mother. He claims, “I want to dispose of myself as I please” [Voglio dispor di me come a me piace] (25). However, disposing of oneself as one pleases proves to be difficult for everyone in this play.
The problem of conflicting pleasures also comes up in a dialogue between Tirsi and Aminta. Aminta decides to let Tirsi in on his amorous troubles because he enjoys Tirsi’s narrative of the court: “It please me to hear what you have to tell” [Piacemi d’udire / quanto mi narri] (652-53). Here is a shared pleasure. However, Tirsi’s story also brings up the problem of conflicting pleasures. He relates that he was called back from pleasant court life “as it was pleasing to someone else” [come altrui piacque] (638). This dialogue shows that mutual pleasure happens rarely; all too often pleasure for one person is distasteful or inconvenient to another.

In her opening argument with the hard-hearted Silvia, Dafne brings up the lovers’ dilemma that classically motivates amorous drama, that desires rarely seem to be mutual. She recalls that, when younger, she hated to be admired and was “displeased in as much as I was pleasing to another” [dispiacente / quanto di me piaceva altrui] (153-54). More threateningly, Dafne warns that Aminta’s pleasure may turn him away from her to Amaryllis, who presently loves him unrequitedly: “in the end you will cause that he will find pleasure in [your rival] to whom he is so pleasing” [al fin procuri / ch’a lui piacci colei cui tanto ei piace] (188-89). In rebuttal Silvia invokes the notion of everyone’s freedom to pursue their own pleasures, “Let Aminta make of himself and his love whatever he wants” [Facci Aminta di sé e de’ suoi amori / quel ch’a lui piace] (192). The manneristic, ornamental way in which Tasso plays with the word piacere in this passage highlights the convoluted paths of conflicting pleasures. Pleasure is no straightforward path to universal happiness, rather it introduces twists and turns into the journey to mutual happiness. Pleasure is a concept malleable to rhetorical and sophistic play, a concept that marks shifts in perspective rather than universality.

A utopia based on one person’s vision of pleasure might in fact have to be maintained by force and sophistry. In one of the play’s darker moments, Tirsi attempts to persuade Aminta that Silvia would take pleasure in being raped by
him. His argument plays insistently on the theme of pleasure’s subjectivity and manipulates it to make it a weapon of self-interest:

Now, don’t you see that by seeking her express consent, you are wanting what would most displease her? Now where is your desire to please her? And if she really wants you to delight in your theft or rapine, and not in her gift or payment what does it matter to you, fool, which means you use? [Or, se’l consenso espresso / cerchi di lei, non vedi che tu cerchi / quel che più le dispiace? Or dove è dunque / questo tuo desiderio di piacerle? / E s’ella vuol che ’l tuo diletto sia / tuo furto o tua rapina, e non suo dono / né sua mercede, a te folle, che importa / più l’un modo che l’altro?] (1117-124)

Tirsi’s appeal to Silvia’s pleasure is a sophistic and cynical manipulation of Aminta’s own intense longing and of his purer motives. He makes a distorted argument based on considering the pleasure of others.

Aminta’s happy ending depends on Aminta’s and Silvia’s learning to accommodate each other’s vision of happiness. When he incites Aminta to seek out Silvia at her bath, Tirsi does not have too much trouble convincing Aminta that fulfilling his own wishes would be somehow really granting Silvia’s. However, when Aminta temporarily does have her in his power, his much more delicate and unselfish attitude proves his worthiness. Aminta does not even look at the nude Silvia, “denying himself of his own pleasure” [negando a se medesmo il suo piacere] (1293). Silvia also undergoes a similar transformation. As Giorgio Bàrberi Squarotti points out, Silvia transforms from a rather Narcissistic character who is enjoying the power of her beauty into a compassionate human being. Silvia’s change of heart is signaled when she goes in search of Aminta who has purportedly killed himself for love of her: “until now I have lived for myself and my hunting [with a dual sense of wounding], now for what remains of my life I want to live for Aminta” [Sin qui vissi a me stessa, / a la mia feritate: or, quel ch’avanza, / viver voglio ad Aminta] (1809-811).
Learning to transcend their own pleasures leads to the ultimate happiness of Silvia and Aminta.

Transcending personal pleasure is also a central theme in Tasso’s dialogue, “Nifo overo del piacere,” (1580, 1583). Tasso stages a dialogue between Agostino Nifo, a Neapolitan philosopher well known for his study of Aristotle and Plato, and a young aristocrat, Ferrante Gonzaga.27 As Giovanna Scianatico points out, Nifo intends to lure his listener away from sensuous pleasures to moral and intellectual ones.28 During the course of this discussion, Tasso revisits the claim of Aminta’s chorus, that pleasure is nature’s golden law. Nifo distinguishes between two types of pleasure, “one in movement, which is known even among beasts, the other in stability and quiet” [l’una nel movimento, chè nota sino alle bestie, l’altra ne lo stato a ne la quiete].29 The first involves mostly bodily desires in search of requitement; the other the pleasure of the mind. The young Gonzaga objects:

Yet this [notion of intellectual pleasure] is countered by an almost universal voice of nature, which with marvelous harmony issues from founts and the waves of the sea and the flowering boughs of the trees and from the ivy-covered caves, and sweetly resounds from all sensible things. [Nondimeno par che ripugni ad una voce quasi universale de la natura, la qual con maravigliosa armonia esca da i fonti e da l’onde del mare e da’ fioriti rami de gli alberi a da le spelunche coperte d’ederà, e da tutte le cose sensibili risouna dolcemente.]30

Nifo’s response is not unsympathetic, but he insistently places intellectual pleasure on a higher plane and argues for the subjectivity of the apparently “almost universal voice of nature”:

I do not deny that you may seem to hear this voice, since many others seem to hear it, even myself, although I am old, murmuring from these boughs and fountains. Still, understanding what reason tells you to the contrary, you can recall yourself from those outer senses to the inner ones, and I
Insisting on the word *parere* (to appear), Nifo emphasizes that Gonzaga’s notion of “the voice of nature” is a matter of illusion, deceptive appearances.

Similarly, the “natural law” espoused by *Aminta’s* chorus is a delusion of the senses rather than a reality on which norms may be founded. Tasso further argues the artificiality of such arguments from nature. The Armida episode in *Gerusalemme Liberata*, which Tasso may have been working on while he was writing *Aminta*, amplifies themes and tensions in the golden age chorus. Artifice masking itself as nature is the hallmark of Armida’s magical, ensnaring garden in *Gerusalemme Liberata*. As Carlo and Ubaldo enter the garden to rescue Rinaldo from Armida’s amorous clutches, a nymph sings, “Only he who seeks what pleases is wise …. This is what nature proclaims” [Solo chi segue ciò che piace è saggio …. Questo grida natura]. The song concludes on a somewhat Epicurean note, “Enjoy the sure delights of the body and in happy objects gratify a tranquil mind and the frail senses” [Goda il corpo sicuro, e in lieti oggetti / l’alma tranquilla appaghi i sensi fraili …. Questo è saver, questa è felice vita: si l’insegna natura e si l’addita]. Tasso makes an ironic contrast between these praises of simple, frank nature and their singer. Armida’s garden is not the nature “senza velo” apparently praised by the chorus in *Aminta*. The garden is itself a deceptive veil, an artful and unreal construction. Even the enticing invitation to embrace nature is sung, not by a real nymph, but a magical, artificial creation of Armida’s. Advice on how to live according to nature emanates from a most unnatural setting.
One of the marvelous features of the garden is that “the art which created it all, was revealed nowhere” [L’arte, che tutto fa, nulla si scopre]. Armida’s garden operates under a distorted version of the ideal of sprezzatura, the art of achieving a natural-looking kind of grace. Aminta’s chorus, and its praise of “natural” pleasure and license is a similar instance of artifice masquerading as nature. The chorus, a supposedly simple-hearted plea for a return to freedom, is of course the artistic performance of a courtier. The speech purports to critique honor as courtly artifice; however it may actually criticize how artifice seeks to replace nature, to remake it in its own image.

Tasso critiques similar pastoral impositions of the human world onto the natural one in other cantos of his Gerusalemme Liberata. In Erminia’s pastoral sojourn, Tasso makes gentle fun of the theme of the rejected lover to whose lovelorn songs all of nature responds with sympathetic echoes. Erminia inscribes her human history of ill-fated love in various trees, calling on them to sympathize with her, “Preserve in yourselves, this sorrowful history, friendly plants” [In voi serbate, questa dolente istoria, amiche piante]. The poet deflatingly comments, “So she spoke to the deaf trees” [Così ragiona a i sordi tronchi]. Tasso pointedly contrasts Erminia’s voluble, emotional laments with a deaf and silent nature on which human beings inscribe their desires.

Aminta’s famous chorus is one of a series of episodes in which characters create images of nature and its golden age in order to persuade or to justify their own behavior. Far from offering one vision of paradise in the golden age speech, Tasso’s Aminta lays out a number of conflicting, artfully created “utopias” that reveal the desires of their creators rather than universal standards for behavior.

One of these suspect utopias is Tirsi’s vision of the court. He is utterly enchanted by what he sees as a world of poetry kept in order by a benevolent ruler. Tirsi’s vision of the court bears a striking resemblance to a pastoral paradise, overrun
with “divinities; graceful, pretty nymphs / new Orpheuses and Linuses” [celesti
dee, ninfe leggiadre e belle / novi Lini ed Orfei] (626-27). Tirsi claims to have seen
Aurora, “unveiled, unclouded, just as she appears before the gods, strewing golden
and silver dews and rays” [Senza vel, senza nube, e quale e quante / a gl’immortali
 appar, vergine Aurora / sparger d’argento e d’or rugiade e raggi] (628-30). Like
Aminta’s chorus, which celebrates the natural beauties of nude women (690, 695),
Tirsi claims to have seen nature unveiled. Tasso counters such proclamations as
mistaken or sophistic.

In the court, Tirsi has encountered as artificial and deceptive a world as Armida’s
garden. In a passage that alludes to one of the models for this garden, Alcina’s
demonic court in Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso, Tirsi recalls a conversation in which
Mopso warned him of the dangers of going to the city and above all against mingling
with the courtly society where “live magicians whose enchantments alter every sight
and sound. What seem to be diamonds and fine gold are glass and copper” [Abitan
le maghe, che incantando / fan traveder e traudir ciascun. / Ciò che diamante sembra
ed oro fino / è vetro e rame] (583-86). Here not only are base materials transformed
into higher ones, but humans are transformed into lower forms of life: “you might
end up transformed into a willow or beast or into water or fire” [tu potresti indi
restarne / converso in selce, in fera, in acqua, o in foco] (605-06), Mopso cautions
Tirsi about the power of magicians, or skillful rhetoricians, to transform and
manipulate appearances.

Tirsi’s exaltation of the court may simply rewrite Ariosto’s satire with a positive
slant intended to flatter his courtly audience. However, it seems more likely that
Tasso here gives a lighter version of the kind of court critique he writes in his
dialogue, “Malpiglio overo de la corte,” (1584-85). Perhaps the comparatively young
Tirsi simply has not seen beneath the deception any better than Ruggiero does in
Ariosto’s story of a virile warrior enslaved by a crafty sorceress. Rather than viewing
“Aurora senza velo,” Tirsi has simply seen the court through the veil of his own desires. Likewise, Tasso suggests that visions of golden-age nature are poetic fictions, alternatives to real nature seen through the veils of personal desire.

Both Dafne and the Satyr appeal to images of a golden age in order to further an argument. Dafne mourns the lost golden age of her youth, warning Silvia not to waste time. Silvia resists Dafne’s arguments, contending that her argument is more beautiful than true. Sylvia dismisses Dafne’s persuasions as “these words you feign and decorate” [parole che tu fingi ed orni] (132). The word fingere, a common word for poetic creation, labels Dafne’s arguments as poetic fictions. Dafne goes impenitently on to create an image of a golden age in which all nature is enamored (212-57). The conversation is a kind of poetic play that suggests how Tasso wants his readers to understand the golden age dreams of the chorus. In Aminta, poetic images of a golden age are lovely fictions that mirror the diverse desires of their creators rather than an authentic nature to be taken as a guide for behavior.

A less lovely view of nature is imagined by the Satyr. The famous golden age chorus that concludes the drama’s first act is immediately followed and countered by the satyr’s diatribe against the present golden age, one in which only those with gold flourish and are able to obtain their desires: “Truly this is the age of gold, since only gold conquers and rules” [E veramente il secol d’oro è questo, / poiché sol vince l’oro e regna l’oro] (780-81). The satyr also transforms the chorus’s contention that what is natural is licit. For the chorus pleasure is natural; for the satyr, violence is nature’s way. When Silvia scorns his gifts of fruit and flowers, the satyr justifies taking the violent approach to wooing, justifying himself with a view of nature at war that inverts Dafne’s ideal of nature in love:

Everyone uses those weapons that nature has given them for their own good: the deer has speed; the lion, claws; and the frothing boar, teeth…why not, for my own well-being, use violence, since Nature shaped me for violence and rapine?” [Usa ciascuno / quell’armi che gli ha date la natura
The satyr’s speech is another rhetorical creation that does not reveal Nature so much as his own nature. The juxtaposition of the satyr’s dark vision with the chorus argues the dangers of mistaking individual desires for a true view of nature. In Aminta, Tasso does not present his readers with a unified vision of what constitutes a golden age or natural behavior, but with the diversity of judgments.

In his dialogue, “Il Malpiglio Seconda overo del fuggir la moltetudine” (1585), Tasso characterizes human notions of nature as multitudinous. The variety of things written about rivers and mountains is endless. Accounts appear not only in the works of philosophers, but also in “the fables of poets and authorities on pagan theology, who write many things full of reverence and horror, which ought to be interpreted by philosophers of customs rather than natural philosophers” [le favole de’ poeti a l’autorità de’ gentili teologi, che scrivono molte cose pie di riverenze e d’orrore, le quale deono essere interpretate anzi da’ filosofi de’ costumi che da’ naturali]. In other words, endlessly various conceptions of nature belong to the realm of what Tasso called “most changeable custom” [mutabilissimo uso] in his poetic discourses, to the realms of uncertain knowledge to be negotiated by prudence rather than certain knowledge or scienza.

Aminta takes place in the uncertain realm of variety. In the intermezzo that follows the first act, Proteus introduces himself as one who “frequently alters appearances and forms” [trasmutar sembianti / e forme soglio variar sì spesso] (l.1-2). Proteus takes credit only for directing this particular interlude, but his presiding over the first one suggests his presence in the whole of the drama.

Tasso does, however, suggest a tranquil world of order above the confusing and various dreams and desires pursued by the characters in the drama. In her discussion
of the dialogue “Nifo overo del piacere,” Giovanna Sciannatico characterizes Tasso’s notion of judgment as a kind of imperfect prudence inevitably immersed in the changeable and immutable. She sees Tasso as looking to faith to supplement the imperfections of judgment:

It is not certain knowledge, the unreachable truth, that inspires Tasso’s thinking, but the search for a mobile knowledge, mixed with things, that works through choice, through opinion – a topos of sixteenth-century writing – and that seeks its compensation on another plane, fideistic, theological. [Non dunque la scienza, la verità inarrivabile, muove la riflessione del poeta, ma la ricerca di un sapere mobile, mescolate con le cose, che si elabora per “elezione”, per “opinione” – è un topos del resto della trattatistica del cinquecento – e che richiede pertic il risarcimento su di un altro piano, fideistico, della teologia.]\(^{40}\)

Such a compensating, divine perspective, calling for faith, complements Tasso’s portrayal of human judgment in error.

The third intermezzo is spoken by deities who enjoy tranquil vision and bliss in the unchangeable and serene upper realms of the cosmos: “We are divinities, who in endless serenity, among heavenly sapphires and lovely crystals, dance endless balls, where there is neither summer nor winter” [Divi noi siam, che ne ’l sereno eterno / Fra celesti zaffiri e bei cristalli / Meniam perpetui balli, / Dove non è giamaia state nè verno] (1-4). The gods enjoy a tranquil state like the one Lucretius pictures for divinities who do not trouble themselves with human problems. These gods, however, do not just watch but actually descend into the “theater of the world” [del teatro del mondo] (5-7).

Aminta ends at such a moment, when divine providence intervenes to elevate the characters above their usual limited abilities and vision. When he thinks Aminta may have killed himself, Tirsi turns to Elpino, whose name means hope.\(^{41}\) The hope-
giving poet Elpino recreates a kind of golden age with his song; he “makes the rivers flow with pure milk, and honey ooze from tough bark” [Correr fa di puro latte i fiumi, / e stillar mele da le dure scorze] (1321-22). With this description of Elpino’s poetic golden age, Tasso may argue that all golden ages are merely creations of individual desire and beautiful rhetoric. However, Elpino’s hopeful pronouncements also seem to suggest some way out of the tangles of merely human judgment.

Elpino returns from his mission to save Aminta with news of divine intervention that brings a happy ending. Aminta has survived his jump and revived with the compassionate attentions of Silvia. Elpino thanks the god of Love, who mysteriously accomplishes his designs:

Truly the law by which Love eternally governs his empire is neither harsh nor hidden: and his works full of providence and mystery, others condemn wrongly. Oh with what art and by what unseen ways he leads man to be blessed, and sets him down in the joys of his amorous paradise when he believes himself to be at the nadir of his fortunes. [Veramente la legge con che Amore / il suo imperio governa eternamente / non è dura né obliqua: e l’opre sue, / piene di providenza e di mistero, / altri a torto condanna. Oh con quant’arte, / e per che ignote strade egli conduce / l’uom ad esser beato, e fra le gioie / del suo amoroso paradiso il pone / quando ei più crede al fondo esser de’ mali!] (1839-848)

Elpino’s speech offers the possibility of transcending subjective individual visions. It suggests that there is a divine and clarifying art at work, even when it is not perceived by erring human judgment. James Yoch argues that “Elpino’s conclusion directs the audience to see the scene as a whole, ultimately ordered despite the momentary confusions experienced on the way to the final triumph.”42 The providential view literally sees further and more comprehensively than the limited characters can. Yoch compares the design of the play to the layout of a renaissance Italian garden constructed to lead its visitors on labyrinthine paths but with an order that is clearly
perceivable from above. This view recalls God’s view in the opening of *Gerusalemme Liberata*, a view that reconciles diversity into “a single point and view” [in un sol punto e in una / vista mirò ciò che in sé il mondo aduna]. Elpino’s evocation of Amor as providence echoes endings of many renaissance comedies that wrap up happily with a nod to the divine providence that works unseen through human folly.

*Aminta* hardly celebrates a “natural law” of hedonism. Instead it is a fable of the vagaries of human judgment. Tasso cautions that notions of nature are more likely to reflect the subjective desires and manipulative schemes of fallible humans than to reveal truths. He plays the confusing variety of human perspective off a view from on high that reveals the presence of a guiding providence. When Daniel takes up *Aminta* as a source for *The Queene’s Arcadia*, he thoughtfully engages this portrayal of erring human judgment.

11. *The Queenes Arcadia*

Daniel engages Tasso and Montaigne both as champions of Nature and as critics of the distorted way in which judgment may construe the natural and authentic. Daniel derives, from both Tasso and from Montaigne, a sense of how personal desire, self-interest, and mortal fallibility may create distorted views of what is natural. Daniel adopts these views to his own notion of judgment. He corrects what he sees as a fallacious view of nature presented by Tasso’s chorus. He qualifies Montaigne’s skepticism, adapting it to Protestant notions of nature and judgment as informed, however imperfectly, by grace. This sense of divine grace strengthens Daniel’s sense of the efficacy of another, though related kind of grace, the naturalness achieved through observance of decorum. Daniel understands decorum, accommodation to times, places, and persons, as an imperfect kind of knowledge related to prudence. His notion of moral judgment is ultimately an adaptation of decorum as a kind of moral guide – imperfect but rooted in nature and divine grace.
From Tasso’s pastoral drama *Aminta*, Daniel not only draws the outlines of some of the romantic subplots of *The Queenes Arcadia*, but he also engages Tasso’s thinking on judgment. On one hand he sympathizes with the chorus’s rhetorically powerful protest against the way courtly life corrupts simple, natural ways. However, he also sees the speech as a mistaken view of what is authentic. Daniel adapts Tasso’s golden age chorus for the conclusion of *The Queenes Arcadia*. One of the wise elders of Arcadia, Melibaeus, laments the stranglehold that custom, especially the mores of a cultivated society, puts on nature. Melibaeus claims that custom, the “universall Tyran of the earth … takes from us our priviledge / to be our selves, rendes that great charter too / of nature.” Melibaeus here echoes *Aminta’s* famous diatribe against the smothering of natural liberty by courtly artifice. The chorus protests the restraints imposed by “that empty word without substance, that idol of errors, idol of deceit, which was later called honor by the unsound mob, which made it the tyrant over our nature” [quel vano / nome senza soggetto, / quell’idolo d’errori, idol d’inganno, / quel che dal volgo insano / onor poscia fu detto, / che di nostra natura’l feo tiranno] (670-75). The chorus accuses Honor of having “veiled natural pleasures, imposed restraints on speech and artfulness on movement” [Tu prima, Onor, velasti / la fonte de i diletti / a i detti il fren ponesti, a i passi l’arte] (695-96, 705). The only law of this free and easy age was “the golden and joyous law that nature inscribed: ‘whatever pleases is lawful’” [legge aurea e felice / che natura scolpì : S’ei piace, ei lice”] (80). This protest against idolizing courtly artifice has a strong attraction for Daniel, and he echoes it throughout his works.

In Daniel’s many reworkings of Tasso’s golden age chorus, he finds it a convenient weapon against courtly artifice. In a verse epistle to Lucy Harington, a prominent but ultimately disaffected member of the Stuart court, Daniel decries courtly practices which alienate individuals from their true selves, who are “let out to custome fashion and to shew … As if we onely were compos’d by Arte, / Not
Nature.” Daniel embraces the way the chorus longs for a more natural mode of being. However, Daniel is often careful to correct its vision of unfettered sensuality to what he sees as natural values of innocence and modesty. Rosamund echoes the chorus in order to condemn cosmetic and courtly deceit as new idols that have replaced natural modesty. Daniel’s own counsel for the new King James, the “Panegyrike Congratulatrie” asks that the King banish indecent and enervating foreign ways, in order to “bring us back unto our selves again, / Unto our ancient native modestie.” For Daniel the state of nature is to some degree a touchstone or source of morality.

In the Queenes Arcadia, Daniel also corrects Aminta’s celebration of what it perceives as natural license. In a subplot that echoes Aminta, the chastely reticent Cloris realizes her love for her admirer Amyntas when she learns that he has attempted suicide out of love for her. As Cloris grieves for what she thinks is Amyntas’ death, Nature provides her with veiling tears:

Or else did Nature, taking pittie now
Of her distresse, imploy them in that store
To serve as vailes, and to be interposed
Betwixt her griefe and her (5.2.126-29).

Cloris’ natural tears provide a welcome shield from the raw facts of passion and sorrow. With a concept of nature that provides kind veils of protection, Daniel refutes sharply the libidinous unveiled nature celebrated by Aminta’s chorus.

While Daniel makes a corrected version of the chorus’s call for a return to a more natural being, he is also attentive to Tasso’s sense of the malleability of concepts of nature, their vulnerability to misconception and misuse. In Aminta Tasso argues that the chorus’s dream of unimpeded license is merely one of many perceptions of nature, all veils imposed by the limitations of human judgment. As Daniel depicts a
nature that may actually impose veils rather than insisting on tearing away the veils of nature, he is calling for intellectual as well as sexual modesty.

Daniel derives such a call for intellectual modesty not only from Tasso, but also from Montaigne. In 1603, Montaigne's *Essais* are published in an English translation by Daniel's brother-in-law John Florio. Florio, a significant figure in the exchange of ideas between England and the Continent, dedicates an Italian-English dictionary to Queen Anne. His translation of the *Essais* is completed with the support of Lucy Harington, one of the members of the Queen's retinue and a patron of Daniel's.49 Daniel himself promotes the work with a poem praising Montaigne. This work deeply permeates Daniel's thinking: *The Queenes Arcadia* and the “Defense of Ryme” are full of echoes from Florio's translation. As Daniel thinks through the relationship of judgment and nature, Montaigne provides him with a defense of following the dictates of nature, but he also complicates this notion with insistence on the faultiness of human judgment.

In his essay, “Of the Canniballes,” Montaigne argues that supposedly barbaric societies, living closer to nature, may actually show much less savagery than those that claim a superior level of civilization.

> Where is ever perfect religion, perfect policie, perfect and compleat use of all things. They are even savage, as we call those fruits wilde, which nature of hir selfe, and of her ordinarie progresse hath produced; whereas indeed, they are those which our selves have altered by our artificiall devices, and diverted from their common order we should rather term savage. In those are the true and most profitable vertues, and naturall properties most lively and vigorous, which in these we have bastardized, applying them to the pleasure of our corrupted taste.50

Daniel echoes this essay in *The Queenes Arcadia*. Melibaeus' concluding speech laments a fallen state that may be the result of the encroachments of foreign custom:

> “Corrupted and abastardizéd thus, / [We] thinke all lookes ill that does not looke like
us” (5. 4.251-52). Ergastus, another of the wise elders of Arcadia, decries sophisticated foreigners for “reckoning us barbarous,” and adds that if adopting corrupting customs would “civilize, let us be barbarous still” (5.3, 70-71). Daniel finds that Montaigne’s criticism of biased cultural judgment makes a useful defense for Arcadians – and for the English derided as “barbarian” by snobbish Continentals.

Montaigne’s preference for natural ways echoes throughout Daniel’s Arcadia. In “Of Experience,” Montaigne champions societies that are closer to nature: “Nature gives [laws] ever more happy then those we give ourselves. Witnesse the image of the golden age that Poets faine; and the state wherein we see divers nations to live, which have no other.” Ergastus echoes this phrase in The Queenes Arcadia, railing against foreign lawyers, who introduce unnecessary legal baggage into Arcadia: “As if that nature had not tooke more care / For us, then we for our owne selves can take, / And makes us better lawes then those we make (3.5. 14-16). Alcon and Lincus, a fomenter of legal quarrels and a quack doctor, both lament that the golden innocence of the Arcadians makes it hard for them to do business. Lincus finds that the Arcadians still enjoy the happiness of living in a kind of Eden:

before men have transform’id
Their state of nature in so many shapes,
Of their owne management, and are cast out
Into confusion, by their knowledges. (3.1.41-44)

Here Daniel may allude to a favorite theme of Montaigne’s, the distortion that individual and cultural perceptions impose on nature. Montaigne’s writings offer Daniel a justification of cultures that are close to nature, a defense of natural goodness against hypercivilized courtly fashion. However, Montaigne simultaneously challenges these foundations as he is skeptical about judgment’s ability to determine what is natural with any degree of certainty.
Montaigne’s essay “Of Canniballes” is probably less a defense of cannibals than a wakeup call to the self-satisfaction of “civilized” nations: “There is nothing in that nation, that is either barbarous or savage, unlesse men call that barbarisme which is not common to them. As indeede, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, than the example and Idea of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live in.” Montaigne argues that judgment is so immersed in local custom that no one can claim complete access to “truth and reason.” Montaigne makes this argument even more explicitly in “The Apology for Raymond Sebond” a work much quoted by Daniel. Montaigne argues, “Truth ought to have a like and universal visage throughout the world.” However, if such a truth exists, it is utterly obscured. Montaigne takes issue with those thinkers who identify some laws or customs as universal. “But they are pleasant, when to allow the Lawes some certainties, they say that these be some time perpetuall and immoveable, which they call naturall, and by the condition of their proper essence, are imprinted in man-kind.” Montaigne argues that custom and law vary so widely between different nations that there is no perceptible natural or common law: “there is not so much as one to be found, which fortune or temeritie of chance hath graunted to be universally received and by the consent of unanimitie of all nations to be admitted.” Montaigne allows the possibility that laws directly based on nature exist, but they are inaccessible: “It is credible that there be naturall lawes … but in us they are lost.” With many passages that advocate following nature, and with his critical view of cultural self-satisfaction, Montaigne thus offers Daniel’s Arcadians some support for holding fast to a culture that others may see as barbarous. However, Montaigne’s view of the fallibility of all judgments also undermines Arcadian certainty.

Montaigne’s essay, “On Custome,” argues that custom is severed from nature. Montaigne writes that “Custome quaileth and weakeneth our customary senses.” Once custom becomes ingrained, Montaigne claims, “it will soone discover a furious
and tyrannical countenance unto us, against which we have no more the libertie to
lift so much as our eies; wee may plainly see it upon every ocassion to force the rules
of Nature.” Custom so powerfully imposes itself on nature that objective judgment
is nearly impossible.

In a speech that alludes to this essay, Daniel’s Melibaeus closes The Queene’s
Arcadia not simply with a condemnation of foreign corruption, but with a rather
riddling, ambiguous perspective on the problems of making moral judgments.
Melibaeus echoes Montaigne’s sense that tyrannical custom interferes with our
senses, and he suggests that the Arcadians too may have “no other ayme of truth
and reason, than the example and Ideas of the opinions and customes” of Arcadia.
Melibaeus claims that custom, the “universall Tyran of the earth,” comes between
judgment and nature:

[it] so inchaynes our judgments and discourse
Unto the present usances, that we
Must all our senses thereunto refer.
As if we had no other touch of truth
And reason then the nations of the times
And place wherein we live, and being our selves
Corrupted, and abastardizéd thus,
Thinke all lookes ill that does not looke like us. (5. 4.240, 248-252)

The notion that custom so blinds judgment that we “thinke all lookes ill that does not
looke like us” not only condemns foreign corruption, but also questions the validity
of the localized perspective. Melibaeus’ concluding speech laments the way custom
binds judgment to the limited perspective of a particular time and place, obscures
nature, and therefore obfuscates sound and reliable judgment. His speech suggests
that the Arcadians, locked into their own local perspective, may be more insularized
than innocent, themselves separated from nature by a layer of custom and thus
unable to value foreign customs objectively.
Melibaeus final advice thus sounds paradoxical. Having acknowledged the way custom obscures natural judgment, he advises the Arcadians to cling to it:

And therefore let us recollect ourselves
Dispers'd into these strange confuséd ills,
And be again Arcadians as we were
In manners, and in habits as we were. (5. 4.253-56)

This apparently conflictive advice has its source in Montaigne. On one hand, Montaigne argues the difficulty of accessing universal law. On the other hand, in his “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” Montaigne also argues that the most reasonable course, given universal variation, is to follow local law. However, this is not a course of certainty: “What wil Philosophie then say to us in this necessity? That we follow the lawes of our country, that is to say, this waving sea of a peoples or of a Princes opinions, which shall paint me forth justice with as many colours, and reforme the same into as many visages as there are changes and altertions of passion in them. I cannot have my judgment so flexible.” Nevertheless, this sort of flexibility is exactly what Montaigne elsewhere embraces as a solution to the uncertainty of judgment.

Having argued that custom is without foundation in reason or nature, Montaigne still insists that it is to be observed in all outward matters. In “Of Custome,” he insists on one universal “rule,” namely, accommodation to local custom.

Rather on the contrary, me seemeth, that all several, strange, and particular fashions proceede rather of follie, or ambitious affectations, than of true reason; and that a wise man ought inwardly to retire his minde from the common presse, and hold the same liberty and power to judge freely of all things, but for outward matters, he ought absolutely to follow the fashions and forme customarily received. … For that is the rule of rules, and generall law of lawes, for every man to observe those of the place wherein he liveth.”
This passage in favor of observing custom qualifies Montaigne’s argument that judgment is overpowered by custom and that custom has no foundation in nature. Here Montaigne gives the wise man’s judgment some independence from custom. However, Montaigne restricts the realm of such judgment to private concerns. For Montaigne, this is a crucial distinction. By denying that universal truth is reliably perceived by individuals, he undermines the grounds of violent religious and political conflict. For Montaigne, moral judgments are made in the realm of things imperfectly known and require a modest and decorous adjustment to local custom.

Denying certain access to universal laws as a violence-promoting delusion, Montaigne instead advocates the universal of rule of decorum as a way of regulating actions where knowledge is imperfect. Montaigne’s characterization of accommodation as the “rule of rules, and generall law of lawes” echoes the formulas of decorum espoused in Cicero’s Orator. Cicero calls decorum, an awareness of what is fitting to time, place, rank and other circumstances, that principle which “must always be considered in every part of oration and life” [semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceit est considerandum]. He contrasts decorum, an imperfect and active kind of knowledge, with the certainty of abstract speculation. These views are revisited in Castiglione’s influential sixteenth-century guide to courtiership. Discussing how the appearance of grace may be achieved by those that do not have it straight from the heavens, Castiglione’s Ludovico da Canossa offers no easily mastered precepts and no absolute rules, except for one. The graceful courtier must observe the “most universal rule” [regola universalissima] of avoiding affectation, cultivating the effortless attitude of sprezzatura that makes all actions appear natural and artless. Such naturalness is achieved by observing “regole universali” of accommodation to times, places, and persons.

John Florio’s translation of the Essais underscores Montaigne’s application of the rule of decorum to the issue of following local custom. Florio translates the
Greek aphorism with which Montaigne follows his call to observance of native custom [nomois epesthai toisin eg chorois kalon] as “Lawes of the native place, / To follow, is a grace.” Montaigne makes a similar connection between accommodation and decorum in “Of Experience”: “The best and most commendable lives, and best pleasing me are (in my conceit) those which with order are fitted, and with decorum are ranged to the common mould and humane model.” A universal rule of decorous adaptation, given in the absence of any hard and fast rules for achieving the elusive quality of grace, informs Montaigne’s appeal to accommodation as a reasonable alternative to violent conflict over an absolute right that cannot be infallibly claimed by human beings.

Daniel does embrace the possibility of an independent, detached, certain kind of judgment that is something like the inner independence that Montaigne grants to the “wise man.” However, Daniel also appreciates the necessity of accommodation to what is customary or decorous. In his prefatory poem for The Queenes Arcadia, Daniel offers two modes of judgment or points of view. One is a superior view from above that majestically surveys error. The other kind of judgment decorously conforms to its circumstances.

Daniel’s dedicatory epistle to the Queen defends his pastoral drama as a more appropriate and decorous genre than the Jonsonian masque. He argues that a view from on high penetrates the masque’s audacious and inappropriate attempt to represent the mysteries of rule:

…the eye of practice, looking down from hie
Upon such over-reaching vanity,
Sees how from error t’error it doth flote
As from an unknowne Ocean into a Gulfe.  

Daniel’s “eye of practice” that looks down on “error” recalls the famous passage in which Lucretius expounds on the pleasure of beholding folly from the safety of
wisdom.67 This iconoclastic view counters the false appropriation of a powerful, controlling view conferred by the masque’s new use of artistic perspective, introduced to the stage in Jonson’s *Masque of Blackness*, performed the year previous to the publication of Daniel’s *The Queens Arcadia*.68

Daniel targets the masque’s new use of artistic perspective, accusing masque-makers of having “in the view of State t’have show’d / A counterfeit of State.”69 Here he alludes to the way Jones employed perceptive to create an illusion of depth that can only be perfectly appreciated from one position in the hall. As Orgel puts it, “In a theater employing perspective, there is only one focal point, one perfect place in the hall from which the illusion achieves its fullest effect.”70 Perspective is thus a metaphorical tribute to the superior and power and vision of the king.71 However, Daniel finds such a tribute suspect.

Perceptive is objectionable partly because it places a “counterfeit” in the State’s view. Like many of his contemporaries, Daniel equates “counterfeiting” with the illusionistic capabilities of perspective.72 In his preface to his 1598 translation of Lomazzo’s treatise on painting, Haydocke offers his work as a helpful guide to “this Arte of Painting, whereby the unskilfull eye is so often cozened and deluded, taking counterfeit creatures for true and naturall.”73 The shadowing and coloring that gives dimensions to a perspectival painting are synonymous for Daniel with the deceitful shaping of right by self-interest. In his “Defense of Rhyme,” he argues “For if this right, or truth, should be no other thing than that wee make it, we shall shape it into a thousand figures, seeing this excellent painter Man, can so well lay the colours which himselfe grindes in his owne affections, as that hee will make them serve for any shadow, and any counterfeit.”74 In contrast to the flattering perspectival view offered by the masque makers, Daniel offers an opposing metaphor for a point of view, the philosopher’s detached and disenchanted view from on high.
However, while Daniel sometimes presents the view from on high as error-piercing, he sees its false appropriation as dangerous. In his prefatory poem to Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s essays, Daniel condemns pride in one’s own faulty judgment to mounting “This Babel of our skill, this Towre of wit,” a flawed attempt to appropriate a divine view. Such a mistaken misappropriation of a kind of view from on high leads to the fracturing or misperception of truth that Daniel equates with the perspectival view. Daniel’s “Musophilus” (1599) plays the advantages of a detached view against those of accommodation. Musophilus does defend a view “That over-lookes the base, contemptible / And low-laid follies of mortalities.” Philocosmus defends the lower view, “For not discreetly to compose our parts / Unto the frame of men (which we must be)” makes us “Rebels to Nature and societie.”

While Daniel does see the appeal of some kind of error-piercing view from on high, he also advocates the value of practical discretion and decorous accommodation to society.

In the “Defense of Ryme,” Daniel advocates judicious accommodation to custom as an antidote to the tyrannical impulses of rebels, absolutist rulers, wrong-headed arbitrators of taste, and self-interested charlatans:

> Were it not farre better to holde us fast to our old custome, than to stand thus distracted with uncertaine Lawe, wherein Right shal have as many faces as it pleases Passion to make it, …What colours are there laid upon indifferent things to make them seem other then they are, as if it were but only to intertaine contestation amongst men; who standing according to the prospective of their owne humour, seeme to see the selfe same things to appeare otherwise to them.”

Here custom is an equally valid way to oppose the fracturing effects of false claims to absolute right.
In the preface to *The Queenes Arcadia*, Daniel chooses the lowly view for himself, condemning the practitioners of the flattering masque as violaters of decorous accommodation. Alluding to Horace’s strictures of decorum, Daniel compares masque-makers to misguided painters who attach human heads to the bodies of horses or fish. Masque-makers “forme more monstrous figures than containe / a possibility,” and thus “their common decency they marre.” Instead of building a tower in the air, Daniel chooses to conform to decorum, building his argument “on the ground.” He chooses a stance that is more decorously appropriate to his social position, but also to the limitations of a human view. In his preface Daniel signals his departure from what he sees as inappropriate stances for judgment: flattering perspective and a misappropriation of the view from on high. His pastoral drama will explore instead the value of decorous accommodation.

Rather than rail from the heights, Daniel chooses “plaine simplicity” as the style for *The Queenes Arcadia*. “Plain” is probably a pun, suggesting the simple style appropriate to pastoral as well its metaphorical orientation on the ground rather than in the heights. The opening of the play emphasizes the theme of plainness. Ergastus laments Arcadia’s fall from its once innocent state, a “region of plaine honesty” (1.1.6). Later, Ergastus complains of corrupting foreign custom that has “infected thus our honest plaines” (1.1. 65).

Like Montaigne, Daniel endorses following custom as an accommodation to the errors of individual judgment. However, he is more insistent than Montaigne on the connections between custom and nature. Both Montaigne’s skeptical assessment of the accessibility of universal law and more traditional concepts of natural law and judgment inform Daniel’s concept of the relationship between judgment, custom, and nature.

Daniel clearly finds Montaigne useful in his defense of native English customs. However, Daniel’s concept of the relationship between nature and custom, and his
sense of foundations of judgment is less skeptical. He amends one of Montaigne’s passages when he quotes it in Melibaeus’ concluding speech. In “On the Caniballes,” Montaigne claims it is wrong to label other peoples barbarous with no other ground to stand on than one’s native mores: “As indeed, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, than the example and Ideas of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live in.” Melibaeus’ speech alters Montaigne’s “As indeed” to a less adamant “As if.” Montaigne argues that it is nearly impossible to discern native customs from nature, that our assessment of cultural mores is more a matter of upbringing than absolute right. Daniel shares Montaigne’s distrust of intellectual and cultural arrogance, but he is somewhat more reluctant to argue that the only foundations of truth and reason are in customs that have no foundation in nature. While Daniel does see moral judgment as fallible, he also argues that it does have a foundation that does offer some measure of stability.

One of the difficulties of Melibaeus’ concluding speech stems from Daniel’s complex notion of the relationship between custom and nature. This complexity is reflected in the two different readings that two of the play’s editors, Elizabeth Donno and Alexander Grosart, take on a crucial verb in this passage. Donno’s edition reads as follows:

That universall Tyrant of the earth
Custome, who takes from us our priviledge
To be our selves, reades that great charter too
Of nature, and would likewise cancell man. (5.4.240-44)

Grosart takes the “reades” of the 1606 and 1623 editions to be a typographical error and amends “reades” to “rendes.”82 This emendation conveys the sense of custom destroying the map nature has laid out. This reading makes sense given the general tone of the passage; it parallels the following phrase in which custom attempts to “cancell” man. However, “reades,” the version that Donno retains, may also be
justifiable on the grounds of the complex relationship that Daniel sees between custom and nature. While he often argues that custom obfuscates judgment, Daniel also suggests that, ideally, custom “reads” nature. To some degree, customs are based on nature’s book.

Daniel sees customs as having some connection, however tenuous, to stabilizing foundations in nature. In his “Defense of Ryme,” he argues that English poets should retain their customary rhymes rather than slavishly following ancient metrical models because rhyme is more natural. Custom and Nature are allies; they both “most powerfully defend” the English practice of rhyme. Custom is not an absolute evil; rather it has its place in a hierarchy of goods. “Custome that is before all Law, Nature that is above all Arte” are both more fundamental bases for judgment in matters both moral and artistic than man-made Art and Law.83

In his “Defense of Ryme,” Daniel justifies English customs, both poetic and legal, not only as prior to art or law, but also as derived from nature. English poets are as entitled to their customary rhymes as the Greeks and Romans are to their metrical verse because they are both following the dictates of nature: “We are the children of nature as well as they, we are not so placed out of the way of judgment, but that the same Sunne of Discretion shineth upon us....Time and the turne of things bring about these faculties according to the present situation ... So that we must never rebel against use.”84 Here Daniel sides with Philocosmus; rebellion against custom amounts to rebellion against nature.

While Daniel is influenced by Montaigne’s skeptical sense of the accessibility of natural law, his view of the relationship between custom and nature largely adheres to a long tradition that sees them as closely related. According to Cicero, moral law and reason are implanted in human beings by Nature.85 This natural sense of what is morally right is equivalent to decorum or propriety – rational, moral, temperate behavior that is naturally appropriate to human beings. Cicero equates moral
propriety with poetic decorum, which dictates the choice of appropriate language and action for each character. Cicero argues that decorum is ultimately a universal construct based on cosmic harmonies that inform both ideal morality and beauty. This kind of harmony confers “a certain grace” [quodam lepore] both on good lives and harmonious features.

For Daniel, Cicero’s sense of the relationship between nature and custom is mediated by Castiglione, a mediation which both strengthens and complicates Daniel’s own sense of the ties between nature and custom. Daniel’s argument that good usage comes from nature rather than art could derive directly from Cicero, but it also echoes the discussion of language in the first book of Castiglione’s Courtier. Ludovico da Canossa contends that good usage, a kind of enlightened custom, comes from sound natural judgment rather than from art or rules.

Especially important for Daniel, though, is Castiglione’s discussion of courtly grace, or sprezzatura. Following Cicero, Castiglione contends that grace comes from observance of decorum, a natural ability to accommodate to circumstances. Cicero’s Nature seems to be something of a divine guide, and this sense is reinforced in Castiglione’s Courtier as Cesare Gonzaga argues that grace comes as “a gift of nature and the heavens” [don della natura e de’ cieli]. He explains that “the bountiful favor of heaven doth (as it were) in spite of them, guide them higher than they covet” [quel benigno favor del cielo quasi al suo dispetto i guida più alto che essi non desiderano]. Daniel adopts this matrix of grace, nature, and good judgment for his argument in “The Defense of Ryme”: “It is not bookes, but onely that great booke of the world, and the all-overspreading grace of heaven that makes men truely judiciall.” Daniel’s “great booke of the world” might equally be taken as the book of nature or as the book of custom, the way things are done in the world. The “overspreading grace of heaven” upholds human judgment and custom, ensuring some stability for readings from the book of nature.
While Daniel adopts Castiglione’s formula for judgment informed by the heavens, his emphasis on grace is slightly different. Castiglione’s notion of grace seems to suggest both a divine source that informs good judgment and courtly behavior. However, Daniel, and other early modern English readers of the *Courtier*, are anxious that the divine associations of grace not be vitiated by its association with courtliness. The sixteenth-century educator Roger Ascham praises Castiglione’s *Courtier*; however, he is anxious to point out how would-be courtiers might misinterpret grace, substituting worldly smoothness for a theological virtue. A marginal gloss, “The Grace in Courte,” draws attention to a passage in which Ascham inveighs against those sophisticates who would mock the innocent blush of a young man as rudeness, “so ungraciouslie do som gracelesse men, misuse the faire and godlie word grace.” Daniel shares this concern. Where Castiglione, perhaps somewhat playfully, suggests divine origins for courtly grace, Daniel puts a stronger emphasis on “the all-overspreading grace of heaven.”

For Daniel, the divine origins of grace make it an essential link between nature, custom, and judgment. This concept of judgment is informed by sixteenth-century Protestant thinkers who argue that, though judgment and nature are corrupted by the fall, they are yet informed to some degree by grace. Darryl Gless points out that Reformed Protestants believe that “grace works incessantly within the souls of faithful Christians in a created world that God’s gracious immanence supervises and maintains, down to its slightest details.” The Elizabethan theologian Richard Hooker, for instance, argues that God speaks through Nature: “for that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught, and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument.” Hooker argues that human judgments do not, however, have unimpeded access to the voice of God. The message may be clouded by “lewd and wickd custom … [which] may be of force even in plain things to smoother the light of the natural understanding.” Because judgment is
fallible, Hooker argues that understanding must be upheld by grace: “there is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly perform the function allotted to it, without perpetual aid and concurrent of that Supreme Cause of all things.”

Daniel’s notion of “all-overspreading grace of heaven” may allude more directly to Calvin’s *Institutes*. This grace is not the same thing as Calvin’s concept of a grace that fills the elect, but a more universal gift that undergirds civil order and makes possible a universal aptitude for the manual and liberal arts. According to Calvin, in its universality, this good is recognizable as “a special gift of God” [peculiarem gratiam]. This is a propensity that exceeds nature, which would be weak without his “gratuitous gift” [gratuitum munus]. All are eligible for some measure of those “most excellent blessings which the Divine Spirit dispenses to whom he wills for the common benefit of mankind….He fills, moves, and invigorates all things by the virtue of the Spirit” [haec praestantissima divini Spiritus esse, quae in publicum generis humani bonum quibus vult dispensat … replet, movet, vegetat omni eiusdem Spiritus virtute]. Calvin argues that while moral judgment has weaknesses, all human beings have a sense of right and wrong, and all share a desire for an orderly community. Daniel alludes to this argument in “The Defense of Ryme”:

Nor can it be but a touch of arrogant ignorance, to hold this or that nation Barbarous, these or those times grosse, considering how this manifold creature man, wheresoever hee stand in the world, hath always some disposition of worth, intertaines the order of societie, affects that which is most in use, and is eminent in some one thing or other, that fits his humour and the times.

Daniel here expresses a position that combines Calvin’s sense of a stabilizing divine grace that undergirds all communities with a skeptical insistence on the fallibilities of judgment derived from Montaigne’s “On Caniballes.” Daniel shapes this argument to
fit his notion of judgment that accounts for fallibility but also offers stability. Where Calvin justifies the reading of the ancient non-Christian authors because they too were informed by a measure of grace, Daniel extends this notion of universal grace to justify decorous adaptation to one’s own humor and times. Where Montaigne argues that natural law is inaccessible, Daniel argues the stabilizing presence of grace that remedies even corrupted judgment to some extent.

Daniel appeals to both contemporary and traditional thinking on how grace remedies the weaknesses of judgment. Following Cicero and Castiglione, Daniel sees grace as closely allied to decorum, which is an expression of ideal harmonies. However, he also sees grace and nature as concepts vulnerable to misapprehension and misuse.

In *The Queenes Arcadia*, Daniel makes grace a touchstone for moral judgment. Colax, the archvillain of the play, offends against grace both courtly and divine. He violates Castiglione’s strictures for grace; he shows affectation rather than courtly *sprezzatura*. Cloris is appalled by the “affected apish grace” of her would-be seducer, Colax, who has just returned from foreign courts with an arsenal of artificial manners (4.3.29, 63). Cloris sees Colax as guilty of “shallow impudence, affected grace” (4.3.62). She characterizes his affectation as “never of substance nor Sincere” (4.3.66). As Colax denies Arcadian custom and its connection to nature, he epitomizes a failure to observe the decorum that confers true grace, the ability to accommodate to what is customary to the place where he is.

As a worldly and graceless mocker of innocence, Colax embodies Ascham’s fears that young Englishmen traveling abroad will return with corrupted values and a contempt for true grace. Daniel also portrays Colax as rebelling against the grace that Calvin sees as informing all human judgment. Calvin argues that the notion of universal morality is not threatened by the fact that some apply its particulars differently or that others willfully rather than ignorantly “loosen the bonds of law,
and give free scope to their lust” [soluta legum repagula, libidinem solam pro iure grassari]. Daniel derives the name of his chief villain, Colax, from the Latin verb collaxare, an intensified form of laxare, meaning to separate or unbind. Daniel’s Melibaeus echoes Calvin, calling Colax “a monster that hath made his lustes / As wide as is his will, and leaft his will / Without all bounds” (1.4.5-7). Colax dissolves bonds of faith between lovers, bonds between words and meaning, and bonds between custom and nature. Colax, the self-styled champion of nature, is actually as Melibaeus puts it, “a monster,” something unnatural.

Daniel develops the character of Colax not only with Calvin in mind, but also through Tasso’s Aminta and its revision in Battista Guarini’s Il Pastor Fido. Throughout Aminta, Tasso shows characters molding conceptions of nature to their own wishes, sometimes in order to manipulate other characters. In his imitation of Aminta, Guarini pursues this theme of the manipulative uses one may make of an argument from nature. Guarini echoes the lament of Tasso’s chorus against “the meaningless name” of honor, giving the phrase to the scheming and unscrupulous Corsica, who claims faith and constancy are “empty names to deceive simple girls” [nomi vani / per ingannar le semplici fanciulle]. Like his predecessors in Aminta and Il Pastor Fido, Colax argues that honor is a meaningless construct. He schemes to break the bonds between lovers by separating honor from its meaningful contexts and dividing customs from their origin in nature. His seduction ploy takes a cynical reading of Montaigne’s skeptical assessment that “The laws of conscience, which we say proceed from nature, rise and proceed of custom.” Where Montaigne advocates modestly following custom in the absence of certain knowledge, Colax, no disinterested skeptic, takes this separation to promote his own self-serving misconception of nature.
One of his victims, Daphne, laments how she was deceived by his notion that honor is only a name, urging her to break the bonds of custom, which imprison nature.

How that those vowes I made unto my love  
Were bands of custome, and could not lay on  
Those manacles on nature, which should keepe  
Her freedome prisoner by our dome of breath. (3. 2. 78-81)

Daniel condemns a similar argument in his “Ulysses and the Syren.” The poem depicts Ulysses being tempted by a Siren, who pits pleasure against the horrors of war and what she sees as the specious ideal of honor. Echoing lines from Tasso and Guarini, the Siren proclaims honor to be an empty illusion, an “unreall name.” When Ulysses argues that noble natures find pleasure in labor and danger, the Siren counters with an argument that divides nature from custom.

That doth opinion onley cause  
That’s out of custome bred,  
Which makes us many other lawes  
Than ever Nature did.

The Siren’s argument here parallels Colax’s argument. Both Colax and the Siren take the argument that custom obscures nature and use it to create their own self-interested and manipulative concept of nature.

However, for Daniel, the argument presented by the Siren and by Colax may be disconcerting in its proximity to Ergastus’ position that nature makes better laws than civilization or art does. Daniel raises not only the possibility that it may be difficult to distinguish genuine appeals to nature from those in which nature is manipulated by scheming rhetoricians, but also the problem that even the comparatively innocent find that custom obscures judgment. “As if that nature had
not tooke more care / For us, then we for our owne selves can take, / And makes us better lawes then those we make” (3.5. 14-16). Daniel argues that, while this position can be misused and natural law can be misinterpreted, some kind of grace still guides judgment.

In *The Queenes Arcadia*, nature sometimes powerfully manifests itself to correct faulty judgment. Daphne ultimately sees through Colax’s separation of nature and custom: “O impious wretch, now nature give the lie / To thy foule heart” (82-3). Daphne realizes Colax’s falsehood partly because she experiences her violation of custom viscerally; it makes her physically unwell. Here custom asserts itself not as an imaginative construct, but as a perceptible force of nature. Daniel portrays this force of nature as gentle and graceful as well as forceful. Nature steps in to shield Cloris as she modestly struggles with the expression of her new love and her new feeling for Amyntas’s anguish. Daniel personifies Nature as a kindly being that works like grace to supplement human weakness (5.2.126-29). Grace-filled nature supports the modest customs of the Arcadians.

This kind of reliance on grace-filled nature is different from arrogant and factitious claims to know what nature is and thus to offer innovations. Daniel stresses a kind grace that rewards and aids the humble and faithful. When Amyntas and Carinus argue about whom Cloris loves best, Carinus makes his argument from works. Because he has saved Cloris from a lustful satyr, love for him should rightfully “raigne Soveraigne” (1.2.106) in her heart. Daniel here alters the plot of Tasso’s *Aminta* to create a greater distance between faith and works. Where Tasso has Aminta rescuing Silvia but not being accepted by her for that reason, Daniel makes the rescuer another character. He thus makes Amyntas more reliant on faith. Amyntas claims he may not deserve Cloris’s love but may obtain it all the same: “Desert I cannot urge, but faith I can, / If that may have reward, then happy man” (1.2.101-02). Carinus sums up their differences: “Plead thou thy faith, whilst I will get
Daniel’s emphasis on grace rather than merit qualifies the nationalism that the close relationship between Arcadian custom and nature might appear to justify. *The Queens Arcadia*, like “Defense of Ryme” defends English custom. As Richard Helgerson argues Daniel is “intent on “repel[ing] the incroachments of royal invaders who might try to do to English law what Campion wanted to do to English verse.”

Carlo Ginzburg sees this defense of national custom as insularizing. He characterizes Daniel’s “Defense of Ryme” as “a declaration of intellectual independence from the continent.” According to Ginzburg this work “plays a minor but distinctive in role” in “what one might call the insularization of England.” Daniel does indeed argue that English customs are best for the English. However, he is also critical of English self-satisfaction, and he has a broad definition of what constitutes English custom.

Melibaeus’s concluding speeches do indeed extol insularity. Melibaeus celebrates Arcadia as safely, innocently isolated from the rest of the world.

…shut up here  
Within these Rockes, these unfrequented Clifts,  
The walles and Bulwarke of our libertie,  
From out the noice of tumult, and the throng  
Of sweating toyle, ratling concurrance, (5.3.3-7).

Melibaeus characterizes Arcadia as inhabiting a golden age, preserved by its isolation from the changing world. Melibaeus here echoes his probable namesake, Spenser’s Melibœe, who in turn, alludes to a sententious character of Chaucer’s. Daniel thus not only claims descent in a line of English poets, but he may also allude to how Spenser’s Melibœe rejects foreign custom. Melibœe has few regrets for his former courtly life: “So taught of nature, which doth little need / Of forreigne helpes to lifes due nourishment.”

thy love, / For you kinde soules do seldome gracefull prove” (1.2.114-15). Ultimately, the humble Carinus is rewarded by being graced with Cloris’s affections.
Still, while Daniel champions native custom as more fitting for the English, he does not grant them or their counterparts, the Arcadians, judicial or cultural supremacy. Daniel somewhat distances himself from the Arcadians in his dedicatory epistle. He composes a pastoral in the mode of one who would “seeme to sympathize / With innocent, and plaine simplicity.” Daniel plays the role of a sympathizer; he does not totally identify himself with the Arcadian perspective. Like Tasso’s golden age speech, Melibaeus’s invective against foreign custom may not reflect the author’s own views. Rather both are evocations of golden age dreams that signal the speaker’s own limited judgment. Like Tasso, Daniel underscores the fallibility of all human perspectives.

Even Daniel’s source, the pastoral sixth book of *The Fairie Queene*, repeatedly undermines the myth of the golden age, revealing it as an impossible in a fallen world. The innocence and inexperience of Melibœe and his fellow shepherds leaves their community vulnerable to its ultimate ruin by marauders. Like Spenser’s shepherds, Daniel’s Arcadians show a precarious innocence. Their credulousness spells vulnerability to the scheming interlopers who profit from it. The plainness of the Arcadians looks like an invitation to Colax:

```
these simple grosse Arcadians here,
That know no other world but their own plaines,
Nor yet can apprehend the subtile traines
We lay, to mock their rurall ignorance. (1.2. 3-6).
```

While Colax intends to corrupt the Arcadians, he ultimately offers a useful critique of what the perhaps overly insular, overly contented Arcadians see as their innocence. His self-interested view no more represents absolute truth than Arcadian self-satisfaction. What he ultimately, though unintentionally, offers is a useful counterperspective essential to their ability to truly know themselves. While Daniel champions natural, authentic laws, and suggests that Arcadia is blessed by some
measure of grace, he also maintains Montaigne’s sense of the fallibility of judgment. Daniel cautions his readers of how vulnerable judgment is to self-satisfaction. The foreign invaders dislocate the Arcadians from their thoughtless immersion in their own customs in a way that enables them to clearly see their weaknesses and to value their strengths.

The arrival of foreign customs may not so much corrupt innocent souls as bring impulses to the surface that were already present. While the Arcadians may indeed be closer to divine laws of nature, their natures are still imperfect, in need of the assistance of grace. As Pierre Spriet suggests, the Arcadians suffer not so much from innocence as from a culpable degree of self-satisfaction; they may not have needed the influence of foreign custom to fall into the clutches of depraved manners so readily. Melibæus argues that Colax’s contact with foreign courts has sharpened an already existing “disposition … to selfe conceited surlimesse” (1.4.23-24). Even more laudable Arcadians are not free from fault. A jealous emulation makes Arcadian woman rush to Alcon for remedies for imaginary illness. A touch of vanity may lead Cloris to fall for Techne’s ruse to lure her to the cave where Colax lurks to assail her virtue (2.2. 189-198, 4.3.18-27). The Arcadians are not simply the victims of foreign influences. Rather, exposure to bad foreign custom seems to bring out impulses that were already there, and to some extent, this brings useful knowledge.

One of the ironies of Melibæus’s banishment speech is his hope that the Arcadians can return to their original state. He hopes to “be again Arcadians as we were / In manners, and in habits as we were.” The repetition of “as we were” takes on ironic force. It may not be desirable for the Arcadians to return to blissful self-contentment. Contact with foreign temptation brings the Arcadians valuable self-knowledge. Cloris recognizes her own credulity, calling herself a “poore foole” (4.3.25). Less directly she may also acknowledge Techne’s embarrassingly effective appeal to her vanity, when she describes her hope to have tried what she dismissing
calls a “new strange dressing” (4.3 23). Daphne may not be able to recognize Colax’s argument from nature as fallacious until she has emerged from nature. Only after being exposed to custom can she perceive the difference between nature and custom.

The estranged lovers, Palaemon and Silvia, demonstrate both negative and positive aspects of the impossibility of returning to “as we were.” Their experience has given them a new and painful wariness; they are at first unable even to trust the wise old elders who assure them of each other’s innocence. However, they ultimately develop a deeper love for each other. Palaemon claims, “I finde this wound / That pierc’d into the center of my heart, / Hath let in love farre deeper then it was” (5.4.72-74). Silvia answers that her love too “is now become farre more” (5.4.77). The experience of opposition both lets the Arcadians see their own faults and to appreciate their strengths, their more natural customs and their bonds of faith.

While Daniel favors English custom as decorously appropriate to the English, he also points out that observance of custom, even when supported by grace, is only an imperfect knowledge. Daniel’s championing of English custom thus takes account of Montaigne’s sense of the ineluctability of cultural bias. When Daniel argues that grace does sustain human judgment, he gives judgment some grounds for stability. However, the Protestant sense of grace is inseparable from a sense of human fallibility. It does not allow resting in self-satisfaction.

Because of this emphasis on fallibility, Daniel’s defense of English custom does not justify self-satisfied isolationism. Daniel’s focus in both The Queenes Arcadia and “The Defense of Ryme” is to win acceptance for local, established English custom threatened by unsound innovations. However, Daniel does not necessarily think of foreign custom as useful only as a threatening, negative contrast. Rather he thinks of it as something to be adopted judiciously.

Although Daniel champions English custom, this avid reader and emulator of Montaigne, Castiglione, Guarini, and Tasso is far from being a xenophobe.112 Jason
Lawrence notes that nearly all of Daniel’s commendatory poems praise translations or dictionaries, the instruments of intercultural exchange. Daniel’s defense of the English custom of rhyming poetry imports an argument against imposing foreign custom from Montaigne’s Essais and defends a poetic practice that ultimately has continental roots. As Helgerson remarks, “to identify immemorial custom with the sonnet was to invent history.”

Daniel’s reinvention of history is informed by his sense that foreign custom may be adopted and naturalized. Daniel’s characterization of the sonnet as an English genre has a parallel in the praise he gives to Florio’s translation of Montaigne. Montaigne, claims Daniel, has now become “as well ours as theirs.” Daniel’s broad definition of what constitutes English custom suggests his ideal Arcadia is not isolated.

For Daniel a good natural judgment guides the naturalization of foreign custom. Daniel considers “the Generall Custome, and use of Ryme” irreproachable because of its long establishment in England “as if from a Graunt of Nature.” This long endurance has allowed it to “become so natural, as we should never have had a thought to cast it off into reproach, or be made to thinke that it ill-became our language.” The foreign mode of rhymed poetry has become naturalized into English as judicious ears have gone to work on it: “Every language hath her proper number or measure fitted to use and delight, which Custome intertaining by allowance of the Eare, doth indenize, and make naturall.” Daniel’s use of the phrase “judicious ears” has precedent in sixteenth-century Italian literary treatises that discuss how to adopt foreign words or how to ensure that the poet’s treatment of custom is up-to-date and decorously appropriate. On the topic of decorous adaptation to the manners of the time, Tasso praises Ariosto’s inventions as “more lovely and more accommodated to our ears” [più vaghe a e più accomodate a le nostre orecchie]. In his 1554 treatise on the romance, Cinthio contends that “natural judgment of the ears” [giudico naturale degli orecchi] determines which
new words deserve importation into Italian. This is a judgment that arises from a correspondence between the ears of the mind and universal harmony: “our ears, that is our minds, through the sounds sent them through the ears naturally possess a certain measure that produces judgment” [i nostri orecchi, overo gli animi nostri, per gli suoni a lor mandati per lo sentimento dell’orecchi hanno naturalmente in sé una certa misura del suon delle voci che genera il guidicio] (124). By “judgment of the ear” Daniel means a kind of prudence, a loose kind of judgment that accommodates to circumstances, but yet has some grounding in nature. The notions of prudential judgment and decorum with which Daniel is working do suggest that adherence to local custom may be most appropriate. However, they also traditionally enable engagement with foreign and changeable things.

Daniel not only argues that foreign custom can be naturalized, but he also justifies divergent custom. In “The Defense of Ryme,” Daniel argues that “one and the self-same spirit worketh in all. We have but one body of Justice, one body of Wisedome throughout the whole world, which is but apparaled according to the fashion of every nation.” Daniel’s position differs from Montaigne’s insistence that there are no common natural laws, at least none that are accessible. However, Daniel’s insistence on common principles in different clothing also potentially offers grounds for tolerance of the different apparel worn in various nations. Daniel ultimately rejects Melibaeus’s argument that isolation preserves freedom of judgment. In his poem praising Florio’s translation of Montaigne, Daniel argues that no barriers can prevent beneficial exchanges among a

better world of men
Whose spirits all are of one communitie.
Whome neither Oceans, Deserts, Rocks nor Sands
Can keep from th’intertraffique of the minde."
Daniel’s sense of commerce among elite spirits may not argue universal tolerance. It does argue that his ideal judgment is one that ventures out into the world. Like Tasso, he may see judgment as a virtue that inherently goes out to encounter an infinite variety that allows for the exercise of prudent choices. Bacon makes a similar connection between variety and the ability to choose in his travel advice to the Earl of Rutland: “when you see infinite variety of behaviour and manners of men, you may choose and imitate the best.” While the closing speeches of *The Queenes Arcadia* sing the praises of isolation, the play’s pervasive allusions to Tasso and Montaigne argue the value of judicious accommodation.

Daniel’s understanding of judgment is itself a product of judicious adaptation. For Daniel the argument that authentic judgment has roots in nature makes a powerful defense for beleagured English customs. Daniel happily adopts passages in Tasso and Montaigne that support this argument. However, Daniel also recognizes that Tasso and Montaigne make arguments that complicate this idea, stressing that nature is mediated through imperfect human judgment. Montaigne even argues that natural law is inaccessible. To some extent, Daniel accepts this sense of the frailty of judgment.

Daniel creates a vivid image of the nature of judgment in several of his poems. In his dedicatory poem to Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s essays, Daniel argues that learning provides the mind with the “the likeliest images frailtie can finde” and directs it to that place “where [the mind’s] motions evenst come to rowle / About this doubtfull center of the right.” Similarly, Daniel comforts another Montaigne reader, Lucy Harington, with the hope that books can assist the mind to come near a not quite fully attainable truth:

as that it turnes that way
Where judgement lies: and though we cannot finde
The certaine place of truth, yet doe they stay
And intertaine us neere about the same.
While Daniel sees judgment as fallible, he also believes it is capable of some kind of approximation of truth. Daniel argues that judgment and custom do have stabilizing and perceptible, if tenuous, foundations in nature. Where Montaigne argues a decorous observance of custom as a kind of grace, Daniel argues that divine grace informs even corrupted judgment to some extent. Daniel’s conception of judgment strives to reconcile Protestant and skeptical thinking, stability and fallibility, to each other. Daniel sees judgment not as a resting place of stability, but as the nearest certainty human beings can attain, a knowledge continually in movement, humbly indebted to grace.
ENDNOTES

1. The play’s title becomes *The Queenes Arcadia* when it is published and dedicated to Queen Anne in 1606. For the circumstances of this first performance, see James Lawrence, “‘The Whole Complection of Arcadia Chang’d’: Samuel Daniel and Italian Lyrical Drama,” *Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England* 11(1999): 154.


3. Torquato Tasso, *Aminta*, a cura di Claudio Varese (Milano: Mursia, 1985), 670-75. Subsequent references will be given in parentheses and refer to line numbers. The English translations from Tasso’s works are mine.


8. Ibid., 179.

9. Ibid., 269.

10. Torquato Tasso, *Prose*, a cura di Ettore Mazzali (Milano: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1959). For these dates, see the editor’s comments on page 349.

11. Ibid., 514.

12. Ibid., 515.

13. Ibid., 583.


15. Ibid., 584.

16. Ibid., 384.

17. Ibid., 585.

18. Ibid., 384.

19. Ibid., 585.

20. See the editor’s comments, on 585-86, note 6.


23. Ibid., 561.


25. Ibid., 224, 225.


30. Ibid., 298.

31. Ibid., 298-99.

32. Sergio Zatti, “Natura e potere nell’*Aminta,*” *Studi di filologia e letteratura offerti a Franco Croce* (Roma: Bulzoni Editori, 1997), 139.


34. Ibid., 14.64. 1-2, 7-8.


37. Ibid., 7.20.1-2, 7.22.5.


40. Scianatico, 89.

41. Jessica Wolfe’s observation.


47. Ibid., 141-52.


51. Ibid., 634.


54. Ibid., 336.

55. Ibid., 337.

56. Ibid., 46.

57. Ibid., 47.

58. Ibid., 337.
59. Ibid., 52.


61. Cicero, Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1939), 21.70-21.72. “The universal rule, in oratory as in life, is to consider propriety. This depends on the subject under discussion, and on the character of both the speaker and the audience. The philosophers are accustomed to consider this extensive subject under the head of duties—not when they discuss absolute perfection, for that is one and unchanging.”[semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat est considerandum; quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt et eorum qui audiunt. Itaque hunc locum longe et late patetem philosophi solent in officiis tractare—non cum de recto ipso disputant, nam id quidem unum est.]


63. Ibid., 61, III.

64. Montaigne, Essays, 52.

65. Ibid., 664.


69. Samuel Daniel, “To the Queens most excellent Majestie,” 43-44.

70. Orgel, 10.


80. Daniel, “To the Queens most excellent Majestie,” 27, 30, 49.

81. Ibid., 17.

82. See the list of alternate readings at the end of the play text, 210.


86. Ibid., 1.27.94-1.28.101. This passage is discussed by Alison Thorne, *Vision and Rhetoric in Shakespeare: Looking through Language*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 87-103.

87. Ibid., 1.27.98.

88. Castiglione, 75.


94. Ibid., 1.8.11.

95. Ibid., 1.8.11. This passage is discussed by Gless in both “Nature” and *Interpretation*, 32.

97. Ibid., 2.2.16.

98. Ibid., 2.2.13.


100. Ascham, 154-77, 112.

101. Calvin, 2.2.13.


105. Ibid., 51-53.


112. Cf. Spriet, 162.

113. Lawrence, 142.

114. Helgerson, 39.


117. Ibid., 131.


In 1613 Robert Dallington dedicates his *Aphorismes Civill and Militarie* to Prince Charles. The overt purpose of his work is to offer this future ruler lessons in political prudence. Dallington condenses educational episodes from the first five books of Guicciardini’s *Storia d’Italia*, introducing each with a moral of his own and *sententiae* from various sources. On the surface, the *Aphorismes* is a typical approach to methodizing the art of prudence. Dallington is only one of many early modern authors to compile a collection of political wisdom based on the works of the famously prudent Guicciardini, but the *Aphorismes* stands out from similar works because of how the author approaches the challenge of cultivating the reader’s prudence. Like other collectors, Dallington does methodize, order, and condense. However, Dallington’s method does not simply arrange static precepts for easy consumption. Rather, Dallington employs a method of prudent indirection to immerse precepts in dynamic and complicating contexts that enable readers to develop skills of discretion and flexibility. Dallington not only adopts an essentially Ramist method to Baconian and Guicciardinian ideals of induction, but he also takes an Odyssean route to prudence, incorporating romance conventions of voyage and digression that transform his manual of prudence into something more adventurous and more effective than the typical aphorism collection.

In this work Dallington not only teaches prudence by indirection, but he also practices the virtue he teaches, modeling a prudently indirect way of expressing a potentially unwelcome agenda. Noting that the *Aphorismes* was begun with the
warm approval of Prince Henry, Dallington urges Charles not only to adopt the work intended for his deceased brother, but also to take on his brother’s mantle. Dallington may encourage Charles to share the sympathies that drew many Essex sympathizers to Henry.²

Dallington had longtime associations with the Essex-Sidney group. His first published work, which he never openly claimed, is a partial translation of the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* (1592).³ Dallington prefaces his translation with dedications to Sidney and Essex that sympathetically echo their impatience with being restricted from more active political roles. He laments that he has been “restrained of my liberty, and helde in the grave of oblivion.”⁴ Dallington’s subsequent works also reflect his connections with the Essex circle. Dallington came to Prince Henry’s notice through his patron Roger Manners, the Earl of Rutland, who married Sidney’s daughter and served with Essex both in Ireland and on the Azores expedition.⁵ While in the service of the Manners family, Dallington undertook the travel that informs his View of France and the Survey of Tuscany. In another introductory epistle to readers of the Aphorismes, Dallington asks readers to remember that he has “long since disclaimed” these two works.⁶ The reasons for the disclaimer may have something to do with Dallington’s political convictions. The Survey of Tuscany did stir up some mild furor for its unflattering characterization of Medici tyranny, and Dallington was brought before a Privy Council in England that perfunctorily burned a mere three copies of the book.⁷ Given the mildness of the alarm caused by the work’s initial publication, Dallington may be indirectly drawing attention to his ideals, rather than repenting of them. As a reading of the Aphorismes shows, Dallington has not abandoned his sympathies. His work not only immerses readers in the variable circumstances with which prudence must contend, but also demonstrates a prudently indirect expression of his commitment to international Protestantism and his suspicion of Stuart absolutism.
The epigraphs Dallington chooses for the title page state his overt goal for this work: to instruct the reader in prudence, the capacity to accommodate to everchanging variety, through exemplary materials gathered from history. In the first citation, Lipsius praises Guicciardini as a paragon of prudence whose writings inculcate that virtue in his readers: “Prudens peritusque, & qui tales Lectores suos facit.” The second epigraph, from Saint Basil, argues that history offers moral lessons and guidance in negotiating varying, unstable circumstances:

Do not refuse to travel through ancient histories. For there you will find without toil, and you will seize eagerly, what others have laboriously gathered, the virtues of the good, and the vices of the wicked, the various alterations and mutations of this human life: the instability of this world and the falls of empires. [Per historias veteres ire ne recusa. Ibi enim reperies sine labore, quae alii cum labore collegerunt, atque illinc hauries, & bonorum virtutes, & improborum vitia: vitae humanae varias mutationes, & rerum in ea conversiones: mundi huis instabilitatem, & imperiorem instabiles casus.]

What Basil characterizes as the material of history – “alterations,” “mutations,” “instability,” and “falls” – is the terrain of prudence, that virtue that negotiates variable things. Basil argues that histories present this material in a labor-saving format. With this quotation, Dallington allies himself with the gatherers who makes the lessons of history readily accessible and easy to learn.

This is a goal Dallington shares with a number of late-sixteenth-century authors who make the lessons of history even more accessible as they offer epitomes of histories and collections of aphoristic advice. Like these authors, Dallington culls instructive material from history, ordering it “in an easy-to-learn form” for an audience that desires “concrete and practical political information.” A good number of these collectors focus on the Storia and the Ricordi (known in most early modern editions as the Avvertimenti) of the famously prudent Guicciardini. All these
collections share a conviction that history provides valuable life lessons and that a condensed, well-methodized presentation can teach the reader something about prudence.

One of the earliest and most important works for Dallington is Thamoso Porcacchi’s 1574 edition of Guicciardini’s *Storia*. Dallington cites 46 sententiae from Porcacchi’s handy collection of “Sententie Sparse Per L’Historia del Guicciardini. Et raccolte à utile degli Studiosi.” Porcacchi’s desire to make Guicciardini’s wisdom more accessible as a list of precepts culled from their often more complicating contexts is shared by other writers who were influential in England.

Remigio Nannini’s *Considerationi civili sopra l’historie di M. Francesco Guicciardini, e d’altri historici*, published in 1582 by Fra Sisto, is a likely precedent for Dallington’s approach to combining aphorisms with historical illustrations. The work presents one hundred political aphorisms, mostly from Machiavelli and Guicciardini. A range of other ancient and contemporary historians, including Tacitus, Livy, Plutarch, and Villani, are listed in his table of authors. Nannini illustrates each of these aphorisms with an educational historical episode; however, the reader too busy to make it through the book might be able to get a crash course in prudence from the table of contents alone. The table of contents, which presents all the aphorisms as a list, could be read as a pamphlet on prudence. This work is also available to Elizabethan English readers in translation. W. T. translates this work into English from the French translation of Gabriel Chappuys in 1601. Alluding to the Italian word for precepts, *avvertimenti*, or “warnings,” W. T.’s introduction exhorts readers to “finde fit advertisements to learne by them other mens harmes to beware, and examples to imitate.” Both Italian and English compilers hope that these pithy, condensed lessons from history can teach their readers how to live more wisely.

Francesco Sansovino’s *Propositioni overo Considerationi in materia di cose di Stato* is another of the more significant collections of aphorisms for the English
and a probable model for Dallington. Sansovino divides his collection into three sections dedicated to aphorisms from the works of Lottini, Guicciardini, and himself. The quotations do not all come from these authors alone, but from a variety of authorities. While Sansovino does not credit the authors of individual quotations, he provides a list that includes both ancients (e.g. Tacitus, Cicero, Plato, Sallust) and moderns (e.g. Bembo, Giovio, della Casa). While the quotations appear in a random order, the reader seeking guidance on a particular issue is aided by an alphabetized topical index.14

This work is available to sixteenth-century English readers both in Italian and in English.15 In his 1590 translation, *The Quintessence of Wit*, Robert Hichcock appreciates how this work gathers wisdom together in a convenient and powerful form, a quintessence: “The value and varietie of the worke is so excellent: that it argues of it selfe to be a rich store-house of precious compoundes.”16 Here the translator is echoing Sansovino’s letter to Rudolf II on the value of his collection of *sententiae*. According to Sansovino, his work as a sentence collector has been to “suck out of all these particular things, the sap, the sweete and marrow, reducing them into precepts” for princes who are usually too busy to read.17 Sansovino and Hichcock argue that experience can be abstracted or boiled down to the graspable essence of an aphorism. As Paul Grendler points out, the popularizers “attempted to reduce historical reality to static, easy-to-learn commonplaces.”18 Overall, these collections strive to offer the reader a quick, efficacious guide to wisdom, suggesting that prudence might be a simple matter of getting a few simple rules down.

However, as the collectors themselves often warn, reliance on commonplaces alone cannot prepare one for the infinite variety of circumstances. Sansovino cautions his readers, “these accidents, which doo at unawares chaunce unto men in their affaires, and upon the deed dooing, are so many and so unknowen, that they cannot be comprehended within the compasse of precepts ...”19 Fra Sisto’s
Nannini presents the consequences of misapplying a general rule without regard to circumstances as the second topic in his Civil Considerations: “It is very dangerous to be governed by the same example, without the same reason, and the same fortune.”

Nannini illustrates this rule with an account of Piero di Medici’s disastrous appeal to Naples, a misguided imitation of Lorenzo’s actions in similar, but unfortunately not entirely parallel circumstances. Here Nannini’s work, a fairly typical collection that appears to order and methodize the challenges of prudence, is also making concessions to the nearly intractable nature of this virtue that inherently deals with circumstances too infinite and varying to be contained. Nannini’s stance here is informed by one of Dallington’s most important influences, Francesco Guicciardini.

Nannini draws both the precept and the illustrating example from Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia. The limitations of precept and the necessity of adaptability are central to Guicciardini’s thought. In his Ricordi, Guicciardini repeats the reflections that he makes on Piero’s disastrous failure of judgment in his Storia:

It is most erroneous to make judgments on the basis of example, for if the circumstances are not entirely alike they are useless, for the least variation in the thing can cause the greatest variations in the result, and to discern these variations requires a sound and perspicacious eye.
giudicare per gli esempi, perché, se non sono simili in tutto e per tutto, non servono, conciosia che ogni minima varietà nel cosa può essere causa di grandissima variazione nello effetto: e el discernere queste varietà, vuole buono e perspicace occhio.]^{23}

Guicciardini makes a similar point in another ricordo, arguing that one may not indiscriminately and generally apply precepts to situations that differ, but must approach them with discretion, the ability to make fine distinctions:

It is a great error to speak of the things of the world indistinctly and absolutely, because almost everything differs because of the variety of circumstances, which cannot be evaluated with the same measure, and these distinctions are not written in books, but taught by discretion. [È grande errore parlare delle cose del mondo indistintamente e assolutamente e, per dire così per regola; perché quasi tutte hanno distinzione e eccezione per la varietà delle circumstanze, le quali non si possono fermare con una medesima misura; e queste distinzioni e eccezioni non si trovano scritte in su’ libri, ma bisogna le insegni la discrezione.]^{24}

Guicciardini argues that possession of general precepts does not prepare one to encounter the infinite variety of circumstances. Rather, what is necessary is discretion, “the sound and perspicacious eye” that scrutinizes particulars and circumstances minutely, discerning their essential differences.

While Guicciardini argues that discretion is inherent rather than teachable, he also structures both his Ricordi and his Storia to help the reader makes the leap from reading to prudent practice. In his Ricordi, Guicciardini offers readers not so much a collection of generalized rules as an exercise in developing discretion. No table of contents or index orders this apparently random and often contradictory collection. Instead, the random arrangement of the aphorisms reflects the variety of experience. Olivia Holmes compares Guicciardini’s ordering of Ricordi to Petrarch’s Rime Sparse: “Like Petrarch, Guicciardini sought a flexible system of distribution which avoids
perfect symmetries and assures variety.” This open system of organization promotes a flexible attitude to the variety of experience. “Guicciardini constantly modifies his point of view in order to promote a code of behavior consonant with the mutability and instability of human experience.” According to Nancy Struever, Guicciardini intends to teach, not universal rules, but rather a “habit of mind,” a mental capacity for dealing with variety. The Ricordi’s random format allows the readers to exercise their discretion. As the readers wind their way through the collection, they are required to reconcile advice that sometimes appears contradictory, to revise their strategies and expectations, and to consider carefully the circumstances in which a precept may be applicable.

Guicciardini’s Storia, which shares many aphorisms with the Ricordi, also stresses that aphorisms are useful only when circumstances are taken into account. Guicciardini puts his aphorisms into contexts that often dramatize their erroneous use or suggests how the aphorisms themselves demonstrate a range of interpretation. In his discussion of aphorisms in the Storia, Mark Phillips shows how Guicciardini dramatizes debates in which characters on both sides cite aphorisms to support their case and how even erroneous counsel can be justified with aphorisms. Guicciardini thus demonstrates “that no maxim has value without experience, tact, and discretion. However attractive the maxims of the Storia may be as isolated aphorisms their effect is to return us to the complexities of history.” Setting aphorisms in the current of history allows the reader to play aphorisms against each other and to weigh the effects of time, place, and persons prudently. Rather than coming away with easy universal rules, readers of Guiccardini’s Storia learn to exercise their discretion as they consider the contexts in which precepts may be applied.

Like Guicciardini, Dallington’s English contemporary Francis Bacon champions an contextualizing, inductive approach to the lessons of history. Bacon objects to methodical collections of aphorisms that give them a determined, limited meaning
that stifles the growth of judgment and knowledge. Like Guicciardini, Bacon also puts a high value on the particulars of circumstance. Bacon approves the kind of scattered collection of aphorisms that Guicciardini makes in his Ricordi. In his Advancement of Learning, Bacon argues that “particulars being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions.” Bacon objects to epitomes because they leave out the circumstances that inform and nuance their advice. In his “Advice to Fulke Greville on his studies,” Bacon laments, “in matter of history the things done [are recorded] without the councils and circumstances, which indeed are of a thousand times more use than the examples themselves.” Such accounts “cannot breed soundness of judgement, which is the true use of all learning.” Bacon’s approval of the contextualized historical lesson and the particular aphorism is part of his larger commitment to a reforming, inductive approach to knowledge. Throughout his Advancement to Learning, Bacon champions a searching inquiry into the “small things [that] discover the great better than great can discover the small.” Bacon resists the deformation of knowledge that results from forcing particulars to conform to generalizing, abstract theory.

Bacon’s inductive, complicating approach to aphorisms runs parallel to Guicciardini’s partly because he is directly influenced by Guicciardini’s disconnected Ricordi, and partly because both Bacon and Guicciardini are influenced by Machiavelli. Victoria Kahn argues that Bacon admires Machiavelli for a rhetorical approach that encourages growth and inquiry. Machiavelli uses maxims and examples not simply to illustrate general, universally accepted principles, but rather to provide particulars that complicate general arguments, encouraging inductive reading.

While Dallington does follow a Ramist approach to argument, the kind of method that Bacon opposed, he is also influenced by these inductive, experiential models. While Dallington does abridge Guicciardini and does methodize his aphorisms, his approach nevertheless keeps intact the circumstances that promote the development of judgment. Dallington’s own pedagogy of prudence both
methodizes and plunges readers into variety. He does attempt to impose some kind of meaningful, instructive method on the variety of experience. However, Dallington also adapts to the limitations of method and the complexities of moral conduct by leading the reader beyond easily grasped abstractions. Dallington orders and methodizes his work on prudence, while at the same time accounting for the variety and unpredictability of experience.

To structure his *Aphorismes* Dallington adopts from Peter Ramus two rhetorical strategies that give his work both stability and flexibility. Dallington uses two approaches that Ramus describes as the “method of nature” and “method of prudence.” The “method of nature” is a deductive approach aimed at matters that can be known with some certainty. Such an argument or exposition begins in a general principle that is broken down into ever more concrete and particular divisions. Ramus explains this method as follows:

Now, then, although in all true disciplines all rules are general and universal, nevertheless they have distinct degrees, and to the extent that one is more general, to that extent it will precede the others, and the most general will be the first in rank and order, for it is the first in clarity and comprehensibility. The subordinate ones will follow, for they are next in clarity, and of the those, the more manifest ones will precede, the less manifest ones will follow. And finally, examples, which are most specialized, will be put in the last position.33

This type of argument can be summarized or arranged as a tree diagram.34 This is the method Dallington uses to organize his two travel books on France and Tuscany, which both open with a Ramist tree diagram that previews the contents of the books in a visual, easily grasped manner. The analytical diagram for *The Survey of the Great Dukes State of Tuscany* looks like a genealogical chart, or like bifurcated tree branches, as it divides its subject into increasingly concrete dichotomies. Dallington first divides the discourse into “Country” and “Government,” and these
large categories are each split into two smaller units. “Government” breaks down as “Governor” and “Governed.” The heading of “Governor” heads up more concrete particulars, such as “parentage,” “forces,” and “expenses.”

In his *Aphorismes*, Dallington organizes individual episodes from the history by this “method of nature,” moving from general principles to ever more concrete branches. Dallington heads up each selection with a short paragraph that moralizes on the episode, or presents the general rule or most abstract principle to be gleaned. Dallington often divides this paragraph into two or three branches, as he does for Aphorism 52 in book one.

It is then sure trusting, when we take from a man all means of breaking. For the proverbe saith, that a true man can scarce hold his fingers, if he finde a chest open. As therefore it is a staine to the honours of a Prince, not to keep his word and covenent. So it is not lesse blemish to the wisdom of a State, in time of just suspect, not to prevent and stop the means of breaking it: or not to take pledges of the discontented and suspected subject, as well in such jealous times, as formerly in cases of less danger.

Each of these divisions corresponds to a section in a list of sententiae that follows the moral. Section one, for instance, includes quotations from Suetonius, Seneca, and a collection of Italian proverbs that each argue that even the honest may be tempted. Each general principle thus gets more specific commentary. Finally, Dallington gives the historical example, the most particular, concrete part of the argument. In this case, he summarizes the consequences of the Florentines’ lack of preparation for the revolt of Pisa.

This method gives Dallington a way to present principles in a systematic, memorable form; however he is alert to the limitations of an overly methodized, potentially static, format for presenting a virtue of flexibility. Writing in the wake of champions of induction and experience like Guicciardini and Bacon, he is aware of
the limitations of a deductive method to describe experience. Dallington thus also adopts not only the Ramist “method of nature,” but also the “method of prudence.” According to Ramus, a “method of prudence” is suitable for communicating or exploring subjects that cannot be dealt with in a straightforward manner. The writer will use this method when he has to deal with matters of opinion rather than fact or when it is necessary to woo a recalcitrant audience. Ramus portrays the writer using this method as a prudent sailor who seeks a roundabout way to the port.

For this reason, if the entryway to the path of truth and art is closed, the logician will make another way for himself by dint of his wits and his prudence, and because he is deprived of any help from [the method of] teaching, he will seek everywhere else for every kind of usual and customary assistance. And because he cannot maintain the correct course, he will change his sails and will lead his ship, safe and sound to port by such winds as he is able to use.”

This prudent method leads an audience to the writer’s purposes by indirect paths. Dallington gives his subject of prudence a fitting form by adopting Ramus’ second method. He leads the reader by necessarily winding paths to knowledge that is inescapably variable, and he sometimes deceives them for their own good.

For Ramus, metaphor, parables, and similitudes characterize this indirect but necessarily alluring way to present the argument. Dallington often begins his morals with a metaphorical description of an animal or fact of natural history that embodies the concept he wants his reader to internalize. One probable source for some of these examples and the rationale for their use is Erasmus’ Parabolae sive Similia, a collection of moralized facts and curiosities from Plutarch, Pliny, Aristotle and Theophrastus. Erasmus argues that figurative language brings an argument to life:

Do you wish to entertain? Nothing adds more sparkle. Are you concerned to convey information? Nothing makes your point so clearly. … Would you
be vivid and picturesque? Metaphor brings it before one’s eyes better than anything else. [Delectare vis? Nulla plus habet festivitatis. Docere studes? Non alia probat vel efficatius, vel apertius. ... Enargeian captas ad lucem? Nulla melius rem ob oculos ponit.]39

Dallington may have Erasmus in mind when he claims to have enlivened his arguments with “some force of illustration.”

Dallington uses such enlivening metaphor to lure a potentially reluctant reader. For Ramus, the indirect, figurative method of prudence works to “lead the troublesome and stubborn auditor ....”40 Dallington echoes this view in his introduction, “To the Aphorismes I have given some force of illustration, which falles not necessarily in the nature of the conclusion; but this I did of purpose, to give them better relish in the dainty palate of a Prince, and to draw him on with the variety of his viands.”41 Like Lucretius and Tasso, who defend their poetic approach to instruction as honeyed coating for hard-to-swallow moral instruction, Dallington uses poetic language prudently to lure a potentially unwilling audience.

Metaphoric language that allures an otherwise reluctant reader is not only an ornament, but also a kind of dissimulation. In The Arte of English Poesie, George Puttenham describes metaphor as deceptive swerving from straightforward language:

As Figures be the instruments of ornament in every language, so be they also in a sorte abuses or rather trespasses in speech, because they passe the ordinary limits of common utterance, and be occupied of purpose to deceive the eare and also the mind, drawing it from plainesse and simplicitie to a certaine doublenesse, whereby our talke is the more guilefull and abusing, for what els is your Metaphor but an inversion of sense by transport; your allegorie but a duplictitie of meaning or dissimulation under covert and darke intendments.42

As Daniel Javitch has argued, Puttenham links poetic dissimulation and ornament with codes of prudent courtly behavior.43 Dallington’s metaphorical, playful approach
to the aphorisms signals his participation in, and willingness to accommodate to, the expectations of his courtly audience.

This kind of play is part of a more extensive, more serious kind of dissimulation prudently employed by Dallington. Dallington’s *Aphorisms* not only addresses the serious topic of prudence in a playful guise, but they also prudently sweeten the touchy topics of absolutism and religion to accommodate a royal palate. Dallington advocates such prudent dissimulation as the theme of Aphorism 1.12. “Though simulation of what is good, and dissimulation of what is evil be vices in a private man, yet in a publicke person they are necessary evils.” The moral comments on an episode in which the young Neapolitan prince, Alphonso, breaks into an honest but untimely accusation against Ludovico Sforza, thus provoking him to imprudently rush into a war ruinous not only to Sforza, but also to the Spanish dynasty in Naples.

For Dallington this episode might have recalled some history closer to home. Like Alphonso, the Earl of Essex was known for a quick temper and tactless tongue that contributed to his disastrous political career.44 Dallington was one of the associates of the Essex circle who suffered in the aftermath of the rebellion. In 1601 Dallington and his patron Roger Manners, the Earl of Rutland, were imprisoned, fined, and ultimately pardoned when James came to the throne.45 Dallington emerged from this experience still committed to many of the ideals of the Sidney-Essex circle, especially their anxieties about Catholicism and tyranny, but also interested in a prudent way of expressing them.

While a 1608 peace treaty between Spain and Holland seems to have stilled the cry for English intervention in the Protestant cause abroad, there was still considerable anxiety about the intentions of Catholic rulers and considerable discontent with James’ apparent tolerance of a Catholic presence in England. Dallington expresses his fears in an appendage to the *Aphorisms*, “A Briefe Inference
on Guicciardini’s Digression.” Dallington here presents passages from book 4 of the Storia, in which Guicciardini describes how the popes established their present claims to temporal jurisdiction. Dallington also includes passages from books 3 and 10, which hint at incestuous relations among the Borgia and report Pompeo Colonna’s incendiary speech condemning the pope. All these passages were suppressed in Italian printings. Dallington is drawing on the work of Protestant printers and writers who eagerly seized on this insider critique and worked to make it available to an international audience.46

In the “Briefe Inference,” Dallington openly expresses fears that the pope is anxious to spread his influence abroad. He exhorts readers to “clip his wings of Ambition that would still flutter over us.”47 However, Dallington also prudently, politicly, and even irenically softens his criticism of James’ tolerance of Catholicism. Although the “Briefe Inference” is printed for a public audience along with the Aphorismes, Dallington presents his work as a response solicited by a friend or patron and meant for his “private reading” rather than as a project taken up under his own initiative. Dallington comes at his own concerns as a commentary on Guicciardini rather than as a straightforward assessment of James’ policies. Dallington expresses his own views through Guicciardini, “a worthy Gentleman, of a noble house, learned in the Lawes, experienced in the greatest affairs, well read in the most approved Authors, allowed of all wise men for his judgement, beleved of all good men for his truth, he wrote not but what he saw by proofe, or knew by reading; he complained not but upon just cause.”48 Dallington’s argument is also made palatable by his somewhat irenic approach. He insists that both Protestants and Catholics share roots and beliefs.49 On religious conflict in general, he takes the position that it is more important to practice faith, hope, and charity than to wrangle about obscure points of doctrine.50 Dallington’s indirect and even irenic approach somewhat softens the criticisms that dominate the work.
A similar, indirectly expressed, anti-papal agenda permeates the *Aphorismes* as well as the “Briefe Inference.” Dallington often accompanies his morals with examples from the *Storia* that depict papal ambition or seditious preachers.\(^{51}\) Dallington may also draw attention to his religious concerns in more subtle ways. In one of the introductory letters to the *Aphorismes*, Dallington pointedly disclaims his two travel guides, *The View of Fraunce* and *The Survey of Tuscany*. This gesture may be an artfully disingenuous strategy to remind the reader of his commitment to international Protestantism. Both the guides begin with Ramist tables, which Dallington may employ not simply as a useful rhetorical method, but also as a way of declaring his sympathies with the cause of international Protestantism championed by Essex. As Paul Hammer argues, Essex and his circle took a strong interest in Ramus.\(^{52}\) Dallington’s use of Ramist tables in the travel books alludes to his sympathies with Essex and to the martyred Protestant, Ramus. By mentioning his more openly Ramist works in his introduction, Dallington may thus draw attention to the less obvious, but pervasive, Ramist method that organizes the *Aphorismes*. On this level, Dallington’s adherence to international Protestantism underlies the whole of his work.

Dallington’s artful disavowal of his travel books may also alert readers of the *Aphorismes* to look for prudently indirect criticisms of absolutist rule at home. In Dallington’s *Survey of Tuscany*, he depicts Tuscany as an ailing body and concludes his discourse with a sour note: “Qui sub Medicis vivit, misere vivit” [Who lives under the Medici, lives wretchedly].\(^{53}\) He is careful to contrast “the heavy Dinasty of small Tuscany, with the flourishing Monarchy, and happy government of great Brittany.”\(^{54}\) The contrast may, however, be intended as irony or admonition. In his *Aphorismes*, Dallington employs a similar strategy of prudent indirection to express his concern over what he perceives as the growing absolutism of James’ rule and the corruption of his court. In the fourth aphorism of the first book, Dallington condemns
innovation in government. He advises the Prince to “prescribe him no unusual or unheard of forme, and for which he hath no former precedent.” A few pages later, Dallington reminds his readers that “there is no Prince living, be he never so wise, but he sometimes erreth” (1.6). Dallington may also express his fears about absolutist tendencies at home as he condemns the willful and tyrannical behavior of the popes in his comments on the “Briefe Inference.” Dallington’s concerns about tyranny are also suggested not only by his examples from Guicciardini’s history, but also by the prevalence of Tacitus and Seneca among the supporting citations. As J. H. Salmon has argued, a predilection for Seneca and Tacitus influences the Essex circle’s suspicion of tyranny and their increasing inclination to what they saw as a Stoic response to court corruption. Dallington’s historical approach allows him to couch his criticisms as occasioned more by scholarship than discontent. By citing examples of abuse of power from Guicciardini and classical authors notable for recounting life under tyrannical reigns, Dallington prudently targets contemporary tyranny.

Dallington employs the “method of prudence” as a kind of dissimulation, which placates and moves a potentially recalcitrant reader. He enlivens his discussion with metaphor and veils criticism with prudent indirection. Dallington also finds a “method of prudence” congenial for teaching this virtue that rests on accommodation to varying circumstances and on knowledge reached through experience and induction. Dallington organizes both individual aphorisms and the work as a whole in a way that allows for the reader to learn from an approximation of the variety of actual experience.

The method of organization Dallington chooses is modeled on his understanding of prudence as a flexible virtue that must often accommodate to circumstances by veering off from a direct line. Dallington’s Aphorism 4.4 compares the prudent statesman to a sailor who knows how to alter his course to fit the circumstances:
wise men apply their counsel and actions, to the times....For, as the Mariner changeth his course upon the change of the winde and weather, yet still holdeth his purpose of getting in to the harbrough; so should States-men, upon every new occasion alter their sailes, and veere another way, still making their course to the Port of the publicke good and safetie.

Aphorism 4.47 provides a similar image of the statesmen who makes his ambagious way to the safe port:

Though it be true, that the Statesman as the Steeresman, may shape his course according to the winde and weather of present occurences, that he may arrive to the harbrough of safety; sailing besides compasse, and swarving from the direct line of sincere and ouvert dealing: Yet may he by no means, nor for any end whatsoever, be false of his faith or breaker of his word.

Dallington understands prudence as flexible adaptation to circumstances that change, the ability to veer from a planned course when necessary. This ability to swerve also includes the ability to dissimulate, to veer from the direct course of plain and open dealing. When necessary the statesman is justified in swerving from sincerity, though not in engaging in treachery.

Early modern readers have a model of this ability to change course and to dissimulate as the circumstances demand in Homer’s Odysseus, who ends his own long sea voyage successfully. Dallington elaborates Aphorism 4.4 with two references to Odysseus. One of these draws special attention to his flexibility: “Thus the Poet praises Ulysses, as ‘a man much traveled [or of many turnings] and of great prudence’” [Sic Poeta laudat Ulyssem polytropon, kai polymeton]. The context of the aphorism suggests Dallington glosses *polytropos* as the ability to engage in prudent swerving and veering. His interpretation is similar to that offered in Erasmus’ *Adagia*. In a grouping of adages which explore appropriate flexibility versus fickle changeability,
Erasmus twice refers to Odysseus as an exemplar. According to Erasmus, the adage, “Polypi mentem obtine (adopt the attitude of the polyp), exhorts “us to take up for the time being this or that kind of behavior, this or that kind of face. Homer seems to praise this in Ulysses, and to call him ‘a man of many turnings,’ changeful in his ways.” In his exposition of the adage, “Corthurno versatilior (as versatile as buskin),” Erasmus notes that “Homer calls Ulysses a ‘man of many turnings’ because he could play any part to perfection.” Odysseus is associated with the ability to act and dissimulate as circumstances demand. Early modern readers also see Odysseus an exemplar of constancy that wins out over change. In his translation of the Odyssey, George Chapman glosses Odysseus polypotropos as “a man whose mind turns to the truth through varied and multiple ways” [homo cuius ingenium velut per multas, et varias vias, vertitur in verum]. Chapman sees Odysseus as an emblem of the soul who finally reaches the safe harbour of heaven after the “entanglements” of this life. Something of both these readings of Odysseus, as changeable chameleon and constant soul, informs Dallington’s notion of bendable yet honest prudence.

To depict this necessary swerving, Dallington draws on the methods of romance, a genre particularly associated with the prudent Odysseus by sixteenth-century critics. In his defense of the romance, Giraldi Cinzio remarks that romance is closer to the Odyssey than to the Iliad. Cinzio does not expand on this parallel at length, perhaps assuming that it is obvious to his readers. He suggests that the reason is the greater “varietà” that Homer incorporates into the Odyssey. Cinzio may also link the “errori di Ulisse” with those of the cavaliers errant.

While the winding path to truth features in a number of genres, it is romance that particularly embraces it as a means both of delight and instruction. The winding, interlaced paths of romance embody a mode of knowing and teaching that makes it apt for the portrayal of prudence. Romance scholars argue that, especially in contrast to epic, romance deals with a prudential rather than a certain knowledge,
a “horizontal” rather than “vertical” perspective. Where epic posits purpose and design to be seen from a privileged, elevated viewpoint; romance protagonists proceed through time, accommodating themselves to an unpredictable series of adventures, wandering at the mercy of chance, unperceived providence, their own frailty, and sometimes their willful errors. Romance recreates the world of changing, imperfectly understood circumstances in which prudence must operate as best as it can. As David Quint observes, romance puts its protagonists in the realm of “contingent forces which man cannot control but which, through foresight and exertion – the Renaissance virtues of prudence and fortitude – he can learn to time properly and turn to his advantage.” As a genre that demands prudence of its protagonists, romance offers useful examples for readers. Dallington adapts the Romance genre to give his work the openness and flexibility that will help his readers develop their own judgment.

Dallington organizes his aphorisms not only by the deductive, ordered “method of nature,” but also by the model of the digressive, winding path of romance. Dallington’s introductory epistle to the general reader explains that he has “enterlaced [the aphorisms] with variety of language, to procure his better appetite from whom they were written.” The technique of interlacement is a focus of sixteenth-century debates on romance. One of the important features of this debate is the question of how romance employs variety, especially in relation to its characteristic interlacing of several plot lines and its deferral of resolution as its protagonists wander off on their varied adventures. Interlacement is criticized by some contemporary readers as a needless, frustrating interruption. For some critics, such as Minturno and Tasso, interlacement and multiple plots are an aberration, even in a moral sense, from the unity of epic. Others champion interlacement as bringing in variety that lures otherwise recalcitrant readers to the morally edifying aspects of their work.
Dallington’s explanation that he has “interlaced variety of language” into his aphorisms echoes Giovambattista Giraldi Cinzio’s advice for the writer of romances. Cinzio praises Homer for appealing to a broad audience by taking words from all the best Grecian dialects “so that all Greece might receive instruction and delight from his work” [acchiodé tutta la Grecia pigliasse piacere et utile de’ suoi componimenti, usò le voci che a tutte le lingue buone della Grecia erano ne’ suoi tempi communi].

Dallington aims to instruct and please his audience by offering aphorisms from a variety of authors that represent a range of language and genres. These selections come from Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, and Italian works. Tacitus and Seneca dominate his collection. Along with quotations from works of history and moral philosophy, Dallington draws on poetic works, especially Ovid and Ariosto.

The small, but pronounced, presence of the poets suggests Dallington has mixed obviously serious sources with apparently lighter reading in order to coat instruction with delight and appeal to as many readers as possible. However, Dallington also intends to teach discretion with variety. While all these sources usually do represent a broad consensus on some particular issue, they also add nuances to the morals they comment on. Interlacement of aphorisms from different sources allows Dallington to present a concept in varying shades. It allows him to present advice that may differ with circumstances and, occasionally, authorities in conflict with each other.

Dallington’s adoption of the Ramist tree diagram does present aphorisms deductively, but it also suggests how they might be prudently applied, with regard to circumstances. Dallington applies the technique of interlacement to the branches of the Ramist tree. Thus they do not simply reinforce the general principle; they adapt it to specific situations and even subject it to interrogation. Dallington requires the reader to look at this deductive scheme with the perspicacious eye that considers particulars inductively. In his introductory epistle, Dallington cautions the reader to look for where the sententiae, moral, and example may be in tension with each
other: “Some of them likewise compared together may seeme one and the same, yet is not their co-incidence so close, but that the more diligent reader may observe a difference, either in the Roote or in the Branches.” Dallington encourages his readers to develop and exercise their discretion, that is their ability to look for the distinctions that make up the variety of circumstances.

By presenting conflicting views, lines of argument that offer alternative paths, Dallington’s morals also resist closure. Remarking on Dallington’s organization of the *Aphorismes*, Napoleone Orsini points out that “from each episode the moral is drawn out and discussed with the kind of pleasurable dallying that one might expect of this method” [Da ogni episodio si cava la morale e la si commenta, con la peregrinità e la amenità che si possono immaginare in tal modo di procedere]. Orsini’s choice of adjectives for the organization of the Aphorisms, *peregrinità*, recalls the romance characteristic of erring [*errare*]. The potentially endless interlacement of plot lines in a romance delays both its narrative and ideological closure. For Dallington, as for the romance poet, interlacement resists absolute, undiscriminating conclusions. Besides being pleasurable, this wandering, dilatory path makes the reader continue to think rather than rest on abstract and general moral pronouncements.

Aphorism 1.39, for instance, demonstrates how Dallington uses interlacement to complicate a precept. The discussion inquires into what makes a war just, rendering the complexity of such decisions rather than giving a certain guide for all circumstances. Dallington’s moral and supporting aphorisms are divided into three sections. The first compares war to the destructive basilisk; the second enumerates the horrors of war; the third argues that “Peace therefore is to be preferred; so it be not with the blemish of the Princes honours, or prejudice of the publicke good.” The supporting aphorisms represent a range of opinion on the circumstances that call for war or peace. A quotation from Livy attacks the justice of a war of aggression, arguing, “A sure peace is better and safer than a hoped-for victory. The first is in your
hands; the second, in the hands of the gods” [Melior tutiorque, certa Pax, quàm sperata victoria: illa, in tua, haec, deorum in manu est]. Some quotations seem to argue peace as an absolute good. Cicero prefers the most unjust peace to the most just war. [Iniustissimam pacem iustissimo bello antefero.] On the other hand, a quotation from Ariosto argues that peace is best appreciated by those who have had to endure war. The quotation argues that war is an evil, but also may suggest that too much peace leads to undervaluing it. Taken together, Dallington’s general aphorism and the following sententiae lead the reader to a careful consideration of circumstances rather than to an abstract precept.

Dallington sets up tensions not only between sententiae, but also among aphorisms, sententiae, and their historical contexts. Dallington’s approach to context responds to Bacon’s rejection of epitomes that eliminate the very circumstances that enable readers to develop judgment. Even though he condenses the history, Dallington is mindful of how Guicciardini’s Storia puts his aphorisms into context, often dramatizing their erroneous use, or suggesting how the aphorisms themselves demonstrate the variety of lessons that might be drawn from history. The relationship between aphorism and historical example in Dallington also often complicates rather than simply illustrates.

Dallington sometimes sets up a conflict between the moral and the following example. Such a distinction between roots and branches may mark a gap between ideal precepts and experience in the ways of worldly politics. Aphorism 3.15 laments that the old virtues have been forsaken for profit. The various sententiae idealistically condemn amoral, profit-seeking politics. The example from Guicciardini’s history offers a contrasting observation on contemporary experience, describing Venice’s decision to support Pisa’s rebellion as motivated by considerations of profit rather than justice. Dallington sums up, “Thus standeth the observation, but the precept
teacheth the contrary.” He leaves the readers to draw their own conclusions about this gap.

The relationship between precept and example also offers a sense of how difficult it may be to reconcile morality and necessity. The moral for Aphorism 5.19 argues that reconciling strict honesty and justified dissimulation is simply a matter of finding the mean between them:

All Moralists hold nothing profitable that is not honest. Some Politicks have inverted this order, and perverted the sense, by transposing the terms in the proposition; holding nothing honest that is not profitable. Howsoever those former may seem too streightlaced, these surely are too loose. For there is a middle way between both, which a right Statesman must take.

Dallington’s moral argues for a middle path between the loose and the streightlaced, between expediency and morality. However, with the subsequent historical example, Dallington also suggests how hard it might be to walk this narrow line. Iacopo d’Appiano appeals to the French King for defense against Cesare Borgia. This appeal is couched in terms sympathetic to d’Appiano: “He desires the King for his owne honour, not to abandon his poore distressed client, and see him perish.” The king counters with an argument of utility, telling him in “plaine termes that though indeed he ought to defend him … yet he could not oppose the Pope without great loss to himself.” Dallington ends his summary on a note of sympathy for the abandoned ally, “The poore Signor loseth his Estate.” Rather than illustrating a happy compromise between utility and morality, the story suggests their incompatibility. Dallington does not always offer straightforward lessons from history; he leaves the reader to make judgments about real, challenging situations. Even within the apparently deductive structure of his individual arguments, Dallington conveys a sense of the need to regard particulars, the need for a protean approach to political and moral judgment.
Dallington’s Ramist approach apparently structures and organizes the material in order to make it more manageable for the reader. This arrangement seems to be the sort of judgment-stifling methodizing that Bacon condemns in his *Advancement of Learning*. Ideally aphorisms should be “cut off” from illustrations, examples, and “discourse of connexion and order” so that only what is “sound and grounded” remains. Such aphorisms, not yet reduced to a method indicate “knowledge in growth,” still capable of continual expansion. However, while Dallington does not cut his aphorisms off from potentially deluding ideas of order, he still makes room for inquiry and growth. Dallington's method does not create a deceptive security nor does it rest on foregone conclusions. Rather, Dallington challenges the reader to exercise their discretion, to wrestle with circumstances.

Dallington’s organization of the work as a whole is also intended to provide space for expanding judgment. Dallington’s *Aphorismes*, like Guicciardini’s *Ricordi*, offers the reader a way to develop prudence as it is not usually presented in books. This overall structure is intentionally loose. Dallington’s aphorisms are not set into a discourse or treatise. They are not arranged to support the well organized sections of a discourse on rule like Lipsius’s *Sixe Bookes*. Since Dallington offers no alphabetic index or table of contents, the reader may not start with a search for general principles. Instead, the reader has to work from the scattered particulars of the individual aphorisms.

In contrast to other collections, Dallington’s overarching organizational principle is chronological rather than topical. This chronological ordering sets him apart even from Nannini’s collection, which also illustrates aphorisms with historical contexts. Exemplary value is the main criteria for Nannini’s selection of materials from various historians; they are not arranged in chronological order. While Dallington does select and condense, his selections faithfully follow chronology. By bringing up aphorisms as they are suggested by events rather than bringing up events as they
become relevant to aphorisms, Dallington’s approach is actually more inductive than deductive. Dallington reverses the collectors’ method of gathering and arranging the aphorisms scattered throughout Guicciardini’s *Storia*. His aphorisms spring up in response to the unpredictable variety of circumstances presented in the passing of time.

Within this overall organization, determined more by chronology than theme, Dallington’s citations have a degree of looseness. However, Dallington does have a kind of unity in mind. In his introductory epistle, Dallington argues that the aphorism are not “so loose but that with Lipsius Soder you may cyment them together, and make them con-center in the maine proposition.” A good number of the sententiae Dallington collects come from Lipsius. Oestreich counts 76 aphorisms taken from Lipsius’s *Sixe Bookes* and 20 from his other works. However, Lipsius’s unifying influence is more pervasive than the number of these citations suggests.

Lipsius’s influence is also felt in the way Tacitus and Seneca, available in editions by Lipsius, dominate Dallington’s collection of sententiae. This particular constellation of authors suggests the motivation that directs this apparently random chronological organization. As Richard Tuck shows, interest in these authors fuels what he call a “new humanism,” marked by a skeptical approach to received morality and focus on role of self-interest in politics. In his *Aphorismes* Dallington explores the relationship of prudence, which adapts itself to all circumstances, with the uses and dangers of the emerging philosophy of *ragione di stato*. Dallington embraces flexibility, but is also concerned that such looseness be contained within the bounds of constancy and morality. As he argues in Aphorism 4.47, the prudent statesman is justified in “swarving from the direct line of sincere and ouvert dealing,” but he must not go beyond certain moral bounds.

When Dallington argues that his work is unified by “Lipsius Soder,” he may mean that Lipsius’s synthesis of Tacitus and Seneca provides an exemplary balance
of looseness and stability, the adaptability of *ragione di stato* within the bounds of a strict sense of morality. Lipsius does argue for flexibility and wise accommodation to the treacheries and dangers of contemporary politics, urging readers not to “so strictly condemne the Italian faulter-writer” [*nec Maculonum Italum tam districte damnandum*].

Although Lipsius defends Machiavelli, his notion of *virtus* has more to do with constancy and morality than does Machiavellian *virtù*. Lipsius’s *De Politica*, opens by placing prudence in the stabilizing company of virtue: “Without vertue, such wisedome should rather be subtil crafte, and malice, and any other thing rather than vertue” [*Sine Virtute, Calliditas ea sit et malitia, et quidlibet potius quam Prudentia*].

Such flexibility, bounded and checked by virtue, is also Dallington’s difficult goal and one of the major themes that unifies his loose, chronological account.

This quest for a synthesis of flexibility and stability characterizes the smaller themes, many of them also inspired by Lipsius’s *De Politica*, that bind Dallington’s *Aphorismes* together. Dallington sets these themes – misplaced ambition, conflict between the interests of state and religion, questions of warfare, the importance of oaths, and the uses and abuses of dissimulation – in varying circumstances. The repetition of themes works along the same principles as the interlacement of sententiae; it provides a multi-faceted view. Repetition sometimes underscores principles, arguing the importance of constancy in all circumstances. However, the overall chronological ordering keeps the discussion from ever becoming quite conclusive. Subsequent examples and sententiae often modify conclusions reached earlier. Readers continuously have to modify and adapt general principles as they apply them to various circumstances.

Dallington presents the principle of keeping one’s word in a way that stresses constancy in changing circumstances. As the principle comes up in various circumstances, Dallington condemns oath-breaking as motivated by papal
corruption, misguided ambition, or rash contract-making. He does once suggest that alliances may be broken for the common good, but overwhelmingly treats oath-breaking as a wrong kind of looseness.\textsuperscript{81} Other principles are nuanced or contradicted as Dallington applies them to different circumstances. Sometimes this circumstantiating of principles is fairly straightforward. For instance, it seems to be a matter of common sense that long deliberation is safest (1.37), but sometimes quick action is preferable (1.62, 3.18). However, other themes get presented with a greater degree of complexity.

Among the themes that Dallington interlaces, dissimulation presents one of the more complicated instances of applying general rules to circumstances and of balancing expediency with morality. Dallington includes some general guidelines, but disperses them in the collection, leaving it to the reader to find them. He also presents contradictory approaches to the issue of dissimulation, again leaving it to the reader to grapple with what appear to be inconsistencies.

Dallington appeals to “Lipsius’s Soder” by plotting good and bad dissimulation along a kind of spectrum. Among the sententiae for Aphorism 5.9, Dallington condenses Lipsius’s distinction of different degrees of deceit:

\textit{Deceit is three-fold; the first is light, as dissimulation and distrust, this I praise. The middle kind, as council and deception, I tolerate. The third, great deceit such as perfidy and injustice, I condemn. [Fraus triplex; prima levis, ut dissimulatio, & diffidentia, hanc suadeo. Seconda media, ut conciliatio & dequeptio, illam tolero. Tertia magna, ut perfidia & iniustia; istam damno.]\textsuperscript{82}}

Many of Dallington’s examples of dissimulation can be placed into Lipsius’s categories of praiseworthy, allowable, and damnable deceit. The historical episode that accompanies Aphorism 5.9 relates the betrayal of Federico of Naples by relatives and allies, which Dallington condemns as treachery rather than political expediency.
At the other end of the spectrum, Dallington argues that dissimulation is often necessary in public life, praising Ferdinando of Naples who conceals his fears of invasion from his followers (1.15). Various aphorisms throughout the work represent the extremes of justified and damnable deceit and shade in the area between them.

Dallington’s aphorisms on dissimulation argue both aloofness from, and accommodation to, a treacherous political world. These aphorisms can appear to be contradictory. At times Dallington seems to argue that a ruler may be able to remain pure and aloof from the amoral dealings of other rulers. Aphorism 3.4 counsels absolute truthfulness: “The beautie of Truth is in her nakednesse, and therefore she seekes no corners, to hide it.” The ruler is counseled to keep his own integrity and safety by making no treaty with the untrustworthy. In contrast, Aphorism 2.14 argues that ideal morality must be adapted to the reality of political dealings. Dissimulation is wrong in “an abstract morall sence,” but justified by “necessitie” as a “usuall and useful policy.” Here Dallington appears to contradict himself, appealing to the same standards of custom or use that he has criticized earlier. In Aphorism 1.36, Dallington’s moral argues that “truth and vertue are rather to be embraced and loved for their own sakes, then for ours; for that they are good in themselves, not for the good we get by them” He condemns princes “who make no difference betweene truth and falsehood, vertue and vice, but by the use.” Dallington’s stance on dissimulation appears to veer back and forth between accommodation to circumstances and insistence on absolute standards of truthfulness.

Dallington thus urges his readers to use their discretion, to examine the circumstances that determine what appear to be contradictory policies. Circumstances explain Dallington’s vigorous condemnation of dishonesty in Aphorism 3.4. Here Dallington sharply criticizes Ludovico Sforza for breaking his treaty with Charles 8. Dallington everywhere condemns such treaty-breaking as unjustifiable deceit. The sharpness of the aphorism’s insistence on absolute standards
of morality is meant to curb clearly reprehensible actions. The historical episode that accompanies Aphorism 2.14, which justifies dissimulation on the basis of custom and utility, describes the King and Queen of Spain, Isabella and Ferdinand, covertly preparing forces to defend their interests in southern Italy. This is perhaps an example of deceit justified for defense or for the public good. On the other hand, the condemnation of a slippery standard of “use” in Aphorism 1.36 is illustrated by an episode of deceitful statesmen caught in their own snares. When Piero de Medici uses a ruse to uncover Sforza’s treachery to the French, his duplicity has unanticipated ill effects, as the French reveal the Piero’s trick to Sforza. Thus Piero de Medici simply intensifies hostilities between Florence and Milan with his deceitful politics. By comparing and discriminating among the circumstances that attend various instances of deceit, Dallington urges his reader to exercise prudent discretion, distinguishing between various shades of good and bad dissimulation.

Dallington also urges his readers to inquire into the grounds upon which they make such distinctions. In general Dallington argues that dissimulation is justified when it serves the common good. In 3.16, for instance, Dallington argues that consideration of the public good may require a prince to dissimulate friendship with a weaker power while allying himself with a stronger. However, he does complicate this general principle, challenging its utility or accessibility. Dallington shows that the notion of common good is dependent on individual perception and vulnerable to self-interest. The twenty-seventh aphorism of book 3 describes how Ludovico Sforza “with a discourse full of fraud and duplicity” enlists the emperor Maximilian against the Florentines. All parties, notes Dallington, “made their pretence, that is was for the publicke good of Italie.” Dallington thus gives his readers the notion of the public good as rule for judgment, but he makes them consider this principle with a perspicacious eye.
As Dallington’s discussion of dissimulation stretches across the work, it becomes clear that he does not offer his readers easy answers. Rather he urges his readers to develop their discretion, the perspicacious eye that recognizes crucial differences. Dallington requires readers to go beyond the general abstraction that aphorisms represent. Readers confronted with unmethodized aphorisms and apparently contradictory advice must use their discretion to formulate their own philosophy of appropriate dissimulation.

While he appears to offer his readers a shortcut to prudence, Dallington actually dissimulates the challenges of his work. On the surface Dallington’s Aphorismes has much in common with other labor-saving collections. Nevertheless, even within this apparently simplifying format, Dallington also manages to convey the difficulties of accommodation to endless variety. Borrowing the technique of interlacement from the genre of romance, Dallington invites scrutiny of the contradictions between the methodized roots and branches of the sententiae and examples. He further requires the reader to examine principles as they operate in various circumstances stretching throughout the work. His chronologically organized collection does not spare the reader the labor of gathering and sifting particulars for themselves. Ultimately this is an open work rather than a easy epitome or handbook to wisdom. Dallington makes something of a dissimulating understatement when he ends his short introduction with an invitation to the reader, “What else is to be observed, your judgment may discern.”83 Among those things “to be observed” is Dallington’s own commitment to the values of the Essex circle. His indirect critique provides an alternative to the kind of withdrawal from public life that J. H. Salmon sees many former Essex circle members taking.84 Dallington ultimately argues that with some prudential adjustment for adverse winds, it may still be possible to take an active part in guiding the ship of state to the hoped for port.
ENDNOTES


5. Höltgen, 154, 158.


7. Anna Maria Crinò, *Fatti e Figure del Seicento Anglo-Toscano* (Firenze: Leo S. Olski, 1957) 43-44.

8. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Latin passages from Dallington’s work are mine.


15. Napoleone Orsini notes that there was a copy in Italian, Latin and English (pub 1585) in the Count of Leicester’s library. See *Studii sul Rinascimento Italiano in Inghilterra* (Firenze: G. Sansoni, 1937), 89. Donne not only owned a copy of the 1588 *Propositioni*, but he also “correctly annotated Machiavelli and Guicciardini as the authors of many maxims.” (Grendler, 164).
16. Robert Hichcock, trans. and ed, *The Quintesence of Wit being A corrant comfort of conceites, Maximes, and poleticke devises*, selected and gathered by Francisco Sansovino. Wherin is set foorth sundrye excellent and wise sentences, worthy to be regarded and followed. Translated out of the Italian tung, and put into English for the benefit of all those that please to read and understand the works and worth of a worthy writer (At London. Printed by Edward Allde, dwelling without Cripple-gate at the signe of the gilded Cuppe. 1590), A2.

17. Quoted and translated by Hichcock, A4.


21. W. T., trans, *Civill Considerations*, B.


24. Ibid., ricordo 6.


28. Ibid., 116.

30. Ibid., 103.

31. Ibid., 178.


37. Ibid., 158-59.

38. For examples of Dallington’s use of imagery in the *Aphorismes*, see 1. 2, 9, 10, 18-22, 38-4; 2.25; 3. 9, 36, 39, 43, 47; 4. 1, 3. 4, 14, 19, 48.


40. Ramus, 159.


44. Salmon sees Aphorism 3.16 as another potential allusion to Essex (217).

45. Höltgen, 158.

46. A version in Latin, French, and Italian is published by the Italian exile Pietro Perna in Basel. Luciani (208-09, 208-22) gives an account of Protestant responses to Guicciardini. An English translation, including Latin, French, and Italian, is published in 1595. [Two Discourses of Master Frances Guicciardin, which are wanting in the thirde and fourthe Bookes of his Historie, in all the Italian, Latin, and French Coppies heretofore imprinted;Which for the worthinesse of the matter they containe were published in those three Languages at Basile in 1561. And are now for the same cause done into English. (Printed at London for William Ponsonbie 1595.)] Dallington may have seen this version, but he does his own translation of the passages, breaking them up to offer extensive commentary.

47. Dallington, “Briefe Inference,” 44.

48. Ibid., 25.

49. Ibid., 42-43.

50. Ibid., 53.

51. In the *Aphorismes*, see, for instance, 1.10, 1.27, 2. 6, 2.8, 2.46, 3.49, 4.20, 5.15, 5.26.


54. Ibid., 49.

55. Dallington, “Briefe Inference,” 18, 41-44.

56. Dallington cites Tacitus or commentaries on Tacitus 262 times. He cites Seneca’s drama and moral philosophy 178 times.
57. Salmon, “Stoicism and Roman Example.”


59. Ibid., adage 1.1.94.


61. Ibid., 14.


64. See Quint, “Boat,” 186; Parker 20-23.


69. Cinzio, 47.

70. Next in importance to Tacitus and Seneca come Livy (100), Cicero (82), and Ovid (71). Authors cited 40 or more times include Aristotle (46), Ariosto (45), Lucan (41), and Pliny (40). Other authors who get significant use include Virgil (32), Tasso (16), and Paruta (14). Gerhard Oestreich counts 33 citations from Bodin. (NeoStoicism and the Early Modern State, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H. G. Koenigsberger, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 116.) There are also a sprinkling of citations that sound like they are from a Latin translation of Macchiaveli, and a small number of citations come from what must be a compilation of aphorisms called Ragione di Stato.

71. Dallington, Aphorismes, A4, verso.


73. Parker 4. The connection between narrative and ideologic closure is also one of the central arguments of David Quint’s Epic and Empire, Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

74. Bacon, Advancement, 234.

75. Ibid, 146.

76. Dallington, Aphorismes, A4, verso.

77. Oestreich, 116.


80. Lipisius, “Sixe Bookes,” 1.1.1 [1.1 261].

81. Dallington, *Aphorismes*, 1.8, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, 1.57, 2.1, 2.12, 5.9, 5.18.

82. Dallington is quoting from *De Politica*. “There are three kinds: light middle and grave. Light deceit I call the kind which departs only slightly from virtue, and contains not more than a little drop of malice, which category I take to contain Distrust and Dissimulation. The middle sort is that which departs further from virtue, and comes very close to sin. In which category I place Bribery and Deception. The third kind is that which deviates not only from virtue but from the laws and represents a solid and full-fledged malice. Such as breach of faith, and Injustice. I recommend the first kind, tolerate the second, and condemn the third. [Ea triplex: Levis, Media, Magna. Illam apello, quae haut longe a virtute abit, malitiae rore leviter aspersa. in quo genere mihi est Diffidentia et Dissimulatio. Mediam, quae ad eadem virtute flectit longius, et ad vitii coninia venit. in qua pono Conciliationem, et Deceptionem. Tertiam, quae non a virtute solum sed legibus etiam recedit, malitiae iam robustae et perfectae. uti sunt Perfidia et Iniustitia. Illam suadeo, hanc tolero, istam damno.](The English translation and Latin text are from the Waszink edition 4.14, 512 and 513).


84. Salmon, 224.
“Mutuall Raies”: The Eucharistic Perspective 
in George Chapman’s Hero and Leander

Readers of Chapman’s Hero and Leander are often struck by the ambivalence of the narrator’s attitude toward the tragically erring lovers. The third sestiad, which begins where Marlowe left off, opens with a call to “censure,” a tone “more harsh (at lest more hard) more grave and hie.”1 By the end of the sestiad the narrator has adopted a wholly different position. Sympathizing with Hero, he cries out against the apparently pitiless heavens (3.385). Readers note that the narrator’s vacillation from censure to pity persists throughout the poem. John Huntington remarks, “if the poet is rigorously harsh with [Hero] at one point, he is forgiving and pitying at another.”2 The narrator’s ambivalence denies an easy, obvious perspective to readers. Gerald Snare sees the poem as full of paradoxes and “contrarieties,” with a “moral and erotic voice fundamentally in conflict throughout, a conflict that is never settled.”3 This reading agrees that Chapman does purposefully set erotic and moral, pitying and censuring, voices in conflict. However, I argue that Chapman does not leave this conflict in perpetual suspension, but instead employs conflicting voices to dislocate readers from expected or comfortable stances in order to immerse them in the process of locating what Chapman calls the “judiciall perspective.” Chapman sets up this problem of moral judgment with the metaphor of rightly viewing an anamorphic artwork. Right judgment must be made from a proper location, neither too close nor too far, from its object. Given the fallibilities of judgment, this distance is not
easily located. Ultimately, Chapman turns to what might be called a Eucharistic perspective, one that embraces and redeems judgment’s fallibility.

With the ambivalence of the narrator, Chapman purposefully offers his readers a poetic equivalent of an anamorphic artwork. The narrator’s shifting moods of censure and pity replicate the way that an anamorphic artwork presents opposing images. Two kinds of anamorphic artworks then popular with English audiences shed some light on the problem of judgment presented by Chapman. In one, a mirror is positioned next to a corrugated panel with the components of two different images on each side of the triangles formed by the corrugation: the mirror can be manipulated to present two mutually exclusive and radically different images. In the other kind of anamorphic artwork, the image looks distorted from the expected point of view. As Ernest Gilman explains, the second kind of anamorphosis requires the viewer “to shift his point of view, to take up an unconventional stance, in order to make sense of the image before him.” This kind of anamorphic image requires the viewer “to see the work of art from multiple ‘perspectives’ before he grasps it fully.” Both types of anamorphosis have relevance to the paradoxes of Chapman’s *Hero and Leander*. Like the first kind of anamorphosis, the narrator’s conflictive responses of pity and censure present mutually exclusive and perhaps unresolvable images. The poem may ultimately, however, more closely follow the second kind of anamorphosis. Rather than giving readers a ready-made moral, Chapman impels readers to shift and adjust their viewpoints, to undergo a process of fine-tuning their moral vision in order to find a location from which these apparently conflicting images resolve into intelligibility.

Anamorphic objects and metaphors abound in Chapman’s works, both symbolizing the vulnerabilities and difficulties of moral judgments and offering readers a chance to exercise their perspicuity. In his prefatory letter to *Ovid’s Banquet of Sense*, Chapman praises his ideally discerning reader as having “the judiciall
perspective.” Chapman offers a definition of what such a “judiciall perspective” might be in The Tragedie of Chabot Admirall of France. Chapman depicts Chabot’s character as an anamorphic puzzle, presenting shifting and monstrous aspects until the viewer finds “the right laid line of truth” from which Chabot appears as “wise, just, good.”

While Chapman’s predilection for anamorphic puzzles has received some excellent critical discussion, it has not yet been applied to the problem of the ambivalent narrator and the problem of moral judgment in Hero and Leander.

The central anamorphic figure of Hero and Leander is Ceremony, the goddess who descends to admonish Leander for his breach of her laws. She embodies both of the apparently conflictive principles of pity and censure displayed by the poem’s ambivalent narrator. Ceremony is “changeable to everie eie / One way lookt ill, another graciouslie” (3.126). Ceremony thus recalls the first kind of anamorphic artwork, one that reveals two images that exclude each other, depending on the perspective of the viewer. Ceremony’s dual aspects reflect the natures of the viewers themselves. Steadfast viewers see her gracious aspect, while the erring see her as unbeautiful: “Which while men viewed they cheerfull were & holy: / but looking off, vicious and melancholy” (3.125). Both Ceremony and the viewers themselves are altered by the viewer’s moral perspective. While looking at Ceremony, observing her rites, viewers are happy and morally sound. When they lose sight of her, they become unhappy and full of vice. Ceremony holds up a mirror to her beholders. Chapman here suggests that right judgment depends on one’s state of mind.

The problem of just judgment may seem to be a simple matter of aligning oneself with Ceremony. However, keeping one’s eyes fixed on Ceremony is not entirely straightforward; Ceremony’s gracious aspect presents further complexities of interpretation. The word grace pervades Chapman’s Hero and Leander; its rich associations include beauty, harmony, decorum, and charitable judgment. These associations connect Ceremony with standards that confer stability. However, early
modern conceptions of decorum and grace also suggest the necessity and beauty of flexibility.

Ceremony, grace, and decorum are overlapping principles for Chapman, describing both physical and moral beauties. These concepts all are associated with ideals of harmony. “Morallitie and Comeliness themselves in all their sightly figures dress” (3.135-36), guided by the light emanating from Ceremony’s eyes. Grace describes or honors various aesthetically and morally pleasing harmonies between persons, times, and circumstances. Hymen’s harmonious features are so pleasing to the eye “that lovers were esteemde in their full grace” (5.109). The notion of graceful concord applies to behavioral as well as visual harmonies. Chapman writes that a “modest shame … should grace a dame” who is about to be married (5.354). A failure of concord makes Hero’s strained cheer at the wedding feast of Alcmane and Mya strike a false note: “Nor hath constrained laughter any grace” (5.58). Hero’s cheer is graceless because it is out of harmony with her feelings. Teras’s epithalamion celebrates “Nuptiall grace” (5.443), suggesting that ceremony sanctions marriage, making it decorous.

This investment in harmony makes grace, ceremony, and decorum principles of stability. Ceremony’s ability to impose decorous order is figured in her “Mathematique Christall … gathering in one line a thousand rayes” (3.132-33). The “one line” into which Ceremony gathers multiplicity may suggest Chapman’s “right laid line” from which confusing images become clear. Such an equation argues that grace and graceful judgment are principles of stability. Ceremony orders variety by upholding the existing social order; by her light “all estates of men” are maintained.

Grace, however, is also a principle of dynamism for Chapman and his contemporaries. The sixteenth-century art theorist Giovanni Lomazzo connects grace, decorum, and enargeia as principles of vitality: “By Motion, the Painters meane that comeliness, and grace in the proportion and disposition of a picture, which
is also called the spirite and life of a picture.” Chapman has this constellation of meaning in mind when he describes how Hero embroiders Leander’s image. Hero endows her work with convincing “spirite and life.” “Working his fayre neck she did so grace it” (4.70-71), that Hero longs to embrace her own creation.

Vitality-conferring grace is a principle of movement and flexibility. Lomazzo argues that to give a figure the motion that confers “the greatest grace and life,” the painter ought to make it “Serpentlike,” shaping both the whole figure and its limbs in an S-curve. Lomazzo’s connection of curving and grace originates in Quintillian’s contention that rhetorical grace is conferred by using figures of speech which, like the gracefully curved limbs of a statue, swerve away from straightforward expression. This notion of conferring grace by swerving from a direct course informs Chapman’s understanding of Ceremony and judgment.

Ceremony wears serpentlike movements of graceful decorum in her heart: “The snakie paths to each observed law, / Did Policie in her broad bosome draw” (3.129). Ceremony embodies not only the necessary swervings of prudent politics, but also all the graces of civilized, artful behavior that bend raw desire and nature from a rudely direct course. Accompanied by the Hours and Graces (3.142), Ceremony enjoins the accommodation of nature to gracefully appropriate times. Ceremony reproves Leander’s “bluntnes in his violent love” (145-46), the way “he close and flatly fell to his delites” (3.158). Ceremony’s speech reinforces the narrator’s earlier condemnation of Leander’s precipitate rush to gratification, his “ranke desire to joy it all at first” (1.49).

Ceremony enjoins decorous delay, bending desire from a straight course, delaying its fulfillment to the proper time, which keeps all things “in sacred harmonie” (3.62). Under her direction, dress and custom are “So orderd that it still excites desire, / And still gives pleasure freenes to aspire” (3.55-56). Ceremonial swerving from a direct course keeps desire in pleasurable suspense, conferring both bounds and freedom.
Chapman thinks of grace not only as the artful bending of raw desire or rude nature, but also as the merciful accommodation of divine laws to earthly apprehension and human fallibility. When Ceremony descends to admonish Leander, “heaven with her descended” (3.113). Ceremony symbolizes heaven’s willingness to descend to the level of earthly frailty; her gracious looks allude to that divine grace that rescues humanity, otherwise condemned to damnation by their fallen state.

Ceremony’s merciful accommodation of heaven to earth offers a pattern for human institutions. D. J. Gordon points out that the snaky designs on her bosom symbolize prudent policy, the “winding indirect ways that must be followed if the law is to be observed.” In *The Tragedie of Chabot Admirall of France*, Chapman argues that mercy actually upholds justice. Conspired against by powerful enemies who alienate the King from him, Chabot dies of a broken heart. On his deathbed, attended by the repentant King, Chabot is offered the chance to name his enemy’s punishment. Chabot, exemplary for his rigorous sense of justice, protests “O farre be such injustice.” Instead he asks that “where mercie may be let into his sentence / For my sake you would soften it.” Such merciful bending is actually more just than a strict observance of law.

Neptune’s transformation of Hero and Leander demonstrates this kind of mercifully indirect observance of law. Neptune is moved by “just ruth,” which could suggest either that his pity respects justice or perhaps that pity is itself the most just response. Neptune softens Hero and Leander’s fate, letting in mercy as far as he can (“Argument” 6.13). Although transformed to nonhuman shapes and doomed to a prickly diet of thistles, the lovers get to stay together. As a narrator, Chapman lets in mercy as he employs digressions that swerve from the storyline, delaying the tragic ending. He devotes an extensive description to the wedding celebration that fills Hero’s last day because he feels sorry for Hero, “whose wound because I grieve so to display / I use digressions thus t’encrease the day” (5.495-96). Even the tragic
conclusion of the poem embodies a kind of merciful bending. As Chapman’s own invention, the metamorphosis that ends the poem also represents Chapman’s creative and merciful swerving from his original source.

Both Neptune and Chapman are limited in how far they can swerve, however. Chapman puts the swervings of policy and mercy within bounds. In Andromeda Liberata, Chapman praises a kind of “true Policie” that “windes like a serpent, through all Empery” (87-88). The windings of policy are kept under control, though, so that they do not burst into a destructive flood; “Her folds [are] on both sides bounded … / With high-shores listed” (89-90). Similarly, while Ceremony enjoins swerving, she keeps within bounds; desires are “with civill forms confirm’d and bounded” (3.151).

In An Epicede or Funerall Song, Chapman praises Prince Henry’s ability to combine wily, twisting politics with transparent truthfulness: “His heart wore all the foldes of Policie, / Yet went as naked as Simplicitie” (246-47). Chapman insists that even politic expediency has moral bounds. Ideally, decorous ceremony also swerves within boundaries, combining intricacy and transparency. Ceremony wears snaky patterns on her bosom, but, like the prudent but honest Prince Henry, she is “cleere and transparent as the purest glasse” (3.118).

Ceremony’s embodiment of multifaceted and elusive grace requires that the viewer see her from a “right laid line of truth.” Distinguishing between merciful but bounded swerving and illicit erring is one of the perceptual puzzles Hero and Leander presents to the reader. Like an anamorphic image, Ceremony looks gracious or forbidding depending on the viewer. Her dual aspect presents further complications in that her snaky aspect can be read rightly as mercy or wrongly as a justification for dissembling. Chapman’s narrator condemns priests who abuse the notion of Grace in this manner. They dissemble an appearance of righteousness, behaving “As if their lives were cut out by their places, / And they the only fathers of the Graces”
The narrator finds such hardened hypocrisy more culpable than Hero’s; nevertheless, he does not entirely excuse her.

The distraught Hero pulls herself together with the hope that beauty (Leander’s and her own) will soften justice. Her conclusion is summed up in an aphorism: “Beautie in heaven and earth this grace doth win, / It supples rigor, and it lessens sin.” Her conclusion is suspect, arising from “her sharpe wit, her love, her secrecie, / Trouping together” (3.397-98). While Chapman may champion mercy’s ability to soften rigor, he argues that mercy should not be confounded with sophistic evasion. Hero’s attempt to cover her error is punished with the incarnation of dissimulation, Eronusis. The monstrous Eronusis is “girdled with painted snakes,” and has a “Scorpions taile” for legs (4.295-96). While heaven does advocate some merciful swerving, Ceremony condemns a “loose” disregard for forms and right (3.151-54). By juxtaposing the snaky images of Ceremony and Eronusis, Chapman presents his readers with a kind of anamorphic puzzle. Chapman challenges readers to interpret not just one figure that embodies opposing aspects, but to distinguish between two similar figures that mean very different things.

Chapman challenges readers to bring Ceremony’s gracious aspect into focus. The reader must negotiate fine distinctions to arrive at a judgment both merciful and moral, just but not overly severe. These modes of judgment appear to be mutually exclusive, at least until the viewer is impelled to step out of his or her usual perspective. With the narrator’s opposing moods of pity and censure, Chapman nudges readers to interpret his poem as viewers approach an anamorphic image, testing various positions before they find a right laid line of truth.

One likely location for Chapman’s “judicial perspective” might be at a mean between the extremes of pity and censure. Like many of his contemporaries, Chapman would be familiar with Aristotle’s notion that virtue resides at the mean between two undesirable extremes. Some early modern approaches to perspectival
painting appeal to Aristotle’s notion of a virtuous mean as a standard for locating a happy distance between the artist, viewer, and the object portrayed.

Lomazzo appeals to such a notion of an ideal mean as he instructs the artist on selecting a proper distance from the subject. To make a convincing image, the artist must accurately calculate how distance and location shape perception. Lomazzo advises the artist to “make an especiall choice of a convenient distance.” The artist should stand neither too close nor too far; one “cannot see without Distance, that is without some space between his eie, and the thing to bee seen …. Again if the thing shall be too farre of, it cannot be seen.” Lomazzo figures the appropriate distance in metaphorically satisfying terms. The distance of three times the height of the figure for him is “the most proportionable to the eie that can be devised, and is that which makes all painted workes appeare more gratiously to the eie, then the extreames can doe.” Lomazzo’s terms – “convenient,” “proportionable,” “gratiously” – connect questions of distance with those of decorum. Chapman may similarly argue that finding the proper distance from the person or situation under judgment will locate the viewer at the “judiciall perspective” from which the anamorphic image of his poem becomes intelligible.

The Elizabethan miniaturist Nicholas Hilliard places the question of decorous distance in the context of the affections. Hilliard portrays the difficult achievement of capturing a subject’s “grace in countenance” as a problem of locating a decorous mean between detachment and seduction:

It behoveth that he be in hart wisse, as it will hardly faill that he shal be amorous, . . . Wee are all generally commanded to turne awaye ouer eyes frome beauty of humayne shape, least it inflamme the mind, howe then the curious drawer wach, and as it [were] catch thosse lovely graces wittye smilings and those stolen glances which sudainely like light[n]ing pass … except hee behould, and very well noate, and Conceit to lyke, soe that he can hardly take them truly, and expresse them well, without an affectionate good Jugment, and without blasting his young and simpel hart.
The portrait painter is faced with two erring extremes. Without some kind of sympathy and appreciation for beauty, he will fail to capture the graces that give life to the portrait; “he can hardly take them truly.” On the other hand, he runs the risk of “blasting his young and simpel hart” by his close observation of these seductive beauties. Striking an ideal mean between these extremes requires “an affectionate good Judgment,” an ideal combination of wisdom and affection. In Hero and Leander Chapman asks readers to seek a similar decorous mean between too great and too narrow an emotional distance from the erring characters.

Chapman sees uncontrolled, excessive affections as a threat to decorous, moral judgment. In the introductory epistle to The Shadow of Night, Chapman argues that good judgment is a matter of that decorum that informs aesthetic and moral beauty – “most beautifull judgment” subdues “monstrous affections.” In one of the poems that make up The Shadow of Night, “Hymnus in Cynthiam,” Chapman portrays “monstrous affection” as an irrational and sensual threat to clear judgment. He describes a pack of hunting dogs that enter an enchanted thicket and are overcome with fear at the piteous things they see there:

For ruth (first shaken from the braine of Love,  
And love the soule of vertue) now did move,  
Not in their soules (spheres meane enough for such)  
But in theire eyes: and thence did conscience touch  
Their harts with pitie; where her proper throne,  
Is in the minde, and there should first have shone:  
Eyes should guide bodies, and our souls our eyes.  
...  
So sence brought terror; where the mindes presight  
Had saft that feare, and done but pitie right (314-20, 322-23).

Chapman does not condemn all emotion. Love is “the soule of vertue,” useful for stirring one to good deeds. Chapman’s position is similar to that of Thomas Wright,
author of a treatise on the affections. Wright argues for the usefulness of emotions, “Passions, are not only, not wholly to be extinguished (as the Stoicks seemed to affirme) but sometimes to be moved and stirred up for the service of virtue.”21 Chapman likewise argues that the affections serve virtue, but only if they are governed by reason rather than sense alone.

For Chapman, judgment fails when it comes too close to the objects of the senses, rather than relying on the controlling and steadying power of reason. Immersed in the immediate and seductive experience of the senses and emotions, judgment construes only blurred and confused images. Chapman parallels judgment overcome by sense with improper proximity in Ovid’s Banquet of Sense. Setting the scene for Ovid’s encounter with Corinna, Chapman describes a statue of Niobe which is better discerned from a distance than up close:

So cunningly to optick reason wrought,
    That a farre of, it shewd a women's face,
Heavie, and weeping; but more neerely viewed,
    Nor weeping, heavy, nor a woman shewed (3.7-9).

Raymond Waddington reads Ovid’s Banquet of Sense as championing a judgment that achieves its accuracy by maintaining a proper distance from its object. As the statue of Niobe dissolves into meaningless formlessness when a viewer comes too close, so Waddington argues, Ovid’s failure to keep his distance from the lovely Corinna marks the dissolution of reasonable, clear judgment. “If he then gets too close, commits his presumptuous act, he then loses perspective, the sensory data overwhelm his intelligence, and he perceives only non-sense.”22 According to Waddington, the poem depicts Chapman’s “allegiance to reason, the demand for constancy in behavior, the drive to disengage from a too immediate involvement in order to arrive at a dispassionate decision.”23 To see Chapman’s conception of an ideal viewpoint as “dispassionate” may be to make Chapman’s conception of ideal judgment
Chapman's Ovid loses his ability to reason when he comes too close to the object of his desire, insisting on touch, the most bodily of the senses. In his portrayal of Ovid, Chapman alludes to the story of Narcissus, recounted by Ovid in the *Metamorphoses*. Interpreted Neoplatonically by Ficino in his *Commentary on the Symposium*, Narcissus epitomizes “the pitiable calamity of men,” a deluded attachment to merely physical beauty. Gazing at his reflection, Narcissus fails to recognize his true “substance and character.” Instead, “the soul admires in the body, which is unstable and in flux, like water, a beauty which is the shadow of the soul itself.”24 Chapman quotes this passage in his poem, “A Hymne to Our Saviour on the Crosse,” (1612),25 lamenting that the soul, too often enamored of bodily beauty forgets its true, spiritual identity:

```
Hence came the cruell fate that Orpheus
Sings of Narcissus: who being amorous
Of his shade in the water (which denotes
Beauty in bodies, that like water flotes)
Despisd himselfe, his soule, and so let fade
His substance for a never-purchast shade. (235-40)
```

Here, as in *Ovid’s Banquet*, Chapman argues that the desire to get too close, to touch, can be destructive. Chapman's Ovid and Ovid's Narcissus suffer from a desire to get too close to their objects because they are immersed in the senses, in bodily beauty, rather than directed by moral and rational judgment.

Chapman portrays Hero as a kind of Narcissus, whose young and simple heart is blasted as she grasps after love and beauty without the guidance of affectionate good judgment. As Pamela Royston points out, Chapman’s description of Hero working Leander’s image into her scarf alludes to Narcissus. Royston argues that
Hero’s intensely erotic approach to her embroidery makes Hero a narcissistic artist “wrapping the self in the workings of the erotic imagination.” As she hovers above her depiction of Leander swimming, Hero recalls Narcissus longingly gazing at a beloved image that he can not ever reach:

In working his fayre neck she did so grace it
She still was working her owne armes t’imbrace it:
That, and his shoulders, and his hands were seen
Above the streame, and with a pure Sea greene
She did so quenly shadow every lim,
All might be seene beneath the wave to swim. (3.70-75).

Chapman depicts Hero’s deluded judgment, her sensual immersion in illusion. Like Narcissus, Hero reaches for the “shadow” of physical beauty rather than real substance.

This passage draws not only on Neoplatonic notions of illusion, but also on early modern ambivalence about perspectival painting. “Shadow” refers to the technique of shading that creates the appearance of three-dimensional depth. In his preface to Ovid’s Banquet of Sense, Chapman describes how shadowing gives enargeia or vitality to an artwork. “It serves not a skilfull Painters turne, to draw the figure of a face onely to make knowne who it represents; but hee must lymn, give luster, shaddow, and heightening; which though ignorants will esteeme spic’d and too curious, yet such as have the judiciall perspective, will see it hath, motion, spirit and life.” Hero’s shadowing makes Leander’s figure life-like. The narrator remarks that her image “did live” and aphorizes, “Things senseles live by art, and rationall die, / By rude contempt of art and industrie” (4.55-56). Hero “shadows” Leander’s limbs so that they look like they are swimming beneath the waves; she achieves a life-like, three-dimensional effect. Hero thus “graces” her image, giving it vitality. However, she also dangerously deludes herself.
The term *shadow* can be used in a positive sense, but also reflects a feeling that perspectival art is an illusion, a mere shadow of a reality, or a sinister deception. Perspectival art creates an illusion “whereby the unskilfull eye is so often cozened and deluded, taking counterfeit creatures for true and naturall,” as Richard Haydocke puts it in the preface to his translation of Lomazzo. In a passage on how the affections may color and mislead judgment, Samuel Daniel equates “shadow” with “counterfeit”: “For if this right, or truth, should be no other thing than that wee make it, we shall shape it into a thousand figures, seeing this excellent painter Man, can so well lay the colours which himselfe grindes in his owne affections, as that hee will make them serve for any shadow, and any counterfeit.” Daniel’s sense of the confounding of clear judgment describes the affectionate delusion both of Hero and of the narrator.

Chapman characterizes Hero as a Narcissus figure who is deluded by her affections and senses. His portrait parallels the way Leon Battista Alberti reads Narcissus in his *On Painting*. Alberti’s Narcissus figures the necessity of an artful, decorous approach to the desires of the affections and senses. Defending the honor of painting, Alberti explains, “I used to tell my friends that the inventor of painting, according to the poets, was Narcissus …. What is painting but the act of embracing by means of art the surface of the pool?” Alberti’s conception of painting provides an answer to the dilemma of Ovid’s Narcissus, who pleads, “Still may it be mine to gaze on what I may not touch, and by that gaze feed my unhappy passion” [liceat, quod tangere non est, / adspicere et misero praebere alimenta furori]. Alberti offers Narcissus a way of figuratively achieving this impossible embrace. Alberti calls the key measurement for creating proportion and the illusion of depth *bracchia* (arms). This name for the measurement is fairly common, but by putting it in the context of Narcissus’ story, Alberti suggests that painting gives the artist a means of artfully, intellectually embracing the object of desire.
attachment to beauty, the Albertian system of perspective also sets decorous bounds, warning the viewer to distinguish between illusion and reality, and to restrain desire with decorum and reason.

In his *Apologhi*, Alberti provides analogues for the Narcissus myth that argue for the necessity of a decorous distance between the viewer or artist and the object of desire. Both tales admonish the naïve viewer who precipitately rushes to lay hands on beauty. A little boy vainly attempting to capture “the rays of sun in his embraces” [*radios soli amplexibus*] learns that no mortal thing can contain the divine. In the second tale, a fish attempts to leap into the trees “painted” on the surface of its pond (“*arbores pictas in fontis superficie*”). The reflection disappears as the fish breaks the surface, provoking the trees to comment, “Are you so foolish that even pretend trees flee you?” With its Horatian allusion to the indecorum of fishes swimming through the branches of trees, the second story especially connects decorum and perspective. Alberti warns the viewer who mistakes shadow for substance that too close an approach to an artwork destroys the illusion. Viewers who attempt physically to grasp the beauties tenuously captured on canvas will come up empty-handed.

Confounded by his own susceptibility to Hero’s beauty, Chapman’s narrator seems oblivious to the eroticism of Hero’s needlework; he celebrates it as a triumph over affection, wishing that more ladies might take up embroidery in order to manage their unruly passions:

> That their plied wits in numbred silks might sing
> Passions huge conquest, and their needels leading
> Affection prisoner through their own-built citties,
> Piniond with stories and Arachnean ditties. (4.118-21)

“Passions huge conquest” is an ambivalent phrase, suggesting not only mastery of passion, but also subjection to it. An embroiderer or poet who imagines she has
mastered passion and affection may instead be the one being led prisoner by passion. The reference to Arachne, ultimately metamorphosed into a spider for daring to match her weaving skill with Minerva’s, also suggests a kind of hubris. The scarf, as an image of divinely proportioned beauty, does have healing powers for the people of Sestus and Abydus. Nevertheless, the scarf also represents Hero’s turn from piety to dissimulation and an idolatrous love of Leander, her decision that “her Religion should be Policie, / to follow love with zeale her pietie” (4.178-79). Venus answers Hero’s deception with the embodiment of dissimulation, Eronusis, who wears a robe that outdoes Arachne’s weaving, “never was Arachnes web so glorious” (4.302). The narrator’s apparent praise of “Arachnean ditties” actually foreshadows punitive metamorphoses. The narrator’s misreading of Hero’s art betrays a kind of hubristic confidence in the power of art. Ironically, he shows his own overmastering by passion.

The narrator misreads Hero’s artworks because he is overcome by erotic attachment and pity, contagious emotions that can lead to over-identification with their objects and to corruption of judgment. Chapman’s conception of contagious love and pity comes partly from Ficino’s explanation of the physics of love in his Commentary on the Symposium. Explaining the way love and various other afflictions can be passed along, Ficino theorizes that spirits carried in the bloodstream can send out rays through the eyes. An observer can contract any number of physical ills carried along with these rays. In the case of erotic attraction, the gaze may carry a vaporous spiritual substance into the eyes and to the heart of the viewer, infecting the viewer with passionate attachment. Ultimately, the observer is literally infected with the substance of the beloved, and thus becomes like what he or she observes, sharing the “colors, or features, or feelings, or gestures” of the beloved.

Mood-altering spirits are partially responsible for emotional contagion in Hero and Leander. Dark clouds mirror Venus’ anger at the defection of her one chaste
acolyte; their impenetrable darkness impedes her attempt to return to the heavens. When Apollo dispels the cloud as rain, it falls in potent, piercing drops that infect innocent bystanders: “In every drop a torturing Spirit flew, / It pierst so deeply, and it burned so blew” (4.343-44). In a sense, spirits generated by Venus’s chagrin infect bystanders.

Both the beauty and the emotions of Hero and Leander infect the narrator, causing him to identify with them. Leander’s amorous mood and beautiful presence are literally contagious. White roses appear to spring from the water dripping from Leander’s body. The narrator remarks that “all objects that in compasse came / Of any sense he had” are affected. The smitten narrator rhapsodizes in a love-filled sentence: “Love-blest Leander was with love so filled, / that love to all that toucht him he instilled” (3.84-85). This feeling temporarily overshadows the narrator’s judgment. Admiring the lovely Leander, the narrator moralizes “love is sweet and faire in every thing” (3.81). This is a judgment he later revises when, with Leander out of his immediate sight, he contemplates Hero’s desolation. Then Leander’s conquest is described as more forceful than sweet; Leander has “made Mars his Cupid” (3.211). The narrator’s susceptibility to Leander’s beauty when nearby shows the danger of a lack of emotional distance that leaves the viewer susceptible to corrupted judgment.

In the passage from The Shadow of Night quoted above, Chapman argues that good pity springs from love, the emotion that inspires virtue. However, misguided pity and love also intertwine in Hero and Leander; both are forms of emotional contagion that obstruct judgment. Giving instructions on how an artist may depict different emotions, Lomazzo writes that pity “causeth weeping and hollowe eies; bringing the bodie by a certaine imitation, unto the same passions wherewith it is affected. So that the mercifull man conceaveth the same passions which the poore & grieved do.” This identification can lead to merciful actions; however it may also obscure good judgment. As the sorrowing Hero shrouds herself in her cloak, the
narrator comments, “Yet might an imitating eye well see, / How fast her cleere teares melted on her knee” (3.307-08). The “imitating eye” suggests the artist who depicts Hero, who imitates her in the Aristotelian sense of mimesis. It could also belong to one who imitates her by weeping with her, one who has been infected by her emotion and who thus assumes her shape. Chapman suggests that these two kinds of imitation are inevitably close for the poet or artist. Chapman depicts his narrator as culpably infected by the beauty and sorrow that he imitates both as creator and pitier.

Infected with Hero’s beauty and with pity for her, the narrator loses his objective distance. The effect of Hero’s beauty on the narrator’s judgment can be traced in the poem’s aphorisms. These phrases, often italicized to stand out from the rest of the poem, offer moral judgments on the action of the poem from an apparent distance. In the opening of the poem, for instance, the narrator rebukes Leander’s hasty passion with a proverbial expression, “Joy graven in sence, like snow in water wasts; / without preserve of vertue nothing lasts” (3.35-36). Here the narrator has the senses under control and offers readers a reliable moral stance.

However, the narrator so falls under the sway of Hero’s beauty that he comes to identify with her. Hero herself takes over the aphoristic lines at times, and at times the narrator’s voice becomes indistinguishable from Hero’s. Grieving with Hero, the narrator cries out, “Aie me, hath heavens straight fingers no more graces, / For such as Hero, then for homeliest face?” (3.385-86). This is a conclusion Hero shortly comes to as she decides to dissimulate her error. The italicized aphorism that follows sums up her conclusion: “Beautie in heaven and earth this grace doth win, / It supplies rigor, and it lessens sin” (3.395-96). It is difficult to attribute this saying definitively to either the narrator or to Hero since it proclaims a shared sentiment. The affectionate narrator has come to identify with Hero, taking on her attributes in the way Ficino describes the lover taking on the characteristics of the beloved. Significantly, this melding of
sentiments occurs just a few lines after Hero, in the tradition of the Neoplatonic lover, has declared her identity with Leander: “Such vertue love hath to make one of two” (3.358). By falling in love with Hero, the narrator becomes one with her, losing his separate identity and his judicial distance.

This lack of judicial distance is also apparent in the aphorism that comments on Hero’s drinking at the wedding celebration of Alcmane and Mya. The aphorism proclaims, “Who feares the threats of fortune, let him drinke” (5.60). As Gerald Snare has noted, this is a completely inadequate response to the tragic fate that ineluctably awaits Hero. The narrator’s comments strike the reader as “inappropriate, foreign … irrelevant.” The narrator here uncritically approves Hero’s actions; his judgment is warped by his infatuation with Hero’s beauty. The passion that clouds the narrator’s judgment fills him with a culpable kind of pity. Rather than offering moral judgment from an impartial distance, the narrator identifies with and justifies his erring heroine.

Chapman’s criticism of judgment overcome by desire and pity is informed by the sixteenth-century revival of Stoic and Epicurean philosophies that idealize mental imperturbability. For Seneca, pity is a mental frailty that clouds good judgment:

Pity is a sickness of the mind brought about by the sight of the distress of others, or sadness caused by the ills of others which it believes come undeservedly. But no sickness befalls the wise man. His mind is serene and nothing can happen to becloud it. [Misericordia est aegritudo animi ob alienarum miseriae speciem; aut tristitia ex alienis malis concepta, quae accidere immerentibus credit. Aegritudo autem in sapientem virum non cadit. Serena est enim eius mens est, nec quicquam incidere potest quod illam obducat.]

While Chapman does see overly emotional judgment as imperfect, he does not necessarily embrace Seneca’s ideal of imperturbable tranquility, nor does he share the confidence this passage expresses about the superior judgment of the wise. For
Chapman, judgment that claims impartiality may represent the other undesirable extreme of viewing from too great a distance.

While sixteenth-century writers see the affections as endangering judgment, many of them argue for moderating rather than eradicating emotions such as anger and fear. Most condemn the Stoic notion of eliminating pity. Chapman may be directly influenced by Jean Calvin’s commentary on Seneca’s De clementia. Calvin praises feeling and activity as virtuous:

> Obviously we ought to be persuaded of the fact that pity is virtue, and that he who feels no pity cannot be a good man – whatever these idle sages may discuss in their shady nooks. [Illud sane nobis persuasum esse debet, & virtute esse misericordiam, nec bonum hominem esse posse, qui non sit misericors, quicquid in suis umbris disputent otiosi isti sapientes.]

To Calvin, the tranquility of Seneca’s sequestered sage is idle and uncharitable. Objecting to Seneca’s advocation of detached pity, “He will bring relief to another’s tears, but will not add his own,” Calvin condemns lofty isolation from the suffering of others:

> by this standard especially the Stoics would like people to judge their “wise man,” as if he as it were from his lofty citadel looks down on Fortune’s game in human affairs, and considers his own and others’ misfortunes have nothing to do with him. [Hac re potissimum sapientum suum censeri volunt Stoici, si velut ex editissima arce fortunam spectet in rebus humanis ludentem, & nihil ad se pertinere casus suos aut alienos reputet.]

Calvin here critiques not only Seneca, but also Lucretius, whose De rerum natura includes a famous passage on the contemplative tranquility of the wise man. The second book opens with an image of philosopher who looks down in complacent bliss on the errors of other less happy mortals. Calvin criticizes such luxurious
looking down from a “lofty citadel,” arguing for active and charitable involvement. Chapman makes a similar criticism of detached judgment.

Like Calvin, Chapman argues that there is no true bliss in isolation from others’ suffering, even if such an invulnerable view were possible. Chapman counters Lucretius’ image of the bliss of detachment in what at first appears to be a rather odd observation on Leander’s struggles with the raging waves that will eventually drown him. The narrator comments, “Blisse not in height doth dwell” (6.184). The aphorism might be read as a comically inappropriate observation on the high and threatening waves. More seriously, Chapman may, as John Huntington suggests, make a morally serious “comment on social reality,” the discomforts that attend ambition and high position. However, this comment just as likely refers to the narrator’s situation. As the narrator looks down on Leander struggling in the waves, he has something like the view of Lucretius’s philosopher who serenely observes the struggles of others from a safe height. Like the sage criticized by Calvin, he may falsely assume that “other’s misfortunes have nothing to do with him.” The narrator’s detached judgment on the unblissful heights that menace Leander may actually apply to the delusions of his own detachment. On the other hand, he may consciously reject impartial, distanced judgment. This aphorism argues that true bliss does not come from lofty isolation from the struggles of other human beings. When Chapman continues Marlowe’s often humorously ironic poem, his turn to a more “grave and high” tone does not necessarily mean that he embraces harsh judgment from a lofty point of view. The gravity of the poem may not emanate from a high and lofty view, but instead from Chapman’s sympathetic engagement with the suffering of the erring lovers.

What at first appears to be misplaced humor about high waves may actually be a criticism of the detachment that would find humor in Leander’s plight. While some of the poem’s aphorisms offer what seem to be reasonable judgments, others reflect
the narrator's limitations. This aphorism, like many of the aphorisms throughout the poem, points not so much to a clear moral as to a gap between sentence and circumstance. As Snare argues, the aphorisms “continually hint at something else: at their own anomaly, at being either different from, anomalous, or anachronistic to the signified narrative in which they are imbedded.”47 These gaps, I believe, are intended to dislocate the reader from their accustomed perspective, just as an anamorphic image forces viewers to experiment with different locations until they find the one that makes the image intelligible. Chapman’s aphorisms push readers into fine-tuning their moral visions as they have to negotiate an uncertain relationship between aphorism and event. Chapman urges readers to move beyond their first interpretation to a deeper reading. In the case of “Blisse not in height doth dwell,” the reader has to move from what appears to be an inappropriate and hard-hearted assessment of Leander’s plight to a serious critique of the narrator’s, and their own, detachment.

Other aphorisms in poem function in the same way, calling for readers to temper their harsh judgment as they contemplate gaps between sentences and circumstances. The aphorism, “Beautie in heaven and earth this grace doth win, / It supples rigor, and it lessens sin” (3.395-96), marks the narrator’s loss of judicial distance. However, it is open to a reading that calls for the readers’ sympathy as well as censure. Even while Chapman is showing his narrator as too attached to Hero to judge her fairly, he is also criticizing the opposite extreme. Huntington argues that, on one hand, the aphorism exemplifies Hero’s sophism and the narrator’s loss of good judgment, “perhaps the poet’s judgment has been overcome by a pretty face.” However, Huntington argues that this aphorism may suggest the injustice of the opposite extreme of censoriousness; the aphorism “condemns Hero and also the stern and graceless world that refuses to pity her.”48 In this passage, Chapman juxtaposes the extreme, judgment-bending susceptibility of Hero and narrator with the other
extreme of unbending condemnation. He describes Venus refusing to hear Hero because she “Burnd with too sterne a heat, and would not heare” (3.384). Not to pity Hero is equally or perhaps more culpable than pitying her too much. Chapman’s aphorism, capable of multiple and opposing interpretations, nudges the reader away from the extremes of susceptibility and detachment.

A similar, dislocating aphorism comments on Hero’s embroidery. Hero becomes so wrapped up in her illusion that “in her strength of thought, / she feard she prickt Leander as she wrought” (4.57-58). Rather comically, Chapman depicts her as frightening her guardian as she sympathetically shrieks for fear of hurting the image. The episode may further distance the reader as it implicitly mocks the similar plight of her tender-hearted narrator, who likewise laments the suffering he is inflicting on his own creation. The potential humor of the episode distances the reader from both Hero and narrator. However, the aphorism that follows checks the reader who is too ready to find humor in Hero’s affectionate delusion. The narrator shifts the question of sympathy onto another, graver plane: “They double life that dead things griefs sustayne: / They kill that feele not their friends living payne” (4.62-63). The aphorism at first seems out of place as a comment on Hero’s rather comic suffering. However, its very oddity is intentional; it requires readers to shift gears from superior contemplation of Hero’s error to an examination of their own ability to react compassionately. The aphorism does not merely comment on Hero’s ability to be moved by her creations. Sympathetic readers of histories like Chapman’s also “dead things griefs sustayne.” The humor in these aphorisms helps to put the reader in a judging frame of mind rather than becoming immersed in the tragedy. However, humor that is too detached can represent another erring extreme. Chapman turns the detached reader’s amusement inward to self-examination, asking them to take the pain of the dead heroine seriously, and to consider their sympathetic response to the sorrows of their own real friends. Chapman urges his readers to shift their
perspectives, moving from immersion in the tragedy to detached enjoyment, and arriving at a judiciously grieving engagement.

In *Euthymiae Raptus*, a poem written to accompany his 1609 translation of the *Iliad*, Chapman criticizes Lucretius’ definition of bliss as philosophic detachment and praises the utility of grief:

> Homer tould me that there are  
> Passions, in which corruption hath no share;  
> There is a joy of soule; and why not then  
> A griefe of soule, that is no skathe to men?  
> For both are Passions, though not such as raigne  
> In blood, and humor, that engender paine. (184-189)

For Chapman a lofty detachment from other’s suffering is not truly happy. Where Lucretius describes this superior aloofness as “blissful” [suave], Chapman insists that “Griefe, that dischargeth Conscience, is delight” (195). Paradoxically, real pleasure comes from productive moral suffering. In *Hero and Leander*, Chapman praises the intertwined conscience-discharging griefs of pity and self-recognition.

The deities who appear in Chapman’s poetry are not the tranquil and unconcerned beings pictured by Lucretius. They do not coolly observe the play of human suffering from their lofty height. Rather, they descend “downe to the Destinies” (5.22) to plead for Hero and Leander. Homer’s *Iliad* offered Chapman many similar examples of compassionate divinity. In Chapman’s translation, marginal notes draw attention to Venus’s anxiety for her son Aeneas and Jove’s being “much moved’ at the imminent death of his son Sarpedon. The compassionate gods are models for humanity in the *Iliad*. Phoenix admonishes the stubborn Achilles that “The Gods themselves are flexible, whose vertue, honors, powers / Are more than thine; yet they will bend their breasts as we bend ours.” Even when the gods are not capable of altering fate, they do intervene to soften and bend its harshness. In the
Iliad, Jove instructs Apollo to rescue Sarpedon’s body from possible desecration by the enemy. In Chapman’s Hero and Leander, compassionate deities also intervene to some effect. The gods’ descent to plead with the fates has some effect at least on the climate, “with their descent the day grew something fayre” (5.29). In Hero and Leander, Chapman contrasts the flexible, piercable gods with hard-hearted humanity. When the gods are unable to save Hero and Leander the narrator comments that they are “Pierst with our humane miseries more then men” (5.25-26). Gods who grieve offer a pattern for humanity.

In Eugenia, Chapman justifies grief, arguing that Christ wept over the death of Lazarus: “Oh why wept, mans great Patterne for his friend, / But these affections, gravely to commend? (1014-15). In his comments on the first book of the Iliad Chapman also recalls Christ’s weeping, calling it “a president of great and most perfect humanitie.” Chapman departs from the Stoic and Epicurean condemnation of emotional pain. Rather than being a weakness or a disagreeable sensation, the ability to grieve is deeply humanizing.

Chapman challenges Stoic and Epicurean notions of a lofty, detached view of the errors of others. Such complacent viewers, Chapman argues, have their vision blinded by their own failings. In The Revenge of Bussy D’Ambois, Clermont constructs the “Senecall man” in a rather unSenecan fashion. Clermont’s ideal is capable of emotion which readily bends to mercy. Clermont praises “the flexibilitie of his most anger, / Even in the maine careere and fury of it, / When any object of desertfull pittie / Offers it selfe to him.” Clermont’s view of the necessity of anger and pity is implicitly contrasted with that of the less admirable Montsurr in Bussy D’Ambois. Montsurr has reason to be angry about the adultery of Bussy and Tamara, but his response makes him guilty of the very traits he claims to despise. After arranging Bussy’s murder, he exiles his wife, claiming “I must not yeeld to pity nor to love / So servile and so trayterous.” This condemnation of servile treachery is hypocritical
coming from a man who does not confront his enemy directly, but arranges for him to be lured into an ambush. Chapman argues that censuring judgment reveals the moral state of the judge rather than the judged.

In *Hero and Leander*, the less than compassionate Venus exemplifies the hypocrisy that may motivate overly severe moral judgments. Venus’s attendant Leucote cries out against the injustice of punishing Hero for sharing faults that the goddess commits on an even grander scale, “Why in your preist then call you that offence / That shines in you, and is your influence? (4.282-83). Venus is especially angry because she has been wounded in her pride. With Hero’s fall, Venus loses her chance to prove Diana wrong for mocking Venus for having no virgins among her followers (4.320-28). The narrator sums up, “Sin is asham’d of sin” (4.328).

The creation of the monster Eronusis is as much a reflection of the imperfection of her creator, Venus, as it is of Hero. Chapman argues that severe judges censure out of their own failings. The too distant view, the refusal to see oneself in others, obfuscates judgment as culpably as does pity.

Chapman argues that near-sighted pity and self-righteously distant censure are erring extremes that both have their roots in the delusions attendant upon narcissism. Ficino argues that Narcissus fails to recognize his true essence or virtue because he is too much immersed in sensual beauty. One the other hand, early modern readers also interpret narcissistic blindness as a failure to recognize one’s failings. In his preface to *The Alchemist*, Ben Jonson offers a similar caution to his reader, suggesting that Narcissus-like readers may be entertained by a depiction of their failings so long as they do not recognize them as their own:

> If there be any that will sit so nigh  
> Unto the stream, to look what it doth run,  
> They shall find things, they’d think or wish were done:  
> They are so natural follies, but so shown,  
> As even the doers may see, and yet not own.\(^{55}\)
With a pen that “did never aim to grieve, but better men,” Jonson ironically urges his readers not to be like Narcissus, but to recognize themselves clearly and thus be able to change. Chapman gives a similar account of the poet’s role in his “Hymnus in Noctem.” Poets reform their audiences by creating images in which they can recognize their failings. Ancient poets created “Centaurs, Harpies, Lapithes” so that their “almost savage” audience, “Seeing themselves in those Pierean founts, / Might mend their mindes” (137-38). With his tragedy, Chapman does intend to grieve readers in order that they may become better. He may urge his readers to react with pity to Hero and Leander, to see their own weaknesses in the mirror image that a sympathetic reading of the plight provides, and thus be able to reform.

Chapman argues that a poet’s role is to produce “grief that discharges conscience.” In the “Hymnus in Cynthia,” Chapman’s story of the terrified hunting dogs condemns the effects of blind terror and pity. However, in its companion poem, “Hymnus in Noctem,” Chapman longs for words that pierce and break hearts in order to lead his audience to virtue.

Let them break harts, as well as yeelding ayre,
That all mens bosoms (pierst with no affaires,
But gaine of riches) might be lanced wide,
And with the threates of vertue terrified” (25-28).

*Hero and Leander* depicts hearts pierced by such painful self-recognition. The piercing shower that accompanies Venus’ return to the heavens may embody her tears of chagrin. However, this piercing rain may also signify the goddess’ own painful moment of self-recognition and her change of heart. Without shedding some piercing tears of painful self-recognition, she may not return to the celestial sphere. At the start of the sixth sestiad (10-12), Venus has softened her heart enough to send Leucote to plead with the Fates to show mercy to Hero and Leander.
In *Hero and Leander*, being “pierst to the heart” often describes this kind of beneficial grief. Ceremony’s rebuke helps Leander to see his actions more clearly and to reform. When she disappears “leaving pierst Leander’s heart” (3.155), he immediately resolves on a plan to remedy his fault with a proper marriage.

Hero also undergoes a heart-piercing self-recognition. Although she justifies herself with sophistry and persists in dissimulation, still she knows that not even “wits subtilst art” can conceal her fall from Venus’ sharp eyes. This knowledge “was the point pierst Hero to the hart” (3.289-90). Knowledge of her own vulnerability moves Hero to a kind of mercy. She allows the marriage of Alcmane and Mya and treats them with great kindness.

That when her fault should chance t’abide the light,
Their loves might cover or extenuate it,
And high in her worst fate make pittie sit. (5.50-52).

Hero’s kindness is not exactly selfless, but her willingness to pardon others so that she might be forgiven herself is superior to hypocritical condemnation. As the overly pitying narrator shows, identification with the sufferer can warp judgment, but the ability to participate imaginatively and humbly in another’s feelings also leads to virtuous action. Lomazzo argues that compassionate identification incites humble charity: “It provokes a man to give, succour, and helpe with all humility without any pride or loftinesse.” Hero’s change of heart about the marriage of her associates suggests she has begun to develop this kind of humble compassion. Rather than insist on rigor, she transforms her sense of her own vulnerability into mercy. Her humble judgment on Myra and Alcmane may thus offer an example of what Chapman sees as an appropriate “judiciall perspective.”

Chapman’s erring narrator veers between extremes of excessive pity and censure. From an overly passionate perspective, he identifies too closely with the lovers.
to perceive their errors. His more censorious comments, on the other hand, also
demonstrate a moral blindness, an inability to recognize himself in those who err.
Chapman’s depiction of these erring extremes dislocates the reader from expected
points of view. It seems likely that Chapman would encourage the reader to locate
the virtuous mean between these extremes. However, Chapman may locate the
judicial perspective not so much at the expected mean between two undesirable
extremes as in a transformation of the first extreme. Chapman portrays the
narcissistic, sterile specularity of erotic attraction and injudicious pity transformed
into a redemptive kind of seeing oneself in others, which is exemplified in the rite of
the Eucharist.

In the fifth sestiad, Chapman returns to an elaboration of the theme of
Ceremony not only to reiterate its ability to regulate erotic attraction, but also
to provide a model for right pity. At the wedding of Alcmane and Mya, another
divine messenger, Teras, entertains the guests with the love story of Hymen and
Eucharis. The names of the couple signal that the story elaborates Chapman’s ideal
of ceremony, presented earlier in the poem. With this tale, Chapman illustrates
how specific rites of marriage and the communion confer grace onto otherwise rude
nature, how they sanction passion, and how ceremony binds communities. Where
the story of Hero and Leander begins with a tragically untimely consummation of
their love, the tale of Hymen and Eucharis gracefully twists through digressive delays
and trials before arriving at the marriage. A great deal of the story is then devoted
to the artful, graceful ceremony that sanctions their union, ranging from public
pageant that connects their marriage with universal ideals of concord to more private
“ceremonies of delight” (5.394) that underscore the pleasures of decorous delay.

The story not only reiterates that ceremony sanctions and civilizes raw desire,
but also suggests that ceremony provides a corrective perspective to the excesses
of passionate pity and cold censure. Eucharis, whose name means good charity or
good grace, specifically figures the commemoration of divine grace in the rite of communion. With the character of Eucharis, Chapman alludes to a rich conflation of notions of grace and compassion that represents a redemptive redirection of erring judgment, an “eucharistic perspective” that both embraces and redeems fallibility.

In one episode of the long, adventurous courtship of Hymen and Eucharis, Eucharis and her friends have been captured by pirates. Chapman describes Eucharis and her friends as grieving like mourners at a wake who take comfort in a bowl of wine. As the mourners drink, their tears fall into the bowl, and they share sorrow and consolation simultaneously:

>The golden boale drinks teares out of their eine,  
As they drinke wine from it; and round it goes,  
Each helping other to relieve their woes” (194-96).

Their ceremonial sharing of sorrow contrasts with Hero’s sad attempt to drown her secret sorrows with wine at the wedding of Alcmane and Mya. This open, communal sharing is healing.

Like the mourners, Eucharis and her friends share sorrow in a way that ultimately comforts them.

>So cast these virgins beauties mutuall raies,  
One lights another, face the face displaies;  
Lips by reflexion kist, and hand hand shooke,  
Even by the whitenes each of other tooke (194-200).

Chapman’s description of Eucharis and her friends creates a kind of emblematic image of the Graces, who stand in a circle, holding hands and sometimes exchanging glances. Generally, three Graces are depicted. The sixteenth-century mythographer, Vincenzo Cartari, however, gives examples of groupings of two and four graces, and there is precedent for variations that include more figures. Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s
twelfth-century depiction of good government in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena includes a large group of dancing women who symbolize harmony in general; their gestures and clasped hands may allude to the image of the Graces in particular. Such an allusion would be appropriate for the depiction of the benefits of good government as the Graces traditionally figure the spread of binding, civilizing affections between human beings.

Early modern iconology of the Graces derives from Seneca, who describes them as symbols for a continual cycle of giving and receiving benefits. Vincenzo Cartari’s _Le Immagini de i Dei de gli Antichi_, a probable source for Chapman, gives them an interpretation that ultimately derives from Seneca’s _De Beneficiis_. Cartari describes the Graces as emblems of the bonds that hold civilization together.

So the Graces keep human beings together, because the benefits which human beings do by turns for each other, are the reason that they are dear and gracious to each other, whence they are joined by the beautiful knot of friendship, without which no doubt humans would be much inferior to the other animals, and cities would become caves or rather not exist. [Così le Gratie tengono i mortali insieme raccolti, perché i beneficii, che à vicenda si fanno gli huomini l’un con l’altro, sono cagione, che l’uno all’altro è caro e grato, onde stanno congiunti insieme del bel nodo della amicitia; senza la quale non è dubbio alcuno che gli huomini sarebbono inferiori di gran lunga à gli altri animali, e le città diverrebono spelonche, anzi pure non sarebbono.]

As they clasp hands and mourn together, Eucharis and her companions form such a “beautiful knot of friendship.” These bonds remedy the tragedy and social disorder that the narrator laments earlier in the poem, “Ah, nothing doth the world with mischieve fill, / But want of feeling one anothers ill” (5.25-28). Chapman portrays misguided pity as dangerously delusional, but right compassion as the foundation of civilization.
Chapman heightens the notion of compassion symbolized by the Graces by emphasizing the exchanged gazes of Eucharis and her friends. Many depictions of the Graces depict them facing away from each other. A few images, like Botticelli’s and Aliciato’s depict two of the three gazing at each other. Chapman modifies the traditional images to draw attention to a gaze that seems to be shared among all the women. The language in his description not only draws attention to exchanged looks of pity, but also depicts these gazes as specular. The women’s “lips by reflexion kiss.” Doubling of “face” and “hand” in the phrases “face the face displaies” and “hand hand shooke” makes these phrases visual images of mirroring. The image of Eucharis and her friends thus presents a transformed version of Hero’s vain attempt to embrace the image of Leander, a redemptive version of frustrated narcissistic specularity. Narcissus wastes away longing for an unobtainable illusion. Hero falls victim to a sensual desire that starves the soul. Bonded by ties of compassion, sharing each other’s grief, Eucharis and her friends meet with sympathetic flesh when they reach out to their reflections. Rather than absorbing light into themselves, they reflect it onto each other. The “mutuall raies” that pass between them offer a model of sight and judgment that is beneficent. This model resembles, but transforms, Ficino’s construct of erotic passion.

Chapman here transforms the conventions of both Petrarchan love poetry and Neoplatonism. Like other sixteenth-century English poets, Chapman employs the Neoplatonic notion of ascending stages of love to portray the sublimation of Petrarchan passion into divine love. In addition, he alters this Neoplatonic ladder to encompass marriage and community. Chapman’s image of reflected light recalls a contemporary sonnet in Spenser’s Amoretti (1595), a series which charts the lover’s progress from the anguished self-absorption of Petrarchan passion into more companionate and spiritual kinds of love. In Sonnet 66, Spenser addresses a beloved, either a human lover or Christ, who inspires him with divine love. Spenser depicts
this divine love as a mutually illuminating reflection: “Yet since your light hath once enlumined me, / with my reflex yours shall increased be.” Like Spenser, Chapman appeals to the image of reflected light to redeem Petrarchism’s anguished, specular absorption in erotic passion.

Chapman’s image of light reflected and enhanced characterizes a beneficial infection that transforms the Neoplatonic notion of the contagion of erotic passion. The clasped hands of Eucharis’ friends spread a good contagion of compassion as opposed to a sensual, self-gratifying touch. They exchange a healing force rather than spiritous vapors that infect a viewer with romantic passion. They share the kind of grief that Chapman describes in *Euthymiae Raptus* as a “griefe of soule,” rather than a passion that comes from the corruptible blood or humors (184-89). The friends spread what the seventeenth-century writer Jean-François Senault defines as the “sanctified Contagion” of compassion. John Staines explains Senault’s sense of a holy contagion: “The grief of compassion is good and holy because, as it touches each person – in the root sense of contagion, contact – it spreads virtuous behavior. This contact spreads what is, in effect, a physiological disease, but it is as a ‘sanctified’ infection.” Senault’s mid-seventeenth-century notion of a contagion of compassion aptly reflects sixteenth-century conceptions of the Eucharist that are congenial to Chapman. “The Homilie of the Worthie Receiving and Reverend Esteeming of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ” describes the Eucharist as a vehicle of sacred contagion, claiming that this sacrament sets in motion “the large spreading abroad of brotherly kindnesse with many other sundry graces of God.” Chapman evokes this rite with Eucharis’s name and the parallel to the vigil keepers who share a bowl of wine. Clasping hands and interlocking sympathetic gazes, Eucharis and her friends spread a beneficial contagion of kindness and grace throughout their group.

For Chapman, the rite of the Eucharist not only represents the transformation of narcissistic attachment into altruism, but also teaches compassion as it
The Eucharist reminds participants that they are all dependent on a love that forgives and redeems their failings. This indebtedness requires that they forgive each other. Spenser depicts this recognition as one of the steps of the soul’s ascent from earthly to divine love. In “Heavenly Love,” Spenser argues that Christ’s charity for imperfect human beings is a model of how we should love one another.

Shewing us mercie miserable crew,
That we the like shoulde to the wretches shew,
And love our brethren; thereby to approve,
How much himselfe that loved us, we love.66

The notion of divine love shared by Spenser and Chapman promotes compassion rather than censure.

As a commemoration of the Lord’s supper, the Eucharist recalls the saving grace made possible by Christ’s loving sacrifice for humanity and reminds participants that they owe such charitable forgiveness to each other. For Richard Hooker, the sacraments link recollection of Christ’s goodness with incitement to charity; these rites “serve as bonds of obedience to God, strict obligations to the mutual exercise of Christian charity, provocations to godliness, preservations from sin, memorials of the principal benefits of Christ.”67 Reminded of the saving grace of Christ, partakers of the Eucharist are urged to be merciful themselves. The Elizabethan homily on “The Worthie Receiving and Reverend Esteeming of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ” calls for mutual compassion, rebuking the hard-hearted: “It is a table of pitie, and thou art unmercifull.”68 The Eucharist thus represents not only the transformation of erotic passion and erring pity into charity, but also a reformation of overly harsh censure.

From the perspective afforded by the Eucharist, viewers achieve a way of judging others that transcends the erring extremes of pity and censure. The rite
directs affections away from erotic attachment. In *Hero and Leander*, the Eucharist represents the redemption of the sterile specularity of erotic passion. The Eucharist also chastens detachment; the viewer sees his or her own frailty in others. Compassion arises from this sense of mutual frailty and dependence on grace. The rite of the Eucharist symbolizes the same kind of self-recognition that Chapman hopes good poets will be able to promote. Like the rite of communion, poetry leads its participants to see themselves in a true mirror, and thus to reform themselves and develop civilizing compassion for others.

In *Hero and Leander* Chapman presents a vulnerable narrator who first identifies too closely with the lovers, falling prey to a kind of pity that is much like their own erotic delusion. He then guiltily condemns them from too great a distance. Chapman's erring narrator thus gives readers an anamorphic image that appears distorted both from the badly located perspectives of excessive pity and overly harsh censure. Chapman frames the tragedy with this erring viewpoint to dislocate readers from expected or comfortable stances of judgment. He also, however, argues the vulnerability of all judgments including his own. Chapman's erring narrator is something of a mirror for himself, the creator who sits in imperfect judgment on his characters. Chapman invites readers to look into the glass of the poem, to recognize their own frailty as erring, guilty judges. Chapman argues that the best possible human judgment begins in this recognition of imperfection. Rather than exhort his readers to cool judgment, Chapman hopes to infect them with the holy contagion of compassion.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., 37.

6. Ibid., 50.


11. Ibid., 1.17.


15. Gordon, 106.


17. Lomazzo, 5.199.

18. Ibid., 5.200.


30. It is hard to determine whether Chapman would have read Alberti’s works, which were available, though rare, in sixteenth-century England. Alberti’s work *On Painting* was available in England, owned by John Dee and Inigo Jones, and perhaps cited by Sidney. See Gent 26, 68, 72, 80.


33. Mary Pardo discussed this idea in her graduate seminar on Alberti, Spring 2004. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She also mentions this idea in her dissertation, “Paolo Pino’s Dialogo di Pittura: A Translation with Commentary” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1984): “Alberti’s own very beautiful comparison of the painter to Narcissus had underscored the reciprocity of subject and object implicit in the one-point perspective” (183).


35. Ibid., 98 (section 83).


37. Ficino, 159-61.

38. Ibid., 164-65.

39. Lomazzo, 2.45.

40. Snare, 95-96.


44. Ibid., 371-73.


47. Snare, 98. See also Huntington, “Aphorism,” 107-08.


50. Ibid., 9.469-70.


52. Ibid., page 19.


54. Ibid., 5.4.187-88.


56. Lomazzo, 2.45.


58. Cartari, 559-61.


61. D. J. Gordon argues that Vincenzo’s Cartari’s *Le Imagini* is the source for Chapman’s images of the four winds and of Venus’s dove-drawn chariot and his inspiration for Eronusis (104-05).


64. John Staines, “Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and King Charles,” in *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion,* ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvannia Press, 2004), 100. I quote Senault as cited by Staines. Senault’s work on the passions is orginally published as *Le usage des passions* in 1641 and translated into English by Henry Carey as *The Use of the Passions* (London 1649). Staines argues that Protestants come to be uncomfortable with a “visceral notion of compassion” (100); however, Senault’s notion of compassion as a contagion passed through a kind of touch does seem to be an apt description of some English Protestant conceptions of the Eucharist.


68. *Certaine Homilies*, 204.
Conclusion

In his “Of the Progress of the Soul: The Second Anniversary,” John Donne describes judgment as ideally clear and unfettered once the soul leaves the body and achieves a heavenly perspective:

Thou shalt not peep through lattices of eyes,
Nor hear through labyrinths of ears, nor learn
By circuit, or collections to discern.
In heaven thou straight know’st all.¹

The authors considered in this dissertation – Samuel Daniel, Robert Dallington, and George Chapman – aspire to such an ideal clarity of vision, but acknowledge that mortal minds inevitably do have to approach truth “by circuit.” Their works negotiate winding paths that run through variable circumstances, or they wrestle with adjusting to the distortions inflicted by the lenses of the senses, passions, or local customs. Daniel argues that custom may smother natural judgment, but advocates adherence to it as the clearest, most decorous course for fallible judgment. Dallington takes the circuitous path of romance as the most fitting way to teach how prudence accommodates to variable circumstance. Chapman argues that moral judgments must be made from a recognition of universal fallibility.

While these authors argue that judgment provides imperfect knowledge, they do find some grounds of stability. Dallington’s collection of precepts and historical vignettes offers an array of possible responses to variable circumstance. This approach promotes a flexibility that exceeds the strictures of precept. However,
Dallington puts stabilizing boundaries on this flexibility. Some stable principles, keeping one’s word and setting public good first, are repeated and reinforced throughout his various collection. Daniel and Chapman both find theologically and aesthetically convincing ways of coping with the frailties of judgment. They both see judgment as a loose, imperfect knowledge that takes a kind of authority from a potent, if elusive, sense of grace and beauty. Daniel advocates the observance of custom as decorous. His notion of judgment is derived from traditions that see decorum – social, aesthetic, and moral – as the effort to recreate or observe cosmic harmonies. Observance of decorum does not grant absolute certainty, but it does confer a kind of graceful rightness. Daniel associates the decorous grace of custom with a divine grace that supplements the weakness of human judgment. Chapman also sees fallible human judgment as having some kind of foundation in grace. His *Hero and Leander* argues that moral judgment is inevitably tinted by the lenses of the senses and passions. Thus, the most appropriate moral judgment is embodied in the Eucharist, the rite that commemorates the redemption of human weakness by divine grace. Chapman complicates access to divine grace, suggesting that the attractions of sensual beauty can lead judgment astray. However, he also argues that sustaining divine grace is embodied in the tangible beauties of ritual. His allusion to the Graces connects aesthetic and moral beauty in a powerful image.

While these authors do strive for stability, they also find consolations in variety. Variable circumstances challenge fixed precepts, and varying customs may obscure a clear sense of what is authentic. However, variety also inspires these authors with a sense of wonder and exhilaration. Daniel sees variety as offering multiple expressions of a common good. In his “Defense of Ryme,” Daniel argues that “this manifold creature man, wheresoever hee stand in the world, hath alwayes some disposition of worth.” Daniel’s sense of the worth of diverse customs not only defends traditional English custom, but it also inspires his receptiveness to Continental culture.
Dallington’s *Aphorismes* present a variety of genres, languages, and opinions. This multiple and sometimes contradictory collection offers no easy route to always doing well. However, this multi-faceted work presents variety not only as a challenge, but also as an opportunity. The work argues that useful knowledge is available in an wonderfully wide array of sources. Dallington urges his readers to their own explorations.

The works of Dallington, and Chapman present the reader with unresolved wrestlings that reflect the difficulties of judgment. They author open works that reflect their understanding of judgment as an imperfect knowledge, always in process. They not only portray their own struggles, but they also build indeterminacy into their works in order to give their readers a chance to develop judgment and to make their own choices. Daniel’s readers have a more clear perspective than the characters of his drama; Daniel points out the drama’s insidious villains from the beginning of the play. However Daniel does not clarify all aspects of the issues of judgment with which the play deals. He suggests that even the wise elders of Arcadia have limited judgment. He leaves it to the readers to come to their own conclusions about the wisdom of isolation and the paradox of conforming to imperfect custom. Dallington’s *Aphorismes* differ from most other contemporary collections of wisdom. Instead of organizing aphorisms for ready apprehension and handy use, Dallington sets his readers on an *Odyssey*. Readers develop their own prudence as they encounter multiple, varying circumstances. In *Hero and Leander*, Chapman presents readers with a variable, unreliable narrator rather than a clear moral judgment. The imperfections of the narrator’s judgment lead readers to examine the problem of judgment itself and to shift stances in order to make sense of the anamorphic image the poem presents.

Daniel, Dallington, and Chapman see judgment as a loose and imperfect kind of knowledge at work in a realm of constant change and variety. This realm provides a
realm for decision-making that is both exciting and precarious. These authors leave their works open to allow their readers to make choices and to develop judgment. This openness also mirrors their sense of their own imperfect judgment, their sense that all knowledge is mediated by senses, passions, and customs. Still, while they argue that judgment is inevitably mediated and imperfect, these authors do find sustaining foundations for imperfect knowledge in divine grace and in charitable community.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


Certaine Sermons or Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches in the Time of Queen
Mary Ellen Rickey and Thomas B. Stroup. Gainesville: Scholars Facsimilies and
Reprints, 1968.


———. The Poems of George Chapman. Edited by Phyllis Brooks Bartlett. New York:


Cicero. Orator. Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge,

———. De officiis. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge,

Cinzio, Giovambattista Giraldi. Discorso dei Romanzi. Edited by L. Benedetti, G.

Civill Considerations Upon Many and Sundrie Histories, As Well Ancient As Moderne,
And principallie upon those of Guicciardin. Containing Sundry Rules and Precepts
For Princes, Common-wealths, Captaines, Coronels, Ambassadours, and others,
Agents, and servants of Princes, with sundry advertisements and counsels concerning
a civill life, gathered out of the examples of the greatest Princes and Common-wealths
in Christendome. Handle After The Manner Of A discourse, by the Lord Remy of
Florence, and done into French by Gabriel Chappuys, Tourangeau, and out of French into
English by W.T. At London. Imprinted by F. K. for Matthew Lownes, and are to be
sold at his shope under S. Dunstons Church in the West. 1601.


Hichcock, Robert, trans. and ed. The Quintessence of Wit being A corrant comfort of conceites, Maximes, and poleticke devises, selected and gathered by Francisco Sansovino. Wherin is set forth sundrye excellent and wise sentences, worthy to be regarded and followed. Translated out of the Italian tung, and put into English for the benefit of all those that please to read and understand the works and worth of a worthy writer. At London. Printed by Edward Allde, dwelling without Cripple-gate at the signe of the gilded Cuppe, 1590.


Two Discourses of Master Frances Guicciardin, which are wanting in the thirde and fourthe Bookes of his Historie, in all the Italian, Latin, and French Coppies heretofore imprinted; Which for the worthinesse of the matter they containe were published in those three Languages at Basile in 1561. And are now for the same cause done into English. Printed at London for William Ponsonbie 1595.


Secondary Sources


———.“Moral and Political Philosophy: Readings of Lucretius from Virgil to Voltaire.” Forthcoming.


Crinò, Anna Maria. Fatti e Figure del Seicento Anglo-Toscano. Firenze: Leo S. Olski, 1957.


