

AGENDA SETTERS, RESPONDERS, OR BOTH? ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND  
CONGRESSIONAL AGENDAS

Jennifer E. Sykes

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill  
2009

Approved by:

Virginia Gray

James A. Stimson

Jason M. Roberts

## **ABSTRACT**

JENNIFER E. SYKES: Agenda Setters, Responders, or Both? Organized Interests and Congressional Agendas  
(Under the direction of Virginia Gray.)

At what point organized interests become involved in the policy process is a matter of debate for scholars. On one side are the interest groups scholars who argue that groups set the agenda and members of Congress respond; at the other end of the spectrum are Congressionalists who give credit to those with power over the formal agenda and relegate organized interests to a responsive position. The compromise approach promoted by some is that both are involved in a muddied process to shape the agenda. By looking at activity both before and after arrival on the formal agenda, I test to see which comes first — the group, the member, or both? Using three different tests for agenda-setting activity, I discern that both members of Congress and organized interests play a role in agenda-setting, but organized interests play the larger part.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Much appreciation goes to Virginia Gray for reading multiple drafts of this and Jim Stimson for tolerating all questions and arguments on error-correction models. Sarah Szatkowski provided excellent feedback on making the writing make sense to normal people. And special thanks is due to Diana M. Peloquin for coding much of the data — maybe someday she will go to grad school.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	v
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	vi
Thesis . . . . .	1
APPENDIX . . . . .	17
References . . . . .	33

## LIST OF TABLES

### Table

1	Issues Used in Analysis . . . . .	18
2	Variable List and Data Sources . . . . .	19
3	Descriptive Statistics for Variables . . . . .	19
4	OI Integration Summary Results . . . . .	20
5	MOC integration summary results . . . . .	21
6	Error Correction Results for OI as Agenda-Setter . . . . .	28
7	Error Correction Results for OI as Agenda-Responder . . . . .	28
8	Breaks in Trends — OI . . . . .	29
9	Agenda-Setting Model — OI Activity Only . . . . .	30
10	Agenda-Setting Model — MOC Activity Only . . . . .	30
11	Agenda-Setting Model — No Controls . . . . .	31
12	Full Agenda-Setting Model . . . . .	32

## LIST OF FIGURES

### Figure

1	Agenda-Setters . . . . .	17
2	Agenda-Responders . . . . .	17
3	Interactive . . . . .	18
4	Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 1 . . . . .	22
5	Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 2 . . . . .	23
6	Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 3 . . . . .	24
7	Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 1 . . . . .	25
8	Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 2 . . . . .	26
9	Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 3 . . . . .	27

Different issues appear on the formal government agenda at different times in the political process. The reasons for this can be that some rare event has raised awareness to a previously unknown problem or that “an idea’s time has come,” thanks in large parts to efforts of policy entrepreneurs. Why certain issues appear at certain times — who brings these issues to the forefront, has been answered many times over the years in many different ways. The specific answers that scholars find for this question typically reflect the biases of what subfield of American politics they studied: institutionalists focused on elected representatives or those endowed with Constitutional authority to handle policy, while those who focused on the policy-process gave greater credit to the external actors.

Though recent efforts have been made to reconcile these two schools of thought, the results of these studies rarely have replicable findings. The studies of single policy areas that span decades find some policy entrepreneur — either an organized interest (OI) or a single member of Congress (MOC) — serve as the key player for bringing an issue to the public’s agenda. Research examining a number of issues at the same time has found differences across areas, generally with few conclusive reasons as to why some issues differ from others.

My question is what role OIs play in this process relative to MOCs. When are OIs the most active? Are OIs the ones bringing issues to the attention of Congress, or do they specify the alternatives after MOCs set the agenda? Or, is it that these two actors are working together, and by ignoring each actor’s contributions we have an incomplete understanding of the process?

To answer these questions, I establish the necessary conditions for OIs to be agenda-setters, agenda-responders, or to work with and respond to MOCs to get issues onto the formal agenda. I look at this process over a ten-year period at the national level on a subset of non-rare events to see who is active and who is not, and how those actors behave over time. From this set-up I can draw conclusions about who is correct — the institutionalists or the interest group specialists — and see how, over time, different levels of activity from these two alters the content of what government pays attention to.

Past works on agenda-setting either have an explicit focus on the role of interest groups or completely ignore them. This is a particular problem when examining the Congressional agenda. At one end of the spectrum are those who give interest groups a prominent role. These scholars argue that OIs are more concerned about issues than MOCs and can focus more of their efforts at getting a specific item on the agenda (Baumgartner and Jones (1993)). In the most extreme interpretation of this, all it takes is time for an interest group to succeed in introducing and passing into law a certain policy. More often scholars argue that over time enough OIs band together to force government to act on an issue, and government acts in response to the cue from

the OIs.

Other scholars view agenda-setting as something that strictly relates to what MOCs want. Regardless of Congressionalists' views of whether parties or preferences dominate what policies are introduced and voted on in Congress, both sides agree that the agenda is set by the members, *not* outside actors (Cox and McCubbins (2005)).<sup>1</sup> Preference-based theories of Congressional agendas say that members have reasonably well-formed preferences and enact what maximizes their utility, while party-based theories say the party leaders put forth an agenda that maximizes their party members' chances of reelection. Both views heavily discount OIs' lobbying efforts. When organized interests do enter these scholars' equations, it is after Congress has begun to act. Members can call on OIs for information on the subject, or OIs may see the appearance of the issue as an opportunity to specify alternatives to it. Many recent pieces have used the population ecology model to argue this exact point: the appearance of something on the formal Congressional agenda leads to an increase in political energy, which in turn creates more opportunities for OIs (Leech et al. (2005);Dusso (2008)).

Still more scholars look for compromises between these two extremes. Some view the agenda-setting process as so complex and intertwined that interest groups and elected officials must work together. Actors across formal and informal venues with interests in the same area naturally interact and work together towards a solution to the problem (Kingdon 1984). Instead of having a dichotomy between which came first, the complications of the process lead to a forced interaction at all times between the two.

Because scholarship has developed in such a disjointed fashion over the years, there appear to be three different roles that OIs can play in the agenda-setting process. Depending on which theoretical frame is used, OIs set, respond, or interact with others to raise issue awareness. If OIs are *agenda-setters*, then they should be more active than MOCs on an issue before that issue is dealt with formally in the institution. If they are what I term *agenda-responders*, then once an issue appears on the formal Congressional agenda, OIs should become involved in pushing for changes to it. In other words, their activity comes from alternative specifications, not issue awareness. If MOCs and OIs are working together over time, then both parties should be active before and after an issue appears on the formal agenda. Each of these is plausible and has been shown to be true. However, comparing each theory to another requires a clearer specification of the assumptions that differentiate them and determining a means of testing one against the other.

Three conditions must hold for interest groups to be setting the agenda: OIs must have a

---

<sup>1</sup> Unless thinking about veto pivots, in which case another elected official may constrict what appears on the agenda (Krehbiel (1998)).

narrow scope of issues they pursue, they must pursue these same issues over time, and more groups should form or begin lobbying on that issue over time. If these three conditions are true, then it makes sense that OIs are agenda-setters.

Interest groups have goals. Groups form to respond to problems in society, and they work towards solving these problems when they engage in lobbying the government.<sup>2</sup> This mirrors the pluralistic view of OI formation. Problems emerge, groups form, and after this expansion of conflict, government responds (Truman (1951);Schattschneider (1960)). OIs do not necessarily have to have a single set of goals, but they should engage government only in a limited number of issues. Interest groups have limited resources and cannot focus on all things at all times.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the number of issues, interest group activities should be consistent over time. We know that it takes time for an issue to appear on the government agenda, and since OIs have a narrow scope of issues to focus on, their activity should be in that area until the problem appears on the agenda. After it appears and is dealt with (or ignored), an organized interest may retire from that issue and move into another area.<sup>4</sup> Either way, there should not be a sudden spike in activity at some point in the process — instead there should be a steady stream of activity before and after the government deals with the issue.

Finally, because the agenda-setting process requires that a critical mass of support be reached, it should be expected that no single OI succeeds at getting an item on the agenda. Instead, there needs to be a bandwagon of support and coalitions of interest groups. These coalitions need not be formal, but just appear to exist (Hula (1999)). The call for policy change from any side of an issue should grow over time. As a potential policy develops more support, more organized interests should form or lobby on that issue, regardless of Congress' activity. When looking at the aggregate activities of groups, there should be some sort of deterministic trend line that best fits the OI time-series.

In the end, MOCs become involved after organized interests have shown there is enough support for the issue to be addressed. Members are too busy dealing with a wide array of issues — some whose time has come and others which must be dealt with each year — to pay attention to all activity or to initiate much on their own. Instead, they read cues from the outside. Once a tipping point is reached, they are forced to respond by dealing with an issue either in terms of hearings or bill introductions. They are not, however, part of the bandwagon.

---

<sup>2</sup> For business or trade groups this process only requires the second step — they may already exist but are not active in governmental lobbying.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, the dominant paradigm for interest group studies now is that they form policy niches and focus on even fewer and narrower issues than before Browne (1990).

<sup>4</sup> Or continue to work on it because of a feedback process. A fair proportion should drop off the radar after the issue is handled though.

In most agenda-setting studies focusing exclusively on MOCs, the only assumptions made are that certain members have control over the agenda, that those members have preferences, and their goal is to maximize their utilities (Shepsle and Weingast (1984*a*); Weingast and Marshall (1988)). Recently, with the focus on political party power, anything involving agendas references the leadership's power over the agenda (Cox and McCubbins (2005)). In the end though, members of the institution have preferences over policy outcomes, little constraint on pursuing those policy goals before they appear on the agenda, and, for most Congressionalists, MOCs do this independently of other actors.

After the reelection goal, MOCs pursue good public policy. This implies that MOCs do have preferences about which issues are important and how they should be handled. It is necessary to assume that these preferences exist on a wide range of issues and remain somewhat consistent. While both of these seem like strong assumptions, there is reason to believe they are valid. Representatives need to be aware of a large number of issues. Not only do their jobs require it, but for reelection their constituencies may demand it. Additionally these positions should be consistent. On the one hand, we know individual's ideologies rarely change. For members in particular, voters respond to MOCs who posit the same positions each year, so to be reelected members should be consistent.

MOCs also have the power to say what issues are formally discussed in their institution. Most of this power belongs certain members — party leaders and committee chairs — though there is no formal constraint on members introducing bills. Additionally, the leaders have a goal of maintaining their positions. To accomplish this they must keep the support of the rank and file member. In other words, if there is a groundswell of support for an issue coming from the members, the chair cannot block it without risk of removal by the members-at-large (Rohde (1991)).

There is a notable absence of OIs when Congressionalists discuss Congressional agenda-setting. Groups do not have the formal authority to introduce legislation and can make few credible threats against the gatekeepers of these policies. However, OIs still have policy goals and are still active in government. The reasoning is that they come in after Congress has taken action. They cannot shape preferences or force the hand of the members to pursue a certain topic, but they can provide information on relevant subjects that the institution itself chooses to address.

Even with an OI focus, there is some argument for this sequence of events. One argument frequently made in studies is that once attention has been drawn to an area, groups step in and respond to the shift in political energy (Gray and Lowery (1996)). OIs will have more

information on the specifics of the policy than the members. Their expertise then is in deriving the alternatives, not bringing the issue to the forefront.

Some scholars realize the agenda-setting process is not as cut-and-dry as described. Instead of one set of actors strictly leading the other, the two must collaborate. The traditional source for this argument comes from Kingdon's (1984) observations about the relevant actors in a policy community. These included *both* OIs and legislators. Both sets of actors have preferences and goals. Both have specialty functions in government: legislators have the final say on the formal agenda, and OIs have the information on the issues. As a result, both must work together to bring issues to the forefront.

The specifics of this interaction are debatable. The idea of OIs as constituents was once very popular within the Congressional literature. MOCs responded to constituent pressures, and OIs were a main avenue for reflecting constituency preferences (Fenno (1978)). Though the focus now tends towards parties, even in this framework interest groups appear. Some define parties as coalitions of OIs, giving them an indirect say in the happenings of Congress (Aldrich (1995)).

From the OI perspective there is the service bureaus' idea (Hall and Deardorff (2006)). Here the groups and members must work hand-in-hand. When both sets of actors have similar policy goals, OIs work in tandem with MOCs to pursue specific agenda items. Over time support grows and policy enactment occurs, but as a result of joint efforts.

For each potential relationship between elected officials and outside actors there is a temporal sequence that must occur for each to be true. For the first two, behaviors should be different before and after an item appears on the formal agenda. If the two are collaborating, then they should have similar levels of activity over time. Detecting these patterns of activity is the best means of testing how MOCs and OIs handle the agenda-setting process relative to one another.

This assumes a dynamic process for agenda-setting. Getting an item on the agenda takes time and support. For the first two arguments, it is a question of who builds this support. If agenda-setting is collaborative, then neither should be a leader or a laggard.

Before an item is taken up formally by the government, there should be growth over time in the level of activity from the relevant actors on the issue. As more groups and/or members begin signaling greater interest in a policy area, after some critical mass is met the issue should appear on the agenda. There should also be changes in behavior after an item appears on the agenda. If OIs are responding, they should show growth in attention to an issue once it falls onto the agenda. MOCs, upon realizing that interest groups are paying attention to an issue, should lag in their activities. In either case, the activities of OIs and MOCs should be unrelated to one another.

If both set the agenda then the opposite of this would happen. Groups and members would be working in tandem, with both actors showing growth in their attention to an issue before it arrives on the formal agenda and no substantial change in what they do after it appears.

Each theory then, has three different components to test for to verify if it best explains the agenda-setting process. Which actor takes action first, the OIs, the MOCs, or both? Secondly, are the actions of the two main actors related to one another or not? Finally, after (or near) the arrival of an item on the formal agenda, does the behavior of the actor not setting the agenda change? Specifically, for each theory, if it is true, the following should hold:

- If OIs are agenda-setters, they should 1) be more active in an issue area than MOCs before the issue appears on the formal agenda, 2) what MOCs do should not simultaneously cause what OIs do, and 3) after the issue appears on the formal agenda, there should be no substantial increase in the level of organized interest activity.
- If OIs are agenda-responders, they should 1) not be very active in an issue area until it appears on the formal agenda, 2) not simultaneously cause what MOCs do but instead follow it, and 3) after an issue appears on the agenda OIs should become much more active.
- If both actors are working together, then their activities should parallel one another's. Both actors should 1) show similar levels of changes in activity before an issue appears on the agenda, 2) both MOCs and OIs should cause one another's actions, and 3) after the issue appears on the formal agenda both OIs and MOCs should not see substantial growth in their activities in response to the new issue.

Figures 1 through 3 reflect each of these hypotheses graphically. Figure 1 shows OIs as agenda-setters, with Figure 2 showing them as agenda-responders, and Figure 3 the interactive relationship between OIs and MOCs. Though exaggerations on what may actually happen, they show what could be expected. Depending on which actor sets the agenda, their activity level should grow over time independent of the other actor's, and after a significant uptick in formal activity, the laggard should see an increase in their efforts. The vertical line in each figure is simply meant to represent when an item appeared on the formal agenda.

The data here covers a span of 29 issues (listed in Table 1), for 20 six-month periods between 1999 and 2008. The issue codes used come from the ones used in the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), and are cross-walked against those used in the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) and Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (LIV). While these all use different categorization schemes for each issue area, at the broadest level (which is the LDA level), they are roughly equal. There are links between the LDA codes and LIV codes through the PAP coding. So I feel secure in

assuming that each issue area covers the same issue.<sup>5</sup> The reason for six-month intervals is also due to the limitations of the LDA forms — most years they are filed every six-months with no dates for when actual lobbying occurred in that period.<sup>6</sup>

The main goal is to get at how much activity OIs and MOCs engage in before and after an issue appears on the formal agenda. The measures of activities are counts. For OIs, they are the counts of the total number of lobbying forms filed in a given six-month period. This is a somewhat questionable measure. It neglects any strategic outside lobbying efforts and thus actually underestimates the total amount of activity (Kollman (1998)). However, it does approximate the amount of activity in an issue area and is currently our best public measure of interest group activities by issue area. Additionally, only the Senate count is used. More than 90 percent of organized interests who lobby the Senate also lobby the House, and including the House activities would be the equivalent of double-counting.<sup>7</sup>

On the Congressional side, activity is measured as the total number of bills filed in an issue area during a six-month period. Bill filings, while not the easiest means of expressing support, do reflect the preferences of the members in the chamber. The main problem with this measure is that it is highly seasonal and avoids the fact that members may signal preferences via cosponsorship. However, it is what is available.

The formal agenda is measured using the same technique Baumgartner and Jones opt for in their works — the number of hearings in an issue area in Congress. Though there are rarely zero hearings in a given area each period, there is variation in the number of hearings held. In most cases I can analyze the agenda with standard time-series models, but in some cases need to find a specific point for when an issue has “arrived.” For that, I approximate an issue’s arrival on the agenda as whether or not there are significantly different levels of activity in a given period. In other words, are there more hearings than expected? This is approximated for periods where the number of hearings is greater than two standard deviations from the mean number of hearings per issue area in the 10 year period.<sup>8</sup>

Not every issue that appears on the agenda is the result of factors within the control of government. There is a large body of literature on focusing events and their impact on what

---

<sup>5</sup> Most of the LIV and PAP codes were identical in their phrasing at the different levels; the LDA and PAP codes were taken from an appendix in a paper by Leech and others (2002).

<sup>6</sup> In 2008 the Senate switched to a quarterly filing system. For this last year only the second and fourth quarters’ counts are used because the first and thirds were almost identical in terms of filers and resulted in double-counting with their inclusion.

<sup>7</sup> The House data cover a smaller frame of time than the Senate as well.

<sup>8</sup> I went with the two standard deviations measure over one standard deviation because most of the activity that deviates by either one or two standard deviations is clustered in the same time. In most cases there is only one period that spikes as high as two standard deviations, and it is preceded by a period one standard deviation higher and then shifts to periods of one standard deviation higher.

government deals with. The general conclusion is that the policy process does not follow the normal procedures at this point. Because of this, the sample of issues used here try to avoid this confounding factor — Homeland Security and Emergency Management, for example, are excluded.<sup>9</sup> There is a potential for a completely spurious relationship between OI activities, MOC activities, and the formal agenda. It could be that both interest group behavior and Congressional behavior are driven by public opinion. Executive and judicial activity could be driving all sorts of behavior.

To account for this, I include controls for presidential activity, judicial activity, and changes in party control in the presidency and Congress. Each of these actors plays a strong role in government and could potentially be driving the activities of others. Presidents are known to have agenda-control because they are a unitary actor and they have more media control. Court rulings that overturn existing statutes can provide a shock to the system that forces a response. Parties prioritize different issues and, if they gain control of a branch of government, are more likely to bring them up. We assume that elected officials are responsive to citizens. Changes in citizen sentiment lead to greater activity from interest groups, either by new groups forming or existing ones getting more resources to be more active. Congress routinely brings up authorizations and appropriations, which will draw attention to some issues.

Because of the issue sample, two other potential factors (public opinion and mandatory Congressional bills), are not needed since there is no variation on those variables.<sup>10</sup> Finally, I include a seasonal dummy variable to account for the start of a new session and handle some of the variation in the data. More information on the coding of these variables can be seen in Table 2. Descriptive statistics for these variables appear in Table 3.

Since there are three components to each hypothesized relationship, three tests are needed to examine the relationship between OIs and MOCs. The first component involves the level of activity. Agenda-setting theories imply there should be growth in the activities of the actor setting the agenda; the real question is whether or not these actors show growth trends in their time-series. Whichever actor sets the agenda should not have a mean in their time-series. Instead, they should have a deterministic trend. If both actors are working together to set the agenda, they should both be trending at the same approximate rate and for the same amount of time. Testing for this involves looking at the nature of the series using Box-Jenkins identification techniques and unit root tests. I use two unit root tests — the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with five lags to cover seasonality, and the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test for unit roots with

---

<sup>9</sup> Those two are also avoided because they did not have filings for the entire time period.

<sup>10</sup> In no case did the issue become highly salient for the public using Gallup's "Most Important Problem" measure. Because the issue categories are so broad, Congressional legislation such as reauthorizations or appropriations happen either in every period on every issue or never happen.

controls for potential breaks in trends and intercepts to identify if the series are trending. Each test is run on the individual series, and inferences can be made about the entirety of the panel from there.<sup>11</sup> The ADF test has some problems: it is biased towards returning a unit root as the result and is particularly sensitive to lag specification. Though it is a normal test to use, there are some problems with it. The ZA test, while not as commonly used, at least avoids some problems associated with the ADF test, including the bias towards a unit root, particularly when a trend is present.

The second test relates to which actor acts first. Does OI action cause MOC action, and vice versa? Because of the potential for integrated series, I use an error-correction model (ECM) to determine if there is a causal relationship between one actor and the other. If OI activity begets MOC activity, then the differenced and lagged values of OI activity should be significant predictors of MOC activity in the agenda-setting model. The opposite holds for agenda-responders. If the two simultaneously cause one another, then their differences and lags should be significant predictors of each other's efforts. The error-correction model implies that there is a short, correcting relationship between variable and an overall long-term relationship.

The third test of this relationship is to look at shifts in behavior after the appearance of an issue on the formal agenda. If there is a significant shift upward in activity after the hearing, then it indicates that that actor is responding. If there is no significant break between activity before and after the hearing, then it shows the actor was setting the agenda beforehand. Testing for this involves looking at behavior at the time of the hearing with tests for structural breaks in the time-series. I use the standard Chow breakpoint test to see if there is a break in either the trend or intercept for a series, and compare when the returned breakpoints occur against significant changes in hearing activities. If the series breaks at roughly the same time as the hearing, then the actor is responding to a change in the agenda; instead they have already been working on it and are continuing to do so.

Finally, the big question — does any of this matter? Even if groups respond to members or vice versa, does any of it have any influence on the actual agenda in government? Do any of the effects found in the bivariate analyses hold up to multivariate tests? To test for this, I again employ a series of ECMs, but checking for how they alter the number of hearings held. A final specification of this is to test for spuriousness by seeing how the two target variables work against the roles of presidential and court agenda-setting.

Most theories now predict that agenda-setting activities take time to develop. As such, one should expect to see growth in the number of activities an agenda-setter engages in over time.

---

<sup>11</sup> There are panel unit root tests out there, but not ones that can handle breaks well.

For OIs as agenda-setters, there should be an increase in the number of filings before an item arrives on the agenda; for MOCs as agenda-setters (or OIs as agenda-responders), this means there should be a steady increase in the number of bills filed on a subject. Testing either of these claims involves seeing if there is any trend to the data — in other words, are either of the series unit roots? Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix provide information about three tests run on each series. The tables do not report specific values for these tests, but rather give information on whether or not the series was diagnosed as being integrated or stationary.

First, for OIs, it does appear that they do demonstrate growth over time in their activities before they arrive on the agenda. Table 4 shows that almost half of the organized interests are integrated to some order. Some series do not appear to have trends based on standard tests but do show clear trend lines in plots. The same cannot be said regarding Congressional behavior. With the exception of a seasonal spike at the start of the session, Congressional bill filings are a predominately stationary series. They have a mean, not a trend. In other words, there is no growth or dramatic change in what MOCs focus their attention on. Even looking at plots of the series on graphs shows that there is no upward or downward trend to these data. However, tests of these (Table 5) return mixed results. The Box-Jenkins identification tests say these are stationary series, though identification is a less robust test of this. The ADF test says most of these series are integrated, while the ZA test does not.

In general there are problems with the ADF test. It is sensitive to the lag specification and biased towards diagnosing a series as a unit root. While studies of the ZA test are not as clear on its problems, the fact that it and Box-Jenkins Identification procedures tend to show mostly the same results is a bit reassuring. In particular, it seems that about half of the OI series are trending, and that, on the whole, MOC activity is stationary. One final test for this — the eyeball test — can be seen in Figures 4 through 9. Each series is plotted over time. What is most striking is the growth and decay in the OI series, while for MOCs there are the seasonal spikes but mostly flat-lines for the rest of the periods.<sup>12</sup>

For the general idea of agenda-setters or responders, this means that, based on this test, OIs are setting the agenda. MOCs are not necessarily responding to what they are pushing for, however. MOCs, based on this look, are not really responding to anything other but try to seem active in the beginning. This would give more credence to the first theoretical argument since the activity level for one is changing but not the other.

Even though MOC activities are not growing over time, that does not mean there is a nonexistant relationship between their activities and those of OIs. The next question is whether

---

<sup>12</sup> After deseasoning the series and analyzing the residuals, most of the bills are either completely stationary or moving averages. I did not include the residual diagnoses of the series here.

or not one actor causes the other actor's behavior. The agenda-setting actor should have their activities not only precede the other's activities, but cause a shift in what that actor does over time. In the end, we know that both actors become involved — the question here is does one precede the other?

Since the two series have different time-series properties (stationarity versus trends), the appropriate test for this is via error-correction models (ECM). ECMs can account for the differences in these two series and model them in a way that makes it possible to test for a causal relationship. Tables 6 and 7 provide the results of these tests for the effect of one variable on the other.

The ECM results show something different from the first test. Based on this analysis, it appears that OIs cause MOC behavior, and MOCs cause OI behavior.<sup>13</sup> In other words, there is a two-way causal process. Both single equation ECMs show the expected negative relationship between the past period and the difference. As well, the seasonal controls have no statistically significant effect on OI activity but do for MOC actions; that mirrors the initial results of the series diagnoses.

The model fit for OIs as agenda-setters is dramatically better than the one for OIs as agenda-responders. This is interesting to take note of. Even though the individual coefficient estimates are statistically significant, the OI-as-agenda-setter model fits better, by a dramatic amount. While this does not directly say that OIs play a larger agenda-setting role, it does show that their behavior predicts MOC behavior better than MOC behavior predicts OI behavior.

In both models there is evidence of causality based on the results of the differenced terms. For an additional bill filing it takes roughly three more OIs to jump on an issue bandwagon, though for greater lobbyist involvement it takes about ten additional bills filed by MOCs. Given that these two series have radically different scales, this result is unsurprising. The take-away point is that there is evidence of the two series responding to one another in the short-run. Shocks in the activities in one series are corrected in the other in the short term. Both ECM tests show a long-run relationship between the two series as well. Again, the magnitude of the effect for MOC activity on OI activity is larger, but the scale on these two differs dramatically.

Here the results indicate that the two cause one another. This lends support to the third option — that Kingdon's garbage can model is how the agenda gets set in Washington. With proof of both long and short term causality in both directions, there appears to be a mutually reinforcing process among actors.

---

<sup>13</sup> I ran these models using the proportion of bills filed without seasonal dummies, and along with fixed and random effects. With the exception of the seasonal fixed-effects model, the results are the same throughout; in the model with seasonal dummies and fixed effects, the long-run effect of OI behavior on MOC behavior is insignificant. The seasonal FE models also had the worst goodness-of-fit statistics for all models.

The first test, however, showed that Congressional activity was stationary. How is it that changes in MOC behavior can influence a deterministic trend? The ECMs indicate that shocks to either system alter the behavior of the other. While OIs may steadily increase their activity levels to a point, they are still paying attention to whether or not MOCs are deviating more than expected from their typical behavior. If they do, more OIs become involved than expected, though they are still trending upward over time.

Most theories on agenda-setting predict greater levels of activity by actors responding to new issues after those issues enter the formal agenda. Agenda-setters, however, should already be active on the issue. They may increase their activity after the issue arrives, but because of previous activity this should not be a substantial increase. For MOCs, this question is already answered. There is little to no change in anything they do over time, so either before or after agenda arrival, they should not change much of anything.

OIs may show dramatic changes in their behavior after an issue arrives. Many theories on organized interests predict an uptick in their activities once the issue is picked up — the amount of political attention to the issue feeds into their abilities to work on it. This comports with the idea of OIs as agenda-responders. However, given that they are already active, they may still increase their activities, but not in a substantially different way from before. Table 8 provides the results of a Chow break-point test on each individual series for OI activities. It also shows when, for each series, there is an outlier in the number of hearings held.<sup>14</sup>

The results of Table 8 show that OIs occasionally do respond to increases in agenda activity, roughly one year after the issue arrives on the agenda. This seems to reflect a very slow response from OIs to agenda attention, something wholly inconsistent with past studies on this issue. It is also less frequent than expected. There are many changes in when an issue arrives, but maybe one-third of the time OIs change their behavior afterwards. Another interesting point to note is the direction of the break.

Comparing the series that do indicate a substantial break in trend or intercept, of that subset a little over half show *decreases* in activity. Ones that show increases do not have a corresponding hearing time (and often a previous break). This is surprising, given the expectation is that once an issue appears, if the actor is responding their activities should increase. Instead they are falling off the scene after the issue appears. This could be indicative of the policy passing into law and the feedback process completing. There are still active groups in these policy areas; however, the OIs that joined the bandwagon as the issue started up end up leaving.

Growth still occurs in some areas even after Congress brings forth attention though. Many

---

<sup>14</sup> This is for positive outliers only — this indicates an increase in the level of activity for that issue area, or arrival on the agenda.

OIs still work in issue areas after the issue arrives, as evidenced by the lack of a break-in-trend. They maintain their level of activity, and some even come on board. The main point is that this is not a dramatic shift from before. It does not show that, after an issue arrives, there is a dramatic uptick in activity. Instead, OIs continue to work on issues and bring more groups in. They do not erupt on the scene after the issue arrives, however.

It is easy to say, from this result, that OIs are not responding to shifts in the agenda. It is more difficult to gauge whether or not OIs are the only actors setting it or whether both OIs and MOCs are from this test. There is no significant shift in activity for either actor in response to the arrival of an issue on the formal agenda. OIs continue to trend upward for a while, but there is not surprisingly large growth in their activities in response to this. MOCs do not respond to much of anything except when the session commences. Since neither actor responds in a significantly different way to an issue's arrival on the agenda, the most likely conclusion is that they are both setting the agenda.

So far it appears that OIs and MOCs respond to one another and mutually set the agenda for one another. MOC behavior influences OI behavior, and vice versa. OIs push for issues over time, while MOCs tend to engage in the same behaviors each time. After an issue arrives, there is no dramatic shift in activity from either actor.

But do these behaviors actually change the content of the formal governmental agenda? Does one bring in a call for more hearings than another? Additionally, are there outside factors — presidential actions, court activities, or electoral changes — that make any perceived relationship between OIs, MOCs, and the formal agenda utterly irrelevant?

Testing for this requires looking at a more thorough model and the actual agenda. I use the measure of the formal agenda — hearings in Congress — to gauge if an issue has arrived. Again, I ran an error correction model to test for the effects of one actor on the agenda. Tables 9 and 10 show the individual effects of each actor of interest on the formal agenda, and Table 11 shows the results of the two together. I also ran this model with additional controls for other potential agenda-setting factors: Presidential activities, Court activities, changes in majority control (to Democrats), and a Democratic President. The results for this specification are presented in Table 12.

Agenda-setting is almost certainly the muddled process described by Kingdon when comparing the results of Tables 9 and 10. OIs and MOCs are still causing the arrival of issues on the agenda. When looked at on their own, OI and MOC activities do cause an increase in the number of hearings held on an issue in both the short and long-term. The magnitude of the coefficients is larger for MOC activity. Though again, comparing across models is not advisable,

particularly given the range of each scale. However, positive shocks to both OI activity and MOC activity in a period lead to positive shocks in the number of hearings later.

Table 11 shows how the two primary variables of interest compare when placed head-to-head in gauging agenda-setting. Both variables show short and long-run causal effects. The long-run impact of OI activity is diminished, both in terms of the coefficient and the level of statistical significance. MOC activity, however, does not change much. What this implies is that yes, both OI and MOC activities are relevant to the formation of the governmental agenda, but that OI activities have a greater short-term effect than long-term one. The MOC result is unsurprising, given that the measure of the formal government agenda is a means of measuring Congressional activity, and the other covariate is another measure of Congressional activity.

If one uses a model that incorporates many outside elements into judging how the formal agenda is set, the picture becomes even more complicated. Except for the courts, all other potential factors that set the formal agenda used here are statistically significant at conventional levels in either the short or long-run. Court activity comes fairly close in the short-term as well. To begin, this means the agenda-setting process is far more complicated than expected. It appears that, in the short-term, which parties are in charge of different branches matters a great deal for the agenda. Different parties have different priorities and when they take over, the content of the agenda can change. It is odd to see that this does not matter in the long-run. Presidential activity however, does seem to matter in the long-term. This implies that what presidents want can change the agenda in Congress. However, the negative coefficient for that variable implies that Congress reacts by focusing on other issues.

For the variables of interest though, they are (mostly) significant. MOC activity does cause the number of hearings to go up, in both the short and long-run. OI activity does seem to cause hearings to increase as well. The long-run variable is not significant at the standard cut-off for a two-tailed test, but it comes close (0.10 versus 0.11). It, as with other variables, is worth attention. Both show that, when controlling for one another and additional factors the two matter.

Comparing the goodness-of-fit statistics on all models provides more information on what is happening. Most of the results seem to be driven by MOC activities. While the OI model does have reasonably good  $R^2$  statistics, the MOC-only structure fits nearly as well as the other two, with higher  $R^2$  statistics. Running F-tests on these models to drop the OI variables does not show they are insignificant. OIs do contribute to setting the agenda, but it may be that since MOC activity and hearings are likely to be highly correlated, they show a larger effect.

Additionally (though not reported here), it appears that hearing activity causes both lobbyist

activity and further Congressional bill filings, based on two other ECMs. While hearing activity strongly predicted both long and short-term behaviors for MOCs and OIs, the magnitude of the coefficients was notably different. Even though it is not advisable to compare coefficients on different models, when the variable with the higher mean (OI activity), has a substantially smaller coefficient on it than the one with the smaller mean, one can make an easy argument that the effect, while significant, is not as great.<sup>15</sup> This further reinforces that the feedback cycle is in effect, but, given the results of the second test, nothing dramatically different happens over time.

There are a few things to be said from this. First, it does not appear that OIs are agenda-responders. Interest groups play an integral role in setting the agenda for Congress. This process takes time, and groups are highly active in these areas over time. They do seem to work in tandem with MOCs. OIs and MOCs can be shown to cause one another's behavior in terms of agenda-setting. This provides some serious evidence against findings of OI activity greatly changing as a result of new attention to the issue. By looking at a longer period of activity, I show that, no, what OIs do after an issue arrives on the agenda is not as dramatic a shift as previously expected. In fact, the big break happens later than most studies of these dynamics cover, and flow in the opposite direction than most claim.

Most studies do predict a feedback process in the policy-making process. What I demonstrate here is that may not be as slow a process as previously expected. In roughly half the cases it appears that an issue arrives on the formal agenda (in the form of a hearing), and about a year later the level of activity from interested OIs trails off significantly. There are a number of potential explanations for this which cannot be determined with aggregated data. First, and most likely, a number of new OIs form as the issue gains steam among the elites and policy community. After the issue becomes important for the government agenda and is, in some way, dealt with, these groups lose their purpose and dismantle. A number of studies show a high mortality rate among OIs (Schlozman and Tierney (1986); Gray and Lowery (1996)), and one implication of this finding is that such a process is happening. Another possibility is that existing OIs focus their energies on a different, more closely related policy area. If, for example, environmental groups move from clean air and water over to waste reduction. These OIs are still active in the same broad area, but on a different subcomponent; most of the big groups are able to adopt different niches over time, and they proceed to do this.

Third, by considering both OI and MOC activity, I show that the agenda-setting process is not as one-sided as scholars from interest group and institutionalist camps make it out to be.


---

<sup>15</sup> For reference, both had p-values of 0.00, but the coefficients on the effect of hearing behavior on lobbyist filings were less than two, while for bill filings the short-term effect was greater than seven and long-term greater than three.

John Kingdon was right twenty years ago. Policy communities are messy things, with multiple actors from multiple venues working together over time to get items on the agenda. The activities of one group play into the activities of another. Utilizing measures of activities for both, as well as other actors, provides more robust information about how issues arrive on the agenda and get dealt with. It may be that measuring the formal agenda as Congressional activity limits the role of the courts and the President in terms of setting the agenda. As well, looking only at measures of OI activity that link directly to Congressional activity may be influencing the results somewhat. Another issue here is the subsample of issues. Obviously things like airline safety and defense became very important after September 11<sup>th</sup>, but I do not address that issue here. My goal is instead to show how regular issues arrive on the agenda, not the ones determined by exogenous shocks. I show that there is a connection between MOC and OI activities in average issue areas over time, and both actors behaviors should be considered when explaining the agenda-setting process.


# APPENDIX

**Organized Interest as Agenda-Setters**



*Fig. 1: Agenda-Setters*

**Organized Interests as Agenda-Responders**



*Fig. 2: Agenda-Responders*




Fig. 3: Interactive

Table 1: Issues Used in Analysis

Bankruptcy	Housing	Retirement
Civil Rights	Immigration	Roads
Clean Air and Water	Indian Affairs	Science
Commodities	Insurance	Small Business
Communications	Labor	Telecommunications
District of Columbia	Law Enforcement	Transportation
Family Issues	Medical Research	Trucking
Food Industry	Monetary Policy	Waste
Fuel/Gas/Oil	Post Office	Welfare
Gambling	Railroads	

Issues that were excluded because of the problems of external events were aerospace, agriculture, aviation, banking, consumer issues, copyrights, defense, disaster planning, education, energy, environment, foreign relations, taxes, trade, and veterans. Issues that were excluded for not having corresponding issue codes to either the Policy Agendas Project or easy-to-determine ones for the Legislative Indexing Vocabulary were advertising, alcohol and drug abuse, animals, apparel, automotive industry, beverages, budgets, chemicals, computer industries, constitutional issues, economics, firearms, health issues, manufacturing, maritime, media issues, Medicare/Medicaid, pharmaceuticals, real estate, religion, sports, tobacco, travel, urban issues, and utilities.

Table 2: Variable List and Data Sources

Variable Name	Coding	Source	Details
Bill Filing	Count	Thomas	Bills Filed in Issue Area
Lobby Filing	Count	Senate Clerk	Lobby Forms Filed in Issue Area
Hearing	Count	PAP, Thomas	All Hearings in Area
President	Count	PAP, C-SPAN	Policy Sentences in State of the Union
Courts	Count	Oyez	All Cases Decided by SCOTUS in Area
Clinton	Binary	NA	Indicator for Clinton as President
Democrats	Binary	NA	Indicator for Democratic Control of any chamber of Congress
New Session	Binary	NA	Indicator for start of new Congress

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables

Variable Name	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Bill Filing	238	232	8	1601
Lobby Filing	174	207	0	1503
Hearing	14	21	0	173
President	0.283	0.451	0	1
Courts	0.153	0.361	0	1

Summary statistics are taken for the entirety of the panel. Remaining variables are based on when they occurred in time.

Table 4: OI Integration Summary Results

Series	ARIMA Diagnosis	Dickey-Fuller	Zivot-Andrews
Bankruptcy	Int.	Stat.	Stat.
Civil Rights	Int.	Int.	Int.
Clean Air and Water	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Commodities	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Communications	Stat.	Int.	Int.
District of Columbia	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Family Issues	Int.	Int.	Int.
Food Industry	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Fuel/Gas/Oil	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Gambling	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Housing	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Immigration	Int.	Int.	Int.
Indian Affairs	Int.	Int.	Stat.
Insurance	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Labor	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Law Enforcement	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Medical Research	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Monetary Policy	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Post Office	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Railroads	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Retirement	Int.	Int.	Int.
Roads	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Science	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Small Business	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Telecommunications	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Transportation	Int.	Int.	Stat.
Trucking	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Waste	Int.	Int.	Int.
Welfare	Int.	Int.	Stat.

Table 5: MOC integration summary results

Series	ARIMA Diagnosis	Dickey-Fuller	Zivot-Andrews
Bankruptcy	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Civil Rights	Int.	Int.	Stat.
Clean Air and Water	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Commodities	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Communications	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
District of Columbia	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Family Issues	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Food Industry	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Fuel/Gas/Oil	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Gambling	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Housing	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Immigration	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Indian Affairs	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Insurance	Int.	Int.	Stat.
Labor	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Law Enforcement	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Medical Research	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Monetary Policy	Stat.	Stat.	Stat.
Post Office	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Railroads	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Retirement	Stat.	Stat.	Stat.
Roads	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Science	Stat.	Int.	Int.
Small Business	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Telecommunications	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Transportation	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Trucking	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Waste	Stat.	Int.	Stat.
Welfare	Stat.	Int.	Stat.




Fig. 4: Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 1




Fig. 5: Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 2




Fig. 6: Growth in Activities over Time — OI, part 3




Fig. 7: Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 1




Fig. 8: Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 2




Fig. 9: Growth in Activities over Time — MOC, part 3

Table 6: Error Correction Results for OI as Agenda-Setter

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Bill Filings $_{t-1}$	-0.37	0.031	-12.09	0.00
$\Delta$ Lobby Filings	0.30	0.079	3.77	0.00
Lobby Filings $_{t-1}$	0.12	0.026	4.65	0.00
$\Delta$ New Session	219.87	13.53	16.25	0.00
New Session $_{t-1}$	164.46	21.28	7.73	0.00
Constant	-6.08	9.19	-0.66	0.51
$R^2$ :	0.57			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.56			
RMSE:	121.8			
Observations:	551			

Model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. Dependent variable is the first-difference of the number of bills filed in a given period.

Table 7: Error Correction Results for OI as Agenda-Responder

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Lobby Filings $_{t-1}$	-0.054	0.014	-3.91	0.00
$\Delta$ Bill Filings	0.085	.023	3.77	0.00
Bill Filings $_{t-1}$	0.075	0.018	4.16	0.00
$\Delta$ New Session	-16.59	8.18	-2.03	0.94
New Session $_{t-1}$	1.70	11.93	0.14	0.89
Constant	2.66	4.89	0.54	0.59
$R^2$ :	0.059			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.050			
RMSE:	64.85			
Observations	551			

Model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. Dependent variable is the first-difference of the number of lobbying reports filed in a given period.

Table 8: Breaks in Trends — OI

Series	Break Points Returned	Corresponding Hearing Times
Bankruptcy	Spring 2000	Spring 1999
Civil Rights		Spring 2007
Clean Air and Water		Spring 1999
Commodities	Spring 2000, 2002, Fall 2003	Spring 1999
Communications		Spring 1999
District of Columbia	Fall 2001, Spring 2005	Spring 1999, Spring 2007
Family Issues		Spring 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007
Food Industry		Spring 2000, 2001, 2003, Fall 2003
Fuel/Gas/Oil		Spring 1999, 2001, 2007
Gambling		Spring 1999
Housing		Spring 1999
Immigration	Fall 2005	
Indian Affairs		
Insurance	Spring 2001	Spring 1999
Labor		Spring 1999
Law Enforcement		Spring 1999, 2007
Medical Research		Spring 2003
Monetary Policy		Fall 1999
Post Office		Spring 1999
Railroads		Spring 1999
Retirement		Spring 1999
Roads	Fall 2001	Spring 2002
Science	Fall 2006	Spring 1999, 2007
Small Business	Spring 2000	Spring 1999
Telecommunications		Spring 1999
Transportation		Spring 1999
Trucking		Spring 2003
Waste	Spring 2000	Spring 1999
Welfare	Spring 2000	Spring 1999

Table 9: Agenda-Setting Model — OI Activity Only

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Hearings $_{t-1}$	-0.59	0.033	-18.20	0.00
$\Delta$ Lobby Filings	0.057	0.008	6.68	0.00
Lobby Filings $_{t-1}$	0.017	0.003	6.25	0.00
$\Delta$ New Session	20.72	1.46	14.20	0.00
New Session $_{t-1}$	19.52	2.27	8.60	0.00
Constant	-1.66	0.98	-1.71	0.087
$R^2$ :	0.62			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.62			
RMSE:	13.04			
Observations:	551			

Estimated as error-correction model using OLS. Dependent variable is  $\Delta$  Hearings in Congressional Committees by issue area.

Table 10: Agenda-Setting Model — MOC Activity Only

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Hearings $_{t-1}$	-0.59	0.031	-18.71	0.00
$\Delta$ Bill Filings	0.089	0.003	33.14	0.00
Bill Filings $_{t-1}$	0.042	0.003	13.86	0.00
$\Delta$ New Session	1.99	1.05	1.89	0.059
New Session $_{t-1}$	4.10	1.41	2.90	0.004
Constant	-1.17	0.53	-2.24	0.025
$R^2$ :	0.87			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.86			
RMSE:	7.81			
Observations:	551			

Estimated as error-correction model using OLS. Dependent variable is  $\Delta$  Hearings in Congressional Committees by issue area.

Table 11: Agenda-Setting Model — No Controls

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Hearings $_{t-1}$	-0.60	0.031	-19.42	0.00
$\Delta$ Bill Filings	0.086	0.0027	31.89	0.00
Bill Filings $_{t-1}$	0.040	0.003	12.95	0.00
$\Delta$ Lobby Filings	0.028	0.005	5.66	0.00
Lobby Filings $_{t-1}$	0.0031	0.0017	1.90	0.058
$\Delta$ New Session	-2.06	1.03	2.01	0.045
New Session $_{t-1}$	4.32	1.40	3.09	0.002
Constant	-1.51	0.57	-2.63	0.009
$R^2$ :	0.87			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.87			
RMSE:	7.60			
Observations:	551			

Estimated as error-correction model using OLS. Dependent variable is  $\Delta$  Hearings in Congressional Committees by issue area.

Table 12: Full Agenda-Setting Model

Variable	$\beta$	$\sigma^2$	t-score	p-value
Hearings $_{t-1}$	-0.60	0.032	-18.66	0.00
$\Delta$ Lobby Filings	0.034	0.005	6.57	0.00
Lobby Filings $_{t-1}$	0.0026	0.002	1.60	0.11
$\Delta$ Bill Filings	0.089	0.003	32.81	0.00
Bill Filings $_{t-1}$	0.043	0.003	12.86	0.00
$\Delta$ Pres. Activity	-0.24	1.45	-0.18	0.86
Pres. Activity $_{t-1}$	-2.93	0.88	-3.35	0.001
$\Delta$ Court Activity	1.77	1.18	1.50	0.13
Court Activity $_{t-1}$	1.32	1.10	1.20	0.23
$\Delta$ Dem. Majority	3.57	0.94	3.81	0.00
Dem. Majority $_{t-1}$	1.35	0.91	1.50	0.14
$\Delta$ Clinton Pres.	-7.86	1.89	-4.15	0.00
Clinton Pres. $_{t-1}$	0.18	1.00	0.18	0.86
$\Delta$ New Session	-0.20	1.13	-0.18	0.86
New Session $_{t-1}$	2.32	1.47	1.58	0.12
Constant	-1.73	0.68	-2.55	0.01
$R^2$ :	0.88			
Adj. $R^2$ :	0.88			
RMSE:	7.33			
Observations:	551			

Estimated as error-correction model using OLS Dependent variable is  $\Delta$  Hearings in Congressional Committees by issue area.

## References

- Aldrich, J.H. 1995. *Why Parties?: The origin and transformation of political parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.
- Baumgartner, F.R. and B.D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and instability in American politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Baumgartner, F.R., B.D. Jones and J.D. Wilkerson. 2002. "Studying policy dynamics." *Policy dynamics* pp. 29–46.
- Browne, W.P. 1990. "Organized interests and their issue niches: A search for pluralism in a policy domain." *The Journal of Politics* pp. 477–509.
- Cox, G.W. and M.D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, G.W. and M.D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative leviathan: Party government in the House*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dusso, A. 2008. "Legislation, Political Context, and Interest Group Behavior." *Political Research Quarterly* p. 1065912908324202v1.
- Fenno, R.F. 1978. *Home style: House members in their districts*. Little, Brown.
- Gray, V. and D. Lowery. 1996. *The population ecology of interest representation: Lobbying communities in the American states*. University of Michigan Press.
- Gray, V., D. Lowery, M. Fellowes and J.L. Anderson. 2005. "Legislative agendas and interest advocacy: Understanding the demand side of lobbying." *American Politics Research* 33(3):404.
- Hall, R.L. and A.V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as legislative subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100(01):69–84.
- Hula, K.W. 1999. *Lobbying together: Interest group coalitions in legislative politics*. Georgetown University Press.
- Jones, B.D. and F.R. Baumgartner. 2005. *The politics of attention*. University of Chicago Press.
- Jones, B.D., F.R. Baumgartner and J.C. Talbert. 1993. "The destruction of issue monopolies in Congress." *American Political Science Review* pp. 657–671.
- Kingdon, JW. 1984. "Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston, MA, Little, Brown).".

- Kollman, K. 1998. *Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies*. Princeton University Press.
- Krehbiel, K. 1991. *Information and legislative organization*. Univ of Michigan Pr.
- Krehbiel, K. 1998. *Pivotal politics: A theory of US lawmaking*. University of Chicago Press.
- Leech, B.L., F.R. Baumgartner, T. La Pira and N.A. Semanko. 2002. The Demand Side of Lobbying: Government Attention and the Mobilization of Organized Interests. In *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April*. pp. 25–28.
- Leech, B.L., F.R. Baumgartner, T.M. La Pira and N.A. Semanko. 2005. “Drawing lobbyists to Washington: Government activity and the demand for advocacy.” *Political Research Quarterly* 58(1):19.
- Rohde, D.W. 1991. *Parties and leaders in the postreform House*. University of Chicago Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The semisovereign people: A realist’s view of democracy in America*. Harcourt School.
- Schlozman, K.L. and J.T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized interests and American democracy*. Harper & Row New York.
- Shepsle, K.A. and B.R. Weingast. 1984a. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 49–74.
- Shepsle, K.A. and B.R. Weingast. 1984b. “When do rules of procedure matter?” *The Journal of Politics* pp. 206–221.
- Truman, D. 1951. “The government process.” *New York: Knopf* .
- Weingast, B.R. and W.J. Marshall. 1988. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” *The Journal of Political Economy* pp. 132–163.
- Wood, B.D. and A. Doan. 2003. “The politics of problem definition: Applying and testing threshold models.” *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 640–653.