EXPLAINING RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN CENTRAL ASIA

Terence William Bacon

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Approved By:
Dr. Robert Jenkins
Dr. Chad Bryant
Dr. Erica Johnson
ABSTRACT

TERENCE BACON: Explaining Russian Strength in Central Asia 
(Under the Direction of Robert Jenkins)

Despite the best efforts and billions of dollars spent by the United States to gain influence and access in Central Asia during the war in Afghanistan, Russia has become stronger in Central Asia. This paper examines how Russia has increased their strength in the region. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 brought the US military to Central Asia and revitalized Russian interest in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Rising oil prices and growth in the Russian economy gave Russia the ability to increase their economic and military strength in Central Asia. I will show how Russian economic connections to remittances, trade and foreign direct investment are irreplaceable to some economies in Central Asia and how they are used by Russia to influence the region. I will also show how the connection to the security in and around each country has allowed Russia to become stronger.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States has invested billions of dollars in Central Asia supporting access into and out of Afghanistan.\(^1\) There have been periods of warmth and mistrust in the wake of 9/11 between the US and Central Asian countries. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan temporarily increased levels of access and cooperation with the US. The US paid $692.5 million per year in container transit fees and $500 million per year in annual fees from 2008-2012 to countries located on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) (Lee 2012).\(^2\) US fuel purchases at the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan totaled over $2.1 billion from 2001-2011 (Karbuz 2013). From 2011 until present, the new fuel contracts at Manas have been estimated to be worth $400 million per year (Gazpromneft – Aero Kyrgyzstan starts 2011). Total US aid and security assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from 1992 – 2008 was $2.1 billion (Nichol 2010, 63-65). Despite the increased US presence, spending and

\(^1\) Central Asia refers to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for this paper.

\(^2\) The NDN is a logistical network that was created by the United States to bring supplies overland into Afghanistan. It crosses Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Payments are distributed to each country mentioned for their permission to transfer cargo to Afghanistan (Lee 2012).
attention, Central Asian countries’ relationship with the US has taken a back seat to their relations with Russia. Why has Russia become stronger in the region since 9/11?

From the fall of the Soviet Union until 9/11, Russia did not have an active foreign policy in Central Asia (Nygren 2008, 212). There was less contact between the government of Russia and their Central Asian counterparts before 9/11 than after (213). Most Central Asian countries were looking for aid from anyone willing to help, Russia or the west.

Several circumstances prior to 9/11 put Russia in a better position to influence Central Asia. On December 31, 1999, Vladimir Putin was appointed President of Russia (Vladimir Putin’s Biography 2013). President Putin centralized power and eliminated competition to his authority. His presidency also coincided with an increase in oil prices and an economic resurgence that allowed Russia to secure their domestic situation with oil revenues. The price of a barrel of oil rose from $11 to $60 per barrel between 1998 and 2006 (Sestanovich 2006, 10). The price of oil eventually climbed up to $145 per barrel in 2008 and gradually decreased back down to $90/ barrel in 2013 (Crude Oil Price History 2013). The rise in oil prices caused a favorable economic surplus for Russia.

The economic surplus strengthened the Russian domestic situation. The economic surplus allowed President Putin to increase his popular support at home and Russia to expand their attention beyond their own borders. After 9/11 the presence of the US in Central Asia refocused Russian interest in the region. The early Twenty-First Century also coincided with an increase in Russian economic
strength that would trickle down to feed the economies of Central Asia and allow Russia to exert new levers of economic and security influence in Central Asia.

Russia wants a greater say in Central Asian affairs and will use all available leverage on Central Asia countries to increase their strength. Russian influence has extended through Central Asia by exploiting economic and security situations. Regardless of the how much the United States spends in Central Asia, the US has been perceived as a less attractive alternative than Russia.

Explaining the level of reliance each country has on Russia begins with an economic evaluation. Economic factors help explain the relationship Central Asian countries have with Moscow. If a country has a strong economy, it will not be as dependent on Russia and should show some additional independence from Moscow’s authority. The same principle applies to the security situation in each country. If independent, the country will be able to form economic and security alliances with any country or organization they choose. The country in question will be able to sell their goods, resources and services to whomever they choose. They will also be able to make decisions that are not in Russia’s best interest. An example of this independence in a neighboring region is Azerbaijan’s establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The BTC pipeline ships crude oil from Baku, Azerbaijan, on the coast of the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan, Turkey, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, where it is transported to Europe (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 2013).³

³ The BTC pipeline was the first pipeline to the West from the Caspian Sea. It was a sign to Russia that the countries of the Caucasus were sovereign and could enter into economic relationships of their choosing. They did not need to rely on Russia’s
Despite the increased interest and effort from the United States in Central Asia since 9/11, Russia has strengthened their overall position in Central Asia because of the interdependence of economic and security relationships. To illustrate the relationships between Russian and Central Asia I have used a wide variety of sources. Academic journals, books on foreign policy, government websites, US Government reports, non-governmental organization reports, analytical products from think tanks, executive summaries, news stories, international organizations’ websites, research databases and summaries for Congress were all consulted to assemble the most complete pictures of the economic and security situations in Central Asia.

The goal of this paper is to provide insight into the complexities of the development of the relationship between Russia and Central Asian countries for policy makers and government employees who might not have a background in Central Asia and Russia. The goal is also to show how Russia improved their pipelines and established infrastructure to take their oil to market (Cornell, Mamuka and Sokor 2005, 17).
influence in Central Asia. Figure 1 is a map of Central Asia.

Russia is stronger in Central Asia because of their economic and security relationships in Central Asia. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia has increased strength because of weak economies and each country's inability to control their security situation without Russian support. Russian economic influence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is necessary to keep the economies functioning. There is also an increase in Russian military forces in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since 9/11.

Kazakhstan has a strong economy and the country has control over the security situation. Russia was unable to increase strength by exploiting weaknesses. Yet, Russian strength in Kazakhstan has increased because of Kazakhstan's agreement to join a Russian unified air defense network and increased frequency of
military cooperation with Kazakhstan. The air defense network links Kazakhstan’s security to Russia and increases Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia. The increased frequency of military exercises created a stronger relationship benefitting both countries.

Turkmenistan has remained neutral from 2001 to present. The economy and security situation in Turkmenistan are more independent of Russia than the other Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan began exclusively purchasing military equipment from Russia since 2004, increasing their reliance on Russia as a provider of security equipment. The bilateral defense agreement between Turkmenistan and Russia gives Russia more influence over Turkmenistan than they had in 2001.

Uzbekistan is functioning economically and providing security without an increase in Russian strength in the country since 2001. Uzbekistan’s resistance to Russian influence is due to the strong coercive capabilities of the government of Uzbekistan and their will to use force to maintain the status quo. Russia is not stronger in Uzbekistan, but since 9/11 they are stronger around Uzbekistan. Russia has increased their ability to influence Uzbekistan because of the increased strength of their forces in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and by making Kazakhstan’s military stronger with cooperation.

The following chapters will look at the economic and security connections between Russia and Central Asia and show why Russia is stronger in Central Asia now than they were before 9/11.
CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

Central Asia is an economically challenged region. To gain a perspective of each country, this chapter will start on a macro level and gradually zoom in to each country. The evaluation will begin looking at differences and similarities and measures that can be compared between the countries. Economic measurements will establish the relative size and health of the economies. Sources of trade and investment will be evaluated to see how reliant each country is on Russia. Additional measurements of economic health evaluated will be remittances, unemployment data and developmental assistance received. The goal of the economic section is to see if it is possible to explain Russia’s increase in strength in Central Asia because of economic conditions.

Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia, followed by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has more financial resources at their disposal because of natural gas deposits in the country. Kazakhstan is the most economically stable country in Central Asia. Table 1 provides an inventory for some important factors that help to gain an appreciation for the geography, resources and poverty levels in each country.
Table 1 | Country Snapshot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Vast steppe</td>
<td>Mountainous</td>
<td>Mountainous</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>Dry, land-locked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Fuel reserves Uranium, copper, zinc, livestock</td>
<td>Gold, cotton, tobacco</td>
<td>Cotton, aluminum, electricity</td>
<td>Gas, oil, cotton, wheat, chemicals</td>
<td>Cotton, gas, gold,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>Oil, gas, machinery</td>
<td>Gas, oil, food Machinery</td>
<td>Food, Machinery</td>
<td>Machinery, foodstuffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>8% below poverty line</td>
<td>33% below poverty line</td>
<td>47% below poverty line</td>
<td>30% below poverty line</td>
<td>26% below poverty line</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 shows the population of each country in the region and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Russia is included in the GDP comparison to show the size of the Russian economy next to Central Asia. The GDP will be an important measure used throughout the economic evaluation of Central Asian countries. Each measurement of financial support or commerce with Russia will be tied to the overall GDP to show how significance the relationship with Russia is to each country.
### Table 2: Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>491%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>293%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>29.34</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>298%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>702%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>16.56</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>133.4</td>
<td>115.3</td>
<td>148.1</td>
<td>188.1</td>
<td>747%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>141.93</td>
<td>306.6</td>
<td>345.1</td>
<td>430.4</td>
<td>591.0</td>
<td>764.0</td>
<td>989.9</td>
<td>1,299.7</td>
<td>1,660.9</td>
<td>1,222.6</td>
<td>1,487.5</td>
<td>1,857.7</td>
<td>506%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2011, Russia was the world's seventh largest economy (The World Fact Book 2013). As the next biggest regional economy, Kazakhstan is only about 10 percent of the size of the Russian economy. The other countries have much smaller GDPs than Kazakhstan. The size difference of GDPs is important because of the significance of Russian commerce, investment and trade to Central Asia. Central Asia is not a significant overall percentage in Russian transactions. Russia is a large economy with many trading partners. Financial transaction to and from Central Asia from a Russian perspective often do not amount to a whole percentage point according to financial data on the Central Bank of Russia website. However, when viewed from the Central Asian perspective, Russia is one of the most important influences. The figure that is less than one percent of Russian trade is a much higher

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4 The US has the largest single economy in the world in 2011 with a GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $15.32 trillion, which is second only to the all of the European Union (countries) economies added together. The remaining Central Asian countries come in placed 53rd Kazakhstan, 71st, Uzbekistan, 97th Turkmenistan, 136th Tajikistan and 145th, Kyrgyzstan out of 229 countries measured by the CIA for GDP PPP (World Fact Book, 2013).
percent when viewed from the perspective of Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan with their smaller GDPS. The populations listed in Table 2 are also helpful to show the size of the country and help calculate the Per Capita GDP. Per Capita GDP is an additional tool for comparison of the countries in Central Asia. Increases in the Per Capita GDP are indicators of an increase in productivity and well being for the economic health of the country. Per Capita GDP is also a measurement of the standard of living.

Table 3 is a breakdown of the Per Capita GDP for the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In US Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Per Capita GDP shows large differences in the standards of living between the countries in Central Asia. It is important to note how close and how small the Per Capita GDPS are for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2011.

In 2009 in Tajikistan, 60 percent of the population lived on $1.40 per day, and 17 percent of the population lived on less then $26 per month (Central Asia: Migrants 2010, 4). The situation was only marginally better in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The World Bank Reports that 25 percent of the population lived on $2
per day in 2002 and 6 percent of population survived on $2 per day from 2003 to 2009 (World Data Bank 2013). Data on poverty in Uzbekistan is difficult for organizations to compile. The government of Uzbekistan continues to deny that poverty is a problem and discourages collection of information on the subject (Central Asia: Migrants 2010, 16). The CIA World Fact Book estimates that 26 percent of Uzbekistan lives in poverty (World Fact Book 2013).

Turkmenistan has a high GDP and Per Capita GDP because there are natural gas deposits in the country. Between 2001 and 2011, Turkmenistan attributed approximately 90 percent of their overall value of exports to minerals, fuels, oils and distillation products (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013).

Kazakhstan has a similar reliance on hydrocarbons. In 2012, 75 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports were oil and gas (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013). The emphasis on hydrocarbons explains their elevated GDP and Per Capita GDP in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s economy parallels Russia’s because of the reliance on oil. The International Monetary Fund estimates that a one percent change in Russian GDP correlates to a 0.8 percent change to Kazakhstan’s GDP because of the similarities in each country’s dependence on the price of oil (Central Asia: Migrants 2010, 2).

The size and strength of each country’s economy is seen in each country’s GDP and Per Capita GDP. In order to see the relationship between each country and Russia the most important factors are remittances, trade with Russia, foreign direct investment and developmental assistance.
Remittances

Remittances are an important economic measure for three of the Central Asian countries. Labor migration to Russia is a substantial source of revenue in Central Asia since 9/11. After the fall of the Soviet Union, all ethnic Russians living outside of Russia were allowed to return home. Those who resided outside of Russia and returned home did so throughout the 1990s. When the permanent populations settled, a new wave of migration began. In the early 2000s large migrant populations, legal and illegal, in search of seasonal and temporary labor began to arrive in Russia (Laruelle 2007, 101 and Anichkova 2012). The migrant workers from Central Asia were able find jobs in Russia that paid as much as five to twenty times higher than jobs in their own countries (Laruelle 2007,105).

The migrant workers were able to escape high levels of unemployment in Central Asia and continue to support their families. It is difficult to obtain reliable figures for unemployment in the region. The World Bank’s database of developmental indicators was used for the measurements in Table 4. The World Bank does not have reported data on unemployment from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Another poll conducted between 2008-2010 estimated that 50 percent of the workforce in Tajikistan was unemployed (Central Asia: Migrants 2010, 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Bank: Worldwide Development Indicators

In addition to difficulties collecting data on unemployment, Central Asian populations working abroad are also difficult to count. Official estimates in 2008 said there were 300,000 Kyrgyz, 250,000 Uzbek and 1,500,000 Tajiks working abroad (Anichkova 2012). Unofficial estimates from the same study say that 800,000 of the total 5.4 million people (15 percent) in Kyrgyzstan work and live abroad, 5-6 million of 28.4 million residents (21 percent) of Uzbekistan migrate abroad and over 1.5 million of 6.9 million residents (22 percent) of Tajikistan migrate abroad for work. The numbers of workers abroad are estimated by the amounts of remittances sent to the country of origin from Russia. Actual migration numbers are difficult to obtain because of the high numbers of illegal workers from Central Asia in Russia. Table 5 shows an estimated percentage of the workforce from each country that works abroad.
Table 5 Percent of Population ages 15-64 Living and Working in Russia in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Estimated Population in Russia</th>
<th>Population of Country Ages 15-64</th>
<th>Percentage of Population ages 15-64 estimated to be living and working in Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>4,022,000</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>3,499,000</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>28,400,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>18,400,000</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The population estimated to be abroad in Russia also skew the problem of unemployment back home. If there are 800,000 Kyrgyz working abroad in Russia, they are employed and not counted as unemployed in Kyrgyzstan. The same goes for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, if they were to keep track of unemployment numbers.

Remittances are an important source of economic support in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan also receive remittances from Russia, but in smaller quantities that do not represent a significant portion of their GDP. Table 6 shows remittances from Russia to the countries of Central Asia. Data is unavailable for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan from 2002 to 2005. It is worth noting the drop in remittances in Table 6 between 2008 and 2009. The global financial crisis effected the amount of work available for migrant workers in Russia.
and trickled down to the economies of all Central Asian countries (Remittances to Banks in Tajikistan 2011).

Table 6  Remittances from Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>2544</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>2306</td>
<td>3060</td>
<td>3739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>2075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>2978</td>
<td>2052</td>
<td>2845</td>
<td>4262</td>
<td>5021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>148</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Bank of Russia, [www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics](http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics)

The remittances sent to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are a major source of support. The remaining Central Asian countries do not have a significant portion of their GDP made up by remittances from Russia.

Table 7  Remittances from Russia by Percent of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Bank of Russia, [www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics](http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics)

In Tajikistan, 30 percent of households had at least one member of their family working abroad contributing remittances in 2008 (Anichkova 2012, 4). The
remittances sent home were valued at 59 percent of the household income. In Kyrgyzstan, over half of all families surveyed relied on remittances as a majority share of their income each month (Anichkova 2012, 4). Information from families in Uzbekistan is difficult to acquire because of the government sensitivity to their own inability to create enough jobs for Uzbek citizens and their refusal to admit a dependence on remittances to sustain a healthy economy (3). Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are not dependent on Russia for remittances.

Additional analysis highlights some dangers to reducing remissions to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The macro economic situation would not be sustainable in each country with drastic reductions in remittances. A reduction in remittances would cause a reduction in consumer spending, which would lead to a reduction in sales and trade taxes (Kyrgyz Republic/ Armenia/ Georgia 2012). The taxes are an integral and overly relied on component of government revenue that would be badly damaged by a large reduction in consumer spending (Kyrgyz Republic/ Armenia/ Georgia 2012).

Russian domestic policies on work permits and allowances for migrant labor are important legislation to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan because of the billions of dollars at stake each year in remittances sent home. This is a very important source of leverage for Russia in their pursuit of influencing the economies, governments and security situations in Central Asia. The Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia has become more restrictive in their policies governing migrant registration and work permits during the terms of the past two
presidents of Russia. Each time modifications occurred, the FMS has become more restrictive on migrants for language requirements, registration and quotas allowed into each region of Russia. Currently, there are quotas for only 2 million foreign work permits in Russia, down from 3 million in 2008 and 2.3 million in 2011 (Balmforth 2013).

The increased restrictions on work permits, language tests and decreased quotas have been accompanied by nationalist themed speeches from current President Vladimir Putin calling for reductions in migrants allowed from Central Asia, fewer work permits, tighter border controls and more aggressive prosecution of illegal workers in Russia (Ó Súilleabháin 2013).

Trade

The amount of trade each country has with Russia is important to evaluate the relationship between Russia and the Central Asian countries. Table 8 shows the percentage of imports from Russia to the Central Asian countries.

---

5 Before December 1, 2012, each labor migrant had to fill out a migration card upon entry, register their temporary residence in Russian within 3 days and carry the card with them until they exit Russia. They also had to register their work permit within 10 days with the Federal Migration Service. The work permit could be issued for a migrant for 90 days from Central Asian countries without a labor contract. The labor contract would extend the work permit an additional 9 months. The labor migrants also had to prove they were not drug addicted and were free of infectious diseases within 30 days of their arrival. Failure to comply with previous guidelines would be grounds for removal from Russia and a five-year expulsion (Impact of the global 2009, 14). Since December 1, 2012, workers in the public sector have been subject to a language test. Migrants must possess a certificate of language proficiency from the Russian government, documentation of education from their home country, and proof of having studied Russian in their home country (С 1 декабря 2012 г. мигрантам 2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<th>2009</th>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, [http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx](http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx)
Turkmenistan 2012, Statistical Yearbook, pg 143

Imports from Russia to Central Asian countries are a significant source of trade for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has the smallest percent of Russian imports in the region. An example of how Russia has used a country's dependence on imports to exert leverage occurred in Ukraine in the winters of 2005 and 2009 when Russia stopped pumping gas through pipelines that crossed Ukraine to Europe over disagreements about pricing, gas usage and repayment of debts (Russia gas to Europe 2009).

The bilateral trade relationships of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have similar attributes. Between 2001 and 2011, each of the previous countries relied on Russia to import significant quantities of hydrocarbons. Although Kazakhstan produces large quantities of oil and is developing their gas

---

6 For comparison, China is the largest trade partner for US and Russian imports. Imports of Chinese goods make up 15 percent of all Russian imports and 18 percent of US imports (CIA World Fact Book 2013). The reliance of Central Asia on Russia is higher than the US’s and Russia’s reliance on any one source country for imports.
production, they still import large quantities of refined petroleum products from Russia.\(^7\) Between 2001 and 2011, Kazakh imports of Russian hydrocarbons made up between 10-25 percent of all imports from Russian (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013). Kyrgyzstan’s hydrocarbon imports from Russia for the same period of time were valued at 10 – 70 percent of their total imports from Russia. The values of Russian hydrocarbons in Tajikistan’s imports were between 11 – 50 percent of import values per year. The most valuable commodity imported for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was Russian hydrocarbons each year. In Uzbekistan’s import values, hydrocarbons from Russia ranked third or fourth most valuable commodity traded with Russia each year. The total value of hydrocarbon imports to Uzbekistan from Russian was between five and nine percent each year of total import value (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013).

Russia has shown the capability to withhold hydrocarbons from a country based on their actions towards Ukraine. Four of the five Central Asian countries could find themselves in a similar situation.

The percent of exports each country sends to Russia illustrates a different picture than the imports. Table 9 shows the percent of each country’s total exports made up by their relationship with Russia.

---

\(^7\) Hydrocarbons discussed in this paragraph are categorized as minerals, fuels, oils and distillation products by trademap.org and are counted as one commodity in trade statistics.
The percent of exports sent to Russia is shown in Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, [http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx](http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx)
Turkmenistan 2012, Statistical Yearbook, pg 143

The export data shows Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had the largest percentage of their exports go to Russia. In Turkmenistan, the percentage of exports to Russia has decreased. In 2007 – 2009, Turkmenistan sent greater quantities of natural gas to Russia. Since 2009, Turkmenistan increased the quantities of plastics and cotton sent to Russia. Turkmen gas was still exported to Russia, but in smaller quantities than in 2007-2009.

Uzbekistan’s largest exports to Russia in 2011 were vehicles, fruits and vegetables (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013). Russia continues to be the largest trading partner since 2002 (Trade Map, Trade Statistics 2013). In 2011, Russia had $6.86 billion in commodity turnover (Agadzhanyan 2013, 1). By comparison, the next largest trading partner, China is not scheduled to reach $5 billion in turnover commodity until 2015 in Uzbekistan (1).

Uzbekistan also signed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) free trade agreement in early 2012 but did not join the EurAsian Economic Community
(EurAsEC) customs union (Uzbekistan Country Assessment 2013). The agreement gives Uzbekistan the benefits of no customs duties on importing and exporting products with other CIS countries and makes them more regionally competitive. Uzbekistan is dependent on Russian trade, Russian owned businesses in Uzbekistan and the free trade agreement that will allow their trade with other countries within the free trade zone to flourish.

**Foreign Direct Investment and Developmental Assistance**

Russia’s influence on each economy is also seen by the amount of Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central Asia. There were some problems finding FDI in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Figures for the entire period were not available. Table 10 shows how many millions of dollars Russia invested in Central Asia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10 Russian FDI in millions of USD</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>198</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>2036</td>
<td>2514</td>
</tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>626</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a limit to the amount of information found on ownership of companies in Central Asia and the share of the market occupied by Russian
companies. It was possible to find news stories with information that Russian ownership is high or alleged, but difficult to find technical or scholarly sources supporting trends over time or details of ownership. An example of the details available on Russian investments in Uzbekistan is a statement in an article that, “Russian investments account for over 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector,” (Agadzhanyan 2013,2).

The actual quantities of FDI from Russia for each country in 2011 were 1.3 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP, 2 percent of Uzbekistan’s GDP, 3.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s and 9.6 percent of the total GDP value for Tajikistan. These measures will seem more significant when paired up with other figures from Russia in the conclusion of the chapter.

The last measure of Russian influence on the economy is based more on speculation than evidence. The amount of official aid and developmental assistance per country is only listed in total figures per year. The origin and quantity of aid is not listed. Table 11 shows the total aid per country in Central Asia.

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8 One of the documents I was unable to obtain for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan were the Oil and Gas Reports, by Business Monitor International. They each cost $900 and were unable to be acquired through the library. The Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Report for 2012 was available and provided excellent information on the shares of projects, oil fields, pipelines and developmental rights by company. There is also a great deal of background on each company operating in the country.
Table 11  Official Development Assistance and Aid Received (Current USD) in millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>293.9</td>
<td>267.8</td>
<td>228.9</td>
<td>174.3</td>
<td>210.8</td>
<td>335.4</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>223.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>185.6</td>
<td>200.1</td>
<td>261.4</td>
<td>267.9</td>
<td>310.6</td>
<td>274.6</td>
<td>359.8</td>
<td>313.4</td>
<td>380.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>148.1</td>
<td>253.4</td>
<td>251.5</td>
<td>241.2</td>
<td>222.1</td>
<td>288.7</td>
<td>408.1</td>
<td>436.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>54.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>189.3</td>
<td>194.6</td>
<td>245.9</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>149.3</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>187.3</td>
<td>189.8</td>
<td>230.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Bank: Worldwide Development Indicators  

While the total amount of aid may not seem as significant as trade totals or be a large percentage of GDP total, it is still hundreds of millions of dollars per year in four of five countries, which is a large sum of money. In Kyrgyzstan, the total developmental assistance in 2010 was larger than Russian FDI and significant when viewed as a steady stream of more than a quarter of a billion dollars per year since 2004.

**Conclusion**

Russia is stronger in Central Asia since 9/11 because of their economic influence. The growth of the Russian economy is the biggest reason for this. The success or stagnation of the Russian economy is a driver for what trickles down to the region because of remittances from Russia, trade with Russia and FDI from Russia.
Remittances were not created because of 9/11, they just became relevant at the same time (Laruelle 2007, 101 & Anichkova 2012). The increase in the remittances of several countries is very significant. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan’s total yearly remittances were 56 times greater than their 2002 levels. Tajikistan’s were 47 times greater. Data was not collected on Uzbekistan’s totals until 2006. In six years, remittances in Uzbekistan increased almost six times original levels. The percentage of GDP made up by remittances alone was also significant. In Kyrgyzstan remittances were only two percent of the GDP in 2002. By 2012, remittances were 29 percent of the GDP. In Tajikistan that level went from 7 to 47 percent. Uzbekistan finished with remittances accounting for almost ten percent of the GDP. Remittances in each country made up large percentages of economic growth that was possible because of circumstances outside of the country.

The impact of remittances does not stop with the amount of money brought in to each country. The millions of Central Asians in Russia sending money home are contributing to their country with financial support. If Central Asian migrants were removed from Russia, the strain on their home country would have wide reaching effects. The economic effects could have destabilizing consequences for the economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There would be a rise in unemployed and discontent working age people in Central Asia. This increase could have repercussions to the security situation and will be evaluated in the next chapter.

When the remittances are combined with the FDI from Russia to Central Asia, it shows a more significant inflow of money than the remittances alone. Table 7
showed remittances as a percentage of GDP. Table 12 shows the remittances plus FDI as a percentage of GDP. This number shows a larger amount of money flowing from Russia to Central Asia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<th>2008</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The percentage of GDP from Russia to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is very significant and shows rapid growth since 9/11. The eleven percent of GDP to Uzbekistan is also an important part of the Uzbek economy. There are different levels of dependency on the support from remittances and FDI from Russia in each of the three previously identified countries.

Russia has demonstrated leverage over this dependence by sending migrant workers home when there are disagreements with Central Asian governments (Balmforth 2013, Laruelle 2007 & Rights activists condemn raids 2013). When this action occurs, remittances decrease and the country of origin receives large
quantities of angry and unemployed citizens (Kyrgyz Republic/ Armenia/ Georgia 2012). There are many examples of this occurring in the news (Tajikistan politics: strict Russian 2013 & Balmforth 2013).

A recent popular example occurred in 2011 when a Russian pilot was arrested and sentenced in Tajikistan for smuggling contraband. Shortly after the pilot was sentenced and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to have him returned to Russia failed, Russian security services arrested and deported 1,500 Tajik migrants from Russia (Tajik court releases jailed 2011). The Russian government was discussing additional waves of deportation to influence the government of Tajikistan. Russia’s chief public health official Gennady Onishchenko, even recommended a total ban of people from Tajikistan into Russia because he claimed they carried higher rates of HIV and tuberculosis (Schwirtz 2011). The pilot was eventually released from the Tajik jail and anti-Tajik rhetoric stopped appearing in the news.

Central Asian trade relationships are strong with Russia. The overall percentages of imports and exports have not increased dramatically over time. The percentage of hydrocarbons imported by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has remained high. The willingness of Russia to stop hydrocarbon shipments to Ukraine in 2005 and 2009 shows Russia has an increased strength in the region because of their willingness to withhold crucial resources from countries (Russian Gas to Europe 2009).

Some economic problems contribute to security issues and will be discussed again from a security perspective when relevant.
CHAPTER 3
THE SECURITY SITUATION

Each country in Central Asia has different concerns, techniques and resources at their disposal for dealing with their security situation. The internal threats to Central Asian countries are crime, corruption, and terrorism, ethnic and civil unrest. The main external and regional threats are border tensions, disputes over water, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and trafficking in illegal narcotics and persons (Nichol 2010, 1).

In this chapter, each country’s ability to deal with terrorism and regional conflicts will be evaluated. This is a difficult topic to analyze because of the secrecy surrounding a country’s military and security capabilities. It is impossible to speculate the proficiency and competency of a country’s military based upon documents available to the public. There were many areas of research that were incomplete or unavailable. With some threats to each country, it is difficult to judge the country’s ability to handle the threat. For example, trafficking of illegal drugs is a problem in Central Asia. Opiates from Afghanistan travel through Central Asia to Russia and Europe (UN Office of drug Control 2013). Measuring the effectiveness of a country at stopping illegal drugs is difficult. Illegal drug seizure rates are a measurement of success, but don’t tell much about the county’s control of the
problem. When analyzing quantities seized per county, even the UN Office of Drugs and Crime can only speculate about what increases and decreases mean. The conditions for growing drugs, weather and water are often to blame for seizure increases and decreases more than the effectiveness of counter drug operations (World Drug Report 2012, 32). There is also a great deal of data missing from databases on Central Asia. When comparing trends over the past decade, many indicators like percent of GDP spent on defense, quantities of arms imported and exported per year are unavailable or do not match up with press releases and announcements that were printed in agreements between countries. There are differences between what Russia and Central Asian countries agree to do in formal meetings and what they actually do. This difference between words and deed often makes acquiring reliable data difficult.

Of the measurements available, the size and composition of the military and security forces will be compared to internal and regional threats. If a threat is difficult to measure, like Islamic extremists, historical data of terrorist attacks and violent acts will be looked at for increases and decreases. The most complete sources available are the Rand National Defense Research Institute Worldwide Terrorism Incident Database and analytical products from the US Military’s Foreign Military Studies Office. Reports for Congress have also proved to be useful assessments of threats in Central Asia.

If a threat is known such as a border conflict, a comparison of the two countries’ military and security forces will be looked at to see if the country in
question appears capable of defending their own borders and conducting all of the normal security functions that would be reasonably expected of a sovereign nation.

Each country’s relationship with Russia on military and security will be compared. Do they cooperate, are they neutral, or do they oppose one another? If the country has Russian troops in the country, are they increasing their capabilities or numbers or transitioning out of the country? Are the agreements to keep the troops causing friction or is the country pleased with their choice to have Russian troops in their country? Each country’s military training program and their procurement of weapons will also be looked at as a snapshot of their readiness and relationship with Russia. Do any of the countries have an over-reliance on Russia as a source for military equipment or preparation? Sources used and evaluation techniques are different for each country. Information is not standardized or widely available on these topics. Large-scale military actions and operations are well documented by a wide range of government and mass media sources. Agreements are mainly found in news releases from official visits between Russia and Central Asian countries. The overall security analysis of each country will be analyzed to conclude if Russia is stronger in each Central Asian country since 9/11.

Each county in Central Asia has military and security services. The sizes and capabilities of the militaries are the main tools to promote security for each country. Table 13 shows the sizes of the militaries and security forces for each Central Asia country.
Uzbekistan has the largest number of military personnel and the largest population in the region, followed by Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan's population in 2012 was 29.34 million and Kazakhstan's was 16.56 million. The strong economy of Kazakhstan helps them increase the size of their formations. Kazakhstan can buy more military equipment and pay their soldiers with the country's greater economic wealth. Aside from having the second largest military in the region, Kazakhstan has the largest concentration of forces based on their population size. There are 4.8
military and security personnel per 1000 residents of Kazakhstan; this is the highest concentration of forces in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan’s large military is a product of their population size and continued border conflicts with each country in Central Asia (Nichol 2010, 13). Uzbekistan has the second lowest concentration of forces per thousand people. When the Russian troops in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are factored in to the equation, Uzbekistan’s 2.9 military and security services personnel per 1000 people is the lowest concentration in Central Asia. As a comparison, the US population in 2009 had 7.3 soldiers per 1000 residents (By The Numbers: Today’s 2009).

Turkmenistan’s military is comparable in total size to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan’s greater economic capability helps them maintain the concentration of their military to 4.3 military and security personnel per 1000 residents. Turkmenistan has a policy of total neutrality. They do not support anyone in armed conflict and refuse to join alliances (Blank 2007, 10). Turkmenistan’s military and security forces are used only for self-defense and do not participate in military and security alliances or participate in joint training exercises.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan each have militaries that resemble their economies. They are small, underfunded and recognized as having no discernable combined arms doctrine to coordinate the components of the military into a cohesive fighting force (Stein 2012, 38, 40). They are mainly composed of Soviet-era technology and equipment.
In addition to military and security services populations, a comparison of the number of aircraft, tanks and armored vehicles will be used to show the relative sizes of military capabilities. Table 14 shows the military and security formation size of each country by major weapon systems in Central Asia. This data was not available by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14</th>
<th>Size of Military by Major Weapon Systems</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stein 2009, pgs 34-43, Compendium of Central Asian Militaries, All equipment in each countries militaries is Russian-made with the exception of 6 UH-1H helicopters in Kazakhstan which were made in the USA.

The composition of military equipment sheds new light on the security picture. Kazakhstan has the second largest military by population and the largest by military equipment. The country has the largest land area in Central Asia and has tank and armored vehicle forces in large enough quantities to counter those of any

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9 The measure of aircraft, tanks and armored vehicles is a relative measure of combat power, which is the universal measurement of militaries. Combat power is defined as "the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time." (FM 3.0 Operations, US Army 2008, 4-1). An inherent weakness of this comparison is the unknown mechanical conditions of vehicles and weapons systems compared (Stein, 2012).
regional threat in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s large numbers of tanks and armored vehicles are also useful defending the country’s wide-open steppes. There is plenty of room to conduct armored warfare over open terrain. There is also a widely developed road network that would facilitate rapid travel by Kazakhstan’s numerous armored vehicles and tanks to repel an attack from Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan also has the largest and most sophisticated collection of aircraft in Central Asia.

Turkmenistan has the next largest concentration of tanks and armored vehicles. Since their country’s military is set up for self-defense only, the country’s desert terrain is well suited to armored vehicles and tanks operating over desert terrain. The numbers of tanks and armored vehicles are much greater in Turkmenistan than in Uzbekistan, their only neighbor with which they have border disagreements. There are more than twice as many tanks and almost three times as many armored vehicles in Turkmenistan compared to Uzbekistan.10

Uzbekistan’s military is large in numbers, but smaller in quantities of military equipment than it’s neighbors Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The smaller number of tanks and armored vehicles would make large scale combat operations against Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan inadvisable. Uzbekistan’s fighting forces would be at a disadvantage fighting without as many tanks and armored vehicles over the open terrain in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan does have more people and equipment than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The military and security services of Uzbekistan would have overwhelming advantages over Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

10 Turkmenistan’s tanks are also newer. They are all Russian T-90 and T-72 tanks, while Uzbekistan has older T-64 and T-62 tanks (Stein 2012, 34-43).
military forces if any of Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s threats of invasion towards Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were ever acted upon (Nurshayeva 2012).

Kyrgyzstan has much less military equipment and fewer troops than Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz military is under equipped, poorly trained and relies on security and military aid from Russia and the US (Central Asia Executive Summary 2009, 36). Mountains split the country down the middle, into a north and south portion. The country’s capital, Bishkek, is seen as the northern capital. The city of Osh, is often seen as the southern capital (Nichol 2010, 2). The north and south of the country are constantly in competition and contention for resources and control (2). Militarily, Kyrgyzstan cannot quickly mass forces to the north or south in a timely manner because of their lack of aircraft and vehicles. It would be necessary to fly military forces over the mountains between the north and south of the country for an efficient military defense from Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan does not have enough aircraft or vehicles for major troop movements. Kyrgyz forces would need help from Russia for troop movements over the mountains. Kyrgyzstan also shares the volatile border in the Fergana Valley with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan’s military has the same challenges as Kyrgyzstan’s. They are small in size and have less military equipment than the rest of Central Asia. Tajikistan shares a border with Afghanistan. This shared border is the source of Islamic extremists and illegal narcotics entering the country. Tajikistan also shares a border with Uzbekistan, who has threatened them with invasion and has planted explosive mines on the border (Nurshayeva 2012). Tajikistan has poor relations with
Uzbekistan and a dangerous border with Afghanistan. They are also the least capable military in Central Asia.

All of the countries of Central Asia rely almost exclusively on Russian-made military equipment. The only vehicles counted in Table 14 that were not made from a Russian or Soviet design were six US-made, Bell UH-1H helicopters that are in service in Kazakhstan (Stein 2012, 39). Details on weapons sales and military aid are best tracked by press releases. The state run export company responsible for all Russia’s military equipment sales, Rosoboronexport does not release data about weapon sales on their English or Russian websites (РОСОБОРОНЭКСПОРТ 2013). The best way to get information on military sales and military aid to countries in Central Asia is to search press releases and newspaper articles for announcements of sales, aid and agreements (Russian Military Journal editor 2009) (Russian Paper: Turkmenistan now 2009). 11

Military expenditures by country are a difficult measurement in Central Asia. Consistent data does not exist. The most complete database found was the World Bank’s World Data Bank. However, multiple years were missing. The data is inconclusive.

11 The absence of historical arms sales is unfortunate. Due to the secrecy of such topics, historical data cannot be acquired to show sales over time increasing. There are enough sources throughout the text that show sales are continuing in larger dollar figures than in the past between Russia and Central Asian countries.
Table 15 shows constant spending by Kazakhstan. Spending around 1 percent of GDP gives Kazakhstan the appearance of spending just to keep money flowing to their organizations. There is no spike or drastic decrease in their spending from year to year that can be tied to outside events. In the economic analysis section, Kazakhstan’s economy correlates with the Russian economy for changes in GDP due to oil prices and overall growth, but the two countries have different policies on military expenditures. Russia has a much higher percent of GDP spent on their military. Kazakhstan appears to be a country that is not concerned about spending on their military and security services. From this data, Kazakhstan does not appear to be threatened by their neighbors or external threats. The constant one percent of GDP spent on defense could also mean that the amount of military equipment on hand in Table 14 was left over from the Soviet Union and not acquired in the past 10 years.

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5*</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CIA World Fact Book was used for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 2005 and *Kyrgyzstan 2009, the CIA World Fact Book estimate a.5% expenditure as a % of GDP, this was a significant deviation from the World Bank’s figure of 3.52%.
In Table 15, the only year with data from each country is 2005. As a point of comparison, the recommended percent of GDP spent on defense for NATO members is two percent of GDP, and between 2005-2009 only six of twenty-six NATO members averaged over two percent of GDP (Financial and Economic Data 2011, 6). The only countries below the NATO standard are Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

Tajikistan has a strained financial situation. There are also Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan to bolster Tajikistan's forces and alleviate some of the financial strain needed for an adequate defense.

Russia is interested in helping friendly Central Asia leaders stay in power and in maintaining a strategic buffer from potential enemies. Russia would like to stop terrorism and unrest within all the countries of Central Asia, before the problems get to Russia. The external and regional threats Russia hopes to pacify are border conflicts, conflicts over water rights, counter proliferation of WMD and stopping the flow of illegal narcotics before they get to Russia. The Russian military thinks of Central Asia as a buffer zone along the southern border that can be defended by supporting indigenous forces and forward deploying military units and border troops (Lepingwell 2008, 77).

Terrorism and Islamic extremism are a problem for Russia within the Northern Caucasus region of Russia. There have been two wars fought in Chechnya over separatism (Chechnya Profile 2012). Conflict continues in the North Caucasus

\[12\] The presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have all been in power since the early 1990s. In Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazerbaev has been the president since December 1, 1991 (Anceschi 2012). In Uzbekistan, president Islam Karimov has been the president since December 1, 1991 (Anceschi 2012). In Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmonov has been president since 1992 (Anceschi 2012).
region of Russia between government forces and Islamic militants where casualties have been reported through 2012 (Violence in Russia’s North 2012). There have also been over 300 deaths because of alleged terrorist bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities following the Chechen Defeat in Dagestan in 2000 (Shah 2004). Russia wants to stop terrorism, extremism, and separatism before it arrives at the Russian border. Security cooperation with Central Asian countries is part of Russia’s strategy to prevent violent extremism from getting to their border. Russia’s relationship with each country in Central Asia is different and their level of involvement in fighting terrorism changes based on the host country’s capabilities and desire for Russian help. Table 16 shows the incidents of terrorist attacks in Central Asian countries and Russia.13

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13 A terrorist incident is “defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause; key elements include: Violence or threat of violence, calculated to create fear, intended to coerce certain actions, motive must include a political objective, generally directed against civilian targets, can be a group or individual.” (Database Definitions, Rand National Defense Research 2013).
### Table 16  
Terrorist Incidents Per Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terrorist Incident Database, Rand National Defense Research  
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php

Russian cooperation with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has increased since 9/11. Both countries are poor, have small militaries, are close to Afghanistan, share a border in the Fergana Valley and have border conflicts with Uzbekistan over demarcation and water rights.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) The Fergana Valley is where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan come together. The valley is a fertile recruiting ground for Islamic extremist organizations that seek out residents with high unemployment, high levels of poverty and discontent (Nichol 2012, 3). The Fergana Valley has been an area of terrorist activities and a source of border tension between the three border countries. There are some places in Fergana where the border is very complex. The international border separates towns, streets and even houses in some neighborhoods (12). The governments of all three countries have combated terrorism and accused each other of harboring terrorists and of unauthorized attacks on terrorists within each other’s countries (13). Uzbekistan has conducted airstrikes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan against terrorist targets (7). Uzbek security services have also raided houses in Tajikistan and claimed they were in Uzbekistan (10). Uzbekistan has mined the borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (13) because of the Uzbeks’ displeasure with the efforts of border services of each country in stopping terrorists.
The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov has also threatened Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with offensive military operations as a result of increased hydro-electric station construction that effects the water availability in downstream Uzbekistan (Nurshayeva 2012). Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would be severely overmatched by Uzbekistan in any armed conflict because of the size of Uzbekistan's military and security services. The differences between the sizes of militaries gives Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan a reason to want Russian security guarantees and soldiers stationed in their countries.

Russia's relationship with Kazakhstan has become one of increased cooperation and joint exercises between the militaries of the two countries. Uzbekistan has had a hot and cold relationship with Russia at different times based on their relations with the US. The most recent Uzbek position remains militarily independent of Russia. Turkmenistan has continued to remain neutral and has not had a warm security relationship with Russia. The analysis of Russian involvement in Central Asia will be broken up into countries. The security relationship will be assessed based on the how the country is doing fighting terrorists. How each country compares militarily to conflicts on the borders. The source of each country’s military strength will also be assessed for reliance on Russia.

**Tajikistan**

Russia's security relationship with Tajikistan is unique because it began immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union. A civil war occurred in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997. Russian military assistance and economic support held
Tajikistan together from the beginning of the civil war and continues to support the country. In 1992, the Russian Army’s 201st Division was in the process of demobilizing after the fall of the Soviet Union and was invited to remain in Tajikistan by the Tajik government. Current President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rhakhmonov, became the leader of the pro-communist forces in 1992 after the previous president Rakhmon Nabiev was forced to resign by an armed opposition group while trying to fly out of the Dushanbe airport (Clark 1993, 12).

There were 15,000 Russian soldiers in Tajikistan at the time of the initial military intervention. The government of Tajikistan asked them to keep the peace, protect the borders and protect important facilities. Tajikistan was unable to field their own military to stop the struggle for power between the pro-communist forces and the coalition of democratic nationalists and Islamists (Clark 1993, 12).

By the end of 1992, there were 40,000 casualties and 800,000 refugees from the civil war in Tajikistan. Many of the 800,000 refugees went south into Afghanistan and maintained ties to Tajikistan (Nichols 2010, 8). The borders were poorly protected between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Refugees departed and foreign fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Al Qaeda entered the country from Afghanistan to fight the government loyal to the former communists (Nichols 2010, 9). The borders between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were a problem during the civil war because of the movement of foreign fighters. Today, borders continue to be problematic for Tajikistan because Islamic extremists have the ability to travel between countries and up to 25 percent of the opiates from Afghanistan transit
through Tajikistan (Nichols 2010, 27). Tajikistan’s terrain is mountainous and difficult to monitor on the Kyrgyz and Afghan borders. There are numerous mountain passes on the borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on known drug smuggling routes that are unmanned during the winter months because of a lack of funding and logistical difficulties supporting their remote locations (10). Figure 2 shows suspected routes for illegal drugs through Central Asia.

**Figure 2 Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan**

![Map of Central Asia showing drug trafficking routes](https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270chap3.html)

The end of the civil war brought a cease-fire to the country, but left it unstable. The comprehensive peace agreement between Emomoli Rakhmonov and the opposition allowed Rakhmonov to remain as the president, but 30 percent of the ministerial positions in the government went to the opposition (Nichols 2010, 8).15

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15 The opposition in the civil war was composed of democrats and Islamists.
The stability of the country is still challenged by the cease-fire agreement from 1997.

In 2012, 42 people were killed when fighting erupted in southeast Tajikistan because a current member of the country’s security forces shot and killed the local military commander (Olimova 2012). The member of the security forces that killed the military commander was a rebel leader from the time of the civil war. He was given a position in the security forces as a commander of the local border guards as part of the cease-fire agreement. Turning the rebel leaders into border guard commanders was a common practice as part of the cease-fire agreement. Allowing former opponents of the government to control the border has led to destabilized portions of the border. The former rebel leaders have been corrupt and allowed illegal narcotics trafficking to occur (Olimova 2012). There are also pockets of resistance to the Tajik government built up around some of the former oppositionists to the government that are not in power. The borders of Tajikistan are vulnerable to illegal narcotics from Afghanistan and foreign fighters crossing them.

At the height of Russian military activity and involvement between 1996-97 in Tajikistan, there were over 25,000 soldiers and border guards operating in Tajikistan (Russian Military in Tajikistan 1998). The massive Russian military presence in Tajikistan eventually decreased. The civil war ended in 1997 and Russia sent home all but 6,000 soldiers and border guards. From 1997 to 2005 the remaining Russian soldiers and border guards continued to provide security on the Tajik borders with Afghanistan and China (Peyrouse and Trenin 2013).
In 2005, the Russian forces were removed from the borders but the 201st Division remained in Tajikistan. Russia was no longer in charge of patrolling the borders with vehicles, aircraft and personnel. The government of Tajikistan received help from the EU and the US on their border with Afghanistan.

Cooperation with the EU and US began prior to the Russian border guards leaving (USA to Step up 2004). Between 2007-2010 the EU bilaterally contributed 66 million EUR and from 2010-2011, the EU contributed 62 million EUR. Total contributions from the EU to Tajikistan from 1992-2011 are over 550 million EUR (International Conference on Tajik 2012). The US contributed $85.8 million between 1992-2008 to border security in Tajikistan (Nichol 2010, 64-65) and $9.5 million in 2012 (USA Provides 9.5M 2012). There is an agreement between the US and EU to share responsibility for the Tajik – Afghan border. Since 2005, the US has been responsible for the western section from the Uzbek-Tajik-Afghan border to Sharabad, Tajikistan (The EU-UNDP Border Management 2012). The EU is responsible for the eastern section, from Gorno Badakhsan to Ishkashim (The EU-UNDP Border Management 2012). Both the EU and US construct and renovate border structures, conduct training of the Tajik border guards and supply them with equipment.

NATO secured the Afghan border with Tajikistan with a larger, more sophisticated force than Russia or Tajikistan could produce. The government of

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16 Initial announcements of US and EU support did not include dollar or Euro figures of support from 2004-2007. There are maps that show different border crossing sites that the EU and the US maintain between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (EU Border Management Northern 2013).
Tajikistan also received weapons, equipment and training from the US and the EU to help secure their borders.

In 2001, Russia had one base for the 201st Division in Dushanbe. Figure 3 shows the total size and location of Russian forces in Tajikistan. The forces in Tajikistan were the remaining soldiers from the Tajik Civil War.

**Figure 3  Russian Bases in Tajikistan 2001**

While Russia ceased operations on Tajikistan’s border, they were able to keep the 201st Division in Tajikistan under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) regional military force (Troitskiy 2006, 8). The 201st Division changed from a force to supplement the border guards of Tajikistan to an organization training the Tajik Army, preparing for war and conducting counter narcotics operations. The Russian army has become a more formidable organization in Tajikistan with the ability to show force throughout the country by
expanding their one base outside Dushanbe into three bases spread out over hundreds of kilometers.\(^\text{17}\)

Russian bases in Tajikistan have multiplied since 9/11. The 201\(^{\text{st}}\) Division has moved from one base to three different bases, giving them influence over more geography. One base is near Dushanbe, the capital. The second is located in the city of Qurgonteppa 100 kilometers to the south and a third in Kulob, 150 kilometers southeast of the capital (Nordic Intel 2012). There is also an air base and space facility at Anya that the Russian army occupied in 2008 (Stein 2012, 1). Figure 4 shows Russian forces in Tajikistan in 2012.

![Russian Bases in Tajikistan 2012](image)

**Figure 4** Russian Bases in Tajikistan 2012

Russia recently extended the leases on their three bases for the 201\(^{\text{st}}\) Division and an air base at Anya until 2042 (Kucera 2012). This new lease

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\(^{17}\) The spread of the Russian 201\(^{\text{st}}\) Division from one to three bases happened some time between 2001 and 2007. The first mention of three bases was noticed in a Russian article about Russian military bases abroad in 2007 (Lukin, 2007). The bases were confirmed in an article in 2012 (Russian Military Bases in Tajikistan 2012).
agreement legitimates the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan under multilateral cooperation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The terms of the lease extension are similar to original support from Russia to Tajikistan at the time of the civil war 20 years ago. They bring an increase of Russian military presence and stability to Tajikistan.

Russian military support to Tajikistan has been accompanied by foreign aid whenever new lease agreements have been reached between 1992 and 2012 (Clark 1993, 15 & Kucera 2012). In 1992, Russia postponed Tajikistan’s loan repayments from 1992 to 2000, extended additional credits to the country and forgave loans in exchange for a Russian military presence to ensure the survival of the friendly government and protection of Central Asia’s southern flank from Afghanistan (Clark 1993, 15). Russia’s military and economic aid was delivered to stabilize the government of Tajikistan while dealing with the civil war (16). Without the military aid in 1992, the current Tajik regime might have fallen to the opposition in the civil war.

The most recent agreement for an extension on the base in Tajikistan sent $200 million in economic aid, $200 million in upgrades to an existing Russian-made air defense network, $200 million in discounted fuel deliveries, future additional duty free shipments of fuel, and undisclosed forgiveness of debts (Kucera 2012). Russia has also agreed to extend residency and work permits to 1.1 million Tajiks in Russia, fund a $5 million counter-narcotics center and increase in the number of joint Russian and Tajik military patrols along the border with Afghanistan (Nordic Intel 2012).  Russia has been able to use Tajikistan’s poor economic and security
situations to their advantage by tying agreements for security and economic aid together.

The current situation in Tajikistan shows some similarities to 1992. The country is poor, the government is unstable and they are looking for a lifeline from Russia. The announced reduction of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014 has Tajikistan worried (Tajikistan Concerned Over Withdrawal 2013). All the help Tajikistan received on the borders has not given them the confidence for which they originally hoped. Russia has capitalized on the lack of confidence and has offered to help by increasing their military presence in Tajikistan. There has been discussion between Russia and Tajikistan about bringing more Russian troops to Tajikistan in order to protect the border. Russian forces in Tajikistan have recently received 200 new vehicles and more modern weapon systems (Tajikistan Concerned 2013). This increase in military hardware could be in preparation for an increased role in Tajikistan for Russian troops that may come as NATO forces in the region decrease.

After 9/11, when the US moved into Afghanistan it allowed Russia to gain troop strength in Tajikistan. Russia added 1,500 soldiers to the 6,000 soldiers already in Tajikistan between 2002 and 2010 as noted in a Report for Congress bringing the total number of Russian soldiers in Tajikistan to 7500 (Nichol 2010, 56).

The continued presence of Russian troops since 9/11 guarantees that Russia has a say in Tajikistan’s security policies and more influence in regional affairs. Uzbekistan has threatened Tajikistan with military action in the past. The presence of Russian troops in the country would give Russia an opportunity to militarily
intervene on issues that arise between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and ensure regional stability.

Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev previously weighed in on the construction of dams in the region. In 2009 he said that all Central Asian states and Russia should agree before dams are built on rivers that flow across national borders (Nichols 2010, 20). The presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan makes that statement stronger to neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia is not conducting foreign policy mediation from Moscow; they are physically invested in the region and would separate two arguing neighbors with Russian troops under the authority of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) from their bases in Tajikistan if needed.\textsuperscript{18}

The presence of Russian soldiers also extends the depth of the Russian defenses. They will have another country from which to fight drug trafficking, Islamic extremism and separatism before they get to Russia’s borders (Upadhyuy 2013). Russia is also currently in negotiations with Tajikistan to include the airspace over Tajikistan in a Russian unified air defense network that recently added Kazakhstan to Russia’s protected airspace (Russia intends to increase 2013). This increase in cooperation would come with additional security guarantees from Russian and promises of continued loyalty from Tajikistan.

Russia is militarily stronger by the increased number of soldiers, equipment and the addition of aircraft to their formations in Tajikistan. They are postured to

\textsuperscript{18} When Uzbekistan withdrew from CSTO in 2012, they knew that their position in border conflicts would be weaker because Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are still CSTO members. Russia now has a collective security obligation to protect Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan (Организация Договора о коллективной 2013).
increase operations after the withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan and they are currently increasing counter drug operations with their Tajik counterparts (Upadhyuy 2013). The presence of Russian troops also provides Tajikistan a security guarantee that they will not be invaded by Uzbekistan. Russian economic aid accompanies military bases and ties economic and security aid together. There has been thousands of Russian soldiers spending money in the economy. In addition, the Russian government employs local Tajiks on the bases adding to the economic benefits of the bases.

Tajikistan’s organic military and security formations are small compared to the size of other militaries in Central Asia. They are also not spending much to maintain or improve upon their formations. The GDP expenditures are unavailable (see Table 10) after 2005. The only announcements of new weapons for Tajikistan found in all available search engines were about agreements that provided military aid from Russia to Tajikistan (Kucera 2012; Russia to Army Kyrgyzstan 2012). There were no announcements of Tajikistan purchasing new weapons or entering into agreements with Russia or any other country for defense cooperation.

Tajikistan’s army routinely showed up to CSTO and other regional training events with observers instead of participating forces (Stein 2012, 23-34). They have the soldiers but lack the modern technology needed for some joint air defense and attack aviation CSTO and SCO training events (23-34). The lack of modern equipment and financial support to conduct training in several of the regional exercises shows a deficiency in their overall capabilities.
The review of the security situation in Tajikistan also highlights the economic reliance of Tajikistan on Russia. Whenever Russia needs to get Tajikistan’s attention or an agreement, Moscow has used two different strategies. In the first strategy, the Russian Ministry of the Interior rounds up large numbers of migrant workers in Moscow and sends them home over fabricated law violations (Nordic Intel 2012).

One of the regulations in Russia’s labor laws says there can only be 2 million foreign employees in the country (Tajikistan Politics: Strict Migration 2013). There were over 2.3 million jobs that fall into categories routinely filled by migrant workers in 2012. Tajikistan’s need for remittances from labor migration gave the Russian government leverage each time it needed to get the attention of Tajikistan when negotiating on the lease extension for the 201st divisions bases (Tajikistan Politics: Strict Migration 2013). Another large-scale migrant raid took place in Apraksin Dvor in February 2013 when Federal Security Services (FSB) Special Forces units rounded up over 1,000 labor migrants from Central Asia and locked them in a mosque (Rights activists condemn raids 2013).

Similar operations took place in the suburbs of Moscow and St. Petersburg on the same day. Hundreds of migrant workers were arrested and sent home in the operation. The arrested workers were separated from their children and sent home. The children were processed through a juvenile care facility that prepares them to be sent home to Central Asia (Rights activists condemn raids 2013). The return of poor, unemployed and frustrated working age males to Tajikistan has proved an effective negotiation technique for Russia against Tajikistan.
The second coercive tool is additional tariffs on petroleum products imported to Tajikistan from Russia (Russian Energy Security 2011). These two measures of economic leverage have been used by Russia to gain favorable security agreements.

**Kyrgyzstan**

The government of Kyrgyzstan has similar security concerns to Tajikistan. The flow of drugs and Islamist extremists is a worry for Kyrgyzstan (Central Asian Executive Summary 2009, 5). Table 16 shows an average of 2 terrorist attacks per year between 2001-2009. The largest terrorist attack occurred on March 16, 2003, and involved a busload of 20 hostages that were kidnapped, killed and their bodies were burned (Terrorist Incident Database Rand 2013). There were also multiple assaults by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000 in the vicinity of Osh and the Fergana Valley (Stein 2012, 47). The IMU currently views southern Kyrgyzstan’s portion of the Fergana Valley as a fertile recruiting ground for members (36).

Kyrgyzstan has a history of instability. The government of Kyrgyzstan has fallen to popular unrest in 2005 (Tulip Revolution) and 2010 (sometimes called the ‘Roza Revolution’) (Stein 2012, 47-48). In 2005 protesters clashed with police and physically took control of the White House to remove the President of Kyrgyzstan from power. In 2010, protesters clashed with police and were fired on with rubber bullets and tear gas (49). Over 80 people were killed and hundreds were injured in the storming of the White House and protest. An interim government

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19 The White House in Kyrgyzstan is the former headquarters of the communist party and serves as the office for the President (Russian Military Bases in 2013).
ruled the country from spring 2010 until winter 2011, when elections were held.

During the rule of the interim government, ethnic violence occurred in Batken, Jalal-abad and Osh in May of 2010. The first wave of violence was started by supporters of the ousted President, Maksim Bakiyev, and was executed to create an unpleasant political situation for the interim government (49).

A second wave of violence occurred in June 2010 and was ethnic in origin. Uzbek and Kyrgyz residents of Osh started a fight in a casino and the violence grew so large that it overwhelmed regional law enforcement (Stein 2012, 50). Tens of thousands of Uzbek refugees left Kyrgyzstan. The military declared martial law, imposed a curfew and was ordered to shoot curfew violators on sight by the interim government (50). The Kyrgyz military was used to take control of the areas affected by violence and the Uzbek military was put on alert on the border between the two countries. Kyrgyzstan’s internal security situation has a history of unrest and incidents that exceed the Kyrgyz security services capabilities.

The external threats to Kyrgyzstan are similarly overwhelming to the military and security services. Kyrgyzstan’s disputes with Uzbekistan involve recognition of the border between the two countries and water rights. Kyrgyzstan’s energy dependence causes internal frustration and brings Uzbekistan closer to threatening cross border violence. Uzbekistan shuts off gas to Kyrgyzstan because of non-payment or because of cross border disagreements (Central Asian Executive Summary 2009, 38). Kyrgyzstan does not have enough gas or oil to be self-sufficient. Because of the mountainous terrain, Kyrgyzstan relies on hydroelectric stations to generate power.
In the winter, Kyrgyzstan must let water through the Toktogul Dam to generate power (38). The release of water in the winter in Kyrgyzstan causes flooding in Uzbekistan. In the summer it is the opposite scenario. Kyrgyzstan does not release water through Toktogul dam in order to save it for winter. The conservation of water by Kyrgyzstan causes droughts in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields, which are the Uzbek’s largest source of export revenue (38). This cycle is constant. Kyrgyzstan cannot pay world prices for Uzbek gas. Uzbekistan will not agree to subsidize the cost of gas for the use of water in their cotton fields, or to keep the water from flooding their country in the winter. Uzbekistan feels their water rights should be guaranteed and not controlled upstream by Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan’s control over water and Uzbekistan’s control over gas continues to frustrate both sides. Uzbekistan is the largest external security threat to Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectric station construction up-stream of Uzbekistan has upset their neighbor. Uzbek President, Islam Karimov has said diverting water from Uzbekistan could be grounds for war (Nurshayeva 2012). Uzbekistan has a bigger population, a bigger economy and a much bigger military than Kyrgyzstan. The benefit of increased energy production forces Kyrgyzstan to rely on Russia to guarantee their security from Uzbekistan.

Russian-Kyrgyz agreements on hydroelectric dams have been brought to the forefront by recent cold weather, which has caused rolling blackouts in Kyrgyzstan. Blackouts in the winter make life more difficult in Kyrgyzstan. The problems with energy security also make the Kyrgyz government more susceptible to Russia’s requests for expelling the US from Manas and strengthening the Russian position at
the Kant Air Base. During this winter’s cold weather, Kazakhstan has cut gas imports (Ibrahimov 2012). Kazakh gas companies blame cuts farther upstream in their source pipeline in Uzbekistan for the interruption. With gas cuts, residents of Kyrgyzstan use electricity for their heating and cooking which causes rolling blackouts in the coldest times of year (Ibrahimov 2012). Isa Omurkulov, the mayor of Bishkek says that the capital averages over 900 blackouts per week in the winter months (Ibrahimov 2012).

The Kyrgyz energy situation is dire. A study funded by the US State Department said the energy infrastructure of Kyrgyzstan needs $1.5 – 2.1 billion in upgrades just to be categorically upgraded to “reliable,” (Ibrahimov 2012). Kyrgyzstan’s energy situation illustrates Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Russia for energy, economic and military support. Russia is offering subsidized fuel deliveries, increased hydroelectric capacity and protection from Uzbekistan.

Russia’s main security goal in Kyrgyzstan since 9/11 has been to establish military forces in Kyrgyzstan to counter the US presence. Their secondary goal has been to evict the US from the Transit Center at Manas International Airport.20 Russia has four military bases throughout Kyrgyzstan; Kant, Chaldovar, Karakol and Mailuu Suu (Lukin 2007). See Figure 5 for the map of Russian military installations.

20 The US use of Manas International Airport in Kyrgyzstan has been an integral part of the US war plans in Afghanistan. The airport started out as a place to stage US forces and bring them to Afghanistan and as a search and rescue center. It evolved into a passenger terminal and place to park aircraft involved in air-to-air refueling operations. As the war in Afghanistan progressed, more restrictions were put on the US and what they could do from Kyrgyzstan. US forces were restricted from performing offensive operations and could not move any lethal cargo through the airfield. The name of the base was changed from an airbase to a “Transit Center,” (Blank 2007, 8). The transit center has been the target of Russian efforts to remove the US from Central Asia.
The base at Kant is the largest concentration of Russian forces in Kyrgyzstan and operates as a regional base in support of the CSTO. Kant was established in 2003 and increased Russia’s military strength in Kyrgyzstan. There are over 700 soldiers, attack jets and helicopters. Improvements are underway to the runways in order to accept the transfer of strategic bombers in the summer of 2013, allowing further influence in the region (Russia ‘no plans’ to 2012). The Russian Army has also announced they may transfer additional soldiers supported by a greater number of helicopters to increase the capability to conduct military operations across international borders (Konovalov 2012). The Russian military did not have access to the Kant air base from the fall of the Soviet Union until 2003. The establishment of the base at Kant was the Russian response to the US base at Manas.

Lukin, Mikhail. 'Все Российские базы.' Коммерсантъ Власть 19 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/766822

Figure 5 Russian Bases in Kyrgyzstan 2012

Chaldovar Communications Node
Kant Airbase 700 Soldiers Aircraft
Karakol Anti-Submarine Base
Mailuu-Suu Radio Seismic Lab No. 17
Kant air base is Russia’s largest power projection center in Kyrgyzstan and serves as a symbol of deterrence against aggression by Uzbekistan.

Other Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan are legacy facilities from the time of the Soviet Union. Karakol is a testing site for naval torpedo propulsion and guidance systems. Chaldovar is located in Kara Baltar and is a naval communications and electronic warfare center. Mailuu Suu is the home to Radio-seismic Laboratory no. 17, a center for the detection of earthquakes and nuclear tests throughout the world (Lukin 2007). These three sites are not as important or influential as the base at Kant. All four bases are a substantial source of economic stability for Kyrgyzstan because of the commerce, infrastructure and stability that accompany military installations.

Russia and Kyrgyzstan extended the lease on the base at Kant for 15 years in October 2012 (Russia: ‘no plans’ to 2012). The details of the extension are not known, but several announcements were made immediately following the news of the agreement. In the first announcement, which was made the same week as the base agreement, Russia promised to relax restrictions and quotas on work permits for Kyrgyz citizens in Russia in order to increase remittances (Nordic Intel 2012). There was also a $1 billion military aid package promised from Russia to Kyrgyzstan to balance against US cooperation in the region (Kucera 2012). Following the military agreement, the Russian state owned company, RusHydro, also signed an agreement to build four hydroelectric power stations valued at $410-425 million while writing off $500 million in loans (Dzybenko 2012). RusHydro agreed to build eight more power stations after 2016 and manage each one until it they are
profitable. The Russian government said they would turn the hydroelectric stations over to Kyrgyzstan once profitable. This agreement on hydroelectric power will make Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector more secure but increase their security dependence on Russia.

There is also a $2 billion loan from Russia that was conditionally promised to the Kyrgyz government once the US is evicted from the Transit Center at Manas (Krickus 2011, 109). All benefits from the relationship with Russia are connected to expanding the lease on their military base at Kant and evicting the US military from Manas. Just like in Tajikistan, Russia packages economic and military aid together to make the agreement irresistible to the government of Kyrgyzstan.

Russia has also been pursuing an agreement to open a base in the southern portion of Kyrgyzstan near Osh (Kucera 2013) (Russia Opens Military Base 2013). Russia had an agreement signed with former Kyrgyz president Maksim Bakiyev in 2009 for a new CSTO base in the vicinity of Osh (A New Russian Base 2009, 1). After Bakiyev was removed from power in 2010, the interim government did not honor the agreement. Current presidents Putin and Atambayev have discussed a Russian base in Southern Kyrgyzstan but have not reached an agreement (Kucera 2013).

Kyrgyzstan has a security situation that leaves them with some resource shortcomings. The Kyrgyz military and security services are the second smallest in Central Asia by troop numbers and the amount of equipment. There have been terrorist attacks on a regular basis in the last decade. Two revolutions have occurred. Ethnic violence has escalated out of control along the border with Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is also located on illegal narcotics trafficking routes.
Seizures of illegal drugs are taking place, but it is difficult to see a measure of the government's effectiveness fighting drug smuggling.

Kyrgyzstan's military and security services rely on Russian-made and donated weapons. There is military aid from the US and China, but they are not arming Kyrgyzstan to the extent the Russian military aid packages are. The $1 billion military aid package from Russia to Kyrgyzstan eclipses any other foreign aid found during research (Kucera 2013). The invitation to join the combined air defense network, the pursuit of a second base in the south of Kyrgyzstan and continued improvements to the runways at Kant show a Russian desire to continue expanding their influence in Kyrgyzstan and the region.

Kazakhstan

The security situation in Kazakhstan is different than Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan has the largest economy and the second largest military and security services population in Central Asia. The military and security services of Kazakhstan appear to control both internal and external threats. The attacks in the terrorist attack database (See Table 16) have very few casualties associated with them. Incidents that have occurred since the data in Table 16 was completed have not been large. In 2011, there were 4 suicide bomber detonations in Kazakhstan that did not have additional deaths beyond the bomber (Stein 2012, 43-46). There

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21 The only figure available for Chinese military aid occurred in 2002 and was for $970,000 for one year (Daly 2013). The US has given military aid to Kyrgyzstan, it is much smaller than the Russian agreements to extend the base at Manas. From 1992 to 2008 the US gave Kyrgyzstan $40.15 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (Nichol 2010, 63-65). FMF for that time frame only included non-lethal military agreements (61). IMET is made up of military training in the US. The Security Assistance budget for other defense related programs to Kyrgyzstan totaled $28 million from 2008 to 2010 (63).
were also some incidents of residents of Kazakhstan shooting police officers. The attacks did not have connections to terrorist organizations and suspects were either apprehended by police or killed by Ministry of the Interior special operations forces (Stein 2012, 46).

Kazakhstan borders Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The border with Uzbekistan is contested in several areas over the actual boundaries. There have been no recent conflicts between the two countries. Kazakhstan’s border with China is modernizing as the two countries continue to develop relations. Points of entry with modern customs inspection facilities have been constructed to expedite the flow of Chinese goods and rail lines are being improved between the two countries (Weitz 2013). There are no border problems between China and Kazakhstan.

The border with Russia is 6,846 kilometers (Central Asia Executive Summary 2009, 45). There are no foreign military bases in Kazakhstan. Russia has not increased the amount of military forces based in Kazakhstan since 9/11. Russia has increased their strength based on cooperation, increased exercises with Kazakhstan’s military and security services and the inclusion of Kazakhstan in Russia’s unified air defense network (Kazakhstan, Russia to create 2013).

Since 9/11 Russia and Kazakhstan have completed 14 major bilateral training events and Kazakhstan has participated in 40 multilateral training exercises

\[6846 \text{ kilometers} = 4235.91 \text{ miles}\]

\[226\text{ Russia leases the Baikonor Cosmodrome. It is not a military base. The cosmodrome is a space launch facility under lease to Russia until 2050 (Central Asia Executive Summary 2009, 21).}\]
with Russia and other Central Asian countries (Stein 2012, 6-23). Table 17 breaks down the amount of bilateral military exercises conducted between Russia and all Central Asian countries. Russia has conducted more training with Kazakhstan than with any other country.

Table 17 Bilateral Military Exercises with Russia*

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*There were 90 military joint exercises involving Central Asian Militaries in this time. Joint exercised conducted under the banner of multilateral organizations like the SCO or CSTO are not counted in this chart, unless a preponderance of the forces belong to Russia and one other country. For example in 2009, Exercise Cooperation (Interaction) was a joint exercise, but 600 soldiers, 20 aircraft, and 95 people from the Ministry of the Interior came from Russia, 1,500 Kazakh soldiers, 86 Kyrgyz soldiers and 3 Tajik soldiers participated (Stein 2012, 13). Cooperation (Interaction) 2009 was counted as a bilateral Kazakh- Russian exercise on this chart because of the high percentage of Kazakh and Russian soldiers.

Military exercises ensure that the countries are capable of fighting together. Their technology, weapon systems, operational language and spoken language must be the same. Each exercise is an investment of time and resources into making a stronger partnership. Kazakhstan also invests in individual education and training in Russia. From 1993 – 2006, 2,500 military and security personnel went to formal

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24 For the purposes of this paper, a multilateral training exercise is counted for a country if that country and Russia have over 90 percent of the forces in the exercise and the other partner states send minimal participants.
training in Russia with the Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Ministry of Emergency Services (МЧС) (McDermott 2009, 48). Russia regularly provides military officers to instruct at the National Defense Academy of Kazakhstan (48). This level of individual training builds contacts between organizations and ensures common understanding between organizations.

The joint Russian – Kazakh training has focused on repelling an attack from a “neighboring country,” and on securing strategic and important assets against non-state actors (Stein 2012, 21). The joint exercises have taken place near the Kazakh – Russian border on the Caspian Sea, and near Kazakhstan’s borders with China and Uzbekistan. Exercises range in size from 100s to 10,000s of troops and have focused on fighting armed bands of insurgents, all the way to full-scale nuclear war with a “neighbor” (21). It is a comprehensive plan to keep Russia and Kazakhstan in compatible partnership.

Military sales and bilateral agreements that include military equipment have also increased between Kazakhstan and Russia. There are multiple agreements that show Kazakhstan increased purchases of Russian made weapons since 9/11 and proclamations by the Government of Russia that Kazakhstan is Russia’s most trusted security ally (McDermott 2009, 39).25

25 In 2002 the Army of Kazakhstan purchased Russian made S-75, S-200, S-300 missiles, Su-25, Su-27 and Mig-29 jets (McDermott 2009, 3). The size of Kazakhstan’s defense budget doubled in 2004 and included increased purchases of Russian military hardware (viii). In 2007, Kazakhstan purchased additional Mig-31s, Mig-29s, Su-25 fighters and numerous missiles (51). In 2008, Kazakhstan agreed to use only Russian made equipment in their air defense network, no western equipment can be integrated with their networks after this decision (50).
Russia and Kazakhstan recently signed an agreement to create a unified air defense network (Kazakhstan, Russia to create 2013). The agreement will extend the border of Russia’s air defense system to include all of Kazakhstan. The only other agreement like this exists between Russia and Belarus. The agreement comes with promises of increased Russian technical cooperation and military education (Kazakhstan, Russia to create 2013). Russia has also entered into negotiations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to include those countries in the unified air defense network, proposing expansion from the agreement with Kazakhstan. If the agreement is reached between Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian air defense network will cover most of Central Asia, to the borders of China and Afghanistan (Russia intends to increase 2013). This air defense umbrella will give Russia more influence over Central Asia and tie Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan closer to Russia.

The increased cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan has brought a change in Kazakhstan-US cooperation. Between 2000 and 2007, US military advisors worked with the Kazakh military to help create a new national doctrine (McDermott 2009, 46). When the final doctrine for Kazakhstan’s military strategy was complete in 2008, several of the US advisors were disappointed to see that the sections that included principles of openness and transparency were removed from the final version (McDermott 2009, 46). The final draft’s sections resembled Russian military doctrine and not Western practices. This lack of success in cooperation with the US and movement towards the Russian military illustrates that Kazakhstan has purchased more Russian-made military equipment than from any other country.
Kazakhstan no longer wants to play partner to both the US and Russia. Kazakhstan has a stronger desire to have security cooperation with Russia than with NATO and the US.

One of the reasons that Kazakhstan has increased cooperation with Russia and not the US and the West is the “Russian – Georgian Conflict Syndrome,” 26 (Central Asia Executive Summary 2009, 45). When Kazakhstan saw that the US did not intervene on Georgia’s behalf against Russia in 2008, despite the claims of US – Georgia partnership, there was no choice but to increase cooperation with Russia. The amount of bilateral training exercises between Russian and Kazakhstan increased after 2008. There was also a reduction in cooperation between Kazakhstan and the US after 2008 (Stein 2012, 34-43).

The final summary of Kazakhstan’s alliance with Russia for security came in a 2009 interview with Bulat Sultanov, the Director of Kazakhstan’s Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Mr. Sultanov said, “as a nuclear power, Russia is a guarantor of national security for Kazakhstan,” (McDermott 2009, 45).

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26 The “Russian – Georgian Conflict Syndrome,” was caused by the lack of US and NATO military reaction to Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Because of the security ties Georgia had to the US, and their actions on the membership path to NATO, many countries believed that the US and/or NATO would help the Georgians. When they did not, it caused several countries on Russia’s borders to seek closer relations with Russia and not cling to the illusion that their bilateral relations with the US would protect them from Russia. Russia’s willingness to use force on a neighbor and new military strategy through 2020 that emphasizes Russia’s willingness to use force to solve problems on Russia’s border brought improved relations with Kazakhstan (Central Asia Executive Summary 2009, 45).
Uzbekistan

Prior to 9/11 there was a wave of terrorist activity in Uzbekistan. In 1998, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) declared war on the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and announced their goal of an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley (Stein 2013, 3). In February 1999 the IMU detonated several car bombs throughout Tashkent, killing 16 people and injuring over 100 (Stein 2012, 54). In 2000, the IMU attacked the Uzbek province of Surkhandarya with 200 fighters and fought with security forces (55). Most of the 200 fighters and 12 policemen were killed.

The security situation changed after 9/11. Uzbekistan allowed the US to use the airbase at Kharshi- Kanabad (K2). The increase in cooperation and use of the airbase was contingent on the US targeting the IMU while conducting military operations in Afghanistan (Stein 2013, 6). US airstrikes devastated the IMU in the early days of the war in Afghanistan, temporarily disabling the IMU’s overall capabilities in Afghanistan. Their top leadership was killed, their camps were destroyed and their members scattered (Stein 2013, 8).

The security situation in Uzbekistan spiked with violence between 2004-2005 with a string of terrorist activity that caused the country to increase their use of security services. There were three suicide bombers in 2004 that caused over 13 deaths and over 30 people wounded (Terrorism incident database 2013). Terrorist organizations targeted the government of Uzbekistan and the embassies of the US and Israel (Terrorism incident database 2013).
Currently in Afghanistan, the IMU is often making headlines. The IMU has integrated with the Taliban and operates in Northern Afghanistan (Roggio 2011). Prisoners interrogated after a 2011 NATO ISAF mission divulged that Islamic extremists from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Chechnya make up the IMU and they have their sights set on destroying the government of Uzbekistan (Roggio 2011). The US Department of State advises travelers on their website that the threat of terrorist attacks exists in Uzbekistan and travelers should be warned (Uzbekistan Country Specific Information 2013). Despite the ability of the IMU to capture headlines and remain in the security conversation, they are not a regionally destabilizing force because their operations are concentrated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are not large enough at this time to conduct operations in Central Asia (Stein 2013, 19). Uzbekistan’s military and security forces are motivated to operate at a high state of alert and remain aggressive to deter terrorism (Uzbekistan Country Specific Information 2013).

The security situation in Uzbekistan is different than the other states in Central Asia because of their relationship with Russia. Uzbekistan has reduced their partnership with the Russian military since 9/11. Of the 90 joint training exercises that took place with Central Asian militaries between 2001 and 2012, Uzbekistan only participated with troops in nine exercises and sent observers to four exercises (Stein 2012, 23-34). Uzbekistan conducted 12 exercises with the US and NATO in the same time frame (Stein 2012, 24-30).

Uzbekistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006 and terminated their membership in 2012 (Организация Договора о
Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and remains a member (Shanghai Cooperation Organization Webpage 2013). The decision to join the CSTO came after the Uzbek government had a falling out with the US over criticism of the Uzbek government. During May 2005 in Andijan, Uzbekistan government security services fired at a crowd of protesters. Casualty estimates range from 187 to several hundred (Patton-Walsh 2005). After the US denounced the incident and helped some of the refugees from Andijan get to Kyrgyzstan, the US was evicted from their military base in Uzbekistan and all security partnerships were terminated.

After the falling out, Uzbekistan had a temporary increase in relations with Russia. Presidents Putin and Karimov signed a treaty in November 2005 that guaranteed each country would provide military support to one another in the event of foreign aggression. The agreement also granted each country use of the other’s military facilities and made promises of future military exercises (Isachenkov 2005). The only Russian – Uzbek military training that took place from 2001-2012 occurred in the wake of this agreement. Basing of Russian forces in Uzbekistan never occurred. Uzbekistan’s participation in the CSTO and SCO increased immediately following the bilateral agreement with Russia, but soon started to decline. Uzbekistan began to strain relations with the SCO, CSTO and Russia. There were two instances of Uzbekistan refusing to allow SCO and CSTO allies to cross their territory. In the first, Kazakhstan could not transport military equipment through Uzbekistan on the way to Tajikistan for an SCO exercise (Kucera 2012). In the second, Tajikistan was not permitted to cross Uzbekistan on the way
to a CSTO training exercise (Agadzhanyan 2013). Uzbekistan also refused to support both alliances with soldiers required for joint training exercises (Stein 2012, 34-43).

Recent events aimed at showing cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia focus only on commercial relations and agreements. There has been no mention of military or security cooperation between the two countries. Presidential meetings in the last year have only mentioned Uzbekistan’s desire to join the Central Asian Customs Union (Uzbek leader says relations 2012).

The freezing of Uzbek-Russian security cooperation is due to a thawing of Uzbek-US relations. After the incidents of Andijan and the eviction of US forces from Uzbekistan, US security assistance was frozen to Uzbekistan from 2005-2012. The US government reinstated military aid to Uzbekistan in 2012 (Kucera 2013). That same year, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO.

In recent testimony before the US House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake spoke of increased military aid to Uzbekistan (Blake 2013). He said the US is currently supporting Uzbekistan with body armor, global positioning systems and night vision devices. Secretary Blake also used his testimony to let Congress know that the US State Department plans to equip the Uzbek military with unmanned aerial vehicles in the next year. In a conversation between the Uzbek president and congressman Dana Rohrabacher in February
2013, Rohrabacher reported that Karimov would like to replace all of his military’s Soviet-era weapons with American equipment (Kucera 2013).

Uzbekistan has more than enough military and security forces to deal with the internal threats they face. The violence that spiked from 2004-2005 in Table 16 has dissipated. The threat of Islamic extremist organizations and the IMU in Uzbekistan is exaggerated by the Uzbek Government to use military and security services against enemies of the ruling regime (Schwartz 2007). Government opposition in Uzbekistan is often categorized as Islamic extremists if they oppose government policies or if the regime feels threatened by them. President Karimov is in total control and does not need outside assistance to control the security situation in Uzbekistan.

The total control exerted by President Karimov is what separates Uzbekistan from other countries in Central Asia that rely on Russia. Since taking over the presidency March 24, 1990, President Karimov has eliminated all challengers to his authority through political maneuvering and use of the state security services to coerce Uzbekistan (McGlinchey 2011, 114). Uzbekistan has used state security services to conduct widespread arrests, threaten, harass and physically abuse citizens (Chivers 2005). There have also been reports filed by international organizations in support of human rights that accuse the government of intimidating and abusing media, prisoners and families of those accused of crimes against the government (Chivers 2005). There is no political opposition in

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27 Congressman Dana Rohrabacher is a California Republican who was recently named the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats Subcommittee. He visited Uzbekistan in February 2013 (Kucera 2013)
Uzbekistan. The opposition is either in jail or has been driven from the country. The political elite is deferential to the president. President Karimov has also used a number of referendums and modifications to the constitution to continue to defy term limits and remain the president for over 23 years (115). Karimov won the 2007 Presidential election in Uzbekistan with 90 percent of the vote (115). President Karimov has a strong coercive instrument in his state security services and does not need outside help to control Uzbekistan.

Current events on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border show a new trait in Uzbek security trends: restraint. In January 2013, fighting occurred in the Fergana Valley between Uzbek and Kyrgyz villages. The Uzbek village is located on a geographic island surrounded by Kyrgyz territory and has been blocked off by local Kyrgyz residents. The Kyrgyz residents were not allowing supplies to enter the village and were physically guarding roads. President Karimov has not ordered an armed solution to the problem. Uzbek security and military forces are negotiating with their Kyrgyz counterparts to come to a peaceful solution (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: border quarrel 2013). Karimov has used the threat of violence in the past over water rights (Nurshayeva 2012). It is telling that he is not using threats of violence to protect his citizens.

Uzbekistan cancelled their membership in the CSTO in 2012. Kyrgyzstan and Russia are members. The collective defense agreement of the CSTO seems to be the reason that President Karimov is not pursuing a military solution to end the disagreement on the border with Kyrgyzstan (Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности 2013). Uzbekistan has a larger and better-equipped
military than Kyrgyzstan. President Karimov appears to not want to involve Russian and the CSTO in their border dispute. This shows that Russia is stronger in the region because of their increased strength in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and increased joint capabilities with Kazakhstan.

Despite the influence exerted in this situation, Russia is not stronger in Uzbekistan since 9/11. Uzbekistan does have primarily Russian-made military equipment (Stein 2012, 41-43). The legacy equipment would force the Uzbek military and security services to be attached to Russian-made equipment because of the resources needed to re-equip and re-train the military to use a new type of technology. This dependence seems like a by-product of what was left behind by the Soviet Union and past military agreements. It does not appear to be something Uzbekistan wants to maintain based on Karimov’s statements to Congressman Rohrabacher (Kucera 2013). Uzbekistan looks to be choosing security cooperation with the US more than with Russia.

**Turkmenistan**

There is no documented evidence to support that Russia has increased their military strength in Turkmenistan since 9/11. Turkmenistan has sent observers to multi-lateral military exercises in the region, but continues to remain isolated with no military alliances (Stein 2012, 8). Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO. There is evidence of anti terrorism coordination between the two countries, but not on a large scale. In Ashgabat, police pursued members of a criminal gang, a standoff occurred and the criminals were killed in 2008 (Stein 2012, 54). Members of a
Russian special forces unit were present; both countries confirmed it was in an advisory role only (54).

Where Russia has a significant relationship with Turkmenistan is in the sale of military equipment. Russia has increased their sales of military equipment to Turkmenistan since 9/11. Before 2004, Turkmenistan was not a significant customer for Russian weapons (Russian Paper: Turkmenistan now 2009). Orders from the Russian government’s arms exporting company, Rosoboroneksport show that Turkmenistan was the fifth largest client worldwide in 2009 (Russian Paper: Turkmenistan now 2009). The same article also outlined the history of Turkmenistan’s military acquisitions. Before President Niyazov died in 2006, Turkmenistan primarily purchased weapons from Georgia and Ukraine. Under the new President, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, an agreement of increased military technical cooperation was signed between Turkmenistan and Russia in 2008 (Russian Paper: Turkmenistan now 2009). Since the agreement, there have been multiple contracts signed for billions of rubles worth of tanks, boats and aircraft. (Russian military journal editor 2009). Russian military sales are the only documented weapons sales to Turkmenistan that could be found. The dependence on one source of military equipment shows a security reliance on Moscow for continued readiness of the military and security forces of Turkmenistan.29

28 Turkmenistan was behind China, India, Vietnam and Algeria (Russian Paper: Turkmenistan now 2019).

29 The military and security forces of Turkmenistan are used only for self-defense of Turkmenistan according to the President of Turkmenistan (Turkmen President Addresses Nation 2012).
Conclusion

Russia has gotten stronger in Central Asia since 9/11 with military and security guarantees, but not everywhere. Russia is stronger in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries need a Russian military presence to counter possible conflicts with Uzbekistan on the border. The Russian military footprint has also increased in each country since 9/11. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan both have circumstances that foster unrest within the country. In Tajikistan, there are pockets of resistance from the time of the civil war that need to be deterred by the stability of a Russian military presence. In Kyrgyzstan, two popular uprisings have changed the government since 9/11. The Tajik and Kyrgyz governments both require Russian assistance fighting Islamic extremism and illegal narcotics. Russian security and energy aid has been instrumental in keeping Bishkek and Dushanbe in control.

Russia has a stronger partnership and improved levels of coordination with Kazakhstan since 9/11. Kazakhstan’s agreement to join Russia’s unified air defense network brings Kazakhstan under Russia’s air defense umbrella and extends Russia’s reach into the skies around their country. Both countries have also benefitted from the increase in training between their militaries and security services. In Kazakhstan, there is a dependence on Russia for military hardware. All Kazakhstan’s weapons are Russian designed, except the six US-made helicopters. Russia is stronger and more compatible with the Kazakh military and security services because of the amount of training between the two countries and the relationship shared between the governments.
Uzbekistan is capable of dealing with their internal threats. President Karimov and his military and security services do not need Russian assistance. The internal strength of the president and the security services is what allows Uzbekistan to be move towards security assistance from the US instead of Russia. Russia has a stronger influence on Uzbekistan with their bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The lack of a military response or threat from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan on their most recent border quarrel shows Russia’s regional influence. Russia is not stronger in Uzbekistan since 9/11 because President Karimov does not need any help controlling his country.

Since Turkmenistan remains neutral, Russia has not increased strength in the country. Russia does have increased influence over Turkmenistan’s weapons purchases. Turkmenistan signed the agreement to increase military technological cooperation with Russia and they purchase all their weapons from Russia, making them reliant on Russia for military sales. The hypothesis from the beginning of the chapter that the size of the military would correlate to the level of military reliance on Russia did not hold. Turkmenistan has the third smallest population of military and security personnel and is the region’s least dependent country on Russia.
CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION

Central Asia is reliant on economic and security support from Russia. Reliance is why Russia is stronger in the region since 9/11. The main explanation for Russia’s increased strength in Central Asia is their ability to influence countries with their economic and security support.

Weaker economies are easier for Russia to influence. The amount of dependence that a country’s economy has on Russia increases as a greater percentage of their economy is fueled by Russia. Remittances are a phenomenon that has increased a great deal since 9/11. Remittances and FDI are levers of influence that Russia could reduce or remove from a country in Central Asia. The government of Russia could use their security forces to expel legal and illegal migrant workers to cut down on remittances. Russia’s Federal Migration Service could also decrease the number of work permits for foreigners to degrade three of the five Central Asian countries economically.

Foreign direct investment could be reduced through government regulation because of the amount of control the government exerts over businesses in Russia. Russia’s ability to influence the remittances and FDI in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and to
a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, has grown since 9/11 and has reached 33, 57 and 11 percent of the three country’s GDPs.

The amount of hydrocarbon imports from Russia to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also shows an increase in Russia’s influence in each country. Since 9/11, Russia has shown their willingness to shut off the gas supply to Ukraine on two occasions in 2005 and 2009. Russia could do the same to each of the Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan’s trade relationship with Russia is also very important to Uzbekistan because 29 percent of Uzbek exports are sent to Russia, the largest percentage in Central Asia.

The security situation in Central Asia shows an increase in troop strength and influence for Russia. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, weak economies are paired with a security situation that the host country cannot manage without Russian support. Kyrgyzstan’s history of political instability makes it reliant on Russian security assistance to maintain the status quo. Tajikistan’s domestic situation has been unstable since the civil war in 1992. The Tajik government has been reliant on Russian security guarantees to stay in power since the first Russian military intervention twenty-one years ago. Russia has made gains in the numbers of troops and bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan since 9/11. Russia also packaged their military presence in each country as a deterrent to Uzbek aggression. Russia has paired economic aid with security agreements to ensure that the host nation granted extensions to bases in each country. The invitation from Russia to join the unified air defense network in each country shows the potential for Russia to gain even more military strength in each country in the future.
In Kazakhstan, the agreement on the Russian unified air defense network strengthens Russia’s position in the country. Russia will control the airspace over Kazakhstan with an extension of their existing air defense network and have an additional defensive buffer around their country. The increased military and security services training and cooperation between the two countries also show a stronger bond forming over the past ten years.

Turkmenistan’s agreement to increase military technical cooperation and purchase more weapons from Russia shows an increase in Russian influence since 9/11. Before 2004, Turkmenistan purchased military equipment from Georgia and Ukraine. Ongoing Russian arms purchases could increase in importance and be used as influence if a border disagreement between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan escalated to something more violent. Turkmenistan would need to purchase more military weapons from Russia. Russia would most likely agree to continue military sales with an increased alliance of some sort, linking Turkmenistan to Russia.

The security situation in Uzbekistan has not changed to make Russia stronger within the country. Uzbekistan has increased cooperation with the US and distanced themselves from Russia. Uzbekistan’s choice of the US over Russia is because of the strength of President Islam Karimov and his ability to control the country with coercion. President Karimov does not need Russian help to secure his country.

However, since Russia has increased their strength in three of Uzbekistan’s neighbors, Russia is in a better position to contain Uzbekistan with military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and a stronger ally in Kazakhstan. Russia also has
justification to protect Uzbekistan’s weaker neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, because of their involvement in the CSTO. Uzbekistan withdrew from CSTO in 2012. Since Uzbekistan is no longer a member of the treaty organization, they are a potential enemy to Russia if they aggress against Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. Russia has a potential justification to use force against Uzbekistan based on international law and the CSTO, making Russia’s position towards Uzbekistan stronger.

One of the biggest threats to the security of Central Asian countries is unrest. Unrest can be fueled by poor economic conditions. Understanding the section on remittances in the previous chapter is paramount to understanding security in Central Asia. With such an emphasis on remittances to support the country economically, the same emphasis on remittances exists from a security standpoint. The remittances keep Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan economically healthy. The large percentage of the working population living abroad (See Table 5) contributes economically to support their families in their home country. The population of workers in Russia does not cause trouble for their country of origin’s government. If they were not employed in Russia things would be different. There would be several million unemployed, discontented working age people who could be at home taking out their frustrations on the government of their home country.

Without a job and the ability to financially provide for their families, the millions of working age people might be more inclined to pursue financial support through illegal activities. Desperate people do desperate things to support their
families. If unable to find work, they could be recruited by an extremist organization or participate in illegal trafficking of drugs or humans through Central Asia and into Russia. Both careers could help to destabilize their country and strain the security situation.

Terrorist and extremist organizations look for the following characteristics when recruiting new members: a high level of distress or dissatisfaction, cultural disillusionment and frustration and a dysfunctional family situation, which could be brought on by financial hardships (Gerwehr and Daly 2013,14). The age groups most often recruited by terrorist and extremist organizations are between 20-30 years old (Hudson 1999, 7). If Russia decided to enforce their labor laws and deport all the illegal employees, or restrict workers from a certain Central Asian country, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could have millions of people returned to their country that fit the profile to be recruited by extremist organizations. The growth to terrorist populations could have a very destabilizing effect on all of the countries in Central Asia and Russia. The employment of migrants in Russia is preferable to the Central Asian and Russian governments than those same populations fueling unrest in their country of origin.

Russia uses the Central Asian countries dependence on remittances to get favorable foreign policy concessions, base agreements, and influence in each country in need. The government of Russia understands how important the money transfers from migrants are to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There have been disagreements between Russia and these three countries when migrant workers were arrested in Moscow and deported home in large numbers (Russian
Military Bases in 2012). The return of enough disgruntled residents could have destabilizing effects for the country in which it occurs.

This body of work shows a great deal of Russia’s strength gained in Central Asia occurred because of changes in the economic situation that had nothing to do with the United States’ involvement. The rise of oil prices and the growth of the Russian economy contributed a great deal to their increased influence in Central Asia. The remittances to Central Asia were a bi-product of economic growth that occurred in Russia around the same time as 9/11. Russia needed workers in order to develop their country and Central Asia had bodies willing to do the work.

FDI and increased trade with Russia help explain Russia’s increased influence in the region. The increased measures of commerce also appear to be because of Russia’s economic growth resulting from rising oil prices. Remittances, FDI and trade have all become tools of Russian foreign policy. They are levers to be used to increase influence each country in Central Asia.

The security situation seems connected to a strategy of reassertion of Russian influence over Central Asia. The increase in Russian forces in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan seem to be direct responses to a US presence in Kyrgyzstan. Russia’s pursuit of influence and strength in the region has become a priority since 9/11.

US policy makers should acknowledge this increase in Russian influence and be aware of it when working bi-laterally with Central Asian countries and when dealing with Russia in other geographic areas. The US has paid billions of dollars to access Central Asia in support of combat operations in Afghanistan. It may have
been cheaper, or could become cheaper if the US improves their relationship with Russia in order to gain greater access to Central Asia.
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