Abstract

Christopher Lee Plummer: Dreaming Up Snow: Registration, Restriction and Radicalization of Russian NGOs 2000-2010
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson)

Following the chaotic first years after the fall of the Soviet Union nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have tried to create a vibrant and healthy civil society in modern Russia. While many of these NGOs have flourished in this period, others have experienced repression at the hand of state actors. One form of repression is differential application of registration, anti-extremism, and tax laws against specific types of NGOs in a way to exclude them from, or make it difficult to participate in, the arena of sanctioned activity. Which NGOs are targeted by differential application, and how they respond if pushed to the point of liquidation is determined by different organizational characteristics. One of these responses is an unintended consequence of such state repression, unsanctioned political protest. This thesis addresses the organizational characteristics that attract differential application and explores the outcomes following the liquidation of NGOs as a result of such repression.
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The May 2010 events in the small monogorod of Pikalevo drew the eyes of the world to the clash between aggrieved workers and the state in modern Russia. But beyond drawing the world's attention to their economic plight, Pikalevo’s workers challenged the myth that Russian civil society is immersed in a submissive malaise. In fact, since the fall of communism nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have engaged in a struggle with the State to realize their goals. Prior to this, civic organizations were almost exclusively associated with, or operated by, the Soviet state and Communist party. Carving out a third sector of society amidst full economic and ideological transformation was a herculean task, and this process continues today. The environment in which NGOs operate has experienced a metamorphosis from the chaotic first years following communism to a slow re-centralization of power under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. This return to a more centralized power structure in the Russian state has not only affected economic and political sectors, but the civil sector as well. Within this centralized power structure the Russian state continues to repress nongovernmental organizations with coercive and channeling measures. But while the latter affects all

1 Non-governmental organizations in Russia are actually termed non-commercial organizations (NCOs).
NGOs operating in Russia, there is an additional element of differential application of bureaucratic measures within channeling that makes the work of specific NGOs especially difficult to engage in. This work seeks to answer the questions: Which NGOs are targeted, and how do they respond after differential application has been carried out to the extreme and has shut them down?

Beginning by examining the different types of techniques employed by state actors against nongovernmental organizations, I will form a typology of civil society control in Russia. Adapting this typology from the work of American sociologist Jennifer Earl, I will distinguish between techniques of coercion and channeling. Additionally, I will identify which state actors carry out these actions, stressing the fact that it is the differential application of bureaucratic measures associated with channeling that ultimately represses certain nongovernmental organizations. Focusing on differential application due to the unique role of channeling in hybrid regimes, and its underrepresentation in media, I will detail multiple specific instantiations of it being employed in Russia during the past decade.

Following my discussion of the methods of civil society control, and the actors who employ them, I will move on to discuss which type of organizations are targeted with differential application in Chapter 2. While other organizational characteristics affect how legitimate of a threat to elite interests an NGO can be, such as access to a transnational resource pool and the NGO’s organizational type, I argue, it is ultimately whether an NGO maintains asymmetrical goals that determine whether it will become the target of differential application.
I will next move onto the second argument of this thesis in Chapter Three. My argument, one that steps beyond the current literature, is that there are three possible responses for nongovernmental organizations that have been forced to a liquidation point\textsuperscript{2} through differential application: complete liquidation, liquidation and re-establishment, and liquidation and radicalization. The first option is simply the cessation of the NGO’s activities with no further action. The second option is the closure of the original organization followed by the subsequent establishment of a new organization that addresses the same or similar issues under a new guise. This second option often manifests in the organization locating its headquarters outside Russian borders while continuing to pursue goals within them. The final option is liquidation and radicalization, which occurs when an NGO ceases its formal activities and pursues its goals in the form of protest. Within this chapter I will focus on first two of these three responses, saving the discussion of liquidation and radicalization for Chapter 5.

In Chapter 4 I will test my arguments by examining multiple nongovernmental organizations. I will discuss the characteristics of organizations that have and have not been subject to differential application, confining my selections to organizations that were in existence before the introduction of specific methods of persecution. Such a selection process eliminates the possibility of examining an organization whose initial formation process was affected by these channeling methods. I will then detail what happened to NGOs that were liquidated

\textsuperscript{2} Liquidation point is the term at which an NGO has no further legal recourse and has been effectively removed from the third sector as an organization.
as result of differential application, showing how their options were dictated by the organizational characteristics that defined them.

In Chapter 5 I address the third option for NGOs that have reached the liquidation point. Liquidation and radicalization takes form in the increased emergence of protest movements. These movements are not formal, they do not maintain legal statuses, but have opted out of the system and continue to address the same issues that the former organizations addressed from outside of regulated channels. Their activity is unsanctioned, unauthorized political activity free from differential application of channeling methods. Due to the increase in protest activity and the variety of protest interests within the past five years, I will claim a correlation between the introduction of differential application and a groundswell in protest.

In conclusion I summarize my findings and their significance, while also raising several possible avenues for future research. Ultimately, the development of a vibrant third sector will be necessary if democratization in Russia is to ever be truly achieved. Although civil society has begun to become more and more populated with organizations of men and women pursuing an interactive future with their government, until the differential application of laws and regulations are stopped from being commonly employed, Russian civil society will remain in a state of arrested development.
Chapter One: Coercion, Channeling and Differential Application

Before discussing which NGOs are more likely to face differential application from the Russian state, it is important to understand the nature of the repression these NGOs face. The repertoire of repression in Russia, as in most states, involves a combination of directly coercive measures and, often not much more subtle, administrative ways of inhibiting or channeling forms of behavior. Both coercion and channeling are types of repression that state actors use to divert or influence the political activity of their populations.\(^3\) (Earl, 2003) They do so by changing the costs and benefits of certain types of behavior; as Charles Tilly notes, repression in general is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action.” (Tilly, 1978, p 100) Therefore these two types of repression seek to change the cost of doing business for NGOs.

This chapter will begin with a deeper discussion of just precisely what coercion and channeling are and what distinguishes one from the other. Following this, I define differential application and discuss several measures of channeling introduced within the past decade that have been applied differentially. In conclusion, I stress how differential application can be used to affect an NGO’s survival without undermining the state’s efforts to retain an appearance of legitimacy.

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\(^3\) Earl does not limit the usage of coercion and channeling to solely state actors, she stresses that state actors associated with and not associated with political elites, as well as private actors, can employ these methods of repression. (Earl, 2003)
Forms of Repression

In terms of repression, coercion and channeling are two sides of the same coin. However, whereas coercion “means the threat or use of physical force to achieve compliance,” (Taylor, p 422) channeling is defined as indirect repression that seeks to affect the type and timing of action available. (Earl, 2003) In order to characterize the different methods of coercion and channeling I will use a typology employed by Jennifer Earl in her analysis of repression and the social control of protest in American society. (Earl, 2003) This typology was initially used to categorize repression against protest movements, but protest is only one of a range of tactics that an NGO can apply, so for the purpose of this study this typology has been altered in order to be applicable to NGOs rather than protest. By broadening the scope of this typology, it will be easier to isolate the specific ways in which differential application have been employed in the Russian context.

Earl’s twelve-cell typology divides control methods between agents of control and the methods they employ. Earl further divides the agents of control into three categories along the vertical axis: state agents tightly connected with national political elites, state agents, and private agents. Additionally, the typology is divided along the horizontal axis into four subcategories of control type: observable and unobserved methods of coercion and observable and unobserved methods of channeling. To illustrate concretely the kinds of action these terms imply in Russia, I have populated the categories with Russian methods of coercion and channeling. For my purposes the distinction between observed and unobserved forms of

4 See Fig. 1
Coercion is unnecessary, although it is clear that some of the examples listed below are more public than others. Rather, the focus here is on the difference between coercion and channeling, a distinction that is exhibited best by one particular set within the modified version of Earl’s typology: observed and unobserved coercion and channeling by state agents tightly connected with political elites.  

Cells one and two concern methods of coercion by state agents tightly connected with national political elites. The latter two cells, which are of major concern in this work, consist of forms of channeling performed by state actors connected with political elites. These manifest in the form of legal requirements of Russian nongovernmental organizations, the most significant of which is Federal Law No. 18-FZ. Below I will additionally show how these channeling methods carry with them an air of legitimacy that can have a more damning result upon nongovernmental organizations than coercive methods.  

**Coercion**

The most visible form of civil society control takes its form in coercion. Coercion involves methods that can be public or private and that are designed to eliminate social movements. Additionally, both observable and unobserved coercive methods are performed by a variety of actors, some with direct ties to political elites and some who are independent civil society actors. Within this section of the

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5 See Figure 2.

6 I refer to legitimacy here in the sense of the methods being based on codified law, as opposed to illegitimate tactics, which imply exclusion from organizational existence without legal sanction.
typology the most visible forms of civil society control occurs, the violent disruption of protest, countermovement violence, and assassinations.7

An apparatus for coercion is present in all forms of the modern state, but they can vary between the different forms that state. As Anthony Oberschall notes, democratic societies have a higher rate of open conflict on the part of more sophisticated opponents and therefore may have the need for a larger apparatus for coercion. Conversely, authoritarian regimes may require smaller coercive forces due to a social environment in which social mobilization is not allowed to germinate. (Oberschall, 1973) Although Russia is neither definitively a democratic state nor a pure authoritarian regime, it nonetheless maintains a coercive apparatus. Defined by many as a ‘hybrid regime,’ Russia exhibits many of the trappings of a democratic state, such as competitive elections, but allows them to exist on “a playing field that renders this competition unfair.” (Roberston, pg 9)

Like in other regimes, Russia’s coercive apparatus is used in multiple ways, by both military and police actors, some of which are more public than others. The more publicized coercion can manifest in police and military action against protests and public arrests of activists. Although action against protests, due to an oft-complacent media, is often covered in newspapers and television reports minimally,8 the action involved is overt and is carried out publicly. The less public

7 Levine (200) discusses several of the high profile assassinations in the past decade, other coercion has been documented by Goble (2008) amongst others.

8 Of course, these reports just as often misrepresent the nature of the protest, often depicting organizers as anti-Russian radicals. Nevertheless, the military presence in this coverage still is quite observable.
type of coercion is typically carried out behind closed doors, only being discovered after it has been carried out. This was the case, for example, with the arrest of Other Russia activists before a planned rally in order to minimalize their role in the event. Another recent example culminated with the seizure of account information and computers of the environmental NGO Baikal Wave in 2010. After the seizure had occurred it was revealed that undercover government agents had appeared at group meetings asking questions about accounting procedures and forcefully asking for employment in order to infiltrate the NGO. While seemingly different, these examples maintain the one of the defining characteristics of coercion, the use of force to achieve compliance.

**Channeling**

While coercion may cause the most visceral reaction to state repression, channeling methods can be just as effective in repressing civil society. Beyond the repressive effects, however, channeling also provides the state with an air of legitimacy that is rooted in portraying an established rule of law. Akin to the environment of political competition under a hybrid regime, civil society organizations see the trappings of a well-regulated, vibrant third sector, while operating on an uneven playing field. (Robertson, 2009)

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9 This opinion on the cause of the arrest was denied by the police, claiming that the arrests were carried out because of the activists' involvement in nationalist riots in December. (Reuters, 2011)

10 http://www.pacificenvironment.org/article.php?id=3217

11 This is not to say that the creation of a system of laws regarding civil organizations has not provided actual legitimacy to the third sector. Objectively, and
approach to civil society control allows state actors to continue to exert efforts to control NGOs while eschewing much of the condemnation that employment of coercive techniques entails.

While coercion is typically employed against protest and what state actors consider criminal or directly threatening behavior, channeling is employed to encourage activity in one direction and not another on a grand scale. (Earl, 2003) The channeling side of the typology addresses multiple actors and varied types of behavior. The focus here will be specific cells of this section of the typology, namely, those regarding the methods of channeling by state actors closely associated with political elites.12

These particular cells have partly been chosen due to the fact that while coercion is often given much attention by the media, although perhaps not often enough, channeling methods have been woefully under reported. While office raids by the police and military can disrupt the work of an NGO or frighten its members, channeling can have an equally, if not greater, negative impact on the ability of an organization to remain intact. This is because channeling measures are rooted in law and carried out by legal institutions. Following the introduction of the Federal Law No.18 FZ in 2006, which is concerned with registration of NGOs, and other

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12 "State actors closely associated with political elites" is defined by Earl as military/police agencies in authoritarian regimes. These agencies are generally under the control of political elites. In regards to the case of channeling in Russia this will manifest in the Federal Registration Service (FRS) and the Public Chamber.
regulatory laws that can be used in conjunction with it, NGOs were placed in an arena in which there were new costs and benefits for different types of activity.

Federal Law No. 18-FZ provided the government bureaucracy with an NGO registration process that could be used as a tool with which to eliminate criminal and business organizations masquerading as NGOs. However, the fine points of the law make it bureaucratic quagmire through which many NGOs have difficulty passing. In fact, many organizations can only hope to make it through this registration process with deep pools of resources and the ability to maneuver the legal labyrinth that the registration process can be. Failing to do so leads to the inability to fund-raise and perhaps to organizational liquidation. Through the employment of Earl’s typology it is possible to differentiate such a measure from coercion because it affects the environment in which NGOs operate.

Another way in which the third sector has been channeled was with the creation of the Public Chamber, a federal government body populated by a variety of politicians, government employees and selected members of NGOs that would act as a “platform for extensive dialogue, where citizen’s initiatives could be presented and discussed in detail.” However, its role as open medium for interaction between the government and NGOs has been questioned:

“to a certain extent the chamber serves more as a buffer that blocks direct consultation, and as a means of co-opting or marginalizing independent groups. One-third of its 126 members are appointed by the president; those members choose the second third, and the resulting total chooses the remainder.” (Freedom House, 2008, p 38)
Additionally, as funds are awarded by the Chamber for certain NGO projects, there is clear creation of channeling that affects the behavior of NGOs that seek such funding. (Evans, 2008)

Much of the literature on the emerging third sector in Russia covers the Public Chamber and Federal Law No. 18-FZ, and rightfully so, they are two of the most important introductions of channeling since the fall of communism. Although these two introductions have been highlighted here to show the large-scale changes in government interaction with the NGO sector, channeling itself is much broader in Russia. Every aspect of an NGO is affected by a variety of laws and codes similar to the registration law that seek to reward specific behavior while restricting other types. Tax laws, office licensing and demonstration permits, to name a few, can inhibit an NGO’s effectiveness, and in some situations, lead to its liquidation.

But what really differentiates between these types of laws and the other channeling measures, such as the Public Chamber, is that the former can be applied differentially. As discussed in the next section, channeling employed to affect the entire environment in which NGOs operate can be applied strategically in an effort to target specific NGOs. The benefits for repressing an NGO in this way is that while it may draw criticism from certain sources, it will not draw the negative attention that is brought on by the swinging of truncheons in unarmed crowd.

**Differential Application**

“In several cases authorities seemed to selectively apply these tax requirements to threaten organizations with possible closure.”13 (2008 Human Rights Report, US Department of State)

13 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119101.htm
Channeling is employed to affect the environment in which NGOs operate. It alters how the entirety of NGOs experiences the costs and benefits of particular types of behavior. To what extent such measures impact the activities of particular NGOs varies, as some have the capacity to comply with laws or gain access while some do not. True, the introduction of certain laws on civil society can yield positive results, such as building a foundation for a future healthy civil society.\(^\text{14}\) The tools of channeling do not, according to the substance of their texts and charters, pointedly repress individual NGOs; ideally, every nongovernmental organization would face the same bureaucratic process to register for licensing, pass tax inspections, and to request permission to hold a rally. Failure to become registered, being audited, or achieve rally permission would be the fault of the organization, not the fault of a biased civil servant. However, in the hands of state actors that have vested interest with political elites, such benign laws, codes and institutions can become incredibly effective tools of repression against specific nongovernmental organizations; it is at this point that registration requirements, tax regulations, and licensing of offices are no longer benign.

Just as coercion can be employed to target specific groups, channeling can be used similarly through differential application. This manifests in the use of laws and codes against particular groups in the most rigid of ways possible in order to make them impossible to prepare for or to comply with. While differential application does not always lead to the liquidation of an NGO, it can often lead to temporary

\(^{14}\) Robertson, 2010
suspension of the NGO’s activities, engagement in lengthy and costly trials, or an increase in operating costs due to a protracted bureaucratic war of attrition.

Federal Law NO. 18-FZ can harm NGOs in several ways. The process of registering itself can be time consuming and costly for an NGO to engage in; highly technical terminology, complicated filing procedures, and lengthy appeals processes cost the NGO time and money that is often in low supply. But beyond the damage the registration law can do to an NGO during the process of registration, denial or revocation of registration due to improperly filed forms or reports can lead to suspension of an NGO’s activities, or in some cases, liquidation of the organization. Failure to achieve legal status is not merely the failure to achieve a bureaucratic status, it has severe consequences, numbering among these is the inability to maintain office space, hold legal events, keep a bank account, or to access funds due to the organization’s accounts being frozen.

Besides being suspended or liquidated due to improper filing, NGOs can be denied due to even the slightest piece of incorrect information within the registration forms. NGOs have been harassed by members of the registration service due to engaging in an activity that was not explicitly stated in their charter, such as engaging in an educational activity as opposed to enlightenment work.16

15 According to the Global Integrity Report (2008), the average process to register an NGO takes 6-8 weeks, while registering a business is done in around a week. Additionally, the costs for registering an NGO as compared to a business is 33% higher.

16 See CERP in Chapter 4
Another law that is used in conjunction with the registration law is the notorious anti-extremism law that was updated in 2007. An NGO’s founder, if convicted of violating the anti-extremism law, will summarily lose registration of the NGO and not be able to found a new one ever again. The anti-extremism law harkens back to the time of the introduction of the No.18-FZ itself, when Putin pushed for the passage of the law to eliminate terrorist groups masquerading as NGOs. However, as the law has been updated, the definition of what extremist activities are has been simultaneously expanded and made more vague, leaving room for differential application by state officials. (GRC, 2008)

The text of the law states that a person is guilty of extremist activities if they engage in activities that incite hatred against any race, religion, ethnicity, or political, ideological or social group. While inciting hatred against any racial, ethnic or religious group is clearer to identify, what precisely constitutes inciting hatred against socio-political groups is often left to interpretation. Such was the case with the Russia-Chechen Friendship Society when government officials charged the leader of the NGO with extremist activities for publishing open letters for peace from Chechen rebel leaders in his human rights publication.17

Additionally, tax codes and laws can also be differentially applied against specific organizations in order to suspend their activities or inhibit their effectiveness as well. Like the registration law, submitted forms can be denied due to typos, or slight accounting mistakes, but denial can also be given based off of the loosest interpretation of tax codes. As an example, such was the case with St.

17 See Chapter 4
Petersburg’s Bellona in 2007. In this case, government auditors attempted to financially cripple the environmental NGO through the accusation of failure to pay taxes on donations. The auditors termed the donations as taxable due to the fact that they went towards advertising the organization. But as the advertising in question was merely a partnership with two international NGOs to train journalists on environmental issues, and the subsequent ‘advertisement’ of that partnership was in their own newsletter, the accusations were false. Nevertheless, the application of the tax law in this way was differential due to the fact that it was not applied due to legitimate failures to pay taxes. (Digges, 2007)\(^\text{18}\)

Many more manifestations of such differential application can be found, several of which will be gone into with detail in Chapter 4. But, in summary, differential application is the use of broad channeling measures against specific actors in a manner that makes them difficult or impossible to prepare for or comply with.

This chapter has covered the variety of ways in which the Russian government has attempted to repress civil society. This repression comes in two forms: coercion and channeling. While coercion receives much attention, due to it being the most identifiable form of repression, channeling can yield similarly repressive results. Channeling typically affects the whole environment in which NGOs operate, but as I have shown the tools of channeling can be applied

\(^{18}\) For a full account of the events surrounding the case, see Charles Digge’s article, *Bellona St. Petersburg Under the Gun of Russia’s New NGO Laws*, posted on the Bellona website: http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2007/bellona_NGO
differentially in order to use non-coercive means to target individual NGOs. Through differential application, political elites can exert pressure on specific organizations without the condemnation that comes from applying coercive measures. Simply put, the exclusion of an NGO from legitimacy at least appears much more kosher when it happens due to a pen stroke as opposed to at gunpoint.

Having identified the forms in which the Russian state controls civil society and how differential application works, in the next chapter I answer the question: Which groups are more likely to be the targets of differential application? The answer is found in the characteristics of the NGO and, specifically, in the symmetry of their goals.
Chapter Two: Organizational Characteristics

The material thus far has painted a bleak picture of Russian civil society, but the truth is that in the first decade of the new millennium there has been significant growth in the number of nongovernmental organizations in Russia.\(^\text{19}\) Figures vary over the exact number of NGOs that were liquidated as a result of the introduction of No. 18 F-Z and the Public Chamber, but there is legitimacy to the claims that introduction of regulatory measures did not necessarily entail complete arrest of civil society growth. That being said, the focus of this work has not been to explain the increase or decrease of total number of NGOs in Russia, but rather how specific measures are used against a particular type of NGO. In other words, the goal is not to analyze the effects of these regulatory measures on the quantity of NGOs in Russia, but rather the quality of NGOs since their introduction.

That certain NGOs have been the target of such measures without maintaining any characteristics of criminality or subversion is the central assumption of this chapter. This begs the question: Which organizational characteristics do attract differential application? In this chapter I discuss several possible answers to this question but ultimately show that it is whether an NGO maintains asymmetrical goals that is indicative. While it is arguable that when additional characteristics are intertwined with asymmetrical goals the NGO may be

\(^{19}\) While reported numbers of NGOs vary, some sources indicate that between 2000-2006 the overall numbers of NGOs increased from 275,000 to near 600,000. (http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Domrin1.swf?POPUP_ENABLED=true)
a larger target for differential application because it makes them more of a legitimate threat to elite interests, without asymmetrical goals the NGO is likely not to be a target at all.

**Characteristics of Targeted Organizations**

**Asymmetrical Goals**

As political scientist Laura Henry has commented in her streamlined categorization of organizational goals, there are three categories of NGO goals: substantive, transformational and internal. (Henry, 2010) An organization’s substantive goals are those around which the organization was created, the impetus for action, and often the issues through which an organization’s membership wishes to gain access to the political process. Transformational goals are those goals that whose design is to advance civil society as a whole, advances towards creating a more hospitable environment for NGO work. Transformational and substantive goals need not be mutually exclusive; in fact they often bolster one another when advances are made in the pursuit of either of them. The last category, internal goals, is populated by those goals that are directed towards organizational maintenance. (Henry, 2010)

In terms of goals that increase the likelihood of being the target of differential application, however, substantive and transformational goals have an additional characteristic, one that regards their symmetry to the goals of political elites. While asymmetrical substantive goals can draw the ire of political elites due to
confrontation over specific policy issues or conflict with elite interests, when they have a direct relation to transformational goals they are the most likely to attract differential application.

What makes these goals in Russia asymmetrical? As mentioned in Chapter 2, Russia is a hybrid regime. In such a regime a semi-authoritarian rule is in place. It is a vertical power structure that exists in a political environment that makes allusions to pluralism, but is rarely in any danger of being challenged. Political risk is minimal and power is mostly consolidated with political elites and those societal actors aligned with them.

In order to minimize this political risk, and keep power concentrated, elites must adapt as time goes on. Federal Law No. 18-FZ and many of the laws associated with it were introduced following the tragedy at Beslan, a three day stand off in 2004 between Ingush and Chechen militants and Russian authorities which resulted in 334 people killed, including 186 children. Theses laws were partly introduced in the name of eliminating criminal and terrorist organizations masquerading as NGOs, and international organizations suspected of subversion. But a restructuring of regional and national political power also paralleled them. Vladimir Putin began by proposing that regional governors should no longer be popularly elected, but rather appointed centrally, and to no longer be susceptible to term limits. This move effectively forced governors to curry favor with the Kremlin else they be removed from their post. (Bremmer, 2006)
This consolidation of power did not mean that every act undertaken by, and every interest of, regional elites has since been in lockstep with the Kremlin. Often policies introduced centrally are interpreted in a variety of ways by regional elites, but all interpretations fall within the realm of symmetrical goals:

“It (the Kremlin) has designed a complex of policies to encourage and select for NGOs that are likely to support, not so much the Kremlin, as has been argued, but the national projects that the Kremlin has deemed compelling and important...In other words, the government, rather than being anti-advocacy, is trying to select the advocacy that it prefers to see.” (Henderson, p 275)

Here, the type of advocacy that political elites wish to see is the advocacy that typically avoids issues regarding civil liberties and political rights. (Henderson, 2010) The goals that do address these issues are asymmetrical. For if they are successfully pursued, asymmetrical goals can weaken elites’ positions or interests, thus making their monopoly of power susceptible.

Additionally, goals can be asymmetrical because of their relationship to interests of non-state actors. Such actors often have ties to political elites and manipulate their relationship with such elites to maintain advantages economically, often through the payment of bribes to government officials. Such corruption has

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20 Although, as Sundstrom notes:

“Overall, it is doubtful that one could find any level or locality of government in Russia that could be called ‘supportive’ relative to the more positive environment for civil society that is found in many liberal, long-standing Western democracies.” (Sundstrom, p104)
been pervasive, as indicated by Russia's low ranking on corruption indexes within the past decade.\footnote{During the drafting of the registration legislation and the centralization under Putin, Russia was ranked 126th out of 159 countries by Freedom House. (http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2006)}

Nongovernmental organizations have the capacity to challenge elites through mass mobilization around specific issues that threaten specific interests or the raising of awareness to draw international pressure or shame on the regime. In the former, such challenges can manifest in the mobilization of community members around particular issues that will affect business interests of elites, as occurred in the Baikal Wave protest of the BPPM paper mill.\footnote{For more information on the Baikal Wave protests see the Radio Free Europe article, Siberians Hold Competing Rallies Over Reopening of Baikal Paper Mill, (Jan. 2010) (http://www.rferl.org/content/Siberians_Hold_Competing_Rallies_Over_Baikal_Paper_Mill/1957064.html)} And the latter can occur through presenting cases to international bodies, such as with the Human Rights NGO Memorial drawing attention to violations of the European Convention of Human Rights to the European Court of Human Rights.\footnote{http://www.rightsinrussia.info/international-comment/ai-hrw/ehraceuropenecourtrulesagainstrussiainrighttolifeandextraditioncases}

Such a combination of issue specific asymmetrical substantive goals with overarching goals of access and political accountability, or transformational goals, challenges the vertical power structure of political elites in ways that simply maintain an asymmetrical substantive goal cannot. For example, an NGO that is concerned with veteran's benefits, such as The Don Veterans of Military Operations,
may have an asymmetrical substantive goal that antagonizes Russian elites, but that substantive goal of is not affiliated with a transformational goal. The organization as a whole does not specifically seek mass political change, increased access, or an environment more conducive to future mobilization, but rather the satisfaction of immediate demands. That such a substantive goals has no direct ties to transformational goals does not mean that transformational goals are not achieved, however, but merely that if they are then it is because they are the by-products of the pursuit of substantive goals.

The challenging of the elite status quo is the central characteristic of asymmetrical goal-type organizations, and is the determinative factor in whether an NGO will be targeted for differential application. Simply put, if an NGO pursues asymmetrical goals that are intertwined with transformational goals then it is more likely that they will become targets of differential application.

**Alternative Explanations: Transnational Resources and NGO Structure**

Upon examining characteristics of NGOs targeted with differential application of channeling measures I discovered that asymmetrical goals alone were determinative. However, in the process of my research I isolated two other defining characteristics of NGOs in Russia and the impact they have on whether an NGO is effective in pursuing its goals, and therefore how legitimate it can be as a threat to political elites. As these characteristics are not maintained solely by NGOs that have been subjected to differential application, they are not determinative factors. These

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24 In Rostov-on-Don veterans protested in order to secure financial benefits and state housing. (http://www.speroforum.com/a/48434/Soviet-Russian-War-Veterans-Protest-In-Russia)
characteristics are worth noting here, however, due to the role they play in determining post-liquidation choices, as will be seen in Chapter 3.

**Transnational Resources**

Transnational resources can have an effect on the legitimacy of the threat an NGO can pose to political elites. Resources, as defined here, consist of monetary resources and interpersonal, non-monetary resources. Perhaps the access to such transnational funds could alleviate the pressure on the state to help develop a functional third sector. However, some scholars consider the dynamics of foreign assistance as a method to influence political regimes, “not by coercion, but by conflict-free promotion of changes in the behavior of citizens at the sub-state level.” (Sundstrom, xi

Such a theory has crossed the mind of Vladimir Putin as well. On multiple occasions he has spoken of civil society entrepreneurs who pursue their ends with means from transnational organizations with scorn, referring to them as traitors, implying that the influx of such funds is a veiled attack on the sovereignty of Russia.

Additionally, the ability to draw funds from trans-national sources can attract the ire of political elites because such funds can enable an organization to withstand state challenges to its legitimacy. With foreign support organizations might be able to afford to hire legal defense, engage in lengthy bureaucratic processes, such as with No. 18 FZ, and to continue working toward organizational goals while engaged in such legal matters. Such monetary freedom allows the

organization to maintain an element of independence that political elites are uncomfortable with. Most importantly, however, high levels of NGO success have been connected with access to foreign funding, especially when associated with norms that are universally embraced. This is because NGOs that have such access are able to grow their organization at a much quicker rate and work on a larger scale. (Sundstrom, 2005)

Interpersonal, non-monetary resources are also those that are gained through connections with membership of transnational nongovernmental organizations. Unlike increased funding however, these resources manifest in training, sharing of information, advice, and in external pressure on Russian political elites. The latter can take form in direct pressure from the transnational organization itself, or through pressure applied by foreign governments or coalitions of foreign governments, such as the UN or the Council of Europe. This advantage over NGOs that do not maintain such interconnectedness allows some to avoid the pitfalls that are associated with a protracted legal battle with the state.

While access to trans-national resources can enhance the legitimacy of the threat to political elites from asymmetrical NGOs, it can also enhance the ability of symmetrical NGOs to achieve success. Access and usage of such funds by symmetrical NGOs, while perhaps not ideal in the eyes of Russian elites, often are used in conjunction with the Russian government on certain projects. Such

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26 As Sundstrom notes, however, foreign funds employed by NGOs to institute a set of norms that are specific to the nation from which the funds are originated find low rates of success. (Sundstrom, 2005)
instances are not uncommon. Therefore, the types of NGOs that are most likely to receive such funding are professional and service providing NGOs. Grassroots organizations, by definition are local, community-based organizations that do not have access to such funding sources. But as symmetrical NGOs have received transnational funding without experiencing differential application, this characteristic alone is not determinative.

**Organizational Type**

As hinted at above, there are different types of NGOs based off of organizational type. This type is not determined by the size of the NGO’s membership alone, rather, it is determined by the organizational capacity of the NGO. I classify NGOs into three types of organizations: Professional, service-oriented, and grassroots, each of which has varying levels of capacity to deal with the legal and bureaucratic requirements of operating in a well-regulated third sector. Service-oriented NGOs can vary in size from local to region-wide, and can maintain varying sizes of staff, although they typically have a higher level of bureaucratic capability. Such an organization not only is most likely to receive state funding, but it also seeks to achieve its goals effectively through working in partnership with the state.

Professional organizations are typically adept at dealing with bureaucratic challenges and carrying out NGO functions, as they maintain offices and an

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27 See Chapter 3

28 The World Bank classifies grassroots organizations slightly differently, terming them Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (World Bank)
organizational hierarchy that increases efficiency. Professional NGOs often maintain legal and financial counsel and engage in training to more effectively pressure state actors into achieving organizational goals. Additionally, this type of NGO has a high skill set that works to fund-raise and promote their goals through both the local and international press. They carry out both operational and campaigning functions as an organization, meaning that they work both on projects and lobby for influence with state elites. (Willett, 1995) And due to their typically large memberships they have a larger presence in Russian society, thus maintaining a larger presence in the public discourse. According to data provided by the Regional Environmental Center for Eastern and Central Europe (REC), higher rates of success for NGOs are correlated to larger organizations. While success in this instance may not manifest in the creation of serious political contention, it may sway public opinion, or attract enough international attention, to force elites to adjust policy. Such organizations also are more likely able to negotiate complicated reporting and registration procedures, or be able to withstand lengthy legal battles to retain their status as a legal entity, which threatens elites.

Grassroots organizations as a type are typically small in membership, and solely work on localized issues. They are either solely made up of volunteers or

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29 While the REC’s research only concerns environmental NGOs, I argue that such a trend crosses across multiple sectors of NGO activity. The REC notes that while NGOs employing 51-500 members experience partial success, organizations larger than 500 members are deemed ‘successful.’ http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/NGONeeds/ch3activity.html

30 By localized I mean issues that are occurring in the community but of course can be included in a broader tapestry of a particular interest. For example, a grassroots
employ a small staff that encourages local participation in community projects. These organizations generally do not have the legal and financial counsel that professional organizations employ and do not work in tandem with government officials like service-providing NGOs. (Shieh, 2010)

However, while organizational type may indicate how effective an NGO is, and therefore how legitimate of a threat it may pose to political elites, alone it is not indicative of whether an NGO will be the target of differential application. The technical, fund-raising and mobilization capacities associated with different organizational forms are neutral until combined with the nature of the organization’s goals. In conclusion, while several factors can influence the effectiveness of an NGO, it is ultimately whether the NGO maintains asymmetrical goals that attracts differential application. Transnational resources and a more efficient organizational type make it likely that the NGO will be more successful, depending on their goals, but as multiple NGOs that have these characteristics do not experience differential application, they are not the determinative.

organization may just be dealing with a local issue of pollution, but this of course is part of the wider scope of environmentalism in Russia that national or regional NGOs address.
Chapter 3: Avenues of NGO Response After the Liquidation Point

A Predictive Framework

Many NGOs successfully battle through the legal challenges that are brought about by differential application, such success can be a costly experience and can last a lengthy period of time, but in the end they come out of the process intact. For the rest that are targeted, however, there is a liquidation point at which an NGO has several different options for action. This point is reached after it is no longer possible for an NGO to exist in its present incarnation, having been removed from the legal registry of NGOs and having been given a court order to liquidate as a functioning legal organization. At this point three options for action exist: Complete Liquidation, Liquidation and Re-establishment, and Liquidation and Radicalization. Two of the three paths available will each be discussed here with additional focus being put on the last of these paths, radicalization, in Chapter Five. Each of these options will be expanded upon further in the following chapter when specific examples are enumerated.31

Post Liquidation Responses: Complete Liquidation and Liquidation followed by Re-Establishment

Much of what defines the characteristics of NGOs that attract differential application, detailed in Chapter 2, remains the same in terms of determining how an

31 See Fig. 2
NGO will respond following liquidation, with a few exceptions. Regarding organizational type, grassroots NGOs are typically smaller and lack the capacity to deal with the bureaucratic necessities of forming a new NGO. As the U.S. State Department noted in its 2008 Human Rights Report regarding the capacity of grassroots NGOs to deal with various tax laws:

For smaller NGOs without the organizational capacity to respond to tax investigations, such investigations had a more crippling effect on operations.32

If such grassroots NGOs have difficulty negotiating the tax laws pertaining to NGOs, and likewise the registration process, it follows that the same lack of organizational capacity will apply to the registration process as a prospective NGO.

Additionally, the ability to access transnational resources has a major affect as well. As an NGO is no longer able to maintain a bank account following liquidation, or in some cases it has its funds frozen, it is necessary to pull resources for reestablishment of the organization from a transnational resource pool.33 Below I discuss in detail what these options for movement mean and which characteristics determine which of these paths the NGO will take.

**Complete Liquidation**

Complete liquidation occurs when an organization’s members decide to simply close operation and to no longer pursue their substantive goals.

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32 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119101.htm

33 Boris Putinsev, chairman of the St. Petersburg based Citizen’s Watch, in an interview for the 2008 Global Integrity Scorecard
Organizations that take this route can have either a professional or grassroots organizational type, but have no access to transnational resources. Grassroots NGOs do not have the technical expertise to deal with the bureaucratic process that is involved in registering a new organization, and typically do not have the access to the transnational resources that could enable them to acquire the staff to do so. (Shieh, 2010) Professional organizations have the expertise, but if lacking the access to transnational funds will likely be incapable of supporting the extensive bureaucracy that is inherent in a professional organization. In both cases the organizational characteristics make it likely that the NGO will shut down and not emerge again in a similar form.

**Liquidation and Re-establishment**

Liquidation and re-establishment occurs when a NGO is forced to cease operations and the membership decides to continue addressing the goals of the previous organization in a new organizational form. This re-formation can occur domestically, but often it occurs outside of the borders of Russia while still addressing the same substantive goals within Russian borders. Organizations that take this option are likely to be characterized by access to transnational funds and professional organizational type. This type of NGO has access to transnational resources in order to pay for moving the organization or to pay for the lengthy process that is reregistering, while maintaining the professional organizational type that makes negotiating the registration process possible.
In summary, multiple combinations of these characteristics make it likely that an NGO at the point of liquidation will not reemerge as a new organization. In fact it is more likely that only organizations that have a professional organizational type and still maintain access to transnational resource goals will be able to pursue their former goals within a new NGO. In the next chapter the hypotheses regarding which NGOs are targeted by differential application and how targeted NGOs respond following liquidation will be tested by looking at a wide array of organizations.
Chapter 4: Symmetrical and Asymmetrical NGOs and Post-Liquidation Response: Case Studies

In this chapter I will introduce several NGOs in order to test the theories advanced in chapters 2 and 3. I will give a small biography of each of these organizations, identify their organizational characteristics, and determine if and how differential application was employed against them. Each organization was in existence before the introduction of the Public Chamber and Federal Law No.18-FZ, and has been selected in order to illustrate the different organizational characteristics enumerated in Chapter 2. I begin by examining the characteristics of symmetrical NGOs in order to illustrate how symmetrical goals do not attract differential application. I then examine the characteristics of NGOs that have fallen victim to the bias of state actors, concluding that while maintaining asymmetrical goals attracted differential application in the first place, it is the organizational type and the ability to access transnational resources that determine

Symmetrical NGOs

Symmetrical organizations

EkoDom (‘EcoHouse’)

Following the uncertainty in the early 1990’s from the collapse of the Soviet Union, many scientists and educators were found unemployed due to lack of funds to support educational institutions. One of these then unemployed educators was
confronted by the increasing urban decay and lack of sustainable living in St. Petersburg. The leader of the organization, Alla Sokol, found success in transforming dilapidated apartment building into homes for rooftop gardens that went towards achieving sustainability in St. Petersburg’s urban center. (Henry, 195)

Following success in an urban setting, EkoDom branched out and pursued the creation of reformed housing construction sector free of harmful chemical components and made from earth-friendly products. Such homes would not only reduce the negative environmental impact that present construction techniques cause, but also to make homes that are energy efficient and of low cost to construct. (ecodom.ru) While these goals may threaten business interests of traditional construction companies, who may have connections to political elites, no evidence has surfaced thus far. Additionally, even if such interests were threatened in the future, EkoDom’s organizational goals are not concerned with transformation of the Russian system on the whole; therefore their goals are symmetrical.

Concerning the financing of EkoDom, according to the group’s manifesto, they have achieved success in multiple regions across Russia without financial support from sponsors or from public resources. This financial independence allows the organization to pursue their goals free of obligation to donors. More importantly for this discussion, even though goal type is the determinative factor, the additional absence of transnational funding reduces the likelihood has not led to any differential application of bureaucratic measures due to transnational influence.

Perspektiva
Founded in 1997, Perspektiva is one of the most well known NGOs operating in Russia. Pursuing equality for the disabled, Perspektiva promotes training for officials and educators to work with the disabled while simultaneously pushing for increased access to public buildings and employment. In 2009 alone the organization supported like-minded organizations in fifteen regions and formed partnerships with such NGOs in 12 cities. (Perspektiva-inva.ru, 2009) Acting often as an umbrella organization for these fellow NGOs, Perspektiva maintains an extensive membership at their headquarters in St. Petersburg and in their multiple offices across Russia.

While the organization often holds public events decrying the current lack of inclusive education or the lack of access to public buildings for the disabled, their goals do not seek to overhaul the current political system. The fact that their events garner much media attention and that partnerships with public figures on projects are often made indicates that while the organization may challenge the inaction of government officials in addressing their issues, they do not seek their removal from office.34 Additionally, that the goals of the organization seek inclusiveness into the Russian system indicates that the organization seeks to provide for a sector of the population that is more aligned with a service providing type of NGO as opposed to one that challenges the legitimacy of the regime. Perspektiva has additionally

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34 As an example of such partnerships, in 2009 Perspektiva united with Irina Yasina, a member of Medvedev's President's Civil Society and Human Rights Committee to push for inclusiveness in the public education system. (http://eng.perspektiva-inva.ru/index.php?1395)
received funding from multiple international aid projects but due to their symmetrical goals have not been targeted like their asymmetrical counterparts.

**Parent’s Bridge**

Begun during the faltering years of the Soviet Union, Parent’s Bridge is concerned with child abandonment and the state of orphanages in St. Petersburg. Begun by volunteers in hospitals and orphanages, with in a few years of its inception it had established yearly conferences of NGOs in order to support and train fellow NGOs in the field. One of the organization’s high achievements was the creation of the “Bridge to the Children of Russia” program that pushed for professional development in the area of child welfare.

Consisting of an extensive network of natural and adoptive parents, Parent’s Bridge began as a small organization but grew over time due to an influx of international aid from such sources as USAID, the EU, and the Dutch organization MATRA. This access to transnational funds has yet to affect the NGO’s ability to function, and there is no evidence that the NGO has experienced any differential application despite the fact that other NGOs who have received funding from the same sources have been pushed to the point of liquidation. Such lack of differential application is likely due to the absence of asymmetrical goals.

**Asymmetrical NGOs**

**Russian-Chechen Friendship Society**
Founded by Stanislav Dmitrievski in the early 2000’s, the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) was created in order to publicize human rights violations in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Maintaining an extensive network of associates, such as famed journalist Anna Politkovskaya, Dmitrievski and his staff published in a frequent newsletter specific acts of violence and violations of human rights by Russian military forces in areas of combat. Beyond raising awareness of the human rights violations in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the RCFS also provided refugees with medical assistance, food and shelter in collaboration with other NGOs in the region. Branched in Moscow, Ingushetia and Chechnya, the RCFS gained international recognition for its work and was heralded by European human rights organizations. The abundance of the RCFS’s funding came from international grants, the majority of which were of U.S. origin.

As with most human rights NGOs, the RCFS through the pursuit of openness in Chechnya maintained asymmetrical goals. Beyond affecting public approval of the military’s action, RCFS’s work reflected poorly on Vladimir Putin and prominent military figures. Considering that Putin’s decision to engage militarily in Chechnya following the 1999 Moscow bombings led to a rise in his popularity, publication of misdeeds under his watch would be less than favorable.

35 Russia’s Human Rights Defenders in Danger, Human Rights First, 2006

36 The RCFS received an award for recognition in 2004 from the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

37 Putin ordered troops into Chechnya as Prime Minister following the assertion that it was Chechen separatists who bombed the Moscow Apartment buildings.
One of the first NGOs to have the NGO law employed against them, the RCFS received notice in late 2005 that its leader, Stanislav Dmitrievsky would be charged with a criminal violation of the anti-extremism law. This charge stemmed from Dmitrievsky’s publishing of Chechen leaders’ open letters to European parliament and the people of Russia, letters that pressed for peace in the conflict. Despite the fact that many observers found no violation of the anti-extremism law, the court found Dmitrievsky guilty in February of 2006.

While other investigations were brought against the RCFS, such as tax reporting violations, it was this guilty verdict that ultimately led to the liquidation of the organization. Due to this conviction, the RCFS was in violation of the new registration law, which prohibits any nongovernmental organization from being headed by anyone convicted of extremist activities. The case would ultimately lead to the Supreme Court, but on January 23, 2007, the case was upheld and the RCFS was ordered to liquidate.

Following the liquidation of the RCFS, Stanislav Dmitrievsky began three new NGOs, the largest of which is named the Nizhny-Novgorod Foundation to Support Tolerance. Based in Finland, but working in Russia, the group’s goals remain identical to the goals of the RCFS. As the former members of the foundation stayed

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38 Part 2 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code, which concerns “inciting hatred or enmity on the basis of ethnicity and religion”

39 “Russian-Chechen Friendship Society” is under severe risk of being destroyed by Russian authorities, Prague Watchdog, 2005

40 Russia: Activist’s Conviction Hurts Freedom of Expression, Human Rights Watch, New York, 4 February, 2006
unified, and the organization still had access to the foreign funds that were previously available, Open Russia re-formed instead of simply ceasing to exist.

**Open Russia**

Created by the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his corporation YUKOS, once one of Russia’s largest oil companies, Open Russia was designed to assist academic and nongovernmental organizations while simultaneously trying to create a more open relationship with the peoples of other nations. Along with his partner, Platon Lebedev, Khodorkovsky sought to create within Russia the first organization for corporate philanthropy. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union, Khodorkovsky was one of the oligarchs that emerged in the first chaotic years of post-communist Russia. Open Russia pursued a variety of goals, often assisting local grassroots organizations and creating educational opportunities in multiple regions. While many of the organization’s goals concerned symmetrical goals with the state, such as goals associated with educational and cultural projects, Open Russia also assisted in issues involved with civil rights and development of the rule of law. Often critical of Russian policies, Khodorkovsky decried the state of the

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41 At the time of the conviction of Dmitrievsky the RCFS’ members could have continued the organization in its same form. However, as the court required the membership to denounce Dmitrievsky as an extremist, they refused and re-formed with Dmitrievsky in the new NGOs. *(Russian Federation: Freedom limited - the right to freedom of expression in the Russian Federation, Amnesty International, 2008)*

42 Statement by the Presscentre for Defence Attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, [http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/openrussia/](http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/openrussia/)

43 One of these creations was the School of Public Politics, which provided information about foreign politics and domestic civic issues that would help transform Russia into more of a Western country from the bottom-up. [http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/openrussia/134916.html](http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/openrussia/134916.html)
Russian court system, its civil rights record, and press freedom. As the organization was funded by YUKOS it remained relatively independent from both domestic and international resource ties.

Beginning in 2003 Open Russia came under attack by state prosecutors. Accused of embezzlement, Khodorkovsky was arrested and imprisoned. While the Russian government claims that there is no differential application of the law in this case, many critics assert that the charges were manufactured due to Khodorkovsky’s increasing popularity and political ambitions. Much of this popularity had to do with the work of Open Russia. As a result of the criminal case Khodorkovsky’s assets were frozen, which included the six million dollars in assets possessed by Open Russia.44 With no remaining assets to continue work or to deal with the legal requirements of remaining a registered NGO, Open Russia was forced to liquidate.

Although Open Russia maintained a large resource base before its closure, the freezing of assets associated with the continued incarceration of the organization’s founders, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, prevented it from starting anew as a different organization. Its role as a funder of a variety of organizations and initiatives meant that it had different organizational characteristics than smaller grass roots asymmetrical NGOs. Therefore it did not radicalize either. While other organizations continue to address many of the issues that Open Russia did, the lack of assets and membership cohesion following the court decisions against the organization led to the complete and final liquidation of

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44 *Russia’s Attack on Independent Voices*, Frontline, May, 2007
Open Russia. As of 2011, the remnants of Open Russia have not reformed to realize the initial goals of creating a corporate philanthropic venture in Russia.

**Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia**

Founded in 2005 from the merger of two like-minded NGOs, the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia (FNCAUR) focused on charity projects and art in order to highlight Ukrainian culture and language. Additionally, the organization sought to help Ukrainians living in Russia maintain their civil rights and cultural integrity.45 Supported by Ukrainian resources, the professional organization worked with multiple communities and many people across multiple regions of Russia.

Goals of promoting the Ukrainians, however, were deemed by the Russian courts to be “aimed at discrediting the political course of the Russian government on interracial unity,” (Ruling of the High Court of Russia, 2010) Because of this ruling the Federal Registration Service (FRS) was now free to revoke the registration of FNCAUR due to a clause in the registration law. This clause states that officials can deny or revoke registration if they deem the NGO’s,

“Goals and objectives . . . create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation.” (Federal Law No. 18 F-Z)

In November of 2010 the courts confirmed the FRS’s decision against FNCAUR and revoked their registration.

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Subsequent to the regional court finding against FNCAUR, the organization appealed to the Russian Supreme Court, several months later the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the regional court and the organization was officially liquidated.\footnote{Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia Finally Liquidated (Автономия украинцев в России окончательно ликвидирована), ForUm, 1/27/2011} The liquidation of the NGO did not frighten away any of the organization’s former support, nor did membership scatter. Valery Semenenko, the organization’s spokesperson, has insisted that plans for a new organization are underway. During the time of FNCAUR’s appeal another Ukrainian rights organization, the Association of Ukrainians in Russia, was beginning their own court case regarding their registration. Depending on the outcome of that case a planned union will be formed between them in the creation of a new organization. But due to the professional organizational type and the continued access to transnational resources the NGO is reemerging.

**Sodeystvie (Assistance)**

Located in Vladimir, Assistance deals with refugees and internally displaced peoples. A small organization founded in the late 1990’s by a Tajik couple, Valery and Nina Madyarov, Assistance worked along with joint venture created by the couple that organized children’s dance troupes in multiple Russian regions. As a grassroots organization with no access to transnational resources, were mostly volunteer based. While seemingly innocuous, the goals of the organization did
promote the inclusion of refugees into a smaller locale, an area that has been contentious for many Russian elites.47

Assistance’s liquidation was rooted in the complicated bureaucratic process that characterizes the satisfaction of tax laws associated with the registration. Although the group successfully filed a tax report on its activities with one institution, complications arose with the filing of a nearly identical report to the FRS. Despite the government having the information filed in one institution, the FRS recommended liquidation because of failure to file the report with them. In February 2008 the Vladimir district court sided with the FRS and the Madyarovs’ NGO was liquidated. The fact that other organizations have had success in appealing the decision in such cases where the grounds for liquidation were improperly filed documents, leads many figures believe that the case of Assistance concluded as such due to a desire by regional elites to assert their power over civil society.48

Despite having the correct tax reports filed, because of the complicated registration process with the FRS, Assistance was ordered to liquidate following their unsuccessful appeal to the Russian Supreme Court.49 This verdict was handed

47 That such inclusion has been contentious has been reflected in many international reports on Russia’s civil society, such as The Fund for Peace’s 2008 annual report: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=392&Itemid=551


49 “Vladimir organization of refugees and internally displace persons ‘Assistance’ liquidated by court decision” (Владимирская организацией беженцев и внутренне перемещенных лиц ‘Возьмите’)
down despite the fact that the registration law indicates that an NGO should only be eliminated following flagrant violations of registration procedure. As Assistance had filed a large part of their paperwork with the tax authorities, much of which is the same material that is to be included with the FRS materials, the violation could hardly be flagrant. As international and Russian activists noted, the move by the FRS and the court system seemed indicative of a precedent setting move, by which future NGOs could face liquidation over similar ‘flagrant’ violations.

Nevertheless, on March 22, 2008, Assistance was liquidated. Following the liquidation, despite plans to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, Assistance closed its doors for good. Without a deep domestic or international resource base, nor a professional organizational type, the NGO has yet to start anew.

**Center for Enlightenment and Research Programs**

The Center for Enlightenment and Research Programs (CERP) was founded in the early 2000’s it worked on advising fellow NGOs in how to maneuver the Russian legal system, training journalists, amongst other educational goals. With the introduction of the 2006 registration law, CERP’s focus was to assist these organizations in satisfying the requirements of the law and to retain their legal status. One way in which it advised these fellow NGOs was to hold educational workshops in St. Petersburg and the surrounding region.

vihuzhedennix pereselentsev “Sodeistvie” likvidirovana po resheniyu suda), Regnum, 4/22/08

50 Article 4, Federal Law No. 18-FZ
CERP’s work effectively supported a variety of NGO’s in St. Petersburg and the surrounding region. While this work perhaps was not asymmetrical in its substantive goals, the overarching transformative goals surely were, as they effectively assisted other NGOs in maintaining their legal status.\textsuperscript{51} Through this work the organization gained the attention of international organizations and was able to attract funding from them, particularly from the Dutch-government backed organization MATRA,\textsuperscript{52} an organization that supported the development of civil society and institutions internationally.\textsuperscript{53} At the same time that CERP was targeted two similar organizations were as well, however CERP was the only one out of the three that was successfully liquidated.\textsuperscript{54} The FRS successfully brought charges against CERP for tax evasion regarding foreign funds and for undermining Russia’s interests “because it characterized police as not having sufficient awareness of the rights of refugees.” (Global Integrity Report, pg 26)

The Center for Enlightenment and Research Programs was liquidated on February 14, 2008,\textsuperscript{55} following a failed appeal the founder of the center created a new organization. Because the organization maintained a high resource level from

\textsuperscript{51} Choking on Bureaucracy, Human Rights Watch, 2008

\textsuperscript{52} The name ‘MATRA’ is from the Dutch words for social transformation, ‘maatschappelijke transformatie.’

\textsuperscript{53} http://www.bearr.org/en/node/1921

\textsuperscript{54} The two NGOs that survived were St. Petersburg based Bellona and Citizen’s Watch.

\textsuperscript{55} 2008 Human Rights Report, U.S. Department of State
an international source, and was a professional organization the founder was able to pursue similar asymmetrical goals within the new organization.
Chapter 5: Liquidation and Radicalization: The Rise in Protest Movements

Liquidation and Radicalization

The third option for liquidated NGOs is one that is an unintended result of the practice of differential application, radicalization into a protest movement. Such a movement from registered activism to protest occurs when an NGO does not have the ability to emerge as a new organization but refuses to cease engaging in activism. The members of such organizations have not necessarily packed up their offices and shuffled home but have chosen to opt out of the licensed civil sector altogether. Opting out manifests in the increase in protest movements, which are not simply random groups of outraged people, but political activity in an unauthorized arena:

“Thus, rather than being a manifest expression of anger, protest is conceived of by proponents of the mobilization perspective as a continuation of institutional politics by non-institutional means.” (Khwaja, p. 49)

Unfortunately, as these movements are unsanctioned, unauthorized and often illegal, concrete information on the movement of their members, and whether they were members of former NGOs is difficult to come by. But data on protest activity over much of the past decade indicates that there has been an upswing in the amount and variation of unsanctioned political activism that can be correlated to the successful repression of NGOs. (Robertson, 2011)

The reason why so little information is available regarding liquidated NGOs who radicalize is not because such radicalization doesn’t occur. These groups exist.
As others have noted, the change in the character of protest movements over the past five years is significant, moving from an activism made up primarily of labor and pensioners to one made up of activists from multiple areas of interest. The emergence of movements concerned with human rights, environmentalism, civil rights, housing and immigrant rights now combine with traditional Russian protest interests to create a mosaic of activism not seen in the past. (Robertson, 2011)

The Federal Registration Service (FSR) has released annual reports on NGO growth and activity, but as these reports only concern NGOs that are currently active, post-liquidation behavior is not discussed. Additionally, in an effort to not discourage further NGO growth, closed NGOs rarely publicly address their liquidation in an effort to not weaken the morale of would-be activists. Many protest movements’ members seek anonymity in their activity, wearing masks to pickets and rallies, thus making it difficult to ascertain direct lines of connection between members of liquidated NGOs and their participation in current actions.

But, in an effort at symmetry to the previous NGO responses, I surmise that NGOs that are liquidated and emerge as unsanctioned political action, or protest movements, are those that maintain the polar opposite of organizations that re-establish themselves. I think it is highly likely that these groups are of a grassroots organizational type and maintain no access to transnational resources. While I do not have the data to support such a claim for the reasons listed above, this seems to be the most likely combination of traits that lead to protest activity due to the lack of formal avenues of activity available to liquidated NGOs and the absence of transnational resources at their disposal.
Over the past five years, since the introduction of the Public Chamber and the registration law, there has been the emergence of the Defend Khimki Forest movement, Antifa, Strategy-31, the January 19th movement, and even an automobile protest movement that raised the frequency and intensity of protest to a level unseen in years past. The choice by these groups, and countless others, to opt out of formal activity, takes form in unauthorized and unsanctioned political action that addresses asymmetrical goals without being subject to the biased application of bureaucratic measures. While protest movements may apply for permits to hold an event, the denial of such a permit and the subsequent holding of the event anyway do not threaten the existence of the movement itself. Whereas with NGOs who are denied registration face several crippling blows to their ability to address their core issues.

Again, while this does not portray a direct relationship between former NGO members and current protest movements, it does depict the most accessible forum for activists that have been effectively excluded from the official realm of NGO activity. For liquidated NGOs without the international connections, monetary resources or large mobilized membership base, protest movements provide the arena in which to pursue both transformative and substantive goals. Below I examine several of the protest movements that have emerged following the introduction of Federal Law No. 18-FZ in an effort to display the growth in variety and frequency of unsanctioned political activism since it came into effect.

**Case Studies: The expansion of Protest**

**Khimki Forest Movement**
Begun by Yevgeniya Cherikova, a Moscow lawyer, in 2007, the Defend Khimki Forrest Movement was created to oppose the construction of a new high-speed toll highway that would connect Moscow and St. Petersburg. The construction of the highway would disrupt the ecology of the vast green space that surrounds much of Moscow. Citing the damage to animals and plant-life, Cherikova began petitioning the local government to halt construction and build the toll-road on the already existing transit space that housed railway lines further towards the center of Moscow.56

Cherikova, with no allegiance to any environmental NGOs, began to pamphlet the surrounding neighborhoods and appeal to local authorities to move the project. The authorities ignored Cherikova’s initial efforts, so she then began to employ tactics that would gain heightened publicity and local opposition to the construction project grew. With her now sizeable movement, a series of pickets were held with members of regional environmental groups such as St. Petersburg-based Bellona. Such measures no longer were ignored by the local political elites, and despite the reasonable demands of the movement, masked men beat protestors and several prominent figures were arrested.57

Antifa

56 Khimki Forest Defender Yevgenia Chirikova Is New Face Of Russian Civic Activism, RFE/RL, 7/29/10
http://www.rferl.org/content/Khimki_Forest_Defender_Yevgenia_Chirikova_Is_New_Face_Of_Russian_Civic_Activism/2113306.html

In response to rising sentiments of nationalism and rising right wing radicalism in Russia, a group of youth activists began disseminating information, holding rallies, and taking direct action. Named AntiFascist Attitude, but familiarly known as Antifa, the movement is made up of individually autonomous groups across Russia who act primarily on local issues but often take part in federal protest actions.\(^58\)

Comprised of anarchists, activists, musicians and artists, Antifa holds regular marches and rallies in various locales against violent skinhead groups and oppressive government policies. While Antifa often participates in other movements' actions, the movement states that they will form unions with others that often stand in opposition to their goals if it serves their purposes in the long run.\(^59\) While violence is not core tactic for the organization, Antifa states clearly that it will not shy away from the usage of it to battle other violent groups.\(^60\)

**Strategy 31**

“Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.” - Constitution of the Russian Federation, Chapter 2, Article 31

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\(^{58}\) Manifesto of Antifa, http://www.antifa.ru/about/manifest

\(^{59}\) This has occurred when Antifa has participated in the Strategy 31, a movement begun by the oft-controversial Eduard Limonov, and the Khimki forest protests, amongst others.

\(^{60}\) Interview with Godzilla (Antifa founder), Antifascist Attitude (Film), Children of Bukunin, Unknown Date, Internet Video http://nycantifa.wordpress.com/2010/11/08/russia-antifascist-attitude/
Unlike the Khimki movement, Strategy 31 directly addresses transformative goals. Named after Article 31 of the constitution of the Russian Federation, the article regarding the freedom of assembly, this movement organizes large-scale rallies on the final day of every month that has 31 days. Begun on July 31, 2009, Strategy 31 seeks to hold peaceful protests across party lines in order to assert the civil rights guaranteed by the constitution. Thousands of activists across Russia participate in more than 70 cities, however the largest protests occur on Triumph Square in Moscow. Initially begun by the head of the outlawed National Bolshevik party and current member of the Other Russia coalition, Eduard Limonov, the movement now is composed of members of political coalitions, various NGO-affiliated political activists, and grassroots support. Current supporters include famed chess champion and activist Gary Kasparov, Human Rights champion Ludmila Alexeeva, and Ilya Yashin, the head of the political party Yabloko’s youth division. While there have been larger protests in Russia since the inception of Strategy 31, this movement is the largest mobilizer of protest operating in Russia today.

January 19th Committee

Largely affiliated with the Russian Antifa movement, the January 19th Committee holds yearly protests against the current state of counter-movement.

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62 http://www.theotherrussia.org/2011/01/31/more-blood-spilt-than-usual-at/latest-strategy-31/

63 http://strategy-31.ru/

64 While the “Day of Wrath” on March 20th, 2010 drew large numbers of protestors, it occurred in fewer cities than the current Strategy 31 protests.
violence in Russia. On January 19, 2009, Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova, two prominent activists, were shot in their heads on a street near the Kremlin. Marekelov was a prominent lawyer who had represented famed Russian human rights defender Anna Politkovskaya and multiple victims of human rights violations in Chechnya. Baburova, a journalist, died as well as a result of coming to Markelov's aide when the gunmen appeared. As Markelov had done much work to assist the anti-fascist movement, activists of such groups unified to create a day of protest in memory of him and Baburova.65

While the movement was created in memory of the two activists it addresses issues beyond their murders, such as issues of corruption and accountability. Additional murders have also become part of the focus of the movement, and like Antifa, they seek to address the alarming number of violent crimes perpetrated by Neo-Nazi and fascist groups.66

Revolt of the Used Car Dealers and The Blue Bucket Society

In late December 2008, Vladimir Putin ordered a plane full of OMON67 forces in Moscow to fly to Vladivostok, over six thousand kilometers and nine hours away, to break up protests led by car importers. Five hundred miles from the coast of Japan, Vladivostok houses the majority of Russia's Pacific Ocean fleet, and being a

66 They also are addressing other murders such as the gunning down of a Moscow city court judge in 2010 that had convicted Neo-Nazis gangs the year before.
67 Отряд милиции особого назначения; Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya, (Special Purpose Police Unit) is the elite police force of Russia whose motto is, “We know no mercy, and do not ask for any.”
main import center, Vladivostok once maintained a significant population in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Since the fall of communism, however, the population has steadily decreased. (Russian Analytical Digest, 2010)

Despite having a bustling fishing industry, the largest section of economy in terms of financial impact was devoted to the importation of used Japanese automobiles.68 However, subsequent to the global financial crisis in 2008 the federal government proposed introducing tariffs on imported goods in order to stimulate demand for domestic manufacturers, including the faltering automotive industry.69 In response to the proposal of increased tariffs that would severely damage their livelihood, the people of Vladivostok took to the streets and decried the federal government for what appeared to be a dismissal of the Far East of the country.

Automotive protests have not occurred solely in Vladivostok, in the Russia’s major metropolitan centers, St. Petersburg and Moscow, they have occurred as well. Epitomized by the migalki70 that are fashioned to the top official vehicles that allow government officials, or their close friends, to zip through rush hour traffic and red traffic lights, protesters began donning blue buckets and stopping traffic in protest. The group is made up of frustrated drivers who have witnessed a rise in car

68 Sources indicate that this sector of Vladivostok’s economy employs upwards of 100,000 people. (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/world/europe/16russia.html)

69 The tariff on automotive imports for this market increased by as much as 30% (Tariff Protests in Eastern Port Rattle Kremlin, New York Times, 2/15/09)

70 Migalki are the flashing blue lights attached to police cars and official vehicles to be used in emergency capacity or for the transport of officials. They resemble bright blue upside-down buckets.
accidents due to the increase in the presence of milgaki and the revelation that businessmen have bought the emergency lights from corrupt police officers and officials.\textsuperscript{71} Such corruption is the true issue at the heart of the movement with the milgaki acting as the symbol of the activists’ disgust.

Each of these protest movements is indicative of the growing frustration within Russia today. Additionally, they are all ideal outlets for activists that could end up without a legal organization to act in, as shown by the amount of political activists from unregistered parties that participate in them. That these movements all occur across multiple regions of Russia, occur with great frequency, and mobilize large numbers of activists is indicative of the nature of civic protest in modern Russia. It is an environment in which repression of particular legal organizations leads to a growth in protest.

\textsuperscript{71} Russian Traffic Police Crush Blue Bucket Protests, The Australian 4/27/2010
Conclusion

“Genius is an African who dreams up snow”-Vladimir Nabokov

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society actors were faced with the unimaginable task of excavating an independent third sector. Despite a long history of social organizations solely being associated with the state or communist party they dreamed of such independence boldly. The boldness of such dreams alone must have been difficult, but as the steam-shovel operators of this excavation, the task before them was herculean.

For some that task became even more challenging in 2005 as the Russian state began a recentralization of power that paralleled an increase in the regulation of civil society. This increased regulation formed a process of legitimization for many NGOs, but also introduced new ways by which the Russian state could repress particular types of other NGOs. While one aspect of repression continues to be employed, coercion, the other, channeling, was being employed in accordance with these new ways of repression. Although channeling is meant to affect the type and timing available for action, it was now being differentially applied in accordance through these new regulatory laws to persecute individual NGOs The anti-extremism law, various tax codes, and Federal Law No. 18-FZ were used against certain organizations to exclude them from legitimacy and limit their effectiveness.

While access to transnational resources and organizational type has an effect on how effective an NGO can be in the pursuit of their goals, it is ultimately whether
an NGO maintains asymmetrical goals that makes it more likely that an NGO will become the target of differential application. While many NGOs successfully battle through differential application, many are pushed to the point of liquidation, a point at which they can no longer function as a legal entity. Once at this point, the NGO has a limited number of options, complete liquidation, liquidation and re-establishment, and liquidation and radicalization. In this research I have found that the NGOs most likely to be able to emerge anew and address the same asymmetrical goals are those that maintain a profession organizational type and an access to transnational resources. Without the combination of these two characteristics, as my research has shown, it is more likely that the NGO will cease operating in a legal form.

While some NGOs have simply closed after they had been ordered to liquidate and have had their registration denied or revoked, I have made a correlation to an increase in the variety and frequency of protest that parallels the differential application of the aforementioned regulatory measures. This groundswell of unauthorized, unsanctioned, and often-illegal form of activism indicates not simply a rise of anger in the populace, but a surge in the amount of activists that are pursuing political goals through non-institutional means. The nature of protest activity makes it difficult to draw lines of causation between the liquidation of NGOs and such a growth in protest, activist face very real threats if they are too open about their participation. But that such a growth has occurred subsequent to the introduction of these regulatory laws and their differential application indicates that it is far more than a coincidence.
While the establishment of regulations may prove to be beneficial to Russian civil society in the long run, that differential application persists indicates that Russia’s third sector will remain in a state of arrested development. For now, much like with the competitive political arena in Russia, civil society experiences the trappings of a legitimate third sector but on an uneven playing field.

**Areas of Future Research:**

In the process of this work I have encountered two areas of recommended future research. One of these areas constituted a major part of the previous chapter, while another sprung from my research on the difficulties faced by NGOs following failed appeals to the Russian Supreme Court. The former concerns the rise in protest movements in Russia today. As the 2011 regional election results show, contention for power seems to be more viable now than it was in the years of the Putin presidency. While these recent elections still were convincingly won by United Russia, in some regions their percentage of the vote fell below 40%.[72] Such signs of discontent with Russia’s ruling party betray the current economic and political atmosphere in Russia, an atmosphere that is rife with opportunities for increased protest.

The anonymity of membership in many protest movements is a direct result of many repressive measures employed by the state to exterminate or channel certain social movements. The bolder of activists rightly fear revealing their

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identities due to the many journalists, lawyers and protestors who have been imprisoned, committed, or murdered. The difficulty of identifying these actors in the protest movements of Russia should not deter us from further examining protest as a social force. The movements listed above are important outlets for dissatisfaction with the hybrid nature of Russian politics and social policy, and there are legions more of such movements operating in Russia's civil society.

As with NGOs, protest movements face both channeling and coercive measures of repression. Permits to hold rallies are routinely denied to movements with asymmetrical goals and peaceful marches are often dispersed through the use of the dreaded OMON.73

All of this begs the questions, “Who are these people, what differentiates them from the majority of Russians who do not engage in such civil disobedience, and how do they effectively mobilize without a formal organization?” As I have argued in this work, the increased pressure on NGOs combined with other socio-economic factors has led to increase in both national and localized protest movements and their membership. The answers to the remaining questions, however, merit deeper discussion. The first steps towards determining how these actors differ from the rest of Russian society would seem to be investigating communal and national social and economic factors. In regards to the answer to the latter question, the growth in social media in Russia seems to be indicative of a

73 While not all protests are nonviolent, the usage of force by OMON seems to be applied to both violent and nonviolent protest.
transformation of the mobilization process. The use of livejournal, facebook, Twitter, and various other webpages provide movements with the ability to mobilize effectively without the risks that come with face-to-face encounters and underground meetings.

The second area of further research concerns the process of appealing to international organizations to overturn the liquidation verdicts of Russian courts. In the process of researching this project I found several cases in which a NGO that had been liquidated was allowed to continue its work as a legal entity through a successful appeal to the European Court on Human Rights (EHCR).\textsuperscript{74} Despite contention between Russia and the Council of Europe it would appear that for the time being the rulings of the EHCR are now binding within the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{75} As my research has concerned NGOs that failed to maintain organizational integrity and the methods by which elites used channeling to repress them, the EHCR appeals process was not covered here. While I think many of the organizational characteristics that enable NGOs to reform following liquidation may indicate the likelihood of an NGO pursuing an appeal through the EHCR, further analysis is necessary.

\textsuperscript{74} These organizations include: AGORA, YHRM, Forum for Migrants’ Organizations, and

\textsuperscript{75} Tensions Multiply between Russia and Council of Europe: Could the Malaise be Terminal?, Bill Bowring, The EU-Russia Review, Issue 6 Russian and the Rule of Law, April, 2008
Table 1. Earl Typology On Protest Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Actors Tightly Connected to Political Elites</th>
<th>Observed Coercion</th>
<th>Unobserved Coercion</th>
<th>Observed Channeling</th>
<th>Unobserved Channeling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Cell One) Military Action Against Protests</td>
<td>(Cell Two) Counterintelligence Programs</td>
<td>(Cell Three) Cutting Off Funding and Access to NGOs</td>
<td>(Cell Four) Differential Application of NGO Registration Law, Anti-Extremism Law, and Tax Laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cell Five) Local Policing of Protest Events</td>
<td>(Cell Six) Local Police Department Counter-Intelligence Programs</td>
<td>(Cell Seven) Permit Requirements for Protest Events</td>
<td>(Cell Eight) Aid Restrictions on people convicted of certain crimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cell Nine) Violence of a Counter-movement</td>
<td>(Cell Ten) Private Threats Made by Counter-movements</td>
<td>(Cell Eleven) Elite Patronage Limited to Specific Goals or Tactics</td>
<td>(Cell Twelve) Company Towns (Monogorods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 - Modified Earl Typology (Cells 1-4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Channeling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell 1</td>
<td>Cell 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Raids and</td>
<td>The Public Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Busting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unobserved</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell 2</td>
<td>Cell 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Espionage on NGOs</td>
<td>Federal Law No. 18-FZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Extremism Law</td>
<td>Tax Codes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3 Asymmetrical Case Studies Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Resources</th>
<th>Low Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
<td>Cell 1: RCFS, CERP, FNCAUR</td>
<td>Cell 2: Open Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grassroot</strong></td>
<td>Cell 3: (No Members)</td>
<td>Cell 4: Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix- Russian NGO and Protest Movement Fact Sheet

NGOs
1) Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS)
   Goals: Human Rights in Chechnya and Ingushetia
   Resources: International Grants
   Organizational Type: Professional
   Leader: Stanislav Dmitrievski
   Inception Date: Prior to 2004.
   Liquidation Date: January 23rd, 2007
   Differential Application Employed: Combination of Registration Law and Anti-Extremist Law.

2) Open Russia- Philanthropic NGO
   Goals: Various, both symmetrical and asymmetrical
   Resources: High Before Liquidation/Low After Liquidation
   Organizational Type: Professional
   Leader: Mikhail Khodorkovsky
   Inception date: 2001
   Liquidation Date: March 2006
   Channeling Method: Freezing of assets and legal case against Khodorkovsky.

3) Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia (FNCAUR)
   Goals: Promotion of Ukrainian cultural and linguistic characteristics
   Resources: Transnational (Mostly from Ukraine)
   Membership: Professional
   Leader: Unknown as of yet, formed as a union of two like-minded groups
   Inception Date: Original groups founded in 1995 and 1998, FNCAUR in 2005
   Liquidation Date: November 2010
   Channeling method: Various registration requirements.

4) Assistance (Sodeystvie)
   Goals: Providing assistance to refugees
   Resources: Local
   Membership: Grassroots
   Leader: Unknown as of yet, but was founded by a Tajik family
   Inception Date: 1990’s (Exact date unknown)
   Liquidation Date: February 2008
   Channeling Method: Registration law

5) CERP-
   Goals: Providing legal advice to fellow NGOs.
   Resources: High
   Membership: Professional
   Leader: Kanevska
   Inception Date: Unknown, but prior to 2005
Protest Movements

1) Defenders of the Khimki Forest
   Goals: Prevention of Construction of the Moscow-Petersburg Highway through Moscow’s Khimki Forest
   Leadership: Yevgeniya Chirikova
   Tactics: Petitioning, protests, pickets

2) Antifa
   Goals: Elimination of Neo-Nazi and Nationalist Sentiment
   Leadership: Various youth, anarchists, artists, and professionals
   Tactics: Protest, pickets, and rallies

3) Strategy 31
   Goals: Freedom of Assembly
   Leadership: Eduard Limonov, Ludmila Alexeeva, Ilya Yashin, and Gary Kasparov
   Tactics: Mass protests on the 31st of every month

4) January 19
   Goals: Justice for victims of violence, transparency of the criminal justice system
   Leadership: Antifascists
   Tactics: Yearly protests on January 19th

5) Vladivostok Tariff Protests and other Automotive Protests
   Goals: Removal of the 30% increase tariff on imported cars, anti-corruption
   Leadership: Car importers, automobile workers, commuters
   Tactics: Rallies, road blockage, public humiliation.
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