EXPLAINING POSTWAR STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FORMER ADVERSARIES

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ABSTRACT

CHRISTIAN WATT: Explaining Postwar Strategic Cooperation between the United States and Its Former Adversaries
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi)

I present a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation—which I define as voluntary, deep, and enduring cooperation—that focuses on the influence of credible commitment problems to explain variation in the qualities of strategic cooperation. I argue that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels. I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. I test my theory against a restricted universe of cases that is comprised of the U.S. wars from World War II to present, arguing that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems in these U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary. My case analyses largely support my theory. This has substantial policy implications. My theory should now be tested on a broader array of strategic cooperation contexts to improve its generalizability.

Disclaimer clause: the views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“If you love someone, set them free. If they come back they're yours; if they don't they never were.”—Richard Bach

In All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, Robert Fulghum presents sixteen principles that describe how one should live and what one should do.\(^1\) Four of the most relevant to this study are: don’t hit people; put things back where you found them; clean up your own mess; and say you're sorry when you hurt somebody. How many of these principles are violated when states war against each other? Reflect on Bach’s quote above. Considering the likely gross violations of Fulghum’s principles and the resultant lingering animosity that war often generates, if the victor sets the loser free, will the loser voluntarily “come back”?

Now consider this kindergarten scenario: imagine you are six years old and playing in your school sandbox when the biggest kid in class comes up to you, accuses you of doing something terrible (which may or may not be true), beats you senseless, picks you up by your collar, wipes the tear- and blood-caked sand from your face, offers you a smile and a lollipop, and proposes that the two of you immediately embark upon a long-term friendship. Under what conditions would such a friendship even be plausible? This mind experiment captures the essence of U.S. foreign policy at the nation-state level where, in certain circumstances, the United States has reached out to its former war adversaries, sometimes at

\(^1\) Fulghum 1988, 2-3.
great cost, in an attempt to establish an *enduring, highly-cooperative, voluntary* relationship—the ideal so-called “strategic partnership” of recent policy vernacular. Those like me see this postwar objective as very ambitious, considering its intended polar change in the relationship between the former belligerents—from war adversaries to close partners—and wonder when it could have a reasonable chance for success. Under what conditions can the United States establish such enduring, highly-cooperative relationships with its recent war adversaries?

**The Puzzle, Research Question, and Scope**

Strategic partnership, as termed in contemporary policy circles, is one form of a broader set of highly cooperative ventures that I define as strategic cooperation. For the purposes of this study, *I define strategic cooperation as voluntary, deep (non-trivial, important, intense), and enduring cooperation.*

In the spectrum of postwar conflict resolution outcomes, war sometimes results in continued open hostility, rivalry, or a stable ceasefire. However, war sometimes results in a voluntary, highly-cooperative relationship as embodied in my definition of strategic cooperation. This is perhaps a counterintuitive postwar outcome—a voluntary, highly-cooperative relationship between former adversaries shortly after war. In the context of just U.S. wars, we see varied outcomes with regards to strategic cooperation. This is the heart of my puzzle. Sometimes postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries is nonexistent (e.g., as seen with Vietnam and Serbia). Sometimes postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries achieves

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2 See Appendices A and B for examples of contemporary postwar strategic partnership agreements.
astonishingly high levels of cooperation (e.g., as seen with Germany and Japan). And sometimes strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries struggles at best to achieve even modest levels of cooperation (e.g., as we are seeing with Iraq and Afghanistan). Strategic cooperation between former adversaries is often not attempted, and when it is attempted, it clearly varies in its ambition and realization of cooperation. Why? What explains this variation in postwar strategic cooperation outcomes between the United States and its former adversaries?

As have defined strategic cooperation, it includes two important qualities of cooperation—depth\(^3\) and endurance. Focusing on depth and endurance of cooperation, the primary aim of my dissertation, then, is to address my puzzle (the variation in postwar strategic cooperation outcomes between the United States and its former adversaries) by answering my more narrow empirical research question: what explains the variation in the qualities of cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries?

By addressing this puzzle, I hope to provide a predictive framework that illuminates the dynamics of strategic cooperation in general and, more specifically, predicts the qualities of postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries. This will enable U.S. policymakers to better assess the costs, benefits, and risks of this postwar strategy choice and thereby, ideally, reduce loss and suffering in the future for all parties. As a byproduct of this project, I hope to spark academic interest in this important national policy topic. Finally, I hope to generalize as much as possible with this project. That said, it is

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\(^3\) In line with Downs et al. (1996), who conceptualize a “treaty's depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence,” I conceptualize a strategic cooperation arrangement’s depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence (383).
beyond the scope of this project to generalize beyond U.S. postwar contexts. The United States is unique. It is an atypically wealthy world power with global reach—it has much to offer a former adversary vis-à-vis security and economics. Also, as a democratic superpower, the United States is perhaps atypically amenable to voluntary, cooperative relationships as compared to other world powers that have a higher tendency towards realpolitik.

**Why do these questions matter?**

It is important to address these questions and achieve a better understanding of postwar strategic-cooperation dynamics for several reasons. First, these questions are highly policy relevant in the contemporary strategic environment. At this moment, the United States continues its attempts to establish effective postwar strategic “partnerships” with Iraq and Afghanistan. That is, this ambitious conflict resolution outcome, reminiscent of U.S. efforts with Germany and Japan after World War II, has reemerged as a contemporary and likely future U.S. postwar strategy.⁴ Also, this policy relevance rises to the highest levels of national command. For instance, U.S. President Barack Obama recently flew to Afghanistan to personally sign and announce the strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan.⁵

Second, and more importantly, strategic cooperation in the postwar context is dangerous—it often puts former adversaries in close proximity to each other and requires them to cooperate in a non-trivial and enduring manner. In this way, the pursuit of postwar

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⁴ See Gates 2010 and Panetta 2011.

⁵ This agreement was announced during a live Presidential television address to the American people on May 1, 2012.
strategic cooperation can cost lives and other resources (on both sides) more so than other postwar strategies that pursue abandonment, domination, or less-cooperative institutional arrangements.\textsuperscript{6}

Third, we do not have a sufficient understanding of strategic-cooperation dynamics in these contexts. It is unclear when strategic cooperation is a viable postwar strategy—whether, in contemporary times, the conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan are even conducive to higher qualities of cooperation. We simply do not understand its dynamics nor could we adequately predict the success of future postwar strategic cooperation efforts.

We have given much attention to how wars start, and a bit to how wars end,\textsuperscript{7} but we have not yet given adequate attention to the conditions under which wars can resolve into voluntary, enduring, and deeply cooperative relationships. Regardless, our policymakers commit lives in attempt to achieve postwar strategic cooperation. In this respect, scholarship on this topic is overdue and could bring much needed insight into this re-emergent, costly, and risky U.S. foreign policy choice. Policymakers need to understand and consider the dynamics of postwar strategic cooperation \textit{before} committing lives and resources in pursuit of postwar strategic cooperation, and the academy has a duty to enable this.

\textsuperscript{6} Such efforts can be extremely costly in terms of lives, dollars, and national attention. Consider U.S. partnership efforts in Afghanistan, for instance. 62 ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) service members were killed in 2012 as a result of “insider attacks” by their Afghan “partners” (see Armed Forces Press Service, 2013). 35 of these dead were Americans, including several Special Forces troops. Many more were wounded in such attacks. This vulnerability of U.S. troops is in large part due the “partnership” mindset. If securing Afghanistan was the only objective, this could be done with much less risk to U.S. troops (i.e., U.S. troops could use a much more forceful and segregated posture with their Afghan trainees). Also, the United States is currently negotiating with Afghanistan in regards to its post-2014 force structure in Afghanistan. Some of the higher troop levels that have been considered as part of this potential partnership package exceed 20,000 personnel—no cheap endeavor.

\textsuperscript{7} See Reiter 2009, 1.
My Argument

This study presents a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation and focuses on the influence of credible commitment problems to explain variation in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. My argument is that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels. A state’s government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation. From my theory, I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. I argue that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary. In these contexts, if former adversary leaders or their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems with the United States, the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer. If those leaders and their winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the United States, then the relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the presence of political unification problems within the former adversary state. Where political unification is higher, the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher. Where political unification is lower and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States (likely the case), the qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower. From a policy perspective, former adversary reconciliation and political unification are the most
challenging sources of credible commitment problems for the United States to mitigate. They, in turn, are crucial domestic variables that U.S. policymakers should consider in their cost, benefit, and risk analyses before committing U.S. resources in attempt to pursue postwar cooperation with a former adversary, particularly when the vision for that relationship’s depth and endurance of cooperation is ambitious (i.e., strategic).

**Relevant Literature**

What is the current contribution of the literature in explaining variation in U.S. postwar strategic cooperation outcomes? Some studies help explain certain aspects of postwar conflict resolution outcomes, but all fall short in explaining the variation we see in strategic cooperation outcomes. Two of the most relevant theories to this study are John Ikenberry’s institutional theory on rebuilding after war and Charles Kupchan’s theory on state rapprochement. Ikenberry’s theory helps understand why states might desire a postwar institutional arrangement such as a strategic cooperation agreement—it explains incentive. It also highlights the importance of credible commitments to these bargained agreements. Kupchan’s theory helps explain how states reorient identities, for instance from enemy to partner—it explains process.

*Institutional Theory on the Rebuilding of Order after War*

The closest theory that relates to postwar strategic cooperation between former adversaries after war comes from John Ikenberry’s work on institutional agreements between former adversaries after war. In *After Victory*, Ikenberry develops a theory for the interests of and the dynamics between the victor and the vanquished after war. After a war concludes, the winning state has three choices: use its power to dominate the weaker state, abandon the
weaker state and return home, or use its power to create a mutually acceptable postwar order with the weaker state. Success of the latter, more cooperative choice is contingent upon an institutional arrangement that provides the defeated state assurances that the victor will abide by its commitments.⁸

There are several reasons for the victor to prefer a cooperative postwar arrangement to the extent of being willing to exercise “strategic restraint” and thereby restrict itself with an institutional agreement. Such an arrangement might reduce the need for instruments of coercion, for example military force, and thus lower the costs to maintain order. Such an arrangement might also preserve for a longer time some of the victor’s current gains, assuming that the victor realizes it will not have an indefinite power advantage.⁹

If the victors are willing to exercise strategic restraint, there are also several reasons for the vanquished to prefer a cooperative postwar arrangement. Such an arrangement may improve the loser’s bargaining position, which would otherwise be based simply on power differentials that are currently in favor of the victor. The incentives of such bargains, financial or otherwise, may include temporal advantages that are critical for the vanquished—immediate gains in the midst of devastation may have higher appeal than future freedom of choice. Finally, such an agreement may assuage fears that the victor will abandon the vanquished to wallow in the chaos and despair of postwar catastrophe, or fears

⁸ Ikenberry 2001, 4, 50.
⁹ Ikenberry 2001, 18, 53-56.
that the vanquished will be dominated by the victor or by another rival should the victor carry through with abandonment.\textsuperscript{10}

Interestingly, the greater the power disparity between the victor and vanquished, the higher the incentive to institutionalize the arrangement. This is because victors can use their amplified power to create more advantageous arrangements and the increased disparity likewise increases the fear of abandonment and domination for the vanquished state. Such power disparities are influenced by the “extent to which the old order was destroyed by the war, the decisiveness of the victory, and the degree to which the winning state was responsible for winning the war.”\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, there are several incentives for both the victor and the vanquished to establish an institutional arrangement after war, although clearly not all do. Also, while Ikenberry’s theory highlights the incentives for a basic institutional arrangement after war, it stops short of explaining the conditions under which states can achieve the most cooperative arrangements (e.g., strategic cooperation with high qualities of cooperation) and does not explain why such highly cooperative arrangements are seldom achieved. For example, the United States would often seem to support Ikenberry’s model of the victor with a high power advantage in pursuit of an institutional arrangement. However, the United States has frequently attempted a particularly ambitious and highly cooperative variant of institutional arrangement with its former adversaries after war—\textit{strategic cooperation}—as seen in all cases from World War II to present except Korea (which is technically an armistice), Vietnam, Serbia, Iraq 1991, and those under Soviet domination (e.g., Hungary, Romania, and

\textsuperscript{10} Ikenberry 2001, 51-57.

\textsuperscript{11} Ikenberry 2001, 51, 74.
Bulgaria after World War II). The reasons for this U.S. preference could be numerous—for instance to create an ally to help maintain regional stability and to balance against other threats. At other times the United States has not attempted strategic cooperation with former adversaries, although it may have preferred it (e.g., the Eastern Bloc World War II cases). If the United States prefers postwar cooperation and is willing to exercise strategic restraint through a highly cooperative strategic cooperation arrangement (instead of, for instance, a more dominating arrangement), and former adversaries need help mitigating postwar economic and security deficits, what prevents a mutually-acceptable postwar strategic cooperation relationship? When strategic cooperation agreements are reached, what explains the variation in their outcomes? Ikenberry’s theory alone cannot solve my puzzle.

Theory on State Rapprochement

Theories on state rapprochement and reconciliation are also relevant to this study. In How Enemies Become Friends, Charles Kupchan offers a framework to understand the mechanics behind state rapprochement. His model is broken down into four phases. In the first phase, one state (the initiating state) initiates the rapprochement with a unilateral act to accommodate its rival (the target state)—extending the olive branch, if you will. In phase two, the target state reciprocates with its own concessions and accommodations for the initiating state. If the target state does not reciprocate, the initiating state may pull back the offer. Else, during the third phase, a pattern of concessions and cooperative activities follows that reinforces the good will generated in earlier phases and causes the rivalry to abate. In
the final phase, states generate new narratives of each other to change the identity of their former adversary from rival to friend. This begets a stable peace.\footnote{Kupchan 2010a, 16-50.}

While Kupchan offers a theory to articulate the phases of reconciliation between rival states (which might help explain the phases of reconciliation between war adversaries), he stops short of explaining the conditions under which states can achieve the most cooperative reconciliation outcomes (e.g., strategic cooperation agreements) and does not explain why such cooperative arrangements are seldom achieved. What conditions influence the rival state’s willingness to accept or reject the initiating state’s rapprochement offer, let alone a strategic cooperation offer? What happens to strategic cooperation outcomes if the citizens of a prospective partner state fail to “re-identify” a rival group (even at its government’s urging) from enemy to non-enemy, let alone to enduring partner? When does rapprochement lead to relationships with higher qualities of cooperation? Kupchan’s theory alone also cannot solve my puzzle.

**Dissertation Flow**

With this foundation to begin a study of strategic cooperation, the rest of this dissertation will flow as follows. In Chapter 2, I present my theory of strategic cooperation, to include theory and hypotheses dedicated to both general strategic cooperation and strategic cooperation specifically in the U.S. postwar context. In Chapter 3, I present my research design. In Chapter 4, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Germany, which tests my theory against circumstances where both international and domestic conditions were favorable for higher qualities of cooperation (West Germany)
and where international conditions were unfavorable and domestic conditions were favorable for higher qualities of cooperation (East Germany). In Chapter 5, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 1991, which tests my theory against a case where both international and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher qualities of cooperation. In Chapter 6, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 2003, which tests my theory against a case where international conditions were favorable but domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher qualities of cooperation. This case allows us to see how my two key domestic variables—former adversary reconciliation and political unification problems—influence qualities of cooperation in the U.S. postwar context. I conclude my study in Chapter 7, in which I present brief case studies of the postwar relationship between the United States and Serbia and a counterfactual of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 2003. I do this to further demonstrate how variations in former adversary reconciliation and political unification problems influence qualities of cooperation. I also provide specific recommendations for the academy and policymakers.
CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION

In this chapter, I present my theory for the condition(s) that cause variations in the qualities of strategic cooperation between the United States and its recent war adversaries. My argument is that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels. A state’s government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation. From my theory, I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. I argue that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary. In these contexts, if former adversary leaders or their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems with the United States, the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer. If those leaders and their winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the United States, then the relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the presence of political unification problems within the former adversary state. Where political unification is higher, the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher. Where political unification is lower
and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States (likely the case), the qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower. From a policy perspective, former adversary reconciliation and political unification are the most challenging sources of credible commitment problems for the United States to mitigate. They, in turn, are crucial domestic variables that U.S. policymakers should consider in their cost, benefit, and risk analyses before committing U.S. resources in attempt to pursue postwar cooperation with a former adversary, particularly when the vision for that relationship’s depth and endurance of cooperation is ambitious (i.e., “strategic”).

In the remainder of this chapter, I first explain my theoretical perspective. I then theorize on how strategic cooperation works in general. Next, I identify several theoretical sources of credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. From this, I derive four testable and falsifiable general hypotheses about strategic cooperation. I then narrow in on strategic cooperation considerations that are specific to the context of this study—U.S. wars from World War II to present—and use this process to focus my general hypotheses to my interest area and assist with forthcoming case selection and policymaking recommendations.

**Theoretical Perspective**

The theory that I present in this chapter is pragmatic towards the “isms.” It is, at heart, a rationalist theory based upon the widely-proliferated bargaining framework. Thomas Schelling noted that “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations,” and this insight applies to my study of conflict that resolves to varied levels of cooperation.\(^{13}\) The

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\(^{13}\) Schelling 1960, 5. See also Reiter 2009, 2.
bargaining approach led me to consider problems of unenforceable commitments between states—that is, credible commitment problems. This inspired my commitment-based explanation of strategic cooperation outcomes that hinges on the insight that prospective partners who are fearful of credible commitment problems are less likely to enter into or follow through with strategic cooperation agreements.\textsuperscript{14} While this credible commitment construct may perhaps be an imperfect fit for some components of my theory,\textsuperscript{15} it is nonetheless a useful conceptual tool to help grapple with abstract phenomena and identify the potential problems that might undermine a bargain for cooperation. By proceeding with the premise that states must credibly commit to an agreement for cooperation in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation, we gain leverage on this puzzle, perfect fit or otherwise.

My theoretical perspective relies on a few important assumptions. First, states are important actors, but states are not the only important actors in this story. A state, corporately and through its government, declares war, commits to treaties, and importantly to my study, enters strategic cooperation agreements. However, subnational actors are also important in that they make strategic choices, sometimes on behalf of state interests and sometimes on behalf of their own interests, and this dynamic might have significant influence on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

\textsuperscript{14} See Reiter 2009, 5. This analytical approach is modeled upon Walter 2002 and Reiter 2009.

\textsuperscript{15} A purist might argue that a “credible commitment problem” requires the current conditions to support the honoring of commitments while a possible future condition may not support the honoring of commitments, thereby creating a time-inconsistency problem. I take a looser theoretical approach with the perspective that current conditions might support the affirmation (e.g., signing) of an agreement while future or current conditions might not support the honoring of that agreement, thereby creating a credible commitment problem. Also, deadlock preferences—“the absence of mutual interest”—might be another way to describe some of the components of my theory (see Oye 1985, 7).
Secondly, anarchy is unavoidable, and this necessarily creates a situation where state compliance with international agreements, such as a strategic cooperation agreement, is not automatic. There is no world government to enforce strategic cooperation promises. This creates uncertainty as to whether a pledge for strategic cooperation will be honored, even if made—that is, whether commitments to strategic cooperation are credible.\textsuperscript{16} This dynamic has an increased opportunity to affect a strategic cooperation arrangement’s qualities of cooperation because of the enduring nature of the intended relationship.

Third, state power certainly matters in postwar conflict resolution outcomes, especially when it comes to a state’s capacity to offer incentives for cooperation or a state’s need to seek external support through cooperation. However, power is not the only attribute that matters in this credible commitment story—other attributes could take precedence over actor preferences and decisions, especially over the course of an enduring relationship.

Institutions, for instance, may matter more or less to the credibility of commitments over the course of an enduring relationship. Recall that strategic cooperation, as I have defined it, is a voluntary arrangement—state actors eventually have substantive choices about how deeply and enduringly they will cooperate. Thus, institutions may be important to help resolve collaboration and distribution issues. Institutions can reduce transaction costs and thereby increase the payoff of cooperation. Institutions can help resolve problems of information deficits and asymmetries by enhancing transparency through monitoring and reporting. Institutions can facilitate cooperative reciprocity by discouraging backsliding when they have the ability to identify and punish defectors. Importantly, institutions can help

\textsuperscript{16} See Reiter 2009, 23-50 for a similar approach to the topic of anarchy.
overcome certain time-inconsistency problems by insulating leaders from domestic pressures to renege on an agreement. All of these factors combine to help mitigate trust issues and institutionalize strategic cooperation arrangements so they can survive the inevitable “jostling” over the course of an enduring relationship.\(^{17}\)

Identities may also matter to the credibility of commitments over the course of an enduring relationship. While I assume that states and actors are rational, their primary preferences may waver between material and ideational concerns at any given time. Materialism and ideation are both important and both are considered in my theory. One could envision circumstances where short-term preferences would favor material concerns but long-term preferences would bend towards ideational concerns—a Maslowian scenario of sorts where one does what one must in order to survive today in hopes that one might be able to improve one’s circumstances tomorrow. For example, a weak state might cooperate in the immediate aftermath of war to reap available benefits (e.g., material aid) to mitigate immediate security deficiencies. However, once that weak state is self-sufficient with respect to security (i.e., has regained enough power to neutralize an internal or external threat), ideational preferences over religion, ethnicity, culture, or regime-type, for instance, may inspire alteration to the status quo, thereby altering the qualities of cooperation. For some actors, ideational concerns may outweigh all others outright, regardless of immediate security or survival concerns. Importantly, as I will demonstrate later, the material benefits of strategic cooperation are often great, particularly after war. However, states do not always agree to such cooperation. Nor, when states do agree to cooperation, do states always “do

\(^{17}\) See Martin and Simmons 1998, Keohane and Martin 1995, and Keohane 1984 for explanations of these and other merits and limits of institutions.
cooperation” well, even when there are obvious gains to be made. Materialism is clearly not the only driving factor of strategic cooperation outcomes!

A last assumption is that structural factors and actors are both important to strategic cooperation outcomes—both must be supportive to enable the highest qualities of cooperation. When able, I give privilege to structural factors and how structure influences an actor’s opportunity or willingness to commit to strategic cooperation. This is in hopes to improve the predictive power of my theory.

This pragmatic and somewhat eclectic theoretical perspective suggests that I should consider a great many conditions that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Strategic cooperation agreements are intended to be enduring—a great many of these considerations might take primacy at one point or another and have a large influence on strategic cooperation outcomes.

**How to Make Strategic Cooperation Work: the Ingredients**

Cooperation between nations, especially the deep and enduring cooperation associated with a strategic cooperation agreement, takes effort—it is not without cost. Therefore, there must be some incentive to engage in strategic cooperation—something to gain. Further, since strategic cooperation is voluntary, both sides in a strategic cooperation arrangement have a vote on whether its intended cooperation will commence and whether it will continue.18

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18 A clear foreshadowing of potential time-inconsistency problems, a.k.a., credible commitment problems!
The Incentive for Strategic Cooperation

Accordingly, a strategic cooperation arrangement must generate what David Lake terms a “joint production economy”—an efficiency from cooperation that produces a net gain.\textsuperscript{19} This gain, however, could be material or otherwise. There are several potential benefits of strategic cooperation, including benefits to a state’s economy, security, and intangibles such as status and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{20} Using security as an example, Lake explains that:

“When joint production economies exist, the pooling of resources by two polities produces more security than the sum of their individual efforts; the two polities can thereby enjoy more security for the same cost or the prior level of security at less cost to themselves. Joint production economics are necessary for polities to cooperate at all: as cooperation is costly…there must be some benefit that is not available through unilateralism.”\textsuperscript{21}

Importantly for this study, Lake finds in subsequent work that weaker (subordinate) states tend to spend less on their security than they would otherwise when they participate in security arrangements (often a component of strategic cooperation) with stronger states.\textsuperscript{22}

Similarly, Alexander Cooley studies the politics of basing troops on foreign soil (which is also sometimes a component of strategic cooperation) and finds that “a foreign military presence can offer internal security and a guarantee that the host regime will survive an internal threat.”\textsuperscript{23} Aside from economic gains for certain domestic actors, Cooley finds that oversees U.S. basing arrangements (and I would argue strategic cooperation arrangements as

\textsuperscript{19} See Lake 1999.
\textsuperscript{21} Lake 1999, 7.
\textsuperscript{22} Lake 2007.
\textsuperscript{23} Cooley 2008, 12.
well) “can also provide intangible benefits such as prestige, legitimacy, and association with the United States and the West.”

These benefits are in addition to the benefits that an institutional agreement such as a strategic cooperation agreement can bring, specifically to the postwar environment. As noted previously, Ikenberry argues that a vanquished (weaker) state might improve its bargaining position, garner crucial immediate gains (e.g., reconstructive efforts), and assuage abandonment concerns (and thereby increase security) through such an arrangement. A victorious (stronger) state can reduce the need for costly coercive instruments and preserve gains for a longer period through such an arrangement. Theoretically, then, the spectrum of weak to strong states has potential gains from, and incentives for, strategic cooperation, and as we see often in the U.S. postwar context, even the most powerful state in the system has found incentive to pursue such cooperation.

Clearly not all strategic cooperation is of equal value to a given partner. For example, the robust U.S. strategic cooperation arrangement with Germany after World War II greatly increased U.S. economic influence in Europe at the expense of then-peer-rival Russia. This cooperative arrangement may well have greater utility to the United States than U.S. strategic cooperation arrangements with any number of Caribbean states that have produced more modest gains for U.S. influence at the expense of lesser-rival Cuba. As Lake explains, “The greater the gains from joint production, in turn, the more likely polities are to cooperate.” There may also be disincentives for cooperation that countermand the

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24 Cooley 2008, 12.

25 See Watt 2013.

26 Lake 1999, 7.
incentives for cooperation, and I will discuss many of these disincentives later. But as long as there is a joint economy—as long as there is a net gain of some sort from cooperation—there is an incentive for strategic cooperation, and as I explained, there are numerous reasons for a joint production economy of some sort to exist.

*The Mechanics of Strategic Cooperation: Commit, Cooperate, and Achieve*

In accordance with bargaining theory, if prospective participants in strategic cooperation have something that they would like to gain from a strategic cooperation agreement, they must credibly commit to that agreement to signal to their own agents to cooperate with the other participant and to facilitate reciprocal cooperation from the other partner—states must credibly commit to the cooperative relationship to promote cooperation, let alone deep and enduring cooperation. 27 This credible commitment is the foundation upon which the cooperation is built. Then, throughout the course of the enduring relationship, the states must “do” strategic cooperation—states must cooperate towards mutual interests in an enduring and non-trivial (deep, strategic) manner. 28 These recurring demonstrations of cooperation serve two purposes. First, they serve to further their immediate arrangement objectives (e.g., build joint-use facilities). Second, they serve to signal continued commitment to the relationship. Ultimately, this cooperation yields the fruits of the arrangement—states, working together, achieve results. Depending on the success of the relationship, these results may be net gains or net losses, and may coincide more or less with each participant’s intended purpose for the arrangement. This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 1 below.


28 Note that this is an ambitious requirement between former adversaries, which is the focus of this study.
In this study, as I have previously discussed, I focus on the ambition and realization of the depth and endurance of a relationship’s cooperation—its “qualities of cooperation”—as a tractable measure of these strategic cooperation results. These qualities of cooperation themselves reflect key cooperation purposes and are perhaps the most important aspect of a supposed strategic-cooperation relationship. Further, by utilizing these qualities of cooperation as my dependent variable, I am able to compare qualities of cooperation across cases, whether or not a strategic cooperation relationship was attempted.

As conceptualized in the simplified model in Figure 1, the cooperative relationship is like a beam held up by the credible commitment of the participating nations to their cooperative arrangement. The cooperative relationship itself is comprised of the cooperative

29 Tractability becomes an issue when one tries to define the purposes of a given relationship, which may be explicit or tacit, and may be subject to wide variation in interpretation and debate.
contributions of the participating states to the arrangement. That cooperation produces an output of results—the fruits of the cooperation—which is represented in the container above the output vector.\textsuperscript{30} This model represents a strategic cooperation relationship with higher qualities of cooperation. It is in balance. Both states have credibly demonstrated full commitment to the arrangement and are holding up their end of the beam. Both states are demonstrating full cooperation towards cooperative goals. The output signal is strong (thick), demonstrating that the sum of their joint efforts is greater than the sum of their individual efforts—synergy. The strategic cooperation arrangement is highly ambitious (the container above the output vector is large) and the strategic cooperation is yielding favorable results—a high proportion of these ambitious cooperative goals are being achieved. That is, this strategic cooperation arrangement has both a high level of cooperative ambition and a high level of cooperative realization.

To more practically illuminate the nuances of the linkage between commitment, cooperation, and strategic cooperation outcomes, consider this analogy of engaging in strategic cooperation with a specific state as compared to leasing a new car from a specific dealership. To achieve the ultimate purpose of the relationship—the lessee gets a new car and the dealership gets the lessee’s money—the lessee and the dealer must first obligate themselves by signing a legally-enforceable leasing agreement (i.e., both states must credibly commit to the strategic cooperation agreement). Then, both entities must do those things necessary to complete the transfer of the vehicle and maintain the vehicle warranty—registration, insurance, payments, oil changes, and so forth (i.e., agents of both states must

\textsuperscript{30} There may be other gains from the strategic cooperation arrangement that fall outside of the intended arrangement purposes (i.e., outside of the red and green container). Those are omitted from the model for simplicity and clarity.
cooperate through continued action and, thereby, reinforce that credible commitment). Then, in all likelihood, the result will be a successful long-term lease (i.e., a strategic cooperation arrangement with higher levels of cooperation).

The credibility of commitments can vary and there are several mechanisms that can strengthen the credibility of commitments. Some of the possible mechanisms to strengthen credible commitments include costly signals, credible contracts, institutions, and third party guarantees.\textsuperscript{31}

Costly signals send the message that one is “committed to the cooperative relationship”—the more costly the signal, the more credible the signal. Costly signals in more routine contexts might include an engagement ring in conjunction with a wedding proposal, earnest money for a home-purchase offer, or collateral for a loan. In the strategic cooperation context, irreversible investments can serve as a costly signal. For instance, if a prospective participant completes a high-value infrastructure project on the other’s territory, the resultant asset, which might be vulnerable to nationalization, can improve the credibility of the prospective participant’s commitment to the cooperative relationship. Additionally, in strategic cooperation contexts, costly signals often take the form of public pledges by state officials. For instance, the strategic cooperation agreement between the United States and Iraq is embodied in the \textit{Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq} (a.k.a., the SFA). U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker signed the SFA in 2008 and that SFA is available online to the public, along with updates to its implementation progress. Sending an even costlier

\textsuperscript{31} See, for instance, Morrow in Lake and Powell 1999.
signal, President Obama recently traveled to a combat zone and addressed the United States (and, thereby, the world) on live television from Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan to announce his signing of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Such signals are costly because they are transparent and public (aside from being potentially dangerous, politically costly, and/or financially expensive). They announce to all interested parties that the cooperative relationship is “on.” This stakes the reputation of the sender (the individual and the state) on the conduct and success of the relationship. It also provides the receiver (the other participant) leverage—since the promises of relationship have been made public, others will know if the sender backslides on its promises. Backsliding, therefore, could be costly to the sender in other ventures and, accordingly, such costly signals provide reassurances to the receiver that the sender’s commitment to the relationship is credible.

A credible contract may or may not accompany the costly signal, and may or may not be backed by the strength of credible institutions or third party guarantees. A contract (e.g., a strategic cooperation agreement) with reasonably achievable aims reinforces the idea that the contract is feasible. This contract is more credible than a contract with impossible goals. For instance, a contract for a million-dollar home loan from a bank to a buyer would lack credibility if that buyer was broke, unemployed, undereducated, had a terrible credit rating, and had no prospects for future income. Even if both parties agreed to sign (commit) to the contract, there is little hope that the buyer would ever achieve the capacity to fulfill the contractual obligations (i.e., the loan payments). Additionally, a contract with enforcement mechanisms is more credible than a similar contract without such mechanisms. Credible institutions and third party guarantees can reinforce the idea that the contract is enforceable.

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32 May 1, 2012.
and therefore protected. For instance, strong domestic institutions that respect the rule of contractual law might better protect the agreement in the future so that the contract will not be subject solely to the whim of an individual leader’s preferences. Institutional strategies like “cost-sharing” (splitting the cost of subcomponents of the contract so that those components fail without joint effort) and “tit-for-tat” (each participant gives a little at a time, waiting for reciprocation) can also help contractual credibility. Pertinent to my specific research question, credible U.S. commitment is more likely than credible former adversary commitment. This is because consolidated democracies, in general, offer the most credible contracts while states under transition are the most uncertain. While the United States is a consolidated democracy, its former adversaries almost never are. Rather, those former adversaries are often in political transition after war (e.g., democratizing like Germany, Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan), which is the least favorable scenario for credible contracts.

Lastly, some strategic cooperation agreements are more loosely specified than others. Consider the differences in language between the renowned NATO Article 5 (invoked for the first and only time thus far after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001) and the sole paragraph on defense and security cooperation from the SFA between the United States and Iraq, as depicted below:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to

33 See Cooley 2008 and also Morrow in Lake and Powell 1999.

34 Cooley 2008, 13.
“restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”—Excerpt from North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 (emphasis mine)

“In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.”—Excerpt from SFA (emphasis mine)

As seen in this example, some strategic cooperation agreements may lack some of the binding language of other interstate contracts. Since some strategic cooperation agreements can be vague, open to wide interpretation, and therefore hard to enforce from a traditional credible contract perspective, credibly committing to strategic cooperation may be more heavily dependent on costly signals such as costly public affirmation of the relationship and recurring and enduring demonstrations of cooperation. When credible commitment to the relationship is in question, cost sharing and tit-for-tat strategies may help mitigate concerns.

Undermining Strategic Cooperation Outcomes: Credible Commitment Problems

While there are often joint economies to be gained from a strategic cooperation, cooperation is not always attempted. Nor, when strategic cooperation is attempted, do those cooperative relationships necessarily exhibit the same depth and endurance of cooperation, particularly in the postwar context. What explains these variations in strategic cooperation outcomes? I argue that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels.

Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr provide a framework that helps to systematically theorize the potential variables that might influence a state’s ability to credibly commit to a
While states might have much to gain from strategic cooperation, they must also have the opportunity and the willingness to credibly commit to a cooperative agreement. Else, their ability to send costly signals that they are committed to the cooperative relationship, initially and through recurring acts of cooperation, will be impaired. This will be perceived by the other participant and, in turn, decrease that participant’s willingness to contribute to the cooperative relationship. In such circumstances, a relationship’s depth and endurance of cooperation will suffer—one or both of the participants will backslide on the arrangement. As such, I consider in this study a great many potential variables from a wide range of literature that might affect the opportunity or willingness of a state to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.

Robert Putnam’s framework for two-level games, which analyzes the dynamics of international agreements at the international and domestic levels, is useful to this study as well. Reflecting on Putnam’s insights, one must consider the wider international audience (which might include a range of states from friendly to hostile towards the participants or the cooperative arrangement) and domestic audience (which might likewise include a range of populations from friendly to hostile towards the participants or the cooperative arrangement).

35 See Most and Starr 1989.

36 To demonstrate how these credible commitment problems manifest (play out) mechanically (as a causal mechanism), consider a hypothetical prospective strategic cooperation arrangement between two states—Partner A and Partner B. When Partner A’s opportunity or willingness to commit to the strategic cooperation arrangement is reduced, there will be a corresponding decrease in Partner A’s opportunity or willingness to send a costly signal to affirm its commitment to strategic cooperation. For example, Partner A’s leaders will struggle (or fail) to send a costly signal (i.e., publicly affirm the partnership as President Obama did in Afghanistan, approve a liberal status of forces agreement as Germany did, or allow robust basing as Japan did) to provide assurances to Partner B that commitment problems will not undermine Partner A’s ability to contribute to the cooperative arrangement now or in the future. In this case, Partner B will have less assurance that Partner A will have the opportunity and willingness to abide later by any promises it makes today. This creates a time inconsistency problem, a.k.a. a commitment problem. In such circumstances, the strategic cooperation outcome will suffer—one or both of the partners will backslide on the arrangement.

and how this dynamic might affect a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement. A state’s agents (e.g., its leaders) might voluntarily defect from a cooperative relationship of their own accord (i.e., they lack willingness), or they might involuntary defect when they are unable to deliver on promises because of international or domestic forces (i.e., they lack the opportunity).\textsuperscript{38} Cooley observes this as well in his study on the politics of basing, explaining how this dynamic might affect a bargaining situation:

“rulers of host countries are involved in two sets of hierarchical political relationships, or nested hierarchies, in that they manage relations with the sending\textsuperscript{39} state while simultaneously providing public goods and selective incentives to their domestic political clients and supporters, who are also known as the ‘selectorate.’ These dual imperatives interact in a two-level game in which rulers use base-related [or, for this study, we could substitute ‘strategic-cooperation-related’] issues and resources for their domestic political purposes but can also invoke domestic constraints in their negotiations with the sender.”\textsuperscript{40}

With all of this in mind, I consider variables that emanate from both the international and domestic levels that might affect the opportunity or willingness of a state to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory is also applicable to this study.\textsuperscript{41} Reflecting on the insights of selectorate theory, one must consider both the state leadership and other influential subnational entities as one considers the opportunity and willingness of a state government to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement. Selectorate

\textsuperscript{38} Putnam 1988, 438.

\textsuperscript{39} The sender here is the state that is sending forces to base on the host country’s soil.

\textsuperscript{40} Cooley 2008, 11.

\textsuperscript{41} Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003. See also Cooley 2008, 10.
theory compliments Putnam’s theory in that it specifies several important types of actors at the domestic level that might influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Importantly, it assumes, as do I in this study, that leaders want to stay in power.\footnote{Following the approach of Cooley, I also assume that state leaders “value and pursue, above all else, their own domestic political survival. Rulers certainly value other things, such as following their political ideologies, improving domestic conditions, and securing the national interest, but rulers wield power in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas in order to maximize their own political benefit and maintain their office” (Cooley 2008, 10).} Strategic cooperation can provide a variety of benefits, resources, and opportunities to leaders in achieving those ends.\footnote{Similarly stated by Cooley (2008, 10) in reference to the benefits of hosting bases for foreign military forces.}

The \textit{selectorate} is the enfranchised portion of a state’s residents that has a formal role in selecting its government’s leadership. The selectorate can be large or small. For instance, in a consolidated democracy with widespread suffrage, the selectorate could be quite large in proportion to the resident population. In an autocracy, the selectorate may be quite small, perhaps just a few powerful elite. The \textit{winning coalition} is the subset of the selectorate that controls whether a leader remains in power. The winning coalition may be large or small as well. For instance, in a consolidated two-party democracy, the winning coalition may be as large as the simple majority (i.e., 51%) of the voting population. In an autocracy, the winning coalition may be quite small, consisting of only a handful of powerful elite with the power to suppress the preferences of the masses. Large winning coalitions often encourage leaders to provide more public goods to stay in power, while small winning coalitions often encourage leaders to provide more private goods to their smaller pool of vital supporters to stay in power. Importantly for this study, selectorate theory draws one inward to look at leaders, those who keep leaders in power (i.e., the winning coalition), \textit{other influential}
*domestic actors* who might challenge the leaders and winning coalition based on their own strategic cooperation preferences, and how all of these types of actors are rewarded or punished by a given strategic cooperation agreement.

Selectorate theory highlights the possibility that a strategic cooperation agreement could become politicized. As Cooley finds with respect to hosting foreign bases, strategic cooperation with a particular state might mean different things to different actors, and a single actor’s views might change considerably over time.\(^{44}\) A given strategic cooperation agreement might represent a welcomed opportunity for prosperity or security to some, while at the same time representing unwanted competition and meddling to others. In the postwar environment, a given strategic cooperation agreement might represent a welcomed linkage to a liberator from oppression to some, while at the same time representing an untoward, lingering tie to an oppressor to others. As a practical example from U.S. history, when basing presence is a security byproduct of a strategic cooperation agreement, that basing could be seen as an endorsement of a political regime to some, or a “symbol of violated national sovereignty, U.S. imperialism, and political struggle” to others.\(^{45}\) Other actors might be completely ambivalent to the cooperative relationship. This dynamic creates cleavages that can be exploited politically by actors who are in or out of the winning coalition or selectorate. Leaders, then, must be vigilant to appease their winning coalition or that winning coalition might defect and allow the selectorate to replace those leaders with others who match their strategic-cooperation-willingness level (e.g., pro-strategic cooperation or

\(^{44}\) Cooley 2008, xii.

\(^{45}\) Cooley 2008, xii.
otherwise). Leaders must also be mindful of other influential actors who might use a strategic cooperation issue as an opportunity or motive to challenge the leader.

Accordingly, while I consider state behavior, I also consider the behavior of several other important actors that matter to this story. As a review, external (international) actors that have the power to influence the cooperative relationship matter, and these actors can promote or undermine the relationship. Domestic leaders—those policymakers who make the decision to commit to the cooperative relationship (e.g., a president or parliament)—and their winning coalitions matter as well. For autocracies, the winning coalition could be a small group whose loyalty can be secured with private goods. For democracies, this is typically a large group that demands public goods. Other influential domestic actors that have the opportunity and willingness to influence the cooperative relationship also matter. They may have their own interests that conflict with those of the state, its leaders, or the winning coalition, and they may be able to challenge the government for the loyalty of the population and effectively undermine a strategic cooperation agreement. They might also resort to extra-legal means to intimidate or exploit, and in so doing, undermine the cooperative relationship. A recent example might be Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq whose followers violently challenged both the Iraqi government and U.S. forces, and in doing so, the U.S.-Iraq cooperative relationship.

To summarize, as I weigh the theoretical insights of Most and Starr, Putnam, and Bueno de Mesquita et al., I consider many potential sources of credible commitment problems extracted from many types of literatures (e.g., bargaining, nation building, alliance, and rapprochement literatures), emanating from multiple levels (e.g., international and domestic levels), and contingent upon the preferences and dynamics of several important actors (e.g.,
leaders, their winning coalition, and other influential domestic actors). I prioritize, narrow, and simplify those variables in a structured and methodical way using Most and Starr’s framework—what most affects a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly commit to strategic cooperation agreements and, in turn, cooperate to achieve desired results?

I identify eight sources of credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels—my independent variables that affect my dependent variable of a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. At the international level, I find three potential sources of credible commitment problems: spoilers, competitors, and other international conditions. At the domestic level, I find five potential sources of credible commitment problems: disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems.

To avoid confusion, I caution the reader that these independent variables should not be assumed as “good” or “bad” for a relationship’s qualities of cooperation based on the normative connotation of their labels. Much of my terminology to label the sources of credible commitment problems was chosen to best match extant literature (which talks about reconciliation, not irreconciliation; trust issues, not mistrust issues; political unification, not political disunification, and so forth). “Trust” is normatively good. “Spoiler” is normatively bad. “Other international conditions” is normatively neutral. Yet problems in any of these “sources of credible commitment problems” would be “bad” for a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. For instance, the act of reconciliation may be normatively good for cooperation, but the related source of credible commitment problem is a lack of or a deficiency in

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46 The terms “political unification” and “political unity” are used interchangeably throughout this study.
reconciliation that would undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. The independent variable’s “reconciliation” label is simply used to identify the source-type for the credible commitment problem in a way that is parsimonious, natural, and familiar.

Figure 2 below graphically depicts the effects of these sources of credible commitment problems on my original model depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 2: General Strategic Cooperation Framework with Credible Commitment Problems

As conceptualized in the simplified model of Figure 2, the introduction of credible commitment problems to the strategic cooperation framework causes a breakdown in credible commitment, cooperation, and ultimately strategic cooperation results. A credible commitment problem from any of the sources in the red container at the bottom of the model
could undermine the relationship at its very foundation—the opportunity or willingness of one or both of the participants to credibly commit to the strategic cooperation relationship. This model represents a strategic cooperation relationship with lower qualities of cooperation. State B has credible commitment problems causing State B’s end of the beam (i.e., the cooperative relationship) to fall. State B’s deficiency in credible commitment causes State B’s cooperation to fall off—the progress towards achieving immediate cooperation objectives is faltering, and State B’s opportunity and willingness to recurrently signal credible commitment through cooperation towards the relationship is undermined. The strategic cooperation output signal is weak—the states are not achieving the desired joint economies. The cooperative relationship is highly ambitious (the container above the output vector is large) but is yielding unfavorable results—a high proportion of its ambitious cooperative goals are not being achieved. That is, this strategic cooperation arrangement has a high level of cooperative ambition but a low level of cooperative realization. Further, State B’s credible commitment problem is sensed by State A and, accordingly, State A feels the increasing burden of the relationship’s load. State A also observes State B’s commensurate drop-off in cooperation, the reduced output signal, and the unfavorable cooperation results. State A must decide how to respond to State B’s credible commitment problem. State A then reduces its own commitment and cooperation. The degenerative cycle might then repeat, depending on the circumstances, and further erode the relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

*International sources of credible commitment problems*

I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation: spoilers, competitors, and other international conditions. Credible commitment problems from any one of these sources
could significantly undermine strategic cooperation results or even preclude an attempt of strategic cooperation outright.

A spoiler is a state that has both the opportunity and the willingness to preclude the possibility of strategic cooperation by force or coercion. This creates an opportunity problem for both of the prospective strategic cooperation participants—even if they are willing to cooperate, a spoiler might preclude such cooperation at any time of its choosing. An example of this would be the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II and throughout the Cold War. The Soviets simply would not have allowed the United States and Eastern Bloc nations to engage in strategic cooperation at that time. A spoiler is not synonymous with threat, enemy, or nemesis. North Korea is currently an enemy of the United States and a threat to South Korea, but lacks the opportunity (power) to spoil the fruitful cooperation between Washington and Seoul. After World War II, the United States was neither enemy nor threat to Germany (quite the opposite), but was a spoiler to any potential strategic cooperation between the Russians and Germans in the Western zones it occupied.

A spoiler could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation agreements, and thereby degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways. It could, for instance, physically block the costly signals of commitment to the arrangement or the commensurate recurring acts of cooperation between the prospective participants by controlling physical access to territory, post, the media, and so forth (e.g., to deny access for agreement negotiations). A spoiler could also use violence, credible threats of reprisal, or other forms of intimidation to prevent or coerce a prospective participant from committing to and participating in a cooperative agreement. If State B from my model has a spoiler as a source of credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B would
renege on its promises in the future and involuntarily defect from the cooperative agreement due to interference from the spoiler (that is, if the spoiler allows the prospective participants to communicate and come to terms for a strategic cooperation agreement in the first place).

A competitor is a state that has the opportunity and the willingness to provide a more desirable outcome for one of the prospective strategic cooperation participants (I will call this participant the target state)—a better offer. This creates a willingness problem for the target state—even if it has the opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation with the other prospective participant, the target state might willingly succumb to a competitor’s higher bid at any time of the target state’s choosing. Importantly, there must be an element of exclusivity to the competitor’s offer—something that precludes the target state from strategic cooperation with both the competitor and the other prospective participant. The U.S. cooperative relationship with Germany after World War II was not entirely exclusive. Germany has enjoyed close cooperation with both the United States and the United Kingdom since that time. However, had West Germany pursued strategic cooperation with Russia after World War II, it is entirely conceivable that the United States would have forced West Germany to “choose sides” or lose U.S. support.

A competitor could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation, and thereby degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways. It could offer better security or economic advantages to the target state—for instance, the sale or transfer of superior hi-technology weaponry (public goods) to U.S. partners during the Cold War that was contingent upon those states keeping their alignment clear and keeping their distance from U.S. rivals. A competitor could also undermine strategic cooperation at a subnational (private goods) level. For instance, a competitor might offer exclusive rents to key
policymakers or members of the target state’s winning coalition (if that state’s laws allow or if there is corruption) that could not be equaled or exceeded by the other prospective participant and that would be forfeit if that strategic cooperation were to transpire. If State B from my model has a competitor as a source of credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B would renege on its promises in the future and voluntarily defect from the strategic cooperation agreement to capture a higher payoff from the exclusive cooperation rents of the competitor.

*Other international conditions* may also be international sources of credible commitment problems. This is a regrettable but necessary “catch all” category, and issues that arise from this source of credible commitment problems could create an opportunity or willingness problem for one or both of the prospective participants of a cooperative agreement. For instance, the regional geopolitical situation may be such that strategic cooperation between the two prospective participants causes undesirable second and third order effects, perhaps by conflicting with existing alliances and international agreements for one of the participants. Perhaps one of the states is considered a “pariah” and any cooperation with it would bring fears of contributing to regional or global instability, empowering a threat, and damaging one’s image. Perhaps there is an incompatibility with ideology, as seen between the states that voluntarily aligned with the West or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These other international conditions could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation, and thereby degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways or might preclude the willingness of states to even consider (let alone credibly commit to) a cooperative arrangement outright. For instance, if State B from my model is ruled by someone whom many consider to be a ruthless dictator or a war criminal, State A has good cause to fear that
State B would renege in the future on critical cooperation promises (such as not using the proceeds from the cooperative relationship to harm its residents or others). State B cannot credibly commit to being a non-pariah in the future and, therefore, cannot credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement with another state that is unwilling to closely cooperate with such types.

*Domestic sources of credible commitment problems*

I identify five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation: disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems. As with credible commitment problems from international sources, credible commitment problems from any one of these domestic sources could significantly undermine strategic cooperation results or preclude an attempt of strategic cooperation outright.

A *disinterest* problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants is insufficiently interested in the gains that could be made from that specific strategic cooperation arrangement. This creates a willingness problem for the state in question—even if it has the opportunity to engage in a particular cooperative relationship, it might decline to consider (let alone credibly commit to) the relationship or fail to enduringly cooperate towards cooperation goals because it deems the gains from the relationship to be unworthy of its effort. To emphasize, a disinterest problem in this context means that there is a deficiency of interest in the available net gains that could be obtained from that specific cooperative relationship (say, one unit of utility)—a participant is not interested in that gain regardless of which cooperation opportunity it might come from. Sometimes an apparent disinterest
problem actually has a different root cause. For instance, if a prospective participant is interested in the same net gain (the one unit of utility) from strategic cooperation with a different state, just not from strategic cooperation with the original state, this indicates a different root cause (source) for the credible commitment problems such as a trust problem or a reconciliation problem. If disinterest is because there is more to gain from another cooperative agreement and that other agreement is exclusive (one cannot have both), this also indicates a different root cause for the credible commitment problem such as a competitor problem.

Disinterest in the strategic cooperation gains on behalf of one or both of the prospective participants could be caused by complacency or pride—a prospective participant might feel that it can forego the benefits from any strategic cooperation and either live with its existing circumstances or achieve its goals unilaterally. In a wartime scenario, for instance, the damage that a nation incurs during a war may not create sufficient security challenges or economic strife as to warrant the complications of external commitments for states that traditionally prefer to avoid such entanglements.

Disinterest could also be a problem if the gains that a state could achieve from the cooperative agreement were too minimal to warrant serious consideration. This addresses the question of joint economy from cooperation for each of the prospective participants — clearly there must be something to gain from strategic cooperation or there would be no reason for actors to want strategic cooperation at the micro level or for states to obligate themselves to strategic cooperation at the macro level. Reflecting back on Ikenberry’s postwar scenarios, perhaps the cost of occupation and governance is low (e.g., no occupation is required and abandonment is a viable option) or perhaps the capacity for the more
powerful adversary to help with postwar reconstitution of the weaker adversary is insufficient and this leads to limited cooperative gains for both sides of a prospective relationship. Where there is less to gain from a strategic cooperation relationship, there will be less interest. Note, however, that when multiple cooperative relationships are possible, it would be rational to capture any available gains, even if those gains are very modest.

In some cases, there may actually be a net loss to a potential strategic cooperation relationship, and this may cause strong disinterest. At the macro level, for instance, the security gains from a cooperative relationship may be far outweighed by the domestic political losses or extralegal (e.g., terrorist) losses of a specific joint-security endeavor (e.g., host-basing for participant military forces). At the micro level, some actors might fear that a given cooperative relationship (say, with Japan) might precipitate unwanted competition to the domestic industry that supports their livelihood (say, auto manufacturing). Or perhaps the strategic cooperation arrangement would interfere with an actor’s ongoing rent-seeking (e.g., corruption). In such situations, affected actors might very well view the relationship as a threat. However, for these concerns to be causal in undermining the relationship, there must be insufficient means to mitigate them or alter the relationship to accommodate them (e.g., considering my examples, states could not exclude “auto imports” or “basing” from the strategic cooperation agreement for some reason).

Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a disinterest problem that State A cannot remedy (e.g., by increasing State B’s share of cooperation gains), State A has cause to fear that State B would voluntarily backslide in the future on its strategic cooperation promises.

47 See Wu (2012) on the case of Vincent Chin. Vincent Chin was killed in Detroit in 1982 by U.S. autoworkers who are said to have thought he was Japanese and have exclaimed “It’s because of you we’re out of work” before bludgeoning him to death with a baseball bat.
(provided that State B agrees to strategic cooperation in the first place) to forgo the cost of cooperation and forfeit the cooperative gains (or losses) that State B is insufficiently interested in to begin with. This serves to degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

A trust problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants fears that the other will not honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future. This creates a willingness problem for the state in question—even if it has the opportunity to engage in a particular strategic cooperation arrangement and is otherwise willing to do so, it might decline to consider (let alone credibly commit to) the arrangement or fail to endurably cooperate towards arrangement goals because it does not trust that the other participant will reciprocate. This variable captures past behavior (reputation), the perceived strength of the institutional arrangement, and anticipated future behavior. For instance, referring back to my model, State A’s reputation for honoring institutional arrangements (e.g., treaties, bargains, and so forth), its current resources that are devoted to the cooperative relationship (e.g., the current number of personnel and materials actually participating in the arrangement), and its public rhetoric (e.g., statements from political elites that would influence future strategic cooperation activities) could influence State B’s belief that State A will honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future. As a practical example, reflect back on my car leasing analogy. A dealer would have good reason to trust a lessee who had a robust and spotless credit history (i.e., had honored several other institutional agreements), had ample resources devoted to the lease (e.g., a reasonable down payment and automatic payments set up from a well-funded bank account), and had not volunteered any information that would hint at future problems (e.g., an impending layoff). However, the dealer would have ample reason not to trust a lessee who had an awful credit history (e.g., had defaulted on several previous
institutional agreements), was in debt (i.e., could not afford a down payment), and disclosed a probable layoff in the future. This would make the dealer reluctant to credibly commit to the lease.

The analysis of trust problems is complicated in that trust problems are, by definition, part of every credible commitment story in some way. For example, recalling my explanation of disinterest problems, State A cannot trust that State B will honor future cooperation promises because State B is insufficiently interested in the strategic cooperation gains. State B has a disinterest problem, and this causes State A to have a trust problem—the root cause of this predicament is disinterest problems within State B, not trust problems within State A. But trust problems can have an independent effect as well. If every other variable is favorable for strategic cooperation—all international sources of credible commitment problems are favorable for strategic cooperation and the other domestic sources (disinterest, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unity) are all favorable as well—a trust problem alone could still undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Back to my disinterest example, if State B remedied the disinterest problem, strategic cooperation outcomes could still suffer because State A simply does not trust State B from the outset and forevermore.

Importantly, for trust problems to be the root cause of a breakdown in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, the many tools available to mitigate trust problems, such as tit-for-tat and cost-sharing strategies, must be insufficient to alleviate those problems. Also, trust depends heavily on the perception of whether the other participant will follow through with strategic cooperation promises, not necessarily the reality of whether the other participant will follow through with those promises.
Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a trust problem that cannot be remedied by State A’s demonstrations of commitment or trust-building strategies like tit-for-tat or cost sharing, then State B would be dubious that State A would honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future and this, in turn, undermines State B’s commitment to and cooperation in the strategic cooperation relationship—regardless of State A’s actions and intent, State B’s ill perceptions of State A’s trustworthiness continue to undermine the relationship.

A reconciliation problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants harbors resentment against the other for perceived past injustices. This creates a willingness problem for the participant in question—even if it has the opportunity to engage in a particular strategic cooperation arrangement and is otherwise willing to do so, it might decline to consider (let alone credibly commit to) the arrangement or fail to enduringly cooperate towards arrangement goals because it finds association with the other participant to be offensive. A reconciliation problem might arise because, at some point, there was conflict (e.g., a trade dispute or a war) between the two entities such that at least one of the prospective participants identifies the other as a non-friend. Perhaps the identification is that of rival, or worse, enemy, and reconciliation is required before any cooperation is possible, let alone the deep and enduring cooperation associated with strategic cooperation.

The dynamics of reconciliation at the macro and micro levels are important to this study so that we might recognize causal reconciliation problems and understand how they influence various actors. At the macro level, a state’s government plays a crucial role in facilitating reconciliation between participant populations. As Thomas Berger notes,

“The ways in which most people remember the past is powerfully conditioned by the narratives generated by the state, which are, in turn, driven primarily by
practical considerations of security and economic gain. States are not only capable of overriding the powerful feelings of anger, guilt, and resentment generated by memories that its people may have of the injustices that have been inflicted on them, but to a surprising—and perhaps saddening—degree they are able to ignore, defuse, and even redirect them.\textsuperscript{48}

Recalling Kupchan’s contributions on state rapprochement, we find a framework for how states go about promoting such narratives to change an identity from enemy to friend: one state makes a unilateral offer for rapprochement to a rival through diplomatic engagement (e.g., a strategic cooperation offer); the other state reciprocates; concessions and cooperation follow and cause the rivalry to abate; and, finally, “top decision-makers” change the identity of the former adversary from rival to friend and “bring around bureaucracies, legislative bodies, private interest groups, and ordinary citizens through lobbying and public outreach.”\textsuperscript{49} While I have noted the limits of Kupchan’s framework for this study, it shows that when top decision makers have reconciled enough to reciprocate, they play a key role in convincing the remainder of the population to reconcile. This also highlights the inherent problem of when states lack political unification (and thus the allegiance of large segments of their residents), in which case a deficiency in reconciliation of actors who ignore their government can increasingly undermine credible commitment.

While this provides a macro-understanding of state preferences and how states go about reorienting the identity of a prospective strategic cooperation participant, we must look to the micro level to understand the dynamics of reconciliation for individual actors. How do top decision makers and others go about the sometimes arduous internal task of reorienting their identity of a former adversary from enemy to partner? First, we must understand what

\textsuperscript{48} Berger 2012, 2.

\textsuperscript{49} Kupchan 2010b, 123.
reconciliation is. Ervin Staub defines reconciliation as “mutual acceptance by groups of each other,” where former adversaries change their psychological orientation toward each other, “do not see the past as defining the future,” and “see the possibility of a constructive relationship.”

Next, we must understand the mechanics of what promotes and undermines reconciliation in the individual psyche. There are several relevant dimensions of reconciliation to consider, including the roles of shame (I’m bad), guilt (I did something bad), shared responsibility (it’s my fault too), injustice (someone did something bad to me that I didn’t deserve), and forgiveness (I no longer harbor resentment for the injustice done to me).

Shame and guilt come not just from (perhaps) losing a conflict, but also from the “internal acknowledgement that what one did was blameworthy.” Importantly, literature warns of problems with reconciliation when actors do not acknowledge their own group’s contribution to a conflict. Shame and guilt can play a constructive role in promoting reconciliation, but they can also undermine reconciliation. Catherine Lu argues that “experiences of shame and guilt may be pivotal for creating conditions of possibility for reconciliation marked by political and moral transformation.” However, unhealthy applications of shame or guilt can lead to a sense of injustice and, in turn, further conflict.

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50 Staub 2006, 868.
51 From Lu (2008, 370), “Guilt involves a painful feeling of self-reproach that arises from one’s recognition of the (negative) consequences (to significant others) of one’s agency”—i.e., feeling bad for what one has done. “Shame corresponds to a painful awareness of inadequacies in oneself, including in one’s ideals or beliefs”—i.e., feeling bad about who one is.
52 Lu 2008, 371.
53 Staub 2006, see also Lind 2009.
54 Lu 2008, 367.
For instance, one could argue that the Treaty of Versailles did not foster feelings of shame and guilt amongst the Germans about their role in World War I, but instead left the Germans feeling victimized and preoccupied with expressing their rejection of the peace.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, shame and guilt are important predictors of reconciliation, yet one must examine the effects that shame and guilt have on a specific actor to understand whether that shame or guilt is promoting a sense of shared responsibility that fosters reconciliation or a sense of injustice that fosters resentment. A sense of injustice can severely damage the prospects for strategic cooperation. Some would go as far as to say that a stable and lasting peace is impossible without justice.\textsuperscript{56} Importantly, some may not identify with their government’s actions or feel in any way responsible for its transgressions. Those actors may feel unjustly treated if they were at all adversely affected by any reprisals against their government.

Finally, forgiveness is critical to moving past injustices. A key consideration of forgiveness in strategic cooperation scenarios is that “forgiving the other group seems more important for advancing reconciliation than forgiving the actual perpetrators” of injustices.\textsuperscript{57} This offers hope to move past isolated accidents (perhaps even past atrocities) in cooperation efforts. Also, acts of contrition from one state to its former adversary are not required for reconciliation and, in certain circumstances, may be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Lu 2008.

\textsuperscript{56} See Berger for a summary for the argument of those who believe that historical memory has a decisive, even overwhelming, impact on politics. Berger proposes that “If one were to boil down their argument to a bumper sticker, it would read ‘no justice, no peace’ - or at least not a stable and lasting one” (2012, 11).

\textsuperscript{57} Staub 2006, 887.

\textsuperscript{58} Lind 2009, 517.
When these many dimensions of reconciliation are resolved to individual needs, individuals can reorient their identity of prospective strategic cooperation participants and achieve true reconciliation.

This discussion of the dynamics of the macro and micro levels of reconciliation puts much authority and responsibility on the state to reshape the collective memory of their society and impose reconciliation—to create a healthy sense of shame or guilt and a sense of shared responsibility for past conflict, to eradicate perceptions of injustice, and to promote forgiveness. However, as previously discussed, strategic cooperation arrangements can become politicized. In a democratic society, in particular, unresolved resentment may very well have a voice at some point. As Berger notes:

“We also must be realistic about the limits of political power to reshape historical memory. This holds true not only for democratic societies but for authoritarian ones as well, albeit to a lesser degree. Although states can suppress the memories social groups and individuals may have, insurgent historical narratives can spring up that challenge the existing official narratives. These insurgent narratives evolve in response to forces that are only partly related to considerations of the material interests of the state or of the groups that promote them. They are rooted in the actual experiences of the people, and they evolve according to a dynamic that cannot be explained by material considerations alone. Even though narratives can be ignored or suppressed by the state, over time they have real political effects that political leaders can ignore only at their own peril. Time and again, groups representing the victims of historical injustice, as well as groups who for their own reasons promote a historical narrative different from the existing official one, have been able to place their own concerns on the political agenda in ways that greatly complicate the efforts of political leaders to promote what they see as national interest. The impact of such groups is particularly large in democratic countries.”

Thus, state efforts to reorient a prospective participant’s identity, if required for strategic cooperation, are important to promote reconciliation between the states’ actors. But state

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59 Berger 2012, 3.
efforts alone may not be enough. The official narrative may not necessarily match the collective memory of society, and while they can influence each other, “we cannot assume a priori dominance of one over the other.” Further, state efforts to promote reconciliation that trivialize the injustices of some groups can lead to problems. “The official narrative of the state can thus promote reconciliation efforts between groups by exposing their members to the basic facts as well as the viewpoint of the other side. Conversely, the failure of the official historical narrative to recognize the perspective of a group or nation will hinder the recovery of traumatized individuals, breed resentment and discord between groups, and sow the seeds for future conflict.” So while material factors may dominate the state’s preferences and short-term decisions, ideational factors may eventually take precedence amongst a society. Unresolved reconciliation issues, especially in democratic societies, may be immune to state reshaping efforts and might undermine qualities of cooperation at some point in an enduring relationship.

Additionally, there are several other mechanisms besides a state’s reshaping efforts that might help cause or resolve reconciliation issues between societies and thereby affect credible commitment to strategic cooperation arrangements. For instance, a harsh postwar military occupation may breed a strong sense of injustice and therefore much resentment within the occupied population. The occupied population may very well enduringly resent the occupier and withdraw cooperation or cut ties as soon as the circumstances are favorable (e.g., as seen with several Eastern Bloc states and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union). However, while occupations are typically resented, David Edelstein finds that

60 Berger 2012, 13.
61 Berger 2012, 19.
military occupations are more palatable when the occupier and the occupied share a common threat.\textsuperscript{62} This would mitigate the buildup of resentment and perhaps help solidify a cooperative relationship. The passage of time might help as well. Then again, some resentment is timeless (as seen in present day sectarian battles that have spanned centuries). What is most important, however, is whether reorientation from enemy to partner takes place, regardless of the mechanism that causes the reorientation, and this can be a long or short, easy or difficult process depending on the circumstances and the population involved.

The microfoundations of reconciliation, coupled with the macro level insights on the role of the state and the framework for state rapprochement, highlight the importance and challenges of reconciliation. While we see great hope for reconciliation when considering, for instance, the monumental transformation of relationships between the United States, Germany, and Japan after World War II, we should be leery of reconciliation problems in cases where a potential strategic cooperation participant does not feel shame or guilt for its part in a conflict or has an unhealthy sense of shame or guilt, lacks a sense of shared responsibility for a conflict, or feels unjustly treated. We should also be leery when state efforts to help reorient the identity of a potential strategic cooperation participant from enemy to partner are absent, protested, or ineffectual. Ultimately, these problems can undermine true reconciliation and, in turn, credible commitment to strategic cooperation. Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a reconciliation problem (e.g., a sense of resentment towards the prospective participant amongst important actors and ineffectual government efforts to reorient the correspondingly unfavorable identity), then State A has good cause to fear that State B would voluntarily (if the reconciliation problem lies within

\textsuperscript{62} See Edelstein 2008.
the leadership or its winning coalition) or involuntarily (if the reconciliation problem lies within other influential domestic actors) backslide in the future on any strategic cooperation promises (provided that State B agrees to strategic cooperation in the first place), perhaps in a manner that reignites the original conflict and maximizes State B’s advantage over State A.

The final two sources of credible commitment problems that I identify are linked. **State Capacity** problems are material in nature. **Political Unification** problems are ideological in nature. Either type of problem can degrade qualities of cooperation by reducing a state’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.

When a prospective participant has a state capacity problem, it lacks sufficient resources to meet strategic cooperation obligations. For instance, the cooperation obligations may require a state to provide ten units of manpower, ten units of financial resources, and ten units of territory while the state has only five units of each resource type in its entire store of wealth. The state is therefore materially unable to meet the requirements of the cooperative arrangement, and this reduces that state’s opportunity to credibly commit to the arrangement. For states to have the capacity to meet their strategic cooperation obligations, they must be able to prioritize efforts, direct the activities of their agents, and allocate resources as related to the cooperative arrangement. State capacity refers, then, to a state’s ability to govern and manage, at a minimum, the spaces, organizations, and personnel that are relevant to the cooperative arrangement. This is not to say that states always require a lot of capacity for a given cooperative arrangement. Rather, they require enough capacity to meet the requirements of the specific cooperative arrangement. For instance, the stronger participant may simply require access to a weaker participant’s territory (e.g., permission to help) for the weaker participant’s contribution to the cooperative relationship. Reflecting back on my
model, if State B has state capacity as a source of credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B would simply lack the resources to fulfill its strategic cooperation promises in the future.

State capacity has linkages to, but is distinct from, another source of credible commitment problems—political unification. When a state has a political unification problem, its residents do not identify with the state government. If the residents identify with another powerful actor (e.g., a powerful religious leader or a warlord) who resists strategic cooperation, this could create an opportunity problem for that government to credibly commit to strategic cooperation—that powerful actor might direct masses of followers to resist the relationship, perhaps violently, which could undermine credible commitment, deep and enduring cooperation and, thereby, strategic cooperation outcomes. In this scenario, the state’s political unification problem becomes a source of credible commitment problems for strategic cooperation.

Political unification is distinct from state capacity in that it focuses on identity rather than resource and management capacity. It is about allegiance to a government, not just capacity of a government. Amati Etzioni describes three considerations that we can use as indicators

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63 Other scholars consider the importance of identity similarly, but with different terms and nuances. Andrew Reynolds refers to the importance of “belief in nation”—an overarching sense of national loyalty which transcends societal divisions” (2011, 46). He sees the “commitment to the nation” as important for stability, and I would argue similarly that political unification is important for stability. Dankwart Rustow refers to the importance of “national unity” to democratization. By national unity, Rustow means that that “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (1970, 350). I would argue the same for the importance and sentiment of political unification, provided that the political community he refers to aligns with the state government and not a rival shadow government (e.g., tribes, sects, or warlords). Andrew Sobel notes that “nation is one of the few identities that large numbers of people seem willing to kill and die for” and that “a shared sense of common destiny or common future” is the critical necessary and sufficient condition for the development of a nation (2013, 62-66). Similarly, I would argue that a shared sense of common future is required for political unification and that one of the means to assess the political unification of a state is to measure how willing the population is to “stand up” for the state (i.e., kill and die for the state).
that a government has achieved political unification: “it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of means of violence…it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community… and it is the superior focus of political identification for the large majority of the politically aware citizens.” Thus, there may be violence. However, a politically-unified government’s violence is seen as legitimate, while other violence (e.g., from local warlords or tribal leaders) is not. There may be many sources of resources and rewards (note that both state capacity and political unification have a resource-allocation component). However, a politically-unified government can affect the whole of its territorial responsibility, while non-governmental sources may lack such far-reaching capability. Lastly, there may be many rivals contesting for political voice, but this is done within the boundaries of a politically-unified government’s political system rather than within a competing shadow political system (e.g., a tribal governance structure that is the “real” government). To emphasize, a state may possess the capacity to manage sufficient strategic cooperation resources (i.e., no problem with state capacity), but this does not guarantee that its citizens accept the state government and look to it for leadership and support.

As I have conceptualized state capacity and political unification, a state can have one without the other—they are distinct. A state could lack the capacity to fulfill its required strategic cooperation obligations but have no problems with political unification. As an example, consider Costa Rica. Costa Rica is a consolidated democracy that abolished its army in 1949. Costa Rica could not credibly commit to a strategic cooperation arrangement that had a collective-security component, for instance, that required Costa Rica to contribute

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64 Etzioni 1962, 45.
a few highly-trained and modernly-equipped infantry brigades for joint defense efforts. This is not a political unification problem, but a state capacity problem. Conversely, a state could have ample capacity to meet strategic cooperation obligations but lack the collective will to do so due to a political unification problem. Consider, as an example, events in Somalia over recent decades. A prospective strategic cooperation participant might only require water, desert space for basing, and a handful of translators as the Somali contribution to a strategic cooperation arrangement—contributions within the material capacity of the Somali government. Yet Somalia has a political unification problem that might undermine this relationship. There are vast numbers of Somalis who do not identify with their government, but identify with and follow the directives of other influential domestic actors. These influential domestic actors, who are seen as legitimate by and hold the loyalty of large portions of the population, may well resort to violence or other means to mount a credible resistance to strategic cooperation. They might credibly threaten water access or participant assets. Somalia might have the capacity to defend these assets, but might not be able to credibly guarantee that their security agents would not “turn a blind eye” at a critical moment out of loyalty to other influential domestic actors. In a more benign scenario, the Somali translators might be dissuaded from cooperating (e.g., conveniently “mis-translate”) because of their loyalty to the other influential domestic actors. In this case, a prospective co-participant with the Somalis would receive mixed signals of Somali commitment—the Somali government may well profess commitment to strategic cooperation, but other Somali influential domestic actors may countermand that signal. This is a political unification problem, not a state capacity problem, and its effects combine to undermine credible commitment to the strategic cooperation arrangement and degrade qualities of cooperation.
That said, there is a relationship between state capacity and political unification—they are not perfectly distinct. Political unification requires a minimum level of state capacity to meet Etzioni’s criteria (i.e., a state must have enough state capacity to affect the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community) which may be more or less than the state capacity required to meet the obligations of a strategic cooperation agreement. Regardless, most importantly for this study, political unification as I have defined it is centered on identity of the population and the credibility of state promises in light of those circumstances, not just a state’s material capacity to meet its strategic cooperation obligations. Just because a state has the capacity to meet its obligations doesn’t mean it can credibly commit to do so. A political unification problem is one of the reasons it might not be able to do so.

This has important implications for policymakers. One might examine a prospective participant’s limited internal security capacity, for instance, and believe that bestowing that participant with enough equipment and training—Humvees, rifles, radios, and command and control centers—will solve the problems seen in my Somali example. However, painful U.S. lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that having capacity and choosing to use that capacity for its intended purposes are different things. If identity problems are not remedied, that equipment and training may well become tools of other influential domestic actors and be used for purposes that are inimical to strategic cooperation.

A state’s political unification problem may not always result in credible commitment problems for strategic cooperation. Circumstances are important. A political unification problem can provide an incentive for the affected state to seek external support that might help it consolidate and vie for the loyalty of its population. If that state is otherwise disinterested in strategic cooperation, the political unification problem, especially if it were
associated with an internal threat that could jeopardize regime survival, may help mitigate
that disinterest problem, at least while that political unification problem exists. Regardless, if
that political unification problem is associated with influential domestic actors who resist
strategic cooperation, a credible commitment problem exists—if a prospective participant
has a political unification problem and influential domestic actors resist strategic
cooperation, this alone would likely undermine the prospective participant’s opportunity to
credibly commit to the strategic cooperation agreement and would thereby degrade the
relationship’s qualities of cooperation. This, I would argue, is more likely than a scenario
where a state has a political unification problem but no influential actors resist strategic
cooperation. It would be an unusually permissive environment if no one profited from
resisting strategic cooperation.

Influential domestic actors might resist a given strategic cooperation arrangement for
myriad reasons. Perhaps they have disinterest problems in that the arrangement would
interfere with their rent seeking (e.g., corruption), or perhaps they have reconciliation or trust
issues with the other participant. In line with this thought, Cooley finds in his study on
oversees U.S. basing that “Certain political environments, especially periods of volatile
democratic transition, afford considerable political benefits to elites who contest basing
agreements. Conversely, the consolidation of a base host’s democratic institutions tends to
lead to the depoliticization of the issue, regardless of prevailing public opinion or anti-U.S.
sentiment.” Adopting Cooley’s insight to my study’s context, I would argue that certain
political environments, especially the sometimes tumultuous postwar environments that are
the focus of my study, offer incentives for elites to contest strategic cooperation agreements.

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65 Cooley 2008, 3.
However, when democratic institutions consolidate, which is commensurate with an increase in political unification, those incentives are reduced. In the former situation, a state with political unification problems may send mixed signals to the prospective participant about the credibility of its commitment to the strategic cooperation agreement. The government might signal that it is committed, while elites signal credible resistance. This would undermine a prospective participant’s confidence that the other will have the opportunity to abide by strategic cooperation promises in the future, especially if large segments of the population identify with the resisting elites instead of the government.

Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a political unification problem as a source of credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B will lack the opportunity to fulfill its strategic cooperation promises in the future because other influential domestic actors might effectively resist strategic cooperation.

The Roles of External and Internal Threats

I pause here to reflect on an important nuance that I intersected occasionally in my theorization: the roles of external and internal threats. One of the stronger alternate theories I will discuss in my upcoming case studies is that external threats are necessary for strategic cooperation between former adversaries. This is one explanation for why the United States and Germany and the United States and Japan were able to mend fences so spectacularly after World War II—they united against a common Soviet threat. Of course, that common threat subsided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, yet the deeply-cooperative U.S. partnerships from World War II continue to endure and are in some ways
growing stronger. However, more recent U.S. postwar strategic cooperation efforts (i.e., with Iraq and Afghanistan) have lacked a similarly powerful common threat and are clearly not enjoying the same success as the World War II cooperative relationships.

Relatedly, Edelstein finds that a common external threat makes lengthy occupations more acceptable to the host population and more palatable to the states that provide the occupation forces. Other threat scenarios (no threat or internal threat) have a somewhat negative effect on occupations. This could clearly have an effect on the prospects for strategic cooperation in postwar cases that involve occupations—without a common external threat, those occupations may foment resentment and cause reconciliation problems between prospective strategic cooperation participants.

My response to this potential confounder is that I find no theoretical reason why an external threat (or internal threat for that matter) is necessary for higher qualities of cooperation, even amongst former adversaries. This is not to say that a threat cannot promote the prospects for strategic cooperation—certainly the Soviet threat had a positive influence on the growing partnership between the United States and Germany after World War II. However, as will be evident in my case studies, a threat is one means, not the only means, to help reduce credible commitment problems and promote cooperation. What is most important is how threats, in conjunction with the many other conditions that might

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66 The United States and Japan, for instance, recently discussed new and more robust security initiatives. See the “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities” that was issued by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, and Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera in Tokyo, Japan on October 3, 2013.

affect those credible commitment problems, aggregately affect the eight sources of credible commitment problems that I have described.

An external threat can influence several of the credible commitment variables that I identified. For instance, it could increase state interest in collective security arrangements for the duration of the threat—any means of increasing power and security may look more attractive when threatened. But this interest would be in external assistance (e.g., military aid, protectorate status, alliance, and so forth) from perhaps several entities, not necessarily deep and enduring strategic cooperation with a particular state. An external threat could also help with reconciliation by providing opportunities to make one look “just” and good (e.g., the U.S. occupiers as compared to the Russian occupiers in World War II) or by providing opportunities to be seen as a hero (i.e., to demonstrate commitment, such as with the Berlin Airlift), thereby assisting in a reorientation from foe to friend. Lastly, an external threat could help with political unification by spurring disparate domestic factions to unite against a common threat.

But several other mechanisms could influence these variables too. An increase in interest could come from a substantial joint economy (e.g., creative technical expertise married with robust manufacturing capability) or amplified need (e.g., devastating damage from war or natural disaster). Reconciliation problems could be mitigated by a strong sense of responsibility and remorse (e.g., the so-called German “guilt” from World War II⁶⁸), restitution, apologies, or the passage of time. Political unification may not be a problem to begin with, or could be achieved when a previously hierarchical society simply falls back

⁶⁸ See Berger 2012.
into old habits after regime collapse. In the case of war and occupation, political unification could be retained by not completely dismantling the previous government of a hierarchical society (e.g., by leaving the Japanese Emperor in place after WWII).

An internal threat can similarly promote cooperation for the time it exists, particularly when government survival is in jeopardy. Interest may increase and reconciliation problems may subside, at least temporarily. However, as previously highlighted, internal threat scenarios may be associated with political unification problems that could undermine cooperation.

Additionally, it is the enduring effects that the external or internal threats have on my credible commitment variables that are most important. If those threats do not have a lasting effect, then this bodes ill for the qualities of cooperation of an enduring strategic cooperation relationship in the long run. If an external or internal threat is the only thing holding a strategic cooperation relationship together and the underlying credible commitment problems are not resolved, my theory predicts that the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will suffer. A threat does not guarantee, for instance, that reconciliation will take place, although that threat will perhaps subdue reconciliation problems for a while. What I am most interested in, then, is assessing whether my independent variables (e.g., disinterest, reconciliation, and political unification) are favorable for strategic cooperation. Secondary to that is assessing the specific mechanism (e.g., threat, restitution, or remorse) that happened to cure these potential sources of credible commitment problems.

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69 See Beuno de Mesquita et al. (2003) for a discussion on the logic of political survival.
General Hypotheses

My theoretical analysis generates eight possible sources of credible commitment problems (independent variables) that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation (my dependent variable). These eight international and domestic sources of credible commitment problems encapsulate the incentives to do and the incentives not to do strategic cooperation and, in turn, affect a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. As a general proposition, with limited exceptions, an increase in the presence of any of these sources of credible commitment problems will likely decrease a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.\textsuperscript{70} Conditions should be favorable where qualities of cooperation are higher. Conversely, at least one condition should not be favorable where qualities of cooperation are lower.

One should think of these variables as having a “product” effect and not a “sum” effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. To formally illustrate, let $C$ represent the predicted level of the qualities of cooperation and $v_1, v_2, \ldots v_8$ represent the eight sources of credible commitment problems which serve as my independent variables. Say that all but one of these independent variables are highly favorable for strategic cooperation (say, 0.95 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) and the outlying variable is highly unfavorable for strategic cooperation (say, 0.15 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) at time ($t$). If one thinks of the relationship of these variables as a sum, one would get the following result:

$$C_t = \sum v_{1t}, v_{2t} \ldots v_{8t} = (0.95 \times 7) + (0.15) = 6.8$$

\textsuperscript{70} See the previous discussion on political unification, where circumstances are important for low political unification to manifest into a problem for strategic cooperation.
This sum of 6.8 equals the sum that one would get in the case that all independent variables were favorable (say, 0.85 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) and falls relatively close to the sum 7.6 that one would get if every variable were highly favorable (again, 0.95 on a continuous scale of 0 to 1). One might therefore reasonably predict that the corresponding relationship would have high qualities of cooperation, and this is precisely contrary to my theory. To avoid this fallacy, think of the relationship of the variables as a product, in which case my example yields the following result:

\[ C_t = \Pi v_{1t}, v_{2t}, ... v_{8t} = (0.95)^7 \times (0.15) = 0.10 \]

This product of 0.10 is well shy (2.7 times) of the product 0.27 that one would get in the case that all independent variables were favorable (say, 0.85 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) and even further off (6.6 times) the product of 0.66 that one would get if every variable were highly favorable (again, 0.95 on a continuous scale of 0 to 1). One might therefore predict that the corresponding relationship would have low qualities of cooperation, and this is precisely congruent with my theory—one unfavorable variable can greatly reduce the likelihood of higher qualities of cooperation. In my example, the one unfavorable variable (0.15 instead of 0.95) dropped the product for an otherwise highly favorable scenario from 0.66 to 0.10—a substantial effect. This perspective suggests that, as I go about generating hypotheses and conducting my case analyses, I can expect relatively low qualities of cooperation whether credible commitment problems stem from just one or multiple sources.

Considering all that has been theorized, I garner four general, condensed, testable, and falsifiable hypotheses regarding qualities of cooperation and, in turn, strategic cooperation outcomes. Hypothesis 1 recognizes that international barriers to strategic cooperation may
be so strong as to preclude cooperation or, should cooperation be attempted, severely undermine it. International conditions must support strategic cooperation for it to prosper. This is the first (outer) layer of the onion for policymakers to analyze when predicting the costs, benefits, and risks of a particular strategic cooperation arrangement.

**H1:** An increase in credible commitment problems at the international level (from spoilers, competitors, or otherwise) decreases the opportunity for and/or willingness of governments to credibly commit to strategic cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

The next three hypotheses focus at the domestic level. Domestic conditions must also support strategic cooperation for it to prosper. The domestic level is the second (inner) layer of the onion for policymakers to analyze when predicting the costs, benefits, and risks of a particular strategic cooperation arrangement.

Hypothesis 2 recognizes that both the leadership and its winning coalition must be willing to engage in strategic cooperation for it to prosper over the course of an enduring relationship. Leaders may be able to influence their winning coalition’s willingness for strategic cooperation and vice versa, but leaders must ultimately appease their winning coalition or they jeopardize their own political survival.

**H2:** At the domestic level, an increase in disinterest problems, trust problems, or reconciliation problems within a state’s leadership or its winning coalition reduces a government’s willingness to credibly commit to strategic
cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

Hypothesis 3 recognizes that even if leaders and their winning coalitions are otherwise willing to credibly commit to strategic cooperation, they must have the opportunity to do so. Opportunity, in part, is dependent upon a state’s capacity to meet its strategic cooperation obligations—if a state lacks the resources to meet those obligations, qualities of cooperation suffer.

**H3:** At the domestic level, an increase in state capacity problems reduces the respective government’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

Hypothesis 4 is the second to focus on the opportunity for strategic cooperation from a domestic perspective. It recognizes that even if leaders and their winning coalitions are otherwise willing to credibly commit to strategic cooperation, and even if the state has the resources required to meet its strategic cooperation obligations, a problem with political unification could still undermine the relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Under such conditions, influential domestic actors might mount effective resistance to strategic cooperation.

**H4:** At the domestic level, an increase in political unification problems reduces the respective government’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation when influential domestic actor(s) resist such agreements (for myriad reasons, including reconciliation problems or outside
options). This, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

Strategic Cooperation between the United States and its Former Adversaries

In this section, I tailor my general strategic cooperation theory to specific contexts of strategic cooperation between the United States and its recent war adversaries. It is not my intent to assume away any of the eight commitment problems that I have identified on either side of a relationship (i.e., on the U.S. side or the former adversary side). However, I have a research challenge—too many independent variables (eight) in my general hypotheses for the amount of available cases in general, let alone the cases within the scope of this project—an “N” deficiency. My methodological choice is to narrow the focus to what should be the most important variables in U.S. cases—the primary levers that should influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation in these contexts. This will help me select the best cases for study from my small universe. This will also, in the end, help U.S. policymakers focus on the “big rocks”—the primary levers—while still allowing examination of all other variables within these cases, albeit perhaps not evaluation.

This tailored theory is designed to apply to U.S. postwar relationships from World War II to present and similar contexts. It is written from a perspective of how things should “be” in these contexts and is based, in part, on the dynamics of how things “were” during the timeframe of my study for a democratic superpower (the United States) and its typically less-advantaged (in the postwar timeframe) former adversaries. For example, the United States “was” a preeminent world power during the timeframe of this study. It therefore “is” a preeminent world power in these contexts. Accordingly, U.S. state capacity “is” not a likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts. This tailored theory should apply to present day U.S. postwar contexts and into the future as long as the relative qualities of the United States and its former adversaries do not substantively change. This tailored theory may apply to other similar contexts as well.
Reviewing the Context

A review of the context of this study helps to narrow my focus. The context is U.S. wars from World War II to present. Two things differentiate this context from the generic strategic cooperation context: first, war; and second, the United States is specified as one of the prospective participants. How do these qualities help us focus?

The wartime environment brings much baggage to a prospective strategic cooperation relationship—commitment and cooperation (let alone deep and enduring cooperation) between former adversaries can be particularly challenging. Commitment problems can inhibit a state’s ability, in certain circumstances, to commit to a bargain short of war, let alone to a highly amicable conflict resolution outcome as envisioned in strategic cooperation.72 Such a commitment problem would contribute to a deficiency in cooperation, which is a requirement just to maintain peace (i.e., a simple ceasefire) in the aftermath of war.73 In that sense, cooperation is ever more crucial for the success of a strategic cooperation arrangement in the postwar environment. Consider also that strategic cooperation is enduring in nature and, as a result, recurrent acts of cooperation are required to credibly signal continued commitment to the relationship. It is understandable that strategic cooperation arrangements between former adversaries are rare—the level of commitment and cooperation required from the former adversaries is ambitious, to say the least. Further, the wartime dynamic implies increased salience of certain variables that would be particularly troublesome for commitment and cooperation in the postwar environment. Focusing on domestic variables, reconciliation problems stand out as one probable source of credible

72 Fearon 1995, 409. See also Walter 2002.

73 Fortna 2003, 366.
commitment problems in postwar strategic cooperation scenarios. Lu calls war “the ultimate act of estrangement between states.”\textsuperscript{74} One must consider that states choose war for a reason, and are willing to kill and die for that reason. Trust problems stand out as another probable source of credible commitment problems in postwar strategic cooperation scenarios. As Dan Reiter notes,

“Belligerents consumed by the heat of war are especially unlikely to trust each other. Two states cannot build much trust while fighting. Making matters worse, there is likely a history of broken trust between two belligerents, as an attacker often breaks a neutrality or border agreement when it decides to launch a war.”\textsuperscript{75}

The salience of the other variables in the postwar context depends more on the specific circumstances of the conflict. State capacity may be more or less of a problem based on its status before a war, its erosion during the war, and the demands of the specific cooperative arrangement. Disinterest might depend more on the damage sustained during the war and the capacity of the stronger state to offer support after a conflict. Political unification problems might depend more on the qualities of a given state—whether it had a history of political unification before the war or whether there was an imposed regime change, and therefore political transitions to consolidate, as a result of the war.

Next, the United States is specified as one of the prospective participants in this study. How does this help us focus? First, in these contexts, the United States is a preeminent (if not hegemonic) global power. Second, in these contexts, the United States has immense economic capacity as the world’s largest consumer. Third, in these contexts, the United States, which has a long history of fighting its wars on foreign soil, has enviable military

\textsuperscript{74} Lu 2008, 367.

\textsuperscript{75} Reiter 2009, 25.
capacity with which to offer security to a former adversary. In effect, in these contexts, the United States has the capability, should it choose, to offer its former adversary the “keys to the kingdom.”

Considering this, in these contexts, the United States should emerge from war as the “stronger” state (not necessarily the “victor”) with excess resources to offer towards strategic cooperation—the United States should have the capacity to help a needy former adversary when many others cannot. Consequently, in these contexts, the former U.S. adversary should emerge from war as the “weaker” state, be more likely in need of external support, and have fewer resources to offer towards strategic cooperation. For instance, it is quite possible that the former U.S. adversary would need assistance restarting its economy, regaining security, and establishing a new regime. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter in my discussion of the incentives for strategic cooperation, a strategic cooperation arrangement can be very useful towards those ends.76 Importantly, the United States, perhaps more so than many other states and probably any previous superpower, has been historically interested in such cooperative arrangements and institutions.77 Typically, it has been willing to credibly bind itself to an institutional arrangement even when it is the more powerful state—to exercise “strategic restraint” as Ikenberry terms it—in order to achieve a mutually acceptable, voluntary, cooperative postwar resolution. Further, for all the reasons previously noted in my discussion of the incentives for strategic cooperation—plus the likelihood that the United

76 See the subsection titled “The Incentive for Strategic Cooperation” earlier in this chapter for a rundown of the applicable strategic cooperation benefits.

77 Note, for example, Sylvan and Majeski’s book *U.S Foreign Policy in Perspective*, in which they identify some 80 U.S. clients and only 6 U.S. enemies as of 2006 (2009, 1).
States does not want to have a recurrence of war, wants allies, and wants stability for the global economy—the United States would also have incentives for strategic cooperation.

Therefore, in these contexts, there should be a substantial joint economy to be gained by both sides. However, there may also be a substantial legacy of baggage from the war (i.e., perhaps something in line with the bully example from my opener). All of this combines to suggest that the salience of some sources of credible commitment problems is greater than others in these contexts. Disinterest and trust variables may be less salient because of potential gains to both participants and the historical willingness of the United States (the stronger state) to mitigate trust issues through credible institutional arrangements. As a wealthy and powerful state, the United States may be wholly unconcerned with former adversary state capacity problems and may be willing to accept an institutional agreement with little resource contributions from the former adversary. There are no reasons to believe, however, that reconciliation and political unification problems would be less salient.

**Necking it down**

In light of these insights, I narrow the focus of my study on those sources of credible commitment problems that are most difficult for states to mitigate or control in these contexts by first considering the international variables, then the domestic variables from the U.S. side, and finally the domestic variables from the former U.S. adversary side.

All strategic cooperation arrangements are subject to the international environment. Which international sources of credible commitment problems should most affect a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, and thereby the outcome of strategic cooperation arrangements between the United States and its former adversaries, during the timeframe of
This category is hard to narrow—all are possible—but some of these problems are more likely than others in these contexts. Spoiler problems could be a factor, but considering U.S. power in these contexts, a spoiler would have to be extremely strong (e.g., Russia during World War II, having already occupied Eastern Bloc states) to have both the opportunity and the willingness to create a credible barrier between the United States and its former adversary, especially if the United States were resolute on strategic cooperation. Competitor problems are less likely considering the immense resources at the disposal of the United States in these contexts. Consider that the United States controls how many resources it is willing to offer towards strategic cooperation and has the capacity to outbid just about any conceivable competitor in these contexts. If the United States chooses not to outbid a competitor, this indicates a different root cause to the credible commitment problems (e.g., other international conditions). Further, it is unlikely that a former U.S. adversary has to “compete” for strategic cooperation with the United States since the United States has demonstrated a preference for such relationships, has the capacity for many, and may consider the relationship itself worth more than any material cooperative gains. Problems from other international conditions are a more likely international source of credible commitment problems in these contexts. Cold War-like considerations, complications to existing alliance patterns (e.g., when existing allies identify the prospective U.S. partner as an enemy), and U.S. concerns over its image (e.g., wanting to be seen as supporting democratic ideals) may very well undermine strategic cooperation prospects.

Turning now to domestic sources of credible commitment problems on the U.S. side, this category is easier to narrow in these contexts. Disinterest problems on the U.S. side, for all the reasons previously discussed, are unlikely. Additionally, in these contexts, something
compels the United States to expend resources and risk forces in war. If U.S. interests in the former adversary state or region are important enough for war, they are important enough for strategic cooperation—the United States would likely want to secure any gains from this expensive endeavor for as long as possible. Recall that a disinterest problem would apply to the applicable strategic cooperation gains in general—if one is disinterested in those gains from just a specific entity, the root cause of the problem lies with a different source (e.g., a trust problem or reconciliation problem).

Trust problems are likely to exist in these contexts, but not likely, on their own, to prevent a U.S. attempt at strategic cooperation due to the historical U.S. affinity for trust-building institutions and strategies like tit-for-tat and cost sharing. Recall that trust problems are part of every credible commitment breakdown at some level, but in these contexts, trust problems on the U.S. side are more likely to be in response to former adversary credible commitment problems (e.g. former adversary political unification problems) than the independent cause of credible commitment problems.

Reconciliation problems are possible but, overall, unlikely from the U.S side in these contexts. Aggregately, the United States, typically, is pragmatic and has a short memory. This was demonstrated in World War II where the United States vilified entire populations (specifically the Germans and Japanese) with slurs and propaganda during the war and then followed with active and publicly-accepted state reorientation efforts shortly thereafter to shore up support for the Marshall Plan. The United States has been more selective about attributing evil to an enemy in more recent conflicts (e.g., Manuel Noriega was bad, not all

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78 While President Roosevelt harbored resentment towards the Germans and wanted them to pay a price for their actions, President Truman took a markedly different approach.
Panamanians; Slobodan Milosevic was bad, not all Serbs; the Taliban were bad, not all Afghans; Saddam Hussein and the Baathists were bad, not all Iraqis), making national reconciliation easier from the U.S. side once the “evil element” has been removed. The exceptions to this would be the wars with Vietnam and perhaps North Korea, conflicts in which the United States did not win. \(^7\) Perhaps this is because it is easier for a clear victor to reconcile—it got its way.

Finally, state capacity and political unification problems are unambiguously not sources of credible commitment problems on the U.S. side in these contexts. Consider that, in these contexts, the United States has international state capacity (the resources to meet its strategic cooperation requirements globally and, in all likelihood, the resources to ensure that a prospective participant could meet its strategic cooperation requirements too), not just state capacity. Further, since the end of the U.S. Civil War, the United States has maintained its democratic consolidation.

I turn now to the domestic sources of credible commitment problems on the former U.S. adversary side. Disinterest problems at the macro (state interest) level are unlikely in these contexts for all the reasons previously discussed. A former U.S. adversary is by nature weaker and more vulnerable than preferred, having expended critical resources in conflict. Its economy is likely in shambles, and it may be going through a perilous regime transition. It is unlikely that a former adversary government would pass on the opportunity to remedy these critical deficits out of disinterest. Further, the United States has some control over this variable—it can, for instance, increase the war damage to an adversary (to increase the

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\(^7\) U.S. reconciliation with Vietnam, in particular, was complicated by resentment over the treatment of U.S. prisoners of war.
former adversary’s need for external help) or increase U.S. contributions to the strategic cooperation arrangement (i.e., sweeten the deal). Also, the United States, as a preeminent world power in these contexts, has capacity, more so than many others, to remedy these economic and security deficits and, through strategic cooperation, would likely take active measures to underwrite former adversary success. At the micro level, however, certain actors may have more tendencies towards disinterest, perhaps fearing a personal loss from strategic cooperation (instead of gain) due to U.S. competition in their markets or meddling with their rent seeking (i.e., corruption). However, one can mitigate this by avoiding those areas of strategic cooperation or by making provisions to compensate losers specifically for their strategic cooperation losses (i.e., with private goods). Therefore, if the former adversary eschews U.S. strategic cooperation in these contexts, I would suspect that this is not because it is disinterested in any cooperative gains or that it believes that the United States could not help solve its problems. I would suspect, rather, that the former adversary wants strategic cooperation (external support), just not (collectively) strategic cooperation with the United States. This would suggest a different root cause for the problem (e.g., reconciliation or political unification problems).

Trust problems on the former U.S. adversary side are also unlikely to be a source of credible commitment problems in these contexts. A former U.S. adversary has little reason to doubt that the United States would honor its strategic cooperation commitments in these contexts. The United States has remained a stable and consolidated democracy, which Cooley finds to be the most credible form of government for honoring contracts.80

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strategic cooperation offers have been backed very publicly by its highest officials—particularly credible and costly signals. Further, despite its typical power advantage, the U.S. has historically shown great willingness to exercise strategic restraint and bind its power through institutions (e.g., the United Nations and World Trade Organization) and strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat and cost sharing) that are routinely used to mitigate typical multinational trust problems.

Reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side are much more likely in these contexts. At the micro level, actors may very well identify with my opening story, feeling that a bully has just clobbered them, perhaps unjustly, and then audaciously extended a hand of friendship in expectation of reciprocation. Individuals might identify the United States as an enemy, rival, or opportunist—far from partner or friend. These reconciliation problems can manifest at many levels in the former adversary structure. For instance, they could manifest with the leaders who decide to engage in strategic cooperation (Kupchan’s “top decision makers”), with their winning coalitions, with other influential domestic actors, or with the people (agents) in the field who actually cooperate to conduct the relationship’s activities. This is not hard to conceptualize—having recently gone to war, it is not surprising that a lingering potential for ill will exists. Turning to the macro level, former adversary governments may be resistant to or ineffectual at changing these identities through their official narrative. Reconciliation, therefore, is a primary variable of interest.

State capacity problems on the former U.S. adversary side are an unlikely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts, at least in the short term. A high U.S. interest in strategic cooperation, coupled with comparatively vast U.S. resources, combines to decrease the expected material contributions from former adversaries in these contexts.
Further, the United States would likely solve former adversary capacity problems until such time as the former adversary could manage on its own. The United States, for instance, has often devoted substantial resources (the pinnacle being the Marshall Plan) and imbedded advisors with local civil and military entities up through the most senior leadership (e.g., the prime minister) to routinely exercise state capacity functions in parallel until their former adversary had the capacity to manage on its own. There are, perhaps, limits to how long the United States would “carry” a co-participant, but there would likely be other problems (specifically, reconciliation and/or political unification problems) underlying an enduring state capacity problem. For instance, the former adversary government may have the capacity to direct its agents to cooperate with U.S. advisors in an effort improve overall state capacity but opt not to because of a leadership or winning coalition reconciliation problem.

Political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side, like reconciliation problems, are a more likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts. Regime change has often been a byproduct of war with the United States and, depending on the conditions, political transitions may be easier or harder to consolidate—that is if they ever consolidate. There may be little that the stronger state (the United States) could do to mitigate this. While it is relatively straight-forward to increase one’s material offer to increase a former adversary’s interest in strategic cooperation or fend off a competitor, encouraging former adversary residents to identify with their new government instead of powerful non-governmental actors is not so clear cut. This is especially the case when the former adversary lacked political unification even before the war, as seen in more recent U.S. conflicts. This could very conceivably create a situation where former adversary policymakers might decide that the best future for their nation lay in strategic cooperation
with the United States, but other influential domestic actors may not desire such a relationship. These influential actors may feel this way for many reasons—reconciliation problems themselves, or perhaps unsanctioned outside options in which they profit from no strategic cooperation (this could be the case for government officials as well, acting outside their official capacity).\textsuperscript{81} If these power players have sufficient influence, their effects could aggregate to a level that precludes “collective” former adversary willingness, prevents credible commitment, and undermines the relationship’s qualities of cooperation. The question, then, is whether governmental influence (when the government desires the strategic cooperation arrangement) is sufficient to overcome the influence of dissenting groups—whether power is consolidated to the point that the political authorities can credibly commit to strategic cooperation despite domestic pressure to the contrary. Political unification, therefore, is another primary variable of interest.

\textit{The Finalists}

Factoring all of this, neither international nor domestic sources of credible commitment problems can be “ruled out” for consideration in these contexts, which include U.S. wars from World War II to present. However, there is room to focus the domestic variables to optimize this project’s explanatory power with the limited cases at hand and within the scope of this study. In these contexts, the most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems on the U.S. side are trust problems and reconciliation problems. However, the United States has demonstrated a strong capability to mitigate such problems. In these

\textsuperscript{81} I consider government officials acting outside of their government capacities (e.g. corruptly accepting private incentives to forego strategic cooperation that the government has determined is in the best interest of its citizens) to be a political unification problem—they don’t identify with the government they themselves are running.
contexts, the most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems on the former U.S. adversary side are reconciliation problems and political unification problems, and these are much more challenging problems to mitigate. As a result, *the most likely domestic sources of credible commitment problems overall in these contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side.* This puts a lot of explanatory weight on the former U.S. adversary side of the strategic cooperation equation. Therefore, in my case analyses, I focus my research to address these variables and, accordingly, put more brief attention on the U.S. side of the equation while focusing a bulk of my attention on the former U.S. adversary side of the equation, where most of the potential problems (and learning) should exist.

**Conclusion**

In closing my theory chapter, I highlight that this line of reasoning, if supported, creates an interesting implication for foreseeable (i.e., while the United States is still a democratic superpower) U.S. strategic cooperation arrangements with its former adversaries: barring some international force that would preclude the possibility of cooperation between the United States and its former adversary, former adversary collective willingness for deep and enduring cooperation with the United States is *the* primary driver of variation in the relationship’s qualities of cooperation and, in turn, strategic cooperation outcomes. This means that the former adversary must be politically unified and have a reconciled government and winning coalition to support higher qualities of cooperation or the former adversary must have a completely willing (i.e., no resistance from influential domestic actors) resident population to support higher qualities of cooperation. This is important for policymakers and has predictive power. While U.S. policymakers may have some control
over a former adversary’s disinterest (e.g., by adjusting the “sweetness” of its strategic cooperation offer), trust (e.g., by the institutional guarantees it commits to), and state capacity (e.g., by the state capacity it will provide the former adversary), U.S. policymakers must evaluate the prospects of resolving sources of credible commitment problems that are much harder for them to control—former adversary reconciliation problems and political unification problems—to adequately assess the costs, benefits, and risks of a given strategic-cooperation policy choice. This is the key.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I first discuss my method to empirically test my hypotheses. I then discuss my case selection process and identify the cases on which I utilize this methodology. Next, I discuss how I operationalize and measure my variables that I test in those cases and close with a preview of my case study format and flow.

As a review, my first hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the international level. Sources of these credible commitment problems include spoilers, competitors, and other international conditions. My second hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that would undermine the willingness of a state’s leadership or its winning coalition to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. Sources of these credible commitment problems include disinterest, trust, and reconciliation problems; of these, the most likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts is reconciliation problems within the former U.S. adversary. My third and fourth hypotheses suggest that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that would undermine the opportunity of a state’s leadership to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. Sources of these credible commitment problems include
state capacity and political unification problems; of these, the most likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts is political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary.


My theory identifies several sources of credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. My theory recognizes that there is a great deal of complexity and texture in the circumstances that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation over the course of an enduring relationship. All of this complexity and texture must be accounted for in my research design and conduct. In the remainder of this section, I identify my methodological approach, justify this choice, and explain my process for data collection.

The approach

My central empirical approach is qualitative—an in-depth examination of strategic cooperation behavior in a small number of cases involving the United States and war. The strategy I use is best characterized as Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA). It includes “structured and focused” controlled comparisons to guide data collection and enable systematic comparisons of the cases to gain leverage over my puzzle.\(^{82}\) Although I do not employ “process tracing” in the conventional sense,\(^{83}\) I do trace the evolution of variables over time to show how variations in sources of credible commitment problems cause variations in qualities of cooperation and how the prospective participants do or do not

\(^{82}\) See George and Bennett 2005, 67 and George and McKeown 1985, 44-49.

\(^{83}\) See Bennett in Brady and Collier, 2010.
become gradually enmeshed in a relationship with higher qualities of cooperation. Taken as a whole, the cases I study demonstrate how variations in sources of credible commitment problems at both the international and domestic levels cause variations in qualities of cooperation.

The Justification

The obvious rationale for choosing this approach is that there are relatively few cases in my universe (less than 20) which makes a large-N study impractical. But beyond that, the evolutions of the variables in these cases are big, contextual, textured, transpire over long periods of time, and are driven in part by strategic behavior at the highest levels of a state. It is important to capture the nuances of these evolutions to better understand the dynamics of strategic cooperation outcomes, and the qualitative CHA method accommodates this aim nicely.

To be more specific, strategic cooperation decisions are made by state leaders and the best way to assess my hypotheses with high confidence and within the scope of this study is to assess each variable and how those variables influence policymaker decisions regarding cooperation with their former adversary.84 We need a deep understanding of decision making processes to do this.

Temporal effects are also important. If one was to ask if there was a commitment problem based on disinterest in the cooperative arrangement between the United States and Germany after World War II, the answer could be either yes or no depending on where one looks in that variable’s evolution process. Immediately after World War II, the United States

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84 See Reiter 2009, 52 for a similar approach.
wanted to abandon Europe—it was disinterested in an intense form of strategic cooperation that we might now call an ideal strategic partnership. But as events unfolded, the U.S. position changed—disinterest ceased to be a problem within a few years of the war’s end. Further, interest is not irreversible, and had it changed, that would have suggested that the qualities of cooperation would have suffered. It is important to understand how a variable unfolds in relation to the others across time and how this dynamic influences strategic cooperation choices.

Equifinality, or “many alternative causal paths to the same outcome,” is a key consideration for this study.\(^{85}\) There are numerous ways that prospective participants could resolve credible commitment problems to improve their relationship’s qualities of cooperation. For example, there are many ways to promote reconciliation. This could be a byproduct of unquestionably just action, such as when a prospective participant removes a vile, coup-born government and restores a country’s legitimate government with the overwhelming consent of the domestic community (e.g., perhaps U.S. action in Grenada, 1983). Reconciliation could also be promoted by a prospective participant’s “hero moments,” such as the Berlin Airlift or natural disaster relief. This might also be done through prolonged confidence-building measures in conjunction with a cooperative government that promotes a new official narrative to reorient the public’s identity of a prospective participant from foe to non-foe or friend. Similarly, there are numerous paths on which a credible commitment problem might originate, surface, and, in turn, undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. A reconciliation problem might develop when a prospective participant initiates what many believe is an unjust war. Even if the war is

\(^{85}\) George and Bennett 2005, 10.
perceived to be just, the postwar treatment of the defeated population might be perceived as unjust and create a reconciliation problem. A reconciliation problem could also preexist from centuries past and change little as a result of a more current conflict.

Finally, endogeneity, covariance, and interaction of the variables are important considerations for this study as well. Regarding endogeneity, not only do credible commitment problems cause variation in strategic cooperation results, but strategic cooperation results might cause variation in credible commitment problems, for better or worse. For instance, a pattern of successful cooperative ventures may help resolve trust issues, thereby rectifying that existing source of credible commitment problems. Conversely, a pattern of unsuccessful strategic cooperation ventures may spawn disinterest towards the relationship, thereby creating a credible commitment problem where none previously existed. Further, the actors in this story are not completely independent of each other. For instance, the winning coalition can influence a leader’s behavior towards strategic cooperation, but a leader can influence its winning coalition’s behavior towards strategic cooperation as well. Regarding covariance and interaction, the variables in this story may not always be independent of each other. In a case of extreme political unification problems, for example, we might also see an associated internal threat to regime survival (e.g., an insurgency). This could influence other variables such as disinterest. For instance, a regime might be otherwise unwilling to engage in strategic cooperation because of disinterest but, facing survival challenges caused by an insurgency, may suspend its disinterest problem at least until the threat to the regime’ survival subsides.

The small-N, CHA approach allows me to thoroughly address all of these complexities and conduct controlled comparisons across cases to observe the various causal paths and
independent causal effects of my independent variables. This approach also allows me to intensely examine the unfolding of each case over time and in sequence. In addition, it allows me to assess a wide variety of causal paths that may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to adequately model quantitatively. It allows me to assess the myriad interdependent effects of the variables and assess the directions of their influence and causality. Plus, frankly, in my humble opinion, we learn more and could have a larger policy impact from a thicker study of this puzzle. A thicker study allows one to tease out the other unobservable implications of my theory in a way that is not possible in a large-N study, and a thicker study is more accessible to policymakers who might be encouraged to act upon its findings.

Data

I use a variety of evidence, from both primary and secondary data sources, to assess the evolution of each variable over time and how these variables affect the key decisions of policymakers who are responsible for strategic cooperation choices. Primary sources include public and private information from diaries, official government documents (e.g., actual strategic cooperation agreements), official government statements and press releases (e.g., White House and U.S. State Department communications), raw transcripts of speeches and conversations (e.g., transcripts from recordings of Saddam Hussein’s private conversations), survey data, interview data, and so forth. Secondary sources favor recognized subject matter experts (e.g., seasoned historiographers) as much as possible.

86 See “The Saddam Tapes,” Woods et al., 2011, which includes transcripts and analyses of Saddam Hussein’s conversations that were gleaned from tapes recovered during the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
While this technique helps to build a thick and comprehensive story of the preferences and intent behind observed actions, it is not without its challenges. For instance, primary sources include public and private statements of key actors for a given story. It can be good to “get it from the horse’s mouth,” so to speak. However, sometimes individuals misstate their preferences and intentions, intentionally (strategically) or otherwise. Some primary sources are widely available, and some are still classified. This can create an incomplete picture or an alternate reality. Secondary sources, particularly those from seasoned historiographers, can provide great insight into thoroughly debated topics. Secondary sources from the World War II era are abundant, thorough, and fairly stable after years of peer review. However, secondary sources are much less advanced for more recent conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This can create skepticism with regards to newer secondary information.

Where primary and secondary sources fall short, I turn towards the historical record, interpreting and assessing key decisions, actions, and consequences. Actions speak louder than words, as they say.

**Case Selection**

In this section, I clearly identify and justify my universe of cases, then present my case selections, selection criteria, and rationale.

*My Universe*

My universe of cases includes U.S. wars from World War II to present. I am primarily trying to explain strategic cooperation outcomes for this specific subcomponent of all

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87 See Reiter 2009, 57-58.
possible strategic cooperation contexts. The U.S. wars in my universe are coincident with the Correlates of War Project’s inter-state war list, with the exception of Grenada and Panama, which I add because of their nature (a U.S. invasion followed by a regime change) and Libya, which has transpired since the last Correlates of War update. This universe of war dyads for possible postwar strategic cooperation relationships is comprised of the United States and:

From World War II (1941-1945)\textsuperscript{88}—Germany, Japan, Italy, and to some extent, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of whom sided with the Axis.

From the Korean War (1950-1953)—North Korea, and to some extent, China and Russia.

From the Vietnam War (1965-1975)—Vietnam.

From Operation Urgent Fury (1983)—Grenada.

From Operation Just Cause (1989)—Panama.


From the War for Kosovo (1999)—Serbia.

From Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)—Afghanistan.


I focus on U.S. wars for several reasons. First, in the context of this study, the United States has the opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation more so than many other states due to its ample resources and global reach. Second, in the context of this study, the United States has an affinity for democratic institutions and cooperative relationships. The United States, more than any other nation I can think of, has engaged globally to pursue this strategic cooperation option, postwar or otherwise. In that sense, the United States has the willingness, more so than many other states, to engage in strategic cooperation. Lastly, by focusing on U.S.-only wars, I control better for some of the variation in circumstances between cases.

I focus on the time period of World War II to present for several reasons as well. First, the world was fundamentally different during this period than it was previously. Second, the United States was fundamentally different in this period than it was previously.

The world was fundamentally different in the more recent period due to the rise of the nuclear age, and new existential threats may well have changed the calculus for the benefits of cooperative relationships (and the dangers of going it alone) for many states. Further, as Thomas Berger notes for some of the states involved in World War II and in this study, “World War II was a seminal experience as well as an apparent rupture in the development of each country’s [Japan’s, Germany’s, and Austria’s] national identity and political system.”

The United States was fundamentally different in the more recent time period for several reasons. First, the United States fundamentally changed its foreign policy. Previous U.S.

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89 Berger 2012, 32.
foreign policy was more aligned with the philosophies of President George Washington who “warned his fellow citizens against permanent alliances in the conduct of foreign affairs”90 and President Thomas Jefferson who declared “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”91 Emerging from World War II, we saw quite a different U.S. foreign policy—the United States began to embrace entangling alliances and other relationships that we might call strategic partnerships today. Second, by this time the United States had accepted its role of global hegemon. While the United States avoided its role as a hegemon in the interwar periods, by World War II it had accepted its role as a world leader and continued to engage globally. Third, and partially as a byproduct of the capacity it had built up during World War II, the United States could credibly offer protectorate status and enviable strategic cooperation benefits to nations around the globe in this timeframe.

My Case Selections, Selection Criteria, and Rationale

From my universe of cases, I do full case studies on Germany (East and West), Iraq 1991, and Iraq 2003. I do abbreviated case studies on Serbia and a counterfactual of Iraq 2003. The following explains my rationale for these choices.

I followed the case-selection philosophy of George and Bennett who argue that case selection should be guided by a well-defined research objective and an appropriate research strategy—cases should not be chosen just because they are interesting or because a lot of data exists.92 Rather, as professed by George and Bennett, I chose my cases because they are

90 Lake 1999, 3.
91 Quoted in Lake 1999, 3.
92 George and Bennett 2005, 83.
relevant to my research project, provide the best mix of control and variation for my research problem, and demonstrate the explanatory power of my primary variables of interest.\textsuperscript{93}

In light of this philosophy, I necked down my universe of cases to a shortlist of candidates using a series of elimination criteria. I then selected the most suitable cases from that shortlist. For the first criteria, I chose to avoid cases with intractably powerful forces that overwhelm and confound other variables. For this reason, I eliminated the cases of Grenada and Panama. Although the United States invaded these states, forced regime change, and occupied these states briefly, these states are solidly in the U.S. “sphere of influence.” While the favorable variables and very cooperative relationships of these cases would support my theory, I cannot distinguish between voluntary strategic cooperation and domination—the power differentials between the United States, Grenada, and Panama, coupled with their extremely close geographic proximity, are too confounding.

Second, I eliminated the cases of wars that the United States didn’t “win.” This includes the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. It is not surprising or overly informative that some of the credible commitment variables were unfavorable and that the corresponding qualities of cooperation were low or absent in these cases. By not winning, the United States was not able to resolve the issues it had with these states—they remained adversaries. Further, while the United States did not win, it was nonetheless a very strong state and not in need of support—and it had little incentive to offer a helping hand to those who refused its will. Also, the U.S. adversaries in these conflicts found themselves on the communist side of the Cold War—an international condition that made strategic cooperation untenable and

\textsuperscript{93} The first two case-selection criteria are from George and Bennett 2005, 83-84; the last is from Reiter 2009, 52-56.
overwhelmed the effects of all other variables. Counterfactually, I may not have eliminated this category of cases if there had been an example in which, for instance, the United States warred against a near-peer, did not win, suffered catastrophic losses, was left in great need, and its former adversary had spare resources with which to offer the United States a valuable strategic cooperation relationship (a “shoe on the other foot” scenario). However, there are no examples of this in my universe. In my universe, the United States, win or otherwise, emerged from conflict as a powerful, resource-rich, and self-sufficient state.

Third, I eliminated the newest cases which are not yet ready for analysis. This includes the cases of war in Afghanistan and Libya.

Lastly, for the remaining cases, I favored the crucial cases. For World War II, I consider Germany and Japan to be crucial cases. Italy joined the Allies in 1943—it is not surprising that the corresponding qualities of cooperation would be high. U.S. action with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria paled in comparison to U.S. action in Germany and Japan, and the low qualities of cooperation of the corresponding relationships is not surprising considering that they fell behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. While those effects are useful to demonstrate how international sources of credible commitment problems can degrade qualities of cooperation, those effects are already evident in my case study of (East) Germany.

This resulted in the following shortlist of cases for possible inclusion in my study: the World War II cases of Germany and Japan, Iraq 1991, Serbia, and Iraq 2003. From this shortlist, I used the following criteria to select the specific cases for my study. First, I endeavored to address each possible permutation of international and domestic sources of
credible commitment problems to demonstrate what happens when credible commitment problems exist in none, one, or both levels of analysis. Second, I endeavored to maximize the variation in my dependent variable (qualities of cooperation) and my key domestic independent variables (reconciliation and political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side).

Figure 3 below shows how my shortlist of cases fits into the possible permutations of the basic favorability (based on a simplified, dichotomous, preliminary assessment) of international and domestic sources of credible commitment problems towards strategic cooperation. The cases that I chose for this study are emphasized in *bold italic*. Note that all possible permutations are covered by my case selection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Conditions</th>
<th>International Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Quadrant I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany, Japan</td>
<td>Quadrant II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Quadrant IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Quadrant III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 2003</td>
<td>Iraq 1991, Serbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Case Selection Based on Permutations of International and Domestic Conditions

My theory of strategic cooperation suggests that Quadrant I cases will exhibit higher qualities of cooperation. Quadrant III and IV cases may not be attempted because of international barriers to strategic cooperation. If attempted, they will likely experience lower qualities of cooperation. Quadrant II cases are more likely to be attempted because
international conditions are permissive, but since domestic conditions are unfavorable, qualities of cooperation will likely suffer.

To select cases in a way that maximizes variation in my key domestic independent variables (reconciliation and political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side) for my study’s context (U.S. wars from World War II to present), I adjust my original hypotheses from Chapter 2 to reflect just these primary variables of interest. These key domestic independent variables are components of Hypotheses 2 and 4, and adjusting these hypotheses results in the following “tailored” hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2 becomes “Hypothesis 2-tailored” (H2t) and is specifically focused on reconciliation within the former adversary state.

**H2t:** At the domestic level, an increase in reconciliation problems within a former adversary’s leadership or its winning coalition reduces a former adversary government’s willingness to credibly commit to strategic cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

Hypothesis 4 becomes “Hypothesis 4-tailored” (H4t) and is specifically focused on political unification problems within the former adversary state.

**H4t:** At the domestic level, an increase in a former adversary’s political unification problems reduces the respective government’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation when influential domestic actor(s) resist such agreements (for myriad reasons, including reconciliation problems
or outside options). This, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright.

Figure 4 below depicts all possible permutations (eight) that result from variations in my primary domestic variables of interest (former adversary political unification and reconciliation problems) within my theory’s hypotheses. This disregards any effects at the international level (e.g., spoiling, competition, and so forth). The second column is extracted from Hypothesis 2-tailored (H2t) and accounts for the favorability of a former adversary’s willingness to engage in strategic cooperation based on the status of reconciliation within its state leadership and the respective winning coalition. The third and fourth columns are extracted from Hypothesis 4-tailored (H4t) and account for the favorability of a former adversary’s opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation based on the status of political unification and resistance of influential domestic actors. Within the matrix, a “+” symbol means that the condition is favorable for strategic cooperation and a “-” symbol means that the condition is unfavorable for strategic cooperation—again, a simplified, dichotomous construct.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>H2t</th>
<th>H4t Component 1</th>
<th>H4t Component 2</th>
<th>Theory’s prediction for qualities of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Possible Case Permutations Based on Former Adversary Reconciliation and Political Unification

Note that, with the exception of Case Type 3, both former adversary reconciliation and political unification (i.e., the second and third columns) must be favorable for my theory to predict higher qualities of cooperation. Conversely, with the exception of Case Type 3, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation whenever either reconciliation or political unification (i.e., the second and third columns) is unfavorable. Accordingly, H4t Component 2, the willingness of the former U.S. adversary’s influential domestic actors, only changes the otherwise-predicted outcome in Case Type 3.

Case Type 3 represents a permissive environment where the former adversary leadership, winning coalition, and all influential domestic actors are willing to engage in strategic cooperation with the United States, but for some reason the state lacks political unification. Importantly, there are no known real-world examples of this case type in my universe of cases. Perhaps this is because Case Type 3 is theoretically possible but not likely in postwar
scenarios—we can almost be assured that a powerful actor will resist strategic cooperation with the United States, and political unification will determine if a willing government has the opportunity to make a credible commitment to strategic cooperation in spite of that resistance. In light of this, I set aside H4t Component 2 and focus my case selection on those conditions that matter most in practice.

This results in a useful simplification to Figure 4, as depicted in Figure 5 below. This matrix has four (instead of eight) case types. To further simplify, these four case types are broken down into two categories: the “all is well” category (Category 1) in which both reconciliation and political unification variables are favorable for strategic cooperation and my theory predicts higher qualities of cooperation; and the “something is awry” category (Category 2) in which one or both of the reconciliation and political unification variables are unfavorable for strategic cooperation and my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation.

Figure 5 shows how my shortlist of cases fits into the possible permutations of the basic favorability (based on a simplified, dichotomous, preliminary assessment) of my key domestic independent variables towards strategic cooperation. The cases that I chose for this study are emphasized in **bold italic**. Note that all possible permutations are covered by my case selection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th><strong>H2t</strong></th>
<th><strong>H4t component 1</strong></th>
<th>Theory's prediction for qualities of cooperation</th>
<th>Cases that demonstrate this</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Germany, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Iraq 2003 Counterfactual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Case Selection Based on Permutations of Former Adversary Reconciliation and Political Unification

Of note, the Serbia and Iraq 1991 cases are confounded by credible commitment problems at the international level, making these suboptimal to isolate strictly domestic-level effects. Unfortunately, it is quite challenging to find cases in my universe where international forces are not a big part of the explanation. The counterfactual case of Iraq 2003 demonstrates how qualities of cooperation respond when international conditions are favorable, the reconciliation of the former U.S. adversary leadership and its winning coalition is favorable, yet the political unification of the former adversary is low and influential domestic actors resist strategic cooperation.

My case selections from my shortlist (Germany, Iraq 1991, Serbia, and Iraq 2003) maximize my available variation in the permutations of problems at the international and domestic levels and in permutations of my key domestic variables of interest (former adversary reconciliation and political unification problems). The cases of Germany and Japan show the same variation in my permutations. I elected to do the German case because
of the utility of its East German component, which helps me address the conditions represented in Quadrant IV of Figure 3.

Consequently, I do not complete case studies of all 17 cases in my universe. Nor are my case selections random. However, they meet my selection criteria, provide substantial variation in my independent variables and dependent variable, and span the timeframe of my study. Further, they occur in a wide range of contexts yet control for many contextual variations to improve focus on the independent effects of variables. As George and McKeown stress, “If exogenous (i.e. contextual) differences between cases can be ruled out as a source of variations in outcome (admittedly not a simple manner…), then differences in outcomes in the two cases could be attributed to differences on the one dimension of the typology.”

By choosing the German case and comparing the experiences of West and East Germany, I avoid many contextual confounders and better isolate the effects of my variables of interest than if I were to choose, for instance, Japan for my Quadrant I case and East Germany for my Quadrant IV case. The same benefit exists by studying Iraq 1991 and comparing it to Iraq 2003. Finally, the constant U.S. side of the cooperative relationship helps control some of the contextual variation as well.

In the subsequent chapters, I do full case studies of Germany, Iraq 1991, and Iraq 2003, each of which are key to explaining variation in the sources of credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels and within the domestic level (see Figures 3 and 5). I do brief case studies on Serbia and a counterfactual of Iraq 2003 to further demonstrate the nuances of the domestic “something is awry” category (see Figure 5).

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94 George and McKeown 1985, 28.
Operationalization and Measurement of Variables

In this section, I describe how I operationalize and measure each variable. I begin with the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable. I then proceed with the operationalization and measurement of the independent variables, beginning with the international sources of credible commitment problems and concluding with the domestic sources of credible commitment problems.

The Dependent Variable: Qualities of Cooperation

Recall from my introduction that I define strategic cooperation as voluntary, deep, and enduring cooperation. The depth and endurance of cooperation have a level of ambition and a level of realization, both of which are important in the evaluation of a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. This continuous relationship is graphically depicted in a simplified manner in Figure 6 below.

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95 The model in Figure 6 is further simplified in that the possibility that realization exceeds ambition is not represented. For instance, the lower right quadrant represents a relationship that successfully meets its lowly cooperative ambitions. As I have constructed this model, a relationship that exceeds its lowly cooperative ambitions would fall somewhere to the right of this quadrant. Alternately, one could draw a vector from the lower left corner of the quadrants to the upper right corner of the quadrants and consider the levels of ambition and realization in a pure mathematical sense. Every point on that vector would represent a relationship where realization perfectly meets ambition. Every point to the left of the vector (upper left triangle of the split matrix) would represent a relationship where realization falls short of ambition. Every point to the right of that vector (lower right triangle of the split matrix) would represent a relationship where realization exceeds ambition. To model the relationships in this way would complicate the model and the explanation while providing limited analytical benefit within the confines of this study where ambition, measured by explicit agreements, is not static (i.e., can increase or decrease over time) and in all likelihood precedes and exceeds realization. Further, the focus of this study is on the upper right quadrant. The best strategic cooperation sets high goals and achieves them rather than only reaching agreement on low goals and unexpectedly exceeding them.
Figure 6: Assessing Qualities of Cooperation

I evaluate and code the qualities of cooperation for postwar relationships as *highly cooperative, cooperative, semi-cooperative, uncooperative, or absent* based on a qualitative assessment of the levels of ambition and realization associated with their postwar cooperation. Although my dependent variable is continuous in nature, this simplified 5-point coding scheme is sufficient for the purposes of this study.

To assess a relationship’s ambition of cooperation, I evaluate the depth and endurance of cooperation as described in explicit agreements (if any) between states. In strategic-cooperation agreements, cooperative ambitions vary widely. For example, the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) between the United States and Iraq includes comprehensive provisions for political, diplomatic, defense, security, cultural, economic, energy, health, environmental, information technology, communications, law enforcement, and judicial cooperation and is designed to enable the achievement of broader mutual interests with

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96 While I acknowledge that tacit agreements for cooperation may exist, I set them aside for this initial study and focus on the more tractable explicit agreements. This technique is sufficient for the purposes of this study.
respect to regional security and prosperity.\textsuperscript{97} To assess the realization of cooperation, I evaluate the achieved depth and endurance of cooperation as reflected in the historical record.

Endurance of cooperation is fairly straightforward to stratify. A low endurance of cooperation might be reflected by the persistence of cooperation for only a few years to a couple of decades. A higher endurance of cooperation might be reflected by the persistence of cooperation beyond a couple of decades (beyond a generation). The highest depth of cooperation might be reflected by persistent and indefinite cooperation that survives jostling (i.e., recovers from “accidents” or conflicts and survives substantial changes to the status quo).

Evaluating the depth of cooperation is more complex. In line with Downs et al., who conceptualize a “treaty’s depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence,” I conceptualize the depth of cooperation for a strategic cooperation arrangement as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence.\textsuperscript{98} There are numerable dimensions with which to evaluate a postwar relationship’s depth of cooperation, including security, foreign policy, domestic policy, and economic dimensions, amongst others. Perhaps the most readily apparent and easiest to stratify is the security dimension. With the presumption that former adversaries have a recent history of highly uncooperative behavior (war) towards each other in the security dimension, joint cooperation in this dimension can be readily

\textsuperscript{97} See the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq in Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{98} Downs et al. 1996, 383.
evaluated using the perspective given by Downs et al. A low depth of cooperation in the security dimension might be reflected by a mutual non-aggression pact or limited joint security efforts. A higher depth of cooperation might be reflected with a defensive alliance.

The highest depth of cooperation might be reflected in the voluntary hosting of substantial numbers of former adversary troops on the other’s soil—certainly something states would not do in the absence of very deep cooperation. Likewise, one can look towards foreign and domestic policy choices or economics, given an understanding of state preferences, and assess the depth of cooperation based on how much a state deviated from their preferences to accommodate their former adversary.

The following typology shows how these qualities of cooperation overlay into my coding scheme.

*Highly cooperative:* high; relationship has high cooperative ambition and a highly realized depth and endurance of cooperation (upper right quadrant of Figure 6); deep cooperation endures (or, for newer cases, is on track to endure) at least four decades (two generations)—it is long-term and survives jostling.

*Cooperative:* middling; relationship has moderate to high cooperative ambition and a moderately realized depth of cooperation; moderately deep cooperation endures (or, for newer cases, is on track to endure) at least four decades—it is long-term and survives jostling.

*Semi-cooperative:* low; relationship has low cooperative ambition, which it realizes (sets and achieves low goals) or has higher cooperative ambition with a low level of
cooperative realization (upper left or lower right quadrants of Figure 6); cooperation endures at least two decades (one generation).

*Uncooperative:* troubled; relationship has varied levels of cooperative ambition but relationship fails to realize even low cooperative ambitions (e.g., lower left quadrant of Figure 6); relationship is often uncooperative—participants often counter each other’s important interests; cooperation does not endure at least two decades—it is not long-term (by design or it fails/does not survive jostling) or (for the newer cases) is failing.

*Absent:* no appreciable ambition or realization of cooperation (i.e., no attempt at strategic cooperation or other forms of cooperative relationships).

**The Independent Variables**

I evaluate and code all international and domestic sources of credible commitment problems as *favorable, ambiguous, or unfavorable* for a relationship’s qualities of cooperation based on a qualitative assessment of their status. Additionally, in my assessment of disinterest, trust, and reconciliation problems, I pay particular attention to the segments of the population from which the problem emanates (e.g., within the leadership, its winning coalition, or other influential domestic actors). Although my independent variables are continuous in nature, this simplified 3-point coding scheme is sufficient for the purposes of this study.

Recall that I define a *spoiler* as a rival state that has both the opportunity and the willingness to preclude the possibility of strategic cooperation by localized force or coercion. This does not necessarily require the spoiler to be a peer U.S. rival, but, in the context of this
study, it must be powerful enough to deny strategic cooperation activities such as negotiations and ongoing cooperation between a superpower (the United States) and its prospective co-participant.

Evidence of spoilers includes, for example, a rival’s military occupations of a prospective participant, installation of puppet regimes, credible threats of reprisal for engaging in strategic cooperation, or assassinations or kidnappings of key persons to, in part, discourage strategic cooperation. Counterevidence of sufficient capacity to spoil includes, for example, a prospective participant’s military occupation of the other’s prospective participant’s state or a laughable power differential between the supposed spoiler and the strongest of the prospective participants.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of spoiler problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

**Favorable:** No spoiler exists that demonstrates both the opportunity and the willingness to preclude the possibility of a cooperative relationship between the United States and its former adversary.

**Ambiguous:** Powerful rivals have the opportunity to preclude the possibility of a cooperative relationship, but their intentions (willingness) are unclear (e.g., referencing the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, Russia demonstrates the opportunity to quickly occupy and potentially deny strategic cooperation for nearby states, but Russia’s willingness to enduringly do so is unclear).

**Unfavorable:** A spoiler clearly demonstrates both the opportunity and the willingness to deny the possibility of a cooperative relationship between the United States and its
former adversary (e.g., the Soviets in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II and throughout the Cold War).

Recall that I define a competitor as a state that has both the opportunity and the willingness to provide one of the prospective strategic cooperation participants a better strategic cooperation offer and that there must be an element of exclusivity to that offer such that the prospective participant cannot participate in both prospective strategic cooperation arrangements. A more attractive offer could come in the form of more reliable and affordable security or economic benefits.

Evidence of competitor problems includes, for example, exclusive and comparatively better competitor offers to engage in treaties or other forms of strategic cooperation, provide or sell military equipment, contribute forces to enhance security, provide economic aid, improve infrastructure, or engage in joint economic ventures. A prospective participant need not accept these offers for a credible commitment problem to exist (i.e., these exclusive offers alone can cause fears of future voluntary defection from a strategic cooperation agreement). Counterevidence includes, for example, clear disadvantage in the prospective gains of a competitor’s offer or evidence that a competitor’s offer is non-exclusive.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of competitor problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

**Favorable:** No competitor exists that demonstrates both the opportunity and the willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.

**Ambiguous:** Competitors have the opportunity to provide a better strategic cooperation offer but their willingness to do so is unclear.
Unfavorable: A competitor clearly demonstrates both the opportunity and the willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.

Recall that other international conditions could vary in nature and may create an opportunity or a willingness problem for one or both of the prospective participants that would undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation. Such conditions could come in the form of competing alliances (e.g., if a prospective participant is an enemy of the other’s existing allies), untenable political situations (e.g., if pariahs or war criminals remain in political control of a prospective participant state), incompatibility of ideology (e.g., incompatibilities with Cold War alignment), and so forth.

Evidence of this includes, for example, State Department and Foreign Ministry policy analyses that identify such problems, identification of incompatible treaty structures, or policymaker statements linking strategic cooperation refusal to such a condition.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of other international conditions towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

Favorable: No adverse international conditions exist that are likely to preclude or undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation.

Ambiguous: The effects of other international conditions are not assessable.

Unfavorable: Adverse international conditions exist that are likely to preclude or undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation.

Turning to the domestic independent variables, recall that I define a disinterest problem as when at least one of the prospective participants is insufficiently interested in the gains
that could be made from that specific strategic cooperation arrangement and that the participant must not be interested in that gain regardless of which strategic cooperation opportunity it might come from (else a different problem is indicated, such as a trust or reconciliation problem). Disinterest problems could stem from a prospective participant’s perceptions that gains from the arrangement are trivial, that the arrangement might cause a net loss, or that one is self-sufficient and better off without potentially entangling relations.

Evidence of disinterest problems includes, for example, a rejected strategic cooperation offer without seeking or accepting other strategic cooperation offers of equal or lesser gain, complacency and contentment in rhetoric about one’s state of being, or avoidable neglect of the strategic cooperation arrangement and one’s required cooperative contributions. Counterevidence includes, for instance, public rhetoric, diplomatic inquiries and policy decisions seeking external strategic cooperation arrangements and support, or eager and faithful participation in strategic cooperation.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of disinterest problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

**Favorable:** A preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems do not exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.

**Ambiguous:** The effects of disinterest problems are not assessable.
Unfavorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.\textsuperscript{99}

Recall that I define a trust problem as when \textit{at least one of the prospective participants fears that the other will not honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future}. Trust problems are part of every credible commitment breakdown in some way, so it is important to note whether trust problems are the independent cause of a breakdown in credible commitment, or in response to other credible commitment problems (e.g., in response to disinterest problems on the other prospective participant’s side). Further, for trust problems to be the root cause of a breakdown in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, the many tools that are available to mitigate trust problems must be insufficient to alleviate those problems. Trust problems could stem from a prospective participant’s poor reputation for honoring agreements, a prospective participant’s hostile public rhetoric towards the cooperative relationship, or in response to other credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels, and so forth.

Evidence of trust problems includes, for example, unfavorable policy analyses regarding the trustworthiness of a prospective participant. Other evidence includes a participant’s request for, and subsequent other participant’s rejection of, trust-problem mitigation measures such as up-front contributions, cost sharing or tit-for-tat agreements, or asset protection agreements (e.g., a status of forces agreement, also known as a SOFA, designed to prevent participant forces from being subject to host-nation laws). Counterevidence includes, for example, favorable policy analyses regarding the trustworthiness of a

\textsuperscript{99} If disinterest problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and there is low political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status.
prospective participant or acceptance of and compliance with trust-problem mitigation measures.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of trust problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

*Favorable:* A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems do not exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.

*Ambiguous:* the effects of trust problems are not assessable.

*Unfavorable:* A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.\(^{100}\)

Recall that I define a *reconciliation* problem as when *at least one of the prospective participants harbors resentment against the other for perceived past injustices* and identifies the other as a non-friend, or perhaps even a rival or an enemy. Reconciliation problems could stem from a previous conflict between the participants (e.g., a trade dispute, a diplomatic slight, or a war) from which there are lingering feelings of injustice, a lack of a sense of shared responsibility, an unhealthy sense of shame or guilt, or an absence of forgiveness. Importantly, I assess the sense of reconciliation based on a qualitative assessment of the *evidence* of reconciliation, not whether a former adversary *should* feel reconciled.

Evidence of reconciliation problems includes, for example, rhetoric from government officials or other influential actors that condemns or vilifies a prospective participant,

\(^{100}\) If trust problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and there is low political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status.
politicization of strategic cooperation issues to take advantage of cleavages caused by reconciliation problems in certain segments of a society, protests against the participant or the strategic cooperation arrangement, or violence against participant resources. Counterevidence includes, for example, government narratives to reorient the identity of a participant that are generally accepted by the population, displays of forgiveness, positive public opinion regarding a prospective participant, and evidence of friendly identification (e.g., fraternization and intermarriages between prospective participant residents).

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of reconciliation problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

- **Favorable:** A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems do not exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.

- **Ambiguous:** The effects of reconciliation problems are not assessable.

- **Unfavorable:** A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.\(^{101}\)

Recall that I define a *state capacity* problem as when *at least one of the prospective participants lacks sufficient resources to meet strategic cooperation obligations*. State capacity problems could stem from an inability to generate resources, exhaustion of existing resources during a conflict, or from unrealistic strategic cooperation requirements.

Evidence of this includes, for example, policy analyses that reference a prospective participant’s lack of state capacity as an immitigable concern, observed resource deficiencies

\(^{101}\) If reconciliation problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and there is low political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status.
with respect to strategic cooperation requirements, or observed failures in strategic cooperation responsibilities that can be attributed to a lack of sufficient state capacity (i.e., the participant lacks the resources to prioritize efforts, direct the activities of their agents, and allocate assets as required to meet its obligations under the strategic cooperation arrangement). Counterevidence includes, for example, favorable analyses of a prospective participant’s state capacity, amenable adjustment to strategic cooperation requirements to mitigate state capacity deficiencies, observed resource surpluses with respect to strategic cooperation requirements, and recurring successful strategic cooperation activities with the state capacity at hand.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of state capacity problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

Favorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable state capacity problems do not exist from the other participant’s perspective.

Ambiguous: The effects of state capacity problems are not assessable.

Unfavorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable state capacity problems exist from the other participant’s perspective.

Recall that I define a political unification problem as when a prospective participant’s residents do not identify with their state’s government. When residents identify with other influential domestic actors who resist strategic cooperation, those influential actors can mount a credible resistance to strategic cooperation and thereby undermine a state’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. Such a combination of conditions is unfavorable for cooperation. Political unification problems could stem from a historical lack
of political consolidation, domestic or foreign imposed regime transition (e.g., from a coup or war), or a rising challenge to government control (e.g., an insurgency). The resistance of influential domestic actors to strategic cooperation could stem from disinterest, trust, or reconciliation problems. They may profit when strategic cooperation is rejected.

Evidence of political unification problems includes, for example, patterns of non-governmentally-sanctioned violence that are tolerated or seen as legitimate by large portions of the population, widespread public disregard for the rule of law, poor resident perception of government legitimacy, the existence of shadow governments (e.g., tribal organizations) that challenge the officially-sanctioned political process, and organizations or cults of personality that command the loyalty of large segments of the population at the expense of the official government. Counterevidence includes, for example, well-ordered political behavior that is subordinate to state laws and favorable public perception of government legitimacy.

The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of political unification problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.

*Favorable:* No substantial evidence of political unification problems exists—political unification is high or a preponderance of residents (including influential domestic actors) favors strategic cooperation.

*Ambiguous:* The effects of political unification problems are not assessable.

*Unfavorable:* Substantial evidence of political unification problems exists—political unification is low and influential domestic actors resist strategic cooperation.
Case Analyses Preview

In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I present full case studies. In Chapter 7 (the Conclusion), I briefly apply my theoretical framework to two additional cases. Each case is presented in the same basic flow. After I introduce a case, I conduct a historical review to provide a common baseline for author and reader of the basic evolution of relations between the United States and its adversary as well as additional information that is important in the context of strategic cooperation. Next, I measure my variables, beginning with the independent variables (international first, then domestic on the U.S. side, then domestic on the former U.S. adversary side) and then the dependent variable. I then conduct a holistic analysis of the case. For the full case studies, I next address alternate theories as applicable. I conclude each case with a summary of my findings with respect to the case’s support (or lack thereof) of my hypotheses and, in turn, my theory.
CHAPTER 4: THE GERMAN CASE

The Relationship between the United States and Germany after World War II

In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Germany after World War II. This case provides two distinct sets of circumstances—two distinct treatments on the German population by either Western or Soviet occupiers—upon which to test my theory. First, in “West” Germany (a term that refers to the zones\textsuperscript{102} of Western-occupied Germany and, once established in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany), international and domestic conditions were favorable towards higher postwar qualities of cooperation shortly after the end of World War II. My theory predicts higher qualities of cooperation in this situation. Second, in “East” Germany (a term that refers to the “Russian” or “eastern” zone of occupied Germany and, once established in 1949, the German Democratic Republic), international conditions were unfavorable and domestic conditions were otherwise favorable (when controlling for the influence of the unfavorable international conditions) for higher qualities of cooperation from the end of World War II until the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation.

The United States and the Western-occupied zones of postwar Germany resolved their credible commitment problems fairly expeditiously after World War II. In short order, there

\textsuperscript{102}See the map, Appendix C, which depicts the British, French, U.S., and Russian occupation zones. The “Western-occupied” zones were those occupied by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
were no conditions at the international or domestic levels that were sufficient to trigger lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in my four hypotheses. This side of the German case provides a baseline with which to compare the favorability of variables in other cases. In what would become East Germany, however, international conditions were markedly different. Unlike their countrymen in the Western-occupied zones of postwar Germany, this portion of the German population was under Soviet occupation. The Soviets served as a credible spoiler, and as such, presented a condition that was unfavorable for strategic cooperation (and as a byproduct, a condition that undermined the favorability of several variables at the domestic level). In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in my Hypothesis 1.

My theory’s predictions hold up in this case. The postwar relationship between the United States and West Germany (and, much later, unified Germany after the fall of the Soviet Union) had a high ambition and realization of cooperative depth and endurance throughout the many decades after the war. The postwar relationship between the United States and East Germany (before the fall of the Soviet Union) had little, if any, ambition or realization of cooperative depth and endurance.

After my historical review, which is focused mainly on the 1941-1955 timeframe, I proceed with my variable measurement and analysis, writing mainly in reference to West Germany except where noted. After this, I discuss the East German experience specifically, explaining what was different for this segment of the German population and why its outcome was different.
Pertinent Historical Record

When World War II ended in May 1945, Germany lay utterly devastated and was completely occupied by Allied forces. Hitler was dead, and the Nazi regime was decisively defeated. The Americans and British eventually colluded to form a separate West Germany. These actions set the path to permanently orient western Germany towards the West. By 1955, a separate West Germany enjoyed a rebuilt economy, was rearming, was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and was emerging as a model of Western liberal democracy. Deep cooperation between the United States and Germany (West Germany initially, and then unified Germany after the fall of the Soviet Union) endures to this day.

Prewar-1945: U.S. Pursuit of Unconditional Surrender and Abandonment, not Strategic Cooperation

After World War I, Germany was initially led by the peaceful and liberal democratic Weimar government. By 1932, the Nazi’s, capitalizing on the ill effects of hyperinflation, world depression, and public resentment towards the conditions of the Versailles Treaty that ended World War I, won a third of the vote on a platform that stressed nationalist and racist themes. By 1934, Adolf Hitler was both Reich Chancellor and President. Under Hitler’s direction, the Nazis implemented a program of genocide and set upon a plan for world domination by co-opting, attacking, or invading their European neighbors and others. In

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103 Per Eisenberg (1996, 485), in violation of the quadripartite framework established at Yalta and Potsdam and to the dismay their Russian “allies,” the Americans and British took measures “to fuse their two zones economically (December 1946), to incorporate western Germany in the Marshall Plan (July 1947), to implement separate currency reform (June 1948), and to convene a Parliamentary Council for the establishment of a West German state (September 1948).”

1941, the United States joined the ongoing war against Germany, having provided material and other support to allies prior to declaring war.\textsuperscript{105}

The Lead-up to V-E Day

The aggression between the Allies and Germany during the war is well known. This was a war in which all sides purposely targeted civilian population centers via area bombing and rockets to weaken civilian morale.\textsuperscript{106} Germany was left physically and psychologically devastated at the war’s end.\textsuperscript{107} “Major cities were almost entirely destroyed—93 percent of the houses in Düsseldorf, 75 percent in Frankfurt, and 66 percent in Cologne” were in ruins.\textsuperscript{108} A U.S. Army observer reported that “more than 20 million Germans [were] homeless or without adequate shelter. The average basic ration [was] less than 1,000 calories. The ability to wage war in this generation has been destroyed.”\textsuperscript{109} The devastation of this war permeated the German society, and there was great potential for lasting animosity and fear on all sides after the war.

This was also a war with clear and decisive U.S. military objectives—unconditional surrender, complete occupation, and Allied governance—and no American prewar plan for deep and enduring cooperation with the Germans. At Casablanca in 1943, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) proclaimed his goal of unconditional surrender, “affirming his antipathy

\textsuperscript{105} For this paragraph, see U.S. State Department “Background Notes on Germany,” October 2003.

\textsuperscript{106} See Wilson in Moten, ed., 2011, 205. See also an April 1945 statement by John McCloy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of War and future U.S. military governor in West Germany: “complete economic, social and political collapse going on in Central Europe, the extent of which is unparalleled in history” (in Leffler 1992, 63).

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, 214.

\textsuperscript{108} Edelstein 2008, 38.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
toward all things German and also a blithe disregard for the complications of planning and implementing a military occupation.” If it were up to him, there would likely have been a short U.S. occupation of defeated Germany followed by an abandonment of Europe. Many others also considered the “permanent occupation of Germany by the Allies, and particularly by the United States, [as] inconceivable.” As a result, initial U.S. planning was for an occupation of no more than two years. Europeans hoped otherwise. “Throughout the postwar period, European leaders were more concerned with American abandonment than with domination, and they consistently pressed for a formal and permanent American security commitment.”

Far from strategic cooperation, FDR wanted Germans to feel the pain of the war they started, stating in August 1944 that “every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation…The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.” Further, FDR “placed no importance on what the German people would or would not accept as a reasonable settlement after the war,” and although he affirmed that the German people would be treated fairly by the Allies, FDR clearly retained the prerogative to break up the German nation. FDR was “convinced that Germany was incorrigibly militaristic, [and] he thought the country must be substantially weakened in

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111 McAllister 2002, 17.
113 Ikenberry 2001, 165.
114 McAllister 2002, 52.
115 Ibid, 50.
order to prevent future aggression. For this purpose, FDR's preferred method was to carve it into several parts.”¹¹⁶ These ideas were embodied in the harsh and punitive Morgenthau Plan, which was designed to eliminate German industry by stripping the German industrial heartland of all existing industries and by preventing that heartland from reemerging as an industrial area for the foreseeable future.¹¹⁷

Importantly, these draconian views were not shared by all U.S. policymakers. As early as 1943, the U.S. State Department, which believed that a postwar order would have to respect the needs and desires of the German people, supported a policy to “integrate a disarmed but united Germany into the World economy.”¹¹⁸ Reinforcing this attitude, fear about the Soviets and their communist influence had already mounted prior to the war’s conclusion on May 8, 1945, with U.S. officials expressing concern that communists “would capitalize on the unrest.”¹¹⁹ Notably, Admiral Karl Donitz, Commander and Chief of the German armed forces upon Hitler’s suicide, proposed to surrender to the Allies in the West while continuing the resistance to the Red Army in the East, to which General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, subsequently refused.¹²⁰ The Allies seem to have compared favorably to the Soviets from a German perspective very early on.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 49.
¹¹⁹ Leffler 1992, 64.
1945-1955: Building a Foundation for Deep and Enduring Cooperation in the West

At the end of the war, as FDR envisioned, Germany was divided into four zones to be governed by the United States, England, France, and Russia. Berlin, 110 miles inside the Russian zone in the East, was itself carved into four zones of responsibility (see map, Appendix C). The postwar occupation was intended to be harsh. “While FDR backed away from the punitive Morgenthau Plan in late 1944, its spirit lingered in the occupation directive for American forces, JCS 1067,”¹²¹ which had the following stated goals:

“Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the inevitable consequences of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German population. The German population must be made to understand that all necessary steps will be taken to guarantee against a third attempt by them to conquer the world.”¹²²

U.S. occupational forces were to do just enough with the German economy to “prevent disease and unrest.”¹²³ They were strictly forbidden from fraternizing with the German population. However, the U.S. military governor for Germany, General Lucius Clay, and his American troops found prohibitions against fraternization with the Germans to be ridiculous and quickly devised ways to circumvent them, going so far as to transplant democracy into the parts of Germany that they controlled.¹²⁴

The Allies proceeded to exploit Germany’s resources while doing just enough to prevent disease and unrest. Coal extraction to feed the needs of the European continent was

¹²¹ Gaddis 1997, 44.
¹²² Extracted from Eisenberg 1996, 47.
¹²⁴ Gaddis 1997, 45.
imperative from the outset of the occupation. In June 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “Without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest” that could threaten the stability of the whole continent.\textsuperscript{125} Truman accepted that this policy might cause great suffering and provoke violence inside Germany.\textsuperscript{126} Meanwhile, the Soviets were focused on extracting war reparations. Soviet officials gave German territory to Poland and dismantled “German factories for transshipment to the Soviet Union,” which antagonized German opinion.\textsuperscript{127}

Soon, however, it was clear that such massive extraction operations (by which the victors extracted “reparations”) were not just irritating the Germans, but exacerbating the whole economic debacle in Europe. Further, “the economy in the U.S. zone was in shambles…Clay feared mass starvation, runaway inflation, and total economic paralysis,” and other officials feared that “millions of Germans might die from famine in the forthcoming winter.”\textsuperscript{128} By April 1946, food shortages in western Germany had forced the American military government to slash the already low 1,275 calorie ration (a 1,500 calorie ration was originally promised) and to cut the bread provision by a third. Rickets, malnutrition, and anemia were imminent concerns.\textsuperscript{129}

In response, contrary to the mandate of JCS 1067 and the previous Allied agreements, the United States set about reviving the German economy and pressured the Kremlin to reduce

\textsuperscript{125} Leffler 1992, 64.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, 65.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 68.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 69.
\textsuperscript{129} Eisenberg 208-234.
its demands for German war reparations. Notably, it was the Americans and the British who stood up against the Soviets on behalf of Germany. While the Soviets felt betrayed that the wartime promises of reparations were being broken, it was the “Americans and British delegates [who] privately denounced them as looters.” Around this time, U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s influential “long telegram” made its way to Washington, signaling the recognition of the Soviet threat and setting the stage for the imminent four-decade U.S. grand strategy of Soviet containment. “Identification of the Soviet Union as the enemy eased U.S. policymaking” and also galvanized support for the forthcoming Marshall Plan.

1946-1947: The Seeds of Strategic Cooperation Emerge

With the dire conditions in Germany and the recognition of the Soviet threat, U.S. objectives were modified. The primary U.S. fear was that these conditions might spark a communist revolution and drive the Germans to the Soviet camp (not necessarily that JCS 1067 was too harsh on the Germans). Coal production was still only about 30 percent of 1938 levels, and this was stalling recovery everywhere. “The people of the western zones were hungry, demoralized, and defeated.” By the fall of 1946, an acknowledged American priority had become priming the German economy for self-sustainment of an average European standard of living in addition to “promot[ing] the recovery of Western Europe, check[ing] Soviet influence, thwart[ing] Communist gains, and lower[ing] occupation

131 Eisenberg 1996, 89-110.
132 Kennan, 1946. See also Kennan’s follow-on article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” July, 1947.
133 Leffler 1992, 121.
134 Hal Brands, interview, 13 Nov 2012.
135 Ibid, 117.
The first real American bid for the loyalty of the German people came in a September 1946 speech at Stuttgart by Secretary Byrnes.” This important speech “went a long way toward distancing the Truman administration from the legacy of the Morgenthau Plan and the popular perception that America would quickly withdraw from Europe.” Byrnes “openly appealed to German nationalism and promised that American troops would stay in Germany as long as the other occupying powers did,” thereby marking “the unofficial end of Roosevelt’s grand design and exit strategy for postwar Europe.” “Byrnes’s speech was warmly approved by the American occupational authorities and by the German people.” It was the first joint public meeting between German and American officials since the end of World War II, and the speech received a standing ovation from the German audience—without doubt, Byrnes vision of a restored Germany under the protection of American power provided great relief to many.

136 Ibid, 120.
137 Burns 1986, 35.
138 McAllister 2002, 22.
139 Ibid, 76 for the previous two sentences.
140 Ibid, 257.
141 Ibid, 76.
As U.S. policy continued to evolve towards a divided-Germany solution, policymakers increasingly acknowledged the importance of German cooperation and partnership. Kennan saw only two choices for U.S. policy: “to unify Germany with the high probability that it would pass into the Soviet sphere, or to divide the country and integrate the western zones with Western Europe.” Of course, the latter was preferred.\textsuperscript{143} However, the plan to divide Germany and fashion a West European orbit that was amenable to American leadership required reassurances to the Germans and the other allies.\textsuperscript{144} Regarding German cooperation for American policy in general, Clay “realized that he would not enlist German backing for his policies if he did not promise to improve their economic lot, restore their political autonomy, and revive their national dignity.”\textsuperscript{145} The United States was compelled to represent German interests with the French on a frequent basis. Consistently, from before the war’s end (and until the West German admittance to NATO), the French were cautious of any measure that might increase German power. The French resisted a unified administration of the German economy, feeling that “their security depended on German dismemberment…and the containment of Soviet influence.”\textsuperscript{146} Eisenhower noted that the French “continued to be terrified at the thought of a unified Germany, no matter how much it [was] weakened” nor how long the occupation.\textsuperscript{147} Despite French concerns, the U.S. and British zones united economically in January 1947, “symbolizing a widening gulf between

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 224.

\textsuperscript{144} Leffler 1992, 120.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 68.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
the Western allies and the Soviet Union” and mitigating the previous Soviet monopoly on printing money.\textsuperscript{148}

\textit{1947 and the Marshall Plan: A Tangible U.S. Commitment to Strategic Cooperation}

When Truman came to power after FDR’s death in 1945, he was still a bit naïve about Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s nature.\textsuperscript{149} However, he soon recognized the need to reverse FDR’s course of minimizing Europe’s significance in world affairs and, in short order, “the focus shifted to the containment of Soviet aggression.”\textsuperscript{150} Further, “the situation in the western zones of Germany was worsening every day. Major food riots erupted, and even the 1,550-calories ration was imperiled by growing shortages.”\textsuperscript{151} By late spring 1947, rations were down to 1,200 calories a day and officials feared that, without additional food, they would lose the struggle to prevent Germany from going communist.\textsuperscript{152}

Still, there was fear from Republican spokesman (and future Secretary of State) John Dulles and others that a recovered Germany would seek revenge, would attempt to return to great power status, and would be tempted to align with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{153} Communists were improving in elections throughout Europe and, alarmingly, had achieved victories in Italian municipal elections.\textsuperscript{154} There was fear at that time that “no one could predict the orientation

\textsuperscript{148} Edelstein 2008, 32 and Dobbins 2003, 23.

\textsuperscript{149} Miscamble, 2009.

\textsuperscript{150} Eisenberg 1996, 491.

\textsuperscript{151} Leffler 1992, 154.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, 155.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, 152.

\textsuperscript{154} Leffler, 1988, 279-280.
of a future German government,” particularly once the occupation was over. Despite this debate, “there was no more important priority than reviving the production of western Germany and using it to win the loyalty of the German people.”

The U.S. answer to these woes was the Marshall Plan, launched in June 1947. Secretary of State George Marshall took office in January 1947 and soon after championed his namesake plan to integrate Germany into Europe and restore an indigenous balance of power in Europe. The Marshall Plan included $13 billion in assistance for Europe, and its major objectives were numerous. First, American officials wanted to “spawn economic recovery in Western and Southern Europe, undermine the appeal of communist parties, and thereby circumscribe the latent influence and power of the Kremlin.” Second, American officials wanted to “revive the western zones of Germany and to integrate them into a Western economic and political orbit.” Finally, “American Marshall Planners hoped to drive a wedge into the emerging Soviet bloc of satellite states in Eastern Europe.”

The Marshall Plan was hatched not only to address the economic strife in Europe, but also to stave off the threat of communist political victories, often by placing anti-communism conditions on its aid. It was the chief instrument of containment against the Soviet Union.

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156 Leffler 1992, 151.
157 McAllister 2002, 22.
158 Ikenberry 2001, 264; $13 billion in 1950 dollars is approximately $147 billion in 2014 dollars, assuming an average annual inflation rate of 3.86%.
159 Leffler 1988, 277 for the final 3 quotes of this paragraph.
160 Leffler 1992, 159-163.
at that time. The Marshall Plan was carefully crafted to bolster American influence and power, “bind European economies to the American economy,” and ultimately, it signified “that the economic recovery of Europe, including western Germany, had become the number-one priority of the Truman administration.” The Soviets recognized that the Marshall Plan would not only revive Germany’s strength, but also undermine communist strength in Western Europe, and they expectedly opposed the plan. The Soviets were not alone in their opposition; the French also strongly opposed the plan for typical reasons. Yet, in the end, the United States represented German interests as well as its own.

1948-1949: Consolidating Westward Orientation—the Berlin Blockade and a West German State

The call for a West German government became more widespread, setting the path towards a long-divided Germany. Kennan was keenly interested in separating Germany and Russia, warning that if there were ever “a happy marriage between Germany and Russia…we might as well fold up.” In early 1948, “both American occupational authorities and the State Department were already pushing for the creation of a separate West German state.” Furthermore, the Americans and British had resolved to have two Germanies for the

161 Gaddis 1997, 37.
162 Leffler 1992, 163-164.
163 Ibid, 185.
164 Ibid, 186.
165 Leffler 1988, 297.
166 McAllister 2002, 22.
foreseeable future—the Russians would get the East and the western zones would form a separate state.¹⁶⁷

German participation in their governance increased, and U.S. officials began to worry more that Allied demands might incite German nationalism, undermine pro-democratic Germans, and create opportunities for the Kremlin to steal Germany.¹⁶⁸ Kennan reported a sense of German resentment over Allied demands, especially the “prospective of long-term division of their countries,” and that the old defiant German nationalism was resurfacing.¹⁶⁹ He worried that “a united Germany would be strongly nationalistic, authoritarian, and susceptible to offers from the Soviet Union.”¹⁷⁰ While he thought a West German government would just make things worse, he realized that democratic forces in Germany were faltering and that the United States had to minimize occupation controls and allow the Germans to govern themselves or they would turn away from the West.¹⁷¹ The French, predictably, voiced concerns, and American policymakers pressured the French to “stop obstructing the formation of a West German government…and accept reductions in reparations.”¹⁷² However, U.S. policymakers also voiced assurances that it was “very unlikely that American forces would be withdrawn from Germany for a long time—until the threat from the East had disappeared.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ Eisenberg 1996, 363.
¹⁶⁸ Leffler 1992, 277.
¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 279.
¹⁷² Ibid, 278.
¹⁷³ McAllister 2002, 151.
In the midst of the migration towards a West German state, a great opportunity arose for the Americans to demonstrate their commitment to strategic cooperation with the German people. On June 24, 1948, “Russian military authorities cut off the electricity, and stopped all railroads, barges, cars, trucks, and pedestrians going into and out of the western sectors of Berlin.”174 This was the start of the infamous Berlin Blockade. Importantly, it presented the United States a choice to either abandon Berlin or stand up with the Germans to resist Russian aggression. The United States chose the latter, and this proved pivotal for the U.S.-German partnership. Eisenberg sums up the events and consequences, explaining that:

“By October, the airlift had surpassed all expectation as a dramatic and effective means of supplying the city. Furthermore, rather than undermining the London Accords, Soviet militancy was facilitating their realization. Against the backdrop of the blockade, the Americans were enjoying unprecedented success in disciplining West European allies and enlisting the enthusiastic cooperation of west German inhabitants.” U.S. policymakers “increasingly perceived the Soviet blockade of Berlin as a diplomatic windfall. By trying to cut off the city the Russians had discredited the German Communists, demeaned Marxist ideology, sowed fear across Western Europe, and provided the Americans with the chance to display their humanitarianism and military might.” “On May 12, 1949—one minute past midnight—the lights went on in the western sectors of Berlin as cars, trucks, and trains resumed their travel into and out of the city. Clumps of citizens stood along the autobahn, where they cheered and placed flowers on the passing vehicles. Over the next two days, there were ceremonies and demonstrations honoring the bravery of the Allied airmen and the sacrifice of the local populace. At the city assembly, members unanimously voted to name the square in front of Tempelhof Airport ‘Platz der Luftbrüche’ (Airlift Square).”175

The triumph of the Allies in maintaining this foothold in Berlin, 110 miles inside the future German Democratic Republic, was a key partnership moment. The Berlin Airlift showed the “resolve of the United States to share in the protection of the young democracy


175 Extracted from Eisenberg 1996, 412, 459, and 476.
that had risen from the ashes of World War II.”\textsuperscript{176} Berlin “became the primary channel through which East Germans could flee their own state and settle in the West. The Western allies, together with the West Germans, actively encouraged this process, with the result that between 1945 and 1961, approximately one sixth of all East Germans departed for the West, most of them through Berlin. There was no corresponding flow of people in the opposite direction.”\textsuperscript{177}

Another key strategic development during this timeframe was the groundwork to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In February 1949, the new U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had a first draft of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO was to be more than just a security alliance—European and American officials saw it as a way to “reinforce wider realms of postwar cooperation.”\textsuperscript{178} The looming issue for policymakers was whether West Germany would be allowed to join this alliance.

Although Americans and Russians still feared that a united Germany would side with an adversary or reemerge as a threat in its own right, plans to establish “West Germany” were completed.\textsuperscript{179} In a May 1949 meeting of French, British, U.S., and Soviet foreign ministers, Acheson successfully executed a negotiation plan that paved the way for a West German government and the end of the military “occupation,” although U.S. troops would explicitly remain in Germany.\textsuperscript{180} By September, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was

\textsuperscript{176} Burns 1986, 36.
\textsuperscript{177} Gaddis 1997, 138.
\textsuperscript{178} Ikenberry 2001, 265.
\textsuperscript{179} Gaddis 1997, 115.
\textsuperscript{180} Leffler 1992, 284-285.
established, the occupational military government was terminated, and the FRG had democratically-elected leadership. Konrad Adenauer, a member of the Christian Democratic Party and a particularly U.S.-friendly political figure, was surprisingly elected by the Bundestag parliament as the first chancellor of the FRG, a position he would hold until 1963.\footnote{Leffler 1988, 298.}

Adenauer believed that “the quickest way to end the occupation regime was by increasing the level of trust the Western powers had in Germany,” while his main political opponent, Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), thought that “the occupying powers would only make concessions in response to concerted pressure” and sought to tarnish Adenauer as the “Chancellor of the Allies.”\footnote{McAllister 2002, 180.} Throughout the future interactions between the United States and Germany, Schumacher proved “eager to capitalize on allegations that Adenauer was kowtowing to the allies” and helped pressure Adenauer to seek increased sovereignty for West Germany.\footnote{Leffler 1992, 318.} U.S. policymakers respected Adenauer’s delicate position and avoided undermining him. In return, the U.S.-friendly policies of Adenauer solved problems that were generated by the Schumacher-types who wanted to unify Germany at the expense of cooperation with the West.

In response to the creation of West Germany, the Soviets created the German Democratic Republic in eastern Germany, putting the nail in the coffin of near-term German reunification and any chances of aligning eastern Germany with the West. Schumacher “assailed Adenauer for compromising too much and for indifference to the fate of 18 million east
Germans.”

Despite this pressure, the Adenauer-U.S. partnership held, the United States achieved its divided-Germany solution, and Adenauer, democratically, held power for more than a decade to follow.

**1949-1955: Deepening Strategic Cooperation with West Germany—Rearmament, Returning Sovereignty, and NATO Membership**

Adenauer was a proponent of German rearmament and let “American officials know on several occasions throughout 1949 that he was in favor of a German defense contribution.”

From the U.S. perspective, “the realities pointed inexorably to a greater use of German resources for the defense of Europe,” although Acheson and others worried that the Germans had not yet proven themselves as reliable partners and were not so strongly aligned with the West that they would not cut a deal with the East.

Aside from resistance in the United States, there was resistance in Western Europe, even among many West Germans, with respect to rearming West Germany. Schumacher and the SPD, for instance, wanted to hold off on rearmament to get more concessions from the occupying powers, and based on their recent gains in local elections, it seemed that the population, particularly pacifists and those demanding greater equality, were receptive to this strategy. The French pitched the Pleven Plan, designed to postpone any form of German rearmament, and Acheson rebutted that the Germans would not accept an organization where they were openly and blatantly labeled as inferiors. Once again, U.S. policymakers advocated for Adenauer and his fellow

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184 Ibid 320; see also Gaddis 1997, 127.

185 McAllister 2002, 175.


188 McAllister 2002, 197.
Providing impetus and reaffirming the Soviet threat, NSC-68 was completed in April 1950 with an overall recommendation for a “rapid and sustained build-up of political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” The Korean War helped the United States with this rearmament dilemma. In light of the recent Berlin Blockade, the successful Soviet detonation of a nuclear bomb, and the new Soviet-backed war in Korea, the Truman government proposed the rearmament of West Germany in the summer of 1950. In April 1951, Adenauer was vindicated, and the plan that established the preconditions for German rearmament was signed, against the objections of Schumacher and his like.

Negotiations for German reunification and West German sovereignty kept policymakers busy over the next year. “Adenauer himself remained strongly committed to integration with Western Europe and the Atlantic community,” but not all Germans felt this way. Some resented Allied efforts to control their foreign policy and intervene in their internal affairs. Schumacher’s party constrained Adenauer in this respect, but such domestic pressure also helped Adenauer bargain for German equality in the European Defense Community (EDC), full membership in NATO, and authority over foreign troop levels on West German soil. The French were initially resistant to the idea of West German admittance to NATO. U.S. policymakers allayed these fears, promising that U.S. troops would remain on German soil,

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189 Ibid, 195.
190 NSC-68, 64.
192 Leffler 1992, 411.
193 Ibid, 453.
although not as occupiers, and assuring that Germany’s admittance to NATO would wait. While the FRG was still not a member of NATO, FRG’s rearmed forces were to be bound to the EDC, which was subordinated to NATO and was “a supranational security regime designed to make West German rearmament more acceptable to the French.” Such “complex arrangements, made possible by the willingness of the United States to extend its aid and incur military obligations, satisfied Adenauer’s ambitions for German renewal, comforted Schuman’s [the French foreign minister] quest for French security, and established a configuration of power in the Old World that comported well with U.S. national security interests”—a co-option of German power and a concession for the Germans short of unification.

The Soviets still had not abandoned the idea of unification. In March 1952, the Soviets proposed a unified, unaligned Germany, though Acheson was not interested. Acheson wanted to co-opt German power, not create a unified Germany that could align with Moscow or grow into a future threat in its own right. Most Germans, however, “still preferred unification over integration” and, fortunately for U.S. policymakers, Adenauer shared Acheson’s perspective.

In May 1952, a new agreement was signed in Bonn that ceased the “occupation,” while prohibiting West Germany from expelling Western troops, and gave the FRG “full control over domestic affairs, except in times of emergency.” It also granted the FRG “increased

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196 McAllister 2002, 171.
197 Leffler 1992, 460.
autonomy over its foreign policy, except that it could not...alter its territorial boundaries, conclude a peace treaty with the Kremlin, or jeopardize Western access to Berlin.”\textsuperscript{199} This was a step towards full sovereignty, and again, U.S. policymakers advocated for Adenauer’s position and Adenauer delivered West German cooperation. Adenauer’s political standing held strong and he was “triumphantly” reelected in 1953. “The West Germans had chosen and, on the whole, were satisfied with their government,” despite Schumacher’s harsh criticisms.\textsuperscript{200}

1954 and 1955 saw the final steps to full partnership with the return of West German sovereignty, rearmament, and West German admittance to NATO. When the FRG negotiated its return to sovereignty in 1954, “it had an incentive to embrace its new democratic institutions—recognizing that the western allies could only be relied upon to defend Germany if it embraced democratic values.”\textsuperscript{201} Despite all the actions taken to secure West German admission into the EDC, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty in 1954. The British, however, suggested making West Germany a member of NATO, and surprisingly, the French accepted this idea. The FRG joined the NATO alliance in May 1955.\textsuperscript{202}

In this period, “U.S. officials intelligently decided to rebuild Western Europe and to co-opt German...strength”—actions that were “prudently conceived and skillfully implemented

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid, 459, previous two sentences.

\textsuperscript{200} Gaddis 1997, 133 and 136 for previous two sentences.

\textsuperscript{201} Ikenberry 2001, 213.

\textsuperscript{202} Gaddis 1997, 134.
in cooperation with indigenous elites.” Adenauer, who used these last few years to gain the confidence of his West European neighbors, was crucial in making this American-partner-backed security solution palatable to Western European decision authorities when it had previously been rejected. Further, Adenauer led the effort of postponing reunification and joining NATO as the path to rearmament and, as historian Marc Trachtenberg notes, “Adenauer was viewed by western statesman…as almost too good to be true [and] as much more committed to the West than they logically had any right to expect from a German statesman.”

1955 to Present: An Enviable Cooperative Relationship between the United States and West/Unified Germany

For the world powers, the division of Germany was institutionalized, convenient, and preferable to other alternatives by 1955. Although the original U.S. postwar plan was to withdraw forces from Europe as soon as possible, U.S. military presence has been constant in Germany and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. In fact, more than 90,000 U.S. military personnel still remained in Germany in 2003, more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and there were approximately 40,000 U.S. troops in Germany at the time of this writing, more than two decades after the Soviet collapse. “Ensuring the maintenance of a permanent military presence in Europe after the Cold War was one of the most important” U.S. policy goals when negotiating German reunification. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Warren Christopher pledged to keep U.S.

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203 Leffler 1992, 516.
204 Gaddis 1997, 134 and 135 for previous two sentences.
206 See U.S. State Department “Background Notes on Germany,” October 2003 and Cooper and Erlanger 2014.
military presence on European soil to “help preserve peace and prosperity for the next fifty years and beyond.”

This is not to say that the U.S-German partnership has not been tested along the way or experienced its ups and downs. The 1960’s brought concerns over U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The 1970s brought concerns over American proposals to deploy the neutron bomb on West German soil. While this concern caused massive anxiety in segments of German society, Carter’s ultimate decision not to proceed with the deployment of the “bomb” disappointed the West German government and left hard feelings. The relationship was tested strongly in the 1980’s. There was great controversy over U.S. deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces (i.e., Pershing II missiles) to Germany, which caused widespread protests and demonstrations in Germany. There was controversy when West Germany went ahead with a project to finance the Siberian natural gas pipeline. The United States opposed this project, fearing that it would render NATO Allies vulnerable to Soviet manipulation (as has been witnessed in practice during the time of this writing). While this almost led to a crisis in the NATO Alliance, European interests were accommodated in the end. Further, the 1985 visit by President Reagan to West Germany during the 40th anniversary of V-E Day, which became known as the “Bitburg Affair,” caused diplomatic turmoil. SS members were buried near the visit site, which sparked pressure from some American Jews for the U.S. president not to attend. Reagan stuck with the trip, deferring to the German position, but this demonstrated that “the reconciliation between the German

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207 McAllister 2002, 245 for the previous two sentences.
208 Burns 1986, 37.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid, 7-8.
public and other peoples of the world [was] less complete than was generally supposed. Unhealed wounds remain[ed] a painful legacy of the Nazi era.”

When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, Germany reunified and had a prime opportunity to leave NATO. Yet, “East and West Germans overwhelmingly favored joining NATO” and, with the support of the U.S. Government to pressure Gorbachev and a German “aid” package to buy Soviet concurrence, Germany reunited and remained in the alliance. More recently, the German government was a staunch opponent of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet, German soldiers lined the roads, shoulder to shoulder, to salute the U.S. wounded as they made their way to the major U.S. medical facility at Landstuhl, Germany, and German soldiers and civilians alike left gifts for the wounded. After the war, the German government rushed to pursue rapprochement.

Measurement of the Variables

International Independent Variables (with respect to the United States and West Germany)

Spoiler Problems

There was one possible spoiler at the end of the war that was strong enough to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Germany through force or coercion—the Soviet Union. The Soviets had the willingness to spoil until perhaps the late 1980s when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev courted support from the West to ease the Soviet fall.

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214 Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 94-104.
The Soviet opportunity to spoil was limited to the eastern zone of Germany that was under Russian postwar occupation, and this opportunity lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets acted as a spoiler in Germany’s eastern zone and could have spoiled a unified Germany. The United States precluded the latter with the divided-Germany solution and, conversely, served as a spoiler for cooperation between the Soviets and the Germans in the western zones that were under American-led occupation. While the Soviets took measures to keep Germany neutral or on its side, they could not exercise the level of force and coercion required to spoil U.S. cooperation with West Germany without risking open war against an American adversary that had proven its ability to use nuclear weapons. U.S. policymakers considered and rejected the notion that the Soviets were looking for a fight and willing to take those measures.

The Soviets did, however, use force and coercion when and where they were able, as seen during the Berlin crisis. They were successful at spoiling cooperation between the United States and East Germans/East Berliners through brute force military strength until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The exceptions to this were the millions of East Germans who escaped through Berlin’s western zones and subsequently participated in West Germany’s deep and enduring cooperation with the United States. While the Soviets tried to spoil U.S. efforts to strategically cooperate with West Berliners outright, this was ultimately ineffective as seen in the aftermath of the Berlin Airlift. Upon the collapse of Soviet power in 1989 and the subsequent German reunification in 1990, the Soviets no longer had sufficient power to spoil cooperation between the United States and East Germany. This change in dynamic was recognized and capitalized upon by the West as seen by the subsequent German reunification and the continued orientation of unified Germany towards the West.
Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe (and, as will be explored more fully later, UNFAVORABLE vis-à-vis East Germany until the collapse of Soviet power circa 1989).

Competitor Problems

There was one potential competitor that might have had both the opportunity and willingness to undermine cooperation between the United States and Germany by means of an exclusive and better strategic cooperation offer, including competitive security and economic benefits—the Soviets. The Soviets, however, squandered any opportunity to do so from the beginning of their harsh occupations in Eastern Europe. Conversely, the Americans, having recognized the Soviet threat shortly after the war’s end, came to see the need to compete for German allegiance and made this sentiment clear with the Marshall Plan in 1947.

As a result of Soviet unwillingness or ineptness to compete, the Soviet opportunity to credibly do so in the eyes of its target population was materially undermined. While the Russians clearly demonstrated the military capacity and conviction to secure the territory under their occupational responsibility, their brutality on the local population made the Germans want to be “secured from” the Russians, not “secured by” the Russians. The Kremlin’s opportunity to provide competitive economic benefits was suspect in light of its heavy war damage and expenditures, and its willingness was likewise suspect in light of its aggressive program to extract “reparations” and dismantle German factories to ship home to

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215 This brutality is discussed in depth in my upcoming assessment of reconciliation problems.
the Soviet Union, while the Americans and the British, recognizing the worsening economic disaster in 1946, chided those Soviets as looters. The difference between eastern and western economic capacities was made even starker after the inception of the Marshall Plan in 1947. Berliners could see the difference in the economic wellbeing between the eastern and western zones first hand and often voted with their feet.

In contrast to the Soviets, the United States also demonstrated the ability to secure the territory under its responsibility, but without the pervasive brutality. Also, while the western zones experienced great economic strife early in the occupation that certainly could have opened up opportunity for a competitor, the United States took aggressive economic measures through the Marshall Plan to gain advantage over any competition. This competitive economic advantage never faltered, extending beyond the point where deep U.S.-German cooperation was institutionalized via the NATO alliance and beyond.

Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation from 1947 throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with both the opportunity and willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.

*Other International Conditions*

There are two international conditions that stand out as potential sources of credible commitment problems in this case: the Nazi problem and communism.

The dynamics of the postwar Nazi problem were challenging to navigate for the Americans. Clearly, Nazi leadership would not be tolerated—the United States could not be perceived as partnering with the war criminals responsible for Auschwitz and still maintain
any semblance of legitimacy with domestic or international audiences. Yet, Nazism was pervasive throughout Germany. Widespread denazification was challenged by U.S. occupational forces from the outset of their occupation. General Patton, for instance, argued that 98 percent of the Nazis were just “camp followers” who were coerced into joining. The United States had to decide the limits of their denazification program, and chose to purge “more than nominal” Nazis, which amassed to more than a million investigations and tens of thousands of trials and job vacancies—vacancies for which the occupiers had to compensate. At times, the military occupiers were seen as lax on the Nazis, and U.S. policymakers were compelled to protect the image of being tough on Nazis. Ultimately, the tough image was sustained until the emphasis on denazification was overcome by other priorities and responsibility for denazification was passed to the Germans. In short, aggressive actions by the Soviets encouraged Europeans to reprioritize their desires—the desire to co-opt German power to maintain security trumped the desire for retribution against lower-level Nazis.

The incompatible communist ideology had great potential to create a credible commitment problem that would undermine cooperation between the United States and Germany. Communist parties were pervasive throughout Europe and communist political victories were mounting in neighboring countries (e.g., Italy) in the wake of V-E Day. The Soviets were actively promoting communism in their spheres. If German communists would have gained power, their incompatible ideology would have severely undermined cooperation with the democratic West. Fortunately, communism had difficulty gaining

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216 Eisenberg 1996, 129-138 for the preceding information in this paragraph. General Patton, known for his open contempt of denazification, was relieved of command shortly after comments to the press regarding the matter.
ground in Germany. Even in the eastern (Russian-occupied) zone, communism had difficulty taking root. During elections in October 1946, for example, the Russian-backed Socialist Unity Party (SED) barely held control in eastern Germany and Berliners stunned the Russians with their lack of support for the SED, which garnered only 19.8 percent of their vote. Ultimately, West Germany democratically elected Adenauer to power, and an ideology extremely friendly towards U.S. strategic cooperation was emplaced.

Status of other international conditions: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe—while problems with the Nazi image and communism had the potential to undermine cooperation, these conditions were effectively mitigated in the early postwar period and beyond.

**Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side (towards West Germany)**

*Disinterest Problems*

A case could be made that United States entered the postwar period with a disinterest problem. However, any postwar U.S. disinterest problem was resolved in short order upon the broader recognition of the Soviet threat, no later than 1946.

FDR’s disinterest in the gains to be made from a cooperative relationship with Germany was evident in his pre-victory vision of a harsh and brief occupation that was to be followed with abandonment of Europe. Even before the war’s end, however, these sentiments were not universal amongst U.S. policymakers. As U.S. policymakers increasingly perceived a

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Soviet threat, they increasingly perceived the gains to be made from cooperation with a Germany that was oriented towards the West (which U.S. policymakers were able to secure with the divided-Germany solution). These gains included, amongst others, hedges against both Soviet influence and the spread of communism. When Truman replaced FDR before the war’s end, a new sentiment emerged and, by Kennan’s “long telegram” in 1946, the gains to be made by cooperating with Germany to counter the Soviets were widely coveted. The generous Marshall Plan soon followed as a testament to U.S. interest in those gains.

Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation no later than 1946 and throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition during this period.

Trust Problems

There is little evidence of immitigable U.S. trust problems with the Germans in the western zone. There, the United States initially ensured German compliance with cooperative agreements through unconditional surrender and occupational force. As the United States began to compete for German allegiance and allow Germans more say in their governance, those Germans built U.S. confidence in German willingness to abide by strategic cooperation obligations through consistent affirmation of U.S. interests. For instance, those Germans repeatedly elected the pro-U.S. Adenauer, delayed reunification, enabled an easy occupation (unlike the recent U.S. experience in Iraq), and permitted substantial U.S. troop presence and basing on their soil that has continued to the time of this writing. West German adherence to institutional agreements, such as the Marshall Plan’s anti-communism
conditions, also helped reinforce U.S. trust. In response, the United States encouraged and entered into more substantial agreements with the West Germans such as the NATO Alliance.

Status of U.S. trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that immittigable trust problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.

Reconciliation Problems

Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side were remedied to some extent by the death of Hitler and the removal of the Nazi regime. However, more work had to be done with some of the American people to reorient their identity towards the German population. This was an important requirement to gain American support for the generous Marshall Plan.

Unlike more recent conflicts in which U.S. policymakers were careful to villainize only regime leaders and their henchman (e.g., Hussein and the Baathists in Iraq or Milosevic and his officers in Serbia) and not the enemy population as a whole in the prelude to war, World War II was a conflict in which whole societies were villainized. FDR embodied this sentiment, wanting the whole of the German population to pay for Germany’s crimes. Truman was more pragmatic and eventually sought to co-opt Germany into the West to contain Soviet influence. To do this, and to gain support for the generous Marshall Plan (which they did successfully by 1947), U.S. policymakers created an official narrative to

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218 Consider that American warfighters were asked to bomb civilian population centers purposefully and the psychological orientation towards the German population that this required.
reorient American identities towards Germans. This was also a necessary step to include Germany in the NATO alliance. Of course, not all Americans struggled to reorient their identity of Germans, as evidenced by the rampant fraternization and the thousands of marriages between U.S. troops and German citizens shortly after the war.

Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany no later than 1947 and throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition in this period.

**Domestic Independent Variables on West Germany’s Side**

*Disinterest Problems*

To suggest that Germans were not interested in the potential gains that could be made from cooperation with the United States is to suggest that they could either live with their existing circumstances or achieve their reconstitution goals without external assistance. Further, it is to suggest that they envisioned a postwar situation that avoided occupation and were ambivalent to the thought of being abandoned to the Soviet threat.

Historical evidence does not bear out these claims. Germany was devastated and starving at the end of the war—many Germans literally could not exist, let alone live with their current circumstances. As history shows, conditions in occupied Germany were dire in 1945 and 1946, even with Allied help. Germany could not meet its reparation requirements, fuel Europe with its coal, and achieve domestic improvements without external cooperation. Further, Germans knew they would be occupied by some world power and were keenly
interested in who would be doing the occupying. While some Germans toyed with non-
alignment (e.g., Schumacher), those who were democratically elected and spoke for the
majority of Germans (e.g., Adenauer) realized the utility of strategic cooperation to the long-
term health of Germany. By 1949, when the Soviets exploded an atomic weapon and the
United States lost its nuclear monopoly, the Germans were especially vulnerable and
appeared, by the account of the leading American in Germany in 1950, “nervous, hysterical,
and uncertain.” Thus, harkening back to Ikenberry’s theory on postwar order, Germans
were not interested just in the handouts associated with a friendly occupation. They had an
interest in establishing a long-term cooperative relationship with a power of their choice to
prevent abandonment into Soviet hands.

Status of West Germany’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests
that disinterest problems did not exist within the West German leadership or its winning
coaition.

Trust Problems

There is little evidence of immitigable West German trust problems after the United
States firmly committed to co-opting Germany as an ally against the Soviet threat and began
competing for German allegiance circa 1947.

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219 As Edelstein (2008, 28-29) notes, “Germans recognized that they were going to be occupied by somebody
after World War II, and if the choice was between being occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and even France or, alternatively, the Soviet Union, then most west Germans preferred occupation by the
Western powers.”

220 Leffler 1988, 299.
Before the war’s end, there was little commitment to Europe from FDR in general—he wanted to keep the occupation short and reduce European influence in world affairs. In 1946, the reassessment of the Soviet threat changed the U.S. perspective and set the United States down a path of true commitment to strategic cooperation in Europe. The Americans subsequently increased German confidence in U.S. willingness to abide by strategic cooperation obligations in several ways. For instance, Byrnes’ crucial Stuttgart speech signaled a commitment to an enduring U.S. presence in Europe and was well-received by the German population. The Marshall Plan, made available in 1947, was an explicit and very credible demonstration of commitment to strategic cooperation. West Germany was a notable recipient of the benefits of that plan and Germany’s citizens regularly observed the United States honoring its aid promises. The United States further quelled trust concerns during the Berlin Airlift, where it was clear that trust grew as Germans observed the United States honoring its security commitments. However, despite these explicit displays of commitment, the West Germans maintained a watchful eye, and in the 1950s, they worried whether the United States would stand against a new Soviet nuclear power if West Germany were threatened. Many of these fears were allayed with West German admittance into the formal NATO Alliance, made possible by the collaboration and cooperation between Adenauer and U.S. policymakers.\(^\text{221}\) In the mid-1960s, West Germans supported U.S. action in Vietnam and viewed it as a testing ground of how the United States honored its commitments.\(^\text{222}\) While the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was a matter of concern and seen

\(^{221}\) As Ikenberry notes, “in the case of security guarantees, the United States moved toward a fixed and absolute commitment only with great reluctance, which was never fully resolved until the late 1950s. But the Europeans were able to work the emerging Atlantic system to extract American commitments…the array of binding institutions connected to democratic states provide the basis for both commitment and restraint” (2001, 166).

\(^{222}\) Moyar 2006, 378.
by some as abandonment, some of these concerns have been mitigated by the persistent presence of U.S. troops and substantial military might on German soil, operating side by side with German forces, even until today.

In summary, the West Germans consistently and understandably sought reassurances of U.S. commitment, and the United States consistently took measures to demonstrate commitment, both institutionally (e.g., NATO) and materially (e.g., by establishing the Marshall Plan and by stationing tens of thousands of U.S. forces and their families on the Cold War front alongside their German partners). Further, the Soviets were useful catalysts to mitigate trust concerns by creating “incentive to trust” and by giving the United States ample opportunity to demonstrate its credible commitment to strategic cooperation. Also, without a credible Soviet alternative, the West Germans, in some ways, had no alternative but to trust the Americans despite their anxiety. While trust has been an ever present consideration for U.S.-German affairs, it has never been a consideration that was left unmitigated to fester into a trust problem that would undermine strategic cooperation.

Status of West Germany’s trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems did not exist within the West German leadership or its winning coalition.

Reconciliation Problems

A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems on the West German side were not a substantial source of credible commitment problems.
Evidence to suggest that West Germany had a reconciliation problem is minimal. First, there were understandable German complaints and riots over food shortages and general conditions during the early years of the occupation. However, the Marshall Plan addressed these issues and, by the time of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the superiority of the conditions in the western zones was more than evident to the German public on both sides. Second, there was rumored activity of a Nazi insurgent group called the Werwolfs. However, their efficacy is suspect. According to Edelstein:

“Little opposition to the occupation was evident, as Germans were desperate for the assistance that the Western allies were willing and able to offer. The so-called ‘werewolves’—German military officers trained to disrupt any occupation activities—revealed themselves to have little capability or will to interfere with the occupation.”

Thomas Berger notes similarly that “there was virtually no organized opposition to the occupying forces.” This suggests that this supposed group of unreconciled insurgents, to the extent that it existed, lacked the support of a population that shared its reconciliation problem. Last, there was evidence of reconciliation problems from Adenauer’s main political foes, most notably Schumacher. Schumacher was a nationalist who continually attacked Adenauer for his cooperation with the West, favored reunification over cooperation with the United States, and fought German rearmament. This suggests that Schumacher may have felt that U.S. actions were unjustified and that he may have had a correspondingly low sense of reconciliation. This also suggests that if Schumacher were to have been elected to power in 1949 instead of Adenauer, there could have been a reconciliation problem within

223 Edelstein 2008, 38.

224 Berger 2012, 44.
the West German leadership and its winning coalition. But, as history shows, this was not the case.

Evidence to suggest a high German sense of reconciliation is abundant. First, there was a general appreciation of the U.S. motive for strategic cooperation from the beginning (or, more accurately, an appreciation for what the U.S. motive was not—domination). As Ikenberry notes, European willingness “to participate within the order was due in part to the reluctant posture of American foreign policy” which “allayed some European fears of American domination, but it raised worries about abandonment. After 1945, the United States did find ways to allay these worries, as well.”

Second, as the occupation progressed, there was a pervasive sense that the U.S. treatment of Germans was just and fair, especially when compared to the Russians. The Russian zone was rife with looting and physical assaults on a massive scale—Russian troops raped as many as two million German women in 1945 and 1946 alone. Worse yet, Soviet leaders sanctioned this behavior. According to General Clay, the first commander of U.S. occupation forces in Germany, the Soviet authorities, by their own actions, created enemies out of potential friends, and the Americans looked like “angels” in comparison. As Gaddis explains, despite large numbers of communist party members throughout Germany at the end of the war:

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225 Ikenberry 2001, 200-201.

226 Gaddis 1997, 45.

227 See Gaddis 1997, 40. For example, when the Yugoslavs politely complained that Soviet troops were raping local women, Gaddis notes that Stalin tearfully accused the Yugoslavs of failing to show sufficient respect for Soviet military sacrifices and for failing to sympathize when “a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle.”

228 Gaddis 1997, 45.
“The incidence of rape and other forms of brutality was so much greater on the Soviet than on the western side that it played a major role in determining which way the Germans would tilt in the Cold War that was to come. It ensured a pro-western orientation from the very beginning of that conflict, which surely helps to account for why the West German regime was able to establish itself as a legitimate government while its East German counterpart never did.”  

Third, there was rampant defection from East Germany to the U.S.-led occupation zones that continued despite the threat of capital punishment, and fourth, Adenauer’s U.S.-friendly government was democratically elected and reelected through 1963.

Fifth, there is ample evidence of a strong affinity between the American occupiers and the German populace that began from the earliest days of their postwar relationship and continued to blossom. This is also in stark contrast to the experience in the Russian zone. Whereas the Americans found that they had to reverse their JCS 1067 policy and allow fraternization, the Russians had the opposite experience, having initially encouraged such contacts and then being forced to prohibit them due to the hostility they generated. There were reports of “widespread fraternization between German women and allied soldiers in the Western zones” and a willingness of many women from “respectable backgrounds” to live in common-law marriages with GIs. This affinity continued to manifest such that, “of the 1,865 marriages conducted in Baumholder between 1954 and 1962, 936 of them involved an American spouse. The number of German-American marriages in other communities also

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229 Ibid, 287.
230 Ibid, 45.
231 Hohn 2002, 3-10. While these not welcome developments to many, particularly Protestant and Catholic clergymen, this shows the affinity between the German populace and the Americans.
showed a steady increase throughout the decade, averaging about 20 percent of all marriages.”

Sixth, there is evidence from intelligence reports and public opinion polls that U.S. forces were held in relatively high regard by the Germans throughout the partnership-establishment process. In October 1947, Germans were asked which occupying powers they trusted. In response, 63 percent of Germans said they placed “much” trust in the United States to treat Germany fairly, while only 45 percent held the same regard for the British, 4 percent for the French, and none for the Russians. “In the same survey, 84 percent of Germans in the American zone of occupation said that they would choose the Americans again as their occupying power if they could turn back history.” In 1952, the U.S. Army raised concerns over persistent anti-Americanism in Germany, estimating that 10 percent of Germans were openly hostile towards Americans and another 15-25 percent of Germans were indifferent towards Americans. While the U.S. Army was concerned about these percentages, the remaining 65-75 percent of unambiguously U.S.-friendly Germans appears remarkably favorable considering the domestic approval ratings garnered by most U.S. presidents. Further, “in 1954, when Germans were asked if they preferred a good cooperation with either France or the United States, 69 percent chose the Americans as their preferred partner,” which is quite remarkable considering France’s geostrategic importance to Germany.

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232 Ibid, 74.
234 Edelstein 2008, 36.
236 Ibid, 230.
Lastly, German cooperation in the postwar reparations and massive denazification processes shows that many Germans were at least aware of the Nazi atrocities, if not remorseful and willing to try and make amends. Some history was initially not transmitted to the next generations. In 1986, for instance, Ambassador Burns observed that relatively few young Germans “knew about the Marshall Plan…or how the freedom of Berlin had been preserved by a massive Western airlift.” However, he also noted that “most Germans [were] well aware of Nazi crimes against the Jewish people, and [were] truly remorseful.” By 1997, German political leader Karsten Voigt explained the following rationale for Germany’s continued involvement in NATO and the EU: “we wanted to bind Germany into a structure that practically obliges Germany to take the interests of its neighbors into consideration. We wanted to give our neighbors assurances that we won’t do what we don’t intend to do.” Germany’s past left lasting scars for which they were still atoning. This suggests that Germans had a relatively healthy foundation of shame, guilt, and sense of responsibility that likely traces back to the beginnings of the postwar relationship, even though it is perhaps not explicitly acknowledged at times.

Taken as a whole, it is hard to argue that the Germans, with the exception of Schumacher’s supporters and perhaps the Werwolfs, had a substantial reconciliation problem with the Americans.

Status of West Germany’s reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests

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237 Burns 1986, 4.
238 Ibid, 12.
239 Ikenberry 2001, 251.
that there was a high sense of reconciliation amongst the West German leadership and its winning coalition.

State Capacity Problems

Germany’s limited state capacity at the end of the war certainly could have become a source of credible commitment problems under different circumstances. Instead, heavy U.S. assistance and reasonable U.S. state capacity requirements for West Germany’s strategic cooperation contributions, coupled with West German cooperation and progress towards a quick recovery of West German state capacity, mitigated these potential problems.

Germany was a wholly devastated society upon the conclusion of the war. Their leader had committed suicide, and the country was in ruins. To exacerbate this, an aggressive Allied denazification program was, theoretically, underway and had the potential to further deteriorate state capacity—if all Nazis were purged down to the nominal level, then there would be a severe shortage in the local expertise required to manage German finances, water treatment plants, electricity plants, mines, and the like.

Initially, state capacity was provided by a robustly-manned Allied occupation force (e.g., OMGUS, the Office of the Military Government, United States) and the aggressive Marshall Plan until such time as the West Germans could manage on their own. Denazification was adjusted to accommodate the needs of capacity as well. Eisenberg describes the situation in the late summer of 1945:

“As of August 30 sixty thousand people had been stripped of their positions in the U.S. zone. Yet though these numbers signaled the seriousness of the American commitment to denazification, they obscured certain contradictory trends. Many of the individuals who had been removed were quickly reinstated. Others were bumped down to subordinate positions from which
they continued to exercise their previous authority. Then there were numerous instances where ‘more than nominal’ Nazis were simply replaced by different ‘more than nominal’ Nazis. And finally there were the thousands of culpable people who were never removed at all. Overall, there was great variation in how the public purge was carried out.”

The Americans required little German material capacity, but did require German cooperation to improve capacity, which the Germans delivered. For their part and under the supervision of their occupiers, the Germans quickly organized politically—not surprising for a society that was highly orderly before the war. This led to elections by 1946 in the eastern zone. State capacity in the western zones improved quickly as well, to the point where Adenauer, despite a significant rivalry with Schumacher, could effectively manage his state and deliver on German commitments. The Marshall Plan was instrumental in consolidating state capacity and, by 1955, West Germany was rearming as a full member of NATO. Thus, as predicted by my theory, the resource-rich United States, once interested in a cooperative relationship, was willing to commit the required manpower and financial resources to manage West Germany’s state capacity until the West Germans were able to manage it for themselves. The West Germans, in turn, cooperated with this assistance to increase their state capacity, thereby mitigating this potential source of credible commitment problems.

Status of West Germany’s state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that West Germany did not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. perspective.

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240 Eisenberg 1996, 129.
Political Unification Problems

There is little evidence of a political unification problem in West Germany during the postwar period. West Germans seemed to identify with their (new) government and were relatively quick to organize elections. When West Germany held democratic elections in 1949, the main opposition to Adenauer came from other political parties seeking representation through the democratic process (i.e., Schumacher and the SPD), not via means of a competing political identity. As John Gaddis attests, the West German regime was able to establish itself as a legitimate government despite Schumacher’s political attacks.\textsuperscript{241} The only potentially-substantial challengers to the West German government’s monopoly on legitimate violence were the Werwolfs, and they were shown to be lacking in public support and wholly ineffective. Overall, in light of this high West German political unification, the resistance to strategic cooperation of influential domestic actors like Schumacher was ineffectual.

Status of West Germany’s political unification problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe.

Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States and West Germany

The historical record shows a high postwar cooperative ambition between the United States and West Germany. The states were able to reach agreements to cooperate deeply and enduringly in a number of important dimensions. In the security dimension, the nations reached accord on a number of items including a robust formal alliance (NATO) and

\textsuperscript{241} Gaddis 1997, 287.
substantial host basing that has endured to this day. In the political dimension, both states reached accords that required them to deviate significantly from what they would have done in the absence of their cooperative relationship. For instance, the United States agreed not to abandon Europe after the war and West Germany agreed to acquiesce to the divided-Germany solution and delay reunification. In the economic dimension, the two states reached agreements that were designed to be the backbone of the postwar recovery of Europe. Many of these deep agreements were open-ended or have otherwise endured through the many decades since the war’s end.

This high cooperative ambition has been highly realized. In the security dimension, the states’ alliance was tested throughout the Cold War and after with both states, for instance, answering the call to arms in Afghanistan and elsewhere after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the political dimension, both states followed through with actions that were significant deviations from what they would have done in the absence of their cooperative relationship. For instance, the United States has yet to abandon Europe, while Germany delayed reunification until 1990, after the fall of the Soviet Union, and did so in coordination with its U.S. allies to minimize the geostrategic fallout with Russia. This is not to say that the states always cooperated politically, as evidenced by their discord over the Siberian natural gas pipeline and the Iraq War. In the economic dimension, the states cooperated in a way that not only brought about European economic recovery, but resulted in Germany being a particularly strong economic powerhouse that could help manage economic problems elsewhere on the Continent (e.g., recently, Greece). Lastly, the deeply cooperative relationship between the United States and Germany has endured almost seventy years and has survived much jostling in that time. Most notably, the relationship survived the recovery
of Germany and the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War—changes in relative power and threat conditions that may have signaled the end of such deep cooperation in other scenarios.

Assessment of the qualities of cooperation: HIGHLY COOPERATIVE—the relationship had high ambition for postwar cooperation, had a highly realized depth and endurance of cooperation, and survived substantial jostling.

Analysis

The case of the relationship between the United States and West Germany after World War II had favorable independent variables at both the international and domestic levels shortly after the war’s end and throughout the remainder of its timeframe. My theory predicts higher postwar qualities of cooperation in this situation, and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment.

At the international level, there were no spoilers strong enough to preclude cooperation between the U.S. occupiers and the West Germans. As the Soviets quickly and increasingly discredited themselves, there were no competitors with both the opportunity and willingness to undermine cooperation through a more competitive and exclusive offer. Other international conditions were resolved by German cooperation with denazification and anti-communism efforts. Thus, conditions at the international level were largely supportive of cooperation.

Domestically, on the U.S. side, disinterest problems were resolved shortly after the war. FDR’s death before the war’s end opened the door for voices—voices that already opposed the policy of abandoning Europe after the war—to have greater sway. Thoughts of
abandonment were further sidelined by the fuller recognition of the Soviet threat circa 1946. Trust problems were initially mitigated through occupational force, then through carefully crafted agreements and substantial reinforcement of commitments by German policymakers (e.g., Adenauer). Reconciliation seemed easy for many U.S. occupiers, who fraternized with the local population despite orders to the contrary, and policymakers created a new narrative to help re-identify their former adversary from an “enemy” worthy of abandonment to a “partner” worthy of generous Marshall Plan aid, a dangerous face-off against the Soviets during the Berlin Airlift, and full membership into NATO as allies.

On the West German side, massive devastation ensured that disinterest problems would not be an issue for a long while after the war. While West Germans feared U.S. abandonment after the war, they witnessed, over time, very visible signs of American commitment that permeated the fibers of their society (e.g., the Byrnes speech, the aid from the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, NATO advocacy, and so forth) and this, in turn, helped mitigate potential trust problems. The West German government, it seems, did not have to exercise a large role in selling their new friendly identity of their former American adversaries to their population (as might have been expected in light of Kupchan’s rapprochement framework). There is overwhelming evidence that the Germans, by and large, “liked” the Americans from the beginning. Why? German policymakers and other citizens alike had ample reason for resentment. There was death and destruction all around them that was caused, intentionally, by a U.S. military machine that became their occupiers. Yet Germans could not escape the facts, as reminded throughout the denazification process, that they “elected” a government that shared responsibility for the war (by starting it), and bore shame and guilt for actions during the war (as the full extent of Nazi crimes became
clear). Further, it was apparent to many that millions of Germans would have starved to death without U.S. aid in the aftermath of the war. In light of these facts, and in light of the comparatively harsh practices of the Russian occupiers in the East, it was easy for Germans to feel “justly treated” by their U.S. occupiers. All of this combined to make reconciliation relatively easy for the Germans and, as clearly demonstrated, facilitated widespread fraternization. State capacity was provided initially by the Americans in cooperation with the Germans, and the Germans cooperated to quickly improve their indigenous capacity which mitigated state capacity problems for the long run. Lastly, despite a regime change as a result of the war, the West Germans maintained their identity with their (new) government and did not legitimize non-governmental violence, thereby maintaining political unity throughout a highly precarious period.

Thus, conditions at the domestic level on both the U.S. and West German sides were also largely supportive of cooperation and, as predicted, the relationship thrived and was typified with high qualities of cooperation. As time passed, this highly cooperative relationship became institutionalized such that, by the time the Soviet Union fell and Germany had recovered and reunified, it endured despite substantial jostling.

**East Germany**

As I provide my brief analysis of the very different East German experience, I focus on the primary immediate postwar difference between West Germany and East Germany—the difference in their occupying powers. The West Germans and Americans, under U.S. (and British and French) occupation, were able to establish conditions that were favorable for higher qualities of cooperation shortly after the war’s end. Conversely, in East Germany, the
Soviet occupiers served as a credible spoiler to cooperation between the Americans and East Germans. Aside from creating unfavorable conditions at the international level in its own right, the Soviet spoiler precipitated unfavorable conditions in other otherwise-favorable international and domestic variables as well.

While this approach allows an abbreviated analysis that helps with parsimony, my primary reason for proceeding in this manner is to avoid confusing the important analytical point that it was a condition at the international level alone, the Soviet spoiler, which was the root cause of any problems with other sources of credible commitment problems and, in turn, the primary driver of the low (absent) qualities of cooperation between the United States and East Germany until German reunification. This more clearly demonstrates that problems at the international level alone can undermine strategic cooperation. It also shows more clearly the power of a spoiler.

The logic for this approach is that the German populations in the East and West were similar enough that the primary difference between them at the war’s end was their occupier. Had Germans in the Russian occupation zone been exposed to the same circumstances (i.e., the same treatment) as Germans in the other occupation zones, the outcomes in the case of the United States and East Germany would have resembled the outcomes in the case of the United States and West Germany. The cases would have had similar favorability towards the qualities of cooperation for variables at the international and domestic levels.

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242 This is not to say that conditions and outcomes would have necessarily been the same if Soviets had not occupied the East. Counterfactually, if the United States, for instance, had been the sole occupier of Germany, Germany may have emerged from the occupation “neutral” or may have gravitated towards the Soviet camp. But if the Germans in the East were exposed to the same treatment as Germans in the West (i.e., saw countrymen in another zone being brutalized by a threatening occupier and had a powerful state willing offer true security and economic benefits), conditions and outcomes would theoretically be similar.
domestic levels and, in turn, their postwar qualities of cooperation would have been similar. That is, had East Germans received the same treatment as the West Germans, international and domestic conditions in the case of the United States and East Germany would all have been “favorable” towards higher qualities of cooperation and the actual postwar qualities of cooperation would have been “highly cooperative.” This logic is supported by the similarities in the West German and East German populations immediately after the war, which were most differentiated by lines on a map drawn by their occupiers. This logic is also supported by history, which shows that the favorability of conditions and the qualities of cooperation in the West did not deteriorate over the years as millions of East Germans escaped to West Germany. If one more East German had defected to the West, would the conditions have changed? If a thousand, a million, or the whole of East Germany had defected, would the conditions have changed? One might argue that this was basically what happened after German reunification, and the conditions and qualities of cooperation between the United States and Germany remained relatively stable despite this.

Importantly for this tailored analysis, East Germans and West Germans were not exposed to the same treatment. The Soviet occupiers in the East brutalized the Germans under their jurisdiction and served as a credible spoiler to cooperation between the Americans and East Germans. Further, the Soviet spoiler precipitated unfavorable conditions in several otherwise-favorable international and domestic variables. While the Soviet spoiler was discredited as a competitor, it created problems with other international conditions with its imposition of communism, effectively locking East Germany behind the Iron Curtain for the Cold War. Domestically, on the U.S. side, the spoiler led to immitigable trust problems due to the threat that the spoiler might have caused East Germans to involuntarily defect from
agreements. As the Cold War progressed, a U.S. reconciliation problem may have emerged due to the growing association of East Germany with their spoiler-imposed (initially, but later, perhaps, more deeply rooted) communism. Similarly, reconciliation problems on the East German side may have developed over time as the Soviets pressed their “anti-capitalist” narrative, although these problems were largely remedied by the time of German reunification as communism was discredited. Lastly, East German political unification may have been a problem as evident in the societal unrest and mass defections due to the illegitimacy of the East German government.\textsuperscript{243} As expected, the unfavorable condition at the international level (spoiler) caused low (absent) qualities of cooperation between the United States and East Germany until the Soviet spoiler was neutralized circa 1990, at which time international and domestic conditions and, in turn, qualities of cooperation, quickly improved.

**Assessing Alternate Theories**

Here I briefly acknowledge and assess an alternate theory about the role of external threats—that a common external threat is necessary for cooperation in these contexts. In this case, the theory would suggest that the Soviet threat is what really mattered.

If this were true, it would not explain why the U.S.-German partnership, instead of dissolving, expanded to include the East Germans after the collapse of the Soviet Union and continues today more than two decades after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Further, per Ikenberry:

\begin{footnote}{See Gaddis 1997, 287.}

\textsuperscript{243} See Gaddis 1997, 287.
“The emerging Cold War—and the perceived Soviet threat—did reinforce cooperation among the Western democracies, but it did not create it. Even before the Europeans perceived a direct military threat from the Soviet Union, they actively cultivated a postwar American security commitment. The open character of American hegemony, the extensive reciprocity between the United States and its partners, the absence of hegemonic coercion, and binding institutional relations all provided elements of reassurance and legitimacy despite the huge asymmetries of power.”

I do not argue, however, that the Soviet threat was unimportant. As seen in my analysis, the Soviet threat served as a mechanism to promote U.S. interest (e.g., by creating an incentive for the United States to remain in Europe), German interest (e.g., by providing additional security incentives for strategic cooperation to accompany the clear economic incentives), German trust (e.g., by encouraging the Americans to take active measures to compete for German allegiance through demonstrations of commitment), and German reconciliation (e.g., by helping the Germans recognize the Americans as the “good guys”). That said, the Soviet external threat was not required to mitigate these potential obstacles toward strategic cooperation, nor was it the only mechanism mitigating those obstacles. Per my theory, then, the importance of the Soviet threat was that it helped mitigate sources of credible commitment problems. This could have been done by other mechanisms as well—an external threat was but one possibility. This is an important nuance for policymakers who are contemplating postwar strategic cooperation. Those policymakers need to find a way to assuage disinterest, trust, reconciliation, and other problems (the ends), not necessarily identify or create an external threat (a means). I will discuss this alternate theory further in my following cases.

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244 Ibid, 166.
Summary of Findings

Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Germany after World War II supports my theory. The West German case had favorable conditions for cooperation at both the international and domestic levels. My theory, in this situation, predicts higher qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “highly cooperative” postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany is consistent with this prediction. The East German case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation at the international level (a spoiler) that undermined the favorability of other conditions at the international and domestic levels. My theory, in this situation, predicts lower qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “absent” postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and East Germany (prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and commensurate elimination of the spoiler) is consistent with this prediction.

More specifically, my finding in the West German case of the favorable international and domestic conditions causing higher qualities of cooperation supports my four hypotheses from their inverses (i.e., “decreased problems in all independent variables caused increased cooperation” instead of, as is specified in my hypotheses language, “increased problems in one or more independent variables caused lower cooperation”). My finding in the East German case of the unfavorable international conditions causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 1.
CHAPTER 5: THE IRAQ 1991 CASE

The Relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991

In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. To limit the time period of this case study, I end it in 2002 at the lead up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Chapter 6, the case of the United States and Iraq after their war in 2003, picks up at this point and moves forward to the time of this writing (2014). As the Gulf War case is also foundational for my subsequent case, I provide amplified historical detail here where it fits within this case’s timeframe, particularly when it relates to a key actor in both stories—Saddam Hussein. Further, some of the variable analyses apply to both cases but will not be recreated in whole in my subsequent case. Thus, this case can be read independent of my subsequent case, but not vice versa.

In contrast to the U.S.-Germany case where international and domestic conditions were favorable for higher qualities of cooperation in West Germany and where international conditions were unfavorable and domestic conditions were otherwise favorable for higher qualities of cooperation in East Germany (before the fall of the Soviet Union), the Iraq 1991 case is one where both international and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher postwar qualities of cooperation up through the subsequent war in 2003 between the United States and Iraq. My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation.
As I will show, at the international level, it was not spoilers or competitors that were unfavorable for strategic cooperation, but other international conditions—namely, Saddam Hussein’s pariah regime, its incompatible image, and the threat it continually posed to regional U.S. allies. In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in my Hypothesis 1. At the domestic level there were several conditions that were unfavorable for strategic cooperation, including trust and reconciliation problems on the U.S. side (the root cause being Saddam and his regime) and trust, reconciliation, and political unification problems on the Iraqi side. In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in my Hypotheses 2 and 4.

My theory’s prediction holds up in this case. The postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq lacked any appreciable ambition or realization of cooperative depth and endurance in the years between the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003). Rather, it was typified by ongoing conflict and open hostility, culminating in another war just more than a decade later.

Pertinent Historical Record

Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and the world responded with rare consensus to punish Iraq and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When Iraq accepted the terms for ceasefire in late February 1991, Saddam Hussein remained in power to menace again. Saddam’s problems with the United States predated this case and were constant throughout. The ceasefire, in a way, signaled a transition to an undeclared war that involved the frequent use of deadly force by both sides. In 2003, the United States and Iraq were again, unambiguously, in open war.
Prewar: Building a Foundation of Resentment and Mistrust

Because the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 1991 was so greatly influenced by Saddam Hussein, I begin this historical overview with his rise to power and initial dealings with the United States.

Saddam’s Rise, Soviet Alignment, Consequences, and Brutality

In February 1963, Baath party militants from the Iraqi army, who had been working with the CIA, staged a coup. They overthrew the Iraqi regime, an enemy of the United States, and executed the regime’s strongman, Abdel Karim Qassim. In the Baathist’s words, they “came to power on the CIA train.” Notably, an earlier assassination attempt had been made on Qassim—by a young Saddam Hussein. However, although “the U.S. secretly supplied the Baath regime with military equipment,” that regime fell to another coup within a year and Iraq, consequently, returned to enemy status in U.S. eyes. The Baathists reclaimed power through another coup in 1968, but subsequently aligned with the Soviets.245

Following this, the United States implemented a policy of routinely hostile activities toward Iraq with tactical exceptions during the Iran-Iraq war. For example, the United States aided a guerrilla war by the Kurds against the Baath regime in the early 1970s, to include arms shipments.246 The United States also provided equipment to the U.S.-friendly Shah of Iran during this timeframe “to offset the massive Soviet aid going to the [Baath] regime.”247

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245 Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 45, 185. See also Woods et al. (2011), who note that, in 1972, “then vice president Saddam Hussein signed the fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union,” thus aligning with America’s arch rival (18).


247 Hallion 1992, 125.
Saddam became president of Iraq in 1979 and proceeded to purge the Baath leadership, establishing firm dominance over political rivals as a strongman. One of his early actions was to try and take advantage of the turmoil in neighboring Iran, a historical enemy of Iraq. Iran was in the midst of the 1979 Iranian revolution and overthrow of its Shah. Saddam perceived vulnerability. In 1980, Saddam invaded Iran and this provided an opportunity for the United States and Iraq to cooperate towards their common Iranian enemy. The United States offered tactical support to Iraq to thwart Iran. While the United States had a longstanding antipathy towards Iraq’s Baathist regime, the Reagan administration supported Baghdad just enough to prevent an Iraqi defeat. For example, “the Reagan administration shared intelligence on Iranian troop dispositions.” Regional U.S. allies offered support to Iraq as well. The Saudis, for instance, “supported the Iraqi war effort financially and permitted Iraqi combat planes to launch surprise attacks against Iranian targets from Saudi airspace.” Importantly, the primary U.S. interest in the Iran-Iraq conflict was to prevent disruption of the flow of Gulf oil, not to bolster its 20-year enemy in Iraq. This became painfully evident to Saddam when the revelations of “Irangate,” in which the United States facilitated arms sales to Iran during the conflict, became public.

Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam turned his attention from menacing his neighbor Iran to menacing a domestic enemy. In 1988, Saddam launched the Anfal (meaning “booty” or spoils of war) campaign against his own Kurds in northern Iraq. His attacks “depopulated large areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, along the Iranian border, by razing

248 Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 139 and Brands 2008, 47.
approximately two thousand villages and expelling an estimated 150,000 people from their homes.” Estimates of the dead or “disappeared” Kurds as a result of this campaign range from 50,000 to 150,000.252 One of the most notorious attacks occurred in March 1988 when Saddam hit the Kurdish town of Halabja with mustard gas and nerve gases (specifically, sarin, tabun, and VX) killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds.253

_Failed Rapprochement_

Despite the demonstrable threat that Saddam was to his neighbors and domestic population, the United States contemplated rapprochement. In September 1989, President George H. W. Bush affirmed his desire for close ties with Baghdad.254 His administration considered whether Saddam could change. Perhaps not—Saddam was a brutal dictator—but some saw no harm in trying. The consensus of the administration and its regional partners was that “engagement, not containment, represented the best course for U.S. policy towards Iraq.”255 This was reflected in National Security Directive 26 which accommodated Hussein and stated that “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve [longer-term U.S.] interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.” Rather than force or coercion, it suggested that the U.S. Government propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior.256

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252 Feith 2008, 184 for previous two sentences.
253 Feith 2008, 184 and GT 2006, 75.
254 Brands 2008, 47; see also GT 1995, 11.
Saddam, meanwhile, viewed the American presence in the Gulf during and after the Iran-Iraq War as threatening. While the United States took measures to protect its friends in the Gulf (e.g., by escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers), Iraq complained repeatedly in 1989 and 1990 that “the United States sought to establish an anti-Iraq coalition in the Gulf.” By early 1990, U.S. ideas of rapprochement seemed even less plausible. Iraq demanded that the U.S. Navy leave the Gulf and accused the Americans of spying. In March, U.S. intelligence confirmed that Iraq had deployed its Scud missile launchers within range of Israel—“Bagdad subsequently threatened to burn half of Israel with chemical weapons.” Relations between the United States and Iraq commensurately deteriorated and, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the former U.S. reliance on Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran and a stabilizing presence in the Gulf ceased—the two were now unambiguous enemies.

The Gulf War of 1991: an Unresolved Conflict

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded, quickly defeated, and occupied neighboring Kuwait. Threatening the world’s oil supply, the regional pariah Saddam had elevated to a global menace. From an Iraqi perspective, Kuwait had it coming. The world, in large part, saw otherwise.

Before the invasion, Saddam lamented to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie that Kuwait was “engaging in economic warfare with Iraq by maintaining a high rate of oil production.” In time, Saddam expanded his argument to include several reasons for his
decision to occupy Kuwait: Kuwait was historically part of Iraq; Kuwait was stealing $2.4 billion of Iraqi oil by “slant drilling” across their shared border; Kuwait was overproducing oil in violation of OPEC’s mandate and keeping oil prices down (which hurt the Iraqi economy); and Kuwait refused to forgive loans which Saddam had used to finance his war against Iran—Iraqi blood that had also protected Kuwait from Iran.\textsuperscript{261} The enmity towards Kuwait was not exclusive to Saddam. Iraqi general officers likewise “had nothing but contempt for the Kuwaitis and resented the prosperity the Kuwaitis enjoyed” while the Iraqi population, in general, rejoiced when “Kuwaitis entered their dark night as members of Iraq’s ‘Nineteenth Province.’”\textsuperscript{262}

From a U.S. perspective, the Iraqi invasion, aside from being a violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, was threatening on a global scale. As noted by U.S. officials, “every American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt had insisted that the security of the Persian Gulf oil supply was a vital interest” and “Iraqi domination of one-fifth the world’s oil supply (Iraq’s share plus that of Kuwait) threatened U.S. strategic interests and economic well-being.”\textsuperscript{263} Further, as early as 1943, President Roosevelt had proclaimed, “the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States,” and Iraqi forces were well within striking range of increasing their share of the world’s oil supply as they occupied Kuwait.\textsuperscript{264} While Saddam would claim that he was not clearly warned off the invasion and would say publicly that he perceived a “green light” for the invasion from Glaspie, the validity of this claim is inconsistent with these geostrategic circumstances and has been challenged in recent

\textsuperscript{261} Al-Awadi in Lust 2011, 516.

\textsuperscript{262} GT 1995, 184; then Hallion 1992, 134.

\textsuperscript{263} GT 1995, 33; then Brands 2008, 40.

\textsuperscript{264} Hallion 1992, 134.
scholarship that suggests Saddam and his advisors felt the invasion would lead to confrontation with the United States.\textsuperscript{265}

\textit{The Pariah Saddam Defies the United Nations}

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was brutal. Presidential candidate Bill Clinton would later criticize the Bush administration for not pursuing war crimes. A Pentagon report from January 1992 claimed that 1,082 Kuwaitis had been killed by execution and torture during the Iraqi occupation and that Iraq had abused the prisoners of war it captured, especially the Jewish ones.\textsuperscript{266} Audio tapes recovered after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 confirm that Saddam was aware of the tactics being used and supported them. For example, to gain compliance from Kuwaiti officers, Saddam’s forces interrogated them, tortured them (as an officer reported to Saddam, “after we completed the interrogation, we treated them harshly, really harshly”), killed them, and concluded at their residences where Iraqi forces “brought out the women, killed them, and then burned the house.”\textsuperscript{267} These regime-endorsed murders of prisoners and other non-combatants were not the only atrocities by any means.

The international response to the situation was atypically unified, partly because the Soviet Union was on the decline and needed Western support. With Moscow’s cooperation, “U.S. diplomats won United Nations Security Council approval of a series of resolutions calling for an Iraqi withdrawal and imposing harsh economic and military sanctions on Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{268} Saddam remained defiant and kept Western hostages in Bagdad and around

\begin{footnotes}
\item[266] GT 1995, 459.
\item[268] Brands 2008, 50.
\end{footnotes}
weapons sites as “human shields” to deter attack. Finally, on November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, which authorized the coalition to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait by “all necessary means” (e.g., by military force) if the Iraqis did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

*A Short but Dirty War*

Iraqi forces did not withdraw as mandated by the United Nations and coalition strikes on Iraqi targets began on January 17, 1991. The U.S.-led operation enjoyed high legitimacy with its UN authorization for force. 36 nations provided military assistance and/or billions of dollars of funding, including Japan and Germany. After an air campaign that lasted just over a month, the “100-hour” ground war commenced. Iraqi forces were routed and Kuwait was quickly liberated. U.S. forces occupied southern parts of Iraq to the disgust of Iraqi leaders.

Several of Saddam’s choices during the war would make postwar cooperation with him even more difficult for some to consider than it already was. From the second day of the war, Iraq fired Scud missiles into Israeli population centers—a total of 40 launches against Israel between January 18 and February 25—partly in an effort to bring Israel into the war and, thereby, fracture the U.S.-Arab coalition; and partly because Saddam was highly anti-Semitic and saw an opportunity to strike. Iraqi forces also engaged in what some might call environmental terrorism. As U.S. marines infiltrated into Kuwait days before the

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270 See Brands 2008, 56 and GT 1995, 156.


272 GT 1995, 226-247; see also Woods et al. on Saddam’s strong anti-Semitism.
official allied ground offensive, Iraqi troops set fire to more than a thousand Kuwaiti oil wells.\textsuperscript{273} They also “caused more than 250 million gallons of oil to pour into the Persian Gulf.”\textsuperscript{274} Further, in attempt to start a ground war, Saddam launched a limited offensive into Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1991, in what would be called the Battle of Khafji. While Iraq suffered a stunning defeat at the hands of coalition forces, Iraq threatened and embarrassed its Saudi neighbors in the process instead of withdrawing from Kuwait as mandated by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{275} Lastly, there were failed Iraqi attempts at terrorist attacks against American commercial targets and government buildings in Manila and Jakarta,\textsuperscript{276} and Americans witnessed battered coalition prisoners of war whose “confessions” were televised by Saddam’s forces.

The U.S.-led coalition went after the Iraqi leadership but took measures to protect its image amongst the regional population by, for instance, timing the war to avoid Ramadan and the Haj and avoiding the targeting of holy sites as it went after Iraqi leadership targets in urban centers. “Bush had no apparent reservations about going after the Iraqi leadership or Baath party headquarters, but wanted to make sure that American air strikes would not anger the Iraqi people or the Arab masses.”\textsuperscript{277} Even then, deadly incidents provided propaganda opportunities for Saddam to attack American image. One such incident was the air attack on

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Feith 2008, 185 and GT 1995, 350. The Iraqi rationale was to create smoke to erase the American technology advantage, but this did not work (GT 1995, 364).}
\footnote{Feith 2008, 185; see also GT 1995, 459. As a frame of reference, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico from April to July 2010 was estimated to be 4.9 million barrels or 205.5 million gallons (at 42 gallons per barrel). See the \textit{On Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill}, September 2011, \url{http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf}.}
\footnote{GT 1995, xiv.}
\footnote{These attacks failed because the ill-trained Iraqi agents blew themselves up while trying to assemble bombs (see GT 1995, 242).}
\footnote{GT 1995, 136.}
\end{footnotesize}
Al Firdos bunker. On February 13, intelligence failures led U.S. forces to strike Al Firdos air
raid shelter in Baghdad, which was thought to hold Iraqi leadership. After the strike, Baghdad announced that hundreds of civilians had been killed and the public relations fallout caused the United States to increase its restrictions on urban targeting. Also, as the Iraqis retreated from Kuwait towards the end of the Gulf War (but before the ceasefire), fallout from the “highway of death” incident became another concern. “News reports were beginning to refer to a ‘turkey shoot’ of the retreating Iraqi forces” along the “highway of death,” potentially casting the victimizer of Kuwait as the victim and tarnishing U.S. image. In part, to avoid making the impression that the United States was killing Iraqis just for the sake of killing them, the United States prematurely ended the allied ground campaign and let go a future menace.

Saddam Survives the War to Menace Again

When Bush called for a ceasefire 43 days into the war, Kuwait had been liberated and Iraq was severely damaged. It was a very lopsided victory. By one account there were 348 coalition deaths and approximately 100,000 Iraqi soldier deaths and 35,000 Iraqi civilian deaths. Additionally, most of Saddam’s residences and military command centers were destroyed, the Iraqi electrical grid was down, Iraqi telecommunications links were largely

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278 GT 1995, 324-327.
279 GT 1995, 404-416.
280 GT 1995, 423.
281 Brands 2008, 64.
severed, several bridges were dropped and roads destroyed, and more than 90 percent of Iraqi oil refining capacity (the foundation of their economy) was destroyed.\textsuperscript{282}

Despite this, Saddam emerged from the war alive, defiant, and undeterred. His Republican Guard forces survived to reform and threaten again, contrary to the original coalition goals and thanks to the premature ending of the ground campaign. Those forces would eventually be used to help sustain Saddam’s regime and to quash the Shiite and Kurd rebellions that challenged Saddam’s rule. Further, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability was insufficiently reduced. “Iraq had preserved enough of its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs to necessitate an open-ended program of United Nations inspections” and much of its Scud missile force, used to deliver that WMD vast distances, was unaccounted for.”\textsuperscript{283}

And so, at the war’s end, Saddam had been defeated on the battlefield and discredited in the eyes of military professionals, but still “held fast to the reins of power in Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{284} The pariah Saddam remained in power to threaten his domestic population and neighbors. President Bush captured the essence of these lingering issues and foreshadowed the problems to come when he replied to a reporter’s question about his somber attitude just two days after announcing the ceasefire:

“You know, to be very honest with you, I haven’t yet felt this wonderfully euphoric feeling that many of the American people feel. And I’m beginning to. I feel much better today than I did yesterday. But I think it’s that I want to see an end. You mentioned World War II—there was a definitive end to that

\textsuperscript{282} GT 1995, xi, 315.

\textsuperscript{283} GT 1995, x-xiv, 429.

\textsuperscript{284} GT 1995, 443 and Brands 2008, 64.
conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there—the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.”

1991-2001: Persistent “Postwar” Conflict Lays a Foundation for the Next War

Reporter: “Mr. President, you’ve always said that you were not targeting Saddam…”
President Bush: “We are not targeting Saddam…”

Saddam’s overthrow was not an explicit coalition objective of Operation Desert Storm and the Bush administration consistently denied that there was ever a plan to assassinate Saddam. While Saddam’s removal was desired, and while Iraq’s military leadership (e.g., the military dictator Saddam) was a “target of opportunity” within the laws of war, the United States was willing to end the war without Iraqi regime change. The coalition’s explicit objectives were, in part, to liberate Kuwait and to “incapacitate the Saddam Hussein regime and loosen its hold on power.” That said, since the end of the Gulf War and throughout the interwar period, “the American desideratum [was], implicitly or explicitly,…regime change” and the American strategy was to contain and weaken Saddam and let Iraqi domestic forces (specifically a military coup friendly to U.S. interests) depose Saddam. But, Saddam’s hold on power proved strong.

The Pariah Brutally Crushes Shiite and Kurdish Rebellions

In March 1991, while coalition forces still occupied portions of southern Iraq, Saddam’s attention turned towards domestic threats to his rule. Uprisings had grown since February

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288 Quote from GT 2012, 7; preceding information from GT 1995, 424, 477; see also Hallion 1992, 150.
and Shiites and Kurds were in rebellion. Saddam’s forces crushed the Shiite rebellion first “with extraordinary brutality.”

The Shiites of southern Iraq and the Baathist regime shared a bloody history. “Shiites had a history of asserting themselves when they thought there was a weakening of central authority” and, in the 1970s, “antigovernment demonstrations in the Shiite cities of the Euphrates were brutally put down, Shiite clerics and their families were executed, and tens of thousands of Shiites were exiled to Iran.” Shiite demonstrations surfaced again during the air campaign of Desert Storm and crowds in An Najaf chanted “there is no God but God” and “Saddam is the enemy of God.”

Many argue that the United States encouraged the rebellion. Through various radio venues, the Shiite leaders in An Najaf learned of “both the magnitude of the Iraqi defeat and President Bush’s call for the ouster of Saddam Hussein.” In his news conference on March 1, President Bush said “In my own view I've always said that it would be—that the Iraqi people should put him aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations.”

What the Bush administration wanted was a military coup to replace Saddam with another Iraqi strongman who would hold Iraq together, not ethnic

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289 GT 2006, 12.

290 This paragraph referenced from GT 1995, 434.

291 For example, see Ricks 2006, 5-6 and GT 1995.


Regardless, the message received by some Shiites and Kurds was a call for rebellion.

Saddam took advantage of his surviving Republican Guard, WMD, and apparent loopholes in the ceasefire agreement to brutally crush the rebellions. The ceasefire agreement lacked provisions to protect the Shiites and Kurds and, during the ceasefire negotiations, Commanding General H. Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to a seemingly innocuous request by the defeated Iraqi military to allow helicopter flights in southern Iraq due to the war damage to roads and bridges. Saddam, using his surviving ground forces (including tanks, rockets, and mortars) and the helicopter loophole, was merciless in putting down the rebellion. This created a steady stream of refugees heading south, “looking for medical aid and shelter, seeking protection in the shadow of the American Army and telling tales of atrocities in Basra, Karbala, and An Najaf.” More than a decade later, American intelligence would learn that these ferocious helicopter attacks included the use of chemical weapons.

The Coalition response was underwhelming. Shiite leaders from An Najaf sought support from the allied liberators of Kuwait but the Americans (as well as the French) refused to get involved militarily. Although they provided some humanitarian services to refugees, the Americans “stood by while the rebels were slaughtered.” The United States struggled to compensate for the quick collapse of the Iraqi military effort and was not

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295 GT 1995, 444-449.

296 For instance, one report assessed that “twelve to thirty-two Sarin bombs were dropped from MI-8 helicopters” in an attack in early March 1991 (see GT 2006, 75, 604n16, and 610-611n17).

297 Quote from Ricks 2006, 6; see also GT 1995, 449.
prepared at that time to aid a Shiite rebellion. There was concern from the State Department, which worried about potential Shiite ties to Iran and Hezbollah, and from generals who had reservations about forfeiting a military victory by sticking their nose in a messy domestic fight. They successfully resisted “providing any measure of protection for the Shiites, who had been encouraged to battle Saddam Hussein,” until the 1992 U.S. presidential election season, although President Bush did publicly denounce the Iraqi helicopter attacks on the Shiites as a violation of the ceasefire agreement and threatened that the permanence of the ceasefire was in jeopardy if the attacks did not stop. Tellingly, one Shiite who fled Saddam’s troops said, “Bush told us to revolt against Saddam. We revolt against Saddam. But where is Bush? Where is he?”

After pummeling the Shiites into submission, the Iraqis turned their full attention to the Kurds in northern Iraq and crushed their uprising. Coalition support for the Kurds was more substantial and comparatively swift.

*The Coalition Responds*

Recognizing Saddam’s continued international and domestic threat, the UN Security Council passed two key resolutions just a month after the ceasefire that put coalition forces back in harm’s way. On April 3, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 687 was passed and directed Iraq to destroy its WMD and long range missiles and stop pursuing nuclear weapons. To support this resolution, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was created to monitor Iraqi disarmament. The resolution also reaffirmed economic

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sanctions against Iraq and “banned all commerce other than for humanitarian needs (mainly food and medicine).”\textsuperscript{300} On April 5, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 688 was passed and directed Iraq to cease repressing all Iraqis—its own civilians.\textsuperscript{301} In support of these resolutions, “Britain, France, and the United States established a ‘no-fly zone’ over northern Iraq” that was designed “to protect terrorized Iraqi Kurds and to enable U.S. reconnaissance flights to monitor disarmament.”\textsuperscript{302} This was an open-ended police action that often involved the use of deadly force on both sides.\textsuperscript{303}

The United States took additional action. After Saddam crushed the Shiite and Kurd uprisings, “Bush ordered the CIA to try and get rid of Saddam by giving money to anyone (including family members or close aides) who could pull off a coup d’état.”\textsuperscript{304} In May, Bush announced that economic sanctions would be maintained until Saddam was out of power.\textsuperscript{305} What followed were eleven years of severe economic sanctions—part of “the harshest set of sanctions ever imposed on a modern state.”\textsuperscript{306} Additionally, in August 1992, the Shiites were granted some protection. “A year and a half after the Bush administration decided not to help the Shiites in the south, it reversed itself and imposed a no-flight zone in southern Iraq to protect the Shiites from air attack and demonstrate that Iraq would not have

\textsuperscript{300} Feith 2008, 186.

\textsuperscript{301} See UN Security Council Resolution 688, \url{https://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm}.

\textsuperscript{302} Feith 2008, 186.

\textsuperscript{303} See GT 1995, xii; see also Ricks 2006, 9.

\textsuperscript{304} Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 188.

\textsuperscript{305} GT 1995, 457.

\textsuperscript{306} Boroujerdi in Lust 2011, 451.
full sovereignty over its territory as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power.” 307 And that is precisely what happened—U.S. aircrews and their coalition partners dominated the skies over northern and southern Iraq until Saddam was no more. For many on the front lines of this conflict, it seemed as if the war never ended. As one scholar retrospectively noted, “Hussein and the United States never reconciled.” 308

*Contain and Wait: Cat and Mouse Games*

What followed was a decade of varied levels of conflict between the United States and Iraq. Three U.S. administrations evaluated the situation and ultimately came to the same conclusion regarding Saddam—his regime had to go. What varied was what each administration was willing to do towards those ends. In the earlier years, the United States was willing to contain Iraq (or “dual contain” both Iran and Iraq as seen during the Clinton administration) and indirectly promote regime change. In the latter years, there was a growing sense that a more substantial and direct U.S. role would be required for regime change.

In late 1992, “Baghdad challenged the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq and sought to block demands for United Nations weapons inspections.” The Bush administration, in its last weeks of power, engaged in a series of retaliatory attacks on Iraqi air defense sites and on a military factory that made components for Iraq’s nuclear

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308 Gasper in Lust 2011, 58.
The cat-and-mouse, tit-for-tat conflict that would dominate the subsequent decade was well underway.

In 1993, the Clinton administration arrived and reevaluated the U.S. relationship with Iraq. Ultimately Clinton “insisted that the sanctions be maintained…and carried on the Bush administration’s pattern of limited strikes.” In April 1993, Iraqi agents attempted to assassinate former president Bush in Kuwait with a car bomb. Clinton responded with a cruise missile strike on Baghdad’s intelligence headquarters. While “there had been some talk early in Clinton’s presidency about the United States doing business with a reformed Hussein,” Hussein’s attempt to assassinate former president Bush and his persistent noncompliance with UN sanctions “proved to Clinton that there could be no reconciliation with the Iraqi leader.” Additionally, the Soviet fall continued and was so pronounced that it allowed the Clinton administration to adopt a “dual containment” strategy in early 1994—to “no longer curry favor with Iran or Iraq” but instead to “curb the aspirations of both” because the administration was “no longer worried that a disaffected Iran or Iraq might seek accommodation with Moscow.”

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309 GT 1995, 460 for previous two sentences.
310 GT 1995, 461.
312 GT 1995, 461.
313 Brands 2008, 193. See also GT (2012), who note that, “in early 1993, Clinton suggested that he was prepared for a fresh start with Baghdad, expounding famously that even a dictator like Saddam was capable of a ‘deathbed conversion,’” a position he soon reversed in part because of Saddam’s role in the assassination attempt on his predecessor (5).
Later in 1994, Saddam ordered a large Iraqi military mobilization (80,000 troops) on the Kuwaiti border, “threatening another invasion.”\textsuperscript{315} Saddam explained to his advisors that he ordered this deployment to purposely create a crisis to facilitate the end of sanctions.\textsuperscript{316} There was preexisting concern in the leadership of U.S. Central Command over a “Basra breakout” where Saddam might rush Kuwait before the Americans could respond and, in October, some of the same units that “defeated” the Iraqis in 1991 were ordered back to the Gulf to prevent a possible second Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{317}

The flaws of the “contain and wait” strategy became more and more evident. It was costly and made Washington dependent on corrupt, authoritarian regimes in the region. Clinton’s advisors considered more aggressive measures to topple Saddam’s regime instead of just restraining it. In 1995, Clinton approved an increase in covert anti-Saddam programs such as cultivating internal resistance, supporting exile groups (e.g., the Iraqi National Congress), and aiding Kurdish factions that were opposed to Saddam’s rule. The hope was for a quick coup by dissident army officers or a rebellion by Kurdish forces. These hopes were setback in 1996 when Iraqi armor moved into Irbil where Iraqi forces killed or detained more than a hundred leaders from the Iraqi National Congress and cracked down on Kurdish rebels in the north. Clinton retaliated with strikes on air defense sites in southern and central Iraq. He also expanded the southern no-fly zone. This episode embarrassed Clinton. Forces within his administration grew convinced that Saddam would continue to challenge the coalition and that only a change in Iraqi government could stabilize the region. “Encouraged

\textsuperscript{315} Quote from Feith 2008, 188; see also Brands 2008, 185.

\textsuperscript{316} Woods et al. 2011, 265-269.

\textsuperscript{317} GT 1995, xii.
by a group of senators, congressmen, academics, and former officials, the administration
resolved to make a concerted effort at regime change.”

1996 also saw the advent of additional accommodations that were intended to relieve
suffering amongst the Iraqi public. Sanctions on Iraq were crimping Saddam’s military
supply lines, but they were also hurting ordinary Iraqis. Besides, Saddam was cheating on
the sanctions by smuggling oil through neighboring states. In 1996, the Oil-for-Food
program began, allowing Saddam to sell oil and deposit the revenues into a UN-administered
account which could be accessed only for permissible items. Regardless, Saddam was able
to circumvent this constraint and seized control of billions in oil revenues “which he used to
buy diplomatic support, and to import banned items, including military relevant goods.”

By 1997, the international coalition that stood against Saddam in the Gulf War was
showing cracks. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was seeking closer ties with Iraq
and, in October 1997, France and Russia did not support Clinton in his efforts to punish Iraqi
interference with UN weapons inspections. This crisis passed “only when Russian
negotiators brokered a deal allowing UN inspectors to reenter the country.”

Interestingly, between 1994 and 1998, senior Iraqis repeatedly told the most senior
UNSCOM weapons inspectors that “they wanted to enter into a dialog with the United States
and were prepared to be the United States’ ‘best friend in the region bar none’…The United
States, however, was reportedly uninterested.” These cooperative overtures were certainly

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318 This paragraph referenced from Brands 2008, 185-186 and 239 (quote) and Feith 2008, 191-192.
320 Brands 2008, 239.
not consistent with Iraq’s persistent obstructive behavior towards the UN mandates. By 1998, the Clinton administration had determined that a full invasion would be necessary to topple Saddam. Clinton de-emphasized his regime change stance and “took a low profile on Iraq, waiting for a grievous sanctions violation that would demonstrate Hussein’s intractability.”\textsuperscript{322} He did not have to wait long.

In August 1998, Saddam suspended UN inspections and challenged them again in October and November. “This time, France and Russia backed Clinton’s threat of military action, and the Iraqi president retreated at the last minute.”\textsuperscript{323} However, when Saddam kicked the UNSCOM inspectors out of Iraq in December, Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox and did not bother going to the UN Security Council for approval, to the dismay of the Russians.\textsuperscript{324} Saddam’s deliberate obstructionism, intended to exploit friction and corruption in the UN sanctions regime, precipitated Operation Desert Fox, which was no small affair.\textsuperscript{325} For four days, the United States, with only British assistance, attacked Iraqi targets.\textsuperscript{326} A total of 415 cruise missiles and 600 bombs struck 97 targets, including facilities for the storage and production of chemical weapons, missiles that could deliver such munitions, government command and control facilities, and intelligence and secret police headquarters.\textsuperscript{327} “The Pentagon later estimated that it had killed 1,400 members of Iraq’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[322] Brands 2008, 240.
\item[323] Quote from Brands 2008, 240; see also Feith 2008, 197.
\item[325] Woods et al. 2011, 287.
\item[326] Brands 2008, 240.
\item[327] Ricks 2006, 19.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Republican Guard.” Even after these attacks Saddam was defiant and sought to “redress the affront to his sovereignty by shooting down one of the American and British aircraft that were patrolling the northern and southern swaths of his country.” For the next four years, Iraq fired on patrolling U.S and U.K aircraft almost daily.

The Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 emerged in the midst of this more recent of ongoing crises regarding Iraq. This bipartisan congressional act, which passed with a vote of 360 to 38 in the House and unanimously in the Senate, committed the United States to pursue regime change in Iraq and “required the president to increase support to seven anti-Hussein groups.” Clinton was reluctant to support the act and halfheartedly endorsed it in early 1999. Although administration officials explicitly acknowledged regime change as a goal, “Clinton made no meaningful attempt to topple Saddam.” A factor of Clinton’s reluctance to support the act was the dissolution of the original anti-Hussein Gulf War coalition. By 1999, France and Russia were increasing their calls to end sanctions against Iraq and Arab support was waning. The international consensus and multilateralism that once existed on Iraq was destroyed. Importantly, another player with mass appeal in certain segments of the Arab world also challenged the sanctions against Iraq—Osama bin Laden labeled the

328 GT 2006, 14.
329 GT 2006, 76.
330 Feith 2008, 180, 198-199. Also, in a September 2002 new conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers reported that coalition aircraft in the Southern no-fly zone alone had been fired on 206 times that year (Grant in Air Force Magazine, July 2012, 54).
331 Quote from Brands 2008, 241; see also Feith 2008, 182-197.
332 Brands 2008, 242; see also Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 188.
sanctions a design of the “Crusader-Zionist alliance” to “annihilate what is left of this [Arab] people.”

In December 1999, the United Nations replaced UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), a new weapons inspections and monitoring agency designed to appease Saddam. However, UNMOVIC was not supported by UN Security Council members China, France, and Russia, and “for years Saddam refused to cooperate with this agency as well.”

Campaign season became more prominent in the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections and candidate (and later president) George W. Bush campaigned with a platform that urged regime change in Iraq. Three successive U.S. administrations ultimately came to the same conclusion regarding Saddam—he was intractable and needed to go. He was not partner material. Administrations had bided their time containing Iraq, mired in endless confrontation with weapons of war, and had waited for another mechanism—the Iraqi National Congress, a Kurdish rebellion, a military coup—to bring about regime change. They lacked the willingness to do what was truly necessary to bring about regime change in Iraq…until September 11, 2001. I choose to end this case’s historical review here, at the preamble to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The historical review for my next case, which explores the relationship between the United States and Iraq after their war in 2003, begins at this juncture.

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334 Brands 2008, 270.
335 Feith 2008, 197-198.
Measurement of the Variables

International Independent Variables

Spoiler Problems

The Soviet Union (and, after its dissolution, Russia) and Iran stand out as two potential spoilers in this case. Neither, however, possessed the opportunity, let alone the willingness, to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq by force or coercion during this case’s timeframe. It is important to note that U.S. forces occupied parts of Iraqi territory at the time of the ceasefire and controlled large portions of Iraqi airspace shortly thereafter and for the duration of the case—only a very formidable spoiler would have the power to dislodge the United States by force or coercion in this situation. Also, while Saddam’s military suffered significant losses during the war, it maintained substantial residual capability (enough to repress substantial uprisings, plus the surviving WMD). Further, Saddam’s personal security forces, which helped him survive the war despite Coalition targeting, were still intact. In light of these circumstance, only a very formidable spoiler would have the power to coerce or force a headstrong Saddam into altering his foreign policy choices (and, in doing so, accomplish what a 36-nation coalition of great powers struggled to do through open war, sanctions, and enforcement measures).

The Soviets were a superpower in massive decline even before the war. While they had a historical relationship with Iraq, they were losing power (which reduced their opportunity to spoil) and needed Western cooperation to weather their domestic woes (which reduced their willingness to spoil). As Bush came into office in 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called for continued progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. “Gorbachev desperately needed to
lower defense costs and attract Western economic assistance to keep the Soviet System solvent” and in December 1989, Gorbachev announced “the withdrawal of 500,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.” Instead of standing between the United States and Iraq as the world prepared for war, Gorbachev helped win United Nations Security Council approval for sanctions and the use of force. Towards the end of the war, the best that the Soviets could do for Saddam was to try and push for a diplomatic settlement that would shield Iraq from further humiliation, but Bush was not amenable and the Soviets lacked the power to force a solution. The U.S.-Soviet partnership against Hussein remained unbroken in the end. The Soviet weakness was not lost on Saddam, who lamented during the ground war that the Soviets had “tricked” Iraq in suggesting they would play a role in assuring there would be no ground operations against the Iraqi army if it withdrew from Kuwait. Saddam sensed the lack of Soviet influence in the situation and felt betrayed.

After the war, the Soviet decline continued and their domestic issues overwhelmed them to the point where, on December 25, 1991, the Soviet state simply ceased to exist. The succeeding “Russian” fall persisted and allowed the Clinton administration to adopt the dual containment strategy in 1994. And while Russia’s Yeltsin administration desired closer ties with Baghdad in 1997 (i.e., Russia may have regained the will to spoil), the United States was well entrenched at that time and the Russians still lacked meaningful power (i.e., the Soviets still lacked the opportunity to spoil). Russia lacked the influence to preclude the

338 Brands 2008, 50; see also GT 1995, 155.
341 Brands 2008, 68.
conflict of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, let alone preclude strategic cooperation should the United States and Iraq have chosen that path. This status quo did not change during the remainder of this case’s timeframe.

Iran would likely have been very threatened by strategic cooperation between Iraq, its neighbor and historical enemy, and the United States, its enemy since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979—it very likely had the willingness to spoil strategic cooperation. What it lacked, however, was the opportunity. Iran was in the near aftermath of the long and bloody Iran-Iraq War and its economy had suffered since the 1979 revolution due to sanctions, brain drain, a decline in foreign investment from the West, and reduced oil prices. It lacked the current and projected power to dislodge the already-present United States, a superpower, should the United States and Iraq have chosen strategic cooperation. Also, Saddam had recently survived eight years of war with Iran (i.e., Iran was not able to force or coerce him then) and retained his personal security force and a defensive military capability after the Gulf war. Plus, he retained the ability to strike Tehran with WMD for much of this case’s timeframe. It is unlikely that the Iranians could have coerced Saddam out of cooperating with the United States, should he have chosen this path, for the duration of this case’s timeframe.

Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—no spoiler existed with the opportunity, let alone the willingness, to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq.

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342 See Boroujerdi in Lust 2011, 411-436.

343 After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, a CIA-sponsored investigation would determine that Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs were shelved in late 1998 (see GT 2011, 6).
Competitor Problems

For many of the same reasons outlined in my preceding spoiler discussion, the Soviets (Russia) and Iran lacked the opportunity, if not the willingness, to substantively undermine cooperation between the United States and Iraq by means of an exclusive and better strategic cooperation offer. Both were severely limited, economically and militarily—neither had the capacity to provide more reliable or affordable security and economic benefits to Iraq than could the United States. These limits were recognized by the United States and they influence U.S. policy towards Iraq. Bush had confidence that Iraq could not run to the Kremlin for help—that harsh sanctions on Iraq would not push Iraq farther into the Soviet sphere. This provided the United States with more options to deal with Saddam—it could be firm and not worry about the Soviets capitalizing on it.344 Exclusive offers to the United States from either of these sources that would deter U.S. cooperation with Iraq are not apparent and were unlikely. Russia was seeking Western support to mitigate domestic woes and Iran was an enemy of the United States.

France was another potential competitor. France had a historical trade relationship with Iraq, having provided it military hardware, and was of the first on the UN Security Council to obstruct action against Iraq for its postwar inspection violations. It was also of the first in the West to push for an end to the sanctions against Iraq. However, France did not have the capacity to provide more reliable or affordable security and economic benefits to Iraq than could the United States (lacked the opportunity) and, as a coalition member and the oldest

344 Brands 2008, 52.
U.S. ally, such an offer would not likely have been exclusive (lacked the willingness). No other competitors are apparent.

Finally, to the extent that Iraq’s 1994-1998 overtures for rapprochement with the United States were genuine, this suggests that exclusive competitive offers were not a hindrance to cooperation.

Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with the opportunity, let alone the willingness, to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.

Other International Conditions

Cooperation, supposedly, reaps gains for those who are cooperating (the incentive for strategic cooperation). Cooperation with the United States would ostensibly increase Iraqi power and legitimacy. In the timeframe of this case, this was an intolerable consequence of postwar cooperation with Iraq for the United States. Stemming from Saddam’s hold on power at the conclusion of the war, at least two international conditions were sources of credible commitment problems to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation: competing alliances; and untenable political situations caused by the image of cooperating with and empowering a pariah.

The surviving Iraqi regime was a threat to regional U.S. allies, partners, and clients. Empowering the Hussein menace would have been very threatening to several regional actors. Saddam had already attacked three of his neighbors in the decade before the war’s end (Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War)—it was highly dubious that he could credibly commit to not using the gains from U.S. cooperation to harm U.S. regional allies and other U.S. friends in the future.
Saudi Arabia was an example of one such U.S. ally. The Saudi’s feared Saddam from before the war. One of their prewar concerns was that the United States might lose resolve before ejecting Saddam from Kuwait and “leave the Saudi’s to face Saddam’s wrath alone.” Secretary of State James Baker recalled that the Saudi royal family “wanted [Saddam] destroyed” and strongly supported the resolution to eject Iraq from Kuwait by force. During the war, Saddam’s ground offensive into Khafji “gravely wounded” Saudi pride and showed Saddam’s willingness to invade Saudi Arabia. As the war was ending, the Saudis were “unhappy that Saddam Hussein was still in power and wanted to launch a covert program of weapons deliveries to the Shiites.” Empowering Saddam would have been very threatening to U.S. allies in Saudi Arabia.

Israel was another example of a regional U.S. ally that would have been threatened by an increase in Saddam’s power. Saddam was considered one of Israel’s greatest enemies and his anti-Semitism was “deep and abiding.” He issued violent threats to Israel and launched Scud missiles into its population centers during the war, terrifying Israeli citizens.

Other regional partners had concerns as well. “The decision to invade Kuwait shockingly violated Arab norms (which tolerated competition and subversion but not cross-border invasion) and shocked Arab leaders who had been personally assured by Saddam that force would not be used.” These violations were so grievous that they encouraged Arab

346 Brands 2008, 56.
347 GT 1995, 279.
348 GT 1995, 454.
350 See GT 1995, 468 and Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 54, 139.
leaders to “undertake unprecedented open military cooperation with the United States.”

Thus, throughout the region, Saddam’s postwar hold on power was a threat that would discourage U.S. cooperation that might bolster that threat.

Saddam’s threat to his internal population was also a U.S. concern. The Kurds, and later the Shiites, were ostensibly granted a certain level of U.S. protection shortly after the ceasefire. Empowering Saddam through cooperation could further endanger those populations.

Aside from competing with alliances, the image of cooperating with and empowering the pariah Saddam created untenable political situations for the United States. Before the war, Saddam had been demonized by his own actions and, in turn, by the West. Bush had called Saddam “worse than Hitler” and claimed the war to be a struggle between good and evil. After the war, Bush assessed Saddam as still “evil” in light of his attacks on his own people and was publicly unhappy that Saddam was still in power. Recall from my historical review that Bush was concerned about tarnishing the U.S. image with scenes of brutality from the “highway of death.” He would most certainly have been concerned about the image of empowering someone he had compared to Hitler. When Clinton came to power, he seemed open to a “deathbed conversion” by Saddam, despite “criticiz[ing] Bush for not pursuing war crimes trials against Iraqi leaders” during his 1992 election campaign. In short time,

351 Lynch in Lust 2011, 334 for previous two sentences.

352 GT 1995, 468.

353 GT 1995, 477; see also Hallion 1992, 124-125, who notes similarities between Hitler and Hussein in their expansionist policies, “bottomless capacities for violence,” and “personal participation in the extermination of their enemies.”

354 Quote from GT 1995, 460; see also Woods et al. 2011, 46.
however, the revelation of Saddam’s 1993 assassination attempt on Bush solidified Saddam’s untenable image within the Clinton administration. Then, in the first year of George W. Bush’s presidency, Saddam was included in the “axis of evil.” The image of Saddam the pariah was deeply engrained through three U.S. administrations. He failed to reverse this image and could not credibly commit to being a non-pariah in the future. This conflicted with U.S. democratic ideals and it was politically untenable for the U.S. to overtly cooperate with and empower one that was so demonized.

Status of other international conditions: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—Saddam’s surviving regime created problems with competing alliances and untenable political situations that undermined credible commitment to cooperative relationships between the United States and Iraq.

**Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side**

*Disinterest Problems*

It is implausible that the United States was not interested in the gains that it might have made through a cooperative relationship with Iraq. If Iraq could have been co-opted into true partnership with the United States, the United States could have, for instance: gained a regional ally to counter Iranian influence; gained access to prime geostrategic space; gained access to energy resources; and squelched a proven threat to other regional partners.

Evidence shows that the United States was interested in those strategic cooperation gains. Even before the war, the “White House and State Department continued to believe that theocratic Iran was the state most likely to challenge the status quo in the Gulf” and a co-opted Iraq could have been a bulwark against such an Iranian threat. Further, the “State and
Commerce Departments did not wish for American enterprises to miss out on the opportunity to participate in Iraqi reconstruction” as Iraq recovered from their long war with Iran.\(^{355}\) These and other potential gains are perhaps why President George H.W. Bush sought rapprochement before the war (demonstrated interest), why President Clinton considered rapprochement as he took office after the war, and why Presidents George W. Bush and Obama sought to co-opt Iraq after the war in 2003. Additionally, the United States had sought these same gains elsewhere in the region, so if the United States were to choose to not cooperate with Iraq, it would not have been because of disinterest in the gains.

Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.

*Trust Problems*

Trust problems on the U.S. side were both independent sources of credible commitment problems and in response to credible commitment problems on the Iraqi side. Evidence suggests that the United States felt these trust problems were immitigable after 1993.

Before their war, the United States cooperated with Iraq to an extent during the Iran-Iraq War—it had found a satisfactory means to mitigate the trust issues surrounding its limited bargains with Iraq. After the Iran-Iraq War, the Bush administration’s attempts to cooperate with Iraq suggest that it still felt it could mitigate trust issues. Soon after, the Bush administration changed its identity of Iraq from “enemy capable of change” to “hardened enemy.” This was not because Iraq demonstrated that it would not follow through with

\(^{355}\) Brands and Palkki 2012, 649 for previous two sentences.
strategic cooperation obligations (untrustworthy), but because Iraq had demonstrated hostile behavior towards U.S. presence in the gulf (evidence of Iraqi reconciliation problems) and because Iraq had invaded Kuwait (creating problems with “other international conditions” as previously discussed). However, Saddam’s use of helicopters after the ceasefire to crush the Shiite rebellion (an “other international condition problem,” as previously discussed) was seen by the Bush administration as a violation of ceasefire terms and was an early indication of Saddam’s willingness and adeptness at circumventing bargain requirements (a trustworthiness problem). For the Bush administration, bargain enforcement measures would need to be strong to mitigate trust concerns with Iraq and this was evident in its postwar adoption of no-fly zones and weapons inspection mechanisms to monitor UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688.

The Clinton administration, despite previous rhetoric equating Iraqi leaders to war criminals, considered rapprochement with Iraq early in its tenure which suggests that it initially assessed that it could mitigate its trust problems with Iraq. When the Clinton administration soon after re-concluded that Saddam’s regime was a hardened enemy and retracted, it was because of the revelation of Saddam’s assassination attempt on former President Bush (more evidence of reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side) and Saddam’s persistent circumvention of the ceasefire agreement and UNSCOM inspections (a trustworthiness problem). For the Clinton administration, bargain enforcement measures would also need to be strong to mitigate trust concerns with Iraq.  

By 1998, the Clinton administration considered the challenge of enforcing and verifying the compliance of bargains with Saddam. Saddam’s regime was typified by “fierce resistance to certain inspections, intimidation of inspectors, refusal to name former suppliers, and inability or unwillingness to provide complete and accurate disarmament declarations” which “all undermined the verifiability and credibility of disarmament” (Woods et al. 2011, 256-265).
administration had little, if any, confidence in the bargain enforcement measures as seen in Operation Desert Fox. This status quo persisted until the removal of Saddam’s regime.

This analysis suggests that the U.S. trust problems with Iraq were both independent (based on Iraq’s “untrustworthiness”) and in response to other sources of credible commitment problems (e.g., Iraq’s demonstrations of reconciliation problems and problems of “other international conditions”) at various times during the case. The analysis suggests that the United States felt it could mitigate those trust problems with institutions and strategies until sometime after the revelation of Iraq’s 1993 assassination attempt on former President Bush.

Status of U.S. trust problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation after 1993—a preponderance of evidence suggests that the United States had immittigable trust problems with Saddam’s regime after this time.

Reconciliation Problems

Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side are also part of this case’s story. Importantly, the U.S. reconciliation problems were with Saddam’s regime and its supporters, not with the Iraqi people.

The Bush administration demonized Saddam during the war and compared him to Hitler. Bush lamented that Saddam was still in power as the war was ending, hinting at his lingering resentment. Bush had little opportunity to move past this and reorient Saddam’s “enemy” identity before Saddam embarrassed Bush with the brutal repression of the Shiite rebellion. It is quite clear and understandable that Bush saw this as unjust and resented Saddam for it, as evident in the administration’s continued promotion of regime change in Iraq. Further, the
images of environmental catastrophe and battered coalition prisoners of war certainly did not endear Saddam to certain segments of the American public.\footnote{Coalition prisoners returned with stories indicating that “Saddam Hussein’s jailors were fully as inhumane as the North Vietnamese and North Koreans had been to their prisoners in earlier wars” (Hallion 1992, 239).}

As Clinton came to power, it is clear that he identified Saddam as an enemy, although he was open to a “deathbed conversion” by Saddam and considered rapprochement. While Clinton may not have resented Saddam enough personally to prohibit cooperation, he still identified Saddam as an enemy and recognized that some in his constituency would need to reconcile before cooperation could take place, as suggested by his comment that Saddam first uphold UN requirements to change his behavior.\footnote{In January 1993, president-elect Clinton remarked in an interview that “the people of Iraq would be better off if they had a different leader. But it is not my job to pick their rulers for them. I always tell everybody, ‘I’m a Baptist; I believe in deathbed conversions’” (Woods et al. 2011, 46). While Saddam took this as an opening, Clinton also remarked that “If you [Saddam] want a different relationship with me, you could begin by upholding the UN requirements to change your behavior” (Woods et al. 2011, 46). Clinton identified Saddam as an enemy and simply set his initial requirements for rapprochement.} Soon after, Clinton’s position hardened as Hussein’s attempt to assassinate Bush came to light and Hussein continued to violate UN sanctions, proving “to Clinton that there could be no reconciliation with the Iraqi leader.”\footnote{Brands 2008, 193.} Clinton, too, traded hostile actions with Saddam and adopted strategies to promote regime change in Iraq throughout his presidency. By 1998, Congress had formalized their reconciliation problem with Saddam’s regime in the form of the bipartisan Iraqi Liberation Act.

President George W. Bush had every reason to resent Saddam (who had tried to assassinate his father) and there is little evidence that he did not. After September 11, 2001, his reconciliation problem with Saddam became quite clear, having included Iraq as part of
his “Axis of Evil.”

“We will get this guy [Saddam] at a time and place of our choosing,” Bush said to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shelton after a Camp David meeting shortly after September 11, 2001. Saddam’s open letter to the American people shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, “in which he declared that the United States was getting a taste of the pain it had inflicted upon the Arab world,” certainly did not help ameliorate the reconciliation problems of Bush or the American public.

This analysis suggests that all three U.S. presidential administrations (and/or their constituencies) had reconciliation problems with Saddam’s regime throughout the timeframe of this study.

Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems existed within the U.S. presidential administrations and/or their constituencies.

**Domestic Independent Variables on Iraq’s Side**

“*Iraq is Saddam Hussein and if Saddam says something, Iraq says something.*”

Before proceeding, I want to explain that this section is primarily focused on Iraq’s domestic variables from Saddam’s perspective. The policy alluded to in the above quote was not casual or negotiable. It was law under Saddam’s regime and was enforced with coercion

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360 See Ricks 2006, 35.

361 Quoted in GT 2006, 19.

362 GT 2006, 18.

363 From an internal regime memo to Saddam’s subordinates, quoted in Brands and Palkki 2012, 628.
and violence by Saddam himself, his sons Uday and Qusay, his secret service, and other supporters. Thus, as I examine the domestic variables on Iraq’s side during the interwar period, Saddam’s perspective matters most.

*Disinterest Problems*

It is implausible that Iraq was not interested in the gains that might have been made through a cooperative relationship with the United States after the war. Such a relationship with the unambiguous hegemon (as Russia declined) and world’s largest consumer could have yielded ample economic and security gains for Iraq.

Evidence shows that Saddam was not satisfied with his security and economic situations and was interested in those strategic cooperation gains. Looking first at economics, Iraq’s economy was in dire straits even before the war. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam had grown desperate—oil exports had fallen dramatically, Bagdad had amassed debts of $80 billion, and inflation soared 40 percent annually. There were calls for elections and there were rumors of a possible military coup.\(^{364}\) Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was, after all, primarily motivated by economic woes, and those woes were not solved by his invasion. During the war, Iraq’s infrastructure (e.g., communications exchanges, bridges and roads, and electricity production) was severely damaged and its economic capacity (and, thereby, its future economic outlook) was severely degraded. Iraq’s major oil refineries were destroyed in the first five days of the war—more than 90 percent of Iraq’s oil refining capacity was knocked out by the war’s end.\(^{365}\) By one account, “U.S. and allied bombing reduced Iraq to

\(^{364}\) Brands 2008, 48 for the previous two sentences.

\(^{365}\) GT 1995, 309, 315.
industrial levels of the early 1960s.”366 After the war, Saddam’s economic woes were exacerbated through years of harsh sanctions that endured throughout the interwar period. Saddam circumvented UN mandates by shipping oil through neighboring countries to try and remedy some of these woes.

Saddam’s postwar security situation was clearly less than he would have desired, although he retained sufficient forces to protect himself and squash his domestic rebellions. Besides the losses from his expenditures during the war, his air defense capabilities were “wrecked.”367 His ground forces had lost more than 1,800 tanks, 1,200 of the armored personnel carriers and other armored equipment pieces, and 600 artillery pieces that Iraq had in the Kuwait Theater before the war.368 Desertion rates were as much as fifty percent in some of his units.369 Saddam could not turn to Russia for help. Feeling threatened by Iran, Saddam pursued, to his peril, a strategy of ambiguity with respect to the status of his WMD—he clearly desired gains to his security capability.370

Status of Iraq’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist within Saddam’s regime.

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366 Davis in Lust 2011, 438.
367 Brands 2008, 60. Also, during the war, the Iraqis were only able to fly 910 fighter and bomber missions as compared to the 69,000 flown by the Allies. “Many of the Iraqi front-line fighters were destroyed in their shelters, while others were flown to sanctuary in Iran” (GT 1995, 224).
368 GT 1995, 430.
370 Notably, after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, a CIA-sponsored investigation would determine that Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs were shelved by late 1998 (GT 2012, 6).
Trust Problems

Trust problems on Iraq’s side of this case were both independent sources of credible commitment problems and in response to credible commitment problems on the U.S. side. Evidence suggests that Saddam felt he could mitigate these problems to some extent, but the independent trust problems were so severe (in Saddam’s eyes, the United States, in particular, was exceptionally untrustworthy) that they would likely have adversely affected the depth of cooperation between the United States and Iraq for a great while before sufficient trust could be built.

Saddam’s trust problems were deep and predated the war. From the beginning of his rise to prominence in the 1960s, he had “an unshakable sense of insecurity.” Some might assess this as paranoia, but caution on Saddam’s part was understandable. Saddam came to power through treachery and conspiracy and expected the same from others, as evident in his statement to a confidant in 1979: “I know that there are scores of people plotting to kill me, and this is not difficult to understand. After all, did we not seize power by plotting against our predecessors?” Saddam’s capacity to trust anyone was simply limited.

Saddam held a deep distrust of the United States in particular for decades until his death. As Brands and Palkki describe, “what is remarkable about Saddam’s view of the United States is how consistently and virulently hostile it was. From early on, Saddam believed that the United States was unalterably opposed to his Baathist project and that

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371 Brands and Palkki 2012, 628.

372 Quoted in Brands and Palkki 2012, 629.

373 Woods et al. 2011, 330, from tapes captured after the 2003 war and from a post-capture conversation with Saddam in 2004.
efforts to marginalize and weaken Iraq were at the center of U.S. policy in the region.”

Brands and Palkki assess that Saddam “clearly had what political psychologists call a ‘bad faith image’ of the United States—a sense that Washington was unalterably duplicitous and that its policies had not only the effect but also the intention of harming Iraqi interests.” Further, Saddam and his advisors held a firm belief, from before the war, that the United States was trying to overthrow his regime. During the Gulf War, Saddam commented explicitly in a letter to Gorbachev that “the Americans, especially their president, have no honor. We do not trust them.” Saddam’s trust problems remained evident after the war. Shortly after the war, Saddam felt that, regardless of Iraqi compliance with weapons inspections, the United States would pursue regime change. As time went on, he complained (perhaps strategically, in part) that the United States was using the inspections as a means to collect targeting data for future attacks and that UNSCOM (which Saddam thought was an agent of the United States) “wished to prolong [their] sanctions and inspections regardless of Iraqi compliance.” He acted on those feelings of mistrust by obstructing the weapons inspections.

Part of Saddam’s mistrust of the United States was fueled by U.S. actions (in response to U.S. credible commitment problems) and his animosity towards Israel and Iraq’s traditional rival Iran. Early in his tenure, “Saddam frequently alleged that Washington was conspiring

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374 Brands and Palkki 2012, 626.
375 Brands and Palkki 2012, 634.
376 See, for example, GT 1995, 197.
377 Woods et al. 2011, 197.
378 Woods et al. 2011, 257, 326.
379 Woods et al. 2011, 256.
with the Shah of Iran to keep Iraq weak and that the Western powers had created Israel as a way of dividing and humiliating the Arabs.”

His mistrust of the United States was reinforced by several U.S. actions, such as Washington’s continued support for Israel, U.S. involvement with Kurdish rebels in the 1970s, the revelations of Irangate, and other U.S. attempts at regime change (i.e., evidence of U.S. reconciliation problems). Learning of Irangate, Saddam commented that “The Americans are still conspiring bastards.” He worried that the United States was trying to assassinate him and that it was conspiring with Israel and Kuwait to strangle Iraq and topple his regime.

Interestingly, this enduring and deep lack of trust “did not prevent Saddam from doing business with Washington when his interests dictated,” as was seen, for instance, during the Iran-Iraq War and perhaps after the war (to the extent that his 1994-1998 overtures for rapprochement through weapons inspectors were genuine). Saddam also observed, in conversation with his advisors, the U.S. affinity for institutions like the United Nations. This suggests that Saddam was able to find ways to mitigate his trust issues with the United States for limited bargains when it was in his best interest—that he might be able to trust the United States to uphold its end of an agreement, but that the United States might very well work other agreements on the side that were inimical to Saddam.

380 Brands and Palkki 2012, 630-631. Saddam’s anti-Semitism was “deep and abiding” (see Woods et al. 2011, 59-83, 328) and, accordingly, he was suspicious of and resented any who supported those things associated with Jews, Zionism, or Israel (a U.S. ally).

381 The United States had been “Israel’s closest ally and its main supplier of military and financial assistance” (see Arian in Lust 2011, 484).

382 See Brands and Palkki 2012, 626. Also, during the war, 260 coalition airstrikes were attempted at “Iraqi leadership” and 580 were attempted at “command and control” which could understandably be understood by Saddam as attempts at regime change (see GT 1995, 313).

383 Brands and Palkki 2012, 626-627.

384 Brands and Palkki 2012, 626.
This analysis suggests that the Saddam’s trust problems with the United States were independent (based on his poor assessment of U.S. trustworthiness) and severe throughout the timeframe of this case. While Saddam had found ways to mitigate these trust issues at certain times for certain limited bargains, it is likely that the severity of these trust issues would have adversely influenced the depth of cooperation that Iraq was willing to accept with the United States.

Status of Iraqi trust problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that the Saddam had severe trust problems with the United States that would adversely affect (at least) the depth of cooperation.

Reconciliation Problems

Reconciliation problems on Iraq’s side were sources of credible commitment problems in this case. There is overwhelming evidence that Saddam strongly resented the United States. He persistently identified the United States as an enemy, despite tactical cooperation, and “frequently displayed an expectation of an eventual showdown with America.”

Saddam’s animosity towards the United States handily predated the war. Much of what I discussed previously about Saddam’s trust problems also created a sense of injustice and resentment that contributed to an intractable reconciliation problem. The U.S. support for the Kurds in the 1970s helped fuel these feelings, as did Saddam’s unending suspicion of a U.S.-Iranian conspiracy during the Iran-Iraq War—“even at the height of bilateral cooperation,

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Saddam’s animosity toward the United States remained intact.” The influence of Irangate was severe. In addition to compounding Saddam’s problems with trust, Irangate infuriated Saddam and caused, in his words, a strong sense of anger and betrayal amongst the Iraqis: “Saddam was outraged. While the Iraqi leader had never trusted the United States and had long speculated that Washington favored Tehran, this top-level public disclosure that Reagan had sold Iran the advanced weapons he denied to Baghdad had a jarring impact on the regime.” Saddam remarked that “This level of bad and immoral behavior is a new thing” and considered the U.S. assistance to Iran a “stab in the back.” Washington’s continued support for Israel further exacerbated Saddam’s reconciliation problem and “dovetailed with Saddam’s entrenched anti-Semitism to create a permanent lamina of hostility toward the United States.” For Saddam, the United States was not just an enemy, but was “the most powerful of the enemies trying to bring about the ‘psychological collapse’ of the Baathist project and the broader Arab nation.”

The economic carrots associated with NSD 26, part of the Bush administration’s attempt to woo Saddam into better behavior, did not assuage Saddam’s resentment. While Saddam was willing to accept the handouts, the “U.S. policies did little, if anything, to alleviate the underlying hostility in Baghdad. The combined weight of Iraqi paranoia, ingrained skepticism of American intentions, anger at recent sanctions bills in the U.S. Congress, and

386 Brands and Palkki 2012, 640.
389 Brands and Palkki 2012, 630.
concrete experiences with U.S. double-dealing during the 1970s and 1980s was simply too great.”

“Saddam gave pungent expression to his appraisal of American intentions in 1980, calling the United States ‘the arch-Satan.’ This identification of the United States seems to not have changed much, despite the carrots and limited cooperation before the war. Months before his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam discussed potential terrorist operations against the United States with Yasser Arafat: “we can send a lot of people to Washington just like the old days. For instance, the person with an explosive belt around him would throw himself at Bush’s car.”

The war reinforced Saddam’s preexisting feelings of animosity towards the United States. He resented the Kuwaitis and felt a sense of injustice from the “economic war” the Kuwaitis were waging on Iraq. It follows that he would feel the same about Kuwait’s defenders. The Gulf War was humiliating for Saddam, whose forces were routed. He felt the U.S. response was unjustified, claiming that Bush just wanted to help his own party counter Democratic control of Congress by taking military action against Iraq. Importantly, this condemning perception of Saddam’s transcended Bush. In 1995 (Clinton’s era), Saddam debated “whether the American president needs a war before the elections” and did not put it

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390 Brands and Palkki 2012, 650.
391 Brands and Palkki 2012, 634.
392 Woods et al. 2011, 114-117.
393 See Brands 2008, 48.
394 Brands 2008, 64.

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past Clinton to kill Iraqis for domestic political gains.\textsuperscript{395} That is, Saddam saw war as a political tool to bolster one’s domestic power and saw Iraq as just a tool for U.S. presidents to use for domestic political gain. This created a sense of injustice and a lack of a sense of shared responsibility for conflict (i.e., U.S. presidents picked on Saddam to increase domestic power, not because Saddam did anything egregious). Saddam raged that “Bush’s hands are loaded with bloodshed and the killing of innocent people.”\textsuperscript{396} One could logically surmise that U.S. attempts at Saddam’s life during the war (i.e., when striking “leadership targets”) did not sit well with Saddam, nor did U.S. attempts to weaken his regime.\textsuperscript{397}

Saddam’s animosity and identity of the United States as an enemy did not subside after the war. He harbored resentment towards Bush, complaining that Bush had messed relations up with Iraq since 1984.\textsuperscript{398} He blamed the United States for the substantial uprisings during and after the Gulf War in seventeen of his eighteen provinces (including the Shiite and Kurd uprisings—only al-Anbar Province remained loyal in Saddam’s eyes).\textsuperscript{399} He equated the United States and UNSCOM as enemies of Iraq in August 1991 while complaining about weapons inspections. While he felt he was not in a position yet “to go to war because of this,” he called on his advisors to at least “harass our enemy”—that enemy being the United States and its current weapon of war, UNSCOM.\textsuperscript{400} Saddam “expressed satisfaction that

\textsuperscript{395} Woods et al. 2011, 16-21, 54-57.

\textsuperscript{396} In a letter to Gorbachev during the ground war; see Woods et al. 2011, 199.

\textsuperscript{397} As seen in National Security Directive 54, the Bush administration wanted to destroy Iraq’s ability to act as a regional power, eliminate the Republican Guard, and weaken Iraqi public support for their government; see U.S. National Security Directive 54, January 15, 1991.

\textsuperscript{398} Woods et al. 2011, 46.

\textsuperscript{399} Woods et al. 2011, 200-203.

\textsuperscript{400} Woods et al. 2011, 257-261.
Bush lost the 1992 election and pleasure with the role Iraq played in ‘Bush’s fall.’ Acting on his reconciliation problem, Saddam tried to have Bush assassinated in 1993.

Saddam’s initial sense of President Clinton was that Clinton was pragmatic (although Saddam’s inherent animosity towards the United States in general seems to not have wavered). This is perhaps reflected in his rapprochement offers from 1994 to 1998 through senior weapons inspectors (if in earnest). Regardless, Saddam thought that “U.S. support for Israel and its desire for cheap oil would hinder rapprochement.” He stated in a 1993 meeting that “all this animosity toward the United States and all its interests in the Middle East are due to—are due to an international and Arab imbalance.” That is, in Saddam’s eyes, the Arab situation, not just Iraq’s, was unjust and the United States was at least partially responsible. Clinton continued the humiliating no-fly zones and sanctions. Saddam expressed feelings of humiliation and resentment at the sanctions before deploying troops to the Kuwaiti border to intentionally precipitate the 1994 crisis. In Saddam’s words to his advisors, “we do not accept that our people will die of hunger and we are just sitting idle watching it become like Somalia, or like Haiti…and watch our people receive leftovers thrown in by the Westerners in a humiliating manner.” One might also surmise that the continued U.S. promotion of regime change (e.g., the coup attempt in 1996 that the United States halfheartedly supported and the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998) and military responses (e.g., Desert Fox in 1998) did little to assuage Saddam’s reconciliation problems with the United States. By the time President George W. Bush came to office, if not sooner,

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401 Woods et al. 2011, 16-17.
402 Woods et al. 2011, 40-41.
403 Woods et al. 2011, 44-45.
404 Woods et al. 2011, 267.
Saddam’s four decades of hostility towards the United States was ingrained into an intractable reconciliation problem. Saddam simply had no healthy sense of shame or guilt, no sense of shared responsibility, and a hyper-sense of injustice towards the United States.

There is evidence that other segments of Iraqi society had reconciliation problems too, but I will only discuss those briefly here since Saddam clearly had reconciliation problems (when a brutal dictator has reconciliation problems, one can code this independent variable “unfavorable”…). These other sources of Iraqi reconciliation problems will play a more prominent role in my next case and will be discussed more fully there. Importantly, they suggest that, even if Saddam had been removed, the United States may still have needed to mitigate reconciliation problems with certain segments of the Iraqi population.

As Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil conveyed to Saddam in 1996, “Your Excellency knows that we were raised hating the Americans.”405 This sentiment applied to many Iraqis, and especially the Baathists, who were specifically targeted in the war in attempt to weaken their hold on power. One might have expected a resentment problem with the Baathists (and their mainly Sunni supporters), even if Saddam remained in power. If Saddam had been removed from power by the United States and this segment was, in turn, victimized by other segments of Iraqi society, this would have only exacerbated that segment’s reconciliation problem with the United States.

The Iraqi military expressed a sense of enmity and injustice at times as well. At the ceasefire negotiations, military leaders were upset that the coalition went into Iraq even though Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. They were also humiliated by the losses they took

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during an accidental encounter with U.S. troops after the Iraqis had signaled their general retreat.406

The Shiites in southern Iraq suffered greatly when Saddam crushed their uprisings, and many felt that the United States coaxed them into those uprisings and implied that the United States would support them. This created a strong sense of distrust for America and, for some, a strong sense of betrayal.407 If Saddam had remained in power and the United States had cooperated with his regime, Saddam’s regime would have been strengthened. This would have threatened the Shiites and Kurds and likely sparked resentment towards the United States for empowering their domestic enemy Saddam, whom the United States had encouraged them to rebel against.

For other Iraqis, “The war, and subsequent UN sanctions and enforcement measures, increasingly placed the United States on the wrong side of Arab public opinion” in general.408 “The allies failed to target Baghdad with an effective propaganda campaign making it clear that the coalition’s bombs were not intended for the Iraqi people.”409 The damage to the Iraqi power grid imposed extra hardship on the Iraqi people that the United States was trying to win over. According to a Harvard team of experts, “the destruction of the electrical plants had hampered efforts to purify water and contributed to an alarming escalation in infant mortality rates.”410 “During the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime


407 See Ricks 2006, 5-6.


that lasted from 1991 to 2003, Iraqis struggled to sustain themselves and their families as large segments of the population experienced economic deprivation, loss of social services such as education, and declining health conditions. Saddam built palaces and his people suffered. The war and the sanctions hurt the people, perhaps more than Saddam, and provided a strong foundation for them to have reconciliation problems with both Saddam and the United States.

Status of Iraqi reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Saddam (as well as other segments of Iraqi society) had severe reconciliation problems with the United States.

State Capacity Problems

There is little evidence to suggest that Iraq lacked the material capacity, even after the war, to meet whatever strategic cooperation obligations that the United States (counterfactually) might have required. After the war, Saddam retained governance and control over his agents, unlike other wartime scenarios in which there was a government collapse that required help from outside sources (e.g., an occupier). While his military was degraded, Saddam retained enough power to manage the spaces, organizations, and personnel that might have been relevant to a strategic cooperation agreement. This capacity was demonstrated handily during Saddam’s crushing of the rebellions after the war—Saddam wielded enough control (through brutal dictatorship) to materially meet obligations of foreseen cooperative ventures. Also, counterfactually, with as much as the United States

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411 Davis in Lust 2011, 438.
stood to gain from strategic partnership with Iraq (e.g., a bulwark against Iran, petrol resources, geostrategic access, and so forth), it is likely that the United States would have provided or accommodated whatever material resources were necessary for strategic cooperation as it had in other scenarios.

Status of Iraqi state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq did not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. perspective.

**Political Unification Problems**

There is strong evidence that large portions of the Iraqi population did not identify with their government and that influential domestic actors would likely have mounted a credible resistance to strategic cooperation.

Iraqis have a long history of political unification problems. Eric Davis assesses, in part, whether “Iraqis, as is often asserted, are more loyal to tribes, ethnic groups, and religious sects than to Iraq as a nation-state.”412 While Davis argues that Iraqis do have a “strong” national identity that has, on occasion, led them to band together (typically against an external threat, such as was seen during Iran-Iraq War, where Shiite fought Shiite) and that weak institutions and sectarian identities are to blame for many of Iraq’s political-unification woes, he nonetheless provides ample evidence that, for a vast majority of their history, Iraqis have failed to exhibit political unity as I have defined it.413

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412 Davis in Lust 2011, 437.

413 E.g., “Numerous public opinion polls since 2003 have pointed to a decline in support for sectarianism” (Davis in Lust 2011, 440), indicating that there was and still is support for sectarianism, just less. As we have seen since the Davis writing, sectarian politics in Iraq have returned in a tragically large and destructive way.
External and internal forces have exploited and exacerbated Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian cleavages and have, in turn, fractured Iraqi political unity and perpetuated Iraq’s identity problems, often intentionally and to their own ends. The Ottomans encouraged sectarianism by “purposely favor[ing] Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab elite as junior officers in the army, policemen, and lower-level bureaucrats during their rule of Iraq, which lasted from the seventeenth century until 1918.” The British followed the Ottoman policy when they created the Hashemite monarchy in 1921, which was dominated by Sunni Arab elite until it was overthrown in 1958. The British “pursued the typical colonial policy of divide and conquer and within the state tacitly supported traditional Sunni Arab interests that largely excluded Shiites and Kurds.” In the 1930s, the British established the tribal system which competes for the loyalty of the Iraqi people still. This special legal system in Iraq’s tribal regions “made tribal shaykhs masters of rural Iraq” so much so that “the state could not enter the tribal domain without permission of the paramount shaykh.”

After World War II, the Iraqi government cracked down on nationalist movements and tensions built up between “Iraqists” (nationalists who promoted cross-ethnic and culturally-tolerant pluralism) and “pan-Arabists” (nationalists who saw Iraq as part of a bigger Arab structure and “sought to privilege Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab community”). These tensions are “only now beginning to be addressed.” Throughout, Iraqi political elites, for the most part, promoted narrow economic and sectarian agendas that have not contributed to the

Davis goes on to say that weak political institutions and sectarian identities have “prevented Iraq from achieving its potential to become a prosperous and stable democracy” (and, as I would argue, a politically unified state) (Davis in Lust 2011, 444). Reynolds (2011) codes Iraq’s nationalism as unfavorable for stability. He, like I, is less optimistic than Davis that Iraq’s sense of nation is “strong.” Likewise, Cooley (2005) notes that “Iraq’s ethnic and religious differences, not new political parties or Western political ideologies, endured as the basis for political affiliation” after Saddam was ousted (2). Thus, strong sectarianism endures in Iraq.

414 This paragraph referenced from Davis in Lust 2011, 437-459; quotes from 442, 445.
national interest. When Abdel Karim Qassim took control of Iraq on 1958, he tried to embrace Iraqist nationalism and reach out to the Kurds. The Kurds, however, wanted autonomy and attacked Qassim’s army in 1961. When the Baathists came to power shortly thereafter, they suppressed the Iraqist movement. The Baathists (and especially Saddam) favored pan-Arabism, which appealed to the Sunni population but marginalized most Shiites and Kurds. Saddam often promoted state-sponsored sectarianism (e.g., the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s). Subsequently, “when the Arab and Kurdish populations rose against Saddam Hussein’s regime in late February and March 1991, Saddam began promoting sectarianism” as a means to stay in power.\footnote{This paragraph referenced from Davis in Lust 2011, 441-449; quotes from 441, 444-447.}

The Coalition’s actions during and after the war did little to rectify Iraq’s preexisting political unification problems. The destruction of the Gulf War, encouragement of uprisings, and subsequent 12-year sanction regime weakened the Baathist state and Saddam responded by turning to tribes (so-called “retribilization”) and religious groups for support. As future history would demonstrate, “much of the sectarianism that emerged after the U.S. invasion of 2003 had already developed during the 1990s in response to economic deprivation and Saddam’s self-conscious efforts to follow a divide-and-conquer policy” that pitted Iraq’s ethnic groups against one another. “The collapse of the economy and educational system and the turning inward of Iraqis to traditional organizations based in tribe and religion only intensified the policies deployed by the Baathist state,” exacerbating sectarianism.\footnote{Davis in Lust 2011, 441 for previous sentences in this paragraph.}
Further, the no-fly zones protected the Kurds and Shiites, but also “separated” them from other segments of Iraq largely along ethnic lines, reinforcing that sectarianism.417

The result of this all is that, during the timeframe of this study, many Iraqis did not identify with their government. There was a shadow government—the tribes and religious groups. The Iraqi government did not have a monopoly over the legitimate use of means of violence—the violence of sectarian organizations was seen as more legitimate than that of the government by large segments of the Iraqi population.

Given that there was little political unity in Iraq, would influential domestic actors have mounted a credible resistance to postwar cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi government? Likely so. No Iraqi group has historically wanted the other to get too strong, and strategic cooperation increases the capacity of some more than others. Consider that cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi government would likely have strengthened the incumbent regime and that, if Saddam had remained in power, the Kurds and Shiites would have found this very threatening based on Saddam’s behavior.418 These groups had demonstrated a strong capacity for organized violence. If a new regime were to have taken over, history shows a propensity for Iraq to behave along sectarian lines and the tremendous violence we have seen in Iraq as of late is a testimony to the likely outcome of

417 “The north was virtually out of [Saddam’s] control. The south was isolated” (GT 2006, 21).

418 Saddam himself, a brutally strong ruler, “faced formidable challenges in ruling Iraq,” with a population “roughly one fifth Sunni Muslim Kurdish tribesmen, one-fifth Sunni Muslim Arab, one-half Shia Muslim Arab, and one tenth non-Muslim and/or non-Arab.” His solution was “a draconian mix of domestic spying…intimidation, and outright terror” (Hallion 1992, 125). Saddam committed atrocities on these populations before, during, and after the war as seen during the Anfal campaign and the brutal repressions of their uprisings. This repression continued. Saddam’s security services, for instance, murdered the Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, father or Muqtada al-Sadr (an important figure in my following case of the United States and Iraq after 2003) for running “afoul of Saddam” (GT 2012, 44; see also Davis in Lust 2011, 452).
this scenario—certain groups would likely feel marginalized and react violently to the regime and whichever entities support it.

Status of Iraqi political unification problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq had severe political unification problems and influential domestic actors would likely have mounted a credible resistance to cooperation.

Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States and Iraq

The historical record shows that, for the entire timeframe of this case, the United States and Iraq never progressed beyond their oft-violated ceasefire agreement to reach an agreement with any appreciable depth or endurance of true cooperation. This is far off the mark from the ambition of cooperation that was seen between the United States and West Germany after World War II. The realization of cooperation for the relationship between the United States and Iraq was, frankly, even worse than its miniscule ambition of cooperation. The United States and Iraq did not realize any appreciable depth of cooperation. On the contrary, they were in constant conflict, not even meeting the terms of their ceasefire agreement. Blood was shed—it was an undeclared war in which Saddam resisted his U.S. and UNSCOM “enemy” by any means possible and the United States increasingly pursued regime change by destabilizing Saddam’s regime. Even the undeclared war did not endure—the two nations were in open war again just 12 years later.\(^\text{419}\)

\(^{419}\) Woods et al. (2011) describe the interwar period as “neither war nor peace” (254). While this does not conflict with my assessment of a lack of cooperation, those who were on the receiving end of the plethora of deadly force used in the interwar period (e.g., the Iraqis impacted by the 415 cruise missiles and 600 bombs of
Assessment of the qualities of cooperation: ABSENT—there was no appreciable ambition or realization of postwar cooperation between the United States and Iraq during the timeframe of this study.

**Analysis**

This case had unfavorable independent variables at both the international and domestic levels throughout its timeframe. At the international level, it was not spoilers or competitors that were sources of credible commitment problems, but other international conditions. When Saddam retained power after the war, it created a problem of competing alliances for the United States—the United States could not cooperate with Saddam’s persistently hostile regime (and thereby strengthen it) without increasing a threat to several U.S. friends in the region. Further, Saddam was a pariah—it was politically untenable for the United States to cooperate with such types and, thereby, degrade U.S. (or administration) image, internationally or domestically. With such problems at the international level, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation, and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment.

The international problems were enough to preclude attempts at cooperation outright and they overshadow the many other problems that existed at the domestic level. Domestically, on the U.S. side, there were problems with trust and reconciliation. On the Iraqi (Saddam) side, there were problems with trust, reconciliation, and political unification. If the international sources of credible commitment problems could have been overcome, the United States would likely have proceeded very slowly (if at all) with cooperation due to its Desert Fox or the coalition personnel subjected to the frequent, sometimes daily, fire from Iraqis) might have a less equivocal assessment of the situation. Others assessed this as an unfinished war (e.g., GT 1995, 461).
lack of trust in Saddam’s regime and its reconciliation problems (the U.S. administrations would have had a lot of work to do to reorient the identity of Saddam in their selectorate from “Hitler” to “partner”). If the United States had overcome these problems to where it was willing to proceed with cooperation, Saddam’s lack of trust and reconciliation problems would likely have undermined his depth of cooperation. Even if these problems could have been resolved, U.S. cooperation with Saddam would have been threatening to domestic Iraqi groups and, due to Iraq’s political unification problems, resistance would likely have hurt the depth and endurance of cooperation that the United States and Iraq could achieve. For each of these problems at the domestic level, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation, and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment.

Assessing Alternate Theories

Similar to the alternate theory I explored in my German case, an alternate theory to my explanation above might be that a common external threat is not only required for cooperation, but that it promotes cooperation. In this U.S.-Iraq case, examining the relationships with Iran demonstrates the limits of this alternate theory as an explanation.

As the historical record shows, the United States and Iran were enemies from the overthrow of the Shah (and seizure of U.S. hostages for 444 days) in 1979, through the Iran-Iraq war in which the United States tactically supported Iraq (albeit while also supporting Iran), and throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe, including when Iran was a target of Clinton’s “dual containment” strategy. This was because the United States felt that Iran was a threat to its regional interests at least (if not beyond due to Iran’s potential WMD and terrorism threat).
Iran was also an enemy of Iraq throughout this case’s timeframe. Recall the terrible bloodshed of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. And while Saddam evacuated parts of his air force to Iran during the Gulf War, his postwar behavior suggests that he still considered Iran a threat. For instance, he pursued “ambiguous disarmament” after the Gulf War and bluffed that he possessed WMD to his peril because he feared that signaling weakness would “encourage an Iranian or Israeli attack.”

If this “external threat” alternate theory were to explain the case of the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War, the United States and Iraq should have set their differences aside and cooperated because of their common enemy, Iran. But we know that the United States and Iraq continued to engage in deadly conflict, quite the opposite of cooperation. Clearly, other concerns take precedence over external threats and this demonstrates the limits of the “external threat” alternate theory.

Another alternate theory might be that an internal threat would spur cooperation. As I discussed my theory chapter, a political unification problem associated with a threat to the government (e.g., an insurgency) could theoretically spur cooperation while the internal threat exists. In this case, Saddam had many internal threats (e.g., the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south), yet Saddam was combative towards the United States. Further, to compare, Germany had little, if any, internal threats after the war and the United States and Germany experienced very high postwar qualities of cooperation. Clearly other concerns take precedence over internal threats and this shows the limits of the “internal threat” alternate theory.

420 Woods et al. 2011, 256.
Summary of Findings

Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 supports my theory. This case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation at both the international and domestic levels. My theory, in this situation, predicts lower qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “absent” qualities of cooperation between the United States and Iraq after the war is consistent with this prediction, unlike the alternate theories I discussed regarding the roles of external and internal threats. Regardless of the status of those threats, the sources of credible commitment problems that I have identified must be resolved to achieve higher qualities of cooperation.

More specifically, my finding of the unfavorable “other international conditions” at the international level causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 1. My finding of the unfavorable trust and reconciliation problems on both the American and Iraqi sides causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 2. My finding of the unfavorable political unification problems on the Iraqi side causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 4.
CHAPTER 6: THE IRAQ 2003 CASE

The Relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003

In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003. I begin my historical review in 2001, where the previous case left off, and move forward to the time of this writing (2014). My previous case is foundational to this case and should be read prior to this case because, for parsimony, some relevant analyses from my previous case are not recreated in whole in this case.

In contrast to previous cases, the Iraq 2003 case is one where international conditions were favorable and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher postwar qualities of cooperation up through the time of this writing. My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation.

As I will show, in removing Saddam’s regime from power, the United States remedied many of the existing international sources of credible commitment problems. However, while removing Saddam’s regime remedied some of the domestic sources of credible commitment problems, other unfavorable domestic conditions for strategic cooperation, primarily reconciliation and political unification problems on the Iraqi side, remained substantial. In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in my Hypotheses 2 and 4.
My theory’s prediction holds up in this case. The postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 2003 had a moderate level of ambition, but was relatively low in its realization of cooperative depth and endurance as compared to more promising cases (e.g., the United States and Germany). The countries struggle to this day to cooperate on a range of bilateral, regional, and international issues.

Pertinent Historical Record

At the end of my historical review of the previous case, the Bush administration was in its early months of office, establishing itself and reviewing threats. Like previous administrations, it had come to the conclusion that Saddam was intractable. Iraqi regime change was desired, but U.S. policymakers struggled over how to bring it about. The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought a new sense of urgency to the matter. The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 and removed the Saddam Hussein threat. However, after liberating Iraq from Saddam, the United States found itself trapped in a long occupation in attempt to establish order and responsible governance in Iraq. After losing nearly 4,500 troops and many more Iraqi lives, and expending more than $800 billion towards the war, the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq in December 2011.\textsuperscript{421} The United States and Iraq have struggled to achieve envisioned levels of postwar cooperation, particularly after the U.S. withdrawal.

\textsuperscript{421} GT 2012, 4. The cost varies depending on the source. In their 2012 analysis, GT cite $800 billion. Sylvan and Majeski (2009) offer a figure of $3 trillion from a “well-researched estimate” that includes “long-term care of the wounded, replacement of lost or damaged equipment, and interest on borrowed money” (225, 283).
2001-2003: Removing Saddam (and, Thereby, Some Sources of Credible Commitment Problems)

In its early months in office, the Bush administration reviewed U.S. policies towards regimes that were hostile to the United States such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Libya. As with previous administrations, Iraqi regime change was desired and the administration struggled with how to bring it about.\textsuperscript{422} It recognized, as did the previous administration, that containment was failing and that regime change would require direct U.S. involvement—coupds and opposition groups were unlikely to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{423} The former Gulf War coalition was waning, as was international support for sanctions.\textsuperscript{424}

September 11, 2001—a Game Changer

The September 11 attacks brought a new sense of urgency and willingness to use force against threats that were actively hostile towards the United States, particularly those who supported terrorism and/or aspired for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).\textsuperscript{425} The administration chose to solve the Afghanistan problem first by war and defer on the Iraq problem.\textsuperscript{426} In the meantime, Bush called for the return of weapons inspections in Iraq,

\textsuperscript{422} See, for example, Brands 2008, 266.

\textsuperscript{423} Feith 2008, 202-208.

\textsuperscript{424} France, Russia, Germany, and China, for example, had been angling “for oil contracts and other business opportunities with the Iraqis” and were seeking to end sanctions to reap economic gains (see Gates 2014, 27).


\textsuperscript{426} Feith 2008, 48-52.
which Saddam summarily rejected. By summer 2002, Bush administration officials considered whether a credible threat of war (not war itself) might induce regime change.

By fall 2002, the administration was again rallying for international support to decisively solve the ongoing Iraq problem. The international community had already tried “diplomatic protests, Security Council resolutions, weapons inspections, economic sanctions, no-fly zones, no-drive zones, and limited military strikes.” Yet Saddam had violated all sixteen UN Security Council resolutions that were adopted between 1991 and 1999 to try and contain his aggression and his forces were firing on coalition aircraft daily. In September 2002, President Bush made his “Iraq speech” to the UN General Assembly, outlining the continued danger that Saddam’s regime posed and calling on the UN to enforce its already-existing resolutions.

Within days of Bush’s speech, Iraq “announced that it would allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq for the first time since 1998.” On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1441, “deploring” Saddam’s previous resolution violations, particularly the violations of WMD disclosure, and gave Saddam “a final opportunity” to, amongst other things, “comply with its disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” Saddam followed through with his promise to allow

427 Bush called for the inspections on November 27, 2001 (see Woods et al. 2011, 339).

428 Feith 2008, 274.

429 Feith 2008, 224.

430 Feith 2008, 14, 233.


weapons inspections in November. On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its weapons declaration, which Secretary of State Colin Powell described in a press conference as “a catalogue of recycled information and flagrant omissions.” “The interpretation in Washington and elsewhere was that [Iraq] was still concealing its activities.” After this, Bush, in the judgment of administration official Douglas Feith, made the decision to remove Saddam’s regime by war. Importantly, this would be a “preemptive” war—Saddam had not yet used WMD on the United States or given it to terrorists to do so, but was anticipated to do so in the future. This was a departure from previous U.S. deference to sovereignty.

On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC, having conducted on-site inspections and reviewed Iraq’s weapons declaration for seven weeks, delivered his report to the UN Security Council. He was not satisfied with Iraq’s transparency—Iraq had not genuinely accepted the disarmament demands and had not shared information to resolve troubling questions about its WMD program. Further, weapons inspectors had found prohibited items and evidence of undeclared work on chemical and biological weapons. On February 5, Powell made his memorable case against Iraq to the United Nations and on March 17, Bush extended a formal ultimatum to Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. Saddam declined.

433 Feith 2008, 344.
434 Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 217.
437 Feith 2008, 352.
438 Feith 2008, 391.
The Iraq War, March-April 2003

On March 19, a U.S.-led coalition began its attack on Iraq with an unsuccessful decapitation strike on Saddam that might have precluded the need for invasion.\(^{439}\) In contrast to the Gulf War, the United States gave up on going to the UN Security Council for a resolution to authorize war, although the United Nations later recognized the occupation and “called on member states to support Iraqi reconstruction.”\(^{440}\) Also, this war had much less international support. Although “the list of coalition members publicly acknowledged by the State Department eventually ran to thirty countries,” key U.S. allies France and Germany, along with Russia, urged for inspectors to be given more time and there were “massive peace demonstrations all over the world.”\(^{441}\)

Iraq was “liberated” a few short weeks later. Baghdad fell to U.S. forces on April 9 and Saddam’s statue in Firdos square was torn down by a jubilant Iraqi population with American assistance.\(^{442}\) Saddam was ousted, but force levels were inadequate to quell the mayhem that followed.\(^{443}\) Substantial looting and sackings of government buildings, shootings, and


\(^{440}\) Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 218.


\(^{442}\) See Feith 2008, 413 and Byman 2008, 603.

\(^{443}\) On-the-shelf military war plans called for more than 500,000 troops for a war with Iraq, similar to Desert Storm levels. After much wrangling over force levels, the United States invaded Iraq with approximately 200,000 troops and was down to 185,000 troops in May (see Feith 2008, 393, GT 2006, and Byman 2008, 622). Secretary Powell later argued that there were not enough troops for postwar occupational security (GT 2012, 270).
disorder, apparently organized purposefully, in part, by ousted Baathists, took an immediate toll on U.S. image and standing.  

April 2003-2011: Exacerbating Other Domestic Sources of Credible Commitment Problems

“I think the biggest sin was to change the mission from liberation to occupation. That was the mother of all sins, honestly”—Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari

From Liberation to Occupation: Sewing More Seeds of Resentment

In May, Bush appointed former Ambassador Paul Bremer as the senior U.S. civilian official in Iraq. U.S. officials had wrestled with how much to involve the Iraqis in their own governance right after the war, but the prewar plan was for a very quick transfer of government to Iraqis (that is, to an “Iraqi Interim Authority”). On May 12, however, Bremer arrived in Baghdad and proceeded to stall the transfer of governance to the Iraqis, contrary to the plan Bush had approved. Bremer chose to run Iraq “as the head of an occupation authority while nurturing a Western-style government.” He led the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and created the advisory Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), composed of twenty-five members to represent the various groups across Iraqi society. The IGC was established “to assuage Iraqi concerns about the unrepresentative nature of the

446 See Feith 2008, 408.
447 Feith 2008, 422.
448 GT 2012, 13.
Bremer then pursued a strategy that required democratic elections and a constitution before he would grant Iraq full sovereignty. In short order, Bremer issued two decrees that had a profound influence on the length and tone of the occupation. The first centered on the issue of de-Baathification. CPA Order No. 1, issued May 16, barred officials who had served in the top four ranks of the Baath party (roughly the top 1 percent of the approximately two-million Baath party members) from serving in the new Iraqi government. While this was the official CPA policy, there were several reports in later years that newly-empowered Iraqis enforced de-Baathification in great excess of this policy. CPA Order No. 2, issued May 23, formally dissolved Iraq’s military and its national security entities. Bremer wanted to rebuild Iraq’s army from scratch because, as he saw it, Iraq’s current army was top-heavy, corrupt, and featured a mostly-Sunni officer class that was prone to brutalizing its mostly-Shiite enlisted class. Further, according to Bremer, Kurd leaders threatened to secede if Saddam’s army was recalled to duty.

There were early indications that a lengthy occupation and nation-building exercise would meet resistance from Iraqis. IGC members “grew resentful of the foreigners’

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450 GT 2012, 15.
451 GT 2012, 14, 427-429.
452 See, for example, Feith 2008, 431.
454 Feith 2008, 431.
455 Feith 2008, 432.
authority” and they wanted the occupation to end. In Bremer’s initial meeting with Iraqi leaders, one warned him to hasten the political process because the “[Arab] ‘street’ is waiting for the freedom you promised.” Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the preeminent Shiite cleric in Iraq, complicated Bremer’s problems further, threatening a fatwa if appointed (rather than elected) Iraqis drafted their constitution. Bremer, however, was in no hurry to turn over the governance of Iraq to Iraqis, doubting the abilities of their political leadership.

Violence: Insurgency and Other Mayhem

Postwar violence grew and, by July 2003, ground commanders acknowledged publicly that they were facing a “guerrilla-type campaign.” Sunnis (mostly) were prosecuting a staunch insurgency. They were “angry that they had been displaced from the top strata of Iraqi society and were fearful that they would be marginalized politically” or abused by the Shiite majority. Further, actors like Al-Qaeda wannabe Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would try and ignite a civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites, used the open-ended occupation as a recruitment tool. “The insurgency was able to develop a widening base of support from ordinary Iraqis, who came to believe that the United States was in their country to exploit them and dominate them, to control their lives and steal their soil.”

456 Quote from GT 2012, 15-16; see also Edelstein 2008, 160.
457 Feith 2008, 444.
458 GT 2012, 17, 41; Feith 2008, 466.
459 Feith 2008, 444.
460 General John Abizaid, CENTCOM commander, quoted in GT 2012, 19.
461 GT 2012, 23; see also Byman 2008, 604.
462 GT 2012, 49.
463 Feith 2008, 498.
the Sunni insurgents who were making war on the American-led coalition and the Iraqi government appeared increasingly to be maneuvering in a warm and inviting sea.\footnote{GT 2012, 23.} That is, insurgents had the support of the population for refuge and recruitment.

These violent actors proved formidable. In August, for instance, a car-bomb attack against UN headquarters in Baghdad killed UN-lead Sergio de Mello and twenty members of his staff.\footnote{GT 2012, 42.} “This, together with later attacks, soon led the United Nations and other organizations to withdraw most of their personnel from Iraq.”\footnote{Feith 2008, 449.} Towards the end of August, another bombing killed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) leader Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim and four of his fellow Shiite clerics.\footnote{Feith 2008, 449.} U.S. military responses to the initial insurgent violence seemed indiscriminant to some and fomented more resentment.\footnote{See Byman 2008, 604.} Some Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, however, showed interest in a better relationship with the Americans.\footnote{GT 2012, 35.} While they were rebuffed at this point, their cooperation would eventually lead to the “Awakening” a few years later.

Iraqi Shiites also conducted substantial violence. By summer 2003, the “fiery anti-American Shiite cleric” Muqtada al-Sadr, who had ties to Iran, had amassed a strong following with his anti-occupation sermons. He recruited a militia called the Jaish al-Mahdi.
(a.k.a., JAM or the Mahdi Army) which he used to control neighborhoods and engage in violence against coalition forces and domestic rivals.\textsuperscript{470}

In December 2003, Saddam was captured, although the Sunni insurgency that he helped enable raged on. Saddam would be executed in December 2006, as even bloodier sectarian fighting raged, for his hand in the murder of 146 citizens of the Shiite village Dujayl.\textsuperscript{471}

The Euphrates valley in Anbar, home of violent hotspots like Fallujah and Ramadi, housed 1.2 million Sunni Arabs and was home to several former military bases and retired officers who were loyal to the Baath Party. On March 31, 2004, four U.S. contractors were ambushed in Fallujah and, having been abandoned by their Iraqi military escort, were killed. Two of their bodies were infamously hung, upside down, on a railroad bridge that spanned the Euphrates to discourage Americans from future venturing into the city. With Zarqawi and insurgents running amok in Fallujah, U.S. Marines and a limited number of Iraqi forces moved in to pacify the city. Al-Jazeera broadcasted the carnage, which included many civilian dead, leading to denunciation of the effort by the leading Sunni IGC member and distancing from the British—the closest U.S. allies in the campaign. The Americans stopped the assault just as they were making progress, only to have to return to Fallujah for a second major battle within the year. Around this time, similar battles between U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents were taking place in Ramadi.\textsuperscript{472}

\textsuperscript{470} GT 2012, 45. The overarching political and military group, the “Sadrist Trend,” has been compared to Hezbollah with respect to its structure and its ties to Iran (see GT 2012, 45).

\textsuperscript{471} GT 2012, 309. Before the war, Saddam established weapons caches around Iraq to put down possible Shiite and Kurd revolts, later used to arm insurgents and other violent actors.

\textsuperscript{472} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 56-66.
Bremer tried to challenge Sadr around this time, suspending the Sadrist Trend’s newspaper for “inciting violence against allied troops.” Sadr was furious and, shortly thereafter, denounced the Americans and praised the September 11 attacks in a sermon to his faithful masses. The Mahdi Army took to the streets and a violent Sadr City uprising ensued. Elsewhere, in cities like Karbala and Najaf, Sadr supporters tried to take control. By June, coalition and Iraqi forces inflicted enough losses for Sadr to call for a ceasefire which, in retrospect, allowed his Mahdi Army to regenerate to menace again.473

The Return of Iraqi Sovereignty: Elections and Increasing Sectarian Violence

President Bush intervened to accelerate Bremer’s transfer of governance to the Iraqis, which occurred on June 28.474 After more than a year of occupational governance, the CPA was dissolved and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) was established with Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite technocrat, at the helm as the first Iraqi prime minister. Iraq was “sovereign.”475 Regardless, Sunni discontent remained. A classified memo from a meeting of more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies noted that “a large number of Sunni Arabs still believe they have no stake in the Coalition vision for Iraq”—that Shiites and Kurds were taking over the government with U.S. backing and leaving the Sunnis vulnerable to retribution. The memo also noted that the hostile Arab media was drowning out Coalition

473 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 67-69 and 72-73.


475 The extent of Iraqi sovereignty at this time is debatable, as more than 160,000 coalition troops were present in a combat role. Nonetheless, the advisory IGC was dissolved and the Interim Iraqi Government was in place with a purpose to organize elections by January 2005 (Feith 2008, 468 and Edelstein 2008, 161).
public relations efforts with “anti-U.S. commentary, false conspiracy theories, and negative spin regarding ongoing developments,” further damaging U.S. image amongst Sunnis.476

In summer 2004, despite Iraq’s “symbolic sovereignty,” the Sunni insurgency was “more active than ever.” Fallujah became a hotspot again, confidence in Allawi’s ability to improve the security situation fell, and “the most revered leader in Iraq was Sistani” who repeatedly refused to meet with Americans. Further, Sadr’s ceasefire had broken down and he and his Mahdi Army, with the help if an Iranian Quds Force operative, were raising trouble in Najaf. Although U.S. forces severely damaged the Mahdi Army, Sistani, who had been in London for medical treatment, returned and organized a truce—Sadr and his forces were again allowed to escape to again regenerate and cause further strife for U.S. forces.477

Fighting continued in Sadr City; Fallujah was out of control. With explicit Iraqi government sanctioning this time, U.S.-led forces assaulted Fallujah to drive out the insurgents and terrorists. Fallujah was devastated. Marines estimated that between seven and ten thousand of the city’s fifty thousand residences were destroyed, along with sixty mosques. By this time, as many as 200,000 of the city’s approximately 300,000 residents were displaced. While the Americans had killed an estimated 2,175 insurgents in the battle, scenes of dogs gnawing on dead insurgent bones did little to bolster U.S. image in the Arab world. Fallujah had been calmed by December 2004, prior to the elections, but many

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476 GT 2012, 82-83.

477 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 96-105.
insurgents escaped to other cities like Mosul to conduct violence to threaten the January elections.\footnote{478}

The Iraqis held elections in January 2005. There were concerns from some, including Allawi, that Sunnis needed more time to get on board. Regardless, elections went ahead as planned. Overall, 58 percent of eligible Iraqis voted despite the three hundred election-day insurgent attacks. Sunnis, as Allawi had feared, were grossly underrepresented, with only a 2 percent voter turnout in Anbar. The election hardened sectarian divides, with the Shiite coalition, “The United Iraqi Alliance,” taking the most seats, the Kurdish parties taking the second most seats, and the Sunnis largely boycotting the election. Allawi fared poorly. His party took only 25 of the 275 parliament seats that would choose the next prime minister. From a U.S. perspective, Allawi had been a good partner, cooperating on key events like the Fallujah campaign. He was “action-oriented and eager to cooperate with the United States.” That said, he lacked domestic clout and had not secured much support in the elections.\footnote{479}

Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who had fled to Iran during Saddam’s rule, was selected to replace Allawi and took the helm in April 2005. Importantly, as the government was reforming, SCIRI machinated to obtain control of the Interior Ministry and, thereby, the Iraqi National Police and security forces. Under Jaafari, a renewed de-Baathification effort transpired and SCIRI governors and councils replaced several local police chiefs with Badr Corps militia members. Considering this, the outgoing Interior Minister warned of a great potential for a civil war. Jaafari, however, was seemingly disengaged or disinterested in many of the problems facing Iraq. Iraqi politicians chose him as prime because he posed little threat to

\footnote{478} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 112-126.  
\footnote{479} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012 128, 135, and 139.
their interests. He was largely “oblivious” to the sectarianism in his security apparatus and
the threat of civil war. Sectarian violence worsened over the summer.\footnote{This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 140-150. Evidence of sectarian violence was plentiful and severe. At this time, for example, the “Wolf Brigade”—an Iraqi Special Police Commando unit that was widely feared by Sunnis and had a “heavy Badr tinge”—was under accusation of torture and abuse while Zarqawi directed Sunni insurgents against the Badr Corps. Also, in November, American commanders found Jadriya Bunker which contained 168 detainees, many of which were former Sunni pilots or their relatives. Americans believed that Shiites were using the interior ministry to exact revenge for Saddam’s air strikes against the Shiite uprisings in 1991 (GT 2012 142-150, 186-187).}

December 2005 saw new elections with little violence as compared to the previous
election in January. Sunni leaders appeared ready to put aside their boycott and participate in
elections, but they also had ties to, and sway over, insurgents. By early 2006, “Al-Qaeda in
Iraq was stronger than it had ever been” and Zarqawi was diligently continuing efforts to
expand ongoing sectarian conflict into a full-blown civil war. In February 2006, Al-Qaeda
operatives set off explosives inside Samarra’s Al-Askari Mosque, a Shiite holy site,
collapsing its famous golden dome. American leaders feared that Shiite militias would seek
revenge, but Jaafari was indifferent to American concerns. The Iraqi government’s response
was to send Iraqi National Police into Sunni areas, to the horror of Sunnis, one Sheikh
lamenting that “you’re bringing the devil into our homes.” Sectarian violence spiraled with
attacks and revenge killings.\footnote{This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 183-185 and 191-193. For examples of sectarian violence, see GT 2012, 213-215, 225-229, and 340-342. Aside from the ongoing violence by Sunni insurgents, JAM members were using police checkpoints to systematically kill Sunnis (213); “Sunni fighters killed Shiite residents suspected of collaborating with the militia and left their bodies in the street” (214); residents fled their homes to find sanctuary amongst like-sects and neighborhoods were homogenizing (213-215). There were assassinations and the Iraqi National Police was complicit, helping funnel civilians to slaughter at the hands of the Shiite militias and operating off-the-books detention facilities full of Sunnis (225-229, 340-342).}
2006-2008: Maliki’s Rise and the Fight against Civil War

The American-led coalition was unhappy with Jaafari’s persistent lack of leadership on the sectarian issue and supported Nuri-al Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister from May 2006 to the time of this writing, to replace him. Maliki was seen as more action-oriented than Jaafari, but was also seen as partial to Shiite concerns.482

About the time of Maliki’s assumption of the lead, American forces were struggling with recent atrocities committed by American troops, sure to foment resentment to a wide audience with the help of prolific and hostile media. Two years earlier had been the Abu Grhaib scandal, in which U.S. forces abused detainees. More recently, a Marine unit was under investigation, accused of murdering twenty four civilians in Haditha after one of their Marines was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED). And in Yusafiya, Army soldiers were accused of raping a 14-year old girl, killing her and three of her family members, and setting their house on fire. This is not to say that abuses were not being conducted by the Iraqi government as well. After discoveries of abuse at Jadriya Bunker,483 American forces began inspecting other Interior Ministry detention facilities in Baghdad, finding “widespread beatings and rape and an attitude among the staff that there was nothing wrong with it.”484

482 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 185-200.
483 See note 480.
484 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 203 except where otherwise noted.
U.S. forces also struggled to preclude a full-blown sectarian civil war.\textsuperscript{485} In June 2006, American forces killed Zarqawi and learned that Al-Qaeda thought that the “Americans were winning the battle” in important Sunni areas. The Iraqis launched, with U.S. support, Operation Together Forward to quell the violence in Baghdad, but U.S. officials felt that the Iraqi government was biased and not doing enough to address Shiite-perpetrated violence. Worse, there were clear indications that the Iraqi government was complicit in the sectarian violence. Yet Maliki, as was the case with his predecessor, did not address his government’s role in stoking the sectarian violence.\textsuperscript{486}

By September 2006, tribal leaders in Anbar, fed up with Al-Qaeda’s abuse of their lands and people, were aligning with American forces to drive out the terrorists. As one Sunni cleric explained, the Americans, while an unwelcome occupying force, had been determined not to be a threat to their faith and way of life. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, was. This became known as the Sunni “Awakening” and was a key element in the fight to quell civil war.\textsuperscript{487}

The U.S. surge was another key element in the fight to quell civil war. In January 2007, President Bush, going against the advice of some military and administration officials, convinced a reluctant Maliki to ask for more troops and ordered a surge of some 33,000

\textsuperscript{485} By November 2006, U.S. officials were acknowledging that Iraq was in a state of civil war, as noted in a classified CIA document (see GT 2012, 295).

\textsuperscript{486} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 207-208, 216, 290, 340-341, and 372.

\textsuperscript{487} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 263.
additional U.S. troops into Iraq to help quell the civil war.\textsuperscript{488} In February 2007, surge troops started to arrive and the monthly ethno-sectarian civilian deaths in Baghdad fell sharply.\textsuperscript{489}

In June 2007, the Askari Mosque in Samarra was bombed again. This time the Iraqi government took action by ordering a curfew; resurging sectarian violence was averted. Maliki did take the opportunity, however, to fire the commander in Samarra and replace him with a National Police commander who had known Sadrist connections—“a fresh reminder of the virulent and seemingly intractable sectarianism of the Maliki government.”\textsuperscript{490}

By summer 2007, the Awakening was gaining traction. “The surge served as a catalyst that encouraged the Awakening to spread to Sunni areas beyond Anbar.” The Awakening’s “Sons of Iraq” forces would eventually be put on a payroll and compliment U.S. efforts to fight Al-Qaeda. The Maliki government was content with this as long as the efforts were focused on Al-Qaeda and stayed “in Sunni areas away from Baghdad.” Although the insurgency was weakening, the Shiite militias became more active as the surging American forces took the offensive to root out sectarian violence. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates talked with Maliki in Baghdad about the continuing problems that Iraq faced, which Maliki downplayed. Gates noted that Maliki “seemed out of touch with reality.”\textsuperscript{491} That September, a leading figure in the Awakening, Sheikh Abd al-Sattar, expressed gratitude to a visiting President Bush, telling Bush that “he and the Sunni population he represented would always

\textsuperscript{488} See GT 2012, 301-309 and Gates 2014, 42 and 574; see Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 141 for troop numbers.

\textsuperscript{489} In Baghdad, overall civilian deaths fell from approximately 3,600 in December 2006 and January 2007 (pre-surge) to 2,300 in February 2007 (post-surge). Ethno-sectarian deaths fell from approximately 1,550 in December 2006 and January 2007 to 800 in February and 500 in March (GT 2012, 338).

\textsuperscript{490} GT 2012, 368.

\textsuperscript{491} Gates 2014, 34.
remember the sacrifice American families had made in sending their sons and daughters to Iraq.” Ten days later, Sattar was killed in an attack for which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. Also in September, Sadr called for another ceasefire (which some Shiites did not obey) and Shiite violence levels began to drop. By the end of 2007, the American military had “yanked Iraq back from the brink of civil war.”

Maliki seized opportunities to increase his power in early 2008. Basra was overrun with violent Shiite militias and gangs. Maliki went there personally in March to restore order (with robust Coalition air support), having either grown tired of the Mahdi Army and its criminal offshoots or, perhaps more likely, having perceived a threat to his rule. Importantly, it was perceived by some as hope for a less sectarian stance from Maliki. Shortly after returning from Basra, Maliki “handily fended off” a renewed push for a no-confidence vote that the Sadrists had been plotting to challenge his rule. The Mahdi Army became highly active and violence sprung up in many Shiite areas, including Sadr City, which was home to more than two million Iraqi citizens. Having previously “asserted his sovereignty and prevented the Americans from having a free hand in Sadr City, Maliki was no longer sovereign” of these sprawling neighborhoods that were overrun by Sadrists. From Sadr City, Maliki’s enemies launched attacks on Americans and the Iraqi Government; Maliki sent in Iraqi forces along with the Americans to take on the militias. By showing his willingness to

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492 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 384-385, 406, 424-425, 428, and 456 except where otherwise noted.

go after the militias in Basra and Sadr City, Maliki earned the support of most in Baghdad except, of course, the Iranian Ambassador and Sadr himself.\textsuperscript{494}

2008-2011: Pre-Withdrawal Normalization

In late 2007, the United States began pursuing a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq to replace the UN Security Council resolution that authorized U.S. military presence in Iraq, which was set to expire by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{495} The Americans wanted, amongst other things, “legal immunity for civilian contractors, airtight legal protections for the troops, and the assurance that American forces would be able to operate in Iraq as they deemed necessary.”\textsuperscript{496} The Iraqis wanted, amongst other things, U.S. commitments to “defend Iraq against attack,” to “defend their regime against a potential coup,” to “work to have Iraq’s international debts from the Saddam era forgiven,” and to strenuously work “to ensure that United Nations sanctions from that period were lifted.”\textsuperscript{497} A traditional SOFA captured the troop protective measures and a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA, see Appendix A) was created to capture the other desired forms of cooperation.

Procedurally, and primarily for political reasons, Maliki chose to submit the agreements to the Iraqi parliament. This procedure proved critical in the subsequent SOFA negotiations three years later. Maliki also feared that Sadr and Iran would exploit the SOFA negotiations for political gain. The Iraqis demanded a withdrawal date on the SOFA. In a compromise,

\textsuperscript{494} The Basra effort was known as Operation Charge of the Knights; this paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 471-474, 482-483, 487-488, and 503-504 except where otherwise noted.

\textsuperscript{495} Gates 2014, 235 and GT 2012, 523.

\textsuperscript{496} GT 2012, 524.

\textsuperscript{497} GT 2012, 524-525.
Bush and Maliki agreed on goals to withdraw American forces from Iraqi towns and cities by June 2009 (which Maliki wanted in order to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty and to give him latitude to go after his enemies without U.S. interference) and to remove all American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011, conditions permitting. The SOFA passed the Iraqi parliament 149 to 35, with 91 abstaining or not present. All but five of the nay votes came from Sadrists. It had been a struggle to draft a mutually acceptable SOFA and it was more than a year in the making. It took a lot of personal involvement from both Bush and Maliki. In December 2008, when Bush and Maliki stood together in front of cameras to sign these very important accords, a man in the audience hurled a shoe at Bush, one of the gravest insults in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{498}

President Obama took office in January 2009 and began to implement his vision of extricating the United States from Iraq. Realizing he could not responsibly implement his 16-month withdrawal plan, he eventually chose to end the American \textit{combat mission} in Iraq by August 31, 2010, nineteen months later. The United States began pulling back surge troops although, at times, Maliki expressed reservations that the Americans were withdrawing too fast and, thereby, creating opportunity for Al-Qaeda and insurgents to attack.\textsuperscript{499}

In April 2009, after a two month ambassadorial vacancy, Ambassador Chris Hill arrived in Baghdad with a much different agenda than former Ambassador Crocker. Hill wanted to wrest the lead role in Iraq from the military, put more responsibility on the Iraqis, and

\textsuperscript{498} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 526-530, 539-540, 558-559, and Gates 2014, 237. Also, during this timeframe, American special operators killed one of Maliki’s cousins in a botched raid, raising “the political stakes on immunities for U.S. troops” (GT 2012, 528-529).

\textsuperscript{499} This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 560-579.
normalize the U.S. relationship with Iraq. Early on, Maliki expressed to Hill a desire for a strong relationship with the Obama administration. Hill had a favorable view of Maliki and thought little of Maliki’s Sunni and Kurd rivals. However, when Maliki went to Washington to talk with Obama in the summer of 2009, he deviated sharply from the agenda Hill had arranged. Instead of using the visit to launch the SFA as had been coordinated, Maliki threatened Obama by “playing the Iran card: if the United States could not persuade the Sunni Arab countries to stop rallying the Sunnis, the Iranians would have an excuse to intervene in Iraqi politics.” Maliki also expressed discontent that U.S. military representatives had met with exiled Baathists in Turkey, an event that stoked Maliki’s inherent fear of Baathist conspiracies. This uncoordinated complaining angered Hill and, privately, Maliki’s “position was unmistakable: if the Americans did not respect his concerns, they could get the hell out of Iraq.”

As the Americans proceeded with their withdrawal from Iraqi cities leading up to the June 2009 deadline, Maliki had several Awakening leaders arrested, the very ones that had allied with the Americans. Further, the Iraqi government had a habit of deferring payments to Awakening volunteers and Iraqi security forces were disproportionately targeting Sunni’s in other areas.

Parliamentary elections were scheduled for March 2010. “Under American pressure, the de-Baathification campaign had been defused” and “the Sunnis had decided not to boycott the election.” U.S. officials expressed concern that Maliki would not leave power if he lost, but might rather stage a coup and refuse to honor the balloting. “62 percent of the electorate

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500 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 581-582, 587, and 597-598.

voted” and Allawi’s party won 91 seats while Maliki’s party won 89 seats. Both were short of the 163 seats required to control the 325-seat parliament, but Maliki, by challenging the constitution, calling for recounts, and reinvigorating de-Baathification to disqualify rival candidates, merged the Shiite factions (with Sadr’s support) into a mega-bloc that was deemed constitutionally sufficient to establish the government to the shock of Sunnis. The Obama administration worked to facilitate suitable power-sharing amongst the key leadership positions but, in the end, Maliki retained his prime ministership and broke nearly all the agreements and promises that were made to keep him there. Still, “for all his flaws, Maliki, Hill thought, was somebody with whom the United States could work.” The White House agreed to stick with Maliki and “try to soothe hurt feelings all over Baghdad.”

On September 1, 2010, America declared the end of its “combat mission” at a formal ceremony in Baghdad. “Fifty thousand U.S. troops would remain in Iraq, deployed in six ‘advise and assist’ training brigades.” One week later, American “train, advise, and assist” forces, to include Stryker platoons, Special Forces, attack helicopters, and fighter aircraft, were called in to assist Iraqi soldiers and police that were under heavy attack.

In the summer of 2011, with the 2008 SOFA set to expire in December 2011, U.S. diplomats began discussions with Iraq for a new SOFA so that the United States could keep several thousand troops in Iraq to continue to “train Iraq’s armed forces, protect its skies, and conduct joint counterterrorism operations” beyond 2011. This was a politically sticky

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502 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 614-620, 632, 635, and 650.
503 Gates 2014, 474.
504 GT 2012, 636-637.
505 GT 2012, 4.
issue for Obama, who had “campaigned on Iraq being the wrong war,” since leaving troops might have been considered by some as a departure from his campaign promises. However, several key actors on both sides, including top U.S. and Iraqi military commanders, Allawi, the Kurdish leader Barzani, and even Maliki himself, considered it wise if not vital to keep U.S. forces present. Maliki was willing to support continued U.S. military presence if he could garner enough domestic support but was doubtful that he could get Council of Representatives approval.

U.S. officials had spent the early months of 2011 debating about how many troops to leave in Iraq beyond 2011, with the U.S. commander in Iraq initially calling for up to 24,000 troops and the White House countering with options for 8,000 to 16,000 troops. In June, Maliki and his advisors discussed the possibility of 20,000 U.S. troops. President Obama eventually proposed a new plan of 3,500-5,000 troops. In the end, however, the debate over troop levels was overcome by the fact that the United States and Iraq could not reach an agreement on the SOFA. In a June 2011 videoconference with Maliki, Obama had levied a requirement that the Iraqi parliament would need to approve any agreement for U.S. troop presence beyond 2011. The Iraqis officially “asked” for U.S. troops to stay in August 2011, and in October the Iraqi parliament “approved U.S. military trainers but ruled out immunities. Only the Kurds supported the U.S. immunities requirement.” “Maliki was just too fearful of the political consequences” of trying to push through an agreement for continued U.S. military presence—it was a democracy and most Iraqis wanted U.S. forces to leave. Shortly thereafter, Obama had another videoconference with Maliki to tell him that

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506 GT 2012, 643.
the SOFA negotiations were over and that all American troops would be coming home. This critical event was embarrassing and politically costly for the United States, perilous for the Iraqis, detrimental to bilateral cooperation, and a win for Iran.  

As the United States prepared to withdraw, the violence that once wracked Iraq was at a record low. On December 15, 2011, “the American command in Iraq formally cased its colors in a ceremony that Maliki and [Iraqi President] Talabani, both invited, did not attend.” The last U.S. military convoy left Iraq on December 18, 2011. Iraq was fully and unequivocally sovereign.

2012-Present: Iraqi Regression and Disappointing Strategic “Cooperation”

Since the U.S. withdrawal, Maliki has been accused of centralizing power, aligning with Iran, and stoking sectarianism; Iraq has regressed to alarming levels of violence. Approaching the U.S. withdrawal, nearly a thousand Iraqis were detained by the Maliki government as suspected Baathists. Other Iraqi military members who were seen as “too close” with the American military were pushed out, their services no longer needed, and Maliki ordered tanks “to take up positions near the residences of” Sunni politicians. This behavior continued in earnest after the U.S. withdrawal. Maliki issued an arrest warrant for his lone Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, who fled. Hashimi was later sentenced to death in abSENTia by Iraqi courts. Recently, Sadr withdrew from the government and described Maliki as a “‘tyrant’ who heads a ‘corrupt’ government and suppresses his

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508 This paragraph referenced from Gates 2014, 555 and GT 2012, 4, 655-671.
509 This paragraph referenced from GT 2012, 4, 671, and Air Force Magazine, March 2012, 27.
510 GT 2012, 4, 672, 676.
511 See GT 2012, 4 and Al-Jawoshy and Schwirtz 2012.
Maliki’s alignment with Iran is less clear, although he has clearly sought favor with both the United States and Iran. The United States witnessed Maliki’s deference to Iranian interests during the occupation when Maliki, on behalf of Iranian-supported Shiites or Iranian agents, interfered with U.S. security operations on several occasions. After the U.S. withdrawal, Iran certainly capitalized on the situation, further clouding the alignment issue. As Maliki’s deputy prime minister recently lamented, “we were listening to Mr. Obama when he was saying, ‘we will withdraw [from Iraq], but withdraw in a responsible way.’ But in fact, the way he did it was irresponsible. Because he left a vacuum behind him that was filled by the Iranians.”

Maliki’s past and current policies have been accused of stoking the recent alarming increase in sectarian violence in Iraq. According to one scholar, “with two-thirds of Iraq’s provinces in open conflict with the capital, Nouri al-Maliki is resorting to Saddam Hussein’s playbook to keep the country together.” 7,818 Iraqi civilians were killed in 2013, making it the deadliest year in Iraq since 2008, when 6,787 Iraqis were killed. This is a sharp increase to the roughly 3,000 Iraqi civilians killed each year from 2009 through 2012. Abhorrent body counts in the early months of 2014 suggest that the violence has not abated.

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513 See, for example, GT 2012, 351-354.
514 Kenner 2014.
515 Ottaway 2014.
516 See UN Assistance Mission to Iraq, http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?lang=en, and Parker 2014. Additionally, “up to 300,000 people have now been displaced by the fighting between Sunni militants and security forces in Iraq's western province of Anbar” per the UN (see “Violence in Iraq's Anbar province 'displaces 300,000,'” February 12, 2014, BBC).
The U.S.-Iraqi relationship has struggled since the withdrawal. On the positive side, there has been progress on several major weapons purchases and the semi-autonomous Kurds have signed major oil exploration deals with U.S. companies. However, there have been notable and persistent problems with cooperation as well.

The civil war in Syria has been a substantial source of conflict between the United States and Iraq. By 2012 alone, Iran had flown “about two hundred tons of arms—rockets, ammunition, mortar rounds, heavy machine guns, and assault rifles—through Iraqi airspace to Damascus.” The United States and its Arab allies unequivocally condemned Syrian President Bashar Assad’s repression of his people and President Obama came close to committing troops to Syria to address the problem. Efforts to get Iraq to support the interests of the United States and its Arab neighbors in this matter, however, have highlighted the troubles within the partnership. In early 2012, Ambassador Jeffrey launched a strenuous objection to Maliki about the Iranian use of Iraqi space to support Assad. This was followed up with a request by Vice President Biden in August. In March 2013, Secretary of State Kerry informed reporters that he had a “very spirited discussion” with Maliki about the Iranian overflights of Iraqi territory to help sustain Assad’s regime, a regime the Obama administration had urged to step down. According to Kerry, he told Maliki that “there are members of Congress and people in America who increasingly are watching what Iraq is doing and wondering how it is that a partner in the efforts for democracy and a partner for

517 See, for example, GT 2012, 679.
518 GT 2012, 677.
whom Americans feel they have tried so hard to be helpful…can be, in fact, doing something that makes it more difficult to achieve our common goals.”

More recently, there has been conflict over the timing of weapons deliveries and other U.S. support to Iraq that Maliki wishes to expedite to help quell Iraq’s recent increase in domestic violence. Iraq has requested substantial defense-related transfers from the United States and “the United States has delivered more than $14 billion in equipment, services and training to the Iraqi military and security forces since 2005,” to include six C-130J transport aircraft, a Rapid Avenger surface-to-air missile battery, 140 M1A1 tanks, Hellfire missiles, assault rifles, and ammunition. However, Iraq also ordered a total of 36 F-16 fighter aircraft and, although some Iraqi pilots have trained at U.S. bases to fly these aircraft, the aircraft have not yet been delivered. Further, Iraq agreed to purchase 24 Apache attack helicopters and lease another six, yet the “leased helicopters aren't scheduled to arrive in Iraq until the summer [2014] and the purchased Apaches haven't even been built yet.”

With mounting domestic violence, Maliki met with President Obama in November 2013 to request early delivery of these systems and military aid, to include “more American intelligence and other forms of counterterrorism support like reconnaissance drones that would be operated by Americans.” While the Department of Defense has accelerated the delivery of some equipment, U.S. policymakers and others, including prominent Iraqis (e.g., Kurdish leader Barzani), have expressed concerns over how this and other equipment might

520 See Griffin 2014 and Yacoub 2014.
521 See Johnson 2012 and Hudson 2014.
522 See Gordon and Schmitt 2013 and Dreazen and Hudson 2014.
be used, foreseeing a possibility that Maliki’s government might use the attack aircraft to oppress Sunnis and Kurds.\textsuperscript{523} The sentiment was strong enough that President Obama recently found it necessary to appeal to Congress to lift their ongoing block on the Apache deliveries.\textsuperscript{524}

Maliki has recently increased his appeals for U.S. assistance and, apparently, sought equipment from Iran in violation of UN sanctions.\textsuperscript{525} Reuters reported that Iran signed contracts in late November 2013 “to sell Iraq arms and ammunition worth $195 million,” just weeks after Maliki met with Obama to request amplified and expedited aid. Several Iraqi lawmakers claim the deal was made because Maliki was “fed up with delays in U.S. arms deliveries” while others more directly accused the Americans of purposely “dragging their feet” on their already-signed arms deals.\textsuperscript{526}

\textsuperscript{523} See \textit{Air Force Magazine}, March 2014, 18, which reports that the Department of Defense “will speed delivery of combat aircraft, air-to-ground missiles, and other key military aid to Iraq” and send “an additional 100 Hellfire missiles” and several remotely piloted aircraft.

\textsuperscript{524} See Letter from the U.S. Senate to President Barack Obama, October 29, 2013, signed by Senators Levin, McCain, and others; see also GT 2012, 680, Hudson 2014, and Khoury 2014.

\textsuperscript{525} For instance, Maliki penned an article in February 2014, in which he pleaded for U.S. support—American equipment, know-how (not American troops), and partnership—to help defeat Al-Qaeda. He also called for commercial investment in his country and pledged to fight sectarianism (see Maliki, “A Comprehensive Strategy against Terrorism,” February 18, 2014, \textit{Foreign Policy}).

\textsuperscript{526} Rasheed 2014. “Any transfer of arms from Iran to a third country is in direct violation of UNSCR 1747” according to State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, who expressed U.S. concern about the possible sales. “We are seeking clarification on the matter from the government of Iraq and to ensure that Iraqi officials understand the limits that international law places on arms trade with Iran” (quoted in Rasheed, 2014).
Measurement of the Variables

International Independent Variables

Spoiler Problems

As with the previous case, Russia and Iran stand out as potential spoilers in this case. Both likely had the willingness to preclude strategic cooperation at times in this case, but both lacked the opportunity to do so. It is important to note that the United States occupied Iraq with substantial military force for more than eight years following its invasion and provided credible personal security protection to Iraqi leaders—only a very formidable spoiler would have been able to block cooperation between the United States and Iraq by force or coercion in this situation. More likely, instances of uncooperative behavior between Iraq and the United States were matters of choice rather than force from an external source.

Russia regained some of its former strength during this case’s timeframe, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin demonstrated a new willingness for aggressive Russian behavior in more recent years as seen with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. However, these are neighboring lands and this demonstration of Russian power, while unwise to ignore, is far from the power required to dislodge the United States from far-away Iraq.527

Iran certainly had a persistent influence in Iraq that cannot be ignored, but fell short of the power required to spoil strategic cooperation between the United States and Iraq. Iran wanted a weak Iraq, but not a full disaster that would bleed over to cause Iran problems.

527 In response to the Crimea crisis, President Obama recently argued that Russia is at this time best considered a “regional” power (see Wilson 2014).
Iran, therefore, accepted a certain level of cooperation that strengthened Iraq while resisting otherwise. As the historical record showed, Iran exercised its influence by, according to Arab leaders, providing Shiite organizations like SCIRI and the Dawa Party (Maliki’s political party) with “funds, material, refuge, and other support.” During the U.S. occupation, Iran’s Quds and Revolutionary Guard forces infiltrated Iraq and organized, armed, and participated in resistance to U.S. interests, to include lethal attacks on Americans in Iraq. During the 2008 SOFA negotiations, an Iranian general was arrested in Iraq “for bribing legislators with $250,000 each to vote against the SOFA” and the leader of the Iranian Quds Force told Iraqi President Talabani that Iraq should not sign any agreement with Bush. However, the historical record also shows that U.S. and Iraqi leaders were aware of Iran’s generally deleterious influence, took steps to mitigate it, and had the power to overcome it when they had a mind to. For example, U.S. Special Forces once captured Iranian officers who were suspected of anti-Coalition activity and the Iraqi government pressured for their release. In January 2007, however, U.S. officials received a promise from Maliki that they would not be forced to release captured Iranian Quds Force operatives in the future. Soon after, U.S. Special Forces captured five Quds operatives in Irbil. Iran, subsequently, “locked down its Iraqi consulates and pulled most of its Quds Force officers

528 Feith 2008, 201.

529 See, for example, GT 2012, 312. When U.S. forces eventually went after Iranian agents (primarily Quds Force operatives and IRG officers) that were causing trouble in Iraq, they found documentation and other evidence that Iran was supplying the Mahdi Army and other Shiite groups with weapons, economic aid, and humanitarian aid. Sadr had ties to Iran and several influential Kurds also had ties to Iran (GT 2012, 323-327).

530 Gates 2014, 236.

531 Allawi, for instance, noted that Iranian influence was a problem during his tenure and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recognized the potential that Iran could threaten and intimidate Maliki through Sadr (see GT 2012, 110, 321).
out of the country.” U.S. forces compounded that blow with a defeat of Iranian proxies in Sadr City in 2008. Clearly Maliki did not want trouble with his neighbor to the East and courted support from Iran, as well as from the United States, but Iran’s power was not sufficient to force Maliki to eschew cooperation with the United States against Maliki’s will. The 2008 SOFA was signed, despite Iran’s machinations against it.

Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—no spoiler existed with the opportunity to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq.

Competitor Problems

Referencing my previous case, potential competitors such as Russia and Iran still lacked the opportunity to substantively undermine cooperation between the United States and Iraq by means of an exclusive and better strategic cooperation offer, although Russia may have had more willingness to do so in this timeframe. The United States remained a hegemon and these other nations, while perhaps improving in capacity, still paled in comparison to the United States. Further, the demonstrated postwar U.S. contribution to Iraqi security and humanitarian, economic, and political development was, as concise as can be stated, staggering in terms of lives, dollars, and attention.

532 GT 2012, 323-325.
533 GT 2012, 515.
534 See, for example, GT 2012, 519-520. This is consistent with the assessment of policymakers like Ambassador James Jeffrey, who once assessed that, when it came to policies like the SOFA and economic policies to attract oil companies, Iran could put significant pressure on Maliki but could not block him from implementing those policies (GT 2012, 642).
Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with the opportunity to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.

*Other International Conditions*

The removal of Saddam’s regime alleviated some of the other international conditions that conspired against U.S.-Iraqi cooperation, such as competing alliances (i.e., strengthening Saddam through cooperation would have alarmed other regional U.S. allies) and untenable political situations caused by the image of cooperating with a pariah. Certain aspects of the post-Saddam situation did not sit well with some regional powers. For instance, a democracy in the region did not necessarily appeal to theocratic Iran (not that Iran’s discomfort would make cooperation with Iraq any less appealing to the United States). Further, “the Saudis and other authoritarian Sunni states were deeply suspicious of a Shiite-dominated and potentially democratic Iraq.” However, while these potential issues over democracy’s influence were a concern to some regional U.S. allies, they paled in significance to other potential international conditions such as those posed previously by Saddam’s regime or the Cold War structure. More concerning were the sectarian and authoritarian tendencies demonstrated by Maliki (such that U.S. cooperation with Iraq might have enabled him to oppress his people), coupled with his deference towards Iranian interests (such that U.S. cooperation with Iraq might have indirectly, or worse, directly, empowered Iran), which became even more apparent after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Although Maliki is far from Saddam (so far) with respect to authoritarianism and, alignment-wise, Iraq is, collectively, far

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535 See GT 2012, 7.

536 GT 2012, 411; see also Feith 2008, 190.
from being a “Warsaw Pact” ally of Iran, these concerns and the threats that they pose for U.S. image and interests have been noted by U.S. officials and have caused some to be increasingly cautious about cooperating with Iraq.

Status of other international conditions: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation though late 2011, then AMBIGUOUS for the remainder of this case’s timeframe—while removing Saddam mitigated many problems with other international conditions in postwar Iraq, Maliki’s behavior, particularly approaching the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and after, has raised significant questions amongst U.S. policymakers about the future effects that cooperation with Iraq would have on U.S. interests, image, and Iranian power.537

**Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side**

*Disinterest Problems*

As with the previous case, it is implausible that the United States was not interested in the gains that could be made through a cooperative relationship with Iraq. In line with my previous evidence, which endures, a co-opted Iraq might have resolved once and for all the anxiety over current or future Iraqi WMD capability and would have recruited an ally in the war against violent extremism.538 A democracy in Iraq might have had a domino effect throughout the rest of the region “that would dramatically improve the U.S. security posture,” especially with respect to threats in Iran and Syria.539

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537 I argue later that the root causes of these potential “other international conditions” problems were political unification and reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side. These problems contributed to Maliki’s sectarianism and gravitation towards Iran, which had repercussions at the international level as seen here.

538 GT 2012, 8.

539 Brands 2008, 315. Similarly, Peter Feaver argues that strategic partnership with Iraq could provide a counterbalance against Iranian influence and that “a partnership with a united and pluralistic Iraq would also be
Defense, he urged that “developments in Iraq” would “shape the entire Middle East and greatly influence global geopolitics for years to come.” The violence in Iraq and the potential of it to spread throughout the region made it clear to Gates that it was important to work with Iraq to protect U.S. regional long-term interests. So, as time went on, U.S. interest in the potential gains that could be made from cooperation with Iraq did not wane (although, perhaps, the U.S. assessment of whether those gains were attainable changed). The historical record shows that the United States was so interested in those gains that it expended enormous resources to try and achieve them.

Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.

Trust Problems

In contrast to the previous case, with Saddam gone, trust problems on the U.S. side were clearly mitigable until perhaps the latter years of this case’s timeframe. In the latter years, U.S. trust problems emerged in response to Iraqi reconciliation and political unification problems and there are currently questions with U.S. policymakers over whether those trust problems are mitigable.

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540 Gates 2014, 18.

Feaver in Fontaine and Lord, eds., 2012, 66.
The historical record shows that the United States had questions about Maliki’s character since before he became prime minister, which could have developed into a trust issue.\textsuperscript{541} Instead, the United States and Iraq mitigated these and other trust problems through institutions such as the 2008 SOFA and SFA. Both states carefully drafted these agreements over an extended timeframe, suggesting that they felt them to be “more than paper” and expected themselves and the other signatory to honor those agreements.\textsuperscript{542} In general, they reinforced mutual trust by honoring those agreements. However, the historical record shows that Iraqi behavior leading up to the failure of the SOFA in 2011 and after has caused several prominent U.S. policymakers to question whether Iraq would abide by its key commitments to strengthen and develop its democracy and play a constructive role in the region as generally described in the SFA. Reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side, in part, caused the failure of the 2011 SOFA and caused the United States to reevaluate its position in Iraq and how much it could trust the Iraqis to behave as “partners.” Likewise, significant Iraqi political unification problems, as evidenced by Iraq’s persistent and often violent sectarianism (which I will discuss in detail shortly), caused some U.S. policymakers to question whether the Iraqi government would continue the SFA’s path towards democracy or use the gains from U.S. cooperation to consolidate authoritarian power and undemocratically repress its own people. The Maliki government’s overtures towards Iran, motivated, in part, by sectarianism, exacerbated these potential trust problems.

\textsuperscript{541} Former Ambassador Crocker, for instance, noted that Maliki was no Mandela, but no new Saddam either. Maliki’s government was considered dysfunctional. The Bush administration considered dumping Maliki at times, as did the Obama administration, but in the end they always stuck with Maliki (see, for example, GT 2012, 431).

\textsuperscript{542} Late in the 2008 SOFA negotiations, for example, the Iraqis sent a list of 110 total amendments to be adopted. While Ambassador Crocker considered Maliki to be a “conspiracy theorist,” Maliki and his government had strongly lawyered the SOFA. Considering all of this, Crocker assessed that when Maliki was willing to put something on paper, there was a credible signal that he intended to follow through with the agreement (see GT 2012, 556).
Status of U.S. trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation until 2011, then AMBIGUOUS for the remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that the United States felt it could mitigate its trust problems with Iraq until 2011, after which time the ability to mitigate those trust problems has been questioned by prominent U.S. policymakers.\textsuperscript{543}

Reconciliation Problems

Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side were largely remedied by the removal of Saddam’s regime, although there is a heightened potential for these problems to resurface in the future in light of recent Iraqi behavior.

There was little preexisting U.S. resentment towards post-Saddam Iraq. Leading up to the war in 2003, U.S. administrations were careful to vilify Saddam, not the Iraqi people. President Bush specifically gave Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay 48 hours to leave Iraq, carefully distancing their sins from the rest of the Iraqi population. The Bush administration seemed to hold the Iraqi people in high regard to the end; those who opposed the war or occupation seemed to resent U.S. policy, not the Iraqi people.

The U.S. mission in Iraq was called “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM” and U.S. forces were sent in as “liberators.” Unlike previous wars with Germany and Japan, an official narrative did not have to be created to eradicate denigrating stereotypes and reorient identities of former adversary populations. Had Americans been treated as liberators

\textsuperscript{543} I code this as AMBIGUOUS after 2011, although an argument could be made that it was UNFAVORABLE. With Saddam at the helm, inimitable trust problems were present on the U.S. side to the extent that successive administrations pursued Iraqi regime change. In comparison, U.S. trust problems with the Maliki government exist(ed), but not nearly as severe as with Saddam’s regime, and there are still questions as to the extent to which those trust problems with Maliki can be mitigated. My coding reflects those nuances.
throughout the occupation and reconstruction period, reconciliation problems on the U.S. side likely would have remained unambiguously favorable. But this is not the case. U.S. forces were treated as occupiers and paid a deadly price during their attempts to put Iraq on a stable trajectory, due in large part to reconciliation problems and political unification problems on the Iraqi side. While U.S. forces were eventually successful at reducing violence and greatly improved Iraqi stability leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, perceived slights, such as the embarrassing failure of the SOFA in 2011, Iraqi deference to Iran, and the lack of Iraqi support for U.S. interests in Syria, have encouraged resentment amongst some Americans who are bitter about unappreciated U.S. sacrifices. This sentiment could manifest into a larger reconciliation problem if not corrected.

Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation until 2012 (circa the crisis in Syria), then AMBIGUOUS—a preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems did not exist within the U.S. administrations or their winning coalitions initially, but U.S. resentment seems to be growing in recent years.

Domestic Independent Variables on Iraq’s Side

Disinterest Problems

As with the previous case, it is implausible that Iraq was not interested in the gains that might have been made through a cooperative postwar relationship with the United States. Post-Saddam Iraq retained its preexisting economic and security problems as previously described, many of which were exacerbated by war damage and, after the war, as a result of

544 This can be observed frequently in op-eds and was recently alluded to poignantly by Secretary Kerry to Maliki as quoted previously. Also, according to Gallup, U.S. public opinion of Iraq is low and worsening, dropping from 23 percent favorable in 2010 down to 16 percent favorable on 2014 (see Saad 2014).
de-Baathification, the dissolution of the Iraqi army, and the looting and mayhem that followed. Furthermore, the Iraqis were put on a path towards democratic governance and needed support for their political consolidation. This interest in the gains that could be made through cooperation persisted throughout the timeframe of this case as seen, for example, in the explicit language of the SFA, Iraqi requests for support, Maliki’s recent threats to turn U.S. rivals (i.e., Iran) for such gains, and persistent subnational extra-legal measures to compensate for deficiencies (e.g., the Mahdi Army, which sought a wide range of support from Iran).

Status of Iraq’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist.

Trust Problems

In contrast to the previous case, trust problems on Iraq’s side were much less of a factor in this case. The removal of Saddam, a paranoid conspiracy theorist who had little capacity to trust anyone, created opportunity for institutions to help mitigate trust problems as they do for many other international endeavors. The Iraqis, especially Maliki, put a lot of stock in agreements like the SFA and SOFA to mitigate trust issues, as I previously explained. However, in more recent months, Maliki and other Iraqis have complained that the United States has stalled on its deliveries of military aid and hardware as per contractual agreements. This may indicate or result in an emerging immitigable trust problem.

One issue that must be analyzed carefully is the general effect of the Obama administration on Iraqi trust. Iraqi leaders such as Maliki grew accustomed to significant
personal U.S. presidential involvement during the Bush era. Bush visited Iraq frequently, had weekly conversations with Maliki, and took measures to protect Maliki from those who militated for his ouster. Bush personally worked with Maliki on the U.S. troop surge and the 2008 SOFA and SFA. At one point, Bush vetoed a U.S. bill that could have resulted in claims against the current Iraqi government for Saddam-era injustices, something that greatly concerned Maliki. This action “reflected the strength of Bush’s commitment to Iraq, even if it meant political costs at home.”\textsuperscript{545} The Obama administration set quite a different tone with the Iraqis—Iraq was the “bad” war and Democrats made several attempts to remove U.S. troops from Iraq faster, regardless of the situation on the ground.\textsuperscript{546} As a Senator, Obama introduced a bill that would remove American combat brigades by March 2008 and, as a candidate, Obama proposed a withdrawal plan that was time-based, not conditions-based—that is, the United States would withdraw, whether or not its security commitments to Iraq were fulfilled.\textsuperscript{547} As Obama took office, the personal presidential attention, to which Maliki was accustomed, waned. Obama had only two secure videoconferences with Maliki in 2011—quite a departure from the weekly conversations Maliki had with the previous U.S. president.\textsuperscript{548} This likely raised Iraqi concerns over a possible change in U.S. commitment to their security as seen, for example, by Maliki’s expressions of concern that the U.S. was withdrawing too fast and creating space for Al Qaeda. While this change in atmosphere between administrations may have created a substantial trust problem in other settings, here it did not. The reason is that many Iraqis wanted U.S. forces to leave, torn between that and the

\textsuperscript{545} See, for example, GT 2012, 295, 455-458.

\textsuperscript{546} See Gates 2014, 223, referencing events in 2007 specifically.

\textsuperscript{547} GT 2012, 331.

\textsuperscript{548} GT 2012, 670.
danger it posed. Overtures for withdrawal were welcomed, and many Iraqis ignored the implications that these overtures had for the credibility of U.S. commitments and Iraqi security. Aside from this issue of the U.S. withdrawal, the Obama administration essentially followed the path agreed to by Bush in the 2008 SFA, thereby honoring those U.S. commitments and encouraging trust.  

Status of Iraqi trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems did not exist within the Iraqi leadership or its winning coalition, although very recent concerns over the delivery of military aid and hardware could reflect, or result in, an immitigable trust issue.

Reconciliation Problems

In this case, as with my previous case, reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side were a substantial source of credible commitment problems. The removal of Saddam remedied his reconciliation problems, but many others remained threaded throughout several segments of Iraqi society. The war and postwar occupation only exacerbated these reconciliation problems.

As I explained in the previous case, reconciliation problems amongst various segments of Iraqi society predated the war. Arab opinion of the West was generally and persistently low to begin with. The Baathists considered the United States an enemy. Many Shiites

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549 Gates 2014, 297.

550 See, for example: Lynch 2013; Hal Brands 2008 (246), who explains that globalization has led to internet pornography and U.S. movies being piped into homes of devout Muslims in the Middle East, challenging their values and norms and “provoking a sharp reaction from jihadist groups;” Jamal in Lust 2011 (208-209) on how “U.S. support for oppressive and authoritarian regimes” has fueled resentment and bolstered Islamist
strongly resented that, in their mind, the United States had betrayed them, encouraging their revolt against Saddam in 1991 and then refusing to help when Saddam horrifically repressed them.\textsuperscript{551} Saddam shaped Iraqi opinion against Americans for decades and Iraqis, in general, resented the years of suffering under sanctions. The Iraqis who least had reconciliation problems with the United States were perhaps the Kurds and Iraqi exiles, longstanding U.S. partners against Saddam, but they comprised only 20 percent of the Iraqi population.

“In general, the war resulted in a marked upswing in anti-U.S. opinion in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{552} More specifically, the war exacerbated problems with Sunnis who became angry over being displaced from their position of primacy and, importantly, resented the Americans for being the agent of that change.\textsuperscript{553}

Events after the war only added to and exacerbated Iraqi reconciliation problems. Americans were soon seen as unjust occupiers, not liberators as had been promised, and large segments of Iraqi society were all too willing to demonstrate their associated resentment in lethal ways.\textsuperscript{554} The delays in the transfer of sovereignty only aggravated their animosity.\textsuperscript{555}

\textsuperscript{551} Secretary Gates, for instance, assessed that the Shiites would never forgive Americans “for not coming to their assistance after they thought we had encouraged them to take up arms” (Gates 2014, 26).

\textsuperscript{552} “The war produced a strong anti-U.S. reaction in the region” and “the Arab league termed the attack ‘illegitimate’” with its Secretary calling the event “a sad day for all Arabs” (quoted in Brands 2008, 319). See also Jamal and Lynch in Lust 2011.

\textsuperscript{553} GT 2012, 13, 37.

\textsuperscript{554} “For many Iraqis, [Americans] would always be seen as invaders and occupiers, not as liberators” (Gates 2014, 62, 238; see also GT 2012, 663). “The occupation was a barrier to cooperation. In fact, it encouraged active opposition” (Feith 2008, 498). Iraqis thought they had been “liberated,” not defeated. They therefore felt that they should not be occupied and saw the occupation as illegitimate (see Edelstein 2008, 136-37, 163, for the ill effects of this scenario). See also the testimony of Dr. Steven Kull before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, July 23, 2008, in
The de-Baathification process was “poisonous” and was conducted in excess by some opportunistic Iraqis, nonetheless tarnishing the Americans who had initiated the process.\footnote{See Byman 2008, 629.} The CPAs’ dissolution of the Iraqi army, national police, and 125,000 public sector workers adversely affected (by loss of salary at the least) six to ten million of Iraq’s estimated twenty-six million citizens (that is, according to Iraqi estimates, roughly 20-40 percent of the population) and was seen as a blow to Iraqi national pride.\footnote{See, for example, GT 2012, 136, and Byman 2008, 634.} Humiliation at the hands of U.S. contractors and perceived injustices at Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere further fueled resentment in an Iraqi population that was primed for decades to see the worst in their American occupiers and equate the inevitable bad behavior of a few to that of many.\footnote{Davis in Lust 2011, 453; see also GT 2006, 585 and Byman 2008, 625-626. One reporter found that disgruntled military officers “were the ‘backbone’ of the insurgency,” expressing their resentment in very visceral ways (Byman 2008, 626).}

These reconciliation problems were evident in the persistent attacks that some Iraqis conducted against Americans throughout the occupation and by the support that the attackers received from large portions of the Iraqi population to do so. As another example, when the time came to renew the SOFA in 2011, Iraqi leaders were hesitant about such an
agreement. Why? Iraq was supposedly on the path to democracy and cooperating with the Americans on the SOFA could cost votes and jeopardize political survival. Why? Because Americans were resented amongst significant portions of the Iraqi population and opponents could politicize the issue of cooperation with Americans to successfully attack Iraqi politicians.

In sum, many Iraqis lacked a healthy sense of shame, guilt, or shared responsibility for the war for many reasons. Many Iraqis felt the war was unjust and felt unjustly treated before, during, and after the war. This fomented a formidable reconciliation problem within many segments of Iraqi society and this was demonstrated unequivocally.

Status of Iraqi reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that severe reconciliation problems existed within significant segments of Iraqi society, including Maliki’s winning coalition and perhaps Maliki himself.

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559 This was also a problem during the 2008 SOFA negotiations. For instance, Maliki recognized that the 2008 SOFA for continued U.S. military presence and a long-term relationship with the United States were in Iraq’s best interest. “In fact, all the key Iraqi leaders wanted the agreements; it was just that no one wanted to be the first to say so publicly” (Gates 2014, 237).

560 Maliki, for instance, had to consider the Sadrists of his fledgling democracy who consistently and persistently machinated against cooperation with the Americans (see, for example, GT 2012, 296, 662).

561 One could argue that the less multilateral nature of this war, the prominent international objection to the war, the lack of UN Security Council resolution to authorize the war, the preemptive policy for the war, and the lack of WMD stockpiles found after the war all contributed to a sense if illegitimacy of the war and injustice as a byproduct of the war (see Byman 2008, 624, and Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 183). Regarding WMD, Feith states that, “the Iraq Survey Group found that [Saddam] intended to reinvigorate his efforts to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and long-range missiles after [UN economic] sanctions were removed—and had taken pains to preserve Iraq’s ability to do so” (2008, 223). Feith argues that, while the Iraqi Survey Group did not find WMD stockpiles, Saddam had the “intention and capability to produce biological and chemical weapons,” (2008, 227, see also 471). Regardless, a popular (if not misleading) narrative, often used by Bush’s opponents, was that the lack of WMD stockpiles made the war illegitimate (see, for example, Feith 2008, 474). It is not within the scope of this paper to assess the war’s legitimacy based on WMD status. The importance of the WMD issue here is that it may have contributed to an Iraqi sense of injustice and therefore exacerbated Iraqi reconciliation problems.
State Capacity Problems

Iraq’s material capacity after the war was limited, but sufficient to meet the strategic cooperation obligations that the United States required. After the war, the United States, rich in resources, expected little materially from the Iraqi side other than cooperation and permission to help stabilize the country. The initial U.S.-administered government was followed with U.S. advisors that were imbedded up through the ministries. The United States, essentially, provided a bulk of Iraqi state capacity and, counterfactually, would likely have continued to do so if the 2011 SOFA had been accepted, considering all that the United States stood to gain from Iraqi strategic cooperation.

Status of Iraqi state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq did not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. perspective.

Political Unification Problems

“My friend, here is something you need to understand about Iraq. We say ‘me against my brother...me and my brother against our cousin...my family against your family.’ This is our way.”—General Muhammad, 2010, assassinated in April 2011

The substantial political unification problems that I described in my last case persisted and were exacerbated in this case. There is strong evidence that significant portions of the Iraqi population did not identify with their government and considered non-governmental violence to be legitimate. Influential domestic actors capitalized on this dynamic and mounted a credible resistance to strategic cooperation.
The quote above is my best recollection of a lesson an Iraqi general taught me in Baghdad when I was an American advisor to the Iraqi military. It was his prediction of events to come—as soon as we Americans left, Iraqi brother would earnestly get back to the business of killing Iraqi brother. From my perspective, Muhammad’s insight of the hyper-ingrained sectarianism that dominates Iraq, at the expense of Iraqi political unification, has been revalidated by the resurgence of Iraqi sectarian violence in recent years since the U.S. withdrawal. Some see little hope for improvement. According to SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, it might be possible for the various Shiite militias to reconcile, but they would “never reconcile with the Saddamists” who were “killing us for the last thirty-five years, and now we are paying them back.”

The staunch political unification problems that I discussed in the previous case predated the Iraq War and were exacerbated during and after the war. As Ambassador Crocker explained, after thirty-five years of Saddam, Iraq’s people had been reduced to their fears—“they were sectarian” and this “cycle of fear” would take a long time to break. While the United States tried to establish a plural government, Sadr, Zarqawi, and other influential domestic actors militated along sectarian lines. They politicized and conducted violence against cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi Government. Further, some U.S. choices exacerbated Iraq’s political unification problems. The IGC, for instance, was

562 Violent sectarianism is a symptom of an extreme political unification problem. It shows that residents do not identify with their government, and shows that the government does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Violent sectarianism also perpetuates and exacerbates political unification problems, strongly encouraging residents to honor their sectarian, rather than national, identities.


564 See, for example, the previous case, Edelstein 2008, 162, and Byman 2008, 608 and 611.

565 Gates 2014, 74.
“structured along explicitly sectarian lines” and “sent a message to all Iraq’s major political actors and organizations that sectarian-based politics was the new order of the day.”\footnote{Davis in Lust 2011, 452.} Eric Davis argues that the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, which was ethnically integrated, exacerbated sectarianism.\footnote{Davis in Lust 2011, 453.} De-Baathification hurt political unification as well—with the old construct gone and the current construct in turmoil due to loss of Baathist technocrats and rampant insecurity, Iraqis fell back on two things: “the mosque and their family, which was the clan, the tribe.”\footnote{Colonel Derek Harvey, U.S. intelligence, quoted in GT 2012, 37.}

The new Iraqi government exacerbated sectarianism as well. Shortly after the war, the United States was focused on fighting the insurgency and inadvertently enabled a sectarian government that encouraged Iraqis to “take refuge in their sectarian and ethic identities.”\footnote{GT 2012, 356.} Iraqi politicians as a whole were considered “parochial rather than nationalist” by some U.S. intelligence officials and used de-Baathification for personal gain.\footnote{GT 2012, 269. As Crocker observed, “there is no Nelson Mandela because Saddam killed them all” (Gates 2014, 74). According to Secretary of State Powell, some Iraqi officials hijacked de-Baathification to “purge a vast number of officials,” alarming Sunnis (GT 2012, 270).}

Iraqi politicians as a whole were considered “parochial rather than nationalist” by some U.S. intelligence officials and used de-Baathification for personal gain.\footnote{GT 2012, 269. As Crocker observed, “there is no Nelson Mandela because Saddam killed them all” (Gates 2014, 74). According to Secretary of State Powell, some Iraqi officials hijacked de-Baathification to “purge a vast number of officials,” alarming Sunnis (GT 2012, 270).} The historical record is rife with examples of the Jaafari and Maliki governments stoking sectarianism with bias in favor of Shiite concerns. Maliki did counter this perception temporarily with his “Charge of the Knights” into Basra, but Maliki’s sectarian stance resurfaced. In 2008, while negotiating the SOFA, an Iraqi Special Forces unit went after a Sunni political opponent of Maliki’s government and Iraqi troops initiated a standoff with Kurdish Peshmerga, raising renewed fears of sectarianism and accusations of “dictatorial tendencies” against Maliki from Kurd
leaders. Maliki’s behavior was not unnoticed by the Sunnis either, many of whom felt the government was sectarian and “out to crush them.”571 Approaching the U.S. withdrawal and after, Maliki’s alarming behavior (e.g., the tanks parked near the residences of Sunni political opponents) further encouraged sectarianism. Maliki’s behavior was not lost on U.S. officials who have recently expressed concern about the ramifications of supporting a sectarian Maliki government.

The Iraqi people also played a role in exacerbating sectarianism. Many of them submitted to it and conducted or supported violence on its behalf. The January 2005 election results were largely along sectarian lines, showing that few thought outside sectarian frames. In 2008, Cooley wrote that “the Iraqi party system remains politically fragmented and was founded along ethnic and sectarian lines.”572 The horrific sectarian violence leading up to 2008 was conducted by masses of Iraqis in militias and insurgent groups and, even though it temporarily subsided, it has strongly resurfaced in the years after the U.S. withdrawal.

An important ingredient for political unification is that the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which was not the situation in Iraq where non-governmental violence was considered legitimate by substantial portions of the population. Coupled with deep sectarianism, the result was bloody. No sectarian group wanted another group to get too powerful. Any policy that favored one group over the other met with extremely violent, publicly-sanctioned opposition.573 These conditions also created opportunity for influential actors to credibly resist Iraqi cooperation with the United States.

571 GT 2012, 289, 546-547.
572 Cooley 2008, 269.
573 Edelstein 2008, 163.
The credible insurgency is one example—many Iraqi Sunnis strongly feared a sectarian Shiite government, especially one with ties to Iran, and violently resisted U.S.-Iraqi cooperation that might strengthen that Iraqi government. Sadr and his followers wanted U.S. forces to leave. Sadr commanded his sectarian forces to resist, and that resistance was formidable. Sistani also held much more sway than the government over many Shiites. With one fatwa, these religious figures could incite and sanction non-governmental violence or, conversely, suppress much of that violence.

In sum, significant portions of the Iraqi people did not identify with their Baghdad government. Iraq’s government did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and Iraq’s influential domestic actors used these circumstances to mount credible resistance to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation.

Status of Iraqi political unification problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq had severe political unification problems and influential domestic actors mounted a credible resistance to cooperation.

**Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States and Iraq**

The historical record shows a moderate postwar cooperative ambition between the United States and Iraq as compared to other postwar scenarios. Unlike some other scenarios (e.g., the United States and East Germany or Vietnam), the two states were able to come to an

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574 “In the summer of 2004, more than 1,000 IEDs exploded in Sadr City alone, and another 1,200 were dug up” (Gates 2014, 121). This level of organized non-governmental violence does not happen without the support of the population, who would be at risk too if they did not know where the IEDs were located.
agreement to generally cooperate in a variety of areas, including regional security, economics, and politics, as evident with the SFA. Substantial weapons purchases (e.g., capable fighters and attack helicopters) and economic ventures (e.g., oil exploration) have been agreed upon. However, unlike some more ambitious scenarios (e.g., the United States and Germany or Japan after World War II), there is no agreement for a formal alliance or continued presence of U.S. forces—the relationship has not yet been envisioned as a deep security partnership like the one built to take on the Soviet threat. It was not envisioned to be a deep economic partnership that would help rebuild the region (i.e., like with Germany and its coal after WWII). It was, however, envisioned to be politically deep through cooperation in democratization (and, thereby, alignment with West) and regional stability. The SFA specifies an open-ended “long-term” cooperative relationship between the states, testifying to its high ambition of cooperative endurance.

The realization of the depth of cooperation has fallen short of these moderate goals. In the realm of security cooperation, the states have had difficulties simply cooperating to address problems with Iraq’s domestic violence, with the Jaafari and Maliki governments interfering with U.S. security efforts and behaving in biased, sectarian ways during and after the occupation. The states were not able to cooperate effectively and come to an accord on the 2011 SOFA, something that exacerbated the security problem in Iraq and, perhaps, neighboring lands as well. As Maliki now attempts to quell the sectarian violence that he, in part, bears responsibility for, the two states find it difficult to cooperate on deliveries of military aid and hardware. In the realm of political cooperation, the two states have found themselves in conflict on vital issues. They are on opposite sides of a war between Assad and the Syrian rebels. Iraq has accommodated Iranian overflights to arm Assad, despite
strenuous U.S. objections, and has turned to Iran for arms in violation of UN sanctions, alarming U.S. policymakers over Iraq’s possible alignment with Iran, a U.S. enemy. Also, Maliki’s authoritarian centralization of power and his general backsliding on democracy have been a concern for many. A moderate level of cooperation has yet to be achieved, let alone endure. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan sum up the relationship’s qualities of cooperation harshly: Iraq “is not a partner of the United States on any of the key issues in the region: from its evasion of economic sanctions on Iran to its support for the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, Iraq stands in Tehran’s camp, not Washington’s.”

Assessment of the qualities of cooperation: UNCOOPERATIVE—the relationship had moderate ambition for postwar cooperation, but has failed to realize many of its ambitions. The relationship was often uncooperative. Further, there is substantial concern that the existing cooperative relationship, such that it is, has failed or is failing.

Analysis

This case had unfavorable independent variables at the domestic level throughout its timeframe. There were substantial reconciliation and political unification problems on the Iraqi side which, aside from their direct effects, interactively spurred issues with other sources of credible commitment problems. For each of these problems at the domestic level,

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575 Ottaway assesses that Maliki “has been unresponsive to U.S. pressure to thwart weapon transfers from Iran to the Assad regime through its airspace” (2013, 6).

576 A recent bipartisan letter from the Senate to President Obama specifically lamented Maliki’s sectarian agenda and Iran’s use of Iraqi airspace to arm Assad. These and other Iraqi actions hurt the ability of the United States to build support “to enhance [their] strategic partnership” (Letter from the U.S. Senate to President Barack Obama, October 29, 2013, signed by Senators Levin, McCain, and others).

my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation, and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment.

The removal of Saddam remedied several international and domestic sources of credible commitment problems. However, preexisting reconciliation and political unification problems on the Iraqi side were not remedied. Worse, they were exacerbated by the war and postwar events.

Iraqi political unification problems were most evident by Iraq’s violent sectarianism and played both a direct and interactive role against cooperation between the United States and Iraq. In a direct role, Iraq’s political unification problems enabled actors like Sadr and Zarqawi to mount a credible resistance to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation for various reasons, such as resentment, nationalism, and opportunism, and to do so with the support of significant portions of the population. In an interactive role, political unification problems may be creating problems with other international conditions—the United States does not want to be seen as helping a sectarian government oppress its people and violent sectarianism has caused Maliki to go to Iran for support, raising questions of Iraqi alignment and reducing U.S. willingness to cooperate. Political unification problems contributed to a difficult U.S. occupation and, thereby, increased reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side.\textsuperscript{578} Iraq’s sectarianism may be creating trust problems on the U.S. side—U.S. policymakers have recently questioned whether Iraq will abide by its commitment towards democracy or backslide and whether Iraq will maintain a Western alignment or join Iran’s camp. Finally, Iraq’s political unification problems may be creating a reconciliation problem on the U.S.

\textsuperscript{578} See Edelstein 2008, 155.
side—Maliki’s sectarian gravitation towards Iran has been seen as a slap in the face by some Americans and resentment on the U.S. side could build and make cooperation tougher.\textsuperscript{579}

Likewise, Iraq’s reconciliation problems played both a direct and interactive role against cooperation between the United States and Iraq. In a direct role, reconciliation problems caused some Iraqis to resist occupation, making the occupation more difficult and, thereby, reinforcing those reconciliation problems and fomenting new ones. Reconciliation problems amongst Iraqi policymakers and their constituents caused Iraq to hesitate on the 2011 SOFA agreement, directly limiting U.S. ability to cooperate on important security efforts. In an interactive role, the failed SOFA agreement has given Maliki more cause to gravitate toward Iran, potentially creating problems with other international conditions over Iraq’s alignment and, in turn, potentially creating trust problems on the U.S. side over whether Iraq will abide by the cooperative platitudes in the SFA. The failed SOFA also signaled Iraqi reconciliation problems to the U.S. side which highlighted, amongst other things, the possibility of revenge prosecutions against U.S. troops and militated against U.S. trust.

\textbf{Assessing Alternate Theories}

The alternate theory that Iran was too powerful and drove events in Iraq as either a spoiler or competitor has been dispelled in my previous analysis. Iraqi gravitation towards Iran was a matter of Iraqi choice (due, in part, to Iraqi political unification problems—sectarianism on behalf of a biased Shiite government—and reconciliation problems), not Iranian force or a better Iranian offer. The United States and Iraq demonstrated the ability to sideline Iran when they wanted to.

\textsuperscript{579} See the “Letter from the U.S. Senate to President Barack Obama,” October 29, 2013, signed by Senators Levin, McCain, and others.
The alternate theory that a common external threat promotes cooperation would fail to explain why Iraqi Sunnis and the Americans did not cooperate earlier and more enduringly against the Iranians after the war, although the theory is supported by the reduced cooperation between the United States and the sectarian Maliki government, which is courting Iran rather than treating it as a common enemy.\textsuperscript{580} The theory that an internal threat would spur cooperation fails to explain why the Maliki government did not advocate more strongly for U.S. presence during the 2011 SOFA negotiations or court U.S. favor more strongly (e.g., by clearing up alignment questions and cooperating with the United States on its Syria policy) to gain support against the substantial internal threat that has resurfaced in recent years.

A final alternate theory that I will address is that the low postwar cooperation between the United States and Iraq was because the U.S. public (and/or the Obama administration) simply “wanted out of Iraq.” This theory is incomplete and ignores the important role that Iraqis played in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. It is evident that the initial American support for the war to “liberate” Iraq waned as the occupation progressed to the point where, in 2008, Americans elected a president that promised to extricate them from Iraq.\textsuperscript{581} However, just because some Americans wanted U.S. troops out of Iraq did not mean that those Americans did not want the United States to cooperate with Iraq as partners. Additionally, while this sentiment may have been strong in some circles, it was not overwhelming—many prominent policymakers, including President Obama, saw the wisdom in keeping U.S. troops in Iraq and pursued the 2011 SOFA to enable troops to remain. Lastly, to the extent that this

\textsuperscript{580} Edelstein argues that “the Iraqi population, divided amongst itself, did not perceive an external threat greater than the occupying power itself” (2008, 159).

\textsuperscript{581} See, for example, Reynolds 2011, 6.
sentiment grew strong enough to discourage U.S. cooperation, one must ask why. Important factors in this were Iraqi political unification and reconciliation problems, which contributed to a difficult and costly occupation for the Americans. Christopher Gelpi et al. (2009) find that the American public’s most important consideration for whether it will support military force is whether there is an expectation of success, even if the cost is great. As the occupation progressed and Iraqi resistance mounted, the American public’s expectation for success quickly declined and support predictably waned. Thus, Iraqi credible commitment problems were a strong contributor to the “get-us-out-of-Iraq” sentiment.

Summary of Findings

Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003 supports my theory. This case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation at the domestic level. My theory, in this situation, predicts lower qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “uncooperative” postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and Iraq is consistent with this prediction, unlike the alternate theories I discussed regarding the roles of external and internal threats. Also, while Iran militated against U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and some Americans wanted U.S. troops out of Iraq, the strength of these confounders against cooperation was driven by Iraqi choices—by Iraqi political unification and reconciliation problems that caused some Iraqis to violently resist American presence and gravitate towards Iran. Regardless of the status of those actors or threats, the sources of credible commitment problems that I have identified must be resolved to achieve higher qualities of cooperation.

More specifically, my finding of the unfavorable reconciliation problems in the Iraqi side causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 2. My finding of the unfavorable political unification problems on the Iraqi side causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 4.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
With Brief Case Studies of Serbia and an Iraq 2003 Counterfactual

I have presented a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation that focuses on the influence of credible commitment problems to explain variation in strategic cooperation outcomes. I chose to focus on U.S. postwar scenarios in hopes that explaining the variation in strategic cooperation outcomes between the United States and its former adversaries would help policymakers to better assess the costs, benefits, and risks of this postwar strategy choice and thereby, ideally, reduce loss and suffering in the future for all parties. I also hope to spark academic interest in this important national policy topic.

I argued that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels. A state’s government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation. From my theory, I identified three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. I argued that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary. In these contexts, if former adversary leaders or
their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems with the United States, the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer. If those leaders and their winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the United States, then the relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the presence of political unification problems within the former adversary state. Where political unification is higher, the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher. Where political unification is lower and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States (likely the case), the qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower.

Findings

I tested four hypotheses in a restricted universe of cases to explore the validity of my theory. Hypothesis 1 focused on the international level and stated that an increase in credible commitment problems at the international level (from spoilers, competitors, or otherwise) would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. My case analyses support Hypothesis 1. In the case of the United States and Germany after World War II, where international (and domestic) conditions were favorable (i.e., West Germany and reunified Germany), qualities of cooperation were high. Conversely, where international conditions were unfavorable (i.e., East Germany before reunification due to a spoiler or Iraq 1991 due to other international conditions), qualities of cooperation were low. Hypothesis 2 focused at the domestic level and stated that an increase in disinterest, trust, or reconciliation problems within a state’s leadership or its winning coalition would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. My case analyses support Hypothesis 2. In the case of the United States and Germany after World War II, where all domestic (and international) variables (including those listed in Hypothesis 2) were favorable (i.e., West
Germany and reunified Germany), qualities of cooperation were high. Conversely, where reconciliation problems were unfavorable (e.g., Iraq 1991, although several other variables were also unfavorable; and Iraq 2003, although political unification problems were also unfavorable), qualities of cooperation were low. Hypothesis 3 focused at the domestic level and stated that *an increase in state capacity problems would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation*. My case analyses were unable to assess Hypothesis 3. While the German case, in which all variables (including state capacity) were favorable, had a high quality of cooperation, there were no cases where state capacity was unfavorable to assess its supposed negative effects. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 focused at the domestic level and stated that *an increase in political unification problems, when influential domestic actor(s) resist cooperation, would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation*. My case analyses support Hypothesis 4. In the case of the United States and Germany after World War II, where all domestic (and international) variables (including political unification) were favorable (i.e., West Germany and reunified Germany), qualities of cooperation were high. Conversely, where political unification problems were unfavorable (e.g., Iraq 1991, although several other variables were also unfavorable, and Iraq 2003, although reconciliation problems were also unfavorable), qualities of cooperation were low.

Altogether, the case support for my hypotheses affirms my theoretical argument that international and domestic conditions both matter to qualities of cooperation and, in turn, to strategic cooperation outcomes. Problems at either or both levels can have a substantial negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Problems at the international level alone were shown to have a substantial negative effect in the German case, in which
qualities of cooperation were low because just spoiler problems were unfavorable (i.e., East Germany) and high when all variables at the international and domestic levels were favorable (i.e., West Germany). Problems at the domestic level alone were shown to have a substantial negative effect in the Iraq 2003 case, in which qualities of cooperation were low because reconciliation and political unification problems were unfavorable and, in turn, were the root causes of problems in other areas. Problems at both the international and domestic levels were shown to have a negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation in the Iraq 1991 case.

The cases also demonstrated the power of several of the specific variables that I identified in my theory. At the international level, the power of spoilers was demonstrated in the (East) German case and the power of other international conditions, such as competing alliances and untenable political situations (e.g., due to empowering a pariah or a repressive government), was demonstrated in the Iraq 1991 case. In no case was the power of competitors demonstrated. At the domestic level, the power of immitigable independent trust problems was demonstrated in the Iraq 1991 case and the power of reconciliation and political unification problems was demonstrated best in the Iraq 2003 case. In no case was the power of disinterest or state capacity problems demonstrated.

What about the effects of my primary domestic variables of interest—political unification problems and reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side—as demonstrated independent of each other? While I was able to demonstrate their effects in tandem in the Iraq 2003 case, it would be useful to witness the strength of these primary variables of interest without the confounding influence of the other. I pause here to conduct two brief applications of my theory in hopes to demonstrate those effects. With my restricted universe
of cases, the best I can do to demonstrate the independent effect of reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side is to analyze the relationship of the United States and Serbia after the War for Kosovo. The best I can do to demonstrate the independent effect of political unification problems is to counterfactually analyze the relationship of the United States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003, having counterfactually assumed that the status of reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side was favorable.

The Serbian Case

A brief application of my theoretical framework to the relationship between the United States and Serbia after the War for Kosovo helps to illuminate the effect of reconciliation problems independent of political unification problems. Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic from 1989 to 2000, committed several atrocities after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. In 1999, the United States, acting as a member of NATO, attacked Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Shortly after the war, the war criminal Milosevic was voted out of power and turned over to war crimes tribunals. Yet, unlike many of its neighbors, Serbia has eschewed opportunities for deeper cooperation with the United States in the postwar period. A primary reason for this is reconciliation problems on the Serbian side.

A Brief History

In the decades leading up to the war, Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, although it had long historical ties to Russia and utilized Russian military hardware. The Serbian republic within Yugoslavia, in particular, gravitated towards Russia, its Slavic relative. As the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990’s, and without the late strongman Josip Broz Tito at the helm to repress factious nationalism throughout Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia broke apart with Slovenia and Croatia, and later others, declaring their independence in 1991. Serbia was soon identified by both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations as an aggressor in the region that was trying to victimize the other former-Yugoslav republics in pursuit Milosevic’s expansionist “Greater Serbia” policy.\footnote{For this paragraph see Brands 2008, 89, Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 54, Konitzer 2011, and Gates 2014, 157.}

Years of conflict between the West and Serbia followed, which included attempts to curb Serbian aggression through resolutions, sanctions, and embargos. Regardless, Serbia pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing and committed several atrocities in Bosnia and elsewhere. In 1995 alone, Serb forces shelled Sarajevo, took 350 UN peacekeepers hostage, and committed the infamous Srebrenica massacre which the West suspected to have been tacitly supported by Milosevic and his Army of Republika Srpska. This elicited a substantial military response from the United States through NATO in the form of sustained air strikes.\footnote{See Brands 2008, 176-177.}

Kosovo was a semi-autonomous region of the Serbian republic with a population that was roughly 90 percent ethnic Albanian Muslim and 10 percent ethnic Serb Orthodox. Serbia and Kosovo were in conflict over how much autonomy Kosovo would have. Serbia demanded territorial integrity and feared for the safety of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. Milosevic “treated the province as a conquered territory,” attempting to “Serbianize” Kosovo by “replacing Albanian officeholders with Serbs and stationing 60,000 police and soldiers in the province.”\footnote{Brands 2008, 209.} Many from the Albanian majority increasingly felt that independence from Serbia was the only solution to Serb oppression. By the mid-1990s, the Kosovo Liberation

\footnote{Brands 2008, 209.}
Army (KLA) was in sporadic conflict with Serbian security forces. The U.S. State Department sums up the subsequent history succinctly:

“In late 1998, Milosevic unleashed a brutal police and military campaign against the KLA, which included widespread atrocities against civilians. As Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign progressed, over 800,000 ethnic Albanians were forced from their homes in Kosovo. Intense international mediation efforts led to the Rambouillet Accords, which called for Kosovo autonomy and the insertion of NATO troops to preserve the peace. Milosevic's failure to agree to the Rambouillet Accords triggered a NATO military campaign to halt the violence in Kosovo. This campaign consisted primarily of aerial bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.), including Belgrade, and continued from March through June 1999. After 78 days, Milosevic capitulated. Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), which suspended Belgrade's governance over Kosovo, established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and authorized a NATO peacekeeping force. Resolution 1244 also envisioned a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status.

As ethnic Albanians returned to their homes, elements of the KLA conducted reprisal killings and abductions of ethnic Serbs and Roma in Kosovo. Thousands of ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities fled from their homes during the latter half of 1999, and many remain displaced.”

The postwar relationship between the United States and Serbia has been precarious, often undermined by events in Kosovo. Milosevic was voted out of power in 2000 and was delivered to The Hague where he defiantly faced a war crimes tribunal, but died in 2006 before verdicts were reached. U.S. diplomatic presence was reestablished in Belgrade in 2000 and the United States lifted its sanctions on Serbia in 2001. However, violence against Serbs in Kosovo continued and, in 2004, a flare-up resulted in deaths, displacements, and the torching of Serbian monasteries and churches to the alarm and protest of Serbians and others. Notably, nationalist Albanians had also attacked “symbols of the UNMIK


presence, including the UN’s iconic white vehicles,” in their frustration over the lack of progress towards self-determination. By 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. Kosovo’s independence was recognized by the United States and, eventually, by more than 100 other countries with the notable exception of Serbia, which summarily rejected Kosovo’s independence. In response, Serbia withdrew its Ambassador to the United States in protest for several months in 2008 and Serb protestors attacked the American Embassy in Belgrade.

Normalization between Serbia and the West has been slow. Serbia had long pursued EU accession as a matter of economic survival, but the EU (with U.S. support) made it clear that the Kosovo issue must be resolved before accession. In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo finally reached an initial agreement on normalization and in early 2014, almost a full generation after the War for Kosovo, the EU opened accession talks with Serbia. While Serbia has been a member of NATO’s Partners for Peace program since 2006, Serbia has kept its distance and refrained from joining the Alliance, unlike many of its surrounding neighbors.

Measurement of the Variables

At the international level, Russia stood out as a potential spoiler and competitor. Russia considered Serbia to be its “turf” and, reciprocally, felt a connection to Serbian Slavs—it certainly had the willingness to undermine cooperation between Serbia and the United States

588 Edelstein 2008, 146.
589 See Finn and Wright 2008.
in both capacities. However, its opportunity to do so was less clear. Russia’s capacity to spoil was limited by its decline in power and by the geographic position of Serbia. While Russia had a limited number of military forces in the area to help with peacekeeping operations, forces that were sufficient to seize Pristina airport for a time as Kosovo was being occupied by NATO peacekeeping forces, Russian power was not sufficient to credibly spoil strategic cooperation should the United States and Serbia have desired to cooperate. There is evidence of an exclusive competitive offer from Russia. Russia adamantly opposed the NATO action against Serbia, precluded a UN Security Council authorization for war, and was a strong advocate for Serbian territorial integrity. Russia eventually made it clear to Serbia that Russia’s continued support for Serbian retention of Kosovo was contingent upon Serbia staying out of NATO. While Russia could not rival the United States by offering better security or economic benefits to Serbia on an exclusive basis, it was prepared to offer Serbia something that the United States refused to offer—support to retain sovereignty over Kosovo. Thus, the strength of the competitive Russian offer depended on what Serbia valued most—improved economics and security or nominal sovereignty over Kosovo (NATO made it clear with its continued presence of peacekeepers that Serbia would never again have a free hand in Kosovo). That said, Andrew Konitzer argues that Serbian political actors have been

592 See, for example, Brands 2008, 121, 177.

593 Serbia, unlike Georgia (invaded by neighboring Russia in 2008) and the Crimea (overtaken by neighboring Russia in 2014), was dislocated from Russia and, by 2004, was surrounded by NATO members, including Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

594 See, for example, Gates 2014, 159 and Edelstein 2008, 149. Also, in early 2008, Russia called potential Kosovo independence “a violation of international law” (Gates 2014, 167).

595 “Russia’s Ambassador to Serbia, Alexander Konuzin, bluntly warned that Serbia could not have both NATO and Kosovo and the Russian Ambassador to NATO stated that if Serbia joined NATO, Russia would reconsider its stance on Kosovo” (Konitzer 2011, 115-116, referencing a statement made by Konuzin on November 6, 2009).
able to court both the West (EU) and Russia, “simultaneously acquiring the benefits of relations with both while avoiding serious costs in terms of broken ties.” It would therefore seem that Serbia, to an extent, found ways to mitigate other potential problems stemming from competitors.

Other international conditions were also a factor. Most importantly was the issue of Milosevic, a pariah and war criminal in Western (but not necessarily Serbian) eyes. Cooperation with such a type would have created an untenable political situation for the United States and strengthening him and those who advocated his policies through cooperation would have posed a threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. When Serbians voted Milosevic out of power in 2000 and submitted him to The Hague, they went a long way to remedy this barrier to cooperation. However, Serbian nationalism and sentiment for a “Greater Serbia” persisted in the population, as seen by Serbia’s enduring resistance to normalize relations with Kosovo. Only very recently has this barrier to EU accession—accession that the United States supports and that would foster greater cooperation with the West—begun to truly be addressed by Serbians.

Overall, I assess the status of these international variables as follows: Spoiler problems were FAVORABLE; Competitor problems were AMBIGUOUS; and Other International Conditions were AMBIGUOUS (after 2000) for cooperation (until, perhaps, very recently).

At the domestic level on the U.S. side, disinterest was not a problem. For example, the United States pursued cooperative relationships and, in some cases, military basing arrangements, with several of Serbia’s immediate neighbors to support its global efforts

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596 Konitzer 2011, 105.
against terrorism. Gains from a cooperative relationship with Serbia could have helped in those efforts as well. Trust problems existed, but were mitigated through institutions that were generally respected by both sides (e.g., the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or “ICTY,” and the EU) and tit-for-tat strategies (e.g., if Serbia normalized relations with Kosovo, the United States would support deeper Western cooperation) once Milosevic was ousted.597 Reconciliation problems were tied to Milosevic and his henchmen who ordered atrocities, but not to the Serbian people as long as they renounced the atrocities and cooperated with the ICTY.598 Once Serbians turned over Milosevic and, eventually, other war criminals to The Hague, many of these potential problems were mitigated.

Overall, I assess the status of domestic variables on the U.S. side as follows: Disinterest problems were FAVORABLE; Trust and Reconciliation problems were FAVORABLE after 2000.

At the domestic level on the Serbian side, disinterest, trust, and state capacity problems were not substantial. Serbia had been hurt by sanctions and sustained considerable war damage during the 78 days of bombing—Serbia’s economic and security situations were less


598 As Clinton explained shortly after the NATO bombing campaign, Serbs were “going to have to come to grips with what Mr. Milosevic ordered in Kosovo. They're just going to have to come to grips with it, and they're going to have to get out of denial. They're going to have to come to grips with it. And then they're going to have to decide whether they support his leadership or not, whether they think it's okay that all those tens of thousands of people were killed and all those hundreds of thousands of people were run out of their homes and all those little girls were raped and all those little boys were murdered. They're going to have to decide if they think that is okay… And if they think it's okay, they can make that decision. But I wouldn't give them one red cent for reconstruction if they think it's okay, because I don't think it's okay, and I don't think that's the world we're trying to build for our children” (President Clinton’s News Conference, June 25, 1999, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=57792). See also the remarks of William Burns, referenced previously.
than it desired and it was interested in gains to improve them, eventually seeking EU accession as a mechanism to bring some of this about. As described with respect to the U.S. side, trust problems were mitigated through institutions and tit-for-tat strategies after Milosevic was ousted. Lastly, while Serbia sustained damage to its state capacity during the war, its government did not collapse and it maintained enough material capacity to govern its spaces, control its agents, and even threaten its neighbors should it have chosen. Further, as with other cases, it is unlikely that the United States would have required much more than perhaps access to territory and restraint from repressive behavior (towards Kosovo and elsewhere) as the Serbian contribution to a strategic cooperation agreement.

Even after Yugoslavia broke apart and Serbia became a largely homogenous state, political unification was still a problem until Kosovo was effectively “separated” from Serbia, initially under the occupational protection of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, then as a recognized independent state in 2008. A large majority of Kosovars did not identify with the Serbian government. It is unclear whether influential domestic (ethnic Albanian) actors would have resisted cooperation between the United States and Serbia, but it is clear that non-governmental violence (e.g., by the KLA), at least against Serbian interests, was considered legitimate by large segments of the Albanian Kosovar population beginning in the mid-1990s when violent resistance against Serbian security forces began in earnest.

Reconciliation problems on the Serbian side stand out as the most significant and persistent barrier to cooperation with the United States. There was a strong element of nationalism in Serbia and a lasting appreciation of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” vision by
many Serbians. The United States and Serbian worldviews on Kosovo and elsewhere were at a fundamental impasse and remained so until perhaps very recently when Serbia took initial steps to normalize relations with Kosovo. From some Serb perspectives, they were wrongly accused of genocide, attacked without UN Security Council authorization, and suffered unjust losses in the war. Further, in their mind, the United States had sided with KLA terrorists who had oppressed Serbs in Kosovo and the United States and its peacekeepers (along with other NATO forces) had failed to protect Kosovar Serbs from reprisal as Kosovar Albanians returned after the war. The continued U.S. support for Kosovo’s autonomy and, later, Kosovo’s independence has only perpetuated Serbian feelings of injustice and resentment after the war. This resentment was reflected in persistent hostile feelings towards NATO (seen as an agent of the United States) and the mob attack by angry Serb demonstrators on the American Embassy in Belgrade after the U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Serbian resentment has been politicized at times such that deeper

599 See, for example, Seroka 2008, 138.

600 See, for example, Zorana Brozovic (2010), who states unambiguously that “an obstacle to the establishment of stronger cooperation is made by the fact that NATO bombarded FRY in 1999” (59). Also, the NATO aerial campaign included dual-use targets that were used by both civilians and the military, including bridges, power stations, telecommunications facilities, and headquarters, causing military as well as civilian hardship and deaths. Some high-profile bombings, such as the unintentional bombing of the Chinese Embassy and the bombing of the Gredelica passenger train as it passed over a railway bridge, fueled a sense of injustice and, in turn, resentment. Regarding the charges of genocide, a United Nations court “ruled that Serbian troops did not carry out genocide against ethnic Albanians during Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign of aggression in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999” although “crimes against humanity and war crimes did take place” (see “Kosovo assault ‘was not genocide,’” September 7, 2001, BBC).

cooperation with NATO (and, thereby, with the United States) has been politically untenable.602

Overall, I assess the status of domestic variables on the Serbian side as follows: Disinterest, Trust, and State Capacity problems were FAVORABLE; Political Unification problems were AMBIGIOUS until, at the latest, 2008 (if not much sooner), then FAVORABLE; Reconciliation problems were UNFAVORABLE.

In assessing the dependent variable—the postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and Serbia—one sees very limited evidence of cooperation. Overall, I assess a low ambition and low realization of cooperative depth during a bulk of this case’s timeframe. Looking at cooperation in the security and political dimensions, Serbia has been a standoffish member of NATO’s Partners for Peace Program (so has Russia, attesting to the limited depth of that program) and has eschewed potentially deeper forms of cooperation such as membership in the NATO Alliance. Further, Serbia has yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence despite U.S. prodding and has only recently taken initial steps towards normalization with Kosovo, which has limited the envisioned depth of cooperation that the nations (and the EU) would agree to. The realization of cooperation between the United

602 “Available public opinion polls from 2003 until today have shown that the bombing NATO launched against the FRY is the most stable factor influencing public sentiment towards the Alliance and towards the possibility of Serbia’s future application for membership…The consistent ratio of more than fifty percent of the Serbian population who would say ‘no’ in a referendum on Serbian membership in the Alliance, and less than 30 percent who would say ‘yes’, is one of the factors Serbian decision makers take into serious account when discussing Serbian politics towards the Alliance. The prevailing negative image of NATO among the Serbian public has frequently served as an excuse for the state leadership to artificially remove the possibility of joining NATO from the agenda and to choose not to speak clearly on the issue. Public opinion polls are indeed a limiting maneuver for the Serbian establishment since they indicate that any establishment willing to promote the idea of Serbian membership in the Alliance would risk negative voter response during elections” (Radoman 2012, 12-13). See also Bugajski and Conley 2011, 7 and Seroka 2008.
States and Serbia has been commensurately low. While there has been cooperation with war crimes tribunals, the relationship has been conflictual when it comes to the status of Kosovo.

Overall, I assess the qualities of cooperation as (comparatively) ABSENT until perhaps very recently.

Analysis and Findings

This case had favorable to ambiguous independent variables at the international level after Milosevic was removed in 2000, but a clearly unfavorable variable at the domestic level throughout its timeframe. My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment. The most evident problem at the domestic level was Serbian reconciliation problems. Because of these problems, caused by perceived U.S. injustices during the war and continued U.S. support for Kosovo’s autonomy and independence (and, thereby, U.S. non-support for Serbian territorial integrity), cooperation between the United States and Serbia was politicized, making such cooperation politically untenable in Belgrade. This, in turn, has limited the depth of cooperation that Serbian politicians would agree to and support. This case supports my Hypothesis 2 and, accordingly, my theory. Further, it demonstrates that reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side can significantly undermine cooperation even when the status of former adversary political unification is supportive.

Iraq 2003, Counterfactual

The best I can do to illuminate the effect of political unification problems independent of reconciliation problems is to analyze my Iraq 2003 case (Chapter 6) counterfactually. Holding everything else constant, if one counterfactually assumes that reconciliation
problems did not exist within the Iraqi leadership or its winning coalition, what would be the likely change in outcome with respect to the postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and Iraq? To do this, I will briefly reassess the variables and reanalyze the case in light of this assumption.

Counterfactual Measurement of the Variables

At the international level, the favorable reconciliation assumption would not change the favorable assessments of spoiler and competitor problems. Regarding other international conditions, there may have been less (but not zero) U.S. concern over Iraqi alignment with Iran. The reason for this is that, without reconciliation problems amongst the Iraqi leadership or its winning coalition, there would have been a higher probability that the 2011 SOFA would have passed so that U.S. troops would have remained in Iraq. These troops, presumably, could have deterred Iran from using Iraqi space to support Assad in Syria and, thereby, could have precluded that specific rift between the United States and Iraq. This may have mitigated some associated U.S. concerns regarding Iraqi alignment. That said, Iraqi political unification problems, as seen in its violent sectarianism, also caused U.S. concerns over Iraqi alignment. Maliki led in sectarian ways and this drew him to Iran for support, as seen before and after the U.S. withdrawal. Further, emerging U.S. concerns that it might be empowering a sectarian regime that would oppress its people would not be resolved by the elimination of U.S.-Iraqi reconciliation problems alone—political unification problems would still have to be addressed.
Status of international variables: no change from the previous case. Spoiler and Competitor problems remain FAVORABLE and Other International Conditions remain AMBIGUOUS (after 2011) towards the qualities of cooperation.

At the domestic level on the U.S. side, the reconciliation assumption would not change the favorable assessment of disinterest problems. Regarding trust problems, the U.S. concerns caused by Iraq’s possible Iranian alignment may have been reduced (but not eliminated) through a successful 2011 SOFA as previously described. However, sectarianism would likely still have created concerns over alignment and whether the Iraqi government would continue the SFA’s path towards democracy. Without the slaps in the face over the 2011 SOFA failure and Syria policy, recently emerging U.S. reconciliation problems would less likely have occurred.

Status of domestic variables on the U.S. side: Disinterest problems remain FAVORABLE; Trust problems remain FAVORABLE until recent years as sectarianism increasingly raises concerns; Reconciliation problems change to FAVORABLE for the duration of this case’s timeframe.

At the domestic level on the Iraqi side, the favorable reconciliation assumption would not change the favorable assessments of disinterest, trust, or state capacity problems. The assessment of reconciliation problems would change to favorable as per the assumption. Because of this, one would expect less resistance to the occupation and a higher likelihood that the 2011 SOFA would have passed as previously explained. The status of political unification problems would have remained unfavorable and would have been the lone primary driver of problems with the other variables that I assessed as less than favorable.
Status of domestic variables on the Iraqi side: Disinterest, Trust, and State Capacity problems remain FAVORABLE; Reconciliation problems change to FAVORABLE; and Political Unification Problems remain UNFAVORABLE for the duration of this case’s timeframe.

In assessing the dependent variable—the postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and Iraq—the elimination of Iraqi reconciliation problems would likely have changed some aspects of the qualities of cooperation for the better. However, Iraqi political unification problems would still have militated against those qualities of cooperation.

The ambition of cooperative depth would likely have remained moderate or increased. The SFA would likely still have been signed, and may have been more substantial. The weapons purchases and economic agreements would likely have remained and there would have been an increased chance that the 2011 SOFA would have passed, allowing a limited number of U.S. troops to remain. Troop levels would likely have remained modest (recall that President Obama’s latest figures were for 3,500-5,000 troops) because of the legacy of a still-difficult occupation. Additionally, some influential Iraqis resisted cooperation with the United States so that they could have a freer sectarian hand and some still had a sectarian desire to court Iran for support against their domestic foes. These problems would remain despite the remedy to the reconciliation problems and would make a full alliance and indefinite U.S. presence less likely. The ambition of cooperative endurance for this counterfactual depth of endurance would likely have remained “long-term” (indefinite) as per the SFA.

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603 The occupation was difficult in part due to reconciliation problems within the Iraqi leadership and its winning coalition that are assumed to be remedied in this scenario, but also very much due to Iraqi political unification problems that would remain in this scenario.
The realization of cooperative depth would have improved in some areas but still would have suffered in other areas, especially over time as Iraqi political unification problems (i.e., sectarianism) took greater effect. That is, the relationship’s counterfactual realization of cooperation would still fall short of its modest counterfactual ambition, although the relationship may not have been as blatantly conflictual. It is likely that there would still have been a formidable resistance to the occupation that would have been orchestrated by influential domestic actors who would have taken advantage of political unification problems to resist U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and its commensurate strengthening of the new Iraqi government. This is essentially what took place during the U.S.-friendly Allawi administration (when Fallujah and Sadr City were engulfed in anti-Coalition violence). It is likely that sectarian voting would still have resulted in a Jaafari/Maliki-type remaining in office and allowing or pressing a sectarian agenda. As such, there would still have been great challenges in cooperation towards basic Iraqi internal security as seen in the Jaafari/Maliki years due to government-sponsored sectarianism. Thus, much of the pre-2011 realization of cooperation would have remained unchanged in this counterfactual scenario. There would likely have been greater cooperation during the 2011 SOFA negotiations and this may have resulted in a small post-2011 U.S. presence (which would have been wholly insufficient to combat the sectarianism). In more recent years, sectarianism would likely still have continued to push a Maliki-type against U.S. regional interests with regards to Iran and Syria and this would, eventually, have caused the same U.S. concerns about empowering a repressive government that was aligning with Iran and supporting Assad, thereby militating against cooperation.
Assessment of the qualities of cooperation: UNCOOPERATIVE to SEMI-COOPERATIVE—sectarianism would still have militated against cooperation and the relationship, in turn, would have failed to realize many of its ambitions. Blatant uncooperative behavior may have been less prominent and, without such strong evidence of uncooperative behavior, qualities of cooperation may have improved from uncooperative to semi-cooperative.

Counterfactual Analysis and Findings

Overall, this counterfactual case had favorable to ambiguous variables at the international level, but a clearly unfavorable variable at the domestic level throughout its timeframe. My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation and that is what is expected in my counterfactual dependent variable assessment. The most evident problem at the domestic level was Iraqi political unification problems. Despite the counterfactual absence of reconciliation problems amongst the Iraqi leadership and its winning coalition, these political unification problems would enable influential domestic actors, for various reasons including resentment, nationalism, and opportunism, to capitalize on the situation and mount a credible resistance to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation (including cooperation to strengthen the Iraqi government), and to do so with the support of significant portions of the population. The occupation would still be difficult. The Iraqi government would still behave in sectarian ways and seek external support for its sectarian desires which, in this case, would cause it to gravitate towards Iran. This would breed more resistance from “out groups” in the population. While the SFA and perhaps the 2011 SOFA would pass, political unification problems would eventually take their toll on the partnership as U.S. concerns about repressive governance, Iranian alignment, and Iraqi support for U.S. regional interests (i.e.,
Syria policy) emerged. This would all combine to cause U.S. policymakers to be increasingly cautious with their cooperation, thereby reducing the relationship’s qualities of cooperation. This counterfactual case supports my Hypothesis 4 and, in turn, my theory. Further, it demonstrates that political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side can significantly undermine cooperation even when the status of former adversary reconciliation problems is supportive.

Other Takeaways and Implications

In light of my case analyses, findings, and additional analysis on my primary variables of interest, there are several other takeaways and implications of my theory. However, as a note of caution, one should be careful about generalizing some of these takeaways and implications too broadly. The internal validity of this study should be strong—almost the entire universe of cases (U.S. wars from World War II to present) was examined to some extent in this study. External validity is less strong because the United States had such particular attributes during the timeframe of this study. With that in mind, here are several key takeaways and implications to consider:

1) Postwar relationships with higher qualities of cooperation might be rare in the future. My analysis shows that conditions at both the international and domestic levels must be (perhaps atypically) supportive for cooperation to prosper and that even one unfavorable variable can have a substantial negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. Achieving such favorable conditions is even more challenging in the postwar environment and this all combines to reduce the
likelihood of higher postwar qualities of cooperation. The World War II cases may have been anomalies.

2) State leadership is crucial. My analysis demonstrates that leaders have a profound influence on postwar qualities of cooperation. Former adversary leaders could remain in power and the relationship still enjoy higher postwar qualities of cooperation as long as those leaders renounced their previous “evil” ways and supported cooperation with the United States (e.g., the Emperor of Japan). Where this did not happen (e.g., Saddam after the Gulf War and Milosevic after the War for Kosovo), problems with other international conditions and other domestic variables severely undermined cooperation. Even when regime change was accomplished, the postwar qualities of cooperation were greatly influenced by the new former-adversary leadership. Where that leadership was eager to cooperate with the United States (e.g., Adenauer and Allawi), qualities of cooperation improved. Where that leadership was ambivalent towards cooperation or against it (e.g., Milosevic, Saddam, Jaafari, and Maliki), cooperation suffered.

3) The winning coalition matters. Do not ignore the “will of the people.” The German winning coalition was willing to support cooperation with the United States; the Iraqi winning coalition was not and, worse, contributed to the breakdown in the rule of law and the legitimization of non-governmental violence. These winning coalitions were able to influence the postwar relationship’s outcome towards their divergent preferences.
4) *Democracy may be counterproductive to higher postwar qualities of cooperation.* In line with the above insights is the mechanism with which leaders are chosen. Regime type matters. The larger the winning coalition, the more opportunity for barriers to cooperation to manifest. It would be nice for the victor if the vanquished population willingly and persistently elected friendly rulers that were eager to cooperate with the victor. But democracy creates uncertainty and may spell trouble for postwar cooperation. If Schumacher had been elected leader of postwar West Germany instead of Adenauer, the relationship between the United States and West Germany may have been much less cooperative. If Allawi had been elected leader of postwar Iraq instead of Jaafari and, later, Maliki, the relationship between the United States and Iraq may have been much more cooperative. A cooperative strongman or cult of personality that could influence or suppress the will of the population, or repress influential domestic actors who resist strategic cooperation, could eliminate some of this uncertainty, at least in the short term. However, while installing a friendly strongman may resolve barriers to cooperation with the former adversary, it could also subject a victor to losses in other areas through reputation costs and so forth. Thus, there may be no viable solution that allows a victor to both achieve high postwar qualities of cooperation with its former adversary and also protect interests elsewhere.\(^{604}\)

\(^{604}\) Similarly, Cooley finds that there is “tension inherent in the current U.S. strategy of promoting democracy abroad while maintaining an extensive global basing presence—the pursuit of one may actually undermine the viability of the other in any given base host” (2008, 4). Accordingly, democratically increasing the selectorate, as is often done after U.S. wars where there is regime change, may actually increase the voice of an unwilling population and decrease the qualities of strategic cooperation in certain circumstances.
5) *Political unification problems are a key consideration and may be intractable.* Some influential domestic actors will likely resist strategic cooperation; political unification will determine if those actors are successful. Each case had an influential domestic actor of some sort who resisted strategic cooperation. Someone usually profits in some way from promoting an “opposition.” Germany had its Schumachers. Serbia had its Milosevics. Iraq had its Sadrs. Their success in resisting strategic cooperation against the will of the state leadership and its winning coalition depended upon their ability to wield force and coercion. This, in turn, depended upon support from a population that would sanction their violence. Where the population did not identify with the government and saw non-governmental violence as legitimate (Iraq), influential domestic actors were able to mount a very credible resistance to cooperation. There were no cases where preexisting political unification problems were overcome—Iraq had them prior to war and kept them.

6) *Reconciliation problems are a key consideration and may be intractable.* Where reconciliation problems existed within the leadership or its winning coalition (e.g., Iraq and Serbia), cooperation suffered. Elsewhere (e.g., Germany), cooperation flourished. Occupations were a double-edged sword. Occupation helped ameliorate reconciliation problems in Germany where U.S. forces were seen as providers and protectors. Conversely, occupation helped exacerbate reconciliation problems in Iraq where U.S. forces were seen as invaders. One, therefore, may be forced into a no-win scenario where one must occupy to prevent a failed state, but in doing so exacerbate reconciliation problems. Regardless of the choice, postwar qualities of cooperation would suffer. Also, “Berlin Airlift moments” help—the opportunity to be seen as the
hero and demonstrate one’s commitment to the other is extremely important for reorientation of identities in these scenarios.

7) Independent trust problems are not always mitigable. Saddam had extreme trust issues, and although his deeply-entrenched paranoia was perhaps rare (yet, perhaps not unique considering North Korean leadership), his case shows that independent trust problems are more of a factor than I theorized and that institutions, while important to mitigate trust issues, may have their limits in these extreme cases.

8) Disinterest and state capacity problems are not as likely in these scenarios. These problems seemed theoretically unlikely and were not factors in practice. Of all the takeaways, this is perhaps the least generalizable because of the abundance of U.S. resources in my universe of cases.

**Recommendations for (U.S.) Policymakers**

My takeaways and implications highlight the challenging nature of postwar strategic cooperation. It is precarious—several conditions could derail it and just one problem area can have a substantial negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. In general, for strategic cooperation, policymakers should plan early, plan often, execute accordingly, and have an out option. More specifically, my analysis shows that former adversary reconciliation problems and political unification problems are extremely difficult for even a hegemon to overcome, and U.S. policymakers should pay particular attention to these conditions.

1) Policymakers should identify their desire for strategic cooperation as early as possible and shape the environment accordingly. If U.S. policymakers could have
foreseen the future U.S. desire to become strategic partners with Iraq in the 2000s, how different would U.S. policy towards Iraq have been during the Iran-Iraq War, during the Shiite uprisings in 1991, or during the post-2003 occupation? Efforts to prevent or remedy reconciliation problems and political unification problems need not wait until war has erupted.

2) *Policymakers should select their war strategy based on an attainable postwar relationship.* There has been much criticism over U.S. planning on how to end wars once started (exit strategies). I would argue that even this is short-sighted—policymakers need to think not only about how they will initiate war, conduct war, and end war, but how they will achieve their most-preferred “attainable postwar relationship” with their adversary. Using my theory’s framework to analyze conditions at the international and domestic levels, policymakers should assess the likely qualities of cooperation for postwar strategic cooperation scenarios—what is the likely range of possible cooperation outcomes (e.g., absent to highly cooperative, absent to semi-cooperative, or just plain absent)? In their analyses, policymakers should be particularly wary of preexisting reconciliation and political unification problems. How will they mitigate those and other preexisting problems and not create new problems during and after the war? Who will lead the former adversary state, will the winning coalition keep a U.S.-friendly leader in power, and how will the effects of influential domestic actors who would resist strategic cooperation be mitigated? While policymakers might prefer a highly cooperative postwar relationship, such a relationship may seem overly optimistic after this analysis. Conversely, policymakers might identify a permissive environment that affords them
a wide range of desirable strategic cooperation outcomes. From this analysis of the likely range of possible outcomes, policymakers can run their cost/benefit/risk analyses to determine their most preferred strategy. A permissive environment with the full range of attainable strategic cooperation outcomes will offer policymakers great latitude to choose a variety of viable strategies. Do policymakers care if the states remain enemies? Are they satisfied with a simple cessation of hostilities and a state of ambivalence towards each other? Or do they wish to embark upon a friendship that is characterized by deep and enduring cooperation? Which plausibly attainable end state, on this continuous spectrum of conflict resolution outcomes, and in light of their analysis, is most preferred? If the cost/benefit/risk analyses bode poorly for the attainable strategic cooperation outcomes, policymakers should consider one of Ikenberry’s other postwar strategies—abandonment, domination, or a different institutional arrangement—that creates less vulnerability for their forces.

3) **Policymakers should ensure that prewar, war, and postwar decisions and actions support their chosen postwar relationship.** This would suggest that, if strategic cooperation is the desired end state, U.S. policymakers should be prepared to identify and neutralize spoilers, outbid competitors, and mitigate other international conditions. At the domestic level, those policymakers should be prepared to mitigate any disinterest, trust, or reconciliation problems within their own population. They should also be prepared to offer desirable gains to the former adversary to eliminate disinterest problems, establish credible institutions to mitigate inevitable trust issues, and commit enough resources to ensure that the former adversary has the required state capacity to meet future strategic cooperation responsibilities. Many items on
this laundry list are within U.S. control. Finally, policymakers should be prepared to counter preexisting and emerging former adversary reconciliation problems and political unification problems as rapidly and effectively as possible. As forces carry out the war and postwar policies, policymakers should minimize the opportunity for such problems to be created or exacerbated.

4) Policymakers should regularly reevaluate the attainability of various postwar relationships. War plans never survive the first shot, as they say. In light of the many conditions that could militate against qualities of cooperation, policymakers should be prepared to act quickly to reduce the vulnerability of their forces if circumstances warrant. Conversely, in light of everything there is to gain from strategic cooperation with a former adversary (e.g., at the very least, minimizing the chance of recurring war), if the international and domestic conditions change to favor higher qualities of cooperation, policymakers should be prepared to capitalize on the opportunity.

5) Policymakers should be dubious about trying to solve former adversary reconciliation problems and political unification problems with aid. A policymaker may be tempted to think that, if they give their former adversary enough stuff, they will fix their strategic cooperation problems and get a more capable partner. However, there is also a strong possibility in these unfavorable scenarios that the former adversary will simply pocket the gifts and, sooner or later, use them to counter the policymaker’s interests.
**Future Research**

Moving forward from this study, there are several options for future research. One might open up the universe of cases to look at permutations beyond just U.S. wars. What are the keys to strategic cooperation outcomes in all postwar scenarios? What are the keys to strategic cooperation outcomes in non-war scenarios? One might also examine the relationship between reputation and strategic cooperation outcomes. If one has a favorable reputation as a partner, does this change subsequent strategic cooperation outcomes? Is the ambition for cooperation higher and does this, in turn, translate into higher realized cooperation as might be anticipated? What about the reverse scenario? Also, what is the effect of exceeding expectations (i.e., were the Germans pleasantly surprised and did a sense of “mercy” encourage strategic cooperation?) or failing to meet them (i.e., did Iraqis expect the Marshall Plan and were they disappointed enough to undermine strategic cooperation when they didn’t get it?)? One could examine broken strategic-cooperation relationships and explore the reasons that some relationships are restored (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) and others are not (e.g., the United States and Iran). Finally, one might practically examine how to overcome a combination of political unification and reconciliation problems in these scenarios. If both are unfavorable, does the order of their remedy matter? If so, would it be best to first establish political unification at all costs (e.g., through domination if necessary) and then try and reconcile with the former adversary population? Much is left to answer.
APPENDIX A: U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq

Preamble

The United States of America and the Republic of Iraq:

1. Affirming the genuine desire of the two countries to establish a long-term relationship of cooperation and friendship, based on the principle of equality in sovereignty and the rights and principles that are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and their common interests;

2. Recognizing the major and positive developments in Iraq that have taken place subsequent to April 9, 2003; the courage of the Iraqi people in establishing a democratically elected government under a new constitution; and welcoming no later than December 31, 2008, the termination of the Chapter VII authorization for and mandate of the multinational forces in UNSCR 1790; noting that the situation in Iraq is fundamentally different than that which existed when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 in 1990, and in particular that the threat to international peace and security posed by the Government of Iraq no longer exists; and affirming in that regard that Iraq should return by December 31, 2008 to the legal and international standing that it enjoyed prior to the issuance of UNSCR 661;

3. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, which was signed on November 26, 2007;

4. Recognizing both countries’ desire to establish a long-term relationship, the need to support the success of the political process, reinforce national reconciliation within the framework of a unified and federal Iraq, and to build a diversified and advanced economy that ensures the integration of Iraq into the international community; and

5. Reaffirming that such a long-term relationship in economic, diplomatic, cultural and security fields will contribute to the strengthening and development of democracy in Iraq, as well as ensuring that Iraq will assume full responsibility for its security, the safety of its people, and maintaining peace within Iraq and among the countries of the region.

Have agreed to the following:
Section I: Principles of Cooperation

This Agreement is based on a number of general principles to establish the course of the future relationship between the two countries as follows:

1. A relationship of friendship and cooperation is based on mutual respect; recognized principles and norms of international law and fulfillment of international obligations; the principle of non-interference in internal affairs; and rejection of the use of violence to settle disputes.

2. A strong Iraq capable of self-defense is essential for achieving stability in the region.

3. The temporary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is at the request and invitation of the sovereign Government of Iraq and with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq.

4. The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.

Section II: Political and Diplomatic Cooperation

The Parties share a common understanding that their mutual efforts and cooperation on political and diplomatic issues shall improve and strengthen security and stability in Iraq and the region. In this regard, the United States shall ensure maximum efforts to work with and through the democratically elected Government of Iraq to:

1. Support and strengthen Iraq's democracy and its democratic institutions as defined and established in the Iraqi Constitution, and in so doing, enhance Iraq's capability to protect these institutions against all internal and external threats.

2. Support and enhance Iraq's status in regional and international organizations and institutions so that it may play a positive and constructive role in the international community.

3. Support the Government of Iraq in establishing positive relations with the states of the region, including on issues consequent to the actions of the former regime that continue to harm Iraq, based on mutual respect and the principles of non-interference and positive dialogue among states, and the peaceful resolution of disputes, without the use of force or violence, in a manner that enhances the security and stability of the region and the prosperity of its peoples.
Section III: Defense and Security Cooperation

In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory. Such security and defense cooperation shall be undertaken pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

Section IV: Cultural Cooperation

The Parties share the conviction that connections between their citizens, forged through cultural exchanges, educational links and the exploration of their common archeological heritage will forge strong, long lasting bonds of friendship and mutual respect. To that end, the Parties agree to cooperate to:

1. Promote cultural and social exchanges and facilitate cultural activities, such as Citizens Exchanges, the Youth Exchange and Study Program, the Global Connections and Exchange (GCE) program, and the English Language Teaching and Learning program.

2. Promote and facilitate cooperation and coordination in the field of higher education and scientific research, as well as encouraging investment in education, including through the establishment of universities and affiliations between Iraqi and American social and academic institutions such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA’s) agricultural extension program.

3. Strengthen the development of Iraq’s future leaders, through exchanges, training programs, and fellowships, such as the Fulbright program and the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), in fields including science, engineering, medicine, information technology, telecommunications, public administration, and strategic planning.

4. Strengthen and facilitate the application process for U.S visas consistent with U.S. laws and procedures, to enhance the participation of qualified Iraqi individuals in scientific, educational, and cultural activities.

5. Promote Iraq’s efforts in the field of social welfare and human rights.

6. Promote Iraqi efforts and contributions to international efforts to preserve Iraqi cultural heritage and protect archeological antiquities, rehabilitate Iraqi museums, and assist Iraq in recovering and restoring its smuggled artifacts through projects such as the Future of Babylon Project, and

Section V: Economic and Energy Cooperation

Building a prosperous, diversified, growing economy in Iraq, integrated in the global economic system, capable of meeting the essential service needs of the Iraqi people, as well as welcoming home Iraqi citizens currently dwelling outside of the country, will require unprecedented capital investment in reconstruction, the development of Iraq’s extraordinary natural and human resources, and the integration of Iraq into the international economy and its institutions. To that end the Parties agree to cooperate to:

1. Support Iraq’s efforts to invest its resources towards economic development, sustainable development and investment in projects that improve the basic services for the Iraqi people.

2. Maintain active bilateral dialogue on measures to increase Iraq’s development, including through the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation (DEC) and, upon entry into force, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.

3. Promote expansion of bilateral trade through the U.S.-Iraq Business Dialogue, as well as bilateral exchanges, such as trade promotion activities and access to Export-Import Bank programs.

4. Support Iraq’s further integration into regional and international financial and economic communities and institutions, including membership in the World Trade Organization and through continued Normal Trade Relations with the United States.

5. Reinforce international efforts to develop the Iraqi economy and Iraqi efforts to reconstruct, rehabilitate, and maintain its economic infrastructure, including continuing cooperation with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

6. Urge all parties to abide by commitments made under the International Compact with Iraq with the goal of rehabilitating Iraq’s economic institutions and increasing economic growth through the implementation of reforms that lay the foundation for private sector development and job creation.

7. Facilitate the flow of direct investment into Iraq to contribute to the reconstruction and development of its economy.

8. Promote Iraq’s development of the Iraqi electricity, oil, and gas sector, including the rehabilitation of vital facilities and institutions and strengthening and rehabilitating Iraqi capabilities.

9. Work with the international community to help locate and reclaim illegally exported funds and properties of Saddam Hussein’s family and key members of his regime, as well as its smuggled archeological artifacts and cultural heritage before and after April 9, 2003.
10. Encourage the creation of a positive investment environment to modernize Iraq's private industrial sector to enhance growth and expand industrial production including through encouraging networking with U.S. industrial institutions.

11. Encourage development in the fields of air, land, and sea transportation as well as rehabilitation of Iraqi ports and enhancement of maritime trade between the Parties, including by facilitating cooperation with the U.S. Federal Highway Administration.

12. Maintain an active dialogue on agricultural issues to help Iraq develop its domestic agricultural production and trade policies.

13. Promote access to programs that increase farm, firm, and marketing productivity to generate higher incomes and expanded employment, building on successful programs by the USDA and the USAID programs in agribusiness, agriculture extension, and policy engagement.

14. Encourage increased Iraqi agricultural exports, including through policy engagement and encouraging education of Iraqi exporters on U.S. health and safety regulations.

Section VI: Health and Environmental Cooperation

In order to improve the health of the citizens of Iraq, as well as protect and improve the extraordinary natural environment of the historic Lands of the Two Rivers, the Parties agree to cooperate to:

1. Support and strengthen Iraq's efforts to build its health infrastructure and to strengthen health systems and networks.

2. Support Iraq's efforts to train health and medical cadres and staff.

3. Maintain dialogue on health policy issues to support Iraq's long-term development. Topics may include controlling the spread of infectious diseases, preventative and mental health, tertiary care, and increasing the efficiency of Iraq's medicine procurement system.

4. Encourage Iraqi and international investment in the health field, and facilitate specialized professional exchanges in order to promote the transfer of expertise and to help foster relationships between medical and health institutions building on existing programs with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, including its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
5. Encourage Iraqi efforts to strengthen mechanisms for protecting, preserving, improving, and developing the Iraqi environment and encouraging regional and international environmental cooperation.

Section VII: Information Technology and Communications Cooperation

Communications are the lifeblood of economic growth in the twenty-first century, as well as the foundation for the enhancement of democracy and civil society. In order to improve access to information and promote the development of a modern and state of the art communications industry in Iraq, the Parties agree to cooperate to:

1. Support the exchange of information and best practices in the fields of regulating telecommunications services and the development of information technology policies.

2. Exchange views and practices relating to liberalizing information technologies and telecommunications services markets, and the strengthening of an independent regulator.

3. Promote active Iraqi participation in the meetings and initiatives of the Internet Governance Forum, including its next global meetings.

Section VIII: Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation

The Parties agree to cooperate to:

1. Support the further integration and security of the Iraqi criminal justice system, including police, courts, and prisons.

2. Exchange views and best practices related to judicial capacity building and training, including on continuing professional development for judges, judicial investigators, judicial security personnel, and court administrative staff.

3. Enhance law enforcement and judicial relationships to address corruption, and common transnational criminal threats, such as terrorism, trafficking in persons, organized crime, drugs, money laundering, smuggling of archeological artifacts, and cyber crime.

Section IX: Joint Committees

1. The Parties shall establish a Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) to monitor the overall implementation of the Agreement and develop the agreed upon objectives. The committee shall meet periodically and may include representatives from relevant departments and ministries.
2. The Parties shall seek to establish additional Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs), as necessary, responsible for executing and overseeing this Agreement. The JCCs will report to the HCC and are to:

   a. Monitor implementation and consult regularly to promote the most effective implementation of this Agreement and to assist in dispute resolution as necessary;

   b. Propose new cooperation projects and carry out discussions and negotiations as necessary to reach an agreement about details of such cooperation; and

   c. Include other governmental departments and ministries for broader coordination from time to time, with meetings in Iraq and the United States, as appropriate.

3. Disputes that may arise under this Agreement, if not resolved within the relevant JCC, and not amenable to resolution within the HCC, are to be settled through diplomatic channels.

Section X: Implementing Agreements and Arrangements

The Parties may enter into further agreements or arrangements as necessary and appropriate to implement this Agreement.

Section XI: Final Provisions

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 2009, following an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that the actions by the Parties necessary to bring the Agreement into force in accordance with the respective constitutional procedures in effect in both countries have been completed.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force unless either Party provides written notice to the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement. The termination shall be effective one year after the date of such notification.

3. This Agreement may be amended with the mutual written agreement of the Parties and in accordance with the constitutional procedures in effect in both countries.

4. All cooperation under this Agreement shall be subject to the laws and regulations of both countries.
Signed in duplicate in Baghdad on this 17th day of November, 2008, in the English and Arabic language, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ:

[Signatures]
I. PREAMBLE

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ("Afghanistan") and the United States of America ("United States") have partnered closely since 2001 to respond to threats to international peace and security and help the Afghan people chart a secure, democratic, and prosperous future. As a result, Afghanistan is now on a path towards sustainable self-reliance in security, governance, economic and social development, and constructive partnership at the regional level.

The Parties express their appreciation for the November 2011 Traditional Loya Jirga, which declared: “Emphasizing the need to preserve the achievements of the past ten years, respect the Afghan Constitution, women’s rights, freedom of speech, and taking into consideration the prevailing situation in the region, strategic cooperation with the United States of America, which is a strategic ally of the people and government of Afghanistan, is considered important in order to ensure political, economic and military security of the country. Signing a strategic cooperation document with the United States conforms with the national interest of Afghanistan and is of significant importance... When signing this document Afghanistan and the United States must be considered as two sovereign and equal countries”, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Emphasizing their shared determination to further advance the Afghan people’s desire for a stable and independent Afghan state, governed on the basis of Afghanistan’s Constitution and shared democratic values, including respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of all men and women, Afghanistan and the United States ("the Parties") commit to strengthen long-term strategic cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including: advancing peace, security, and reconciliation; strengthening state institutions; supporting Afghanistan’s long-term economic and social development; and encouraging regional cooperation. Recognizing the continued relevance of their commitments at the 2010 London and Kabul Conferences, as well as the 2011 Bonn Conference, the Parties affirm their resolve to strengthen Afghanistan’s institutions and governance capacity to advance such areas of long-term strategic cooperation.

Cooperation between Afghanistan and the United States is based on mutual respect and shared interests – most notably, a common desire for peace and to strengthen collective efforts to achieve a region that is economically integrated, and no longer a safe haven for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Afghanistan and the United States go forward in this partnership with confidence because they are committed to seeking a future of justice, peace, security, and opportunity for the Afghan people.

Respect for the sovereignty and equality of states constitutes the foundation of this partnership.
Respect for the rule of law, as well as the sound and transparent adherence to Afghanistan’s Constitution and all other operative laws, reinforces its foundation. The Parties reaffirm their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the Parties agree to the following:

II. PROTECTING AND PROMOTING SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES

1. The Parties agree that a strong commitment to protecting and promoting democratic values and human rights is a fundamental aspect of their long-term partnership and cooperation.

2. Underscoring the central importance of the values and principles of the Afghan Constitution, Afghanistan reaffirms its strong commitment to inclusive and pluralistic democratic governance, including free, fair, and transparent elections in which all the people of Afghanistan participate freely without internal or external interference. Reaffirming its commitments made at the 2011 Bonn Conference, Afghanistan shall strengthen and improve its electoral process.

3. Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to protecting human and political rights under its Constitution and international obligations, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this regard, Afghanistan shall strengthen the integrity and capacity of its democratic institutions and processes, including by taking tangible steps to further the efficiency and effectiveness of its three branches of state, within its unitary system of government, and supporting development of a vibrant civil society, including a free and open media.

4. Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to ensuring that any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden, and ensuring the rights and freedoms that are guaranteed to all Afghans under Afghan law and the Afghan Constitution. Consistent with its Constitution and international obligations, Afghanistan shall ensure and advance the essential role of women in society, so that they may fully enjoy their economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights.

III. ADVANCING LONG-TERM SECURITY

1. The Parties reaffirm that the presence and operations of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan since 2001 are aimed at defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Parties acknowledge the great sacrifices and suffering that the Afghan people have endured in the struggle against terrorism and the continued threats to their desire for peace, security and prosperity. The Parties also pay tribute to the sacrifices made by the people of the United States in this struggle.

2. In order to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security.
arrangements, as may be mutually determined.

a. The Parties’ respective obligations under this Agreement, and any subsequent
arrangements, are without prejudice to Afghan sovereignty over its territory, and each
Party’s right of self-defense, consistent with international law.

b. The Parties shall, subject to their internal procedures, initiate negotiations on a
Bilateral Security Agreement. Negotiations should begin after the signing of this
Strategic Partnership Agreement, with the goal of concluding within one year a
Bilateral Security Agreement to supersede the Agreement regarding the Status of
United States Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense
Present in Afghanistan in connection with Cooperative Efforts in Response to
Terrorism, Humanitarian, and Civic Assistance, Military Training and Exercises, and
Other Activities (2003), and other such related agreements and understandings that
are mutually determined to be contrary to the provisions of the Bilateral Security
Agreement.

c. The conduct of ongoing military operations shall continue under existing frameworks,
which include the Memorandum of Understanding on the Transfer of U.S. Detention
Facilities (2012) and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Afghanistanization of
Special Operations (2012), until superseded by the Bilateral Security Agreement or
other arrangements, as mutually determined. This obligation is without prejudice to
the status, commitments, and understandings of those frameworks, until superseded
as noted above.

3. To help provide a long-term framework for mutual security and defense cooperation, the
United States shall designate Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally.”

4. The Parties underscore their strong support for Afghan efforts towards peace and
reconciliation.

a. The necessary outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process are for
individuals and entities to: break ties with al-Qaeda; renounce violence; and
abide by the Afghan Constitution, including its protections for all Afghan women
and men.

b. Afghanistan affirms that in all state actions and understandings with regard to
peace and reconciliation, it shall uphold the values of the Afghan Constitution.

5. Beyond 2014, the United States shall seek funds, on a yearly basis, to support the training,
equipping, advising, and sustaining of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), so that
Afghanistan can independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats,
and help ensure that terrorists never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan,
the region, and the world.

a. Such support should: (1) help build appropriate capabilities reflecting the
evolving nature of mutually-recognized threats to Afghan stability; (2) support efforts to help the Afghan State attain a sustainable security structure; and (3) strengthen the capacity of security institutions of Afghanistan.

b. A U.S.-Afghanistan Working Group on Defense and Security, established under the framework of this Agreement, shall undertake regular assessments of the level of threat facing Afghanistan, as well as the country's security and defense requirements, and make specific recommendations about future cooperation in this field to the Bilateral Commission.

c. Assistance to the ANSF should have the goal of being consistent with NATO standards and promote interoperability with NATO forces.

d. The Parties further call on NATO member states to sustain and improve Afghan security capabilities beyond 2014, by taking concrete measures to implement the Declaration by NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership concluded at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit.

6. Afghanistan shall provide U.S. forces continued access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014, and beyond as may be agreed in the Bilateral Security Agreement, for the purposes of combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates, training the Afghan National Security Forces, and other mutually determined missions to advance shared security interests.

   a. The United States emphasizes its full respect for the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. It renews its commitment to the integral framework, and a transition to full Afghan security responsibility. It further reaffirms that it does not seek permanent military facilities in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan's neighbors.

   b. The United States further pledges not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries.

   c. The nature and scope of the future presence and operations of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and the related obligations of Afghanistan and the United States, shall be addressed in the Bilateral Security Agreement.

7. The Parties shall enhance information and intelligence sharing to counter common threats, including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering.

8. The Parties also underscore their support to improve regional security cooperation and coordination. The Parties affirm that the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit narcotics poses a major threat to ensuring security and the formation of a licit Afghan economy, as well as to regional security and a healthy world. They are determined to cooperate in Afghanistan, the region, and the world to eliminate this threat.
9. Recognizing that the stability of Afghanistan would contribute to the development and stability of South-Central Asia, the United States affirms that it shall regard with grave concern any external aggression against Afghanistan. Were this to occur, the Parties shall hold consultations on an urgent basis to develop and implement an appropriate response, including, as may be mutually determined, political, diplomatic, economic, or military measures, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

IV. REINFORCING REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION

1. The Parties agree on the importance of Afghanistan having cooperative and friendly relations with its neighbors, and emphasize that such relations should be conducted on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference, and equality. They call on all nations to respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and democratic processes.

2. With a view to the importance of regional cooperation for the consolidation of security in the region, the Parties shall undertake earnest cooperation with the countries of the region, regional organizations, the United Nations, and other international organizations on mutually recognized threats, including: terrorist networks; organized crime; narcotics trafficking; and money laundering.

3. To enhance regional stability and prosperity, the Parties shall further cooperate in restoring Afghanistan’s historic role as a bridge connecting Central and South Asia and the Middle East by:
   a. building on and facilitating implementation of existing and future regional initiatives, including transit and trade agreements;
   b. strengthening border coordination and management between Afghanistan and its neighbors;
   c. expanding linkages to regional transportation, transit, and energy networks through the realization of projects, including infrastructure, throughout Afghanistan; and
   d. mobilizing international support for regional investments that facilitate Afghanistan’s integration with the region.

V. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. The Parties agree that developing Afghanistan’s human and natural resources is crucial to regional stability, sustainable economic growth, and Afghanistan’s recovery from more than three decades of war and that Afghanistan will have special, significant and continuing fiscal requirements that cannot be met by domestic revenues in the years following Transition. In this regard, the United States reaffirms its commitment made at the 2011 Bonn Conference to directing financial support, consistent with the Kabul Process, towards Afghanistan’s economic development, helping Afghanistan address its continuing budget shortfall to secure
the gains of the last decade, make Transition irreversible, and become self-sustaining.

2. In the economic sphere:

a. The Parties shall pursue consolidation and growth of a market economy, and long-term cooperation for Afghanistan's sustainable economic growth, taking into consideration Afghanistan's Constitution, as well as its historical and social realities.

b. Noting Afghanistan's priorities, the United States shall help strengthen Afghanistan's economic foundation and support sustainable development and self-sufficiency, particularly in the areas of: licit agricultural production; transportation, trade, transit, water, and energy infrastructure; fostering responsible management of natural resources; and building a strong financial system, which is needed to sustain private investment.

c. To encourage trade and private sector development, the Parties shall undertake common efforts to increasingly use the Generalized System of Preferences. Further, to encourage investment, the United States intends to mobilize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, U.S. Export-Import Bank, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency to encourage U.S. private sector activity in Afghanistan. Afghanistan shall augment its support for the development of its private sector through the relevant Afghan institutions.

d. The Parties affirm their strong desire that the Afghan people should be the primary beneficiaries of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. The United States shall therefore support Afghanistan's efforts to govern its natural wealth through an accountable, efficient, effective and transparent framework that builds upon and surpasses international best practices.

3. In the social sphere, the Parties shall undertake sustainable joint efforts to help Afghanistan develop its human capacity through:

a. access to and enhancing the quality of education, including higher education and vocational training in key areas for all Afghans; and

b. access to basic health services and specialized care, including for women and children.

4. The Parties underscore the crucial importance of the fight against corruption.

a. The Parties shall fight decisively against all forms of corruption.

b. The Parties shall devise mechanisms to enhance aid effectiveness and avoid corruption through improved procurement practices, transparency, and accountability.

c. Afghanistan shall strengthen its anticorruption institutions, and revise and enforce its
laws, as necessary, in accordance with its national and international obligations.

d. Afghanistan further shall safeguard and enhance the Afghan financial system by implementing recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force Asia Pacific Group (FATF/APG) regarding anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing.

5. The United States and Afghanistan shall continue their cooperation to promote Afghanistan's development, including annual U.S. social and economic assistance to Afghanistan commensurate with the strategic importance of the U.S.-Afghan partnership.

a. To achieve this goal, the United States shall seek on a yearly basis, funding for social and economic assistance to Afghanistan. The United States also supports Afghanistan's efforts to encourage international investment and support for the Afghan private sector, which is crucial to developing a secure, prosperous, peaceful Afghanistan and region.

b. Building on its commitments at the 2010 Kabul and London Conferences ("the Conferences"), the United States reiterates its commitment to channel at least 50 percent of such economic and social assistance to Afghanistan through Afghan government budgetary mechanisms. The Parties shall periodically review this commitment, through the Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission, established under this Agreement, with the goal of increasing the percentage of assistance channeled through Afghan Government budgetary mechanisms beyond 2012.

c. The United States also reaffirms its 2010 Kabul Conference commitment to progressively align its development assistance behind Afghan National Priority Programs, as mutually determined by both Parties, with the goal of achieving 80 percent of alignment by the end of 2012. The United States agrees that any development assistance not aligned is to be fully transparent and consulted with the Government of Afghanistan.

d. These commitments are contingent upon the Afghan government establishing mechanisms and demonstrating agreed-upon progress to ensure financial transparency and accountability, increasing budget expenditures, improving revenue collection, enhancing public financial management systems, and other mutually determined measures of performance and progress, including those committed at the Conferences.

6. The Parties shall strengthen the long-standing relations between their people and civil societies through a range of efforts, including youth and women's initiatives, and cooperation between their universities and institutions of higher education.

7. The United States shall promote exchanges and related activities, which may include initiatives such as the Fulbright Program and International Visitor Leadership Program.
8. The Parties also shall cooperate to support Afghan cultural institutions, and preservation of cultural heritage.

VI. STRENGTHENING AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE

1. The Parties shall cooperate towards improving the human capacity of Afghanistan’s crucial government institutions. U.S. assistance to Afghanistan should be based on the priorities of the Afghan Government and mutually identified needs.

2. Afghanistan shall improve governance by increasing the responsiveness, and transparency of Afghan executive, legislative, and judicial institutions so that they better meet the civil and economic needs of the Afghan people. It shall promote efficiency and accountability at all levels of the government, consistent with Afghan law, and ensure that they provide services according to fair and objectively applied procedures and consistent with national standards for minimum service delivery.

3. The United States shall support the Afghan Government in strengthening the capacity, self-reliance, and effectiveness of Afghan institutions and their ability to deliver basic services.

4. The Parties shall work cooperatively to eliminate “parallel structures,” including Provincial Reconstruction Teams and District Stabilization Teams consistent with the Inteqal framework.

VII. IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENTS AND MECHANISMS

1. To advance cooperation and monitor progress towards implementing this Agreement, the Parties shall establish an Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Commission and associated implementation mechanisms.

   a. The Commission shall be chaired by the respective foreign ministers of Afghanistan and the United States, or their designees, and meet semi-annually in Kabul and Washington on a rotational basis.

      i. Preexisting bilateral forums, such as the Afghanistan-United States Bilateral Security Consultative Forum, shall be incorporated into the framework of this new structure.

   b. A Joint Steering Committee shall guide and report to Ministers on the work of standing expert working groups formed to implement this Agreement.

      i. These working groups shall be chaired by relevant ministers, or their designees, and are to constitute a forum for regular, senior-level consultations on issues of mutual concern. These issues include, but are not limited to, advancing long-term security, promoting social, democratic, and economic development, and strengthening Afghan institutions and governance.
c. The Joint Steering Committee should also convene regularly to assess common threats and discuss regional issues of mutual concern.

2. Through the Bilateral Commission, Parties should establish mutually determined levels of support and assistance.

3. Afghanistan and the United States may enter into further arrangements or agreements, as necessary and appropriate, to implement this Agreement, subject to the relevant laws and regulations of both Parties.

VIII. FINAL PROVISIONS

1. This Agreement shall enter into force when the Parties notify one another, through diplomatic channels, of the completion of their respective internal legal requirements necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement. It shall remain in force until the end of 2024. Upon mutual written agreement of the Parties, six months prior to the expiration of the Agreement, it may be renewed for a mutually agreed period. This Agreement may be amended or terminated by mutual written agreement of both Parties at any time, and either Party may provide written notice to the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement, which shall be effective one year after the date of such notification.

2. All actions taken under this Agreement shall be consistent with the Parties’ respective commitments and obligations under international law. Cooperation under this Agreement is subject to the relevant laws and regulations of the respective Parties, including applicable appropriations laws.

3. Any disputes with respect to implementation of this Agreement shall be settled through diplomatic consultations between the Parties.

Signed in duplicate by the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on this 2nd day of the month of May, in the year 2012, in the city of Kabul, in the Pashto, Dari and English languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

[Signature]

For the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:

[Signature]
APPENDIX C: MAP OF OCCUPATION ZONES IN GERMANY, 1945
(from Eisenberg 1996, xiii)

Germany – Occupation Zones, 1945
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