GROUPS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR BLATANT RACE STEREOTYPING

Erin E. Cooley

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Psychology.

Chapel Hill
2012

Approved by:

B. Keith Payne

Chester A. Insko

Melanie C. Green

ABSTRACT

ERIN COOLEY: Groups as Justification for Blatant Race Stereotyping
(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne)

Research has shown that groups are perceived as more aggressive and less trustworthy than individuals and Blacks are perceived as more aggressive than Whites. In two studies, I examined how these biases interact, leading to especially negative perceptions of Black groups. In Study 1, subjects made ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness of Black groups, White groups, Black individuals and White individuals. On measures of both implicit and explicit attitudes, participants displayed a tendency to judge Black groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Black individuals; this tendency was greater than a similar tendency to judge White groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White individuals. While I expected racial bias on a measure of implicit attitudes, I was surprised to see strong levels of racial bias on a measure of explicit attitudes in a college population that tends to be liberally biased. In Study 2, I simplified my design to look only at explicit ratings of Black and White groups. I also included hypothesized moderators including a validated measure of general expectations about groups. Results indicated that Black groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups. Further, this racial bias was most likely among those who also had negative expectations about groups in general. Consistent with the justification-suppression theory of prejudice, I conclude that participants use their negative expectations about groups as a justification for expressing prejudice toward Black groups on an explicit measure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Table

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you have just arrived for your first night-shift at a local convenience store. As you are organizing shelves, an hour or so into your shift, you notice a Black individual lingering outside the storefront. Not wanting any action on your part to be taken as race-related, you busy yourself with organizing the products you are placing on the shelves. A couple of minutes later you glance at the door and see that this individual has been joined by two other Black individuals. At this point, do you feel any more justified to take actions -- asking them to leave, notifying your supervisor, calling the police? Would your feeling of threat be any stronger than that you would have felt for a White individual who was then joined by two other White individuals? The present research suggests that the answers may be "yes" and "yes."

Centrality of Groups

Humans are a group-dwelling species (Coon, 1946); undoubtedly this aspect of humanity has both practical and psychological implications for human survival and experience. Practically, groups increase the chance of survival and reproduction through providing childcare, protection, and additional forces for attaining food, water, and shelter (Kameda & Tindale, 2006; Macdonald, 1983). In modern times, research in organizational behavior supports that working together, in many instances, leads to better outcomes than

working as individuals (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hill, 1982; Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; Kraut, 2002).

Beyond the utility of groups, the psychological function of human groups is much more complicated. Reflecting the centrality of group membership to the self, Tajfel (1981) proposed that human identity can be divided into two dimensions: individual identity and social identity. This novel proposal of a "social" identity refers to the portion of our identity that is intertwined with our group membership. Supporting the importance of group membership to the self, Leary and Baumeister (2005) reviewed evidence that the experience of "belonging" reduces both physical, as well as, psychological impairments. In particular, these authors present various literatures signifying the relation between steady emotional contact with others and the decreased occurrence of anxiety and experienced stress, as well as, cancers and a variety of other illnesses. In fact, loneliness appears to be extremely detrimental to our health with repercussions including increased cortisol levels, physical illness, and even mental illness (see Leary & Baumeister, 2005, for review). Given the evidence that groups are integral to our human experience, it becomes important to understand not just how individuals interact with one another, but also the distinct social dynamics of groups of individuals acting together.

CHAPTER 2

INTERGROUP INTERACTION

Salient instances of extreme violence between groups are not scarce: the Natzis toward the Jewish people, the KKK toward African Americans, Palestinians and Israelis, pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi groups in Libya; the list goes on and on. With these instances in mind, it is easy to envision instances of extreme intergroup conflict between well-established and cohesive groups who represent a particular religion, race, or belief system. Likewise, the level of anger and hostility that one may expect from such groups seems to supersede that expressed by individuals acting independently from their group membership.

While these real-world rivals are important to explore in their own right, more startling evidence comes from the findings on interactions between minimal groups (see Pinter & Greenwald, 2011 for a review). In these studies, individuals are grouped together based on arbitrary details such as whether they tend to overestimate or underestimate when guessing the number of dots that appear on a screen (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Although such group memberships are unrelated to the deep-seated ideological groups that we commonly imagine in contentious intergroup interactions, evidence of intergroup conflict still emerges. In fact, even these "minimal groups" show a rapid production of ingroup favoritism, frequently accompanied by outgroup aversion and even outgroup hate and hostility.

In the well-known Robber's Cave studies, Sherif et al. (1961) show clearly how even groups formed arbitrarily, can quickly develop a strong dislike of other similar groups leading to diverse forms of outgroup hostility. Specifically, Sherif et al. (1961) brought 24 boys, 12 years of age, to an isolated campsite where they were divided randomly into two groups; after a short time of separation, these two groups interacted in competitions designed to invoke mutual frustration. Quickly, outgroup hostility rose to an impressive level: each group engaged in outgroup stereotypes, outgroup ridicule, intergroup avoidance, and even intergroup violence. This finding of extreme intergroup behavior, based on groups that are formed arbitrarily, has been replicated numerous times in controlled laboratory settings (Tajfel et al., 1971; Diehl, 1988; Ostrom, 1992). These findings imply that there is an inherent aspect of group membership, separate from shared group beliefs or ideologies, which cause humans to behave distinctly when interacting as a group.

More recently, laboratory research has directly examined interactions between individuals as they compare to interactions between even minimal groups. This research has consistently found that interactions between groups (again, even minimal groups) operate distinctly from interactions between individuals: specifically, the behavior of groups is more competitive and marked by less trust than the behavior of individuals. This phenomenon, termed the interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect has been widely researched (McCallum et al., 1985; Insko et al. 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2005; Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko 2010; Gaertner & Insko, 2000, 2001; Schopler et al., 1993, 1999; Wildschut, Insko, Gaertner, 2002; Wildschut et al., 2003).

In the original studies by Insko et al. (1987), two individuals or two groups interacted with one another in a game of money payoffs, specifically a prisoner's dilemma game

(PDG). In a PDG, interaction partners can either choose to cooperate or can choose to compete. If both sides cooperate, both receive equal and moderately beneficial outcomes (average amounts of money). Competing leads to a less clear outcome. If one side of the interaction chooses to compete and the other side cooperates, then the competing team benefits by gaining extra money. If both teams compete, both receive inferior outcomes (lowest amount of money). A matrix, similar to those used in the studies on the interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect can be seen in Appendix A.

In comparing intergroup interactions with interindividual interactions in the PDG, groups are much more likely to compete. Further research has shown that this interindividual intergroup discontinuity is partially mediated by trust: groups tend to feel less trust of their interaction partner and this lack of trust is related to increased tendency to compete (Cohen et al., 2010). This finding suggests a pernicious cycle of expectations ("The other group will not be trustworthy") and behavioral confirmation ("I need to compete to preempt their non-cooperative nature").

The interindividual intergroup discontinuity has been replicated outside of the lab setting, as well as with competitive and cooperative interactions aside from the PDG matrix (Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1995; Schopler et al., 2001; Wolf et al., 2008). The interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect has also proven to be cross-culturally robust: in fact, the tendency for groups to behave more competitively than individuals is similar across individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Wildschut et al., 2001; Takemura & Yuki, 2002; Derlega et al. 2002)

Furthering the implications of the interindividual intergroup discontinuity, Meier and Hinsz (2003) have found that not only competition, but also aggression is enhanced when a group is the receiver or the giver of the potentially aggressive response. Specifically, these researchers found that when groups and individuals are given the task of deciding how much hot sauce another group or individual must ingest, groups are more likely to choose painful outcomes for others (i.e. large amounts of hot sauce) (Meier & Hinsz, 2003). Interestingly, they also found increased aggression with interactions between an individual and a group: apparently a group does not need to be interacting with another group to see evidence of increased aggression.

CHAPTER 3

EXISTING STEREOTYPES OF GROUPS AND BLACKS

Perception of Groups

Given these behavioral differences of even minimal groups, it would make sense that people would hold different expectations for the behavior of groups as compared to the behavior of individuals. Hoyle, Pinkley, and Insko (1989) found just this: participants asked to consider adjectives they believed would apply to interindividual interactions as compared to intergroup interactions, attributed adjectives related to "abrasiveness" to group interactions and adjectives related to "agreeableness" to interindividual interactions. Given the negativity of both expectations and outcomes involving groups, in the present analyses, I examine how perceptions of groups interact with established race-related stereotypes in an interaction involving a Black group. Are Blacks viewed as a group especially vulnerable to these negative group-based judgments?

Stereotypes of Blacks

Many stereotypes associated with Black individuals are negative in valence: unintelligent, hostile, poor, lazy and dishonest (Devine, 1989; Devine and Eliot, 1995). Broadly, stereotypes can be defined as cognitive representations of culturally held beliefs about individuals based on their group membership (Jost & Hamilton, 2005). Although stereotypes free cognitive energy by simplifying perception of others, these cognitive

shortcuts will inevitably lead to the mischaracterization of some group members. Because of this, stereotyping can lead to not only undesirable, but also inaccurate perceptions of others based on superficial characteristics (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981).

On the surface, America has made substantial progress in the past 50 years in fighting race-related stereotyping and discrimination (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Fewer people are willing to directly express stereotype-based beliefs, and those that do openly express race-related prejudice are more likely to be chastised. As an example, the recent comments of Senate majority leader Harry Reid elicited public outrage. In conjecturing why Obama had found success with the American public, Reid stated it was due to Obama's "light skinned appearance" and speaking patterns "with no Negro dialect unless he wanted to have one." Reid was compelled to apologize due to the public outcry which followed his remarks (Preston, 2010). In relation to this, the fact that Obama has been elected our first Black President, provides a more salient indicator of increased racial tolerance, and may, in and of itself, have positive repercussions for perceptions of Blacks (Plant et al., 2009). Unfortunately, the salience of America's election of Obama may camouflage both more subtle present-day racism, as well as, the continuation of blatant bigotry.

In fact, there are a variety of factors that undermine the positivity of the apparent changes in race- related interactions. For one, the majority of social psychological experiments are run on college sophomores. Because this population tends to be far more liberal than the more general population, levels of direct prejudice may be underestimated (Henry, 2008). In more representative populations, the expression of prejudice toward Blacks has by no means disappeared. A recent national elections survey reflected that individual differences in explicit prejudice were strong predictors of voting for Obama across a variety

of measures of explicit prejudice: feelings of warmth, empathy, and admiration for Blacks, as well as, a battery of items measuring Symbolic Racism (Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, & Tompson, 2010). Therefore, despite the apparent increase in interracial tolerance, emblems of prejudice toward Blacks persist.

CHAPTER 4

MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACKS

In response to the apparent complexity of modern day prejudice expression, measures of racial bias have become more sophisticated; specifically, measures of direct, or explicit, attitudes have become less direct, while a new class of measures which capture indirect, implicit attitudes and stereotyping have gained momentum. In regard to adapted explicit measures, two scales are commonly used: the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and the Symbolic Racism Scale (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Each of these scales addresses an explicit prejudice that is distinct from blatant old- fashioned racism; while old-fashioned racism is marked by openly negative affect toward Blacks, Modern Racism and Symbolic Racism capture a more discrete, although still explicit, level of bias. In particular, Modern Racism contends that the affective and cognitive aspects of prejudice are distinct. Under this form of racism, it is thought that the affective, emotion-laden portion of prejudice is learned early in life and therefore, difficult to overcome—even despite later cognitive disagreement with prejudice (McConahay, Hardee, Batts, 1981; McConahay, 1986). Symbolic Racism, used in the present study, measures underlying prejudice toward Blacks based on the endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate traditional values. These beliefs are strongly driven by a value of individualism, or the obligation of an individual to manage and overcome his or her own struggles. Given this, Symbolic Racism tends to predict political

conservatism, as well as the rejection of pro-black policies such as affirmative action (Sears 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003).

In comparison, measures of implicit attitudes avoid direct reports of attitudes completely by tapping into quick, automatic associations. The early literature on implicit attitudes argued that there were four necessary components necessary to make an attitude implicit. Bargh (1994) described these as the "four horseman" of automaticity: lack of awareness, independence of cognitive resources, lack of controllability, and lack of intention. However, current theory proposes that not all four of these elements must occur for a measure to be described as implicit (see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009, for review). In fact, we have unpublished data showing that participants *are aware* of the bias that they report on an implicit measure, and that how they think about this expression of bias, specifically how much they *own* these implicit attitudes, dictates how they report their biases on a subsequent direct measure (Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 2010). Therefore, the aspects of implicit measures focused on in the present analysis are the latter two components: lack of controllability and independence from the goals and intentions of the respondent.

There are currently myriad measures that can be used to measure implicit race attitudes. These measures include, but are not limited to: the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Go/No Go Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji 2001), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), as well as, a variety of other sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) Of these, the IAT published by Greenwald and colleagues (1998), is one of the most widely used implicit measures. The AMP, used in the

present study, is also gaining popularity as a reliable and valid measure of implicit attitudes which provides large effect sizes.

Although a degree of debate continues as to whether implicit and explicit attitudes represent one underlying attitude or two separate attitudes, many agree that implicit and explicit attitudes may result from separate processing systems (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Snyder, 1977; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In fact, Payne and Stewart (2007), in their process disassociation approach, mathematically separate those portions of our judgments that are automatic (implicit) from those portions that result from controlled (explicit) responding.

Because measures of implicit and explicit attitudes sometimes converge, sometimes diverge, and sometimes overlap only slightly, it is helpful to measure both implicit and explicit attitudes to better capture the mechanisms and processes underlying individuals' prejudices. Given this varying relation between implicit and explicit attitudes, theorists have developed a variety of theories to predict when the two will be related and when they will not. Cunninham, Preacher, & Banaji (2001) have found that using latent variables can greatly reduce the measurement error of implicit measures, which therefore increases implicit-explicit correspondence. Processing capacity, and whether one is assessing personal or extrapersonal associations has also proven useful for understanding implicit-explicit correspondence (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 2010). Finally, structural fit, or matching the procedural components of implicit and explicit measures, improves implicit-explicit correspondence (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).

CHAPTER 5

THE PRESENT RESEARCH

In the present series of studies, I measure both direct, explicit race bias, as well as automatic, implicit bias to examine my expectation of increased stereotyping of Blacks viewed as a group. To boost correspondence between these two types of measures, I increased structural fit by using the same images of Blacks and Whites for both implicit and explicit judgments (see Appendix A). Evidence shows that this process can increase implicit-explicit correspondence.

To measure implicit bias I used the AMP. The AMP's approach to measuring implicit attitudes is to take advantage of the ambiguity associated with the origin of an attitude by measuring to what extent people misattribute attitudes toward photos (such as Black or White individuals or groups) onto subsequent ambiguous objects (such as Chinese pictographs). Participants are asked to ignore the photos which flash before the Chinese pictograph and to judge whether they believe the pictograph is pleasant or unpleasant. The AMP is also flexible in that the response dimensions (pleasant or unpleasant) can be catered to the task at hand (in the present analyses: aggressive or non- aggressive and trustworthy or non-trustworthy).

In Study 1, I tested my primary prediction regarding stereotyping of Blacks viewed as a group. Specifically, I measured explicit and implicit stereotyping of photos of White and Black individuals and White and Black groups on the dimensions of aggression and trust. I hypothesized that Blacks viewed as a group would be particularly likely to be judged as

aggressive and non-trustworthy. In Study 2, I explored the mechanism behind the enhanced

tendency to stereotype Blacks viewed as a group. Specifically, I measured endorsement of

adjectives used to describe interactions between groups as compared to endorsement of

adjectives used to describe interactions between individuals. I predicted that those who

expected intergroup interactions to be particularly abrasive in general would subsequently

feel more justified in expressing bias on an explicit measure (the same used in Study 1) when

rating Black groups

CHAPTER 6

STUDY 1

My goal in the first study was to determine if people are more likely to use stereotypes about Blacks when these Blacks are encountered as a group as opposed to when they are encountered as individuals. I focused on two specific dimensions of racial stereotypes: aggression and trustworthiness. Aggression is relevant to both judgments of groups as well as judgments of Blacks: an identical behavior is perceived as more competitive when executed by a group as compared to when it is executed by an individual, and aggression is a common stereotype of Blacks (Devine & Eliot, 1995; Insko et al. 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2005). Trust is relevant to judgments of groups as well: research has shown a tendency to view groups, and especially those to which we do not belong (outgroups), with distrust (Campbell & Levine, 1961; Cohen et al., 2010). Therefore, I expected White participants, for whom Blacks are a relevant racial outgroup, to judge Black groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Black individuals. I expected this difference to be much greater than a similar tendency to rate White groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White individuals. I measured each participant's attitudes as reported on both implicit and explicit measures in a counterbalanced design.

Method

Participants

Participants were 111 undergraduates (86% White; 9% African American or Black; 8% Asian; 3% Hispanic; 3% Native American or Pacific Islander; 2% Other) at the University of North Carolina- Chapel hill participating for partial course credit. Up to four participants signed up for 60-minute sessions through an internet website for human research participation. Eight participants who reported being able to speak, read, or understand Chinese were eliminated due the difficultly of interpreting their implicit biases: because the AMP uses Chinese symbols as neutral stimuli, being able to read these symbols interferes with their neutrality. Additionally, because I was interested in attitudes toward Blacks, to simplify my interpretations I only analyzed the data of those who self-reported as White. All analyses were run on the remaining 85 participants (22 males; 63 females).

Procedure

Upon arriving to the experiment, participants were seated at a computer in individual cubicles for privacy. After signing an informed consent, the experimenter read a brief explanation of the study to participants.

Participants were told that they would be completing two unrelated tasks on the computer. One task was described as a concentration task (implicit ratings). For the other task, participants were told they would be making judgments about groups and individuals based only on looking at their photos. These two tasks were counterbalanced so that some participants completed the measure of explicit attitudes first and some participants completed the measure of implicit attitudes first. Participants concluded by completing two general measures of race attitudes.

Explicit evaluations

For the explicit measure of stereotyping, participants saw photo primes of Black groups, Black individuals, White groups and White individuals in a 2 (group context: group or individual) x 2 (race: Black or White) within-subjects design. A total of 12 Black individual photos and 12 White individual photos were used; group photos were created by using Adobe Photoshop to put three of the same race individuals into one photo. The background and size of the pictures were standardized across primes; specifically, the background was the hallway of the UNC-Chapel Hill psychology building which supported the explanation that these were prior participants in our experiments.

Each participant was exposed to 6 White individual photos and 6 Black individual photos. The group photos they saw consisted of two White groups of three and 2 Black groups of 3; these groups consisted of the individuals from the photos that participants had not yet been exposed to. This assured that no participant saw a particular individual presented as both an individual, as well as, part of a group. All photos showed only the neck and face of the models, with neutral facial expressions. These photos were previously pilot tested so that Black and White photos were matched on attractiveness and were selected to be highly prototypical of their respective racial category.

Before seeing the photos, participants were told that, even with small amounts of information, people's judgments about others can be quite accurate. Therefore, they were told they would view photos of participants who came into lab last semester to interact in an experimental game. Participants were told that in one version of the prior study, we had individuals sign up so that we would have individuals interacting with other individuals. In another version, the experimenter explained that we had participants sign up in groups of three so that we could have groups interacting with other groups. The interaction was

described as an experimental game that involved opportunities for gaining points by using either cooperative or competitive strategies. This information was verbally stated by the experimenter before the study began; additionally, this information appeared in instructions given by the computer program directly before the explicit judgment portion.

Participants then saw 6 individual Black photos, 6 individual White photos, 2 White group photos and 2 Black group photos created as explained previously. Each photo was shown two times in random order so that participants could answer both how aggressive they found the individual or group in each photo to be, as well as, how trustworthy they found the individual or group to be. These judgments were made on 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) response scales. Because participants were directly reporting their judgments, there was not a need to ask them to make the same judgment multiple times as is common in implicit tasks.

Implicit evaluations (AMP)

To measure implicit attitudes, I used the AMP. The primes were the photos of Black groups, Black individuals, White groups and White individuals used in the explicit task. Contrary to the explicit task, though, participants were asked to ignore the influence of these photos on their judgments. Previous research has shown that it takes as little as 100 ms for the eye to make a full saccade, or left to right motion (Fischer & Weber, 1993). Because it was important that participants had time to see all three group members in the group photo primes, all primes appeared in the center of the screen for a conservative 200 ms. The Chinese pictograph subsequently appeared for 125 ms. A blank gray square followed and remained on the screen until participants made their judgments. Specifically, participants were instructed to choose if the Chinese symbol's meaning was more in line with one of two

English concepts. In one block of trials these judgments involved pressing "Q" for "non trustworthy" or "P" for "trustworthy." In a second block of trials, these judgments involved pressing "Q" for "non aggressive" or "P" for "aggressive." In each of the two blocks, there were 80 randomly ordered trials: 20 trials with Black group photo primes, 20 trials with Black individual photo primes, 20 trials with White group photo primes, and 20 trials with White individual photo primes. All primes were randomly paired with one of 80 unique Chinese pictographs.

Participants were told this task was a concentration task. They were advised to ignore the photo prime and focus on the Chinese symbol. This warning served to make certain that any influences of the photo primes occurred even though participants were instructed to ignore their influence; this increases confidence that differences are indications of automatic influences of attitudes elicited by the photo primes. Participants made judgments about whether the Chinese symbol's meaning was more in line with the English concept of "trustworthy" or "non trustworthy" in one block. In the other block, participants made a similar judgment using "aggressive" or "non aggressive" response options.

Self-report attitude measures

Two self-report measures of racial attitudes completed the study: the Symbolic Racism scale (SRS; Henry & Sears, 2002) and the Internal and External Motivations to Control Prejudice scale (IMS/EMS; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). The SRS is a 10-item scale measuring a subtle form of present day racism: the degree to which individuals resist change to the current racial status quo. The scale measures agreement to items such as "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and

worked their way up. Blacks should do the same." The IMS/EMS is a 10 item assessment of how motivated participants are to control prejudice. Responses were made on a 1(*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) scale. This scale is a combination of both internal motivation (IMS) and external motivation (EMS) subscales. The internal motivation subscale measures intrinsic motivation to control prejudice with items such as "I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me." The external subscale measures extrinsic motivation to control prejudice with items such as "Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people." Previous research has found that these two subscales can have differential impacts on expressions of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).

<div align="center">Results</div>

Scoring of DVs

For explicit judgments of how aggressive photos appeared, I first took separate averages of responses to Black group photos, Black individual photos, White group photos and White individual photos. I then converted these averages into proportions of the maximum possible score to allow comparisons with explicit evaluations in further analyses. Because ratings were on a 1 to 5 scale, I subtracted 1 from all scores to create minimum of 0 and then divided this number by 4. This process was repeated for explicit judgments of how trustworthy each photo appeared.

For implicit judgments of aggressiveness, I looked at the block of 80 AMP trials (20 per type of prime) measuring aggression. I then calculated the proportion of times

participants hit the response key which indicated "aggressive" for Black groups, Black individuals, White groups, and White individuals.

Likewise, for implicit judgments of trustworthiness, I looked at the block of 80 AMP trials measuring trust. I then calculated the proportion of times participants hit the response key which indicated "trustworthy" for each type of prime.

Impact of Groups on Race Bias

Although I counterbalanced measures of implicit and explicit attitudes, I did not observe any effect of order for aggressiveness ratings. Therefore, the remaining analyses are collapsed across order condition. To examine my main hypothesis for aggressiveness judgments, I performed a 2 (Race: Black or White) x 2 (Group: Individual or Group) x 2 (Type of Measure: Implicit or Explicit) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). I found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in Figure 1. Black photos were rated as more aggressive than White photos, $F(1, 84) = 48.23$, $p < .001$, and groups were rated as more aggressive than individuals $F(1, 84) = 23.77$, $p < .001$. Importantly, these main effects were qualified by a significant Race x Group interaction, $F(1, 84) = 16.74$, $p < .001$. Specifically, Black groups were judged as significantly more aggressive than White groups, $F(1, 84) = 59.57$, $p < .001$; likewise, Black individuals were judged as significantly more aggressive than White individuals $F(1,84) = 20.24$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Black groups were judged as significantly more aggressive than Black individuals, $F(1, 84) = 41.43$, $p < .001$, while ratings of White groups did not differ from ratings of White individuals $F(1, 84) = 2.86$, $p = .10$. The three-way, Race x Group x Type of Measure interaction revealed no significant difference between the explicit and implicit measures, $F(1, 84) = 1.64$, $p = .20$. In

sum, Blacks were perceived as more aggressive than Whites, especially when in groups; this racial bias was evident on both explicit and implicit measures.

As with aggressiveness ratings, I did not observe any effect of the order of measures of implicit and explicit attitudes for trustworthiness ratings. Therefore, the remaining analyses are collapsed across order condition. To examine my main hypothesis for trustworthiness judgments, I performed a second 2 (Race: Black or White) x 2 (Group: Individual or Group) x 2 (Type of Measure: Implicit or Explicit) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Again, I found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in Figure 2. Black photos were rated as less trustworthy than White photos, $F(1, 84) = 18.97$, $p < .001$, and groups were rated as less trustworthy than individuals $F(1, 84) = 8.76$, $p < .01$. These main effects were qualified by a significant Race x Group interaction, $F(1, 84) = 8.35$, $p < .01$. Specifically, Black groups were judged as significantly less trustworthy than White groups, $F(1, 84) = 26.89$, $p < .001$; likewise, Black individuals were judged as significantly less trustworthy than White individuals $F(1,84) = 5.83$, $p = .02$. Additionally, Black groups were judged as significantly less trustworthy than Black individuals $F(1, 84) = 13.75$, $p < .001$, while ratings of White groups did not differ from ratings of White individuals $F(1, 84) = .322$, $p = .57$. As with aggression, the Race x Group x Type of Measure interaction revealed no significant differences based on type of measure, $F(1, 84) = .576$, $p = .45$. In sum, Blacks were perceived as less trustworthy than Whites, especially when in groups; as with aggression ratings, this racial bias was evident on both explicit and implicit measures.

Discussion

Past research has established that groups are perceived differently from individuals. In their work on universal stereotypes, Campbell & Levine (1961), proposed that cross-

culturally, outgroups, or groups to which we do not belong, are perceived as "aggressive and expansionistic" and with sentiments such as "they will cheat us if they can" (Campbell & Levine, 1961; Levine, 1965). More recently, the interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect has found that, in the context of a PDG, groups behave more competitively than individuals (Insko et al., 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001; Meier & Hinsz, 2004; Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, & Wildschut, 2008). A mediator of this increased competition between two groups, as compared to the level of competition between two individuals, is the tendency to view groups with more distrust (Cohen et al., 2010). Likewise, previous research has found similar race-based stereotypes of Blacks. Although, in modern times, people are less likely to *endorse* stereotypes of Blacks, a majority report *knowledge* of the common stereotypes of Blacks; one prominent stereotype involves viewing Blacks as aggressive (Devine, 1989; Devine & Eliot, 1995).

Consistent with this literature, I predicted that race-related biases would interact with relevant outgroup biases, to create exacerbated stereotyping for Blacks viewed as a group. Specifically, I predicted that White subjects would view Blacks groups as particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy. I found support for my hypothesis through two main effects and an interaction: groups were judged as more aggressive and less trustworthy than individuals, Blacks were judged as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Whites, and the detrimental effect of seeing Blacks as a group was much stronger than the effect of seeing Whites as a group. In other words, Black groups were judged as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups, and this difference was significantly larger than a similar tendency to rate Black individuals as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White

individuals. Unfortunately, these findings seem to imply that multiple Blacks, viewed as a group, may be especially susceptible to stereotypical judgments.

As stated earlier, because of increasingly strong norms that overtly endorsing race biases is not socially acceptable, I expected that participants would express less bias on an explicit measure than on an implicit measure such as the AMP. Contrary to this prediction, however, both the measure of implicit race attitudes as well as the measure of explicit race attitudes showed exacerbated stereotyping of Black groups. Although some evidence suggests that explicit stereotyping has not diminished as much as we may think, it is rare to see such extreme explicit reports of stereotyping among a liberally biased college population.

There are a variety of suggestions why explicit and implicit measures would or would not be correlated. Some theories propose that implicit and explicit measures will show distinct results when motivations and opportunity to control prejudice are present (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). Motivations to control prejudice are predicted to have an impact on deliberate, explicit judgments, due to the fact that participants have time and capacity to take their motivations into account. Measures of implicit attitudes are thought to measure attitudes that are too automatic for motivations to intervene. Contrary to this hypothesis, participants in the current study were high in motivations to control prejudice, yet still showed strong explicit biases. Why might participants, who were relatively high in motivations to control prejudice, feel so uniformly comfortable expressing extreme bias on a direct measure? I considered two plausible explanations for this finding.

First, I was asking participants to make judgments based on minimal information: specifically, participants made ratings of photos of individuals and photos of groups and were

told that people can be quite accurate at making judgments about others based on small amounts of information (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Rule & Ambady, 2010; Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010). Therefore, I may have been inadvertently encouraging participants to consider their gut reactions to be valid. Thus, on the direct measure, a photo of a Black group may have appeared on the screen asking for a judgment of how aggressive the group appeared. Participants may have felt an automatic negative reaction to this photo, and, instead of correcting for this quick reaction, they may have felt encouraged to accept their primary reaction as valid. Our previous research has indicated that thoughts about one's implicit reactions can impact their correlation with explicit reports (Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 2010).

This explanation, however, does not account for the finding that participants seemed to feel particularly comfortable rating Black groups as aggressive and non- trustworthy, above and beyond bias expressed toward Black individuals. The difference between bias expressed toward White and Black groups was significantly greater than the difference between bias expressed toward White and Black individuals. Therefore, I suspect that while accepting one's gut reaction as valid may account for some of the comfort in expressing bias directly, that it does not fully account for the explicit findings.

Secondly, research has shown that certain forms of racism function by heightening sensitivity to "nonracial factors that can justify, rationalize, or legitimize behavior that more generally disadvantages Blacks relative to Whites" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The Justification-Suppression model of the expression of prejudice provides a framework that would explain my counterintuitive results. In their research, Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argue that individuals, early in development, are exposed to

and absorb prejudice toward racial outgroups. However, they argue, norms of tolerance and appropriate expression cause most to suppress these ingrained prejudices. They hypothesize that prejudice is only expressed when there is a race-irrelevant justification such as religion, political orientation, or situational ambiguity. For example, Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) found that when choosing between two rooms in which to watch a movie, one room with a disabled person already occupying it, participants were more likely to avoid the disabled person if they could attribute it to wanting to see an alternate movie (i.e. a different movie was playing in each theatre). However, if both theatres were playing the same movie, participants did not show an avoidance of the handicapped occupant. In other words, the preference of one movie over the other, when available, was used as a justification for a choice that was clearly based on differential responding to a disabled person. To extend this justification- suppression argument to the present study, it seems plausible that participants are using the fact that they are judging a group as a justification for extreme judgments of aggression and non-trustworthiness of Blacks viewed as a group. I would expect that those participants who are high in other measures of racism would be most likely to look for, and use, justifications for suppressing prejudice. In other words, I thought my hypothesis may be particularly likely among those with higher racial bias.

Study 2 aimed to test this hypothesis by looking at expectations about interactions between groups as compared to expectations about interactions between individuals, independent of race, as a moderator of direct racial bias as expressed through ratings of photos of White and Black groups.

CHAPTER 7

STUDY 2

In Study 2 I examined whether negative expectations about groups in general function as a justification for race-related stereotyping. In line with the Justification- Suppression model of the expression of prejudice, Study 2 examined whether race-irrelevant justifications for prejudice (in this case, the degree to which participants believe that groups are abrasive), moderate overt expressions of negative beliefs about Blacks. Specifically, Study 2 examined ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness of photos of groups with the Race (Black or White) of the groups as a within subjects variable. I also measured the degree to which participants expect groups to be more abrasive than individuals as a continuous moderator of the effect of race on judgments of groups.

Previous research has shown that participants expect hypothetical interactions between groups to be more abrasive and less agreeable than hypothetical interactions between individuals (Hoyle et al., 1989). This tendency holds even when participants are expecting to take part in the interactions themselves (Hoyle et al., 1989). In this study, I predicted that negative expectations about groups in general would serve as a justification for expressing prejudice and would moderate the degree of bias expressed on subsequent explicit ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness of White and Black groups. Specifically, I

expected that participants who believe interactions between groups are particularly abrasive would be more likely to show race- related stereotyping of Black groups.

While I did not have a specific hypothesis about individual difference variables that may enhance the use of justifications to express prejudice, an open question for exploration was whether the use of justifications to directly express racial prejudice may be related to other measures of racism. To examine this question, I included a measure of Symbolic Racism. Symbolic Racism measures a more subtle form of explicit racism by measuring underlying prejudice toward Blacks based on the endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate traditional values. These beliefs are strongly driven by a belief in the obligation of an individual to manage and overcome his or her own struggles. Given the relevance of this scale, I included Symbolic Racism scores in relevant analyses to explore whether the tendency to use negative group expectations as a justification of explicit racial bias varies based on levels of underlying racial attitudes. In other words, in addition to looking at moderation of explicit race bias by expectations about groups, I also measured Symbolic Racism in order to explore individual differences in the use of justifications. It seems possible that having justifications available may allow participants to feel comfortable expressing their underlying racial attitudes in their ratings of photos of Black and White groups.

To verify that negative group expectations are operating as a justification of explicit prejudice, I also included a measure of implicit stereotyping. Under my hypothesis, I would expect that negative expectations about groups in general may serve as a justification or moderator of an explicit tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups; however, I would not expect that justifications would be

related to implicit stereotyping. As described above, measures of implicit attitudes function by interfering with conscious corrections of automatic attitudes. Therefore, I predicted that negative expectations about groups would moderate explicit prejudice but not implicit prejudice.

Method

Participants

Participants were 113 undergraduates (63 % White; 11% African American or Black; 19% Asian; 4% Hispanic; 1% Native American or Pacific Islander; 2% Other) at the University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill participating for partial course credit. Up to five participants signed up for 60-minute sessions through an internet website for human research participation. Because my interest in the use of justifications for expressing racial prejudice may operate differently if a participant is Black, to simplify interpretations I ran all analyses on non-Black participants. Analyses were run on the remaining 101 participants (73% female; 27% male).

Procedure

Upon arriving to the experiment, participants were seated at a computer in individual cubicles for privacy. After signing an informed consent, participants completed a series of tasks prompted by the computer in front of them.

First participants read that they would be completing two unrelated tasks on the computer. In the first task, participants learned that researchers are interested in their expectations about interactions between individuals and their expectations about interactions between groups. Participants then reported the degree to which they endorse a series of

29

adjectives in describing interactions between individuals and interactions between groups.

The same photos of Black and White groups used in Study 1 followed. Specifically,

participants were told that people can be quite accurate at making judgments about others

based on small amounts of information; for that reason, participants learned that researchers

are interested in their ratings of photos of groups who had interacted in an experimental game

the previous semester. I expected that those who endorsed more adjectives related to

abrasiveness in respect to interactions between groups as compared to interactions between

individuals on the general measure of expectations subsequently would feel more justified to

report Black groups as particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy as compared to White

groups.

The second portion of the experiment was described as a concentration task (implicit

ratings). As in Study 1, I measured implicit attitudes by using an AMP. After completing the

AMP, participants completed two questionnaires measuring general race attitudes.

Measure of General Expectations

The measure of general expectations of interactions between groups as compared to

interactions between individuals was adapted from Hoyle et al., (1989). In their studies,

participants were asked to rate 14 adjectives on 1 (*almost never applies*) to 9 (*almost always*

applies) scales to reflect how much they believed each adjective applied to interindividual or

intergroup interactions. To examine the factor structure of these adjectives, Hoyle and

colleagues performed an exploratory factor analysis, which was then confirmed on a

withheld portion of the initial sample in a confirmatory factor analysis. The authors found

that the adjectives loaded onto two distinct factors: Agreeableness (Helpful, Loyal,

Forgiving, Unselfish, Patient, Trustworthy, Cooperative) and Abrasiveness (Proud,

Competitive, Overconfident, Aggressive, Demanding, Boastful, Domineering).

This procedure was adapted from its original pencil and paper format for use as a

computer-based questionnaire in the present study. Specifically, participants were first told

that researchers were interested in their expectations of interactions between individuals and

their expectations of interactions between groups. In the following portion, participants were

told to report how much they endorsed each adjective as descriptive of interactions between

individuals on the 1 to 9 scale. Each adjective appeared on the computer screen alone with a

scale; once participants made their rating for that adjective, the next adjective appeared with

the same 1 to 9 response scale. Participants then repeated this series of 14 judgments for

expectations of interactions between groups.

Explicit evaluations

The explicit measure of stereotyping replicated the one used in Study 1 with one

minor exception. Because my interest was to explore my finding that groups of Blacks, as

compared to individual Blacks, may be particularly vulnerable to stereotypes, I simplified the

design by eliminating judgments of photos of Black and White individuals. Therefore,

participants made ratings on a randomized series of the 4 photos of Black groups and the 4

photos of White groups used in Study 1. In one block of judgments, all 8 photos were rated

on how aggressive the group in the photo appeared on a 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) scale.

In another block, all photos were rated on how trustworthy the group in the photo appeared

on a 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) scale. Photos appeared in a random order.

*Sel*f-*report attitude measures*

I used the Symbolic Racism Scale as my self-report measure of racial attitudes (SRS; Henry & Sears, 2002). As discussed previously, I wanted to explore the possibility that the use of justifications may be particularly likely for those who hold negative race related beliefs.

Results

Scoring of Continuous Moderators

To understand participants' general expectations about groups as compared to individuals, I first examined whether groups were rated as more abrasive than individuals on the measure of general expectations. Replicating previous work using this scale, I found that overall, participants expected interactions between groups (M =5.62, SD =1.25) to be more abrasive than interactions between individuals (M =5.17, SD = 1.27), $F(1,100) = 7.341$, $p = .008$, $\eta^2 = .068$.

Given that abrasiveness has been found to be a unique factor in previous work using the scale, I created an individual difference variable of expectations of abrasiveness of interactions between groups as compared to expectations of the abrasiveness of interactions between individuals. Specifically, I subtracted the average score on the abrasiveness factor when rating individuals, from the same score in regard to groups; higher values of this moderator indicated that a participant viewed interactions between groups as more abrasive than interactions between individuals ($M = .444$, $SD = 1.65$). To create the Symbolic Racism variable, I summed scores across the ten items that make up the Symbolic Racism scale ($M = 23$, $SD = 4.67$).

Main analyses

Explicit evaluations of aggressiveness were scored as the proportion of the maximum rating of aggressiveness as in Study 1. To examine explicit racial bias for aggressiveness ratings, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. All covariates were standardized before entering them into the ANOVA. I found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in Figure 3. Photos of Black groups ($M = .49$ $SD = .18$) were rated as more aggressive than photos of White groups ($M = .34$ $SD = .18$), $F(1, 97) = 80.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .452$.

Having established race related bias in aggressiveness ratings, I examined the interaction of this racial bias with the two continuous moderators. The tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than White groups was not moderated by general expectations about groups, $F(1, 97) = .769$, $p = .383$. However, the tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than White groups was moderated by Symbolic Racism as I might expect: those who were higher in Symbolic Racism showed more racial bias, $F(1, 97) = 4.43$, $p = .038$. Finally, the interaction of general group expectations with Symbolic Racism also significantly moderated the tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than White groups: $F(1, 97) = 4.8$, $p = .031$. Simple effects analyses showed that among those high in the expectation that groups are abrasive, Symbolic Racism moderated the level of racial bias such that those who were high in Symbolic Racism showed significantly more racial bias than those who were low in Symbolic Racism, $t(4, 93) = 3.20$, $p = .03$. On the other hand, for those who were low in the expectation that groups are abrasive, racial bias expressed toward Black groups did not differ based on levels of Symbolic Racism, $t(4, 93) = 1.026$, $p = .363$ (see Figure 4).

Explicit evaluations of trustworthiness were scored as the proportion of the maximum

rating of trustworthiness as in Study 1. To examine explicit race bias for trustworthiness

ratings, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of

variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their

interaction entered as continuous covariates. All covariates were standardized before entering

them into the ANOVA. Again, I found support for my main hypothesis such that Black

groups ($M = .38$, $SD = .15$) were rated as less trustworthy than White groups ($M = .42$, $SD =$

.13), $F(1, 97) = 5.992$, $p = .016$, $\eta^2 = .058$ (see Figure 5).

Looking at moderation analyses, the effects of both continuous moderators were

significant. Symbolic Racism predicted the tendency to rate Black groups as less trustworthy

than White groups, $F(1, 97) = 13.12$, $p < .001$. More importantly, the tendency to rate Black

groups as less trustworthy than White groups was moderated by general expectations about

groups, $F(1, 97) = 5.08$, $p = .027$. There was no three way interaction: $F(2, 97) = .335$, $p =$

.564 (see Table 1). In total, these results indicate that the tendency to rate Black groups as

less trustworthy than White groups is related to both high Symbolic Racism and the tendency

to have general expectations that groups are abrasive, but not the interaction of these two

moderators.

Additional Analyses

Although not central to my hypothesis, I ran a series of additional analyses on

implicit ratings of Black and White groups. Because implicit measures avoid the same

conscious deliberation available on an explicit measure, I did not expect justifications to

work in the same way on my measure of implicit attitudes.

Implicit bias was calculated as the proportion of the maximum rating of aggression as in Study 1. These analyses of implicit ratings involved eliminating an additional 11 participants: 9 participants who reported being able to read Chinese (due to the use of Chinese symbols on the AMP), and 3 participants who did not follow task directions for the implicit measure and pressed the same button for all stimuli. The following analyses were run on the remaining 90 participants.

To examine implicit ratings of aggressiveness, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. All covariates were standardized before entering them into the ANOVA. As with explicit bias, on a measure of implicit attitudes, participants showed a tendency to associate "aggressive" more often with Black groups ($M = .50$, $SD = .161$) than with White groups ($M = .44$, $SD = .139$), $F(1, 86) = 7.315$, $p = .008$, $\eta^2 = .078$.

Further supporting my hypothesis that participants were consciously using justifications to express explicit bias, moderation analyses that were significant for explicit bias were not significant for implicit bias. Implicit bias was not moderated by general expectations about groups, $F(1, 86) = 1.824$, $p = .18$, nor Symbolic Racism, $F(1, 86) = .569$, $p = .453$. Additionally, the interaction of group expectations with Symbolic Racism also did not reach significance, $F(1, 86) = 2.428$, $p = .123$.

To examine implicit ratings of trustworthiness, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. All

covariates were standardized before entering them into the ANOVA. As with explicit bias, on a measure of implicit attitudes, participants showed a tendency to associate "trustworthy" more often with White groups ($M = .56$, $SD = .134$) than with Black groups ($M = .52$, $SD = .167$), $F(1, 86) = 3.842$, $p = .053$, $\eta^2 = .043$.

Further supporting my hypotheses that participants were consciously using justifications to express explicit bias, moderation analyses involving general expectations about groups that were significant for explicit bias were not significant for implicit bias. While implicit race bias was moderated by Symbolic Racism, $F(1, 86) = 5.88$, $p = .017$, implicit bias was not moderated by general expectations about groups, $F(1, 86) = .03$, $p = .864$. Additionally, the interaction of general expectations about groups with Symbolic Racism did not reach significance, $F(1, 86) = 0.67$, $p = .796$.

Discussion

Study 2 simplified my Study 1 design to replicate the finding that on an explicit measure, Black groups would be rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than comparable White groups. Following my hypotheses, Study 2 results demonstrated that participants are willing to express racial bias toward groups on an explicit measure: Black groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups.

In Study 2, I also explored a potential mechanism behind this explicit racial bias. I hypothesized that explicit racial bias expressed toward Black groups may operate through the use of justifications for expressing prejudice. In particular, I expected that negative expectations about groups in general may moderate racial bias expressed toward Black groups. Further I thought it was possible that justifications may be sought out most by those who display other forms of subtle racism—specifically as measured by a Symbolic Racism

scale. Symbolic Racism measures a more subtle form of racism by measuring underlying negative affect toward Blacks based on the endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate traditional values. As predicted, results indicated that general expectations that groups are abrasive moderate levels of racial bias expressed toward Black groups on an explicit measure. However, there were slightly different patterns of moderation depending on whether subjects were rating groups on aggressiveness or trustworthiness.

In the case of aggression, the tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than White groups on an explicit measure was moderated by the interaction of Symbolic Racism and negative group expectations. Those who were high in the expectation that groups are abrasive and high in Symbolic Racism expressed significantly more racial bias than those who were high in the expectation that groups are abrasive but low in Symbolic Racism. I interpreted these findings as indicating that expectations that groups in general are abrasive serves as a justification for people to express their underlying racial attitudes (as measured by the Symbolic Racism Scale) on explicit ratings of Black groups.

In the case of trust, the tendency to rate Black groups as less trustworthy than White groups on an explicit measure was moderated by negative expectations about groups and Symbolic Racism individually, but not by their interaction. While I thought it was possible that high levels of Symbolic Racism may make individuals particularly aware of, and likely to use justifications for expressing prejudice, I did not expect the role of Symbolic Racism to vary based on type of rating (i.e. aggressiveness or trustworthiness).

To explain this unexpected difference, it seems possible that the two adjectives I used were differentially tied to knowledge of stereotypes of Blacks. While aggressiveness is a

well-known stereotype of Blacks, trust is more generally related to outgroups (Devine, 1989; Devine and Eliot, 1995). Therefore it may be that aggressiveness ratings are interpreted as a more race-relevant judgment than trustworthiness ratings. It follows that ratings of aggressiveness may be a more likely candidate to interact with levels of Symbolic Racism because aggression is a distinct stereotype of Blacks. In line with this explanation, use of negative expectations about groups as a justification for racial bias depended on levels of Symbolic Racism for aggressiveness ratings, but not for trustworthiness ratings.

My findings were further supported by examining parallel moderation analyses of implicit racial bias. I found that while Black groups were more associated with the term "aggressive" and less associated with the term "trustworthy" as compared to White groups on a measure of implicit attitudes, negative expectations about groups did not moderate implicit racial bias. I did not expect the use of justifications to operate on implicit attitudes, as measures of these attitudes capture reactions that take place before conscious deliberation can occur.

CHAPTER 8

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present two studies expand upon knowledge of intergroup conflict and race stereotyping by examining perceptions of Blacks who are viewed as a group. In Study 1 I found that for both implicit and explicit ratings, Black groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Black individuals. Importantly, this tendency was significantly larger than a similar tendency to rate White groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White individuals. While I expected racial bias on a measure of implicit attitudes, I were surprised to see equally strong levels of racial bias on a measure of explicit attitudes in a college population that tends to be motivated to control prejudice.

Study 2 explored the mechanisms behind my Study 1 findings of strong explicit bias toward Black groups. I first simplified my design by looking only at explicit perceptions of Black and White groups. Again indicating explicit racial bias, I found that Black groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups. Further I discovered that negative expectations about groups in general played a strong role in the expression of racial bias. For aggressiveness ratings, negative expectations about groups in general moderated the degree to which participants expressed their racial attitudes (as indicated by Symbolic Racism scores) in their ratings of photos of Black and White groups. In particular, those who were high in the expectation that groups in general are abrasive and also high in Symbolic

Racism expressed the most racial bias in aggressiveness judgments. For trustworthiness ratings, those who were high in the expectation that groups are abrasive showed the most racial bias, regardless of levels of Symbolic Racism. I interpreted these findings as indicating that negative expectations about groups in general may serve as one justification people use to express particularly negative judgments of Blacks viewed as a group.

Theoretical Contribution

Our findings both contribute to existing theories about interactions between groups as well as build upon theories of how racial bias toward Blacks is expressed. First, replicating prior work of Hoyle et al. (1989), I found that people hold negative general expectations about interactions between groups. Specifically, with no other information about the groups or individuals available, purely imagining interactions between groups and then purely imagining interactions between individuals leads to differential perceptions: hypothetical interactions between groups are more strongly associated with negative adjectives such as "hostile" and "domineering" as compared to hypothetical interactions between individuals. Other research shows that these negative expectations about groups seem to be based on true differences in how groups behave. In the Robbers Cave studies, for example, Sherif and colleagues (1961) show that dividing otherwise similar boys into groups at a summer camp created surprising levels of aggression and even violence between the two groups in subsequent camp games. Extending these findings to the lab, work on the interindividual intergroup discontinuity shows consistently that groups behave more competitively than individuals (Insko et al., 1994). These findings have been extended to actual aggression within the lab (Meier & Hinsz, 2003) and have been found cross culturally (Takemura & Yuki, 2002). Therefore the present replication of the finding that people expect groups to be

40

more abrasive than individuals becomes more understandable when one considers that these perceptions may sometimes be quite accurate: groups *do* behave differently than individuals.

Given my interpretation that these negative expectations about groups serve as a justification for expressing explicit racial bias toward Black groups, the current findings also extend the Justification- Suppression theory of prejudice. As Crandall & Eshleman (2003) proposed, people seem willing to express their race related beliefs as long as race irrelevant justifications (in this case, negative expectations about groups in general) are available. In the present study, group membership was experimentally combined with race to explore how Black groups are perceived. While Black individuals may elicit negative judgments when certain justifications are available, Black groups seem to elicit a distinct use of justifications. In fact, the present studies show that the mere fact that multiple Blacks are viewed together allows participants who are otherwise motivated to control prejudice to feel justified in expressing negative beliefs based on race. In other words, it seems possible that some participants are rating Black groups as particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy while maintaining that these ratings are unrelated to skin color; instead they may contend that their negative ratings stem from their belief that groups are generally up to no good.

Given that humans are a group dwelling species and that people seek out others who are similar to themselves, the fact that Blacks appearing as a group are particularly vulnerable to explicit racial bias is problematic. One way to tackle this racial bias may be to encourage recategorization of Black groups into a superordinate group which is independent of race and which includes the participant as a group member. Previous research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model shows that categorizing outgroups into higher order groups to which the participant belongs, reduces bias expressed toward former outgroup members

(Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzoc & Matoka, 1997). For example, in the context of the present study, encouraging participants to think of the groups of Blacks as part of the more inclusive group of University of Chapel Hill undergraduates would allow White participants to have a common ingroup identity with the Black groups in the photos (i.e. school affiliation). Because negative expectations about groups probably only applies to outgroups, a common ingroup identity may decrease the availability of this justification for expressing explicit racial bias toward Black groups.

A different approach to eliminating the negative explicit bias expressed toward Black groups may stem from research on the Cross Race Effect. The Cross Race Effect refers to a well-established perceptual bias in which those who are of another race appear more similar to one another than do members of our own race: in other words this effect refers to the idea that we more easily individuate ingroup members than outgroup members (Chance & Goldstein, 1996; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). As an example, these studies indicate that a White individual will tend to have a harder time recognizing individuating features of a Black individual than of another White individual. Research also indicates that the more similar members of a group seem, the more "group-like" they are perceived to be (Crawford, Sherman & Hamilton, 2002). Combining this with the Cross Race Effect, it seems possible that Black groups may seem more "group-like" than White groups (assuming perceivers are White) due to a greater difficulty in individuating racial outgroups. Therefore, a second potential strategy to reduce the expression of racial bias toward Black groups could be the use of individuation, or the focus on the individual rather than the group. In line with this idea, research on the Cross Race Effect has shown that individuation training (i.e. training skills that help individuate cross race others) minimizes difficulty in individuating outgroup

members (McGugin, Tanaka, Lebrecht, Tarr, & Gauthier, 2011; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool 2007). Therefore, training participants to distinguish among others of another race and emphasizing a focus on one individual in the group rather than the whole group, may help to eliminate the salience of group membership and prevent its use as a justification for expressing explicit racial bias.

Measurement Implications

On a measurement level, these findings also raise interesting questions about the type of stimuli that should be used in experiments to best capture racial attitudes. Because explicit racial bias expressed toward groups correlated quite strongly with Symbolic Racism (more strongly, although not significantly, than racial bias expressed toward individuals), it seems possible that explicit bias toward Black groups rather than explicit bias toward Black individuals, may be a better proxy of individuals' race attitudes. In other words, because scales that measure explicit prejudice such as Symbolic Racism and motivations to control prejudice generally ask for attitudes toward "Blacks" as a group, ratings of Black groups may be a more accurate way of measuring race stereotyping. Future studies could more formally investigate whether explicit ratings of Black groups show greater convergent validity with explicit measures of prejudice than do explicit ratings of Black individuals. This could have implications for how racial bias is measured in the lab in the future.

Practical Implications

On a more practical level, the present findings have implications for inter-race conflict in general. When race conflict arises, Blacks are often viewed as a group--united by skin color, beliefs, friendships, and motive. Given the present finding that racial bias is

exacerbated when applied toward Black groups, we can begin to imagine a pernicious cycle of conflict escalation between groups of different races. Some evidence for this potential pattern of conflict escalation comes from work on the interindividual intergroup discontinuity. These studies have shown that groups behave more competitively and less cooperatively than individuals. Additionally, this competitive behavior between interacting groups has been found to be mediated by a lack of trust for groups (Cohen et al., 2010). Mixing these findings with my current findings, if a White group had the expectation that actions undertaken by a Black group would be particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy this could lead White group members to behave in a way that elicits more negative behavior from Black groups. Therefore, interactions with groups of Blacks may more easily fall into a pattern of increasing anger and lack of trust based on racially biased expectations. Future studies could examine patterns of behavior within actual interactions between groups of different races.

A related question is whether groups that differ based on affiliation with different nations will exhibit particularly lethal levels of conflict when these two nations are predominantly different races. This line of thought stems from the idea that nations are inherently conceptualized as groups and frequently differ in skin color. For example, do the present findings imply that a conflict between England and America (both predominantly light-skinned) would be less violent than a conflict between Africa and America (predominantly dark-skinned and predominantly light-skinned, respectively)? In reaction to the present findings, it seems possible that nations may encounter more intense conflict from others who do not share their racial identity than from others who do share their racial identity-- holding constant for ideological differences. Future directions could examine this

44

potential by looking at records of international conflict and examining if wars have more violent outcomes when the combating nations are of different races.

Overall, the present studies help to clarify how Blacks are perceived. These findings indicate the need to explore both theoretical and practical applications. Theoretically, it is important to understand how using groups as compared to individual stimuli changes the meaning of ratings as well as their relation with general measures of racial attitudes such as Symbolic Racism. Practically, the current findings help to clarify how negative, explicit perceptions of Black groups may contribute to intense intergroup conflict between different races. Hopefully we can use this information to create more effective interventions for reducing conflict between groups of different races.

Table 1. Moderation of Explicit Racial Bias for Trustworthiness Judgments by Group Expectations and Symbolic Racism, Study 2

Race Bias (Z) for Trustworthiness Ratings

Predictor	B	SE	T	p-value
Constant	.011	.094	.115	.909
Group Expectations (GE)	.212	.093	2.281	.025
Symbolic Racism (SR)	.339	.094	3.591	.001
GE X SR	-.053	.091	-.579	.564

Note: *B*'s are unstandardized regression coefficients. All variables were standardized before being entered into the regression.

Figure 1. Rated aggressiveness of groups and individuals of different races.

Figure 2. Rated trustworthiness of groups and individuals of different races.

Figure 3. Rated aggressiveness of Black and White groups.

Figure 4. Moderation of aggressiveness ratings by Symbolic Racism and general expectations about groups.

Figure 5. Rated trustworthiness of Black and White groups.

REFERENCES

Allport, G. W. (2000). The nature of prejudice. In C. Stangor, C. Stangor (Eds.), Stereotypes and prejudice: Essential readings (pp. 20-48). New York, NY US: Psychology Press.

Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1993). Half a minute: Predicting teacher evaluations from thin slices of nonverbal behavior and physical attractiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64(3), 431-441.

Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In R. r. Wyer, T. K. Srull, R. r. Wyer, T. K. Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of social cognition, Vol. 1: Basic processes; Vol. 2: Applications (2nd ed.)* (pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Baumeister, R. F., & Mark, L.R. (2005). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3), 497-529.

Brown, R. J., Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1980). Minimal group situations and intergroup discriminations: Comments on the paper by Aschenbrenner and Schaefer. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 10(4), 399-414.

Campbell, D. T., & Levine, R. A. (1961). A proposal for cooperative cross-cultural research on ethnocentrism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 582-108.

Chance, J.E., & Goldstein, A.G. (1996). The other-race effect and eyewitness identification. In S. Sporer, R. S. Malpass, G. Koehnken, S. Sporer, R. S. Malpass, G. Koehnken (Eds.), *Psychological issues in eyewitness identification* (pp. 153-176). Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Cohen, T. R., Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2010). How communication increases interpersonal cooperation in mixed-motive situations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 46(1), 39-50.

Coon, C. S. (1946). The universality of natural groupings in human societies. *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 20163-168.

Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3), 414-446.

Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., & Hamilton, D. L. (2002). Perceived entitativity, stereotype formation, and the interchangeability of group members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(5), 1076-1094.

Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 87(3), 546-563.

Cunningham, W. A., Preacher, K. J., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitude measures: Consistency, stability, and convergent validity. *Psychological Science*, 12(2), 163-170.

De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009). Implicit measures: A normative analysis and review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 135(3), 347-368.

Derlega, V. J., Cukur, C., Kuang, J. C., & Forsyth, D. R. (2002). Interdependent construal of self and the endorsement of conflict resolution strategies in interpersonal, intergroup and international disputes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 33(6), 610-625.

Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(1), 5-18.

Devine, P. G., & Elliot, A. J. (1995). Are racial stereotypes really fading? The Princeton trilogy revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21(11), 1139-1150.

Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60(6), 817-830.

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Validzic, A., & Matoka, K. (1997). Extending the benefits of recategorization: Evaluations, self-disclosure, and helping. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *33*(4), 401-420.

Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice   and interracial interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(1), 62-68.

Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual difference measure of motivation to control prejudiced reactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23(3), 316-326.

Fazio, R. H. (1990). A practical guide to the use of response latency in social psychological research. In C. Hendrick, M. S. Clark, C. Hendrick, M. S. Clark (Eds.), *Research methods in personality and social psychology* (pp. 74-97). Thousand Oaks, CA US: Sage Publications, Inc.

Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobstrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69(6), 1013-1027.

Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and uses. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 54297-327.

Fazio, R. H., & Towles-Schwen, T. (1999). The MODE model of attitude-behavior processes. In S. Chaiken, Y. Trope, S. Chaiken, Y. Trope (Eds.) , *Dual-process theories in social psychology* (pp. 97-116). New York, NY US: Guilford Press.

Fischer, B., & Weber, H. H. (1993). Express saccades and visual attention. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 16(3), 553-610.

Freeman, J. B., Johnson, K. L., Ambady, N., & Rule, N. O. (2010). Sexual orientation perception involves gendered facial cues. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36(10), 1318-1331.

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio, S. L. Gaertner, J. F. Dovidio, S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 61-89). San Diego, CA US: Academic Press.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 4. pp. 1–26). New York:Wiley.

Gaertner, L., & Insko, C. A. (2000). Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation, or fear?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(1), 77-94.

Gaertner, L., & Insko, C. A. (2001). On the measurement of social orientations in the minimal group paradigm: Norms as moderators of the expression of intergroup bias. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 31(2), 143-154.

Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2007). Unraveling the processes underlying evaluation: Attitudes from the perspective of the APE model. *Social Cognition*, 25(5), 687-717.

Gigone, D., & Hastie, R. (1997). The impact of information on small group choice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72(1), 132-140.

Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological Review*, 102(1), 4-27.

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), 1464-1480.

Gruenfeld, D. H., & Hollingshead, A. B. (1993). Sociocognition in work groups: The evolution of group integrative complexity and its relation to task performance. *Small Group Research*, 24(3), 383-405

Henry, P. J. (2008). College sophomores in the laboratory redux: Influences of a narrow data base on social psychology's view of the nature of prejudice. *Psychological Inquiry*, 19(2), 49-71.

Hill, G. W. (1982). Group versus individual performance: Are N + 1 heads better than one?. *Psychological Bulletin*, 91(3), 517-539.

Hoyle, R. H., Pinkley, R. L., & Insko, C. A. (1989). Perceptions of social behavior: Evidence of differing expectations for interpersonal and intergroup interaction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 15(3), 365-376.

Hugenberg, K., Miller, J., & Claypool, H. M. (2007). Categorization and individuation in the cross-race recognition deficit: Toward a solution to an insidious problem. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *43*(2), 334-340.

Insko, C. A., Kirchner, J. L., Pinter, B., Efaw, J., & Wildschut, T. (2005). Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity as a Function of Trust and Categorization: The Paradox of Expected Cooperation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88(2), 365-385.

Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (1987). Categorization, competition, and collectivity. In C. Hendrick, C. Hendrick (Eds.), *Group processes* (pp. 213-251). Thousand Oaks, CA US: Sage Publications, Inc.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Drigotas, S. M., & Graetz, K. A. (1993). The role of communication in interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1), 108-138.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Graetz, K. A., & Drigotas, S. M. (1994). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the prisoner's dilemma game. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(1), 87-116.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Hoyle, R. H., Dardis, G. J., & Graetz, K. A. (1990). Individual-group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(1), 68-79.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Kennedy, J. F., & Dahl, K. R. (1992). Individual-group discontinuity from the differing perspectives of Campbell's Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 55(3), 272-291.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Pemberton, M. B., Wieselquist, J., McIlraith, S. A., Currey, D. P., & Gaertner, L. (1998). Long-term outcome maximization and the reduction of interindividual–intergroup discontinuity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(3), 695-711.

Jost, J. T., & Hamilton, D. L. (2005). Stereotypes in Our Culture. In J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, L. A. Rudman, J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, L. A. Rudman (Eds.) , *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport* (pp. 208-224).

Kameda, T., & Tindale, R. (2006). Groups as Adaptive Devices: Human Docility and Group Aggregation Mechanisms in Evolutionary Context. In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, D. T. Kenrick, M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), *Evolution and social psychology* (pp. 317-341). Madison, CT US: Psychosocial Press.

Macdonald, D. W. (1983). The ecology of carnivore social behaviour. *Nature*, 301(5899), 379-384.

McCallum, D. (1985). Competition and cooperation between groups and between individuals. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 21(4), 301-320.

McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio, S. L. Gaertner, J. F. Dovidio, S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 91-125).

McConahay, J. B., Hardee, B. B., & Batts, V. (1981). Has racism declined in America? It depends on who is asking and what is asked. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(4), 563-579.

McConnell, A. R., & Leibold, J. M. (2001). Relations among the Implicit Association Test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures of racial attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37(5), 435-442.

McGugin, R. W., Tanaka, J. W., Lebrecht, S., Tarr, M. J., & Gauthier, I. (2011). Race-specific perceptual discrimination improvement following short individuation training with faces. *Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, *35*(2), 330-347.

Meier, B. P., & Hinsz, V. B. (2004). A comparison of human aggression committed by groups and individuals: An interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40(4), 551-559.

Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). Thirty years of investigating the own-race bias in memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. *Psychology, Public Policy, And Law*, *7*(1), 3-35.

Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). The Go/No-go Association Task. *Social Cognition*, 19(6), 625-666.

Oakes, P. J., & Turner, J. C. (1980). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour: Does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity more positive?. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 10(3), 295-301.

Payne, B. K., Burkley, M., & Stokes, M. B. (2008). Why do implicit and explicit attitude tests diverge? The role of structural fit. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94, 16-31.

Payne, B., Cheng, C., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(3), 277-293.

Payne, B. K., Cooley, E. C., Lei, F. (2011). Who owns implicit attitudes? Testing a metacognitive perspective. Unpublished raw data.

Payne, B. K., Krosnick, J. A., Pasek, J. Lelkes, Y., Akhtar, O., & Tompson, T. (2010). Implicit and explicit prejudice in the 2008 American presidential election. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 367-374.

Payne, B. K., & Stewart, B. D. (2007). Automatic and controlled components of social cognition: A process dissociation approach. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Pinter, B., & Greenwald, A. G. (2011). A comparison of minimal group induction procedures. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 14(1), 81-98.

Plant, E., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(3), 811-832.

Plant, E., Devine, P. G., Cox, W. L., Columb, C., Miller, S. L., Goplen, J., & Peruche, B. (2009). The Obama effect: Decreasing implicit prejudice and stereotyping. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45(4), 961-964.

Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Facilitation and inhibitionin the processing of signals. In P. M. A. Rabbitt & S. Dornic (Eds.), Attention and performance V (pp. 669-682). New York: Academic Press.

Preston, M. (2010, January 9). Reid apologizes for racial remarks about Obama during campaign. *CNN Politcs*. Retrieved April 1, 2011, from http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-09/politics/obama.reid_1_john-heilemann-african-american-voters-senator-reid?_s=PM:POLITICS.

Rule, N., & Ambady, N. (2010). First impressions of the face: Predicting success. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 4(8), 506-516.

Schopler, J., & Insko, C. A. (1999). The reduction of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect: The role of future consequences. In M. Foddy, M. Smithson, S.

Schneider, M. Hogg, M. Foddy, M. Smithson, M. Hogg (Eds.) , *Resolving social dilemmas: Dynamic, structural, and intergroup aspects* (pp. 281-293).

Schopler, J., Insko, C. A., Drigotas, S., & Graetz, K. A. (1993). Individual-group discontinuity: Further evidence for mediation by fear and greed. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19(4), 419-431.

Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo L., & Krysan M. (1997). *Racial attitudes in America: Trends and interpretations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sears, D. O. (1988). Symbolic racism. In P. A. Katz, D. A. Taylor, P. A. Katz, D. A. Taylor (Eds.), *Eliminating racism: Profiles in controversy* (pp. 53-84). New York, NY US: Plenum Press.

Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2003). The origins of symbolic racism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(2), 259-275.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). *Intergroup cooperation and competition: The Robbers Cave experiment*. Norman, OK: University Book Exchange.

Sloman, S. A. (1996). The probative value of simultaneous contradictory belief: Reply to Gigerenzer and Regier (1996). *Psychological Bulletin*, 119(1), 27-30.

Smith, E. R., & DeCoster J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* 4(2) 108-131.

Snyder, M. L., Kleck, R. E., Strenta, A., & Mentzer, S. J. (1979). Avoidance of the handicapped: An attributional ambiguity analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37(12), 2297-2306.

Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 8(3), 220-247.

Takemura, K., & Yuki, M. (2007). Are Japanese groups more competititve than Japanese individuals? A cross-cultural validation of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. *International Journal of Psychology*, 42(1), 27-35.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1(2), 149-178.

Van Avermaet, E., Buelens, H., Vanbeselaere, N., & Van Vaerenbergh, G. (1999). Intragroup social influence processes in intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29(5-6), 815-823.

Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., & Sechrest, L. (1966). *Unobtrusive measures: Nonreactive research in the social sciences*. Oxford England: Rand Mcnally.

Wildschut, T., Insko, C. A., & Gaertner, L. (2002). Intragroup social influence and intergroup competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(6), 975-992.

Wildschut, T., Lodewijkx, H. M., & Insko, C. A. (2001). Toward a reconciliation of diverging perspectives on interindividual-group discontinuity: The role of procedural interdependence. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37(4), 273-285.

Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(5), 698-722.

Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72(2), 262-274.