Because I Felt Like It: An Explanation of Arational Actions

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  • March 20, 2019
Creator
  • Stuart, Allison A.
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Philosophy
Abstract
  • Explanations of intentional action typically involve a combination of a desire and a belief and some form of means-end reasoning. What is often overlooked is whether emotions provide an explanation of action, particularly when the action is intelligible only in terms of the emotion and is performed for no other reason than to express the emotion. The challenge of explaining such actions involves 1) providing an account of intentional action that does not require means-end reasoning, and 2) within that same account, explaining the significance of the emotion that is experienced. I argue that both of these desiderata can be accommodated by adopting a particular account of emotions.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Prinz, Jesse J.
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  • Open access
Date uploaded
  • October 11, 2010

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file details Because I felt like it : an explanation of arational [sic]actions 2019-04-12 Public Download