Two essays on sequential auctions and research joint ventures

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  • March 21, 2019
Creator
  • Celmanbet, Omur
    • Affiliation: College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics
Abstract
  • The dissertation consists of two essays. In "Choosing the Order of Sale in Multi-Unit Auctions" I examine a sequence of two English Auctions of two common-value, heterogeneous objects: a low-value and a high-value object. I ask the question: Should the auctioneer sell the low-value or the high-value first in order to maximize his revenue? Under the assumption that bidders' signals about the common-value are affiliated random variables, I study two models. In Model I, some bidders only want to buy the high-value item while the others only want the low-value item. In Model II, there are also some bidders that want both objects. In Model I, I show that: (1) It is optimal for the seller to auction the low-value item first, when the number of bidders competing for the high-value object is not greater than the number of bidders competing for the low-value object. (2) When there are more bidders in the auction of the high-value item than in the auction of the low-value item, then either order of sale can be optimal for the seller, depending on the relative values of the objects. In particular, if there are sufficiently more bidders competing for the high-value object, then it is optimal for the seller to auction the high-value item first. I also show that the main insights from Model I generalize to Model II. In the second essay, "Voluntary Disclosure to Form a Research Joint Venture" I investigate why many potentially successful research joint ventures (RJV) do not start and suggest a way to remedy the problem. To inform potential partners about the value of the know-how that it would bring into an RJV, a firm must disclose some of this know-how. In a weak intellectual property rights environment, this creates the danger of exposing the firm to expropriation: The revealed know-how cannot be protected and the potential partners may use it to innovate themselves. Because of this fear of expropriation, many potentially successful RJVs cannot be formed. I introduce a contractual procedure that guarantees that firms disclose their know-how fully and encourages firms to form RJVs.
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  • In Copyright
Advisor
  • Mezetti, Claudio
Degree granting institution
  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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  • Open access
Date uploaded
  • October 19, 2010

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