Mediated Memory:
Framing and sustaining collective memory of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots
in contemporary and retrospective newspaper coverage

Kristin M. Simonetti

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication

Chapel Hill
2008

Approved by
Dr. Donald Shaw, chair
Dr. Frank Fee, committee member
Dr. David Copeland, committee member
ABSTRACT

KRISTIN M. SIMONETTI: Mediated Memory: How Three Milwaukee Newspapers Framed the 1967 Milwaukee Race Riots in Contemporary and Retrospective Coverage (Under the direction of Dr. Donald L. Shaw, Dr. Frank E. Fee, & Dr. David A. Copeland)

This study was inspired by scholarship that investigates the relationship between media and the formation of collective memory by communities of individuals. It focused on the way three metropolitan newspapers covered a single event, the Milwaukee race riots of 1967, and also how each newspaper treated the riots in coverage published on the 10, 20, 25, 30, and 40-year anniversaries of the riots. Relying upon a narrative analysis proposed by Jill A. Edy (2006) that focused on the construction of frames within newspaper reporting, this study concluded that, over time, the newspapers engaged in a “replacement” of memory by consistently arguing that problems facing the Milwaukee community in 1967 had not been solved in the decades since the violence and that those problems persisted in modern-day times.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a number of people to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for assisting me and supporting me in the process of completing this truly challenging project. First and foremost, a big “thank you” goes to my parents, Nancy and Tom Simonetti, and my sister, Kaitlin, for their love, their support, and their patience with my frequent, frantic phone calls, text messages, and e-mails related to this project.

I also sincerely thank Dr. Donald L. Shaw, my thesis chair, not only for his guidance in the completion of this project, but also for opening my eyes to different avenues and opportunities for media history research throughout my two years at the University of North Carolina. Thanks also go to Dr. Frank Fee, my first adviser at Carolina, and Dr. David A. Copeland, my favorite professor from my undergraduate days at Elon University, for volunteering to serve on my thesis committee. One other professor deserves special mention here; my thanks to Dr. Carole Blair, of Carolina’s Communications Studies department, for her help in developing this idea as part of her COMM 679: Rhetorics of Public Memory class in the fall of 2007 and also for her continued guidance this spring as I completed this project.

A final round of thanks goes to my classmates at Carolina and my friends in Chapel Hill and elsewhere for serving as sounding boards for my ideas and available vents for my frustrations. I could not have made it through this challenging period of my academic life without you all. KMS.
PREFACE

The idea for this project came to me while I served as an intern at the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in the summer of 2007. I’d never been to Milwaukee before moving there for the internship, and I knew little about the dynamics or history of the city. What struck me most in those first days in Milwaukee was the way Milwaukeeans, to a large degree, self-segregated themselves along racial lines. There was no tension, and there was no outward acknowledgment of this dynamic. But for an outsider from North Carolina, it was particularly noticeable.

I later learned that Milwaukee’s racial dynamic has deep roots in the city’s history. This became only more apparent when, during my internship, the Journal Sentinel published a three-part series commemorating the 40th anniversary of the city’s 1967 race riots. I found the way the reporters, photographers, editors, designers, and graphic editors pieced together the story of the riots and made them relevant to present-day Milwaukeeans intriguing and began exploring this concept upon my return to Carolina in the fall of 2007 through a project for Dr. Blair’s Rhetorics of Public Memory class. That project focused solely on the 2007 Journal Sentinel series. But Dr. Blair and I wondered: what did the original news coverage of the event look like, and how might newspapers’ construction of the collective memory of the riots changed over time? This question sparked the focus of this thesis. It also served to help me better understand the history of the complicated question of race in Milwaukee.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................................................... ix

Chapter

I. COLLECTIVE MEMORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE 1967 MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS......................................................... 1
  Defining Collective Memory................................................................................................. 1
  Collective Memory and the Civil Rights Movement......................................................... 6
  The Civil Rights Movement and Violent Uprising:
  The 1967 Milwaukee Race Riots..................................................................................... 11
  Summary............................................................................................................................. 15

II. COLLECTIVE MEMORY, FRAMING, AND MEDIA................................................. 17
  Collective Memory and Framing Theory......................................................................... 17
  Media and Collective Memory of the Civil Rights Movement........................................ 25
  Summary............................................................................................................................. 30

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD................................................................. 31
  Conceptualizing Narrative.............................................................................................. 32
  Study Design.................................................................................................................... 34
  Limitations....................................................................................................................... 36

IV. CONTEMPORARY COVERAGE OF THE MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS.................. 38
  General Informative Classification.................................................................................. 40
  Consequences and Aftermath Classification.................................................................... 44
The Riots as a Result of Economic and Social Deprivation For Blacks Frame .............................................................. 46
The Riots as an Example of Swift, Effective Administrative Action Frame ................................................................. 55
The Maier-vs.-Black Community Leaders Frame .......................................................... 66
Contemporary Coverage: Summary ................................................................. 72

V. RETROSPECTIVE AND COMMEMORATIVE COVERAGE OF THE MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS ................................................................. 74
General Observations: Inclusions in the Riot Narrative .................................................. 75
General Observations: Exclusions in the Riot Narrative ........................................... 76
General Observations: The 2007 Journal Sentinel Series ........................................ 77
The Problems Persist Frame ................................................................................. 80
Retrospective and Commemorative Coverage: Summary ...................................... 92

VI. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 94
What Frames are Used in the Narrative of the Milwaukee Race Riots Constructed by the Newspapers’ Contemporary Coverage of the Riots? ........................................ 95
How Have the Frames Identified in the Narrative of the Milwaukee Race Riots Constructed by the Newspapers’ Contemporary Coverage of the Riots Changed in the Newspapers’ Retrospective Coverage? ........................................ 96
What New Frames are Used in the Narrative of the Milwaukee Race Riots Constructed by the Newspapers’ Retrospective Coverage Suggest for Milwaukee’s Present and Future Race Relations? .......................... 97
What Arguments do the Frames Identified in the Narrative of the Milwaukee Race Riots Constructed by the Newspapers’ Retrospective Coverage Suggest for Milwaukee’s Present and Future Race Relations? ........................................ 99
Media and the Collective Memory of The 1967 Milwaukee Race Riots ................................................................. 101
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

1. A graphical representation of the progression of narrative threads in coverage of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots..........................102
CHAPTER 1
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE 1967 MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS

This study focused on how three media entities—the Milwaukee Journal, the Milwaukee Sentinel, and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel—constructed and framed the collective memory of the city’s race riots and the ensuing city-wide curfew, which spanned ten days from July 30, 1967, through August 9, 1967, in the 40 years since the original event. The purpose of this study was to analyze original and retrospective coverage of the 1967 riots in the Journal, the Sentinel, and the Journal Sentinel, which have been city’s daily newspapers from the time of the riots forward. Ultimately it sought to answer a complicated question: What kind of memory of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots was constructed by contemporary and retrospective coverage of the event in these newspapers, and what vision of the present and future does it “help legitimize, valorize, or condemn?” (Romano & Raiford, 2006, xv).

Defining Collective Memory

According to memory scholar Barbie Zelizer (1995), memory research shifted its focus toward collective, rather than personal, memory in the 1970s and 1980s with the increased push for Holocaust remembrance. But what does the term “collective memory” mean? Zelizer (1995) explained that collective memories are “recollections of the past that are determined and shaped by the group” (214). Another scholar, Iwona Irwin-Zarecka (2007), suggested that collective memory is “a set of ideas, images,
feelings about the past … best located not in the minds of individuals, but in the resources they share” (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 4). Historian John Bodnar (1992), using the term “public memory” instead of “collective memory,” explained that the memory of the group is neither individual nor collective but is instead “an argument about the interpretation of reality” (14) produced at the “intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions” (13). Finally, Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver (2004), too, argued that it is “unsustainable … to assert a pristine separation between” personal and collective memory (4). They presented a concept of collective memory that suggested a give-and-take relationship between collective memory and personal memory. They argued that “for collective expressions of memory to occur, individuals must participate; the memories of individuals, in turn, are structured and influenced by the memory practices of the community to which they belong and by the exchange of memory content with other members of that community” (Gray & Oliver, 2004, 4).

Though these and other scholars offered definitions of collective memory that differed in the details, they each assume, perhaps obviously, that collective memory draws upon the past. In this way, it might seem acceptable to interchange the terms “collective memory” and “history.” Irwin-Zarecka (2007) asserted that part of the reason collective memory might be confused with history is because those who construct collective memory “assume an unobtrusive presence. From the viewer’s perspective, the record is a record, even when it actually does a great deal more than securing remembrance” (168). However, as Jill A. Edy (2006) pointed out, “memory is always an imperfect representation of the past, despite the fact that we often treat it as the
equivalent of the past itself” (2). In essence, memory must be considered based on what its creators choose to include and to exclude.

Other memory scholars have been more emphatic and explicit than Irwin-Zarecka (2007) and Edy (2006) in noting the distinction between memory and history. In fact, many memory scholars have antagonized history since memory studies—whether they focused on collective memory or individual memory—became prevalent. According to Gray & Oliver (2004), memory scholars frequently “antithesize history by attributing to [memory] an archaic, organic, almost spiritual quality that distinguished it from the analytical practices of [history]” (4). Zelizer (1995) argued that one of the key differences between collective memory and history is that “collective memory is both more mobile and mutable than history” and has become viewed as “a kind of history-in-motion which moves at a different pace and rate than traditional history” (216).

Characteristics of Collective Memory

To understand fully how collective memory operates, it is important to understand the several characteristics scholars have identified in fleshing out the concept. The preceding discussion that reviewed definitions of collective memory, as well as collective memory’s relationship to history, alluded to some of these characteristics. But Zelizer (1995) offered a comprehensive list of six major characteristics of collective memory that guide the following discussion. She explained that memory is processual, unpredictable, usable, particular and universal, material, and partial.

identifiable beginning and end;” instead, it is always “unfolding, changing, and transforming” (218). Gray & Oliver (2004) explained collective memory’s constant state of change as “the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between individual members of the group” for whom the memories are meaningful (5). Similarly, Zelizer’s (1995) second characteristic also tapped into the ever-changing nature of collective memory: unpredictability. Collective memory, she argued, is unpredictable precisely because it is dependent on the present, and the present is always changing. People cannot possibly “prepare for which parts of the past become significant dimensions of a recollection, which personalities are the most effective in activating memory, or which contemporary circumstances serve to engender new rewritings of the past” (Zelizer, 1995, 221).

Third, Zelizer (1995) argued, collective memory is usable. Collective memory is implicated in a variety of cultural constructions, foremost of which is that of a group’s collective identity. Collective memory may also be used to “validate political and social traditions” (Zelizer, 1995, 227). Fourth, Zelizer (1995) argued, collective memory is both particular and universal. She explained: “[T]he same memory can act as a particular representation of the past for certain groups while taking on a universal significance for others” (Zelizer, 1995, 230). For example, the collective memory of Pope John Paul II might be interpreted differently by Roman Catholics than it is interpreted by non-Catholic Christians worldwide.

Fifth, Zelizer (1995) noted that collective memory is material. She explained that “in between one’s head and the world … is a repertoire of different agents of mediation” (Zelizer, 1995, 232). She referred here to the mass media, but she also argued that “[e]vidence of the past exists in every mode of public expression in everyday
life—in wedding celebrations, clothes, gestures, household artifacts, reputations, art exhibitions, public memorials, and television retrospectives” (232). Finally, Zelizer (1995) argued that collective memory is partial. “No single memory contains all that we know, or could know, about any given event, personality or issue,” she argued. “Rather, memories are often pieced together, like a mosaic” (Zelizer, 1995, 224). Collective memories, then, are defined not only by the information they include, but also by the information they exclude. Collective memory’s partiality, Zelizer (1995) suggested, may lead to unrest between individual members of a group. These individuals have a vested interest in the dominant collective memory of the group, and therefore there may be debate and perhaps dispute over what information should be included and what should be excluded in that memory.

**Importance of Collective Memory**

Clearly, memory scholars believe collective memory to be a critical and intriguing concept. But why might collective memory be important to those outside the academic community? At a basic level, as these and other scholars have suggested, all individuals in modern society are engaged in and are affected by collective memory. But as Zelizer (1995) explained, collective memory involves much more than the “simple act of recall” (214). Collective memory has the potential to affect “a range of other activities having as much to do with identity formation, power and authority, cultural norms, and social interaction” (Zelizer, 1995, 214). For example, many scholars have observed the influence collective memory has on the process of forging a collective identity. Edy (2006) noted that collective memories help not only to build a group’s collective identity, but also to “influence the way future events are understood and
managed” based on the way such events were addressed in the past (2). Also, Gray & Oliver (2004) argued that collective memory fosters “a sense both of agency and continuity with the past” (3). Finally, Irwin-Zarecka (2007) offered an effective summary of the relationship between collective identity and collective memory. She described collective memory as an orienting force, “something we need to understand better in order to account for why people do what they do” (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 9).

Irwin-Zarecka (2007) also observed that collective memory plays a part in the construction of cultural norms and morals. Collective memories, she explained, are “imbued with moral imperatives—the obligations to one’s kin, notions of justice, indeed, the lessons of right and wrong—that form the basic parts of the normative order” (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 9). In addition, Zelizer (1995) argued, collective memory is important because it has staying power. “Unlike individual memory,” she explained, “collective memory can increase with time, taking on new complications, nuances, and interests” (Zelizer, 1995, 217).

Collective Memory and the Civil Rights Movement

A great example of the construction, evolution, and importance of collective memory is that of the Civil Rights Movement. Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (2006) noted that “some of the most heated battles over the question of race in this country revolve around how the Civil Rights Movement should be remembered” (xii, emphasis authors’). In essence, these authors suggested, modern conceptualizations of race in America today are tied very much to the way Americans construct and frame the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement.
The battle over proper remembrance of the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement has many fronts. The United States public education system is one such front. John Wills (2005), for example, studied the way elementary school curricula educated students about Martin Luther King, Jr., on or around the time of the federally observed holiday in his honor. He noted that such curricula portrayed King and the Civil Rights Movement in ways that “echo[ed] the collective remembering privileged in mainstream U.S. culture and society” (Wills, 2005, 128). Physical monuments and memorials erected across the nation provide another front. Memory scholars Carole Blair and Neil Michel (2000), for example, focused on the Civil Rights Memorial in Birmingham, Alabama. They argued that the memorial suggests that “the continuity between past and present is Racism . . . . [D]espite the institutional changes, the goal of racial justice has not been achieved, that methods of the past have succeeded only in part . . . . [B]ut it clearly argues that change is possible and desirable now” (Blair & Michel, 2000, 47). For many other scholars whose work will be discussed later, a major front in the battle over the memory of the Civil Rights Movement has been the media; in newspapers, local television news, major motion pictures, and the Internet.

**Dominant Collective Memory of the Civil Rights Movement**

As Michael K. Brown, et al. (2003) noted in their volume of essays titled *Whitewashing Race*, most Americans today were not even alive at the time of the Civil Rights Movement. “In a very real sense,” these authors argued, America’s youth “are a post-civil rights generation. They have grown up in a world where *de jure* discrimination and segregation have been illegal for nearly forty years, the longest period this has been true in American history” (Brown, et al., 2003, 223). Even for those alive who lived
through the events of the Civil Rights Movement, the authors noted, “in the decades since the Civil Rights Movement, the nation had prided itself on extending equal rights to all its citizens; the movement had supposedly led to a new racial unity” (Fuller, 2006, 169). Whether Americans experienced the Civil Rights Movement first-hand or retrospectively, therefore, it can be suggested that the way collective memory of the movement is framed is important because that memory “can have a powerful influence on how [they] understand not only the past but the present as well” (Romano & Raiford, 2006, xvi).

But what exactly does the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement look like? Romano & Raiford (2006) suggested that a “consensus memory” of the Civil Rights movement exists (xiv). They described this dominant collective memory thusly:

[T]he Civil Rights Movement began in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision to desegregate Southern schools “with all deliberate speed” and ended in 1968 with the death of Martin Luther King Jr. and the rise of Black Power in the country’s northern and western cities. Charismatic and eloquent leaders led a nonviolent movement of African Americans and supportive whites in a struggle that sought to change legal and social, rather than economic, barriers to equality (Romano & Raiford, 2006, xiv-xv).

As the final sentence of this excerpt from Romano & Raiford’s (2006) book suggests, this dominant collective memory of the movement promotes the idea that the movement was successful in achieving equality in political participation and social justice. But this conceptualization conspicuously omits other facets of the Civil Rights Movement—black nationalism, northern conflicts over race, and issues of economic equality. In sum, the dominant collective memory portrays the Civil Rights Movement as “finished.”
Products of Dominant Memory: “Racial Realism” and “Modern Racism”

This particular construction of the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement has consequences. People who ascribe to this particular collective memory, Romano & Raiford (2006) suggested, “believe the movement was successful in incorporating America’s black minority into the mainstream [and] may see little role for the state in ameliorating current racial inequalities” (Romano & Raiford, 2006, xvi). Brown, et al. (2003) and Robert M. Entman (1990, 1992) also suggested that such a construction of the memory of the Civil Rights Movement might also lay the groundwork for modern racist ideologies. Brown, et al. (2003) called this ideology “racial realism.” Entman (1990, 1992) called it “modern racism.”

At the core of Brown, et al.’s (2003) concept of racial realism is a belief that “the civil rights revolution was successful, and they [Americans] wholeheartedly accept the principles enshrined in civil rights laws. They [Americans] assume civil rights laws ended racial inequality by striking down segregation and outlawing discrimination” (1). Based on this core belief, Brown, et al. (2003) argued, the racial realist ideology is predicated upon three assumptions. First, as a result of America’s “great progress in rectifying racial justice” in the last 40 years, racial realists argue that racism has been virtually eradicated (Brown, et al., 2003, 6). In a related point, when race does become a social and political issue today, it is because “distorting and distracting policies” such as affirmative action and the supporters of such policies (Brown, et al., 2003, 6). Second, racial realists believe that if “racial inequalities in income, employment, residence, and political representation” exist, it is not because of racism but rather because of “the lethargic, incorrigible, even pathological behavior of people who fail to take
responsibility for their own lives” (Brown, et al., 2003, 6). Third, racial realists argue that if the Civil Rights Movement’s political agenda and legacy has failed to materialize, it is not because of racism, but rather the “manipulative, expedient behavior of black nationalists . . . . [And] black militants like Al Sharpton who . . . . benefit from government handouts and affirmative action” (Brown, et al., 2003, 7).

Entman (1990, 1992) described a similar concept in explaining black/white relations today: “modern racism.” Simply put, Entman (1992) argued, “modern racism is a compound of hostility, rejection, and denial on the part of whites toward the activities and aspirations of black people” (541). Like Brown, et al.’s (2003) racial realist ideology, Entman’s (1990, 1992) modern racism concept is based on three components. First, modern racism is motivated by “anti-black affect—a general emotional hostility toward blacks” (Entman, 1990, 332). Second, modern racism arises in “resistance to the political demands of blacks” (Entman, 1990, 332). Finally, modern racism adheres to “a belief that racism is dead and that racial discrimination no longer inhibits black achievement” (Entman, 1990, 332).

It can be inferred from this explanation of racial realism and modern racism that some aspects of the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement as outlined by Romano and Raiford (2006) are evident in both Brown, et al.’s (2003) and Entman’s (1990, 1992) assessments of contemporary race relations. Both racial realism and modern racism rely upon a basic assumption that the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in wiping America clean of racism and that, for all intents and purposes, racial equality has been achieved in the United States. In this way, the concepts of racial realism and modern racism lend support to Romano and Raiford’s (2006) observation
that “representations of the past can be mobilized to serve partisan interests … they can shape a nation’s sense of identity … and they can certainly influence the ways in which people understand their world” (xxi).

The Civil Rights Movement and Violent Uprising: The 1967 Milwaukee Race Riots

As the preceding review of scholarship regarding collective memory and the memory of the Civil Rights Movement has suggested, the way a particular version of collective memory is constructed may have varied and profound implications. In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, the dominant memory of the movement as “finished” has laid the groundwork for modern conceptualizations of racism. As previously noted, what this dominant memory of the movement does not focus on are the many episodes of violence and black militancy that paralleled the peaceful, nonviolent protests of the movement throughout the 1960s. This study was designed to address the collective memory of one incident of racial violence within the greater Civil Rights Movement: the 1967 Milwaukee race riots. Specifically, this study addressed the collective memory of the riots as constructed by the city’s three metropolitan newspapers. But before engaging in a meaningful analysis of the way the newspapers constructed this memory through contemporary and retrospective coverage, it is first necessary to have a basic historical understanding of the key players, events, and dates of the riots.

The violent episodes of the Milwaukee race riots began on July 30, 1967, and lasted through August 1, 1967. The Milwaukee riots were smaller in scale than those that preceded them in Newark and Detroit—both in July 1967. They were also smaller
than those which plagued many other cities including New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles earlier in the decade. But the three days of violence, followed by week-and-a-half-long, city-wide curfew, rattled Milwaukee residents.

Unlike Chicago, its neighbor less than a two hour drive south-southeast, Milwaukee did not experience a considerable increase in African American residents until the mid-twentieth century. As a result of the “Great Migration” of African-Americans from the South to the Upper Midwest, Chicago’s black population was as large as 4 percent in 1920 and 7 percent in 1930 (Gurda, 1999, 259). Historian John Gurda (1999) stated that “comparable figures for Milwaukee were 0.5 percent and 1.3 percent,” in those years, respectively (259). Before World War I, Gurda (1999) explained, Milwaukee’s immigrant population primarily came from Western and Northern Europe. But when the war slowed the pace of immigration from Europe, Milwaukee faced a “critical shortage of unskilled workers” (Gurda, 1999, 257) to keep its packing plants, tanneries, and foundries running. The promise of available jobs drew African Americans from the South and lower Midwest in droves. The majority of the African Americans who came to Milwaukee during this period and afterward settled in an area “bordered by State Street and North Avenue, between Third and Twelfth streets,” an area that became known as Milwaukee’s “inner core” (Gurda, 1999, 258).

According to Gurda (1999), the inner core of Milwaukee was the city’s “epicenter of urban decay” in the 1950s and 1960s (253). Sociologist Karl H. Flaming (1984) noted that the black population of Milwaukee residing in the inner core during this period faced “inadequate and discriminatory practices and opportunities in employment, education, and housing,” as well as “indifference and then hostility” from
the white-dominated city administration (33). In the early 1960s, just after Mayor Henry W. Maier was elected, housing discrimination became the hot-button issue among Milwaukee blacks, but Maier and other city officials paid it little attention. Beginning in 1965, Milwaukee’s NAACP Youth Council began pressuring the city’s Common Council to legislate against housing discrimination, which at the time was not explicitly illegal under Wisconsin state law (Gurda, 1999, 370). The Common Council did not yield to their demands. Led by a white Catholic priest, Father James Groppi, the Youth Council began protesting at the homes of city aldermen (Gurda, 1999, 371). It was in the midst of these demonstrations that the riots of 1967 broke out.

A Milwaukee Journal civil rights beat reporter-turned-historian, Frank Aukofer (1968), was on the scene as the event unfolded and later wrote a book about the riots. In it, he described the beginning of the violence:

It started on Milwaukee’s North Third Street. Third Street is one of those dilapidated business arteries that can be found in the Negro ghettos of almost any modern city . . . Sunday night, July 30, was one of those warm summer nights that bring slum-dwellers out in the streets. The atmosphere was made warmer by widespread rumors in and out of the Negro community that Milwaukee was due for a riot. The Detroit riot was fresh in everyone’s minds (Aukofer, 1968, 7-8).

Aukofer (1968) noted that “an incident on Third Street early Sunday morning” (8) occurred hours before the actual rioting began. It was a fight between two black women outside a nightclub that drew a sizeable crowd of spectators. Several hours later, the first report of rioting Sunday night came at about 9:45 p.m.

Negroes, it said, had broken windows at a Third Street intersection. The situation soon went out of control. Youths in cars drove around the area honking horns. Bands of young Negroes—police later estimated the total number at about 300—roved up and down Third Street and on adjacent streets. Bottles, stones, cans, and chunks of concrete were thrown at passing cars. Hundreds of windows were broken (Aukofer, 1968, 9).
Shortly after the violence began, Mayor Maier asked Wisconsin Governor Warren Knowles to send the state’s national guard to Milwaukee to assist the city’s law enforcement personnel (Gurda, 1999, 371). He also declared a state of emergency and instituted a round-the-clock curfew for the entire city (Aukofer, 1968, 9). All told, Gurda (1999) and Aukofer (1986) agreed, the worst violence of the Milwaukee riots was concentrated in a window beginning at approximately 9:45 p.m. on July 30, 1967, through 2:45 a.m. on August 1, 1967 (Aukofer, 1968, 9; Gurda, 1999, 371). Maier relaxed the 24-hour curfew on August 1, 1967, but a night-time curfew remained in place through August 9, 1967. Final statistics of the riots’ destruction included four dead, approximately 100 injuries (including 33 police officers), 1,740 arrests (though, Aukofer (1968) noted, most of these were violations of the citywide curfew), and more than $500,000 in property damage, estimated in 1967 dollars (Aukofer, 1968, 9; Gurda, 1999, 371).

Flaming (1984) argued that because of the racial tension in Northern cities in the sixties, “Milwaukeeans should not have been unduly surprised at the outbreak of violence in the heart of the city” (33) because anytime “there is grievance and unrest, the potential for violence is very great” (51). Aukofer (1968) suggested that, Milwaukee, in comparison to other cities like Detroit (which saw 43 killed, approximately 2,000 injured, and more than 7,000 arrests) and Newark (which saw 23 killed, approximately 100 injured, and approximately 1400 arrests), emerged from its social breach relatively unscathed (7). Still, Gurda (1999) noted, the riot had a profound effect on Milwaukee’s self-image. The city’s “relative good fortune did not keep the community from feeling
traumatized to their bones . . . [N]ot since 1886 had a civil disturbance [in the city] cost people their lives” (371).

The year 1967 has become a watermark in Milwaukee’s history in large part due to the riots. Gurda (1999), in fact, referred to the last 40 years of Milwaukee history as “the post-1967 period” (378) in his final chapter. In concluding this section, however, it is important to note that the city as a whole changed dramatically in the 40 years since the riots not only because of the violence of the summer of 1967 but also because of Milwaukee’s transition away from a manufacturing-based economy. Gurda (1999) estimated that in a four-year period, from 1979 to 1983 alone, Milwaukee “lost more than 50,000 manufacturing jobs … a quarter of the total” (378). He also noted that during the process of “deindustrialization” (378), the predominantly black inner city was affected most. He said:

In the years following World War II, blacks made significant inroads in local industry, finding work as machinists and welders as well as foundry hands. In 1980, 49.7 percent of Milwaukee’s employed black males were engaged in manufacturing, compared with 40.9 percent of all male workers. Many African-Americans, in other words, had finally found family-supporting jobs, but they had found them in the most rapidly declining sector of the economy. When the ax began to fall in the 1980s, blacks bore a disproportionate share of the cuts. . . . As old jobs disappeared and new ones moved beyond easy reach, parts of the inner city came perilously close to collapse (Gurda, 1999, 420-421).

Summary

This thesis drew upon information and theories from a variety of disciplines, including memory studies, mass communication studies, and history. As such, this chapter and the one that follows were intended to highlight the relationships between these fields. They also intended to offer a brief review of the scholarship of these
disciplines most relevant to the design of this study. This chapter was intended, first, to provide a brief introduction to collective memory and its characteristics and implications. To illustrate these dynamics of collective memory, the chapter offered the example of the construction and development of the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, this chapter introduced the 1967 Milwaukee race riots, which were the focus of this thesis. It sought to provide a basic overview of events, people, and statistics related to the events, as well as a perspective of where the riots occurred within the greater scheme of the Civil Rights Movement.

The following chapter will take this chapter’s discussion of collective memory a step further. It will explore the relationship between collective memory and framing theory. It will also address how this relationship is enhanced through the construction of collective memory in different forms of media. Finally, it will offer a brief review of scholarship that has specifically tied collective memory, framing theory, and media together.
CHAPTER 2
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, FRAMING, AND MEDIA

The preceding chapter listed seven characteristics of collective memory identified by Zelizer (1995). The last of the characteristics listed, partiality, is the characteristic most essential to the focus of this study. Because, as Zelizer (1995) suggested, collective memories are defined both by what they include and what they exclude, they often are defined by the way they are framed. As Irwin-Zarecka (2007) observed, “individuals are perfectly capable of ignoring even the best told stories, or injecting their own subversive meanings into even the most rhetorically accomplished ‘texts’—and of attending to only those ways of making sense of the past that fit their own. . . . The notion of framing serves this purpose very well” (4). Irwin-Zarecka’s (2007) work, *Frames of Memory*, was influenced heavily by concepts advanced by social scientist Erving Goffman (1974), who developed the modern concept of framing in his own influential work, *Frame Analysis*. In acknowledging Goffman’s (1974) influence on her own work, Irwin-Zarecka (2007) explained that “how we define the situation at hand is largely, but not totally, dependent on socially shared framing strategies and devices” (5).

Collective Memory and Framing Theory

Goffman (1974), however, was not the first to address framing. One who preceded Goffman was journalist Walter Lippmann (1922). In one of his books, *Public
Opinion, Lippmann sought to explain how individuals constructed their opinions about events, especially events they did not experience first-hand. He concluded that “the only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of the event” (Lippmann, 1922, 13). Because no individual could possibly experience everything that goes on in the world, Lippmann (1922) argued, individuals must “reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it” (15-16).

Goffman (1974) gave Lippmann’s “simpler models” a name: frames (10-11). Frames, Goffman (1974) explained, are “definitions of a situation [that] are built up in accordance with the principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them” (10-11). He used the term “frame analysis” to describe the process of examining frames “in terms of the organization of experience” (Goffman, 1974, 11). Individual frames, he argued, are organized into frameworks, “rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” (Goffman, 1974, 21). Frames, therefore, can have a powerful influence on individuals’ thoughts and opinions. As Lippmann (1922) observed:

The account of what has happened out of sight and hearing in a place where we have never been … can arouse all, and sometimes even more emotion than the reality. . . . The stimulus which originally pulled the trigger may have been a series of pictures in the mind aroused by printed or spoken words. These pictures fade and are hard to keep steady. . . . The fading pictures are displaced with other pictures, and then by names or symbols. But the emotion goes on, capable now of being aroused by substituted images and names (203).

Edy (2006) argued that Goffman’s theory of framing was particularly useful in her study of the collective memory of social unrest. She argued that
frames function to confer perspective on events, issues, and people; that is, to make them meaningful. Developing collective memory of a troubled past involves a struggle over how to frame something … so the concept of framing is a useful analytical tool (Edy, 2006, 8).

She also noted that the concept of framing was useful because it left open the possibility that the same event, individual, or object can be framed “in various contradictory ways,” thus providing several different, and potentially contradictory, meanings (Edy, 2006, 8).

The application of framing to collective memory studies forces memory scholars to look at much more than the words, pictures, or video of a given text. A focus on framing requires researchers to ask questions to determine who constructs the memory, for whom, and with what purpose. Irwin-Zarecka (2007) argued that applying frame analysis to the study of collective memory would require a focus on “a great deal more than our continuous ‘rewriting of history’” (7). She continued: “[P]ublic discourse about the past when seen as a whole does more than telling what happened. Framing devices employed at this meta-level, as it were, provide the structure to both the contents of the past and the forms of remembrance” (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 7, emphasis author’s).

*Collective Memory and Media*

Collective memory can be framed a variety of ways using a variety of resources. But, as Edy (2006) observed, one of the most effective means through which to construct and frame collective memory is the mass media. She explained:

In modern society, it is the mass media that are primarily responsible for disseminating shared stories to a public that is demographically diverse and geographically scattered. The news media have a special responsibility for creating and disseminating stories of “real events,” and in their role as monitors of the social world, they not only tell their own stories but report on the cultural products and stories created by other individuals and institutions that deal in public memory: from the speeches
of public officials, to the reminiscences of eyewitnesses, to the content of movies and museums (Edy, 2006, 5).

But how, specifically, can media construct and frame collective memory? Several of the memory scholars mentioned thus far in this thesis offered some possibilities. First, through real-time, contemporary media coverage, media provide the “raw materials” of memory production (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 165). This is possible because most people “experience major national events through media coverage of them” (Edy, 2006, 22). Media are particularly adept at creating what Irwin-Zarecka (2007) called “instant memory,” because “a picture gives the all-too-complex reality a face. It offers the crucial emotional bridge between the distant events and our private world” (167). As such, Edy (2006) argued, “virtually all of the material used to create collective memory” after the fact “existed in the earliest coverage of these events, and it is rare to see novel interpretations” (22-23). Media also support the construction of collective memory by serving as a “warehouse” of raw materials (Zelizer, 1995, 233). Whether recorded on paper, in video, or recently, on the Web, media capture information for later use. Media technology “facilitates access to group memory” because it provides “a means of marking, memorizing, and registering events” (Zelizer, 1995, 233).

Perhaps most pertinent to the purposes of this study, however, is the media’s function as “intermediaries,” or framers (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 175). Intermediaries, Irwin-Zarecka (2007) explained, are charged with “constructing ‘realities of the past’” through the “editorial framing of raw materials,” thereby “giving sense and structure to physical traces, records, [and] tellings” (175). She pointed out media as prime examples of intermediaries. Inherently, however, intermediaries serve as interpreters and choosers. Irwin-Zarecka (2007) argued:
The past itself serves as a reservoir, to be freely rummaged through for memory markers. In the process, “texts” that were never intended to be a historical record become just that. Unlike photographs, which are memory markers at conception, as it were, these are all framed as such after the fact. And since their original meaning is no longer readily available to us, it is up to the memory editors to restore it, alter it, or perhaps make it up altogether (179).

Media act as intermediaries by using the past “as a contemporary force, making history a metaphor through which the current world is viewed” (Schudson, 1992, 2, in Winfield, Friedman & Trisnadi, 2002, 290). But media use the past in different ways. First, media often draw upon the past to provide historical analogies. By providing historical analogies, journalists can “claim that present circumstances are similar to some past event or circumstance” (Edy, 2006, 93). In this way, journalists often use the past as a source, which “suggests that reporters perceive the past as an objective commentator on events” (Edy, 2006, 93). Second, media draw upon the past to provide historical context. Though similar to historical analogies, Edy (2006) differentiates media use of the past for historical context in that “contexts differ in that they describe the series of events that lead up to the present moment” (94). Here, too, journalists’ use of the past helps them to avoid “violating the norms of objectivity” while retaining the past’s “powerful interpretive potential” (Edy, 2006, 94). In addition, journalists can use the past in their reporting to serve other purposes, such as “adding new pieces of evidence, revising a once-agreed-upon past … and giving the story a narrative context” (Winfield, Friedman & Trisnadi, 2002, 290).

A final way journalists use the past in reporting is through commemoration. A variety of occurrences may provide grounds for journalistic remembrance through commemoration, particularly “anniversaries—of the births or deaths of major public
figures or important events” (Edy, 2006, 93). Zelizer (1995) argued that commemoration “stabilizes and clarifies memory” (219). Commemorations, Bodnar (1992) noted, are also “inevitably multivocal,” and “they contain powerful symbolic expressions—metaphors, signs, and rituals—that give meaning to competing interpretations of past and present reality” (16). Perhaps most importantly, however, is the near-universal appeal of commemoration; just about anyone can participate in commemoration, as “it does not insist on any shared, direct experience” with an individual, event or object (Zelizer, 1995, 219).

**Media Frames: A Brief Overview**

The components of collective memory, like all information disseminated through the media, are subject to framing by media actors, be they reporters or editors, producers or publishers. The use of frames in media is a well-researched area of mass communication scholarship. Entman (1993), building on Goffman’s (1974) framing concept, explained that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating texts” (51-52). Dietram Scheufele (1999) defined frames specifically in terms of the news media: “The news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality . . . an essential function of news” (106, citing Tuchman, 1978).

Frames are important because, as Shanto Iyengar (1991) suggested, they can produce “changes in decision outcomes resulting from alterations” to the frame (11). Entman (1993), too, argued that frames are important because the “analysis of frames illustrates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location (such as a speech,
utterance, news report, or novel) to that consciousness” (51-52). Dietram Scheufele (1999) also referred to the effect that frames can have on individual decision-making. He noted that, through frames, “the mass media can thus systematically affect how recipients of the news come to understand these events” (Scheufele, 1999, 107).

But how do frames operate in the media in order to bring about the effects that these scholars allude to? Entman (1993) offered insight with his explanation of the four functions of frames. According to Entman (1993), frames:

\[
\text{[D]efine problems}—\text{determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes}—\text{identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments}—\text{evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies}—\text{offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects (52, emphases author’s).}
\]

Entman (1993) also argued that conscious choices go into deciding what information is included in a given frame; frames operate by “highlighting some features of reality while omitting others” (54). He added that “the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience” (Entman, 1993, 54).

Collective Memory and Media Frames

Memory scholars have recognized the work of Entman (1993) and other framing researchers as useful tools in understanding how collective memory can be constructed and shaped, particularly through the media. Edy (2006) observed that Entman’s (1993) work offers “a functional perspective that describes elements of a text in terms of how they ‘work’ in the broader context of the story” and therefore “preserves a sense of narrative that alternative definitions do not” (Edy, 2006, 25). Also, importantly,
Entman’s conceptualization of framing “opens up the possibility that the same information can perform different functions depending on the story in which it is embedded . . . [Competing] stories do sometimes omit information, but they also incorporate the same information into multiple, unique, irreconcilable story structures” (Edy, 2006, 25).

The concept of framing also prompts memory scholars to be aware of the many constraints on media in producing news that may affect the way collective memory is constructed and framed through the media. Media may facilitate the construction of collective memory by “keeping some [memories] alive while burying others’” (Morgan, 2006, 138, citing Emily S. Rosenberg, 5). Media choose which memories to keep alive and which to bury for a variety of reasons. Media constructions of the past are “governed first and foremost by the imperative of maximizing audiences and readers” and therefore reflect “fundamental economic, organizational, and ideological forces at work” (Morgan, 2006, 138). Irwin-Zarecka (2007) specifically addressed how economic factors can affect what information is passed on to the consumer on television:

“Good stories” may be those judged most relevant to the public, or those with the best visuals, or those valuable for their unique point of view, or simply those well told on any given day, unless an event becomes subject to special, extensive coverage, the sheer time limits of news broadcasts result in further choices that may have little if anything to do with the qualities of the stories themselves (170).

Edward P. Morgan (2006), whose research on the image of Martin Luther King, Jr., in media will be presented shortly, argued that economic pressures have produced a media paradigm that focuses more on entertaining audiences than educating them. As a result, then, the world is “simplify[ed] … in a way that is inherently ideological” and often “reflects the market-driven imperatives of mass enterprise” (139). Similarly, for Irwin-
Zarecka (2007), the result is a past that is “cleaner, more orderly, prettier than it actually had been” (179).

Media and Collective Memory of the Civil Rights Movement

Several scholars have argued that one of the primary means through which collective memory is constructed and framed is through the mass media. Likewise, a dominant collective memory, such as the one suggested by Romano and Raiford (2006) regarding the Civil Rights Movement, has the potential to gain power and legitimacy when disseminated through the media. As such, several scholars have addressed the way the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement has been constructed and framed through a variety of media products. For example, Jennifer Hyland Wang (2000) studied the way the film Forrest Gump portrayed African Americans and the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s forward. Another scholar, Jennifer Fuller (2006), also studied the portrayal of the Civil Rights Movement in film, but focused on the way 1990s films portrayed the movement and race relations during an era in which America began reexamining its racial politics. Edward P. Morgan’s (2006) study of the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement as constructed in news magazines and newspapers also focused on the decade of the 1990s. And, finally, Helán E. Page (1997) and Entman (1990, 1992) each studied the image of the black male in television news from the 1980s forward.

Collective Memory of the Civil Rights Movement and Film

Wang (2000) focused on depictions of the Civil Rights Movement and post-civil rights race relations in the 1994 film, Forrest Gump. She argued first that by condensing
the entire Civil Rights Movement’s history into two scenes (one involving George
Wallace and his defense of segregation at the time the University of Alabama was
desegregated, and the other involving Forrest Gump’s experience at a Black Panther
Party safe house), the film “situates racial conflict in the sixties as a result of extremist
political groups . . . [that] can be safely articulated as neither a product of nor a concern
argued that by moving African Americans nearly wholly out of the film in scenes
depicting the 1970s and 1980s, the film offers “an ‘integrated’ view of American society
where . . . race relations have progressed” (99). Finally, she underscored the potentially
damaging implications of such a portrayal of the Civil Rights Movement and its legacy
by addressing the way the Republican party harnessed the power of the Forrest Gump to
portray the 1960s and liberals as dangerous forces that have led America to abandon its
moral values (Wang, 2000, 104).

Fuller (2006), too, focused on depictions of the Civil Rights Movement in film in
the 1990s. Drawing on an array of “civil rights melodrama” of both the major motion
picture and made-for-TV varieties, she concluded that portrayals of the Civil Rights
Movement and race relations in America were couched in terms of the “racial divide”
and promoted the need for “racial reconciliation” (Fuller, 2006, 170, 173). She
attributed this to the racial climate of the 1990s, during which the 1992 riots in South
Central Los Angeles and the 1995 O.J. Simpson murder trial caused Americans to
reconsider the nation’s progress in race relations (Fuller, 2006, 169). Films of this era,
Fuller (2006) argued, tended to transform the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement from
a movement “creating social equality through policy to fostering racial harmony between
individuals;” borrowing a term from writer Benjamin DeMott, she deemed this “the friendship orthodoxy” (171, emphasis Fuller’s).

In their studies of the portrayals of the Civil Rights Movement and its legacy in film, both Wang (2000) and Fuller (2006) argued that films constructed a collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement that focuses on progress in race relations from the time of the movement forward. Wang (2000) concluded that Forrest Gump advanced the ideas that “racism has been gradually erased from contemporary society . . . that the civil rights struggle was a movement that was once essential but is no longer necessary . . . [and] if racism still exists, then it is because black Americans and liberals supported late civil rights agendas and politicized race” (99). Similarly, Fuller (2006) concluded that “civil rights melodramas” primarily championed the idea that “the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in dismantling racist strictures and in guaranteeing quality before the law,” and that any efforts to achieve further racial equality were the responsibility of individuals, not the state (173). According to Wang (2000) and Fuller (2006), films have both reflected and helped solidify the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement as outlined by Romano & Raiford (2006).

*Collective Memory of the Civil Rights Movement in News*

Film, however, is but one medium to study in the construction of collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement. Another area scoured by scholars is the portrayal of the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the news media. Morgan (2006), as previously mentioned in this chapter, focused on portrayals in the national media, particularly those of Martin Luther King Jr. published on or about the federal holiday observing his birthday in various years. He argued that in the national media,
“public memory’s Martin Luther King Jr. has been ideologically sanitized, detached from his own politics and their more radical, or system-critical, implication,” and that it “obscured a [Civil Rights] Movement built on the courageous and determined efforts of thousands upon thousands of everyday people” (Morgan, 2006, 141). Though he acknowledged the simplification of a complex concept such as the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in America is at least in part due to news norms and “the journalistic credo of balance and impartiality” (148), Morgan (2006) argued:

Mass media’s public memory of the broader era of the civil rights struggle reinforces the boundaries of public discourse by legitimizing national institutions and stigmatizing voices critical of those institutions. The end result, a kind of self-contained media “reality” designed for mass consumption, reinforces the hegemony of consumer capitalism (152-153).

The phenomenon Morgan (2006) alluded to here has not occurred without consequences; contemporary portrayals of African Americans, particularly males in positions in power, have not been favorable. Citing such modern African American celebrities as Bill Cosby and Michael Jordan, Page (1997) argued that “successful African American men may try to clarify their own behavior in an attempt to make the public feel safe with their particular black male image” (107). Page (1997) related this directly to contemporary and retrospective portrayals of “unembraceable” civil rights figures like Emmett Till, Malcolm X, and Medgar Evers, who were “eradicated from white public space because what they said and did never made the white public feel safe enough” (107).

Like Page (1997), Entman (1990) argued that the black male image portrayed in today’s news is often a threatening one. Entman (1990), however, attributed such portrayals as much to journalistic norms, as Morgan (2006) did, as to lingering fears
about black militants and civil rights figures. Associations of the black male with
violent crime or, politically, with special interests, “are not products of bad faith or
malign intentions,” he argued (Entman, 1990, 333). Rather, Entman (1992) argued, a
factor that might have influenced the way blacks were portrayed in news was the
“interaction of elite discourse with underlying social realities of American society”
(360). He elaborated:

Traditional American racism identified blacks as inferior and undesirable . . . .
[O]ld-fashioned racism is no longer a central tenet of the American culture . . . .
Having outlawed discrimination, white elites have not come to a consensus on
who is responsible for negative conditions in the black community . . . . Other
elements of traditional American ideology that white elites do generally agree
upon (or at least endorse rhetorically) and that persist within the culture will
more consistently shape the news, and audiences’ processing of it. These
components of culture include distrust of big government, and, especially, the
assumption that individuals are responsible for their own fate. Such affirmations
help to produce modern racism by denying the history of discrimination whose
residue—high crime and high, impatient demands for services—local television
so graphically emphasizes (Entman, 1992, 360-361).

Morgan’s (2006), Page’s (1997), and Entman’s (1990, 1992) arguments, too,
illustrate how media can construct and perpetuate the narrative strains of collective
memory—in this case, the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement.
Morgan (2006) contended that the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement, as
exemplified by news portrayals of Martin Luther King, Jr., tended to sanitize the
movement in an attempt to make it more palatable to majority-white audiences. Page’s
(1997) and Entman’s (1990, 1992) observations about the black male image, especially
the image portrayed by news, perpetuate the tenets of racial realist and modern racist
ideologies, are heavily influenced by the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights
Movement. And as Morgan (2006) and Entman (1990, 1992) observed, this phenomenon
is all too easily facilitated by the strictures and norms of modern journalism.
Summary

This chapter intended to clearly identify the relationship between the concept of collective memory, as explored in chapter one, and framing theory as applied to the media. This relationship was central to the design and implementation of this study. Several points outlined in this chapter are critical to the establishment of this relationship. First, collective memory is defined by the way it is framed, by what is included, and what is excluded from the frame. Second, media are instrumental in providing the “raw materials”—text, photos, video, audio, etc.—for memory-making. Third, media also play a role in framing events, individuals, and other subjects retrospectively. Fourth, because media are a pervasive force in modern society, media have considerable power to construct and frame collective memory for large populations. Finally, the way a subject is framed in the media may affect the construction of collective memory for large populations. The work of scholars presented in this chapter regarding the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement as constructed by the media illustrated, at least on a nominal level, this relationship.

The design of this study was built upon the scholarship presented in the first two chapters of this thesis. Specifically, it applied the concepts and theories to a particular subject—that of the collective memory of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots. The following chapter lists in more detail this study’s design. It also illustrates more fully the relationship between this conceptual discussion and the method utilized to complete the following analysis.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD

As the preceding chapters have noted, the purpose of this study was to analyze contemporary and retrospective coverage of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots published in Milwaukee’s three metropolitan newspapers: the *Milwaukee Journal*, the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, and the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*. At the time of the riots in 1967, the *Sentinel* and the *Journal* were separate entities. Both were owned by the *Journal* Company, but the *Sentinel* operated as a Monday through Saturday morning daily, and the *Journal* operated as a Monday through Saturday afternoon daily that also published a Sunday morning edition. In April 1995, the parent company merged the two to form a seven-day morning daily that continues to operate today as Milwaukee’s primary newspaper.

This study sought to identify the way these three newspapers constructed a collective memory of the riots through frames present in the newspapers’ reporting published in contemporary and retrospective coverage of the riots. This research design was based predominantly upon Edy’s (2006) study of media coverage of the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles. Edy (2006) adopted a qualitative narrative analysis approach, drawing up on concepts of narrative put forth by scholars such as Hayden White (1987) and Walter Fisher (1984, 1985), and also Entman’s (1993) conceptualization of frames as used in media. Ultimately, this study sought answers to the following questions:
1. What frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots?

2. How have the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots changed in the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?

3. What new frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?

4. What arguments do the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage suggest for Milwaukee’s present and future race relations?

Conceptualizing Narrative

Before delving into the particular design this thesis adopted, it is necessary to briefly review the scholarship from which the design is drawn. First, it is important to briefly introduce narrative theory and how it relates to the design of this thesis. Narrative is not simply a vehicle for relating fictional stories. The “narrative impulse,” Fisher (1984) argued, “is part of our very being” (8). Narrative, White (1987) argued, offers a solution to the “problem of how to translate knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human” (1). Narrative is able to produce meaning chiefly through the use of symbols—“words and/or deeds—that have a sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them (Fisher, 1984, 2). Perhaps most importantly, however, White (1987) suggested that narrative is a universal vehicle for meaning-making. Through
narrative, he argued, “transcultural messages about the nature of shared reality can be transmitted (White, 1987, 1).

Both White (1987) and Fisher (1984, 1985) identified characteristics of narrative that are important to have in mind when approaching a given text for analysis. White (1987) offered three characteristics: structure, selection, and moralization. First, narratives not only present a given event of series of events “within the chronological framework of their original occurrence,” but they also present the event or events as “possessing a structure, an order of meaning that they do not possess as mere sequence” (White, 1987, 5). Second, narratives are selective because “every narrative, however seemingly ‘full,’ is constructed on the basis of a set of events that might have been included but were left out” (White, 1987, 10). Third, White (1987) argued that the ultimate aim of a narrative is to “moralize the events of which it treats . . . . that is, to identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine” (14).

Fisher (1984), too, noted that a desire to moralize reality was a key characteristic of narrative. However, he referred to this not as moralizing but rather human beings’ reliance on “good reasons.” Citing one of his earlier works, Fisher (1984) explained that good reasons are “those events that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication” (7). He further explained that “the production and practice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and character” (Fisher, 1984, 7).

Fisher (1984, 1985) argued that this “logic of good reasons” could be applied to narratives in order to test their narrative rationality. Fisher (1984, 1985) introduced the
concept of narrative rationality to assess these characteristics and determine which narrative is “better” than another. Narrative rationality itself encompasses two concepts: narrative probability and narrative fidelity. Narrative probability “concerns the question of whether or not a story coheres or ‘hangs together,’ whether the story is free from contradictions” (Fisher, 1985, 349). Narrative probability may be assessed by examining “the consistency of characters and actions” within the narrative, and determining whether the “narrative satisfied the demands of a coherent theory of truth” (Fisher, 1984, 16). Narrative fidelity “concerns the ‘truth qualities’ of the story, the degree to which it accords with the logic of good reasons” (Fisher, 1985, 349). Fisher (1984) suggested that Bormann’s concepts of “corroboration” and “social convergence” may be used to determine whether one “story is better than another” (16). But he argued that his concept of the logic of good reasons is a more adequate means to do so. On the other hand, to determine narrative fidelity “requires an examination of reasoning and ‘inspection of facts, values, self, and society’ within a given narrative” (Fisher, 1984, 16).

Study Design

Drawing upon White and Fisher, as well as other scholars focusing on narrative, Edy (2006) combined narrative theory with Entman’s framing concept in designing her analysis of media coverage of the 1965 Watts riots in South Central Los Angeles. To assess narratives constructed in contemporary and retrospective coverage of the Watts riots, Edy (2006) engaged in “a close reading of newsmagazine texts looking not only at facts or themes, but also at how various story elements function within the texts” (26). Edy (2006) argued that Entman’s (1993) concept of framing could be useful in
discovering these aspects of narrative. In particular, she approached each news report by identifying the four elements of framing established by Entman (1993): How did each story define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies? (Edy, 2006, 25). She also sought to discern how “the same information can perform different functions depending on the story in which it is embedded” (Edy, 2006, 25).

This study was designed using Edy’s (2006) analysis and research design as a guide. This study utilized a qualitative narrative analysis that involved a close reading of newspaper stories, paying close attention to Entman’s (1993) four elements of frames and Fisher’s (1984, 1985) concept of narrative rationality. The articles analyzed in this study were drawn from the Milwaukee Journal, the Milwaukee Sentinel, and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel—three newspapers that have served the Milwaukee metropolitan area from the time of the riots in 1967 through the present. The articles were published in these newspapers from July 30 through August 9 in 1967, the year the riots occurred, and on major anniversaries of the riots in 1977, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2007. The dates July 30 through August 9 were chosen as limits because, in 1967, the riots began late the night of July 30 and the subsequent city-wide curfew lasted through August 9. It could be logically concluded that any major commemorative or retrospective coverage of the riots would fall between these dates during the years chosen. Archived copies of all articles published within these parameters were obtained on microfilm at the Walter R. Davis Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Golda Meir Library at the University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee.

The analysis of these articles was completed in three steps. First, contemporary coverage (articles published in the Journal and the Sentinel in 1967) was examined to
identify the prominent frames used in the narratives each newspaper constructed about the riots. Second, retrospective coverage (articles published in the Journal and the Sentinel in 1977, 1987, and 1992; articles published in the Journal Sentinel in 1997 and 2007) were examined to identify the prominent frames used in the narratives the newspapers constructed about the riots. Finally, both contemporary coverage and retrospective coverage were compared to see which frames endured, which frames disappeared, and which new frames emerged over time.

Limitations

The scope of this study was limited to the original coverage of the riots, as well as the retrospective coverage published on the 10th, 20th, 25th, 30th, and 40th anniversaries of the riots. As such, some coverage of the riots in the intervening years was not included in this study. This study was also limited to coverage during the dates the riots and subsequent city-wide curfew occurred in 1967—from July 30 through August 9. This, too, may have omitted a certain amount of pertinent coverage from the analysis. However, to address all the coverage published in the Journal, the Sentinel, and the Journal Sentinel regarding the 1967 race riots on each day of each year that has passed since the events would be well beyond the scope of this study, and addressing so many articles would have necessarily limited the depth of the narrative analysis undertaken in this study.

Also, this study addressed the narrative of the 1967 riots constructed in newspapers alone. It did not address contemporary or retrospective coverage of the riots in other media such as television, radio, books, or the Internet. This, too, was due to time and resource restraints. However, the omission of these media from this particular
study offers an opportunity for future research in this area that might more fully illustrate the way a collective memory of the 1967 race riots was constructed and has evolved in the Milwaukee media.

Finally, this study focused on a very specific event covered by local media that, it can be argued, affected a very specific—and small—geographic area and population. Therefore, the results of this study cannot, and were not intended to, be generalized to a wider area or population. Nor were these results intended to be considered indicative of how media construct and frame the collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement generally. This study, rather, intended to investigate one instance of the construction of collective memory in media and examine how it reflects or differs from other, larger trends in this area of study.
CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY COVERAGE OF THE MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS

Contemporary coverage of the Milwaukee race riots was drawn from issues of the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Milwaukee Sentinel* from July 30, 1967, through August 9, 1967. As could be expected, the coverage was overwhelming, with articles spilling from the first section of the newspapers into the local section, the “women’s page,” and the business section. Both newspapers published the greatest amount of coverage on Tuesday, August 1, 1967, and Wednesday, August 2, 1967. Coverage dwindled consistently from then until August 9, 1967, when extensive coverage of Mayor Henry Maier’s “lifting-the-curfew” speech was published. Over this time span, the newspapers published articles that included reviews of previous days’ events, information about utility and transportation stoppages, portraits of life under the curfew inside and outside of the city, and notices of court hearings. Though the coverage was copious and diverse, a few general observations of the coverage can be made.

The contemporary coverage of the riots relied heavily on officials or prominent community leaders as sources. Maier, his aides, and Police Chief Harold Breier were quoted frequently and occasionally profiled in articles. The Sentinel not only reported on Maier’s speeches, but also printed the full text of many of these addresses. Governor Warren Knowles and his aides, too, often were sources for articles. Black community leaders associated with established organizations, such as Cecil Brown Jr. of the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and Fred Bronson of the city’s NAACP Youth Council, were frequent sources representing the “other” side of the argument.

The diverse nature of the contemporary coverage also indicated a concerted effort by both newspapers to show many sides of the issues related to the riots. The newspapers devoted a great deal of coverage to the city administration’s efforts, particularly in declaring the state of emergency, imposing and eventually lifting the curfew, and introducing proposals to ease the problems of the inner city. They also focused on the efforts and experiences of the police and national guardsmen stationed in the inner core and around the city, including mention of their injuries, their battles with snipers, and the conditions at their command posts. Likewise, the newspapers focused on the inner core’s black community and its frustrations over police-community relations and city hall’s apparent inability to help them with their problems. Finally, coverage also provided a glimpse into what life was like for citizens both inside and outside of the city during the violence of the first nights of rioting and, later, under the strictly enforced curfew.

Though the coverage of the Milwaukee race riots in both the Journal and the Sentinel focused on a variety of different subjects, this study found three frames discernible in the coverage: the riots as a result of economic and social deprivation for blacks frame; the riots as an example of swift, effective administrative action frame; and the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame. Each of these frames incorporated Entman’s (1993) four elements of framing; they defined problems, diagnosed causes, made moral judgments, and suggested remedies. This analysis also found that some of the coverage in both newspapers did not have these frames and instead fell into two
classifications: the general informative classification and the consequences and aftermath classification. These classifications were determined to be separate from the three frames because they did not include all of Entman’s (1993) elements of framing. However, they are notable because they might be significant in providing the “raw materials” of collective memory as it is shaped in later years (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 165). The following discussion offers a more comprehensive explanation, with examples, of these frames and classifications.

General Informative Classification

The general informative classification and the consequences and aftermath classification encompassed several articles that ranged in length but which lacked clearly identifiable framing elements on their own. The general informative classification included articles that were written for the express purpose of informing the public of riot-related issues important to their daily lives. Articles of this nature occurred most often in the first few days of riot coverage, but some could be found in both the Journal and the Sentinel throughout the 10 days of coverage studied. The consequences and aftermath classification included articles that attempted to produce a snapshot of what life was like in both city and suburban communities during the violence and subsequent curfew. These fell into two major categories: downtown life under the curfew and the curfew’s effect on everyday necessities and luxuries.

The examples that follow are indicative of the general informative classification and include reports of court cases, hospital cases, the status of vital services and businesses, the status of previously scheduled events, job-related information, financial damage due to the riots, and changes to the curfew in the city and in its suburbs. General
informative articles covering court cases basically featured a big block of public notices announcing “hearings in connection with the arrest of the scores of Milwaukeeans during rioting late Sunday (July 30, 1967) and early Monday” (“Courts Hold Marathon Hearings,” 9A). The articles included the names of the accused, their ages, addresses, charges against them, and the state of their case (whether it adjourned with bail or sentenced immediately). There were no indications as to the race of the arrestees. A story about court cases was included in every day of the coverage studied, with the list of cases heard dwindling as the violence calmed and the curfew eased. General informative articles covering hospital cases were similar to the court case reports. These articles were also structured as a block of public notices announcing those who were taken to area hospitals after the rioting (“Hospitals Treat,” 7B). It listed injured individuals by the hospital to which they were taken. Police, firemen, or rescue personnel who were injured were listed first. Again, there were no indications as to the race of the injured persons.

Many of the general informative articles dealt with the status of vital services and businesses in the city. A July 31, 1967, Journal article reported that businesses, public transportation, utilities, and educational institutions in the city had closed (“Businesses, Most Stores Shut,” 1B). Another article published in the Journal that day announced that the state of emergency had stopped deliveries of milk and livestock to the city (“Emergency Halts Flow,” 1B). An August 1, 1967, Sentinel article reported that Milwaukee County’s emergency hospital, located closer to the city, was closing and all personnel were being transferred to the county’s general hospital, located farther away, because the latter was more prepared to handle the amount and severity of injuries likely
to come in (“County Hospital Services Shifted,” 9A). An article published in the 
Sentinel the following day informed readers that, because of Maier’s relaxation of the 
curfew to only night-time hours, many services, including transportation, utility 
companies, cabs, trash pickup, and mail delivery were available or partially available to 

Some of the general informative articles reported the cancellation or 
postponement of events that were scheduled to take place in the city during the 10-day 
curfew. One notable article in the Journal published on August 1, 1967, reported that 
the music group The Monkees had canceled their show scheduled for later in the week at 
The Arena, a city auditorium, and that refunds would be given (“Monkees Cancel,” 1B). 
The Journal also reported in an article on August 2, 1967, that the Milwaukee County 
school district had cancelled summer school graduation as a result of the riots, and that 
diplomas for graduates could be picked up at the school administration building (“High 
School Rite,” 3B).

Of major concern to the citizens of Milwaukee was the stoppage of work due to 
Maier’s enforcement of a citywide curfew. Several articles under the general 
informative classification reported the developments at the city’s factories and breweries 
as Maier gradually relaxed the curfew after August 1, 1967. A Sentinel article published 
August 2, 1967, reported on how the curfew had affected industries, factories, and 
breweries, altering and, in some cases, canceling, shifts, shutting down plants, and 
keeping people out of work (“Changes in Shifts,” 5A). Two days later, the Sentinel 
published an article reporting that Maier’s postponement of the night-time curfew to
nine o’clock on Thursday, August 3, 1967, allowed more workers to return to their jobs and more plants and factories to run at full capacity (“More Workers Back,” 2A).

Many general informative articles published in the latter days of the riot-induced curfew summarized the costs of the curfew and the state of emergency to both local property and to the city and state governments. An article published in the *Journal* on August 2, 1967, reported that the window damage alone to businesses in the inner core would surpass $200,000 (“Window Damage,” 1B). Another *Journal* article published on August 4, 1967, reported that calling up and paying the national guard to help in restoring order to the inner core would cost nearly $300,000 (“Cost of Guard Callup,” 3A). Still another article, published in the *Journal* on August 9, 1967, reported that “Milwaukee’s curfews of last week—generally conceded to be effective in preventing riots—may cost Milwaukee businesses millions of dollars despite their insurance against interruption of business” (“Curfews May Cost Millions,” 1B).

Finally, the general informative articles published in the latter days of the riot-induced curfew reported changes to the state of emergency restrictions and the curfew—what time it would be imposed and what time it would be lifted—in both the city and its suburbs. For example, an August 3, 1967, *Journal* article reported that Maier would postpone the imposition of the curfew from seven o’clock to nine o’clock that evening (“Maier Says,” 1A). An article published in the *Journal* the following day reported that Maier would postpone the imposition of the curfew from nine o’clock to midnight that night, and, for the first time since the riots began late the night of July 30, 1967, Maier would allow liquor stores to open and bars and restaurants to serve alcohol (“Suburbs Ease Curfew,” 1B).
Consequences and Aftermath Classification

As previously noted, articles falling under the consequences and aftermath classification were split into two major categories: downtown life under the curfew and the curfew’s effect on everyday luxuries and necessities. The first category of articles included those reporting on what the downtown and inner core areas of Milwaukee looked like under the curfew. The *Journal* published an article on July 31, 1967, that described an aerial view of Milwaukee during the daytime Monday, the first day of the citywide curfew:

Aside from the obvious effects of violence, the most noticeable remnant of the rioting was the lack of people, the lack of activity. It was as if the sprawling city had pulled itself inside a box, closed the lid, and turned the key. . . . Milwaukee, most of it, looked green and lush, neatly arranged in fine block squares. But it had a lonely look about it. And even the sun couldn’t chase away the sadness” (Reed, 1967, p. 1B).

Other stories offered a less lyrical account of post-riot life in Milwaukee. An August 1, 1967, article published in the *Sentinel* reported on downtown hotels in the city and how they served and entertained their stranded patrons with very little staff available (Bernstein, 1967a, 10A). Another *Sentinel* article, published on August 2, 1967, reported on the tense atmosphere in the inner core as the curfew began one night. It reported that residents of the core “were outside on their porches or standing next to their apartment buildings, watching. If they got too far away from their homes, though, police and guardsmen moved in” (“Everybody’s Watchful,” 5A). Still another *Sentinel* article, published on August 5, 1967, reported an incident involving a girl stranded downtown when police would not allow her father into the area to pick her up before the curfew went into effect one night. The article reported that the manager and catering director of
the downtown Holiday Inn saw that the girl was in trouble and took her in for the night at no cost to her or her family (Bernstein, 1967b, 6A).

The second category of articles included those reporting on the effect the curfew had on everyday necessities and luxuries. An article published in the Sentinel on August 1, 1967, reported that, because the curfew kept milk carriers out of the inner city and stores were closed, milk was sold out of trucks manned by national guardsmen to inner core residents. It highlighted a climate of desperation among some inner-city residents: “A Negro father, his small son in tow, also talked to a reporter. ‘He’s 3 years old, and I have a 2 week old baby in the house. They’re going to have some milk today, even if I have to walk through windows,’ he said” (Guarded Trucks,” 7A). Another Sentinel article, published on August 1, 1967, in the newspaper’s “World of Women” pages, also addressed the food-related hysteria gripping the inner core. This article reported on the pandemonium at several downtown and suburban supermarkets that were open for two hours, from four o’clock to six o’clock, on Monday, July 31, 1967, when Maier briefly lifted the curfew. It reported: “It took nearly an hour to get through checkout lines in many stores. One excited woman shopper commented, ‘This is worse than the war’” (Tusa, 1967, 10A). A related story published on August 1, 1967, in the Journal reported a similar circumstance: “Grocery shopping Monday meant standing in long lines and waiting. . . . Shoppers came in families. Sometimes there were six adults in a car. They seemed to be shopping more from compulsion than need” (Freese & Whiteside, 1967, 1B).

Another luxury in short supply during the curfew was alcohol. A humorous article published in the Journal on August 2, 1967, reported on life without liquor in
Milwaukee. It read: “Not since the white man’s civilization arrived in bottles and kegs at the mouth of the Milwaukee River has it been so hard to get a drink in a region which is famous for its hospitality to the thirsty” (Wells, 1967, 1B). A later article, published in the Sentinel on August 5, 1967, reported the sentiments of happy drinkers at bars around the city after Maier lifted the ban on the sale of liquor Friday, August 4, 1967 (Pecor, 1967).

In summary, the articles that fell under the general informative classification and the consequences and aftermath classification appeared to be intended simply to inform the newspapers’ audiences about the goings-on of post-riot Milwaukee. They did little to delve deeper into the causes of the riots and even less to suggest who might be to blame or who should be responsible for solving such problems. These arguments were more clearly evident in the articles utilizing one of the three frames identified in this study. A discussion of these three frames follows.

The Riots as a Result of Economic and Social Deprivation for Blacks Frame

This frame focused primarily on the black community in Milwaukee’s inner city at the time of the riots, highlighted their struggles, and explored the ties between those struggles and the outbreak of rioting in the city in the summer of 1967. The frame also pointed to the city administration’s lack of solutions to the problems faced by the black community. As the following discussion shows, the sources used for these articles were, with few exceptions, rioters and from black community leaders.
Define Problems

The economic and social deprivation for blacks frame suggested that the primary problem was a general sense of anger on the part of black residents as a result of various economic and social inequalities. This was particularly visible in many articles published by the newspapers in which rioters were interviewed, speaking for themselves about their reasons for rioting. In these interviews it became very clear that the most militant members of the black community blamed white citizens and the white-dominated city government for the plight of inner-city blacks. For starters, an article published in the Sentinel on August 1, 1967, offered the account of “John,” a “negro” and an anonymous rioter in his late 20s:

“We hurt the white man, not the Negro. The Negro don’t have anything anyhow.”.

John said that the thought of killing a white person “don’t bother me. . . .
All black people are angry.”.

“The white man stood up and said that he should have. Why shouldn’t we? He’s (the white man) out there marching up and down with his guns. Why can’t we march up and down with our guns? . . . Will violence work? Definitely. We walk out (on a picket line) with signs and the man say ‘here come those niggers with them signs again.’ We walk around humming and he say we sing good. We went before (Mayor) Maier and we argued and argued and argued and argued and argued and argued and it didn’t do no good.”.

As a result of the violence in Milwaukee, (John said) “If we hurt the economy, I think it’s gonna change” (Buresh, 1967a, 11A).

Another article, published in the Journal on August 1, 1967, offered a similar view from a black man arrested during the riots, 22-year-old Earnest Dotson:

“We was trying to show that the poor man wants just as much as the rich man, if not more. That’s why we did what we did last night. Because we want the same things you got. It’s going to take some years and some people are going to have to die. I’m not afraid to die, not for my civil rights” (Hale, 1967, 5A).
The article also noted Dotson’s response to why he smashed windows during the rioting:

“‘Well, the white man owned this place. No negroes have no big places like this. We make him rich and he treat us like a dog’” (Hale, 1967, 5A).

An article published in the Journal on August 9, 1967, involved an interview with another anonymous rioter who gave his name as “Johnny Davis.” The 19-year-old was asked why he joined in the riot. He replied, “‘I was mad; I wanted to show them that I got a right to everything they got’” (Murrell, 1967, 1B). The article continued:

He analyzes the “white establishment” this way: “It’s plain racism, is what it is. They want to keep us as second-class citizens. All the white man can see is the almighty dollar. The more he can keep us from having, the more he’ll have for himself. . . . Baby, this is war,” he said. “For 300 years, we been asking the white man for what’s rightfully ours. Now it’s time to stop asking and start taking” (Murrell, 1967, 1B, 2B).

Finally, another article published in the Journal on August 9, 1967, quoted a 16-year-old boy saying of the riots: “‘It were [sic] fun to me’” (“Rioting Called Fun,” 2B). The article also reported:

The boy who said he had enjoyed the rioting added that he had another reason for taking part in the violence. He insisted several times that he couldn’t explain the reason. “I can’t say the right words for it,” he told a reporter. Then, he said, almost abruptly. “It was a feeling of revenge, that’s what it was.”

“Against whom?” he was asked.

“The whites,” he replied. “For the things they do to us. No jobs. That’s it, no jobs. I can’t think of no other reason right now’ (“Rioting Called Fun,” 2B).

**Diagnose Causes**

This frame suggested that the causes for the great anger among Milwaukee’s black community was due in large part to general inequalities among the city’s black population, white bias, and police brutality suffered by the black community. The first
articles included in this portion of the discussion addressed inequalities and
discrimination in various areas of city life.

On August 2, 1967, the *Journal* published an article reporting the release of a
five-page statement by a group of black community leaders calling themselves the
“Common View” group. The article noted that the group criticized Milwaukee’s city
government for turning a deaf ear to the problems of the black community:

It accused the “white power structure” of apathy, indifference, and
ignorance toward the needs of the Negro community. “The paternalistic
attitude of the white power structure in ‘knowing’ all of the answers as to
what is best for the black community has been the major contributing
factor which led to the present confrontation,” the statement said. . . . The
statement contained a list of complaints in the areas of housing,
education, employment, and police-community relations” (“Riots Called
Reaction,” 10A).

Two articles published on August 7, 1967, one each in the *Journal* and the
*Sentinel*, reported the comments of Wesley L. Scott, a black man and the director of the
Milwaukee Urban League, about the underlying causes of the riots and of black anger.
The *Journal* article paraphrased Scott as saying that “Milwaukee’s riot last week ‘was
definitely not just lawlessness’ … but a symptom of little effort being made by the
community to relieve continued injustice” (“Bias Termed Cause,” 17A). The *Sentinel*
quoted him directly on what he believed to be the cause of the riots:

“Using one word, I think it would have to be discrimination. I wouldn’t
characterize it as a race riot per se. . . . It pertained to race, yes, largely
because minority groups are affected most by inequities. . . . (in) housing,
jobs, better education, and full mobility in the Milwaukee community so
there are no restrictions for potential to achieve other than those self-
imposed” (“Negro Feeling,” 5A).

Black leaders, however, weren’t the only ones consulted by the newspapers’
reporters to comment on the underlying causes of black anger in Milwaukee. Joseph C.
Fagan, an aide to Wisconsin Governor Warren Knowles and the chairman of the State Industrial Commission, was also quoted by reporters on the topic of economic and social inequalities in Milwaukee. The *Journal* on August 3, 1967, published an article quoting Fagan as saying: “‘The mayor ought to realize how important the least little thread is to these people.’ . . . ‘They have to get rid of the monotony and misery and hopelessness’” (“Give Poor Hope,” 6A). An article published the next day in the *Sentinel* reported on Fagan’s musings on a conversation he had with black residents:

Fagan said he was especially interested in a talk he had Friday with inner core residents who said that they viewed the disturbances as a ‘revolt’ rather than a race riot. Elements of an inner core revolt—youngsters showing no respect for law and order and their rebellion against poverty—were most apparent, Fagan said he was told (“Knowles to Get Fagan Report,” 14A).

Both newspapers published nationally focused wire stories that addressed economic and social deprivation among blacks in America as a possible cause for rioting across the country. Two articles dealt with inadequate housing for inner city residents. The *Journal* on August 1, 1967, published an article headlined: “22 Leaders Demand U.S. War on Slums” (“22 Leaders Demand,” 2A). On August 5, 1967, the *Sentinel* published an article reporting that a Wisconsin legislator in the U.S. House of Representatives proposed a bill to increase low and moderate income housing construction in America’s inner cities (Wieghart, 1967, 4A). Another article, published in the *Journal* on August 7, 1967, reported that another Wisconsin representative in the House cited the rioting as a result of insufficient federal funds for inner city programs. The article quoted Representative Melvin R. Laird as blaming the “breakdown in society” on “the ineffectiveness of the categorical federal grant program that has dominated federal thinking in recent history” (“Fund Sharing Pushed,” 10A).
The second group of articles published in the newspapers suggested that another cause for black anger in Milwaukee was police brutality. This was evident in the coverage of police treatment of some black citizens after the rioting occurred. One Sentinel article published on August 2, 1967, reported that a representative of the CORE heard complaints from inner core residents about police treatment:

(Johnie) Robinson said that one group of people, at N. 16th St. and W. North Av., was particularly bitter. . . . Inner city residents were particularly angry with police “because of the way they handled this,” he said. He cited as an example an incident in which he said four police officers jumped from a patrol car and pointed guns at a 16-year-old youth who was walking along the street (Engel, 1967, 5A).

The police-brutality-as-cause theme was particularly evident in coverage of the shooting by police of Clifford McKissick, an 18-year-old black man they suspected of being a fire bomber. McKissick was shot and killed by police as he ran into the back door of his family’s home. This theme was evident in coverage drawing upon sources from within McKissick’s family, friends, co-workers, and neighbors. For example, a Journal article published on August 3, 1967, the day after the shooting, reported:

Wilbur Davis, director of the club (Milwaukee’s Boys’ Club), said Clifford was a group leader who tried to keep the other youngsters out of trouble. “I would classify him as a good kid, one who had been a credit to youth,” said Davis, himself a Negro. “Clifford had outstanding concern for the betterment of the boys in the core” (Field, 1967, 1A).

The Sentinel’s August 3, 1967, article about the shooting offered this telling quote from the McKissicks’ neighbor, Mrs. J.L. Outlaw: “‘They (the police) know this area is predominantly Negro and that’s why I think they don’t care where they shoot’” (“Woman at Scene,” 3A).

Both newspapers also devoted coverage to the many protests of McKissick’s death. A Sentinel article published on August 4, 1967, reported that the day after the
shooting, a group of approximately 60 black activists gathered near the McKissick home to view the site of the shooting (“Militants View Site,” 5A). Another Sentinel article, published on August 5, 1967, reported that another group of citizens had drafted a petition to send to the U.S. District Attorney for Milwaukee to investigate McKissick’s shooting because “[t]here are certain circumstances and witnesses surrounding this tragic incident that make us demand this investigation as quickly as possible” (Feyen, 1967, 2A). A Journal article published on August 7, 1967, reported that “about 100 persons walked 30 blocks in the rain” from the McKissick home to the Milwaukee safety building to protest the death, noting that “about three-fourths of the marchers were Negro” (“March and Prayer,” 1B). Finally, another Journal article, published on August 9, 1967, reported that approximately 500 people attended McKissick’s funeral and burial. The black community’s frustration over police brutality might be crystallized in the following passage quoted in this article. It came from the eulogy given by Father James E. Groppi, the NAACP Youth Council adviser:

We have a reason for all of us to get involved. One of our black brothers was killed. He was killed unnecessarily and irresponsibly. . . . In my judgment, and in the judgment of others who witnessed this wild shooting, there need not be a funeral today. . . . It was a wild and irresponsible use of firearms. Don’t let his death be in vain. We need action. We want a federal investigation of what went on that night, otherwise we might as well all have stayed home (“500 Mourn McKissick,” 1B).

Make Moral Judgments

As might be expected, the black community, its leaders, and its sympathizers occupied the moral high ground in articles using this frame. Milwaukee’s inner-city blacks were portrayed as victims of discrimination and inequalities in the areas of
housing, education, employment, and police relations. Also, as some articles reported, 
not only were inner-city blacks victims, but also the vast majority did not even 
participate in any of the violence. An article published in the Sentinel on August 3, 
1967, quoted the president of a Milwaukee suburb, a white man, as stating that the riot 
“‘was inspired by a small percentage of hoodlums who are bent on lawlessness, not civil 
rights’” (“Most People Sorry,” 10A). The story went on to quote a white woman from 
the near east side of Milwaukee as saying that she recognized the riot involved “‘mostly 
young people. . . . Many of these Negro kids have grown up since the Supreme Court 
decision (in Brown v. Board of Education), but it hasn’t changed anything for them, 
including their schools’” (“Most People Sorry,” 10A).

The articles using this frame also suggested that the blacks involved in the 
rioting, though a small number, might somehow have been justified because their calls 
for help were not being answered by city government and they were being treated 
unjustly by law enforcement. A Sentinel article published on August 2, 1967, quoted 
George Pazik, the vice-president of the Norhttown Planning and Development Council, 
saying that blacks’ resort to violence was a result of their life situation in Milwaukee:

“They (Negroes) find life so intolerable that it no longer has meaning for 
them. I think we have to ask ourselves why there are so many people in 
our society who resort to lawlessness and violence. . . . For many of these 
people . . . [t]hey have nothing to lose.” He said that some of the white 
people he has talked to feel that the “lawlessness must stop, but their 
concern stops there. . . . Our (white) reactions (to black problems) are the 
opposite of what they ought to be” (Patrinos, 1967, 1A).

Suggest Remedies

Put simply, the remedy suggested by this frame was the eradication of 
discrimination and bias against Milwaukee’s black community. Also, this frame
suggested that improving relations between the black community and city administration would help alleviate some of the problems facing the black community. Many of the black leaders and even some of the rioters alluded to this remedy in various articles mentioned in this discussion. Outside of the black community, the clergy of the Catholic and Episcopal churches, composed predominantly of white men, encouraged individuals in their dioceses to eradicate their own biases and be sensitive to the needs of the black community. The *Sentinel* published an article on August 1, 1967, reporting that the Milwaukee Conference on Religion and Race had released a statement condemning the violence and encouraging reconciliation. According to the report, the Milwaukee-area clergy said in its statement:

> “If … we recognize in the present crisis a failure in which every one of us—white and Negro, rich and poor, city dweller and suburbanite—has participated and if we now discipline ourselves against action and attitudes born of fear and suspicion, we will yet manage to atone for our sins against one another” (Johnston, 1967, 11A).

Nearly a week later, the *Sentinel* published a similar article reporting that the Archbishop of the Milwaukee Catholic diocese offered a similar message. The article reviewed Archbishop William E. Cousins’ televised address about the riots and race relations in Milwaukee. According to the article, he encouraged personal action; both Catholics and non-Catholics should “examine their consciences calmly and reasonably’ about their beliefs and attitudes on race relations and civil rights” (“Archbishop Pleads,” 1A). In addition, the article reported, Cousins encouraged societal remedies in housing conditions and employment discrimination, involvement by the church and clergy in bringing about civil rights change, better communication between city administrators and the black community, better police-community relations, and school integration.
In summary, the economic and social deprivation for blacks frame suggested that the main problem of the riots was the deep-seated anger of the city’s black residents. It traced the cause of such anger to socioeconomic inequalities suffered by the black community and general negligence on the part of the city’s government and law enforcement. It portrayed the inner-city black community in a sympathetic light, that they were victims who possibly were justified in their resort to violence. Finally, it suggested that the solution to these problems and their causes was the eradication of discrimination on the part of white-dominated Milwaukee government and law enforcement against the inner-city black community. The elements of the economic and social deprivation frame, of course, stood in stark contrast to the elements contained in the following frame, the swift, effective administration frame, which was roundly positive in its reference to the city’s administration and, in particular, the mayor.

The Riots as an Example of Swift, Effective Administrative Action Frame

This frame focused primarily on the white-dominated Milwaukee city administration and police force, as well as the Wisconsin state national guard which was called in to help bring order to the city. This frame placed Milwaukee’s Mayor Henry Maier in a positive light, portraying him as an effective leader who made difficult but necessary decisions quickly to calm the violence. It also placed police officers and national guardsmen in a positive light by providing vivid descriptions of the violence they faced and the injuries some suffered in helping to keep Milwaukee’s citizens safe during the violent episodes of the riots and the subsequent curfew. In general, it suggested that Maier’s decisions were the right decisions to make and that the police and
guardsmen’s strict enforcement of the state of emergency was effective in quelling the violence.

**Define Problems**

The swift, effective administrative action frame suggested that the problem was the potential for and eventual carrying out of violent racial protest. It achieved this first through the mention of other racially charged incidents of violence in Wisconsin and elsewhere in the United States. The *Sentinel* published an article on August 1, 1967, reporting reactions to the Milwaukee riots and Maier’s declaration of the city’s state of emergency. The article reported that Milwaukee citizens were well aware of the riots that had sparked violence in many cities earlier in the summer of 1967: “Local civil rights groups, leaders in the Negro community, and governmental agencies have kept a watchful eye on the uneasy peace in Milwaukee since the first of the summer riots began elsewhere. With Newark and Detroit, concern grew” (Cunningham, 1967, 3A).

This frame also suggested the problem was the potential for violent racial protest by providing a portrait of the Milwaukee riots themselves. Many articles, especially those published over the first three days of coverage, vividly described the fear citizens felt and the violence citizens faced during the riots. An article in the *Journal* published July 31, 1967, summarized the events in its lead: “Milwaukee’s borders were closed Monday in a state of emergency after a night of rioting by Negroes who set fires, looted stores, and shot at police” (“180 Seized,” 1A; “Guardsmen Called Out,” p. 1A). In the second edition of the *Journal* that day, a full page of photos of buildings on fire and silhouetted men with rifles featured this caption:
Houses burned out for a time early Monday near N. 2nd and W. Center sts [sic]. during the racial violence. Snipers fired from the upper floor windows, and looters ran rampant along N. 3rd St. Early Monday, Milwaukee was in a state of emergency and national guardsmen were called in to help city and county law enforcement officials quell the riots and seal off the area. Firemen were hampered in fighting many of the blazes by the snipers who, from places of concealment, could fire at the well lighted targets. But the fire light also provided illumination for locating the attackers. As the fires raged, police tried to protect themselves and searched the windows for signs of hidden riflemen (“Snipers Hamper Firemen’s Efforts,” 5B).

Another article published in the second edition of the Journal on July 31, 1967, featured the recollections of Martin Savasta, a man who was attacked during the riots:

“We were coming from the Lakefront. . . . They were colored kids from 14 to maybe 20—about 20 or 30 of them. ‘Stone them. Stone them,’ they kept yelling. We ducked in the car so not to be hit. They must have run out of stones because a car came from the right and cut us off. We hit the car, and then they opened our doors and started tearing out our hair. They ripped my shirt; hit us with bats, bottles, and pipes” (Dobish, 1967, 2B).

Finally, an article published in the first edition of the Journal on July 31, 1967, featured recollections a UPI reporter, Tom Drolschagen, who was attacked by one of the gangs of rioters roaming Milwaukee’s streets:

“[A]s I got between Center and Wright, a band of Negroes closed in behind me and started badgering me. ‘Are you prepared to die?’ one of them asked. Others called me ‘Whitey’ and made remarks. . . . Two of them flanked me and continued badgering. . . . Something struck my head and knocked me to the ground. . . . I said my prayers because I thought I was hit” (“‘Are You Prepared to Die?’” 8A).

Diagnose Causes

This frame suggested that the causes of violent racial protest were out-of-control black militants, or the “roving bands of Negroes” cited as the perpetrators of the Milwaukee riots in several of the articles published in both the Journal and the Sentinel.
(“180 Seized,” 1A). Most photos during the first few days of coverage featured white policemen or guardsmen restraining black men. One photograph showed three black men reaching through a broken liquor store window for loot. All of this seemed to suggest that blacks were the problem, and the protection provided by the predominantly white policemen and guardsmen were the positive force.

The articles using this frame offered much of the same. An article published in the Journal on July 31, 1967, offered this glimpse of a scene during the first night of rioting:

Leaning out of those windows were at least seven Negroes, including two women, who jeered and taunted officers. No one knew whether they were armed. . . . [R]oving gangs of young Negroes moved through the streets, breaking store windows, throwing rocks, bricks and bottles at passing cars and jeering and taunting the police. . . . Rocks, bottles and cans rained into the street. The crowd shouted “Shoot,” and “Freedom Now.” One Negro youth marched down the sidewalk singing, “It’ll be a long, long night tonight, yeah.” (“180 Seized,” 1A, 4A).

An article published in the Sentinel on July 31, 1967, reported that the predominantly black rioters did not respond even to a fellow black man’s calls to stop the violence:

A Negro youth climbed into a police car and pleaded over a loud speaker to the crowd at Meinecke and 3rd. to “stop this, what is the sense of this? I am a soul brother. Believe me, this isn’t doing any good. I’m like you, a soul brother!” The crowd, however, started shouting back and throwing rocks (“Man Killed By Sniper,” 11A).

That same article also reported that Cecil Brown Jr., chairman of CORE, encouraged a Sentinel reporter to leave the area because he was white, underscoring the racial focus of the violence.

The newspapers, however, were quick to quote Maier and other authorities who distinguished the young black men leading the riot from those pursuing civil rights reforms in a “legal” manner. The Sentinel published an article on August 2, 1967,
reporting comments made by Maier during a news conference. In the article, Maier is quoted as saying of the riots: ‘We are dealing with outlawry, we’re not dealing with the civil rights movement’” (“Bullets Pin Policemen,” 4A). Articles published in later days would report many similar comments by Maier and other officials.

Make Moral Judgments

As opposed to the economic and social deprivation frame, the swift, effective administrative action frame portrayed Maier and his administration in a positive light. It also offered a favorable view of the police and the national guard. And, as one might conclude from the preceding discussion, it portrayed the rioters in a negative light.

Maier was portrayed positively for his quick response to the riots, his decision to impose the curfew, and his attempts to address the problems facing the black community in order to prevent another riot from happening. An article in the Journal published on August 1, 1967, praised Maier for his “technique in containing the riot” and for the fact that he “wound up his long office stay looking fresh and neat. His appearances before the television cameras gave little indication of fatigue” (Lohmann, 1967, 11A). Another Journal article published on August 1, 1967, compared Maier’s response to the Milwaukee riots with other city leaders’ responses to earlier rioting in other U.S. cities. Two Journal reporters who were on the scene of rioting in Newark and Detroit, Frank A. Aukofer and Kenneth C. Field, offered a comparison that was overwhelmingly favorable to Maier and his administration:

From the beginning, the disorders in Milwaukee differed from those in Detroit and Newark: There was swift police response here to mobs of Negroes—young and old—rampaging down a main street smashing windows and destroying private property. A 24-hour curfew was imposed and enforced hours after the violence erupted here. Authorities
in both Detroit and Newark were criticized for not taking these steps quickly enough (Aukofer & Field, August 1, 1967, 1A).

The newspapers also published reports praising Maier and the city’s response to the riots from sources outside of Milwaukee. An article published in the *Journal* on August 3, 1967, reported that Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire said:

Milwaukee may have taught the nation a lesson in how to handle big city riots. . . . [O]n the basis of number of people killed, the personal injury sustained, the value of property destroyed, Milwaukee seems to be coming through its nightmare far, far better than any other big city in the nation (“Riot Control Here,” 8A).

An article published in the *Journal* on August 6, 1967, reprinted praise for Maier and the city’s administration in the editorial comments of major newspapers from around Wisconsin. One comment from the *LaCrosse Tribune* read:

These are the actions of prudent and determined men, working together without regard to potential party or social views. This is what was so sadly lacking in Detroit (“State Press Hails,” 18A).

The article also included this comment from the *Capital Times* in Madison:

All during the months and years he has been trying to put over a program that would get at the root of these riots he has either been ignored or condemned by those who oppose him. Throughout all this, Mayor Maier has warned time and time again that Milwaukee’s crisis is heightening; that Milwaukee could become another Watts. And he has planned for such an emergency. We suspect that Mayor Maier would rather have support for some of his programs to avoid these emergencies than praise for the manner in which he is dealing with the emergencies (“State Press Hails,” 18A).

While this frame roundly praised Maier, it also highlighted the efforts of the policemen responding to the violence of the riots. In some cases, coverage portrayed police in a heroic, self-sacrificing light. For example, in an article published on August 1, 1967, the *Journal* profiled a day in the life of Police Chief Harold Breier as he led the
police effort from a remote command post inside the riot zone. It portrayed Breier and his officers as hard-working and capable:

A weary Police Chief Harold A. Breier went off duty Tuesday morning for the first time since riots in the city’s inner core pushed Milwaukee into a state of emergency. . . . Breier said police “were actually eager to get at the job. They were professional in the way they handled it. . . . They used good judgment and common sense in handling the people. . . . You talk about dedication to duty, we really saw it this weekend” (Buelow, 1967a, 4A).

Other articles humanized the policemen, describing their experiences at the command post. An article published in the Sentinel on August 1, 1967, described the atmosphere at the remote command post as “tense but convivial”; some officers “sat on the sidewalk, others sprawled on a stretch of lawn” (Lamke, 1967, 6A).

This frame also pointed up the heroism of the police officers by focusing on the violence they faced and, in the case of Patrolman Bryan Moschea, their ultimate sacrifice in service of the safety of Milwaukee’s citizens. An article published in the Sentinel on August 1, 1967, reported Officer Harry Daniels’ recollections of the scene at 134 W. Center St., where Moschea was killed and several other officers were injured by a black sniper. Daniels gave an account of the grave injury suffered by Police Captain Kenneth Hagopian in the shooting, and how Daniels and fellow officers were able to get him to the hospital for treatment:

Under fire, he said, “we dragged him (Hagopian) maybe 40 foot [sic], out of the line of fire. I ran back to the squad, backed it up, and we picked up Hagopian and put him in the front seat of the car and drove him to the hospital” (“Officer Tells,” 9A).

An article published in the Sentinel on August 6, 1967, also focused on an officer injured in the line of duty. The article reported the improving condition of Patrolman John Carter, who was injured at the same Center Street incident where Hagopian suffered his
injury. Using Carter as an exemplar and quoting his thoughts about his injury and his feelings toward those who hurt him, the article portrayed the Milwaukee police as selfless, brave and good:

“If I thought losing both of my eyes would solve Milwaukee’s problems, I would be pleased. . . . I always wanted to be a policeman,” he said. It didn’t sound corny when Carter said: “It boils down to just wanting to help people.” He said he would jump at the chance to get back on the police force (Buelow, 1967b, 1B).

An article published in the *Sentinel* on August 1, 1967, reported the story of Kenneth Moschea, a Milwaukee firefighter, who was called to the scene of the 134 W. Center St. fire and fought it not knowing his son, Bryan, had been shot and was dying inside:

The father did not know his son was dead until the fireman reported for work Monday morning. “I felt like saying, ‘Shoot all of them [the rioters],’ but Bryan would not want that” (Spiegel, 1967, 5A).

Both newspapers published coverage of Bryan Moschea’s funeral on August 3, 1967. Also, they each ran a powerful large photo of uniformed officers carrying a flag-draped coffin out of a church door and through two straight rows of officers standing at attention.

Similarly, this frame portrayed national guardsmen in a positive light. An article published in the *Sentinel* on August 1, 1967, humanized the guardsmen by focusing on the towns they came from and mentioning that some were on extended duty, having been called up to quell recent disturbances in nearby Lake Geneva. The article also quoted family members who watched their kin leave Sheboygan and Plymouth for duty in Milwaukee. Said one Mrs. Carol Beck of Sheboygan in the article: “‘I don’t want my brother to get hurt’” (“Half of State Guardsmen,” 8A). Another article described the
personal, and, in some cases, financial, sacrifices some of the guardsmen had to make due to the emergency call-up:

Morale is generally high, but some top officers ... conceded that troop spirit would drop if duty was protracted here. Military obligations this summer have cleaned some guardsmen out of money, made them virtually strangers to relatives and wrecked their vacation plans (Jensen, 1967, 4A).

Finally, this frame generally portrayed the rioters, predominantly black, in a negative light for resorting to violence. In one editorial published in the Journal on July 31, 1967, this was achieved by juxtaposing the violence with the example of peaceful protest:

There is a legitimate civil rights movement. It cannot be helped by riots. Murder and pillage can only delay the day of justice for our Negro citizens and violate the very goals of equality and freedom. . . . [R]ioting is a crime, and crime must be put down with whatever force is needed (“Order Must Prevail,” 1A).

Suggest Remedies

This frame tacitly suggested that, because the curfew enforced by Maier worked to quell the riots so effectively, his plans to alleviate the problems of the inner core’s black community might also be successful. The series of articles denoting the progress made in bringing stability back to the city by suggested that Maier handled the riots appropriately (“Guardsmen, Police Keep,” 1A; “Emergency Rule Cuts,” 5A; “Quiet Night Pleases Maier,” 1A; “Entire Force May Leave,” 1A). One article published in the Journal on August 9, 1967, concluded: “From all the figures we have been able to develop, Milwaukee’s total loss was far less than that of any other city affected by a major disturbance” (“Mayor Calls for Reforms,” 1A).
Preventing a riot from happening again, however, was another matter. But both newspapers gave ample coverage to Maier’s pronouncements of possible solutions to the inner core’s problems. The Sentinel published an article on August 1, 1967, reporting that at the heart of Maier’s plan was the need for “a greater share in the nation’s resources to deal with the hard core economic and social problems facing most central cities” (“Maier Asks Help,” 5A). To advance his goals, the Sentinel reported on August 5, 1967, Maier placed a five-column by thirteen-inch ad in the front section of the New York Times asking for federal aid for the inner cities. The article about Maier’s ad published an excerpt from the ad reading: “If we are to translate the longstanding concern into meaningful action, I think every voice must be raised to express this need of our cities for more resources” (“5 Groups Pay,” 16A). This article published excerpts from the ad and reactions to Maier’s decision to place the ad. It also reported that five local religious groups supplied the funding for it. On the other hand, the Journal on August 6, 1967, simply published the text of the advertisement in full.

Finally, the newspapers also reported on Maier’s meetings with black community leadership and his ideas for helping to solve the community’s problems at a grass-roots level. A Sentinel article published on August 7, 1967, reported that Maier met with clergymen from the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance and some other associates. After the meeting, the article reported, Maier and aides drew up a 39-point plan to solve the city’s racial problems. The article provided an overview of the plan and noted that many of the points required federal and state aid, and many required actions of the state legislature. Each of his 39 points dealt with aspects of the black community that its leaders in the past had demanded needed improvement, including: better communication
with the mayor’s office (solution: hiring a Negro staffer at the office); improvements in relations between police and the black community (solution: have a new biracial council meet with fire and police departments); improvements to inner core housing (solution: introduce and pass open housing legislation); improve early-childhood and public education (solution: federal aid); and improve employment opportunities for blacks (solution: procure federal and state aid to bring industrial jobs to the inner city and encourage establishment of black-owned businesses (“Maier Will Press,” 12A).

In summary, the swift, effective administrative action frame was largely favorable to Maier, Milwaukee police, and the Wisconsin state national guard that was called up to assist in bringing order back to the city. This frame suggested that the main problem of the riots was the potential for and carrying out of violent racial protest. It traced the cause of this problem to the actions of out-of-control black militants. It portrayed Maier in a very positive light, both for his handling of the riots and for his suggestions to improve life for inner-city black residents after the riots. It also portrayed the police and the national guardsmen in a positive light, as heroic and self-sacrificing. On the whole, its treatment of blacks was negative; however the negative treatment was reserved for the out-of-control blacks that perpetrated the violent episodes of the riots. Finally, it suggested that the solution to the problems facing post-riot Milwaukee was to follow the 39-point plan Maier devised, which called for increased federal funding and state action to bring about change in the inner city.
The Maier-vs.-Black Community Leaders Frame

The Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame represented a blend of the two preceding frames: the riots as a result of economic and social deprivation for blacks frame and the riots as an example of swift, effective administrative action frame. Many of the stories published in the contemporary coverage that contained a discernable frame used this particular frame. In general, this frame focused on hostility between Maier and his administration and the black community and its leaders. It suggested that the root cause of this hostility was a lack of communication between the parties, and that the most effective way to remedy the situation would be to increase communication and understanding between the Maier administration and the black community.

Define Problems

The primary problem defined by the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame was the bad relationship between Maier, his administration, and the black community’s leaders. This toxic relationship, the frame suggested, led to an inability to solve the socioeconomic problems facing Milwaukee’s inner core and its black residents. As was previously noted, many articles focused on this root problem. For example, an article published in the Sentinel on August 2, 1967, reported that a statement critical of the mayor’s riot policy had been released by a newly formed biracial group, Common View. An article classified under the effective administration frame addressed this statement as well. The article reported that the statement “charged the Mayor and city administrators with circumventing the needs for equality of opportunity and local government by ignoring studies which cite substandard conditions as the cause of the riots” (Buresh,
1967b, 6A). It followed this bit of information with a comment from the mayor’s office reiterating Maier’s continued willingness to meet with any and all civil rights groups.

In another example, an article published in the *Journal* on August 3, 1967, reported that a group of inner core representatives walked out of a meeting with city administration representatives because the mayor did not show up at the meeting (“Maier Not Present,” 6A). A *Sentinel* report about the same meeting drew upon sources on both sides to tell the story of the meeting. It reported:

The Rev. Lucius Walker Jr., executive director of the Northcott Neighborhood house, commented, “Mayor Maier has been issuing calculated insults. He advises rather than listens to the Negro Community. We will continue to try to meet with him despite his almost cynical response” (“We’re Gonna Burn This Town Down,” 8A).

It followed this information with comments from the mayor’s representatives. According to the article, these representatives said that they were “disappointed that the meeting had such negative results” and “stressed the mayor’s willingness to meet with representatives of civic groups” (“We’re Gonna Burn This Town Down,” 8A).

In yet another example, an article published in the *Sentinel* on August 4, 1967, reported comments from several black leaders about the problems facing the black community and relations between the community and Maier. It offered a quote from the research director of the Milwaukee Urban League, Corneff R. Taylor: “‘A lot of people are concerned as well as angry. . . . Everybody recognizes the need for something to be done which is not being done. The thing seems to point to the second floor of city hall’” (“Situation Grim,” 1A). Again, the article follows Taylor’s criticism with a comment from the mayor’s office that Maier was making earnest attempts to speak with the black community’s leaders.
Diagnose Causes

As can be inferred from the preceding discussion, this frame suggested that the main cause for the rift between Maier and the black community was a lack of communication between the parties. Much of this was self-evident in the excerpts provided in the preceding section. However, another example throws this particular cause into sharp relief.

A *Sentinel* article published on August 1, 1967, reported that Maier rejected the offer of local churches and civil rights organizations to go to into the inner core and try to calm its agitated residents. It quoted Maier’s press secretary, James Newcomb, as saying “CORE ‘and at least four or five different groups wanted to go into the area that the chief had cordoned off,’” that Maier and the police chief “‘thought it would do some good. . . . but it was so dangerous that the chief would not authorize it’” (“Rights Units Rejected,” 5A). Later, the article quoted Milwaukee’s NAACP chairman Walter B. Hoard as saying: “I don’t think the Mayor should play politics with a riot” (“Rights Units Rejected,” 5A). As Newcomb’s statement suggested, the mayor’s and the police chief’s intentions to keep the black activists out of the riot area were linked to safety concern. As Hoard’s comment suggested, black leaders either didn’t get this message or disregarded it; they believed that Maier had ulterior motives in keeping the black activists out of the riot area. The lack of communication between the parties led to Hoard’s criticism, and such miscommunication was emblematic of the tension between Maier and black community leaders.
Make Moral Judgments

This frame featured a blend of the moral threads of the economic and social deprivation frame and the swift, effective administration frame. For lack of a better label, the separate moral judgments will be referred to as “anti-Maier” (pro-black community leaders) and “pro-Maier” (anti-black community leaders).

The “anti-Maier” judgment of this frame portrayed Maier as arrogant and unwilling to truly listen to the black community. An article published in the Sentinel on August 3, 1967, illustrated this judgment well:

“What Henry (Maier) refuses to acknowledge is that we are not here to fight him but to offer our cooperation,” said Wesley L. Scott, executive director of the Milwaukee Urban League. “I suggest that the Mayor does not know his community as well as he likes to think he does, or says. . . .” The statements by Scott echoed the feelings of others involved in the civil rights movement. Their main complaint was that the mayor did not want to talk with them or meet with their organizations unless it was strictly on his terms and they were prepared to accept his proposals. . . .

Ray Alexander, community relations director of the Northtown Planning and Development Council, said, “The Mayor is trying to come out of this a boy hero, as if there are no civil rights leaders and that he is the only one capable of solving anything. But if he really wants to get anything solved, he should be willing to talk” (Thien, 1967, 5A, 9A).

On the other hand, the same article exhibited the “pro-Maier” judgment of this frame. It reported Maier’s comments that there was not “‘what I (Maier) consider to be any single, valid, effective Negro leader. There is a divergence of leadership’” (Thien, 1967, 5A). It reported also that his administration had “made extensive attempts to talk with Negro leaders,” but to no avail (Thien, 1967, 5A). In this way, it suggested that the fault was not Maier’s, but the black community’s lack of leadership.

In another example, an article published on August 9, 1967, in the Journal reported response to Maier’s August 8, 1967, speech ending the state of emergency and
the curfew. The article featured examples of both the “anti-Maier” and “pro-Maier” judgments. On one hand, it reported that Walker and Assemblyman Lloyd A. Barbee, both black, “said the mayor had passed the buck for solving the city’s race and poverty problems to other levels of government” (“Both Praise, Censure Greet,” 5A). It also reported that Walker charged Maier with “not listening to the people best acquainted with the problems of Milwaukee’s inner core. . . . ‘I think he’s using those ministers (the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance, with whom Maier constructed his 39-point-plan to solve the inner core’s problems) he can use. He certainly is not dealing honestly with them’” (“Both Praise, Censure Greet,” 5A). On the other hand, it published some comments of Maier’s supporters. One of these was Peter G. Scotese, chairman of the Milwaukee Voluntary Equal Employment Opportunity Council, who said, “‘He (Maier) has done an outstanding job in terms of containing the situation and in preserving life and property’” (“Both Praise, Censure Greet,” 5A).

Clearly, this frame illustrated the best judgments in favor of both Maier and the black community and its leaders. It also illustrated the best judgments against both parties. On a basic level, it produced an indeterminate moral judgment. It offered no suggestion as to which side should be afforded more weight in the moral balancing of the scales.

Suggest Remedies

As mentioned previously in the discussion of this frame, the remedy suggested by this frame is an improvement in the communication between Maier and the black community and its leaders. A number of articles offered such a suggestion. The article cited previously in this discussion covering the release of the statement by the Common
View group was one example. (Buresh, 1967b, 1A). The article highlighted the statement’s suggestion that the city government should begin “taking advantage of the expertise set up in this group (Common View)” to get more informed on the real problems the city’s black community was facing (Buresh, 1967b, 1A).

In another example, an article published in the *Sentinel* on August 4, 1967, said that the main question being asked by core leaders at a neighborhood meeting was: “‘What does it take to gain an audience with the mayor?’” (“Situation Grim,” 14A). In still another example, an article published in the *Journal* on August 9, 1967, reported that Maier and the Common View group were set to follow the group’s advice and meet face-to-face. The article said that the meeting would center around “a series of recommendations to correct problems in housing, unemployment, education, the court system, recreation, and police-community relations,” as well as “more decision-making roles for Negroes in city planning and development’” (“Maier Agrees,” 1B). This final article offered hope that clear communication might result in both Maier’s and black community leaders’ being able to solve the inner city’s problems.

In summary, the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame suggested that the problem facing Milwaukee before, during, and after the riots was a bad relationship between the Maier administration and the city’s black community. According to this frame, the primary cause of this problem was a lack of communication between both sides. This frame offered moral judgments in favor of both sides, but did not clearly indicate which of the two sides should carry more weight for the reader. It did suggest, however, that efforts by both sides to improve the communication gap that existed between them would have been a key step toward solving the problem.
Contemporary Coverage: Summary

This chapter intended to provide an overview of contemporary coverage of the Milwaukee race riots as it was published in the city’s two primary newspapers, the Journal and the Sentinel, from July 30, 1967 through August 9, 1967. As noted in this chapter’s introduction, the sheer amount of coverage was staggering. The newspapers published articles to serve seemingly every possible need, to cover every possible angle of the story. However, this analysis found two classifications and three major frames evident in the coverage.

This analysis determined that much of the coverage did not appear to have any discernible frame. However, simply because these articles did not contain all four of Entman’s (1993) elements of framing does not mean that the information contained in them could not be useful for later memory construction. As Irwin-Zarecka (2007) instructed, media not only frame events for memory, but also can provide the “raw materials” for later generations to use in fashioning a cohesive collective memory (165). The articles that fell under the general informative classification and the consequences and aftermath classification, then, may play an important role in the commemorative coverage of the Milwaukee race riots.

Many articles did contain all of Entman’s four elements of framing. The three frames identified were: the riots as a result of economic and social deprivation for blacks frame; the riots as an example of swift, effective administrative action frame; and the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame. As this analysis found, the final frame, the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame, incorporated many of the elements present in the preceding two frames in its definition of problems, diagnosis of causes, assessment
of moral judgments, and suggestion of remedies. Aside from that, however, the frames varied on nearly all four of the elements of framing as established by Entman. The question remains whether the elements of each of these frames will converge at all in the commemorative coverage of the riots. The next chapter provides an answer.
CHAPTER 5
RETROSPECTIVE AND COMMEMORATIVE COVERAGE
OF THE MILWAUKEE RACE RIOTS

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of the retrospective and commemorative coverage of the Milwaukee race riots in the *Journal*, the *Sentinel*, and the *Journal Sentinel* was its sparse and sporadic nature. There was very little coverage published in any of the newspapers in the intervening years of 1977, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Two straight-news (non-editorial or interpretive) articles published in the *Journal* on July 31, 1977, and August 2, 1977, addressed issues related to the riots but did not mention the riots by name. Another straight-news article published in the *Sentinel* on July 31, 1992, the 25th anniversary of the riots, mentioned the riot specifically. The *Journal* published one editorial on August 2, 1992, that focused on the riots. Finally, on August 1, 1997, the *Journal Sentinel* published an editorial focusing on the riots and their impact on Milwaukee in the decades that had passed since the event.

The most extensive retrospective and commemorative coverage of the race riots, however, was provided in a three-part series published daily in the *Journal Sentinel* from July 30, 2007, through August 1, 2007. The first two articles in the *Journal Sentinel*’s 2007 series attempted to reconstruct the events of the 1967 riots for readers, many of whom, presumably, were either not alive or not living in Milwaukee at the time of the riots. There were likely still more readers for whom personal memories of the riots may have faded. The third article attempted to construct a depiction of life today in the areas
where the riots broke out in 1967 and made tacit comparisons between present-day and riot-era Milwaukee.

Each editorial, article, or series of articles identified within the parameters of this study as retrospective or commemorative coverage shared a basic underlying frame, despite some differences in presentation. This frame, the “problems persist” frame, focused on the socioeconomic problems facing the city in the present, whether that present was 1977 or 1997. It addressed how those problems were similar to those the city faced at the time of the riots. And it offered a subtle warning as to the consequences that might occur if those problems were not rectified.

General Observations: Inclusions in the Riot Narrative

Each of the retrospective or commemorative articles included in this analysis approached the events of the riots and the underlying causes of the riots in different ways. The two articles published in the *Journal* in 1977 did not specifically mention the riots at all. But both articles addressed the inability of black youths to get jobs, which was a problem that factored significantly into the economic causes of the 1967 rioting, according to contemporary coverage. The article published in the *Sentinel* in 1992 included two short paragraphs reviewing the events of the riots. It described the violence of the first night of the rioting, which according to the article featured “rocks hurled out of windows and shotguns pointed out of windows” (Moore, 1992, 5A). It then briefly mentioned the mayor’s declaration of emergency, the activation of national guard troops, the enforcement of the curfew, and a mention of the number of killed and wounded persons (This, in fact, was incorrect. The article listed three dead, but both
contemporary and other commemorative coverage lists the death count of the riots at four).

The editorial published in the *Journal* in 1992 focused on the city administration and police response to the riots 25 years earlier. It paid particular attention to the police action on the first night of rioting at 134 W. Center St. (The author incorrectly identified the site as 130 W. Center St., but this was identified in contemporary coverage consistently as 134 W. Center St.). The narrow, favorable focus of this editorial on the predominantly white city administration and law enforcement establishment might have been due to the fact that its author was formerly a Maier aide. Finally, the editorial published in the *Journal Sentinel* in 1997 focused mainly on the police experience at 134 W. Center St. as told by officers John Carter and LeRoy Jones, who were on the scene of the event. It made special mention of the fact that Jones was one of only a handful of black police officers on Milwaukee’s force at the time. The editorial also included observations by former *Sentinel* reporter Joseph M. Pecor on the atmosphere in the city at the time of the rioting.

**General Observations: Exclusions in the Riot Narrative**

The retrospective and commemorative articles included in this analysis on the whole lacked any mention of the clashes between Milwaukee’s civil rights leadership and the city’s administration at the time of the riots. Notable in particular was the absence until the 2007 coverage of any mention of the issue of open housing that was a hot topic in the summer of 1967 before the riots. Also notable was the lack of any mention of both sides’ failed attempts to collaborate on ways to ameliorate problems after the riots. Rarely did this coverage cite the voices of civil rights figures such as
Cecil Brown, Jr., of CORE, who was a frequent source for contemporary reporters. Coverage did not address any of the major grievances civil rights figures had with the city’s administration. The two editorials published in the Journal in 1992 and the *Journal Sentinel* in 1997 placed a heavy emphasis on remembering the police experience and the administration’s response to the violence on the first night of rioting. The brief account of the riots in the 1992 article published in the *Sentinel* covered mainly the emergency response and casualty count of the riots rather than the at-the-time struggles between the black community and its leaders and the city’s administration.

**General Observations: The 2007 Journal Sentinel Series**

As was previously mentioned, the most extensive commemorative coverage of the Milwaukee riots came from the *Journal Sentinel’s* three-part series published in the summer of 2007. Where the other instances of commemorative and retrospective coverage of the riots essentially omitted the struggle between the black community and city government, the 2007 *Journal Sentinel* series did not.

For starters, the first two installments of the series, which together retold the story of the riots, produced a more detailed construction of the events than the other retrospective articles and editorials. The first installment, which consisted of one article, told the story of the first night of the riots from many perspectives. It told the story from the point of view of Thomas Crosby, then a young black musician who was on the scene of the first skirmishes of the riots. It told the story from the point of view of LeRoy Jones about his experiences at 134 W. Center St. It told the story from the point of view of Fred Bronson and another member of the NAACP Youth Council at the time, Margaret “Peggy” Rozga, a white woman who later married council adviser Father
James Groppi. It told the story from the point of view of Shirley Orndoff, a white woman who was at the time of the riots a nurse at Mt. Sinai Hospital. Finally, it told the story from the point of view of Bill Graham, a national guardsman called up for riot duty. Though it devoted about a third of its coverage to the police’s and the city administration’s actions and experiences on the first night of the rioting (It described the fight between a sniper and police at 134 W. Center St. in fairly lengthy detail), it also mentioned that the rioting came on the heels of demonstrations by civil rights groups advocating open housing legislation for the city:

Local civil rights activists had turned their attention to fair housing in the city, highly segregated by race and ethnicity. NAACP Youth Council members spent the early weeks of the summer picketing homes of aldermen who continued to vote against a proposed ordinance to outlaw racial discrimination in home sales and rentals (Price & Uebelherr, 2007a, 1A, 6A).

This page design encompassing this article also featured a pull-quote from Father Groppi. It was a warning to the city’s Common Council that appeared in the contemporary coverage of the riots as well: “Unless something is done about the uninhabitable conditions that the black man has to live in, Milwaukee could become a holocaust” (Price & Uebelherr, 2007a, 6A). In the article, the reporters followed Groppi’s quote with this phrase: “Violence broke out five days later—lootings, brawls, shootings, and fires” (Price & Uebelherr, 2007a, 6A). The juxtaposition seemed to establish a relationship between the protests and the outbreak of violence.

The second installment of the series featured one main article, which focused on the killing of Clifford McKissick, and two side-bar articles. Though the main article did not specifically address clashes between the black community and the city’s administration, it did pick up on one of the themes inherent in the economic and social
deprivation frame identified in the contemporary coverage insofar as it suggested that, in 1968, Milwaukee’s black community suffered from incidents of police brutality. The article noted that Ralph Schroeder, the police officer who shot McKissick, was cleared of using excessive force in the shooting in 1981. It also reported that a circuit court later ruled that McKissick had caused his own death. But it drew primarily from sources within the McKissick family and from those who knew Clifford well to tell the story. The star of this article was Clifford’s younger brother, Raymus McKissick, who later changed his name, according to the article, to Rahman Malik. It also described Clifford’s background as a college student who worked a summer job as a camp counselor, who “liked children and was majoring in education because he wanted to be a teacher, according to his siblings” (Price, 2007, 7A). The choice of sources used in this article and the recounting of their tales of Clifford McKissick humanized him and portrayed him as, at least potentially, an innocent victim of overzealous police pursuit.

Also in the second installment, one of the sidebar articles explicitly addressed some of the differing views as to Maier’s handling of the riots and the progress made in the years after them. The article reported:

By mid-August, when tension in the city had begun to settle down, Time magazine would say that “Detroit was a burned-out volcano, and although Milwaukee trembled, its authorities hammered down an iron lid that saved the city from massive hurt” (Price & Uebelherr, 2007b, 7A).

But as the article reported later, some people associated with Milwaukee’s black community did not agree with Time’s glowing portrait of Maier’s handling of the riots:

The feeling in the black community was that Maier was looking for an opportunity to show he was in control of the city, said Margaret “Peggy” Rozga, then a member of the Milwaukee Youth Council of the NAACP, who took part in open housing marches in the city that summer. “So, he drew up a plan to show how he would respond, and if any likely situation
happened, he would use such a plan,” Rozga said (Price & Uebelherr, 2007b, 7A).
The article closed with the recollections of a former aide to Wisconsin Senator William
Proxmire, Bill Drew, on the impact the riots had on Milwaukee. Drew’s comments
largely supported Maier’s post-riot actions:

“If it was just one (day), it might’ve passed,” Drew says. “But
collectively, it sent a signal that there’s something going on here that
needs to be looked at. Beyond that, I think it really spurred large-city
mayors to really address urban policy” (Price & Uebelherr, 2007b, 7A).

Each of these retrospective constructions of the Milwaukee race riots served a
different purpose. Each included and omitted different details, people, and events from
its story of the riots. This partiality is emblematic of any construction of collective
memory. But though they differ in many ways, each of these articles was built upon a
basic underlying frame that was similar in each story. That frame was the “problems
persist” frame mentioned earlier in this chapter. In each of these retrospective articles,
and particularly in the third installment of the 2007 Journal Sentinel series, the authors
of the articles suggested that there was some major problem at the time of publication,
usually something socioeconomic, facing the city of Milwaukee in general and its black
community in particular.

The Problems Persist Frame

In a nutshell, Problems Persist frame suggested that the problems that plagued
Milwaukee at the time of the riots in 1967 continued to affect the city’s black
community in the years that followed. But because the retrospective and
commemorative coverage included in this analysis spanned several years, this frame at
times varied in specific details. For example, articles published in the Journal in 1977
diagnosed the cause of the problems in a different way than an article published in the *Journal* in 1992. The 1977 *Journal* articles suggested one cause of problems among the black community was a lack of available jobs for black youths. On the other hand, an article published in the *Journal* in 1992 suggested the cause of such problems was the city administration’s investment of money in other parts of the city instead of the crime-ridden inner core. But though the specific details of the problems varied in the retrospective coverage, the overall message was the same: problems persist.

**Define Problems**

The specific problems defined by this frame varied depending on the year each article or editorial was published. However, the problems defined were all primarily linked to the economic and social deprivation of Milwaukee’s inner-city black community. In 1977, articles published in the *Journal* defined the problem as disillusioned, poverty-stricken black youths. In 1992, an article published in the *Journal* defined the problem as tensions between inner city residents and city administration. In editorials published in the *Journal* in 1992 and the *Journal Sentinel* in 1997, the problem was defined as the potential for racial unrest and violent uprising. In the commemorative series published in the *Journal Sentinel* in 2007, the problem was defined as the inequalities that existed between members of the city’s black community. Finally, an editorial published at the conclusion of the *Journal Sentinel*’s 2007 series suggested that the problem was the city’s regression, rather than progression, in racial equality in the four decades since the race riots.

The two articles published in the *Journal* in 1977 focused on the problem of disillusioned, poverty-stricken black youths. The article published on July 31, 1977,
addressed the problem by providing the testimony of several black youths who had been unsuccessful in getting jobs. One source was 18-year-old Charles Hierrezuelo:

Noting that he has filled out applications at stores and restaurants, he added: “They told me they’d call me in a couple of days, but they never did. I went to the employment office … they gave me a card.” Hierrezuelo said he had stopped going to the employment office “because they ain’t doing no good,” and the youth, who lives with his mother, frankly stated that he spent his idle time “gettin’ high” (Alexander, 1977, 18A).

Another source cited in this article was Lois Ball, who said, “‘I can’t find no job anywhere.’” Having pounded the pavement looking for work and finding no takers, she said she had given up. ‘You get mad. You want a job and people won’t hire you,’ she said” (Alexander, 1977, 18A). The article published in the Journal on August 2, 1977, defined the problem by reporting the results of a nationwide survey of youth employment. It read: “Herb Bienstock, regional commissioner of the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, said the survey showed a devastating rate of idleness among the nation’s young people, a youth employment disaster” (“Youth Job Picture Labeled,” 1A).

The article published in the Journal on July 31, 1992, focused on the problem of tensions between inner city residents and city administration. This article addressed the inner city community’s attempts to commemorate the riots. One of the primary sources for the article, former city alderman Michael R. McGee, explained how his request to block off the 2600 block of Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, formerly N. 3rd St., for a public commemoration of the riots was originally denied. “‘Twenty-five years later, we wonder why there is no justice,’” the article quoted McGee as saying to his audience (Moore, 1992, 5A).
Two editorials published in the *Journal* in 1992 and the *Journal Sentinel* in 1997 suggested that the problem was the potential for another episode of violent racial unrest. They achieved this by focusing on the violence and the climate of fear surrounding the actual riot. For example, the 1992 *Journal* editorial, written by a former Maier aide, focused on the fire and sniping at 134 W. Center St., the deaths of Bryan Moschea and the elderly woman who lived in the Center Street house, and Maier’s declaration of a state of emergency and the call up of the national guard. His closing suggested that the same problems that prompted the violent action in 1967 might still have been present in 1992 (Johnson, 1992, 14A). Later, in the 1997 *Journal Sentinel* editorial, the focus was on the bravery of the police, the extensive damage to property, and the warlike atmosphere during the riots in 1967. It addressed the life-changing injuries to Officer John Carter and Captain Kenneth Hagopian, as well as the recollections of Detective LeRoy Jones, all of whom were present and injured at the 134 W. Center St. incident. It reported: “‘It sounded like a war,’ Jones said. He still has pellets in his body from that war” (Janz, 1997, 1B).

Finally, the *Journal Sentinel’s* 2007 series commemorating the riots suggested that socioeconomic inequalities persisted between the races, even in 2007. In the concluding article of the series, published on August 1, 2007, the reporters “looked at the neighborhood near the epicenter of the 1967 riots—a 12-block swath that runs east of N. King Drive between Wright and Locust streets” (Perez & McClain, 2007, 14A). The article provided a statistical comparison of the economic status of the neighborhood between 1967 and 2007. Their findings were summarized well by Milwaukee Urban League President Ralph Hollman, whom they quoted in the following passage:
“I like to characterize our community as a tale of two cities,” Hollmon said of black Milwaukee. “On the one hand, you have some African Americans who are doing well if not very well, but on the other hand you have some African-Americans that are not doing well. They’re still mired in poverty and hopelessness.” This 12-block neighborhood straddles Milwaukee’s two cities” (Perez & McClain, 2007, 14A).

An editorial published a few pages later in this same issue of the *Journal Sentinel* supported this observation:

The *Journal Sentinel* concludes a three-day series of articles today marking the 40th Anniversary of the Milwaukee disturbances. . . . Alarmingly, they (the reporters of the series) found regression, not progress. Incomes have declined and joblessness has soared (“Still a Long Way to Go,” 16A).

*Diagnose Causes*

Retrospective and commemorative coverage of the Milwaukee race riots suggested a number of different causes for the economic and social deprivation of the inner city’s black community. The 1977 articles published in the *Journal* suggested that the lack of jobs for black youths began a cycle of discontent and disenfranchisement. Later articles and editorials pointed to a socioeconomic disparity between blacks and whites in the city. An article published in the *Journal Sentinel* in 2007 suggested that laziness on the part of some in the inner city black community was to blame for the problem. Finally, an editorial published in the *Journal Sentinel* in 2007 suggested that an undercurrent of racism and discrimination in all aspects of city life might have been a major contributor to persisting economic and social deprivation for Milwaukee’s black community.

The first articles published in 1977 provided a report about the epidemic of jobless black youths in Milwaukee’s inner city. An article published in the *Journal* on
July 31, 1977, suggested that the lack of jobs available to black youths bred frustration and anger among the youths. The article reported:

According to the Wisconsin Job Service, there are as many as 20,000 youths in Milwaukee between the ages of 14 and 22 who can show they are poor enough to qualify. . . . There are fewer than 5,000 such jobs (available through the Social Development Commission’s Youth Aid Programs) (Alexander, 1977, 1A).

The article also reported that, even for black youths who got jobs, there was a disparity between their income and the income of white youths in similar situations:

The bureau (of Labor Statistics) reported … that the median annual income for white teens was $1,420 and for black teens $846, a significant difference indicating infrequent employment for the black teenager (Alexander, 1977, 1A).

Further, the Journal noted that this was not a problem specific to Milwaukee or the state of Wisconsin. In fact, Milwaukee’s black youth employment statistics were somewhat better than those of other cities. It reported in an article published on August 2, 1977, that, according to a national survey of teenagers ages 16-19, the national average employment rate for black and white youths was 23.7 percent and 47.9 percent, respectively. The article reported that Milwaukee’s numbers for black and white youth employment were 38.3 percent and 48.7 percent, respectively. (“Youth Job Picture Labeled,” p. 1A).

Overall, however, editorials and articles published in the Journal Sentinel in 1997 and 2007 suggested that larger socioeconomic disparities existed in Milwaukee’s black community adding to the feeling of anger within the community. The editorial published in the Journal Sentinel on August 1, 1997, quoted Pecor, the previously-mentioned former Sentinel reporter who was on the scene of the riots in 1967. Pecor offered some insights into the social and economic problems that led to the rioting and
suggested that some also might have been present thirty years later: “‘There was a real hopelessness then,’ Pecor said. ‘People are trying now. There’s a greater realization that all citizens were not being treated equally’” (Janz, 1997, 1B). An article published in the Journal Sentinel on August 1, 2007, offered more specific evidence of the socioeconomic problems facing the riot area forty years after the riots occurred. The article reported:

Residents of the 12-block neighborhood on average make less than half the money they did back then, even after adjusting for inflation. . . . Male residents are twice as likely to be jobless. The neighborhood has seen a nearly 15 percentage-point drop in the proportion of residents working in manufacturing. . . . Many of the jobless have barricades that make them tough sells for employers while also making them feel increasingly hopeless. Many have criminal records, have no driver’s license, or can’t pass a drug test (Perez & McClain, D, 2007, 14A).

This article, however, also suggested that the problems might be exacerbated by laziness on the part of the inner core’s young black population. The article published the comments of Ken Johnson, a black man in his late 60s who lived near N. 2nd and W. Wright streets in the inner core in 2007. It gave a brief look into Johnson’s background as “one of the first black men hired as a central office technician for the phone company,” and it mentioned that he held two jobs at a local store and a hotel “just to keep busy” (Perez & McClain, 2007, 15A). It provided Johnson’s thoughts on the laziness of black youth in his neighborhood:

He thinks the younger generation lacks his strong work ethic. “There’s jobs, but a lot of people don’t want to work,” Johnson said. “I hear them sit and talk. They’d rather sell dope” (Perez & McClain, 2007, 15A).

Finally, the Journal Sentinel on August 1, 2007, published an editorial that suggested the underlying problem facing the inner core black community’s struggles was an undercurrent of racism and discrimination that often passed unnoticed by
Milwaukee’s citizens. To drive home its point, this editorial brought to light one aspect of Milwaukee’s turbulent summer of 1967 that was not mentioned in either the contemporary or the retrospective coverage included in this study: white aggression against peaceful civil rights protesters:

In focusing on the riots, the metropolitan area must not forget that 1967 also marked the high point in Milwaukee of the non-violent civil rights revolution that was sweeping the nation. The Milwaukee NAACP Youth Council and its adviser, Father James Groppi, led open housing marches for 200 straight days, a remarkable achievement. This marathon series of marches drew participants from across America. The metro area must not forget that there were two sets of riots that summer—the second occurring when white South Siders attacked the racially diverse marchers (“Still a Long Way to Go,” 16A).

Make Moral Judgments

The problems persist frame portrayed the inner core’s black community as victims of failed government policies. The frame also portrayed city government as being negligent in addressing the needs of the inner core’s black community while focusing on development in other areas of the city. Finally, the frame suggested that members of the inner core’s black community were victims of a vicious cycle of hopelessness. In general, the frame portrayed the inner core’s black community in a sympathetic light. On the other hand, it portrayed the city government, from Maier’s time forward, in a somewhat negative light.

The earlier retrospective coverage of the riots, published in the Journal in 1977 and 1992, suggested that Milwaukee’s black community was and continued to be a victim of failed government policies. In the Journal’s 1977 coverage of the struggles of black youths to find jobs, one article singled out the programs of the city’s Social Development Commission as “well-intentioned,” but failing (Alexander, 1977, 1A). A
later article published in the Journal on July 31, 1992, suggested that instead of investing money to solve the problems of the inner core, the city invested money in other, less essential projects. This article quoted former alderman Michael McGee as saying, “Nothing is happening for the black community,’ with city and private investments going to other areas, such as the redevelopment near Marquette University” (Moore, 1992, 5A). Further, it reported the comments of Ryck Johnson, director of an inner core summer basketball program, who said that “he wants people to become aware of the potential in the central city that is not being used” (Moore, 1992, 5A).

The strongest moral judgments to come from the problems persist frame were associated with vivid illustrations of the hopelessness of living in the inner core. In particular, the final article published in the Journal Sentinel’s 2007 commemorative series focused on the story of one man, Lonnie Smith, to illustrate the vicious cycle of poverty in the inner core. It began by describing Smith’s living conditions:

For Lonnie Smith, it’s not hard to believe the dilapidated duplex where he lives is just around the corner from the place that saw the most violent episode of Milwaukee’s riots 40 years ago (Perez & McClain, 2007, 15A).

It continued by highlighting Smith’s struggles in finding employment and supporting his family:

In a manila folder, Smith keeps evidence of his working life: an expired license from the Wisconsin Department of Regulation and Licensing as a private security person and a tractor-trailer training certificate from a company in Chicago. . . . [H]e’s been employed for what he describes as his longest stretch—two years without a job. . . . [S]mith meets with employment specialist Antonio Serrano to look at job leads.

“There’s a security job at 85th and Capitol,” Serrano says.

“Is that SPI (Security Personnel Inc.)?” Smith says. “I done applied there so many times.”

“My suggestion is,” Serrano says, “You ask for the hiring manager. You go speak to the manager, or get a card so you could call the next day.”
Smith nods. He doesn’t have a phone.
Serrano points out another job. “Oh, you need a driver’s license. Never mind.”
Serrano prints job listings for Smith and reminds him: Find out what you owe for the driver’s license. Get to the Courthouse to show you have custody of the kids so you can stop owing child support. Find an apartment with heat. (Perez & McClain, 2007, 15A).

Finally, the article illustrated the widespread nature of this hopeless cycle by noting that

Smith’s situation is hardly uncommon:

Smith’s driver’s license problem is one of the most pervasive. Another study by UWM’s (John) Pawasarat (a research scientist) found Milwaukee’s municipal courts have suspended or revoked driver’s licenses for mostly African-Americans for non-driving related offenses. In 2003, the court suspended some 68,191 licenses for not paying civil forfeitures, and 81% of these suspensions were African Americans (Perez & McClain, 2007, 15A).

Suggest Remedies

In general, the remedies suggested by the problems persist frame included increased funding from city, state, and federal sources to help alleviate some of the problems of the inner city’s black community. In a column published in the Journal on August 2, 1992, it was suggested that Maier’s original call for increased funding needed to be reissued in the 1990s. The article also suggested that cuts in funds to cities nationwide in the years since 1967 had thwarted efforts to solve socioeconomic problems in predominantly black inner city areas:

When Maier ended the state of emergency after 10 days, he said . . . “There is no place to hide from these responsibilities. . . . The events of the past 10 days have shown that. The curfew covered us all.” I thought about that as I drove past the scene of the Center St. fire. I also thought of the federal government’s 60% cut in urban programs since 1980. I thought of the Kerner Commission’s 1968 warning that metropolitan America was in danger of becoming ‘two nations,’ separate and unequal, of rich suburbs and poor central cities. And I thought of the latest census showing that Milwaukee’s metropolitan area is the most
segregated in the nation. There is still no place to hide, but there is plenty of room to run (Johnson, 1992, 14A).

But even in 1977, some reporters realized that government funding was not enough to solve the problems facing Milwaukee’s inner core. An article published in the *Journal* on July 31, 1977, regarding the lack of jobs among Milwaukee’s black youths suggested that a solution might involve soliciting help from private enterprise to offer or subsidize job opportunities for black youths. The article reported:

> Although the government channels millions of dollars into summer employment programs for needy youths, Ms. (Amanda) Coomer (North Central Youth Service Area Coordinator) said she hoped the private sector “would look at the lack of employment for young people and get into hiring them. I certainly feel the economic deprivation that involves a lot of families contributes to the crime rate … when you get kids who can’t logically look at things, they’ll take what they want, and I can see why” (Alexander, 1977, 18A).

The problems persist frame also argued that just as government funds were not sufficient to solve inner city problems, neither were government-based efforts enough. Just as private capital needed to be tapped to help fund the programs to alleviate problems faced by Milwaukee’s black community, so too did there need to be individual efforts to bring these solutions to fruition. In an article published in the *Journal* on July 31, 1992, former alderman Michael R. McGee illustrated this point. The article reported that “McGee said that he was rededicating himself to the next 25 years of black equality in Milwaukee. ‘We should pledge that 25 years from now won’t come out like this,’ he said” (Moore, 1992, 5A). In an editorial published in the 1997 *Journal Sentinel*, it is suggested that there needs to be increased personal efforts akin to those exerted by the police officers and guardsmen who responded to the reports of violence in 1967:

> But there are still segregated neighborhoods, and no one seems to know what to do. . . . How do we help the poor, mostly black and Hispanic
neighborhoods that have been drenched in dope and terrorized by drive-by
shootings? Maybe the first thing we should do is what (Detective LeRoy)
Jones and (officer John) Carter did 30 years ago when there was a call for
help. They showed up (Janz, 1997, 1B).

Finally, in the editorial published at the conclusion of the Journal Sentinel’s
three-part commemorative series, it was suggested that there was not any one tangible,
specific remedy to the problems facing Milwaukee’s inner city blacks. There were many
steps that could have been taken to alleviate the socioeconomic crisis that was
emblematic of Milwaukee’s inner core. The editorial appeared to suggest, however, that
a step toward the solution to these problems was increasing awareness of these
problems. It argued that progress in other areas of city life has led to citizens’ forgetting
that these problems continued to exist. It argued that citizens, too, had forgotten the
history of these problems. In a way, they had forgotten the riots:

They (the 1967 riots) led to more opportunities for African Americans.
They became lawyers, doctors, bankers, engineers, police officers,
journalists, professors, elected officials and social workers in numbers not
seen before. But the plight of other African Americans worsened, in large
part due to the downturn in manufacturing.
And, in some quarters, racial understanding still seems like nothing more
than a pipe dream, as many believe blacks have only themselves to blame
for their lowly plight. Make no mistake. Rage persists among blacks.
Young African Americans must find constructive ways to channel their
rage, just as the NAACP Youth Council members did.
The 40th anniversary of the 1967 riots is a reminder that the area has much
work to do to achieve racial parity and harmony (“Still a Long Way to
Go,” 16A).

In summary, the problems persist frame suggested that the problems facing
Milwaukee at the time of the race riots in 1967 were not completely solved in the
decades that followed the events. In fact, the problems persist frame might be
interpreted as suggesting that the same problems that faced the city in 1967 lie just under
the surface in modern-day Milwaukee. The exact definition of the problems varied depending on the time period in which each article or editorial was written. So, too, did a precise explanation of the causes of the problems. Suggestions as to which remedies would be best to solve the problems also varied depending on the date of publication of the article or editorial. There was more consensus as to the moral judgment offered by the retrospective coverage. The frame placed Milwaukee’s inner-city black community in a sympathetic light, as victims of failed government policies and mired in a vicious cycle of hopelessness. But though the articles and editorials using the problems persist frame seemed to vary over time, the elements of the frame each had some relation to the social and economic deprivation faced by Milwaukee’s black community.

Retrospective and Commemorative Coverage: Summary

This chapter intended to provide an overview of the retrospective and commemorative coverage of the Milwaukee race riots as it was published in the city’s three primary newspapers since the time of the riots: the Journal, the Sentinel, and the Journal Sentinel. As noted in this chapter’s introduction, the amount of coverage published in each newspaper in the years 1977, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2007 between the dates of July 30 and August 9 turned out to be considerably less than expected. Retrospective coverage was sporadic until 2007, when the Journal Sentinel published a three-part series commemorating the 40th anniversary of the city’s race riots from July 30, 2007, through August 1, 2007.

The retrospective coverage analyzed in this study placed heavy emphasis remembering the police experience and the violence of the first night of the rioting. Several of the articles and editorials studied mentioned in detail the battle between police
officers and a black sniper at 134 W. Center St. on the night of July 30, 1967. Largely absent from this coverage was any mention of the clashes between civil rights leadership and the Maier administration; the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame was nonexistent. Also absent from this coverage, until the 2007 *Journal Sentinel* series, were the voices of civil rights leaders who were frequent sources of contemporary reporters.

The overarching frame that was used in these articles was one that suggested that the problems that plagued Milwaukee and its inner-city black community at the time of the 1967 riots were not solved in the decades that followed. The problems persist frame, at a basic level, argued that much work still needed to be done to solve the problems of the inner city and achieve racial equality. The *Journal Sentinel*’s 2007 series, especially the editorial published on the final day the series ran, strongly drove this point home.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

As the first chapter noted, this study was designed to discover how three Milwaukee metropolitan newspapers constructed and framed the collective memory of the city’s race riots, which began late the night of July 30, 1967, and lasted through August 9, 1967, when the city-wide curfew was lifted. The analysis included contemporary coverage published in the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Milwaukee Sentinel* over those ten days in 1967. It also included retrospective coverage published in the *Journal*, the *Sentinel*, and the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* on the same dates the riot occurred in the years 1977, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2007. The analysis sought to identify frames that were used by the newspapers in the contemporary and retrospective coverage in order to ultimately answer this question: What kind of memory of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots was constructed by contemporary and retrospective coverage of the event in these newspapers, and what vision of the present and future does it “help legitimize, valorize, or condemn?” (Romano & Raiford, 2006, xv). Specifically, the analysis answered four questions:

1. What frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots?

2. How have the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots changed in the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?
3. What new frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?

4. What arguments do the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage suggest for Milwaukee’s present and future race relations?

The results of the analysis will be presented by answering each of these questions in turn in the following discussion.

What frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots?

The analysis identified the presence of three frames in the contemporary coverage of the Milwaukee race riots. These frames were: the riots as a result of economic and social deprivation for blacks frame; the riots as an example of swift, effective administrative action frame; and the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame. Chapter four offered specific details as to how the four elements of framing as defined by Entman (1993) were exhibited in articles using each of these frames. The analysis also identified two classifications for articles that did not exhibit all of Entman’s (1993) four elements of framing. These classifications were the general informative classification and the consequences and aftermath classification. The two classifications, though lacking a complete frame, were still important to note because, as Irwin-Zarecka (2007) argued, one of the key roles media play in the memory-making process is in providing “raw materials” that can be drawn upon to construct collective memories in the future (165).
In general, the results of the analysis of contemporary coverage of the riots published in the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* produced narrative chaos rather than a cohesive narrative, or in Fisher’s (1984, 1985) terms, narrative rationality. Narrative rationality (Fisher, 1984, 1985) requires a narrative to have both narrative probability—“whether or not a story coheres or ‘hangs together’” (1985, 349)—and narrative fidelity—whether the story “accords with the logic of good reasons” (1985, 349). The frames present in the contemporary coverage of the Milwaukee race riots lacked narrative rationality because the three frames varied on all four of the elements of framing established by Entman (1993). In the case of the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame, for example, there was contradiction within the frame itself. Articles using this frame presented competing definitions of problems, diagnoses of causes, moral judgments, and suggestions of remedies. In short, the contemporary coverage did not provide one cohesive narrative of the riots. Instead, it provided several different narratives in reporting the events of the riots.

How have the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ contemporary coverage of the riots changed in the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?

In general, the three frames identified in the contemporary coverage of the Milwaukee race riots were not clearly evident in the retrospective coverage. This may be partially due to the fact that the retrospective coverage examined in this study was much more sparse than the contemporary coverage. The most significant amount of retrospective coverage came in 2007, when the *Journal Sentinel* published a three-part series commemorating the 40th anniversary of the riots. Retrospective coverage published before the 2007 *Journal Sentinel* series highlighted the police experience
during the riots and the curfew, often including several specific mentions of the episode at 134 W. Center St. on July 30, 1967. The violence at that site killed two people, including a police patrolman, and also injured many other police officers. Coverage published in the 2007 *Journal Sentinel* series highlighted the socioeconomic inequalities that existed at the time of the rioting between blacks and whites. It also addressed alleged police brutality that affected the inner city’s black community.

Largely absent from this coverage was mention of the clashes between the black community leaders and Mayor Maier. There were no details of the arguments both sides made against one another, a facet that was so pervasive in the contemporary coverage. Also absent from the pre-2007 *Journal Sentinel* coverage were the voices of civil rights leaders who were frequent sources for contemporary reporters. Interestingly, very little of the information present in the contemporary coverage’s general informative and consequence and aftermath classifications was taken and used in the retrospective coverage. Beyond the inclusion of some details in the retrospective articles focusing on the violence of the rioting, the police officers’ experiences, and the general climate of fear in the city at the time of the riots, elements of the general informative and consequence and aftermath classifications did not carry over into the retrospective coverage.

What new frames are used in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage?

There was one frame identified that appeared consistently through retroactive coverage in the *Journal*, the *Sentinel*, and the *Journal Sentinel*. This frame, the problems persist frame, suggested generally that the problems that were present at the
time of the riots in 1967 may not have been solved immediately following or in the
decades after the riots broke out. Some elements of the economic and social deprivation
frame and the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame carried over and were identified
in the elements of the problems persist frame. For example, the economic and social
deprivation frame defined the problem as anger among black Milwaukee residents. One
of the problems defined by the problems persist frame was the disillusionment and anger
among Milwaukee’s black youths. Both frames suggested this problem was caused by
economic and social inequalities between the city’s blacks and whites. In another
example, the Maier-vs.-black community leaders frame defined the problem as a bad
relationship between Maier and the city’s black community. One of the problems
defined by the problems persist frame was tension that still existed between
Milwaukee’s predominantly black inner city and the city’s government.

It is interesting to note here that Edy (2006) identified a similar phenomenon in
contemporary and retrospective coverage of the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles. Her
analysis of contemporary coverage of the 1967 Watts riots in Los Angeles yielded four
frames: “the riots as lawless behavior, the riots as an insurrection, the riots as a protest
against police brutality, and the riots as a protest against economic and social conditions
in the ghetto” (Edy, 2006, 29). She observed that the “most commonly told and
dominant story” in the retrospective coverage was the “riots as protest against economic
and social conditions in the ghetto” frame (Edy, 2006, 130). The economic deprivation
frame changed as time passed, reflecting political and social changes in the United States
generally and Los Angeles particularly (Edy, 2006, 131). Of the contemporary and
retrospective coverage of the 1965 Watts riots, Edy (2006) concluded:
The stories exhibit a steadily improving gestalt that demonstrates the influence of narrative expectations. The stories make better sense, meaning they both better meet our expectations of how a story should go and fit reasonably well with the stories we tell ourselves about both the past and the present (159).

In general, under the problems persist frame, the retrospective coverage examined in this analysis showed, in Edy’s (2006) terms, the “steadily improving gestalt that demonstrates the influence of narrative expectations” (159). It offered more of a claim to narrative rationality than did the commemorative coverage. The retrospective coverage provided narrative probability. It presented elements of framing that related to one another, rather than competed with one another, in presenting a relatively cohesive portrait of the riots and their aftermath. There was, as Fisher (1984) explained it, a “consistency of characters and actions” (16). The retrospective coverage also proved to have some degree of narrative fidelity. The facts present in the retrospective coverage that referred to the 1967 riots were on the whole consistent with those present in the contemporary coverage of the riot, thereby lending the retrospective narrative the “truth quality” Fisher (1985) listed as a requirement of narrative fidelity (349).

What arguments do the frames identified in the narrative of the Milwaukee race riots constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage suggest for Milwaukee’s present and future race relations?

The overarching narrative constructed by the newspapers’ retrospective coverage, through the problems persist frame, suggested that Milwaukee and its citizens may not have progressed as far in terms of racial equality since the time of the city’s race riots as some may have thought. The retrospective coverage highlighted the problems still facing Milwaukee and particularly its black community, from the dearth of jobs for black youths in 1977 to the cycle of chronic unemployment exampled by inner core
resident Lonnie Smith in 2007. These problems were portrayed as related to the problems that were present at the time of the riots in an effort to show that progress, in fact, has not been made in many areas, and that Milwaukee’s citizens should be aware of that fact. The editorial published at the conclusion of the Journal Sentinel’s 2007 series commemorating the 40th anniversary of the riots was particularly forceful in making this argument, stating that “racial understanding still seems like nothing more than a pipe dream. . . . The 40th anniversary of the 1967 race riots is a reminder that the area has much work to do to achieve racial parity and harmony” (“Still a Long Way to Go,” 16A).

In memory studies terms, what the retrospective coverage of the Milwaukee race riots appears to attempt is a “replacement” of memory. The act of memory replacement involves “dislodging the established patterns of thinking and feeling, patterns responsible for the gaps in memory” (Irwin-Zarecka, 2007, 126-127). Another example of an attempt to replace memory would be the mainstream U.S. media’s attempt to reexamine the dominant collective memory of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1990s. As Romano & Raiford (2006) noted, the dominant memory of the Civil Rights Movement suggested that the movement ended in 1968 and achieved its goals of racial equality (xiv-xv). But as Fuller (2006) argued, the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the 1995 O.J. Simpson murder trial called America’s progress in race relations into question (Fuller, 2006, 169). Media from films to newspapers to television attempted to fill this memory gap.

A similar phenomenon is at work here. As Gurda (1999) noted, Milwaukee underwent a sea change in terms of its economic structure in the 1980s. That change, he
argued, threw the city into “what might be described as a collective midlife crisis. Divorced from its past but uncertain of its future, trusting neither its accumulated skills or its long-term prospects, the community engaged in a great deal of anxious soul-searching … and issues of image and identity came to the fore’ (419). A focus on the economy and a recalibration of Milwaukee’s self-image might well have prompted the kind of replacement the retrospective coverage of the riots attempted to produce. But the retrospective coverage in this study attempted much more than replacement. It did more than merely prompt its audience to remember the problems that sparked the race riots in 1967. It intended to remind the audience that those problems had not been solved, and that a large portion of the city’s population remained mired in poverty and hopelessness. It also called the audience to action; for example, in the 1997 *Journal Sentinel* editorial, the writer concludes: “How do we help the poor, mostly black and Hispanic neighborhoods that have been drenched in dope and terrorized by drive-by shootings? Maybe the first thing we should do is what (officer LeRoy) Jones and (officer John) Carter did 30 years ago when there was a call for help. They showed up” (Janz, 1997, 1B).

Media and the Collective Memory of the 1967 Milwaukee Race Riots

The findings of this study indicated that the construction of the collective memory of a single event through contemporary and retrospective coverage in media seemed to suggest a model of the progression of journalistic reporting of a significant event over time. Figure 1, pictured below, offers a graphical representation of the progression of the reporting of the Milwaukee riots from 1967 through 2007. At the time of the riots in 1967, coverage in the Journal and the Sentinel was copious. The
newspapers published articles on a variety of articles on just about every topic that might possibly be relevant to their readers. But later, at the natural evolutionary points examined in this study, the volume of coverage diminished significantly. The bulk of the retrospective coverage also appeared after a time when economic disaster prompted the city to reexamine its identity. Also noticeable were the narratives present in the retrospective coverage; what was included, and what was excluded?

As chapter five noted, in retrospective coverage, the story of the Milwaukee race riots became streamlined, or “smoothed out” over time. To borrow a phrase from Irwin-Zarecka (2007), the product—the collective memory of the riots—is a recollection of the past that is “cleaner, more orderly, prettier than it had been” (179). The major enduring narrative thread in the retrospective coverage focused on the social and economic

![Figure 1: A graphical representation of the progression of narrative threads in coverage of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots.](image)
struggles faced by Milwaukee’s black community. There were also brief mentions of the police and national guard efforts and snapshots of the violence that occurred during the original event. Other narrative threads present in the contemporary coverage, though, fell away. Absent from most of the retrospective coverage was significant mention of the bitter struggles between the city’s administration and the inner core’s black community in 1967. There was also little mention of Mayor Maier or the leaders of the black community who were frequent sources of information in the contemporary coverage. Finally few of the details included in the general informative or consequences and aftermath classifications carried over into the retrospective coverage.

In a way, the coverage of the 1967 Milwaukee race riots present in these three newspapers showed a change in focus from the participants in the event (the contemporary coverage) to the relationships that linked those participants together (the retrospective coverage). In particular, the retrospective coverage focused solely on those relationships that were most useful or relevant to the values and norms of the present day. Much of the retrospective coverage about the riots was published during or after what Gurda (1999) described as the city’s reexamination of itself after the 1980s economic crisis. Therefore, it is not surprising that this study found that the narrative of the social and economic deprivation frame persisted in the retrospective coverage of the Milwaukee race riots.

On a concluding note, after reviewing the findings of this study, one might argue that it cannot be assumed that the collective memory of the Milwaukee riots as constructed in the Journal, the Sentinel, and the Journal Sentinel has automatically become the collective memory of the city’s general population. Indeed, this is one of the
limitations of this study. However, it does offer an opportunity for future research. One might engage in a quantitative public opinion survey of Milwaukee’s residents and compare the results of the survey to the results of this study or one similar to this study. Such a study would provide a more comprehensive explanation of the relationship between media coverage of a historical event and the collective memory of that event for a given population.

The scholarship presented in the literature review portion of this thesis suggested, however, that the results of this study have value on their own. Though this study cannot prove a conclusive link between the collective memory of the riots constructed by media coverage and the collective memory of the riots among members of Milwaukee’s population, memory scholars have suggested that media do play an important role in the construction of such a collective memory. As Edy (2006) noted, much of what people experience about the world around them comes through various media (22). As Irwin-Zarecka (2007) noted, media give a sense of structure to the past through interpretation and selection of information (175). Irwin-Zarecka (2007) also argued that the media’s construction of collective memory can be particularly influential when an event’s “original meaning is no longer readily available to us” (179).

It could be argued, as it is briefly earlier in this paper, that many readers of the Journal, the Sentinel, and the Journal Sentinel over the 40 years that have passed since the riots may no longer have the original meaning of the riots readily available. Many readers, particularly those who read the Journal Sentinel’s commemorative series in 2007, might not have been alive in 1967 when the riots occurred. Others may not have been living in the city of Milwaukee at the time. Still others may not have had personal
experiences with the violent episodes of the rioting, but learned about it on television or in the newspaper. In addition, the *Journal*, the *Sentinel*, and the *Journal Sentinel* have been the only major metropolitan newspapers in Milwaukee published since the time of the riots. Considering the newspapers’ potential market penetration, it could be argued that their construction of the memory of the 1967 race riots would be very influential. Taking into account the arguments of memory scholars and these reasons, the construction of the collective memory of the Milwaukee race riots as constructed in the city’s three metropolitan newspapers could reasonably have an effect on consumers’ collective memory of the riots. Such an argument lends credibility to the findings of this study.
REFERENCES

5 Groups Pay for Maier’s Ad. *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 5). p. 16A.


60 Militants View Site of Youth’s Slaying. *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 4). p. 5A.


Buresh, B. (1967a, August 1). ‘Gotta Outshoot the White Man.’ *Milwaukee Sentinel*. pp. 1A, 11A.

Buresh, B. (1967b, August 2). Rights Figures Criticize City Policy. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. pp. 1A, 6A.


Cost of Guard Callup Close to $300,000. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. (1967, August 4). p. 3A.

County Hospital Services Shifted. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. (1967, August 1). p. 9A.


Cunningham, G. (1967, August 1). Curfew Here Most Rigid in U.S. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. pp. 1A, 3A.


Everybody’s Watchful as Curfew Begins. Milwaukee Sentinel. (1967, August 2). p. 5A.

Feyen, S. (1967, August 5). Petition is Drafted in McKissick Death. Milwaukee Sentinel. p. 2A.


Maier Asks Help of Core Residents. *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 1). p. 5A.


Most People Sorry for Blameless Negroes. *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 3). p. 10A.


Officer Tells How Shooting Started. *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 1). p. 9A.


Rights Units Rejected on Offers. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. (1967, August 1). p. 5A.

Riot Control Here Called Lesson for U.S. *Milwaukee Journal*. (1967, August 3). p. 8A.


Tusa, R. (1967, August 1). ‘Yes! We Have No Bananas.’ *Milwaukee Sentinel.* p. 10A.


‘We’re Gonna Burn This Town Down.’ *Milwaukee Sentinel.* (1967, August 3). pp. 1A, 8A.


Window Damage “to Top” $200,000. *Milwaukee Journal.* (1967, August 2). pp. 1B, 2B.

Winfield, B.H., Friedman, B., & Trisnadi, V. (2002). History as the Metaphor through Which the Current World is Viewed: British and American Newspapers’ Uses of

Woman at Scene Describes Shooting. *Milwaukee Sentinel*. (1967, August 3). p. 3A.
