Negotiation in the shadow of an extremist threat
Public Deposited- Last Modified
- March 21, 2019
- Creator
-
Best, Rebecca Hope
- Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- In this paper I model negotiations between a state and the moderate faction of a terrorist organization first with complete information and later with this assumption dropped. The goal of this exercise is to reach a more complete understanding of what can be expected from such negotiations. The results of the model indicate that under certain circumstances, when moderates agree to cooperate with the state, extremists may attack the moderates of their own organization. This provides an explanation for the elevated levels of terrorist violence that accompany state negotiations with terrorists. The model also suggests that, under certain circumstances, the moderate faction may initiate negotiations with the state to push the extremists into offering concessions (which might include, among other things, a greater role in the decision making of the group or public services such as schools and infrastructure) to the moderates.
- Date of publication
- August 2008
- DOI
- Resource type
- Rights statement
- In Copyright
- Advisor
- Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
- Degree granting institution
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Language
- Access right
- Open access
- Date uploaded
- October 11, 2010
Relations
- Parents:
This work has no parents.
Items
| Thumbnail | Title | Date Uploaded | Visibility | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Negotiation in the shadow of an extremist threat | 2019-04-11 | Public | Download |