CONTEMPORARY POLISH SECURITY POLICY: ARE NATO BENEFITS AT RISK?

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ABSTRACT

NICHOLAS CONSTANTINE KANIOS
Contemporary Polish Security Policy: Are NATO Benefits at Risk?
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Jenkins)

What the future holds for Poland’s reliance on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unknown. As the war in Afghanistan dwindles down, NATO’s members look forward to bringing home their troops and to reducing further their military budgets. A military capability gap on both sides of the Atlantic is Poland’s primary concern, even if the US narrows this gap with its presence in Europe. As a result, Poland’s security concerns resurfaced when America announced a strategic shift from Europe towards Asia in January 2012. America has pledged to continue its NATO commitments as a reassurance to European security. The Polish political elite, however, is skeptical about NATO’s future ability to provide security to Poland’s territory.

This paper addresses whether a shift in US military strategy towards Asia and Europe’s declining military budgets pose a threat to Poland’s security apparatus. The author argues that, in spite of concerns from either sides of the Atlantic, an American strategic refocus toward the Asian-Pacific will not threaten Poland’s security.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION

In January 2012, the US Obama Administration made an announcement that its security strategy was pivoting towards Asia. America’s refocusing its security interests toward the Pacific from the Atlantic, coupled with the administration’s announcement that Europe was no longer in danger, caused anxiety not only in Europe, but also in America as well. As a new and proactive member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Poland has been advocating for a stronger Alliance; rather, it has pushed for a European commitment to collective security, worried that US forces will eventually depart from Europe.

What has Poland’s political elite gained by becoming a member of NATO? One can view Poland’s accession to NATO as a prerequisite for entering the European Union (EU), which it accomplished in 2004. Most importantly, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, signed April 4, 1949, Poland receives a security guarantee from NATO to defend Polish territory. As a member of the Alliance, Poland minimizes its security concerns and plays a major role in shaping NATO’s defense policy. The credibility of the alliance is currently in question, as national defense budgets continue to decline and military capabilities are slowly diminishing. The fundamental issues in Polish security have been associated with NATO’s stance on European security. One source of disappointment for Poland was the outcome of

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1 For more details on Article 5, see What is Article 5? Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm
the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) that NATO held during the Chicago Summit on May 2012: differences of opinion among the Alliance members about the need to retain a US nuclear weapon arsenal in Europe divided the Organization.\(^2\) Another disappointment for Poland is the neglect of conventional military capabilities by NATO members – with the exclusion of the US and France – which continues to widen the gap in transatlantic relations. The last major issue involves concerns about technology transfers through the acquisition business from NATO countries to non-NATO countries.\(^3\) Overall, a grave concern for the Polish elite stems from the perceived lack of interest or political and military will of the Alliance – the diminishing commitments to European security – that Poland foresees as jeopardizing its own security strategy.

The main objective of my thesis is to analyze whether future changes to NATO pose a threat to Poland’s security apparatus. Is the on-going debate about the decrease in NATO commitments from its members a legitimate concern to the Polish security? This question gets at the greater ability of NATO to fulfill its collective security guarantees in the face of declining military budgets and as the United States shifts its military focus to the Pacific.

This topic provides a lens through which to investigate whether Poland’s security is really at risk as the Alliance struggles financially to maintain its obligations. In answering this question, my thesis argues that Polish concerns about a diminishing NATO commitment from its members are nonetheless warranted, but realistically such concerns do not diminish military capabilities that NATO provides for Poland’s security. In order to answer this question, my thesis argues that although there is a differentiation in NATO commitments


\(^3\) Ibid., 739
between members of the Alliance, realistically such differentiation does not diminish military capabilities that NATO provides for Poland’s security.

Even in the face of continuing European defense cuts, America demonstrates a commitment to European defense by providing specific military capabilities that are vital to realizing both NATO and Poland’s security objectives. For instance, the threat of a ballistic missile (long or medium-range) attack on Poland’s territory is eliminated by a US missile shield capability. The United States also supports NATO’s 2010 strategic concept, a renewal of a 1999 document which focused on issues from missile defense to terrorism to cyber warfare, and that also included a pledge between the Alliance members to support the war in Afghanistan. The US can even supplement conventional military ground operations, or “boots on the ground,” by deploying its troops in Europe. At the core, the transatlantic security architecture, or the ability of NATO to provide global security, is an asset that neither America nor its European allies would want to give up.

In spite of this commitment, however, defense budget cuts are affecting European armies by diminishing their distinct military capabilities. A large number of Europe’s medium-sized states are cutting their defense budgets by anywhere from 10 to 15 percent. As a result of these defense budget cuts and shortfalls in military capabilities, these countries will no longer support NATO’s current strategic concept. It has been more than a decade since NATO members discussed the idea of “pooling and sharing” their resources in order to save money, but the alliance members feel uneasy about entrusting their state sovereignty to one another.

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4 O’Donnell, Marina C. et al. (2012). Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO’s largest members. 30; 5. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings. 29; 4
My thesis examines the framework of Polish defense strategy in relation to NATO-Polish objectives briefly from the interwar period through the end of the Cold War, and then up until the present. It takes into account economic and political developments that affect the defense industry and the interplay between domestic party politics, as these variables certainly influence Poland’s security policy. However, the main purpose of this thesis, however, is not to focus on such variables, but; rather, I seek to analyze the premise of Polish security policy in relation to NATO.

I conclude that Poland’s political elite, or individuals of authority who take part in national decisions, has no choice but to continue to defend its official position on the future challenges that NATO security faces. In order to ensure congruity between Poland’s security policy and Polish security strategy, the country’s leaders will continue to push for a tighter, more cooperative agenda to combat the effects of ongoing European defense cuts. From this perspective, Poland’s political elite cannot afford to disregard the soft and hard power (diplomacy and military force) it receives from the US-NATO relationship; indeed, absent such a relationship, Poland would become insignificant in world affairs, and there is too much at stake for Poland’s security policy. Poland’s sacrifices for the war on terror – referred by the US Obama administration as the “Overseas Contingency Operations” - have been immense. Poland bears a much greater combat burden than other members of the Alliance. Poland might be, in this sense, working too hard for the NATO membership benefits common to all members without receiving a voice (i.e. political influence) equal in power to that of more established members.

There are political, military, and economic benefits for Poland that make it worth preserving the foundations of a strong NATO Alliance. First, Poland will be able to
minimize its national security concerns and play a major role in shaping NATO’s defense policy. Second, Poland has already benefited and continues to benefit from modernizing, training, and transforming its military into a NATO-interoperable military force. Third, as a member of the Alliance, the shared costs of collective security are less than 0.5 percent of each member’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) defense expenditures. Hence, the benefits of NATO membership outweigh the costs that are incurred by the European national defense budgets. Further, even small collaborations between regional alliances that constitute the second pillar of Poland’s security policy, or the pursuit of a comprehensive Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with the aim to replace NATO would not be realistic unless America’s allies had similar military capabilities.

This thesis analyzes one segment of Polish security, particularly the element of defense security, or the security of a state’s territory and sovereignty, in Poland’s contemporary national security policy. It focuses on NATO as the main actor providing a security guarantee for Poland, and confirms that, even amidst ongoing public debate over the diminishing military capabilities of European states (in relation to European security and the world economic crisis), Poland’s security will not be in jeopardy as long as United States continues to be a member of the alliance.

This thesis begins by examining critical junctures in Poland’s security policy transition from the interwar period until present. It investigates costs and benefits associated with Poland’s membership in NATO and concludes with an in-depth analysis of current changes in NATO as critical to the establishment of Poland’s contemporary security policy. The scope of this thesis does not include examining either the role of Poland in regional

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alliances or Europe’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). To expand my study in this way would detract from my focus on answering questions about future challenges for NATO.

This paper uses primary and secondary sources from the Internet and printed reference material to substantiate its conclusions. I found these works by reviewing published books, journals, magazines, government documents, reports, newspapers, and encyclopedias from the 1970s to today in an effort to explore my central question using a comprehensive approach. My argument relies upon multiple American, Polish, and European perspectives; these different lenses provide a broad window onto the Polish-NATO security relationship.

For clarity purposes, the nouns ‘collective security’, ‘multilateralism’, and ‘regionalism’ require definitions. First, collective security in the context of military alliances (such as NATO) is when more than one state actor is involved in a military alliance for the purpose of protecting or repelling a third. In practical terms, collective security is central to

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6 I have looked at American and European think tanks to assess security and foreign policy. I searched on academic/research institutions like the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PPC) of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, the National Defense University, the US Army War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the George C. Marshall Institute. I have followed events and read primary sources in the news media like Reuters, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Warsaw Business Journal and the Warsaw Voice newspaper, public access information from Polish government websites, the US State Department, the Associated Press, NATO Source, Atlantic Council, Foreign Policy Association, and Foreign Affairs. I gained a lot of insight from European and American institutes on security like the Polish Institute for Strategic Studies, the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the American Brookings Institute, STRATFOR, Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Strategic Forecasting Inc (STRATFOR). I accessed library printed material from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, contacted Poland’s National Security Bureau and the US Embassy in Warsaw requesting information on developing events in Polish security. See Works Cited

7 Collective defense is a union of states that on the basis of treaties create an organization for the purpose of defending the members of the organization. It is emphasized that ‘collective security’ falls under the category of international relations and it should not be confused with ‘military alliances’ that have an objective in defending members of the alliance (such as NATO). See: de Wet, Erika, Wood, Michael. (2010). Collective Security, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
the mission of NATO, which is also referred to as the Alliance. *Multilateralism* is “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through *ad hoc* arrangements or by means of institutions.” Multilateralism can also be used to mean multilateral defense initiatives or a state seeking a defense relationship with another or others. Third, *regionalism*, in the context of security, alludes to those states with “a common sense of identity and purpose … that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region.” In literal terms, *regionalism* is used to indicate specific geographical regions; however, the word *regionalism* is not often utilized in a security context. In this paper, the phrase “regional defense cooperation” will be used instead of *regionalism*, as it is more appropriate to military affairs. Finally, the concept of security also demands a specific explanation, as there are many understandings of the contemporary security environment. As these terms are used interchangeably, the concept of security requires close analysis, since security is defined differently throughout the literature.

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8 A multilateral arrangement in a global sense refers to NATO, while a ‘regional military cooperation’ is used interchangeably with a ‘multilateral defense cooperation’ or a ‘multilateral military cooperation’. See Keohane, Robert O. (1990). “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research.” *International Journal*, 45:731

9 ‘Regionalization’ in reference to the ‘New Regionalization Approach’ actually refers to the economic and human development in a particular geographic region. However, regionalization differs in that it relies on observation in the improvement of relations (cooperation) and regional unity of states in a geographical region. See Fawcett, Louise. (1996). "Regionalism in Historical Perspective". *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Oxford University Press
CHAPTER II:
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY

The question of what defines the term security is in the eye of the beholder, as the concept encompasses an array of issues and concerns. Because security strategy reflects states’ interests, it is very difficult to settle upon a universal definition. Nonetheless, security can be described as an arrangement of conditions relating to national security issues with realistic aims and a clear path leading to policy making.\(^\text{10}\) The question remains, however: can threats to security be assessed in simple terms of descriptions, compositions, and methods?

The concept of security can be explained accurately in comprehensive terms using a predictable theoretical framework.\(^\text{11}\) Scholars who study security theory – mainly international relations theorists - say that security should be based a synthesis of theory and experience, i.e. personal security is tied to state and global security. They also maintain that as an assessment tool to define its security objectives, a state should identify what capabilities it has or does not have, that prevent it from deterring a new threat.\(^\text{12}\)

There is another perspective, however, which eliminates completely our ability to define security. Security is hard to define as a concept, since in meaning it constantly changes in relation to new threats. Hence, as a field of study security has been neglected in


\(^{11}\) Ibid., 7

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 7-8
the past. David A. Baldwin, a political scientist, argues that one cannot rely on a definition of security as a neglected concept in designing our own theory of security.\textsuperscript{13} Per his interpretation of a “neglected” concept, security is characterized as a complicated theory that is frequently abandoned by field experts. It is a combination of power and security one that is challenged by a fast-paced technology and policy.\textsuperscript{14} Emma Rothschild, a British economic historian, makes her own attempt to parse the concept of security within the realm of academia. Rothschild refers to Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968), an international relations expert, who argued that the basic definition of security is nonexistent threats to obtained values.\textsuperscript{15}

Baldwin considers another important question for security, which would be one to answer when considering security strategy in the early stages of analysis or calculation. He views identifying the beneficiary of security as important in determining realistic security goals. What constitutes adequate security?\textsuperscript{16} Even if this important question has an answer, the assessment of how to address a given threat differs. Baldwin’s insight on security theory illustrates the systemic problems in the field of security studies. We can conclude, however, that concept of security has evolved beyond perceived threats to state sovereignty or to human security. It now includes also other forms of threats that security providers themselves can identify.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 10
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 8-9
\textsuperscript{15} In this article, Rothschild begins its article with examples of security corresponding to significant time periods in history; the latest time-period of significance in defining national security were the 1990’s after the Cold War as human rights became the liberal urge for freedom in the former Warsaw Pact members. She also illustrates how other scholars view security as a contested topic have often failed to define security conceptually, since they rely on empirical evidence of policymakers to support their claims. See: Rothschild, Emma. (1995). “What is Security?” \textit{Daedalus},124(3):53–98
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 13,15, & 26
The security environment is a place where states compete against each other for self-interest. Kenneth Waltz, a political scientist, states that, “In anarchy, security is the highest end…. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.” An earlier concept of security gives the meaning of security a choice, either one has it or not. The concept of security is simplified in this quote from General Jacob L. Devers: “National security is a condition which cannot be qualified…. We shall either be secure, or we shall be insecure…. We cannot have partial security…. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.” Hence, security can be described as a condition where human beings or states have either reached their goal to deter a specified threat and safeguard their interests or not. Since the security environment is also dynamic, the degree to which the state and human interests are safeguarded also has to be measured.

With regard to Poland, security involves the protection of Polish territory and sovereignty by internal and external means, is. Internally, security is characterized as a “lack of threats, a nation’s ability to save its own values from the outer threats, and as a measurement of the chance of survival and development of the state, society, and citizens.” An example of internal security is the utilization of Poland’s state agencies like the Internal Security Agency (the Polish version of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation) to identify and deter threats that jeopardize the functionality of the state. Externally, security hinges

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18 Ibid.,14
20 In close cooperation with Poland’s national defense forces and other agencies, the Internal Security Agency in many respects mirror the purpose of its American FBI counterpart. See the Internal Security Agency (Poland) on line. Retrieved from http://www.abw.gov.pl/portal/en/17/14/Our_Mission.html
on Poland’s alliances. According to the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities for 2012-2016 (an official State document), one of Poland’s security objectives is “to keep our influence on the evolution of NATO and the EU.” The authors view “the preservation of the potential of these structures,” as “a condition of the effective implementation of the Polish security policy.”

Poland’s external security is also complimented by regional defense cooperation with its neighboring states. Indeed, the State’s ability to safeguard its people and sovereignty has been a predominant issue in Polish foreign policy since Poland’s declaration of independence in 1918.

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CHAPTER III:

ORIGINS OF A POLISH SECURITY CULTURE

According to experts on Polish security, the creation of a “security culture” traces its origins to the Interwar period (1918-39), a time of identity crisis and the solidification of two opposing political camps. These two camps, participants in the “Piłsudski/Dmowski debate,” continue to influence Polish politics, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. Though both camps related to issues of Polish nationalism differently, the divide nevertheless marked a new beginning in Polish politics.

Józef Klemens Piłsudski, the General and the first Chief of State of Poland, had a profound influence on the framework of Poland’s security. Piłsudski’s early political life as an activist and his military leadership not only brought him fame among the Poles, but also enabled him to be the first candidate to lead the Polish Republic. One defining quality of the Piłsudski camp is its characterization of Polish idealism: the state is perceived as a sanctified entity that should deny and fight its enemies. Piłsudski himself supported Poland’s


23 Piłsudski formed the Polish Legions that were vital for Poland’s security and defense as a new Republic. As a young activist, Piłsudski lead the Socialist Party in the former Russian territory of Poland and created paramilitary groups to support the Polish nationalist cause against Russia. He also created a secret military organization called the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa. Afterwards, he became head of the Polish Socialist Party in Poland. See Holzer, Jerzy. (1977). The Political Right in Poland, 1918-39, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 3, Sage Publications, Ltd:8,395-412;401
eastern neighbors in their fight for independence.\textsuperscript{24} As a result of Piłsudski’s service as political head of the Polish Socialist Party and military alliances against the former Polish occupiers, he became a hero to a nationalist cause.\textsuperscript{25}

The second camp, known at the “realist” camp, was founded on Dmowski’s views, which were quite different from Piłsudski’s. Dmowski was a politician and co-founder of the right wing National Democracy party. Dmowski disagreed with Piłsudski’s advocacy for multi-ethnicity and preferred a mono-ethnic state in which the minority would conform to Polish identity.\textsuperscript{26} On the topic of foreign affairs, Dmowski also opposed the idea of “extending an arm” in foreign policy; rather, he believed that relations with Russia were more favorable to Poland’s security than relations with Germany.

The events that followed the German invasion of Poland in WWII also played a role in shaping Poland’s security culture. Poland’s inability to halt its enemies and the unwillingness of its Western allies to assist with military force served as a credibility test for Polish security policy. In three instances, Poland failed to provide for the security of its people and protect its state sovereignty: in the first instance, the Polish armed forces and the Warsaw Uprising did not defeat their enemies, while in the second instance, the pacification policy of the United Kingdom and France made Poles suspicious of their European alliances. In the third instance, reliance on the West after the end of the war became resulted in great

\textsuperscript{24} Piłsudski also believed in a poly-ethnic Polish state and the emphasis on foreign affairs to protect Poland’s sovereignty. Poland’s foreign affairs were backed by its military capabilities in pursuit of expanding its territories with Ukraine and Lithuania (the territory of Vilnius), and in resisting defeat from the Bolshevik movement of Russia. Piłsudski realized that a Polish geostrategic influence would only strengthen his position among his larger rivals, Germany and Russia. Hence, a federation with Ukraine and Belorussia would provide Piłsudski with a resistance against Russian ambitions. Ibid., 5-9


\textsuperscript{26} Longhurst, Kerry Anne and Marcin Zabarowski. (2007). The new Atlanticist : Poland's foreign and security priorities. London: Chatham House; Oxford: Blackwell, 113;2-10
Polish disappointment following a devastated land with an immense death toll resulting from the Annexation of Poland by Russia and the provisions in the Yalta agreement relinquishing Poland to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{27} Because these events shaped Poland’s security culture, a short examination of Interwar Poland and beyond will clarify the Polish view on security when assessing threat.

\textbf{The Interwar Period (1918-39)}

An examination of Poland’s security history from the interwar period until the present reveals that Poland’s allies have repeatedly ignored the country’s security concerns and/or made hollow collective security agreements. Historically, Poland’s state sovereignty has been subjugated to other powers’ interests. Prior to World War I (WWI), Poland was dominated for more than a century by three major powers: Habsburg Austria, the Kingdom of Prussia Germany, and the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{28} In WWII, Poland was as a military battleground between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, where it functioned as a German military industrial complex and a location for German extermination camps.\textsuperscript{29} The Polish civilian population and its military forces were nearly eradicated in WWII, and its communist takeover by Soviet troops did not help rebuild a Polish state that had just begun to enjoy its sovereignty during the interwar period (1918-39).

The role of the Second Republic in WWII continues to be an important influence on Polish security culture. A territorial security guarantee was urgently sought by Ignace Jan Paderewski, Poland's first post-war prime minister. In an official statement addressed to the

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 11-2


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.,ix-x,x
League of Nations on September 18, 1919 he wrote: “Standing, as we are, between Germany on one side and Russia on the other, we cannot hope to maintain our integrity during these years, while we build up the strength of our people, unless we have the protection of the League.” Paderewski’s security concerns were genuine, but his efforts failed to convince the League of Nations.

The idea that a central authority on the world stage could direct individual-state affairs seemed unrealistic, the governments of the League suspected. As head of the government and the military of Poland, Piłsudski believed that future military conflict was inevitable. The perceived threat of military attack by Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, along with distrust in the League of Nations’ commitment to provide collective security for its members concerned the Polish leadership. Hence, Poland’s security depended on its bilateral military alliances (in this case with France), and Polish diplomats had to act cautiously when conducting foreign diplomacy with the Soviet Union and Germany. Such alliances and tactful diplomacy, however, did not prevent the outbreak of the war.

As a young republic, Poland could not impress upon its Western allies the urgency of collective security, nor did it have the ability to shift the balance of power in Europe. Despite Piłsudski’s military achievements when confronting the Russians, the Polish political leadership realized the limitations of its foreign policy when interacting with the United States and its stronger European allies. Even though France served as a guarantor for Poland’s sovereignty, Poland’s inability to join the alliance of Little Entente (France’s

30 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp

31 Piłsudski’s concerns for Poland encountering a future conflict with its neighbors was reflected in Ignace Paderewski’s (Poland's delegate to the League of Nations) official statement to the League of Nations and should have been acknowledged as a warning sign to its members. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Paderewski stated to the League that, “The pressure is upon us on all sides through military action and through Bolshevik propagand and an intense propaganda from Germany…. I fear for the safety of our [Polish] democracy.” See http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/poland_paderewski2.htm
alliance with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in response to Hungarian ambitions to restore the Habsburg Monarchy) was due partly to Czechoslovakia’s distrust of Poland’s desire for more territory.  

Piłsudski’s plans for dismembering the Russian empire and backing Ukrainian and Lithuanian independence ran contrary to US foreign policy towards Russia. President Woodrow Wilson believed that the United States had a moral commitment to protect Russian territory; in this regard, Poland’s conflict with Russia was not in concert with US Policy. The Bolshevik revolution was not a threat to Wilson, since self-determination was the foundation of his political philosophy. He believed that a territorially intact Russia could be beneficial to the United States. Piłsudski thought otherwise, as he had personally experienced the Polish national struggle in his partitioned homeland that once belonged to the Russian empire; he saw instead an opportunity to fight against the Bolsheviks and neutralize the Russian threat.

The cumulative result of these events is that Poland has many reasons not to rely fully on International Organizations (IOs) for its security needs. In terms established by the balance of power principle Poland was placed in a no-win situation, and the league could not fulfill its collective security purpose. Articles X and XI of the League of Nations covenant stipulate that members were “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League” and that in the case of “any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the


Members of the League or not … the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”

The reality was that the concept of collective security was ambiguously defined in the League of Nations covenant (containing 26 articles). Although the covenant was drafted by the US President, even Congress did not want America to become a member of the League. The failure of the League of Nations to provide collective security for Poland highlights the weaknesses of collective security organizations.

**Poland and the Warsaw Pact**

Throughout the Cold War, Poland’s security was primarily in the hands of the Soviet leadership. Prospects for regaining an independent security policy for the new communist government in Warsaw were not too promising, and agreements between the Western Alliance and the Communist Bloc were not carried out as indicated. Although the 1945 Yalta agreement assured U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill that Poland would be granted a freer and more democratic government by General Secretary Joseph Stalin, the opposite occurred. Soviet control of elections forced Poland to turn into a communist state, while Soviet troops committed atrocities against Polish citizens and soldiers alike. As a result of Poland’s integration into the Soviet Bloc, Poland found itself on the “other side” of the Iron Curtain with no agency on the international stage to dictate its own state affairs.

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34 Ibid.

A Subordinate Warsaw Pact Strategy and Policy

The redrawing of Poland’s borders in favor of the Soviet Union as detailed in the Yalta agreement effectively enforced the surrender of Poland’s sovereignty to Stalin’s own security ambitions. The German question, resolved by the apportionment of Germany into zones of occupation, complicated Poland’s position. Poland, together with East Germany, acted as a buffer zone between Western Europe and the Soviet Union; a direct confrontation from either side meant battle on Polish and East German soil. This contributed to the West’s perception that Poland was either part of the Soviet problem or an enemy of NATO.

The Polish leadership was aware that if any military conflict occurred between NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliance, Central Europe would be the first battleground of conflict. The Polish defense strategy was based on the Warsaw Pact’s threat perception in response to the Berlin Crisis. Hence, the strategy was mainly aimed at deterring threats posed by NATO and at maintaining a good relationship with Soviet Russia to preserve Poland’s territorial security. Nonetheless, the scenario of a military conflict on Polish territory was a reality that was inescapable.

Against its will, Poland would indeed be brought into military conflict. Polish military doctrine stated that, in case of war, Poland would autonomously handle the conflict, which meant operationally commanding its own military without acknowledging that the military forces which defended Poland’s territory were part of United Armed Forces (belonging to the

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36 The Polish perception of threat was expected to be that of its Warsaw Pact members, which meant that a war by conventional means would meet NATO forces in Northern Europe. Poland regarded its threat perception to be West Germany’s invasion where it would serve as a gateway for NATO’s troops. See Threat Perception. (1992). Retrieved from http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/poland/poland244.html


Warsaw Pact). Indeed, Poland, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, could not have an independent security policy even if military doctrine advocated for the autonomous control of its military forces.

Poland’s lack of control in its own state affairs meant not having an independent security policy and no options other than to rely on the Warsaw Pact. The Russian military that was based in Poland prevented the Polish government from pursuing an independent national security strategy, one that would most likely have contradicted the Warsaw Pact’s security strategy. In addition, Poland lacked strategic think tanks, and the General Staff of the Polish Army was even unable to determine a viable defense strategy. By the late 1980s Poland’s defense strategy had become defensive rather than offensive. Meanwhile, the Polish strategy focused on being able to assemble military formations on the Polish border and face the enemy.

There were instances during the Cold War, however, where Poland did attempt to influence Soviet security policy. The majority of the time, Poland’s rather subordinate Cold War security strategy (which entailed complimenting the Warsaw Pact’s security policy) was inhibited by Soviet control from Moscow; however, it did exhibit individual-state tendencies during notable events in Cold War history. For instance, Poland’s leaders, particularly Minister Adam Rapacki angered both sides by proposing the institution of a nuclear-free

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zone in Central Europe to the United Nations in 1957.\textsuperscript{42} Then again in 1987 another plan to reduce nuclear threat in Central Europe was proposed by the Polish Government.\textsuperscript{43}

Civil-military relations in Poland changed drastically in the final decade of the Cold War, when a weak Soviet Union could no longer squelch Polish aspirations for social and government reform, especially after the popular success of the Solidarity movement.\textsuperscript{44} Poland was ready to adopt its own national security strategy before its transition to a Post-Cold War country. Another development that spurred these changes was the reduction of the Polish defense budget in the late 1980s in response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s measures to reduce Soviet military spending in the USSR. Gorbachev hoped that the NATO alliance would restructure and provide a security umbrella for the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{45} Instead, this reduction of military forces coupled with the 1989 revolutions slowly shifted Poland’s national defense policy away from the Warsaw Pact’s feeble security structures toward the stronger ones embraced by NATO.

\textbf{The Solidarity Movement and the “Roundtable” Discussions}

The Solidarity movement altered the course of Poland’s security policy. Lech Wałęsa, co-founder of the Solidarity (Solidarność) movement, became the voice of an alternative to

\textsuperscript{42} The Soviets first offered a similar plan before the Rapacki Plan, which proposed a conventional and nuclear disarmament from both sides that would be internationally regulated. After the West declined the plan in addition to Rapacki’s Plan, then an alternate plan reappeared in 1962 as the Gomulka Plan. See Stefancic, David, (1987, Winter). The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy, \textit{East European Quarterly}, 21:4;401-403

\textsuperscript{43} The Plan was referred to as the Jaruzelski Plan named after General Jaruzelski, the Communist Leader of Poland. The Jaruzelski Plan did not have enough time to transpire since the communist leader was forced to resign his position after the 1989 Polish Round table talks. See Karkoszka, Andrze\l{}. (1988). Merits of the Jaruzelski Plan, \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}, Volume 44, Issue 7; 32

\textsuperscript{44} Wojciechowski, Sławomir. (2008). 36;4

communist oppression by organizing an independent trade union. The Polish communist government’s response to Solidarity led to the institution of martial law, the ban of Solidarity, and the imprisonment of its activists and Wałęsa himself. General Jaruzeski, the communist leader in Poland, was denounced by US President Ronald Regan and Pope John Paul II for these events, culminating in US economic sanctions against Poland.46 This positive upturn in US-Soviet relations permitted Poland to conduct its foreign affairs in such a way as to bring about the end of communist rule in Poland.

Positive US-Soviet relations also changed the direction of Poland’s internal affairs, allowing Wałęsa to negotiate the 1989 Round Table Agreement with the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP, the Polish communist party). As a result, the PUWP government agreed to recognize Solidarity and permitted semi-free elections to take place, which led to changes in the electorate system to permit the creation of new parties.47 After several rounds of elections and the development of party coalitions to form a new government, Poland was on the road to democracy. The Brezhnev Doctrine, the use of Soviet force to crush opposition to communist rule in the Eastern Bloc states, was now replaced by the Sinatra Doctrine, which was marked by Gorbachev’s relaxation of Poland’s governmental arrangements.48 Poland’s first Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was able to change the constitution (December 1989) to allow the restoration of a republic government (the Third

46 On a research thesis regarding the positive influence that United States had on Poland during the Cold War, Gregory A. Kinstetter, writes “through the use of both public and private diplomacy, the Reagan Administration impacted the people of Poland during the decade before the collapse of the Polish United Worker’s Party, and that these decisions were a conscious act by President Reagan.” See Kinstetter, Gregory A. (2012, May). Let Poland Be Poland. A thesis submitted to the University of Wyoming in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in history. Laramie, Whyoming: 38; 2

47 Wałęsa’s Solidarity Party, previously formed as the Solidarity Citizens’ Committee, won all the seats in the Sejm (the Polish parliament’s lower house) and one seat in the senate. See Gdansk-life.com. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.gdansk-life.com/poland/solidarity

Hence, the newly elected parliamentary government in Poland was able to conduct its own affairs without Moscow’s consent (for the most part). In spite of these changes, it still relied on the Warsaw Pact for its collective security needs.

\footnote{Jaruzelski left his post as the First Secretary of the Poland’s Communist Party and served a relative short term. Tadeusz Mazowiecki formed a new government under the approval of the new parliament on September 1989. Lech Wałęsa became the president of the Third Republic of Poland. Soon after the first free parliamentary elections were held (in October 1991) Ibid., 42-9}
CHAPTER IV:
POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES TO POLAND’S SECURITY

The end of the Cold War brought unprecedented changes in the security environment, which effected Poland’s threat perception. As the nature of security threats changed, so did Poland’s interests. First, the restructuring of the former Eastern Bloc states and the Baltic states into Western political and economic institutions impacted Poles. Second, Germany’s official recognition of Poland's western borders was regarded as a positive development, and reduced Poland’s threat perception. Third, following decades of Soviet oppression, Polish people now had aspirations for individual freedom that were in concert with the rest of the Western world.

Piłsudski’s idealism was reborn in Poland, bringing hope to Polish people that they would soon join the rest of the free world. Supporters of the Piłsudski camp pushed for an independent republic in alliance with the West. In order to embrace this capitalist model, Poland’s political elite had to reject the structures of the communist regime. However, their ability to do so hinged on the capacity of Poland’s state institutions to embrace a more Western model, which mainly depended on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The post-Cold War period was marked by significant changes in Poland’s security policy, as the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was unexpectedly thrown off, allowing

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51 Ibid., 14
Poland’s security interests to be independently addressed. These changes in the Post-Cold War balance of power invalidated the ideological structure of communism, which had to be rejected in order to restructure Poland as a Western democratic state. This new security environment and its emerging threats had to be dealt with; the new republic was obligated to pursue its own foreign policy objectives without fear of Russian reprisal.

Poland’s primary objective was to end its security reliance on the Warsaw Pact countries by becoming a member of a Western-supported security system. However, the Polish political elite was aware of limitations in the foreign policies both in the West and the East. To ignore the security arrangements of the Warsaw Pact without being a member of NATO posed a grave security risk.

By the early 90s, Poland had four options to choose from to ensure its security requirements were fulfilled: 1) establish regional security with its neighbors 2) claim neutrality and strengthen its defense posture 3) reestablish a relationship with Russia 4) reach out for trans-Atlantic security (EU and NATO). The Polish elite considered opting for neutrality instead of a NATO, Soviet or regional solution to Poland’s security framework. However, it was eventually determined that neutrality would leave Poland in an unfavorable position in case of war in its influence on foreign affairs.

Poland’s elite had embraced a communist lifestyle and belief system for many years. The communist system could not be cast off quickly, as it had permeated all aspects of life. As a result, Poland was underdeveloped in terms of economy, democracy, and culture,

53 Ibid., 75-8
especially in comparison to their Western counterparts. Even though Poland had external bodies to help institute change, including the Polish-American Congress (Congress of Polonia) and the Roman Catholic Church headed by Pope John Paul II (a Polish native), the problem stemmed from their dependency the familiar Communist structure. Because of these traditions, opposition from Poles to accepting a Western security model (like NATO) during the transitional period was expected, especially from segments of the political elite.

Poland’s leaders had lived under the communist system their entire lives and changing from the familiar Warsaw collective security structure felt risky. Leftist parties, like the Social Democracy, had an ideological and political attachment to Soviet Union, and they regarded the Warsaw Treaty as a guarantor of Poland’s security. Military cooperation between Poland and Germany placed Poland in a favorable position for NATO membership and helped to build confidence and trust.

At the same time, NATO struggled to redefine its own identity, since the Warsaw Pact was no longer a threat to the West. As a security organization in a divided world (NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact) the Alliance had a defined purpose and a clear threat; its members cooperated with NATO to achieve the common goal of defending the West against communism. The Alliance recognized the need for military commitments, since the Soviet threat posed a grave danger to civilization. Thus, NATO “was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat… [and] with the collapse of the Soviet

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56 Kinstetter, Gregory A. (May 2012). Let Poland Be Poland. A thesis submitted to the University of Wyoming in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in history. Laramie, Wyoming: 2


58 Ibid., 108
Union … NATO [had to] either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new
distribution of power in Europe.”

After communism collapsed, NATO had to identify a new vision to maintain its
relevance, creating a rift in transatlantic relations. For the first time in history, NATO
redefined its 1991 Strategic Concept to include new threats even beyond its borders and
deployed its forces; this step was taken not in support of Article 5, but as part of the breakup
of Yugoslavia. Questions about how the former Eastern Bloc states would become
candidates for NATO membership remained unanswered.

Polish security concerns about NATO membership

One of Poland’s security objectives was to change its security arrangements without
damaging relations with the Soviet Union. The question of how to secede from the Warsaw
Pact and join NATO was a difficult one to answer for Poland’s newly elected democratic
government. Poland was aware on the sensitivity involved in departing from the Warsaw
Pact, because US-Russian relations were at their peak. Besides, supporters of the Dmowski

59 Regardless of their functionality, International Organizations (IOs) like NATO have been criticized by
scholars and politicians for their ineffectiveness. The post-Cold War security environment raised many questions
in academia, as well as created many pessimistic views on the role of IOs. John Mearsheimer, a famous
international relations theorist, argues that international institutions have little affect in changing state behavior,
hence they are not needed. See Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95). “The False Promise of International
Institutions.” *International Security* 19(3):5–49; 14

60 The alliance realized during its operations in the former Yugoslavia that NATO had to make changes and be
able to handle a variety of tasks like peacekeeping operations. It also realized that its relationship with other
security organizations like the UN, and with other non-NATO members had changed. See Gregory L. Schulte.

61 NATO started to seek-out to the former Cold-War countries after the 1990 (July) Declaration, and created a
NATO enlargement: opinions and options. Washington, DC: National Defense University, Fort McNair:1
camp defended the Soviet cause by reiterating the necessity of maintaining good relations with Russia.\textsuperscript{62}

Polish security policy had relied on Soviet military doctrine and training for decades, questioning the loyalty of top military brass about favoring the transition to NATO. General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s resignation as chairman of the Polish Council of State after the 1989 Round Table Agreement helped Poland’s military to break ties from the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{63} Equally pressing was the transition from a Communist planned economy to a Western free-market economy, which the Polish government enacted by drastically changing its economic policy.

Everyday life in Poland had depended on a rigid economic model where goods and services were exchanged within the Soviet Union. Poland viewed NATO membership as a vehicle for membership in the European Community (the European Union’s predecessor). In order to enter the European Community, however, Poland had to change its planned economic model to a free-market economy. Despite these hurdles, the strength of the US-Polish relationship along with political leadership from both sides made Poland’s entry into NATO possible. In spite of this eventual success, the road to NATO membership proved a difficult one, since Poland’s direction post-Cold War was marked by ambiguity.


The Decade of Transition (1990-2000)

Poland struggled to make structural changes within the government and to reform the military. There were key events and philosophies that characterized this transformation of Polish security policy. In the 1990s, Polish strategy focused on the quantity of defense rather than quality, and the military organization as a whole suffered as a result. Additionally, because it was the individual responsibility of ministers to take action in defense matters Poles failed to establish a legal framework that would permit required legislation to pass. Defense planning, programming, and long-term budgeting was negatively affected by a lack projection for defense expenditures, as well as by the absence of legal defense procedures and ongoing debate on field expertise.\(^{64}\) The resulting setbacks for military and defense planning were exacerbated by an incapacitated Polish defense industry, a paucity of state resources, and a poor core defense structure. In addition, before revising its own security policy, the Polish government waited on a new NATO strategic concept from Washington, which delayed change.

At long last, a major leap in security policy occurred right after Poland’s 1999 accession to NATO. The 2000 Polish Defense Strategy, a defense project that became an official document, was not only compliant with the Security Strategy document and NATO’s strategic concept, but it provided a plan, procedures and concepts necessary to deploy the strategy in wartime, during a crisis, or in times of peace.\(^{65}\) It defined “national accountability” in a way that reflected the constitutional arrangement of the government with an all-


\(^{65}\) The 2000 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland was regarded as an improvement in involving the different government agencies such as the Council of Ministers and the National Security Bureau, but nonetheless, its legislation was blamed for bypassing the Polish Parliament and the President. Ibid., 421-9
encompassing defense concept that included the security environment in relation to Poland and its regional Alliances (NATO). At the same time, it maintained flexibility in security policy and demanded a comprehensive defense system. In addition, regional security cooperation with the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and with the Weimar Triangle (Poland, France, and Germany) served to supplement to Poland’s security, functioning as a cooperation mechanism to address regional security problems.

One of the most crucial periods of Poland’s security policy transformation occurred between 1990 and 1993. This initial period was distinct because Poland adopted its first Cold War security policy in favor of NATO, while it struggled to balance its political-military framework and its legal framework. Polish foreign policy reflected a desire to avoid another “Yalta agreement.”

Poland’s prosperous foreign relations with Russia lasted only two years before Yeltsin took office in 1993. In the period from 1990 to 1992, Polish-Russian relations warmed under the Wałęsa and Gorbachev governments, and Poland’s leadership was able to secure friendly treaties with Russia and Ukraine. Despite these improvements, their interactions were not altogether smooth. On one hand, talks between Poland and Russia kept both sides on a positive path towards removing Soviet military troops and their equipment


68 Ibid.,15 & 411-20

from Polish soil. On the other hand, the status of Kaliningrad, a territory under Russian jurisdiction bordering the Baltic Sea, Lithuania, and Poland, became of paramount importance to Moscow, and the Russian leadership suspected the countries bordering Kaliningrad (Germany, Poland, and Lithuania) were making claims to its territory.

In other ways, too, Russia and the West further complicated Poland’s goal of NATO membership. The Russian perception of former Warsaw Pact states as prospective NATO members was rather dismissive, and Western politicians and scholars questioned the very viability of NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In response to NATO’s passive interest in expansion, the Polish president came up with his own proposition for an economic and security cooperation among Poland’s neighbors. In addition, Poland’s national defense policy had to be retooled to provide the country’s elites with the stronger military they desired in anticipation of armed conflict.

The Polish government refocused its security system with the aim of deterring armed aggression against the state. The 1990 defense doctrine on Polish security conceived of a non-confrontational style of security, under which Poland’s Central European neighbors would supplement Polish security with their own troops to form a multi-national force capability. This strategy was based on a low-intensity war scenario that Poland alone could

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71 Ibid.; 144

72 President Wałęsa offered a proposal in making a regional cooperation for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to mirror the institutions of the EU and NATO (the so called ‘Mark 2’ versions), but with the prospect of joining NATO. This plan, however, did not materialize during the drafting of the 1992 Polish security strategy. See Kuźniar, Roman, ed. (2001). Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House: 606; 147

handle. For a large-scale war scenario, the doctrine laid out a strategy for “convincing” the enemy that an invasion would be costly in terms of loss, while also persuading Poland’s allies to assist in a conflict. It did not explore the prospect of nuclear war, but after 1992, security took a different approach. This change, however, corresponded with defense policy making. 

In actualizing its strategy through the constitution, Poland’s security policy did encounter an obstacle: the constitutional itself, determined responsibility for Poland’s security and control of the Polish armed forces. This roadblock also had been a problem in the interwar period that led to Marshal Piłsudski’s 1926 *coup d'état*, and it stood in his way while he served as head of the country and the military.\(^74\) To obviate this issue, the arrangements in the constitution regarding control of Poland’s military had to be changed to conform with a democratic model of governance. The legal framework for defending the Polish homeland from military conflict were based on a 1967 statute that was amended in 1991, granting the Poland’s president full control of the armed forces.\(^75\) Along with changes in the Polish constitution, however, came changes to its defense policy. Because the National Defense Committee retained sole responsibility for enacting Poland’s security policy, this was later viewed as not so “constitutional.”

The main government body responsible for crafting laws and outlining agency obligations for state security (i.e. those of the government, financial institutions, social bodies,

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\(^74\) The president of the Polish republic had limited powers. The president did not have control of the armed forces, but rather the commander in chief was the highest ranking-general of the armed forces as a deputy minister of the Military Council. The Military Council was not under control of the parliament and cabinet, which didn’t reflect the 1921 Polish constitution. See Wiatr, J. J. (1988). The soldier and the nation: The role of the military in polish politics, 1918-1985. Boulder: Westview: 3; 23-5

experts, and citizens) was the National Defense Committee, a committee that today deals with matters related to legislature on civil defense, territorial protection, and the armed forces.\textsuperscript{76} The main agent responsible for providing security, according to the Polish Constitution, was the Polish Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{76} The new defense policy, based on the 1990 defense doctrine, assumed a principle of “self-sufficiency,” whereby Poland could not rely on anyone else, including NATO or the Warsaw Pact, for its security.\textsuperscript{77} This policy underscored Poland’s ambivalence in aiming for NATO membership.

The new defense policy also highlighted the difficulties the Soviet Union experienced in transitioning out of the Cold War era. Russia’s internal problems during its evolution out of communism were a major factor in determining Poland’s security policy. One threat was the stationing of Russian troops transferred from East Germany and Poland with an arsenal of Soviet military hardware in Kaliningrad; another was the Carpathian military district of Ukraine’s Soviet Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{78} A third perceived threat was the fragile state of Russia’s democratic government, which could have transformed into a totalitarian or despotic rulership, reinstating the Soviet military presence in Poland.\textsuperscript{79}

However, additional events outside the Soviet dilemma complicated Poland’s security situation further, and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc created other perceived threats to the Polish assessment of security. One was the anticipation of former Soviet republics transitioning into failed states, rather than to democracy. Polish leaders feared potential

\textsuperscript{76} National Defence Committee (OBN). http://www.sejm.gov.pl/komisje/www_obn_e.htm


\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.,1
spillover from Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and Soviet Union over the Polish territory. Another had to do with establishing good relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. To combat any spillover effects, Poland’s security strategies emphasized in building alliances.

After the Cold War, Poland started seeking regional security alliances. These security alliances became a component of the new Polish security strategy as ways to prevent conflicts with Poland’s neighbors and to reduce the cost of defense expenditures. As a precursor to Poland’s new security strategy, three NATO summits made it possible for the Alliance to begin talks with Poland. Following these events, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) became the vehicles for NATO’s expansion eastward. Poland’s foreign affairs were non-linear over the next several years, but this didn’t halt its path to NATO membership. Nonetheless, Poland’s ambitions for joining NATO went through a difficult period as its government institutions had to deal with their own problems of efficiency.

The 1990 Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland became obsolete, as it did not incorporate the new “Constitutional Act” that was drafted in 1992. Before the Small Constitution of 1992 (i.e. the new Constitutional Act) was established, the 1990 Defense Doctrine relied on an older Constitution (the previous socialist constitution of 1952) that

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80 Ibid., 1
81 Ibid., 1
82 These three NATO summits took place from 1989 to 1991 in Brussels, London, and Rome. The major theme in these summits was NATO expansion, or for NATO to take on the obligation in providing security for Poland and its Central European neighbors. This crucial period of talks determined the need to radically change NATO doctrine and strategy for the first time in NATO history. See Kuźniar, Roman, ed. (2001) Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House: 606; 30
prevented the institution of a Western-style economy with political freedoms. The *Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland* and the *Principles of Poland’s Security Policy* were crafted in November 1992 by Poland’s National Defense Committee to reflect the new Constitutional Act. The significance of the Constitutional Act is similar to that of the West: the Small Constitution described the “balance of power” within the main governing bodies while emphasizing collaboration and avoiding direct conflict between them.

From 1994 through 1996, Poland’s relations with the US and NATO improved but grew worse with Russia. As the Russian political elite realized Poland’s NATO membership was inevitable, the Russian government began to use coercive language in its foreign affairs. As a result, the Polish leadership grew more keen to pursue NATO membership while taking precautionary measures when interacting with Russian diplomats. Eventually, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program made Poland’s accession in NATO possible, and the Moscow leadership deviated from its official position on Poland’s future membership in NATO by arguing against it. Perhaps by coincidence, Poland’s foreign policy displayed two contradictory points of view, one that was pro-Western and the other that was pro-Russian. In this way, the Polish government’s official foreign policy objectives, as represented by different by members of the Piłsudski and Dmowski camps, could have been subject to misinterpretation. Another factor that attributed to Poland’s accession in NATO was its positive relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

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85 Ibid.,625-6


87 A mix of events that took place for Poland’s successful membership in NATO. Other than the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the Ministries of Defense of Poland and FRG made successful joint military exercises and
In the case of war with an adversary like Russia, the aim of Poland’s defense strategy was to safeguard the state’s sovereignty, autonomy, and territory. In 1996, the Political Strategic Plan for Poland’s defense, which was drafted by the Polish Ministry of Defense in coordination with other ministries and the National Security Bureau, became the first post-Cold War document for war planning purposes.\(^88\) The Political Strategic Plan’s concept of defense was based on military assessments of threats from neighboring states that were unstable, a local conflict that was limited, and the possibility of engaging in a world war while relying on NATO or with UN assistance. The concept outlined four major themes:

1) It emphasized the strategic responsibilities of the agencies of the Armed Forces, ministries, and provinces.
2) In case of a military-political dilemma, the prospect of war was inevitable, but the Polish objective was to be its prevention.
3) Possible spillover effects from conflicts would jeopardize Poland’s sovereignty.
4) The defense concept included the utilization of all assets on what comprised the “defense system.”\(^89\)

What followed the development of the defense concept was the commencement of a new strategic concept; this long pursued goal had finally been reached.

After the adoption of a new Constitution on April 2, 1997, Poland’s government pursued an autonomous security policy but without agreement on what constituted a real threat to its new sovereignty.\(^90\) A new threat emerged from the nonexistent arms control

\(^{88}\) Ibid., 416-7

\(^{89}\) Ibid., 417

\(^{90}\) The new constitution placed more emphasis on both the Polish armed forces as the protectorate of the state and the President as being overall responsible for Poland’s security. See Mirosław Minkina. (2011). Evolution of the Perception of Threats to the Security of the Republic of Poland in Polish Strategic Documents, The
treaties of the former Soviet Republics. Of particular concern was the lack of administration or control of nuclear weapons that covered the Black Sea on the part of Poland’s neighbors (i.e. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus).\(^9\) In addition, without agreements on arms control, the prospect of an increase in conventional forces or in nuclear proliferation further complicated Poland’s threat perception. A new strategic concept was initiated in 1997 in concert with a newer NATO strategy, as Poland’s accession to NATO was becoming a reality.

Poland’s foreign affairs did not exhibit any policies of the type Dmowski’s camp espoused; instead, it reinvigorated Piłsudski’s embrace of the West. Public surveys conducted in Poland on NATO membership indicated by a large percentage were in favor of joining the Alliance (83 percent supported, 9 percent opposed, and 8 percent had no opinion).\(^9\) Poland eventually became a NATO member in March of 1999 but continued to hold an autonomous strategy.

The Polish government was waiting for Washington’s approval on a concept of NATO’s new strategy, in order to revise Polish strategy. Andrzej Olechowski, who had served as Foreign Minister, commented that Poland’s membership in the Alliance now made his country feel safer, and that, as a result, its security policy could soften up.\(^9\) While Polish reliance on the Warsaw Pact’s strategy appeared to be similar to its reliance on NATO’s

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strategy, it was actually quite the opposite: NATO strategy required consensus from its members, since individual-state strategy dictated its own security interests.  

The 2000 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland project was approved in the Parliament on May 23, 2000. The project was produced by the Defense System Department of the Minister of Defense (MoD). The key objective was to combine the defense strategy and security agents, which it accomplished by involving the executive branch (the President) and the legislative branch (the parliament). Coordination for defense matters occurred between the government and the President, but it had to be approved by the parliament. The defense strategy project was carried out in consultation with the National Security Bureau and the ministries.

The new Polish Defense Strategy document was based on the 1997 Polish Constitution, which replaced the Small Constitution of 1992, and on other statutes and was compliant with the Security Strategy document and NATO’s strategic concept. The new Polish strategic concept was different than before, as it provided detailed procedures for dealing with threats and strategic defense goals, and it included a perspective on defense and the political-military agents who with threats.

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98 Ibid., 636-7
This strategic concept substituted “defensive doctrine” for “defense strategy” to improve the analysis of state defense, national concerns, critical aims with realistic objectives, and the requirements to achieve such objectives.\(^9^9\) Still, such national security strategy objectives had to be in compliance with the Polish Constitution’s main principles of security.

Poland’s security policy protected the homeland and provided for the welfare of the people. The policy coincides with the Constitution, but most importantly, it details the “basic tenants…from values and principles [that are] laid down.”\(^1^0^0\) The Polish constitution gives the President, in consultation with the Prime minister or Council of Ministers, the executive power to participate in “military conflict or to reinforce the forces of the state or the allied countries [and] peace mission, actions aiming at preventing the acts of terror or the results thereof.”\(^1^0^1\) Similarly, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2007) provides the foundation, framework, and objectives for the Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2009).\(^1^0^2\)

Poland’s national security improved as a new legal framework encouraged agency cooperation among the political institutions. The president of Poland was the primary actor in determining the National Security Strategy per the Polish Constitution, but he or she would now do so in conjunction with the Prime Minster, and the Council of Ministers; together they would produce under Article 4a, Clause 1 of the Polish Constitution “the Political and


Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland and other executive documents for the national security strategy…” Pursuant to Art. 4a, Clause 1 of the Act, the President shall: “approve, on the application of the Prime Minister, the national security strategy; issue, on the application of the Prime Minister, by decision, the Political and Strategic Defense Directive of the Republic of Poland and other executive documents for the national security strategy; approve, on the application of the Council of Ministers.” The democratic notion of sharing decision-making through the government executive agencies was emphasized in the Polish Constitution and reflected in the aforementioned strategic documents. These changes in the constitution highlighted the differences between the communist era and the democratic institutions that took root after communism.

Poland’s Generational Gap

A generational gap is evident between the old post-communist Wałęsa government and today’s Komorowski political leadership. During the first elected Wałęsa government in 1990, leftist activists, even remnants of the communist leadership, opposed the idea that NATO would be an element of Poland’s national security strategy. According to Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, the path to NATO was viewed as a decade of political turmoil. “As late as March 1991, the top military brass, all former Communists, touted the idea of ‘armed

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104 Ibid., 1

neutrality’ (zbrojna neutralnosc), Chodakiewicz writes, with the then-President Lech Walesa's idea of a ‘NATO-bis,’ or a shadow NATO, for East Central Europe.”

The majority of today’s Polish political elite opposed the communist party during the 1981 Solidarity (Solidarnośc) movement; Bronisław Komorowski (the President of Poland), Jacek Michałowski (the Head of the Chancellery) Krzysztof Hubert Łaszkiewicz (the Secretary of State), Professor Roman Kuźniar (political advisor), and other members of the current government participated in anti-communist activities by working “underground” and by being imprisoned during and after the martial law period (1981-83). Whether pro-Western or communist political philosophy influences Polish security strategy in the future is another concern, but the safeguarding of Polish territory is, for now, a “Constitutional obligation and duty stemming from the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) ratified by the Republic of Poland.”

106 Chodakiewicz claims that there was a lot of political opposition for Poland in joining NATO. Various of political factions ranging from radical populists to communists rejected or were skeptical of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, while supporting the idea of reentering the Soviet Pact or favoring the Russian solution to security. This uncertainty in joining the Alliance also came at a time where NATO’s expansion to the East was being severely scrutinized by the Allies as being too burdensome and costly. See Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan. Poland and the Future of NATO. (1999, October 11). This was an amendment to a University of Virginia documented speech in February 26, 1999. Retrieved from http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/999/chodakiewicz.html


CHAPTER VII: POLAND’S DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO

The Benefits of NATO Membership

In an interview with the Minister of National Defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, a Warsaw Business Journal reporter asked whether Poland’s security depends on an Alliance or on the Polish armed forces. Siemoniak replied that Poland cannot defend itself without NATO, hence on its own

…defense autarky” is not an option for us…. [since such a military capability] is not affordable – and not necessary…. We use NATO as a system that connects allies’ forces and makes them much more effective and cheaper.109

The last Polish Defense Strategy was published in 2009. Since then, the 2008 world economic crisis, a challenging war in Afghanistan, and a new US strategy aimed at stabilizing relations in Asia have raised European security concerns. At the same time, debates about whether the retraction of American commitments to the Alliance could impact NATO’s strategic capabilities have made Poland’s political elite worried. This ongoing debate has also created another security concern or threat to Poland’s security interests, which in turn affects Poland’s national security. In spite of such concerns, however, Poland continues to receive three chief security benefits that are the main attributes of hard power: air policing, the NATO Response Force, and Air Defense.

First, NATO’s air policing provides a guarantee to safeguard Poland’s territory and its allies by air. Air policing is carried out on a rotational basis, where NATO members provide their national assets to undertake the air policing missions. Rotations are made by different members of the Alliance, and the process involves four aircraft with a crew of anywhere from fifty to one hundred personnel. The rotations cover the airspaces above Albania, Slovenia, Iceland, the Baltic States, and recently, separate bilateral agreements have led to patrolling above the Southeastern European region, i.e. the Balkans, Romania, Albania, Italy and Greece. Newly acquired fighter-aircraft such as the Eurofighter, the F-16 Falcon, or older ones like the F-4F Phantom or the MiG 29 can be utilized for this purpose. Because of defense cuts, however, air policing missions such as these could be in jeopardy in the near future. A lack of air policing would mean that Poland would not be able to cover its own regional airspace or to help its neighbors, since the Polish Air Force will not have NATO resources, namely fighter aircraft or money to continue its policing.

The responsibility for air policing is outlined in the role of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SHAPE), who provides a twenty-four hour air defense and air surveillance that also serves as an early warning system for a quick reaction alert force. Poland has already participated in four air policing rotations, the last of which was carried out on April 2012 by the Polish Military Contingent (ORLIK 4). The future of such air policing is at risk, however, since European budgets continue to decline and aircraft usage is

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111 The Baltics do not have air policing capabilities, therefore NATO has in Siauliai Air Base (Lithuania) a quick reaction alert (QRA) base where designated NATO members can conduct policing operations on a rotational basis. Upon alert, QRA aircraft receives orders from the Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOC) on actions to take in recognize any unidentified aircraft. Ibid

112 Ibid

113 Ibid
costly. Central Eastern European (CEEs) states like Slovakia cannot afford to replace their old MiG29 fleet, and the Baltic States depend on NATO members for their air policing.114

Second, under NATO’s Article 5, Poland’s territory is protected by NATO’s response force (NRF). Defense against armed aggression would constitute the use of NRF by deploying a lethal show of military force and executing different types of missions. If an overwhelming threat should emerge, Poland’s national military capabilities could be augmented using NATO’s immediate response force (IRF). Additional assigned elements of land, maritime, combat air support, and special forces totaling to 13,000 or more troops could also be provided at anywhere from forty-eight hours to a thirty day notice.115 The types of security threats that the response force is capable of combating correspond to the current security environment, per NATO’s strategic concept.

NATO’s capabilities are not exclusively for responding to security threats that could arise in Poland. For instance, NATO’s military assets are also capable of maintaining Poland’s territorial sovereignty by a show of force, conducting security and peace operations, performing initial entry, guarding essential national resources, and providing emergency relief in the case of disaster.116 There are also no constraints over force generation or logistical requirements that could arise in a prolonged conflict. The NATO response force in

114 Scars, scares and scarcity; defence spending in Eastern Europe. (2011). The Economist (US); 66.

115 Ideally, initial entry operations in a conflict made within five days, and forces are able to provide life-support functions for thirty days with replacement forces following a one year rotation cycle. NRF determines the force requirements (composition) in relation to the mission, by ensuring that the IRF will be an agile and high-tech force. However, activation of NRF is made by NATO consensus, as determined from each of the members of the alliance represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). See NATO Air Policing. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.airn.nato.int/focus_areas/ap/ap.htm

recent years, however, has been criticized for its ability and capacity to conduct military operations.

As an agile weapon of NATO, NRF is the solution to “911” calls made in case of an armed attack on Polish territory. A study of NATO response forces by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy of National Defense University (NDU) in 2005 examined the limitations to the capabilities of the Alliance prior to commissioning of the NATO response forces. NATO’s capabilities for coalition technology and information sharing were the main objects of study, and the resulting report focused primarily on the three phases by which the response forces would conduct military operations. While the US military would provide the majority of the capabilities (known as enablers), the European would soon follow with their own arsenal, produced by the European defense industry. The push for European allies to develop airlift, mobility, missile defense, and precision striking capabilities was a requirement that ought to have occurred within a specific time frame. To date, however, little progress has been made.

Since NATO’s response force would assign forces on a rotational basis, the burden of generating needed forces would not rest on Poland’s shoulders. Instead, it would be provided through a response forces pool mechanism and sustained by a joint logistics support group headquarters. In order to ensure that these military forces are adequately certified to deploy at a moments notice, they are assigned to military headquarters commands (HQs) for

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command and control. This illustrates how the Alliance has set standards to ensure that its state members are not only NATO interoperable, but also tactical and technologically capable of conducting operations. Supporting such missions, however, requires military hardware that is available through the “pool” of the Alliance.

The pool provides distinct capabilities and military hardware that are dramatically more powerful than Poland’s own assets. For instance, AWACS aircraft are resourced and operated through partnerships, allowing allies to have greater access to such capabilities at a much more reasonable shared cost. In addition to utilizing NATO shared assets in normal or routine operations, these assets can also be deployed in special missions. For example, upon activation of an intermediate response force, two deployable operating bases and one aerial port of debarkation could provide sixteen fighter/air defense aircraft, four combat search-and-rescue aircraft, six reconnaissance aircraft, six unmanned aerial vehicles, three airborne early warning aircraft, one electronic countermeasures aircraft, and two air-to-air refueling aircraft. As these capabilities demonstrate, NATO augments dramatically the two tactical air wings and the one air transport wing of the Polish air force.

Third, Poland also depends on NATO for an integrated missile defense system, which the Alliance was able to acquire in 2010 in a form of a ballistic missile defense capability.

120 Ibid
124 A mix of NATO capabilities defines the Air Tasking Order (ATO) Integrated Air and Missile Defense concept, an inherit responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The first phase of an initial theatre BMD operation began in 2010, while in the Lisbon 2010 NATO Summit it was agreed on the need to have a more comprehensive BMD system as one of the main tenants of territorial defense. See Ballistic
The Alliance recognized the need for a more capable European theater missile shield, one able to deter weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile warheads. A comprehensive theater missile shield is, in a sense, an active layered theater ballistic missile defense (ALTBMD) that provides low- and high-altitude protection by deterring short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats. The Obama administration has been committed to European security and provides an Aegis ballistic missile defense capability comprised of four US naval warships with advanced radar and target weaponry (which are able to engage ballistic missile threats). These come in addition to four frigates from the Netherlands and early warning defense capabilities from France. Other members of the Alliance like Poland, Romania, and Turkey have also agreed to be part of the ballistic missile defense; Poland and Romania serve as the base location for US SM-3 interceptors and Turkey provides a radar capability.

In addition to an integrated missile defense system, NATO provides Poland with a strategic airlift capability. Airlift capability is an important asset in moving military troops and their equipment quickly obviating reliance on other sources of transportation (e.g. ground or sea). In NATO missions, the goal has been to move light forces in an expedient manner in order to make effective use of deadly force against an armed aggressor. Airlift is an expeditionary, or out-of-area operations, requirement, and the United States has always had the foundation and industry to support it. Indeed, the heavy military hardware demands

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125 As a communications system by means of command, control, and communication (referred to as ‘C3’), ALTBMD provides a coverage beyond Europe’s geographical location in relation to its outside borders. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

aircraft capabilities that only the United States could provide to its allies. The Polish military can utilize such NATO assets to support various national and NATO-based missions.

Poland benefits from NATO’s strategic airlift resources not only by saving direct maintenance-related costs per flight hour, but also because it allows them to take an active role in NATO missions. For example, the current purchase of three C-17 Globemaster IIIs (cargo and transport aircraft) remains NATO’s largest aircraft, capable of handling 170,900 pounds with a range of 2,400 nautical miles. They are able to make multiple missions from heavy military hardware to airdrops of airborne units. A Heavy Airlift Wing based in Hungary’s Papa Air Base, this strategic airlift capability required participating nations to combine their resources for ownership, operation, and maintenance of the C-17 Globemaster IIIs.

Another resource of NATO’s strategic airlift is an interim solution, which involves a conglomerate of NATO nations that have contracted the Antonov Airlines’ (An-124-100) transport aircraft. However, a plethora of issues has plagued the process of adapting a multinational (universal) lift capabilities model by all the members of the Alliance. Each member of the Alliance has its own national security strategy that is driven by national interests. Yet, relying on others to carry out missions for national security is, in some ways, akin to relinquishing the authority of state sovereignty. Burden-sharing activities are also a

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127 Ibid

128 The SAC is different than ordinary NATO functions of command in that not all of the alliance has an agreement to SAC, hence operation of this aircraft is determined by a United States Air Force general officer through a steering committee. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is made through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program with the partnering nations that own the three aircraft. Maintenance is contracted through Boeing and flight hours are determined for each nation according to contribution. See Strategic Airlift Capability. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm

129 Ibid
subject of national debate in European governments, and they have become an obstacle for NATO in achieving organizational efficiency.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{The Latest Challenges for NATO}

The anticipated decline of NATO benefits raises concerns for Poland’s political elite. From the Polish elites’ perspective, the future of NATO as a security organization appears uncertain, a perception that has been reinforced by empty promises made by the Alliance at its summits, the most recent of which was the Chicago NATO Summit 2012. The NATO strategic concept is in danger of failing to fulfill its commitments, which could detriment its ability to provide an adequate security umbrella.

Unfortunately, neither Poland’s foreign policy objectives nor tireless efforts on the part of diplomatic multi-defense initiatives can persuade other NATO members to increase military spending. Current data on the military spending of NATO members indicate a widening gap in European security. NATO’s two percent target in defense spending from its members might serve as a valuable measuring tool, but it has no affect on the spending behavior of its members.\textsuperscript{131} Though influential members of the Alliance like Germany and the United Kingdom have and continue to reduce their military expenditures, Poland and France have not. The middle sized EU countries have, on average, cut their defense budgets by 10-15 percent, while smaller countries have cut as much as 20 percent.\textsuperscript{132}

A close examination on the allies’ defense expenditures as a percentage of gross


\textsuperscript{131} Scars, scares and scarcity; defence spending in eastern Europe (2011) The Economist (US); 66

\textsuperscript{132} O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012). Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO's largest members. 30; 5. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings
domestic product (GDP) over a twenty-year period from 1990 to 2011 suggests trouble for NATO defense spending, especially in the last five years (see Table 1, Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP). Only the past five years of defense GDP expenditures have been analyzed to demonstrate the impact of the world economic crisis on defense spending (see chart/bar-graph 1 on Defense GDP Expenditures from 2007-11). Data demonstrates that Germany and the United Kingdom are fairly stable in defense spending, though the United Kingdom commits more of its budget to defense than Germany. France has historically committed at the same level as the United Kingdom, but these expenditures seem to be dropping.

While some European states like Poland, Estonia, France, Germany, and United Kingdom do not indicate a dramatic increase or decrease in defense spending (see figure 1), these European states do not have sufficient funding for military capabilities needed in the near future. For example, Germany’s spending on defense showed a 0.1 percent increase from 2008 to 2009, but this level has remained steady since; the United Kingdom, a strong US ally, increased funding by 0.2 percent from 2007 to 2008, but then increased only by 0.1 percent before dropping back down to 2008 levels. France’s commitment level has dropped steadily by a rate of 0.1 percent over the last three years, while Poland has increased or decreased by no more than 0.2 percent of a difference without falling below the 1.8% national mandate on GDP defense expenditures (see Table 1). The United States, the

133 Refer to Table 1. Gross domestic product (GDP) and defense expenditures annual percentage change (%). See NATO Diplomacy Division (2012) Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense. Communique PR/CP(2012)047-REV1(5)

134 Refer to Table 1. Beginning with Germany (discussing only the second decade – i.e. from 2000-2011) defense expenditures had a gap in the two (average) periods (2000-2004 and 2005-2009) that accounted for (an average GDP) drop by 0.1 percent (from 1.4 percent to 1.3 percent). However, from 2009 to 2011 (on an annual basis) the percentage in GDP remained the same at 1.4 percent. In France the average for the first average period (accounting for the same years) was at 2.5 percent, while at the second period was at 2.3 percent.
largest NATO contributor, had also seen both an increase and a decrease in defense spending over the past five years owing to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic crisis, which resulted in a multi-trillion dollar budget deficit. As a result, between 2010 and 2011, US spending on defense dropped an entire percent. Nevertheless, at 4.8 percent spending in 2011, the US budget was $731 billion dollars, far surpassing the $282 billion budget of NATO-Europe (see Table 2).  

Other members of the Alliance, like the Baltic States and the Eastern European Central States have cut their defense budgets substantially. Poland saw a drop in its defense expenditures by .3 percent in 2008, which could have occurred in response to the world economic crisis. However, Poland’s defense expenditures went back up in 2009 and have since have remained at 1.7 or 1.8 percent. There are no indications that Poland will reduce substantially its defense budget, instead, it will likely increase spending to support its own defense industry and to modernize its military capabilities. Smaller NATO members like Lithuania and Latvia have reduced defense spending by more than 20 percent, while a large number of medium-sized states like Ireland, Romania, and the Czech Republic have reduced by between 10 and 15 percent. The total contributions of the smaller countries in NATO

(a 0.2 percent drop). From 2009 to 2011, on an annual basis it was uneven spending at 2.1 percent, 2.0 percent, and 1.9 percent respectively. United Kingdom, a strong US ally was at the same two average periods (2000-2004 and 2005-2009) at 2.3 percent and 2.5 percent (a 0.2 percent increase), while at an annual basis from 2009 to 2011 it was at 2.7 percent the both first years and a decrease of 0.1 percent at 2.6 at the last year. The United States for the same average periods was at 3.3 percent and 3.4 percent (an increase of 0.1 percent) and on annual basis at 5.4 percent for the first two years, but dropped at 4.8 percent the last year (a whole 1.0 percent) of a difference. Even though this 1.0 percent has a lot to do with the economic crisis that continuous to severely affect the US economy, United States alone surpasses the spending of its allies. Ibid., 5

135 Ibid., 4


do not make a substantial difference to the Alliance’s military capabilities. When considering the entire spectrum of NATO operations in Afghanistan, these members contribute significantly; however they represent only a very small fraction of NATO aggregate forces. Other than Poland, the Baltic states and the rest of the Eastern and Central European states are beneficial to NATO because of their Special Forces.

Changes in European defense spending will undoubtedly impact the Alliance as a whole. NATO members will not be able to conduct routine operations like Baltic Air Policing. NRF capabilities could be reduced, as the Alliance would not be able to commit either their forces or assets in a crisis situation. There would also be limited strategic airlift or sealift capacities, which would compromise power projection capabilities. Funding for training would be impacted, and military cooperation would not be as effective.

If the US were to reduce defense spending in Europe, than Poland’s security would be affected. America’s allies still depend on its power projection capabilities (ballistic missile submarines, strategic airlift, the aircraft carrier strike group, amphibious and airborne forces, forward basing, etc.) to carry out NATO missions. These include the missile defense initiative referred to as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that will provide a comprehensive Aegis missile defense system able to deter a ballistic missile threat.

America still sees its military and political presence as vital to protecting US interests. Continued defense spending in Europe is evidence that US remains committed to European security regardless of a military “pivot” toward Asia. In a budget request overview for fiscal year (FY) 2013, it was stated that, “the U.S. will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations…. [while the] Emphasis is to build the capacity of partners and allies to defend their own
territory and interests.”

In another official budget summary document for FY 2013, planned support for activities in Europe included $800 million for combatant commanders to spend on exercises and engagement activities, $400 million to spend on security assistance, and $200 million to be used for ground surveillance.139 Regarding military construction projects in Europe as part of the NATO Security Investment Program, a FY 2013 justification data report on military construction projects indicates that, “the U.S. has an abiding national security interest in a stable, integrated European Region…. [and] from a strategic standpoint, NATO is the only forum enabling the U.S. and its European Allies to consult and develop common views and solutions to security challenges, not only in Europe, but also on a global scale.”140

The reorientation toward Asia noted on the FY 2013 budget request does not indicate a great difference in spending in comparison with the budget for Europe in support of NATO. However, the budget for Asian spending suggests that upgrades in military technology will be used as deterrents in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations. A US defense budget summary report for FY 2013 in support of Asian-Pacific and Middle East objectives showed investments of $1.8 billion on electronic equipment (tactical and warfare), $300 million on designing the future bomber, and $100 million on adding missile capacity in future Virginia-


class submarines.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{Future NATO Challenges}

There will be a significant decrease in European military capabilities, widening the gap between the US and Europe. At the last Chicago summit, European leaders announced officially that they pledged to pool and share their resources in keeping with the “Smart Defense” concept known as NATO Forces 2020. However, NATO skeptics are debating whether such defense initiatives will, in fact, come to fruition, since European governments continue to reduce their defense budgets at an alarming rate.

The United Kingdom is decreasing its defense budget and might be losing its political-military influence in the global scene. The United Kingdom will have fewer Maritime and Air Force capabilities; in order to implement savings after operations in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom plans to reduce its military contributions to overseas operations during times of peace except in the case of emergencies. In 2010, official sources had indicated a 7.5 percent reduction in the defense budget for the 2010-2014 period, but in actuality this reduction has been closer to 25 percent. This unexpected drop in the UK’s defense budget occurred because the Department of Defense presumed that the Treasury Department would pay for certain defense programs; the last administration overspent its defense budget, and the current administration was forced to make further budget cuts.\textsuperscript{142} Cutbacks in personnel and naval military hardware from ships to fighter aircraft will diminish Naval capabilities

\textsuperscript{141} Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request United States Department Of Defense. (2012, February 9). (Comptroller) / Chief Financial Officer

\textsuperscript{142} O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012) Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO’s largest members. 30; 5. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings. 29; 10
overall. Army and Air Force cutbacks on personnel and hardware will also impact the
United Kingdom’s operational outreach.

France has remained steady in terms of defense expenditures and will increase spending on research and development. France has not reduced its military acquisitions, as it continues to protect its own security by procuring hardware.

Germany will be decreasing the defense budget by reducing personnel and military hardware. Germany plans to transition to a totally voluntary force and to cut its forces significantly. The goal will be to pressure the defense industry into cutting the price of military hardware instead of retracting from purchases by paying fines. Germany might also sell its tanks or decrease the number of tanks in the force.

NATO’s pooling and sharing initiatives are a response to national defense budget cuts, and they are a clear indication that European national governments have abandoned their commitments to NATO’s collective security. This neglect and these continued reductions in military spending result from the US’s ongoing commitment to NATO. The US military presence in Europe during the Cold War and afterwards created many savings for European defense budgets. A recent NDU study indicated that NATO’s poorer members take

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143 A reduction in the Navy budget will consist of: the canceling the redesign of an aircraft carrier (HMS Ocean) still in service, the lessening down to three ships (destroyer and frigates), or the replacement of aging fighter aircraft with new ones (the Harrier jet was discontinued, procurement delays with the variant of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft (JSF)), and a reduction of a full amphibious commando brigade to a battalion. Ibid., 11

144 These cutbacks include personnel in the Army (more than 22,000 by 2020), decreasing the amount of the battle tank force (118) and small arms, purchasing less Euro-fighters than originally planned (from 232 to 160), reduce the number of A400M aircraft (down to 2) and C-130 aircraft, which is a loss of transport capabilities for the regular and Special Forces - to include a reduction in helicopters after the war in Afghanistan.(page 11-12) Additional reduction in capabilities includes in intelligence and surveillance (retired aircraft and no replacements), and losing military personnel that means less operational capabilities. Ibid.,1&11-2

145 Germany will reduce its combat forces by losing three Army brigades and its military personnel (a 32,000 loss of military personnel in the next 8 years). On hardware, Germany will reduce its aircraft by not procuring eighty-two helicopters and two air drones (as originally planned). Germany has retracted from A-400M purchases (will pay fines), but will resell thirteen of its purchases. Ibid.,15-18
advantage of NATO members with a higher GDP.\textsuperscript{146} This is evidenced by the fact that a large number of members, particularly in the West, exploit their access to NATO security without sharing much of the burden. The fault lies in the common belief that the United States can provide security for Europe, since it is wealthier than its allies.

For example, knowing that the US has more military capabilities, forces, and assets, as well as the highest percentage of defense-related GDP expenditures in NATO has set a precedent. In addition, NATO is an American creation that has been led by a dual-headed US commander who is responsible both for NATO and for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). Hence, knowing that a US commander will always be “at the helm” of NATO means that there is no incentive for European militaries to spend on defense. The majority of the Alliance members in Europe worry only about the internal/state security issues.

The only defense spending that NATO European members are willing to make is on internal/state security. The only time that members of the Alliance seem willing to spend is when it involves the territorial security of their borders, including the threat of terrorism.\textsuperscript{147}


\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 4-11
CHAPTER VIII:  
POLAND’S SECURITY BENEFITS

How NATO Benefits from Poland

Does Poland benefit as a member of the Alliance from sending troops to Afghanistan? Some members of NATO, including Poland, feel that contributing to dangerous operations abroad is to their advantage, while other allies, like Germany, feel the opposite (i.e., they notice a loss of public support). The waxing and waning of public support for the war in Afghanistan has a bearing on governments’ decisions when deciding whether to make mission-related contributions. In one recent 2012 US transatlantic trends survey, the George Marshall fund indicated that the German public favored the complete redeployment of troops to Germany at 53 percent, while Poland stood at 62 percent—even higher than expected. While Poland’s public opinion is not really a surprise, one would ask why the Polish government persists in supporting the Alliance in such a committed way.

Poland’s defense budget supports a military force of 120,000 troops, which is comprised of a large Army and Air Force, a relatively small Navy, and the other military

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148 Annual surveys are made to gather public opinion in the US and in Europe. Interviews were made in United States, twelve European countries, Russia and Turkey. See Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2012. The German Marshall Fund of the United States transatlantic trends survey
Departments.\textsuperscript{149} Poland continues to professionalize its non-conscription military forces and modernize its armaments primarily through capital investment by having a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. Not surprisingly, the Polish Ministry of Defense has adapted the US military chain structure (J/G-1 thru J/G-6) making it compatible with NATO doctrine.

While there are too many external variables to calculate the cost of NATO contributions against the benefits of NATO security (including the status of the economy, the size and modernization of military forces, and political influence (soft power) within the Alliance), political and economic risks overall determine members’ contributions to NATO. The not-so wealthy states, called the “upper-middle-income economies” members of NATO, such as Poland and Romania, take the “hard” combat missions in Afghanistan, in comparison to wealthier members that are classified as “high-income economies” like the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.\textsuperscript{150} Although Poland and Romania contribute more troops and take on more dangerous missions than Germany or Italy, because of their economic status and status as relative NATO newcomers, they do not carry as much soft power in the North Atlantic Council as other countries.

Collective security guarantees are viewed in Polish strategic culture as questionable, if not outright suspect, and they are an element of consideration when Poland drafts its


\textsuperscript{150} Geographic region: Classifications and data reported for geographic regions are for low-income and middle-income economies only. Low-income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies. The use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a preferred or final stage of development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status. Income group: Economies are divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper middle income, $4,036 - $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more. The World Bank. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/
national security strategy. The former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ Brussels speech on June 10, 2011, argued that NATO members who share the burden in combat missions and those that do not. Specifically, he pointed out that NATO has transformed into what appears to be as

…a two-tiered Alliance between members who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and talking tasks and those conducting the “hard” combat missions -- between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of Alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership, be they security guarantees or headquarters billets, but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.¹⁵¹

This observation confirms that free riding is negatively affecting burden-sharing, which paints NATO as a weak coalition.

Poland is quite aware that its security measures must be spread among multiple security alliances, rather than relying solely on NATO. The hard truth is that if Poland wants to remain relevant in world affairs, then the United States must be included in its security equation. Polish national security has to satisfy its strategic security requirements by aligning with a powerful nuclear alliance (like NATO) or, bilaterally, with the United States. Polish diplomats must do everything in their capacity to persuade their European counterparts to remain committed to NATO and to its purpose. The negative consequences of a weak Alliance means that Europe will not have “smart power,” a mix of soft and hard power that is influential on the world stage. This will reduce its influence in world affairs. The United


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States remains a smart power that continues to prove itself through advances in every field, making its hard power (military superiority) a force that is unstoppable.\textsuperscript{152}

**Can NATO Benefits Impact Poland’s Security?**

A drastic change in NATO commitments, primarily the withdrawal of American hegemony would create a void in Poland’s security. Polish defense strategy is determined based on military capabilities that the United States provides to NATO. As the White House announced its 2012 strategic guidance in the beginning of the year, the Polish government became increasingly worried about the future of NATO. If the US were to direct its strategic capability elsewhere (like in Asia), this would hinder NATO’s ability to provide a security umbrella for Europe.

A decreasing US military presence in Europe, and the reduction of US military forces following the end of the Cold War, is a cause for alarm that has been ignored by many European governments. The ongoing European “free-rider” problem within NATO, where Europe relies on the United States to protect its security, has been discussed by many US administrations since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s European members will continue to abstain from increasing their military capabilities to a strategic level as long as the United States continues its military presence in Europe. The European countries have been using political rhetoric to maintain good US-European relations that work to their benefit while saving by reducing their defense expenditures.\textsuperscript{153} Conversely, US planning on a Brigade


\textsuperscript{153} Flamini, Ronald S. (March 23, 2012) *Europe Relations. Is the historic trans-Atlantic alliance still relevant?* Volume 22, Issue 12
Combat Team (BCT) decrease in Europe would be a reason for the Polish government to rely on a US-strategic partnership, as a guarantee for US military assistance in Poland.

For more than a decade, Polish diplomats and politicians have pushed for a comprehensive European security strategy in an effort to prevent a NATO capabilities gap. Such concern suggests that there is dissatisfaction in the area of security. The ongoing issue of European states spending less on security and devoting greater attention to economic problems translates to weaker security for Poland. Further, the current military obligations of the Alliance to EU defense characterize the unwillingness of state governments to continue to pursue open-ended defense policies.

European defense ministers have also identified the gap in European security as a source of concern, as US strategy is diverting US military assets to Asia. The former Armed Forces Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Nick Harvey, on a security forum in Singapore, mentioned that America's repositioning of its naval assets to Asia would create a void in NATO capabilities. Harvey mentioned that his country is not able to fill such a void, even though America expects the Europeans to do so. According to Harvey, Europe has not taken any action. He notes that, if “we're back in the carrier strike game we could pull more weight, [but] if Europe is to take more responsibility, we've got some way to go.”\(^{154}\)

Army leaders in Europe would also feel a diminishing western influence should military forces move out from European soil. Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, former Commander of US Army Europe, has also voiced his concerns to the US secretary of the Army on a trip to Ukraine. When Hertling was asked about the status of the Ukrainian Army, he replied that there were many problems including the Army’s leadership’s tendency towards an old-style

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Soviet model. He added that, if US-Ukrainian military cooperation disintegrated, things could be even worse.\textsuperscript{155}

However, there are European leaders who recognize the need for America to carry out its strategic objectives in Asia and conclude, therefore, that Europeans should take over the American responsibility for protecting Europe. Secretary of State for Defense Phillip Hammond provoked members of the Alliance by saying that “the European NATO powers should welcome the fact that the US is willing to engage in this new strategic challenge on behalf of the Alliance…. [and] as a result, European nations, including the UK, will need to do much more of the heavy lifting in the security of their own region.”\textsuperscript{156}

\textbf{Polish and American Benefits from a US-Polish Strategic Relationship}

The US-Polish defense relationship has been linear, meaning that it has a history of good relations. The Polish defense strategy relies on a US-Polish strategic commitment; such a commitment is outlined in the \textit{Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland} (2009), which notes that the “strategic partnership with the United States of America demonstrably enhances Poland’s security.”\textsuperscript{157} Similarly, Polish military capacity benefits the United States substantially when conducting military operations abroad. Poland supported the Bush

\textsuperscript{155}Mulrine, A. (2012, November 5). In Pentagon's 'pivot' toward Asia, has Europe been forgotten. The Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2012/1105/In-Pentagon-s-pivot-toward-Asia-has-Europe-been-forgotten


administration in the war in Iraq by sending 1,700 troops in 2004, while Germany and France did not send any.\textsuperscript{158}

According to the US Department of State, Poland is ranked fifth in its troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan, and it continues to lead military operations in the Ghazni Province.\textsuperscript{159} Poland is also the only country in Europe that does not have caveats in the Afghanistan mission: the Polish soldier fights next to the American soldier and risks his/her life in dangerous operations. ISAF pre-deployment training requires 2,600 Polish troops (deployed in the theater of operations) to conduct exercises with their American counterparts from US Army Europe, the Illinois National Guard, and the Special Operations Command. The Declaration on Strategic Cooperation (signed on August 2008) made the Polish-US bilateral pact even stronger by offering military training and modernizing equipment, sharing intelligence, conducting research and development, and continuing to work on the missile defense treaty.\textsuperscript{160}

The US-Polish relationship has endured primarily because of US foreign policy objectives that go beyond Poland’s security aspirations. The US-Polish strategic agreement on a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) platform in Poland relies on Russia’s willingness to support the US through U.N. sanctions against Iran and by preventing the sale of a strategic air defense system (S-300) to Iran.\textsuperscript{161} As a response, the Polish government has taken steps to ensure that Poland’s security doesn’t fall short using its extensive foreign US relations.

\textsuperscript{159} For more information see the US Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 2012. Background Note: Poland - The US State Department. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid
The top leadership of the United States and Poland, President Obama and President Komorowski, in Warsaw in 2011, agreed to move forward with stationing a US Air Force Detachment (comprised of F-16s and C-130 aircraft) in Poland. On the topic of missile defense, both presidents and the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, ratified the Missile Defense Agreement (May 2011) for the EPAA, calling it “a new approach to ballistic missile defense in Europe.”

Recently, however, President Komorowski made an announcement that Poland would better benefit if it had its own BMD capabilities instead of purchasing American SM-3 interceptors. This public announcement hints that Poland’s real priority might be building its defense industry as the country continuous to grow economically.

There seems to be a correlation between the demand for military supplies and increasing profits in the defense industry. The defense budget doubled after 9-11, as America’s military forces demanded the best equipment to fight their wars abroad. The mass production of defense equipment during World War II (WWII) was diverted to the private sector after the war by focusing on technology as a means to meet the demands of the military.

Even in terms of domestic politics there are divergent interests within the government, particularly in high positions such as ministers. One such instance occurred when President Komorowski and the Minister of Defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, were reported as having

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opposite views on where the Polish military was headed: Komorowski named missile defense as a national priority, while Siemoniak’s deputy, Vice-Minister Waldemar Skrzypczak (in charge of armaments), indicated armor vehicles as being the national priority. Even though, in an interview on August 14, 2011, Siemoniak took a different stance than his deputy and agreed with Komorowski on armament priorities, a reporter noted in a sarcastic tone that, “I could not imagine that a few weeks from taking over a position in the MoD anyone would decide about spending several hundred million without previously conducting detailed analysis.”

In a meeting held on September 12, 2012, the Polish president, along with his prime minister and other government officials, discussed the development of an anti-missile defense system as part of Poland’s air defense strategy. The head of the BBN, Stanisław Koziej, as well as the minister of defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, spoke to the current problems with Poland’s Air Defense System. The inclusion of anti-missile defense provisions within the framework of the Polish air defense system was a government compromise: it resulted from a shared decision by the president and his government. The proposal of a new Polish missile defense was necessitated by operational requirements in the categories of safety and territorial defense, as well as by the conditions set on the members of the Alliance (the realization of a NATO decision undertaking at the summit in Chicago concerning building a NATO-wide system). The problem, however, was that in order to acquire an anti-missile defense system, there would have to be an amendment to the 2001 law/act that sets fiscal

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167 Ibid
limits in the restructuring and technical modernization of Poland’s military forces.  

Komorowski mentioned that it was a source of personal satisfaction and that is guaranteed a means to finance the modernization of arms at a level that enables the realization of big programs including that of multirole combat aircraft, the program of circular armored personnel carrier, or the armor-piercing rocket program. He also added that Poland would be perceived as a country with clout within the Alliance and one capable of private territory defense.

It was noted, however, that there could be political obstacles that could prevent legislation for an anti-missile defense system. Komorowski mentioned that, in his opinion, “the project amendment of the law would be a good occasion to cue discussion on the theme of prospective defense and capability to cooperation in this area of different political strengths.” At the same time, he expressed interest in recreating an environment similar to 2001, in which party politics were overcome to facilitate discussions concerning the safety of Poland and future decisions. To achieve this goal, the head of BBN proposed a conversation and consultation on the basis of merit from representatives of all branches of parliament.

The top Polish National Security Advisor, Professor Roman Kuzniar, in an interview with Pawel Wronski, a reporter from the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper, made public his belief

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169 Ibid

170 Ibid

171 Ibid
that Poland’s reliance on the US for security was the wrong strategy. Kuzniar mentions that it is the combination of EU, NATO, and Polish military capabilities that protects Poland’s security. While the United States compliments NATO’s security, a US-Polish defense relationship alone is not adequate to keep Poland secure. A proponent of EU security, Kuzniar believes that European security support will emerge once EU leaders – particularly the French and British – put aside their differences. Nonetheless, apart from an incomprehensible EU defense policy, Polish security still relies on an American relationship.

A US-Polish strategic partnership would provide Poland with a guarantee of security. Having some form of US military presence in Poland would place the United States in a difficult position. On one hand, a permanent US military presence in Poland would complicate US-Russian relations, since Russia would perceive this as violating the 2+4 agreement. On the other hand, Poland would satisfy its security umbrella requirement that once was only available through NATO.

With this dynamic in mind, the retracting of the US-Poland BMD agreement in 2009 accounts for Obama’s attempt to reset US-Russian relations. After the Obama administration retracted US President George W. Bush’s 2008 BMD agreement, anxiety spread among the Polish political elite. In response, in July 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Poland to reassure the Polish leadership of a US-Polish strategic partnership. To this day, the US remains Poland’s most powerful ally, and history has demonstrated the success of NATO military operations.


\[^{173}\] Ibid

\[^{174}\] Ibid
America provides a safety net for Poland’s defense strategy because it is a reliable entity of NATO. A case in point is the US’s ability to carry out a deterrence policy that outlasted the Cold War. The Alliance could have difficulties in agreeing on deterrence policies towards the Soviet Union, but it always managed to reestablish relationships through a commonality principle held together by rules within organization.\textsuperscript{175} The French decision to abandon NATO during de Gaulle’s Presidency in response to the United States not supporting a similar Soviet 1964 strategy permitted the Alliance to adopt the strategy of flexible response.\textsuperscript{176} The strength of US foreign policy in NATO, regardless of differences in successive US administrations, brought an end to the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Poland could no longer rely on a weak security structure like the Warsaw Pact.

NATO nations look to the US for leadership. NATO’s ability to continue after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was tested during conflicts in the Balkans. America has never abandoned the Alliance, and it even gave NATO a new purpose during the Bosnian War. During the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO illustrated its capabilities by reestablishing itself as a real security provider and the only collective security actor in Europe. The Clinton Administration persuaded its allies that intervening in Bosnia and later in Kosovo was the solution to ending the war and violence.\textsuperscript{177} The NATO expression “words not deeds” in that NATO’s politicians talk about military action instead of taking action was proven to be wrong; NATO’s intervention against the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and

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\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 70
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the Bosnian Serbs ended the war in socialist Yugoslavia. The outcome of NATO’s success in ending the conflicts in former Yugoslavia reinforced Poland’s ambition in joining the Alliance in the post-Cold War period. However, NATO’s success story in former Yugoslavia might not be as compelling in 2012, as other pressing issues have dominated its agenda.
CHAPTER IX:
A US ASIAN STRATEGY AND A EUROPEAN DILEMMA

Since the US strategy outlined its security interests with regard to Asia in its 2012 national strategic document, concerns have been raised regarding the future of the Alliance. Meanwhile, as the war in Afghanistan dwindles down, Europeans are looking forward to bringing home their troops and to reducing further their military expenditures through sharing and pooling initiatives. Europeans have enjoyed a US security apparatus since the end of WWII, but this might soon change. Western Europeans have benefited from the basing of the US military forces in their countries, but the reduction of the US military footprint in Europe will leave behind a security vacuum. How this security vacuum will be filled is a source of major concern, particularly for Poland.

The United States officially announced in January 2012 that Europeans will be providing their own security, but skeptics doubt that Europeans are prepared to handle major conflicts in their own backyard.\(^{178}\) In resident Obama’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the President emphasized that the US “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region…. [while] our posture in Europe must also evolve.”\(^{179}\) Since this document’s official publication in January 2012, readers have wondered whether Europe is prepared to take the


lead in conducting major military operations in unforeseen conflicts without the US assistance. As a NATO force, the European militaries have been able to take advantage of US assets and training when deploying in dangerous locations (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan).

Further, European defense is very limited in its military capabilities and is reluctant to take another leading role in conducting operations in a civil-war conflict. A case in point was the 2011 French-led NATO air operation (Operation Unified Protector) in Libya. The operation showed that Europe lacks military capabilities, since the US had to provide precision-guided munitions, aerial refueling, targeting, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities (ISR). There were also NATO members that did not even participate in the operation. Another stumbling block is that of a complex bureaucracy, where NATO members need consensus on the use of military force.

What Poland has attempted to accomplish is to patch holes in European security, specifically in its own security, by undertaking measures to prevent the consequences of a weak Alliance, where too few members would be willing to continue their burden sharing commitments after the war in Afghanistan. According to American security analysts, Poland has created a strategic and diverse security approach. Poland has created a battle group through the Visegrad treaty, formed a strategic alliance with Sweden to thwart Russian threats, and attempted to build up EU defense through a stronger NATO partnership during the EU presidency.  


The Polish attitude toward Europe’s disengagement in its own security may not be widely recognized. Poland’s EU presidency objectives in 2011 for European security emphasized the need for EU member states to devote a serious and sustained search

…for a more systematic and harmonized implementation of CSDP initiatives as well as seek for effective partnerships….to take coherent measures if we are to yield considerable results from the time, effort and money invested for more than a decade.  

There is no European consensus what should be done to meet current or future security challenges. Europeans are still trying to figure out how to restructure the current European Defense architecture as the United States refocuses its defense efforts towards Asia. With growing concern over the reduction of national defense spending, Europeans have looked for ways to combine their resources through pooling and sharing and “Smart Defense” (NATO) initiatives. In debriefing after the NATO summit in Chicago, a panel at the annual NATO Brussels Conference placed priority with creating a NATO-China Council (similar to the NATO-Russia Council), an industrial EU defense policy, and a public health and education arrangement after a post-NATO exit strategy. Europeans are trying to figure out how to keep NATO intact for their own security, but actions taken by Europe’s national governments undermine such aims.


One recent November study on determining shortcoming in US-European defense capabilities conducted by the National Defense University identified a wide array of issues that European militaries are facing currently. This study was conducted by interviewing defense officials from all over Europe and the United States, and it analyzed the NATO Chicago Summit’s *NATO Forces 2020* and *Smart Defense* projects along with the Mission Focus Groups (MFGs) concept and by focusing on USEUCOM as the main driver for NATO interoperability.\(^{184}\)

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\(^{184}\) This assessment identified the gaps in military capabilities that European countries in the NATO alliance are experiencing, the trends that forecast near and mid-term capabilities to 2030, proposed four goals that would sustain the alliance as a capable and sustainable force, and explained the problems that NATO as an alliance has to solve in order to close these gaps. See Barry, Charles & Binnendijk, H. (July 2012). Widening Gaps in U.S. and European Defense Capabilities and Cooperation, Defense, Foreign Policy Center for Transatlantic Relations. Retrieved from [http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/articles/Widening%20Gaps%20in%20U.S.%20and%20European%20Defense%20Capabilities%20and%20Cooperation.pdf](http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/articles/Widening%20Gaps%20in%20U.S.%20and%20European%20Defense%20Capabilities%20and%20Cooperation.pdf)
CHAPTER X:
NATO AND POLAND: LOOKING AHEAD

The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has asked the European governments to coordinate closer regional security cooperation, but his requests have not been successful. Tusk is believed to have steered Poland in the right direction in seeking a more comprehensive European security; during the Polish Presidency of the EU Council (where he served a term from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011) Tusk tried his best to strengthen European defense cooperation, but was disappointed by the lack of European solidarity on defense matters. The Georgian-Russian war has made Poles overly concerned, appealing to NATO for reassurance on collective security.\(^{185}\)

The Polish leadership has overstretched its efforts to achieve a collective security guarantee. Territorial integrity is an issue that concerns Poland, but often its European neighbors have worried that Poland would worsen European relations with Russia. The United States has assisted Poland by strengthening military-to-military cooperation, but has not based a military force in Poland. The Poles still are concerned that one day they will be a victim of Russia, just like Georgian was in the Georgian-Russian war.\(^{186}\)

\(^{185}\) O’Donnell, Marina C.et al. (2012) Analysis Paper: The implications of military spending cuts for NATO’s largest members. 30; 5. Center of the United States and Europe, Brookings. 29; 2

\(^{186}\) Ibid., 2
From the Polish elite perspective, Russia disapproves the Eastern partnership program’s objectives in integrating other states in the European Union. However, Russia from the Polish elite perspective does not like the Eastern partnership program on being part of the EU system. In an interview, Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, indicated that an Eastern partnership with Poland’s neighbors (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) \(^{187}\)

Poland’s leaders have pushed for an Eastern Partnership, realizing that states like Ukraine and Georgia might not ever become members of NATO. According to Poland’s security interests, it is better to have a region that is pro-Western then one that is influenced by Russia. Hence, an economic partnership might improve Western relations with aspiring members of NATO, while obviating worry over Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion towards the East. However, Poland alone might not be able to accomplish this task, since a US-Russian reset in relations seems more important for the US. The 2009 Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland clearly identifies the Georgia-Russia conflict as a parochial threat as it …demonstrated the topicality of traditional military threats and the importance of military force, also in Europe’s backyard....[as the] probability of a local conflict occurring close to Poland’s border cannot be excluded.\(^{188}\)

But what does the future hold for Poland’s reliance on Trans-Atlantic security? On January 24, 2012, the European Defense and Security Conference discussed the evolution of European security. According to the conference’s findings, defense “has seemingly come to


a crucial moment in its history…. marked by less spending, fewer interventions and less cooperation continues, Europe’s ability to provide security will be questioned.”

One might argue that relying on other states to provide collective security is very dangerous. Realist critics of collective security like Charles A. Kupchan support individual-state security over collective security, since collective security “at its worst is roughly equivalent to balancing under anarchy at its best is that collective security encourages member states to count on the assistance of others, thereby leaving a directly threatened coalition underprepared for war if the system unravels.” According to Kupchan, in a hypothetical situation, the instruments that provide collective security would collapse little by little, since not all states are ready for the process of war. States that are endangered would be aware that the coalition could not provide adequate defense capabilities, and some members would draw back and others would have to compensate by increasing their forces.

Realistically, if Poland’s sovereignty was violated it could be difficult, if not impossible, to get NATO consensus for collective action (i.e., the invocation of Article 5). NATO consensus is a highly politicized approval process that is usually hampered by member states’ interests. For instance, NATO members like Germany and France would risk their good relations with Russia if they allowed Georgia to become a member of NATO, as occurred when Georgia attempted to join. It has been fours years since the accession

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191 Ibid., 53
192 Germany and France rejected a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia in 2008, which was an important step towards NATO membership. The US position during the George W. Bush Administration
process for Georgia’s membership to NATO came to a halt. In a recent official visit to
Georgia, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen seemed to support the idea
of Georgia joining NATO. Rasmussen replied to Georgian reporters (in the presence of
President Mikheil Saakashvili), that “no third country [Russia] has any right to interfere with
NATO decisions, it’s for NATO to decide on our open door policy and we have stated over
and over again and reinterpreted in Chicago [the NATO Chicago Summit on May 2012] that
our door remains open.”  

According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, the Alliance
would take the appropriate action if one of its members were ever attacked or was a victim of
a military/terrorist conflict. In other words, what Article 5 provides is a broad and
somewhat ambiguous definition of what members of NATO or the Security Council consider
to be “appropriate actions.” As illustrated in Article 5,

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them…in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defence … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary.

Hence, one could speculate whether the Polish security strategy rests on multi-lateral defense
initiatives as an alternative to NATO’s collective security as an insurance policy in case
members of the Alliance do not invoke Article 5.

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193 The NATO Secretary General was asked by Georgian reporters in regards to a statement made by Dmitry
Medvedev, the former president of Russian, if the 2008 Georgian-Russian war halted NATO’s expansion. See
Kucera, Joshua. (2012). NATO Chief Tours Caucasus With Kind Words for Georgia Criticism for Azerbaijan,

194 For more details on Article 5, see What is Article 5? Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm

195 Ibid., 1
State participation in “collective defense” even in contingency operations abroad demands a legal framework or a lengthy approval process. A state’s internal affairs also play a vital role in deciding whether to participate in NATO military operations. Differences of opinion between NATO member states exist, especially between Germany and France: France agrees with using force only following the approval of the United Nations, where as Germany believes that NATO has a responsibility to aid any state that asks for assistance regardless of whether it is a NATO member.\textsuperscript{196}

In an international legal framework, the UN Charter specifies what constitutes self-defense if a state’s sovereignty is undermined. According to the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, a state has “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…. [and] shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{197}

The Poles have been especially concerned (more than any other NATO member) with European security. In order to ensure growth in European security, a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) was formed in 2002 with stringent membership requirements. Even though PESCO was formed under the Lisbon treaty, no one is a more committed member


than Poland to establishing a collective defense against a belligerent state or terrorist organization.198

Nationalist policies also affect who is able to contribute to NATO or EU operations. While Poland’s six-month term as EU president in July 2011 tried to improve the European Union’s command structure and battle group capacity, it itself did not participate in the NATO air operation (Operation Unified Protector) against Libya.199 Members of NATO and the EU continue to pursue their own agendas, making policy-cohesion difficult to achieve. In an effort to limit domestic interests, EU governance attempts to downplay individual-member interests by pressuring governments to abide by the EU rules.200 However, the EU governance pressure does not always work, as domestic politics and economies dictate the behavior of states.

Poland can still influence others with its economic strength, since it continues to be a good and valuable partner. Poland’s defense industry is tied to its strategic government programs. Poland has already reestablished its defense industry by manufacturing tanks, Black Hawk helicopters (through the sister company of the US Sikorsky aircraft manufacturer), self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, armored recovery vehicles, components for US and Canadian firms, Grom rockets, and small arms (assault and sniper rifles).201 The Bumar Group, the state-owned defense company in Poland, is spending profits from its sales


around the world money on R&D; the latest Bumar Group contract was with BELM, an Indian defense company, in the amount of $275 million.  

The current government of Poland, lead by Komorowski and Tusk, has clarified its position in building the defense industry – specifically the Bumar Group and the state-owned Huta Stalowa Wola defense manufacturer – as an exporter and supplier of defense products domestically and abroad. In the interest of safeguarding the economy and the defense industry by providing jobs, an official announcement was made by Tusk that Poland would purchase military armament contracts worth approximately $3 billion dollars (10 billion zloty) in the next two years (2013-14). This move demonstrates Poland’s understanding that the defense industry is a national asset that should also be protected. In order for a defense industry to be healthy, it needs maintain a technological edge and be economically strong to survive in the future.

Global security challenges cannot be ignored, as a weak NATO undermines global stability. Poland has NATO, and as part of the Alliance, it can have its security concerns addressed without seeking smaller bilateral alliances. Paul Gallis of Congressional Research Service mentions, that, “the Alliance is a mutual defense organization, where supreme

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national interests such as the survival of a country and the lives of a government’s soldiers are at issue.”\textsuperscript{205}

Poland and other EU states will be safer if the United States remains in NATO. Military-to-military cooperation between NATO members might build confidence and help to avoid security competition, but it does not prevent the possibility of war between them. Poland would not need to elevate its national defense capabilities if the United States remained on European soil. Promoting national security over collective security would make states behave in a competitive manner by not heeding neighboring states’ concerns.\textsuperscript{206} By retaining the United States as a powerful leader in NATO, other member-states can avoid thinking about the prospect of a possible confrontation with each other. The US has historically built trust and displayed leadership not only during the Cold War, but also into the post-Cold War period. This being said, US participation in NATO has burdened the American taxpayer, since the US spends a considerable amount of GDP on defense.


CHAPTER XI:
CONCLUSION

Today, Poland’s security needs are met by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and through a US-Polish bilateral agreement; secondary features of Poland’s strategic policy are NATO’s air policing, quick response forces, and air missile defense capabilities, and a US military cooperation that improves Poland’s military capabilities. Recently, Poland has been concerned with NATO’s ability to carry out its collective security guarantees should America’s military depart from Europe.

I address in this thesis whether a shift in US military strategy towards Asia coupled with Europe’s declining military budget poses a threat to Poland’s security apparatus. To answer this question required extensive research using primary and secondary sources from the Internet, as well as printed reference material. Published books, journals, magazines, government documents, reports, newspapers, and encyclopedias dating from the 1970s through the present were also utilized in an attempt to argue my answer qualitatively and methodically. I also analyzed additional sources from security conferences, political statements, reports, and think tanks. I made every effort to remain neutral and unbiased by examining multiple American, Polish, and European literature on security. By looking through different lenses, I was able to present a broad perspective on Polish and NATO security.
Revisiting Polish history was vital to understand the genesis of Poland’s security and its evolution. In the Interwar period (1919-39) and throughout the devastating affects of World War II, a Polish security culture emerged along with a distrust in alliances that persists even until today. During the Cold War (1947–1991) Poland’s security relied upon the Warsaw Pact, but in the post-Cold War period (1992-present), the country started down the road toward an independent security policy. In the 1990s, Poland’s security and government institutions went through a difficult transformation. Through NATO membership, Poland was able to modernize, train, and transform its military into a NATO-interoperable military force. The resulting policies for protecting Poland’s territory and sovereignty rely on the protection of the state by internal (domestic armed capabilities) and external means (NATO, European Defense, and regional alliances).

Since its NATO accession in 1999, Poland has been active in NATO operations. Poland surpassed the Alliance’s expectations in carrying out its military and political commitments. Poland has volunteered for more dangerous combat-related missions in both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than its Western European counterparts. As a result, Poland has been able to establish a functional US-Polish strategic partnership.

A US-Polish strategic partnership is important because both countries benefit in one way or another through the relationship. Poland’s military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan supports US interests, just as a US-Polish strategic relationship is important to Poland. America values Poland as an ally just as Poland relies on America for its security interests. As part of a strategic relationship, Poland has trained, modernized, and equipped its military with US assistance. Poland’s security concerns can also be politically backed by the
US in NATO, and Poland satisfies its strategic security policy stipulations by aligning itself with NATO.

In assessing Poland’s security, I investigated the ways it benefited from NATO membership. Poland receives three security benefits, which are the foundational elements of hard power: air policing, aircraft monitoring of Poland’s airspace and that of its allies, the NATO Response Force, a rapid and deployable aggregate of NATO military forces, and the Air Defense, a NATO missile shield comprised of national assets with air and missile defense capabilities. Poland’s concerns include Europe’s ability to uphold NATO’s collective security contract (Article 5), which provides assistance to an injured member in a belligerent conflict, without US assistance.

In the wake of the war in Afghanistan, many of Poland’s European allies have changed their views on military commitments. As a result, Poland has concerns about the ability of the Alliance to perform security tasks. I asked several questions in order to identify the capabilities issues of the Alliance: Could downsizing national military capabilities in Europe compromise Poland’s security in terms of its territorial integrity or sovereignty? To what extent are cuts to the defense budget affecting NATO’s ability to respond to Article 5? Are the pooling and sharing and smart defense initiatives realistic solutions to the shortfall in military capabilities and budgetary cuts in Europe, even if the Alliance members feel uneasy entrusting their state sovereignty to one another? The answers to these questions became clearer after I analyzed NATO’s largest contributors to see how much they would impact European security should their military capabilities diminish.

A military capability gap on both sides of the Atlantic is apparent, and the US continues to narrow it by maintaining its presence in Europe. NATO members like the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany will undergo a military transformation. National defense spending will be steady for Germany and France, but the United Kingdom will continue to decrease its military budget; certain military capabilities will be negatively impacted, if not diminished, but others will improve. The 2012 US budget did not indicate any significant cuts to NATO. US spending for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) will continue as planned until the full implementation of the defense missile shield. Poland will be hosting a segment of NATO’s missile defense system, and also plans to acquire its own missile defense.

Poland has remained steady in its defense expenditures and will increase its spending in the years ahead because of public support and a good economy. In addition, Poland is in the process of making amendments to a 2001 statute on the technical modernization of Poland’s military forces. These changes would allow Poland to finance its own modernized missile defense capabilities. Poland’s politicians will continue to rally their constituents and persuade their voters that defense spending is necessary for Poland’s security. The Polish government announced that a Polish missile defense would not only contribute to the wider NATO missile defense platform but would also boost the Polish defense industry. Poland’s political elites have embraced a strategic philosophy that appeals to the public: Poland’s territorial security and sovereignty can never be compromised as occurred tragically during WWII. At times, Poland’s government officials do not share similar interests or goals, since they support their constituents’ interests. A major proponent of security is Poland’s defense industry, a largely state-owned enterprise. It is evident that domestic politics in Poland play an important role in the sector of defense, especially when rallying supporters for elected officials and when awarding defense contracts. Nonetheless, Poland’s security
concerns resurfaced when America announced a strategic shift from Europe towards Asia on January 2012.

An American strategic refocus to Asia and the Pacific will not threaten Poland’s security, in spite of concerns from either side of the Atlantic. Both US military commanders and European leaders have suggested that the American withdrawal from NATO commitments would detriment Europe’s ability to protect itself. The 2012 US military budget requests for Asia only constituted a small portion of the entire defense budget, and did not affect funding for NATO commitments. The budget for Asia only supplements current technology through upgrades and provides funding for future military aircraft designs. Shifting American assets from Europe, however, might create a security vacuum that could not be filled by Europe’s military forces.

It could be dangerous to European security to rely solely on US commitments to the Alliance. Because of a persisting security culture, Poland feels a need to rely on America’s power projection capabilities, including strategic assets and unique military capabilities, as well as its missile defense for its strategic security requirements. The Polish political elite has tried to reinforce its ability to combat perceived threats to territorial security, but it remains concerned that members of NATO view threat differently, including Poland’s Eastern and Central neighbors. Traditionally, military aggression against a NATO member ought to elicit protection from the other members. With this in mind, Poland’s objective will be to remind the Alliance of the importance of collective security.

What does the future hold for Poland in terms of trans-Atlantic security? On January 24, 2012, the European Defense and Security Conference discussed the future of European security. According to the conference’s findings, because defense and security “has
seemingly come to a crucial moment in its history…. marked by less spending, fewer interventions and less cooperation continues, Europe’s ability to provide security will be questioned.” In a 1995 article, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO,” Robert J. Art raised similar security concerns for Europe. Art warned in response to concerns that Europe no longer takes collective security seriously that, “It is both wrong and dangerous to believe that security and power no longer motivate the Western European states in their relations with one another…. [It is] dangerous because policy based on this mistaken view carries the risk of disastrous outcomes.” From a Polish perspective, a European consensus on defense seems unlikely, as Europe’s focus is on its socio-economic problems, not protection of the homeland.

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Table 1. NATO Defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)

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See Table 3 (page 6) of NATO Diplomacy Division (2012) Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO

Based on current prices / Sur la base des prix courants
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APPENDIX

Figure 1. Defense GDP Expenditures (2007-11)

Poland’s Defense Expenditures (on 1995 constant prices) per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Comparison to NATO, NATO-Europe, United States, and Other NATO member-states from 2007-11.

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211 This data was extracted from Table 1. (NATO Defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)).
WORKS CITED


